ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, A.M. No.

P-02-1651 in marriage and family and the integrity of the courts where
Complainant, (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P) respondent is an employee.

Present: I. THE PAST PROCEEDINGS

PANGANIBAN, CJ., On July 27, 2000, complainant Alejandro Estrada requested Judge
PUNO, Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253, Regional Trial
QUISUMBING, Court of Las Pias City, for an investigation of respondent Soledad
YNARES-SANTIAGO, Escritor, court interpreter in said court, for living with a man not
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, her husband, and having borne a child within this live-in
CARPIO, arrangement. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should
-versus- CORONA, not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear
CARPIO MORALES, that the court condones her act. Hence, respondent was charged
CALLEJO, SR., with committing disgraceful and immoral conduct under Book V,
AZCUNA, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative
TINGA, Code.
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and Defense of the Respondent:
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated: Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered the
SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband having died
Respondent. June 22, 2006 in 1998.[4] She admitted that she started living with Luciano Quilapio,
Jr. without the benefit of marriage more than twenty years ago when
x--------------------------------------------------x her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She also
admitted that she and Quilapio have a son. But as a member of the
RESOLUTION religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and
the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, respondent asserted that
PUNO, J.: their conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs
While man is finite, he seeks and subscribes to the and has the approval of her congregation. In fact, after ten years of
Infinite. Respondent Soledad Escritor once again stands before living together, she executed on July 28, 1991, a Declaration of
the Court invoking her religious freedom and her Jehovah God in Pledging Faithfulness.
a bid to save her family united without the benefit of legal
marriage - and livelihood. The State, on the other hand, seeks to (For Jehovahs Witnesses, the Declaration allows members of
wield its power to regulate her behavior and protect its interest the congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter
into marital relations. The Declaration thus makes the resulting union
moral and binding within the congregation all over the world except
in countries where divorce is allowed.) The congregation requires that
at the time the declarations are executed, only couples who have been
baptized and in good standing may execute the Declaration, which
requires the approval of the elders of the congregation. As a matter of
practice, the marital status of the declarants and their respective
spouses commission of adultery are investigated before the
declarations are executed. Escritor and Quilapios declarations were
executed in the usual and approved form prescribed by the Jehovahs
Witnesses which was approved by elders of the congregation and was
recorded in the Watch Tower Central Office.
In sum, therefore, insofar as the congregation is concerned,
there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between
Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in
the congregation.
By invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral
standards of her congregation, in asserting that her conjugal
arrangement does not constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct for
which she should be held administratively liable, the Court had to
determine the contours of religious freedom under Article III, Section
5 of the Constitution, which provides, viz:
Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for
the exercise of civil or political rights.
ISSUE: W/N THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE under
Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative
Code.
A. RULING
We held that in resolving claims involving religious freedom
(1) benevolent neutrality or accommodation, whether mandatory
or permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the
religion clauses in our Constitution; and (2) in deciding respondents
plea of exemption based on the Free Exercise Clause (from the law
with which she is administratively charged), it is the compelling state
interest test, the strictest test, which must be applied.
Thus, in the decision dated August 4, 2003, we remanded
the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), and
ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to intervene.
The omission of an express guaranty of religious freedom and
other natural rights, however, nearly prevented the ratification of the
Constitution. The restriction had to be made explicit with the adoption
of the religion clauses in the First Amendment as they are worded to
this day. Thus, the First Amendment did not take away or abridge any
power of the national government; its intent was to make express the
absence of power.[24] It commands, in two parts (with the first part
usually referred to as the Establishment Clause and the second part,
the Free Exercise Clause), viz:
Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion (establishment clause/ principle of non-
establishment) or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. [25]
(free exercise clause)
The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, it should be
noted, were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have
a single goal to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and
practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to
deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to
influence individual religious beliefs and practices.
2. RELIGION CLAUSES IN THE U.S. CONTEXT
U.S. history has produced two identifiably different, even
opposing, strains of jurisprudence on the religion clauses. First is the
standard of separation, which may take the form of either (a) strict
separation or (b) the tamer version of strict neutrality or
separation, or what Mr. Justice Carpio refers to as the second theory
of governmental neutrality-- a wall of separation must exist between
the state and the Church to protect the state from the church. On the
other hand, the second standard, the benevolent
neutrality or accommodation, is buttressed by the view that the wall
of separation is meant to protect the church from the state.
A brief review of each theory is in order.
a. Strict Separation and Strict Neutrality/Separation
The Strict Separationist believes that the Establishment Clause
was meant to protect the state from the church, and the states hostility
towards religion allows no interaction between the two. Religious
institutions could not receive aid, whether direct or indirect,
from the state. Nor could the state adjust its secular programs to
alleviate burdens the programs placed on believers. Only the
complete separation of religion from politics would eliminate the
formal influence of religious institutions and provide for a free choice
among political views, thus a strict wall of separation is necessary.
Strict separation faces difficulties, however, as it is deeply
embedded in American history and contemporary practice that
enormous amounts of aid, both direct and indirect, flow to religion
from government in return for huge amounts of mostly indirect aid
from religion.[31] For example, less than twenty-four hours after
Congress adopted the First Amendments prohibition on laws
respecting an establishment of religion, Congress decided to express
its thanks to God Almighty for the many blessings enjoyed by the
nation with a resolution in favor of a presidential proclamation
declaring a national day of Thanksgiving and Prayer.[32] Thus, strict
separationists are caught in an awkward position of claiming a
constitutional principle that has never existed and is never likely to.[33]
The tamer version of the strict separationist view, the strict
neutrality or separationist view, (or, the governmental
neutrality theory) finds basis in Everson v. Board of
Education,[34] where the Court declared that Jeffersons wall of
separation encapsulated the meaning of the First
Amendment. However, unlike the strict separationists, the strict
neutrality believes that the state must be neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and non-believers. The strict
neutrality approach is not hostile to religion, but it is strict in holding
that religion may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes
of governmental action, whether the action confers rights or privileges
or imposes duties or obligations. Only secular criteria may be the basis
of government action. It does not permit, much less
require, accommodation of secular programs to religious belief.[36]
The dilemma of the separationist approach, whether in
the form of strict separation or strict neutrality, is that while the
Jeffersonian wall of separation captures the spirit of the
American ideal of church-state separation, in real life, church and
state are not and cannot be totally separate. This is all the more
true in contemporary times when both the government and
religion are growing and expanding their spheres of involvement
and activity, resulting in the intersection of government and
religion at many points.
b. Benevolent Neutrality/Accommodation
 The theory of benevolent neutrality or accommodation is
premised on a different view of the wall of separation, associated with
Williams, founder of the Rhode Islandcolony. Unlike the Jeffersonian
wall that is meant to protect the state from the church, the wall is
meant to protect the church from the state.
It does not say that in every and all respects
there shall be a separation of Church and State. Rather,
it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in
which there shall be no concert or union or
dependency one or the other. That is the common
sense of the matter. Otherwise, the state and religion
would be aliens to each other.
We find no constitutional requirement which
makes it necessary for government to be hostile to
religion and to throw its weight against efforts to
widen their effective scope of religious influence.
