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PRINCIPLE:
FACTS:
**Labor Arbiter - dismissing for lack of merit the complaint filed by Del Rosario
who was, however, awarded separation pay. According to the Labor Arbiter, Del
Rosario’s length of service for 21 years, without previous derogatory record,
warrants the award of separation pay.
----------- **Separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month’s salary for every
year of service based on his basic salary Php 11,244.00 at the time of his
dismissal. This shall be computed from [1 August 1997] up to June 2000, the
total amount of which is Php 118,062.00.
ISSUE:
RULING:
No. “As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of
the just causes enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not entitled to
a separation pay.” However, in exceptional cases, separation pay has been
granted to a legally dismissed employee as an act of “social justice” or on
“equitable grounds.” In either case, “it is required that the dismissal (1) was not
for serious misconduct; and (2) did not reflect on the moral character of the
employee.”
Citing the leading case of PLDT v. NLRC (247 Phil. 641, 1988), the
Supreme Court laid down the rule “that separation pay shall be allowed as a
measure of social justice only in the instances where the employee is validly
dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct reflecting his moral
character…”
In sum, we hold that the award of separation pay or any other kind of
financial assistance to Del Rosario, under the nomenclature of compassionate
justice, is not warranted in the instant case. A contrary rule would have the
effect of rewarding rather than punishing an erring employee, disturbing the
noble concept of social justice.
FACTS:
The respondents were employees of Bani Rural Bank, Inc. and ENOC Theatre I
and II who filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioners.
The complaint was initially dismissed by Labor Arbiter but on appeal, the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed it and ruled that the
respondents had been illegally dismissed and ordered the petitioners to reinstate
them with payment of backwages from the time o their dismissal (constructive)
until their actual reinstatement, less earnings elsewhere.
The first computation of the monetary award under the March, 17 1995
resolution of the NLRC, the LA fixed the period of backwages from the
respondents' illegal dismissal until August 25 1995 or the date when the
respondents allegedly manifested that they no longer wanted to be reinstated.
The respondents appealed the LA’s computation with the NLRC. On July 31,
1998, the NLRC modified the terms of the March 17, 1995 resolution insofar as it
clarified the phrase less earnings elsewhere. The NLRC additionally awarded the
payment of separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, under the following terms:
The NLRC justified the award of separation pay on account of the strained
relations between the parties. In doing so, the NLRC ruled:
The second computation of the monetary awards under the July 31, 998 decision
of the NLRC. In an order11 dated July 12, 2000, Labor Arbiter Gambito computed
the respondents backwages only up to August 25, 1995.
NLRC’S RULING
In its decision dated September 28, 2001, the NLRC ruled that the computation
of the respondents backwages should be until January 29 1999 which was the
date when the July 31, 1998 decision attained finality.
CA RULING
ISSUE
Whether the respondents’ backwages had been correctly computed under the
decision dated September 28, 2001 of the NLRC, as confirmed by the CA, in light
of the circumstance that there were two final NLRC decisions affecting the
computation of the backwages.
RULING
YES.
First, when reinstatement is ordered, the general concept under Article 279 of
the Labor Code, as amended, computes the backwages from the time of
dismissal until the employee’s reinstatement. The computation of backwages
(and similar benefits considered part of the backwages) can even continue
beyond the decision of the labor arbiter or NLRC and ends only when the
employee is actually reinstated.42
Second, when separation pay is ordered in lieu of reinstatement (in the event
that this aspect of the case is disputed) or reinstatement is waived by the
employee (in the event that the payment of separation pay, in lieu, is not
disputed), backwages is computed from the time of dismissal until the finality of
the decision ordering separation pay.
Third, when separation pay is ordered after the finality of the decision ordering
the reinstatement by reason of a supervening event that makes the award of
reinstatement no longer possible (as in the case), backwages is computed from
the time of dismissal until the finality of the decision ordering separation pay.
The above computation of backwages, when separation pay is ordered, has been
the Court s consistent ruling. In Session Delights Ice Cream and Fast Foods v.
Court Appeals Sixth Division, we explained that the finality of the decision
becomes the reckoning point because in allowing separation pay, the final
decision effectively declares that the employment relationship ended so that
separation pay and backwages are to be computed up to that point. 43
RESPONDENT’S BACKWAGES
As the records show, the contending parties did not dispute the NLRC s order of
separation pay that replaced the award of reinstatement on the ground of the
supervening event arising from the newly-discovered strained relations between
the parties.
