TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 1
V. CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND
OTHER PROHIBITED DRUGS
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 June 7, 2002
AN ACT INSTITUTING THE
COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS
ACT OF 2002, REPEALING REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 6425, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972, AS
AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known
and cited as the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002".
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the
policy of the State to safeguard the integrity of
its territory and the well-being of its citizenry
particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of
dangerous drugs on their physical and mental
well-being, and to defend the same against acts
or omissions detrimental to their development
and preservation. In view of the foregoing, the
State needs to enhance further the efficacy of
the law against dangerous drugs, it being one of
today's more serious social ills.
Toward this end, the government shall pursue
an intensive and unrelenting campaign against
the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and
other similar substances through an integrated
system of planning, implementation and
enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies,
programs, and projects. The government shall
however aim to achieve a balance in the
national drug control program so that people
with legitimate medical needs are not prevented
from being treated with adequate amounts of
appropriate medications, which include the use
of dangerous drugs.
It is further declared the policy of the State to
provide effective mechanisms or measures to
re-integrate into society individuals who have
fallen victims to drug abuse or dangerous drug
dependence through sustainable programs of
treatment and rehabilitation.
ARTICLE I
Definition of terms
Section 3. Definitions. As used in this Act, the
following terms shall mean:
(a) Administer. – Any act of introducing any
dangerous drug into the body of any person,
with or without his/her knowledge, by injection,
inhalation, ingestion or other means, or of
committing any act of indispensable assistance
to a person in administering a dangerous drug
to himself/herself unless administered by a duly
licensed practitioner for purposes of medication.
(b) Board. - Refers to the Dangerous Drugs
Board under Section 77, Article IX of this Act.
(c) Centers. - Any of the treatment and
rehabilitation centers for drug dependents
referred to in Section 34, Article VIII of this Act.
(d) Chemical Diversion. – The sale, distribution,
supply or transport of legitimately imported, in-
transit, manufactured or procured controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, in diluted,
mixtures or in concentrated form, to any person
or entity engaged in the manufacture of any
dangerous drug, and shall include packaging,
repackaging, labeling, relabeling or
concealment of such transaction through fraud,
destruction of documents, fraudulent use of
permits, misdeclaration, use of front companies
or mail fraud.
(e) Clandestine Laboratory. – Any facility used
for the illegal manufacture of any dangerous
drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical.
(f) Confirmatory Test. – An analytical test using
a device, tool or equipment with a different
chemical or physical principle that is more
specific which will validate and confirm the result
of the screening test.

(g) Controlled Delivery. – The investigative
technique of allowing an unlawful or suspect
consignment of any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential chemical,
equipment or paraphernalia, or property
believed to be derived directly or indirectly from
any offense, to pass into, through or out of the
country under the supervision of an authorized
officer, with a view to gathering evidence to
identify any person involved in any dangerous
drugs related offense, or to facilitate prosecution
of that offense.
(h) Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. – Include those listed in Tables I and
II of the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances as enumerated in the attached
annex, which is an integral part of this Act.
(i) Cultivate or Culture. – Any act of knowingly
planting, growing, raising, or permitting the
planting, growing or raising of any plant which is
the source of a dangerous drug.
(j) Dangerous Drugs. – Include those listed in
the Schedules annexed to the 1961 Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by
the 1972 Protocol, and in the Schedules
annexed to the 1971 Single Convention on
Psychotropic Substances as enumerated in the
attached annex which is an integral part of this
Act.
(k) Deliver. – Any act of knowingly passing a
dangerous drug to another, personally or
otherwise, and by any means, with or without
consideration.
(l) Den, Dive or Resort. – A place where any
dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical is administered, delivered,
stored for illegal purposes, distributed, sold or
used in any form.
(m) Dispense. – Any act of giving away, selling
or distributing medicine or any dangerous drug
with or without the use of prescription.
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(n) Drug Dependence. – As based on the World
Health Organization definition, it is a cluster of
physiological, behavioral and cognitive
phenomena of variable intensity, in which the
use of psychoactive drug takes on a high priority
thereby involving, among others, a strong desire
or a sense of compulsion to take the substance
and the difficulties in controlling substance-
taking behavior in terms of its onset,
termination, or levels of use.
(o) Drug Syndicate. – Any organized group of
two (2) or more persons forming or joining
together with the intention of committing any
offense prescribed under this Act.
(p) Employee of Den, Dive or Resort. – The
caretaker, helper, watchman, lookout, and other
persons working in the den, dive or resort,
employed by the maintainer, owner and/or
operator where any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential chemical is
administered, delivered, distributed, sold or
used, with or without compensation, in
connection with the operation thereof.
(q) Financier. – Any person who pays for, raises
or supplies money for, or underwrites any of the
illegal activities prescribed under this Act.
(r) Illegal Trafficking. – The illegal cultivation,
culture, delivery, administration, dispensation,
manufacture, sale, trading, transportation,
distribution, importation, exportation and
possession of any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential chemical.
(s) Instrument. – Any thing that is used in or
intended to be used in any manner in the
commission of illegal drug trafficking or related
offenses.
(t) Laboratory Equipment. – The paraphernalia,
apparatus, materials or appliances when used,
intended for use or designed for use in the
manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential chemical,
such as reaction vessel, preparative/purifying
equipment, fermentors, separatory funnel, flask,

heating mantle, gas generator, or their
substitute.
(u) Manufacture. – The production, preparation,
compounding or processing of any dangerous
drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical, either directly or indirectly or by
extraction from substances of natural origin, or
independently by means of chemical synthesis
or by a combination of extraction and chemical
synthesis, and shall include any packaging or
repackaging of such substances, design or
configuration of its form, or labeling or relabeling
of its container; except that such terms do not
include the preparation, compounding,
packaging or labeling of a drug or other
substances by a duly authorized practitioner as
an incident to his/her administration or
dispensation of such drug or substance in the
course of his/her professional practice including
research, teaching and chemical analysis of
dangerous drugs or such substances that are
not intended for sale or for any other purpose.
(v) Cannabis or commonly known as
"Marijuana" or "Indian Hemp" or by its any other
name. – Embraces every kind, class, genus, or
specie of the plant Cannabis sativa L. including,
but not limited to, Cannabis
americana, hashish, bhang, guaza,
churrus and ganjab, and embraces every kind,
class and character of marijuana, whether dried
or fresh and flowering, flowering or fruiting tops,
or any part or portion of the plant and seeds
thereof, and all its geographic varieties, whether
as a reefer, resin, extract, tincture or in any form
whatsoever.
(w) Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA)
or commonly known as "Ecstasy", or by its any
other name. – Refers to the drug having such
chemical composition, including any of its
isomers or derivatives in any form.
(x) Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or
commonly known as "Shabu", "Ice", "Meth", or
by its any other name. – Refers to the drug
having such chemical composition, including
any of its isomers or derivatives in any form.
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 3
(y) Opium. – Refers to the coagulated juice of
the opium poppy (Papaver somniferum L.) and
embraces every kind, class and character of
opium, whether crude or prepared; the ashes or
refuse of the same; narcotic preparations
thereof or therefrom; morphine or any alkaloid of
opium; preparations in which opium, morphine
or any alkaloid of opium enters as an ingredient;
opium poppy; opium poppy straw; and leaves or
wrappings of opium leaves, whether prepared
for use or not.
(z) Opium Poppy. – Refers to any part of the
plant of the species Papaver somniferum L.,
Papaver setigerum DC, Papaver orientale,
Papaver bracteatum and Papaver rhoeas,
which includes the seeds, straws, branches,
leaves or any part thereof, or substances
derived therefrom, even for floral, decorative
and culinary purposes.
(aa) PDEA. – Refers to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency under Section 82, Article
IX of this Act.
(bb) Person. – Any entity, natural or juridical,
including among others, a corporation,
partnership, trust or estate, joint stock company,
association, syndicate, joint venture or other
unincorporated organization or group capable of
acquiring rights or entering into obligations.
(cc) Planting of Evidence. – The willful act by
any person of maliciously and surreptitiously
inserting, placing, adding or attaching directly or
indirectly, through any overt or covert act,
whatever quantity of any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential chemical in
the person, house, effects or in the immediate
vicinity of an innocent individual for the purpose
of implicating, incriminating or imputing the
commission of any violation of this Act.
(dd) Practitioner. – Any person who is a licensed
physician, dentist, chemist, medical
technologist, nurse, midwife, veterinarian or
pharmacist in the Philippines.
(ee) Protector/Coddler. – Any person who
knowingly and willfully consents to the unlawful

acts provided for in this Act and uses his/her
influence, power or position in shielding,
harboring, screening or facilitating the escape of
any person he/she knows, or has reasonable
grounds to believe on or suspects, has violated
the provisions of this Act in order to prevent the
arrest, prosecution and conviction of the
violator.
(ff) Pusher. – Any person who sells, trades,
administers, dispenses, delivers or gives away
to another, on any terms whatsoever, or
distributes, dispatches in transit or transports
dangerous drugs or who acts as a broker in any
of such transactions, in violation of this Act.
(gg) School. – Any educational institution,
private or public, undertaking educational
operation for pupils/students pursuing certain
studies at defined levels, receiving instructions
from teachers, usually located in a building or a
group of buildings in a particular physical or
cyber site.
(hh) Screening Test. – A rapid test performed to
establish potential/presumptive positive result.
(ii) Sell. – Any act of giving away any dangerous
drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical whether for money or any other
consideration.
(jj) Trading. – Transactions involving the illegal
trafficking of dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals using
electronic devices such as, but not limited to,
text messages, email, mobile or landlines, two-
way radios, internet, instant messengers and
chat rooms or acting as a broker in any of such
transactions whether for money or any other
consideration in violation of this Act.
(kk) Use. – Any act of injecting, intravenously or
intramuscularly, of consuming, either by
chewing, smoking, sniffing, eating, swallowing,
drinking or otherwise introducing into the
physiological system of the body, and of the
dangerous drugs.
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 4
ARTICLE II
Unlawful Acts and Penalties
Section 4. Importation of Dangerous Drugs
and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals.- .The penalty of life imprisonment to
death and a ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million
pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon
any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
import or bring into the Philippines any
dangerous drug, regardless of the quantity and
purity involved, including any and all species of
opium poppy or any part thereof or substances
derived therefrom even for floral, decorative and
culinary purposes.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall import any controlled
precursor and essential chemical.
The maximum penalty provided for under this
Section shall be imposed upon any person,
who, unless authorized under this Act, shall
import or bring into the Philippines any
dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical through the use of a
diplomatic passport, diplomatic facilities or any
other means involving his/her official status
intended to facilitate the unlawful entry of the
same. In addition, the diplomatic passport shall
be confiscated and canceled.
The maximum penalty provided for under this
Section shall be imposed upon any person, who
organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of
any of the illegal activities prescribed in this
Section.
The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a fine
ranging from One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any

person, who acts as a "protector/coddler" of any
violator of the provisions under this Section.
Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration,
Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or
Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million
pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon
any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give
away to another, distribute dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any
and all species of opium poppy regardless of the
quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a
broker in any of such transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
controlled precursor and essential chemical, or
shall act as a broker in such transactions.
If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation,
delivery, distribution or transportation of any
dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical transpires within one
hundred (100) meters from the school, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed in every
case.
For drug pushers who use minors or mentally
incapacitated individuals as runners, couriers
and messengers, or in any other capacity
directly connected to the dangerous drugs
and/or controlled precursors and essential
chemical trade, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed in every case.
If the victim of the offense is a minor or a
mentally incapacitated individual, or should a
dangerous drug and/or a controlled precursor
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 5
and essential chemical involved in any offense
herein provided be the proximate cause of death
of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty
provided for under this Section shall be
imposed.
The maximum penalty provided for under this
Section shall be imposed upon any person who
organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of
any of the illegal activities prescribed in this
Section.
The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a fine
ranging from One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person, who acts as a "protector/coddler" of any
violator of the provisions under this Section.
Section 6. Maintenance of a Den, Dive or
Resort. - The penalty of life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million
pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon
any person or group of persons who shall
maintain a den, dive or resort where any
dangerous drug is used or sold in any form.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person or group of persons
who shall maintain a den, dive, or resort where
any controlled precursor and essential chemical
is used or sold in any form.
The maximum penalty provided for under this
Section shall be imposed in every case where
any dangerous drug is administered, delivered
or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the
same in such a place.
Should any dangerous drug be the proximate
cause of the death of a person using the same
in such den, dive or resort, the penalty of death
and a fine ranging from One million
(P1,000,000.00) to Fifteen million pesos

(P500,000.00) shall be imposed on the
maintainer, owner and/or operator.
If such den, dive or resort is owned by a third
person, the same shall be confiscated and
escheated in favor of the government: Provided,
That the criminal complaint shall specifically
allege that such place is intentionally used in the
furtherance of the crime: Provided, further, That
the prosecution shall prove such intent on the
part of the owner to use the property for such
purpose: Provided, finally, That the owner shall
be included as an accused in the criminal
complaint.
The maximum penalty provided for under this
Section shall be imposed upon any person who
organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of
any of the illegal activities prescribed in this
Section.
The penalty twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a fine
ranging from One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person, who acts as a "protector/coddler" of any
violator of the provisions under this Section.
Section 7. Employees and Visitors of a Den,
Dive or Resort. - The penalty of imprisonment
ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall
be imposed upon:
(a) Any employee of a den, dive or resort,
who is aware of the nature of the place
as such; and
(b) Any person who, not being included
in the provisions of the next preceding,
paragraph, is aware of the nature of the
place as such and shall knowingly visit
the same
Section 8. Manufacture of Dangerous Drugs
and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 6
death and a fine ranging Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
engage in the manufacture of any dangerous
drug.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall manufacture any
controlled precursor and essential chemical.
The presence of any controlled precursor and
essential chemical or laboratory equipment in
the clandestine laboratory is a prima facie proof
of manufacture of any dangerous drug. It shall
be considered an aggravating circumstance if
the clandestine laboratory is undertaken or
established under the following circumstances:
(a) Any phase of the manufacturing
process was conducted in the presence
or with the help of minor/s:
(b) Any phase or manufacturing process
was established or undertaken within one
hundred (100) meters of a residential,
business, church or school premises;
(c) Any clandestine laboratory was
secured or protected with booby traps;
(d) Any clandestine laboratory was
concealed with legitimate business
operations; or
(e) Any employment of a practitioner,
chemical engineer, public official or
foreigner.
The maximum penalty provided for under this
Section shall be imposed upon any person, who
organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of
any of the illegal activities prescribed in this
Section.

The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a fine
ranging from One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person, who acts as a "protector/coddler" of any
violator of the provisions under this Section.
Section 9. Illegal Chemical Diversion of
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.
- The penalty of imprisonment ranging from
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless
authorized by law, shall illegally divert any
controlled precursor and essential chemical.
Section 10. Manufacture or Delivery of
Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus, and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs and/or
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.
- The penalty of imprisonment ranging from
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person who shall deliver,
possess with intent to deliver, or manufacture
with intent to deliver equipment, instrument,
apparatus and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs, knowing, or under
circumstances where one reasonably should
know, that it will be used to plant, propagate,
cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare,
test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain or
conceal any dangerous drug and/or controlled
precursor and essential chemical in violation of
this Act.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six
(6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and
a fine ranging from Ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) shall be imposed if it will be used
to inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce
into the human body a dangerous drug in
violation of this Act.
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The maximum penalty provided for under this
Section shall be imposed upon any person, who
uses a minor or a mentally incapacitated
individual to deliver such equipment, instrument,
apparatus and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs.
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. -
The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a
fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
possess any dangerous drug in the following
quantities, regardless of the degree of purity
thereof:
(1) 10 grams or more of opium;
(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;
(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;
(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or
cocaine hydrochloride;
(5) 50 grams or more of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu";
(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin
or marijuana resin oil;
(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and
(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous
drugs such as, but not limited to,
methylenedioxymethamphetamine
(MDA) or "ecstasy",
paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA),
trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic
acid diethylamine (LSD), gamma
hydroxyamphetamine (GHB), and those
similarly designed or newly introduced
drugs and their derivatives, without
having any therapeutic value or if the
quantity possessed is far beyond
therapeutic requirements, as determined
and promulgated by the Board in

accordance to Section 93, Article XI of
this Act.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than
the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be
graduated as follows:
(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging
from Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand
pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantity of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu" is ten (10) grams or more but
less than fifty (50) grams;
(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years
and one (1) day to life imprisonment and
a fine ranging from Four hundred
thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00),
if the quantities of dangerous drugs are
five (5) grams or more but less than ten
(10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin,
cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride,
marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil,
methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu", or other dangerous drugs such
as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy",
PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those
similarly designed or newly introduced
drugs and their derivatives, without
having any therapeutic value or if the
quantity possessed is far beyond
therapeutic requirements; or three
hundred (300) grams or more but less
than five (hundred) 500) grams of
marijuana; and
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and
a fine ranging from Three hundred
thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four
hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00),
if the quantities of dangerous drugs are
less than five (5) grams of opium,
morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine
hydrochloride, marijuana resin or
marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu", or other
dangerous drugs such as, but not limited
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 8
to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD,
GHB, and those similarly designed or
newly introduced drugs and their
derivatives, without having any
therapeutic value or if the quantity
possessed is far beyond therapeutic
requirements; or less than three hundred
(300) grams of marijuana.
Section 12. Possession of Equipment,
Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia
for Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and
one (1) day to four (4) years and a fine ranging
from Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any person, who, unless authorized by
law, shall possess or have under his/her control
any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking,
consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting,
or introducing any dangerous drug into the
body: Provided, That in the case of medical
practitioners and various professionals who are
required to carry such equipment, instrument,
apparatus and other paraphernalia in the
practice of their profession, the Board shall
prescribe the necessary implementing
guidelines thereof.
The possession of such equipment, instrument,
apparatus and other paraphernalia fit or
intended for any of the purposes enumerated in
the preceding paragraph shall be prima
facie evidence that the possessor has smoked,
consumed, administered to himself/herself,
injected, ingested or used a dangerous drug and
shall be presumed to have violated Section 15
of this Act.
Section 13. Possession of Dangerous Drugs
During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings.
– Any person found possessing any dangerous
drug during a party, or at a social gathering or
meeting, or in the proximate company of at least
two (2) persons, shall suffer the maximum
penalties provided for in Section 11 of this Act,
regardless of the quantity and purity of such
dangerous drugs.

Section 14. Possession of Equipment,
Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia
for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social
Gatherings or Meetings. - The maximum penalty
provided for in Section 12 of this Act shall be
imposed upon any person, who shall possess or
have under his/her control any equipment,
instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia
fit or intended for smoking, consuming,
administering, injecting, ingesting, or
introducing any dangerous drug into the body,
during parties, social gatherings or meetings, or
in the proximate company of at least two (2)
persons.
Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. – A
person apprehended or arrested, who is found
to be positive for use of any dangerous drug,
after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a
penalty of a minimum of six (6) months
rehabilitation in a government center for the first
offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII
of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous
drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and
a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall
not be applicable where the person tested is
also found to have in his/her possession such
quantity of any dangerous drug provided for
under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the
provisions stated therein shall apply.
Section 16. Cultivation or Culture of Plants
Classified as Dangerous Drugs or are Sources
Thereof. - The penalty of life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million
pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon
any person, who shall plant, cultivate or culture
marijuana, opium poppy or any other plant
regardless of quantity, which is or may hereafter
be classified as a dangerous drug or as a source
from which any dangerous drug may be
manufactured or derived: Provided, That in the
case of medical laboratories and medical
research centers which cultivate or culture
marijuana, opium poppy and other plants, or
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 9
materials of such dangerous drugs for medical
experiments and research purposes, or for the
creation of new types of medicine, the Board
shall prescribe the necessary implementing
guidelines for the proper cultivation, culture,
handling, experimentation and disposal of such
plants and materials.
The land or portions thereof and/or
greenhouses on which any of said plants is
cultivated or cultured shall be confiscated and
escheated in favor of the State, unless the
owner thereof can prove lack of knowledge of
such cultivation or culture despite the exercise
of due diligence on his/her part. If the land
involved is part of the public domain, the
maximum penalty provided for under this
Section shall be imposed upon the offender.
The maximum penalty provided for under this
Section shall be imposed upon any person, who
organizes, manages or acts as a "financier" of
any of the illegal activities prescribed in this
Section.
The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a fine
ranging from One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person, who acts as a "protector/coddler" of any
violator of the provisions under this Section.
Section 17. Maintenance and Keeping of
Original Records of Transactions on Dangerous
Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of
imprisonment ranging from one (1) year and one
(1) day to six (6) years and a fine ranging from
Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed
upon any practitioner, manufacturer,
wholesaler, importer, distributor, dealer or
retailer who violates or fails to comply with the
maintenance and keeping of the original records
of transactions on any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential chemical in
accordance with Section 40 of this Act.

An additional penalty shall be imposed through
the revocation of the license to practice his/her
profession, in case of a practitioner, or of the
business, in case of a manufacturer, seller,
importer, distributor, dealer or retailer.
Section 18. Unnecessary Prescription of
Dangerous Drugs. – The penalty of
imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine
ranging from One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) and the additional penalty of the
revocation of his/her license to practice shall be
imposed upon the practitioner, who shall
prescribe any dangerous drug to any person
whose physical or physiological condition does
not require the use or in the dosage prescribed
therein, as determined by the Board in
consultation with recognized competent experts
who are authorized representatives of
professional organizations of practitioners,
particularly those who are involved in the care of
persons with severe pain.
Section 19. Unlawful Prescription of Dangerous
Drugs. – The penalty of life imprisonment to
death and a fine ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million
pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon
any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
make or issue a prescription or any other writing
purporting to be a prescription for any
dangerous drug.
Section 20. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the
Proceeds or Instruments of the Unlawful Act,
Including the Properties or Proceeds Derived
from the Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs
and/or Precursors and Essential Chemicals. –
Every penalty imposed for the unlawful
importation, sale, trading, administration,
dispensation, delivery, distribution,
transportation or manufacture of any dangerous
drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical, the cultivation or culture of plants
which are sources of dangerous drugs, and the
possession of any equipment, instrument,
apparatus and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs including other laboratory
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 10
equipment, shall carry with it the confiscation
and forfeiture, in favor of the government, of all
the proceeds and properties derived from the
unlawful act, including, but not limited to, money
and other assets obtained thereby, and the
instruments or tools with which the particular
unlawful act was committed, unless they are the
property of a third person not liable for the
unlawful act, but those which are not of lawful
commerce shall be ordered destroyed without
delay pursuant to the provisions of Section 21 of
this Act.
After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the
appropriate criminal case filed, the Court shall
immediately schedule a hearing for the
confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of
the offense and all the assets and properties of
the accused either owned or held by him or in
the name of some other persons if the same
shall be found to be manifestly out of proportion
to his/her lawful income: Provided, however,
That if the forfeited property is a vehicle, the
same shall be auctioned off not later than five
(5) days upon order of confiscation or forfeiture.
During the pendency of the case in the Regional
Trial Court, no property, or income derived
therefrom, which may be confiscated and
forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or
transferred and the same shall be in custodia
legis and no bond shall be admitted for the
release of the same.
The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any
property confiscated or forfeited under this
Section shall be used to pay all proper expenses
incurred in the proceedings for the confiscation,
forfeiture, custody and maintenance of the
property pending disposition, as well as
expenses for publication and court costs. The
proceeds in excess of the above expenses shall
accrue to the Board to be used in its campaign
against illegal drugs.
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of
Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 11
Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous
drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall
be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon
confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment, the same shall be
submitted to the PDEA Forensic
Laboratory for a qualitative and
quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic
laboratory examination results, which
shall be done under oath by the forensic
laboratory examiner, shall be issued
within twenty-four (24) hours after the
receipt of the subject item/s: Provided,
That when the volume of the dangerous
drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
and controlled precursors and essential
chemicals does not allow the completion
of testing within the time frame, a partial
laboratory examination report shall be
provisionally issued stating therein the
quantities of dangerous drugs still to be
examined by the forensic
laboratory: Provided, however, That a
final certification shall be issued on the
completed forensic laboratory
examination on the same within the next
twenty-four (24) hours;
(4) After the filing of the criminal case, the
Court shall, within seventy-two (72)
hours, conduct an ocular inspection of
the confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, and
controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, including the
instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment, and through the
PDEA shall within twenty-four (24) hours
thereafter proceed with the destruction or
burning of the same, in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media
and the DOJ, civil society groups and any
elected public official. The Board shall
draw up the guidelines on the manner of
proper disposition and destruction of
such item/s which shall be borne by the
offender: Provided, That those item/s of
lawful commerce, as determined by the
Board, shall be donated, used or
recycled for legitimate
purposes: Provided, further, That a
representative sample, duly weighed and
recorded is retained;
(5) The Board shall then issue a sworn
certification as to the fact of destruction
or burning of the subject item/s which,
together with the representative
sample/s in the custody of the PDEA,
shall be submitted to the court having
jurisdiction over the case. In all
instances, the representative sample/s
shall be kept to a minimum quantity as
determined by the Board;
(6) The alleged offender or his/her
representative or counsel shall be
allowed to personally observe all of the
above proceedings and his/her presence

shall not constitute an admission of guilt.
In case the said offender or accused
refuses or fails to appoint a
representative after due notice in writing
to the accused or his/her counsel within
seventy-two (72) hours before the actual
burning or destruction of the evidence in
question, the Secretary of Justice shall
appoint a member of the public attorney's
office to represent the former;
(7) After the promulgation and judgment
in the criminal case wherein the
representative sample/s was presented
as evidence in court, the trial prosecutor
shall inform the Board of the final
termination of the case and, in turn, shall
request the court for leave to turn over
the said representative sample/s to the
PDEA for proper disposition and
destruction within twenty-four (24) hours
from receipt of the same; and
(8) Transitory Provision: a) Within twenty-
four (24) hours from the effectivity of this
Act, dangerous drugs defined herein
which are presently in possession of law
enforcement agencies shall, with leave of
court, be burned or destroyed, in the
presence of representatives of the Court,
DOJ, Department of Health (DOH) and
the accused/and or his/her counsel, and,
b) Pending the organization of the PDEA,
the custody, disposition, and burning or
destruction of seized/surrendered
dangerous drugs provided under this
Section shall be implemented by the
DOH.
Section 22. Grant of Compensation, Reward
and Award. – The Board shall recommend to the
concerned government agency the grant of
compensation, reward and award to any person
providing information and to law enforcers
participating in the operation, which results in
the successful confiscation, seizure or
surrender of dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and
essential chemicals.
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 12
Section 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. – Any
person charged under any provision of this Act
regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be
allowed to avail of the provision on plea-
bargaining.
Section 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation
Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers. – Any
person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing
under this Act, regardless of the penalty
imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the
privilege granted by the Probation Law or
Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.
Section 25. Qualifying Aggravating
Circumstances in the Commission of a Crime by
an Offender Under the Influence of Dangerous
Drugs. – Notwithstanding the provisions of any
law to the contrary, a positive finding for the use
of dangerous drugs shall be a qualifying
aggravating circumstance in the commission of
a crime by an offender, and the application of
the penalty provided for in the Revised Penal
Code shall be applicable.
Section 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. – Any
attempt or conspiracy to commit the following
unlawful acts shall be penalized by the same
penalty prescribed for the commission of the
same as provided under this Act:
(a) Importation of any dangerous drug
and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical;
(b) Sale, trading, administration,
dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation of any dangerous drug
and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical;
(c) Maintenance of a den, dive or resort
where any dangerous drug is used in any
form;
(d) Manufacture of any dangerous drug
and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical; and

(e) Cultivation or culture of plants which
are sources of dangerous drugs.
Section 27. Criminal Liability of a Public Officer
or Employee for Misappropriation,
Misapplication or Failure to Account for the
Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment Including the Proceeds
or Properties Obtained from the Unlawful Act
Committed. – The penalty of life imprisonment
to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million
pesos (P10,000,000.00), in addition to absolute
perpetual disqualification from any public office,
shall be imposed upon any public officer or
employee who misappropriates, misapplies or
fails to account for confiscated, seized or
surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment including the
proceeds or properties obtained from the
unlawful acts as provided for in this Act.
Any elective local or national official found to
have benefited from the proceeds of the
trafficking of dangerous drugs as prescribed in
this Act, or have received any financial or
material contributions or donations from natural
or juridical persons found guilty of trafficking
dangerous drugs as prescribed in this Act, shall
be removed from office and perpetually
disqualified from holding any elective or
appointive positions in the government, its
divisions, subdivisions, and intermediaries,
including government-owned or –controlled
corporations.
Section 28. Criminal Liability of Government
Officials and Employees. – The maximum
penalties of the unlawful acts provided for in this
Act shall be imposed, in addition to absolute
perpetual disqualification from any public office,
if those found guilty of such unlawful acts are
government officials and employees.
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 13
Section 29. Criminal Liability for Planting of
Evidence. – Any person who is found guilty of
"planting" any dangerous drug and/or controlled
precursor and essential chemical, regardless of
quantity and purity, shall suffer the penalty of
death.
Section 30. Criminal Liability of Officers of
Partnerships, Corporations, Associations or
Other Juridical Entities. – In case any violation
of this Act is committed by a partnership,
corporation, association or any juridical entity,
the partner, president, director, manager,
trustee, estate administrator, or officer who
consents to or knowingly tolerates such violation
shall be held criminally liable as a co-principal.
The penalty provided for the offense under this
Act shall be imposed upon the partner,
president, director, manager, trustee, estate
administrator, or officer who knowingly
authorizes, tolerates or consents to the use of a
vehicle, vessel, aircraft, equipment or other
facility, as an instrument in the importation, sale,
trading, administration, dispensation, delivery,
distribution, transportation or manufacture of
dangerous drugs, or chemical diversion, if such
vehicle, vessel, aircraft, equipment or other
instrument is owned by or under the control or
supervision of the partnership, corporation,
association or juridical entity to which they are
affiliated.
Section 31. Additional Penalty if Offender is an
Alien. – In addition to the penalties prescribed in
the unlawful act committed, any alien who
violates such provisions of this Act shall, after
service of sentence, be deported immediately
without further proceedings, unless the penalty
is death.
Section 32. Liability to a Person Violating Any
Regulation Issued by the Board. – The penalty
of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years and a fine
ranging from Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00)
to Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person found violating any
regulation duly issued by the Board pursuant to

this Act, in addition to the administrative
sanctions imposed by the Board.
Section 33. Immunity from Prosecution and
Punishment. – Notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and the provisions of
Republic Act No. 6981 or the Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Act of 1991,
any person who has violated Sections 7, 11, 12,
14, 15, and 19, Article II of this Act, who
voluntarily gives information about any violation
of Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, and 16, Article II of
this Act as well as any violation of the offenses
mentioned if committed by a drug syndicate, or
any information leading to the whereabouts,
identities and arrest of all or any of the members
thereof; and who willingly testifies against such
persons as described above, shall be exempted
from prosecution or punishment for the offense
with reference to which his/her information of
testimony were given, and may plead or prove
the giving of such information and testimony in
bar of such prosecution: Provided, That the
following conditions concur:
(1) The information and testimony are
necessary for the conviction of the
persons described above;
(2) Such information and testimony are
not yet in the possession of the State;
(3) Such information and testimony can
be corroborated on its material points;
(4) the informant or witness has not been
previously convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude, except when there is no
other direct evidence available for the
State other than the information and
testimony of said informant or witness;
and
(5) The informant or witness shall strictly
and faithfully comply without delay, any
condition or undertaking, reduced into
writing, lawfully imposed by the State as
further consideration for the grant of
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 14
immunity from prosecution and
punishment.
Provided, further, That this immunity may be
enjoyed by such informant or witness who does
not appear to be most guilty for the offense with
reference to which his/her information or
testimony were given: Provided, finally, That
there is no direct evidence available for the
State except for the information and testimony
of the said informant or witness.
Section 34. Termination of the Grant of
Immunity. – The immunity granted to the
informant or witness, as prescribed in Section
33 of this Act, shall not attach should it turn out
subsequently that the information and/or
testimony is false, malicious or made only for
the purpose of harassing, molesting or in any
way prejudicing the persons described in the
preceding Section against whom such
information or testimony is directed against. In
such case, the informant or witness shall be
subject to prosecution and the enjoyment of all
rights and benefits previously accorded him
under this Act or any other law, decree or order
shall be deemed terminated.
In case an informant or witness under this Act
fails or refuses to testify without just cause, and
when lawfully obliged to do so, or should he/she
violate any condition accompanying such
immunity as provided above, his/her immunity
shall be removed and he/she shall likewise be
subject to contempt and/or criminal prosecution,
as the case may be, and the enjoyment of all
rights and benefits previously accorded him
under this Act or in any other law, decree or
order shall be deemed terminated.
In case the informant or witness referred to
under this Act falls under the applicability of this
Section hereof, such individual cannot avail of
the provisions under Article VIII of this Act.
Section 35. Accessory Penalties. – A person
convicted under this Act shall be disqualified to
exercise his/her civil rights such as but not
limited to, the rights of parental authority or
guardianship, either as to the person or property
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 15
of any ward, the rights to dispose of such
property by any act or any conveyance inter
vivos, and political rights such as but not limited
to, the right to vote and be voted for. Such rights
shall also be suspended during the pendency of
an appeal from such conviction.
ARTICLE III
Dangerous Drugs Test and Record
Requirements
Section 36. Authorized Drug Testing. –
Authorized drug testing shall be done by any
government forensic laboratories or by any of
the drug testing laboratories accredited and
monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality
of test results. The DOH shall take steps in
setting the price of the drug test with DOH
accredited drug testing centers to further reduce
the cost of such drug test. The drug testing shall
employ, among others, two (2) testing methods,
the screening test which will determine the
positive result as well as the type of the drug
used and the confirmatory test which will
confirm a positive screening test. Drug test
certificates issued by accredited drug testing
centers shall be valid for a one-year period from
the date of issue which may be used for other
purposes. The following shall be subjected to
undergo drug testing:
(a) Applicants for driver's license. – No
driver's license shall be issued or
renewed to any person unless he/she
presents a certification that he/she has
undergone a mandatory drug test and
indicating thereon that he/she is free from
the use of dangerous drugs;
(b) Applicants for firearm's license and
for permit to carry firearms outside of
residence. – All applicants for firearm's
license and permit to carry firearms
outside of residence shall undergo a
mandatory drug test to ensure that they
are free from the use of dangerous
drugs: Provided, That all persons who by
the nature of their profession carry
firearms shall undergo drug testing;
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary
schools. – Students of secondary and
tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the
related rules and regulations as
contained in the school's student
handbook and with notice to the parents,
undergo a random drug
testing: Provided, That all drug testing
expenses whether in public or private
schools under this Section will be borne
by the government;
(d) Officers and employees of public and
private offices. – Officers and employees
of public and private offices, whether
domestic or overseas, shall be subjected
to undergo a random drug test as
contained in the company's work rules
and regulations, which shall be borne by
the employer, for purposes of reducing
the risk in the workplace. Any officer or
employee found positive for use of
dangerous drugs shall be dealt with
administratively which shall be a ground
for suspension or termination, subject to
the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor
Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil
Service Law;
(e) Officers and members of the military,
police and other law enforcement
agencies. – Officers and members of the
military, police and other law
enforcement agencies shall undergo an
annual mandatory drug test;
(f) All persons charged before the
prosecutor's office with a criminal offense
having an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6)
years and one (1) day shall have to
undergo a mandatory drug test; and
(g) All candidates for public office
whether appointed or elected both in the
national or local government shall
undergo a mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties
in this Section, those found to be positive

for dangerous drugs use shall be subject
to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.
Section 37. Issuance of False or Fraudulent
Drug Test Results. – Any person authorized,
licensed or accredited under this Act and its
implementing rules to conduct drug examination
or test, who issues false or fraudulent drug test
results knowingly, willfully or through gross
negligence, shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine
ranging from One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00).
An additional penalty shall be imposed through
the revocation of the license to practice his/her
profession in case of a practitioner, and the
closure of the drug testing center.
Section 38. Laboratory Examination or Test on
Apprehended/Arrested Offenders. – Subject to
Section 15 of this Act, any person apprehended
or arrested for violating the provisions of this Act
shall be subjected to screening laboratory
examination or test within twenty-four (24)
hours, if the apprehending or arresting officer
has reasonable ground to believe that the
person apprehended or arrested, on account of
physical signs or symptoms or other visible or
outward manifestation, is under the influence of
dangerous drugs. If found to be positive, the
results of the screening laboratory examination
or test shall be challenged within fifteen (15)
days after receipt of the result through a
confirmatory test conducted in any accredited
analytical laboratory equipment with a gas
chromatograph/mass spectrometry equipment
or some such modern and accepted method, if
confirmed the same shall be prima
facie evidence that such person has used
dangerous drugs, which is without prejudice for
the prosecution for other violations of the
provisions of this Act: Provided, That a positive
screening laboratory test must be confirmed for
it to be valid in a court of law.
Section 39. Accreditation of Drug Testing
Centers and Physicians. – The DOH shall be
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 16
tasked to license and accredit drug testing
centers in each province and city in order to
assure their capacity, competence, integrity and
stability to conduct the laboratory examinations
and tests provided in this Article, and appoint
such technical and other personnel as may be
necessary for the effective implementation of
this provision. The DOH shall also accredit
physicians who shall conduct the drug
dependency examination of a drug dependent
as well as the after-care and follow-up program
for the said drug dependent. There shall be a
control regulations, licensing and accreditation
division under the supervision of the DOH for
this purpose.
For this purpose, the DOH shall establish,
operate and maintain drug testing centers in
government hospitals, which must be provided
at least with basic technologically advanced
equipment and materials, in order to conduct the
laboratory examination and tests herein
provided, and appoint such qualified and duly
trained technical and other personnel as may be
necessary for the effective implementation of
this provision.
Section 40. Records Required for Transactions
on Dangerous Drug and Precursors and
Essential Chemicals. –
a) Every pharmacist dealing in
dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals shall
maintain and keep an original record of
sales, purchases, acquisitions and
deliveries of dangerous drugs, indicating
therein the following information:
(1) License number and address
of the pharmacist;
(2) Name, address and license of
the manufacturer, importer or
wholesaler from whom the
dangerous drugs have been
purchased;

(3) Quantity and name of the
dangerous drugs purchased or
acquired;
(4) Date of acquisition or
purchase;
(5) Name, address and
community tax certificate number
of the buyer;
(6) Serial number of the
prescription and the name of the
physician, dentist, veterinarian or
practitioner issuing the same;
(7) Quantity and name of the
dangerous drugs sold or
delivered; and
(8) Date of sale or delivery.
A certified true copy of such record
covering a period of six (6) months, duly
signed by the pharmacist or the owner of
the drugstore, pharmacy or chemical
establishment, shall be forwarded to the
Board within fifteen (15) days following
the last day of June and December of
each year, with a copy thereof furnished
the city or municipal health officer
concerned.
(b) A physician, dentist, veterinarian or
practitioner authorized to prescribe any
dangerous drug shall issue the
prescription therefor in one (1) original
and two (2) duplicate copies. The
original, after the prescription has been
filled, shall be retained by the pharmacist
for a period of one (1) year from the date
of sale or delivery of such drug. One (1)
copy shall be retained by the buyer or by
the person to whom the drug is delivered
until such drug is consumed, while the
second copy shall be retained by the
person issuing the prescription.
For purposes of this Act, all prescriptions
issued by physicians, dentists,
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 17
veterinarians or practitioners shall be
written on forms exclusively issued by
and obtainable from the DOH. Such
forms shall be made of a special kind of
paper and shall be distributed in such
quantities and contain such information
and other data as the DOH may, by rules
and regulations, require. Such forms
shall only be issued by the DOH through
its authorized employees to licensed
physicians, dentists, veterinarians and
practitioners in such quantities as the
Board may authorize. In emergency
cases, however, as the Board may
specify in the public interest, a
prescription need not be accomplished
on such forms. The prescribing
physician, dentist, veterinarian or
practitioner shall, within three (3) days
after issuing such prescription, inform the
DOH of the same in writing. No
prescription once served by the
drugstore or pharmacy be reused nor any
prescription once issued be refilled.
(c) All manufacturers, wholesalers,
distributors, importers, dealers and
retailers of dangerous drugs and/or
controlled precursors and essential
chemicals shall keep a record of all
inventories, sales, purchases,
acquisitions and deliveries of the same
as well as the names, addresses and
licenses of the persons from whom such
items were purchased or acquired or to
whom such items were sold or delivered,
the name and quantity of the same and
the date of the transactions. Such
records may be subjected anytime for
review by the Board.
ARTICLE IV
Participation of the Family, Students,
Teachers and School Authorities in the
Enforcement of this Act
Section 41. Involvement of the Family. – The
family being the basic unit of the Filipino society
shall be primarily responsible for the education

and awareness of the members of the family on
the ill effects of dangerous drugs and close
monitoring of family members who may be
susceptible to drug abuse.
Section 42. Student Councils and Campus
Organizations. – All elementary, secondary and
tertiary schools' student councils and campus
organizations shall include in their activities a
program for the prevention of and deterrence in
the use of dangerous drugs, and referral for
treatment and rehabilitation of students for drug
dependence.
Section 43. School Curricula. – Instruction on
drug abuse prevention and control shall be
integrated in the elementary, secondary and
tertiary curricula of all public and private
schools, whether general, technical, vocational
or agro-industrial as well as in non-formal,
informal and indigenous learning systems. Such
instructions shall include:
(1) Adverse effects of the abuse and
misuse of dangerous drugs on the
person, the family, the school and the
community;
(2) Preventive measures against drug
abuse;
(3) Health, socio-cultural, psychological,
legal and economic dimensions and
implications of the drug problem;
(4) Steps to take when intervention on
behalf of a drug dependent is needed, as
well as the services available for the
treatment and rehabilitation of drug
dependents; and
(5) Misconceptions about the use of
dangerous drugs such as, but not limited
to, the importance and safety of
dangerous drugs for medical and
therapeutic use as well as the
differentiation between medical patients
and drug dependents in order to avoid
confusion and accidental stigmatization
in the consciousness of the students.
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 18
Section 44. Heads, Supervisors, and Teachers
of Schools. – For the purpose of enforcing the
provisions of Article II of this Act, all school
heads, supervisors and teachers shall be
deemed persons in authority and, as such, are
hereby empowered to apprehend, arrest or
cause the apprehension or arrest of any person
who shall violate any of the said provisions,
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court. They shall be deemed persons in
authority if they are in the school or within its
immediate vicinity, or even beyond such
immediate vicinity if they are in attendance at
any school or class function in their official
capacity as school heads, supervisors, and
teachers.
Any teacher or school employee, who discovers
or finds that any person in the school or within
its immediate vicinity is liable for violating any of
said provisions, shall have the duty to report the
same to the school head or immediate superior
who shall, in turn, report the matter to the proper
authorities.
Failure to do so in either case, within a
reasonable period from the time of discovery of
the violation shall, after due hearing, constitute
sufficient cause for disciplinary action by the
school authorities.
Section 45. Publication and Distribution of
Materials on Dangerous Drugs. – With the
assistance of the Board, the Secretary of the
Department of Education (DepEd), the
Chairman of the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED) and the Director-General of
the Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA) shall cause the
development, publication and distribution of
information and support educational materials
on dangerous drugs to the students, the faculty,
the parents, and the community.
Section 46. Special Drug Education Center. –
With the assistance of the Board, the
Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG), the National Youth
Commission (NYC), and the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) shall

establish in each of its provincial office a special
education drug center for out-of-school youth
and street children. Such Center which shall be
headed by the Provincial Social. Welfare
Development Officer shall sponsor drug
prevention programs and activities and
information campaigns with the end in view of
educating the out-of-school youth and street
children regarding the pernicious effects of drug
abuse. The programs initiated by the Center
shall likewise be adopted in all public and
private orphanage and existing special centers
for street children.
ARTICLE V
Promotion of a National Drug-Free
Workplace Program With the Participation of
Private and Labor Sectors and the
Department of Labor and Employment
Section 47. Drug-Free Workplace. – It is
deemed a policy of the State to promote drug-
free workplaces using a tripartite approach. With
the assistance of the Board, the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) shall develop,
promote and implement a national drug abuse
prevention program in the workplace to be
adopted by private companies with ten (10) or
more employees. Such program shall include
the mandatory drafting and adoption of
company policies against drug use in the
workplace in close consultation and
coordination with the DOLE, labor and employer
organizations, human resource development
managers and other such private sector
organizations.
Section 48. Guidelines for the National Drug-
Free Workplace Program. – The Board and the
DOLE shall formulate the necessary guidelines
for the implementation of the national drug-free
workplace program. The amount necessary for
the implementation of which shall be included in
the annual General Appropriations Act.
ARTICLE VI
Participation of the Private and Labor
Sectors in the Enforcement of this Act
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 19
Section 49. Labor Organizations and the
Private Sector. – All labor unions, federations,
associations, or organizations in cooperation
with the respective private sector partners shall
include in their collective bargaining or any
similar agreements, joint continuing programs
and information campaigns for the laborers
similar to the programs provided under Section
47 of this Act with the end in view of achieving a
drug free workplace.
Section 50. Government Assistance. – The
labor sector and the respective partners may, in
pursuit of the programs mentioned in the
preceding Section, secure the technical
assistance, such as but not limited to, seminars
and information dissemination campaigns of the
appropriate government and law enforcement
agencies.
ARTICLE VII
Participation of Local Government Units
Section 51. Local Government Units'
Assistance. – Local government units shall
appropriate a substantial portion of their
respective annual budgets to assist in or
enhance the enforcement of this Act giving
priority to preventive or educational programs
and the rehabilitation or treatment of drug
dependents.
Section 52. Abatement of Drug Related Public
Nuisances. – Any place or premises which have
been used on two or more occasions as the site
of the unlawful sale or delivery of dangerous
drugs may be declared to be a public nuisance,
and such nuisance may be abated, pursuant to
the following procedures:
(1) Any city or municipality may, by
ordinance, create an administrative
board to hear complaints regarding the
nuisances;
(2) any employee, officer, or resident of
the city or municipality may bring a
complaint before the Board after giving
not less than three (3) days written notice

of such complaint to the owner of the
place or premises at his/her last known
address; and
(3) After hearing in which the Board may
consider any evidence, including
evidence of the general reputation of the
place or premises, and at which the
owner of the premises shall have an
opportunity to present evidence in his/her
defense, the Board may declare the
place or premises to be a public
nuisance.
Section 53. Effect of Board Declaration. – If the
Board declares a place or premises to be a
public nuisance, it may declare an order
immediately prohibiting the conduct, operation,
or maintenance of any business or activity on
the premises which is conducive to such
nuisance.
An order entered under this Section shall expire
after one (1) year or at such earlier time as
stated in the order. The Board may bring a
complaint seeking a permanent injunction
against any nuisance described under this
Section.
This Article does not restrict the right of any
person to proceed under the Civil Code against
any public nuisance.
ARTICLE VIII
Program for Treatment and Rehabilitation of
Drug Dependents
Section 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug
Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and
Rehabilitation. – A drug dependent or any
person who violates Section 15 of this Act may,
by himself/herself or through his/her parent,
spouse, guardian or relative within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, apply to the
Board or its duly recognized representative, for
treatment and rehabilitation of the drug
dependency. Upon such application, the Board
shall bring forth the matter to the Court which
shall order that the applicant be examined for
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 20
drug dependency. If the examination by a DOH-
accredited physician results in the issuance of a
certification that the applicant is a drug
dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court
to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in a
Center designated by the Board for a period of
not less than six (6) months: Provided, That a
drug dependent may be placed under the care
of a DOH-accredited physician where there is
no Center near or accessible to the residence of
the drug dependent or where said drug
dependent is below eighteen (18) years of age
and is a first-time offender and non-confinement
in a Center will not pose a serious danger to
his/her family or the community.
Confinement in a Center for treatment and
rehabilitation shall not exceed one (1) year, after
which time the Court, as well as the Board, shall
be apprised by the head of the treatment and
rehabilitation center of the status of said drug
dependent and determine whether further
confinement will be for the welfare of the drug
dependent and his/her family or the community.
Section 55. Exemption from the Criminal
Liability Under the Voluntary Submission
Program. A drug dependent under the voluntary
submission program, who is finally discharged
from confinement, shall be exempt from the
criminal liability under Section 15 of this act
subject to the following conditions:
(1) He/she has complied with the rules
and regulations of the center, the
applicable rules and regulations of the
Board, including the after-care and
follow-up program for at least eighteen
(18) months following temporary
discharge from confinement in the Center
or, in the case of a dependent placed
under the care of the DOH-accredited
physician, the after-care program and
follow-up schedule formulated by the
DSWD and approved by the
Board: Provided, That capability-building
of local government social workers shall
be undertaken by the DSWD;

(2) He/she has never been charged or
convicted of any offense punishable
under this Act, the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972 or Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended; the Revised Penal Code, as
amended; or any special penal laws;
(3) He/she has no record of escape from
a Center: Provided, That had he/she
escaped, he/she surrendered by
himself/herself or through his/her parent,
spouse, guardian or relative within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity,
within one (1) week from the date of the
said escape; and
(4) He/she poses no serious danger to
himself/herself, his/her family or the
community by his/her exemption from
criminal liability.
Section 56. Temporary Release From the
Center; After-Care and Follow-Up Treatment
Under the Voluntary Submission Program. –
Upon certification of the Center that the drug
dependent within the voluntary submission
program may be temporarily released, the Court
shall order his/her release on condition that said
drug dependent shall report to the DOH for
after-care and follow-up treatment, including
urine testing, for a period not exceeding
eighteen (18) months under such terms and
conditions that the Court may impose.
If during the period of after-care and follow-up,
the drug dependent is certified to be
rehabilitated, he/she may be discharged by the
Court, subject to the provisions of Section 55 of
this Act, without prejudice to the outcome of any
pending case filed in court.
However, should the DOH find that during the
initial after-care and follow-up program of
eighteen (18) months, the drug dependent
requires further treatment and rehabilitation in
the Center, he/she shall be recommitted to the
Center for confinement. Thereafter, he/she may
again be certified for temporary release and
ordered released for another after-care and
follow-up program pursuant to this Section.
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 21
Section 57. Probation and Community Service
Under the Voluntary Submission Program. – A
drug dependent who is discharged as
rehabilitated by the DOH-accredited Center
through the voluntary submission program, but
does not qualify for exemption from criminal
liability under Section 55 of this Act, may be
charged under the provisions of this Act, but
shall be placed on probation and undergo a
community service in lieu of imprisonment
and/or fine in the discretion of the court, without
prejudice to the outcome of any pending case
filed in court.
Such drug dependent shall undergo community
service as part of his/her after-care and follow-
up program, which may be done in coordination
with nongovernmental civil organizations
accredited by the DSWD, with the
recommendation of the Board.
Section 58. Filing of Charges Against a Drug
Dependent Who is Not Rehabilitated Under the
Voluntary Submission Program. – A drug
dependent, who is not rehabilitated after the
second commitment to the Center under the
voluntary submission program, shall, upon
recommendation of the Board, be charged for
violation of Section 15 of this Act and
prosecuted like any other offender. If convicted,
he/she shall be credited for the period of
confinement and rehabilitation in the Center in
the service of his/her sentence.
Section 59. Escape and Recommitment for
Confinement and Rehabilitation Under the
Voluntary Submission Program. – Should a drug
dependent under the voluntary submission
program escape from the Center, he/she may
submit himself/herself for recommitment within
one (1) week therefrom, or his/her parent,
spouse, guardian or relative within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity may, within
said period, surrender him for recommitment, in
which case the corresponding order shall be
issued by the Board.
Should the escapee fail to submit
himself/herself or be surrendered after one (1)
week, the Board shall apply to the court for a

recommitment order upon proof of previous
commitment or his/her voluntary submission by
the Board, the court may issue an order for
recommitment within one (1) week.
If, subsequent to a recommitment, the
dependent once again escapes from
confinement, he/she shall be charged for
violation of Section 15 of this Act and he
subjected under section 61 of this Act, either
upon order of the Board or upon order of the
court, as the case may be.
Section 60. Confidentiality of Records Under
the Voluntary Submission Program. – Judicial
and medical records of drug dependents under
the voluntary submission program shall be
confidential and shall not be used against him
for any purpose, except to determine how many
times, by himself/herself or through his/her
parent, spouse, guardian or relative within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, he/she
voluntarily submitted himself/herself for
confinement, treatment and rehabilitation or has
been committed to a Center under this program.
Section 61. Compulsory Confinement of a Drug
Dependent Who Refuses to Apply Under the
Voluntary Submission Program. –
Notwithstanding any law, rule and regulation to
the contrary, any person determined and found
to be dependent on dangerous drugs shall,
upon petition by the Board or any of its
authorized representative, be confined for
treatment and rehabilitation in any Center duly
designated or accredited for the purpose.
A petition for the confinement of a person
alleged to be dependent on dangerous drugs to
a Center may be filed by any person authorized
by the Board with the Regional Trial Court of the
province or city where such person is found.
After the petition is filed, the court, by an order,
shall immediately fix a date for the hearing, and
a copy of such order shall be served on the
person alleged to be dependent on dangerous
drugs, and to the one having charge of him.
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 22
If after such hearing and the facts so warrant,
the court shall order the drug dependent to be
examined by two (2) physicians accredited by
the Board. If both physicians conclude that the
respondent is not a drug dependent, the court
shall order his/her discharge. If either physician
finds him to be a dependent, the court shall
conduct a hearing and consider all relevant
evidence which may be offered. If the court finds
him a drug dependent, it shall issue an order for
his/her commitment to a treatment and
rehabilitation center under the supervision of the
DOH. In any event, the order of discharge or
order of confinement or commitment shall be
issued not later than fifteen (15) days from the
filing of the appropriate petition.
Section 62. Compulsory Submission of a Drug
Dependent Charged with an Offense to
Treatment and Rehabilitation. – If a person
charged with an offense where the imposable
penalty is imprisonment of less than six (6)
years and one (1) day, and is found by the
prosecutor or by the court, at any stage of the
proceedings, to be a drug dependent, the
prosecutor or the court as the case may be, shall
suspend all further proceedings and transmit
copies of the record of the case to the Board.
In the event he Board determines, after medical
examination, that public interest requires that
such drug dependent be committed to a center
for treatment and rehabilitation, it shall file a
petition for his/her commitment with the regional
trial court of the province or city where he/she is
being investigated or tried: Provided, That
where a criminal case is pending in court, such
petition shall be filed in the said court. The court
shall take judicial notice of the prior proceedings
in the case and shall proceed to hear the
petition. If the court finds him to be a drug
dependent, it shall order his/her commitment to
a Center for treatment and rehabilitation. The
head of said Center shall submit to the court
every four (4) months, or as often as the court
may require, a written report on the progress of
the treatment. If the dependent is rehabilitated,
as certified by the center and the Board, he/she
shall be returned to the court, which committed
him, for his/her discharge therefrom.