(1) Legislative Acts and the Free Exercise Clause
Religion clauses are invoked in relation to governmental
action, almost invariably in the form of legislative acts.
Generally speaking, a legislative act that purposely aids or
inhibits religion will be challenged as unconstitutional, either because
it violates the Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause or
both. This is true whether one subscribes to
the separationist approach or the benevolent
neutrality or accommodationist approach.
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect
to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be
allowed, not to promote the governments favored form of religion, but
to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. The purpose of accommodations is to remove a burden
on, or facilitate the exercise of, a persons or institutions religion. In
the ideal world, the legislature would recognize the religions and their
practices and would consider them, when practical, in enacting laws of
general application. But when the legislature fails to do so, religions
that are threatened and burdened may turn to the courts for
protection.[52]
Thus, what is sought under the theory of accommodation is
not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law,
but an exemption from its application or its burdensome effect,
whether by the legislature or the courts.
(2) Free Exercise Jurisprudence: Sherbert, Yoder and
Smith
The pinnacle of free exercise protection and the theory of
accommodation in the U.S. blossomed in the case of Sherbert v.
Verner, which ruled that state regulation that indirectly restrains or
punishes religious belief or conduct must be subjected to strict scrutiny
under the Free Exercise Clause. According to Sherbert, when a law of
general application infringes religious exercise, albeit incidentally,
the state interest sought to be promoted must be so paramount
and compelling as to override the free exercise claim.
***Sherbert Case: denial of
The Court stressed that in the area of religious liberty, it is
basic that it is not sufficient to merely show a rational
relationship of the substantial infringement to the religious right
and a colorable state interest. (I)n this highly sensitive
constitutional area, [o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.[58] This
germinal case of Sherbert firmly established the exemption
doctrine, [59] viz:
It is certain that not every conscience can be
accommodated by all the laws of the land; but when
general laws conflict with scruples of conscience,
 exemptions ought to be granted unless some
compelling state interest intervenes.
Thus, Sherbert and subsequent cases held that when
government action burdens, even inadvertently, a sincerely held
religious belief or practice, the state must justify the burden by
demonstrating that the law embodies a compelling interest, that no
less restrictive alternative exists, and that a religious exemption
would impair the states ability to effectuate its compelling interest.
. . . our decisions have rejected the idea that religiously
grounded conduct is always outside the protection of
the Free Exercise Clause. It is true that activities of
individuals, even when religiously based, are often
subject to regulation by the States in the exercise of
their undoubted power to promote the health, safety,
and general welfare, or the Federal government in the
exercise of its delegated powers . . . But to agree that
religiously grounded conduct must often be subject
to the broad police power of the State is not to
deny that there are areas of conduct protected by
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
and thus beyond the power of the State to control,
even under regulations of general applicability. . . .
The cases of Sherbert and Yoder laid out the following
doctrines: (a) free exercise clause claims were subject to heightened
scrutiny or compelling interest test if government substantially
burdened the exercise of religion; (b) heightened scrutiny
or compelling interest test governed cases where the burden was
direct, i.e., the exercise of religion triggered a criminal or civil
penalty, as well as cases where the burden was indirect, i.e., the
exercise of religion resulted in the forfeiture of a government
benefit;[63]and (c) the Court could carve out accommodations or
exemptions from a facially neutral law of general application, whether
general or criminal.
Thus, Sherbert and subsequent cases held that when
government action burdens, even inadvertently, a sincerely held
religious belief or practice, the state must justify the burden by
demonstrating that the law embodies a compelling interest, that no
less restrictive alternative exists, and that a religious exemption
would impair the states ability to effectuate its compelling interest. As
in other instances of state action affecting fundamental rights,
negative impacts on those rights demand the highest level of judicial
scrutiny. After Sherbert, this strict scrutiny balancing test resulted in
court-mandated religious exemptions from facially-neutral laws of
general application whenever unjustified burdens were found. [60]
. . . our decisions have rejected the idea that religiously
grounded conduct is always outside the protection of
the Free Exercise Clause. It is true that activities of
individuals, even when religiously based, are often
subject to regulation by the States in the exercise of
their undoubted power to promote the health, safety,
and general welfare, or the Federal government in the
exercise of its delegated powers . . . But to agree that
religiously grounded conduct must often be subject
to the broad police power of the State is not to
deny that there are areas of conduct protected by
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment
and thus beyond the power of the State to control,
even under regulations of general applicability.
The cases of Sherbert and Yoder laid out the following
doctrines:
(a) free exercise clause claims were subject to heightened
scrutiny or compelling interest test if government substantially
burdened the exercise of religion;
(b) heightened scrutiny or compelling interest test governed
cases where the burden was direct, i.e., the exercise of religion
triggered a criminal or civil penalty, as well as cases where the
burden was indirect, i.e., the exercise of religion resulted in the
forfeiture of a government benefit;[63]and
(c) the Court could carve out accommodations or exemptions
from a facially neutral law of general application, whether general or
criminal.
Strict or heightened scrutiny and the compelling
justification approach were abandoned for evaluating laws
burdening religion; neutral laws of general applicability only
have to meet the rational basis test, no matter how much they
burden religion.
(3) Accommodation under the Religion Clauses
A free exercise claim could result to three kinds
of accommodation:
(a) those which are found to be constitutionally
compelled, i.e., required by the Free Exercise Clause;
(b) those which are discretionary or legislative, i.e., not
required by the Free Exercise Clause but nonetheless permitted by
the Establishment Clause; and
(c) those which the religion clauses prohibit.[111]
Mandatory accommodation results when the Court finds that
accommodation is required by the Free Exercise Clause. This
accommodation occurs when all three conditions of the compelling
interest test are met. If the states objective could be served as well
or almost as well by granting an exemption to those whose
religious beliefs are burdened by the regulation, the Court must
grant the exemption.
In permissive accommodation, the Court finds that the State
may, but is not required to, accommodate religious interests.
Finally, when the Court finds no basis for a mandatory
accommodation, or it determines that the legislative accommodation
runs afoul of the establishment or the free exercise clause, it results to
a prohibited accommodation. In this case, the Court finds that
establishment concerns prevail over potential accommodation
interests. Given that a free exercise claim could lead to three
different results, the question now remains as to how the Court
should determine which action to take. In this regard, it is the strict
scrutiny-compelling state interest test which is most in line with
the benevolent neutrality-accommodation approach.
Under the benevolent-neutrality theory, that freedom to carry
out ones duties to a Supreme Being is an inalienable right, not one
dependent on the grace of legislature. Religious freedom is seen as a
substantive right and not merely a privilege against
discriminatory legislation. With religion looked upon with
benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows
accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that
free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should
be subject to strict scrutiny.
In its application, the compelling state interest test follows
a three-step process, summarized as follows:
1. If the plaintiff can show that a law or
government practice inhibits the free
exercise of his religious beliefs, the burden
shifts to the government to demonstrate
that the law or practice is necessary to the
accomplishment of some important (or
compelling) secular objective and that it is
 the least restrictive means of achieving that
objective. If the plaintiff meets this burden
and the government does not, the plaintiff is
entitled to exemption from the law or
practice at issue.
