PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NORLITO TAN @ NORLY and JOSE TAN, accused-appellants.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When an accused invokes self-defense, the burden of proof to show that the killing was justified shifts to him. Even if the
prosecution evidence may be weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open admission owing authorship of the killing.
However, to implicate a co-accused as a co-principal, conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. In the absence
of conspiracy, the responsibility of the two accused is individual, not collective.
The Case

Before us is an appeal of the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case No. P-2297,
which convicted Norlito Tan of murder, and Jose Tan of being an accomplice in such crime.
On January 3, 1994, an Information[2] was filed against the appellants, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of September, 1993, in Barangay Gatbo, Municipality of Ocampo, Province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery
and evident premeditation, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stone and stab with a deadly weapon one Magdaleno Rudy Olos alias Modesto
Olos, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the offended party in such amount as may be proven in court.[3]
On December 14, 1995, Jose Tan was arrested in Ocampo, Camarines Sur. Upon his arraignment on January 3, 1996, he
entered a plea of not guilty.[4] Subsequently, Norlito Tan was arrested on April 1, 1996. When arraigned on May 23, 1996,
he likewise pleaded not guilty.[5] Trial on the merits ensued. On July 2, 1997, the trial court rendered its assailed Decision,
the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused NORLY alias NORLITO TAN guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of MURDER and is hereby imposed the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA ranging
from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years while the other accused JOSE TAN is also adjudged guilty as an
accomplice to the offense of MURDER and is hereby imposed an indeterminate penalty of PRISION MAYOR in its medium
period ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day as minimum to ten years (10) as maximum, together with its accessory
penalties. As civil liability, both accused are hereby ordered to pay the heirs of MODESTO OLOS, represented by his widow,
Ofelia Nueca Olos, the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) Philippine currency with costs against them.
The accused Norly Tan and Jose Tan are credited with the full period of their preventive imprisonment if they agreed in
writing to abide with all the terms and conditions of their provisional detention, otherwise, to only 4/5 thereof.[6]
The appellants lodged their appeal with the Court of Appeals which, in view of the penalty imposed, forwarded it to this
Court.[7]
The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

In the Peoples Brief,[8] the Office of the Solicitor General presents the facts as viewed by the prosecution in this wise:
On September 6, 1993, at about 6:00 p.m., Ramon Nueca was weeding his ricefield located at Gatbo, Ocampo, Camarines
Sur. At that time, there was still sunlight. (pp. 7-8, TSN, July 3, 1996).
At a distance of about twenty (20) meters, Ramon Nueca saw Magalino Olos, (who was also his brother-in-law), walking
along the road going to Gatbo. At that time, appellant Jose Tan who was then sixteen (16) years old, was also walking
infront of Olos. Appellant Norlito Tan, (brother of appellant Jose Tan), who was holding an eight-inch knife known as gatab,
suddenly emerged from the grassy portion at the right side of the road where the grasses [were] higher than a person.
Appellant Norlito Tan stabbed Olos three (3) times. Olos was hit twice at the upper portion of his back and once at his
abdomen. Thereafter, appellant Jose Tan threw a stone at Olos, hitting him at his neck (pp. 9-16, 35-37, TSN, July 3, 1996).
Ramon Nueca decided to go to the place of the incident to pacify appellants. However, when appellants saw Ramon Nueca
coming, they fled. Ramon Nueca and his brother, Simplicio, brought Olos to the Municipal Hall of Ocampo. From there, Olos
was brought by an ambulance to the Bicol Regional Hospital in Naga City where he later died. (pp. 18-20, TSN, July 3,
1996).
Olos was examined and treated at the Bicol Regional Hospital by a certain Dr. Jullie Sy. However, at the time of the trial of
this case, he was no longer connected with [the]Bicol Regional Hospital, hence, was not available to testify in this case. His
findings as reflected in the medical certificate (Exhibit B) which he issued were interpreted by Dr. Thomas Gonzales, the
incumbent Municipal Health Officer of Pili, Camarines Sur (p. 3, Annex A, Appellants Brief).
Dr. Gonzales testified that the first finding in the medical certificate (Exhibit B) consists of a 1.4 centimeter-wound found at
the left portion of the back side of the victim which would have been inflicted by a sharp-bladed instrument (pp. 11-12, TSN,
August 14, 1996); the second finding consists of a 1.6 centimeter wound located on the level of the 4th introspect asterior
left side of the body of the victim below the level of the nipple or left front side of his body below the nipple (p. 13, ibid.);
the third finding consists of a fatal injury located at the umbilical area left side of the liver of the victim with the intestine
coming out. (pp. 13-15 ibid).
xxx xxx xxx[9]
Version of the Defense

In their Brief,[10] Appellants Norlito Tan and Jose Tan claim self-defense and denial, respectively, alleging as follows:
B. Evidence for the Defense:
On September 6, 1993 in Bgy. Gatbo, Ocampo, Camarines Sur, at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, Jose Tan was then
watching a basketball game while his brother Norlito Tan was playing basketball. At about 5:30 oclock PM, they left together
to go home but on their way home, they passed the road and dropped by at the house of Wilfredo Bale to chew betel and
betelnut. While they were in yard of Wilfredo Bale, the latter told accused Norlito Tan to go home as Modesto Olos might
chase him again. Heeding the advice of Wifredo, Norlito left to go home, while Jose remained on the yard of Wilfredo. While
Norlito was on his was home, Modesto Olos who was then in the ricefield walked fast towards the road and met the former
who evaded the latter by proceeding to the other side of the road as Modesto had been blocking his way and telling him that
Norlito would be buried alive. Then Modesto drew a knife and stabbed Norlito who was able to parry the thrust and holds the
formers hand holding the knife. Norly Tan immediately drew his knife from his boot and retaliated by stabbing Modesto who
was hit and fell to the ground. Then Ramon Nueca arrived and embraced Norlito, and at this moment, Angel Paular who was
holding a stone ran towards him but Norlito was able to extricate himself from the hold of Ramon and ran away.
When Modesto and Norlito were then fighting, Jose Tan was in front of the house of Wilfredo Bele. Then, when Norlito was
fleeing and passing by the house of Wilfredo, Jose Tan also ran away.
At the time of said incident, Jose Tan was then below sixteen (16) years old as he was born on September 18, 1977 as per
birth certificate submitted to the trial court.
The Trial Courts Ruling

In convicting Appellant Norlito Tan of murder, the trial court ruled that his claim of self-defense was negated by the evidence
on record. It added that when an accused pleads self-defense, the burden of proof shifts on him, a burden Norlito Tan failed
to discharge. Jose Tans denial was equally unavailing in view of the credible prosecution witnesses identification of him.
The lower court held that treachery and evident premeditation accompanied the killing and, thus, the crime committed was
murder. However, the court a quo dismissed the prosecutions claim of conspiracy and adjudged Jose Tan guilty merely as an
accomplice.
The Assigned Errors

Appellants fault the trial court with the following errors:

1. The court a quo seriously erred in finding that accused Norlito Tan treacherously killed Modesto Olos and that accused
Jose Tan helped his brother in the fatal stabbing of the victim.
2. The court a quo gravely erred in relying solely [on] and giving full credence [to] the testimonies of Ramon Nueca and
Ofelia Olos and in disregarding the testimonies of both accused and their witnesses.
3. The court a quo seriously erred in finding that both accused eluded the apprehending authorities indicating that they are
guilty of the crime charged.
4. The court a quo imposed an excessive penalty upon both accused granting but not admitting that accused Norlito Tan is
guilty of the crime charged and accused Jose Tan being a minor below 16 years old is guilty as an accomplice;
5. The court a quo seriously erred in convicting accused Norlito Tan of the crime of murder and accused Jose Tan as an
accomplice.[11]
To resolve the case, the Court believes that the following points should be discussed: (1) credibility of witnesses; (2) self-
defense and burden of proof; and (3) characterization of the crime and the applicable penalty.
The Courts Ruling

The trial court correctly convicted the appellants, but erred in imposing the proper penalty.
First Issue:
Credibility of Witnesses

Well-rooted is the rule that factual findings of the trial judge who tried the case and heard the witnesses are not to be
disturbed on appeal, unless there are circumstances of weight and substance which have been overlooked and which, if
properly considered, might affect the result of the case.[12] Because the trial court is in a better position to examine the
demeanor and conduct of the witnesses while testifying on the stand, its conclusions and findings on their credibility are
entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be changed except for strong and valid reasons.[13]
Alleged Irregularities

Appellants contend that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of Prosecution Witnesses Ramon Nueca
and Ofelia Olos, considering that the defense was not able to cross-examine Nueca thoroughly. With regard to Olos,
appellants claim that her presentation as a rebuttal witness was irregular and, as such, should not have been allowed by the
court a quo.
There is no merit to appellants assertion of procedural prejudice. True, Ramon Nueca did not return to court to finish his
cross-examination; however, this does not mean that his testimony should be expunged, as appellants insists. It must be
noted that his failure to appear before the court was not the fault of prosecution. More important, the defense had the
opportunity to cross-examine him, as in fact he was actually subjected to cross-examination by the appellants counsel, Atty.
Crispo Q. Borja Jr.[14] The cross-examination touched on the material points elicited from Nueca during his direct
examination his eyewitness description of Norly and Jose Tans participation in the killing.
Neither can the presentation of Ofelia Olos as a rebuttal witness be deemed irregular. Considering that the appellants
claimed self-defense only after the prosecution had rested its case, the latter, after being allowed by the trial court, exercised
its prerogative to present Olos, so that she could testify that the attack on her husband was sudden and unexpected.
Furthermore, it is within the sound discretion of a trial judge to allow a party that has rested its case to introduce rebuttal
evidence.[15]
Alleged Inconsistencies

Appellants insist that the testimonies of Nueca and Olos were tainted with contradictions and inconsistencies, viz.:
The vital and material points of the testimony of Ramon Nueca which require careful considerations are as follows, to wit:
1. He saw [his] brother-in-law Modesto Olos stabbed thrice by Norlito Tan, hitting him twice at the back and once in front of
the body, (pp. 12 & 14, tsn, 7-3-96), contrary to the testimony of Dr. Gonzales who testified that the victim suffered injuries
at the left portion of the backside body (intercostal post line), at the left front side below the nipple, and on his abdomen.
(pp. 11, 12 & 14, tsn, 8-14-96).
2. The reason why both accused killed his brother-in-law was that they were apprehended by the victim in the house of
Flores per information given to him by said victim (p. 21, tsn, 7-3-96), while in his sworn statement marked Exh. 1, he stated
that he [did] not know of any motive why accused Norlito stabbed and Jose stoned him.
3. Norlito hid and emerged from the talahib grass and immediately stabbed his brother-in-law (pp. 13, 15 & 40, tsn, 7-3-96),
while in exhibit 1, he stated that while he was walking on the road going to Gatbo, he was approached by Norlito and Jose,
and then Modesto was stabbed by Norlito.
xxx xxx xxx
With respect to the vital and material; points/parts of the testimony of Ofelia Olos which likewise require careful
consideration are as follows:
1. That before the stabbing incident, she saw Norlito suddenly emerged from the talahib grass and immediately stabbed her
husband -- this is contrary to her statement given during the preliminary inquiry conducted by the presiding judge of MTC,
Ocampo, Camarines Sur, which statement is part of the record of this case. In said statement, she said that when she was
out of her house after cooking, she saw her husband being stabbed by Norlito and before her husband was stabbed, he was
standing on the road and about to pick up a stone when attacked by both accused. She did not mention any talahib grass in
said statement.
2. That while Norlito was stabbing her husband, Jose shouted at his brother to stop; - These allegations of Ofelia are
contrary to human experience for the simple reason that if accused Jose really shouted at his brother to stop stabbing
Modesto Olos, he would not throw stones at the latter.
3. That her house is six (6) meters away from the road and in between her house and the road, there are irrigation canal,
ricefield, and a vacant lot (Pp. 16-17, tsn 3-10-97); This is contrary to the testimony of her brother-in-law as according to
him, the house of Ofelia is thirty (30) meters away from the road, and between the road and the house of Olos, there are
two (2) irrigation canals and a ricefield in between said canals (P.30, tsn 7-3-96). Thus, it is improbable that the house of
Ofelia is only 6 meters away from the road, and she could not see the person on the other side of the talahib grass from her
house as the grass is higher than the height of a person and the distance from the house is 30 meters to the road as
testified by Ramon Nueca (Pp. 34-36, tsn 7-3-96).
4. That her husband was twice stabbed at the back on the left side back shoulder (P. 24. Tsn 3-10-97). This is [contrary] to
the testimony of Dr. Tomas Gonzales as already mention in the foregoing.
Considering the foregoing testimony of Ofelia Olos, it is indubitable that she was telling lies when she testified in court and
was not an eye-witness to the incident. Taking into consideration both testimonies of Ramon Nueca whose testimony on
cross-examination was not finished for his failure to return to court and of Ofelia Olos on rebuttal stage whose testimony is
improper for consideration for reason already aforestated, we contend that the trial court gravely erred in relying solely and
giving full credence to the testimonies of said prosecution witnesses and in finding that accused Norlito Tan treacherously
killed Modesto Olos and finding also that Jose [T]an helped his brother in the fatal stabbing of the victim.
These arguments do not persuade. The prosecution witnesses clearly placed the appellants at the scene of the crime and
established that Norly Tan stabbed Olos. These facts were admitted by Norly Tan, who claimed self-defense. True, there are
some apparent minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of Nueca and Olos, but they do not detract from the clarity, the
cohesiveness or the consistency of their testimonies on how Norly Tan killed the victim. Nueca testified thus:
Q Now, were you able to see the persons responsible for the stabbing of Rudy Olos?
xxx xxx xxx
A Yes, sir, there were two (2) persons.
Q Were you able to recognize them?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you tell the Honorable Court their names?
A Yes, sir, Norly Tan and Jose Tan.
Q How is this Norly Tan related to the Norlito Tan impleaded in this case who stabbed Magdalino Rudy Olos?
A The same person, sir.
Q And please tell the Honorable Courtwhat did Norly Tan do?
A Norlito Tan stabbed Magdalino Rudy Olos.
Q Were you able to see the instrument which was used by Norly Tan in stabbing Magdalino Rudy Olos?
A Yes, sir, a kind of knife which is known in our dialect as tabak, or gatab.
Q Will you please describe to the Honorable Court the weapon otherwise called as gatab in your locality?
A Somewhat small knife which is about eight (8) inches long.
Q Was that eight inches long including the handle?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, was Magdalino Rudy Olos hit by the thrusts of Norly Tan?
A Yes, sir.
Q In what part of the body of Magdalino rudy Olos was hit by Norly tan?
A At the back, sir.
COURT
Q Which part of the back?
A Upper portion of his back, Your Honor. At this juncture, witness is pointing the upper right portion of his back.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL RAMOS
Q By the way, what was Magdalino Rudy Olos doing in the road when he was actually assaulted by Norly Tan?
A He was on his way home, sir.
Q Now, in relation to the victim Magdalino Rudy Olos, where was Norly Tan when he stabbed Olos?
A He was on the left side of Magdalino Olos, sir.
Q And where did Norly Tan emerge or where did he come from before he stabbed Magdalino Olos?
A He came from the talahib.
COURT
Q How many times did he stab the victim?
A Three (3) times your honor.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL RAMOS
Q And what injury sustained by victim Magdalino Rudy Olos at his back [--] was that the injury resulting from his death or
which of the stabbing blows made by Norly Tan xxx [h]it him?
A They all hit him, sir.
Q How about the stabbing blow for the second time?
A Still at the back, sir.
Q How about the third time?
A He was hit on the abdomen.
Q Now, you mentioned earlier that Norly Tan emerged from the grassy portion, will you please tell the Honorable Court how
tall [was the] grassy portion where Norly Tan emerged?
A It is higher than a person, sir.
Q How far is that grassy portion where Magdalino Olos came from?
A Just beside the road, sir.
Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court of your own knowledge or observation, was Olos able to see Norly Tan before the
latter emerged from the grassy portion?
A He could not have seen Norly Tan because Magdalino Olos already passed when Norlito Tan emerged from the grassy
portion of the field.
Q Now, for how long had time elapsed when Norly Tan emerged from the grassy portion of the field and stabbed Olos?
A Around one (1) second, sir.
Q When the victim Olos was stabbed by Norly Tan for the first time at his back, what did Olos do, if any?
A When he faced Norly tan, Norly Tan stabbed him in his abdomen?
COURT
Q So the second stab was also in the abdomen of the victim?
A No, your honor, the two (2) stabs hit his back and the third stab hit his abdomen.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL RAMOS
Q Now, how about Jose Tan, do you know where he was at the time his brother Norly Tan emerged from the talahib?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where was he?
A He was at the middle of the road.
Q Now, in relation to where Magdalino Rudy Olos was walking at the middle of the road where was Jose Tan at that time?
A In front of Olos.
Q How far was Jose Tan at that time?
A About five (5) meters.
COURT
Q So they saw each other?
A yes, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL RAMOS
Q What if any, did Jose Tan do?
A He stoned Olos.
Q At what moment did Jose Tan throw [stones at] Magdalino Rudy Olos[?]
A After his brother Norly Tan stabbed Olos, sir.
Q And was Olos hit by the stone of Jose Tan?
A Yes, sir.
Q In what part of his body was he hit was Jose Tan?
A In his neck.
Q How many times did he stone Magdalino Rudy Olos?
A Only one (1) sir.
Q How about you, what did you do while Norly Tan was stabbing the victim, Magdalino Olos?
A I was about to run away to them in order to pacify them, but when the two (2) brothers saw me, they fled.
Q Towards what direction [did] they [flee?].
A Towards the direction of their uncles house.[16]
The above-quoted testimony jibes with that of Ofelia Olos as to how the incident happened,[17] and with that of Dr.
Gonzales as to the number of wounds sustained by the victim.
The inconsistencies pointed out by the appellants refer to their alleged motive for killing the victim, the distance of the
witnesses from the locus criminis and the location of the wounds inflicted. However, motive is not important when there is
no doubt about the identity of the perpetrator of the crime,[18] as in the present case. True, there was variance in the
witnesses testimonies as to their distance from stabbing incident. However, the sketch presented in court showed that they
had a clear view of the scene.[19] And although they could not pinpoint precise locations, they were able to give the correct
number of wounds sustained by the victim. their perception as to where the victim was struck was likewise correct.
In any case, the inconsistencies cited by the appellants are not substantial enough to impair the credibility of these
witnesses. Rather, such minor lapses manifest truthfulness and candor and erase suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.[20]
In all, we cannot fault the trial court for upholding the relevant portions of the prosecution witnesses testimonies.
Second Issue:

