The Diviner Lunar Radiometer

a Mechanical Description
Bruno M. Jau
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
California Institute of Technology
4800 Oak Grove Drive
Pasadena, CA 91109
(818) 354-1875
bjau@jpl.nasa.gov

Abstract—The Diviner instrument is a radiometer that is

mounted on a two axis gimbal. It observes the lunar surface
from aboard the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO)
spacecraft. Diviner’s primary objectives are to map surface
temperatures of the entire surface of the Moon at different
day and night times. The paper briefly describes the
instrument. It focuses on the mechanical implementation,
highlighting many of the technical challenges that occurred
during its construction. Lessons learned, and design
experiences gained, provide future space engineers with
guidelines and advice for developing space mechanisms. 1 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................1
2. SCIENCE ............................................................................1
3. OPERATIONAL SEQUENCE ...............................................2
4. INSTRUMENT DESCRIPTION .............................................2
5. MECHANICAL IMPLEMENTATION ....................................6
6. SUMMARY OF IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES ........................9
REFERENCES ........................................................................9
PICTURE CREDITS ..............................................................10
BIOGRAPHY ........................................................................10
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................10
1. INTRODUCTION
The LRO mission is the first lunar mission to
comprehensively explore and map the entire surface of the
Moon, using seven scientific instruments. The spacecraft
was launched June 18, 2009 onboard an Atlas V rocket. Its
primary mission is a one year survey of the lunar surface. It
collects data by flying over the Moon in a polar orbit, 50km
above the lunar surface. The LRO spacecraft orbits the
Moon every 113 minutes.
Diviner’s sensor system, its data acquisition system, and the
science gained from Diviner, are extensively described in
Ref. [1]. Current mission descriptions and the latest
scientific data can be viewed at the UCLA [2], JPL [3], or
GSFC [4] Diviner websites. This paper focuses on the
mechanical aspects of the Diviner instrument.
1 lunar equator exceed 116degC.
978-1-4244-3888-4/10/$25.00 ©2010 IEEE.
2
IEEEAC paper # 1551, Version 2, Updated December 22, 2009
2. SCIENCE
The Diviner instrument is a nine channel radiometer in the
visible and infrared spectra. Diviner determines the
temperature of the Moon by measuring the intensity of
infrared radiation emitted by the lunar surface, where hotter
surfaces emit greater intensity of infrared radiation. This is
accomplished by using two bore-sighted telescopes that are
mechanically identical, but their individual sensory channels
are for different spectral wavelengths: Emitted and reflected
radiation from the lunar surface is focused onto un-cooled
thermopile detectors. The spatial resolution capability is
400m of lunar surface.
The primary data gathering technique is to take nearly
continuous ~3.5km wide swaths of lunar surface
temperature measurements while flying over the surface.
These slices of lunar temperature scans are being charted
onto lunar maps, generating entire maps of lunar surface
temperatures over time for certain day or night times. The
primary mission goal for Diviner is to map the entire lunar
surface for day and night time surface temperatures.
Fig. 1 shows daytime and nighttime temperature slices
mapped around the south pole of the Moon. Clearly visible
are the polar orbit lines of already available temperature
scans of approx. 3.5km width. This was the latest map
available for inclusion in this paper. Over time, the whole
surface of the Moon will be scanned, thus, the map will
show 100% coverage.
Other scientific returns are to locate and identify cold traps,
which are areas that are cold enough to preserve ice for
billions of years, thus, find potential ice deposits in the
Polar Regions; and to map geological variations in
mineralogy on the lunar surface. The knowledge of the
Moon’s temperature distribution also will assist in finding
suitable landing sites for future astronaut missions to the
Moon.
Measurements in the South Polar Region already verified
the suspected existence of extremely cold temperatures in
the permanently shaded areas of craters, with temperatures
going below -238degC. In contrast, temperatures around the