2. In order to be protected, the claimants
beliefs must be sincere, but they need not
necessarily be consistent, coherent, clearly
articulated, or congruent with those of the
claimants religious denomination.
3. Only beliefs rooted in religion are
protected by the Free Exercise Clause;
secular beliefs, however sincere and
conscientious, do not suffice.[122]
Philippine jurisprudence shows that the Court has
allowed exemptions from a law of general application, in effect,
interpreting our religion clauses to cover both mandatory and
permissive accommodations.[130]
b. The Compelling State Interest Test
As previously stated, the compelling state interest
test involves a three-step process. We explained this process in detail,
by showing the questions which must be answered in each step, viz:
First, [H]as the statute or government action created a
burden on the free exercise of religion? The courts often
look into the sincerity of the religious belief, but
without inquiring into the truth of the belief because
the Free Exercise Clause prohibits inquiring about its
truth.
Second, the court asks: [I]s there a sufficiently
compelling state interest to justify this infringement of
religious liberty? In this step, the government has to
establish that its purposes are legitimate for the
state and that they are compelling. it must precisely
show how and to what extent those objectives will
be undermined if exemptions are granted.
Third, the court asks: [H]as the state in
achieving its legitimate purposes used the least
intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not
infringed any more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state? The analysis requires the
state to show that the means in which it is achieving its
legitimate state objective is the least intrusive
means, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its
legitimate state end that imposes as little as possible
on religious liberties
Again, the application of the compelling state interest test
could result to three situations of accommodation: First, mandatory
accommodation would result if the Court finds that accommodation
is required by the Free Exercise Clause. Second, if the Court finds that
the State may, but is not required to, accommodate religious
interests,permissive accommodation results. Finally, if the Court
finds that that establishment concerns prevail over potential
accommodation interests, then it must rule that
theaccommodation is prohibited.
We here lay down the doctrine that in Philippine
jurisdiction, we adopt the benevolent neutrality
approach not only because of its merits as
discussed above, but more importantly, because
our constitutional history and interpretation
indubitably show that benevolent neutrality is the
launching pad from which the Court should take off
in interpreting religion clause cases. The ideal
 towards which this approach is directed is the
protection of religious liberty not only for a
minority, however small- not only for a majority,
however large but for each of us to the greatest
extent possible within flexible constitutional
limits.[145]
II. THE CURRENT PROCEEDINGS
1. subjecting this case to the careful application of the
compelling state interest test, i.e., determining whether
respondent is entitled to exemption, an issue which is
essentially factual or evidentiary in nature.
After the termination of further proceedings with the OCA, and
with the transmittal of the Hearing Officers report,[146] along with the
evidence submitted by the OSG, this case is once again with us, to
resolve the penultimate question of whether respondent should be
found guilty of the administrative charge of disgraceful and
immoral conduct. It is at this point then that we examine the report
and documents submitted by the hearing officer of this case, and apply
the three-step process of the compelling state interest test based on
the evidence presented by the parties, especially the government.
1. On the sincerity of religious belief, the Solicitor General
categorically concedes that the sincerity and centrality of
respondents claimed religious belief and practice are beyond
serious doubt.[147] the burden shifted to the
government to demonstrate that the law or practice
justifies a compelling secular objective and that it is the
least restrictive means of achieving that objective.
A look at the evidence that the OSG has presented fails to
demonstrate the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests which could limit or override respondents fundamental
right to religious freedom. Neither did the government exert any
effort to show that the means it seeks to achieve its legitimate
state objective is the least intrusive means.
In its Memorandum-In-Intervention, the OSG contends that
the State has a compelling interest to override respondents
claimed religious belief and practice, in order to protect
marriage and the family as basic social institutions. The Solicitor
General, quoting the Constitution[148] and the Family Code,[149] argues
that marriage and the family are so crucial to the stability and peace of
the nation that the conjugal arrangement embraced in the Declaration
of Pledging Faithfulness should not be recognized or given effect, as it
is utterly destructive of the avowed institutions of marriage and the
family for it reduces to a mockery these legally exalted and socially
significant institutions which in their purity demand respect and
dignity.
Parenthetically, the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Carpio
echoes the Solicitor General in so far as he asserts that the State has a
compelling interest in the preservation of marriage and the family as
basic social institutions, which is ultimately the public policy
underlying the criminal sanctions against concubinage and bigamy. He
also argues that in dismissing the administrative complaint against
respondent, the majority opinion effectively condones and accords a
semblance of legitimacy to her patently unlawful cohabitation... and
facilitates the circumvention of the Revised Penal Code. According to
Mr. Justice Carpio, by choosing to turn a blind eye to respondents
criminal conduct, the majority is in fact recognizing a practice, custom
or agreement that subverts marriage. He argues in a similar fashion as
regards the states interest in the sound administration of justice.
There has never been any question that the state has an
interest in protecting the institutions of marriage and the family, or
even in the sound administration of justice. Indeed, the provisions by
which respondents relationship is said to have impinged, e.g., Book V,
Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code,
Articles 334 and 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and even the
provisions on marriage and family in the Civil Code and Family Code,
all clearly demonstrate the States need to protect these secular
interests.
Be that as it may, the free exercise of religion is specifically
articulated as one of the fundamental rights in our Constitution. It is a
fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the
hierarchy of rights the most inalienable and sacred of human
rights, in the words of Jefferson. Hence, it is not enough to contend
that the states interest is important, because our Constitution itself
holds the right to religious freedom sacred. The State must articulate
in specific terms the state interest involved in preventing the
exemption, which must be compelling, for only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests can limit the fundamental right to
religious freedom. To rule otherwise would be to emasculate the Free
Exercise Clause as a source of right by itself.
Thus, it is not the States broad interest in protecting the
institutions of marriage and the family, or even in the sound
administration of justice that must be weighed against respondents
claim, but the States narrow interest in refusing to make an exception
for the cohabitation which respondents faith finds moral. In other
words, the government must do more than assert the objectives
at risk if exemption is given; it must precisely show how and to
what extent those objectives will be undermined if exemptions
are granted.[151] This, the Solicitor General failed to do.
In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete
interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against
respondent or her partner. The State has never sought to prosecute
respondent nor her partner. The States asserted interest thus
amounts only to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
prohibition. Incidentally, as echoes of the words of Messrs. J. Bellosillo
and Vitug, in their concurring opinions in our Decision, dated August
4, 2003, to deny the exemption would effectively break up an
otherwise ideal union of two individuals who have managed to stay
together as husband and wife [approximately twenty-five years] and
have the effect of defeating the very substance of marriage and the
family.
The Solicitor General also argued against respondents
religious freedom on the basis of morality, i.e., that the conjugal
arrangement of respondent and her live-in partner should not be
condoned because adulterous relationships are constantly frowned
upon by society;[152] and that State laws on marriage, which are moral
in nature, take clear precedence over the religious beliefs and
practices of any church, religious sect or denomination on marriage.
Verily, religious beliefs and practices should not be permitted to
override laws relating to public policy such as those of marriage.[153]
The above arguments are mere reiterations of the arguments
raised by Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago in her dissenting opinion to
our Decision dated August 4, 2003, which she offers again in toto.