Thereafter, his/her prosecution for any offense
punishable by law shall be instituted or shall
continue, as the case may be. In case of
conviction, the judgment shall, if the accused is
certified by the treatment and rehabilitation
center to have maintained good behavior,
indicate that he/she shall be given full credit for
the period he/she was confined in the
Center: Provided, however, That when the
offense is for violation of Section 15 of this Act
and the accused is not a recidivist, the penalty
thereof shall be deemed to have been served in
the Center upon his/her release therefrom after
certification by the Center and the Board that
he/she is rehabilitated.
Section 63. Prescription of the Offense
Charged Against a Drug Dependent Under the
Compulsory Submission Program. – The period
of prescription of the offense charged against a
drug dependent under the compulsory
submission program shall not run during the
time that the drug dependent is under
confinement in a Center or otherwise under the
treatment and rehabilitation program approved
by the Board.
Upon certification of the Center that he/she may
temporarily be discharged from the said Center,
the court shall order his/her release on condition
that he/she shall report to the Board through the
DOH for after-care and follow-up treatment for a
period not exceeding eighteen (18) months
under such terms and conditions as may be
imposed by the Board.
If at anytime during the after-care and follow-up
period, the Board certifies to his/her complete
rehabilitation, the court shall order his/her final
discharge from confinement and order for the
immediate resumption of the trial of the case for
which he/she is originally charged. Should the
Board through the DOH find at anytime during
the after-care and follow-up period that he/she
requires further treatment and rehabilitation, it
shall report to the court, which shall order
his/her recommitment to the Center.
Should the drug dependent, having been
committed to a Center upon petition by the
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 23
Board escape therefrom, he/she may resubmit
himself/herself for confinement within one (1)
week from the date of his/her escape; or his/her
parent, spouse, guardian or relative within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity may,
within the same period, surrender him for
recommitment. If, however, the drug dependent
does not resubmit himself/herself for
confinement or he/she is not surrendered for
recommitment, the Board may apply with the
court for the issuance of the recommitment
order. Upon proof of previous commitment, the
court shall issue an order for recommitment. If,
subsequent to such recommitment, he/she
should escape again, he/she shall no longer be
exempt from criminal liability for use of any
dangerous drug.
A drug dependent committed under this
particular Section who is finally discharged from
confinement shall be exempt from criminal
liability under Section 15 of this Act, without
prejudice to the outcome of any pending case
filed in court. On the other hand, a drug
dependent who is not rehabilitated after a
second commitment to the Center shall, upon
conviction by the appropriate court, suffer the
same penalties provided for under Section 15 of
this Act again without prejudice to the outcome
of any pending case filed in court.
Section 64. Confidentiality of Records Under
the Compulsory Submission Program. – The
records of a drug dependent who was
rehabilitated and discharged from the Center
under the compulsory submission program, or
who was charged for violation of Section 15 of
this Act, shall be covered by Section 60 of this
Act. However, the records of a drug dependent
who was not rehabilitated, or who escaped but
did not surrender himself/herself within the
prescribed period, shall be forwarded to the
court and their use shall be determined by the
court, taking into consideration public interest
and the welfare of the drug dependent.
Section 65. Duty of the Prosecutor in the
Proceedings. – It shall be the duty of the
provincial or the city prosecutor or their
assistants or state prosecutors to prepare the

appropriate petition in all proceedings arising
from this Act.
Section 66. Suspension of Sentence of a First-
Time Minor Offender. – An accused who is over
fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense mentioned in Section
11 of this Act, but not more than eighteen (18)
years of age at the time when judgment should
have been promulgated after having been found
guilty of said offense, may be given the benefits
of a suspended sentence, subject to the
following conditions:
(a) He/she has not been previously
convicted of violating any provision of this
Act, or of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended; or of the Revised
Penal Code; or of any special penal laws;
(b) He/she has not been previously
committed to a Center or to the care of a
DOH-accredited physician; and
(c) The Board favorably recommends
that his/her sentence be suspended.
While under suspended sentence, he/she shall
be under the supervision and rehabilitative
surveillance of the Board, under such conditions
that the court may impose for a period ranging
from six (6) months to eighteen (18) months.
Upon recommendation of the Board, the court
may commit the accused under suspended
sentence to a Center, or to the care of a DOH-
accredited physician for at least six (6) months,
with after-care and follow-up program for not
more than eighteen (18) months.
In the case of minors under fifteen (15) years of
age at the time of the commission of any offense
penalized under this Act, Article 192 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known
as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1179 shall
apply, without prejudice to the application of the
provisions of this Section.
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 24
Section 67. Discharge After Compliance with
Conditions of Suspended Sentence of a First-
Time Minor Offender. – If the accused first time
minor offender under suspended sentence
complies with the applicable rules and
regulations of the Board, including confinement
in a Center, the court, upon a favorable
recommendation of the Board for the final
discharge of the accused, shall discharge the
accused and dismiss all proceedings.
Upon the dismissal of the proceedings against
the accused, the court shall enter an order to
expunge all official records, other than the
confidential record to be retained by the DOJ
relating to the case. Such an order, which shall
be kept confidential, shall restore the accused to
his/her status prior to the case. He/she shall not
be held thereafter to be guilty of perjury or of
concealment or misrepresentation by reason of
his/her failure to acknowledge the case or recite
any fact related thereto in response to any
inquiry made of him for any purpose.
Section 68. Privilege of Suspended Sentence
to be Availed of Only Once by a First-Time Minor
Offender. – The privilege of suspended
sentence shall be availed of only once by an
accused drug dependent who is a first-time
offender over fifteen (15) years of age at the
time of the commission of the violation of
Section 15 of this Act but not more than eighteen
(18) years of age at the time when judgment
should have been promulgated.
Section 69. Promulgation of Sentence for First-
Time Minor Offender. – If the accused first-time
minor offender violates any of the conditions of
his/her suspended sentence, the applicable
rules and regulations of the Board exercising
supervision and rehabilitative surveillance over
him, including the rules and regulations of the
Center should confinement be required, the
court shall pronounce judgment of conviction
and he/she shall serve sentence as any other
convicted person.
Section 70. Probation or Community Service
for a First-Time Minor Offender in Lieu of
Imprisonment. – Upon promulgation of the

sentence, the court may, in its discretion, place
the accused under probation, even if the
sentence provided under this Act is higher than
that provided under existing law on probation, or
impose community service in lieu of
imprisonment. In case of probation, the
supervision and rehabilitative surveillance shall
be undertaken by the Board through the DOH in
coordination with the Board of Pardons and
Parole and the Probation Administration. Upon
compliance with the conditions of the probation,
the Board shall submit a written report to the
court recommending termination of probation
and a final discharge of the probationer,
whereupon the court shall issue such an order.
The community service shall be complied with
under conditions, time and place as may be
determined by the court in its discretion and
upon the recommendation of the Board and
shall apply only to violators of Section 15 of this
Act. The completion of the community service
shall be under the supervision and rehabilitative
surveillance of the Board during the period
required by the court. Thereafter, the Board
shall render a report on the manner of
compliance of said community service. The
court in its discretion may require extension of
the community service or order a final
discharge.
In both cases, the judicial records shall be
covered by the provisions of Sections 60 and 64
of this Act.
If the sentence promulgated by the court
requires imprisonment, the period spent in the
Center by the accused during the suspended
sentence period shall be deducted from the
sentence to be served.
Section 71. Records to be kept by the
Department of Justice. – The DOJ shall keep a
confidential record of the proceedings on
suspension of sentence and shall not be used
for any purpose other than to determine whether
or not a person accused under this Act is a first-
time minor offender.
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 25
Section 72. Liability of a Person Who Violates
the Confidentiality of Records. – The penalty of
imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years and a fine ranging
from One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) to Six
thousand pesos (P6,000.00), shall be imposed
upon any person who, having official custody of
or access to the confidential records of any drug
dependent under voluntary submission
programs, or anyone who, having gained
possession of said records, whether lawfully or
not, reveals their content to any person other
than those charged with the prosecution of the
offenses under this Act and its implementation.
The maximum penalty shall be imposed, in
addition to absolute perpetual disqualification
from any public office, when the offender is a
government official or employee. Should the
records be used for unlawful purposes, such as
blackmail of the drug dependent or the
members of his/her family, the penalty imposed
for the crime of violation of confidentiality shall
be in addition to whatever crime he/she may be
convicted of.
Section 73. Liability of a Parent, Spouse or
Guardian Who Refuses to Cooperate with the
Board or any Concerned Agency. – Any parent,
spouse or guardian who, without valid reason,
refuses to cooperate with the Board or any
concerned agency in the treatment and
rehabilitation of a drug dependent who is a
minor, or in any manner, prevents or delays the
after-care, follow-up or other programs for the
welfare of the accused drug dependent, whether
under voluntary submission program or
compulsory submission program, may be cited
for contempt by the court.
Section 74. Cost-Sharing in the Treatment and
Rehabilitation of a Drug Dependent. – The
parent, spouse, guardian or any relative within
the fourth degree of consanguinity of any person
who is confined under the voluntary submission
program or compulsory submission program
shall be charged a certain percentage of the
cost of his/her treatment and rehabilitation, the
guidelines of which shall be formulated by the
DSWD taking into consideration the economic
status of the family of the person confined. The

guidelines therein formulated shall be
implemented by a social worker of the local
government unit.
Section 75. Treatment and Rehabilitation
Centers. – The existing treatment and
rehabilitation centers for drug dependents
operated and maintained by the NBI and the
PNP shall be operated, maintained and
managed by the DOH in coordination with other
concerned agencies. For the purpose of
enlarging the network of centers, the Board
through the DOH shall encourage, promote or
whenever feasible, assist or support in the
establishment, operations and maintenance of
private centers which shall be eligible to receive
grants, donations or subsidy from either
government or private sources. It shall also
support the establishment of government-
operated regional treatment and rehabilitation
centers depending upon the availability of funds.
The national government, through its
appropriate agencies shall give priority funding
for the increase of subsidy to existing
government drug rehabilitation centers, and
shall establish at least one (1) drug rehabilitation
center in each province, depending on the
availability of funds.
Section 76. The Duties and Responsibilities of
the Department of health (DOH) Under this Act.
– The DOH shall:
(1) Oversee the monitor the integration,
coordination and supervision of all drug
rehabilitation, intervention, after-care and
follow-up programs, projects and
activities as well as the establishment,
operations, maintenance and
management of privately-owned drug
treatment rehabilitation centers and drug
testing networks and laboratories
throughout the country in coordination
with the DSWD and other agencies;
(2) License, accredit, establish and
maintain drug test network and
laboratory, initiate, conduct and support
scientific research on drugs and drug
control;
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 26
(3) Encourage, assist and accredit
private centers, promulgate rules and
regulations setting minimum standards
for their accreditation to assure their
competence, integrity and stability;
(4) Prescribe and promulgate rules and
regulations governing the establishment
of such Centers as it may deem
necessary after conducting a feasibility
study thereof;
(5) The DOH shall, without prejudice to
the criminal prosecution of those found
guilty of violating this Act, order the
closure of a Center for treatment and
rehabilitation of drug dependency when,
after investigation it is found guilty of
violating the provisions of this Act or
regulations issued by the Board; and
(6) Charge reasonable fees for drug
dependency examinations, other medical
and legal services provided to the public,
which shall accrue to the Board. All
income derived from these sources shall
be part of the funds constituted as special
funds for the implementation of this Act
under Section 87.
ARTICLE IX
Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency
Section 77. The Dangerous Drugs Board. –
The Board shall be the policy-making and
strategy-formulating body in the planning and
formulation of policies and programs on drug
prevention and control. It shall develop and
adopt a comprehensive, integrated, unified and
balanced national drug abuse prevention and
control strategy. It shall be under the Office of
the President.
Section 78. Composition of the Board. – The
Board shall be composed of seventeen (17)
members wherein three (3) of which are
permanent members, the other twelve (12)

members shall be in an ex officio capacity and
the two (2) shall be regular members.
The three (3) permanent members, who shall
possess at least seven-year training and
experience in the field of dangerous drugs and
in any of the following fields: in law, medicine,
criminology, psychology or social work, shall be
appointed by the President of the Philippines.
The President shall designate a Chairman, who
shall have the rank of a secretary from among
the three (3) permanent members who shall
serve for six (6) years. Of the two (2) other
members, who shall both have the rank of
undersecretary, one (1) shall serve for four (4)
years and the other for two (2) years.
Thereafter, the persons appointed to succeed
such members shall hold office for a term of six
(6) years and until their successors shall have
been duly appointed and qualified.
The other twelve (12) members who shall be ex
officio members of the Board are the following:
(1) Secretary of the Department of
Justice or his/her representative;
(2) Secretary of the Department of Health
or his/her representative;
(3) Secretary of the Department of
National Defense or his/her
representative;
(4) Secretary of the Department of
Finance or his/her representative;
(5) Secretary of the Department of Labor
and Employment or his/her
representative;
(6) Secretary of the Department of the
Interior and Local Government or his/her
representative;
(7) Secretary of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development or his/her
representative;
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 27
(8) Secretary of the Department of
Foreign Affairs or his/her representative;
(9) Secretary of the Department of
Education or his/her representative;
(10) Chairman of the Commission on
Higher Education or his/her
representative;
(11) Chairman of the National Youth
Commission;
(12) Director General of the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency.
Cabinet secretaries who are members of the
Board may designate their duly authorized and
permanent representatives whose ranks shall in
no case be lower than undersecretary.
The two (2) regular members shall be as
follows:
(a) The president of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines; and
(b) The chairman or president of a non-
government organization involved in
dangerous drug campaign to be
appointed by the President of the
Philippines.
The Director of the NBI and the Chief of the PNP
shall be the permanent consultants of the
Board, and shall attend all the meetings of the
Board.
All members of the Board as well as its
permanent consultants shall receive a per diem
for every meeting actually attended subject to
the pertinent budgetary laws, rules and
regulations on compensation, honoraria and
allowances: Provided, That where the
representative of an ex officio member or of the
permanent consultant of the Board attends a
meeting in behalf of the latter, such
representative shall be entitled to receive the
per diem.
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 28
Section 79. Meetings of the Board. – The Board
shall meet once a week or as often as necessary
at the discretion of the Chairman or at the call of
any four (4) other members. The presence of
nine (9) members shall constitute a quorum.
Section 80. Secretariat of the Board. – The
Board shall recommend to the President of the
Philippines the appointment of an Executive
Director, with the rank of an undersecretary,
who shall be the Secretary of the Board and
administrative officer of its secretariat, and shall
perform such other duties that may be assigned
to him/her. He/she must possess adequate
knowledge, training and experience in the field
of dangerous drugs, and in any of the following
fields: law enforcement, law, medicine,
criminology, psychology or social work.
Two deputies executive director, for
administration and operations, with the ranks of
assistant secretary, shall be appointed by the
President upon recommendation of the Board.
They shall possess the same qualifications as
those of the executive director. They shall
receive a salary corresponding to their position
as prescribed by the Salary Standardization
Law as a Career Service Officer.
The existing secretariat of the Board shall be
under the administrative control and supervision
of the Executive Director. It shall be composed
of the following divisions, namely: Policy
Studies, Research and Statistics; Preventive
Education, Training and Information; Legal
Affairs; and the Administrative and Financial
Management.
Section 81. Powers and Duties of the Board. –
The Board shall:
(a) Formulate, develop and establish a
comprehensive, integrated, unified and
balanced national drug use prevention
and control strategy;
(b) Promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the purposes of this Act, including the
manner of safekeeping, disposition,
burning or condemnation of any
dangerous drug and/or controlled
precursor and essential chemical under
its charge and custody, and prescribe
administrative remedies or sanctions for
the violations of such rules and
regulations;
(c) Conduct policy studies, program
monitoring and evaluations and other
researches on drug prevention, control
and enforcement;
(d) Initiate, conduct and support
scientific, clinical, social, psychological,
physical and biological researches on
dangerous drugs and dangerous drugs
prevention and control measures;
(e) Develop an educational program and
information drive on the hazards and
prevention of illegal use of any
dangerous drug and/or controlled
precursor and essential chemical based
on factual data, and disseminate the
same to the general public, for which
purpose the Board shall endeavor to
make the general public aware of the
hazards of any dangerous drugs and/or
controlled precursor and essential
chemical by providing among others,
literature, films, displays or
advertisements and by coordinating with
all institutions of learning as well as with
all national and local enforcement
agencies in planning and conducting its
educational campaign programs to be
implemented by the appropriate
government agencies;
(f) Conduct continuing seminars for, and
consultations with, and provide
information materials to judges and
prosecutors in coordination with the
Office of the Court Administrator, in the
case of judges, and the DOJ, in the case
of prosecutors, which aim to provide
them with the current developments and
programs of the Board pertinent to its
campaign against dangerous drugs and
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 29
its scientific researches on dangerous
drugs, its prevention and control
measures;
(g) Design special trainings in order to
provide law enforcement officers,
members of the judiciary, and
prosecutors, school authorities and
personnel of centers with knowledge and
know-how in dangerous drugs and/or
controlled precursors and essential
chemicals control in coordination with the
Supreme Court to meet the objectives of
the national drug control programs;
(h) Design and develop, in consultation
and coordination with the DOH, DSWD
and other agencies involved in drugs
control, treatment and rehabilitation, both
public and private, a national treatment
and rehabilitation program for drug
dependents including a standard
aftercare and community service
program for recovering drug dependents;
(i) Design and develop, jointly with the
DOLE and in consultation with labor and
employer groups as well as
nongovernment organizations a drug
abuse prevention program in the
workplace that would include a provision
for employee assistance programs for
emotionally-stressed employees;
(j) Initiate and authorize closure
proceedings against non-accredited
and/or substandard rehabilitation centers
based on verified reports of human rights
violations, subhuman conditions,
inadequate medical training and
assistance and excessive fees for
implementation by the PDEA;
(k) Prescribe and promulgate rules and
regulations governing the establishment
of such centers, networks and
laboratories as deemed necessary after
conducting a feasibility study in
coordination with the DOH and other
government agencies;
(l) Receive, gather, collect and evaluate
all information on the importation,
exportation, production, manufacture,
sale, stocks, seizures of and the
estimated need for any dangerous drug
and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical, for which purpose the Board
may require from any official,
instrumentality or agency of the
government or any private person or
enterprise dealing in, or engaged in
activities having to do with any
dangerous drug and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals such
data or information as it may need to
implement this Act;
(m) Gather and prepare detailed
statistics on the importation, exportation,
manufacture, stocks, seizures of and
estimates need for any dangerous drug
and/or controlled precursors and
essential chemicals and such other
statistical data on said drugs as may be
periodically required by the United
Nations Narcotics Drug Commission, the
World Health Organization and other
international organizations in
consonance with the country's
international commitments;
(n) Develop and maintain international
networking coordination with
international drug control agencies and
organizations, and implement the
provisions of international conventions
and agreements thereon which have
been adopted and approved by the
Congress of the Philippines;
(o) Require all government and private
hospitals, clinics, doctors, dentists and
other practitioners to submit a report to it,
in coordination with the PDEA, about all
dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals-
related cases to which they have
attended for statistics and research
purposes;

(p) Receive in trust legacies, gifts and
donations of real and personal properties
of all kinds, to administer and dispose the
same when necessary for the benefit of
government and private rehabilitation
centers subject to limitations, directions
and instructions from the donors, if any;
(q) Issue guidelines as to the approval or
disapproval of applications for voluntary
treatment, rehabilitation or confinement,
wherein it shall issue the necessary
guidelines, rules and regulations
pertaining to the application and its
enforcement;
(r) Formulate guidelines, in coordination
with other government agencies, the
importation, distribution, production,
manufacture, compounding, prescription,
dispensing and sale of, and other lawful
acts in connection with any dangerous
drug, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals and other similar or analogous
substances of such kind and in such
quantity as it may deem necessary
according to the medical and research
needs or requirements of the country
including diet pills containing ephedrine
and other addictive chemicals and
determine the quantity and/or quality of
dangerous drugs and controlled
precursors and essential chemicals to be
imported, manufactured and held in stock
at any given time by authorized importer,
manufacturer or distributor of such drugs;
(s) Develop the utilization of a controlled
delivery scheme in addressing the
transshipment of dangerous drugs into
and out of the country to neutralize
transnational crime syndicates involved
in illegal trafficking of any dangerous
drugs and/or controlled precursors and
essential chemicals;
(t) Recommend the revocation of the
professional license of any practitioner
who is an owner, co-owner, lessee, or in
the employ of the drug establishment, or
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 30
manager of a partnership, corporation,
association, or any juridical entity owning
and/or controlling such drug
establishment, and who knowingly
participates in, or consents to, tolerates,
or abets the commission of the act of
violations as indicated in the preceding
paragraph, all without prejudice to the
criminal prosecution of the person
responsible for the said violation;
(u) Appoint such technical, administrative
and other personnel as may be
necessary for the effective
implementation of this Act, subject to the
Civil Service Law and its rules and
regulations;
(v) Establish a regular and continuing
consultation with concerned government
agencies and medical professional
organizations to determine if balance
exists in policies, procedures, rules and
regulations on dangerous drugs and to
provide recommendations on how the
lawful use of dangerous drugs can be
improved and facilitated; and
(w) Submit an annual and periodic
reports to the President, the Congress of
the Philippines and the Senate and
House of Representatives committees
concerned as may be required from time
to time, and perform such other functions
as may be authorized or required under
existing laws and as directed by the
President himself/herself or as
recommended by the congressional
committees concerned.
Section 82. Creation of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA). – To carry out the
provisions of this Act, the PDEA, which serves
as the implementing arm of the Board, and shall
be responsible for the efficient and effective law
enforcement of all the provisions on any
dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and
essential chemical as provided in this Act.

The PDEA shall be headed by a Director
General with the rank of Undersecretary, who
shall be responsible for the general
administration and management of the Agency.
The Director General of the PDEA shall be
appointed by the President of the Philippines
and shall perform such other duties that may be
assigned to him/her. He/she must possess
adequate knowledge, training and experience in
the field of dangerous drugs, and in any of the
following fields: law enforcement, law, medicine,
criminology, psychology or social work.
The Director General of the PDEA shall be
assisted in the performance of his/her duties
and responsibilities by two (2) deputies director
general with the rank of Assistant Secretary;
one for Operations and the other one for
Administration. The two (2) deputies director
general shall likewise be appointed by the
President of the Philippines upon
recommendation of the Board. The two (2)
deputies director general shall possess the
same qualifications as those of the Director
General of the PDEA. The Director General and
the two (2) deputies director general shall
receive the compensation and salaries as
prescribed by law.
Section 83. Organization of the PDEA. – The
present Secretariat of the National Drug Law
Enforcement and Prevention Coordinating
Center as created by Executive Order No. 61
shall be accordingly modified and absorbed by
the PDEA.
The Director General of the PDEA shall be
responsible for the necessary changes in the
organizational set-up which shall be submitted
to the Board for approval.
For purposes of carrying out its duties and
powers as provided for in the succeeding
Section of this Act, the PDEA shall have the
following Services, namely: Intelligence and
Investigation; International Cooperation and
Foreign Affairs; Preventive Education and
Community Involvement; Plans and Operations;
Compliance; Legal and Prosecution;
Administrative and Human Resource; Financial
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 31
Management; Logistics Management; and
Internal Affairs.
The PDEA shall establish and maintain regional
offices in the different regions of the country
which shall be responsible for the
implementation of this Act and the policies,
programs, and projects of said agency in their
respective regions.
Section 84. Powers and Duties of the PDEA. –
The PDEA shall:
(a) Implement or cause the efficient and
effective implementation of the national
drug control strategy formulated by the
Board thereby carrying out a national
drug campaign program which shall
include drug law enforcement, control
and prevention campaign with the
assistance of concerned government
agencies;
(b) Undertake the enforcement of the
provisions of Article II of this Act relative
to the unlawful acts and penalties
involving any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential
chemical and investigate all violators and
other matters involved in the commission
of any crime relative to the use, abuse or
trafficking of any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential
chemical as provided for in this Act and
the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1619;
(c) Administer oath,
issue subpoena and subpoena duces
tecum relative to the conduct of
investigation involving the violations of
this Act;
(d) Arrest and apprehend as well as
search all violators and seize or
confiscate, the effects or proceeds of the
crimes as provided by law and take
custody thereof, for this purpose the
prosecutors and enforcement agents are
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 32
authorized to possess firearms, in
accordance with existing laws;
(e) Take charge and have custody of all
dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals
seized, confiscated or surrendered to any
national, provincial or local law
enforcement agency, if no longer needed
for purposes of evidence in court;
(f) Establish forensic laboratories in each
PNP office in every province and city in
order to facilitate action on seize or
confiscated drugs, thereby hastening its
destruction without delay;
(g) Recommend to the DOJ the forfeiture
of properties and other assets of persons
and/or corporations found to be violating
the provisions of this Act and in
accordance with the pertinent provisions
of the Anti-Money-Laundering Act of
2001;
(h) Prepare for prosecution or cause the
filing of appropriate criminal and civil
cases for violation of all laws on
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors
and essential chemicals, and other
similar controlled substances, and assist,
support and coordinate with other
government agencies for the proper and
effective prosecution of the same;
(i) Monitor and if warranted by
circumstances, in coordination with the
Philippine Postal Office and the Bureau
of Customs, inspect all air cargo
packages, parcels and mails in the
central post office, which appear from the
package and address itself to be a
possible importation of dangerous drugs
and/or controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, through on-line or
cyber shops via the internet or
cyberspace;
(j) Conduct eradication programs to
destroy wild or illegal growth of plants
from which dangerous drugs may be
extracted;
(k) Initiate and undertake the formation of
a nationwide organization which shall
coordinate and supervise all activities
against drug abuse in every province,
city, municipality and barangay with the
active and direct participation of all such
local government units and
nongovernmental organizations,
including the citizenry, subject to the
provisions of previously formulated
programs of action against dangerous
drugs;
(l) Establish and maintain a national drug
intelligence system in cooperation with
law enforcement agencies, other
government agencies/offices and local
government units that will assist in its
apprehension of big-time drug lords;
(m) Establish and maintain close
coordination, cooperation and linkages
with international drug control and
administration agencies and
organizations, and implement the
applicable provisions of international
conventions and agreements related to
dangerous drugs to which the Philippines
is a signatory;
(n) Create and maintain an efficient
special enforcement unit to conduct an
investigation, file charges and transmit
evidence to the proper court, wherein
members of the said unit shall possess
suitable and adequate firearms for their
protection in connection with the
performance of their duties: Provided,
That no previous special permit for such
possession shall be required;
(o) Require all government and private
hospitals, clinics, doctors, dentists and
other practitioners to submit a report to it,
in coordination with the Board, about all
dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals

which they have attended to for data and
information purposes;
(p) Coordinate with the Board for the
facilitation of the issuance of necessary
guidelines, rules and regulations for the
proper implementation of this Act;
(q) Initiate and undertake a national
campaign for drug prevention and drug
control programs, where it may enlist the
assistance of any department, bureau,
office, agency or instrumentality of the
government, including government-
owned and or –controlled corporations, in
the anti-illegal drugs drive, which may
include the use of their respective
personnel, facilities, and resources for a
more resolute detection and investigation
of drug-related crimes and prosecution of
the drug traffickers; and
(r) Submit an annual and periodic reports
to the Board as may be required from
time to time, and perform such other
functions as may be authorized or
required under existing laws and as
directed by the President himself/herself
or as recommended by the congressional
committees concerned.
Section 85. The PDEA Academy. – Upon the
approval of the Board, the PDEA Academy shall
be established either in Baguio or Tagaytay
City, and in such other places as may be
necessary. The PDEA Academy shall be
responsible in the recruitment and training of all
PDEA agents and personnel. The Board shall
provide for the qualifications and requirements
of its recruits who must be at least twenty-one
(21) years old, of proven integrity and honesty
and a Baccalaureate degree holder.
The graduates of the Academy shall later
comprise the operating units of the PDEA after
the termination of the transition period of five (5)
years during which all the intelligence network
and standard operating procedures of the PDEA
has been set up and operationalized.
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 33
The Academy shall be headed by a
Superintendent, with the rank of Director.
He/she shall be appointed by the PDEA Director
General.
Section 86. Transfer, Absorption, and
Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal
Drugs into the PDEA and Transitory Provisions.
– The Narcotics Group of the PNP, the
Narcotics Division of the NBI and the Customs
Narcotics Interdiction Unit are hereby abolished;
however they shall continue with the
performance of their task as detail service with
the PDEA, subject to screening, until such time
that the organizational structure of the Agency
is fully operational and the number of graduates
of the PDEA Academy is sufficient to do the task
themselves: Provided, That such personnel
who are affected shall have the option of either
being integrated into the PDEA or remain with
their original mother agencies and shall,
thereafter, be immediately reassigned to other
units therein by the head of such agencies.
Such personnel who are transferred, absorbed
and integrated in the PDEA shall be extended
appointments to positions similar in rank, salary,
and other emoluments and privileges granted to
their respective positions in their original mother
agencies.
The transfer, absorption and integration of the
different offices and units provided for in this
Section shall take effect within eighteen (18)
months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided,
That personnel absorbed and on detail service
shall be given until five (5) years to finally decide
to join the PDEA.
Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of
the investigative powers of the NBI and the PNP
on all other crimes as provided for in their
respective organic laws: Provided, however,
That when the investigation being conducted by
the NBI, PNP or any ad hoc anti-drug task force
is found to be a violation of any of the provisions
of this Act, the PDEA shall be the lead agency.
The NBI, PNP or any of the task force shall
immediately transfer the same to the
PDEA: Provided, further, That the NBI, PNP and
the Bureau of Customs shall maintain close

coordination with the PDEA on all drug related
matters.
ARTICLE X
Appropriations, Management of Funds and
Annual Report
Section 87. Appropriations. – The amount
necessary for the operation of the Board and the
PDEA shall be charged against the current
year's appropriations of the Board, the National
Drug Law Enforcement and Prevention
Coordinating Center, the Narcotics Group of the
PNP, the Narcotics Division of the NBI and other
drug abuse units of the different law
enforcement agencies integrated into the PDEA
in order to carry out the provisions of this Act.
Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for
the continued implementation of this Act shall be
included in the annual General Appropriations
Act.
All receipts derived from fines, fees and other
income authorized and imposed in this Act,
including ten percent (10%) of all unclaimed and
forfeited sweepstakes and lotto prizes but not
less than twelve million pesos (P12,000,000.00)
per year from the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), are hereby
constituted as a special account in the general
fund for the implementation of this
Act: Provided, That no amount shall be
disbursed to cover the operating expenses of
the Board and other concerned
agencies: Provided, further, That at least fifty
percent (50%) of all the funds shall be reserved
for assistance to government-owned and/or
operated rehabilitation centers.
The fines shall be remitted to the Board by the
court imposing such fines within thirty (30) days
from the finality of its decisions or orders. The
unclaimed and forfeited prizes shall be turned
over to the Board by the PCSO within thirty (30)
days after these are collected and declared
forfeited.
A portion of the funds generated by the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 34
(PAGCOR) in the amount of Five million pesos
(P5,000,000.00) a month shall be set aside for
the purpose of establishing adequate drug
rehabilitation centers in the country and also for
the maintenance and operations of such
centers: Provided, That the said amount shall
be taken from the fifty percent (50%) share of
the National Government in the income of
PAGCOR: Provided, further, That the said
amount shall automatically be remitted by
PAGCOR to the Board. The amount shall, in
turn, be disbursed by the Dangerous Drugs
Board, subject to the rules and regulations of the
Commission on Audit (COA).
The fund may be augmented by grants,
donations, and endowment from various
sources, domestic or foreign, for purposes
related to their functions, subject to the existing
guidelines set by the government.
Section 88. Management of Funds Under this
Act; Annual Report by the Board and the
PDEA. – The Board shall manage the funds as
it may deem proper for the attainment of the
objectives of this Act. In addition to the periodic
reports as may be required under this Act, the
Chairman of the Board shall submit to the
President of the Philippines and to the presiding
officers of both houses of Congress, within
fifteen (15) days from the opening of the regular
session, an annual report on the dangerous
drugs situation in the country which shall include
detailed account of the programs and projects
undertaken, statistics on crimes related to
dangerous drugs, expenses incurred pursuant
to the provisions of this Act, recommended
remedial legislation, if needed, and such other
relevant facts as it may deem proper to cite.
Section 89. Auditing the Accounts and
Expenses of the Board and the PDEA. – All
accounts and expenses of the Board and the
PDEA shall be audited by the COA or its duly
authorized representative.
ARTICLE XI
Jurisdiction Over Dangerous Drugs Cases

Section 90. Jurisdiction. – The Supreme Court
shall designate special courts from among the
existing Regional Trial Courts in each judicial
region to exclusively try and hear cases
involving violations of this Act. The number of
courts designated in each judicial region shall
be based on the population and the number of
cases pending in their respective jurisdiction.
The DOJ shall designate special prosecutors to
exclusively handle cases involving violations of
this Act.
The preliminary investigation of cases filed
under this Act shall be terminated within a
period of thirty (30) days from the date of their
filing.
When the preliminary investigation is conducted
by a public prosecutor and a probable cause is
established, the corresponding information shall
be filed in court within twenty-four (24) hours
from the termination of the investigation. If the
preliminary investigation is conducted by a
judge and a probable cause is found to exist, the
corresponding information shall be filed by the
proper prosecutor within forty-eight (48) hours
from the date of receipt of the records of the
case.
Trial of the case under this Section shall be
finished by the court not later than sixty (60)
days from the date of the filing of the
information. Decision on said cases shall be
rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days
from the date of submission of the case for
resolution.
Section 91. Responsibility and Liability of Law
Enforcement Agencies and other Government
Officials and Employees in Testifying as
Prosecution Witnesses in Dangerous Drugs
Cases. – Any member of law enforcement
agencies or any other government official and
employee who, after due notice, fails or refuses
intentionally or negligently, to appear as a
witness for the prosecution in any proceedings,
involving violations of this Act, without any valid
reason, shall be punished with imprisonment of
not less than twelve (12) years and one (1) day
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 35
to twenty (20) years and a fine of not less than
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), in
addition to the administrative liability he/she
may be meted out by his/her immediate superior
and/or appropriate body.
The immediate superior of the member of the
law enforcement agency or any other
government employee mentioned in the
preceding paragraph shall be penalized with
imprisonment of not less than two (2) months
and one (1) day but not more than six (6) years
and a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) but not more than Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) and in addition, perpetual
absolute disqualification from public office if
despite due notice to them and to the witness
concerned, the former does not exert
reasonable effort to present the latter to the
court.
The member of the law enforcement agency or
any other government employee mentioned in
the preceding paragraphs shall not be
transferred or re-assigned to any other
government office located in another territorial
jurisdiction during the pendency of the case in
court. However, the concerned member of the
law enforcement agency or government
employee may be transferred or re-assigned for
compelling reasons: Provided, That his/her
immediate superior shall notify the court where
the case is pending of the order to transfer or re-
assign, within twenty-four (24) hours from its
approval; Provided, further, That his/her
immediate superior shall be penalized with
imprisonment of not less than two (2) months
and one (1) day but not more than six (6) years
and a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) but not more than Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) and in addition, perpetual
absolute disqualification from public office,
should he/she fail to notify the court of such
order to transfer or re-assign.
Prosecution and punishment under this Section
shall be without prejudice to any liability for
violation of any existing law.

Section 92. Delay and Bungling in the
Prosecution of Drug Cases. – Any government
officer or employee tasked with the prosecution
of drug-related cases under this act, who,
through patent laxity, inexcusable neglect,
unreasonable delay or deliberately causes the
unsuccessful prosecution and/or dismissal of
the said drug cases, shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to twenty (20) years without
prejudice to his/her prosecution under the
pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Section 93. Reclassification, Addition or
Removal of Any Drug from the List of
Dangerous Drugs. – The Board shall have the
power to reclassify, add to or remove from the
list of dangerous drugs. Proceedings to
reclassify, add, or remove a drug or other
substance may be initiated by the PDEA, the
DOH, or by petition from any interested party,
including the manufacturer of a drug, a medical
society or association, a pharmacy association,
a public interest group concerned with drug
abuse, a national or local government agency,
or an individual citizen. When a petition is
received by the Board, it shall immediately begin
its own investigation of the drug. The PDEA also
may begin an investigation of a drug at any time
based upon the information received from law
enforcement laboratories, national and local law
enforcement and regulatory agencies, or other
sources of information.
The Board after notice and hearing shall
consider the following factors with respect to
each substance proposed to be reclassified,
added or removed from control:
(a) Its actual or relative potential for
abuse;
(b) Scientific evidence of its
pharmacological effect if known;
(c) The state of current scientific
knowledge regarding the drug or other
substance;
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 36
(d) Its history and current pattern of
abuse;
(e) The scope, duration, and significance
of abuse;
(f) Risk to public health; and
(g) Whether the substance is an
immediate precursor of a substance
already controlled under this Act.
The Board shall also take into accord the
obligations and commitments to international
treaties, conventions and agreements to which
the Philippines is a signatory.
The Dangerous Drugs Board shall give notice to
the general public of the public hearing of the
reclassification, addition to or removal from the
list of any drug by publishing such notice in any
newspaper of general circulation once a week
for two (2) weeks.
The effect of such reclassification, addition or
removal shall be as follows:
(a) In case a dangerous drug is
reclassified as precursors and essential
chemicals, the penalties for the violations
of this Act involving the two latter
categories of drugs shall, in case of
conviction, be imposed in all pending
criminal prosecutions;
(b) In case a precursors and essential
chemicals is reclassified as dangerous
drug, the penalties for violations of the
Act involving precursors and essential
chemicals shall, in case of conviction, be
imposed in all pending criminal
prosecutions;
(c) In case of the addition of a new drug
to the list of dangerous drugs and
precursors and essential chemicals, no
criminal liability involving the same under
this Act shall arise until after the lapse of
fifteen (15) days from the last publication
of such notice;

(d) In case of removal of a drug from the
list of dangerous drugs and precursors
and essential chemicals, all persons
convicted and/or detained for the use
and/or possession of such a drug shall be
automatically released and all pending
criminal prosecution involving such a
drug under this Act shall forthwith be
dismissed; and
(e) The Board shall, within five (5) days
from the date of its promulgation submit
to Congress a detailed reclassification,
addition, or removal of any drug from the
list of dangerous drugs.
ARTICLE XII
Implementing Rules and Regulations
Section 94. Implementing Rules and
Regulations. – The present Board in
consultation with the DOH, DILG, DOJ, DepEd,
DSWD, DOLE, PNP, NBI, PAGCOR and the
PCSO and all other concerned government
agencies shall promulgate within sixty (60) days
the Implementing Rules and Regulations that
shall be necessary to implement the provisions
of this Act.
ARTICLE XIII
Final Provisions
Section 95. Congressional Oversight
Committee. – There is hereby created a
Congressional Oversight Committee composed
of seven (7) Members from the Senate and
seven (7) Members from the House of
Representatives. The Members from the Senate
shall be appointed by the Senate President
based on the proportional representation of the
parties or coalitions therein with at least two (2)
Senators representing the Minority. The
Members from the House of Representatives
shall be appointed by the Speaker, also based
on proportional representation of the parties or
coalitions therein with at least two (2) Members
representing the Minority.
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 37
The Committee shall be headed by the
respective Chairpersons of the Senate
Committee on Public Order and Illegal Drugs
and the House of Representatives Committee
on Dangerous Drugs.
Section 96. Powers and Functions of the
Oversight Committee. – The Oversight
Committee on Dangerous Drugs shall, in aid of
legislation, perform the following functions,
among others:
(a) To set the guidelines and overall
framework to monitor and ensure the
proper implementation of this Act;
(b) To ensure transparency and require
the submission of reports from
government agencies concerned on the
conduct of programs, projects and
policies relating to the implementation of
this act;
(c) To approve the budget for the
programs of the Oversight Committee on
Dangerous Drugs and all disbursements
therefrom, including compensation of all
personnel;
(d) To submit periodic reports to the
President of the Philippines and
Congress on the implementation of the
provisions of this Act;
(e) To determine inherent weaknesses in
the law and recommend the necessary
remedial legislation or executive
measures; and
(f) To perform such other duties,
functions and responsibilities as may be
necessary to effectively attain the
objectives of this Act.
Section 97. Adoption of Committee Rules and
Regulations, and Funding. – The Oversight
Committee on Dangerous Drugs shall adopt its
internal rules of procedure, conduct hearings
and receive testimonies, reports, and technical
advice, invite or summon by subpoena ad
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 38

testificandum any public official, private citizen,
or any other person to testify before it, or require
any person by subpoena duces
tecum documents or other materials as it may
require consistent with the provisions of this Act.
the provisions of this Act, are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.
Section 101. Amending Clause. – Republic Act
No. 7659 is hereby amended accordingly.

The Oversight Committee on Dangerous Drugs
shall be assisted by a secretariat to be
composed by personnel who may be seconded
from the Senate and the House of
Representatives and may retain consultants.
Section 102. Effectivity. – This Act shall take
effect fifteen (15) days upon its publication in at
least two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.

To carry out the powers and functions of the

Oversight Committee on Dangerous Drugs, the
initial sum of Twenty-five million pesos
(P25,000,000.00) shall be charged against the
current appropriations of the Senate.
Thereafter, such amount necessary for its
continued operations shall be included in the
annual General Appropriations Act.

The Oversight Committee on Dangerous Drugs

shall exist for a period of ten (10) years from the
effectivity of this Act and may be extended by a
joint concurrent resolution.

Section 98. Limited Applicability of the Revised

Penal Code. – Notwithstanding any law, rule or
regulation to the contrary, the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3814), as
amended, shall not apply to the provisions of
this Act, except in the case of minor offenders.
Where the offender is a minor, the penalty for
acts punishable by life imprisonment to death
provided herein shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.

Section 99. Separability Clause. – If for any

reason any section or provision of this Act, or
any portion thereof, or the application of such
section, provision or portion thereof to any
person, group or circumstance is declared
invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of this
Act shall not be affected by such declaration and
shall remain in force and effect.

Section 100. Repealing Clause. – Republic Act

No. 6425, as amended, is hereby repealed and
all other laws, administrative orders, rules and
regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659
AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY
ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING
FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL
LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL
PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, of
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act 1972, are
hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 3. Importation of Prohibited Drugs. - The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to
ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall
import or bring into the Philippines any
prohibited drug.
"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery,
Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited
Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine from five hundred thousand
pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a
broker in any of such transactions.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of
this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the
offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug
involved in any offense under this Section be the
proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof,
the maximum penalty herein provided shall be
imposed.
"Sec. 5. Maintenance of a Den, Dive or Resort
for Prohibited Drug Users. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
pesos shall be imposed upon any person or
group of persons who shall maintain a den, dive
or resort where any prohibited drug is used in
any form or where such prohibited drugs in
quantities specified in Section 20, Paragraph 1
of this Act are found.
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 39
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of
this Act to the contrary, the maximum of the
penalty shall be imposed in every case where a
prohibited drug is administered, delivered or
sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same
in such place.
Should a prohibited drug be the proximate
cause of the death of a person using the same
in such den, dive or resort, the maximum
penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the
maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 20 of this Act to the contrary.
"Sec. 7. Manufacture of Prohibited Drug. - The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to
ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall
engage in the manufacture of any prohibited
drug.
"Sec. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs.
- The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and
a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos
to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall
possess or use any prohibited drug subject to
the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
"Sec. 9. Cultivation of Plants which are Sources
of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who shall
plant, cultivate or culture any medium Indian
hemp, opium poppy (papaver somniferum), or
any other plant which is or may hereafter be
classified as dangerous drug or from which any
dangerous drug may be manufactured or
derived.
The land or portions hereof, and/or
greenhouses on which any of said plants is
cultivated or cultured shall be confiscated and
escheated to the State, unless the owner
thereof can prove that he did not know such
cultivation or culture despite the exercise of due
diligence on his part.