CEDRIC
CEDRIC
On July 25, 2000, petitioner sent individual letters to its employees, including
respondents, advising them of its decision to cease operations and informing
them that their employment would be terminated
On July 31, 2000, petitioner sent to the Department of Labor and Employment a
letter[5] dated July 28, 2000, informing said office of the termination of its
employees and at the same time informing them that they would be giving a
separation package. The separation package offered to Solidbankers is
more than what is required by law.
On September 27, 2000, respondents filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) complaints
for illegal dismissal, underpayment of separation pay, plus damages and
attorneys fees, and these were docketed as NLRC NCR Case Nos. 30-09-03843-
00, 30-1004350-00, 30-10-03928-00, 30-10-04200-00, and 30-10-04036-00.
On July 22, 2002, the LA rendered a Decision ruling that respondents were
validly terminated from employment as a result of petitioners decision to cease
its banking operations. The LA, however, inspired by compassionate justice,
awarded financial assistance of one months salary to respondents. The
dispositive portion of the Decision.
Both parties appealed the LAs Decision to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).
On October 29, 2002, the NLRC rendered a Decision [10] affirming the findings of
the LA that respondents were validly terminated. The NLRC ruled that the closure
of a business is an authorized cause sanctioned under Article 283 of the Labor
Code and one that is ultimately a management prerogative. The NLRC, however,
modified the LAs Decision by increasing the amount of financial assistance to
two months salary out of compassionate justice.
Aggrieved by the NLRC Decision, petitioner then appealed to the CA, specifically
questioning the grant of financial assistance to respondents.
On May 28, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision reversing the Decision of the
NLRC. The CA shared the view of the LA that respondents should only be
awarded one months salary as financial assistance and not two months salary as
previously decreed by the NLRC.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, which was, however, denied by
the CA in a Resolution dated October 28, 2004.
RULING: NO.
As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just
causes enumerated under Article 282 [26] of the Labor Code is not entitled to
separation pay.[27]Although by way of exception, the grant of separation pay or
some other financial assistance may be allowed to an employee dismissed for
just causes on the basis of equity. [28]
The reason that the law does not statutorily grant separation pay or
financial assistance in instances of termination due to a just cause is precisely
because the cause for termination is due to the acts of the employee. In such
instances, however, this Court, inspired by compassionate and social justice, has
in the past awarded financial assistance to dismissed employees when
circumstances warranted such an award.
Looking now at Article 283, this Court holds that the same was drafted by the
legislature, taking the best interest of laborers in mind. It is clear that the causes
of the termination of an employee under Article 283 are due to circumstances
beyond their control, such as when management decides to reduce personnel
based on valid grounds, or when the employer decides to cease
operations. Thus, the bias towards labor is very apparent, as the employer is
statutorily required to pay separation pay, the amount of which is also statutorily
prescribed.
While the CA should not be faulted for sympathizing with the plight of
respondents as they suddenly lost their means of livelihood, this Court holds that
it is precisely because of the sudden loss of employment − one that is beyond
the control of labor − that the law statutorily grants separation pay and dictates
how the same should be computed. Thus, any business establishment that
decides to cease its operations has the burden of complying with the law. This
Court should refrain from adding more than what the law requires, as the same
is within the realm of the legislature.
Withal, the law, in protecting the rights of the laborers, authorizes neither
oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. While the Constitution is
committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the working class,
it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically decided
in favor of labor. The management also has its own rights, as such, are entitled
to respect and enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern
for those with less privileges in life, the Supreme Court has inclined more often
than not toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts with the
employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to the rule that
justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the
established facts and applicable law and doctrine.
Full Text:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/september2010/160302.htm
However, separation pay is made an alternative relief in lieu of
reinstatement in certain circumstances, like: (a) when reinstatement can no
longer be effected in view of the passage of a long period of time or because of
the realities of the situation; (b) reinstatement is inimical to the employers
interest; (c) reinstatement is no longer feasible; (d) reinstatement does not serve
the best interests of the parties involved; (e) the employer is prejudiced by the
workers continued employment; (f) facts that make execution unjust or
inequitable have supervened; or (g) strained relations between the employer
and employee
The Labor Arbiter ruled that the strike was illegal and they abandoned their
employment.