Self-Defense

When the accused invoke self-defense, the burden of proof is shifted to them to prove that the killing was justified and that
they incurred no criminal liability therefor. They must rely on the strength of their own evidence and not on the weakness of
that of the prosecution, for even if the latter is weak, it could not be disbelieved after their open admission of responsibility
for the killing.[21]
In the present case, it is incumbent upon Appellant Norly Tan to prove self-defense. Thus, he must prove that there was
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, that the means employed to prevent it were reasonable, and that there was
lack of sufficient provocation o his part. However, he failed to discharge this burden.
True, he alleges that it was the victim, Magdalino Olos, who was the aggressor who had started the fracas:
Q When Modesto Olos met you on the left side of the road, what else did he do?
A When we were on the left side of the road, Modesto Olos asked me why I was there and then I told him that I was a
resident and then he told me that he will bury me alive and at the same time he thrust his bladed weapon and stabbed me.
COURT
Q Did he hit you?
A I was able to parry the thrust and [hold] his arm with the weapon. When I was able to hold his hand with the bolo, I was
also able to draw my own bladed weapon and I was able to stab him.
Q From where did you draw that weapon which you used in stabbing Modesto Olos?
A I drew it from inside my boot.
xxx xxx xxx[22]
The above-quoted testimony, however, shows some inherent contradictions. If it was the victim who had attacked Norly Tan,
then why did the former suffer three stab wounds and the latter none? Likewise, the Court finds it hard to believe that Norly
Tan was able to subdue the victim with one hand and at the same time get his weapon from his boot. Clearly then, his self-
serving allegation would not suffice. It pales in comparison with the positive and categorical declaration of the prosecution
witnesses that the attack on the victim was sudden an unprovoked.
Third Issue:

Crime and Its Punishment

The trial court correctly ruled that the killing was attended by treachery; hence, the crime was murder.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of the person
attacked.[23] Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms in the execution thereof, which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.[24] In the case at bar, the attack on Magdalino Olos was
treacherous, because he was caught off guard and was therefore unable to defend himself, as testified to by the prosecution
witnesses and as indicated by the wounds inflicted on him.
Culpability of Jose Tan

We agree with the court a quo that the prosecution was not able to establish conspiracy in the killing of the victim; thus,
Appellant Jose Tan is guilty only as an accomplice. Worth quoting is the trial courts disquisition on the matter:
However, the evidence of the prosecution regarding the participation of the other accused, Jose Tan is not so satisfactory
specially regarding its theory of conspiracy. In fact, according to the widow Ofelio Olos, she even heard Jose Tan telling and
pleading with his brother to stop his attack and stabbing of the victim. the most therefore that said accused could be liable
for is merely that of an accomplice, who, not being a principal cooperated in the execution of the offense by previous and
simultaneous acts, that in this case, by his stoning the victim Modesto Olos and hitting him on the neck. However, the
accused Jose Tans act of stoning was not a direct participation nor indispensable to the killing of the victim. also, as held by
the Supreme court, when doubt exists whether an accused acted as principal or accomplice, the court should favor the lesser
or milder identity (People vs. Irenea, G.R. No. 44410, August 5, 1988).[25]
The above-quoted ruling follows legal and jurisprudential precepts. The Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as those
persons who, not being included in article 17,[26] cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts.[27]
In the present case, the prosecution was not able to prove that Jose Tan conspired with his brother to commit the murder.
Neither was it shown that he had prior knowledge of the latters criminal intent. Absent a conspiracy, the responsibility of the
accused is individual, not collective, and each is to be punished only for his separate acts.
The penalty of Appellant Jose Tan as an accomplice is one degree lower than that of the principal, which in murder cases is
reclusion temporal, in its maximum period, to death. Considering that he is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority,[28] because he was only sixteen years old when the crime was committed,[29] the trial court should have
lowered his penalty by two degrees, i.e. prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium. Likewise, he is entitled to
the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Since no aggravating or mitigating circumstance was proven, the imposable penalty on Norlito Tan is reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that Appellant Norlito Tan, as principal, is
sentenced to reclusion perpetua; while Appellant Jose Tan, as an accomplice and a minor, is sentenced to an indeterminate
prison term of one (1) year and five (5) months of prision correccional as minimum, to seven (7) years of prision mayor as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.

SULTAN PANDAGARANAO A. ILUPA, A.M. No. SCC-11-16-P

Complainant, (formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I No. 10-33-SCC [P]

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,

- versus - BERSAMIN,

VILLARAMA, JR., and

SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

June 1, 2011

MACALINOG S. ABDULLAH,

Clerk of Court II, Sharia Circuit

Court, Marawi City,

Respondent. -- -

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:
The present administrative matter stemmed from the November 29, 2009 letter-complaint[1] of Sultan Pandagaranao A.
Ilupa (complainant) charging Clerk of Court II Macalinog S. Abdullah ( respondent) of the Sharia Circuit Court (SCC) in
Marawi City with abuse of authority in relation with the issuance of a certificate of divorce.
 The Facts

The facts are summarized from the report of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dated July 9, 2010.[2]

The charge

The complainant alleges in support of the charge that the respondent exhibited ignorance of his duties as clerk of court
when he issued a certificate of divorce, (OCRG Form No. 102) relying mainly on an illegal Kapasadan or Agreement. He
claims that the agreement was executed under duress and intimidation; the certificate of divorce itself is defective and
unreliable as there were erroneous entries in the document and unfilled blanks. He claims that the respondent took away his
beautiful wife by force or had a personal interest in her.

The complainant believes that the respondent should not have issued the divorce certificate because divorce is not
recognized in the country and the Kapasadan or separation agreement had already been revoked by Philippine civil law. In a
supplemental letter,[3] the complainant alleges that he signed the Kapasadan because the Principal of the Mindanao State
University, a certain Mackno, and Police Officer Hadji Amin threatened to kill him. For this reason, he wrote a letter to the
SCC judge of Marawi City, assailing the agreement; he even personally handed a copy of the letter to the respondent who
took no action on the matter.

To save his marriage with Nella Rocaya Mikunug originally solemnized on May 19, 1959, based on the Maranao culture, and
later renewed through a civil wedding before a Marawi City judge the complainant filed a petition for restitution of marital
rights[4] with the SCC, Marawi City. To his dismay, the judge dismissed the petition without any notice or summons to him.
He suspects that the dismissal was due to the respondents hukos-pukos or manipulation.

The respondents comment

In his comment dated March 19, 2010,[5] the respondent prays that the complaint be denied for lack of merit. He mainly
argues that his issuance of a certificate of divorce is not illegal, capricious or whimsical as he acted within the bounds of his
authority. He explains that as court registrar, it is his ministerial duty to accept and register marriage contracts, conversions
to Islam and divorce certificates. When he performs this duty, he assumes no responsibility with respect to the entries made
by the applicants or owners of the documents to be registered.

The respondent argues that contrary to the complainants claim, there was a divorce agreement, in the Maranao dialect,
attached to the divorce certificate. The complainant even signed both pages of the agreement. Although the agreement was
not labeled as such, its essence indicates that the couple agreed to have a divorce and it was so understood also by their
children and the witnesses who signed the agreement.
The respondent denies that he took the complainants wife by force or that he was interested in her; he claims that no
evidence was ever adduced to prove these allegations. With the divorce agreement, Mrs. Ilupa applied for a certificate of
divorce which he issued under Divorce Registry No. 2009-027 on November 5, 2009. He points out that in issuing the
certificate of divorce, he observed the same procedure applied to all applicants or registrants.

On the complainants claim that there is no divorce in the Philippines, the respondent points out that this is true only as far as
the civil law is concerned, but not under the Muslim Law which recognizes divorce. The civil marriage they subsequently
entered into was just an affirmation of their marriage vows under the Muslim Law. Also, the courts dismissal of the
complainants petition for restitution of marital rights[6] affirmed the divorce between the Ilupa couple.

The administrative investigation

In compliance with the Courts Resolution dated August 25, 2010,[7] Executive Judge Gamor B. Disalo of the RTC, 12th
Judicial Region, Marawi City, investigated the complaint, and submitted a Report and Recommendation dated January 19,
2010.[8]

It appears from the report that Judge Disalo heard the complaint three times, i.e., on December 15, 22 and 29, 2010. The
respondent appeared at the hearing on December 15, 2010 and reiterated the arguments he earlier raised in his comment.
He failed to appear at the subsequent hearings.

The complainants non-cooperation prompted Judge Disalo to close the investigation and to conclude, based on the facts
gathered by the OCA and on the cited applicable laws, that sufficient grounds existed to dismiss the complaint.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the OCA and Judge Disalo that the complaint is devoid of merit. The issuance of a certificate of divorce is
within the respondents duties, as defined by law. Articles 81 and 83 of the Muslim Code of the Philippines provide:

Article 81. District Registrar. - The Clerk of Court of the Sharia District Court shall, in
addition to his regular functions, act as District Registrar of Muslim Marriages, Divorces,
Revocations of Divorces, and Conversions within the territorial jurisdiction of said court.
The Clerk of Court of the Sharia Circuit Court shall act as Circuit Registrar of
Muslim Marriages, Divorces, Revocations of Divorces, and Conversations
within his jurisdiction.

Article 83. Duties of Circuit Registrar. - Every Circuit Registrar shall:

a) File every certificate of marriage (which shall specify the nature and
 amount of the dower agreed upon), divorce or revocation of divorce and
conversion and such other documents presented to him for registration;

b) Compile said certificates monthly, prepare and send any information

required of him by the District Registrar;

c) Register conversions involving Islam;

d) Issue certified transcripts or copies of any certificate or document

registered upon payment of the required fees[.]