If the land involved in is part of the public
domain, the maximum of the penalties herein
provided shall be imposed upon the offender."
Section 14. Sections 14, 14-A, and 15 of Article
III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are
hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 14. Importation of Regulated Drugs. - The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine
ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to
ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall
import or bring any regulated drug in the
Philippines.
"Sec. 14-A. Manufacture of Regulated Drugs. -
The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and
a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos
to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall
engage in the manufacture of any regulated
drug.
"Sec. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation,
Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of
Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver,
transport or distribute any regulated drug.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of
this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the
offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug
involved in any offense under this Section be the
proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof,
the maximum penalty herein provided shall be
imposed."
Section 15. There shall be incorporated after
Section 15 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended, known as the Dangerous Drug Act
of 1972, a new section to read as follows:
"Sec. 15-a. Maintenance of a den, dive or resort
for regulated drug users. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 40
from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
pesos shall be imposed upon any person or
group of persons who shall maintain a den, dive
or resort where any regulated drugs is used in
any form, or where such regulated drugs in
quantities specified in Section 20, paragraph 1
of this Act are found.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of
this Act to the contrary, the maximum penalty
herein provided shall be imposed in every case
where a regulated drug is administered,
delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to
use the same in such place.
Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause
of the death of a person using the same in such
den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein
provided shall be imposed on the maintainer
notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of
this Act to the contrary."
Section 16. Section 16 of Article III of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is amended to
read as follows:
"Sec. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated
Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who shall possess or
use any regulated drug without the
corresponding license or prescription, subject to
the provisions of Section 20 hereof."
Section 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation
and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of
the Crime. - The penalties for offenses under
Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections
14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall
be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in
any of the following quantities :
1. 40 grams or more of opium;

2. 40 grams or more of morphine;
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or
methylamphetamine hydrochloride;
4. 40 grams or more of heroin;
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or
marijuana;
6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or
marijuana resin oil;
7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine
hydrochloride; or
8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the
quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic
requirements, as determined and promulgated
by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public
consultations/hearings conducted for the
purpose.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than
the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range
from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua
depending upon the quantity.
Every penalty imposed for the unlawful
importation, sale, administration, delivery,
transportation or manufacture of dangerous
drugs, the cultivation of plants which are
sources of dangerous drugs and the possession
of any opium pipe and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs shall carry with it the
confiscation and forfeiture, in favor of the
Government, of all the proceeds of the crime
including but not limited to money and other
obtained thereby and the instruments or tools
with which it was committed, unless they are the
property of a third person not liable for the
offense, but those which are not of lawful
commerce shall be ordered destroyed without
delay. Dangerous drugs and plant sources of
such drugs as well as the proceeds or
instruments of the crime so confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the Government shall be
turned over to the Board for proper disposal
without delay.
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 41
Any apprehending or arresting officer who
misappropriates or misapplies or fails to account
for seized or confiscated dangerous drugs or
plant-sources of dangerous drugs or proceeds
or instruments of the crime as are herein defined
shall after conviction be punished by the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
pesos."
Section 18. There shall be incorporated after
Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, a new section to read as follows:
"Sec. 20-A. Plea-bargaining Provisions. - Any
person charged under any provision of this Act
where the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death shall not be allowed to avail
of the provision on plea bargaining."
Section 19. Section 24 of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read
as follows :
"Sec. 24. Penalties for Government Official and
Employees and Officers and Members of Police
Agencies and the Armed Forces, 'Planting' of
Evidence. - The maximum penalties provided
for Section 3, 4(1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13
of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15(1), 16 and
19 of Article III shall be imposed, if those found
guilty of any of the said offenses are
government officials, employees or officers,
including members of police agencies and the
armed forces.
Any such above government official, employee
or officer who is found guilty of "planting" any
dangerous drugs punished in Sections 3, 4, 7,
8, 9 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A,
15 and 16 of Article III of this Act in the person
or in the immediate vicinity of another as
evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer the
same penalty as therein provided."
Approved: December 13, 1993

[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10640]
AN ACT TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE
ANTI-DRUG CAMPAIGN OF THE
GOVERNMENT, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 9165, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
“COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS
ACT OF 2002″
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. Section 21 of Republic Act No.
9165, otherwise known as the “Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002″, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of
Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous
drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:
“(1) The apprehending team having initial
custody and control of the dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the
seized items and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution
Service or the media who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof: Provided, That the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrant is served; or
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 42
at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance
of these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures and custody over
said items.
“x x x
“(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory
examination results, which shall be done by the
forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued
immediately upon the receipt of the subject
item/s: Provided, That when the volume of
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, and controlled precursors and essential
chemicals does not allow the completion of
testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory
examination report shall be provisionally issued
stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs
still to be examined by the forensic laboratory:
Provided, however, That a final certification
shall be issued immediately upon completion of
the said examination and certification;
“x x x.”
SEC. 2. Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR). – To implement effectively the provisions
of Section 21, the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) shall issue the necessary
guidelines on the IRR for the purpose in
consultation with the Department of Justice (DO
J) and relevant sectors to curb increasing drug
cases.
SEC. 3. Separability Clause. – If any provision
or part hereof is held invalid or unconstitutional,
the remainder of the law or the provision not
otherwise affected shall remain valid and
subsisting.
SEC. 4. Repealing Clause. – All laws,
presidential decrees or issuances, executive
orders, letters of instruction, administrative
orders, rules and regulations contrary to or
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 43

inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are

hereby repealed, modified or amended
accordingly.

SEC. 5. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect

fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in
at least two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.

G.R. No. 88017 January 21, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
LO HO WING alias PETER LO, LIM CHENG
HUAT alias ANTONIO LIM and REYNALDO
TIA y SANTIAGO, defendants. LO HO
WING alias PETER LO, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Segundo M. Gloria, Jr. for defendant-appellant.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This case involves the unlawful transport of
metamphetamine, a regulated drug under
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. One of its
derivatives is metamphetamine hydrochloride,
notoriously known in street parlance as "shabu"
or "poor man's cocaine."
Appellant Peter Lo, together with co-accused
Lim Cheng Huat alias Antonio Lim and
Reynaldo Tia, were charged with a violation of
Section 15, Article III of the aforementioned
statute otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, before Branch 114 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. Only
appellant and co-accused Lim Cheng Huat were
convicted. They were sentenced to suffer life
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P25,000.00 each,
and to pay the costs. Their co-accused
Reynaldo Tia was discharged as a state
witness. The pertinent portion of the information
reads as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1987,
in Pasay City, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another,
without authority of law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously deliver,
dispatch or transport 56 teabags of
Metamphetamine, a regulated drug.
Contrary to law.1
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 44
The antecedent facts of the case as found by
the trial court are as follows:
In July 1987, the Special Operations Group, a
unit of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS)
of the Philippine Constabulary (PC), received a
tip from one of its informers about an organized
group engaged in the importation of illegal
drugs, smuggling of contraband goods, and
gunrunning. After an evaluation of the
information thus received, a project codenamed
"OPLAN SHARON 887" was created in order to
bust the suspected syndicate.
As part of the operations, the recruitment of
confidential men and "deep penetration agents'
was carried out to infiltrate the crime syndicate.
One of those recruited was the discharged
accused, Reynaldo Tia (hereinafter referred to
as Tia).
Tia was introduced to his co-accused Lim
Cheng Huat (hereinafter referred to as Lim) by
another confidential agent named George on
August 3, 1987. Lim expressed a desire to hire
a male travelling companion for his business
nips abroad. Tia offered his services and was
hired.
Lim and Tia met anew on several occasions to
make arrangements for a trip to China. In the
course of those meetings, Tia was introduced to
Peter Lo (hereinafter referred to as appellant),
whom Tia found out to be the person he was to
accompany to China in lieu of Lim.
As a "deep penetration agent," Tia regularly
submitted reports of his undercover activities on
the suspected criminal syndicate. Meanwhile,
the officer-in-charge of OPLAN SHARON 887,
Captain Luisito Palmera, filed with his superiors
the reports submitted to him, and officially
informed the Dangerous Drugs Board of Tia's
activities.
On October 4, 1987, appellant and Tia left for
Hongkong on board a Philippine Airlines flight.
Before they departed, Tia was able to telephone
Captain Palmera to inform him of their expected
date of return to the Philippines as declared in

his round-trip plane ticket-October 6, 1987 at
two o'clock in the afternoon.
The day after they arrived in Hongkong, Tia and
appellant boarded a train bound for Guangzhou,
in the People's Republic of China. Upon arriving
there, they checked in at a hotel, and rested for
a few hours. The pair thereafter went to a local
store where appellant purchased six (6) tin cans
of tea. Tia saw the paper tea bags when the
cans were opened for examination during the
purchase. Afterwards, they returned to the hotel.
Appellant kept the cans of tea in his hotel room.
That evening, Tia went to appellant's room to
talk to him. Upon entering, he saw two other
men with appellant. One was fixing the tea bags,
while the other was burning substance on a
piece of aluminum foil using a cigarette lighter.
Appellant joined the second man and sniffed the
smoke emitted by the burning substance. Tia
asked the latter what they would be bringing
back to the Philippines. He was informed that
their cargo consisted of Chinese drugs. Tia
stayed in the room for about twenty minutes
before going back to his room to sleep.
The next day, October 6,1987, the two returned
to Manila via a China Airlines flight. Appellant
had with him his red traveling bag with wheels.
Before departing from Guangzhou however,
customs examiners inspected their luggage.
The tin cans of tea were brought out from the
traveling bag of appellant. The contents of the
cans were not closely examined, and appellant
was cleared along with Tia.
The plane landed at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA), then named Manila
International Airport, on schedule. Lim met the
newly-arrived pair at the arrival area. Lim talked
to appellant, while Tia, upon being instructed,
looked after their luggage. After Lim and
appellant finished their conversation, the latter
hailed a taxicab. Appellant and Tia boarded the
taxicab after putting their luggage inside the
back compartment of the vehicle. Lim followed
in another taxi cab.
Meanwhile, a team composed of six operatives
headed by Captain Palmera was formed to act
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 45
on the tip given by Tia. On the expected date of
arrival, the team proceeded to the NAIA.
Captain Palmera notified the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) Detachment at the
airport for coordination. After a briefing, the
operatives were ordered to take strategic
positions around the arrival area. Two
operatives stationed just outside the arrival area
were the first ones to spot the suspects
emerging therefrom. Word was passed on to the
other members of the team that the suspects
were in sight. Appellant was pulling along his
red traveling bag while Tia was carrying a
shoulder bag. The operatives also spotted Lim
meeting their quarry.
Upon seeing appellant and Tia leave the airport,
the operatives who first spotted them followed
them. Along Imelda Avenue, the car of the
operatives overtook the taxicab ridden by
appellant and Tia and cut into its path forcing the
taxi driver to stop his vehicle. Meanwhile, the
other taxicab carrying Lim sped away in an
attempt to escape. The operatives disembarked
from their car, approached the taxicab, and
asked the driver to open the baggage
compartment. Three pieces of luggage were
retrieved from the back compartment of the
vehicle. The operatives requested from the
suspects permission to search their luggage. A
tin can of tea was taken out of the red traveling
bag owned by appellant. Sgt. Roberto
Cayabyab, one of the operatives, pried the lid
open, pulled out a paper tea bag from the can
and pressed it in the middle to feel its contents.
Some crystalline white powder resembling
crushed alum came out of the bag. The
sergeant then opened the tea bag and
examined its contents more closely. Suspecting
the crystalline powder to be a dangerous drug,
he had the three traveling bags opened for
inspection. From the red traveling bag, a total of
six (6) tin cans were found, including the one
previously opened. Nothing else of
consequence was recovered from the other
bags. Tia and appellant were taken to the CIS
Headquarters in Quezon City for questioning.
Meanwhile, the second taxicab was eventually
overtaken by two other operatives on Retiro

Street, Quezon City. Lim was likewise
apprehended and brought to the CIS
Headquarters for interrogation.
During the investigation of the case, the six tin
cans recovered from the traveling bag of
appellant were opened and examined. They
contained a total of fifty-six (56) paper tea bags
with white crystalline powder inside instead of
tea leaves.
The tea bag opened by Sgt. Cayabyab during
the search and seizure was sent to the PC-INP
Crime Laboratory for preliminary examination.
Tests conducted on a sample of the crystalline
powder inside the tea bag yielded a positive
result that the specimen submitted was
metamphetamine. Samples from each of the
fifty-six (56) tea bags were similarly tested. The
tests were also positive for metamphetamine.
Hence, the three suspects were indicted.
In rendering a judgment of conviction, the trial
court gave full credence to the testimonies of the
government anti-narcotics operatives, to whom
the said court applied the well-settled
presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties.
Appellant now assigns three errors alleged to
have been committed by the trial court, namely:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE ON
THE ACCUSED AS ILLEGAL.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE
ACCUSED GUILTY OF DELIVERING,
DISPATCHING OR TRANSPORTING
METAMPHETAMINE, A REGULATED DRUG.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISCHARGING
REYNALDO TIA TO TESTIFY FOR THE
PROSECUTION.2
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 46
We affirm.
Anent the first assignment of error, appellant
contends that the warrantless search and
seizure made against the accused is illegal for
being violative of Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution. He reasons that the PC-CIS
officers concerned could very well have
procured a search warrant since they had been
informed of the date and time of a arrival of the
accused at the NAIA well ahead of time,
specifically two (2) days in advance. The fact
that the search and seizure in question were
made on a moving vehicle, appellant argues,
does not automatically make the warrantless
search herein fall within the coverage of the
well-known exception to the rule of the necessity
of a valid warrant to effect a search because, as
aforementioned, the anti-narcotics agents had
both time and opportunity to secure a search
warrant.
The contentions are without merit. As correctly
averred by appellee, that search and seizure
must be supported by a valid warrant is not an
absolute rule. There are at least three (3) well-
recognized exceptions thereto. As set forth in
the case of Manipon, Jr. vs.
3
Sandiganbayan, these are: [1] a search
incidental to an arrest, [2] a search of a moving
vehicle, and [3] seizure of evidence in plain view
(emphasis supplied). The circumstances of the
case clearly show that the search in question
was made as regards a moving vehicle.
Therefore, a valid warrant was not necessary to
effect the search on appellant and his co-
accused.
In this connection, We cite with approval the
averment of the Solicitor General, as contained
in the appellee's brief, that the rules governing
search and seizure have over the years been
steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle
is the object of the search on the basis of
practicality. This is so considering that before a
warrant could be obtained, the place, things and
persons to be searched must be described to
the satisfaction of the issuing judge—a
requirement which borders on the impossible in
the case of smuggling effected by the use of a

moving vehicle that can transport contraband
from one place to another with impunity.4
We might add that a warrantless search of a
moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it
is not practicable to secure a warrant because
the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be sought."5
In the instant case, it was firmly established from
the factual findings of the trial court that the
authorities had reasonable ground to believe
that appellant would attempt to bring in
contraband and transport it within the country.
The belief was based on intelligence reports
gathered from surveillance activities on the
suspected syndicate, of which appellant was
touted to be a member. Aside from this, they
were also certain as to the expected date and
time of arrival of the accused from China. But
such knowledge was clearly insufficient to
enable them to fulfill the requirements for the
issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the
important thing is that there was probable cause
to conduct the warrantless search, which must
still be present in such a case.
The second assignment of error is likewise
lacking in merit. Appellant was charged and
convicted under Section 15, Article III of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, which
reads:
The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a
fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any
person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
dispose, deliver, transport or distribute any
regulated drug (emphasis supplied).
The information charged the accused of
delivering, transporting or dispatching fifty-six
(56) tea bags containing metamphetamine, a
regulated drug. The conjunction "or' was used,
thereby implying that the accused were being
charged of the three specified acts in the
alternative. Appellant argues that he cannot be
convicted of "delivery" because the term
connotes a source and a recipient, the latter
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 47
being absent under the facts of the case. It is
also argued that "dispatching' cannot apply
either since appellant never sent off or disposed
of drugs. As for "transporting," appellant
contends that he cannot also be held liable
therefor because the act of transporting
necessarily requires a point of destination,
which again is non- existent under the given
facts.
The contentions are futile attempts to strain the
meaning of the operative acts of which appellant
and his co-accused were charged in relation to
the facts of the case. There is no doubt that law
enforcers caught appellant and his co-
accused in flagrante delicto of transporting a
prohibited drug. The term "transport" is defined
as "to carry or convey from one place to
another."6 The operative words in the definition
are "to carry or convey." The fact that there is
actual conveyance suffices to support a finding
that the act of transporting was committed. It is
immaterial whether or not the place of
destination is reached. Furthermore, the
argument of appellant gives rise to the illogical
conclusion that he and his co- accused did not
intend to bring the metamphetamine
anywhere, i.e. they had no place of destination.
The situation in the instant case is one where
the transport of a prohibited drug was
interrupted by the search and arrest of the
accused. Interruption necessarily infers that an
act had already been commenced. Otherwise,
there would be nothing to interrupt.
Therefore, considering the foregoing, since the
information included the acts of delivery,
dispatch or transport, proof beyond reasonable
doubt of the commission of any of the acts so
included is sufficient for conviction under
Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended.
Moreover, the act of transporting a prohibited
drug is a malum prohibitum because it is
punished as an offense under a special law. It is
a wrong because it is prohibited by law. Without
the law punishing the act, it cannot be
considered a wrong. As such, the mere
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 48

commission of said act is what constitutes the prosecution that there is absolute necessity for
offense punished and suffices to validly charge the testimony of accused Tia.
and convict an individual caught committing the
act so punished, regardless of criminal intent.7 WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is
As to the third assigned error, appellant contests thereby DISMISSED. No costs.
the discharge of accused Reynaldo Tia to testify
for the prosecution on the ground that there was SO ORDERED.
no necessity for the same. Appellant argues that
deep penetration agents such as Tia "have to
take risks and accept the consequences of their
actions."8 The argument is devoid of merit. The
discharge of accused Tia was based on Section
9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which reads
in part:

Sec. 9. Discharge of the accused to be state

witness. — When two or more persons are
jointly charged with the commission of any
offense, upon motion of the prosecution before
resting its case, the court may directone or more
of the accused to be discharged with their
consent so that they may be witnesses for the
state . . . (emphasis supplied).

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,

the discharge of an accused is left to the sound
discretion of the lower court.1âwphi1 The trial
court has the exclusive responsibility to see that
the conditions prescribed by the rule exist.9 In
the instant case, appellant does not allege that
any of the conditions for the discharge had not
been met by the prosecution. Therefore, the
discharge, as ordered by the trial court, stands.

Finally, appellant alleges that the testimony of

Sgt. Roberto Cayabyab regarding the facts
surrounding the commission of the offense
proves that the discharge of accused Tia is
unnecessary. The allegation is baseless.
Appellant himself admits that the sergeant's
testimony corroborates the testimony of the
discharged accused. The fact of corroboration
of the testimonies bolsters the validity of the
questioned discharge precisely because
paragraph (a) of the aforequoted rule on
discharge requires that the testimony be
substantially corroborated in its material points.
The corroborative testimony of the PC-CIS
operative does not debunk the claim of the

G.R. No. 188611 June 16, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
BELEN MARIACOS, Appellant.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal from the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 02718, which affirmed the
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 29, San Fernando City, La Union, in
Criminal Case No. 7144, finding appellant Belen
Mariacos guilty of violating Article II, Section 5
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA,
are as follows:
Accused-appellant Belen Mariacos was
charged in an Information, dated November 7,
2005 of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic
Act [No.] 9165, allegedly committed as follows:
"That on or about the 27th day of October, 2005,
in the Municipality of San Gabriel, Province of
La Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously transport, deliver 7,030.3, (sic)
grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops without
the necessary permit or authority from the
proper government agency or office.
CONTRARY TO LAW."
When arraigned on December 13, 2005,
accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. During
the pre-trial, the following were stipulated upon:
"1. Accused admits that she is the same person
identified in the information as Belen Mariacos;
2. That accused is a resident of Brgy. Lunoy,
San Gabriel, La Union;
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 49
3. That at the time of the arrest of the accused,
accused had just alighted from a passenger
jeepney;
4. That the marijuana allegedly taken from the
possession of the accused contained in two (2)
bags were submitted for examination to the
Crime Lab;
5. That per Chemistry Report No. D-109-2005,
the alleged drug submitted for examination gave
positive result for the presence of marijuana;
6. That the drugs allegedly obtained from the
accused contained (sic) and submitted for
examination weighed 7,030.3 grams;
7. The Prosecutor admits the existence of a
counter-affidavit executed by the accused; and
8. The existence of the affidavits executed by
the witnesses of the accused family (sic): Lyn
Punasen, Mercedes Tila and Magdalena
Carino."
During the trial, the prosecution established the
following evidence:
On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San
Gabriel Police Station of San Gabriel, La Union,
conducted a checkpoint near the police station
at the poblacion to intercept a suspected
transportation of marijuana from Barangay
Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La Union. The group
at the checkpoint was composed of PO2 Lunes
B. Pallayoc ("PO2 Pallayoc"), the Chief of
Police, and other policemen. When the
checkpoint did not yield any suspect or
marijuana, the Chief of Police instructed PO2
Pallayoc to proceed to Barangay Balbalayang to
conduct surveillance operation (sic).
At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay
Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret
agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network who
informed him that a baggage of marijuana had
been loaded on a passenger jeepney that was
about to leave for the poblacion. The agent
mentioned three (3) bags and one (1) blue
plastic bag. Further, the agent described a

backpack bag with an "O.K." marking. PO2
Pallayoc then boarded the said jeepney and
positioned himself on top thereof. While the
vehicle was in motion, he found the black
backpack with an "O.K." marking and peeked
inside its contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of
marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then
asked the other passengers on top of the
jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no one
knew.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2
Pallayoc alighted together with the other
passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice
who took the black backpack from atop the
jeepney. He only realized a few moments later
that the said bag and three (3) other bags,
including a blue plastic bag, were already being
carried away by two (2) women. He caught up
with the women and introduced himself as a
policeman. He told them that they were under
arrest, but one of the women got away.
PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was
later identified as herein accused-appellant
Belen Mariacos, and the bags to the police
station. At the police station, the investigators
contacted the Mayor of San Gabriel to witness
the opening of the bags. When the Mayor
arrived about fifteen (15) minutes later, the bags
were opened and three (3) bricks of marijuana
wrapped in newspaper, two (2) round bundles of
marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana
fruiting tops, all wrapped in a newspaper, were
recovered.
Thereafter, the investigators marked,
inventoried and forwarded the confiscated
marijuana to the crime laboratory for
examination. The laboratory examination
showed that the stuff found in the bags all tested
positive for marijuana, a dangerous drug.
When it was accused-appellant’s turn to present
evidence, she testified that:
On October 27, 2005, at around 7:00 in the
morning, accused-appellant, together with Lani
Herbacio, was inside a passenger jeepney
bound for the poblacion. While the jeepney was
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 50
still at the terminal waiting for passengers, one
Bennie Lao-ang ("Lao-ang"), her neighbor,
requested her to carry a few bags which had
been loaded on top of the jeepney. At first,
accused-appellant refused, but she was
persuaded later when she was told that she
would only be carrying the bags. When they
reached the poblacion, Lao-ang handed
accused-appellant and her companion, Lani
Herbacio, the bags, and then Lao-ang suddenly
ran away. A few moments later, PO2 Pallayoc
was upon them, arresting them. Without
explanation, they were brought to the police
station. When they were at the police station,
Lani Herbacio disappeared. It was also at the
police station that accused-appellant
discovered the true contents of the bags which
she was asked to carry. She maintained that
she was not the owner of the bags and that she
did not know what were contained in the bags.
At the police station (sic) she executed a
Counter-Affidavit.3
On January 31, 2007, the RTC promulgated a
decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused
Belen Mariacos GUILTY as charged and
sentences here (sic) to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00.
The 7,030.3 grams of marijuana are ordered
confiscated and turned over to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency for destruction in the
presence of the Court personnel and media.
SO ORDERED.4
Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA.
She argued that the trial court erred in
considering the evidence of the prosecution
despite its inadmissibility.5 She claimed that her
right against an unreasonable search was
flagrantly violated by Police Officer (PO)2
Pallayoc when the latter searched the bag,
assuming it was hers, without a search warrant
and with no permission from her. She averred
that PO2 Pallayoc’s purpose for apprehending
her was to verify if the bag she was carrying was
the same one he had illegally searched earlier.

Moreover, appellant contended that there was
no probable cause for her arrest.6
Further, appellant claimed that the prosecution
failed to prove the corpus delicti of the
crime.7 She alleged that the apprehending
police officers violated Dangerous Drugs Board
Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended
by Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990,
which prescribes the procedure in the custody
of seized prohibited and regulated drugs,
instruments, apparatuses, and articles. The said
regulation directs the apprehending team
having initial custody and control of the drugs
and/or paraphernalia, immediately after seizure
or confiscation, to have the same physically
inventoried and photographed in the presence
of appellant or her representative, who shall be
required to sign copies of the inventory. The
failure to comply with this directive, appellant
claimed, casts a serious doubt on the identity of
the items allegedly confiscated from her. She,
likewise, averred that the prosecution failed to
prove that the items allegedly confiscated were
indeed prohibited drugs, and to establish the
chain of custody over the same.
On the other hand, the People, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), argued
that the warrantless arrest of appellant and the
warrantless seizure of marijuana were valid and
legal,8 justified as a search of a moving vehicle.
It averred that PO2 Pallayoc had reasonable
ground to believe that appellant had committed
the crime of delivering dangerous drugs based
on reliable information from their agent, which
was confirmed when he peeked into the bags
and smelled the distinctive odor of
marijuana.9 The OSG also argued that appellant
was now estopped from questioning the
illegality of her arrest since she voluntarily
entered a plea of "not guilty" upon arraignment
and participated in the trial and presented her
evidence.10 The OSG brushed aside appellant’s
argument that the bricks of marijuana were not
photographed and inventoried in her presence
or that of her counsel immediately after
confiscation, positing that physical inventory
may be done at the nearest police station or at
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 51
the nearest office of the apprehending team,
whichever was practicable.11
In a Decision dated January 19, 2009, the CA
dismissed appellant’s appeal and affirmed the
RTC decision in toto.12It held that the
prosecution had successfully proven that
appellant carried away from the jeepney a
number of bags which, when inspected by the
police, contained dangerous drugs. The CA
ruled that appellant was caught in flagrante
delicto of "carrying and conveying" the bag that
contained the illegal drugs, and thus held that
appellant’s warrantless arrest was valid. The
appellate court ratiocinated:
It must be stressed that PO2 Pallayoc had
earlier ascertained the contents of the bags
when he was aboard the jeep. He saw the bricks
of marijuana wrapped in newspaper. That said
marijuana was on board the jeepney to be
delivered to a specified destination was already
unlawful. PO2 Pallayoc needed only to see for
himself to whom those bags belonged. So,
when he saw accused-appellant carrying the
bags, PO2 Pallayoc was within his lawful duty to
make a warrantless arrest of accused-appellant.
xxxx
Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution is
misplaced. At the time, when PO2 Pallayoc
looked into the contents of the suspicious bags,
there was no identified owner. He asked the
other passengers atop the jeepney but no one
knew who owned the bags. Thus, there could be
no violation of the right when no one was
entitled thereto at that time.
Secondly, the facts of the case show the
urgency of the situation. The local police has
been trying to intercept the transport of the
illegal drugs for more than a day, to no avail.
Thus, when PO2 Pallayoc was tipped by the
secret agent of the Barangay Intelligence
Network, PO2 Pallayoc had no other recourse
than to verify as promptly as possible the tip and
check the contents of the bags.

Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a
moving vehicle. Time and again, a search of a
moving vehicle has been justified on the ground
that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it
possible for the vehicle to move out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2 Pallayoc
could not be expected to secure a search
warrant in order to check the contents of the
bags which were loaded on top of the moving
jeepney. Otherwise, a search warrant would
have been of no use because the motor vehicle
had already left the locality.13
Appellant is now before this Court, appealing
her conviction.
Once again, we are asked to determine the
limits of the powers of the State’s agents to
conduct searches and seizures. Over the years,
this Court had laid down the rules on searches
and seizures, providing, more or less, clear
parameters in determining which are proper and
which are not.1avvphi1
Appellant’s main argument before the CA
centered on the inadmissibility of the evidence
used against her. She claims that her
constitutional right against unreasonable
searches was flagrantly violated by the
apprehending officer.
Thus, we must determine if the search was
lawful. If it was, then there would have been
probable cause for the warrantless arrest of
appellant.
Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine
Constitution provides:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 52
searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
Law and jurisprudence have laid down the
instances when a warrantless search is valid.
These are:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest recognized under Section 12 [now
Section 13], Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and
by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the
elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered
by the police who had the right to be where they
are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent[;] and;
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of
evidence without further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated
by the government, the vehicle's inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.14
Both the trial court and the CA anchored their
respective decisions on the fact that the search
was conducted on a moving vehicle to justify the
validity of the search.

Indeed, the search of a moving vehicle is one of
the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
Constitutional mandate that no search or
seizure shall be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge after personally
determining the existence of probable cause.15
In People v. Bagista,16 the Court said:
The constitutional proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures admits of
certain exceptions. Aside from a search incident
to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had
been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and
the seizure of evidence in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicles,
this had been justified on the ground that the
mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for
the vehicle to be searched to move out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be sought.
This in no way, however, gives the police
officers unlimited discretion to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles in the
absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is
stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such a warrantless search has been held to be
valid only as long as the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to
believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a
crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
It is well to remember that in the instances we
have recognized as exceptions to the
requirement of a judicial warrant, it is necessary
that the officer effecting the arrest or seizure
must have been impelled to do so because of
probable cause. The essential requisite of
probable cause must be satisfied before a
warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully
conducted.17 Without probable cause, the
articles seized cannot be admitted in evidence
against the person arrested.18
Probable cause is defined as a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 53
to induce a cautious man to believe that the
person accused is guilty of the offense charged.
It refers to the existence of such facts and
circumstances that can lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that the items,
articles or objects sought in connection with said
offense or subject to seizure and destruction by
law are in the place to be searched.19
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when,
in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt
of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on
probable cause, coupled with good faith on the
part of the peace officers making the arrest.20
Over the years, the rules governing search and
seizure have been steadily liberalized whenever
a moving vehicle is the object of the search on
the basis of practicality. This is so considering
that before a warrant could be obtained, the
place, things and persons to be searched must
be described to the satisfaction of the issuing
judge – a requirement which borders on the
impossible in instances where moving vehicle is
used to transport contraband from one place to
another with impunity.21
This exception is easy to understand. A search
warrant may readily be obtained when the
search is made in a store, dwelling house or
other immobile structure. But it is impracticable
to obtain a warrant when the search is
conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in
other motor vehicles since they can quickly be
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where
the warrant must be sought.22
Given the discussion above, it is readily
apparent that the search in this case is valid.
The vehicle that carried the contraband or
prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2
Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act
fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to

procure a warrant before conducting the search
under the circumstances. Time was of the
essence in this case. The searching officer had
no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had
enough time to board the vehicle before the
same left for its destination.
It is well to remember that on October 26, 2005,
the night before appellant’s arrest, the police
received information that marijuana was to be
transported from Barangay Balbalayang, and
had set up a checkpoint around the area to
intercept the suspects. At dawn of October 27,
2005, PO2 Pallayoc met the secret agent from
the Barangay Intelligence Network, who
informed him that a baggage of marijuana was
loaded on a passenger jeepney about to leave
for the poblacion. Thus, PO2 Pallayoc had
probable cause to search the packages
allegedly containing illegal drugs.
This Court has also, time and again, upheld as
valid a warrantless search incident to a lawful
arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court provides:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.—A
person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may
have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search
warrant.23
For this rule to apply, it is imperative that there
be a prior valid arrest. Although, generally, a
warrant is necessary for a valid arrest, the Rules
of Court provides the exceptions therefor, to wit:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed
and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 54
that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b)
above, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.24
Be that as it may, we have held that a search
substantially contemporaneous with an arrest
can precede the arrest if the police has probable
cause to make the arrest at the outset of the
search.25
Given that the search was valid, appellant’s
arrest based on that search is also valid.
Article II, Section 5 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 states:
SEC. 5 Sale, Trading, Administration,
Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.
– The penalty of life imprisonment to death and
a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand
pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any
and all species of opium poppy regardless of the
quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a
broker in any of such transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from One hundred
thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless

authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer,
dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
controlled precursor and essential chemical, or
shall act as a broker in such transactions.
In her defense, appellant averred that the
packages she was carrying did not belong to her
but to a neighbor who had asked her to carry the
same for him. This contention, however, is of no
consequence.
When an accused is charged with illegal
possession or transportation of prohibited
drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial.
Consequently, proof of ownership of the
confiscated marijuana is not necessary.26
Appellant’s alleged lack of knowledge does not
constitute a valid defense. Lack of criminal
intent and good faith are not exempting
circumstances where the crime charged
is malum prohibitum, as in this case.27 Mere
possession and/or delivery of a prohibited drug,
without legal authority, is punishable under the
Dangerous Drugs Act.28
Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws, are
regulatory statutes. They are rules of
convenience designed to secure a more orderly
regulation of the affairs of society, and their
violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita.
Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn
behavior directed not against particular
individuals, but against public order.29
Jurisprudence defines "transport" as "to carry or
convey from one place to another."30 There is
no definitive moment when an accused
"transports" a prohibited drug. When the
circumstances establish the purpose of an
accused to transport and the fact of
transportation itself, there should be no question
as to the perpetration of the criminal act.31The
fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to
support a finding that the act of transporting was
committed and it is immaterial whether or not
the place of destination is reached.32
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 55
Moreover, appellant’s possession of the
packages containing illegal drugs gave rise to
the disputable presumption33that she is the
owner of the packages and their
contents.34 Appellant failed to rebut this
presumption. Her uncorroborated claim of lack
of knowledge that she had prohibited drug in her
possession is insufficient.
Appellant’s narration of facts deserves little
credence. If it is true that Bennie Lao-ang
merely asked her and her companion to carry
some baggages, it is but logical to first ask what
the packages contained and where these would
be taken. Likewise, if, as appellant said, Lao-
ang ran away after they disembarked from the
jeepney, appellant and her companion should
have ran after him to give him the bags he had
left with them, and not to continue on their
journey without knowing where they were taking
the bags.
Next, appellant argues that the prosecution
failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime. In
particular, she alleged that the apprehending
police officers failed to follow the procedure in
the custody of seized prohibited and regulated
drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles.
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, the existence of all dangerous drugs
is a sine qua non for conviction. The dangerous
drug is the very corpus delicti of that crime.35
Thus, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 prescribes
the procedure for custody and disposition of
seized dangerous drugs, to wit:
Section 21. Custody and Disposition of
Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous
drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized

and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
of R.A. No. 9165 further provides:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of
Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors
and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous
drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 56
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items.
PO2 Pallayoc testified that after apprehending
appellant, he immediately brought her to the
police station. At the station, the police
requested the Mayor to witness the opening of
the bags seized from appellant. When the
Mayor arrived, he opened the bag in front of
appellant and the other police officers. The
black bag yielded three bricks of marijuana
wrapped in newspaper, while the plastic bag
yielded two bundles of marijuana and two bricks
of marijuana fruiting tops.36 PO2 Pallayoc
identified the bricks. He and PO3 Stanley
Campit then marked the same. Then the seized
items were brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination.
It is admitted that there were no photographs
taken of the drugs seized, that appellant was not
accompanied by counsel, and that no
representative from the media and the DOJ
were present. However, this Court has already
previously held that non-compliance with
Section 21 is not fatal and will not render an
accused’s arrest illegal, or make the items
seized inadmissible. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items.37
Based on the testimony of PO2 Pallayoc, after
appellant’s arrest, she was immediately brought
to the police station where she stayed while
waiting for the Mayor. It was the Mayor who
opened the packages, revealing the illegal
drugs, which were thereafter marked and sent
to the police crime laboratory the following day.
Contrary to appellant’s claim, the prosecution’s
evidence establishes the chain of custody from
the time of appellant’s arrest until the prohibited
drugs were tested at the police crime laboratory.
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 57

While it is true that the arresting officer failed to

state explicitly the justifiable ground for non-
compliance with Section 21, this does not
necessarily mean that appellant’s arrest was
illegal or that the items seized are inadmissible.
The justifiable ground will remain unknown
because appellant did not question the custody
and disposition of the items taken from her
during the trial.38 Even assuming that the police
officers failed to abide by Section 21, appellant
should have raised this issue before the trial
court. She could have moved for the quashal of
the information at the first instance. But she did
not. Hence, she is deemed to have waived any
objection on the matter.

Further, the actions of the police officers, in

relation to the procedural rules on the chain of
custody, enjoyed the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official functions. Courts
accord credence and full faith to the testimonies
of police authorities, as they are presumed to be
performing their duties regularly, absent any
convincing proof to the contrary.39

In sum, the prosecution successfully

established appellant’s guilt. Thus, her
conviction must be affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises

considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 02718 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 120670 October 23, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
HEDISHI SUZUKI, appellant.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision1 ofthe
Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Bacolod City in
Criminal Case No. 94-16100 convicting Hedishi
Suzuki, appellant, of illegal possession of
marijuana, defined and penalized under Section
8, Article II of R.A. No. 6525, as amended,2 and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death
and to pay a fine of ₱10,000,000.00.
The Information3 against appellant reads:
"That on or about the 12th day of April, 1994, in
the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein
accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess, prepare, administer or otherwise use
any prohibited drug, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession and under his custody and control
1.9 kilos or 1,900 grams, more or less, of
marijuana which is a prohibited drug, in violation
of the aforementioned laws.
"Acts contrary to law."
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of
not guilty. Thereafter, trial followed.1a\^/phi1.net
The prosecution presented P/Inspector Rea
Abastillas Villavicencio, the forensic chemist of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory, SPO1 Arturo Casugod, Sr. of the
Police Aviation Security Command (PASCOM),
PO3 Rhodelin Poyugao, also of the PASCOM,
and SPO1 Gilbert Linda of the Narcotics
Command (NARCOM), all of Bacolod City. Their
testimonies, woven together, established the
following facts:
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 58
Sometime in November, 1993, the PNP
Narcotics Command issued a directive to all
Chiefs of Narcotics Regional Field Units to cover
all domestic airport terminals within their
respective areas of responsibility, following
reports that drug trafficking is prevalent in
domestic airports; and to coordinate with local
airport authorities and the PASCOM.
In the morning of April 12, 1994, while the
prosecution witnesses were in their respective
stations, appellant and Takeshi Koketsu, both
Japanese nationals, entered the pre-departure
area of the Bacolod Airport Terminal. Appellant
was bound for Manila via flight No. 132 of the
Philippine Airlines and was carrying a small
traveling bag and a box marked
"Bongbong’s piaya." At the pre-departure area,
4
upon the advice of Corazon Sinosa, a civilian
personnel of the PASCOM, appellant
proceeded to the "walk-through metal detector,"
a machine which produces a red light and an
alarm once it detects the presence of metallic
substance or object. Thereupon, the red light
switched on and the alarm sounded, signifying
the presence of metallic substance either in his
person or in the box he was carrying. This
prompted PO3 Poyugao to frisk him bodily.
Finding no metallic object in his body, PO3
Poyugao picked up the box of piaya and passed
it through the machine. Again, the machine was
activated. PO3 Poyugao then ordered appellant
to go to the hand-carried luggage inspection
counter where several PASCOM and NARCOM
personnel were present. SPO1 Casugod
requested appellant to open the box. He
appeared tense and reluctant and started to
leave, but SPO1 Casugod called him.
Eventually he consented, saying in faltering
English, "open, open." SPO1 Casugod opened
the box and found therein eighteen (18) small
packs, seventeen (17) of which were wrapped
in aluminum foil. SPO1 Casugod opened one
pack. Inside were dried fruiting tops which
looked like marijuana. Upon seeing this,
appellant ran outside the pre-departure area but
he was chased by PO3 Poyugao, SPO1 Linda
and Donato Barnezo of the PASCOM.

They apprehended appellant near the entrance
of the terminal and brought him to the PASCOM
office. They also brought Takeshi and his wife,
Lourdes Linsangan, to the office, being
suspects as conspirators with appellant in drug
trafficking. Lourdes asked permission to call
Atty. Silvestre Tayson. When he arrived, the
police apprised appellant of his constitutional
rights.
Meanwhile, SPO1 Casugod weighed the
contents of the box and inventoried the same.
The total weight of the suspected marijuana
fruiting tops was 1.9 kilograms or 1,900 grams.
He then drafted a "confiscation receipt" which
appellant, upon the advice of Atty. Tayson,
refused to acknowledge. SPO1 Casugod turned
over appellant to SPO1 Linda for investigation.
Subsequently, appellant and his companions
were brought to the prosecutor’s office for
inquest and placed under the custody of
C/Inspector Ernesto Alcantara at the NARCOM
office. The box with its contents was brought to
the PNP Crime Laboratory. Inspector
Villavicencio conducted three tests on the
specimen samples which proved positive for
marijuana.
The defense presented appellant as its sole
witness whose testimony is as follows: On April
9, 1994, he and Takeshi Koketsu arrived in
Manila from Osaka, Japan. The purpose of his
trip was to collect from Takeshi Y2.5 million or
₱500,000.00 which the latter owed him. Waiting
for them at the airport was Takeshi’s wife,
Lourdes. On the same day, the three flew to
Bacolod City. Appellant stayed at the house of
Takeshi.
Two days later, appellant asked Takeshi to pay.
When Takeshi admitted he had no money,
appellant got angry and went to the Casino
Filipino where he stayed until 10:30 in the
evening. Upon leaving the casino, he met Pinky
who enticed him to have sex with her. They then
proceeded to the Moonlight Motel. Moments
later, Pinky left, while appellant stayed there for
the night. He told her he was leaving the
following morning.
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 59
The following day or on April 12, 1994, appellant
went to the airport.1awphi1.nét Pinky, who was
there waiting, gave him a box of
"Bongbong’s piaya" as "pasalubong" from
Bacolod City. He did not ascertain the contents
of the box since he trusted Pinky although he
just met her the previous night.
Appellant found and joined Takeshi and
Lourdes at the coffee shop. Takeshi apologized
for his failure to pay his debt, assuring him that
he would settle his obligation next month.
When it was time to leave, appellant,
accompanied by Takeshi, proceeded to the pre-
departure area. When he passed through the
metal detector, a policeman frisked him, got the
box and placed it inside the metal detector. The
machine produced a red light, hence, the
policeman brought the box to the inspection
table, with appellant following him. Thereafter,
the policeman, whom he later knew as SPO1
Arturo Casugod, pointed to the box uttering
something appellant did not understand.
Appellant said, "wait a minute," (in Japanese)
and went outside to ask Takeshi and Lourdes to
interpret for him, but they did not respond. When
PO3 Rhodelin Poyugao called him back to the
pre-departure area, he found Takeshi near the
table and the box containing something
wrapped in aluminum foil already opened.
Takeshi told him that he was carrying marijuana.
He replied it was given to him by a woman that
morning. Then he and SPO1 Casugod went to
the PASCOM office where the latter weighed
the contents of the box. He did not sign the
"Confiscation Receipt" presented to him. They
then proceeded to the NARCOM office with
C/Inspector Ernesto Alcantara, SPO1 Linda,
PO3 Poyugao, and three other officers. From
the NARCOM office, appellant was brought to
the Bacolod Police Station.
Shortly thereafter, they went to the Nagoya
Restaurant owned by Takeshi where appellant
saw C/Inspector Alcantara and Lourdes talking.
When he inquired from Takeshi what was going
on, he was told they needed money in dealing
with the police. Appellant was then brought to
the prosecutor’s office. There Takeshi told him

to keep silent as he would make a deal with the
prosecutor. Then they went to Takeshi’s house
where appellant stayed for two days.
On April 14, 1994, C/Inspector Alcantara and
SPO1 Linda brought appellant to the Bacolod
City Jail. Takeshi visited him twice, advising him
to ask someone from Japan to send him money
and be discreet, otherwise he would be killed;
and to admit he has in his possession less than
750 grams of marijuana so he could post bail.
However, he refused.
Five days later, appellant, escorted by the
police, went to Takeshi’s house to retrieve his
money (Y120,000 equivalent to ₱30,000.00),
but Takeshi told him that it was already spent for
the food and drinks of the NARCOM agents and
the airport policemen.
On December 7, 1994, the trial court rendered
its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused HEDISHI
SUZUKI guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the maximum penalty of death, to pay a
fine of Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00), and
to pay the costs.
"Pursuant to Section 20, Article IV of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of
Republic Act No. 7659, let the 1,547.07 grams
of dried marijuana fruiting tops, subject matter of
this case, be confiscated and forfeited in favor
of the government and be turned over to the
Dangerous Drugs Board Custodian, NBI, to be
disposed according to law.
"SO ORDERED."
Hence the instant mandatory review.
In his brief, appellant ascribes to the trial court
the following errors:
"I
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 60
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE GOVERNMENT AGENTS
HAD THE LEGAL AUTHORITY WHEN THEY
OPENED AND SEARCHED THE SMALL
CARTON IN QUESTION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT PROBABLE
CAUSE EXISTS FOR THE OPENING AND
SEARCH OF THE SUBJECT CARTON AND IN
DECLARING LEGAL AND VALID THE
SEIZURE OF SAID CARTON AND THE
SUBSEQUENT ARREST OF THE
APPELLANT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA
CONTENTS OF THE SUBJECT CARTON
AGAINST THE APPELLANT.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE SEARCH ON THE
CARTON IN QUESTION WAS INCIDENTAL
TO A LAWFUL ARREST.
V
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE SEARCH ON THE
SUBJECT CARTON WAS MADE UNDER THE
EXCEPTION OF SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE IN
PLAIN VIEW.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE ARREST OF THE
APPELLANT WAS VALID AS HE WAS
CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
POSSESSING MARIJUANA.
VII

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THERE WAS UNQUALIFIED,
VOLUNTARY AND AUTHORITATIVE
CONSENT GIVEN BY THE APPELLANT TO
THE OPENING OF THE CARTON.
VIII
ON THE ASSUMPTION EX GRATIA
ARGUMENTI THAT THE APPELLANT WAS
CAUGHT IN POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA,
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING HIM, FOR THE PROSECUTION
FAILED TO PROVE THE NEGATIVE
ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE.
IX
ON THE ASSUMPTION EX GRATIA
ARGUMENTI THAT HE WAS CAUGHT IN
PHYSICAL POSSESSION OF THE CARTON
IN QUESTION (CONTAINING MARIJUANA),
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT APPELLANT INTENDED TO
POSSESS SAID PACKS OF MARIJUANA.
X Considering that the above assigned errors are
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT APPELLANT’S PETITION TO
BE RELEASED ON BAIL CONSTITUTES
WAIVER OF ANY IRREGULARITY
ATTENDING HIS ARREST AND ESTOPS HIM
FROM QUESTIONING ITS VALIDITY.
XI
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
GIVING DUE WEIGHT, CONSIDERATION
AND CREDIT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE
APPELLANT AND IN DECLARING THE SAME
SELF-SERVING AND NOT AMPLY PROVEN.
XII
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
DISREGARDING SUBSTANTIAL
CONTRADICTIONS IN THE EVIDENCE FOR
THE PROSECUTION WHICH CREATE
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 61
REASONABLE DOUBT ON THE GUILT OF
THE APPELLANT.
XIII
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
GOING BEYOND THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION IN
SUPPORT OF ITS DECISION CONVICTING
APPELLANT.
XIV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
SENTENCING APPELLANT TO THE
MAXIMUM PENALTY OF DEATH AND
IMPOSING A FINE OF TEN MILLION PESOS.
XV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
APPELLANT WAS PROVEN BY THE
PROSECUTION BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT AND IN NOT ACQUITTING HIM."
interrelated, they will be discussed jointly.
Appellant invokes his constitutional right against
unreasonable search and seizure, contending
that: (1) the authority to open and investigate
suspicious packages and cargoes under
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 62355 does not
apply to PASCOM and NARCOM agents but is
limited only to aircraft companies or operators of
aircraft for hire; (2) he did not consent to be
searched by the authorities; (3) the prohibited
substances confiscated by the authorities were
not actually in their plain view; and (4) the
search they conducted was not incidental to a
lawful arrest.
Pertinent is Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6235
which reads:
"SECTION 8. Aircraft companies which operate
as public utilities or operators of aircraft which
are for hire are authorized to open and
investigate suspicious packages and cargoes in

the presence of the owner or shipper, or his
authorized representatives if present, in order to
help the authorities in the enforcement of the
provisions of this Act: Provided, That if the
owner, shipper or his representative refuses to
have the same opened and inspected, the
airline or air carrier is authorized to refuse the
loading thereof."
In line with the afore-cited law, the trial court
correctly upheld the PASCOM’s authority to
open packages and cargoes, thus:
"This Court does not subscribe to the contention
of the accused. The Police Aviation Security
Command (PASCOM) is the implementing arm
of the National Action Committee on Anti-
Hijacking (NACAH), which is a creation of
Presidential Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 399,
dated April 28, 1976.
"On February 18, 1978, a Memorandum of
Understanding among the Secretary of National
Defense, the Secretary of Public Works,
Transportation and Communication, the
Secretary of Justice, the Director General,
National Intelligence and Security Authority and
the Secretary of Finance was signed. The
purpose was to establish a working
arrangement among cognizant agencies, set up
guidelines and procedures for the security of the
airport complex throughout the Philippines
particularly handling, coordination and
disposition of hijacking and other criminal
incidents that may occur thereat (PAFM 3-9,
page 1-3).
‘Under the said Memorandum of Understanding
the then AVSECOM (now PASCOM) shall have
the following functions and responsibilities:
1. Secure all airports against offensive and
terroristic acts that threaten civil aviation;
2. Undertake aircraft anti-hijacking operations;
3. Exercise operational control and supervision
over all agencies involved in airport security
operations;
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 62
4. Take all necessary preventive measures to
maintain peace and order, and provide other
pertinent public safety services within the
airports;
xxx
‘One of its guidelines before the passenger can
enter the sanitized area (pre-departure area) is
to check the hand-carried luggage and personal
effects of passengers (PAFM 3-9, page 2-3).
‘Passengers are allowed one hand-carried bag
or attaché case with the following limitation:
a. x x x x x x
b. x x x x x x
c. It can be readily opened for
inspection (PAFM 3-9, page 2-4).
‘Based upon the Memorandum of
Understanding, pursuant to President LOI 399,
in relation to R.A. 6235, the PASCOM had the
legal authority to be at the Bacolod Airport,
Bacolod City and to inspect luggages or hand-
carried bags.
‘Under DOC 8973/3, Security Manual for
Safeguarding Civil Aviation against Acts of
Unlawful Interference, particularly paragraph
3.6.4 ‘when x-ray inspection is not
possible or when the x-ray image of a bag
gives rise to suspicion, x x x, a manual search
must be carried out’ (Memorandum of the
Prosecution, pp. 15-16; underscoring supplied).’
"The prosecution correctly argued that the
PASCOM established a system of
checkpoint at the pre-departure area of the
Bacolod Airport to quickly inspect or screen
persons or hand-carried baggages for illegal
items pursuant to said Memorandum of
Agreement, which in turn derived its life from
LOI 399. In short, the setting up of checkpoint at
the Bacolod Airport on April 12, 1994 does not
have only jurisprudential basis (Valmonte vs. De
Villa, et al., G.R. No. 83288, September 29,