The NLRC agree with the illegal strike; however, disagree that union members
should be considered to have abandoned their employment. The mere
participation of a union member in the illegal strike does not mean loss of
employment status unless he participates in the commission of illegal acts
during the strike. While it is true that complainant thru individual memorandum
directed the respondents to return to work there is no showing that respondents
deliberately refused to return to work. A worker who joins a strike does so
precisely to assert or improve the terms and conditions of his work. If his
purpose is to abandon his work, he would not go to the trouble of joining a strike.
The petitioners were given an order of reinstatement but PINA opted not to
reinstate them, so give them separation pay.
RULING:
The petitioners were ordered reinstated because they were union members
merely instigated or induced to participate in the illegal strike. By joining the
strike, they did not renounce their employment relation with PINA but remained
as its employees.
Here, PINA manifested that the reinstatement of the petitioners would not
be feasible because: (a) it would inflict disruption and oppression upon the
employer; (b) petitioners [had] stayed away for more than 15 years; (c) its
machines had depreciated and had been replaced with newer, better ones; and
(d) it now sold goods through independent distributors, thereby abolishing the
positions related to sales and distribution. [29]
Here, we note that this case has dragged for almost 17 years from the
time of the illegal strike. Bearing in mind PINAs manifestation that the positions
that the petitioners used to hold had ceased to exist for various reasons, we hold
that separation pay equivalent to one month per year of service in lieu of
reinstatement fully aligns with the aforecited rulings of the Court on the matter.
WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision dated August 18, 2003 of the Court
of Appeals, subject to the modification to the effect that in lieu of reinstatement
the petitioners are granted backwages equivalent of one month for every year of
service.
JAS
JAS
The law is explicit that one-half month salary shall mean fifteen
(15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the
cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days service incentive
leaves unless the parties provide for broader inclusions. Evidently,
the law expanded the concept of one-half month salary from the
usual one-month salary divided by two.
After 14 years of service or on July 14, 2006, petitioner applied for optional
retirement from the company. As petitioner’s request to first go over the
computation of his retirement pay was denied, he signed the Quitclaim on which
he wrote U.P. (under protest) after his signature, indicating his protest to the
amount of P75,277.45 which he received, computed by the company at 15 days
per year of service.
Petitioner soon filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter, alleging that the
company erred in its computation since under Republic Act No. 7641, otherwise
known as the Retirement Pay Law, his retirement pay should have been
computed at 22.5 days per year of service to include the cash equivalent of the
5-day service incentive leave (SIL) and 1/12 of the 13th month pay which the
company did not.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of petitioner and awarded him
P116,135.45 as his retirement pay differential. On respondent’s appeal, the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the LA’s decision but
ordered the payment of petitioner’s retirement differential in the P2,365.35. The
NLRC held that since petitioner was paid on purely commission basis, he was
excluded from the coverage of the laws on 13thmonth pay and SIL pay, hence,
the 1/12 of the 13th month pay and the 5-day SIL should not be factored in the
computation of his retirement pay.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 5-day SIL and pro-rated 13 th month pay should be
included in the computation of petitioner’s retirement pay.
RULING: The Supreme Court reinstated the LA’s previous decision and held that
petitioner’s retirement pay should include the cash equivalent of the 5-day SIL
and 1/12 of the 13th month pay.
Republic Act No. 7641 amended Article 287 of the Labor Code by
providing for retirement pay to qualified private sector employees in the absence
of any retirement plan in the establishment. Further, the Implementing Rules of
said law provide:
SECTION 1.
SECTION 5
Retirement Benefits.
5.1 In the absence of an applicable agreement or retirement plan, an employee
who retires pursuant to the Act shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to
at least one-half (―) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least
six (6) months being considered as one whole year.
(a) Fifteen (15) days salary of the employee based on his latest salary
rate. As used herein, the term salary includes all remunerations paid by
an employer to his employees for services rendered during normal
working days and hours, whether such payments are fixed or
ascertained on a time, task, piece of commission basis, or other method
of calculating the same, and includes the fair and reasonable value, as
determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, of food, lodging or other
facilities customarily furnished by the employer to his employees. The term does
not include cost of living allowances, profit-sharing payments and other
monetary benefits which are not considered as part of or integrated into the
regular salary of the employees.
(b) The cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service
incentive leave;
(d) All other benefits that the employer and employee may agree upon that
should be included in the computation of the employees retirement pay.