We quote with approval the following excerpt from the OCAs Report:

Evidently, respondent Clerk of Court merely performed his ministerial duty in accordance with the foregoing provisions. The
alleged erroneous entries on the Certificate of Divorce cannot be attributed to respondent Clerk of Court considering that it is
only his duty to receive, file and register the certificate of divorce presented to him for registration. Further, even if there
were indeed erroneous entries on the certificate of divorce, such errors cannot be corrected nor cancelled through [his]
administrative complaint.

Anent the legality of the divorce of the complainant and Dr. Nella Rocaya Mikunug-Ilupa, this Office is bereft of any authority
to rule on the matter. The issue is judicial in nature which cannot be assailed through this administrative proceeding.

Finally, on the allegation that the respondent Clerk of Court manipulated the dismissal of his petition for restitution of marital
rights, we find the same unsubstantiated. Aside from complainants bare allegation, there was no substantial evidence
presented to prove the charge. It is a settled rule in administrative proceedings that the complainant has the burden of
proving the allegations in his or her complaint with substantial evidence. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duties will prevail ( Rafael Rondina, et al. v. Associate Justice
Eloy Bello, Jr., A.M. No. CA-5-43, 8 July 2005).

RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted, for the consideration of the Honorable Court, is the recommendation that the
administrative case against Macalinog S. Abdullah, Clerk of Court II, Sharia Circuit Court, Marawi City, be DISMISSED for lack
of merit.[9]

We find this evaluation and recommendation fully in order, and accordingly approve the Report. Thus, the complaint should
be dismissed for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the administrative matter against Macalinog S. Abdullah, Clerk of Court II, Sharia
Circuit Court, Marawi City, for abuse of authority is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU G.R. No. 159835
OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION,
Petitioner, Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
perez, JJ.
JUNG KEUN PARK @ JUNG GEUN PARK @ CHUNG
KEUN PARK,
Respondent.
Promulgated:

January 21, 2010

x ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] filed by the petitioner Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID) assailing the June 13, 2002 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
67614, which reversed the deportation orders issued by the BID. The petition also assails the CAs September 4, 2003
Resolution[3] which denied the BIDs motion for reconsideration.

THE FACTS

Respondent Jung Keun Park (Park) is a national of the Republic of Korea who came to the Philippines with his family in the
early 1990s to invest in various businesses in the country.

Sometime in 2000, the BID received a letter dated July 6, 2000[4] (July 6, 2000 letter) from Gyung Taek Cha,
Consul/Police Attach of the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Manila, requesting the BIDs assistance and cooperation in
deporting Park as he was purportedly facing charges of fraud in Korea for which a warrant for his arrest had been issued by
the Korean Police. The letter also stated that Parks Korean Passport No. NW0057145 had been cancelled on March
8, 2000 and no other passport had been issued to him since. Acting on this July 6, 2000 letter, the BID officials
arrested Park and deported him to Korea on July 24, 2000.

On October 28, 2000, Park returned to the Philippines, entering via Zamboanga City from Malaysia, aboard the Sampaguita
Ferry 2. Believing that Park re-entered the country without a valid passport, the BID again arrested Park on December 11,
2000 and, through a Charge Sheet[5] dated December 22, 2000, indicted him for violating Section 37(a)(7) [6] of
Commonwealth Act No. 613 or the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended ( Immigration Act).

On the very same date that Park was indicted, the BID issued a Summary Deportation Order (SDO) against Park
after finding that he had indeed violated the Immigration Act. Accordingly, the BID ordered Park to be deported,
imposed upon him administrative fines and fees, and included him in its Blacklist.

To secure his provisional release pending deportation, Park filed on January 19, 2001 a Petition for Bail [7] with the BID,
stating that he had already paid the administrative fines and fees imposed on him in the SDO. Park also claimed that he
should no longer be considered an undocumented alien because (a) he had been issued a Travel Certificate by the Embassy
of the Republic of Korea in Manila that was valid from January 16, 2001 up to June 19, 2001, and (b) he was a holder of a
Special Investors Resident Visa (SIRV). The BID, however, did not act on his petition, prompting Park to move for its early
resolution on February 19, 2001.[8] Apart from reiterating his plea for his provisional liberty, Park pointed out that there was
no longer any basis for the execution of the SDO. Apparently, Park learned, after communicating with the Korean Embassy,
that it did not issue the July 6, 2000 letter that declared his Passport No. NW0057145 as cancelled. Park argued that since
the SDO was issued solely on the basis of the July 6, 2000 letter, the Korean Embassys disavowal of the letter should result
in the nullification of the SDO against him. In an Order dated February 27, 2001, the BID granted Parks petition for bail but
did not resolve his claim against the validity of the SDO. [9]

About six months after the BID issued the SDO, Park filed a motion to have it set aside. [10] He insisted that he should not
be considered as an undocumented alien since his Passport No. NW0057145 had not really been cancelled as falsely stated
in the July 6, 2000 letter a letter which he claimed was later disavowed by the Korean Embassy. Even assuming that this
passport was actually cancelled, Park argues that the Korean Embassy had already issued him a new passport (Passport No.
PH0003486) on April 5, 2001, with validity up to April 5, 2006. Moreover, he was a holder of a SIRV and a travel certificate.
Without, however, going into the merits of Parks claims, the BID denied his motion to set aside the SDO in a
Resolution dated October 15, 2001 (October 15, 2001 Resolution); it ruled that the motion was belatedly filed, since the
SDO had already become final and executory for Parks failure to appeal it within the reglementary period provided in the
Rules of Procedure to Govern Deportation Proceedings (Deportation Rules).

Park assailed the BIDs SDO and October 15, 2001 Resolution, through a certiorari petition filed before the CA.

[11] He reiterated his arguments why he should no longer be considered as an undocumented alien and submitted the
following in support of his claim:

a. the February 16, 2001 letter[12] from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Manila written by Young Chai Kim,
Consul for Passport Affairs, stating that he did not write the July 6, 2000 letter and that a travel certificate had been issued
in Parks favour; and

b. the May 28, 2001 letter[13] from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Manila written by Consul/Police Attach
Gyung Taek Cha (the same person who wrote the July 6, 2000 letter), stating that Park had no pending criminal cases in
Korea.

Park also claimed that he had been denied of his right to due process, since no hearing of his case was conducted before the
BIDs Board of Special Inquiry or the Board of Commissioners; the SDO was in fact issued on the same day that the Charge
Sheet was filed.

In its Decision dated June 13, 2002,[14] the CA found Parks certiorari petition meritorious. It considered material the
February 16, 2001 and May 28, 2001 letters of the Korean Embassy officials that effectively negated the July 6, 2000 letter.
The appellate court also relied on Parks travel certificate and SIRV as documents supporting his claims. As a result, it set
aside the SDO and the October 15, 2001 Resolution of the BID.[15] As the BIDs motion for reconsideration of the CA
decision had been denied in a resolution dated September 4, 2003, it filed before this Court the present petition for review
on certiorari.
 THE ISSUE and THE PARTIES ARGUMENTS

At the core of the present controversy is the validity of the two issuances by the BID: the SDO dated December 22, 2000
and the October 15, 2001 Resolution denying Parks motion to set aside the SDO. The CA declared that the BIDs
issuance of the SDO and the October 15, 2001 Resolution was characterized by grave abuse of discretion and, accordingly,
nullified them. The BID contests this ruling as legally erroneous and invokes the Courts appellate jurisdiction via a Rule 45
petition.

In its petition, the BID insists that it had sufficient basis for ordering Parks deportation Park did not have with him a valid
passport when he returned to the Philippines on October 28, 2000, and was therefore not lawfully admitted. At the time Park
was indicted, the July 6, 2000 letter reporting the cancellation of Parks Passport No. NW0057145 stood uncontroverted. The
BID thus claims that its reliance on the July 6, 2000 letter cannot be considered an abuse of its discretion.

Although Park was able to present letters[16] from the Korean Embassy that apparently repudiated the July 6, 2000 letter,
the BID alleges that these letters were submitted when the SDO had already become final and executory, since Park failed to
appeal the SDO with the Office of the President within the 30-day period provided under Rule XIII of the Deportation
Rules[17]; the BID, therefore, found it unnecessary to consider the February 16, 2001 and May 28, 2001 letters. As the SDO
had already lapsed into finality, the BID posits that it could not be faulted for denying Parks motion to set aside the SDO in
its October 15, 2001 Resolution.

Park counters the BIDs allegations by insisting that he had a valid and existing passport when he returned to the Philippines
on October 28, 2000. He claims that his Passport No. NW0057145 was never cancelled; otherwise, he would not be able to
use the same on a trip to Malaysia days prior to his return to the Philippines. As proof, he appends to his Comment and
Memorandum a photocopy of this passport bearing stamp marks showing the date of his arrival in and departure from
Malaysia on October 20, 2000 and October 27, 2000,[18] respectively, and of his arrival in the Philippines on October 28,
2000.[19] Moreover, he contends that the Korean Embassys February 16, 2001 and May 28, 2001 letters constituted a
repudiation of the July 6, 2000 letter upon which the SDO was based. With this repudiation, Park insists there was no more
basis for upholding the SDO. Park also relies on the travel certificate and SIRV issued to him by the Korean Embassy and the
Philippine government (through the Bureau of Investments), respectively, as documents that further evidenced his authority
to enter and remain in the country.

While Park concedes that his motion to set aside the SDO was filed beyond the 30-day period, he nevertheless contends that
the SDO could never achieve finality because it was, in the first place, null and void. He attacks the SDO by claiming it was
issued in violation of his right to due process, under Section 37(c) of the Immigration Act, which reads:

No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation nor without being given a hearing
under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.

First, Park claims that the Charge Sheet indicting him for violation of the Immigration Act failed to sufficiently inform him of
the specific grounds for his deportation. He was accused of violating Section 37(a)(7) of the Immigration Act[20] for
remaining in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under which he was admitted as a non-immigrant . A
charge for violation of Section 37(a)(7), he alleges, is contrary to the BIDs claim that he was not lawfully admitted when he
returned to the Philippines on October 28, 2000 because he did not have a valid passport then. If he was not lawfully
admitted in the first place, he could not have violated any limitation or condition of his admission into the country.

Second, he posits that his case should have been heard under the regular deportation proceedings, not the summary
deportation proceedings. Rule X of the Deportation Rules states that summary deportation shall be observed in cases where
the charge is either overstaying or expiration of passport. Since he had been charged for allegedly violating the conditions of
his admission, Park contends his case is not among those covered by summary deportation proceedings.

THE COURTS RULING

We resolve to grant the petition.

A review of the records compels us to rule that the BID had sufficient factual and legal basis for the SDO and the October
15, 2001 Resolution. The CA committed legal error in finding that the BID acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
issued the SDO and the October 15, 2001 Resolution.

Non-immigrants are required by law to present valid

passports and visas upon entry into the Philippines

All non-immigrants are required to present unexpired passports and valid visas prior to their admission into the Philippines
under Section 10 of the Immigration Act:

Section 10. Non-immigrants must present for admission into the Philippines unexpired passports or official
documents in the nature of passports issued by the governments of the countries to which they owe allegiance or other
travel documents showing their origins and identity as prescribed by regulations, and valid passport visas granted by
diplomatic or consular officers, except that such document shall not be required of the following aliens: (a) a child
qualifying as a non-immigrant, born subsequent to the issuance of the passport visa of the accompanying parent, the visa
not having expired; and (b) a seaman qualifying as such under section (9) of this Act. [Emphasis supplied.]

Park was indicted for violating this requirement because when he returned to the Philippines on October 28, 2000, he used
his Passport No. NW0057145 a passport that had already been cancelled according to the Korean Embassys July 6, 2000
letter. At the time Park was indicted, there was no official document repudiating the July 6, 2000 letter. Park did not present
other competent proofs that his Passport No. NW0057145 had not been cancelled. In deportation proceedings, the alien
bears the burden of proving that he entered the Philippines lawfully.[21] We do not believe that Park was able to discharge
this burden by belatedly presenting a photocopy of his Passport No. NW0057145 that bore stamp marks of the date of his
arrival in and departure from Malaysia, just days before his return to the country. In all his pleadings before the BID and the
CA, he never mentioned this prior Malaysian trip, and he conveniently excused the presentation of his Passport No.
NW0057145 by claiming he had misplaced/lost it. Since the authenticity of the arrival and departure stamp marks in Parks
Passport No. NW0057145 had not been passed upon by either the BID or the CA, we cannot accord it weight and credence.

As things therefore stood on December 22, 2000 (when the SDO was issued), there was no evidence that would negate the
cancellation of Parks Passport No. NW0057145 that was stated in the Korean Embassys July 6, 2000 letter. The BID had
sufficient ground to believe that Park did not have with him a valid and existing passport upon his return to the country. We
thus cannot fault the BID for relying in good faith on the letter when it issued the SDO; its act can hardly be classified as a
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, correctable by a writ of certiorari.

No due process violation when the summary deportation

proceedings were held and when the SDO was issued

Were the documents that Park subsequently presented sufficient to set aside the SDO? The BID posits that these documents
should not even be considered because the SDO had already lapsed into finality (for which reason, the BID denied Parks
motion in its October 15, 2001 Resolution). Park disagrees and claims that the SDO cannot be final because its issuance was
tainted with due process violations by the BID. We, however, fail to see the SDO the way Park does.

The Charge Sheet[22] indicted Park for violating Section 37(a)(7) of the Immigration Act, which provision reads:

Section 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of another
officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien:

xxxx

(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or condition under which he was
admitted as a non-immigrant; [Emphasis supplied.]

However, the Charge Sheet contained not just a citation of the provision of law allegedly violated by Park, but more
importantly, a statement of the act constituting the offense, i.e., Parks status as an undocumented alien whose passport had
been cancelled by the Korean Government. The pertinent portion of the Charge Sheet reads:

The undersigned Special Prosecutor charges CHING GEUN PARK @ JUNG GEUN PARK @ CHING KEUN PARK, Korean
national, for deportation for violation of Section 37 (a)(7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, committed
as follows:

That the respondents passport was cancelled by the Korean Government,

therefore, he is now an undocumented alien in violation of Section 37(a)(7) of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. [Emphasis supplied.]