1
 Fig. 1: Daytime and Nighttime Temperatures mapped around the Lunar South Pole Area
Fig. 2 shows a high-resolution daytime thermal map of the
North Polar Region. Interesting is that this image is not a
picture taken in the visible spectra, but a thermal map.
Fig. 2: Thermal Image of the North Pole Region
2
3. OPERATIONAL SEQUENCE
For most scientific observations, the instrument points
downward into the nadir direction while flying above the lunar
surface. Occasionally, it is also being commanded to point into
the limb direction to view the horizon of the Moon, or to view
space.
To re-calibrate its thermal channels, the instrument either turns
toward the complete blackness of space, or it can point directly
upwards to view the black body calibration target, that is
mounted in the base of the yoke. A thermal calibration
sequence is being executed once every 10 minutes. The solar
calibration target allows the solar channels to be calibrated
through absorbing indirect, diffused sunlight that is being
reflected from the solar calibration target, when the incoming
sunlight is at controlled incidence angles. Solar calibration
takes place once every orbit.
4. INSTRUMENT DESCRIPTION
The instrument is mounted to the nadir panel of the LRO
spacecraft, enabling it to view the Moon directly below. Fig.
3 shows the instrument mounted to the spacecraft.
The
Diviner
Instrument

Fig. 3: The Diviner Instrument integrated to the LRO Spacecraft

Fig. 4 shows the completed instrument. Clearly visible are
the thermal blankets that cover the entire instrument. A
special challenge was to separate the stationary and rotating
blanket segments from rubbing each other. This was done
with separation flanges at the rotational-stationary
interfaces; and by wrapping and tensioning the blankets
over blanket rings that are visible in Fig. 5.
The instrument is approx. 400mm tall and weighs 10kg. The
average power consumption is approx. 15W. Peak power
consumption (at cold initialization, with heaters on) can be
as high as 50W.
The LRO Diviner Radiometer is mechanically almost
identical (minor mechanical and electronics upgrades were
implemented) to the Mars Climate Sounder (MCS)
Instrument that was previously described in Ref. [5]. The
mechanical description is thus kept short.
the targets, the instrument rotates its elevation joint into
position. Both joint axes allow 270deg of rotation, enabling
to view the entire surface of the moon, black space, and
even some features of the spacecraft, which turned out to be
quite valuable in the initial spacecraft check-out process!
OPTICAL BENCH ASSEMBLY
The science and sensing part of the instrument is located
within the optical bench, which houses the twin telescopes
(Fig. 6). The three-mirror off-axis telescopes are co-bore-
sighted. At the telescope focal planes are nine 21-element
detector arrays, each with a separate spectral filter. Details
of its design and functioning can be found in Ref. [1]. One
of the telescopes is depicted in Fig. 7. The back plate is the
mounting platform for the focal plane detectors. This plate
features built-in sets of flexures. The telescopes are
supported by sets of monopods.

The mechanical sections of the assembled instrument can JOINT DRIVES

best be seen in Fig. 5. Its major components are the optical
Both joint drives [6] combine an actuator and a twist cap
bench assembly, containing the instrument’s two telescopes
section in a compact design. Their actuators are identical
and the telescope’s control electronics; the yoke that serves
but the output bearing configurations are different:
as mechanical structure for the upper part of the instrument,
and also houses the joint drive electronics for both joints;
and the elevation and azimuth joint drives. Additionally, the
solar calibration target (or reflector), and the blackbody
calibration target, are mounted to the instrument. To view