Admittedly, petitioner worked for 14 years for the bus company which did
not adopt any retirement scheme. Even if petitioner as bus conductor was paid
on commission basis then, he falls within the coverage of R.A. 7641 and its
implementing rules. It bears emphasis that under P.D. 851 or the SIL Law, the
exclusion from its coverage of workers who are paid on a purely commission
basis is only with respect to field personnel.
Facts: Petitioner Bibiano C. Elegir (petitioner) was hired by Philippine Airlines, Inc.
(PAL) as a commercial pilot in 1971. Pursuant to a new flight program adopted by
PAL, petitioner was appointed as one of the pilots for the B747-400 captain
positions. He and the other pilots were sent to Seattle to undergo training for the
new aircraft which he completed in 1995. He decided to retire on May 5, 1996,
after rendering a total of more than 25 years in service which is an option
allowed by the CBA between the airline and the Airline Pilots Association of the
Philippines where he is a member of good standing. PAL asked him to reconsider
his decision saying that they have not yet fully recovered the full value of his
training and that if he should continue with his decision to retire the airline will
be constrained to deduct the expenses of his training from his retirement pay.
On November 6, 1996, the petitioner went on terminal leave for thirty (30) days
and thereafter made effective his retirement from service. Upon securing his
clearance, however, he was informed that the costs of his training will be
deducted from his retirement pay, which will be computed at the rate of P
5,000.00 per year of service. The petitioner argued that his retirement benefits
should be based on the computation stated in Article 287 of the Labor Code, as
amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7641, and that the costs of his training
should not be deducted therefrom.
PAL refused and argued that petitioner's retirement pay should be based on
PALALPAP Retirement Plan of 1967 (PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan) and that he
should reimburse the company with the proportionate costs of his training. Thus,
on August 27, 1997, the petitioner filed a complaint for non-payment of
retirement pay, moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees against
PAL.
LA: On February 6, 1998, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered the decision for the
payment of retirement benefits to the petitioner for a total of P 4,150,106.20
saying that the law intended to give bigger and better benefits to workers under
existing laws or CBA agreements and that PAL had no right to withhold the
petitioner's retirement benefits due to his retirement before the lapse of three
years. There was no document showing that the petitioner was required to stay
with the airline for three years after the training or that he was required to
reimburse the cost of his training from his retirement benefits should he retire
earlier than the three year period. The LA also dismissed PAL's claim that
petitioner's submission of his bid for the position created an innominate contract
du ut facis between him and the company.
NLRC: Modified the decision of the LA. Petitioner was only 52 years old when he
opted to retire and therefore was not qualified to receive the benefits offered
under Article 287 of the Labor Code, but he was eligible for retirement under the
CBA since he had served for more than 25 years with the same company. It ruled
that the benefits should be computed in accordance with both Article 287 of the
Code and the Retirement Plan of the CBA. It also ruled that petitioner is under
obligation to reimburse a portion of the expense for his training program as
captain since it would be grossly unfair for petitioner to reap the fruits of his
training if he would not be made to return the said benefits in form of service for
a reasonable period of time. Both parties filed MR’s. It denied PAL’s MR
CA: Reversed the decision of the NLRC. It ruled that retirement pay should be
computed in accordance with CBA retirement plan as ruled in PAL v. Airline Pilots
Association of the Philippines. It denied petitioner’s MR.
Ruling: Petitioner’s retirement pay should be based on the PAL retirement plans.
The two retirement schemes are alternative in nature such that the retired pilot
can only be entitled to that which provides for the superior benefit. Even if there
is an existing CBA but if it provides lesser benefits than what is provided in the
Labor Code , the Code will apply to assure the retiree of the reasonable amount
of retirement pay. Consistent with the purpose of the law, the CA correctly held
that the PAL retirement plan applies because it provides for higher benefits.
Under the PAL retirement plan petitioner qualified for late retirement sine he
rendered more than 20 years as pilot and is entitled to receive a lump sum of P
125, 000 for his services. He is also entitled to equity of the retirement fund
under the Retirement Benefit Plan. This is more compared to what he will receive
under the Labor Code which is equivalent to at least ½ of his monthly salary for
every year of service. The benefits under the PAL retirement plan are to the
petitioner’s advantage.