These arguments have already been addressed in our decision
dated August 4, 2003.[154] In said Decision, we noted that Mme. Justice
Ynares-Santiagos dissenting opinion dwelt more on the standards of
morality, without categorically holding that religious freedom is not in
issue.[155] We, therefore, went into a discussion on morality, in order
to show that:
(a) The public morality expressed in the law is
necessarily secular for in our constitutional order, the
religion clauses prohibit the state from establishing a
religion, including the morality it sanctions.[156] Thus,
when the law speaks of immorality in the Civil Service
Law or immoral in the Code of Professional
Responsibility for lawyers,[157] or public morals in the
Revised Penal Code,[158] or morals in the New Civil
Code,[159] or moral character in the
Constitution,[160] the distinction between public and
secular morality on the one hand, and religious
morality, on the other, should be kept in mind;[161]
(b) Although the morality contemplated by
laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow
for accommodation of morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend compelling state
interests;[162]
(c) The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to
public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement
the Court makes in the case at bar should be
understood only in this realm where it has
authority.[163]
(d) Having distinguished between public and
secular morality and religious morality, the more
difficult task is determining which immoral acts under
this public and secular morality fall under the phrase
disgraceful and immoral conduct for which a
government employee may be held administratively
liable.[164] Only one conduct is in question before this
Court, i.e., the conjugal arrangement of a government
employee whose partner is legally married to another
which Philippine law and jurisprudence consider both
immoral and illegal.[165]
(e) While there is no dispute that under settled
jurisprudence, respondents conduct constitutes
disgraceful and immoral conduct, the case at bar
involves the defense of religious freedom, therefore
none of the cases cited by Mme. Justice Ynares-
Santiago apply.[166] There is no jurisprudence in
Philippine jurisdiction holding that the defense of
religious freedom of a member of the Jehovahs
Witnesses under the same circumstances as
respondent will not prevail over the laws on adultery,
concubinage or some other law. We cannot summarily
conclude therefore
that her conduct is likewise so odious and barbaric as
to be immoral and punishable by law.[167]
Again, we note the arguments raised by Mr. Justice Carpio with
respect to charging respondent with conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, and we reiterate that the dissent offends due
process as respondent was not given an opportunity to defend herself
against the charge of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.Indeed, there is no evidence of the alleged prejudice to the best
interest of the service.[168]
Mr. Justice Carpios slippery slope argument, on the other hand,
is non-sequitur. If the Court grants respondent exemption from the
laws which respondent Escritor has been charged to have violated, the
exemption would not apply to Catholics who have secured church
annulment of their marriage even without a final annulment from a
civil court.First, unlike Jehovahs Witnesses, the Catholic faith
considers cohabitation without marriage as immoral. Second, but
more important, the Jehovahs Witnesses have standards and
procedures which must be followed before cohabitation without
marriage is given the blessing of the congregation. This includes an
investigative process whereby the elders of the congregation verify
the circumstances of the declarants. Also, the Declaration is not a
blanket authority to cohabit without marriage because once all legal
impediments for the couple are lifted, the validity of the Declaration
ceases, and the congregation requires that the couple legalize their
union.
At bottom, the slippery slope argument of Mr. Justice Carpio is
speculative. Nevertheless, insofar as he raises the issue of equality
among religions, we look to the words of the Religion Clauses, which
clearly single out religion for both a benefit and a burden: No law shall
be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof On its face, the language grants a unique
advantage to religious conduct, protecting it from governmental
imposition; and imposes a unique disadvantage, preventing the
government from supporting it. To understand this as a provision
which puts religion on an equal footing with other bases for action
seems to be a curious reading.There are no free exercise of
establishment provisions for science, sports, philosophy, or family
relations. The language itself thus seems to answer whether we have a
paradigm of equality or liberty; the language of the Clause is clearly in
the form of a grant of liberty. [169]
In this case, the governments conduct may appear innocent
and nondiscriminatory but in effect, it is oppressive to the minority. In
the interpretation of a document, such as the Bill of Rights, designed to
protect the minority from the majority, the question of which
perspective is appropriate would seem easy to answer. Moreover, the
text, history, structure and values implicated in the interpretation of
the clauses, all point toward this perspective. Thus, substantive
equalitya reading of the religion clauses which leaves both politically
dominant and the politically weak religious groups equal in their
inability to use the government (law) to assist their own religion or
burden othersmakes the most sense in the interpretation of the Bill of
Rights, a document designed to protect minorities and individuals
from mobocracy in a democracy (the majority or a coalition of
minorities). [170]
As previously discussed, our Constitution adheres to
the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise
Clause.[171] Thus, in arguing that respondent should be held
administratively liable as the arrangement she had was illegal per
se because, by universally recognized standards, it is inherently or by
its very nature bad, improper, immoral and contrary to good
conscience,[172] the Solicitor General failed to appreciate
that benevolent neutralitycould allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling
state interests.[173]
Finally, even assuming that the OSG has proved a
compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the
state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the free
exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state, i.e., it has chosen a way to achieve its
legitimate state end that imposes as little as possible on religious
liberties.[174] Again, the Solicitor General utterly failed to prove this
element of the test. Other than the two documents offered as cited
above which established the sincerity of respondents religious belief
and the fact that the agreement was an internal arrangement within
respondents congregation, no iota of evidence was offered. In
fact, the records are bereft of even a feeble attempt to procure any
such evidence to show that the means the state adopted in pursuing
this compelling interest is the least restrictive to respondents
religious freedom.
Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these
distinct circumstances, respondent Escritors conjugal arrangement
cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from
the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The
Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that
freedoms - including religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area
of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the state
interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation
will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the
freedom. In the absence of a showing that such state interest exists,
man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant administrative complaint
is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
1.
G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO,
accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
FACTS:
On June 25, 1996, the court rendered decision in the case affirming
the conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-
year old daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April,
1994, during which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known
as the Death Penalty Law, was being imposed by the law.
On July 1996, the accused-appellant filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which focused more on the motive of the victim’s
grandmother that led to filing the false accusation, but since the court
found no merit on such MOR, it did not prosper.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel,
Atty. Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty
Task Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines (FLAG).
On August 23, 1996, the court received the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant. In
its effort to reverse the death sentence, among several motion which has
been raised by the FLAG was alleging that RA 7659, reimposing the death
penalty is unconstitutional per se:
a. For crimes where no death results from the offense, the
death penalty is a severe and excessive penalty in violation of
Article III, Sec. 19 ( I ) of the 1987 Constitution.
b. The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of Article III, Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution."
***3 more issues raised by the accused and the ruling to them:
The Affidavit of Desistance was simply set aside : Ruling was that despite
the admission made by the victim herself in open court that she had
signed an Affidavit of Desistance, she, nevertheless, "strongly pointed out
that she is not withdrawing the charge against the accused because the
latter might do the same sexual assaults to other women."[3] In the case at
bar, all that the accused-appellant offered as defenses mainly consisted of
denial and alibi which cannot outweigh the positive identification and
convincing testimonies given by the prosecution. Hence, the affidavit of
desistance, which the victim herself intended to disregard as earlier
discussed, must have no bearing on the criminal prosecution against the
accused-appellant, particularly on the trial court's jurisdiction over the
case.