3
 Fig. 4: The completed Diviner Instrument

Rotational-Stationary
Interface Mounting Flange Azimuth Actuator

Fig. 5: The Diviner Instrument without its Thermal Blankets

4
 Fig. 6: Cross Sectional view through the Optical Bench

Fig. 7: The Optical Telescope

The azimuth joint has a hub extension so that its bearings
could be spaced further apart; and it features dual duplex
bearings. This enables it to withstand the cantilevered load
at the base of the instrument. To further increase the
bearing’s load capacity, all output bearings feature full
compliment ball bearings, eliminating the usual bearing
retainer. A final difference is that the azimuth joint has the
bearings in a back-to-back configuration for stiffness,
whereas the elevation joint has them aligned front-to-front,
enabling compliance to the third bearing at the other side of
the optical bench. Fig. 8 depicts the azimuth joint with its
output bearings spaced further apart.
The motor is a brushless stepper motor, having a step angle
of 30 degrees. It has redundant windings and detent
capabilities. Its stall torque is .012Nm. The transmission is
comprised of a planetary gear stage, followed by a harmonic
drive. The overall gear ratio is 297:1.
The twist cap chamber contains six printed circuit flex
cables in a clock spring arrangement, enabling the electrical
wiring to transition from the stationary to the rotating
section. Each flex print has 14 electrical traces for a total of
78 power and signal traces and 6 grounding traces.