It also ruled that the petitioner shall reimburse PAL for his training costs. The
court recognized PAL’s right to recoup losses incurred due to pilot training and
modified the provision on age limits for pilots seeking advanced positions. Pilots
57 years old shall be frozen in their position while those 55 years of age that
have previously qualified in the company turbo jet aircraft are permitted to
occupy any position in the turbo jet fleet. Allowing the petitioner to leave the
company before he has t fulfilled is reasonable expectation of service will result
to unjust enrichment since the training gave him new skills and increased his
salary. Reason and fairness dictate that he must return to PAL a proportionate
costs of training.
9. Grace Christian High School vs. Lavandera, G.R. No. 177845, August 20,
2014
Ratio:
Facts:
She alleged that on May 11, 2001, she was informed that her services
were to be terminated effective May 31, 2001, pursuant to GCHS’ retirement
plan which gives the school the option to retire a teacher who has rendered at
least 20 years of service, regardless of age, with a retirement pay of one-half
(½) month for every year of service.
GCHS denied that they illegally dismissed Filipinas. They asserted that
the latter was considered retired on May 31, 1997 after having rendered 20
years of service pursuant to GCHS’ retirement plan and that she was duly
advised that her retirement benefits.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the illegal dismissal complaint for lack of
merit. The LA ruled that Filipinas was not terminated from employment but was
considered retired as of May 31, 1997 after rendering 20 years of service and
was only allowed by GCHS to continue teaching on a year-to-year basis (until
May 31, 2001)in the exercise of its option to do so under the aforementioned
retirement plan until she was informed that her contract would not be renewed
The LA found the retirement benefits payable under GCHS retirement plan
to be deficient vis-à-vis those provided under RA 7641,17 and, accordingly,
awarded Filipinas retirement pay differentials based on her latest salaryas
follows:
P18,662.00/30 = P622.06/day
18
P622.06 x 22.5 = P13,996.35 x 20 = P279,927.00
- P136,210.00
P143,717.00
The NLRC set aside the LA’s award. It held that under Article 287 of the
Labor Code, as amended by RA 7641, the retirement package consists of 15
days salary, plus 13th month pay and SIL pay pro-rated to their one-twelfth
(1/12) equivalent.
Issue/s:
No. Both NLRC and CA correctly ruled that Filipinas’ retirement benefits
should be computed in accordance withArticle 287 of the Labor Code, as
amended by RA 7641, being the more beneficent retirement scheme. They
differ, however, in the resulting benefit differentials due to divergent
interpretations of the term "one-half (1/2) month salary" as used under the law.
There was a random audit conducted where fund deviations upon Rivera’s
instruction were found out. So, Unilever issued a notice to Rivera asking her to
explain on the anomalies. Rivera admitted through an email the fund diversion,
but reasoned that it was due to difficulty of procuring funds from the head office
and those funds were used in the company’s promotional ventures.
Unilever found Rivera guilty resulting to sever their professional relations and
eventually denied Rivera’s request to retirement benefits even if she served the
company for 14 years.
Rivera filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal and other monetary claims against
Unilever.
Labor Arbiter - dismissed her complaint for lack of merit and denied her claim
for retirement benefits, but ordered Unilever to pay a proportionate 13th month
pay and the corresponding cash equivalent of her unused leave credits
NLRC - partially granted Rivera’s prayer - Unilever was guilty of violating the
twin notice requirement in labor cases & was ordered to pay her P30,000.00 as
nominal damages, retirement benefits and separation pay. However, when
Unilever filed a motion for reconsideration, the NLRC modified its earlier ruling
by deleting the award of separation pay and reducing the nominal damages from
P30,000.00 to P20,000.00, but affirmed the award of retirement benefits to
Rivera
CA - affirmed with modification the NLRC resolution stating that Rivera is not
entitled to retirement benefits but awarded separation pay in her favor as a
measure of social justice
Issue:
Ruling:
As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the
just causes enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not
entitled to a separation pay. In exceptional cases, however, the Court
has granted separation pay to a legally dismissed employee as an act of
"social justice" or on "equitable grounds." In both instances, it is
required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2)
did not reflect on the moral character of the employee.
In the case at bar, Rivera was dismissed from work because she intentionally
circumvented a strict company policy, manipulated another entity to carry out
her instructions without the company’s knowledge and approval, and directed
the diversion of funds, which she even admitted doing under the guise of
shortening the laborious process of securing funds for promotional activities from
the head office. These transgressions were serious offenses that warranted her
dismissal from employment and proved that her termination from work was for a
just cause.