1989, 178 SCRA 211, more popularly known as
the ‘checkpoints cases’) but also statutory basis.
"Moreover, to sustain the stand of the accused
exclusively limiting the authority to open and
search ‘suspicious’ luggages would result to
absurdity. It would deprive law enforcers of their
authority to perform their duty of maintaining
order, preserving peace, protecting life and
property and other police works such as crime
detection, while within the airport premises. The
construction given by the accused conveniently
omitted the phrase found in Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6235 which reads ‘in order to
help the authorities in the enforcement of the
provisions of this Act.’ The word ‘authorities’
evidently refers to police officers and other law
enforcers such as the PASCOM officers. It
follows that in allowing or authorizing aircraft
companies which operate as public utilities or
operators of aircraft which are for hire, to open
and investigate suspicious packages and
seizures, the authors of the law does not
disallow or prohibit law enforcement agencies of
the government from assisting or conducting the
opening and investigation of suspicious
packages and cargoes. Otherwise, they will be
remiss in their sworn duty of protecting the
public in general and more particularly those in
the aviation industry. x x x. It becomes crystal-
clear that the PASCOM officers and personnel
had the legal authority when they opened and
investigated the box in the presence of the
accused and his counsel."
This is not the first time we recognize a search
conducted pursuant to routine airport security
procedure as an exception to the proscription
against warrantless searches. In People vs.
Canton,6 and People vs. Johnson,7 we validated
the search conducted on the departing
passengers and the consequent seizure of
the shabu found in their persons, thus:
"Persons may lose the protection of the search
and seizure clause by exposure of their persons
or property to the public in a manner reflecting a
lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 63
airport security procedures. With increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism
has come increased security at the nation’s
airports. Passengers attempting to board an
aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors;
their carry-on baggage as well as checked
luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans.
Should these procedures suggest the presence
of suspicious objects, physical searches are
conducted to determine what the objects are.
There is little question that such searches are
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness,
the gravity of the safety interests involved, and
the reduced privacy expectations associated
with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often
notified through airport public address systems,
signs and notices in their airline tickets that they
are subject to search and, if any prohibited
materials or substances are found, such would
be subject to seizure. These announcements
place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless
searches and seizures do not apply to routine
airport procedures." (Underscoring ours)
Clearly, the PASCOM agents have the right
under the law to conduct search of prohibited
materials or substances. To simply refuse
passengers carrying suspected illegal items to
enter the pre-departure area, as claimed by
appellant, is to deprive the authorities of their
duty to conduct search, thus sanctioning
impotence and ineffectivity of the law enforcers,
to the detriment of society.8
It should be stressed, however, that whenever
the right against unreasonable search and
seizure is challenged, an individual may choose
between invoking the constitutional protection or
waiving his right by giving consent to the search
or seizure.9
Here, appellant voluntarily gave his consent to
the search conducted by the PASCOM agents.
The testimony of SPO1 Arturo Casugod, Sr. is
quite revealing, thus:
"Q And when the said carton box was passed
for the second time thru the walk-through

machine it indicated this metallic element by
flashing a red light, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And because of that, what did you do?
A Rhodelin Poyugao put the box on top of the
inspection table.
Q What happened then?
A And then our non-uniformed personnel, Mr.
Donato Barnezo, asked the passenger Mr.
Hedishi Suzuki, saying, ‘kindly open your box for
inspection’.
Q What happened after he asked the accused
to open the box?
A Mr. Hedishi Suzuki refused to open, sir. He
signaled ‘no, no’.
Q What happened then?
A At that juncture, sir. I advised the said
passenger, Mr. Hedishi Suzuki: ‘Very sorry, sir,
we need to open your luggage because it
indicated a red light’.
Q When you say open the luggage you are
referring to the box?
A Referring to the small carton marked
Bongbong Piaya.
Q What happened then?
A Mr. Hedishi Suzuki tried to get outside of the
pre-departure area instead of opening the box.
Q Where did Mr. Suzuki go if he went away?
A Before he could get out of the door of the pre-
departure area I called his attention to come
back.
Q Did he come back?
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 64
A He came back and I explained to him again,
sir, that we are very sorry but we need to open
your small carton marked Bongbong Piaya. I
told him, ‘I am very sorry, sir, but we need to
open your small carton marked Bongbong
Piaya’.
Q And what did Mr. Suzuki do?
A Mr. Suzuki answered me, ‘open’.
Q What did you do?
A I said ‘kindly open your carton’ and he
repeated, ‘open’.
Q For the second time?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did you do then because he said ‘open’?
A I explained to him, sir, and I asked him again,
‘sir, I am going to open this’ and he told me ‘you
open’.
Q Then, what did you do?
A I got hold of the carton and opened it by
means of cutting the masking tape that bound
both ends of the carton.
Q And what did you find inside the said box?
A When I opened the box, sir, I found out that it
contained suspected dried marijuana fruiting
tops wrapped in an aluminum foil, sir, and
transparent cellophane.
x x x."10
That appellant gave his consent when PO1
Casugod asked him to open the box was
confirmed by SPO1 Linda and PO3
Poyugao.11 As succinctly found by the trial court,
appellant cannot deny that he consented by
feigning ignorance of the English language,
thus:

"Accused through counsel would want this
Court to believe that the opening of the carton
containing marijuana fruiting tops was without
the consent of the accused. The defense relied
on the alleged inability of the accused to
understand nor speak the English language
because he is a Japanese national. It made
capital on the presence of Japanese
interpreters, Tsuyushi Tsuchida and Hideo
Agarie, who assisted during the trial.
"The Court has no doubt in the positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
their categorical declaration that accused
Hedishi Suzuki gave his consent not only
nodding his head but also by saying ‘Open.
Open. Open.’ There was even a ‘third-party
consent’ given by his Japanese companion
Takeshi Koketsu.
"The allegation of the accused that he does not
understand English is indeed incredible to
believe. As aptly observed by Assistant City
Prosecutor Rafael Guanco, the trial prosecutor,
‘the accused might not be able to speak straight
English yet he might understand English’
(Memorandum of the Prosecution, page 21).
The prosecution witnesses categorically
declared that accused Hedishi Suzuki was
speaking English during the airport encounter
with the PASCOM and NARCOM operatives
and while being investigated at the PASCOM
Office. While it may be true that Lourdes
Linsangan participated on some occasions, her
participation merely facilitated the conversation.
"The Court cannot believe accused’s
protestation of ignorance of the English
language. There are several indications that
accused understand the English language. It
may be noted that in filing a motion to terminate
the legal services of Atty. Nicanor Villarosa, it
appeared that accused caused its preparation
or filing without the assistance of a lawyer
(Motion To Terminate Services of Counsel,
page 53, expediente). The accused testified
that his wife is proficient in English. Accused
was able to play games in the casino, the night
before the airport incident. He was able to give
direction to the driver from the motel to the
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 65
airport. He has traveled to the Philippines about
ten (10) times. He claims to be an owner and
manager of a company where some clients or
customers are non-Japanese such as Germans
and Americans. During the trial accused
appeared to be an intelligent witness and this
Court has keenly observed that accused had
shown eagerness and readiness to answer the
questions propounded in the English language
even before the Japanese translation. Above all,
accused answered in the affirmative when
queried by the Court whether he was able to
attend English classes while in college. In short,
the Court was literally taken for a ride when
initially made to believe that the accused could
not read, speak and understand the English
language."
It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to
be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each
case.12 Given the circumstances obtaining here,
we find the search conducted by the airport
authorities reasonable and, therefore, not
violative of his constitutional rights. Hence,
when the search of the box of piaya revealed
several marijuana fruiting tops, appellant is
deemed to have been caught in flagrante
delicto, justifying his arrest even without a
warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure.13 The packs of
marijuana obtained in the course of such valid
search are thus admissible as evidence against
appellant.14
Nonetheless, we find the trial court’s reliance on
the plain view doctrine misplaced. Such doctrine
finds application only when the incriminating
nature of the object is in the "plain view" of the
police officer.15 Here, it is beyond cavil that the
marijuana seized from appellant is contained in
the box of piaya, wrapped in aluminum foil and
not immediately apparent to the airport
authorities.
Neither was the search incidental to a lawful
arrest since appellant was not yet arrested at
the time of the search. To be considered a
search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law

requires that there must be a lawful arrest
before the search can be made.16
At this point, it bears stressing that mere
possession of the prohibited substance is a
crime per se and the burden of proof is upon
appellant to show that he has a license or permit
under the law to possess the prohibited
drug.17 Here, appellant failed to prove that he
has a license to possess the marijuana.
In People vs. Bongcarawan,18 we held that such
possession constitutes prima facie evidence
of animus possidendi sufficient to convict an
accused in the absence of any satisfactory
explanation.
Appellant vigorously contends that the trial court
should have sustained his unrebutted testimony
that he was a victim of frame-up contrived by
Takeshi in connivance with the arresting
officers, especially C/Inspector Ernesto
Alcantara, accused in several criminal charges.
It is noteworthy that aside from appellant’s
testimony, not a shred of evidence was
presented by the defense to prove his claim that
he was framed-up. Not even Pinky who
allegedly gave him the box of piaya containing
marijuana was presented as a witness to
confirm his story. We have ruled that clear and
convincing evidence is required to prove the
defense of "frame-up" because in the absence
of proof of any intent on the part of the police
authorities to falsely impute such crime against
appellant, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty stands.19 Also,
allegations of frame-up are easily fabricated,
making it the common and standard line of
defense in prosecutions involving the
Dangerous Drugs Law.20
We are not swayed by appellant’s reference to
C/Inspector Alcantara’s criminal records.
Suffice it to state that he is neither an accused
in this case or a prosecution witness.
We have carefully reviewed the records and
found no cogent reason to overthrow the
findings of fact and conclusions of law by the
trial court. That this is a matter exclusively within
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 66
its competence, since it had the unique
opportunity of observing the witnesses and their
manner of testifying during trial, had long been
established. Hence, its findings are accorded
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal,
except when there is a clear showing that facts
of weight and substance which would affect the
outcome of the case have been overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied.21 This exception
is not present here.
However, the trial court imposed the wrong
penalty.
Under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
₱500,000.00 to ₱10,000,000.00 shall be
imposed if the quantity of marijuana or Indian
hemp shall be 750 grams or more.22 Section 63
of the Revised Penal Code provides that when
the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be
applied in the absence of any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance. 23
In the case at bar, there being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, appellant’s
24
possession of 1,547.70 grams of marijuana
does not merit the supreme penalty of death but
only reclusion perpetua.
While the imposition of a fine is mandatory in
cases of conviction of possession of illegal
drugs,25 we, however, reduce the fine imposed
by the trial court to ₱1,000,000.00, considering
that courts may fix any amount within the limits
established by law.26
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 45, Bacolod City in Criminal
Case No. 94-16100 finding appellant Hedishi
Suzuki guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425,
as amended, is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION in the sense that he is
sentenced to reclusion perpetuaand fined One
Million (₱1,000,000.00) Pesos.
Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 185719 June 17, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-
APPELLEE,
vs.
MARCELINO COLLADO Y CUNANAN, MYRA
COLLADO Y SENICA, MARK CIPRIANO Y
ROCERO, SAMUEL SHERWIN LATARIO Y
ENRIQUE,* AND REYNALDO RANADA Y
ALAS**, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Mere allegations and self-serving statements
will not overcome the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties accorded to
police officers. There must be a showing of clear
and convincing evidence to successfully rebut
this presumption.
On appeal is the February 28, 2008 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 02626 which affirmed with modification the
December 7, 2005 Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 154 in
Criminal Case Nos. 13781-D, 13783-D and
13784-D. The RTC convicted the appellants and
several other accused for violations of Republic
Act (RA) No. 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and imposed
upon them the penalty of imprisonment and
payment of fine in each of their respective
cases.
Factual Antecedents
On October 14, 2004, appellants Marcelino
Collado (Marcelino) and Myra Collado (Myra)
were charged with the crimes of sale of
dangerous drugs and maintenance of a den,
dive or resort in violation of Sections 5 and 6 of
Article II, RA 9165 docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 13781-D and 13782-D, respectively, viz:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13781-D
On or about October 9, 2004, in Pasig City, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 67
the accused, conspiring and confederating
together and both of them mutually helping and
aiding one another, not being lawfully
authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give
away to PO2 Richard N. Noble, a police poseur
buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing three (3) centigrams (0.03
gram) of white crystalline substance, which was
found positive to the test for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.
Contrary to law.3
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13782-D
On or about or immediately prior to October 9,
2004, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring
and confederating together and both of them
mutually helping and aiding one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously maintain a den, dive or resort located
at No. 32 R. Hernandez St., Brgy. San Joaquin,
Pasig City, where x x x dangerous drugs are
used or sold in any form, in violation of the said
law.
Contrary to law.4
Marcelino was also charged with illegal
possession of dangerous drugs under Section
11, Article II of the same law docketed as
Criminal Case No. 13783-D, viz:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13783-D
On or about October 9, 2004, in Pasig City, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the accused, not being lawfully authorized to
possess any dangerous drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession and under his custody and control
one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing six centigrams (0.06 gram) of white
crystalline substance, which was found to be
positive to the test for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of
the said law.

Contrary to law.5
On the other hand, appellants Mark Cipriano
(Cipriano), Samuel Sherwin Latario (Latario),
Reynaldo Ranada (Ranada), together with co-
accused Melody Apelo (Apelo), Marwin Abache
(Abache), Michael Angelo Sumulong
(Sumulong), and Jay Madarang (Madarang),
were charged with possession of drug
paraphernalia in violation of Section 14, Article
II of RA 9165, docketed as Criminal Case No.
13784-D, viz:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 13784-D
On or about October 9, 2004, in Pasig City, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the accused, each being in the proximate
company of two (2) persons and in conspiracy
with one another, without having been duly
authorized by law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in their
possession and under their custody and control
the following paraphernalias [sic], fit or intended
for smoking, consuming, administering or
introducing any dangerous drug into the body,
to wit:
a. one (1) strip aluminum foil containing traces
of white crystalline substance marked as Exh-D;
b. one (1) improvised glass tooter containing
traces of white crystalline substance marked as
Exh-D1;
c. one (1) pack transparent plastic sachet
marked as Exh-D2;
d. two (2) plastic disposable lighters marked as
Exhs. "G-H";
e. one (1) tape-sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing three (3) rolled aluminum foil
marked as Exh. D5;
f. five (5) unsealed transparent plastic sachets
marked as Exh. D6;
g. one (1) stainless scissor marked as Exh. D7;
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 68
h. one (1) rectangular glass marked as Exh. D8;
and
i. one (1) roll of aluminum foil marked as Exh.
D9.
[Specimens] marked as Exh-D and Exh-D1
were found positive to the test for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.
Contrary to law.6
Upon arraignment on November 4, 2004, all the
appellants and the other accused pleaded not
guilty.7 Pre-trial and joint trial on the merits
subsequently ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented as witnesses PO2
Richard Noble (PO2 Noble) and SPO2
Bernardo Cruz (SPO2 Cruz) who were involved
in the buy-bust operation that led to the arrest of
the appellants. Their testimonies are
summarized as follows:
On October 9, 2004, PO2 Noble received
information from a civilian asset that spouses
Marcelino and Myra were engaged in selling
shabu and that drug users, including out-of-
school youth, were using their residence in 32
R. Hernandez St., San Joaquin, Pasig City, for
their drug sessions.8 After recording the report
in the police blotter, PO2 Noble relayed the
information to his superior, P/Insp. Earl B.
Castillo (P/Insp. Castillo), who in turn ordered
the conduct of a surveillance operation.9 PO2
Noble, SPO2 Cruz and PO1 Anthony Bitbit,
conducted a surveillance on the couple’s
residence. After confirming the reported
activities, SPO2 Cruz looked for an asset who
could introduce them to Marcelino and Myra in
the ensuing buy-bust operation.10
A buy-bust operation team was thereafter
formed. After coordinating with the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency as evidenced by a
Pre-Operation Report,11 the team proceeded to
Marcelino’s and Myra’s residence on board two

private vehicles. Upon reaching the target area,
the asset introduced PO2 Noble to Marcelino as
a regular buyer of shabu.12 When asked how
much shabu he needed, PO2 Noble replied,
"dalawang piso," which means ₱200.00 worth of
drugs. But when PO2 Noble was handing over
the marked money to Marcelino, the latter
motioned that the same be given to his wife,
Myra, who accepted the money. Marcelino then
took from his pocket a small metal container
from which he brought out a small plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance and gave
the same to PO2 Noble. While PO2 Noble was
inspecting its contents, he noticed smoke
coming from a table inside the house of the
couple around which were seven
persons.13 When PO2 Noble gave the pre-
arranged signal, the backup team rushed to the
scene. Simultaneously, PO2 Noble introduced
himself as a policeman and arrested Marcelino.
He frisked him and was able to confiscate the
metal container that contained another sachet of
white crystalline substance. PO2 Noble wrote
the markings "MCC-RNN October 9, 2004" on
both the plastic sachets of white substance sold
to him by Marcelino and the one found inside the
metal container.
Meanwhile, SPO2 Cruz and another police
officer went inside the house of Marcelino and
Myra, where they found Apelo, Cipriano,
Ranada, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang and
Latario gathered around a table littered with
various drug paraphernalia such as an
improvised water pipe, strips of aluminum foil
with traces of white substance, disposable
lighters, and plastic sachets. A strip of aluminum
foil used for smoking marijuana was recovered
from Ranada. The buy-bust team arrested all
these persons, advised them of their
constitutional rights, and brought them to police
headquarters for investigation and drug testing.
A chemistry report14 on all the seized items
yielded positive results for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride. Another chemistry
report15 showed Marcelino, Apelo, Cipriano,
and Ranada positive for drug use while Myra,
Abache, Sumulong, Madarang, and Latario
were found negative.
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 69
Version of the Defense
The defense presented the testimonies of
Marcelino, Myra, and Ranada, who all
essentially put up the defense of denial. The
following is their version of the story.
Marcelino and Myra owned an electronics and
appliance repair shop annexed to their house. In
the evening of October 9, 2004, Marcelino was
in the living room with his children and nieces
fixing a VCD player. Apelo, their househelp, was
in the kitchen preparing food while Ranada, their
repairman, was outside the house fixing
Sumulong’s motorcycle. Cipriano and
Madarang were also present at the shop, the
former to redeem his car stereo and the latter to
borrow a play station CD. Latario, a housemate
of Marcelino and Myra, was also present at the
time.
Marcelino suddenly heard someone say
"Walang tatakbo!" Four armed men rushed
inside the house and pointed their guns at him
and said "Wag ka nang pumalag." He was
thereafter dragged outside where he saw the
other accused already in handcuffs. Marcelino
was later informed that they were being arrested
for selling shabu. Marcelino protested and
disclaimed any knowledge about drugs. When
the officers frisked all the accused, Marcelino
claimed that nothing illegal nor incriminating
was recovered from them.
When Myra arrived at the scene, she was
shocked to see her husband being arrested.
The police officers then brought all the accused
to the police station for further questioning.
At the police station, PO2 Noble asked
Marcelino for ₱50,000.00 as settlement of their
case. Marcelino, Apelo, Cipriano, and Ranada
were also made to drink water that according to
Marcelino tasted bitter.16 They were then
brought to Camp Crame for medical
examination and drug tests. Those who drank
the bitter water tested positive for drugs use
while the others, who did not drink, tested
negative.

Marcelino surmised that their arrest was due to
a misunderstanding he had with a former police
officer named Rey who bought a VCD player
from his shop. He specifically instructed Rey not
to let anyone repair the VCD player should it
malfunction. However, when the VCD player
malfunctioned, Rey had it repaired by
somebody else, hence Marcelino refused to
accept the VCD player and return Rey’s money.
This earned the ire of Rey who threatened him
with the words "Humanda ka pagbalik ko."17
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision18 dated December 7, 2005, the
RTC disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered as follows:
In Crim. Case No. 13781-D, finding the accused
MARCELINO COLLADO y Cunanan and MYRA
COLLADO y Senica GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of
Section 5 of R.A. 9165 (sale of dangerous drug)
and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT.
Additionally, the two accused are ordered to pay
a fine of ONE MILLION PESOS
(₱1,000,000.00) EACH.
In Crim. Case No. 13782-D, judgment is
rendered finding the accused MARCELINO
COLLADO y Cunanan and MYRA COLLADO y
Senica NOT GUILTY of the crime of violation of
Section 6.
In Crim. Case No. 13783-D, finding the accused
MARCELINO COLLADO y Cunanan GUILTY of
the offense of violation of Section 11 of R.A.
9165 and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to
FIFTEEN (15) YEARS.
The accused Marcelino Collado is also ordered
to pay a fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (₱300,000.00).
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 70
In Crim. Case No. 13784-D, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the accused MELODY APELO
y Roman, MARK CIPRIANO y Rocero,
MARWIN ABACHE y Aquilino, MICHAEL
ANGELO SUMULONG y Belarmino, JAY
MADARANG y Gomez, SAMUEL SHERWIN
LATARIO y Enrique and REYNALDO RANADA
y Alas GUILTY of the offense of violation of
Section 14 of R.A. 9165 and they are hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
TWO (2) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and
ONE (1) DAY to FOUR (4) YEARS
imprisonment. Each of them is also ordered to
pay a fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(₱10,000.00).
Let the shabu and paraphernalia alleged to be
the subject[s] of the Information be turned over
and delivered immediately to the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper
disposition.
SO ORDERED.19
Accused Apelo, Abache, Sumulong and
Madarang applied for probation.20 Hence, only
Marcelino, Myra, Cirpriano, Latario and Ranada
appealed to the CA.21
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appellate court found the warrantless arrest
of the appellants to be lawful considering that
they were caught in the act of committing a
crime.22 Thus, the CA affirmed the conviction of
Marcelino and Myra for violation of Section 5 of
RA 9165 (sale of dangerous drugs), as well as
the conviction of Marcelino for violation of
Section 11 of RA 9165 (illegal possession of
dangerous drugs). Anent the violation of Section
14 of RA 9165 (possession of drug
paraphernalia), the CA affirmed the conviction
of Ranada as he was caught having custody
and control of a drug paraphernalia intended for
smoking and injecting illegal drugs into one’s
body.23 As regards Cipriano and Latario, as well
as the other accused Apelo, Abache, Sumulong
and Madarang, the CA found them guilty not as
principals but only as accessories.

Thus, the appellate court affirmed with
modification the trial court’s Decision through a
Decision24 dated February 28, 2008, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is
AFFIRMED with respect to the conviction and
imposition of the respective penalties against
the following: (A) appellants Marcelino Collado
and Myra Collado in Crim. Case No. 13781-
D25 for violation of Section 5, Article II, RA No.
9165; (B) appellant Marcelino Collado in Crim.
Case No. 13783-D for violation of Section 11,
Article II, RA No. 9165; (C) appellant Reynaldo
Ranada in Crim. Case No. 13784-D for violation
of Section 14, Article II, RA No. 9165.
In Crim. Case No. 13784-D, MODIFICATION is
hereby ordered as to appellants Mark Cipriano
and Samuel Sherwin Latario, including co-
accused Melody Apelo, Marwin Abache,
Michael Angelo Sumulong and Jay Madarang –
insofar as they were found GUILTY, not as
principals, but as ACCESSORIES in the offense
of violation of Section 14, Article II of RA No.
9165, in relation to the aforecited provision of
the Revised Penal Code. Each of them shall
suffer the straight penalty of Four (4) Months of
arresto mayor. The fine of Ten Thousand Pesos
already imposed by the trial court upon each of
them is MAINTAINED.
SO ORDERED.26
Not satisfied, the appellants are now before this
Court arguing that irregularities attended their
arrest and detention as well as the procedure in
handling the specimen allegedly seized from
them. Because of these, they assert that their
guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Our Ruling
The appealed Decision should be affirmed, with
modification.
The presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties must
be upheld in the absence of clear and
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 71
convincing evidence to overturn the
same.
Appellants question the validity of the buy-bust
operation and point out the following
irregularities which they claim attended its
conduct: (1) lack of warrant of arrest; (2) non-
compliance with the procedures laid down under
Section 21 of RA 9165; and, (3) the alleged
extortion of money from them by PO2 Noble in
exchange for dropping the charges against
them. Due to these irregularities, appellants
argue that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties accorded to police
officers does not apply in this case.
Lack of a warrant of arrest
Appellants argue that the arrest, search, and
seizure conducted by the police were illegal
since it was not supported by a valid warrant.
They thus posit that their right to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
was violated.27
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
provides for lawful warrantless arrests, viz:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

Section 5(a) is what is known as arrest in
flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless
arrest to be valid, two requisites must concur:
"(1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and, (2) such overt act is done
in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer."28 A common example of an
arrest in flagrante delicto is one made after
conducting a buy-bust operation.
This is precisely what happened in the present
case. The arrest of the appellants was an arrest
in flagrante delicto made in pursuance of Sec.
5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The arrest
was effected after Marcelino and Myra
performed the overt act of selling to PO2 Noble
the sachet of shabu and Ranada of having in his
control and custody illegal drug paraphernalia.
Thus, there is no other logical conclusion than
that the arrest made by the police officers was a
valid warrantless arrest since the same was
made while the appellants were actually
committing the said crimes.
Moreover, assuming that irregularities indeed
attended the arrest of appellants, they can no
longer question the validity thereof as there is
no showing that they objected to the same
before their arraignment. Neither did they take
steps to quash the Informations on such
ground.29 They only raised this issue upon their
appeal to the appellate court. By this omission,
any objections on the legality of their arrest are
deemed to have been waived by them.30
Anent their claim of unreasonable search and
seizure, it is true that under the Constitution, "a
search and consequent seizure must be carried
out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes
unreasonable and any evidence obtained
therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding."31 This proscription,
however, admits of exceptions, one of which is
a warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest.32
The arrest of the appellants was lawful. Under
Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, "[a]
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 72
person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may
have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search
warrant." The factual milieu of this case clearly
shows that the search was made after
appellants were lawfully arrested. Pursuant to
the above-mentioned rule, the subsequent
search and seizure made by the police officers
were likewise valid. Hence, appellants’ claim of
unreasonable search and seizure must
fail.1âwphi1
Extortion
Appellants aver that PO2 Noble tried to extort
money from them in exchange for dropping the
drug charges against them.
The defense of extortion and/or frame-up is
often put up in drugs cases in order to cast doubt
on the credibility of police officers. This is a
serious imputation of a crime hence clear and
convincing evidence must be presented to
support the same. There must also be a
showing that the police officers were inspired by
improper motive. In this case, we find such
imputation unfounded.
In People v. Capalad,33 this Court held thus:
Charges of extortion and frame-up are
frequently made in this jurisdiction. Courts are,
thus, cautious in dealing with such accusations,
which are quite difficult to prove in light of the
presumption of regularity in the performance of
the police officers’ duties. To substantiate such
defense, which can be easily concocted, the
evidence must be clear and convincing and
should show that the members of the buy-bust
team were inspired by any improper motive or
were not properly performing their duty.
Otherwise, the police officers’ testimonies on
the operation deserve full faith and credit.
Here, aside from Marcelino’s self-serving
testimony, appellants’ claim of extortion is not
substantiated by other convincing evidence.
Neither was it established during trial that PO2
Noble or the other members of the buy-bust

team were impelled by improper motive.
Appellants’ allegation that PO2 Noble and his
team arrested them because of Marcelino’s
previous misunderstanding with a certain retired
policeman named Rey deserves no credence.
No evidence was presented to show any
connection between Rey and the buy-bust
team. It was not even shown by the defense who
this person Rey really is. Also, it is highly
unlikely that a team of police officers would
pursue a surveillance, conduct a buy-bust
operation, and arrest all the accused for a
measly ₱1,000.00 VCD player. In view of these,
appellants’ allegation of extortion and improper
motive deserves no credence.
Chain of Custody
Appellants argue that the procedure laid down
in Section 21 of RA 9165 was not followed. They
specifically harp on the fact that the confiscated
drugs were not photographed and inventoried.
Moreover, they contend that the police officers
who handled the seized specimen were not
presented in court to testify on the condition in
which they received the said specimen. For the
appellants, these defects constitute a clear
break in the chain of custody and, consequently,
the prosecution failed to establish corpus
delicti.34
The Court, however, finds this argument
unmeritorious.
Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of RA 9165
provides for the custody and disposition of the
confiscated drugs, to wit:
(1) The apprehending officer/team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof;
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 73
This rule is elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
RA 9165, viz:
a) The apprehending officer/team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/ team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizure;
Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items. (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the above-cited provisions, this
Court has consistently ruled that the failure of
the police officers to inventory and photograph
the confiscated items are not fatal to the
prosecution’s cause,35 provided that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
substance were preserved, as in this case.
Here, PO2 Noble, after apprehending Marcelino
and confiscating from him the sachets of shabu,
immediately placed his markings on them. He
testified thus:
PROSECUTOR PAZ:
Q: What did you do with that sachet containing
white substance that was bought from Marcelino
and the one that you were able to confiscate
from him?
A: I put my markings.

Q: What were those markings?
A: MCC-RNN October 9, 2004.36
In the Request for Laboratory Examination37 the
seized items were listed and inventoried. After
the conduct of the laboratory examination,
Chemistry Report No. D-807-0438 revealed that
the contents of the said sachets tested positive
for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Moreover, it is of no moment that Forensic
Chemist Alejandro De Guzman who conducted
the laboratory examination was not presented
as a witness. The non-presentation as
witnesses of other persons who had custody of
the illegal drugs is not a crucial point against the
prosecution.39 There is no requirement for the
prosecution to present as witness in a drugs
case every person who had something to do
with the arrest of the accused and the seizure of
the prohibited drugs from him.40 To stress, the
implementing rules are clear that non-
compliance with the requirements under
justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items.41
Criminal Case No. 13784-D
With regard to Criminal Case No. 13784-D for
illegal possession of drug paraphernalia, we find
it imperative to re-examine the findings of both
the RTC and the CA.
The RTC’s findings are as follows:
The evidence for the prosecution clearly shows
that certain things or paraphernalia which are fit
or intended [for] smoking shabu were found in
the house of the accused Marcelino and Myra
Collado on the same occasion that the said
spouses were arrested by the police officers.
This fact makes all the accused without
exception liable for violation of Section 14. While
it was only Reynaldo Ranada who was caught
having in his possession an item used in
smoking marijuana, i.e., a strip of aluminum foil
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 74
x x x and nothing was found in the possession
of the other accused, this fact nonetheless does
not render Reynaldo Ranada the only person
liable for violation of Section 14. [Take note] that
the law speaks not only of possession but also
of having under one’s control the paraphernalia
intended for smoking. In the instant case, the
paraphernalia were found by the police on top of
the table around which the accused were
gathered. Hence, even if the x x x accused other
than Ranada did not have in their possession
any of the paraphernalia, it can, however, be
said that the paraphernalia found on top of the
table were under their control. x x x42
Thus, the RTC found Ranada, Cipriano, Latario,
Apelo Abache, Sumulong and Madarang all
equally guilty of illegal possession of drug
paraphernalia.
On appeal, however, the CA found Ranada
guilty as principal while Cipriano, Latario, Apelo,
Abache, Sumulong and Madarang were
adjudged as accessories only for the crime of
illegal possession of drug paraphernalia. The
CA ratiocinated thus:
On the one hand, we sustain the conviction of
Rañada in Crim. Case 13784-D. He was
actually caught having custody and control of
the confiscated drug paraphenalia intended for
smoking, injecting, etc. into one’s body. It was
also indubitably shown that he failed to present
authority to possess the prohibited articles,
much less, an explanation of his possession
thereof. However, as regards the other accused
who were seen in the company of Rañada, the
evidence of conspiracy against them was
insufficient.
To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by
reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have
performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity. Responsibility of a
conspirator is not confined to the
accomplishment of a particular purpose of
conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and
offenses incident to and growing out of the
purpose intended.

It may be that appellants Mark Cipriano and
Samuel Sherwin Latario and co-accused
Melody Apelo, Marwin Abache, Michael Angelo
Sumulong, Jay Madarang were in close
proximity [to] Rañada at the time and place of
the incident. But mere presence at the scene of
the crime does not imply conspiracy. The
prosecution failed to show specific overt acts
that would link these accused to Ranada’s
possession of the said contrabands. As to why
they were there [in] the vicinity of the crime
scene was not explained. They could be mere
innocent onlookers although they were aware of
the illegality of the principal’s acts.
In any event, appellants Cipriano and Latario
and the rest of the accused cannot be totally
exonerated.1âwphi1 [However, we] downgrade
their culpability corresponding to their criminal
design and participation. Evidently, they are
guilty as accessories who, according to
paragraph 1, Article 19 of the Revised Penal
Code, are criminally liable by ‘profiting
themselves or assisting the offender to profit by
the effects of the crime’.43
We find that the CA erred in convicting Cipriano,
Latario, Apelo, Abache, Sumulong and
Madarang as accessories. As pointed out by
Justice Arturo D. Brion:
"[I]llegal possession of equipment, instrument,
apparatus and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs during parties, social
gatherings or meetings under Section 14 of R.A.
No. 9165 is a crime of malum prohibitum, that is,
the act is made wrong or evil because there is a
law prohibiting it. x x x
Since violation of Section 14 of R.A. No. 9165 is
a crime of mala prohibita, the degree of
participation of the offenders is not considered.
All who perpetrated the prohibited act are
penalized to the same extent. There is no
principal or accomplice or accessory to
consider. In short, the degree of participation of
the offenders does not affect their liability, and
the penalty on all of them are the same whether
they are principals or merely accomplices or
accessories.44
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 75
In addition, Section 98 of RA 9165 specifically
provides that "[n]otwithstanding any law, rule or
regulation to the contrary, the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3814), as
amended, shall not apply to the provisions of
this Act, except in the case of minor offenders.
Where the offender is a minor, the penalty for
acts punishable by life imprisonment to death
provided herein shall be reclusion perpetua to
death." It is therefore clear that the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 19
on Accessories, cannot be applied in
determining the degree of participation and
criminal liability of Ranada’s co-accused.
At any rate, this Court is convinced that only
Ranada should be held liable for violation of
Section 14 of RA 9165. It is clear that it was only
Ranada who was caught having in his
possession an aluminum foil intended for using
dangerous drugs.45 As to the other co-accused,
namely Apelo, Abache, Cipriano, Latario,
Madarang, and Sumulong, not one drug
paraphernalia was found in their possession.
The police officers were only able to find the
other drug paraphernalia scattered on top of a
table. It is already established that there was no
conspiracy between Ranada and the other co-
accused. As the CA correctly held, mere
presence at the scene of the crime does not
imply conspiracy.46
PO2 Noble, when placed on the witness stand,
only testified as follows:
A-
While I was checking the item that I bought, I
saw several persons inside their house.
Q-
What were these persons doing?
A-
Some were seated, some were standing and
there was x x x smoke.
Q-
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 76

Where was this smoke coming from?
A-
I did not see where the smoke [was] coming
from because some of the persons were
blocking [my view].
Q-
What about those who were standing, what
were they doing?
A-
The persons who were standing were looking at
the persons who were sitting. I could not see
them clearly because some of them were
blocking my view.

About how many persons were inside who were Q-

seated and who were standing?
How far were they, those who were seated and
A- those who were standing?

Seven (7). A-

Q- They were close to each other.

Will you tell us if they are male or female or Q-

both?
How long did you take a look at these persons
A- inside the house?

Six (6) male persons and one (1) female. A-

Q- Only for a while, only for a glance, sir.47

What are these persons who were seated inside On the other hand, SPO2 Bernardo Cruz
the house doing? testified that it was only Ranada who was
caught holding the aluminum foil, viz:
A-
Q-
They were allegedly engaged in drug session.
How about the aluminum foil that you recovered
COURT: from another?

Q- A-

What do you mean allegedly? I saw him holding the strip of aluminum foil, sir.

A- Q-

Because there was smoke and I did not see So, nothing was confiscated in the person of all
what they were using. other accused except for Ranada?

PROSECUTOR PAZ: A-

Q- Yes, sir.48
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 77

Therefore, Apelo, Abache, Cipriano, Latario,

Madarang, and Sumulong should be acquitted
of the charge of violation of Section 14, RA 9165
on possession of equipment, instrument,
apparatus and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs.

All told, this Court upholds the presumption of

regularity in the performance of official duties by
the police officers involved in this case. The
defense was not able to show by clear and
convincing evidence why the presumption
should be overturned. The prosecution, on the
other hand, was able to establish that Marcelino,
Myra and Ranada committed the crimes
imputed against them, they having been caught
in flagrante delicto. This Court, being convinced
that the guilt of Marcelino, Myra, and Ranada
have been proven beyond reasonable doubt,
must uphold their conviction.

As to Apelo, Abache, Cipriano, Latario,

Madarang, and Sumulong, the Court finds that
they should be acquitted of the offense of
violation of Section 14, Article II, RA 9165, since
the prosecution was not able to clearly show
specific overt acts that would prove that they
were in possession of drug paraphernalia.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY

GRANTED. The February 28, 2008 Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02626 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that
appellants Mark Cipriano and Samuel Sherwin
Latario, including co-accused Melody Apelo,
Marwin Abache, Michael Angelo Sumulong, and
Jay Madarang are hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime of violation of Section 14, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165. They are ordered
released unless they are being lawfully held for
some other cause.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 196966 October 23, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee,
vs.
MICHAEL MAONGCO y YUMONDA and
PHANS BANDALI y SIMPAL, Accused-
Appellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated September 6,
2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 03505, which affirmed in toto the
Decision2 dated June 11, 2008 of the Regional
Trial Court RTC), Branch 82, Quezon City, in
Criminal Case Nos. Q-04-127731-32, finding
accused-appellants Michael Y. Maongco
Maongco) and Phans S. Bandali Bandali) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Article II,
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Accused-appellants were separately charged
for illegally dispensing, delivering, transporting,
distributing, or acting as brokers of dangerous
drugs under the following amended
Informations:
[Criminal Case No. Q-04-127731]
The undersigned accuses MICHAEL
MAONGCO y YUMONDA for Violation of
Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 (Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002), committed as
follows:
That on or about the 19th day of June, 2004 in
Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not
being authorized by law to sell, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous
drug, did, then and there willfully and unlawfully
dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as
broker in the said transaction, four point fifty
(4.50) grams of Methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.3
[Criminal Case No. Q-04-127732]
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 78
The undersigned accuses PHANS BANDALI y
SIMPAL for Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A.
9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002), committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of June, 2004 in
Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, not
being authorized by law to sell, dispense,
deliver, transport or distribute any dangerous
drug, did, then and there willfully and unlawfully
dispense, deliver, transport, distribute or act as
broker in the said transaction, four point forty-
five (4.45) grams of Methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.4
When arraigned on September 13, 2004, both
accused-appellants pleaded not guilty.5
During trial, the prosecution presented the
testimonies of Police Officer (PO) 1 Dominador
Arugay (Arugay)6 and PO2 Vener Ong
(Ong),7 who arrested accused-appellants. The
testimonies of Police Inspector (P/Insp.)
Erickson Calabocal (Calabocal),8 the forensic
chemist, and Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1
Adonis Sugui (Sugui),9 the post investigating
officer, were dispensed with after the defense
agreed to a stipulation of the substance of the
two witnesses’ testimonies, but with the
qualification that said witnesses had no
personal knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding accused-appellants’ arrest and the
source of the plastic sachets of shabu.
The object and documentary evidence of the
prosecution, all admitted by the
10
RTC, consisted of the Request for Laboratory
Examination;11 an Improvised Envelope
containing the plastic sachets of suspected
methamphetamine hydrochloride, more
popularly known as shabu;12 P/Insp.
Calabocal’s Chemistry Report No. D-360-
04;13 P/Insp. Calabocal’s Certification14 stating
that the contents of the plastic sachets tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride;
PO1 Arugay’s Sinumpaang Salaysay;15 PO2
Ong’s Sinumpaang Salaysay;16 and the
Referral of the case to the Prosecutor’s Office of
Quezon City.17

The prosecution’s evidence presented the
following version of the events leading to
accused-appellants’ arrests.
Based on a tip from a confidential informant, the
Station Anti-Illegal Drugs of the Navotas City
Police conducted a special operation on June
18, 2004, which resulted in the arrest of a certain
Alvin Carpio (Carpio) for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs and seizure from Carpio’s
possession of 15 heat-sealed plastic sachets
containing shabu . When questioned by the
police, Carpio admitted that the shabu came
from accused-appellant Maongco.
Consequently, the police planned an operation
to apprehend accused-appellant Maongco and
formed a team for this purpose, composed of
PO1 Arugay, PO2 Ong, PO2 Geoffrey Huertas
(Huertas), and PO1 Jesus del Fierro (Del
Fierro).
On June 19, 2004, after coordination with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA),
the police team was briefed about the operation.
The police team allowed Carpio to talk to
accused-appellant Maongco on the cellphone to
arrange for a sale transaction of shabu. At
around 10:30 in the morning, the police team,
accompanied and guided by Carpio, proceeded
to the vicinity of Quezon corner Roces Avenues
in Quezon City frequented by accused-appellant
Maongco. PO1 Arugay, PO2 Ong, and Carpio
rode a taxi, while PO1 Del Fierro and PO2
Huertas followed in an owner-type jeep. Carpio
spotted accused-appellant Maongco at a
waiting shed and pointed out the latter to the
police. PO2 Arugay alighted from the taxi and
approached accused-appellant Maongco. PO2
Arugay introduced himself to accused-appellant
Maongco as Carpio’s cousin, and claimed that
Carpio was sick and could not be there
personally. PO2 Arugay then asked from
accused-appellant Maongco for Carpio’s order
of " dalawang bulto." Accused-appellant
Maongco drew out from his pocket a sachet of
shabu and showed it to PO2 Arugay. When PO2
Arugay got hold of the sachet of shabu , he
immediately revealed that he was a police
officer, arrested accused-appellant Maongco,
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 79
and apprised the latter of his constitutional
rights.
When the police team questioned accused-
appellant Maongco as to the other " bulto " of
shabu Carpio had ordered, accussed-appellant
disclosed that the same was in the possession
of accused-appellant Bandali, who was then at
Jollibee Pantranco branch along Quezon
Avenue. The police team, with Carpio and
accused-appellant Maongco, went to the said
restaurant where accused-appellant Maongco
identified accused-appellant Bandali to the
police team as the one wearing a blue shirt. PO2
Ong approached accused-appellant Bandali
and demanded from the latter the other half of
the drugs ordered. Accused-appellant Bandali
voluntarily handed over a sachet of shabu to
PO2 Ong. Thereafter, PO2 Ong apprised
accused-appellant Bandali of his constitutional
rights and arrested him.
The police team first brought accused-
appellants to the East Avenue Medical Center
for medical examination to prove that accused-
appellants sustained no physical injuries during
their apprehension. Afterwards, the police team
brought accused-appellants to the police station
in Navotas City. At the police station, PO1
Arugay marked the sachet of shabu from
accused-appellant Maongco with the initials
"MMY," while PO2 Ong marked the sachet of
shabu from accused-appellant Bandali with the
initials "PBS." PO1 Arugay and PO2 Ong turned
over the two sachets of shabu to the custody of
PO1 Del Fierro and SPO1 Sugui. The sachets
of shabu were then inventoried, photographed
in the presence of accused-appellants, and
submitted for laboratory examination.
P/Insp. Calabocal received the sachets of shabu
for chemical analysis. P/Insp. Calabocal’s
examination revealed that the contents of the
sachets marked "MMY" and "PBS" weighed
4.50 grams and 4.45 grams, respectively, and
both tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
When the defense’s turn to present evidence
came, the accused-appellants took the witness

stand.18 Accused-appellants asserted that they
did not know each other prior to their arrests and
they were illegally arrested, extorted for money,
physically beaten, and framed-up by the police.
On June 11, 2008, the RTC promulgated its
Decision finding accused-appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegally selling
shabu, penalized under Article II, Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered finding accused MICHAEL
MAONGCO y YUMONDA, accused in Ciminal
Case No. Q-04-127731 and PHANS BANDALI
y SIMPAL, accused in Ciminal Case No. Q-04-
127732, both guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violations of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165. Accordingly, they are hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT
and each to pay a fine in the amount of Five
Hundred Thousand (₱500,000.00) Pesos.19
Accused-appellants appealed to the Court of
Appeals. In their Brief,20 accused-appellants
imputed the following errors on the part of the
RTC:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO
THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE
NOTWITHSTANDING ITS FAILURE TO
PROVE THE IDENTITY AND INTEGRITY OF
THE SHABU ALLEGEDLY SEIZED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
DESPITE THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
THE "OBJECTIVE TEST" IN BUY-BUST
OPERATIONS.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING
THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN
THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY BY
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 80
THE POLICE OFFICERS DESPITE THE
PATENT IRREGULARITIES IN THE BUY-
BUST OPERATION.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS
DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO
PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. 21
Plaintiff-appellee countered in its Brief22 that:
I.
THE COURT A QUO PROPERLY ADMITTED
THE SHABU IN EVIDENCE.
II.
THERE WAS A LEGITIMATE "BUY-BUST"
OPERATION IN THE CASE AT BAR WHICH
RESULTED IN THE LAWFUL ARREST,
PROSECUTION AND CONVICTION OF
APPELLANTS.
III.
THE COURT A QUO PROPERLY FOUND
APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED.23
In its Decision dated September 6, 2010, the
Court of Appeals found no palpable error in the
judgment of conviction rendered by the RTC
against accused-appellants and rejected
accused-appellants’ argument that the
prosecution failed to establish the factual details
constituting the essential elements of an illegal
sale of dangerous drugs. According to the
appellate court, Article II, Section 5 of Republic
Act No. 9165 penalizes not only those who sell
dangerous drugs, but also those who "trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug," without being
authorized by law. In this case, the prosecution
was able to prove with moral certainty that

accused-appellants were caught in the act of
illegally delivering, giving away to another, or
distributing sachets of shabu. In the end, the
Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 82 dated June 11, 2008 convicting
appellants for violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.24
Hence, this appeal.
Since accused-appellants had opted not to file
any supplemental briefs, the Court considers
the same issues and arguments raised by
accused-appellants before the Court of
Appeals.
Accused-appellants stress that for a judgment of
conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, the identities of the buyer and seller, the
delivery of the drugs, and the payment in
consideration thereof, must all be duly proven.
However, accused-appellants lament that in
their case, the prosecution failed to establish by
evidence these essential elements of the
alleged sale of shabu. Accused-appellants add
that the prosecution was also unable to show
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized shabu had been preserved in
accordance with Section 21(a) of the
Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 9165.
Accused-appellants point out that PO1 Arugay
did not mention the time and place of the
marking of the sachet of shabu purportedly sold
to him by accused-appellant Maongco; while
PO2 Ong admitted that he marked the sachet of
shabu he received from accused-appellant
Bandali only at the police station. Both PO1
Arugay and PO2 Ong merely provided an
obscure account of the marking of the sachets
of shabu, falling short of the statutory
requirement that the marking of the seized
drugs be made immediately after seizure and
confiscation.
The appeal is partly meritorious.
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 81
In the case of accused-appellant Maongco, the
Court finds that the RTC and the Court of
Appeals both erred in convicting him in Criminal
Case No. Q-04-127731 for the illegal sale of
shabu under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 9165. The evidence on record does not
support accused-appellant Maongco’s
conviction for said crime, especially considering
the following answers of prosecution witness
PO1 Arugay during the latter’s cross-
examination, practically admitting the lack of
consideration/payment for the sachet of shabu:
Q. What did you tell Michael Maongco?
A. I introduced myself as the cousin of Alvin, sir.
Q. After that, you immediately arrested him?
A. Yes, sir. I first asked my order of shabu.
Q. In your affidavit, you testified that you asked
one "bulto" of shabu?
A. More or less five grams of shabu, sir.
Q. Did the accused ask any in exchange of that
shabu?
A. No, sir.
Q. Immediately, you arrested him already?
A. After I got my order from him, I introduced
myself as policeman, sir.
COURT:
Who gave you that one "bulto" of shabu?
A. I have the money but he did not ask it from
me, your Honor.
Q. Was there any arrangement between you
and Maongco as to how much this one "bulto"
cost? A. Alvin and Maongco were the ones who
talked.
xxxx

Q. Meaning to say, it was Maongco and Alvin
who talked in Quezon Avenue?
A. They talked over the cellphone.
xxxx
Q. But you did not hear the conversation?
A. No, sir.25 (Emphases supplied.)
Inarguably, consideration/payment is one of the
essential elements of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, without which, accused-appellant
Maongco’s conviction for said crime cannot
stand. Nonetheless, accused-appellant
Maongco is still not absolved of criminal liability.
A review of the Information in Criminal Case No.
Q-04-127731 readily reveals that accused-
appellant Maongco was not actually charged
with illegal sale of shabu. Said Information
specifically alleged that accused-appellant
Maongco "willfully and unlawfully dispensed,
delivered, transported, distributed or acted as
broker" in the transaction involving 4.50 grams
of shabu. These acts are likewise punishable
under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No.
9165.
Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165
provides:
SECTION 5. Sale, Trading, Administration,
Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.
– The penalty of life imprisonment to death and
a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand
pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
(₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
transport any dangerous drug, including any
and all species of opium poppy regardless of the
quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a
broker in any of such transactions. (Emphasis
supplied.)
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 82
Several of the acts enumerated in the foregoing
provision have been explicitly defined under
Article I, Section 3 of the same statute, viz:
Section 3. Definitions. As used in this Act, the
following terms shall mean:
(a) Administer. – Any act of introducing any
dangerous drug into the body of any person,
with or without his/her knowledge, by injection,
inhalation, ingestion or other means, or of
committing any act of indispensable assistance
to a person in administering a dangerous drug
to himself/herself unless administered by a duly
licensed practitioner for purposes of medication.
xxxx
(k) Deliver. – Any act of knowingly passing a
dangerous drug to another, personally or
otherwise, and by any means, with or without
consideration.
xxxx
(m) Dispense. – Any act of giving away, selling
or distributing medicine or any dangerous drug
with or without the use of prescription.
xxxx
(ii) Sell. – Any act of giving away any dangerous
drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical whether for money or any other
consideration.
(jj) Trading. – Transactions involving the illegal
trafficking of dangerous drugs and/or controlled
precursors and essential chemicals using
electronic devices such as, but not limited to,
text messages, e-mail, mobile or landlines, two-
way radios, internet, instant messengers and
chat rooms or acting as a broker in any of such
transactions whether for money or any other
consideration in violation of this Act. (Emphasis
supplied.)
As for the illegal delivery of dangerous drugs, it
must be proven that (1) the accused passed on
possession of a dangerous drug to another,

personally or otherwise, and by any means; (2)
such delivery is not authorized by law; and (3)
the accused knowingly made the delivery.
Worthy of note is that the delivery may be
committed even without consideration.
It is not disputed that accused-appellant
Maongco, who was working as a taxi driver at
the time of his arrest,26 had no authority under
the law to deliver any dangerous drug. The
existence of the two other elements was
established by PO1 Arugay’s testimony that
provided the following details:
FISCAL ANTERO:
Q. Why did you arrest this certain Alvin?
A. For violation of R.A. 9165, sir.
Q. What happened when you arrested this alias
Alvin?
A. We investigated on where the shabu he was
selling came from.
Q. What was the result of your inquiry as to the
source of the shabu?
A. We learned that the source came from a
certain Michael, sir.
Q. When you found out that the source came
from a certain Michael, what did you do, Mr.
Witness?
A. We formed a team and we made a Pre-
Operation Report, sir.
Q. Aside from mentioning about the source as
Michael, what are the other details?
A. No more, sir. On June 19, 2004 at about
10:30 a.m., our group was dispatched in
Quezon Avenue corner Roces Avenue.
xxxx
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 83
Q. What happened when you arrived in that
area?
A. We went to the place where Michael is always
staying and when he arrived he was pointed by
Alvin, sir.
Q. What did you do when Alvin pointed to
Michael?
A. I pretended to be the cousin of Alvin who was
going to get the order.
Q. What happened when you approached this
Michael?
A. I asked from him my order of "dalawang
bulto" and he asked me who am I and I told him
that I am the cousin of Alvin and that Alvin
cannot come because he was sick, sir.
Q. What happened after you said that?
A. I asked from him my order and then he took
something out from his pocket and he showed it
to me. It was a shabu, sir.
Q. What happened next?
A. After I got the order we arrested Michael, sir.
xxxx
ATTY. BARTOLOME:
Q. What was Maongco doing at that time?
A. He was staying in a waiting shed along
Quezon Avenue, sir.
Q. What was he doing there?
A. He was waiting for somebody, sir.
Q. Immediately you approached Maongco?
A. He was pointed by Alvin, sir. I alighted from
the taxi.