5
 Fig. 8: The Azimuth Joint Drive
5. MECHANICAL IMPLEMENTATION
The following is a short description of several critical
development items. The instrument performs flawlessly in
space now, but to achieve that, quite a few items required
careful resolution. With hindsight, it can be said that not
everything was resolved in the best way possible, but within
the available resources and with the best knowledge of that
time. It is hoped that the descriptions and lessons learned
stated below, will assist future spacecraft developers to
make the right decisions up front.
CHOICE OF MOTOR TYPE
Stepper motors were chosen because their controller is
simpler. But as the development of the MCS and other
6
instruments progressed, other instrument development
teams started to levy severe jitter restriction for the MCS
instrument, which no longer could be met with regularly
stepped stepper motors. A more sophisticated motor control
technique had to be implemented to dampen the jitter. This
was done through micro stepping. It defeated the
advantages the stepper motor controller had. Micro
stepping reduced the jitter effect somewhat, especially at
low speed, where the jitter was most severe. But in the end,
an operational constraint was still implemented for the MCS
instrument, restricting the operation of its stepper motors
when one of the other instruments operates in its most
sensitive mode.
Lessons learned: Stepper motors produce jitter that most
other optical instruments are sensitive to. It might be better
to plan using a brushless DC motor from the onset, paying
the price for a more sophisticated motor controller up front.
Also, try to find out early what other instruments might
require. This might otherwise not be communicated until
you are committed with the choice of you hardware.
USE OF EXOTIC STRUCTURAL MATERIALS
Weight savings are always at the forefront of space
hardware developments. Because of initial very low mass
allocations, exotic materials, like Al-Li and AlBeMet, were
chosen. While the use of Al-Li could be justified for the
MCS instrument, because some left-over material was
available from another project, the price was paid for
Diviner when a custom order of this hard to get material of
limited supply had to be placed. The weight savings for Al-
Li are only 5%, which is hardly enough to justify its use.
But changing to another material for Diviner would have
been even costlier, because it would have required re-
qualifying an entire subsection of the instrument. The use of
AlBeMet should be discouraged for development items: Its
special machining requirements in a controlled environment
are not well suited for proto-flight instruments, because no
alterations were possible after delivery of the rather
complex pieces. At one time, a modification was
unavoidable, causing many weeks of delay to get an
alteration implemented.
CHOICE OF BEARINGS
To be able to use smaller bearings (mass savings), full
complement ball bearings were chosen because of their
higher load capacity. Even though it is hard to imagine that
friction, generated from the balls pressing and rubbing
against each other could amount to much, it is believed that
this was responsible for the occasional extremely high
spikes (order of magnitude above base value) of roll
resistance that was sensed during the assembly of the
Diviner joint drives, after the bearings were pre-loaded.
Consulting the bearing manufacturer regarding this
phenomenon revealed that this was known to them, they
even had a technical name for it: the keystoning effect.
Lesson learned: never use full complement bearings; you
might save yourself a lot of trouble. Always use bearings
with retainers to separate the balls from interfering with
each other.
PRELOADING THE BEARING RETAINERS
Experimenting with the partially assembled joint drive
revealed that the above described torque resistance spikes
tended to disappear when the bearing preload was reduced.
The drive was thus disassembled to be able to check the
surface flatness of all bearings, retainers and housing
shoulders for surfaces flatness. All were within 5 microns,
which was ok. This let us believe that compressing the
slender bearing with the axial retainer preload was strong
7
enough to cause increased roll resistance with these full
complement ball bearings.
The Diviner bearing assembly now operates with very little
preload on its bearings. It resolved this issue; we never had
any problems since.
The same phenomenon was never noticed with the MCS
instrument. Since subsequent ground performance testing
never showed any irregularities, it can be assumed that this
phenomenon did not occur with the MCS instrument. We
will never be able to find out if such resistance developed
during flight, because there is no telemetry for sensing
motor currents in flight.
CHOICE OF LUBRICANTS
Pennzane 2000 was the obvious choice as lubricant because
of its superior longevity (3.5M cycles were required). Its
lower temperature limit is listed as -45degC. Even though
we did careful analyses about its viscous behavior at low
temperatures, and tried to estimate the drag resistance
resulting from it, we still were badly surprised during
functional testing when the joint drives had difficulties
running at -10degC, rather than the anticipated -20degC. It
required asking spacecraft management to allocate more
heating power for our instrument, ensuring that the
actuators could be kept above 0degC for any operating
conditions, including cold reboots.
Lessons learned: 1) be very conservative with performance
estimates, 2) make sure sufficient margins are maintained
until the end, for some performance deficiencies might only
surface during final, integrated testing, and 3) have back-up
solutions available: MCS had sufficient heaters and
contingency heating capacity already built-in, so that no late
modifications were required. Fortunately, the spacecraft
also had additional heating power available that could be
allocated for this instrument.
KEEP THE DOCUMENTATION UP TO DATE
The following is a rather dramatic example of how
important it is to keep the documentation up to date: A
vibration fixture was built to hold the elevation joint drive
of the MCS instrument during vibration testing. Its design
was properly documented and the fixture properly stored
after use. Sometime later, someone needed such a fixture
and modified it for their purpose by adding a counter bore
that reduced the clamping thickness. The fixture was later
returned to storage, still having the same drawing number
written on it. The user did not take the time to update the
fixture’s drawing either, probably assuming that the
previous program was complete and that this fixture would
never be used for its originally intended purpose again.
When the Diviner instrument was readied for vibe testing,
nobody on the new implementation team had any
knowledge that this fixture was modified; the test readiness
review did not flush this discrepancy out either, because the
reviewed drawing was proper, whereas the fixture was not
on location for a cross check. Later that day, when the joint
drive was mounted to the fixture, rather than tightening the
screws at the base of the screw head, the screws bottomed
out at the bottom of the tapped, blind holes of the flight
hardware, because the screws were now too long.
Consequence: The screws stamped out the thin wall sections
below the blind threaded holes, some debris fell into the
gear train; some stamped out segments remained attached
but hanging at the inside flange wall as hanging chats. The
entire flight joint had to be disassembled with many
bonding to be separated to clean it out, causing severe
scheduling problems and extensive rework efforts.
Lesson Learned: Keeping the documentation up to date is
essential, also at the end of projects, when people are urged