The actual designation of the offense is not material so long as the act constituting the offense was clearly alleged in the
Charge Sheet and sufficient enough to inform Park of the specific ground for his deportation. In this case, we think it was.
Notably, in the pleadings Park filed with the BID, he insisted that his Passport No. NW0057145 had not been cancelled; that
he possessed the requisite travel documents; and that he is not an undocumented alien. Under these circumstances, we
highly doubt Parks claim that he had been denied of his right to be informed; otherwise, he would not have found the need
to raise such defenses against the charge. Our opinion is fortified by the fact that Park never raised this particular objection
to the charge when the case was still before the BID and the CA. Thus, the allegations in the Charge Sheet were sufficient,
and there was full compliance by the BID with the requirement under Section 37(c) that no alien shall be deported without
being informed of the specific grounds for his deportation.

We likewise do not agree with Parks claim that his case should be heard under the regular deportation proceedings where a
full hearing is required before the BIDs Board of Special Inquiry. Section 1, Rule X of the Deportation Rules states that:

Summary deportation shall be observed in cases where the charge against the alien is overstaying or expiration of his
passport. In such case, the Board of Special Inquiry shall merely require the presentation of the aliens valid
passport and shall submit the appropriate recommendation on the bases thereof. [Emphasis supplied.]

Park was charged for having a cancelled passport, which theoretically is equivalent to an expired passport in either case, the
alien does not possess the valid passport required under Section 10 of the Immigration Act. The July 6, 2000 letter in fact
stated that Parks Korean Passport No. NW0057145 has been expired and cancelled. The BID Office Memorandum Order
No. 19 on Summary Deportation[23] lists aliens with cancelled passports to be covered under Summary Deportation
Proceedings. Thus, Parks case was properly heard as one for summary deportation, and a full-blown deportation hearing was
not necessary.

After rejecting Parks legal objections against the SDO, we proceed to a determination of whether there remains factual basis
to uphold the SDO and affirm the October 15, 2001 Resolution.

Before anything else, we note that upon issuance of the SDO, Park immediately and without any question or reservation paid
the administrative fines and fee imposed on him under the SDO. He supposedly paid the fees to support the petition for bail
which he filed with the BID. The payment of the administrative fines and fees, however, is not material in considering a bail
petition. In deportation proceedings, the decision to grant bail is entirely at the discretion of the BID Commissioner.[24]
While not material in the grant of his bail petition, the payment of the fines and fee was nonetheless a significant indication
of Parks acceptance of and compliance with the SDO. Parks act of payment effectively placed him in estoppel and now bars
him from contesting the validity of the SDO.

Park mainly relies on the following documents that purportedly evidenced his authority to enter and remain in the country:
the February 16, 2001 and May 28, 2001 letters of the Korean Embassy which, he claims, repudiated the July 6, 2000 letter
on which the SDO was based; the travel certificate dated January 16, 2001, also issued by the Korean Embassy; the SIRV
issued on January 8, 1997 by the Bureau of Investments; and the new Passport No. PH0003486 issued on April 5, 2001. The
CA considered the above documents sufficient to overturn the SDO and the October 15, 2001 Resolution, and thus faulted
the BID for disregarding them. A closer inspection of these documents, however, compels us to rule for the BID.

Contrary to Parks claims, the February 16, 2001 and May 28, 2001 letters did not categorically repudiate the
cancellation of Parks Passport No. NW0057145 that was stated in the July 6, 2000 letter. The February 16, 2001
letter simply declared that its author, Young Chai Kim, did not write any letter similar to the July 6, 2000 letter an immaterial
allegation since it was Gyung Taek Cha who wrote it. Gyung Taek Chas May 28, 2001 letter cannot be considered a
repudiation of his July 6, 2000 letter, as it only stated that Park, as of that date (May 28, 2001), did not have any pending
criminal cases in Korea. Not one of the letters definitely stated that Parks Passport No. NW0057145 was not cancelled on
March 8, 2000. Gyung Taek Cha may have written a letter on October 7, 2002 acknowledging error in making the July 6,
2000 letter, but this came in too late and was vague in denying the cancellation of the passport. Besides, the fact that Park
had been previously deported on the strength of the July 6, 2000 letter renders the October 7, 2002 letter suspect. Simply
put, the Korean Embassys letters never directly repudiated the cancellation of Parks Passport No. NW0057145.

Parks SIRV and travel certificate cannot stand as substitutes for his cancelled passport. As mentioned, Section 10 of the
Immigration Act requires non-immigrants to have (1) unexpired passports, and (2) valid passport visas. The grant of the
SIRV only relieves the alien from the necessity of securing a valid visa; it does not replace the requirement of a valid
passport. Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 63 declares that the SIRV entitles the alien to enter and leave the Philippines
without further documentary requirements other than valid passports or other travel documents in the nature of passports.
Neither can Park rely on the travel certificate; it was issued on January 16, 2001 by the Korean Embassy after Park had been
charged and indicted, and served only as authority for Park to return to Korea.

The issuance of a new passport to Park in no way obliterated the fact that he entered the country on October 28, 2000
without the requisite valid passport. Parks Passport No. PH0003486 was issued only on April 5, 2001, months after he had
been charged and indicted for violating our immigration laws.

While we ruled in the 2004 case of Domingo v. Scheer[25] that the subsequent issuance of a new and regular passport to
the alien rendered the SDO moot and academic, we cannot adopt that principle in the present case because the Scheer
ruling was arrived at after considering a significantly different factual situation.

The cancellation of Scheers passport resulted in the loss of his privilege to stay in the country and for which reason, the BID
ordered his deportation. The subsequent issuance of a new passport to Scheer, however, remedied his undocumented status
and authorized his continued stay; thus, we declared the SDO against him moot and academic. On the other hand, Park was
ordered deported because his cancelled passport denied him of the privilege to re-enter the country. The subsequent
issuance of a new passport to Park, as we said, did not erase the fact that he was not lawfully admitted into
the country in the first place, as he returned without a valid passport. When an alien has already physically gained entry
in the country, but such entry is later found unlawful or devoid of legal basis, the alien can be excluded anytime after it is
found that he was not lawfully admissible at the time of his entry.[26]

Given these findings, we rule that the supporting documents presented by Park do not provide sufficient factual basis for
overturning the SDO that, at that point, had already lapsed into finality for Parks failure to contest it on time. The BID thus
correctly denied Parks motion to set aside the SDO in its October 15, 2001 Resolution.

Deported aliens are generally barred from re-entering the

territory of the deporting state

We conclude this case by recognizing and pointing out certain aspects that the BID may, in its discretion, still want to look
into. Section 29 (a) of the Immigration Act states:

Section 29. (a) The following classes of aliens shall be excluded from entry into the Philippines:

xxxx

(15) Persons who have been excluded or deported from the Philippines, but this provision may be waived in the
discretion of the Commissioner of Immigration: Provided, however, That the Commissioner of Immigration shall not exercise
his discretion in favor of aliens excluded or deported on the ground of conviction for any crime involving moral turpitude or
for any crime penalized under sections forty-five and forty-six of this Act or on the ground of having engaged in hoarding,
black-marketing of profiteering unless such aliens have previously resided in the Philippine immediately before his exclusion
or deportation for a period of ten years or more or are married to a native Filipino woman; [Emphasis supplied.]
As a rule, an alien is barred from re-entering the territory of the deporting State. However, States may, upon proper
application, waive previous deportation orders and allow an alien to re-enter, provided, the re-entry and readmission of the
alien do not pose a risk to the general welfare. As stated in the quoted provision above, the Commissioner of Immigration
may exercise sound discretion in the readmission of previously excluded aliens (subject to certain limitations). After Park was
first deported back to Korea on July 24, 2000 on the strength of the July 6, 2000 letter, he returned to the Philippines
apparently without the requisite consent of the Commissioner of Immigration prior to his re-entry. Whether the July 6, 2000
letter was actually repudiated by the Korean Embassy does not figure into this equation, as Parks earlier deportation was
already a fait accompli. His failure to secure the Commissioner of Immigrations consent/waiver prior to readmission into the
deporting State leaves the Commissioner sufficient ground to charge him with violation of Section 37(a)(2) of the
Immigration Act, which declares that:
Section 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of another
officer designated by him or the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged
against the alien:
xxxx

(2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who was not
lawfully admissible at the time of entry; [Emphasis supplied.]

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari and REVERSE the June 13, 2002 Decision and September 4,
2003 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67614. The Summary Deportation Order of December 22, 2000
and Resolution of October 15, 2001 of the petition is AFFIRMED and REINSATED. This ruling is without prejudice to such
action the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation may undertake for the commencement of the proper proceedings against
respondent Jung Keun Park for his re-entry into the Philippines on October 28, 2000, subsequent to his deportation.

SO ORDERED.

JOVITO S. OLAZO, A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC

Complainant,

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,

CARPIO,
- versus -
CARPIO MORALES,

*VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), DEL CASTILLO,

Respondent. ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ,

MENDOZA, and

SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

December 7, 2010

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga ( respondent) filed by Mr.
Jovito S. Olazo (complainant). The respondent is charged of violating Rule 6.02,[1] Rule 6.03[2] and Rule 1.01[3] of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests.

Factual Background

In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in Barangay Lower Bicutan in the
Municipality of Taguig. The land ( subject land) was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and
declared open for disposition pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476,[4] issued on January 7, 1986, and Proclamation No. 172,
[5] issued on October 16, 1987.

To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig,
creating a Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a recommendation on the applications to
purchase the lands declared open for disposition. The Committee on Awards was headed by the Director of Lands and the
respondent was one of the Committee members, in his official capacity as the Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from
1987 to 1998); the respondents district includes the areas covered by the proclamations.

The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02

In the complaint,[6] the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as Congressman and as a member of
the Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainants sales application because of his personal interest
over the subject land. The complainant alleged that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over the
complainants father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the complainants sales application and claim the subject land
for himself. The complainant also alleged that the respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates, sums
of money as payment of the latters alleged rights over the subject land. The complainant further claimed that the
respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is
the nephew of the respondents deceased wife.

As a result of the respondents abuse of his official functions, the complainants sales application was denied. The conveyance
of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were subsequently given due course by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03

The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel Olazo, the complainants
brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the
land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the respondents promptings, the rights to the land were transferred to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of nullifying the
conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant claimed that the respondent wanted the
rights over the land transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this
regard executed an Assurance where he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01

The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his knowledge that Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. The complainant averred that Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas and does not qualify for an award. Thus, the approval of his
sales application by the Committee on Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of Proclamation No. 172 and
Memorandum No. 119.

The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act ( R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in the practice of law, within the one-year
prohibition period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on
Awards.

In his Comment,[7] the respondent claimed that the present complaint is the third malicious charge filed against him by the
complainant. The first one was submitted before the Judicial and Bar Council when he was nominated as an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court; the second complaint is now pending with the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation of
Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a different version of the antecedent events.

The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the subject land and he later conveyed these rights to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Miguel Olazos rights over the subject land and the transfer of his rights to Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez were duly recognized by the Secretary of the DENR before whom the conflict of rights over the subject land
(between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, on one hand, and the complainant on the other hand) was brought. In
its decision, the DENR found Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a qualified applicant, and his application over the subject land was
given due course. The respondent emphasized that the DENR decision is now final and executory. It was affirmed by the
Office of the President, by the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court.

The respondent also advanced the following defenses:

(1) He denied the complainants allegation that Miguel Olazo told him (complainant) that the respondent had been
orchestrating to get the subject land. The respondent argued that this allegation was without corroboration and was
debunked by the affidavits of Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo, the complainants sister.

(2) He denied the complainants allegation that he offered the complainant P50,000.00 for the subject land and that he (the
respondent) had exerted undue pressure and influence on Miguel Olazo to claim the rights over the subject land. The
respondent also denied that he had an inordinate interest in the subject land.

(3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong in signing as a witness in Miguel Olazos affidavit where the latter asserted his
rights over the subject land. The affidavit merely attested to the truth.

(4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo were cousins and that the latter decided to sell his rights over the subject land for
the medical treatment of his heart condition and the illness of his daughter, Francisca Olazo. The respondent insisted that
the money he extended to them was a form of loan.

(5) The respondents participation in the transaction between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez involved the
payment of the loan that the respondent extended to Miguel Olazo.

(6) Manuels belated and secondhand allegation in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, regarding what his
father told him, cannot prevail over his earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay with Francisca Olazo, dated August 2, 1997. In the said
Sinumpaang Salaysay, Manuel categorically asserted that his father Miguel Olazo, not the complainant, was the farmer-
beneficiary. Manuel also expressed his agreement to the transfer of rights ( Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng Karapatan) in favor
of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, and the withdrawal of his fathers application to give way to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguezs
application.

(7) The complainants allegation that the respondent had pressured and influenced Miguel Olazo to sell the subject land was
not sufficient as it was lacking in specificity and corroboration. The DENR decision was clear that the complainant had no
rights over the subject land.

The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He alleged that during his
third term as Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting applications of the complainant, Miguel Olazo and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez were not included in the agenda for deliberation of the Committee on Awards. Rather, their conflicting
claims and their respective supporting documents were before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR. This
office ruled over the conflicting claims only on August 2, 2000. This ruling became the basis of the decision of the Secretary
of the DENR.

Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since the provision
applies to lawyers in the government service who are allowed by law to engage in private law practice and to those who,
though prohibited from engaging in the practice of law, have friends, former associates and relatives who are in the active
practice of law.[8] In this regard, the respondent had already completed his third term in Congress and his stint in the
Committee on Awards when he represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez on May 24, 1999.
Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since
he did not intervene in the disposition of the conflicting applications of the complainant and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
because the applications were not submitted to the Committee on Awards when he was still a member.

The Courts Ruling

Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the
discharge of his duties as a government official.[9] He may be disciplined by this Court as a member of the Bar only when
his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.[10]

The issue in this case calls for a determination of whether the respondents actions constitute a breach of the standard ethical
conduct first, while the respondent was still an elective public official and a member of the Committee on Awards; and
second, when he was no longer a public official, but a private lawyer who represented a client before the office he was
previously connected with.

After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their respective pieces of evidence, we resolve to dismiss
the administrative complaint.