The Accused was denied of due process of law because of a counsel’s
incompetence: the client is bound by the negligence or mistakes of his
counsel.[6] One of the recognized exceptions to this rule is gross
incompetency in a way that the defendant is highly prejudiced and
prevented, in effect, from having his day in court to defend himself.[7]
2. In the instant case, we believe that the former counsel of the accused-
appellant to whom the FLAG lawyers now impute incompetency had
amply exercised the required ordinary diligence or that reasonable decree
of care and skill expected of him relative to his client's defense. As the
rape case was being tried on the merits, Atty. Vitug, from the time he was
assigned to handle the case, dutifully attended the hearings
thereof. Moreover, he had seasonably submitted the Accused-Appellant's
Brief and the Motion for Reconsideration. There is no indication of gross
incompetency that could have resulted from a failure to present any
argument or any witness to defend his client. Neither has he acted
haphazardly in the preparation of his case against the prosecution
evidence. And even when the errors committed by the previous counsel
will be taken into much consideration, it could have not reversed the
decision of the court.
3. Death Penalty is cruel penalty for a crime with no death results.
ISSUE:
W/N RA No 7659 is constitutional.
DISCUSSION/DELIBERATION ON PASSAGE AND VALIDITY OF RA 7659
BEFORE THE LEGISLATIVE BODY.
III
Although its origins seem lost in obscurity, the imposition of death as
punishment for violation of law or custom, religious or secular, is an
ancient practice. We do know that our forefathers killed to avenge
themselves and their kin and that initially, the criminal law was used to
compensate for a wrong done to a private party or his family, not to
punish in the name of the state.
Today, one of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to
secure society against threatened and actual evil. Pursuant to this, the
legislative arm of government enacts criminal laws that define and punish
illegal acts that may be committed by its own subjects, the executive
agencies enforce these laws, and the judiciary tries and sentences the
criminals in accordance with these laws.
Our criminal laws have been perceived as relatively stable and
functional since the enforcement of the Revised Penal Code on January 1,
1932, this notwithstanding occasional opposition to the death penalty
provisions therein. The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally
promulgated, provided for the death penalty in specified crimes under
specific circumstances.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a
constitutional question of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel,
unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional
proscription against cruel and unusual punishments. We unchangingly
answered this question in the negative in the cases of Harden v. Director of
Prison,[8] People v. Limaco,[9] People v. Camano,[10] People v.
Puda and People v. Marcos, In Harden, we ruled:
[11] [12]
"The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor
excessive. In Ex-parte Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme
Court said that 'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the
meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life.'"[13]
"x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that
the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or
ineffective. However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute
books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in
certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the
law regardless of their private opinions,"[14]
and this we have reiterated in the rulings of other cases as well.
In the aftermath of the 1986 revolution that dismantled the Marcos
regime and led to the nullification of the 1973 Constitution, a
Constitutional Commission was convened following appointments thereto
by Corazon Aquino who was catapulted to power by the people.
Tasked with formulating a charter that echoes the new found freedom of a
rejuvenated people, the Constitutional Commissioners grouped
themselves into working committees among which is the Bill of Rights
Committee.
On July 17, 1986, Father Bernas presented the committee draft of the
proposed bill of rights to the rest of the commission. What is now
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution was first denominated
as Section 22 and was originally worded as follows:
"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment, or the death penalty inflicted. Death penalty
already imposed shall be commuted to reclusion perpetua."
Father Bernas explained that the foregoing provision was the result of a
consensus among the members of the Bill of Rights Committee that the
death penalty should be abolished. Having agreed to abolish the death
penalty, they proceeded to deliberate on how the abolition was to be done
-- whether the abolition should be done by the Constitution or by the
legislature -- and the majority voted for a constitutional abolition of the
death penalty. Father Bernas explained:
"x x x [T]here was a division in the Committee not on whether the
death penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on whether the
abolition should be done by the Constitution -- in which case it cannot
be restored by the legislature -- or left to the legislature. The majority
voted for the constitutional abolition of the death penalty. And the of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution in the following
reason is that capital punishment is inhuman for the convict and his tenor:
family who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it is never carried
"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
out. There is no evidence that the death penalty deterred deadly
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless,
criminals, hence, life should not be destroyed just in the hope that
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
other lives might be saved.
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall
It has been discussed by Bishop Bacani and Mr. Padilla that the State be reduced to reclusion perpetua."
has been delegated by God the power to impose the death penalty if
what’s to be promoted is the common good. The church, as been said
by Bishop Bacani, is not in any way depriving the State to inflict the Before the amendment of the said provision, the three-grade penalty
capital punishment, but the issue at stake is whether or not under the was being imposed as penalty on heinous crimes, the death penalty being
present circumstances that will be for the common good. the maximum penalty. After the amendment, the provision now states
“Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.”
What followed, thus, were proposed amendments to the beleaguered
On subsequent cases after the said amendment, there were rulings by the
provision. The move to add the phrase, "unless for compelling reasons
court that still imposes the three-grade penalty, thereby raising an issue on
involving heinous crimes, the national assembly provides for the
whether or not the amended provision of Art 3 Sec 19 of the Constitution
death penalty," He said:
has, in reality, absolutely abolished the death penalty and did not merely
"x x x [T]he issue here is whether or not we should provide this suspended it.
matter in the Constitution or leave it to the discretion of our
A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is
legislature.
really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the
It has been ruled that the proposed amendment is halfhearted. It is death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty
awkward because we will, in effect, repeal by our Constitution a piece shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving
of legislation and after repealing this piece of legislation, tell the heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if
legislature that we have repealed the law and that the legislature can already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
go ahead and enact it again. If the matter of the death penalty will be
Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19
left to the legislature, then leave it completely to the discretion of the
(1) of the 1987 Constitution than the form in which the legislature took
legislature.
the initiative in re-imposing the death penalty.
“I think we should leave this matter to the legislature to enact statutes
The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the
depending on the changing needs of the times. Let us entrust this
constitution, to enact legislation re-imposing the death penalty for
completely to the legislature composed of representatives elected by the
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. Pursuant to this
people. I do not say that we are not competent. But we have to admit
constitutional mandate, the Senate proceeded to a two-step process
the fact that we are not elected by the people and if we are going to
consisting of: first, the decision, as a matter of policy, to re-impose the
entrust this to the legislature, let us not be half-baked nor half-hearted
death penalty or not; and second, the vote to pass on the third reading the
about it. Let us entrust it to the legislature 100 percent."[20]
bill re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons involving
Nonetheless, the proposed amendment was approved with twenty-three heinous crimes.
(23) commissioners voting in favor of the amendment and twelve (12)
xxx
voting against it, followed by more revisions, hence the present wording
REMARKS OF SENATOR ROCO
Senator Roco stated that the Body would vote whether or not death as a
penalty will be reincorporated in the scale of penalties provided by the
Revised Penal Code. However, he pointed out that if the Body decides in
favor of death penalty, the Body would still have to address two issues:
1) Is the crime for which the death penalty is supposed to be imposed
heinous pursuant to the constitutional mandate? 2) And, if so, is there a
compelling reason to impose the death penalty for it? The death penalty,
he stressed, cannot be imposed simply because the crime is heinous."[28]
With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative
votes and no abstention, the Chair declared that the Senate has voted to
re-incorporate death as a penalty in the scale of penalties as provided in
the Revised Penal Code. A nine-person committee was subsequently
created to draft the compromise bill pursuant to said vote. The mandate
of the committee was to retain the death penalty, while the main
debate in the committee would be the determination of the crimes to
be considered heinous.