to transition to other projects. Do not omit to properly
document the “as built” conditions, for many items will be
re-used, and you don’t want to embarrass yourself either
when a flight anomaly occurs and you are being asked to
provide the proper documentation, but this turns out to be
inaccurate, incomplete, or missing.
The Undocumented Modification
Fig. 9: The Test Fixture with the Undocumented
Modification
Fig. 9 shows the test fixture with the added counter bore
that someone had machined into this piece, causing the
screws to protrude too deep into the flight hardware,
stamping the blind hole out.
8
LIFE TEST NOT DONE IN FLIGHT-LIKE CONDITIONS
A never ending discussion with numerous requests for
justifications and numerous requests for action item
responses occurred because the joint life test was not done
in a 0-G environment; and it was not done in vacuum, but in
ambient pressure in a liquid Nitrogen environment.
The test not being done in 0-G could reasonably be justified
by analyses and by positioning the joint axis in a horizontal
position, so that the lubricant would not have a tendency to
leak out of the mechanism. The test not being done in
vacuum was for cost saving reasons; its duration was over
one year. The primary concern was regarding the lubricant.
It was never resolved to most people’s satisfaction before
flight. But now, the MCS instrument has been in space
vacuum for 4 years, has operated continuously in space for
3 years, and also was idle in space for approx. another year
(it took 9 months to reach Mars and perform aero-braking
operations prior to reaching the science orbit). With that
history, and with the joints still performing nominally now,
with no signs of deterioration being detected (i.e. increasing
amounts of current needed from the spacecraft), it can be
stated that no significant shortcuts are being taken by not
testing mechanisms in vacuum; the behavior of space rated
lubes do not significantly change in vacuum.
Fig. 10: A view inside the Joint Drive after the Life Test
Fig. 10 shows part of the transmission after the life test: The
grease had turned black, but analyses revealed that the lube
had retained its lubricating capabilities. The brown colored
lube is of original composition, it was found in areas away
from the engagement zone, for instance at the side of the
sun gear.
OVERALL SYSTEMS TESTING
As happens with many flight projects, subsystem testing has
to be done by utilizing some surrogate hardware to qualify
deliverable flight components, because not all flight
hardware is available for testing yet, but the deliverable
flight subsystems have to be qualified and delivered on
time. A classical example in our development was that no
flight motor controller was available yet for joint drive
testing at the vendor location; a commercial non-micro
stepping controller had to suffice, whereas the flight motor
controller was tested with a commercial stepper motor only,
because the joint drives had not been delivered yet. When
the components were finally brought together for integrated
systems testing, it was detected that the motor produced
substantially less torque with the flight micro stepper
controller than was anticipated. This also nullified much of
the previous joint testing as well. Even though enough
torque margins remained to fly the joint with reduced
torque, the nominally required torque margin of 2 could no
longer be maintained.
The primary lessons learned are 1) design with sufficient
margins 2) always do integrated systems testing with all
flight components integrated together, and 3) schedule
sufficient extra time for integrated testing, for some items
will most likely be delayed and come in at a later date than
expected.
IN-FLIGHT POSITIONING ERRORS
The MCS instrument experienced occasional positioning
errors after several months of flawless operation in space, in
which the actual positioning of the elevation joint deviated
by 4 motor steps from the commanded position. Four motor
steps represent one control sequence because the motor is a
4-phase stepper motor, for which the micro stepper motor
controller issues command functions as a quasi sine wave.
Hence, four cardinal motor steps represent one complete
control sine wave, or one control sequence.
When the motor is energized, it moves in synchronization
with the control sequence. If for any reason, the motor
looses synchronization with the controller, it can only re-
synchronize at the proper step inside the commanded
control sequence or at the proper step inside any control
sequence (which is multiples of 4 steps away from the
commanded position) away from the commanded control
sequence. We are quite certain that when such a 4-step
positioning error occurred, the motor was falling one
control sequence, or 4 steps behind the commanded
position. But we could not determine (lack of in-flight
telemetry) if the motor looses synchronization because of
mechanical impedance, or if the control signal (i.e. at end of
motion as was suggested) got somewhat distorted for a
moment, causing the motor to lose synchronization with the
control signal for a brief moment, then re-synchronized to
9
the controller at the next control sequence, which is 4 steps
behind the commanded position.
Even though the root cause for these stepping errors was
never determined, certain lessons learned can be derived: 1)
it would have been nice to have some diagnostic capabilities
and additional in-flight telemetry available to better isolate
the cause (the instrument only carries the bare essential
sensory and telemetric capabilities required for operation).
2) The availability of additional S/W memory would have
enabled to perform certain in-flight test sequences and
diagnostics operations that might have revealed the cause.
3) Test with the flight controller: stepping errors never
occurred during any testing with the commercial controller.
Without being able to determine the cause of the errors, two
operational constraints were implemented that seem to
avoid producing those stepping errors. These constraints are
a modification to the scanning sequence and to avoid
scanning through a certain rotational sector. Those
modifications almost completely avoided stepping errors
ever since. With these restrictions, over 90% of the science
could still be gathered with the MCS instrument. It was thus
decided that no additional testing would be undertaken,
especially not with the flight instrument.
For the Diviner instrument, this anomaly was a concern, but
was finally categorized as an isolated case, which most
likely would not have any implications for Diviner, and it
hasn’t: No such errors were ever detected with the Diviner
instrument.
6. SUMMARY OF IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
In spite of all the above highlighted occurrences, it is
actually quite amazing that the Diviner instrument performs
flawlessly in space: all potential causes for malfunctioning
seemed to have been flushed out. It is hoped that this
instrument will continue to produce significant scientific
results far beyond its primary mission life.
REFERENCES
[1] D. A. Page et al, “The Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter
Diviner Lunar Radiometer Experiment”, Space Science
Review, DOI 10.1007/sl 1214-009-9529-2, Springer
Verlag, June 26, 2009.
[2] http://www.diviner.ucla.edu/index.html
[3]http://www.jpl.nasa.gov/missions/missiondetails.cfm?mi
ssion=Lunar%20Reconnaissance%20Orbiter
[4] http://lunar.gsfc.nasa.gov/ and http://lro.gsfc.nasa.gov/
[5] B. M. Jau, “Mechanical Description of the Mars Climate Willis; as well as Arlin Bartels · Leslie Hartz · Giulio
Sounder Instrument”, IEEE Aerospace Conference, Paper Rosanova, from GSFC; and Dave Dowen · Brad Griebenow
#1670, Big Sky, Montana, March 1-8, 2008 · Erik Roche from Starsys Inc.