Accountability of a government lawyer in public office

Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the continuing standard of ethical conduct to be observed by
government lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In addition to the standard of conduct laid down under R.A. No.
6713 for government employees, a lawyer in the government service is obliged to observe the standard of conduct under the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government service is more exacting
than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government service are subject to constant public scrutiny
under norms of public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor of
the interest of the public; their private activities should not interfere with the discharge of their official functions.[11]

The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It imposes the following
restrictions in the conduct of a government lawyer:

A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the
latter to interfere with his public duties.

The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote private interests; (2) advance
private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public duties. We previously held that the restriction
extends to all government lawyers who use their public offices to promote their private interests.[12]
In Huyssen v. Gutierrez,[13] we defined promotion of private interest to include soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value
in any transaction requiring the approval of his or her office, or may be affected by the functions of his or her office. In Ali v.
Bubong,[14] we recognized that private interest is not limited to direct interest, but extends to advancing the interest of
relatives. We also ruled that private interest interferes with public duty when the respondent uses the office and his or her
knowledge of the intricacies of the law to benefit relatives.[15]

In Vitriolo v. Dasig,[16] we found the act of the respondent (an official of the Commission on Higher Education) of extorting
money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office to be a serious breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.[17] We reached the same conclusion in Huyssen, where we found the respondent (an
employee of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
based on the evidence showing that he demanded money from the complainant who had a pending application for visas
before his office.[18]

Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano[19] we found the respondent (a Court Attorney of this Court) liable for violating Rule 6.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, after considering the evidence showing that he demanded and received money from the
complainant who had a pending case before this Court.

Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any concrete proof that the respondent abused
his position as a Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

First, the records do not clearly show if the complainants sales application was ever brought before the Committee on
Awards. By the complaints own account, the complainant filed a sales application in March 1990 before the Land
Management Bureau. By 1996, the complainants sales application was pending before the Office of the Regional Director,
NCR of the DENR due to the conflicting claims of Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The records
show that it was only on August 2, 2000 that the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR rendered its decision, or
after the term of the respondents elective public office and membership to the Committee on Awards, which expired in 1997.

These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any way promote, advance or use his private interests in the
discharge of his official duties. To repeat, since the sales application was not brought before the Committee on Awards when
the respondent was still a member, no sufficient basis exists to conclude that he used his position to obtain personal
benefits. We note in this regard that the denial of the complainants sales application over the subject land was made by the
DENR, not by the Committee on Awards.
Second, the complainants allegation that the respondent orchestrated the efforts to get the subject land does not specify
how the orchestration was undertaken. What appears clear in the records is the uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Miguel Olazo, dated May 25, 2003,[20] categorically stating that the respondent had no interest in the subject land, and
neither was he a contracting party in the transfer of his rights over the subject land. In the absence of any specific charge,
Olazos disclaimer is the nearest relevant statement on the respondents alleged participation, and we find it to be in the
respondents favor.

Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to support his claim that the
respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over his father (namely: the letter, dated June 22, 1996, to the DENR
Regional Director-NCR;[21] the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 12, 1996;[22] and the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17,
1996[23]), do not contain any reference to the alleged pressure or force exerted by the respondent over Miguel Olazo. The
documents merely showed that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having his farm lots (covered by the proclaimed
areas) surveyed. They also showed that the respondent merely acted as a witness in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July
17, 1996. To our mind, there are neutral acts that may be rendered by one relative to another, and do not show how the
respondent could have influenced the decision of Miguel Olazo to contest the complainants sales application. At the same
time, we cannot give any credit to the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel. They are not only hearsay
but are contrary to what Miguel Olazo states on the record. We note that Manuel had no personal knowledge, other than
what Miguel Olazo told him, of the force allegedly exerted by the respondent against Miguel Olazo.

In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation - backed by corroborating evidence - of the nature of
the transaction in which he gave the various sums of money to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo in the year 1995. In her
affidavits dated May 25, 2003[24] and July 21, 2010,[25] Francisca Olazo corroborated the respondents claim that the sums
of money he extended to her and Miguel Olazo were loans used for their medical treatment. Miguel Olazo, in his
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated May 25, 2003, asserted that some of the money borrowed from the respondent was used for his
medical treatment and hospitalization expenses.

The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the respondents claim that the latters involvement was limited
to being paid the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo. According to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and Miguel
Olazo agreed that a portion of the loan would be directly paid by Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez to the respondent and the
amount paid would be considered as part of the purchase price of the subject land.[26]

It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary evidence, specifically the dates when the sums of money
were extended by the respondent on February 21, 1995, September 2, 1995 and October 17, 1995, and the date when the
Deed of Conveyance[27] over the subject land was executed or on October 25, 1995, showed that the sums of money were
extended prior to the transfer of rights over the subject land. These pieces of evidence are consistent with the respondents
allegation that Miguel Olazo decided to sell his rights over the subject land to pay the loans he obtained from the respondent
and, also, to finance his continuing medical treatment.

Private practice of law after separation from public office

As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after his separation from the government
service, the complainant presented the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel and the document entitled
Assurance where the respondent legally represented Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the foregoing
pieces of evidence fail to persuade us to conclude that there was a violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

In Cayetano v. Monsod,[28] we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service,
which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.

Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on government lawyers to engage in private practice after their
separation from the service.
Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and

omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall
constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall
not:
xxxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; x x x

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or separation from public
office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in
connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.

As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession during their incumbency.
[29] By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her profession under the following
conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict
or tend to conflict with his or her official functions.[30] The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the
exception. In case of lawyers separated from the government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter before the office
he used to be with.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after leaving the
government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while
in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the term intervene which we
previously interpreted to include an act of a person who has the power to influence the proceedings.[31] Otherwise stated,
to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted
engagement or employment in a matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised power to influence
the outcome of the proceedings.

As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with the sales application
covering Manuels land when the former was still a member of the Committee on Awards. The complainant, too, failed to
sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by the
respondent was limited only in the preparation of a single document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc.,[32] we specifically
described private practice of law as one that contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily
holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.

In any event, even granting that respondents act fell within the definition of practice of law, the available pieces of evidence
are insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before the Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was
intended to be presented before it. These are matters for the complainant to prove and we cannot consider any uncertainty
in this regard against the respondents favor.

Violation of Rule 1.01

Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From the above discussion, we already
struck down the complainants allegation that respondent engaged in an unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as a
lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.

We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainants claim that the respondent violated paragraph 4(1)[33]
of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his knowledge that
his nephew was not a qualified applicant. The matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguezs qualifications to apply for a sales
application over lots covered by the proclaimed areas has been resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in
the decision dated April 3, 2004,[34] when the DENR gave due course to his sales application over the subject land. We are,
at this point, bound by this finding.

As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the President, the Court of Appeals[35]
and, finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R. No. 173453. In our Resolution, we
dismissed the petition for review on certiorari filed by the complainant after finding, among others, that no reversible error
was committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision.[36]

All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the
burden rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for the Court to exercise its disciplinary
powers.[37] The respondent generally is under no obligation to prove his/her defense,[38] until the burden shifts to him/her
because of what the complainant has proven. Where no case has in the first place been proven, nothing has to be rebutted
in defense.[39]

With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for the complainants failure to prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the former committed unethical infractions warranting the exercise of the Courts
disciplinary power.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the administrative case for violation of Rule 6.02, Rule 6.03 and Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, filed against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.

BERSAMIN, J.:
Is the presentation of a stock certificate a condition sine qua non for proving one’s shareholding in a corporation? This is the
decisive question to be resolved in this appeal.
The Case

In this appeal, the petitioners challenge the decision promulgated on June 6, 2012 in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 115203,[1] whereby
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the dismissal of their complaint by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, in Bangued,
Abra under the order dated June 28, 2010 for their failure to comply with the order to present their stock certificates.[2]
Antecedents

Petitioners Grace Borgoña Insigne, Diosdado Borgoña, Osbourne Borgoña, Imelda Borgoña Rivera, Aristotle Borgoña are
siblings of the full blood. Respondent Francis Borgoña (Francis) is their older half-blood brother. The petitioners are the
children of the late Pedro Borgoña (Pedro) by his second wife, Teresita Valeros, while Francis was Pedro’s son by his first
wife, Humvelina Avila.[3] In his lifetime, Pedro was the founder, president and majority stockholder of respondent Abra
Valley Colleges, Inc. (Abra Valley), a stock corporation. After Pedro’s death, Francis succeeded him as the president of Abra
Valley.[4]

On March 26, 2002, the petitioners, along with their brother Romulo Borgoña and Elmer Reyes, filed a complaint (with
application for preliminary injunction) and damages in the RTC against Abra Valley (docketed as Special Civil Action Case No.
2070),[5] praying, among others, that the RTC direct Abra Valley to allow them to inspect its corporate books and records,
and the minutes of meetings, and to provide them with its financial statements[6]

Due to Abra Valley’s failure to file its responsive pleading within the reglementary period provided in the Interim Rules of
Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies,[7] the RTC rendered judgment on May 7, 2002 in favor of the
petitioners,[8] disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered:

(1). Ordering respondent Abra Valley College to allow petitioners to inspect its corporate books and records
and minutes of meetings at reasonable hours on business days, copies of excerpts from said books, records
and minutes shall be allowed reproduction by petitioners at their expense and after written demand pursuant
to Section 74 of the Corporation Code;

(2). Ordering respondent Abra Valley College to furnish petitioners its financial statement at their expense
within ten (10) days from receipt of a written request pursuant to Section 75 of the Corporation Code;

(3). Ordering respondent Abra Valley College to pay petitioners the amount of P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees.

SO ORDERED.[9]

The RTC denied Abra Valley’s motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2002;[10] hence, Abra Valley appealed to the CA,
which promulgated its decision on December 20, 2006,[11] ordering the RTC to admit Abra Valley’s answer despite its
belated filing on May 10, 2002; and remanding the case for further proceedings.

Thereafter, the petitioners amended their complaint[12] to substitute Evelyn Borgoña, the wife of Romulo Borgoña, as one
of the plaintiffs due to Romulo’s intervening death;[13] to implead Francis as an additional defendant, both in his personal
capacity and as the president of Abra Valley; and to include the immediate holding of the annual stockholders’ meeting as
the second cause of action. The amended complaint also alleged that they were bona fide stockholders of Abra Valley,
attaching copies of stock certificates indorsed in their favor on the dorsal portion by the original holders.[14]

On November 10, 2009, Abra Valley and Francis filed their respective answers.[15]
In its answer, Abra Valley raised the following special and affirmative defenses, to wit:
18. Inasmuch as the originals of the above enumerated certificates of stock are still in names of the original
owners, it is the conclusion that the transfers or transactions, if any, that may have transpired between said
owners and plaintiffs are not yet recorded and registered with the corporation issuing the same;

19. If said transaction or transfer was already registered, the stock certificates in the name of the assignor,
transferor or indorses should have been cancelled and replaced with stock certificates in the name of the
assignee, transferee or indorsee;

20. The stocks certificate submitted by the plaintiffs are still not in their respective names, but still in the
name of the supposed assignors, transferors or indorsers.

x x x x

23. To avail of the rights of stockholders, the plaintiffs must present stock certificates already in their names,
and not in the names of other persons;[16]

On his part, Francis averred similar special and affirmative defenses, to wit:
10. From the Annexes of the amended complaint filed by plaintiffs, it appears that not one of them is a
stockholder of record of the Abra Valley Colleges, Inc.;

11. Be that as it is, plaintiffs are not vested with the rights to vote, to notice, to inspect, to call for an annual
meeting or demand the conduct of one, and such other rights and privileges inherent and available only to
stockholders of record;

12. From the copies of Stock Certificate attached to the AMENDED COMPLAINT, some of the plaintiffs are
mere assignees or indorsees, and that the other plaintiffs are not even assignees or indorsee;

13. And the right of an assignee or indorsee of a stock certificate is limited only to the issuance of stock
certificate in his or her name, after the requirements and conditions are complied with;[17]

The respondents then filed on March 2, 2010 a Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Special and Affirmative Defenses. [18] At
the hearing set on March 8, 2010, the RTC ordered the petitioners to present the stock certificates issued by Abra Valley
under their names.

On April 7, 2010, the petitioners submitted their Compliance and Manifestation,[19] attaching the following documents:
(1) Certification of defendant corporation dated April 3, 2001, issued by its Corporate Secretary,
Jocelyn Bernal, officially stating that “as per Records of the Stock and Transfer Book of the Abra Valley
Colleges the following persons has [sic] a share” in defendant corporation, namely: plaintiffs –

(a) Grace V. Borgoña [110 shares],

(b) Aristotle and Imelda V. Borgoña [30 shares],
(c) Diosdado V. Borgoña [15 shares], and
(d) Osbourne V. Borgoña [10 shares].
(Annex “A”);

(2) SEC certified true copy of “ISSUANCE OF PART OF AUTHORIZED AND UNISSUED CAPITAL
STOCK” of defendant corporation, declaring that in a Special Meeting of Trustees held on February 1,
1982, a Resolution to make a private offering of its authorized and unissued capital stock to certain persons,
which included the following plaintiffs: Grace B. Insigne, Osbourne v. Borgoña, Diosdado V. Borgoña,
Imelda B. Rivera and Aristotle V. Borgoña, was duly adopted. (Annex “B”);

(3) Official Receipts (O.R.) of defendant corporation showing that on August 8, 1986, each of the
following plaintiffs paid for 36 shares of stock of defendant corporation, to wit:

1. Grace Insigne [O.R. # 62092],

2. Osbourne Borgoña [O.R. # 62094],
 3. Diosdado Borgoña [O.R. # 62095],
4. Imelda B. Rivera [O.R. # 62096], and
5. Aristotle Borgoña [O.R. # 62097],
(Annexes “C” to “C-4”);

(4) SEC certified copy of “Letter” of defendant corporation’s President Pedro V. Borgoña, dated
June 17, 1987, addressed to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), informing the SEC that
defendant corporation issued 324 shares of its authorized and unissued capital stocks to certain offerees,
which included the following plaintiffs: Grace B. Insigne, Osbourne v. Borgoña, Diosdado V. Borgoña,
Imelda B. Rivera and Aristotle V. Borgoña. (Annex “D”);

(5) SEC certified copy of “Secretary’s Certificate” of defendant corporation, dated June 17, 1987 ,
issued by the Corporate Secretary and attested by its President, stating that at a Special Meeting of the Board
of Trustees held on February 1, 1982, a Resolution was passed formally confirming and ratifying the
issuance of 324 shares from the authorized and unissued capital stock of the corporation to certain persons,
which included the following plaintiffs: Grace B. Insigne, Osbourne V. Borgoña, Diosdado V. Borgoña,
Imelda B. Rivera and Aristotle V. Borgoña, and who subscribed and fully paid their respective number of
shares. (Annex “E”);

(6) SEC certified copy of the “General Information Sheet” (GIS) of defendant corporation showing
that in 1989, the following plaintiffs, namely: Grace B. Insigne, Diosdado V. Borgoña, Imelda B. Rivera
and Aristotle V. Borgoña, together with then President, Pedro V. Borgoña, were members of the Board of
defendant corporation. (Annex “F”); and

(7) SEC certified copy of the “MINUTES OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF DIRECTORS AND
STOCKHOLDERS OF THE ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE ON JANUARY 29, 1989” showing that the following
plaintiffs, namely: Grace B. Insigne, Osbourne V. Borgoña, Diosdado V. Borgoña, Imelda B. Rivera
and Aristotle V. Borgoña, attended said Annual Meeting as stockholders, and the same minutes shows that
some of the plaintiffs were elected members of the 1989 Board of defendant corporation. (Annex “G”)[20]

The petitioners likewise filed a Motion for Production/Inspection of Documents ,[21] asking that the RTC direct the
respondents to produce Abra Valley’s Stock and Transfer Book (STB); and that petitioners be allowed to inspect the same.