From March 17, 1993, when the death penalty bill was presented for
discussion until August 16, 1993, the Members of the Senate debated on
its provisions.
The stiffest opposition thereto was bannered by Senator Lina who
kept prodding the sponsors of the bill to state the compelling reason for
each and every crime for which the supreme penalty of death was
sought. , Senator Lina concluded that there were, in fact, no compelling
reasons therefor. In the alternative, Senator Lina argued that the
compelling reason required by the constitution was that "the State has
done everything in its command so that it can be justified to use an
inhuman punishment called death penalty".[32] The problem, Senator Lina
emphasized, was that even the re-impositionists admit that there were
still numerous reforms in the criminal justice system that may and must
be put in place, and so clearly, the recourse to the enactment of a death
penalty bill was not in the nature of a last resort, hence, unconstitutional
in the absence of compelling reasons.
Equally fit to the task was Senator Wigberto Taada to whom the
battle lines were clearly drawn. He put to issue two things: first, the
definition of "heinous crimes" as provided for in the death penalty
bill; and second, the statement of compelling reasons for each and
every capital crime. His interpellation of Senator Tolentino clearly
showed his objections to the bill:
"Senator Taada. x x x But what would make crimes heinous, Mr.
President? Are crimes heinous by their nature or elements as they are
described in the bill or are crimes heinous because they are punished by
death, as bribery and malversation are proposed to be punished in the
bill?
Senator Tolentino. They are heinous by their nature, Mr. President,
but that is not supposed to be the exclusive criterion. The nature of
the offense is the most important element in considering it heinous but, at
the same time, we should consider the relation of the offense to
society in order to have a complete idea of the heinous nature of
these offenses.
In the case of malversation or bribery, for instance, these offenses by
themselves connected with the effect upon society and the government
have made them fall under the classification of heinous crimes. The
compelling reason for imposing the death penalty is when the offenses of
malversation and bribery becomes so grave and so serious as indicated in
the substitute bill itself, then there is a compelling reason for the death
penalty.
Senator Taada. With respect to the compelling reasons, Mr. President,
does the Gentleman believe that these compelling reasons, which would
call for the reimposition of the death penalty, should be separately,
distinctly and clearly stated for each crime so that it will be very clear to
one and all that not only are these crimes heinous but also one can see the
compelling reasons for the reimposition of the death penalty therefor?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that matter was actually considered by
the Committee. But the decision of the Committee was to avoid stating
the compelling reason for each and every offense that is included in
the substitute measure. That is why in the preamble, general
statements were made to show these compelling reasons. And that,
we believe, included in the bill, when converted into law, would be
sufficient notice as to what were considered compelling reasons by the
Congress, in providing the death penalty for these different offenses.
If a matter like this is questioned before the Supreme Court, I would
suppose that with the preamble already in general terms, the Supreme
Court would feel that it was the sense of Congress that this preamble
would be applicable to each and every offense described or punishable in
the measure.
So we felt that it was not necessary to repeat these compelling reasons for
each and every offense.
Senator Taada. Mr. President, I am thinking about the constitutional
limitations upon the power of Congress to enact criminal legislation,
especially the provisions on the Bill of Rights, particularly the one which
says that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law.
Can we not say that under this provision, it is required that the compelling
reasons be so stated in the bill so that the bill, when it becomes a law, will
clearly define the acts and the omissions punished as crimes?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, I believe that in itself, as substantive
law, this is sufficient. The question of whether there is due process will
more or less be a matter of procedure in the compliance with the
requirements of the Constitution with respect to due process itself which
is a separate matter from the substantive law as to the definition and
penalty for crimes.
Senator Taada. Under the Constitution, Mr. President, it appears that the
reimposition of the death penalty is subject to three conditions and these
are:
1. Congress should so provide such reimposition of the death
penalty;
2. There are compelling reasons; and
3. These involve heinous crimes.
Under these provision of the Constitution, paragraph 1, Section 13,
does the distinguished Gentleman not feel that Congress is bound to
state clearly the compelling reasons for the reimposition of the death
penalty for each crime, as well as the elements that make each of the
crimes heinous included in the bill?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that is a matter of opinion
already. I believe that whether we state the compelling reasons
or not, whether we state why a certain offense is heinous, is not
very important. If the question is raised in the Supreme Court, it
is not what we say in the bill that will be controlling but what the
Supreme Court will fell as a sufficient compelling reason or as to
the heinous nature whether the crime is heinous or not. The
accused can certainly raise the matter of constitutionality but it will
not go into the matter of due process. It will go into the very power of
Congress to enact a bill imposing the death penalty. So that would be
entirely separate from the matter of due process." [34]
With seventeen (17) affirmative votes, four (4) negative votes, and
one abstention, the death penalty bill was approved on third reading on
August 16, 1993.
In his Sponsorship Speech, Representative Manuel R. Sanchez of Rizal
ably essayed the constitutional vesting in Congress of the power to re-
impose the death penalty for compelling reasons invoking heinous
crimes as well as the nature of this constitutional pre-requisite to the
exercise of such power.
"Mr. Speaker, in Article III, Section 19(1) of Constitution reads, a I quote:
'Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress shall thereafter
provide for it . . .'
The phrase 'unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes,
the Congress shall thereafter provide for it was introduced as an
amendment by then Comm. Christian Monsod.
The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment,
the death penalty was not completely abolished by the 1987
Constitution. Rather, it merely suspended the death penalty and gave
Congress the discretion to review it at the propitious time.
Arguing for the inclusion of said amendment in the fine provision,
Comm. Ricardo Romulo said, and I quote:
"'The people should have the final say on the subject, because, at
some future time, the people might want to restore death penalty
through initiative and referendum.
Commissioner Monsod further argued, and I quote:
We cannot presume to have the wisdom of the ages. Therefore, it is
entirely possible in the future that circumstances may arise which we
should not preclude today.
xxx xxx
xxx
I believe that [there] are enough compelling reasons that merit the
reimposition of the capital punishment. The violent manner and the
viciousness in which crimes are now committed with alarming regularity,
show very clearly a patent disregard of the law and a mockery of public
peace and order.
In the public gallery section today are the relatives of the victims of
heinous crimes the Hultmans, the Maguans, the Vizcondes, the Castanoses,
and many more, and they are all crying for justice. We ought to listen to
them because their lives, their hopes, their dreams, their future have
fallen asunder by the cruel and vicious criminality of a few who put their
selfish interest above that of society.
Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly
violent manner in which the same was committed or by the reason of its
inherent viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of the law,
public peace and order, or public morals. It is an offense whose essential
and inherent viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a
civilized society and hence, shock the moral self of a people.