Q. What was his reaction when you approached
him?
A. He was a bit surprised, sir.
Q. What did you tell Michael Maongco?
A. I introduced myself as the cousin of Alvin, sir.
Q. After that, you immediately arrested him?
A. Yes, sir. I first asked my order my shabu.
Q. In your Affidavit, you testified that you asked
one "bulto" of shabu?
A. More or less five grams of shabu,
sir.27 (Emphases supplied.)
There was a prior arrangement between Carpio
and accused-appellant Maongco. When PO1
Arugay appeared for his purportedly indisposed
cousin, Carpio, and asked for his order of
shabu, accused-appellant Maongco
immediately understood what PO1 Arugay
meant. Accused-appellant Maongco took out a
sachet of shabu from his pocket and handed
over possession of said sachet to PO1 Arugay.
Based on the charges against accused-
appellant Maongco and the evidence presented
by the prosecution, accused-appellant Maongco
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
delivery of shabu under Article II, Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9165.
For the same reasons cited in the preceding
paragraphs, the RTC and the Court of Appeals
also erred in convicting accused-appellant
Bandali for the crime of illegal sale of shabu in
Criminal Case No. Q-04-127732.
The Information against accused-appellant
Bandali, same as that against accused-
appellant Maongco, charged him with "willfully
and unlawfully dispensing, delivering,
transporting, distributing or acting as broker" in
the transaction involving 4.45 grams of shabu .
However, unlike accused-appellant Maongco,
accused-appellant Bandali cannot be convicted
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 84
for illegal delivery of shabu under Article II,
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, given that
the circumstances surrounding the arrest of the
latter were radically different from those of the
former.
PO2 Ong testified:
Q. How did this Arugay arrest this Michael?
A. I was only a back-up of Arugay, sir.
Q. What did you see, if any?
A. I saw that he recovered one (1) heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet, sir.
Q. He recovered it from whom?
A. From Michael Maongco, sir.
xxxx
Q. What happened when this man was arrested
by Arugay?
A. We looked for the other "bulto" because
according to Michael there were two and it was
in the possession of Phans, sir.
THE COURT:
Q. Where did you look for him?
A. At Jollibee, Pantranco, your Honor.
xxxx
Q. Did you find him in Jollibee?
A. Yes, your Honor, because according to
Michael Maongco he was wearing blue T-shirt.
Q. What did you do when you found him at
Jollibee?
A. I went near him and asked him to put out the
other shabu in his possession, your Honor.

Q. You yourself?
A. My companions were just there, your Honor.
Q. You yourself approached him?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. When you demanded the production of
what?
A. One (1) bulto of shabu, your Honor.
PROS. ANTERO:
Q. Why do you know that he was Bandali?
A. Because Michael Maongco was pointing to
him that he was Phans Bandali, sir.
Q. Was Michael with you when you went to that
Jollibee?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What happened when you demanded from
Bandali this shabu?
A. He voluntarily put out the shabu, sir.
Q. What happened next, Mr. Witness?
A. I told him of his violation and his rights,
sir.28 PO2 Ong further confirmed during his
cross-examination:
Q. Now, Mr. Witness, you mentioned a while
ago that you arrested Phans Bandali inside
Jollibee, Pantranco.1avvphi1 Is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you did not buy from him a shabu, Mr.
Witness?
A. No, sir.
Q. You just demanded from him a plastic
sachet?
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 85
A. Yes, sir.29 (Emphases supplied.)
In accused-appellant Bandali’s case, it cannot
be said that he knowingly passed on the sachet
of shabu in his possession to PO2 Ong. PO2
Ong approached accused-appellant Bandali as
a police officer, absent any pretense, and
demanded that the latter bring out the other
sachet of shabu. Accused-appellant Bandali’s
voluntary production of the sachet of shabu in
his possession was in subservience to PO2
Ong’s authority. PO2 Ong then acquired the
sachet of shabu from accused-appellant Bandali
by seizure, not by delivery. Even if there may be
doubt as to whether or not accused-appellant
Bandali was actually aware at that moment that
PO2 Ong was a police officer, the ambiguity
would still be resolved in accused-appellant
Bandali’s favor.
This does not mean though that accused-
appellant Bandali goes scot-free. The evidence
for the prosecution did establish that accused-
appellant Bandali committed illegal possession
of dangerous drugs, penalized under Article II,
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165.
For the prosecution of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs to prosper, the following
essential elements must be proven, namely: (1)
the accused is in possession of an item or object
that is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possess the
said drug.30Accused-appellant Maongco
informed the police officers that the other sachet
of shabu was in the possession of accused-
appellant Bandali. Accused-appellant Bandali
herein was in possession of the sachet of shabu
as he was sitting at Jollibee Pantranco branch
and was approached by PO2 Ong. Hence,
accused-appellant Bandali was able to
immediately produce and surrender the said
sachet upon demand by PO2 Ong. Accused-
appellant Bandali, admittedly jobless at the time
of his arrest,31 did not have any authority to
possess shabu. And as to the last element, the
rule is settled that possession of dangerous
drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi, which is

sufficient to convict an accused in the absence
of a satisfactory explanation of such
possession.32
But can accused-appellant Bandali be convicted
for illegal possession of dangerous drugs under
Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165
when he was charged with illegal dispensation,
delivery, transportation, distribution or acting as
broker of dangerous drugs under Article II,
Section 5 of the same statute? The Court
answers in the affirmative.
Rule 120, Section 4 of the Rules of Court
governs situations where there is a variance
between the crime charged and the crime
proved, to wit:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between
allegation and proof. – When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes
the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the
offense charged which is included in the offense
proved.
Well-settled in jurisprudence that the crime of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs necessarily
includes the crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.33 The same ruling may also
be applied to the other acts penalized under
Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165
because for the accused to be able to trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit, or
transport any dangerous drug, he must
necessarily be in possession of said drugs.
At the outset of the trial, both parties had
admitted the laboratory results showing that the
contents of the two sachets tested positive for
shabu, although accused-appellants contest the
identity and integrity of the sachets and contents
actually tested since the chain of custody of the
same was not satisfactorily established in
accordance with Republic Act No. 9165 and its
implementing rules.
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 86
The Court disagrees with accused-appellants as
the police officers had substantially complied
with the chain of custody rule under Section
21(a) of the Implementing Rules of Republic Act
No. 9165. The Court had previously held that in
dangerous drugs cases, the failure of the police
officers to make a physical inventory, to
photograph, and to mark the seized drugs at the
place of arrest do not render said drugs
inadmissible in evidence or automatically impair
the integrity of the chain of custody of the
same.34 The Court had further clarified, in
relation to the requirement of marking the drugs
"immediately after seizure and confiscation,"
that the marking may be undertaken at the
police station rather than at the place of arrest
for as long as it is done in the presence of the
accused and that what is of utmost importance
is the preservation of its integrity and evidentiary
value.35
The Court finds no fault on the part of both the
RTC and the Court of Appeals in giving more
weight and credence to the testimonies of the
police officers vis-à-vis those of the accused-
appellants. Questions as to the credibility of
witnesses are matters best left to the
appreciation of the trial court because of its
unique opportunity of having observed that
elusive and incommunicable evidence of the
witnesses’ deportment on the stand while
testifying, which opportunity is denied to the
reviewing tribunal.36
Moreover, accused-appellants’ uncorroborated
defenses of denial and claims of frame-up
cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti. The
testimonies of police officers who caught the
accused-appellants in flagrante delicto are
usually credited with more weight and credence,
in the absence of evidence that they have been
inspired by an improper or ill motive, than the
defenses of denial and frame-up of an accused
which have been invariably viewed with disfavor
for it can easily be concocted. In order to
prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up
must be proved with strong and convincing
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 87

evidence,37 which accused-appellants failed to ordered to pay a FINE of Five Hundred

present in this case. Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00); and

Lastly, the Court determines the proper
penalties to be imposed upon accused-
appellants.1âwphi1
Under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No.
9165, the penalties for the illegal delivery of
dangerous drugs, regardless of the quantity
thereof, shall be life imprisonment to death and
a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos
(₱10,000,000.00). Hence, accused-appellant
Maongco, for his illegal delivery of shabu in
Criminal Case No. Q-04-127731, is sentenced
to life imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00).
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-04-127732, accused-
appellant PHANS SIMP AL BAND ALI is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
possession of shabu with a net weight of 4.45
grams, penalized under Article II, Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 9165, and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day, as the minimum
term, to twenty (20) years, as the maximum
term, and ordered to pay a FINE of Four
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱400,000.00).
SO ORDERED.

Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165

prescribes the penalty, for possession of less
than five grams of dangerous drugs, of
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years, plus a fine ranging
from Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱400,000.00). Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum
term shall not exceed the maximum fixed by law
and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term as prescribed by the same law.
Resultantly, accused-appellant Bandali, for his
illegal possession of 4.45 grams of shabu in
Criminal Case No. Q-04-127732, is sentenced
to imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day, as the minimum term, to twenty (20) years,
as the maximum term, and ordered to pay a fine
of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱400,000.00).

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision Is

AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS to read as
follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. Q-04-127731, accused-

appellant MICHAEL YUMONDA MAONGCO is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal delivery of shabu penalized under Article
II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, and is
sentenced to LIFE IMPRISONMENT and

G.R. No. 189840 December 11, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee,
vs.
JAY MONTEVIRGEN y OZARAGA, Accused-
Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Failure to physically inventory and photograph
the shabu seized from an accused in the
manner prescribed by law do not invalidate his
arrest or render said drug inadmissible in
evidence if its integrity and evidentiary value
remain intact. It could still be utilized in
determining the guilt or innocence of the
accused.1
Factual Antecedents
On appeal is the Decision2 dated July 31, 2009
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 03208 which affirmed the
Decision3 dated December 18, 2007 of Branch
65, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in
Criminal Case Nos. 05-1396 to 1397 convicting
beyond reasonable doubt Jay
Montevirgen y Oza.raga (appellant) for the
crime of illegal sale and possession
of shabu under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9165 or the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002."
The Informations against appellant read as
follows:
Criminal Case No. 05-1396
That on or about the 19th day of July 2005, in
the City of Makati, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without being authorized by
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell distribute and transport,
weighing zero point zero four (0.04) gram of
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu),
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 88
which is a dangerous drug, in violation of the
above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Criminal Case No. 05-1397
That on or about the 19th day of July 2005, in
the City of Makati, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, not lawfully authorized to
possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug
and without the corresponding license or
prescription, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, direct custody and control weighing
zero point zero four (0.04) gram and zero point
ten (0.10) gram or [a] total weight of zero point
fourteen (0.14) gram of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu), which is a dangerous
drug, in violation of the above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
During arraignment, appellant pleaded "not
guilty" in the two cases. After the pre-trial
conference, a joint trial on the merits ensued.
Version of the Prosecution
On July 18, 2005, P/Supt. Marietto Valerio
(P/Supt. Valerio) of the Makati City Police
Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation
Task Force received a report from a confidential
informant that appellant was selling shabu in
Malvar Street, Barangay South Cembo, Makati
City. Thus, he immediately formed a team
composed of police officers and personnel of
the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council (MADAC)
to conduct a buy-bust operation against
appellant. The members of the entrapment team
were PO3 Esterio M. Ruiz, Jr. (PO3 Ruiz), PO1
Percival Mendoza, PO1 Honorio Marmonejo
(PO1 Marmonejo), Barangay Captain Rodolfo
Doromal, Eugenio Dizer, Miguel Castillo, Leo
Sese, and Anthony Villanueva. PO3 Ruiz was
designated as poseur-buyer and was provided
with two 100-peso bills marked money. PO1
Marmonejo, on the other hand, coordinated the
operation with the Philippine Drug Enforcement

Agency (PDEA), which issued a Certificate of
Coordination.6 The buy-bust team then
proceeded to the subject area but could not
locate appellant.7
The next day, July 19, 2005, the buy-bust team
returned to Malvar Street and found appellant
talking to three men. After these men departed,
PO3 Ruiz, accompanied by the confidential
informant, approached appellant. The
confidential informant introduced PO3 Ruiz to
appellant and told him that PO3 Ruiz wanted to
buy shabu. Appellant asked PO3 Ruiz how
much he wanted to buy and he replied,
₱200.00. Appellant pulled out from his pocket
three plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance and told PO3 Ruiz to choose one. He
complied and gave the marked money to
appellant as payment. Appellant pocketed the
remaining plastic sachets together with the
marked money. PO3 Ruiz then took off his cap
– the pre-arranged signal that the transaction
had been consummated. The other buy-bust
team members then rushed to the scene to
assist PO3 Ruiz in apprehending appellant. The
two other plastic sachets and marked money
were recovered from appellant after PO3 Ruiz
ordered him to empty his pockets. PO3 Ruiz
then marked the plastic sachets – "EMR" for the
one appellant sold to him and "EMR-1" and
"EMR-2"8 for the other two sachets confiscated
from appellant.
Appellant was taken to the police headquarters
where he was booked and the incident recorded
in the police blotter. The items seized from him
were turned over to the duty investigator who
prepared a request for laboratory examination
and then sent to the crime laboratory. The
results revealed that the contents of the plastic
sachets are positive for shabu.9
Version of the Defense
Appellant testified that on July 19, 2005, at
around 2 p.m., he was in his house with his wife
and child when he was roused from sleep by a
man armed with a gun. Several other armed
men entered his house. He was told that a buy-
bust operation was being conducted. They
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 89
searched his house then appellant was made to
board a vehicle where he was showed a plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance
that he believed to be shabu. He struggled to
free himself and denied ownership thereof but
his actions were futile. He was taken
to Barangay Olympia, Makati City, where he
was detained for 30 minutes, then brought to the
crime laboratory for drug testing.10
Defense witness Fancy Dela Cruz corroborated
the testimony of appellant. She averred that at
around 1:30 p.m. of July 19, 2005, two vehicles
parked almost in front of her. Several men
alighted from the vehicles and forced open the
door of appellant’s house. She inquired as to
their intentions but was told not to intervene and
to avoid involvement. She complied but heard
one of the men telling appellant to get up and
put on his clothes. The men then had appellant
board one of the vehicles and sped away. She
looked for appellant’s wife and informed her of
the incident.11
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC gave credence to the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses on the events that
transpired prior to and during the buy-bust
operation. It rendered a verdict of conviction on
December 18, 2007,12 viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 05-1396, the Court finds
accused JAY MONTEVIRGEN y OZARAGA,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the charge
for violation of Sec. 5, Art. II, RA 9165, and
sentences him to suffer LIFE imprisonment and
to pay a fine of FIVE Hundred Thousand
(₱500,000.00) pesos;
2. In Criminal Case No. 05-1397, the Court finds
accused JAY MONTEVIRGEN y OZARAGA,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the charge
for violation of Sec. 11, Art. II, RA 9165 and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of Twelve (12) years and one (1)
day as minimum to Twenty (20) years as

maximum and to pay a fine of Three Hundred
Thousand (₱300,000.00);
The period of detention of the accused should
be given full credit.
Let the dangerous drug subject matter of these
cases be disposed of in the manner provided for
by law.
SO ORDERED.13
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On appeal, the CA concurred with the RTC’s
findings and conclusions and, consequently,
affirmed its judgment in the assailed
Decision14 of July 31, 2009. The dispositive
portion of CA’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The
December 18, 2007 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of the City of Makati, Branch 65 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.15
Assignment of Errors
Still unable to accept his conviction, appellant is
now before us raising the same interrelated
errors he assigned before the CA, viz:
I The appeal is unmeritorious.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROPER
CUSTODY OF SEIZED DANGEROUS DRUGS
UNDER R.A. NO. 9165.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE
NOTWIT[H]STANDING THE FAILURE OF THE
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 90
A[P]PREHENDING TEAM TO PROVE [THE]
INTEGRITY OF THE SEIZED DRUGS.16
In his joint discussion of these errors, appellant
contends that the police officers involved in the
buy-bust operation failed to observe the proper
procedure in the custody and control of the
seized drug by not marking the confiscated
specimens in the manner mandated by law. He
claims that the arresting team did not
immediately conduct a physical inventory of the
seized items and photograph the same in the
presence of his representative or counsel,
representative from media, Department of
Justice, and any elected public officials pursuant
to Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 9165. He also argues that the
Certificate of Coordination has no weight in
evidence and cannot be used to prove the
legitimacy of the buy-bust operation since it was
issued for the failed entrapment operation the
previous day, July 18, 2005.
Appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor
General argues that the prosecution sufficiently
established all the elements of illegal sale and
possession of shabu against appellant. It
asserts that the integrity and evidentiary value
of the shabu seized from appellant were
properly preserved by the arresting team.
Our Ruling
Elements for the Prosecution of Illegal
Sale and Possession of Shabu.
In every prosecution for the illegal sale of shabu,
under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the
following elements must be proved: "(1) the
identity of the buyer and the seller, the object
and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the
thing sold and the payment therefor. x x x What
is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs is the proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti"17 or the illicit drug in evidence. On the
other hand, in prosecuting a case for illegal

possession of dangerous drugs under Section
11, Article II of the same law, the following
elements must concur: "(1) the accused is in
possession of an item or object, which is
identified as a prohibited drug; (2) such
possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the
drug.18
In this case, all the elements for the illegal sale
of shabu were established. PO3 Ruiz, the
poseur-buyer, positively identified appellant as
the person he caught in flagrante delicto selling
a white crystalline substance believed to
be shabu in the entrapment operation
conducted by the police and MADAC
operatives. Upon receipt of the ₱200.00 buy-
bust money, appellant handed to PO3 Ruiz the
sachet containing 0.04 gram of white crystalline
substance which later tested positive for shabu.
"The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-
buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked
money successfully consummated the buy-bust
transaction x x x."19
All the elements in the prosecution for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs were also
established. First, the two plastic sachets
containing shabu subject of the case for the
illegal possession of drugs were found in
appellant’s pocket after a search on his person
was made following his arrest in flagrante
delicto for the illegal sale of shabu. It must be
remembered that a person lawfully arrested
may be searched for anything which may have
been used or constitute proof in the commission
of an offense without a warrant.20 Second,
appellant did not adduce evidence showing his
legal authority to possess the shabu. Third,
appellant’s act of allowing the poseur-buyer to
choose one from among the three sachets and
putting back into his pocket the two sachets
of shabu not chosen clearly shows that he freely
and consciously possessed the illegal drugs.
Hence, appellant was correctly charged and
convicted for illegal possession of shabu.
Appellant’s defense of denial cannot prevail
against the positive testimony of prosecution
witnesses. There is also no imputation by
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 91
appellant of any evil motives on the part of the
buy-bust team to falsely testify against him.
Their testimonies and actuations therefore enjoy
the presumption of regularity.
Failure to Physically Inventory and
Photograph the Shabu After Seizure
and Confiscation is Not Fatal.
Appellant draws attention to the failure of the
apprehending police officers to comply with
Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 regarding
the physical inventory and photograph of the
seized items. This provision reads as follows:
(1) The apprehending officer/team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory
and photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided further, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items.
In other words, the failure of the prosecution to
show that the police officers conducted the
required physical inventory and take photograph
of the objects confiscated does not ipso
facto render inadmissible in evidence the items
seized. There is a proviso in the implementing
rules stating that when it is shown that there
exist justifiable grounds and proof that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 92

have been preserved, the seized items can still
be used in determining the guilt or innocence of
the accused.21
Here, the absence of evidence that the buy-bust
team made an inventory and took photographs
of the drugs seized from appellant was not fatal
since the prosecution was able to preserve the
integrity and evidentiary value of the shabu.
PO3 Ruiz, the poseur-buyer and apprehending
officer, marked the seized items in front of
appellant, the barangay captain and other
members of the buy-bust team, immediately
after the consummation of the drug transaction.
He then delivered the seized items to the duty
investigator, who in turn sent the same to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for examination on the
same day. During trial, PO3 Ruiz was able to
identify the said markings and explain how they
were made.
courts’ imposition of life imprisonment as well as
the payment of fine of ₱500,000.00.
On the other hand, Section 11(3), Article II of the
same law provides that illegal possession of
less than five grams of shabu is penalized with
imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years plus a fine ranging from
₱300,000.00 to ₱400,000.00.
Appellant was found guilty of selling one sachet
containing 0.04 gram of shabu and of
possessing two other sachets of the same
substance with a total weight of 0.14 gram.
Hence, applying the above provisions, the
penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years
and one (1) day as minimum to twenty (20)
years as maximum and the payment of fine of
₱300,000.00 imposed by the RTC and affirmed
by the CA are also proper.

Clearly, there was no hiatus or confusion in the
confiscation, handling, custody and examination
of the shabu.1âwphi1 The illegal drugs that
were confiscated from appellant, taken to the
police headquarters, subjected to qualitative
examination at the crime laboratory, and finally
introduced in evidence against appellant were
the same illegal drugs that were confiscated
from him when he was caught in flagrante
delicto selling and possessing the same.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The
assailed Decision dated July 31, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
03208 affirming the conviction of Jay
Montevirgen y Ozaraga by the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 65, for violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Appellant’s contention that the buy-bust team

should have coordinated with the PDEA on the
day the entrapment operation occurred
deserves scant consideration. Coordination with
the PDEA is not an indispensable element of a
proper buy-bust operation.22 A buy-bust
operation is not invalidated by mere
noncoordination with the PDEA.23

Penalty

Under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the

penalty for the unauthorized sale of shabu,
regardless of its quantity and purity, is life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
₱500,000.00 to ₱10 million. Since the penalty
imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA is
within the prescribed range, we affirm the lower

G.R. No. 205821 October 1, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
GARRY DELA CRUZ y DE
GUZMAN, Accused-appellant.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
"Law enforcers should not trifle with the legal
requirement to ensure integrity in the chain of
custody of seized dangerous drugs and drug
paraphernalia. This is especially true when only
a miniscule amount of dangerous drugs is
alleged to have been taken from the accused." 1
This resolves an appeal from a conviction for
violation of Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act
No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
On September 15, 2004, accused-appellant
Garry dela Cruz (dela Cruz) was charged with
illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous
drugs in two separate informations,2 as follows:
Criminal Case No. 5450 (20920)
VIOLATION OF SECTION 5, A[R]TICLE (sic) II
K OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS
ACT OF 2002
(REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165)
That on or about September 14, 2004, in the
City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not being authorized by law to
sell, deliver, transport, distribute or give away to
another any dangerous drugs, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, SELL
AND DELIVER to PO1 WILFREDO BOBON y
TARROZA, a member of the PNP, who acted as
buyer, one (1) small heat-sealed transparent
plastic pack containing white crystalline
substance having a total weight of 0.0120 gram
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 93
which when subjected to qualitative examination
gave positive result to the tests for the presence
of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE
(shabu) knowing the same to be a dangerous
drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 5451 (20921)
VIOLATION OF SECTION 11, ARTICLE II OF
THE
COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS
ACT OF 2002
(REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165)
That on or about September 14, 2004, in the
City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not being authorized by law,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, have in his possession and under
his custody and control six (6) pieces heat-
sealed transparent plastic sachets each
containing white crystalline substance, each
weighing as follows: 1) 0.0135 gram; 2) 0.0183
gram; 3) 0.0542 gram; 4) 0.0197 gram; 5)
0.0100 [gram]; and 6) 0.0128 gram or a total of
0.1285 gram; which when subjected to
qualitative examination gave positive result to
the tests for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
(shabu) knowing same to be a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3 (Citations omitted)
As alleged by the prosecution, dela Cruz was
arrested in a buy-bust operation. The buy-bust
operation was allegedly conducted after a
civilian informant (the informant) tipped the
Zamboanga City Police Office that a certain
"Gary" was selling illegal drugs at the parking
area for buses behind Food Mart, Governor Lim
Street, Sangali, Bunguioa, Zamboanga City (the
target area).4
The buy-bust operation team included PO1
Wilfredo Bobon (PO1 Bobon), as poseur-buyer,
and SPO1 Roberto Roca (SPO1 Roca), as
back-up arresting officer. It was agreed that

"PO1 Bobon would remove his bull cap once the
sale of illegal drugs was [consummated]." The
buy-bust team prepared a _100.00 bill with
serial number KM 776896 as marked money.5
At around 11:00 a.m. of September 14, 2004,
the buy-bust operation team, accompanied by
the informant, went to the target area. The
informant initially brokered the sale of shabu. It
was PO1 Bobon who handed the marked
money to dela Cruz in exchange for one (1)
heat-sealed plastic sachet of suspected shabu.
After which, he removed his bull cap. SPO1
Roca then arrested dela Cruz.6
Upon frisking dela Cruz, PO1 Bobon
supposedly recovered six (6) more heat-sealed
sachets of suspected shabu. PO1 Bobon placed
the sachet he purchased from dela Cruz in his
right pocket and the six (6) other sachets in his
left pocket. SPO1 Roca recovered the marked
_100.00 bill.7
Dela Cruz and the seven (7) sachets seized
from him were then brought to the Zamboanga
City Police Station.8There, PO1 Bobon taped
the sachets. He then marked the sachet from his
right pocket with his initials, "WB."9 He marked
the sachets from his left pocket as "WB-1," "WB-
2," "WB-3," "WB-4," "WB-5," and "WB-6."10
On the same day, the seven (7) sachets were
turned over to SPO1 Federico Lindo, Jr., the
investigating officer, who prepared the request
for laboratory examination. Subsequently, the
tests yielded positive results for shabu.11
During trial, the prosecution presented as
witnesses PO1 Bobon, SPO1 Roca, and
forensic chemist Police Inspector Melvin L.
Manuel. The sole witness presented for the
defense was dela Cruz himself.12
For his part, dela Cruz acknowledged that on
the morning of September 14, 2004, he was in
the target area. As he was leaving the comfort
room, someone embraced him from behind,
while another poked a gun at him. He was then
handcuffed and brought to an L-300 van which
was parked in front of Food Mart. Inside the van,
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 94
he was asked if he was Jing-Jong, alias Jong-
Jong. Despite his denials, he was brought to the
police station. It was when he was already
detained that he learned that he was charged for
violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.13
On August 19, 2010, the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 13, Zamboanga City, convicted dela
Cruz for violating Article II, Section 5 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
and sentenced him to life imprisonment and a
fine of _500,000.00. He was also convicted for
violating Article II, Section 11 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
and sentenced to 12 years and one day up to 14
years imprisonment and a fine of _300,000.00.
The dispositive portion of this decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds:
1. In Criminal Case No. 5450 (20920), accused
GARRY DELA CRUZ y DE GUZMAN guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 5,
Article II of R.A. 9165 and sentences him to
suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and
to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (₱500,000) without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency;
2. In Criminal Case No. 5451 (20921), accused
GARRY DELA CRUZ y DE GUZMAN guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section
11, Article II of R.A. 9165 and sentences him to
suffer the penalty of TWELVE YEARS AND
ONE DAY to FOURTEEN YEARS of
imprisonment and pay a fine of THREE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱300,000)
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride used as
evidence in these cases are hereby ordered
confiscated to be turned over to the proper
authorities for disposition.
SO ORDERED.14
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, dela Cruz
assailed the prosecution’s failure to establish

the chain of custody of the seized sachets of
shabu. He also assailed the validity of the buy-
bust operation and the prosecution’s failure to
present the informant in court.15
On May 31, 2012, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision16 affirming dela Cruz’
conviction in toto. Thereafter, dela Cruz filed his
notice of appeal.17
In the resolution18 dated April 15, 2013, this
court noted the records forwarded by the Court
of Appeals and informed the parties that they
may file their supplemental briefs.
On June 6, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor
General filed a manifestation and motion,19 on
behalf of the People of the Philippines, noting
that it would no longer file a supplemental brief
as the brief it filed with the Court of Appeals had
adequately addressed the arguments and
issues raised by dela Cruz.
On August 7, 2013, dela Cruz filed a
manifestation20 indicating that he, too, would no
longer file a supplemental brief and that he was
instead re-pleading, adopting, and reiterating
the defenses and arguments in the brief he filed
before the Court of Appeals.
For resolution is the issue of whether dela
Cruz’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for
violating Sections 5 and 11 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
was established. Subsumed in the resolution of
this issue are the issues raised by dela Cruz in
the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals,
foremost of which is whether the prosecution
was able to establish compliance with the chain
of custody requirements under Section 21 of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The elements that must be established to
sustain convictions for illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs are settled:
In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, the following elements must first be
established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 95
took place and (2) the presentation in court of
the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
On the other hand, in prosecutions for illegal
possession of a dangerous drug, it must be
shown that (1) the accused was in possession
of an item or an object identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such
possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the
accused was freely and consciously aware of
being in possession of the drug. Similarly, in this
case, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be
established beyond reasonable doubt.21
With respect to the element of corpus delicti,
Section 21 of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, as amended by Republic Act
No. 10640 provides for the custody and
disposition of confiscated, seized, and/or
surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia.
Particularly on the matter of custody before a
criminal case is filed, Section 21, as amended,
provides:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of
Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous
drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial
custody and control of the dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the
seized items and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution

Service or the media who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof: Provided, That the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrant is served; or
at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance
of these requirements under justifiable grounds,
as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures and custody over
said items.
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon
confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment, the same shall be submitted to the
PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and
quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory
examination results, which shall be done by the
forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued
immediately upon the receipt of the subject
item/s: Provided, That when the volume of
dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, and controlled precursors and essential
chemicals does not allow the completion of
testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory
examination report shall be provisionally issued
stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs
still to be examined by the forensic laboratory:
Provided, however, That a final certification
shall be issued immediately upon completion of
the said examination and certification;
....
The significance of complying with Section 21’s
requirements cannot be overemphasized. Non-
compliance is tantamount to failure in
establishing identity of corpus delicti, an
essential element of the offenses of illegal sale
and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. By
failing to establish an element of these offenses,
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 96
non-compliance will, thus, engender the
acquittal of an accused.
We reiterate the extensive discussion on this
matter from our recent decision in People v.
Holgado:22
As this court declared in People v. Morales,
"failure to comply with Paragraph 1, Section 21,
Article II of RA 9165 implie[s] a concomitant
failure on the part of the prosecution to establish
the identity of the corpus delicti."23 It "produce[s]
doubts as to the origins of the [seized
paraphernalia]."24
The significance of ensuring the integrity of
drugs and drug paraphernalia in prosecutions
under Republic Act No. 9165 is discussed in
People v. Belocura:25
Worse, the Prosecution failed to establish the
identity of the prohibited drug that constituted
the corpus delicti itself. The omission naturally
raises grave doubt about any search being
actually conducted and warrants the suspicion
that the prohibited drugs were planted evidence.
In every criminal prosecution for possession of
illegal drugs, the Prosecution must account for
the custody of the incriminating evidence from
the moment of seizure and confiscation until the
moment it is offered in evidence. That account
goes to the weight of evidence. It is not enough
that the evidence offered has probative value on
the issues, for the evidence must also be
sufficiently connected to and tied with the facts
in issue. The evidence is not relevant merely
because it is available but that it has an actual
connection with the transaction involved and
with the parties thereto. This is the reason why
authentication and laying a foundation for the
introduction of evidence are
important.26 (Emphasis supplied)
In Malilin v. People,27 this court explained that
the exactitude required by Section 21 goes into
the very nature of narcotics as the subject of
prosecutions under Republic Act No. 9165:

Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or
mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest
when the exhibit is small and is one that has
physical characteristics fungible in nature and
similar in form to substances familiar to people
in their daily lives. Graham vs. State positively
acknowledged this danger. In that case where a
substance later analyzed as heroin—was
handled by two police officers prior to
examination who however did not testify in court
on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit
at the time it was in their possession—was
excluded from the prosecution evidence, the
court pointing out that the white powder seized
could have been indeed heroin or it could have
been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that
unless the state can show by records or
testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the
exhibit at least between the time it came into the
possession of police officers until it was tested
in the laboratory to determine its composition,
testimony of the state as to the laboratory’s
findings is inadmissible.
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is
that they are not readily identifiable as in fact
they are subject to scientific analysis to
determine their composition and nature. The
Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the
likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any
of the links in the chain of custody over the same
there could have been tampering, alteration or
substitution of substances from other cases—by
accident or otherwise—in which similar
evidence was seized or in which similar
evidence was submitted for laboratory testing.
Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard
more stringent than that applied to cases
involving objects which are readily identifiable
must be applied, a more exacting standard that
entails a chain of custody of the item with
sufficient completeness if only to render it
improbable that the original item has either been
exchanged with another or been contaminated
or tampered with.28 (Emphasis supplied)
Compliance with the chain of custody
requirement provided by Section 21, therefore,
ensures the integrity of confiscated, seized,
and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 97
paraphernalia in four (4) respects: first, the
nature of the substances or items seized;
second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of the
substances or items seized; third, the relation of
the substances or items seized to the incident
allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth, the
relation of the substances or items seized to the
person/s alleged to have been in possession of
or peddling them. Compliance with this
requirement forecloses opportunities for
planting, contaminating, or tampering of
evidence in any manner.
By failing to establish identity of corpus delicti,
non-compliance with Section 21 indicates a
failure to establish an element of the offense of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs. It follows that
this non-compliance suffices as a ground for
acquittal. As this court stated in People v.
Lorenzo:29
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of
prohibited drugs, conviction cannot be
sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the
identity of the drug. The identity of the prohibited
drug must be established with moral certainty.
Apart from showing that the elements of
possession or sale are present, the fact that the
substance illegally possessed and sold in the
first place is the same substance offered in court
as exhibit must likewise be established with the
same degree of certitude as that needed to
sustain a guilty verdict.30 (Emphasis supplied)
The prosecution’s sweeping guarantees as to
the identity and integrity of seized drugs and
drug paraphernalia will not secure a conviction.
Not even the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties will suffice. In fact,
whatever presumption there is as to the
regularity of the manner by which officers took
and maintained custody of the seized items is
"negated."31 Republic Act No. 9165 requires
compliance with Section 21.
Even the doing of acts which ostensibly
approximate compliance but do not actually
comply with the requirements of Section 21
does not suffice. In People v. Magat,32 for
instance, this court had occasion to emphasize

the inadequacy of merely marking the items
supposedly seized: "Marking of the seized
drugs alone by the law enforcers is not enough
to comply with the clear and unequivocal
procedures prescribed in Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165."33
The exactitude which the state requires in
handling seized narcotics and drug
paraphernalia is bolstered by the amendments
made to Section 21 by Republic Act No. 10640.
Section 21(1), as amended, now includes the
following proviso, thereby making it even more
stringent than as originally worded:
Provided, That the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place
where the search warrant is served; or at the
nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures:
In People v. Nandi,34 this court explained that
four (4) links "should be established in the chain
of custody of the confiscated item: first, the
seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of
the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; third, the
turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal
drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized
from the forensic chemist to the court."35
In Nandi, where the prosecution failed to show
how the seized items were handled following the
actual seizure and, thereafter, turned over for
examination, this court held that the accused
must be acquitted:
After a closer look, the Court finds that the
linkages in the chain of custody of the subject
item were not clearly established. As can be
gleaned from his forequoted testimony, PO1
Collado failed to provide informative details on
how the subject shabu was handled
immediately after the seizure. He just claimed
that the item was handed to him by the accused
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 98
in the course of the transaction and, thereafter,
he handed it to the investigator.
There is no evidence either on how the item was
stored, preserved, labeled, and recorded. PO1
Collado could not even provide the court with
the name of the investigator. He admitted that
he was not present when it was delivered to the
crime laboratory. It was Forensic Chemist
Bernardino M. Banac, Jr. who identified the
person who delivered the specimen to the crime
laboratory. He disclosed that he received the
specimen from one PO1 Cuadra, who was not
even a member of the buy-bust team. Per their
record, PO1 Cuadra delivered the letter-request
with the attached seized item to the CPD Crime
Laboratory Office where a certain PO2 Semacio
recorded it and turned it over to the Chemistry
Section.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the
considered view that chain of custody of the
illicit drug seized was compromised. Hence, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of
duties cannot be applied in this case.
Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police
committed in handling the seized shabu and the
obvious evidentiary gaps in the chain of its
custody, a presumption of regularity in the
performance of duties cannot be made in this
case. A presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty is made in the
context of an existing rule of law or statute
authorizing the performance of an act or duty or
prescribing a procedure in the performance
thereof. The presumption applies when nothing
in the record suggests that the law enforcers
deviated from the standard conduct of official
duty required by law; where the official act is
irregular on its face, the presumption cannot
arise. In light of the flagrant lapses we noted, the
lower courts were obviously wrong when they
relied on the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty.
With the chain of custody in serious question,
the Court cannot gloss over the argument of the
accused regarding the weight of the seized
drug. The standard procedure is that after the

confiscation of the dangerous substance, it is
brought to the crime laboratory for a series of
tests. The result thereof becomes one of the
bases of the charge to be filed.36 (Citations
omitted)
As Holgado emphasized, "[e]ven the doing of
acts which ostensibly approximate compliance
but do not actually comply with the requirements
of Section 21 does not suffice."37 In People v.
Garcia,38 this court noted that the mere marking
of seized paraphernalia, unsupported by a
physical inventory and taking of photographs,
and in the absence of the persons required by
Section 21 to be present, does not suffice:
Thus, other than the markings made by PO1
Garcia and the police investigator (whose
identity was not disclosed), no physical
inventory was ever made, and no photograph of
the seized items was taken under the
circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and its
implementing rules. We observe that while there
was testimony with respect to the marking of the
seized items at the police station, no mention
whatsoever was made on whether the marking
had been done in the presence of Ruiz or his
representatives. There was likewise no mention
that any representative from the media and the
Department of Justice, or any elected official
had been present during this inventory, or that
any of these people had been required to sign
the copies of the inventory.39 (Citations omitted)
In this case, the Regional Trial Court
acknowledged that no physical inventory of the
seized items was conducted.40Similarly, there is
nothing in the records to show that the seized
items were photographed in the manner
required by Section 21. Likewise, none of the
persons required by Section 21 to be present (or
their possible substitutes) have been shown to
be present.
The Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals assert that dela Cruz must
nevertheless be convicted as "it had been
clearly established that the identity of the items
were [sic] properly preserved."41 They anchor
this conclusion on PO1 Bobon’s having
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 99
supposedly kept the seized sachets in his own
pockets: one (1) sachet in his right pocket and
six (6) sachets in his left pocket.
The Court of Appeals reasons:
We found no gap in the prosecution’s
presentation of the chain of custody. There was
a seizure of seven (7) heat-sealed sachets of
shabu as a result of a valid buy-bust operation.
PO1 Bobon and SPO1 Roca testified how the
seizure was conducted. PO1 Bobon was able to
identify the shabu which were involved in the
illegal sale vis-a-vis the one involved in illegal
possession because he knowingly put them in
different pockets. The seized drugs were
marked at the police station which was only 200
meters away from the area where the arrest was
made. The identity of these seized items were
secured as PO1 Bobon placed tapes on the
respective heat-sealed sachets of shabu and
marked them with his initials which he later
identified in court.42 (Citation omitted)
The circumstance of PO1 Bobon keeping
narcotics in his own pockets precisely
underscores the importance of strictly
complying with Section 21. His subsequent
identification in open court of the items coming
out of his own pockets is self-serving.
The prosecution effectively admits that from the
moment of the supposed buy-bust operation
until the seized items’ turnover for examination,
these items had been in the sole possession of
a police officer. In fact, not only had they been
in his possession, they had been in such close
proximity to him that they had been nowhere
else but in his own pockets.
Keeping one of the seized items in his right
pocket and the rest in his left pocket is a doubtful
and suspicious way of ensuring the integrity of
the items. Contrary to the Court of Appeals’
finding that PO1 Bobon took the necessary
precautions, we find his actions reckless, if not
dubious.
Even without referring to the strict requirements
of Section 21, common sense dictates that a

single police officer’s act of bodily-keeping the
item(s) which is at the crux of offenses
penalized under the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, is fraught with dangers. One
need not engage in a meticulous counter-
checking with the requirements of Section 21 to
view with distrust the items coming out of PO1
Bobon’s pockets. That the Regional Trial Court
and the Court of Appeals both failed to see
through this and fell — hook, line, and sinker —
for PO1 Bobon’s avowals is mind-boggling.
Moreover, PO1 Bobon did so without even
offering the slightest justification for dispensing
with the requirements of Section 21.
Section 21, paragraph 1, of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, includes a
proviso to the effect that "noncompliance of (sic)
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures and custody over said
items." Plainly, the prosecution has not shown
that –on September 14, 2004, when dela Cruz
was arrested and the sachets supposedly
seized and marked – there were "justifiable
grounds" for dispensing with compliance with
Section 21. All that the prosecution has done is
insist on its self-serving assertion that the
integrity of the seized sachets has, despite all its
lapses, nevertheless been preserved.
Apart from the blatantly irregular handling by
PO1 Bobon of the seven (7) sachets, it is also
admitted that no physical inventory and taking of
photographs in the presence of dela Cruz or of
any of the other persons specified by Section 21
were conducted.43
As in People v. Garcia, the mere marking of
seized paraphernalia, will not suffice to sustain
a conviction in this case.
The miniscule amount of narcotics supposedly
seized from dela Cruz amplifies the doubts on
their integrity.1âwphi1 In total, the seven (7)
sachets supposedly contained all of 0.1405
gram of shabu. This quantity is so miniscule it
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 100
amounts to little more than 7% of the weight of
a five-centavo coin (1.9 grams) or a one-
centavo coin (2.0 grams).
As we have discussed in People v. Holgado:
While the miniscule amount of narcotics seized
is by itself not a ground for acquittal, this
circumstance underscores the need for more
exacting compliance with Section 21. In Malilin
v. People, this court said that "the likelihood of
tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an
exhibit is greatest when the exhibit is small and
is one that has physical characteristics fungible
in nature and similar in form to substances
familiar to people in their daily lives."
....
Trial courts should meticulously consider the
factual intricacies of cases involving violations of
Republic Act No. 9165. All details that factor into
an ostensibly uncomplicated and barefaced
narrative must be scrupulously considered.
Courts must employ heightened scrutiny,
consistent with the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases involving
miniscule amounts of drugs. These can be
readily planted and tampered. . . . 44(Citations
omitted)
As the integrity of the corpus delicti of the crimes
for which dela Cruz is charged has not been
established, it follows that there is no basis for
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. It is
proper that dela Cruz be acquitted.
We close by hearkening to the same words with
which we ended in Holgado:
It is lamentable that while our dockets are
clogged with prosecutions under Republic Act
No. 9165 involving small-time drug users and
retailers, we are seriously short of prosecutions
involving the proverbial "big fish." We are
swamped with cases involving small fry who
have been arrested for miniscule amounts.
While they are certainly a bane to our society,
small retailers are but low-lying fruits in an
exceedingly vast network of drug cartels. Both
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 101

law enforcers and prosecutors should realize

that the more effective and efficient strategy is
to focus resources more on the source and true
leadership of these nefarious organizations.
Otherwise, all these executive and judicial
resources expended to attempt to convict an
accused for 0.05 gram of shabu under doubtful
custodial arrangements will hardly make a dent
in the overall picture. It might in fact be
distracting our law enforcers from their more
challenging task: to uproot the causes of this
drug menace. We stand ready to assess cases
involving greater amounts of drugs and the
leadership of these cartels.45

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

decision dated May 31, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00869-MIN is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-
appellant Garry dela Cruz y de Guzman is
hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately
RELEASED from detention, unless he is
confined for any other lawful cause.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the

Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City, for immediate implementation.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
directed to report to this court within five days
from receipt of this decision the action he has
taken. Copies shall also be furnished the
Director General of the Philippine National
Police and the Director General of the Philippine
Drugs Enforcement Agency for their
information.