On June 28, 2010, the RTC issued the assailed order dismissing Special Civil Action Case No. 2070 pursuant to Section 3,
Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, pertinently holding:
As can be gleaned, the documents presented are not Stock Certificates as boldly announced by the plaintiff’s
counsel, hence, plaintiffs failed to comply with the order of the Court dated March 8, 2010. Hence, this case is
dismissible under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — “If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to
appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute
his action for an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these rules or any order of the
court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the Court's own
motion without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counter-claim in the
same or in a separate action. The dismissal shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the
merits, unless otherwise declared by the Court.”

Going into the merits, the Court is of the considered opinion that the documents presented in the compliance
failed to defeat the challenge of the defendant. “A mere typewritten statement advising a stockholder of the
extent of his ownership in a corporation xxx cannot be considered a formal Certificate of Stock”. (SEC opinion.
20 October 1970, cited in Bitong vs. CA)

Further, in a derivative suit, it is required that stockholder is an owner of a stock certificate at the time of the
suit. The documents presented are not updated.

WHEREFORE, premises considered this case is ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.[22]
The petitioners appealed the dismissal.

On June 6, 2012, the CA promulgated its assailed decision,[23] the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Order dated 28 June 2010 of the Regional
Trial Court of Bangued, Abra, Branch 1, in Civil Case No. 2070 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[24]

After the CA denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration on October 15, 2012,[25] the petitioners have come to the
Court for review.
Issue

To be resolved is whether the RTC properly dismissed Special Civil Action Case No. 2070 on the ground of the petitioners’
failure to comply with the order issued by the RTC on March 8, 2010 to produce stock certificates. In other words, the Court
should determine whether or not the petitioners were bona fide stockholders of Abra Valley.
Ruling of the Court

The appeal is meritorious.

At the outset, we stress that the Court’s determination is limited to resolving the issue concerning the status or relation of
the petitioners with Abra Valley. Whether or not the petitioners could exercise their right to inspect Abra Valley’s corporate
books, records and minutes of meetings, and be furnished with financial statements, and whether or not they could demand
the immediate holding of the annual stockholders’ meeting are matters to be tried and resolved by the RTC.
1.
Petitioners were stockholders of Abra Valley

In their amended complaint, the petitioners alleged that they were bona fide stockholders of Abra Valley. On the other
hand, the respondents claimed as an affirmative defense that the petitioners were not Abra Valley’s stockholders.

In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence that
is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Thus, the party, whether
the plaintiff or the defendant, who asserts the affirmative of an issue bears the onus to prove his assertion in order to obtain
a favorable judgment. From the plaintiff the burden to prove his positive assertions never parts. Yet, for the defendant, an
affirmative defense is one that is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff’s cause of action, but rather one that,
if established, will be a good defense – i.e., an “avoidance” of the claim.[26]

The petitioners’ causes of action against the respondents were premised on Sections 50, 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code,
[27] to wit:
Section 50. Regular and special meetings of stockholders or members . – Regular meetings of stockholders or
members shall be held annually on a date fixed in the by-laws, or if not so fixed, on any date in April of every
year as determined by the board of directors or trustees: Provided, That written notice of regular meetings
shall be sent to all stockholders or members of record at least two (2) weeks prior to the meeting, unless a
different period is required by the by-laws.

Section 74. Books to be kept; stock transfer agent . – x x x

The records of all business transactions of the corporation and the minutes of any meetings shall be open to
inspection by any director, trustee, stockholder or member of the corporation at reasonable hours on
business days and he may demand, in writing, for a copy of excerpts from said records or minutes, at his
expense.

x x x x

Section 75. Right to financial statements. – Within ten (10) days from receipt of a written request of any
stockholder or member, the corporation shall furnish to him its most recent financial statement, which shall
include a balance sheet as of the end of the last taxable year and a profit or loss statement for said taxable
year, showing in reasonable detail its assets and liabilities and the result of its operations. (Emphasis ours)
 xxxx

Conformably with these provisions, the petitioners had to establish that they were stockholders of Abra Valley. Indeed, the
CA concluded that it was the petitioners who had failed to discharge the burden of proving their stock ownership because
they did not produce their stock certificates.

We reverse the CA.

First of all, the present issue was the offshoot of the RTC’s resolution of the Motion for Preliminary Hearing of Special and
Affirmative Defenses, wherein the respondents alleged that the petitioners were not stockholders of Abra Valley; and that
they had no cause of action against the respondents. Being the parties who filed the Motion for Preliminary Hearing of
Special and Affirmative Defenses, the respondents bore the burden of proof to establish that the petitioners were not
stockholders of Abra Valley. The respondents’ assertion therein, albeit negative, partook of a good defense that, if
established, would result to their “avoidance” of the claim. On that basis, the CA erroneously laid the burden of proof on the
petitioners.

Secondly, the petitioners, assuming that they bore the burden of proving their status as stockholders of Abra Valley,
nonetheless discharged their burden despite their non-production of the stock certificates.

A stock certificate is prima facie evidence that the holder is a shareholder of the corporation,[28] but the possession of the
certificate is not the sole determining factor of one’s stock ownership. A certificate of stock is merely: –
x x x the paper representative or tangible evidence of the stock itself and of the various interests therein. The
certificate is not stock in the corporation but is merely evidence of the holder's interest and
status in the corporation, his ownership of the share represented thereby, but is not in law the
equivalent of such ownership. It expresses the contract between the corporation and the stockholder, but
it is not essential to the existence of a share in stock or the creation of the relation of shareholder to the
corporation.[29] (Emphasis supplied.)

To establish their stock ownership, the petitioners actually turned over to the trial court through their Compliance and
Manifestation submitted on April 7, 2010 the various documents showing their ownership of Abra Valley’s shares,[30]
specifically: the official receipts of their payments for their subscriptions of the shares of Abra Valley; and the copies duly
certified by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) stating that Abra Valley had issued shares in favor of the
petitioners, such as the issuance of part of authorized and unissued capital stock; the letter dated June 17, 1987; the
secretary’s certificate dated June 17, 1987; and the general information sheet.

And, thirdly, the petitioners adduced competent proof showing that the respondents had allowed the petitioners to become
members of the Board of Directors. According to the Minutes of the Annual Meeting of Directors and Stockholders of the
Abra Valley College of January 29, 1989, which was among the documents submitted to the trial court on April 7, 2010
through the Compliance and Manifestation, the petitioners attended the annual meeting of January 29, 1989 as stockholders
of Abra Valley, and participated in the election of the Board of Directors at which some of them were chosen as members.
Considering that Section 23 of the Corporation Code requires every director to be the holder of at least one share of capital
stock of the corporation of which he is a director, the respondents would not have then allowed any of the petitioners to be
elected to sit in the Board of Directors as members unless they believed that the petitioners so elected were not disqualified
for lack of stock ownership. Neither did the respondents thereafter assail their acts as Board Directors. Conformably with the
doctrine of estoppel, the respondents could no longer deny the petitioners’ status as stockholders of Abra Valley. The
application of the doctrine of estoppel, which is based on public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, is only
appropriate because the purpose of the doctrine is to forbid one from speaking against his own act, representations, or
commitments to the injury of another to whom he directed such act, representations, or commitments, and who reasonably
relied thereon. The doctrine springs from equitable principles and the equities in the case, and is designed to aid the law in
the administration of justice where without its aid injustice might result. The Court has applied the doctrine wherever and
whenever special circumstances of the case so demanded.[31]

Under the circumstances, the dismissal of Special Civil Action Case No. 2070 on June 28, 2010 on the basis that “the
documents presented are not Stock Certificates as boldly announced by the plaintiff’s counsel, hence, plaintiffs failed to
comply with the order of the Court dated March 8, 2010” was unwarranted and unreasonable. Although Section 3, Rule 17 of
the Rules of Court[32] expressly empowers the trial court to dismiss the complaint motu proprio or upon motion of the
defendant if, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to comply with any order of the court, the power to dismiss is not to
wielded indiscriminately, but only when the non-compliance constitutes a willful violation of an order of consequence to the
action. Dismissal of the action can be grossly oppressive if it is based on non-compliance with the most trivial order of the
court considering that the dismissal equates to “an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the
court.”[33] A line of demarcation must be drawn between an order whose non-compliance impacts on the case, and an order
whose non-compliance causes little effect on the case. For example, the non-compliance of an order to the plaintiff to amend
his complaint to implead an indispensable party as defendant should be sanctioned with dismissal with prejudice unless the
non-compliance was upon justifiable cause, like such party not within the jurisdiction of the court.

As we have seen, however, the dismissal of Special Civil Action Case No. 2070 by virtue of Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of
Court should be undone because the petitioners’ production of the stock certificates was rendered superfluous by their
submission of other competent means of establishing their shareholdings in Abra Valley.
2.
Petitioners were entitled to demand
the production of the STB of Abra Valley

The respondents insist that the petitioners should establish that the indorsement of the stock certificates by the original
holders was registered in their favor in the STB of Abra Valley.[34]

We do not agree with this insistence.

A person becomes a stockholder of a corporation by acquiring a share through either purchase or subscription. Here, the
petitioners acquired their shares in Abra Valley: (1) by subscribing to 36 shares each from Abra Valley’s authorized and
unissued capital stock;[35] and (2) by purchasing the shareholdings of existing stockholders, as borne out by the latter’s
indorsement on the stock certificates.[36]

In determining the validity of the transfer of shares through purchase, we resort to Section 63 of the Corporation Code,
which pertinently provides:
Section 63. Certificate of stock and transfer of shares. – x x x Shares of stock so issued are personal property
and may be transferred by delivery of the certificate or certificates indorsed by the owner or his attorney-in-
fact or other person legally authorized to make the transfer. No transfer, however, shall be valid, except as
between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation showing the names of the
parties to the transaction, the date of the transfer, the number of the certificate or certificates and the number
of shares transferred.

No shares of stock against which the corporation holds any unpaid claim shall be transferable in the books of
the corporation.

In this regard, the Court has instructed in Ponce v. Alsons Cement Corporation[37] that:
x x x [A] transfer of shares of stock not recorded in the stock and transfer book of the corporation is non-
existent as far as the corporation is concerned. As between the corporation on the one hand, and its
shareholders and third persons on the other, the corporation looks only to its books for the purpose of
determining who its shareholders are. It is only when the transfer has been recorded in the stock and transfer
book that a corporation may rightfully regard the transferee as one of its stockholders. From this time, the
consequent obligation on the part of the corporation to recognize such rights as it is mandated by law to
recognize arises.

Nonetheless, in Lanuza v. Court of Appeals, [38] the Court has underscored that the STB is not the exclusive evidence of the
matters and things that ordinarily are or should be written therein, for parol evidence may be admitted to supply omissions
from the records, or to explain ambiguities, or to contradict such records, to wit:
x x x [A] stock and transfer book is the book which records the names and addresses of all stockholders
arranged alphabetically, the installments paid and unpaid on all stock for which subscription has been made,
and the date of payment thereof; a statement of every alienation, sale or transfer of stock made, the date
thereof and by and to whom made; and such other entries as may be prescribed by law. A stock and transfer
book is necessary as a measure of precaution, expediency and convenience since it provides the only certain
and accurate method of establishing the various corporate acts and transactions and of showing the ownership
of stock and like matters. However, a stock and transfer book, like other corporate books and
records, is not in any sense a public record, and thus is not exclusive evidence of the matters and
things which ordinarily are or should be written therein. In fact, it is generally held that the
 records and minutes of a corporation are not conclusive even against the corporation but are
prima facie evidence only, and may be impeached or even contradicted by other competent
evidence. Thus, parol evidence may be admitted to supply omissions in the records or explain
ambiguities, or to contradict such records. (Emphasis supplied.)

Considering that Abra Valley’s STB was not in the possession of the petitioners, or at their disposal, they could not be
reasonably expected or justly compelled to prove that their stock subscriptions and purchases were recorded therein. This,
more than any other, was precisely why they filed their Motion for Production/Inspection of Documents [39] to compel the
respondents to produce the STB, but the RTC did not act on the motion.

Unfortunately, the CA concurred with the RTC’s inaction on the ground that “the Stock and Transfer Book is one of the
corporate books which may be examined only by a stockholder-of-record.”[40]

In our view, the CA thereby grossly erred. The rules of discovery, including Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court[41]
governing the production or inspection of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects
or tangible things not privileged, which contain or constitute evidence material to any matter involved in the action and
which are in the other party’s possession, custody or control, are to be accorded broad and liberal interpretation.[42] In
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, [43] the Court has dwelt on the breadth of discovery in the following tenor:
What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information which may be useful in the
preparation for trial, such as the identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts; those
relevant facts themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things. Hence, the “deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad
and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to preclude a party from
inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent’s case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by
both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge
whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at
which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the
possibility, of surprise,”...