The seriousness of the situation is such that if no radical action is
taken by this body in restoring death penalty as a positive response to the
overwhelming clamor of the people, then, as Professor Esteban Bautista of
the Philippine Law Center said, and I quote:
'When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or
unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they
deserve, there are sown the seeds of anarchy of self-help, of vigilante
justice and lynch law. The people will take the law upon their hands
and exact vengeance in the nature of personal vendetta.'
But if such a misfortune befalls them, there is the law they could rely
on for justice. A law that will exact retribution for the victims. A law that
will deter future animalistic behavior of the criminal who take their selfish
interest over and above that of society. A law that will deal a deathblow
upon all heinous crimes.
Be it the foregoing general statement of Representative Sanchez or
the following details of the nature of the heinous crimes enumerated in
House Bill No. 62 by Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros Oriental,
there was clearly, among the hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower
House, no doubt as to their cause:
"My friends, this bill provides for the imposition of the death penalty not
only for the importation, manufacture and sale of dangerous drugs, but
also for other heinous crimes such as reason; parricide; murder;
kidnapping; robbery; rape as defined by the Revised Penal Code with or
without additionally defined circumstances; plunder, as defined in R.A.
7080; piracy, as defined under Section 2 of PD 532; carnapping, as defined
in Section 2 of RA 6539, when the owner, driver or occupant is killed;
hijacking, as defined in xxx RA 6235; and arson resulting in the death of
any occupants.
All these crimes have a common denominator which qualifies them
to the level of heinous crimes. A heinous crime is one which, by
reason of its inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity
or perversity, is repugnant and outrageous to the common standards
of decency and morality in a just and civilized society.
On December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, entitled, "An Act
to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for
that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Penal
Laws, and for Other Purposes," took effect.[39]
CASE AT BAR RULING:
Between December 31, 1993, when R.A. No. 7659 took effect, and the
present time, criminal offenders have been prosecuted under said law,
and one of them, herein accused-appellant, has been, pursuant to said law,
meted out the supreme penalty of death for raping his ten-year old
daughter. Upon his conviction, his case was elevated to us on automatic
review. On June 25, 1996, we affirmed his conviction and the death
sentence.
Now, accused-appellant comes to us in the heels of this court's
affirmation of his death sentence and raises for the first time the issue of
the constitutionality of R.A. 7659. His thesis is two-fold: (1) that the death
penalty law is unconstitutional per se for having been enacted in the
absence of compelling reasons therefor; and (2) that the death penalty for
rape is a cruel, excessive and inhuman punishment in violation of the
constitutional proscription against punishment of such nature.
We reject accused-appellant's proposition.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in
Congress the power to re-impose the death penalty "for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes". This power is not subsumed in the
plenary legislative power of Congress, for it is subject to a clear showing of
"compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the
death penalty entails (1) that Congress define or describe what is meant
by heinous crimes; (2) that Congress specify and penalize by death, only
crimes that qualify as heinous in accordance with the definition or
description set in the death penalty bill and/or designate crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death in which latter case, death can
only be imposed upon the attendance of circumstances duly proven in
court that characterize the crime to be heinous; and (3) that Congress, in
enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by "compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes."
In the second whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we
find the definition or description of heinous crimes. Said clause provides
that
"x x x the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous
for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason
of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards
and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society."
Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in People v.
Alicando, [40] traced the etymological root of the word "heinous" to the
Early Spartans' word, "haineus", meaning, hateful and abominable, which,
in turn, was from the Greek prefix "haton", denoting acts so hatefully or
shockingly evil.
There are 2 types of death penalty, one which is imposed on crimes
penalized by reclusion perpetua to death and the other wherein death
penalty is mandatorily imposed.
Under R.A. No. 7659, the following crimes are penalized by reclusion
perpetua to death:
(1) Treason (Sec. 2);
(2) Qualified piracy (Sec. 3);
(3) Parricide (Sec. 5);
(4) Murder (Sec. 6);
(5) Infanticide (Sec. 7);
(6) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention if attended by any of the
following four circumstances: (a) the victim was detained for more than
three days; (b) it was committed simulating public authority; (c) serious
physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were
made; and (d) if the victim is a minor, except when the accused is any of
the parents, female or a public officer (Sec. 8);
(7) Robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation (Sec. 9);
(8) Destructive arson if what is burned is (a) one or more buildings or
edifice; (b) a building where people usually gather; (c) a train, ship or
airplane for public use; (d) a building or factory in the service of public
utilities; (e) a building for the purpose of concealing or destroying
evidence Or a crime; (f) an arsenal, fireworks factory, or government
museum; and (g) a storehouse or factory of explosive materials located in
an inhabited place; or regardless of what is burned, if the arson is
perpetrated by two or more persons (Sec. 10);
(9) Rape attended by any of the following circumstances: (a) the rape is
committed with a deadly weapon; (b) the rape is committed by two or
more persons; and (c) the rape is attempted or frustrated and committed
with homicide (Sec. 11);
(10) Plunder involving at least P50 million (Sec. 12);
(11) Importation of prohibited drugs (Sec. 13);
(12) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and transportation of
prohibited drugs (id.);
(13) Maintenance of den, dive or resort for users of prohibited drugs
(id.);
(14) Manufacture of prohibited drugs (id.);
(15) Possession or use of prohibited drugs in certain specified amounts
(id.);
(16) Cultivation of plants which are sources of prohibited drugs (id.)
(17) Importation of regulated drugs (Sec. 14);
(18) Manufacture of regulated drugs (id.);
(19) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, transportation, and
distribution of regulated drugs (id.);
(20) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs (Sec.
15);
(21) Possession or use of regulated drugs in specified amounts (Sec. 16);
(22) Misappropriation, misapplication or failure to account dangerous
drugs confiscated by the arresting officer (Sec. 17);
(23) Planting evidence of dangerous drugs in person or immediate
vicinity of another to implicate the latter (Sec. 19); and
(24) Carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
motor vehicle is killed or raped (Sec. 20).
All the foregoing crimes are not capital crimes per se, the uniform penalty
for all of them being not mandatory death but the flexible penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death. In other words, it is premature to demand
for a specification of the heinous elements in each of foregoing crimes
because they are not anyway mandatorily penalized with death. The
elements that call for the imposition of the supreme penalty of death in
these crimes, would only be relevant when the trial court, given the
prerogative to impose reclusion perpetua, instead actually imposes the
death penalty because it has, in appreciating the evidence proffered
before it, found the attendance of certain circumstances in the manner by
which the crime was committed, or in the person of the accused on his
own or in relation to the victim, or in any other matter of significance to
the commission of the crime or its effects on the victim or on society,
which circumstances characterize the criminal acts as grievous, odious, or
hateful, or inherently or manifestly wicked, vicious, atrocious or perverse
as to be repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms
of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.
On the other hand, under R.A. No. 7659, the mandatory penalty of
death is imposed in the following crimes:
(1) Qualified bribery
"If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains
from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in consideration of any
offer, promise, gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense
which was not prosecuted.
If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he shall
suffer the penalty of death." (Sec. 4)
(2) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the
death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured or subjected to
dehumanizing acts
"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was
committed for the purpose of ransom from the victim or any other person,
even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the
commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is
raped, or is subject to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty
[of death] shall be imposed." (Sec. 8)
(3) Destructive arson resulting in death
"If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under
this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be
imposed." (Sec. 10)
(4) Rape with the victim becoming insane, rape with homicide and
qualified
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become
insane, the penalty shall be death.
xxx xxx xxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed,
the penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed
with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is
a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent or the victim.