The Regional Trial Court is directed to tum over

the seized sachets of shabu to the Dangerous
Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with
law.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 212160 February 4, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee,
vs.
DENNIS SUMILI, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary
1 2
appeal assailing the Decision dated January
29, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR HC No. 01075, which affirmed in toto
the Decision3 dated August 10, 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 3
(RTC) in Crim. Case No. 12595 finding
accused-appellant Dennis Sumili (Sumili) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section
5,4 Article II of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165,5 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Facts
On June 30, 2006, an Information6 was filed
before the RTC charging Sumili of violating
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, viz.:
Crim. Case No. 12595
That, on or about June 7, 2006, in the City of
Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, without
having been authorized by law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell one
(1) sachet of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
a dangerousdrug commonly known as Shabufor
the amount of ₱200.00.
Contrary to and in violation of Sec. 5, ART. II,
RA 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
City of Iligan, June 30, 2006.
According to the prosecution, on June 7, 2006,
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency Iligan
City Sub-Office received a report from a
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 102
confidential informant that Sumili was selling
shabu. Acting on the same, SPO2 Edgardo
Englatiera7 (SPO2 Englatiera) dispatched
SPO2 Diosdado Cabahug (SPO2 Cabahug) to
conduct surveillance on Sumili, which confirmed
the truth and veracity of the aforesaid report.
Consequently, SPO2 Englatiera organized a
team divided intotwo (2) groups and briefed
them on the buy-bust operation. He also
prepared the marked money, consisting of one
(1) two hundred peso (₱200.00) bill, with serial
number L507313.8
At around 5:10 in the afternoon of the same day,
the buy-bust team headed to the target area.
Upon arrival, the poseur-buyer approached
Sumili’s house to buy shabu. After Sumili let the
poseur-buyer in, the latter gave the pre-
arranged signal that the sale has been
consummated. Almost immediately, the buy-
bust team stormed the house but Sumili
escaped by jumping through the window,
throwing the marked money at the roof beside
his house. The poseur-buyer turnedover the
sachet of suspected shabuto SPO2 Englatiera,
who marked the same with "DC-1," representing
the initials of SPO2 Cabahug.9 SPO2 Englatiera
then prepared a request for laboratory
examination and instructed Non-Uniform
Personnel Carlito Ong (NUP Ong) to bring the
sachet together with the request to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination. However,
NUP Ong failed to do so on the same day as the
PNP Crime Laboratory was already closed.10 It
was only on June 9, 2006, or two (2) days after
the buy-bust operation, that NUP Ong was able
to bring and turn-over the seized sachet to the
PNP Crime Laboratory.11 Upon examination, it
was confirmed thatsaid sachet contained 0.32
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or
shabu.12
In his defense, Sumili denied selling shabu. He
and his daughter claimed that he was a fishball
vendor, and that on the date and time of the
incident, he was at the market buying
ingredients. When he returned to his residence,
his wife told him that policemen were looking for
him.13 The RTC Ruling

In a Decision14 dated August 10, 2009, the RTC
found Sumili guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 and
accordingly, sentenced him to life imprisonment,
and ordered him to pay a fine in the amount of
₱500,000.00.15
The RTC found that a buy-bust operation indeed
occurred where Sumili sold the seized sachet to
the poseur-buyer. In this regard, it gave
credence to the straightforward and categorical
testimonies of prosecution witnesses detailing
how the police officers received information that
Sumili was selling shabu, investigated and
confirmed that he indeed was selling shabu,
conducted the buy-bust operation, recovered,
marked, and transmitted the seized item from
Sumilito the PNP Crime Laboratory, and that the
laboratory results yielded positive for shabu.
Conversely, it did not give weight to the defense
testimonies which merely deniedthe existence
of the buy-bust operation and insisted that
Sumili was not selling drugs.16
Dissatisfied, Sumili appealed17 his conviction to
the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision18 dated January 29, 2014, the CA
affirmed Sumili’s conviction in toto.19 It agreed
with the RTC’s finding that a buy-bust operation
actually occurred, resulting in the seizure of a
sachet containing shabu.20 Further, the CA also
held thatdespite the police officers’
noncompliance with the procedure enshrined in
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, the identity and
integrity of the corpus delicti, or the seized drug
itself, was nevertheless preserved and, thus,
Sumili’s conviction must be sustained.21
Finally, the CA opined that Sumili failed to rebut
by clear and convincing evidence the
presumption ofregularity in the performance of
official duties enjoyed by the police officers
involved in the buy-bust operation.22
Aggrieved, Sumili filed the instant appeal.23
The Issue Before the Court
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 103
The issue for the Court’s resolution is whether
Sumili’s conviction for violation of Section 5,
Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
In order to convict an accused for violation of RA
9165, or the crime of sale of dangerous drugs,
the prosecution must establish the concurrence
of the following elements: (a) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the
consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment.24 Note that what remains
material for conviction is the proof that the
transaction actually took place, coupled with the
presentation before the court of the corpus
delicti.25 It is also important that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items be
preserved. Simply put, the dangerous drug
presented in court as evidence against an
accused must be the same as that seized from
him. The chain of custody requirement removes
any unnecessary doubts regarding the identity
of the evidence.26 As held in People v. Viterbo:27
In every prosecution for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165, the following elements must concur:
(a) the identities of the buyer and the seller,
object, and consideration; and (b) the delivery of
the thing sold and the corresponding payment
for it. As the dangerous drug itself forms an
integral and key part of the corpus delicti of the
crime, it is thereforeessential that the identity of
the prohibited drug be established beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, the prosecution must
be able to account for each link in the chain of
custody over the dangerous drug, fromthe
moment it was seized from the accused up to
the time it was presented in court as proof of the
corpus delicti.Elucidating on the custodial chain
process, the Court, in the case of People v.
Cervantes [(600 Phil. 819, 836 [2009])], held:
As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain
of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is

what the proponent claims it to be.1âwphi1In
context, this would ideally include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the seizure of
the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered
into evidence, in such a way that everyone who
touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was received, where it was and
what happened to it while in the witness’
possession, the condition in which it was
received, and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. x x x.
The chain of custody requirement "ensures that
unnecessary doubts respecting the identity of
the evidence are minimized if not altogether
removed."28 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
To expand, Section 2129 of RA 9165 provides
the "chain of custody rule" outlining the
procedure that the apprehending officers should
follow in handling the seized drugs, in order to
preserve its integrity and evidentiary value. It
requires, inter alia, that: (a) the apprehending
team that has initial custody over the seized
drugs immediately conduct an inventory and
take photographs of the same in the presence
of the accused or the person from whom such
items were seized, orthe accused’s or the
person’s representative or counsel, a
representative from the media, the Department
of Justice, and any elected public official who
shall then sign the copies of the inventory; and
(b) the seized drugs be turned over to the PNP
Crime Laboratory within 24 hours from its
confiscation for examination purposes. While
the "chain of custody rule" demands utmost
compliance from the aforesaid officers, Section
21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of RA 9165,30 as well as jurisprudence
nevertheless provide that noncompliance with
the requirements of thisrule will not
automatically render the seizure and custody of
the items void and invalid, so long as: (a) there
is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance;
AND(b) the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved. Hence, any divergence
from the prescribed procedure must be justified
and should not affect the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated items.31
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 104
After a judicious review of the records, the Court
finds that the prosecution failed to establish the
identity of the substance allegedly confiscated
from Sumili due to unjustified gaps in the chain
of custody, thus, militating against a finding of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
As may be gleaned from the established facts,
the buy-bust operation was conducted on June
7, 2006. When SPO2 Englatieraseized the
sachet from Sumili, he marked the same with
the initials "DC-1" and, later, he returned to the
police station to prepare the request for the
examination of the sachet’s contents.
Thereafter, he ordered NUP Ong to bring the
sachet as well as the request to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination. However, NUP Ong
failed to do so within 24 hours after the buy-bust
operation as he only delivered the sachet to the
PNP Crime Laboratory on June 9, 2006, or two
(2) days after the buy-bust operation.No other
than SPO2 Englatiera and NUP Ong attested to
these facts intheir respective testimonies, to
wit:32 Prosecutor Celso Sarsaba (Pros.
Sarsaba): Who prepared this request for
laboratory examination?
SPO2 Englatiera: I myself, sir.
Q: What did you do with the requestfor the
laboratory examination together with the one
sachet of shabu?
A: I instructed [NUP Ong] to turn-over the
evidence and bring for laboratory examination
(sic).
Q: Was [NUP Ong] able to bring the request for
laboratory examination together with the sachet
of shabu to the crime laboratory on that same
day?
A: The following day.
Q: Why?
A: Because it was already 5:00 o’clock (sic) sir I
think it was Friday sir, the laboratory was
already closed.
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 105

xxxx PNP Crime Laboratory, presents a substantial

and unexplained gap in the chain of custody of
As for NUP Ong:33 the alleged shabu seized from Sumili.
Undoubtedly, the integrity and evidentiary value
Pros. Sarsaba: And how about the one sachet of the corpus delicti had been compromised.
of shabu allegedly bought from the accused,
who was in possession of that shabu at that It must be emphasized that in criminal
time? prosecutions involving illegal drugs, the
presentation of the drugs which constitute the
NUP Ong: SPO2 [Englatiera] placed it inside the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity
cellophane attached together with the request. of proving with moral certainty that they are the
same seized items.35 Failing in which, the
Q: And who was supposed to bring that request acquittal of the accused on the ground of
for laboratory [examination] and the one sachet reasonable doubt becomes a matter of
of shabuallegedly purchased from the accused right,36 as in this case.
to the PNP crime laboratory?
In sum, since the identity of the prohibited drugs
A: No, it was already late at night so we agreed had not been established by proof beyond
to do it on the following day. reasonable doubt, Sumili's conviction must be
immediately set aside.
Q: So June 7, 2006, do you recall what day was
that? WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The
Decision dated January 29, 2014 of the Court of
A: I think it was [a] Friday. Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01075 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accordingly,
Q: And when did you bring this request for accused-appellant Dennis Sumili is
laboratory [examination] to the [PNP] crime ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Section
laboratory, on what date? 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The
Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered
A: It was delivered on June 9, 2006. to cause his immediate release, unless he is
being lawfully held for any other reason.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.
To justify the delay inthe turn-over of the corpus
delicti, SPO2 Englatiera and NUP Ong insist
that the PNP Crime Laboratory was already
closed on June 7, 2006, and since it was a
Friday, the delivery of the seized sachet was
only done on June 9, 2006. However, contrary
to their claims, June 7, 2006 is not a Friday, but
a Wednesday.34Thus, if the PNP Crime
Laboratory was indeed closed on June 7, 2006,
the delivery of the seized sachet could have
easily been done on the next day, or on June 8,
2006, instead of doing it two (2) days after the
buy-bust operation. This glaring fact, coupled
with the absence in the records as to who
among the apprehending officers had actual
custody of the seized sachet from the time it was
prepared for turn-over until its delivery to the

G.R. No. 209588 February 18, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee,
vs.
ERIC ROSAURO y BONGCAWIL, Accused-
Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For the consideration of the Court is an appeal
of the Decision1 dated 19 June 2013 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00552- MIN, which affirmed the
2
Judgment dated 24 November 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cagayan de Oro
City, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 2004-856,
finding accused-appellant Eric Rosauro y
Bongcawil (accused-appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal sale of shabu under
Sec. 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A.
No. 9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and ordering him to
pay a fine of ₱500,000.00.
In an Amended Information dated 21 February
2005,3 accused-appellant was charged with
violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R. A. No. 9165, to
wit:
That on the 3rd day of July, 2004at about 5:30
o’clock in the afternoon, more or less, at Purok
3, Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of
Villanueva, Province of Misamis Oriental,
Republic of the Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, not being authorized by law to
possess and to sell any dangerous drugs,
knowingly, willfully and feloniously, did then and
there, sell and convey to a third person, who
acted as a decoy in a buy bust operation, one
(1) sachet of shabu, containing 0.04 grams (sic)
of shabu, which when examined gave
POSITIVE result to test for the presence of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu), a
dangerous drug.4
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 106
Upon re-arraignment, accused-appellant
pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.5 Thereafter, pre-trial and trial on the
merits ensued.
Based on the records, the prosecution’s version
of the facts is as follows:
On October 13, 2002, on the basis of
unconfirmed reports that accused-appellant Eric
Rosauro (Rosauro for brevity) was selling and
distributing drugs, the Provincial Drug
Enforcement Unit of Misamis Oriental
conducted a test-buy operation in the
Municipality of Villanueva, Misamis Oriental
using a confidential agent. The confidential
agent bought shabu from Rosauro at Purok 2,
Barangay Katipunan, Villanueva, Misamis
Oriental. The substance bought from Rosauro
was examined by the PNP crime laboratory and
yielded a positive result for Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (commonly known as shabu).
On July 3, 2004, the police authorities received
information that again drugs were being
distributed at Purok 3, Barangay Poblacion,
Villanueva, Misamis Oriental. Thus, at 5:30
o’clock in the afternoon, the Provincial Anti-
Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Unit
(PAID-SOTU) elements led by SPO4 Lorenzo
Larot and PO3 Juancho Dizon positioned
themselves in the house of their confidential
agent.
There, the PAID-SOTU elements saw Rosauro
negotiate with the confidential agent. In
exchange for the one (1) sachet of shabu given
by Rosauro to the confidential agent, the latter
gave him a marked 100-peso bill with serial
number YZ7 12579.
After the transaction, Larot and Dizon came out
of their hiding place and arrested Rosauro.
Thereafter, the confidential agent handed the
sachet to Larot, who taped it, mark edit with the
marking "Exhibit A", and placed it inside his
pocket. He also took pictures of Rosauro and
the drugs. In the police station, he prepared a
Certificate of Inventory and a Request for
Laboratory Examination. Both the drugs and

Rosauro were then turned over to the Crime
laboratory.
On the basis of the request made by Larot,
Police Chief Inspector Ma. Leocy Mag-abo, the
Forensic Chemical Officer of PNP Crime
Laboratory conducted a laboratory examination
on the contents of the sachet, on accused-
appellant, and the marked money. The
examination of the seized item yielded positive
result for methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu); while the accused-appellant and the
marked money tested positive for the presence
of ultra-violet fluorescent powder.6
For his part, accused-appellant claims that he
was merely a victim of instigation:
Accused-appellant Rosauro, on the other hand,
tells a different tale. He testified that on July 3,
2004, the police asset went to his house four (4)
times and convinced him to do an errand for
him. Rosauro refused to buy shabu as he did not
know where to buy one. It was the confidential
informant who told him to buy the prohibited
drug from a certain "Kael" and to deliver it to the
former’s house.It was also the informant who
gave the money to Rosauro to buy the shabu.
But Rosauro was not able to meet or buy directly
from Kael because it was a young man who got
and handed to him the shabu on the road. When
Rosauro went to the house of the confidential
informant as instructed, he was arrested by
SPO4 Larot and Dizon. The sachet of shabu
was not even recovered from him but from the
confidential informant.7
Finding the evidence of the prosecution
sufficient to establish the guilt of accused-
appellant, the RTC rendered a judgment of
conviction, viz.:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, this
Court hereby renders Judgment finding accused
ERIC ROSAURO y BONGCAWIL, "guilty"
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
in the information for selling and delivering a
sachet of shabu to the poseur buyer a Violation
of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 and imposes
a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 107
Hundred Thousand (PhP 500,000.00) Pesos
and to pay the cost.
The accused ERIC B. ROSAURO who has
undergone preventive imprisonment shall be
credited in the service of his sentence consisting
of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during
which he has undergone preventive
imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees
voluntarily in writing to abide by the same
disciplinary rule imposed upon convicted
prisoners, except those disqualified by law.
The sachet of shabu, Exh. "A" is confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the government to be
destroyed in accordance with law.8
Accused-appellant appealed before the CA,
assigning a lone error:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
WHEN HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.9
After a review of the records, the CA affirmed
the RTC Judgment. The appellate court ruled
that what transpired in the case at bar was an
entrapment and not an instigation;10 that all the
elements of illegal sale of regulated or
prohibited drugs were duly proven;11 that the
non-presentation of the confidential agent in
court is not fatal;12 that the inconsistencies in the
testimony of the lone witness of the prosecution
do not affect the result of the case;13 and that
the apprehending team was able to preserve the
integrity of the subject drug and that the
prosecution was able to present the required
unbroken chain in the custody of the subject
drug.14 Thus, the CA held:
WHEREFORE, the Judgment dated November
24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25,
Cagayan de Oro City in Criminal Case No.
2004-856 is hereby AFFIRMED.15
Accused-appellant is now before the Court
seeking a review of his conviction.

After a thorough review of the records, however,
we dismiss the appeal.
It is apropos to reiterate here that where there is
no showing that the trial court overlooked or
misinterpreted some material facts or that it
gravely abused its discretion, the Court will not
disturb the trial court’s assessment of the facts
and the credibility of the witnesses since the
RTC was in a better position to assess and
weigh the evidence presented during trial.
Settled too is the rule that the factual findings of
the appellate court sustaining those of the trial
court are binding on this Court, unless there is a
clear showing that such findings are tainted with
arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable
error.16
The RTC and the CA both found the arrest of
accused-appellant to be the result of a
legitimate entrapment procedure, and we find
nothing in the records as to warrant a contrary
finding. In People v. Bartolome,17 we had the
occasion to discuss the legitimacy of a "decoy
solicitation," to wit:
It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that
facilities for its commission were purposely
placed in his way, or that the criminal act was
done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons
seeking to expose the criminal, or that
detectives feigning complicity in the act were
present and apparently assisting its
commission. Especially is this true in that class
of cases where the office is one habitually
committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes
evidence of a course of conduct.
As here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant
by the informant utilized by the police merely
furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. The
police received an intelligence report that
appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal
drugs. They duly acted on it by utilizing an
informant to effect a drug transaction with
appellant. There was no showing that the
informant induced the appellant to sell illegal
drugs to him.1âwphi1
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 108
Similarly, the presentation of an informant as
witness is not regarded as indispensable to the
success of a prosecution of a drug-dealing
accused. As a rule, the informant is not
presented in court for security reasons, in view
of the need to protect the informant from the
retaliation of the culprit arrested through his
efforts. Thereby, the confidentiality of the
informant’s identity is protected in deference to
his invaluable services to law enforcement. Only
when the testimony of the informant is
considered absolutely essential in obtaining the
conviction of the culprit should the need to
protect his security be disregarded.18 In the
present case, as the buy-bust operation was
duly witnessed by the Provincial Anti-Illegal
Drugs Special Operation Task Unit (PAID-
SOTU) elements led by SPO4 Lorenzo Larot
(SPO4 Larot) and PO3 Juancho Dizon, their
testimonies can take the place of that of the
confidential informant.
As to whether accused-appellant’s guilt was
established beyond reasonable doubt, we rule
in the affirmative.
In a catena of cases, this Court laid down the
essential elements to be duly established for a
successful prosecution of offenses involving the
illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs, like
shabu, under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object of the sale, and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and payment therefor. Briefly, the delivery
of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the
receipt of the marked money by the seller
successfully consummate the buy-bust
transaction. What is material, therefore, is the
proof that the transaction or sale transpired,
coupled with the presentation in court of the
corpus delicti.19
Verily, all the elements for a conviction of illegal
sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs were
proven by the prosecution: the identity of
accused-appellant as the seller, and that of the
confidential informant as poseur-buyer were
established, as well as the exchange of the
sachet of shabu and the marked money. It was

also ascertained that the seized item was
positive for shabu, a dangerous drug, and that
the same item was properly identified in open
court by SPO4 Larot. Moreover, the ₱100.00 bill
with serial number YZ712579, or the subject
marked money, as well as the living body of the
accused-appellant revealed a positive result for
ultraviolet fluorescent powder.
Accused-appellant avers that the prosecution
was not able to prove the corpus delicti, and that
the statutory safeguards provided for in Sec. 21
of R.A. No. 9165 were not followed.
Indeed, as we held in People v.
Torres,20 equally important in every prosecution
for illegal sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs
is the presentation of evidence of the seized
drug as the corpus delicti. The identity of the
prohibited drug must be proved with moral
certainty. It must also be established with the
same degree of certitude that the substance
bought or seized during the buy-bust operation
is the same item offered in court as exhibit. In
this regard, paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of
R. A. No. 9165 (the chain of custody rule)
provides for safeguards for the protection of the
identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized,
to wit:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of
Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous
Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take
charge and have custody of all dangerous
drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the
following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 109
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.
However, this Court has, in many cases, held
that while the chain of custody should ideally be
perfect, in reality it is "almost always impossible
to obtain an unbroken chain." The most
important factor is the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items as they will be used to determine the guilt
or innocence of the accused. Hence, the
prosecution’s failure to submit in evidence the
physical inventory and photograph of the seized
drugs as required under Article 21 of R. A. No.
9165, will not render the accused’s arrest illegal
or the items seized from him inadmissible.21
The chain of custody is not established solely by
compliance with the prescribed physical
inventory and photographing of the seized drugs
in the presence of the enumerated persons. The
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R. A.
No. 9165 on the handling and disposition of
seized dangerous drugs states:
x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void
and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items.22 (Italics, emphasis, undescoring
omitted)
In the case at bar, after the sale was
consummated, the confidential informant gave
the seized item to SPO4 Larot who placed tape
on the sachet and marked it "Exhibit A." Upon
reaching the police station, SPO4 Larot
executed the Certificate of Inventory, as well as
the request for laboratory examination. The
request, the specimen, as well as the marked
money and accused-appellant were then
brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
examination. They were received. by SPO2
Ricardo Maisog, the Receiving Clerk of the PNP
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 110

Crime Laboratory Office, who then forwarded

them to Police Inspector Ma. Leocy Jabonillo
Mag-abo, the Forensic Chemical Officer of the
PNP Crime Laboratory.23 Moreover, the seized
item was duly identified by SPO4 Larot in open
court as the same item seized from accused-
appellant.

Accused-appellant's guilt having been

established, we likewise affirm the penalty
imposed by the RTC and the CA. Under the law,
the offense of illegal sale of shabu carries with it
the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a
fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos
(₱10,000,000.00), regardless of the quantity
and purity of the substance.24 Thus, the RTC
and CA were within bounds when they imposed
the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the

present appeal is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 200748 July 23, 2014
JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, filed
by petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz, from the
Decision1 dated 22 June 2011 issued by the
Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA)
and Resolution2 dated 2 February 2012 issued
by the Former Twentieth Division of the CA in
CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS
Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with
violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act
No. (R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the
Office of the Ombudsman - Visayas, in an
Information3 dated 14 February 2006, which
reads:
That on or about the 31st day of January 2006,
at Cebu City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, JAIME D. DE LA CRUZ,
a public officer, having been duly appointed and
qualified to such public position as Police Officer
2 of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
assigned in the Security Service Group of the
Cebu City Police Office, after having
beenarrested by agents of the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) in an entrapment
operation, was found positive for use of
METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDEcommonly known as
"Shabu", the dangerous drug after a
confirmatory test conducted on said accused.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel
de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge. The
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 111
records do not reveal whether De la Cruz was
likewise charged for extortion.
VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION
The evidence of the prosecution reveals that at
8:00 a.m. of 31 January 2006, the agents and
special investigators of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Central Visayas Regional Office
(NBI-CEVRO) or simply NBI, received a
Complaint from Corazon Absin (Corazon) and
Charito Escobido (Charito). The complainants
claimed that at 1:00 a.m. of that same day, Ariel
Escobido (Ariel), the live-in partner of Corazon
and son of Charito, was picked up by several
unknown male persons believed to be police
officers for allegedly selling drugs. An errand
boy gave a number to the complainants, and
when the latter gave the number a ring, they
were instructed to proceed to the Gorordo
Police Office located along Gorordo Avenue,
Cebu City. In the said police office, they met
"James" who demanded from them ₱100,000,
later lowered to ₱40,000, in exchange for the
release of Ariel. After the meeting, the
complainants proceeded to the NBI-CEVRO to
file a complaint and narrate the circumstances
of the meeting to the authorities. While at the
NBI-CEVRO, Charitoeven received calls
supposedly from "James" instructing her to
bring the money as soon as possible.
The special investigators at the NBI-CEVRO
verified the text messages received by the
complainants.1âwphi1 A team was immediately
formed to implement an entrapment operation,
which took place inside a Jollibee branch at the
corner of Gen. Maxilom and Gorordo Avenues,
Cebu City. The officers were able to nab Jaime
dela Cruz by using a pre-marked 500 bill dusted
with fluorescent powder, which was made part
of the amount demanded by "James" and
handed by Corazon. Petitioner was later
brought to the forensic laboratory of the NBI-
CEVRO where forensic examination was done
by forensic chemist Rommel Paglinawan.
Petitioner was required to submit his urine for
drug testing. It later yielded a positive result for
presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the
confirmatory test result labeled as Toxicology

(DangerousDrugs) Report No. 2006-TDD-2402
dated 16 February 2006.
VERSION OF THE DEFENSE
The defense presented petitioner as the lone
witness. He denied the charges and testified
that while eating at the said Jollibee branch, he
was arrested allegedly for extortion by NBI
agents. When he was at the NBI Office, he was
required to extract urine for drug examination,
but he refused saying he wanted it to be done
by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory and not by the NBI. His request was,
however, denied. He also requested to be
allowed to call his lawyer prior to the taking of
his urine sample, to no avail.
THE RULING OF THE RTC
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 58 of
Cebu City, in its Decision4 dated 6 June 2007,
found the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 15, Article II of R.A.
9165 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
compulsory rehabilitation for a period of not less
than six (6) months at the Cebu Center for the
Ultimate Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents
located at Salinas, Lahug, Cebu City.5
Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the
RTC’s validation of the result of the urine test
despite its dubiousness having been admitted in
spite of the lack of legal basis for itsadmission.
First, he alleges that the forensic laboratory
examination was conducted despite the fact that
he was not assisted by counsel, in clear
violation of his constitutional right. Secondly, he
was allegedly held guilty beyond reasonable
doubt notwithstanding the lack of sufficient basis
to convict him.
THE RULING OF THE CA
The CA found the appeal devoid of merit and
affirmed the ruling of the RTC.
Petitioner filed a timely Motion for
Reconsideration. He argued that the CA
overlooked prevailing jurisprudence, which
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 112
states that drug testing conducted under
circumstancessimilar to his would violate a
person’s right to privacy. The appellate court
nevertheless denied the motion.
Petitioner thus filed the present Petition for
Review on certiorari. He assigns as errors the
use of hearsay evidence as basis for his
conviction and the questionable circumstances
surrounding his arrest and drug test.
Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed its Comment,6 saying that
"petitioner’s arguments cannot be the subject of
a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule 45,
as they involve questions of facts which may not
be the subject thereof; after his arraignment, he
can no longer contest the validity of his arrest,
less so at this stage of the proceedings; his guilt
has been adequately established by direct
evidence; and the manner in which the
laboratory examination was conducted was
grounded on a valid and existing law.
THE ISSUE
We deem it proper to give due course to this
Petition by confronting head-on the issue of
whether or not the drug test conducted upon the
petitioner is legal.
OUR RULING
We declare that the drug testconducted upon
petitioner is not grounded upon any existing law
or jurisprudence.
We gloss over petitioner’s non-compliance with
the Resolution7 ordering him to submit clearly
legible duplicate originals or certified true copies
of the assailed Decision and Resolution.
Petitioner was charged with use of dangerous
drugs in violation of the law, the pertinent
provision of which reads:
Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. – A
person apprehended or arrested, who is found
to be positive for use of any dangerous drug,
after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a
penalty of a minimum of six (6) months

rehabilitation in a government center for the first
offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII
of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous
drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and
a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos
(₱50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos
(₱200,000.00): Provided,That this Section shall
not be applicable where the person tested is
also found to have in his/her possession such
quantity of any dangerous drug provided for
under Section 11 of this Act, in which case the
provisions stated therein shall apply.8
The RTC subsequently convicted petitioner,
ruling that the following elements of Section 15
were established: (1) the accused was arrested;
(2) the accused was subjected to drug test; and
(3) the confirmatory test shows that he used a
dangerous drug.
Disregarding petitioner’s objection regarding the
admissibility of the evidence, the lower court
also reasoned that "a suspect cannot invoke his
right to counsel when he is required to extract
urine because, while he is already in custody,
he is not compelled to make a statement or
testimony against himself. Extracting urine from
one’s body is merely a mechanical act, hence,
falling outside the concept of a custodial
investigation."
We find the ruling and reasoning of the trial
court, as well as the subsequent affirmation by
the CA, erroneous on three counts.
The drug test in Section 15 does not cover
persons apprehended or arrested for any
unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts listed
under Article II of R.A. 9165.
First, "[a] person apprehended orarrested"
cannot literally mean any person apprehended
or arrested for any crime.The phrase must be
read in context and understood in consonance
with R.A. 9165. Section 15 comprehends
persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful
acts listed under Article II of the law.
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 113
Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons
who are apprehended or arrested for, among
others, the "importation,"9 "sale, trading,
administration, dispensation, delivery,
distribution and
transportation",10"manufacture"11 and
"possession"12 of dangerous drugs and/or
controlled precursors and essential chemicals;
possession thereof "during parties, social
gatherings or meetings"13 ; being "employees
and visitors of a den, dive or
resort";14 "maintenance of a den, dive or
resort";15 "illegal chemical diversion of
controlled precursors and essential
chemicals"16 ; "manufacture or delivery"17 or
"possession"18 of equipment, instrument,
apparatus, and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors
and essential chemicals; possession of
dangerous drugs "during parties, social
gatherings or meetings"19 ; "unnecessary"20 or
"unlawful"21 prescription thereof; "cultivation or
culture of plantsclassified as dangerous drugs
or are sources thereof";22 and "maintenance
and keeping of original records of transactions
on dangerous drugs and/orcontrolled
precursors and essential chemicals."23 To make
the provision applicable to all persons arrested
or apprehended for any crime not listed under
Article II is tantamount to unduly expanding its
meaning. Note thataccused appellant here was
arrested in the alleged act of extortion.
A charge for violation of Section 15 of R.A. 9165
is seen as expressive of the intent of the law to
rehabilitate persons apprehended or arrested
for the unlawful acts enumerated above instead
of charging and convicting them of other crimes
with heavier penalties. The essence of the
provision is more clearly illustrated in People v.
Martinez24 as follows:
On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity
to be instructive on Sec. 11 (Possession of
Dangerous Drugs) and Sec. 15 (Use of
Dangerous Drugs) of R.A. No. 9165, withregard
to the charges that are filed by law enforcers.
This Court notes the practice of law enforcers of
filing charges under Sec. 11 in cases where the
presence of dangerous drugs as basis for

possession is only and solely in the form of
residue, being subsumed under the last
paragraph of Sec. 11. Although not incorrect, it
would be more in keeping withthe intent of the
law to file charges under Sec. 15 instead in
order to rehabilitate first time offenders of drug
use, provided thatthere is a positive
confirmatory test result as required under Sec.
15.The minimum penalty under the last
paragraph of Sec. 11 for the possession of
residue isimprisonment of twelve years and one
day, while the penalty under Sec. 15 for first time
offenders of drug use is a minimum of six
months rehabilitation in a government center.
To file charges under Sec. 11 on the basis of
residue alone would frustrate the objective of
the law to rehabilitate drug users and provide
them with an opportunity to recover for a second
chance at life.
In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous
drugs was only in the form of residue on the drug
paraphernalia, and the accused were found
positive for use of dangerous drugs. Granting
that the arrest was legal, the evidence obtained
admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the
law enforcers should have filed charges under
Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for use of dangerous
drugs and, if there was no residue at all, they
should have been charged under Sec. 14
(Possession of Equipment, Instrument,
Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social
Gatherings or Meetings). Sec. 14 provides that
the maximum penalty under Sec.
12(Possession of Equipment, Instrument,
Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs) shall be imposed on any
person who shall possess any equipment,
instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia
for dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the
maximum penalty is imprisonment of four years
and a fine of ₱50,000.00. In fact, under the
same section, the possession of such
equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia is
prima facieevidence that the possessor has
used a dangerous drug and shall be presumed
to have violated Sec. 15.
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 114
In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law
to rehabilitate drug users, this Court thus calls
on law enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous
drugs cases to exercise proper discretion in
filing charges when the presence of dangerous
drugs isonly and solely in the form of residue
and the confirmatory test required under Sec. 15
is positive for use of dangerous drugs.In such
cases, to afford the accused a chance to be
rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or involving
possession of dangerous drugs should only be
done when another separate quantity of
dangerous drugs, other than mere residue, is
found in the possession of the accused as
provided for in Sec. 15. (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, making the phrase "a person
apprehended or arrested" in Section 15
applicable to all persons arrested or
apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under
R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount
to a mandatory drug testing of all persons
apprehended or arrested for any crime. To
overextend the application of thisprovision
would run counter to our pronouncement in
Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs
Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency,25 to wit:
x x x [M]andatory drug testing can never be
random and suspicionless. The ideas of
randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a
criminal complaint. They are not randomly
picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
When persons suspected of committing a crime
are charged, they are singled out and are
impleaded against their will. The persons thus
charged, by the bare fact of being haled before
the prosecutor’s office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be
the case, do not necessarily consent to the
procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.
To impose mandatory drug testing on the
accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution,
contrary to the stated objectives of RA 6195.
Drug testing in this case would violate a
person’s right to privacy guaranteed under Sec.
2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the

accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves. (Emphasis supplied)
The drug test is not covered by allowable non-
testimonial compulsion.
We find that petitioner never raisedthe alleged
irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment
and raises the issue only now before this
tribunal; hence, he is deemed to have waived
his right to question the validity of his arrest
curing whatever defect may have attended his
arrest.26 However, "a waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of
the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an
illegal warrantless arrest."27
We are aware of the prohibition against
testimonial compulsion and the allowable
exceptions to such proscription. Cases where
non-testimonial compulsion has been allowed
reveal, however, that the pieces of evidence
obtained were all material to the principal cause
of the arrest.
The constitutional right of an accused against
self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communications
from the accused and not the inclusion of his
body in evidence when it may be material.
Purely mechanical acts are not included in the
prohibition as the accused does not thereby
speak his guilt, hence the assistance and
guiding hand ofcounsel is not required. (People
vs. Olvis, 238 Phil. 513 [1987]) The essence of
the right against selfincrimination is testimonial
compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence
against himself through a testimonial act.
(People vs. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992];
People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455 [1994];
People vs. Rondero, 378 Phil. 123 [1999])
Hence,it has been held that a woman charged
with adultery may be compelled to submit to
physical examination to determine her
pregnancy; (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62
[1920]) and an accused may be compelled to
submit to physical examination and to have a
substance taken from his body for medical
determination as to whether he was suffering
from gonorrhea which was contracted by his
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 115
victim;(U.S. vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912])
to expel morphine from his mouth; (U.S. vs. Ong
Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]) to have the
outline of his foot traced todetermine its identity
with bloody footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil.
337 [1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921])
and to be photographed or measured, or his
garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to
move his body to enable the foregoing things to
be done.(People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil. 244
[1950])28(Emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, we fail to see howa urine
sample could be material to the charge of
extortion.1âwphi1 The RTC and the CA,
therefore, both erred when they held that the
extraction of petitioner’s urine for purposes of
drug testing was "merely a mechanical act,
hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial
investigation."
We note a case where a urine sample was
considered as admissible. In Gutang v.
People,29 the petitioner therein and his
companions were arrested in connection with
the enforcement of a search warrant in his
residence. A PNP-NARCOM team found and
confiscated shabu materials and
paraphernalias. The petitioner and his
companions in that case were also asked to give
urine samples, which yielded positive results.
Later, the petitioner therein was found guilty of
the crime of illegal possession and use of
prohibited drugs. Gutang claimed that the
latter’s urine sample was inadmissible in
evidence, since it was derived in effect from an
uncounselled extrajudicial confession.
In the Gutang et al.case, the Court clarified that
"what the Constitution prohibits is the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from the accused, but not an
inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may
be material." The situation in Gutangwas
categorized as falling among the exemptions
under the freedom from testimonial compulsion
since what was sought tobe examined came
from the body of the accused. The Court said:

This was a mechanical act the accused was
made to undergo which was not meant to
unearth undisclosedfacts but to ascertain
physical attributes determinable by simple
observation. In fact, the record shows that
petitioner and his co-accused were not
compelled to give samples of their urine but they
in fact voluntarily gave the same when they
were requested to undergo a drug test.
Assuming arguendothat the urine samples
taken from the petitioner are inadmissible in
evidence, we agree with the trial court that the
record is replete with other pieces of credible
evidence including the testimonial evidence of
the prosecution which point to the culpability of
the petitioner for the crimes charged.
We emphasize that the circumstances in
Gutangare clearly different from the
circumstances of petitioner in the instant
case.1awp++i1 First, Gutang was arrested in
relation to a drug case. Second, he volunteered
to give his urine. Third, there were other pieces
of evidence that point to his culpability for the
crimes charged. In the present case, though,
petitioner was arrested for extortion; he resisted
having his urine sample taken; and finally, his
urine sample was the only available
evidencethat was used as basis for his
conviction for the use of illegal drugs.
The drug test was a violation of petitioner’s right
to privacy and right against self-incrimination.
It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to
have his urine extracted and tested for drugs.
He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test.
He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all
of his efforts proved futile, because he was still
compelled to submit his urine for drug testing
under those circumstances.
The pertinent provisions in Article III of the
Constitution are clear:
Section 2. The right of the people to be securein
their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 116
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause
to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be
a witness against himself.
In the face of these constitutional guarantees,
we cannot condone drug testing of all arrested
persons regardless of the crime or offense for
which the arrest is being made.
While we express our commendation of law
enforcement agents as they vigorously track
down offenders intheir laudable effort to curb the
pervasive and deleterious effects of dangerous
drugs on our society, they must, however, be
constantly mindful of the reasonable limits of
their authority, because it is not unlikely that in
their clear intent to purge society of its lawless
elements, they may be knowingly or
unknowingly transgressing the protected rights
of its citizens including even members of its own
police force.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
assailed Decision dated 22 June 2011 issued by
the Twentieth Division, and the Resolution
dated 2 February 2012 issued by the former
Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals, in
CA-G.R. C.R. No. 00670 are SET ASIDE.
Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 117

G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008 testing laboratories accredited and monitored by
the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner results. x x x The drug testing shall employ,
vs. among others, two (2) testing methods, the
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and screening test which will determine the positive
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT result as well as the type of drug used and the
AGENCY (PDEA),respondents. confirmatory test which will confirm a positive
screening test. x x x The following shall be
x--------------------------------- subjected to undergo drug testing:
--------------x
xxxx
G.R. No. 158633 November 3, 2008
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.
ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., petitioner - Students of secondary and tertiary schools
vs. shall, pursuant to the related rules and
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and regulations as contained in the school's student
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT handbook and with notice to the parents,
AGENCY, respondents. undergo a random drug testing x x x;

x--------------------------------- (d) Officers and employees of public and private

--------------x
G.R. No. 161658 November 3, 2008
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of
Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates
for public office, students of secondary and
tertiary schools, officers and employees of
public and private offices, and persons charged
before the prosecutor's office with certain
offenses, among other personalities, is put in
issue.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads
as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized
drug testing shall be done by any government
forensic laboratories or by any of the drug
offices. - Officers and employees of public and
private offices, whether domestic or overseas,
shall be subjected to undergo a random drug
test as contained in the company's work rules
and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing
the risk in the workplace. Any officer or
employee found positive for use of dangerous
drugs shall be dealt with administratively which
shall be a ground for suspension or termination,
subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the
Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil
Service Law;
xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's
office with a criminal offense having an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less
than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo
a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether
appointed or elected both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug
test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this
Section, those found to be positive for
dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the
provisions of Section 15 of this Act.

G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections)
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No.
6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on
the mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office in connection with the May 10, 2004
synchronized national and local elections. The
pertinent portions of the said resolution read as
follows:
WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No.
9165 provides:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - x x x
xxxx
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in
the national or local government shall undergo
a mandatory drug test.
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution provides that public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;
WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo
mandatory drug test, the public will know the
quality of candidates they are electing and they
will be assured that only those who can serve
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency would be elected x x x.
NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC],
pursuant to the authority vested in it under the
Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
(Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other
election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it
hereby promulgates, the following rules and
regulations on the conduct of mandatory drug
testing to candidates for public office[:]
SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for
public office, both national and local, in the
May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and
Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug
test in government forensic laboratories or any
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 118
drug testing laboratories monitored and
accredited by the Department of Health.
SEC. 3. x x x
On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug
certificates filed with their respective offices, the
Comelec Offices and employees concerned
shall submit to the Law Department two (2)
separate lists of candidates. The first list shall
consist of those candidates who complied with
the mandatory drug test while the second list
shall consist of those candidates who failed to
comply x x x.
SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of
candidates. - Before the start of the campaign
period, the [COMELEC] shall prepare two
separate lists of candidates. The first list shall
consist of those candidates who complied with
the mandatory drug test while the second list
shall consist of those candidates who failed to
comply with said drug test. x x x
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory
drug test and file drug test certificate. - No
person elected to any public office shall enter
upon the duties of his office until he has
undergone mandatory drug test and filed with
the offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof
the drug test certificate herein required.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of
the Republic and a candidate for re - election in
the May 10, 2004 elections,1 filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he
seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated
December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in
that they impose a qualification for candidates
for senators in addition to those already
provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to
enjoin the COMELEC from implementing
Resolution No. 6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition
Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which
states:

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator
unless he is a natural - born citizen of the
Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at
least thirty - five years of age, able to read and
write, a registered voter, and a resident of the
Philippines for not less than two years
immediately preceding the day of the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only
prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications
for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be
a member of the Senate. He says that both the
Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA
9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial
aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a
mandatory drug test, create an additional
qualification that all candidates for senator must
first be certified as drug free. He adds that there
is no provision in the Constitution authorizing
the Congress or COMELEC to expand the
qualification requirements of candidates for
senator.
G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v.
Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65,
petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a
registered political party, seeks to prohibit the
Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of
Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are
constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions
constitute undue delegation of legislative power
when they give unbridled discretion to schools
and employers to determine the manner of drug
testing. For another, the provisions trench in the
equal protection clause inasmuch as they can
be used to harass a student or an employee
deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person's
constitutional right against unreasonable
searches is also breached by said provisions.
G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr.
v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency)
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 119
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen
and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that
Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck
down as unconstitutional for infringing on the
constitutional right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure, and the right
against self - incrimination, and for being
contrary to the due process and equal protection
guarantees.
The Issue on Locus Standi
First off, we shall address the justiciability of the
cases at bench and the matter of the standing
of petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As
respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and
Laserna failed to allege any incident amounting
to a violation of the constitutional rights
mentioned in their separate petitions.2
It is basic that the power of judicial review can
only be exercised in connection with a bona
fidecontroversy which involves the statute
sought to be reviewed.3 But even with the
presence of an actual case or controversy, the
Court may refuse to exercise judicial review
unless the constitutional question is brought
before it by a party having the requisite standing
to challenge it.4 To have standing, one must
establish that he or she has suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the
injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
and the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.5
The rule on standing, however, is a matter of
procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non -
traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the matter is
of transcendental importance, of overarching
significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.6 There is no doubt that Pimentel, as
senator of the Philippines and candidate for the
May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite
standing since he has substantial interests in
the subject matter of the petition, among other
preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and

Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule
on locus standi owing primarily to the
transcendental importance and the paramount
public interest involved in the enforcement of
Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
The Consolidated Issues
The principal issues before us are as follows:
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator?
Corollarily, can Congress enact a law
prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec.
36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do
these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the
right against unreasonable searches and
seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do
they constitute undue delegation of legislative
power?
Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165
and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
illegally impose an additional qualification on
candidates for senator. He points out that,
subject to the provisions on nuisance
candidates, a candidate for senator needs only
to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3,
Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship,
(2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and
(5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification
requirements, candidates for senator need not
possess any other qualification to run for
senator and be voted upon and elected as
member of the Senate. The Congress cannot
validly amend or otherwise modify these
qualification standards, as it cannot disregard,
evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional
mandate,7 or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 120
Pimentel's contention is well - taken.
Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be,
as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is
basic that if a law or an administrative rule
violates any norm of the Constitution, that
issuance is null and void and has no effect. The
Constitution is the basic law to which all laws
must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts
with the Constitution.8 In the discharge of their
defined functions, the three departments of
government have no choice but to yield
obedience to the commands of the Constitution.
Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.9
Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as
they may be, are subject to certain limitations.
As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer,
the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits
on legislative power in the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the
legislative department of the Government, like
the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In
constitutional governments, however, as well as
governments acting under delegated authority,
the powers of each of the departments x x x are
limited and confined within the four walls of the
constitution or the charter, and each department
can only exercise such powers as are
necessarily implied from the given powers. The
Constitution is the shore of legislative authority
against which the waves of legislative
enactment may dash, but over which it cannot
leap.10
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the
sense that it is subject to substantive and
constitutional limitations which circumscribe
both the exercise of the power itself and the
allowable subjects of legislation.11 The
substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly
found in the Bill of Rights12 and other provisions,
such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution
prescribing the qualifications of candidates for
senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the
guise of enforcing and administering election
laws or promulgating rules and regulations to
implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose

qualifications on candidates for senator in
addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If
Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such
power. The right of a citizen in the democratic
process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution.13
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be
implemented by the assailed COMELEC
resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification
requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI
of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g)
unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to
be certified illegal - drug clean, obviously as a
pre - condition to the validity of a certificate of
candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a
condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if
proper, be proclaimed as senator - elect. The
COMELEC resolution completes the chain with
the proviso that "[n]o person elected to any
public office shall enter upon the duties of his
office until he has undergone mandatory drug
test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper context,
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing
COMELEC Resolution add another qualification
layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the
minimum, requires for membership in the
Senate. Whether or not the drug - free bar set
up under the challenged provision is to be
hurdled before or after election is really of no
moment, as getting elected would be of little
value if one cannot assume office for non -
compliance with the drug - testing requirement.
It may of course be argued, in defense of the
validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the
provision does not expressly state that non -
compliance with the drug test imposition is a
disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a
certificate of candidacy. This argument may be
accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement
is optional. But the particular section of the law,
without exception, made drug - testing on those
covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that
the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the
adverse consequences for not adhering to the
statutory command. And since the provision
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 121
deals with candidates for public office, it stands
to reason that the adverse consequence
adverted to can only refer to and revolve around
the election and the assumption of public office
of the candidates. Any other construal would
reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and
effect whatsoever.
While it is anti - climactic to state it at this
juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no
longer enforceable, for by its terms, it was
intended to cover only the May 10, 2004
synchronized elections and the candidates
running in that electoral event. Nonetheless, to
obviate repetition, the Court deems it
appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby
rules, on its validity as an implementing
issuance.
It ought to be made abundantly clear, however,
that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 is rooted on its having infringed the
constitutional provision defining the qualification
or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run
for and serve as senator.
SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and
[g] of RA 9165)
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d),
and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary
level students and public and private
employees, while mandatory, is a random and
suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to
stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the
process "the well being of [the] citizenry,
particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of
dangerous drugs." This statutory purpose, per
the policy - declaration portion of the law, can be
achieved via the pursuit by the state of "an
intensive and unrelenting campaign against the
trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x
through an integrated system of planning,
implementation and enforcement of anti - drug
abuse policies, programs and projects."14 The
primary legislative intent is not criminal
prosecution, as those found positive for illegal
drug use as a result of this random testing are

not necessarily treated as criminals. They may
even be exempt from criminal liability should the
illegal drug user consent to undergo
rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are
clear on this point:
Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug
Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and
Rehabilitation. - A drug dependent or any
person who violates Section 15 of this Act may,
by himself/herself or through his/her parent,
[close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for
treatment and rehabilitation of the drug
dependency. Upon such application, the Board
shall bring forth the matter to the Court which
shall order that the applicant be examined for
drug dependency. If the examination x x x
results in the certification that the applicant is a
drug dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the
Court to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in
a Center designated by the Board x x x.
xxxx
Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability
Under the Voluntary Submission Program. - A
drug dependent under the voluntary submission
program, who is finally discharged from
confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal
liability under Section 15 of this Act subject to
the following conditions:
xxxx
School children, the US Supreme Court noted,
are most vulnerable to the physical,
psychological, and addictive effects of drugs.
Maturing nervous systems of the young are
more critically impaired by intoxicants and are
more inclined to drug dependency. Their
recovery is also at a depressingly low rate.15
The right to privacy has been accorded
recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the
right protected by the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure16 under Sec.
2, Art. III17 of the Constitution. But while the right
to privacy has long come into its own, this case
appears to be the first time that the validity of a
state - decreed search or intrusion through the
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 122
medium of mandatory random drug testing
among students and employees is, in this
jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the
issue tendered in these proceedings is veritably
one of first impression.
US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of
persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to
random drug testing among school children, we
turn to the teachings of Vernonia School District
47J v. Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education
of Independent School District No. 92 of
Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al.
(Board of Education),18 both fairly pertinent US
Supreme Court - decided cases involving the
constitutionality of governmental search.
In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia,
Oregon wanted to address the drug menace in
their respective institutions following the
discovery of frequent drug use by school
athletes. After consultation with the parents,
they required random urinalysis drug testing for
the school's athletes. James Acton, a high
school student, was denied participation in the
football program after he refused to undertake
the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued,
claiming that the school's drug testing policy
violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment19 of
the US Constitution.
The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution
to the issues raised in Vernonia, considered the
following: (1) schools stand in loco parentis over
their students; (2) school children, while not
shedding their constitutional rights at the school
gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have
less privacy rights than non - athletes since the
former observe communal undress before and
after sports events; (4) by joining the sports
activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected
themselves to a higher degree of school
supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine
samples does not invade a student's privacy
since a student need not undress for this kind of
drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug
testing because of the dangerous effects of
illegal drugs on the young. The US Supreme
Court held that the policy constituted reasonable
search under the Fourth20 and 14th

Amendments and declared the random drug -
testing policy constitutional.
In Board of Education, the Board of Education
of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a
drug test for high school students desiring to join
extra - curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a
member of the show choir, marching band, and
academic team declined to undergo a drug test
and averred that the drug - testing policy made
to apply to non - athletes violated the Fourth and
14th Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike
athletes who routinely undergo physical
examinations and undress before their peers in
locker rooms, non - athletes are entitled to more
privacy.
The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld
the constitutionality of drug testing even among
non - athletes on the basis of the school's
custodial responsibility and authority. In so
ruling, said court made no distinction between a
non - athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that
schools and teachers act in place of the parents
with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding
the health of the students. And in holding that
the school could implement its random drug -
testing policy, the Court hinted that such a test
was a kind of search in which even a reasonable
parent might need to engage.
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from
the above two cases and applied to this
jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their
administrators stand in loco parentis with
respect to their students; (2) minor students
have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and
are subject to the custody and supervision of
their parents, guardians, and schools; (3)
schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to
safeguard the health and well - being of their
students and may adopt such measures as may
reasonably be necessary to discharge such
duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose
conditions on applicants for admission that are
fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education,
the Court is of the view and so holds that the
provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory,
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 123
random, and suspicionless drug testing of
students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within
the prerogative of educational institutions to
require, as a condition for admission,
compliance with reasonable school rules and
regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to
enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable requirements.
The Court can take judicial notice of the
proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country
that threatens the well - being of the
people,21 particularly the youth and school
children who usually end up as victims.
Accordingly, and until a more effective method
is conceptualized and put in motion, a random
drug testing of students in secondary and
tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may
even be necessary if the safety and interest of
the student population, doubtless a legitimate
concern of the government, are to be promoted
and protected. To borrow from Vernonia,
"[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's
schoolchildren is as important as enhancing
efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws
against the importation of drugs"; the necessity
for the State to act is magnified by the fact that
the effects of a drug - infested school are visited
not just upon the users, but upon the entire
student body and faculty.22 Needless to stress,
the random testing scheme provided under the
law argues against the idea that the testing aims
to incriminate unsuspecting individual students.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary
level students, the mandatory but random drug
test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for
officers and employees of public and private
offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the
same reason. The Court notes in this regard that
petitioner SJS, other than saying that
"subjecting almost everybody to drug testing,
without probable cause, is unreasonable, an
unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to
privacy,"23 has failed to show how the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165
violates the right to privacy and constitutes
unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art.
III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.24 Petitioner