In light of the foregoing, the RTC should have favorably acted on the petitioners’ Motion for Production/Inspection of
Documents in order to enable the petitioners, consistent with the recognized privileges and disabilities, to enable them to
obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts to be determined in Special Civil Action Case No. 2070, and
thereby prevent the trial from being carried on in the dark, at least from their side.[44] Doing so would not have caused any
prejudice to the respondents, for, after all, even had the petitioners not filed the Motion for Production/Inspection of
Documents, the respondents would themselves also be expected to produce the STB in court in order to substantiate their
affirmative defense that the petitioners were not stockholders-of-record of Abra Valley. Verily, that there was no entry or
record in the STB showing the petitioners to be stockholders of Abra Valley was no valid justification for the respondents not
to produce the same. Otherwise, the disputable presumption under Section 3 (e) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that
“evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced” could arise against them.

For sure, the transfer of shares in favor of the petitioners was made through the indorsement by the original holders who
were presumably the registered owners of the shares, coupled with the delivery of the stock certificates. Such procedure
conformed to Section 63 of the Corporation Code. Although Abra Valley did not yet recognize such stock purchases until the
surrender of the stock certificates to the corporate secretary to enable the latter to exercise the ministerial duty of recording
the transfers,[45] there was no way of avoiding or evading the production of the STB in court on the part of the
respondents. The STB would definitely be relevant and necessary for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the
petitioners’ subscriptions to the authorized and unissued capital stock of Abra Valley had been duly registered.

Lastly, we take notice of the petitioners’ submission of the certification issued on April 3, 2001 by Abra Valley’s corporate
secretary stating that the petitioners were shareholders “as per Records of the Stock and Transfer Book of the Abra Valley
Colleges” belied the respondents’ claim that no entry or record had been made in the STB.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on June 6, 2012 in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
115203; NULLIFIES and SETS ASIDE the order issued in Special Civil Action Case No. 2070 on June 28, 2010 by the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, in Bangued, Abra; DECLARES the petitioners as stockholders of respondent Abra Valley
Colleges, Inc.; ORDERS the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, in Bangued, Abra TO REINSTATE Special Civil Action Case No.
2070, and TO RESUME its proceedings therein; and DIRECTS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
TRAVEL ON V. CA

210 SCRA 351

FACTS:
Petitioner was a travel agency involved in ticket sales on a commission basis for and on behalf of different
airline companies. Miranda has a revolving credit line with the company. He procured tickets on behalf of others
and derived commissions from it.

Petitioner filed a collection suit against Miranda for the unpaid amount of six checks. Petitioner alleged that
Miranda procured tickets from them which he paid with cash and checks but the checks were dishonored upon
presentment to the bank. This was being refuted by Miranda by saying
that he actually paid for his obligations, even in the excess. He argued that the checks were for
accommodation purposes only. The company needed to show to its Board of Directors that its accounts receivable was
in good standing. The RTC and CA held Miranda not to be liable.

HELD:
Reliance by the lower and appellate court on the company’s financial statements were wrong, to see if Miranda was
liable or not. This financial statements were actually not updated to show that there was indebtedness on the part of
Miranda. The best evidence that the courts should have looked at were the checks itself. There is a prima facie
presumption that a check was issued for valuable consideration and the provision puts the burden upon the drawer to
disprove this presumption. Miranda was unable to relieve himself of this burden.

Only clear and convincing evidence and not mere self-serving evidence of drawer can rebut this presumption. The
company was entitled to the benefit conferred by the statutory provision. Miranda failed to show that the checks
weren’t issued for any valuable consideration. The checks were
clear by stating that the company was the payee and not a mere accommodated party. And also, notice was
given to the fact that the checks were issued after a written demand by the company regarding Miranda’s unpaid
liabilities.

G.R. No. 140895 July 17, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ALMA BISDA y GAUPO and GENEROSA "JENNY ROSE" BASILAN y PAYAN, appellants.
PER CURIAM:

Before this Court on automatic review is the Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City; Branch 272,
convicting appellants Alma Bisda and Generosa "Jenny Rose" Basilan, of kidnapping for ransom; sentencing each of them to
the extreme penalty of death by lethal injection, and ordering them to indemnify the parents of the victim Angela Michelle
Soriano the amount of P100,000 as moral damages, and to pay the costs of the suit.
The Case
In an Amended Information docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-2647-MK, the appellants were charged with the felony of
kidnapping for ransom committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd of September 1998, in the City of Marikina, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did there and then
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly kidnap, detain and deprive ANGELA MICHELLE SORIANO y SAN JUAN
 of her liberty for six (6) days for the purpose of extorting ransom from her/or her family.

Contrary to law.2

When arraigned, the appellants, assisted by counsel, entered separate pleas of not guilty. 3

The Evidence for the Prosecution4

William Soriano, a training consultant by profession, and his wife Marymae Soriano, had two children: Kathleen Denise and
Angela Michelle. They rented a house at No. 5 Col. Divino St., Concepcion, Marikina. Their landlady who lived nearby had a
telephone with number 942-49-18.5 During the school year 1997-1998, then five-year-old Angela was in Prep at the Mother
of Divine Providence School in Marikina Heights, Marikina City. The couple employed Lea and Wendy Salingatog as the yayas
of their children. Angela met appellant Jenny Rose Basilan when the latter visited her niece Wendy in the Soriano residence.
Jenny Rose was, thus, no stranger to Angela.
About 11:00 a.m. on September 3, 1998, Angela's classes had just ended and she was on her way to her school bus which
was parked outside the school campus near the exit gate. She was in her school uniform and wore black shoes. Unknown to
Angela, appellants Alma and Jenny Rose were outside of the school gate waiting for her. When they saw Angela, Alma and
Jenny Rose proceeded to the gate and showed a visitor's gate pass to the security guard. They approached the young girl,
and told her that her parents were waiting for her at the Jollibee Restaurant. Angela initially refused to go with the two
women, but because Alma held on to her hand so tightly and poked a knife at her, Angela had no choice but to go with
them. They rode a tricycle and went to the Jollibee Restaurant where Jenny Rose ordered spaghetti for Angela. When Angela
did not see her parents, she wondered why she went with Jenny Rose and Alma in the first place. With Angela in tow, Alma
and Jenny Rose boarded a white taxi and went to a "dirty house" where they changed Angela's clothes. The girl was made
to wear blouse and shorts, yellow t-shirt and a pair of panties. 6 Alma and Jenny Rose took her earrings. They fed her with
the spaghetti they earlier bought at the restaurant. Alma then left, leaving Angela and Jenny Rose in the house.
Jenny Rose sent Angela to sleep, and after a while, Alma returned. When Angela woke up, Alma and Jenny Rose served her
merienda and allowed her to watch television. Henceforth, Angela was kept in the house. At one time, Alma and Jenny Rose
tied up Angela's hands and feet, and placed scotch tape on her mouth. Angela was sometimes left alone in the house but the
door was kept locked. To pass the time, Angela watched television and made drawings. Jenny Rose and Alma did not fail to
feed and bathe Angela. Angela did not call her parents through the telephone number of their landlady.
In the meantime, when William arrived home shortly before noon on that day, Lea and Wendy told him that Angela had not
yet arrived home from school. He rushed to the school to fetch Angela, but was informed by the school security guard that
his daughter had already been picked up by two women, one of whom was registered in the visitor's slip as Aileen Corpuz.
Because he did not know anyone by that name, William immediately proceeded to the registrar's office to verify the
information, only to find out that "Aileen Corpuz" had earlier inquired at the said office about the possibility of transferring
Angela to another school. The school staff panicked when William demanded to know how unknown persons were able to
get his daughter. He then started calling his friends and relatives to help him locate Angela. He also sought the help of Rizza
Hontiveros, a TV personality who promised to relay his plea to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF).
The school staff also reported the incident to the Marikina Police Force which dispatched a team of investigators to the
Soriano residence.7
When apprised of the incident, the PAOCTF organized a team headed by then Chief Inspector Ricardo Dandan with SPO4
Tito Tuanggang, SPO1 Charles Larroza and civilian agent George Torrente, as members, to conduct surveillance operations
and to recover the victim and arrest the culprits. The team proceeded to the Soriano residence and to Angela's school to
conduct an initial investigation.
At about 6:00 a.m. on September 4, 1998, William's landlady went to his apartment to tell him that a lady had called up
earlier and left a message for him: " Pakisabi na lang kay Mr. Soriano na kakausapin ko siya bukas ng umaga ." When the
landlady asked who the caller was, the voice replied, " Hindi na importante iyon."8 William thereafter convinced his landlady
to have her telephone set transferred to his residence to facilitate communication with his daughter's abductors. 9
Shortly before midnight that same day, George arrived at the Soriano residence and asked William if the kidnapper had
already made contact. William responded that a woman had earlier called, through his landlady. George then instructed
William to prolong the conversation should the kidnapper call again, to enable the agents to establish the possible location of
the caller.10
On September 5, 1998 at around 9:25 p.m., William received a call from an unidentified woman who told him, " Kung gusto
mo pang makita yong anak mo, maghanda ka ng five million pesos." He replied, "Saan naman ako kukuha ng five million?
Alam mo naman na nakatira lang ako sa apartment." The caller said, " Hindi ko masasagot yan. Tatanungin ko na lang sa
aking mga boss." William informed George of his conversation with the caller. George relayed the information by means of a
hand-held radio to the other PAOCTF operatives standing by.11
On September 7, 1998, at about 11:25 a.m., Marymae received a telephone call from a woman demanding for ransom
money. The caller called two more times, at 7:00 p.m. and at 9:26 p.m. Marymae pleaded with the caller to reduce the
ransom money to P25,000, or if that was not possible, to an amount not exceeding P50,000. The caller said, " Hindi ko
masasagot iyan. Dadalhin na lang namin ang bata sa boss namin ." Marymae relayed the conversation to William, their other
daughter Kathleen and to George.12
At about noon that day, PAOCTF Chief of Operations Superintendent Michael Ray Aquino received a call from an anonymous
source informing him that a woman who had talked about a ransom and had acted in a suspicious manner was spotted at
the MSC Freight Service office located at No. 1303 Paz Street, Paco, Manila. Acting on the information, Ricardo, Charles, Tito
and other PAOCTF operatives swooped down on the place and saw a woman, who turned out to be Alma Bisda, emerging
from a small house at No. 1258 Paz Street, some fifty meters or so away from the said office. She had just bought food from
an adjacent store at No. 1246 Paz Street, Paco, Manila. Surveillance operations were thereafter conducted.
At about 3:40 p.m. on September 8, 1998, George and Charles were at the Soriano residence. Ricardo and Tito were in the
periphery of Alma's house, monitoring her whereabouts and movements. Alma again left her house and after locking the
door, went to the small store nearby. She lifted the telephone and called someone. The telephone in the Soriano residence
rang. When William lifted the receiver, he heard a voice similar to that of the woman who had called him the first time. The
caller was asking where the money was. William told her that the P25,000 was ready, to which she replied, " Hindi ko
masasagot iyan, dadalhin na lang namin ang bata sa aking boss ." William told the caller that he was willing to give P50,000
but pleaded that he be given ample time to produce the money. The woman reiterated: " Hindi ko masasagot iyan."13
Ricardo and Tito heard the sound of a car horn blowing while Alma was using the telephone. Tito called up Charles and
inquired whether he (Charles) heard the same sound while William was talking to the caller. After William hung up the
telephone, he told George that he could hear the horn of a car blowing in the background. George then called up Ricardo by
phone and relayed the information. When George inquired if Ricardo heard the sound of the horn of a car while Alma was
talking over the telephone, Ricardo replied in the affirmative. The PAOCTF operatives concluded that Alma was the
kidnapper.
After making the call, Alma hung up the telephone and returned to her house. The PAOCTF operatives followed. When Alma
unlocked the door to the house, the operatives accosted her. She tried to escape, to no avail. Tito heard the cry of a child
coming from inside the house, pleading for help: "Tita ilabas mo ako!" 14 He rushed to the house and saw the victim Angela.
He then carried her outside to safety. The agents searched the house for evidence and found a pair of black shoes, a pair of
panties, a yellow shirt, a set of blouse and shorts with red, yellow and white stripes. The evidence was placed in a plastic
bag.15 The victim and the suspects were thereafter brought to the PAOCTF office for proper documentation.
When informed that his daughter had already been rescued, William rushed to the PAOCTF headquarters where he and
Angela were reunited. Angela identified Alma as her kidnapper. When William asked Alma why she kidnapped Angela and
what she would do with the one-million-peso ransom she was demanding, she replied: " Kuya, wag kang maghusga, pareho
lang tayong biktima." When William asked Alma: "Biktima, saan?" Alma replied: "Ang anak ko, kinidnap din nila."16
Chief Inspector Dandan turned over to Evidence Custodian PO2 Joseph Bagsao, the pieces of evidence contained in a blue
Shoe Mart (SM) plastic bag which the operatives found in Alma's house: a pair of black shoes, a pair of panties, a yellow
shirt, a set of white blouse and shorts with red, yellow and white stripes, all of which were sized to fit a child of 4 to 7 years
of age.17
On October 19, 1998, an information for kidnapping for ransom was filed against Alma and Jane Doe.
On October 26, 1998, at around 11:00 a.m., Jenny Rose arrived at the PAOCTF Headquarters in Camp Crame, and
proceeded to PO2 Joseph Bagsao's office where she announced that she was one of Alma's cohorts. PO2 Bagsao took Jenny
Rose's fingerprints and entered the data in a fingerprint index card. 18 Jenny Rose was thereafter placed in a police line-up.
Angela, who arrived at the PAOCTF office with her father, identified Jenny Rose as one of her kidnappers. Police Chief
Inspector Atty. Aurelio C. Trampe, Jr., the Legal and Investigation Division Chief of the PAOCTF, later referred Jenny Rose to
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Marikina City, for preliminary investigation. 19
The prosecutor later amended the Information by deleting the name Jane Doe and substituting the name Jenny Rose Basilan
y Payan as the second accused.
Alma's Evidence
Alma denied having kidnapped Angela for ransom. She testified that she was married, and a resident of Block 38, Lot 38, G.
Maliputo Street, Phase II, Area 4, Kaunlaran Village, Navotas, Metro Manila. She was a businesswoman who ran a local
employment agency for household help. She was also engaged in the business of buying and selling palay grains. Her local
employment agency was located in Navotas. She had another office at No. 1258 Paz Street, Paco, Manila, which served as a
bodega for items she sent to the province, as well as items she purchased. She had an adopted daughter named Mary Rose,
who, in September 1998, studied at Harris School in Antipolo. She had employed Wendy Salingatog for a time as the yaya of
her adopted daughter. Alma was then residing in V. Luna Street, Quezon City.
Alma employed Jenny Rose as secretary in her employment agency. In payment for services rendered, Jenny Rose was sent
to school at the Lyceum of the Philippines to study B.S. Business Administration. She was also given an allowance.
In September 1998, Alma was looking for a school run by nuns that would be willing to accept her adopted daughter in the
middle of the school year. Jenny Rose suggested the Divine Providence School in Marikina City. In the morning of September
3, 1998, Jenny Rose brought her to the said school. They proceeded to the administration office where Alma inquired if the
school would allow her adopted daughter to enroll. When Jenny Rose and Alma were about to leave, a little girl, who turned
out to be Angela, approached them and asked what Jenny Rose was doing in her school. Jenny Rose introduced Angela to
Alma as her niece, and informed Alma that she would be bringing Angela with her to her boarding house in España Street.
At that point, Alma asked Jenny Rose and Angela if they wanted to eat. When they agreed, the three of them proceeded to
the Jollibee Restaurant near the Meralco office in Marikina City. After eating, Alma bade them goodbye and was about to
leave for her office when Jenny Rose asked if she and Angela could come along with her to Cubao. She acceded to the
request, and they rode a Tamaraw FX taxi. Because Angela was getting sleepy, Alma offered to bring them to Jenny's
boarding house in España, and dropped them off there. Alma thereafter proceeded to her office at 1258 Paz St., Paco,
Manila, where she had been holding office since January 1997, and arrived thereat at about 2:00 p.m.
At or about 8:00 p.m. of the same day, Alma passed by Jenny Rose's boarding house to give her instructions on what to do
the following day. She saw Angela crying profusely. She told Jenny Rose to bring Angela home, but Jenny Rose told her that
Angela's parents would be coming to fetch her. Thinking that Angela was probably bored, Alma suggested that they stay in
her office in Paco so that they could watch television while waiting for Angela's parents. Jenny Rose agreed. They arrived at
the said office at around 8:40 p.m. Alma left at around 10:00 p.m. and went home to her rented house in Palmera Homes,
Antipolo, where she stayed until September 6, 1998.
On September 7, 1998, at around 12:00 noon, Alma arrived at her office in Paco, Manila, and found that Jenny Rose and
Angela were still there. Jenny Rose assured Alma that Angela would be fetched by her parents. At around 4:00 p.m., Alma
instructed Jenny Rose to go to the province to collect some debts. Jenny Rose left for the province on the same day. Alma
stayed in the office because she was having her menstrual period at the time and was not feeling well. She took care of
Angela while Jenny Rose was away.
The next day, September 8, 1998, Alma was still in her office with Angela. At about 3:00 p.m., while she was watching
television with Angela, someone knocked at the door. When she opened it, two male persons entered. One of them was
Inspector Ricardo Dandan who showed her a photograph of Angela and asked if she knew the child. Alma answered in the
affirmative. Ricardo then asked her, "Don't you know that this is kidnapping?" to which Alma replied, "I do not know." She
also told Dandan that she did not know what was happening to her. Suddenly, Alma was handcuffed. Angela cried and asked
Alma: "What are they doing to you, Tita?" She was brought to Camp Crame where she was interrogated and detained. Alma
did not make any telephone calls that day. William, Marymae and Angela arrived at Alma's detention cell. When Angela saw
her, the girl tried to run to Alma but William held on to his daughter. William asked Alma why she took Angela, Alma replied
that it was Jenny Rose who brought the girl along with them. She told William that they were both victims.
Sometime on October 26, 1998, Jenny Rose visited Alma to ask for forgiveness and to assume full responsibility for the
incident. Jenny Rose also informed her that she wanted to ask forgiveness from the Sorianos so that she could finish her
schooling. It was only then that she realized what Jenny Rose had done to her. Nevertheless, she still believed that Jenny
Rose was a good person. She advised her to go home and continue with her studies.
When Angela's sworn statement was shown to her, Alma noticed that Angela did not mention Jenny Rose as one of the two
persons who had kidnapped her. Alma executed a handwritten statement denying the truth of the contents of Angela's
affidavit.20
Jenny Rose's Evidence
Jenny Rose did not testify in her defense. She presented Atty. Aurelio Trampe, Jr. as her witness who testified 21 that he was
the Legal and Investigation Division Chief of the PAOCTF. On October 26, 1998, he interviewed Jenny Rose when the latter
surrendered to the task force. Jenny Rose insisted that she wanted to help Alma and get all the blame for the kidnapping.
She wanted to admit her participation in the crime, and volunteered the information that she and Alma kidnapped Angela.
Atty. Trampe, Jr. wrote a letter22 to the Department of Justice requesting for her inclusion in the ongoing preliminary
investigation. He believed that it would be more appropriate for the prosecutor handling the case to investigate and
determine whether Jenny Rose was the Jane Doe referred to in the complaint. Atty. Trampe, Jr. admitted, however, that
aside from the voluntary surrender of Jenny Rose, he did not have any other evidence to include her as one of the suspects
in the case. Further, he did not provide a lawyer for Jenny Rose because he did not intend to conduct an exhaustive
interrogation, and he knew that even if she admitted her participation, the statement would not be admitted as evidence. 23
Jenny Rose adduced in evidence the letter of Atty. Trampe, Jr. to prove that she voluntarily surrendered and that there was
lack of evidence against her.
On September 16, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the decretal portion of which reads:
 WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the accused ALMA BISDA y GAUPO and GENEROSA BASILAN y PAYAN
are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom penalized under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 and is sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of DOUBLE
DEATH by lethal injection, the two accused having conspired in the commission thereof. They are further ordered to
pay solidarily the parents of the victim the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages and costs of the suit.