2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military
authorities.
3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of
the children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old
5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement
agency.
7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered
permanent physical mutilation." (Sec. 11 )
(5) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of
prohibited drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if
the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved
in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of
victim thereof, the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be
imposed." (Sec. 13)
(6) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of prohibited drugs
where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary,
the maximum of the penalty [of death] shall be imposed in every case
where a prohibited drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who
is allowed to use the same in such place.
Should a prohibited drug be the proximate case of the death of a person
using the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein
provided shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the
provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary." (Sec. 13)
(7) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation of regulated drugs where the victim is a minor or the
victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary,
if the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved
in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a
victim thereof, the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be
imposed." (Sec. 14)
(8) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs
where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary,
the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed in
every case where a regulated drug is administered, delivered or sold to a
minor who is allowed to use the same in such place.
Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of death of a person using
the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein
provided shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the
provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary." (Sec. 15)
(9) Drug offenses if convicted are government officials, employees or
officers including members of police agencies and armed forces
"The maximum penalties [of death] provided for in Section 3, 4 (1), 5(1),
6, 7, 8, 9, 11,12 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 14(1), 15A (1),
16, and 19 of Article III [of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972] shall be
imposed, if those found guilty or any of the same offenses are government
officials, employees or officers including members of police agencies and
the armed forces." (Sec. 19)
(10) Planting of dangerous drugs as evidence in drug offenses with the
mandatory death penalty if convicted are government officials, employees
or officers
"Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found
guilty of 'planting' any dangerous drugs punished in Section s 3, 4, 7, 8, 9
and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15, and 16 of Article III (of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) in the person or in the immediate vicinity
of another as evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer the same penalty
as therein provided." (Sec. 19)
(11) In all the crimes in RA. No. 7659 in their qualified form
"When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the
offender of his public position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its
maximum [of death] regardless of mitigating circumstances.
The maximum penalty [of death] shall be imposed if the offense was
committed by any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime
group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more
persons collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for
purposes of gain in the commission of any crime." (Sec. 23)
It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of
heinousness must be squarely applied.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are,
by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or
the victim is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to
completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human
being.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the
significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of
the larger socio-political and economic context in which the state finds
itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and
underprivileged masses. Terribly lacking the money to provide even the
most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or
misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the
very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people
it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and
repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting
in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or
officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further
destruction and damage to society.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of
heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly identified crimes
warranting the mandatory penalty of death. As to the other crimes in R.A.
No. 7659 punished by reclusion perpetua to death, they are admittingly no
less abominable than those mandatorily penalized by death. The proper
time to determine their heinousness in contemplation of law, is when on
automatic review, we are called to pass on a death sentence involving
crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659,
with the trial court meting out the death sentence in exercise of judicial
discretion.
Thus, construing R.A. No. 7659 in parimateria with the Revised
Penal Code, death may be imposed when (1) aggravating circumstances
attend the commission of the crime as to make operative the provision of
the Revised Penal Code regarding the imposition of the maximum penalty;
and (2) other circumstances attend the commission of the crime which
indubitably characterize the same as heinous Certainly there is an infinity
of circumstances that may attend the commission of a crime to the same
extent that there is no telling the evil that man is capable of. The
legislature cannot and need not foresee and inscribe in law each and every
loathsome act man is capable of. It is sufficient thus that R.A. 7659
provides the test and yardstick for the determination of the legal situation
warranting the imposition of the supreme penalty of death.
The abolitionists in congress insisted that all criminal reforms first be
pursued and implemented before the death penalty be re-imposed in case
such reforms prove unsuccessful. They claimed that the only compelling
reason contemplated of by the constitution is that nothing else but
the death penalty is left for the government to resort to that could
check the chaos and the destruction that is being caused by
unbridled criminality.
 Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that
congress, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose
the death penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement
that for a death penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the
form of a higher incidence of crime should first be perceived and
statistically proven following the suspension of the death penalty. Neither
does the said provision require that the death penalty be resorted to as a
last recourse when all other criminal reforms have failed to abate
criminality in society. Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that
"the Congress, in the interest of justice, public order and rule of law, and
the need to rationalize and harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous
crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said
crimes."
We now proceed to answer accused-appellant's other ground for
attacking the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659, i.e., that the death penalty
imposed in rape is violative of the constitutional proscription against
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.)
Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia.[41] To state, however, that the U.S.
Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically ruled that the death penalty is a
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading and inaccurate.
Next, accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly because
the latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of life. In support of
his contention, accused-appellant largely relies on the ruling of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia.[45]
In Coker, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"x x x It is now settled that the death penalty is not invariably cruel and
unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment; it is
not inherently barbaric or an unacceptable mode of punishment for crime;
neither is it always disproportionate to the crime for which it is imposed
xxx
We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a crime. It is highly
reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total contempt for
the personal integrity and autonomy of the female victim and for the
latter's privilege of choosing those with whom intimate relationships are
to be established. Short of homicide, it is the 'ultimate violation of self.' It
is also a violent crime because it normally involves force, or the threat of
force or intimidation, to over come the will and the capacity of the victim
to resist. Rape is very often accompanied by physical injury to the female
and can also inflict mental and psychological damage. Because it
undermines the community's sense of security, there is public injury as
well.
Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any bearing
on the Philippine experience and in the context of our own culture.
Anent the second ground, we disagree with the court's predicate that
the gauge of whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty or not, is
the attendance of the circumstance of death on the part of the victim. We
have already demonstrated earlier in our discussion of heinous crimes
that the forfeiture of life simply because life was taken, never was a
defining essence of the death penalty in the context of our legal history
and cultural experience; rather, the death penalty is imposed in heinous
crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably
acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts with
severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from
abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based on a
disciplined and honest citizenry, and because they have so caused
irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the
society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the
safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be
permanently prevented from doing so. At any rate, this court has no
doubts as to the innate heinousness of the crime of rape, as we have held
in the case of People v. Cristobal: [46]
"Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It
does injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect,
freedom, and physical and moral integrity to which every person has a
right. It causes grave damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always
an intrinsically evil act xxx an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts
not only the victim but the society itself."
"Capital punishment ought not to be abolished solely because it is
substantially repulsive, if infinitely less repulsive than the acts which
invoke it. Yet the mounting zeal for its abolition seems to arise from a
sentimentalized hyperfastidiousness that seeks to expunge from the
society all that appears harsh and suppressive. If we are to preserve the
humane society we will have to retain sufficient strength of character
and will to do the unpleasant in order that tranquillity and civility
may rule comprehensively. It seems very likely that capital punishment
is a x x x necessary, if limited factor in that maintenance of social
tranquillity and ought to be retained on this ground. To do otherwise is to
indulge in the luxury of permitting a sense of false delicacy to reign over
the necessity of social survival." [47]

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Motion for

Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are
hereby DENIED[48] for LACK OF MERIT.