Laserna's lament is just as simplistic, sweeping,
and gratuitous and does not merit serious
consideration. Consider what he wrote without
elaboration:
The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts
of Appeals have made various rulings on the
constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the
school and the workplaces. The US courts have
been consistent in their rulings that the
mandatory drug tests violate a citizen's
constitutional right to privacy and right against
unreasonable search and seizure. They are
quoted extensively hereinbelow.25
The essence of privacy is the right to be left
alone.26 In context, the right to privacy means
the right to be free from unwarranted
exploitation of one's person or from intrusion
into one's private activities in such a way as to
cause humiliation to a person's ordinary
sensibilities. 27 And while there has been
general agreement as to the basic function of
the guarantee against unwarranted search,
"translation of the abstract prohibition against
‘unreasonable searches and seizures' into
workable broad guidelines for the decision of
particular cases is a difficult task," to borrow
from C. Camara v. Municipal
Court.28 Authorities are agreed though that the
right to privacy yields to certain paramount
rights of the public and defers to the state's
exercise of police power.29
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the
Constitution is couched and as has been held,
"reasonableness" is the touchstone of the
validity of a government search or
intrusion.30 And whether a search at issue hews
to the reasonableness standard is judged by the
balancing of the government - mandated
intrusion on the individual's privacy interest
against the promotion of some compelling state
interest.31 In the criminal context,
reasonableness requires showing of probable
cause to be personally determined by a judge.
Given that the drug - testing policy for
employees--and students for that matter--under
RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative
search needing what was referred to
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 124
in Vernonia as "swift and informal disciplinary
procedures," the probable - cause standard is
not required or even practicable. Be that as it
may, the review should focus on the
reasonableness of the challenged
administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of
reasonableness is the nature of the privacy
interest upon which the drug testing, which
effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2,
Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case,
the office or workplace serves as the backdrop
for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the
employees and the reasonableness of drug
testing requirement. The employees' privacy
interest in an office is to a large extent
circumscribed by the company's work policies,
the collective bargaining agreement, if any,
entered into by management and the bargaining
unit, and the inherent right of the employer to
maintain discipline and efficiency in the
workplace. Their privacy expectation in a
regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced;
and a degree of impingement upon such privacy
has been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the
character of the intrusion authorized by the
challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is
the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set
forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the
enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly
drawn" or "narrowly focused"?32
The poser should be answered in the
affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as
couched, contain provisions specifically
directed towards preventing a situation that
would unduly embarrass the employees or
place them under a humiliating experience.
While every officer and employee in a private
establishment is under the law deemed
forewarned that he or she may be a possible
subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled
out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to
discourage drug use by not telling in advance
anyone when and who is to be tested. And as
may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself

prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing
ingredient by providing that the employees
concerned shall be subjected to "random drug
test as contained in the company's work rules
and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing
the risk in the work place."
For another, the random drug testing shall be
undertaken under conditions calculated to
protect as much as possible the employee's
privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the
test, the law specifies that the procedure shall
employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening
test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to
ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness
of the results. But the more important
consideration lies in the fact that the test shall
be conducted by trained professionals in access
- controlled laboratories monitored by the
Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard
against results tampering and to ensure an
accurate chain of custody.33 In addition, the IRR
issued by the DOH provides that access to the
drug results shall be on the "need to know"
basis;34 that the "drug test result and the records
shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual
accepted practices to protect the confidentiality
of the test results."35 Notably, RA 9165 does not
oblige the employer concerned to report to the
prosecuting agencies any information or
evidence relating to the violation of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act received as a result of the operation of the
drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into
the employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is
accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly
against embarrassing leakages of test results,
and is relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a
measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country
and thus protect the well - being of the citizens,
especially the youth, from the deleterious effects
of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve
this through the medium, among others, of
promoting and resolutely pursuing a national
drug abuse policy in the workplace via a
mandatory random drug test.36 To the Court, the
need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal
drug use is substantial enough to override the
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 125
individual's privacy interest under the premises.
The Court can consider that the illegal drug
menace cuts across gender, age group, and
social - economic lines. And it may not be amiss
to state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking
of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would
be an investor's dream were it not for the illegal
and immoral components of any of such
activities. The drug problem has hardly abated
since the martial law public execution of a
notorious drug trafficker. The state can no
longer assume a laid back stance with respect
to this modern - day scourge. Drug enforcement
agencies perceive a mandatory random drug
test to be an effective way of preventing and
deterring drug use among employees in private
offices, the threat of detection by random testing
being higher than other modes. The Court holds
that the chosen method is a reasonable and
enough means to lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e.,
the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of
the employees, the compelling state concern
likely to be met by the search, and the well -
defined limits set forth in the law to properly
guide authorities in the conduct of the random
testing, we hold that the challenged drug test
requirement is, under the limited context of the
case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector,
government officials and employees also labor
under reasonable supervision and restrictions
imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws
on public officers, all enacted to promote a high
standard of ethics in the public service.37 And if
RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for
private employees, the more reason that it
should pass the test for civil servants, who, by
constitutional command, are required to be
accountable at all times to the people and to
serve them with utmost responsibility and
efficiency.38
Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA
9165 is objectionable on the ground of undue
delegation of power hardly commends itself for
concurrence. Contrary to its position, the
provision in question is not so extensively drawn

as to give unbridled options to schools and
employers to determine the manner of drug
testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug
testing for students of secondary and tertiary
schools and officers/employees of public/private
offices should be conducted. It enumerates the
persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the
case of students, the testing shall be in
accordance with the school rules as contained
in the student handbook and with notice to
parents. On the part of officers/employees, the
testing shall take into account the company's
work rules. In either case, the random
procedure shall be observed, meaning that the
persons to be subjected to drug test shall be
picked by chance or in an unplanned way. And
in all cases, safeguards against misusing and
compromising the confidentiality of the test
results are established.
Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165
charges the DDB to issue, in consultation with
the DOH, Department of the Interior and Local
Government, Department of Education, and
Department of Labor and Employment, among
other agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce
the law. In net effect then, the participation of
schools and offices in the drug testing scheme
shall always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165.
It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and
employers have unchecked discretion to
determine how often, under what conditions,
and where the drug tests shall be conducted.
The validity of delegating legislative power is
now a quiet area in the constitutional
landscape.39 In the face of the increasing
complexity of the task of the government and
the increasing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the many problems demanding its
attention, resort to delegation of power, or
entrusting to administrative agencies the power
of subordinate legislation, has become
imperative, as here.
Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec.
36[c], [d],
[f], and [g] of RA 9165)
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 126
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and
(d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid
justification for mandatory drug testing for
persons accused of crimes. In the case of
students, the constitutional viability of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing for students emanates primarily from the
waiver by the students of their right to privacy
when they seek entry to the school, and from
their voluntarily submitting their persons to the
parental authority of school authorities. In the
case of private and public employees, the
constitutional soundness of the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing
proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug
test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the
case of persons charged before the public
prosecutor's office with criminal offenses
punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the
mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and
"suspicionless." In the case of persons charged
with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and
being suspicionless are antithetical to their
being made defendants in a criminal complaint.
They are not randomly picked; neither are they
beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of
committing a crime are charged, they are
singled out and are impleaded against their will.
The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of
being haled before the prosecutor's office and
peaceably submitting themselves to drug
testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily
consent to the procedure, let alone waive their
right to privacy.40 To impose mandatory drug
testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to
harness a medical test as a tool for criminal
prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of
RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate
a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under
Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the
accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves
to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 127

declares Sec. 36(g) of RA

9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and
to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R.
Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec.
36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL,
but declaring its Sec. 36(f)
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies
are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from
implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 128

activities or games of cockfighting,

jueteng, jai alai or horse racing to
VI. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS include bookie operations and
game fixing, numbers, bingo and
A. GAMBLING AND BETTING other forms of lotteries; cara y
cruz, pompiang and the like; 7-11
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1602 and any game using dice; black
jack, lucky nine, poker and its
PRESCRIBING STIFFER PENALTIES ON derivatives, monte, baccarat,
ILLEGAL GAMBLING cuajao, pangguingue and other
card games; paik que, high and
WHEREAS, Philippine Gambling Laws such as low, mahjong, domino and other
Articles 195-199 of the Revised Penal Code games using plastic tiles and the
(Forms of Gambling and Betting), R.A. 3063 likes; slot machines, roulette,
(Horse racing Bookies), P.D. 449 (Cockfighting), pinball and other mechanical
P.D. 483 (Game Fixing), P.D. 510 (Slot contraptions and devices; dog
Machines) in relation to Opinion Nos. 33 and 97 racing, boat racing, car racing and
of the Ministry of Justice, P.D. 1306 (Jai-Alai other forms of races, basketball,
Bookies) and other City and Municipal boxing, volleyball, bowling,
Ordinances or gambling all over the country pingpong and other forms of
prescribe penalties which are inadequate to individual or team contests to
discourage or stamp out this pernicious include game fixing, point shaving
activities; and other machinations; banking
or percentage game, or any other
WHEREAS, there is now a need to increase game scheme, whether upon
their penalties to make them more effective in chance or skill, wherein wagers
combating this social menace which dissipate consisting of money, articles of
the energy and resources of our people; value or representative of value
are at stake or made;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E.
MARCOS, President of the Republic of the 2. Any person who shall knowingly
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me permit any form of gambling
by the Constitution, do hereby order and decree: referred to in the preceding
subparagraph to be carried on in
Section 1. Penalties. The following penalties inhabited or uninhabited place or
are hereby imposed: in any building, vessel or other
means of transportation owned or
(a) The penalty of prison correccional in controlled by him. If the place
its medium period of a fine ranging from where gambling is carried on has
one thousand to six thousand pesos, and a reputation of a gambling place or
in case of recidivism, the penalty of that prohibited gambling is
prision mayor in its medium period or a frequently carried on therein, or
fine ranging from five thousand to ten the place is a public or
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon: government building or barangay
hall, the malfactor shall be
1. Any person other than those punished by prision correccional
referred to in the succeeding sub- in its maximum period and a fine
sections who in any manner, shall of six thousand pesos.
directly or indirectly take part in
any illegal or unauthorized
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 129

(b) The penalty of prision correccional in Section 2. Informer's reward. Any person who
its maximum period or a fine of six shall disclose information that will lead to the
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon arrest and final conviction of the malfactor shall
the maintainer or conductor of the above be rewarded twenty percent of the cash money
gambling schemes. or articles of value confiscated or forfeited in
favor of the government.
(c) The penalty of prision mayor in its
medium period with temporary absolute Section 3. Repealing Clause. Provisions of Art.
disqualification or a fine of six thousand 195-199 of the Revised Penal Code, as
pesos shall be imposed if the maintainer, amended, Republic Act No. 3063, Presidential
conductor or banker of said gambling Decrees Numbered 483, 449, 510 and 1306,
schemes is a government official, or letters of instructions, laws, executive orders,
where such government official is the rules and regulations, city and municipal
player, promoter, referee, umpire, judge ordinances which are inconsistent with this
or coach in case of game fixing, point Decree are hereby repealed.
shaving and machination.
Section 4. Effectivity. This Decree shall take
(d) The penalty of prision correccional in effect immediately upon publication at least
its medium period or a fine ranging from once in a newspaper of general circulation.
four hundred to two thousand pesos shall
be imposed upon any person who shall, Done in the City of Manila, this 11th day of June,
knowingly and without lawful purpose in in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
any hour of any day, possess any lottery seventy-eight.
list, paper or other matter containing
letters, figures, signs or symbols LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS NO. 816
pertaining to or in any manner used in the
games of jueteng, jai-alai or horse racing
bookies, and similar games of lotteries
and numbers which have taken place or
TO : The Minister of National Defense
about to take place.
The minister of Local Government and
(e) The penalty of temporary absolute
Community Development
disqualifications shall be imposed upon
The Chief of Staff
any barangay official who, with
Armed Forces of the Philippines
knowledge of the existence of a gambling
The Chief Constabulary
house or place in his jurisdiction fails to
Director-General, INP
abate the same or take action in
The Chairman
connection therewith.
Task Force Anti-Gambling
(f) The penalty of prision correccional in
its maximum period or a fine ranging from
SUBJECT : To exclude certain prohibited
five hundred pesos to two thousand
games under Presidential Decree No. 1602
pesos shall be imposed upon any
security officer, security guard,
WHEREAS, it is the intent of the Presidential
watchman, private or house detective of
Decree No. 1602 to discourage and prohibit
hotels, villages, buildings, enclosures
gambling not regulated or sanctioned under
and the like which have the reputation of
existing laws;
a gambling place or where gambling
activities are being held.
WHEREAS, there is need to exclude

therefrom certain games like domino, bingo,
poker when not played with five cards stud,
cuajo, pangguingue and mahjong when
exclusively intended for parlor games or for
home entertainment;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E.
MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do
hereby order that the games of domino, bingo,
poker when not played with five cards stud,
cuajo, pangguingue and mahjong, provided
that they are played as parlor games or for
home entertainment; and Provided Further,
That they are not played in places habitually
used for gambling and the betting is not
disguised to defeat the intent of Presidential
Decree No. 1602, are hereby exempted.
Done in the City of Manila, this 20th day of
February, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy-nine.
Republic Act No. 9287 April 2, 2004
AN ACT INCREASING THE PENALTIES FOR
ILLEGAL NUMBERS GAMES, AMENDING
CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 1602, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is the
policy of the State to promote a just and
dynamic social order that will ensure the
prosperity and independence of the nation and
free the people from poverty through policies
that provide adequate social services, promote
full employment, a rising standard of living, and
an improved quality of life for all. It is likewise
the policy of the State that the promotion of
social justice shall include the commitment to
create economic opportunities based on
freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
Hence, the State hereby condemns the
existence of illegal gambling activities such as
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 130
illegal numbers games as this has become an
influential factor in an individual's disregard for
the value of dignified work, perseverance and
thrift since instant monetary gains from it are
being equated to success, thereby becoming a
widespread social menace and a source of
corruption.
Towards this end, the State shall therefore
adopt more stringent measures to stop and
eradicate the existence of illegal numbers
games in any part of the country.
Sec. 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this
Act, the following terms shall mean:
a) Illegal Numbers Game. - Any form illegal
gambling activity which uses numbers or
combinations thereof as factors in giving out
jackpots.
b) Jueteng. - An illegal numbers game that
involves the combination of thirty-seven (37)
numbers against thirty-seven (37) numbers
from number one (1) to thirty seven (37) or the
combination of thirty-eight (38) numbers in
some areas, serving as a form of local lottery
where bets are placed and accepted per
combination, and its variants.
c) Masiao. - An illegal numbers game where
the winning combination is derived from the
results of the last game of Jai Alai or the
Special Llave portion or any result thereof
based on any fictitious Jai Alai game consisting
of ten (10) players pitted against one another,
and its variants.
d) Last Two. - An illegal numbers game where
the winning combination is derived from the last
two (2) numbers of the first prize of the winning
Sweepstakes ticket which comes out during the
weekly draw of the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), and its variants.
e) Bettor ("Mananaya", "Tayador" or variants
thereof). - Any person who places bets for
himself/herself or in behalf of another person,

or any person, other than the personnel or staff
of any illegal numbers game operation.
f) Personnel or Staff of Illegal Numbers Game
Operation. - Any person, who acts in the
interest of the maintainer, manager or operator,
such as, but not limited to, an accountant,
cashier, checker, guard, runner, table
manager, usher, watcher, or any other
personnel performing such similar functions in
a building structure, vessel, vehicle, or any
other place where an illegal numbers game is
operated or conducted.
g) Collector or Agent ("Cabo", "Cobrador",
"Coriador" or variants thereof). - Any person
who collects, solicits or produces bets in behalf
of his/her principal for any illegal numbers
game who is usually in possession of gambling
paraphernalia.
h) Coordinator, Controller or Supervisor
("Encargado" or variants thereof). - Any person
who exercises control and supervision over the
collector or agent.
i) Maintainer, Manager or Operator. - Any
person who maintains, manages or operates
any illegal number game in a specific area from
whom the coordinator, controller or supervisor,
and collector or agent take orders.
j) Financiers or Capitalist. - Any person who
finances the operations of any illegal numbers
game.
k) Protector or Coddler. - Any person who
lends or provides protection, or receives
benefits in any manner in the operation of any
illegal numbers game.
Sec. 3. Punishable Acts. - Any person who
participates in any illegal numbers game shall
suffer the following penalties:
a) The penalty of imprisonment from thirty (30)
days to ninety (90) days, if such person acts as
a bettor;
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 131
b) The penalty of imprisonment from six (6)
years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, if such
person acts as a personnel or staff of an illegal
numbers game operation;
The same penalty shall likewise be imposed to
any person who allows his vehicle, house,
building or land to be used in the operation of
the illegal numbers games.
c) The penalty of imprisonment from eight (8)
years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, if such
person acts as a collector or agent;
d) The penalty of imprisonment from ten (10)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, if
such person acts as a coordinator, controller or
supervisor;
e) The penalty of imprisonment from twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to ten (10) fourteen
(14) years, if such person acts as a maintainer,
manager or operator; and
f) The penalty of imprisonment from fourteen
(14) years and one (1) day to sixteen (16)
years, if such person acts as a financier or
capitalist;
g) The penalty of imprisonment from sixteen
(16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years,
if such person acts as protector or coddler.
Sec. 4. Possession of Gambling Paraphernalia
or Materials. - The possession of any gambling
paraphernalia and other materials used in the
illegal numbers game operation shall be
deemed prima facie evidence of any offense
covered by this Act.
Sec. 5. Liability of Government Employees
and/or Public Officials. - a) If the collector,
agent, coordinator, controller, supervisor,
maintainer, manager, operator, financier or
capitalist of any illegal numbers game is a
government employee and/or public official,
whether elected or appointed shall suffer the
penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three

million pesos (P3,000,000.00) to Five million
pesos (P5,000,000.00) and perpetual absolute
disqualification from public office.
In addition to the penalty provided in the
immediately preceding section, the accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification from public
office shall be imposed upon any local
government official who, having knowledge of
the existence of the operation of any illegal
numbers game in his/her jurisdiction, fails to
abate or to take action, or tolerates the same in
connection therewith.
b) In the case of failure to apprehend
perpetrators of any illegal numbers game, any
law enforcer shall suffer an administrative
penalty of suspension or dismissal, as the case
may be, to be imposed by the appropriate
authority.
Sec. 6. Liability of Parents/Guardians. - The
penalty of imprisonment from six (6) months
and one (1) day to one (1) year or fine ranging
from One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) to Four hundred thousand
pesos (P400,000.00) shall be imposed upon
any parent, guardian or person exercising
moral authority or ascendancy over a minor,
ward or incapacitated person, and not
otherwise falling under any of the foregoing
subsections, who induces or causes such
minor, ward or incapacitated person to commit
any of the offenses punishable in this Act. Upon
conviction, the parent, guardian or person
exercising moral authority or ascendancy over
the minor, ward or incapacitated person shall
be deprived of his/her authority over such
person in addition to the penalty imposed.
Sec. 7. Recidivism. - The penalty next higher in
degree as provided for under Section 3 hereof
shall be imposed upon a recidivist who
commits any of the offenses punishable in this
Act.
Sec. 8. Immunity from Prosecution. - Any
person who serves as a witness for the
government or provides evidence in a criminal
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 132
case involving any violation of this Act, or who
voluntarily or by virtue of a subpoena
testificandum or duces tecum, produces,
identifies, or gives testimony shall be immune
from any criminal prosecution, subject to the
compliance with the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1732, otherwise known as Decree
Providing Immunity from Criminal Prosecution
to Government Witnesses and the pertinent
provisions of the Rules of Court.
Sec. 9. Prosecution, Judgment and Forfeiture
of Property. - Any person may be charged with
or convicted of the offenses covered by this Act
without prejudice to the prosecution of any act
or acts penalized under the Revised Penal
Code or existing laws.
During the pendency of the case, no property
or income used or derived therefrom which
may be confiscated and forfeited shall be
disposed, alienated or transferred and the
same shall be in custodia legis and no bond
shall be admitted for the release of the same.
The trial prosecutors shall avail of provisional
remedies provided for under the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure.
Upon conviction, all proceeds, gambling
paraphernalia and other instruments of the
crime including any real or personal property
used in any illegal numbers game operation
shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
State. All assets and properties of the accused
either owned or held by him/her in his/her name
or in the name of another person found to be
manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful
income shall be prima facie presumed to be
proceeds of the offense and shall likewise be
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the State.
Sec. 10. Witness Protection. - Any person who
provides material information, whether
testimonial or documentary, necessary for the
investigation or prosecution of individuals
committing any of the offenses under Sections
3, 4, 5 and 6 herein shall be placed under the
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 133

Witness Protection Program pursuant to Sec. 15. Repealing Clause. - The provisions of
Republic Act. No. 6981. other laws, decrees, executive orders, rules
and regulations inconsistent with this Act are
Sec. 11. Informer's Reward. - Any person who, hereby repealed, amended or modified
having knowledge or information of any offense accordingly.
committed under this Act and who shall
disclose the same which may lead to the arrest Sec. 16. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect
and final conviction of the offender, may be fifteen (15) days after its publication in at least
rewarded a certain percentage of the cash two (2) national newspapers of general
money or articles of value confiscated or circulation.
forfeited in favor of the government, which shall
be determined through a policy guideline
promulgated by the Department of Justice
(DOJ) in coordination with the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG) and the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM).

The DILG, the NAPOLCOM and the DOJ shall

provide for a system of rewards and incentives
for law enforcement officers and for local
government official for the effective
implementation of this Act.

Sec. 12. Implementing Rules and Regulations.

- Within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of
this Act, the DILG, DOJ, NAPOLCOM, and
other concerned government agencies shall
jointly promulgate the implementing rules and
regulations, as may be necessary to ensure the
efficient and effective implementation of the
provisions of this Act.

Sec. 13. Separability Clause. - If for any reason

any section or provision of this Act, or any
portion thereof, or the application of such
section, provision or portion thereof to any
person, group or circumstance is declared
invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining
provisions of this Act shall not be affected by
such declaration and shall remain in force and
effect.

Sec. 14. Amendatory Clause. - The pertinent

provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1602, in
so far as they are inconsistent herewith, are
hereby expressly amended or modified
accordingly.

G.R. No. L-13678 November 12, 1918
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PRUDENCIO SALAVERIA, defendant-
appellant.
Jose R. Varela for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for
appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The municipal council of Orion, Bataan,
enacted, on February 28, 1917, an ordinance
which, among other things, prohibited the
playing of panguingue on days not Sundays or
legal holidays, and penalized the violation
thereof by a casero [housekeeper] by a fine of
not less than P10 nor more than P200, and
by jugadores [gamblers] by a fine of not less
than P5 nor more than P200. The justice of the
peace of Orion, when this ordinance went into
effect, was Prudencio Salaveria, now the
defendant and appellant. Notwithstanding his
official station, on the evening of March 8,
1917, not a Sunday or legal holiday, seven
persons including the justice of the peace an
his wife were surprised by the police while
indulging in a game of panguingue in the house
of the justice of the peace. The chief of police
took possession of the cards, the counters
(sigayes), a tray, an P2.07 in money, used in
the game.
These are facts fully proven by the evince and
by the admissions of the accused. Convicted in
the justice of the peace court of Orion, and
again in the Court of First Instance of Bataan,
Salaveria appeals to this court, making five
assignments of error. The three assignments,
of a technical nature, are without merit, and a
fourth, relating to the evidence, is not sustained
by the proof. The remaining assignment of
error, questioning the validity of the ordinance
under which the accused was convicted,
requires serious consideration and final
resolution. This ordinance in part reads:
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 134
RESOLUTION NO. 28
xxx xxx xxx
Whereas, this Council is vested with certain
powers by sections 2184 and 2185 of the
Administrative Code;
Whereas, it is the moral duty of this body to
safeguard the tranquillity and stability of the
Government and to foster the welfare and
prosperity of each an all of the inhabitants of
this municipality; therefore,
Be it resolved to enact, as it hereby is enacted,
the following ordinance:
Ordinance No. 3
xxx xxx xxx
Third. — The games known as "Panguingue"
"Manilla," "Jung-kiang," "Paris-Paris," "Poker,"
"Tute," "Burro," and "Treinta-y-uno" shall be
allowed only on Sundays an official holidays.
xxx xxx xxx
The following penalties shall be imposed upon
those who play the above games on days other
than Sundays and official holidays:
For the owner of the house: A fine of from Ten
to Two hundred pesos, or subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate
of one peso a day.
For the gamblers: A fine of from Five to Two
hundred pesos each or subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate
of one peso a day.
The Philippine Legislature has granted to
municipalities legislative powers of a dual
character, one class mandatory an the other
discretionary. Of the first class is the provision
of the Administrative Code which makes it the
duty of the municipal council, conformably with
law, "to prohibit and penalize . . . gambling."

(Sec. 2188 [i], Adm. Code of 1916; sec. 2242
[i], Adm. Code of 1917.) This is a more
restricted power than that found in the original
Municipal Code which authorized a municipal
council to "provide against the evils of
gambling, gambling houses, and disorderly
houses of whatsoever sort." (Act No. 82, sec.
39 [u].) The present municipal law, since
making use of the word "gambling," must be
construed with reference to the Insular Law,
Act No. 1757, relating to the same subject. Act
No. 1757 in section 1 defines "gambling" as
"the paying of any game for money or any
representative of value or valuable
consideration or thing, the result of which game
depends wholly or chiefly upon chance or
hazard, or the use of any mechanical
inventions or contrivance to determine by
chance the loser or winner of money or of any
representative of value or of any valuable
consideration or thing." In the United
States vs. Hilario ([1913], 24 Phil., 392), the
Supreme Court went into the subject of the
meaning of "gambling" in this jurisdiction, and
found that it includes those games the result of
which depend wholly or chiefly upon chance or
hazard, and excludes those games the result of
which depend wholly or chiefly upon skill, with
the result that sections 621 to 625 of the Revise
Ordinances of the city of Manila (734-738 of the
Revised Ordinances of 1917) were found to
prohibit only games of chance or hazard.
The ordinance of Orion, Bataan, merely
prohibits the playing of panguingue on certain
days, without describing it. Further, although
this court has considered the method by which
many other games are played, it has never as
yet authoritatively decided whether
panguingue was a game of skill or hazard. Nor
was any evidence on this point introduced in
the present case. However, a reading of the
decision of the trial court and of official opinions
of two Attorneys-General, of which we can take
judicial cognizance, warrants the deduction
that panguingue is not a game of chance or
hazard and is not prohibited by Act No. 1757.
(See Opinions of the Attorney-General of July
11, 1904; July 25, 1904; October 10, 1905; and
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 135
September 7, 1911; also Berriz, Diccionario de
la Administracion, p. 35.) If, therefore, we were
to restrict our investigation to those portions of
the Administrative Code which authorize a
municipal council to prohibit and penalize
gambling, there would exist grave doubt, to say
the least, of the validity of ordinance No. 3 of
the municipality of Orion, Bataan.
There remains for consideration a different
approach to the question.
While Philippine law gives to gambling a
restricted meaning, it is to be noted that, in its
broader signification, gambling relates to play
by certain rules at cards, dice, or other
contrivance, so that one shall be the loser an
the other the winner. (20 Cyc., 878; Bouvier's
Law Dictionary; People vs. Todd [1889], 51
Hun [N. Y.], 446 451; 4 N. Y. Supp., 25.) As one
example the Charter of the town of Ruston,
State of Louisiana, authorized it "to restrain,
prohibit, an suppress . . . games and gambling
houses and rooms . . ., and to provide for the
punishment of the persons engaged in the
same." Under this power the town passed an
ordinance prohibiting "all games of chance,
lottery, banking games, raffling, and all other
species of gambling," indicating that there were
other species of gambling in addition to games
of chance. (See Town of Ruston vs. Perkins
[1905], 114 La., 851.) The common law notion
of gambling, which only made it an indictable
offense when the play was attended by such
circumstances as would in themselves amount
to a riot or a nuisance or to an actual breach of
the peace, has given way to statutes and
ordinances designed to restrain, suppress, or
control gambling.
Authority for the State or a municipality to take
action to control gambling in this larger sense
can be found in an analysis of what is calle the
police power.
Any attempt to define the police power with
circumstantial precision would savor of
pedantry. The United States Supreme Court
tritely describes it as "the most essential of all

powers, at times the most insistent, an always
one of least limitable of the powers of
government." (District of Columbia vs. Brooks
[1909], 214 U.S., 138.) The police power is
based on the maxim "salus populi est suprema
lex" — the welfare of the people is the first law.
The United States Supreme Court has said that
it extends "to the protection of the lives, health
and property of the citizens, and to
the preservation of good order and the public
morals." (Beer Co. vs. Massachusetts [1878] ,
97 U.S., 25; Barbier vs. Connolly [1885], 113
U.S., 27.) The Supreme Court of these Islands
has said that it extends "the police power of the
state includes not only the public health safety,
but also the public welfare, protection against
impositions, and generally the public's best
interest." (U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil.,
245.) Recent judicial decisions incline to give a
more extensive scope to the police power that
the older cases. The public welfare is rightfully
made the basis of construction.
Not only does the State effectuate its purposes
through the exercise of the police power but the
municipality does also. Like the State, the
police power of a municipal corporation
extends to all matters affecting the peace,
order, health, morals, convenience, comfort,
and safety of its citizens — the security of social
order — the best and highest interests of the
municipality. (Case vs. Board of Health of
Manila and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil., 250.) The
best considered decisions have tended to
broaden the scope of action of the municipality
in dealing with police offenses. Within the
general police powers of a municipal
corporation is the suppression of gambling.
Ordinances aimed in a reasonable way at the
accomplishment of this purpose are
undoubtedly valid. (See U.S. vs. Pacis [1915],
31 Phil., 524; 39 L. R. A., 523, Note; Cooley's
Constitutional Limitations, 6th edition, pp. 138,
226, 742; Greenville vs.Kemmis [1900], 58 S.
C., 427 [holding that under the general welfare
clause a city may pass an ordinance prohibiting
gambling in any private house].)
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 136
The Philippine Legislature, as before intimated,
delegated to municipalities certain legislative
powers are named specifically. But in addition,
and preceding both the specific powers of a
mandatory and discretionary character, is the
general power of a municipal council to enact
ordinances and make regulations. It is this
grant that the preamble of the ordinance of
Orion assigns as authority for its enactment.
Said section 2184 of the Administrative Code
of 1916 (sec. 2238, Adm. Code of 1917) reads:
The municipal council shall enact such
ordinances and make such regulations, not
repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry
into effect and discharge the powers an duties
conferred upon it by law an such as shall seem
necessary and proper to provide for the health
and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the
morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of
property therein.
This section, known as the general welfare
clause, delegates in statutory form the police
power to a municipality. As above stated, this
clause has been given wide application by
municipal authorities and has in its relation to
the particular circumstances of the case been
liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well
to recall, is the progressive view of Philippine
jurisprudence.
The general welfare clause has two branches.
One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of
municipal authority, and relates to such
ordinances and regulations as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
powers and duties conferred upon the
municipal council by law. With this class we are
not here directly concerned. The second
branch of the clause is much more independent
of the specific functions of the council which are
enumerated by law. It authorizes such
ordinances "as shall seem necessary and
proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort, and convenience

of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof,
and for the protection of property therein."
It is a general rule that ordinances passed by
virtue of the implied power found in the general
powers and purposes of the corporation, and
not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the
State. The ordinance of the municipality of
Orion does not seem in itself to be pernicious,
or unreasonable or discriminatory. Its purposes
evidently are to improve the morals and
stimulate the industry of the people. A person
is to be compelled to refrain from private acts
injurious both to himself an his neighbors.
These objects, to be attained by limiting the
pastime to definite days, do not infringe any law
of the general government.
The constitutional provision that no person
shall be deprived of liberty without due process
of law is not violated by this ordinance. Liberty
of action by the individual is not unduly
circumscribed; that is, it is not unduly
circumscribed if we have in mind the correct
notion of this "the greatest of all rights." That
gravest of sociological questions — How far,
consistently with freedom, may the liberties of
the individual member of society be
subordinated to the will of the Government? —
has been debated for centuries, in vain, if we
can not now discount the time worn objection
to any and all interference with private rights in
order to effectuate the public purpose. (See
Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905], 197 U. S.,
11; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 58 L. R. A.,
748.) Almost countless are the governmental
restrictions on the citizen.
The presumption is all favor of validity. The
inhabitants of a municipality are in themselves
miniature states. The action of the elected
representatives of the people cannot be lightly
set aside. The councilors must, in the very
nature of things, be familiar with the necessities
of their particular municipality an with all the
facts and circumstances which surround the
subject, and necessities of their particular
municipality and with all the facts and
circumstances which surround the subject, and
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 137
necessitate action. The local legislative body,
by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given
notice that the regulations are essential to the
well being of the people. Who is in a better
position to say whether the playing
of panguingue is deleterious to social order
and the public interest in a certain municipality
— the municipal council, or the courts? The
answer is self-evident. The Judiciary should not
lightly set aside legislative action when there is
not a clear invasion of personal or property
rights under the guise of police regulation. (See
U.S. vs. Joson [1913], 26 Phil., 1.)
President McKinley's Instructions to the
Commission still remain undisturbed by
subsequent Acts of Congress dealing with
Philippine affairs and yet constitute a portion of
our constitutional law, as to the inviolable rule
that "municipal governments . . . shall be
afforded the opportunity to manage their own
affairs to the fullest extent of which they are
capable." Again the same organic law says, "In
the distribution of powers among the
governments organized by the Commission,
the presumption is always to be in favor of the
smaller subdivision, so that all the powers
which can properly be exercised by the
municipal government shall be vested in that
government . . . ." Let us never forget these
principles so highly protective of local self-
government.
The judiciary can very well take notice of the
fact that municipalities are accustomed to
enacting ordinances aimed at the regulation of
gambling. The executive authorities an the
Attorney-General have usually upheld the
validity of such ordinances, especially those
intended to restrict the playing of panguingue.
(Opinions of the Attorney-General, supra;
Opinion of the Executive Secretary, July 6,
1909; Indorsement of the Governor-General,
July 21, 1904.) This general municipal practice,
indicative of a social cancer to be eradicated,
should not be discouraged by strict judicial
construction.

More important still, the courts cannot but
realize that gambling, in its larger sense as well
as in its restricted sense, is an act beyond the
pale of good morals, which, for the welfare of
the Filipino people, should be exterminated.
The suppression of the evil does not interfere
with any of the inherent rights of citizenship.
The pernicious practice is rightfully regarded as
the offspring of idleness and the prolific parent
of vice and immorality, demoralizing in its
association and tendencies, detrimental to the
best interests of society, and encouraging
wastefulness, thriftlessness, and a belief that a
livelihood may be earned by other means than
honest industry. To be condemned in itself, it
has the further effect of causing poverty,
dishonesty, fraud, and deceit. Many a man has
neglected his business and mortgaged his
integrity to follow the fickle Goddess of the
cards. Many a woman has wasted her hours
and squandered her substance at the gambling
board while home and children were forgotten.
It is highly proper that this pastime should be
subject to the control of restraints imposed by
the ordinances of local governments peculiarly
afflicted by the evil. (See In re Voss [1903], 11
N. D., 540; Ex parte Tuttle [1891], 91, Cal., 589;
Greenwood vs. State [1873], 6 Baxt., 567; 32
Am. Rep., 539; 12 R. C. L., 709-715.)
For the suppression of such an evil, coordinate
and harmonious action must concur between
the three departments of Government. A law or
ordinance enacted by the legislative body must
exist. Such an ordinance is before us. Vigorous
executive enforcement must take place to
make the law or ordinance a reality. Such
activity by the police has brought this case to
the courts. And finally the Judiciary, having full
respect for the legislative action of the
municipal council and for the prosecution by
the executive officials, must, by judicial
construction, equally as progressive and
constructive, give effect to the action of the
other two powers. Wherefore,
although panguingue is not entirely a game of
chance, since it is a proper subject for
regulation by municipal authorities acting under
their delegated police power, whose laudable
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 138
intention is to improve the public morals and
promote the prosperity of their people, their
action should be upheld by the courts.
Ordinance No. 3 of Orion, Bataan, is found to
be valid.
The culprit in this case is himself a member of
the Judiciary. Instead of enforcing the law, he
has scorned it. His example to the people of
Orion has been pernicious in its influence. If
gambling is to be suppressed, not only the
weak and ignorant must be punished, but those
with full knowledge of the law and the
consequences of violation. We would
accordingly suggest to Courts of First Instance
that in all cases arising under the Gambling
Law or ordinances, except for unusual
circumstances, a prison sentence should be
imposed, if permitted by the law or ordinance.
We further suggest that, where the defendant
has been found guilty and is a man of station,
he be given the maximum penalty.lawphil.net
Applying the foregoing in this instance, it
results that the defendant and appellant must
be found guilty of a violation of ordinance No. 3
of the municipality of Orion, Bataan; and, in
accordance therewith, shall be sentenced to
the maximum penalty of the payment of a fine
of P200, or to subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, with the costs of all three
instances against him. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Araullo and Avanceña,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
JOHNSON, J., concurring:
I concur upon the ground that the ordinance in
question is fully authorized under the "general
welfare" provisions of the Municipal Code.
STREET, J., concurring:
I agree in the conclusion that the ordinance
passed by the municipality of Orion prohibiting
the playing of panguingue on secular days is

valid and am of the opinion that the authority to
pass such an ordinance is to be found
exclusively in section 2184 of the
Administrative Code (1916), which gives a
general authority for the enactment of
ordinances which seem proper to improve the
morals and good order of the community. As
the game of panguingue is admittedly not a
game of chance or hazard played for money, it
is not within the prohibitions of Act No. 1757; an
I think the case should be determined without
reference to the legislation against gambling
and without reference t the circumstance that
under subsection (i) of section 2188 of the
same Code the Legislature has made it
mandatory upon municipal councils to prohibit
and penalize gambling.
The legislature has clearly authorized the
municipal council to use its discretion as to the
measures which it esteems desirable to
promote morals an good order; and I know of
no rule of law which would justify any court in
overruling that discretion in such a matter as is
now before us. Certainly I would be sorry to see
this court adopt a paternalistic attitude of
captious criticism and correction tending to
embarrass the free exercise of the legislative
discretion vested by law in the municipal
councils. Those bodies are undoubtedly
destined to make mistakes in the exercise of
the powers conferred on them, but there is no
better school than that of experience in which
their members may discover what is most likely
to promote the welfare of the community and
the interests of their constituents.
As already suggested, I think that the Gambling
Law (Act No. 1757) and the provisions of the
Municipal Code relative to the suppression of
gambling, strictly speaking, have nothing to do
with the case; and the circumstance that those
measures are upon the statute book cannot
serve in the slightest degree to limit the powers
of a municipal council in legislating upon a
matter not implicated with gambling. From the
preamble to the ordinance it may be seen that
the council had in view the promotion of the
general well-being and the advancement of
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 139
prosperity in the community; and the ordinance
was doubtless intended to discourage the
playing of games which involve a frivolous and
idle waste of time, rather than directly to
suppress gambling. But even if the council had
suppose that the games which it proposed to
regulate are calculated to foment the gambling
instinct and should be suppressed for that
reason, the ordinance in question could not
possibly have been rendered invalid by that
fact.
FISHER, J., dissenting:
The importance of suppressing gambling,
properly emphasized in the majority opinion,
cannot warrant a conviction where gambling is
not involved. The zeal to remedy an evil should
not induce the graver evil of obliterating legal
landmarks.
Gambling is the playing, for money or its
equivalent, of any game of which the result
depends "wholly or chiefly upon chance or
hazard, . . . ." (Act No. 1757).
The defendant herein is accused of playing
panguingue, which is avowedly not a game of
chance or hazard within this definition. It is not
alleged in the information that the playing was
for money or any other thing of value. The fact
that some money was found on the table when
the accused was arrested is immaterial in this
case. The ordinance under which the
conviction was had does not make playing the
prohibited games for money an ingredient of
the offense, and the decision of the majority
proceeds upon the theory that the result would
have been the same had no money been
staked upon the game.
To play a game of skill without risking anything
upon the outcome is not gambling, and the
prohibition of harmless amusements cannot be
justified by the authority to prohibit gambling.
In recognition of the fact that the ordinance
upon which is based this prosecution goes
beyond the terms of the statutory authority, it is

sought to find power to pass the same under
the general welfare clause (section 2238,
Administrative Code of 1917). But the
ordinance which imposes a fine and
imprisonment upon a man and wife who play a
game of cards together as mere pastime, in
their own home, without risking a cent upon the
outcome, is beyond the protection of such
general provision for two reasons. In the first
place, it is unreasonably subversive of the
liberty of the citizen an unnecessary. In the
second place, the Legislature of the Islands
has spoken in well defined terms on the subject
of gambling, and its pronouncement on the
subject fills the field and precludes the
possibility of stretching the authority delegated
to municipalities into the right to repeal, modify,
or supplement existing legislation.
The subject of gambling has merited the
attention of our Legislature and Act No. 1757
very clearly defines the intention and will of that
body in the premises. Its limitation of the
prohibition is its refusal to prohibit games of skill
and games in which no value is at stake, and is
the exact equivalent of a pronouncement that
non-gambling pastimes shall not be prohibited.
When the legislature authorized municipalities
to "penalize . . . . gambling" it was aiming at the
vice of risking money upon the hazard of a
game of chance. The Legislature has not
prohibited the playing of card games — in itself
an innocent pastime — but the playing for
money of games of hazard. When it delegated
like power to municipalities it had a like object
in view and not other.
Equally untenable, to my mind, is the attempt
to justify the statute under the "general welfare"
clause. The prohibition by ordinance of the
playing of certain card games as an
amusement, without stake or wager, cannot be
said to promote the health, safety, morals,
peace, good order, comfort or convenience of
the inhabitants of a municipality. The majority
opinion contends that the purpose of the
enactment was to "improve the morals and
stimulate the industry of the people."
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 140
Unfortunately for that theory it appears that the
ordinance expressly permits these "immoral"
diversions on Sundays and official holidays. I
am unable to see how one's morals are to be
improved by permitting him to
play panguingue, poker or burro all day
Sunday, and then sending him to jail for
engaging in the same amusement Monday
evening. So far as the "stimulation of . . .
industry" is concerned, that argument might
have had some weight if the prohibition of these
amusements had been limited to working
hours. But such is not the case. The inhabitants
of Orion may play poker — without a wager —
to their heart's content on Sunday, but to do it
Saturday evening, after the work of the week is
over, is prohibited — their morals are to be
"improved" and their industry "stimulated" until
midnight. After that they may yield to their
depraved instincts until midnight of Sunday,
without let or hindrance. I submit that it is
obvious that the ordinance in question
was intended to prevent gambling, but is not
warranted by the delegated authority of
municipal councils over this subject, because it
is so drawn as to include harmless
amusements not within the legislative definition
of gambling. By limiting the definition and
prohibition of gambling to the playing
for money of games of hazard, the Legislature
by implication permitted the playing of all other
games not within the prohibition. Is the "general
welfare" clause of grant of power to municipal
corporation to be so construed as to make the
express delegation of power redundant and
useless? If under the general welfare clause
the playing of whist or chess in one's own
house, not for money, but merely for
amusement, may be prohibited under the
general welfare clause, certainly the power "to
penalize and prohibit . . . gambling" must have
been included in that clause. If so, the special
grant relating to gambling is merely redundant.
I submit that when a special power to enact
ordinances is granted to a municipal council
upon a particular subject, the power as to that
matter is to be measured by the express grant,
without enlargement by the interpretation of the

general "welfare clause." The express grant of
power to regulate public dance halls (section
2243 [k], Administrative Code of 1917) is not be
expanded under the general "welfare clause"
so as to authorize the prohibition and
penalizing of dancing in private houses. The
express grant of power to establish and
maintain streets cannot be expanded, under
the general welfare clause, this court has held,
so as to authorize an ordinance to compel
citizen to clean the streets. (U.S. vs. Gaspay,
33 Phil. Rep., 96.)
I think the law on this subject is correctly
expressed in Judge Dillon's authoritative work
on Municipal Corporations as follows:
When there are both special and general
provisions, the power to pass by-laws under
the special or express grant can only be
exercised in the cases and to the extent, as
respects those matters, allowed by the charter
or incorporating act; and the power to pass by-
laws under the general clause does not enlarge
or annul the power conferred by the special
provisions in relation to their various subject
matters, but gives authority to pass by-laws,
reasonable in their character, upon all other
matters within the scope of their municipal
authority, and not repugnant to the Constitution
and general laws of the State.
But if we disregard entirely the delegated
power relating to the prohibition of gambling
and consider the matter from the standpoint of
the general welfare clause alone, it seems
equally clear to me that the ordinance in
question is void as being contrary to the public
legislative policy, as established by the
Philippine Legislature. In Dillon on Municipal
Corporations (fifth edition, paragraph 601) it is
said:
. . . A municipal corporation . . . cannot, in virtue
of its incidental power to pass-by-laws, or
under any general grant of that authority, adopt
by-laws which infringe the spirit or are
repugnant to the policy of the State as declared
in its general legislation. This principle is well
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 141
exemplified by a case in Ohio
(Marietta vs. Fearing, 4 Ohio, 427) in which
incorporated towns were, by statute, prohibited
from subjecting stray animals owned by
persons not residents of such town to their
corporation ordinances. It was held that an
ordinance operating, not on the animals but on
the non-resident owner, in the shape of a
penalty, violated the spirit of the statute, and
was void. So, in a later case in the same State,
it was shown that the general policy of the State
was to allow animals to run at large; and it was
ruled that a municipal corporation with power to
pass "all by-laws deemed necessary for the
well-regulation, health, cleanliness & c.," of the
borough, and with power to "abate nuisances,"
had no authority to pass a by-law restraining
cattle from running at large, such a by-law
being in contravention of the general law of the
State. (Collins vs. Hatch, 18 Ohio, 523.)
The public legislative policy is to permit the
playing of card games as an amusement,
without wagers upon the outcome. That is
shown by the language of Act No. 1757, which,
by limiting the prohibition of gambling to games
of chance or hazard played for money, by
implication permits the playing of games not
prohibited, and by the fact that the Tariff Act in
force (section 3) by prohibiting the importation
of marked cards impliedly authorizes the
importation of others.
Panguingue playing may be so harmful to the
people of this country that the playing of it at
any time, at any place, with or without the
wagering of money, should be prohibited. If that
is so the Legislature should prohibit it. Some
people regard dancing and billiards as equally
harmful. If such people happen to control a
given municipal council we may see
respectable citizens in jail for the offense of
dancing in their own homes, for playing casino
or billiards, or ping-pong, or for engaging in any
other amusement which, while not prohibited
by any general law, may be prohibited in any
municipality under this omnibus general
welfare clause.

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY
OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC.
& PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING
CORPORATION, respondents.
Aquilino G. Pimentel, Jr. and Associates for
petitioners.
R.R. Torralba & Associates for private
respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR
announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan
de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily
denounced the project. The religious elements
echoed the objection and so did the women's
groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led
by the mayor and the city legislators. The
media trumpeted the protest, describing the
casino as an affront to the welfare of the city.
The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its
tremendous success in several cities,
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to
Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a
portion of a building belonging to Pryce
Properties Corporation, Inc., one of the herein
private respondents, renovated and equipped
the same, and prepared to inaugurate its
casino there during the Christmas season.
The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile.
On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance
No. 3353 reading as follows:
ORDINANCE NO. 3353
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE
ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND
CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 142
TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING
AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS
PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR
THE OPERATION OF CASINO.
BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro, in
session assembled that:
Sec. 1. — That pursuant to the policy of the city
banning the operation of casino within its
territorial jurisdiction, no business permit shall
be issued to any person, partnership or
corporation for the operation of casino within
the city limits.
Sec. 2. — That it shall be a violation of existing
business permit by any persons, partnership or
corporation to use its business establishment
or portion thereof, or allow the use thereof by
others for casino operation and other gambling
activities.
Sec. 3. — PENALTIES. — Any violation of such
existing business permit as defined in the
preceding section shall suffer the following
penalties, to wit:
a) Suspension of the business permit for sixty
(60) days for the first offense and a fine of
P1,000.00/day
b) Suspension of the business permit for Six (6)
months for the second offense, and a fine of
P3,000.00/day
c) Permanent revocation of the business permit
and imprisonment of One (1) year, for the third
and subsequent offenses.
Sec. 4. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten
(10) days from publication thereof.
Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted
a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93 reading as
follows:
ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE
OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING
PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR.
WHEREAS, the City Council established a
policy as early as 1990 against CASINO under
its Resolution No. 2295;
WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City
Council passed another Resolution No. 2673,
reiterating its policy against the establishment
of CASINO;
WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it
likewise passed Ordinance No. 3353,
prohibiting the issuance of Business Permit
and to cancel existing Business Permit to any
establishment for the using and allowing to be
used its premises or portion thereof for the
operation of CASINO;
WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4),
sub paragraph VI of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (Rep. Act 7160) and under Art.
99, No. (4), Paragraph VI of the implementing
rules of the Local Government Code, the City
Council as the Legislative Body shall enact
measure to suppress any activity inimical to
public morals and general welfare of the people
and/or regulate or prohibit such activity
pertaining to amusement or entertainment in
order to protect social and moral welfare of the
community;
NOW THEREFORE,
BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in
session duly assembled that:
Sec. 1. — The operation of gambling CASINO
in the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby
prohibited.
Sec. 2. — Any violation of this Ordinance shall
be subject to the following penalties:
a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be
imposed against the proprietor, partnership or
corporation undertaking the operation,
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 143
conduct, maintenance of gambling CASINO in
the City and closure thereof;
b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months
nor more than one (1) year or a fine in the
amount of P5,000.00 or both at the discretion
of the court against the manager, supervisor,
and/or any person responsible in the
establishment, conduct and maintenance of
gambling CASINO.
Sec. 3. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten
(10) days after its publication in a local
newspaper of general circulation.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court
of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as
intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their
challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the
Court of Appeals declared the ordinances
invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit
their enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this
decision was denied on July 13, 1993. 2
Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now
before us in this petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. 3 They aver that the
respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding
that:
1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro
does not have the power and authority to
prohibit the establishment and operation of a
PAGCOR gambling casino within the City's
territorial limits.
2. The phrase "gambling and other prohibited
games of chance" found in Sec. 458, par. (a),
sub-par. (1) — (v) of R.A. 7160 could only
mean "illegal gambling."
3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul
P.D. 1869 and are therefore invalid on that
point.
4. The questioned Ordinances are
discriminatory to casino and partial to

cockfighting and are therefore invalid on that
point.
5. The questioned Ordinances are not
reasonable, not consonant with the general
powers and purposes of the instrumentality
concerned and inconsistent with the laws or
policy of the State.
6. It had no option but to follow the ruling in the
case of Basco, et al. v. PAGCOR, G.R. No.
91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 53 in
disposing of the issues presented in this
present case.
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by
P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all
games of chance, including casinos on land
and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine
Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 4 this
Court sustained the constitutionality of the
decree and even cited the benefits of the entity
to the national economy as the third highest
revenue-earner in the government, next only to
the BIR and the Bureau of Customs.
Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political
subdivisions, is empowered to enact
ordinances for the purposes indicated in the
Local Government Code. It is expressly vested
with the police power under what is known as
the General Welfare Clause now embodied in
Section 16 as follows:
Sec. 16. — General Welfare. — Every local
government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and
effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall
ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture,
promote health and safety, enhance the right of
the people to a balanced ecology, encourage
and support the development of appropriate
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 144
and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their
residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their
inhabitants.
In addition, Section 458 of the said Code
specifically declares that:
Sec. 458. — Powers, Duties, Functions and
Compensation. — (a) The Sangguniang
Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city,
shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare
of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code and in the proper
exercise of the corporate powers of the city as
provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and
shall:
(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions
necessary for an efficient and effective city
government, and in this connection, shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent,
suppress and impose appropriate penalties for
habitual drunkenness in public places,
vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution,
establishment and maintenance of houses of ill
repute, gamblingand other prohibited games of
chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain
money or property, drug addiction,
maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing,
juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution
or exhibition of obscene or pornographic
materials or publications, and such other
activities inimical to the welfare and morals of
the inhabitants of the city;
This section also authorizes the local
government units to regulate properties and
businesses within their territorial limits in the
interest of the general welfare. 5