Facts:
Petitioner Star Paper Corporation (the company) is a corporation engaged
in trading – principally of paper products. Josephine Ongsitco is its Manager of
the Personnel and Administration Department while Sebastian Chua is its
Managing Director.
Respondents, Ronaldo D. Simbol (Simbol), Wilfreda N. Comia (Comia) and
Lorna E. Estrella (Estrella), on the other hand, were all regular employees of the
company.
Respondent Simbol:
During his employment, respondent Simbol met Alma Dayrit, his co-
employee and whom he got married. Prior to their marriage, respondent
Ongsitco advised the couple that if they decide to get married, one of them must
resign pursuant to the company policy promulgated in 1995.
“1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case
he/she has [a] relative, up to [the] 3rd degree of relationship,
already employed by the company.
2. In case of two of our employees (both singles [sic], one
male and another female) developed a friendly relationship during
the course of their employment and then decided to get married,
one of them should resign to preserve the policy stated above.”
Thus, Simbol resigned pursuant to the company policy.
Respondent Comia:
Respondent Comia was also hired by the company where she met her co-
employee, Howard Comia, and got married. Same with the respondent Simbol,
Ongsitco also reminded the couple about the company policy. Hence, respondent
Comia resigned from the company.
Respondent Estrella:
Respondent Estrella was hired by the company wher she met her husband
Luisito Zuñiga (Zuñiga), also her co-worker. Petitioners stated that Zuñiga, a
married man, got Estrella pregnant. The company allegedly could have
terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to resign.
Petitioner’s Argument:
Petitioners allege that its policy "may appear to be contrary to Article 136
of the Labor Code" but it assumes a new meaning if read together with the first
paragraph of the rule. The rule does not require the woman employee to resign.
The employee spouses have the right to choose who between them should
resign. Further, they are free to marry persons other than co-employees. Hence,
it is not the marital status of the employee, per se, that is being discriminated. It
is only intended to carry out its no-employment-for-relatives-within-the-third-
degree-policy which is within the ambit of the prerogatives of management.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the case due to lack of merit which was
affirmed by the NLRC.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the NLRC.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE POLICY OF THE EMPLOYER BANNING SPOUSES
FROM WORKING IN THE SAME COMPANY VIOLATES THE RIGHTS OF THE
EMPLOYEE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LABOR CODE OR IS A VALID
EXERCISE OF MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE.
Court’s Ruling:
YES.
Art. 136 of the Labor Code provides:
“It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a
woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or
tacitly that upon getting married a woman employee shall be
deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge,
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by
reason of her marriage.”
NOTE: (In case Atty. asked the provisions, doctrine and the related
jurisprudence)
1987 Constitution
1. Article II, Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic
force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
xxx
2. Article XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled
to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They
shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting
their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility
between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just
share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable
returns on investments, and to expansion and growth.
2. Art. 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts
shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborer.
DOCTRINES/PRINCIPLES
These courts also find the no-spouse employment policy invalid for failure
of the employer to present any evidence of business necessity other than the
general perception that spouses in the same workplace might adversely affect
the business. They hold that the absence of such a bona fide occupational
qualification invalidates a rule denying employment to one spouse due to the
current employment of the other spouse in the same office. Thus, they rule that
unless the employer can prove that the reasonable demands of the business
require a distinction based on marital status and there is no better available or
acceptable policy which would better accomplish the business purpose, an
employer may not discriminate against an employee based on the identity of the
employee’s spouse. This is known as the bona fide occupational
qualification exception.
JURISPRUDENCE
DON
DON
FACTS
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo, then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed
a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido
Laguesma of DOLE. The complaint contains the following allegations :
Domingo filed a Petition for Review, but was denied for having a defective
verification. MR granted, petition reinstated.
Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review arguing that he is not guilty of
any act of sexual harassment.
Meanwhile, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA, but
was denied.
On June 28, 2004, the Court directed the consolidation of the three (3)
petitions.
ISSUES
Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense is suspension for six
(6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year, while the penalty for the
second offense is dismissal. On the other hand, Section 22(o), Rule XVI of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 and Section 52 A(15) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service both provide that the first offense of disgraceful
and immoral conduct is punishable by suspension of six (6) months and
one (1) day to one (1) year. A second offense is punishable by dismissal.
As cited above, the imposable penalty for the first offense of either
the administrative offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and
immoral conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one
(1) year. Accordingly, it was error for the Office of the President to impose
upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, a penalty which
can only be imposed upon commission of a second offense.