[6] The Joint Drives were supplied by Starsys Inc, a The research described in this paper was carried out at the
subsidiary of SNC Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of
Technology, under a contract with the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration.
PICTURE CREDITS
Copyright 2008 California Institute of Technology
Fig. 1 & 2: Courtesy of UCLA/JPL Science Team

Fig. 3: Courtesy of GSFC

Fig. 8 - 10: Courtesy of Starsys Inc.

BIOGRAPHY
Dr. Bruno Jau is a Member of the
Technical Staff at the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory. He earned a Ph.D. in
ME from the University of Southern
California and a MS degree in ME
from Michigan State University. His
undergraduate work was done in
Switzerland.

His areas of expertise are solid mechanics, mechanisms,

CAD and manufacturing. He gained professional
experiences in corporate, R&D, consulting and University
environments, including a position as a Professor at Texas
A&M University. Principal research activities include the
development, design and implementation of
electromechanical systems and space instruments. He has
published over 30 articles in these areas.

Dr. Jau joined JPL in 1985 and has worked in Robotics and
Mechanical Engineering Sections since then. He was
responsible for the mechanical development of several
space flight instruments. He also developed, designed and
implemented a variety of robotics prototypes, including an
anthropomorphic telerobot system with a four fingered hand
that could be controlled by a human operated glove
controller.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author wishes to thank his JPL colleagues and
acknowledge their contributions in the development of the
Diviner instrument: James Aragon · Glenn Aveni · Henry
Awaya · Peter Barry · Yuri Beregovski · John Bousman ·
John Bulharowski · M.C. Foote · Sam Galaske · Laurie
Guay · Wayne Hartford · Robert Hughes · Mike Jakobs ·
Scott Loring · Thomas Luchik · D.J. McCleese · Pedro
Moreira · Todd Newell · Scott Nolte · Mike O’Connell ·
D.A. Paige · Young Park · Kim Plourde · D.J. Preston · J.T.
Schofield · Robby Stephenson · Lee Wigglesworth · Paul
10