The petitioners argue that by virtue of these
provisions, the Sangguniang Panlungsod may
prohibit the operation of casinos because they
involve games of chance, which are
detrimental to the people. Gambling is not
allowed by general law and even by the
Constitution itself. The legislative power
conferred upon local government units may be
exercised over all kinds of gambling and not
only over "illegal gambling" as the respondents
erroneously argue. Even if the operation of
casinos may have been permitted under P.D.
1869, the government of Cagayan de Oro City
has the authority to prohibit them within its
territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it
by the Local Government Code.
It is submitted that this interpretation is
consonant with the policy of local autonomy as
mandated in Article II, Section 25, and Article X
of the Constitution, as well as various other
provisions therein seeking to strengthen the
character of the nation. In giving the local
government units the power to prevent or
suppress gambling and other social problems,
the Local Government Code has recognized
the competence of such communities to
determine and adopt the measures best
expected to promote the general welfare of
their inhabitants in line with the policies of the
State.
The petitioners also stress that when the Code
expressly authorized the local government
units to prevent and suppress gambling and
other prohibited games of chance, like craps,
baccarat, blackjack and roulette, it
meant allforms of gambling without
distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
distinguere debemos. 6 Otherwise, it would
have expressly excluded from the scope of
their power casinos and other forms of
gambling authorized by special law, as it could
have easily done. The fact that it did not do so
simply means that the local government units
are permitted to prohibit all kinds of gambling
within their territories, including the operation of
casinos.
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 145
The adoption of the Local Government Code, it
is pointed out, had the effect of modifying the
charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only
a later enactment than P.D. 1869 and so is
deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies
between them. More than this, the powers of
the PAGCOR under the decree are expressly
discontinued by the Code insofar as they do not
conform to its philosophy and provisions,
pursuant to Par. (f) of its repealing clause
reading as follows:
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city
charters, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations,
or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent
with any of the provisions of this Code are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
It is also maintained that assuming there is
doubt regarding the effect of the Local
Government Code on P.D. 1869, the doubt
must be resolved in favor of the petitioners, in
accordance with the direction in the Code
calling for its liberal interpretation in favor of the
local government units. Section 5 of the Code
specifically provides:
Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. — In the
interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the
following rules shall apply:
(a) Any provision on a power of a local
government unit shall be liberally interpreted in
its favor, and in case of doubt, any question
thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution
of powers and of the lower local government
unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power shall be interpreted in
favor of the local government unit concerned;
xxx xxx xxx
(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code
shall be liberally interpreted to give more
powers to local government units in
accelerating economic development and

upgrading the quality of life for the people in the
community; . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as
intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions
of the Constitution and several decisions of this
Court expressive of the general and official
disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the
State policies on the family and the proper
upbringing of the youth and, as might be
expected, call attention to the old case of U.S.
v. Salaveria,7 which sustained a municipal
ordinance prohibiting the playing
of panguingue. The petitioners decry the
immorality of gambling. They also impugn the
wisdom of P.D. 1869 (which they describe as
"a martial law instrument") in creating
PAGCOR and authorizing it to operate casinos
"on land and sea within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines."
This is the opportune time to stress an
important point.
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable
issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is
generally considered inimical to the interests of
the people, there is nothing in the Constitution
categorically proscribing or penalizing
gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it
at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the
activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own
discretion, the legislature may prohibit
gambling altogether or allow it without limitation
or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and
allow others for whatever reasons it may
consider sufficient. Thus, it has
prohibited jueteng and monte but permits
lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In
making such choices, Congress has consulted
its own wisdom, which this Court has no
authority to review, much less reverse. Well
has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve
the merits of conflicting theories. 8 That is the
prerogative of the political departments. It is
settled that questions regarding the wisdom,
morality, or practicibility of statutes are not
addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved
only by the legislative and executive
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 146
departments, to which the function belongs in
our scheme of government. That function is
exclusive. Whichever way these branches
decide, they are answerable only to their own
conscience and the constituents who will
ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts
of justice.
The only question we can and shall resolve in
this petition is the validity of Ordinance No.
3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted
by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan
de Oro City. And we shall do so only by the
criteria laid down by law and not by our own
convictions on the propriety of gambling.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well
established. A long line of decisions 9 has held
that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to
the following substantive requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any
statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.
4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public
policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of
the Local Government Code, local government
units are authorized to prevent or suppress,
among others, "gambling and other prohibited
games of chance." Obviously, this provision
excludes games of chance which are not
prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The
petitioners are less than accurate in claiming
that the Code could have excluded such games
of chance but did not. In fact it does. The
language of the section is clear and
unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a
sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted
in relation to, or given the same meaning of,

words with which it is associated. Accordingly,
we conclude that since the word "gambling" is
associated with "and other prohibited games of
chance," the word should be read as referring
to only illegal gambling which, like
the other prohibited games of chance, must be
prevented or suppressed.
We could stop here as this interpretation
should settle the problem quite conclusively.
But we will not. The vigorous efforts of the
petitioners on behalf of the inhabitants of
Cagayan de Oro City, and the earnestness of
their advocacy, deserve more than short shrift
from this Court.
The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question
is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the
public policy embodied therein insofar as they
prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power
conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan
de Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious
answer to this misgiving. They deny that it is
the ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869
for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail
against a statute. Their theory is that the
change has been made by the Local
Government Code itself, which was also
enacted by the national lawmaking authority. In
their view, the decree has been, not really
repealed by the Code, but merely "modified pro
tanto" in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now
operate a casino over the objection of the local
government unit concerned. This modification
of P.D. 1869 by the Local Government Code is
permissible because one law can change or
repeal another law.
It seems to us that the petitioners are playing
with words. While insisting that the decree has
only been "modifiedpro tanto," they are actually
arguing that it is already dead, repealed and
useless for all intents and purposes because
the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to
centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly
speaking, its operations may now be not only
prohibited by the local government unit; in fact,
the prohibition is not only discretionary
but mandated by Section 458 of the Code if the
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 147
word "shall" as used therein is to be given its
accepted meaning. Local government units
have now no choice but to prevent and
suppress gambling, which in the petitioners'
view includes both legal and illegal gambling.
Under this construction, PAGCOR will have no
more games of chance to regulate or centralize
as they must all be prohibited by the local
government units pursuant to the mandatory
duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this
situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to exist
except only as a toothless tiger or a white
elephant and will no longer be able to exercise
its powers as a prime source of government
revenue through the operation of casinos.
It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited
only Par. (f) of the repealing clause,
conveniently discarding the rest of the
provision which painstakingly mentions the
specific laws or the parts thereof which are
repealed (or modified) by the Code.
Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. A
reading of the entire repealing clause, which is
reproduced below, will disclose the omission:
Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. — (a) Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the
"Local Government Code," Executive Order
No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319
(1988) are hereby repealed.
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508
and such other decrees, orders, instructions,
memoranda and issuances related to or
concerning the barangay are hereby repealed.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of
Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital fund;
Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act. No.
5447 regarding the Special Education Fund;
Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by
Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741;
Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended;
Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential
Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752,

and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of
no force and effect.
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby
repealed insofar as it governs locally-funded
projects.
(e) The following provisions are hereby
repealed or amended insofar as they are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Code:
Sections 2, 16, and 29 of Presidential Decree
No. 704; Sections 12 of Presidential Decree
No. 87, as amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67,
68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential
Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16
of Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended,
and
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city
charters, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations,
or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent
with any of the provisions of this Code are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied
repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence
of a clear and unmistakable showing of such
intention. In Lichauco & Co. v. Apostol, 10 this
Court explained:
The cases relating to the subject of repeal by
implication all proceed on the assumption that
if the act of later date clearly reveals an
intention on the part of the lawmaking power to
abrogate the prior law, this intention must be
given effect; but there must always be a
sufficient revelation of this intention, and it has
become an unbending rule of statutory
construction that the intention to repeal a
former law will not be imputed to the Legislature
when it appears that the two statutes, or
provisions, with reference to which the question
arises bear to each other the relation of general
to special.
There is no sufficient indication of an implied
repeal of P.D. 1869. On the contrary, as the
private respondent points out, PAGCOR is
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 148
mentioned as the source of funding in two later
enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309,
creating a Board of Claims under the
Department of Justice for the benefit of victims
of unjust punishment or detention or of violent
crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for measures
for the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR
revenues are tapped by these two statutes.
This would show that the PAGCOR charter has
not been repealed by the Local Government
Code but has in fact been improved as it were
to make the entity more responsive to the fiscal
problems of the government.
It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead
of pitting one statute against another in an
inevitably destructive confrontation, courts
must exert every effort to reconcile them,
remembering that both laws deserve a
becoming respect as the handiwork of a
coordinate branch of the government. On the
assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869
and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold
one and annul the other but to give effect to
both by harmonizing them if possible. This is
possible in the case before us. The proper
resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that
under the Local Government Code, local
government units may (and indeed must)
prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling
within their territories except only those allowed
by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception
reserved in such laws must be read into the
Code, to make both the Code and such laws
equally effective and mutually complementary.
This approach would also affirm that there are
indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal
and those authorized by law. Legalized
gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably
as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more
so. The petitioners' suggestion that the Code
authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of
gambling would erase the distinction between
these two forms of gambling without a clear
indication that this is the will of the legislature.
Plausibly, following this theory, the City of
Manila could, by mere ordinance, prohibit the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office from

conducting a lottery as authorized by R.A. 1169
and B.P. 42 or stop the races at the San Lazaro
Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and
R.A. 983.
In light of all the above considerations, we see
no way of arriving at the conclusion urged on
us by the petitioners that the ordinances in
question are valid. On the contrary, we find that
the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has
the character and force of a statute, as well as
the public policy expressed in the decree
allowing the playing of certain games of chance
despite the prohibition of gambling in general.
The rationale of the requirement that the
ordinances should not contravene a statute is
obvious. Municipal governments are only
agents of the national government. Local
councils exercise only delegated legislative
powers conferred on them by Congress as the
national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot
be superior to the principal or exercise powers
higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to
suggest that the local government units can
undo the acts of Congress, from which they
have derived their power in the first place, and
negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the
statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and
derive their powers and rights wholly from the
legislature. It breathes into them the breath of
life, without which they cannot exist. As it
creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it
may abridge and control. Unless there is some
constitutional limitation on the right, the
legislature might, by a single act, and if we can
suppose it capable of so great a folly and so
great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the
municipal corporations in the State, and the
corporation could not prevent it. We know of no
limitation on the right so far as to the
corporation themselves are concerned. They
are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of
the legislature. 11
This basic relationship between the national
legislature and the local government units has
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 149
not been enfeebled by the new provisions in
the Constitution strengthening the policy of
local autonomy. Without meaning to detract
from that policy, we here confirm that Congress
retains control of the local government units
although in significantly reduced degree now
than under our previous Constitutions. The
power to create still includes the power to
destroy. The power to grant still includes the
power to withhold or recall. True, there are
certain notable innovations in the Constitution,
like the direct conferment on the local
government units of the power to tax, 12 which
cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By
and large, however, the national legislature is
still the principal of the local government units,
which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
The Court understands and admires the
concern of the petitioners for the welfare of their
constituents and their apprehensions that the
welfare of Cagayan de Oro City will be
endangered by the opening of the casino. We
share the view that "the hope of large or easy
gain, obtained without special effort, turns the
head of the workman" 13 and that "habitual
gambling is a cause of laziness and
ruin." 14 In People v. Gorostiza, 15 we declared:
"The social scourge of gambling must be
stamped out. The laws against gambling must
be enforced to the limit." George Washington
called gambling "the child of avarice, the
brother of iniquity and the father of mischief."
Nevertheless, we must recognize the power of
the legislature to decide, in its own wisdom, to
legalize certain forms of gambling, as was done
in P.D. 1869 and impliedly affirmed in the Local
Government Code. That decision can be
revoked by this Court only if it contravenes the
Constitution as the touchstone of all official
acts. We do not find such contravention here.
We hold that the power of PAGCOR to
centralize and regulate all games of chance,
including casinos on land and sea within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains
unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified
by the Local Government Code, which
empowers the local government units to

prevent or suppress only those forms of
gambling prohibited by law.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869.
This decree has the status of a statute that
cannot be amended or nullified by a mere
ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro
City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting
the use of buildings for the operation of a
casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting
the operation of casinos. For all their
praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are
contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy
announced therein and are therefore ultra
vires and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
challenged decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the
petitioners. It is so ordered.
BETTING IN SPORTS CONTEST
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 483 June 13,
1974
PENALIZING BETTING, GAME-FIXING OR
POINT SHAVING AND MACHINATIONS IN
SPORTS CONTESTS
WHEREAS, the evil that is gambling has again
shown its ugly head in the recently-discovered
game-fixing or point- shaving scandals during
sports contests;
WHEREAS, one of the objectives of the New
Society is the development and promotion of
desirable moral and cultural values;
WHEREAS, there is urgent need to protect one
youth and sports programs and the morality of
our society, especially the youth, from the
eroding influence of unscrupulous persons
who, through fraudulent schemes of game-
fixing or point-shaving and other machinations,
have made basketball and other sports
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 150
contests, games and races their media of
subverting the aims and goals of true Philippine
sportsmanship;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E.
MARCOS, by virtue of the powers vested in me
by the Constitution, and pursuant to
Proclamations No. 1081, dated September 21,
1972 and No. 1104, dated January 17, 1973;
and General Order No. 1, dated September 22,
1972, do hereby order and decree that the
following shall be part of the law of the land:
Section 1. Definitions. For purposes of this
Decree, the following terms shall mean and be
understood to be as hereunder indicated:
a. Betting money or any object or article of
value or representative of value upon the result
of any game, races and other sports contest.
b. Game-fixing any arrangement, combination,
scheme or agreement by which the result of
any game, races or sports contests shall be
predicted and/or known other than on the basis
of the honest playing skill or ability of the
players or participants.
c. Point-shaving any such arrangement,
combination, scheme or agreement by which
the skill or ability of any player or participant in
a game, races or sports contests to make
points or scores shall be limited deliberately in
order to influence the result thereof in favor of
one or other team, player or participant therein.
d. Game-machinations any other fraudulent,
deceitful, unfair or dishonest means, method,
manner or practice employed for the purpose
of influencing the result of any game, races or
sport contest.
Section 2. Betting, game-fixing, point-shaving
or game machination unlawful. Game-fixing,
point-shaving, machination, as defined in the
preceding section, in connection with the
games of basketball, volleyball, softball,
baseball; chess, boxing bouts, "jai-alai", "sipa",
"pelota" and all other sports contests, games or

races; as well as betting therein except as may
be authorized by law, is hereby declared
unlawful.
Section 3. Penalty. Any violation of this
Decree, or of the rules and regulations
promulgated in accordance herewith, shall be
punished in the manner following:
a. When the offender is an official, such as
promoter, referee, umpire, judge, or coach in
the game, race or sports contests, or the
manager or sponsor of any participating team,
individual or player therein, or participants or
players in such games, races or other sports
contests, he shall, upon conviction, be
punished by prision correccional in its
maximum period and a fine of 2,000 pesos with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
at the discretion of the court. This penalty shall
also be imposed when the offenders compose
a syndicate of five or more persons.
b. In case of any offender, he shall, upon
conviction, be punished by prision correccional
in its medium period and a fine of 1,000 pesos
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency at the discretion of the court.
c. When the offender is an official or employee
of any government office or agency concerned
with the enforcement or administration of laws
and regulations on sports the penalty provided
for in the preceding Section 3 a small be
imposed. In addition, he shall be disqualified
from holding any public office or employment
for life. If he is an alien, he may be deported.
Section 4. Clearance for arrest, detention or
prosecution. No person who voluntarily
discloses or denounces to the President of the
Philippine Amateur Athletic Federation or to the
National Sports Associations concerned and/or
to any law enforcement/police authority any of
the acts penalized by this Decree shall be
arrested, detained and/or prosecuted except
upon prior written clearance from the President
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 151
of the Philippines and/or of the Secretary of
National Defense.
Section 5. Repealing Clause. Article 197 of
Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, all provisions of
decrees, general orders, letters of instructions,
laws, executive orders and rules and
regulations which are inconsistent with this
Decree are hereby repealed.
Section 6. Effectivity. This Decree shall take
effect immediately upon publication thereof by
the Secretary of the Department of Public
Information at least once in a newspaper of
general circulation.
Done in the City of Manila, this 13th day of
June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and seventy-four.
ILLEGAL COCKFIGTING
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 449 May 9,
1974
COCKFIGHTING LAW OF 1974
WHEREAS, cockfighting has been and still is a
popular, traditional and customary form of
recreation and entertainment among Filipinos
during legal holidays, local fiestas, agricultural,
commercial and industrial fairs, carnivals or
expositions;
WHEREAS, by reason of the aforestated
meaning and connotation of cockfighting in
relation to filipino customs and traditions, it
should neither be exploited as an object of
commercialism or business enterprise, nor
made a tool of uncontrolled gambling, but more
as a vehicle for the preservation and
perpetuation of native Filipino heritage and
thereby enhance our national identity.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E.
MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the

Constitution, do hereby decree and order to be
part of the laws of the land, the following:
Sec 1. Title. This Decree shall be known as the
"Cockfighting Law of 1974".
Section 2. Scope. This law shall govern the
establishment, operation, maintenance and
ownership of cockpits.
Section 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby
declared a policy of the government to insure
within the framework of the New Society
maximum development and promotion of
wholesome recreation and amusement to bring
about the following goals:
(a) To effectively control and regulate
cockfighting towards its establishment as a
national recreation, relaxation and source of
entertainment;
(b) To provide additional revenue for our
tourism program; and
(c) To remove and prevent excessive and
unreasonable business operation and profit
considerations in the management of cockpits
and, instead preserve Philippine customs and
traditions and thereby enhance our national
identity.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. As used in this
law, the following terms shall be understood,
applied and construed as follows:
(a) Cockfighting shall embrace and mean the
commonly known game or term "cockfighting
derby, pintakasi or tupada", or its equivalent
terms in different Philippine localities.
(b) Zoning Law or Ordinance Either both
national or local city or municipal legislation
which logically arranges, prescribes, defines
and apportions a given political subdivision into
specific land uses as present and future
projection of needs warrant.
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 152
(c) Bet Taker of Promoter A person who calls
and takes care of bets from owners of both
gamecocks and those of other bettors before
he orders commencement of the cockfight and
thereafter distributes won bets to the winners
after deducting a certain commission.
(d) Gaffer (Taga Tari) A person knowledgeable
in the art of arming fighting cocks with gaff or
gaffs on either or both legs.
(e) Referee (Sentenciador) A person who
watches and oversees the proper gaffing of
fighting cocks, determines the physical
condition of fighting cocks while cockfighting is
in progress, the injuries sustained by the cocks
and their capability to continue fighting and
decides and make known his decision by work
or gestures and result of the cockfight by
announcing the winner or declaring a tie or no
contest game.
(f) Bettor A person who participates in
cockfights and with the use of money or other
things of value, bets with other bettors or
through the bet taker or promoter and wins or
loses his bet depending upon the result of the
cockfight as announced by the Referee or
Sentenciador. He may be the owner of fighting
cock.
Section 5. Cockpits and Cockfighting: In
General:
(a) Ownership, Operation and Management of
Cockpits. Only Filipino citizens not otherwise
inhibited by existing laws shall be allowed to
own, manage and operate cockpits.
Cooperative capitalization is encouraged.
(b) Establishment of Cockpits. Only one cockpit
shall be allowed in each city or municipality,
except that in cities or municipalities with a
population of over one hundred thousand, two
cockpits may be established, maintained and
operated.
(c) Cockpits Site and Construction. Cockpits
shall be constructed and operated within the

appropriate areas as prescribed in Zoning Law
or Ordinance. In the absence of such law or
ordinance, the local executives shall see to it
that no cockpits are constructed within or near
existing residential or commercial areas,
hospitals, school buildings, churches or other
public buildings. Owners, lessees, or operators
of cockpits which are now in existence and do
not conform to this requirement are given three
years from the date of effectivity of this Decree
to comply herewith. Approval or issuance of
building permits for the construction of cockpits
shall be made by the city or provincial engineer
in accordance with their respective building
codes, ordinances or engineering laws and
practices.
(d) Holding of Cockfights. Except as provided
in this Decree, cockfighting shall be allowed
only in licensed cockpits during Sundays and
legal holidays and during local fiestas for not
more than three days. It may also be held
during provincial, city or municipal, agricultural,
commercial or industrial fair, carnival or
exposition for a similar period of three days
upon resolution of the province, city or
municipality where such fair, carnival or
exposition is to be held, subject to the approval
of the Chief of Constabulary or his authorized
representative: Provided, that, no cockfighting
on the occasion of such fair, carnival or
exposition shall be allowed within the month of
a local fiesta or for more than two occasions a
year in the same city or municipality: Provided,
further, that no cockfighting shall be held on
December 30 (Rizal Day), June 12 (Philippine
Independence Day) November 30 (National
Heroes Day), Holy Thursday, Good Friday,
Election or Referendum Day and during
Registration Days for such election or
referendum.
(e) Cockfighting for Entertainment of Tourists
or for Charitable Purposes. Subject to the
preceding subsection hereof, the Chief
Constabulary or his authorized representative
may also allow the holding of cockfighting for
the entertainment of foreign dignitaries or for
tourists, or for returning Filipinos, commonly
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 153
known as "Balikbayan", or for the support of
national fund-raising campaigns for charitable
purposes as may be authorized by the Office of
the President, upon resolution of a provincial
board, city or municipal council, in licensed
cockpits or in playgrounds or parks: Provided,
that this privilege shall be extended for only one
time, for a period not exceeding three days,
within a year to a province, city, or municipality.
(f) Other games during cockfights prescribed.
No gambling of any kind shall be permitted on
the premises of the cockpit or place of
cockfighting during cockfights. The owner,
manager or lessee off such cockpit and the
violators of this injunction shall be criminally
liable under Section 8 hereof.
Section 6. Licensing of Cockpits. City and
municipal mayors are authorized to issue
licenses for the operation and maintenance of
cockpits subject to the approval of the Chief of
Constabulary or his authorized
representatives. For this purpose, ordinances
may be promulgated for the imposition and
collection of taxes and fees not exceeding the
rates fixed under Section 13, paragraphs (a)
and (b); and 19; paragraph (g) 16 of
Presidential Decree No. 231, dated June 28,
1973, otherwise known as the Local Tax Code,
as amended.
Section 7. Cockfighting Officials. Gaffers,
referees or bet takers or promoters shall not act
as such in any cockfight herein authorized,
without first securing a license renewable every
year on their birthmonth from the city or
municipality where such cockfighting is held.
Cities and municipalities may charge a tax of
not more than twenty pesos. Only licensed
gaffers, referees, bet takers or promoters shall
officiate in all kinds of cockfighting authorized
in this Decree.
Section 8. Penal Provisions. Any violation of
the provisions of this Decree and of the rules
and regulations promulgated by the Chief of
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 154

Constabulary pursuant thereto shall be

punished as follows:

a. By prision correccional in its maximum

period and a fine of two thousand pesos, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
when the offender is the financer, owner,
manger or operator of cockpit, or the gaffer,
referee or bet taker in cockfights; or the
offender is guilty of allowing, promoting or
participating in any other kind of gambling in the
premises of cockfights during cockfights.

b. By prision correccional or a fine of not less

than six hundred pesos nor more than two
thousand pesos or both, such imprisonment
and fine at the discretion of the court, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
in case of any other offender.

Section 9. Repealing Clause. The provisions

of Section 2285 and 2286 of the Revised Penal
Code, Republic Act No. 946, all laws, decrees,
rules and regulations, or orders which are
inconsistent with this Decree are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 10. Date of Effectivity. This Decree

shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following
the completion of the publication in the Official
Gazette.

Done in the City of Manila, this 9th day of May,

in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-four.

B. OFFENSES AGAINST DECENY AND
GOOD CUSTOMS
IMMORAL DOCTRINES, OBSCEBE
PUBLICATIONS AND EXHIBITIONS
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 960 July
14, 1976
AMENDING ARTICLE 201 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, it is the obligation of the
State to safeguard the morality of society,
particularly the youth, against the eroding
influence of immoral doctrines, obscene
publications and exhibitions and indecent
shows;
WHEREAS, in order to arrest the
proliferation of such doctrines,
publications, exhibitions and shows, it is
necessary to amend the pertinent
provision of the Revised Penal Code;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E.
MARCOS, President of the Philippines,
by virtue of the powers vested in me by
the Constitution, do hereby order and
decree as part of the law of the land, the
following:
Section 1. Amendment of Article 201,
Revised Penal Code. Article 201 of Act
Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and
fifteen, otherwise known as the Revised
Penal Code, is hereby amended to read
as follows;
"Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene
publications and exhibitions, and
indecent shows. The penalty of prision
mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand
to twelve thousand pesos, or both such
imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed
upon:
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 155
"1. Those who shall publicly expound or
proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public
morals;
"2. The authors of obscene literature, published
with their knowledge in any form, the editors
publishing such literature, and the
owners/operators of the book store or other
establishments selling the same;
"3. Those who in theaters, fairs cinematographs
or any other place, shall exhibit indecent or
immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, including
the following:
"(a) Films which tend to incite
subversion, insurrection or rebellion
against the State;
"(b) Films which tend to undermine the
faith and confidence of the people in their
Government and/or duly constituted
authorities;
"(c) Films which glorify criminals or
condone crimes;
"(d) Films which serve no other purpose
but to satisfy the market for violence, lust
or pornography;
"(e) Films which offend any race or
religion;
"(f) Films which tend to abet traffic in the
use of prohibited drugs;
"(g) Films contrary to law, public order,
morals, good customs, established
policies, lawful orders, decrees, edicts,
and any or all films which in the judgment
of the Board of Censors for Motion
Pictures or other agency established by
the Government to oversee such motion
pictures are objectionable on some other
legal or moral grounds.
"4. Those who shall sell, give away of exhibit
prints, engravings, sculptures or literature which
are offensive to morals."
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 156

Section 2. Confiscation of articles. The

literature, films, prints, engravings,
sculpture, paintings, or other materials
and articles involved in the violation
referred to in Section 1 hereof shall be
confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
Government to be destroyed.

Section 3. Jurisdiction. Violations of

Section 1 hereof shall be subject to trial
by the military tribunals and the offenders
shall be subject to arrest and detention
pursuant to existing laws, decrees,
orders and instructions promulgated
pursuant to Proclamations No. 1081,
dated September 21, 1972 and No. 1104,
dated January 17, 1973.

Section 4. Additional Penalties.

Additional penalties shall be imposed as
follows:

1. In case the offender is a government official

or employee who allows the violations of
Section 1 hereof, the penalty shall be imposed
in the maximum period and in addition, the
accessory penalties provided for in the Revised
Penal Code, as amended shall likewise be
imposed.

2. The license or permit of the theater,

cinematograph or other place or establishment
where the violation has been committed shall be
canceled temporarily or permanently,
depending upon the gravity of the violation as
determined by the proper military tribunal.

Section 5. Effectivity. This Decree shall

take effect fifteen (15) days after its
publication by the Department of
Information in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation.

Done in the City of Manila this 14th day

of July in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy-six.

[ GR No. 20569, Oct 29, 1923 ]
PEOPLE v. J. J. KOTTINGER
DECISION
45 Phil. 352
MALCOLM, J.:
The question to be here decided is whether or
not pictures portraying the inhabitants of the
country in native dress and as they appear and
can be seen in the regions in which they live, are
obscene or indecent. Surprising as it may seem,
the question is one of first impression not alone
in the Philippine Islands, but in the United
States, Great Britain, and elsewhere. This will
explain why a case which otherwise would be
heard and voted in Division has been submitted
to the court in banc for decision.
On November 24, 1922, detective Juan
Tolentino raided the premises known as
Camera Supply Co. at 110 Escolta, Manila. He
found and confiscated the post-cards which
subsequently were used as evidence against J.
J. Kottinger, the manager of the company.
Out of these facts arose the criminal prosecution
of J. J. Kottinger in the Court of First Instance of
Manila. The information filed in court charged
him with having kept for sale in the store of the
Camera Supply Co., obscene and indecent
pictures, in violation of section 12 of Act No. 277.
To this information, the defendant interposed a
demurrer based upon the ground that the facts
alleged therein did not constitute an offense and
were not contrary to law; but the trial court
overruled the demurrer and the defendant duly
excepted thereto. Following the presentation of
evidence by the Government and the defense,
judgment was rendered finding the defendant
guilty of the offense charged and sentencing
him to pay a fine of P50 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the
costs.
The five errors assigned by defendant-appellant
in this court divide themselves into two general
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 157
issues. The first point sustained by counsel for
the appellant is in nature a technical objection,
growing out of the defendant's demurrer. The
second point, in reality the decisive issue, is as
suggested in the beginning of the decision. We
will take up the assignments of errors as thus
classified in order.
Act No. 277 is the Philippine Libel Law. But
included therein is a section, No. 12, making
obscene or indecent publications
misdemeanors. Said section 12 which, it is
contended by the Government, has here been
violated, and which, appellant argues, does not
apply to the information and the facts, reads as
follows:
"Any person who writes, composes,
stereotypes, prints, publishes, sells, or keeps for
sale, distributes, or exhibits any obscene or
indecent writing, paper, book, or other matter, or
who designs, copies, draws, engraves, paints,
or otherwise prepares any obscene picture or
print, or who moulds, cuts, casts, or otherwise
makes any obscene or indecent figure, or who
writes, composes, or prints any notice or
advertisement of any such writing, paper, book,
print, or figure shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
and punished by a fine of not exceeding one
thousand dollars or by imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or both."
Counsel has gone to the trouble to make a
careful analysis of section 12 of the Libel Law
which is intended to bear out his thesis, first, that
section 12 does not prohibit the taking, selling,
and publishing of alleged obscene and indecent
pictures and prints, and second, that the
information in this case charges no offense
prohibited by section 12. Recall, however, that
the law provides punishment, among other
things, for any person who keeps for sale or
exhibits any obscene or indecent writing, paper,
book, or other matter, and that the information
charges the defendant, among other things, with
having wilfully and feloniously kept for sale,
distribution, or exhibition, obscene and indecent
pictures.

The phrase in the law "or other matter," was
apparently added as a sort of "catch-all." While
limited to that which is of the same kind as its
antecedent, it is intended to cover kindred
subjects. The rule of ejusdem generis invoked
by counsel is by no means a rule of universal
application and should be made to carry out, not
to defeat, the legislative intent. Even if the
phrase "or other matter" be construed to mean
"or other matter of like kind," pictures and post-
cards are not so far unrelated to writings,
papers, and books, as not to be covered by the
general words (Commonwealth vs. Dejardin
[1878], 126 Mass., 46; 30 Am. Rep., 652;
Brown vs. Corbin [1889], 40 Minn., 508).
The line of argumentation is more refined than
practical. Once conceded that section 12 of Act
No. 277 does not cover the present case, there
yet remain for application article 571, No. 2, of
the Penal Code, and section 730 of the Revised
Ordinances of the City of Manila. The section of
the Revised Ordinances cited is most specific
when it provides in part that no person shall
"exhibit, circulate, distribute, sell, offer or
expose for sale, or give or deliver to another, or
cause the same to be done, any lewd, indecent,
or obscene book, picture, pamphlet, card, print,
paper, writing, mould, cast, figure, or any other
thing."
While admittedly the information is lacking in
precision and while the content of section 12 of
the Libel Law is not as inclusive as it might be,
we yet conclude that the information is not
fatally defective, and that said section 12 covers
the alleged facts.
We come now to decide the main issue. We
repeat that our own researches have confirmed
the statement of counsel that not one parallel
case can be found. We must perforce reason
from the general to the specific and from
universal principle to actual fact.
The pictures which it is argued offend against
the law on account of being obscene and
indecent, disclose six different postures of non-
Christian inhabitants of the Philippines. Exhibit
A carries the legend "Philippines, Bontoc
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 158
Woman." Exhibit A-1 is a picture of five young
boys and carries the legend "Greetings from the
Philippines." Exhibit A-2 has the legend "Ifugao
Belle, Philippines. Greetings from the
Philippines." Exhibit A-3 has the legend "Igorrot
Girl, Rice Field Costume." Exhibit A-4 has the
legend "Kalinga Girls, Philippines." Exhibit A-5
has the legend "Moros, Philippines."
The prosecution produced no evidence proving
the post-cards obscene and indecent because it
thought the post-cards themselves the best
evidence of that fact. The fiscal admitted in open
court "that those pictures represented the
natives (non-Christians) in their native dress."
The defendant, on the other hand, attempted to
show that the pictures are true to life. Dr. H.
Otley Beyer, Professor in the University of the
Philippines, corroborated by other witnesses,
testified from his studies in various parts of the
Islands, such as the Mountain Province, Abra,
Palawan, and Mindanao and Sulu, that none of
the pictures represented poses which he had
not observed on various occasions, and that the
costumes worn by the people in the pictures are
the true costumes regularly worn by them. Are
such pictures obscene or indecent?
The word "obscene" and the term "obscenity"
may be defined as meaning something
offensive to chastity, decency, or delicacy.
"Indecency" is an act against good behaviour
and a just delicacy. The test ordinarily followed
by the courts in determining whether a particular
publication or other thing is obscene within the
meaning of the statutes, is whether the
tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is
to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are
open to such immoral influences and into whose
hands a publication or other article charged as
being obscene may fall. Another test of
obscenity is that which shocks the ordinary and
common sense of men as an indecency. (29
Cyc., 1315; 8 R. C. L., 312.)
The Philippine statute does not attempt to define
obscene or indecent pictures, writings, papers,
or books. But the words "obscene or indecent"
are themselves descriptive. They are words in
common use and every person of average

intelligence understands their meaning. Indeed,
beyond the evidence furnished by the pictures
themselves, there is but little scope for proof
bearing on the issue of obscenity or indecency.
Whether a picture is obscene or indecent must
depend upon the circumstances of the case.
(People vs. Muller [1884], 96 N. Y., 408; 48 Am.
Rep., 635.)
Considerable light can be thrown on the subject
by turning to the Federal Laws prohibiting the
use of the mails for obscene matter and
prohibiting the importation into the Philippine
Islands of articles, etc., of obscene or indecent
character. (U. S. Rev. Stat., art. 3893; 36 Stat.
at L., 135; 7 Fed. Stat. Ann., 1194, sec. 3[b].)
"Obscene," as used in the Federal Statutes
making it a criminal offense to place in the mails
any obscene, lewd, or lascivious publication,
according to the United States Supreme Court
and lesser Federal courts, signifies that form of
immorality which has relation to sexual impurity,
and has the same meaning as is given at
common law in prosecutions for obscene libel.
(Swearingen vs. U. S. [1896], 161 U. S., 446; U.
S. vs. Males [1892], 51 Fed., 41; 6 Words and
Phrases, 4888, 4889.)
The case of United States vs. Harmon ([1891],
45 Fed., 414), grew out of an indictment for
depositing an obscene publication in a United
States post-office in violation of the Postal Law.
Judge Philips said:
"The statute does not undertake to define the
meaning of the terms 'obscene,' etc., further
than may be implied by the succeeding phrase,
'or other publication of an indecent character.'
On the well-recognized canon of construction
these words are presumed to have been
employed by the law-maker in their ordinary
acceptation and use. As they cannot be said to
have acquired any technical significance as
applied to some particular matter, calling, or
profession, but are terms of popular use, the
court might perhaps with propriety leave their
import to the presumed intelligence of the jury.
A standard dictionary says that 'obscene' mean
'offensive to chastity and decency; expressing
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 159
or presenting to the mind or view something
which delicacy, purity, and decency forbid to be
exposed.' This mere dictionary definition may be
extended or amplified by the courts in actual
practice, preserving, however, its essential
thought, and having always due regard to the
popular and proper sense in which the
legislature employed the term. Chief Justice
Cockburn, in Rex vs. Hicklin (L. R. 3 Q. B., 360),
said: 'The test of obscenity is this: Where the
tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to
deprave and corrupt those whose minds are
open to such immoral influences, and into
whose hands a publication of this sort may fall;'
and where 'it would suggest to the minds of the
young of either sex, or even to persons of more
advanced years, thoughts of the most impure
and libidinous character.' So, also, it has been
held that a book is obscene which is offensive
to decency or chastity, which is immodest,
which is indelicate, impure, causing lewd
thoughts of an immoral tendency.' U. S. vs.
Bennett, 16 Blatchf., 338. Judge Thayer, in U.
S. vs. Clarke, 38 Fed. Rep., 732, observed:
" 'The word "obscene" ordinarily means
something which is offensive to chastity;
something that is foul or filthy, and for that
reason is offensive to pure-minded persons.
That is the meaning of the word in the concrete;
but when used, as in the statute, to describe the
character of a book, pamphlet, or paper, it
means containing immodest and indecent
matter, the reading whereof would have a
tendency to deprave and corrupt the minds of
those into whose hands the publication might
fall whose minds are open to such immoral
influences.'
"Laws of this character are made for society in
the aggregate, and not in particular. So, while
there may be individuals and societies of men
and women of peculiar notions or
idiosyncrasies, whose moral sense would
neither be depraved nor offended by the
publication now under consideration, yet the
exceptional sensibility, or want of sensibility, of
such cannot be, allowed as a standard by which
its obscenity or indecency is to be tested. Rather
is the test, what is the judgment of the aggregate

sense of the community reached by it? What is
its probable, reasonable effect on the sense of
decency, purity, and chastity of society,
extending to the family, made up of men and
women, young boys and girls, the family, which
is the common nursery of mankind, the
foundation rock upon which the state reposes?
"* * * To the pure all things are pure, is too
poetical for the actualities of practical life. There
is in the popular conception and heart such a
thing as modesty. It was born in the Garden of
Eden. After Adam and Eve ate of the fruit of the
tree of knowledge they passed from that
condition of perfectibility which some people
nowadays aspire to, and, their eyes being
opened, they discerned that there was both
good and evil; 'and they knew that they were
naked; and they sewed fig leaves together, and
made themselves aprons.' From that day to this
civilized man has carried with him the sense of
shame, the feeling that there were some things
on which the eye the mind should not look; and
where men and women become so depraved by
the use, or so insensate from perverted
education, that they will not veil their eyes, nor
hold their tongues, the government should
perform the office for them in protection of the
social compact and the body politic."
As above intimated, the Federal statute
prohibits the importation or shipment into the
Philippine Islands of the following: "Articles,
books, pamphlets, printed matter, manuscripts,
typewritten matter, paintings, illustrations,
figures or objects of obscene or indecent
character or subversive of public order." There
are, however, in the record, copies of reputable
magazines which circulate freely thruout the
United States and other countries, and which
are admitted into the Philippines without
question, containing illustrations identical in
nature to those forming the basis of the
prosecution at bar. Publications of the Philippine
Government have also been offered in evidence
such as Barton's "Ifugao Law," the "Philippine
Journal of Science" for October, 1906, and the
Reports of the Philippine Commission for 1903,
1912, and 1913, in which are found illustrations
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 160
either exactly the same or nearly akin to those
which are now impugned.
It appears therefore that a national standard has
been set up by the Congress of the United
States. Tested by that standard, it would be
extremely doubtful if the pictures here
challenged would be held obscene or indecent
by any state of Federal court. It would be
particularly unwise to sanction a different type of
censorship in the Philippines than in the United
States, or for that matter in the rest of the world.
The pictures in question merely depict persons
as they actually live, without attempted
presentation of persons in unusual postures or
dress. The aggregate judgment of the Philippine
community, the moral sense of all the people in
the Philippines, would not be shocked by
photographs of this type. We are convinced that
the post-card pictures in this case cannot be
characterized as offensive to chastity, or foul, or
filthy.
We readily understand the laudable motives
which moved the Government to initiate this
prosecution. We fully appreciate the sentiments
of colleagues who take a different view of the
case. We would be the last to offend the
sensibilities of the Filipino people and to
sanction anything which would hold them up to
ridicule in the eyes of mankind. But we
emphasize that we are not deciding a question
in political theory or in social ethics. We are
dealing with a legal question predicated on a
legal fact, and on this question and fact, we
reach the conclusion that there has not been
proved a violation of section 12 of the Libel Law.
When other cases predicated on other states of
facts are brought to our attention, we will decide
them as they arise.
We seem to recall the statement of counsel that
the proprietor of the photographic concern
whom he represents would on his own initiative
place suitable and explicit inscriptions on the
pictures so that no one may be misled as to
them. Indeed, he might even go further and out
of consideration for the natural sensibilities of
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 161

his customers, withdraw from sale certain Manila where they were exhibited, no doubt they
pictures which can be pointed out to him. are.

We hold that pictures portraying the inhabitants And the law prohibits the exhibition not only of
of the country in native dress and as they appear obscene pictures, but of indecent as well. (Sec.
and can be seen in the regions in which they 12, Act No. 277.)
live, are not obscene or indecent within the
meaning of the Libel Law. Disagreeing therefore I understand that the judgment appealed from
with the appellant on his technical argument but should have been affirmed.
agreeing with him on his main contention, it
becomes our duty to order the dismissal of the
information.

Judgment is reversed, the information is

dismissed, and the defendant-appellant is
acquitted with all costs de oficio. So ordered.

Johnson, Street, Avanceña,

Villamor, and Johns, JJ., concur.

Mr. Chief Justice Manuel Araullo was present at

the time this case was voted and then voted with
Mr. Justice Romualdez. (Sgd.) E. FINLEY
JOHNSON.

DISSENTING

ROMUALDEZ, J., with whom

concurs ARAULLO, C. J.:

I do not agree with the view taken by the majority

as to the nature of the photographic pictures in
question. While said pictures cannot, strictly, be
termed obscene, they must, however, be
regarded as indecent, for they are so.

Such pictures offend modesty and refinement,

and for this reason, they are indecent. This is
shown by common sense. No woman claiming
to be decent would dare to stand before the
public in Manila, where said pictures were
exhibited, in the same fashion as these pictures
are.

It is alleged that these pictures were taken from

nature in non-Christian regions. We agree that
in said regions they are not, perhaps, regarded
as offensive to modesty, and, therefore, are
accidentally not indecent there. But in the City of
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 162

PEOPLE v. APARICI also advances the argument that the reaction of

the low class and uncultured audience is an
Facts: unreliable gauge in determining the objective
indecency and decency of a performance. The
On February 3, 1953 Detectives Nibungco and court clarified that the test whether a particular
Jose accompanied by photographers Fajardo act is obscene is its tendency “to deprave or
and Domingo of the Manila Chronicle, went to corrupt those whose minds are open to such
Azcarraga Theatre, in order to observe what influences”, be they cultured or not.
was being exhibited by the accused Virginia
Aparici there. She was in a dimly lit stage
“dancing with her hips swaying” with nothing on
except nylon patches over her breasts and a
“too abbreviated pair of nylon panties to
interrupt her stark nakedness” and around her
waist was a “furry white girdle with a middle
piece punctuating attention on the thing she was
supposed to hide”. There were more than 100
customers and all of them were men. Most of
them have been howling and shouting in
tagalog: “sigue muna, sigue nakakalibog”.
Detectives Nibungco and Jose stopped the
show and asked the accused to put on her dress
and to surrender to them her brassiere and
panties.

In her defence, she claimed that her

performance (hula hula dance) was her
portrayal of the life of a widow whose guerrilla
husband was killed by the Japanese; depicting
the different emotions of the widow such as
sadness, anger and happiness. She was
prosecuted for violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code which penalizes:

“3. Those who in theatres, fairs, cinematographs

or any other place open to public view, shall
exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts
and shows.”

Issue: WON accused-appelant’s dancing was

indecent or immoral in violation of article 201 of
the RPC?

Ruling: The court ruled that the accused had

exhibited indecent and immoral acts. The gauge
whether her dancing was immoral or indecent
was the reaction of the public. Evidently, the
spectators had given their unequivocal verdict
when they were howling and shouting: “Sigue
muna, sigue, nakakalibog”. Counsel for defense

G.R. No. L-7295 June 28, 1957
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
MARINA PADAN Y ALOVA, COSME
ESPINOSA, ERNESTO REYES and JOSE
FAJARDO, defendants.
MARINA PADAN Y ALOVA and JOSE
FAJARDO, defendants-appellants.
Augusto Revilla for appellant Jose Fajardo.
W. M. Bayhon for appellant Marina Padan y
Alova.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla
and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
In the Court of First Instance of Manila, Marina
Padan, Jose Fajardo y Garcia, Cosme
Espinosa, and Ernesto Reyes were charged
with a violation of Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code, said to have been committed as
follows:
That on or about the 13th day of September,
1953, in the city of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously exhibit
or cause to be exhibited inside a building at the
corner of Camba Ext. and Morga Ext., Tondo,
this City, immoral scenes and acts, to wit: the
said accused Jose Fajador y Garcia, being then
the manager and Ernesto Reyes y Yabut, as
ticket collector and or exhibitor, willfully
,unlawfully and feloniously hired their co-
accused Marina Palan y Alova and Cosme
Espinosa y Abordo to act as performers or
exhibitionists to perform and in fact performed
sexual intercourse in the presence of many
spectators, thereby exhibiting or performing
highly immoral and indecent acts or shows
thereat.
Upon arraignment, all pleaded not guilty. Later,
however, Marina Padan, with the assistance of
her counsel de parte and counsel de oficio,
asked for permission to withdraw her former
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 163
plea of not guilty, which was granted, and upon
rearraignment, she pleaded guilty to the charge.
In a decision dated October 12, 1953, Marina
Padan was found guilty as charged and
sentenced to six months and one day of prision
correccional and a fine of P200, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to
exceed one-third of the principal penalty, with
the accessory penalties prescribed by the law,
and to pay the proportionate costs. After trial of
the three remaining accused, they were all
found guilty; Cosme Espinosa and Ernesto
Reyes were sentenced each to not less than six
months and one day of prision correccional and
not more than one year, one month and eleven
days of prision correccional, to pay a fine of
P500, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, not to exceed one-third of the
principal penalty, and to pay the proportionate
costs. Jose Fajardo was sentenced to not less
than one year, one month and ten days
of prision correccional and not more than one
year eight months and twenty days, also
of prision correccional, to pay a fine of P1,000,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, not to exceed one-third of the
principal penalty and to pay the proportionate
costs. The army steel bed, the army woolen
blanket, the pillow, the ladies' panties, and the
men's underwear, described in Exhibit C, were
declared confiscated.
The four accused appealed in the decision, the
appeal having been sent to us. Appellants
Espinosa and Reyes failed to file their briefs
within the period prescribed by law and their
appeal was dismissed by resolution of this Court
of November 25, 1955, and the decision as to
them became final and executory on January 7,
1956, as appears from the entry of judgment.
Because of her plea of guilty in the lower court,
appellant Marina in her appeal do not question
her conviction; she merely urges the reduction
of the penalty by eliminating the prison
sentence. We do not feel warranted in
interfering with the exercise of discretion in this
matter, made by the lower court presided by
Judge Magno S. Gatmaitan. According to his
decision of October 12, 1953, in imposing the

sentence, he already considered Marina's plea
of leniency, and so despite the recommendation
of the fiscal that she be fined P600.00 in addition
to the prison sentence of six months and one
day, his honor reduced the fine to only P200.
We believe that the penalty imposed fits the
crime, considering its seriousness. As far as we
know, this is the first time that the courts in this
jurisdiction, at least this Tribunal, have been
called upon to take cognizance of an offense
against morals and decency of this kind. We
have had occasion to consider offenses like the
exhibition of still moving pictures of women in
the nude, which we have condemned for
obscenity and as offensive to morals. In those
cases, one might yet claim that there was
involved the element of art; that connoisseurs of
the same, and painters and sculptors might find
inspiration in the showing of pictures in the
nude, or the human body exhibited in sheer
nakedness, as models in tableaux vivants. But
an actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded
by acts of lasciviousness, can have no
redeeming feature. In it, there is no room for art.
One can see nothing in it but clear and
unmitigated obscenity, indecency, and an
offense to public morals, inspiring and causing
as it does, nothing but lust and lewdness, and
exerting a corrupting influence specially on the
youth of the land. We repeat that because of all
this, the penalty imposed by the trial court on
Marina, despite her plea of guilty, is neither
excessive nor unreasonable.
Going to the appeal of Jose Fajardo y Garcia,
while he does not deny the fact of the
commission of the offense charged, he in its that
he was not the manager or the person incharge
of the show or proceedings on the night of
September 13, 1953; that his participation, if he
participate at all, was to play the role of an
innocent bystander, but that because of his
popularity in the neighborhood, being popularly
known as a "siga-siga" character, he was
requested by the spectators to select the man
and the woman to engage or indulge in the
actual act of coitus before the spectators; that
after making the selection, he did not even care
to witness the act but left the scene and returned
TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 164
to it only when he heard a commotion produced
by the raid conducted by the police.
The evidence on his active participation and that
he was the manager and one in charge of the
show is however ample, even conclusive. We
have carefully examined such evidence, and we
are satisfied that they fully support the findings
of the trial court. Such facts may be briefly stated
as follows: At the corner of Morga Extension and
Camba Extension, Tondo, Manila, was a one
story building which judging from the picture
exhibited is nothing but a shed, with a floor
space of eight by fifteen meters which was
mainly used for playing ping-pong. A ping-pong
table must have been placed in the center and
on two sides were built benches in tiers, so that
the spectators seated on them could look down
and see the game. On September 13, 1953,
however, the building was used for a different
purpose. It was to be the scene of what was said
to be an exhibition of human "fighting fish", the
actual act of coitus or copulation. It must have
been advertised by word of mouth; tickets
therefor were sold at P3 each, and the show was
supposed to begin at 8:00 o'clock in the
evening. About that time of the night, there was
already a crowd around the building, but the
people were not admitted into it until about an
hour later, and the show did not begin until
about 9:15. The Manila Police Department must
have gotten wind of the affair; it bought tickets
and provided several of its members who later
attended the show, but in plain clothes, and after
the show conducted a raid and made arrests. At
the trial, said policemen testified as to what
actually took place inside the building. About
two civilians who attended the affair gave
testimony as to what they saw.
The customers not provided with tickets actually
paid P3 at the entrance to defendant Ernesto
Reyes. He also collected tickets. In all, there
were about ninety paying customers, while
about sixteen were allowed to enter free,
presumably friends of the management. Jose
Fajardo y Garcia was clearly the manager of the
show. He was at the door to see to it that the
customers either were provided with tickets or
paid P3.00 entrance fee. He even asked them
 TITLE V AND VI CRIMINAL LAW ACJUCO 165

from whom they had bought the tickets. He P3.00 Admit one
ordered that an army steel bed be placed at the PLEASURE SHOW
center of the floor, covered with an army blanket Place: P. Morga Ext. and Camba Ext.
and provided with a pillow. Once the spectators, Time : 8:00 o'clock sharp,
about 106 in number, were crowded inside that
small building, the show started. Fajardo and superimposed on the same is the rubber
evidently to arouse more interest among the stamped name "Pepe Fajardo," which
customers, asked them to select among two defendant Fajardo admits to be his name.
girls presented who was to be one of the Considering all the above circumstances, we
principal actors. By pointing to or holding his agree with the trial court that Jose Fajardo is the
hand over the head of each of the two women most guilty of the four, for he was the one who
one after the other, and judging by the shouts of conducted the show and presumably derived
approval emitted by the spectators, he decided the most profit or gain from the same.
that defendant Marina Padan was the subject of
popular approval, and he selected her. After her As regards the penalty imposed by the trial court
selection, the other woman named Concha, left. on appellant Fajardo, we agree with the Solicitor
Without much ado, Fajardo selected Cosme General that the same is correct, except the
Espinosa to be Marina's partner. Thereafter, minimum thereof which is beyond the legal
Cosme and Marina proceeded to disrobe while range, and which should be reduced from one
standing around the bed. When completely year, one month, and ten days of prision
naked, they turned around to exhibit their bodies correccional to only six months of arresto
to the spectators. Then they indulged in mayor.
lascivious acts, consisting of petting, kissing,
and touching the private parts of each other. With the modification above-mentioned, the
When sufficiently aroused, they lay on the bed decision appealed from by Marina Padan and
and proceeded to consummate the act of coitus Jose Fajardo are hereby affirmed, with costs
in three different positions which we deem against both.
unnecessary to describe. The four or five
witnesses who testified for the Government
when asked about their reaction to what they
saw, frankly admitted that they were excited
beyond description. Then the police who were
among the spectators and who were previously
provided with a search warrant made the raid,
arrested the four defendants herein, and took
pictures of Marina and Cosme still naked and of
the army bed, which pictures were presented as
exhibits during the trial. From all this, there can
be no doubt that Jose Fajardo y Garcia contrary
to what he claims, was the person in charge of
the show. Besides, as found by the trial court
and as shown by some of the tickets collected
from the spectators, submitted as exhibits, said
tickets while bearing on one side printed matter
regarding an excursion to Balara to be held on
August 30, 1953 from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.,
sponsored by a certain club, on the other side
appears the following typewritten form, reading: