Krivenko v.

The Register of Deeds, City of Manila

G.R. No. L-360 November 15, 1947

FACTS:
Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot in December of 1941. The
registration was interrupted by war. In 1945, he sought to accomplish the registration but
was denied by the register of deed on ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land
within the jurisdiction. Krivenko appealed to the Court.

ISSUE:
Whether an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land

RULING:
NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the Constitution states that: All agricultural,
timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations
at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any
existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. This means to say that, under the
provisions of the Constitutions, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of urban
or residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions made in
contravention of the prohibitions since the fundamental law became effective are null and
void per se and ab initio.
Frenzel v. Catito
G.R. No. 143958. July 11, 2003

FACTS:
Alfred Fritz Frenzel and Ederlina entered into an amorous relationship while they are
both married. Alfred purchased properties in the Philippines and agreed to place them all
in the name of Ederlina since he knew that as an alien he was disqualified from owning
lands in the Philippines. When their relationship turned sour, Alfred filed complaints
against Ederlina for recovery of real and personal properties.

ISSUE:
Whether Frenzel may recover the properties or the money used in the purchase.

RULING:
NO. Even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question were entered into by him
as the real vendee, the said transactions are in violation of the Constitution; hence, are
null and void ab initio. A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and
void and vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The
petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot come into a court of law and ask to
have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or property by knowingly
engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his own moral turpitude may not
maintain an action for his losses. To him who moves in deliberation and premeditation,
the law is unyielding. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement;
it leaves the parties where it finds them.

Moreover, lands of the public domain, which include private lands, may be transferred or
conveyed only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire or held private lands or lands
of the public domain; Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified
from acquiring lands of the public domain.
Muller v. Muller
G.R. No. 149615. August 29, 2006

FACTS:
Elena Muller and Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany. The couple
decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines. By this time, Helmut had
inherited properties from his parents in Gemany which he sold and used the proceeds for
the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal and was registered in the name of Elena
Muller.

Due to incompatibilities and Helmut alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment,

the spouses eventually separated.

Helmut filed a petition for separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. The court granted said petition. It also decreed the separation of properties
between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the
country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to
the Antipolo property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the
Helmut. However, it ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because the property
was purchased in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.

Helmut elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the RTC
and held that Helmut merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo
property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It ordered the Elena to
reimburse Helmut the amount for the said property.

ISSUE:
Whether Helmut is entitled to reimbursement.

RULING:
No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement. Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the
1987 Constitution provides: “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall
be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified
to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”

In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property despite a
constitutional prohibition. And to get away with that constitutional prohibition, he put
the property under the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what the
fundamental law bars him to do directly.

With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not
permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.
Ting Ho, Jr. vs. Teng Gui
G.R. No. 130115. July 16, 2008

FACTS:
The Ho against their brother, Gui. The controversy revolves around a parcel of land, and
the improvements which should form part of the estate of their deceased father, Felix Ting
Ho, and should be partitioned equally among each of the siblings. The Ho alleged that
their father Felix Ting Ho died intestate and left upon his death an estate, the said lot and
properties were titled and tax declared under trust in the name of Gui for the benefit of
the deceased Felix Ting Ho who, being a Chinese citizen, was then disqualified to own
public lands in the Philippines; and that upon the death of Felix Ting Ho, the Gui took
possession of the same for his own exclusive use and benefit to their exclusion and
prejudice.

ISSUE:
Whether the parcel of land should form part of the estate of Felix.

RULING:
No, the right to acquire lands of the public domain is reserved for Filipino citizens or
corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos.

In addition, the grant of miscellaneous sales patent by the Secretary of Natural Resources,
and the corresponding issuance of the original certificate of title in his name of Gui, show
that the respondent possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to
acquire alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The effect of the registration
of a patent and the issuance of a certificate of title to the patentee is to vest in him an
incontestable title to the land, in the same manner as if ownership had been determined
by final decree of the court, and the title so issued is absolutely conclusive and
indisputable, and is not subject to collateral attack.
Republic vs. T.A.N.
G.R. No. 154953. June 26, 2008

FACTS:
T.A.N. Properties, Inc. (TAN) applied for original registration of title covering a parcel of
land, with an area of 56.4007 hectares, located at Batangas. The sole opposition is the
Republic of the Philippines. TAN presented witnesses to prove that his predecessors in
interest on the said land had peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous possession of the
land in the concept of an owner prior to June 12, 1945 and for 30 years or more.

Trial court and Court of Appeals adjudicated the land in favor of TAN. Petitioner appealed
from the trial court and Court of Appeals’ Decision. Republic contends that TAN as a
corporation is disqualified to acquire the subject tract of land.

ISSUES:
Whether the land is alienable and disposable;

RULING:
No, Respondent Failed to Prove that the Land is Alienable and Disposable. The well-
entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion
presumably belong to the State. The applicant for land registration must prove that the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary had approved the
land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable,
and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area
per verification through survey by the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Offices (PENRO) or Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO).
Malabanan v. Republic
GR No. 179987 April 29, 2009

FACTS:
Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC, covering a parcel of
land situated in Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he
had purchased the property and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious,
continuous, and adverse possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. Among
the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification issued by the
Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was “verified
to be within the Alienable or Disposable land, the RTC approved the application for
registration. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the application
of Malabanan.

ISSUE:
Whether the land may be registered by Malabanan

RULING:
No, it is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan
has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own
evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus,
they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the
subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent
evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the
subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change
its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus,
it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Tirol
G.R. No. 171535 June 5, 2009

FACTS:
Business partners, Tirol and Ngo, claim to have purchased a 2,000 square meter parcel
of land from a certain Jenkins, Tirol and Ngo bought the said property on the strength of
the apparent clean title of vendor as evidenced by the Tax Declaration and TCT No. 18216,
After the sale, Tirol and Ngo succeeded in titling the said lot under their names and
further proceeded to pay realty taxes thereon.

In January 1996 that the Tirol and Ngo discovered a cloud on their title when their request
for a Height Clearance with the DOTC was referred Mactan Cebu International Airport
Authority (MCIAA, for brevity), on account of the latter’s ownership of the said lot by way
of purchase thereof dating far back to 1958.

ISSUE:
Between respondents Spouses Tirol and Spouses Ngo, on the one hand, and petitioner
MCIAA, on the other, who has the superior right to the subject property?

RULING:
The Tirol and Ngo have a better right. Registration of instruments must be done in the
proper registry in order to effect and bind the land; If a parcel of land covered by a Torrens
title is sold, but the sale is registered under Act No. 3344 and not under the Land
Registration Act, the sale is not considered registered and the registration of the deed does
not operate as constructive notice to the whole world.

In addition, the fact that the certificate of title over the registered land is lost does not
convert it into unregistered land and MCIAA should have availed itself of the legal remedy
of reconstitution of the lost certificate of title, instead of registration under Act 3344.
Bulaong v. Gonzales
G.R. No. 156318. September 05, 2011

FACTS:
Two parcels of land were mortgaged by Limpo, to the Bulaongs, to secure a loan. After the
execution of the mortgage, the Bulaongs went to the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan to register and annotate the mortgage on the titles. Thereafter, To the Bulaongs’
astonishment, the new titles of the said parcels of land now contained entries pertaining
to Writ of Execution for a certain Veronica Gonzales. To satisfy the judgment debt, the
two lots were sold at public auction to Veronica, the only bidder. Upon the lapse of the
one-year redemption period, Veronica’s titles over the properties were consolidated.

On the other hand, the Bulaongs also had the mortgage extra judicially foreclosed, The
Bulaongs were the highest bidders, The RTC ruled in favor of the Bulaongs. The CA ruled
in favor of Veronica.

ISSUE:
Whether Veronica has a superior right over the properties.

RULING:
No, From the standpoint of third parties, a property registered under the Torrens system
remains, for all legal purposes, the property of the person in whose name it is registered,
notwithstanding the execution of any deed of conveyance, unless the corresponding deed
is registered. Simply put, if a sale is not registered, it is binding only between the seller
and the buyer, but it does not affect innocent third persons.

One of the principal features of the Torrens system of registration is that all encumbrances
on the land shall be shown, or at least intimated upon the certificate of title and a person
dealing with the owner of the registered land is not bound to go behind the certificate and
inquire into transactions, the existence of which is not there intimated. Since the Bulaongs
had no knowledge of the unregistered sale between Regina and her parents, the Bulaongs
can neither be bound by it, nor can they be prejudiced by its consequences.
Republic v. Bantigue
G.R. No. 162322. March 14, 2012

FACTS:
Bantigue Point Development Corporation (Bantigue) filed with the RTC of Batangas an
application for original registration of title over a parcel of land with an assessed value of
14,920 for the entire property. The RTC clerk of court transmitted the records of the case
to the MTC of San Juan, because the assessed value of the property was less than 100,000
The MTC commenced with the reception of evidence. Among the documents presented
by the respondent in support of its application are tax declarations, a deed of absolute sale
in its favor and a Certification from the DENR Community Environment and Natural
resources offices (CENRO) of batangas that the lot in question is within alienable and
disposable zone. Thereafter it is awarded to Bantigue. The Republic appeal the decision
to the CA but the CA ruled in favor of Bantigue.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not Bantigue presented enough evidence to establish that the land sought to
be registered is alienable or disposable based on positive act of the government.

RULING:
No, the lower court erred in granting Bantigue application for original registration. The
Regalian doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State. The
applicant for land registration has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State
ownership by establishing through incontrovertible evidence that the land sought to be
registered is alienable or disposable based on a positive act of the government. The Court
already ruled that a CENRO certification is insufficient to prove the alienable and
disposable character of the land sought to be registered. The applicant must also show
sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary has approved the land classification and released
the land in question as alienable and disposable.

Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied
by (1) a CENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
Republic vs. Metro Index Realty and Development Corporation
G.R. No. 198585 July 2, 2012

FACTS:
Metro Index Realty and Development Corporation filed w/ the RTC an application for
judicial confirmation of title over 3 parcels of land located at Cavite. During the hearings,
Metro presented two witnesses to testified that: (a) Metro bought the subject properties
from the Sicap; (b) the subject properties had been declared for tax purposes in the
respondent’s name since 2006; (c) the subject properties are alienable and disposable as
evidenced by the certification issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR); (d) as shown by their respective affidavits, the adjoining lot owners
had no adverse claim and objections to the respondent’s application; and (e) the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject
properties for more than fifty (50) years. The RTC and CA ruled in favor of Metro.

ISSUE:
Whether Metro had proven that he is entitled to the benefits of PD 1529 on confirmation
of imperfect titles.

HELD:
No, a mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not constitute
possession under claim of ownership and that properties of the public dominion are not
susceptible to prescription and that only patrimonial properties of the State, may be
acquired by prescription.

Moreover, the indispensability of an official declaration that the property is now a

patrimonial property. The Court finds no evidence of such official declaration and for this
reason alone, the respondent’s application should have been dismissed outright.
Valiao vs. Republic
G.R. No. 170757 November 28, 2011

FACTS:
The Valiao filed with the RTC an application of a parcel of land in Negros Occidental under
the conditions of PD 1529. They claim that they have acquired the property in 1947 after
the death of their uncle Basilio Milliarez.

The petitioners submitted a Tax Declaration under the names of the heirs of Basilio
Millarez. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s decision to grant the petitioner’s
application for registration. Per CA decision the classification of lands of public domain
is an exclusive prerogative of the executive department of the government and in the
absence of such classification, the lands remain unclassified until it is released therefrom
and rendered open to disposition

ISSUES:
1. Whether the parcel of land claimed by the Valiao is an alienable and disposable land of
the public domain.
2. Whether the Valiao and their predecessors-in-interest had been in an open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation under a claim of
ownership.

RULING:
The Valiao application under PD 1529 should be denied, the petitioners failed to prove
that the subject property was classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of the
public domain.

Under the Regalian doctrine, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released
as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of
the inalienable public domain. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how
long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on
the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or
claim) is alienable or disposable.

In addition, there must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable. The petitioners failed to prove that they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in an open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. There is
nothing in the records that would substantiate petitioners’ claim that their uncle was in
possession of the property during the period of possession required by law.
Beumer vs. Amores
G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012

FACTS:
Beumer, a Dutch National, and respondent Amores, a Filipina, were married. After
several years, the RTC declared the nullity of their marriage on the basis of the formers
psychological incapacity. Consequently, Beumer filed a Petition for Dissolution of
Conjugal Partnership praying for the distribution of the six lots claimed to have been
acquired during the subsistence of their marriage.

Beumer averred that while the four lots, excluding the two lots allegedly acquired by
Amores by way of inheritance, were registered in the name of Amores, these properties
were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as his disability
benefit since Amores did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition.

ISSUE:
Whether Beumer is entitled for reimbursement of the value of the lots based on equity.

RULING:
No, Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-
citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners
applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon,
such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly declared to
be co-owned by the parties’ subject to partition. Needless to state, the purpose of the
prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony and it is this policy which the Court is
duty-bound to protect.
Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 184589 June 13, 2013

FACTS:
Purita Landicho filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal an Application for
Registration of a piece of land at Rizal. Upon its decision, the CFI issued an Order for the
issuance of original certificate of title (OCT).

Eventually, Register of Deeds (ROD) for the Province of Rizal, issued Certificate of Title
(TCT) The subject property was thereafter sold several times up to herein respondent
Philippine Chinese Charitable Association, Inc. (PCCAI)

In addition, Landicho executed a Deed of Absolute Sales over the subject property in favor
of herein petitioner Deogenes O. Rodriguez (Rodriguez). Rodriguez filed an Omnibus
Motion before the RTC. Rodriguez alleged that the Decision which confirmed Landicho’s
title over the subject property has not been executed and that no OCT had been ever issued
by the ROD in Landicho’s name. Concerning the aforementioned Omnibus Motion,
Rodriguez himself submitted TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI Thus, the RTC issued a subpoena
commanding PCCAI to appear at the hearing. The ruled in favor of Rodriguez, however,
the LRA upon receipt of the Order, filed a Manifestation informing the trial court that it
cannot comply with said Order since there were already two existing titles covering the
subject property, and to issue a decree of registration and OCT in Landicho’s name would
only further aggravate the problem of double titling. While the CA rule in favor of PCCAI.

ISSUE:
Whether Rodriguez petition is meritorious.

RULING:
NO, the real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any
question as to its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure as Torrens
title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein. A
strong presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued and that they are valid.

Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, explicitly provides that “[a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.” Land Registration Authority exists for the sole purpose of
implementing and protecting the Torrens system of land titling and registration. The duty
of Land Registration Authority officials to issue decrees of registration is ministerial in
the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity
with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record. They have no
discretion in the matter.
Republic v. Camacho
G.R. No. 185604 June 13, 2013

FACTS:
Edward M. Camacho filed a petition for Reconstitution of the Original Title and Issuance
of Owner’s Duplicate Copy” before the RTC. Camacho alleged that the OTC is no longer
legible due to wear and tear. Respondent attached to his petition photocopies of the Deed;
the OCT; Tax Declaration; a Certification issued by the Office of the Register of Deeds
stating that the file copy of the OCT could not be found and is considered lost and beyond
recovery. The RTC and CA ruled in favor of the Camacho, the Republic averred that the
CA and RTC erred because Camacho does not have any basis for reconstitution because
the OCT per se is doubtful existence.

ISSUE:
Whether Camacho has a basis for reconstitution of the Title on the said property.

RULING:
Yes, the nature of the proceeding for reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes a
restoration of the instrument, which is supposed to have been lost or destroyed, in its
original form and condition. However, the CA overlook the law requires that 30 days
before the date of hearing, (1) a notice be published in two successive issues of the Official
Gazette at the expense of the petitioner, and that (2) such notice be posted at the main
entrances of the provincial building and of the municipal hall where the property is
located. The notice shall state the following: (1) the number of the certificate of title, (2)
the name of the registered owner, (3) the names of the interested parties appearing in the
reconstituted certificate of title, (4) the location of the property, and (5) the date on which
all persons having an interest in the property, must appear and file such claims as they
may have. In view of these lapses, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction to proceed with
the case since the mandatory manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by
R.A. No. 26 had not been strictly followed, thereby rendering the proceedings utterly null
and void.
Wee vs. Mardo,
G.R. No. 202414 June 4, 2014

FACTS:
Felicidad Gonzales, married to Leopoldo Mardo was granted a registered Free Patent
covering a Lot, situated in, Cavite. Felicidad allegedly conveyed to petitioner, Josephine
Wee, through a Deed of Absolute Sale, a portion of the said lot, for a consideration of
250,000.00 which was fully paid. Felicidad, however, refused to vacate and turn over the
subject property claiming that the alleged sale was falsified.

Wee filed an application for Original Registration of a parcel of land located at Cavite.
Wee claimed that she is the owner of the said unregistered land by virtue of a deed of
absolute sale. Mardo filed her Opposition to the Application alleging that she is the true
and lawful owner of the parcel of land which is the subject of the application; and 2] that
Wee’s deed of absolute sale is surreptitious.

ISSUE:
Whether Petitioner application for original registration is meritorious

RULING:
No, a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already
decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second decree for
the same land would be null and void, since the principle behind the original registration
is to register a parcel of land only once. Verily, once a title is registered, as a consequence
either of judicial or administrative proceedings, the owner may rest secure, without the
necessity of waiting in the portals of the court sitting in the mirador de su casa to avoid
the possibility of losing his land. The certificate of title cannot be defeated by adverse,
open and notorious possession. Neither can it be defeated by prescription. As provided
under Sec. 47 of PD 1529, no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
Francisco v. Rojas
G.R. No. 167120. April 23, 2014

FACTS:
Francisco, are the applicants for registration in Land, a portion of the 3,181.74 hectares
of a vast track of land, known as the Hacienda de Angono, in Angono, Rizal.

The said land was under Decreto No. 6145, was issued in favor of the brothers Francisco
and Hermogenes on the basis thereof of original certificate of title. Sometime in 1942,
the heirs of Francisco and Hermogenes decided among themselves the same hectares
and transferred the ½ portion thereof to the Rojas, resulting to disputes between the
Francisco and the Rojas.

ISSUE:
Whether an action for reconveyance being maintained by the rojas is the appropriate
proceeding.

RULING:
Yes, In the action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is highly respected as
incontrovertible; what is sought instead is the transfer of the property wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another’s name to its rightful owner or to the one with a better
right. An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes four years from the
discovery of the fraud and if it is based on an implied or a constructive trust it prescribes
ten (10) years from the alleged fraudulent registration or date of issuance of the
certificate of title over the property. However, an action for reconveyance based on
implied or constructive trust is imprescriptible if the plaintiff or the person enforcing
the trust is in possession of the property. In effect, the action for reconveyance is an
action to quiet the property title, which does not prescribe.
Okabe vs. Saturnino,
G.R. No. 196040 August 26, 2014

FACTS:
The subject of the controversy is a property located in Makati City, which was initially
covered by a TCT under the Saturnino, the Saturnino obtained a loan with the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), which was secured by the subject property. Because of the couple’s
failure to settle their loan obligation with the bank, PNB extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgage.

The property was not redeemed by respondent during the redemption period,
consolidation of ownership was inscribed and a new TCT was issued in favor of PNB.
Without taking possession of the subject property, PNB sold the land to petitioner Fe H.
Okabe and a new TCT No. was later issued in the name of OKABE.

OKABE filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City an Ex-Parte Petition for
Issuance of Writ of Possession over the subject property. The RTC ruled in favor of the
Okabe, while the CA for the Saturnino as the writ of possession is only available to
purchaser who is also the mortgagee which is PNB made under the provisions of Act 3135.

ISSUE:
Whether an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession was the proper
remedy of the petitioner in obtaining possession of the subject property.

RULING:
No, rather that Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court be applied to cases involving
extrajudicially foreclosed properties that were bought by a purchaser and later sold to
third-party-purchasers after the lapse of the redemption period. The remedy of a writ of
possession, a remedy that is available to the mortgagee-purchaser to acquire possession
of the foreclosed property from the mortgagor, is made available to a subsequent
purchaser, but only after hearing and after determining that the subject property is still
in the possession of the mortgagor. Unlike if the purchaser is the mortgagee or a third
party during the redemption period, a writ of possession may issue ex-parte or without
hearing. In other words, if the purchaser is a third party who acquired the property after
the redemption period, a hearing must be conducted to determine whether possession
over the subject property is still with the mortgagor or is already in the possession of a
third party holding the same adversely to the defaulting debtor or mortgagor. If the
property is in the possession of the mortgagor, a writ of possession could thus be issued.
Otherwise, the remedy of a writ of possession is no longer available to such purchaser, but
he can wrest possession over the property through an ordinary action of ejectment.
Republic vs. Castuera,
G.R. No. 203384 January 14, 2015

FACTS:
the Spouses Castuera filed with the RTC an application for original registration of title
over the property. They presented documentary evidence to support their application. the
documents included tax receipts and an advance plan with a notation, "Checked and
verified against the cadastral records on file in this office and is for registration purposes.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), through the Office of the Solicitor
General, filed an opposition to the application for original registration.

RTC granted the application for original registration of title over the property, which is
upheld by the CA

ISSUE:
Petitioner raises as issue that the advance plan and the CENRO certification are
insufficient proofs of the alienable and disposable character of the property.

RULING:
Yes, the petition is meritorious, the advance plan and the CENRO certification are
insufficient proofs of the alienable and disposable character of the property. The Spouses
Castuera, as applicants for registration of title, must present a certified true copy of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary’s declaration or
classification of the land as alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration
must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released
the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey
by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of the original
classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR
Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President. Such copy of the DENR Secretary’s
declaration or the President’s proclamation must be certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of such official record. These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable.
Republic vs. Pasicolan
G.R. No. 198543 April 15, 2015

FACTS:
PASICOLAN filed a Petition for Reconstitution of OCT in the name of Pedro Callueng
(Pedro) before the RTC of Tuguegarao City. Respondents claimed to be the legal and
forced heirs of the late Pedro. The RTC granted the Petition,

Believing that the RTC erred in granting the Petition for Reconstitution on the basis that
respondents failed to present competent evidence to show that the alleged lost of
certificate of tile was valid at the time of its loss, petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(petitioner), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed to the CA. The
Ca ruled in favor of PASICOLAN. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether Pasicolan presented sufficient evidence to grant the reconstitution of records.

RULING:
No, The survey plan and technical description are not competent and sufficient sources
of reconstitution when the petition is based on Section 2(f) of RA 26. They are mere
additional documentary requirements. This is the clear import of the last sentence of
Section 12, RA 26 earlier quoted. Thus, in Lee v. Republic of the Philippines, where the
trial court ordered reconstitution on the basis of the survey plan and technical
description, we declared the order of reconstitution void for want of factual support.
Republic vs. Pasicolan, 755 SCRA 495, G.R. No. 198543 April 15, 2015
Republic vs. Sogod Development Corporation
G.R. No. 175760 February 17, 2016

FACTS:
Respondent Sogod Development Corporation (Sogod) filed an application for
registration and confirmation of land that it purchased from Catalina Rivera, averring
that “by itself and through its predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land since June 12, 1945.”

DENR filed an Opposition on the ground that the land was previously forest land and
was certified and released as alienable and disposable only on January 17, 1986.
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Catmon-Carmen-Sogod ruled in favour herein
respondent Sogod, which the Court of Appeals affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the occupation of forest lands prior to its classification as alienable and
disposable land may be considered for purposes of complying with the requirements for
judicial confirmation of title

RULING:
Yes, this court, has clarified that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 qualifies possession and
occupation, not land classification, as alienable and disposable. The agricultural land
subject of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the
time of the application, provided the applicant’s possession and occupation of the land
dates back to June 12, 1945, or earlier.