SO ORDERED.24
The assigned errors ascribed by the appellants to the trial court may be synthesized, thus: (a) the trial court erred in
convicting the appellants of kidnapping; (b) the trial court erred in sentencing the appellants to double death. 25 The Court
will delve into and resolve the issues simultaneously.
The prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants kidnapped the victim.
The appellants aver that the prosecution failed to muster proof beyond reasonable doubt that they kidnapped and illegally
detained Angela. Angela in fact voluntarily went with them, and she was free to roam around the house, and to call her
parents through the telephone of their landlady which Angela knew by heart.
There is no proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants conspired to kidnap Angela. Appellant Bisda avers that she is
guilty only of slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code because (a) Angela stayed in her office for
only three days; and (b) the circumstance of a female offender and a female offended party is not one of those included in
the definition of kidnapping or serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the RPC.
The trial court's reliance on Angela's testimony is misplaced because the records do not show that Angela had the capacity to
distinguish right from wrong when she testified in open court. The appellants point out that she was merely six years old at
the time. Although Angela took an oath before she testified, the trial judge failed to ask any questions to determine whether
or not she could distinguish right from wrong, and comprehend the obligation of telling the truth before the court. Hence,
one of the standards in determining the credibility of a child witness was not followed. There is, thus, a veritable doubt that
Angela told the truth when she testified.
Moreover, Angela's testimony is, besides being inconsistent on material points, contrary to ordinary human experience.
Angela did not shout or cry when she was forced to leave the school premises and brought to the Jollibee Restaurant. Angela
could have easily sought help from the security guard at the exit gate of the school and from the customers in the
restaurant, or even from the tricycle and taxi drivers; but Angela did not. Angela even admitted that she voluntarily went
with the appellants. She did not cry while detained in the office of appellant Bisda, and even admitted that it was only that
time when she was rescued that she cried. The conduct of Angela, the appellants insist, is contrary to ordinary human
experience, knowledge and observation. By her own admission in her sworn statement 26 to the PAOCTF agents, Angela was
assisted by her parents while she was giving the said statement. This raised doubts as to the veracity of her testimony.
The contentions of the appellants are bereft of merit.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 reads:
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or
in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to
kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or a
public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom
from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the
commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (As amended by RA No. 7659). 27
For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping or serious illegal detention, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely, (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains
another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in
the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more
than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or
a public officer.28 If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is
immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his
detention is immaterial.29 The word "female" in paragraph 1(4) of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code refers to the gender
of the victim and not of the offender.
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty under any of the above-mentioned
circumstances, coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same. 30 There must be a purposeful or
knowing action by the accused to forcibly restrain the victim because taking coupled with intent completes the offense. 31
Kidnapping which involves the detention of another is by its nature a continuing crime. 32
The victim's lack of consent is also a fundamental element of kidnapping. The involuntariness of the seizure and detention is
the very essence of the crime. 33 The general rule is that the prosecution is burdened to prove lack of consent on the part of
the victim. However, where the victim is a minor especially if she is only five years old, lack of consent is presumed. She is
incompetent to assent to seizure and illegal detention. 34 In this case, Angela was merely five years old when she was
kidnapped; thus incapable of giving consent. The consent of such child could place the appellants in no better position than
if the act had been done against her will. The appellants cannot rely on Angela's initial willingness to go along with them to
the restaurant. As Judge Shepherd stated in State v. Chisenhall:35
It is clear that the consent of the child, obtained by means of persuasion, is no defense, since the result of such
persuasion is just as great an evil as if it had been accomplished by other means.
A kidnapper should not be rewarded with an acquittal simply because she is ingenious enough to conceal her true motive
from her victim until she is able to transport the latter to another place.
Although Angela was free to roam around in the "dirty house," to draw and to watch television during the entire period of
her detention, and was regularly fed and bathed, the appellants are nevertheless guilty of kidnapping and illegally detaining
the five-year-old child. As Judge McGill of the United States Court of Appeals said in United States v. McCabe,36 "to accept a
child's desire for food, comfort as the type of will or consent contemplated in the context of kidnapping would render the
concept meaningless."

In People v. Baldogo,37 this Court held that illegal serious detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended, includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of her liberty in whatever form and for
whatever length of time. It includes a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention or is
restricted or impeded in his liberty to move. 38 In this case, the door to the office of appellant Bisda was locked while Angela
was detained therein. Even if she wanted to escape and go home, Angela, at her age, could not do so all by herself. During
the period of her confinement, Angela was under the control of the appellants. The helpless child was waiting and hoping
that she would be brought home, or that her parents would come and fetch her.
The prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants conspired to kidnap and illegally detain Angela.
The appellants' testimonies even buttressed the testimonies of both the victim and the other witnesses for the prosecution.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony
and decide to commit it.39 In People v. Pagalasan,40 this Court held that conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence.
It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they
had acted with a common purpose and design. 41 Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed
by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts,
though apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished
unless abandoned or broken up.42 To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to
have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. 43 There must be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.44
Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the execution of a
common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even though it was not intended as part of the original
design.45 Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but
extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended. 46 Conspirators are held to have
intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a
prohibited result, they are, in contemplation of law, chargeable with intending that result. 47 Conspirators are necessarily
liable for the acts of another conspirator unless such act differs radically and substantively from that which they intended to
commit.48 As Judge Learned Hand put it in United States v. Andolscheck,49 "when a conspirator embarks upon a criminal
venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its content and membership, so be it that they fall within the
common purposes as he understands them."
The appellants inveigled Angela into going with them by telling her that her parents were waiting for her at the Jollibee
Restaurant. Appellant Bisda poked a knife at Angela and held her hands so tightly that the helpless child had no recourse but
to come along. The appellants transported Angela on board a taxi and brought her to Cubao, and then to appellant Bisda's
office at No. 1258 Paz St., Paco, Manila. The appellants tied her hands, covered her mouth with scotch tape, and detained
her from September 3, 1998 until September 8, 1998, when she was providentially rescued by the operatives of the PAOCTF.
The collective, concerted and synchronized acts of the appellants before, during and after the kidnapping and the illegal
detention of Angela constitute indubitable proof that the appellants conspired with each other to attain a common objective,
i.e., to kidnap Angela and detain her illegally. The appellants are thus principals by direct participation in the kidnapping of
Angela and illegally detaining her.
Appellant Basilan cannot escape conviction for the crime charged on her barefaced claim that she merely accompanied
appellant Bisda to the latter's office with the victim in tow. The records show that the appellant presented as her sole
witness Atty. Aurelio Trampe, Jr., then PAOCTF Legal and Investigation Division Chief, who testified that when she
surrendered to him, the appellant admitted that she and appellant Bisda had kidnapped Angela:
ATTY. SALAMERA:
This court would like to be cleared (sic). Did she admit to you the condition of the alleged kidnapping on
September 3, 1998?
WITNESS:
She volunteered that statement that she was together with Ms. Alma Besda ( sic) kidnap (sic) Angela
Michelle Soriano.50
The appellants' contention that the prosecution failed to establish that Angela understood the nature of an oath and the
need for her to tell the truth must fail.
Section 1, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of evidence provides that the examination of witnesses shall be under oath or
affirmation:51
SECTION 1. Examination to be done in open court . — The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing
shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the
question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally. (1a). 52
An oath is defined as an outward pledge, given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an
immediate sense of his responsibility to God. 53 The object of the rule is to affect the conscience of the witness and thus
compel him to speak the truth, and also to lay him open to punishment for perjury in case he willfully falsifies. 54 A witness
must be sensible to the obligation of an oath before he can be permitted to testify. 55 It is not, however, essential that he
knows how he will be punished if he testify falsely. 56 Under modern statutes, a person is not disqualified as a witness simply
because he is unable to tell the nature of the oath administered to a witness. 57 In order that one may be competent as a
witness, it is not necessary that he has a definite knowledge of the difference between his duty to tell the truth after being
sworn and before, or that he be able to state it, but it is necessary that he be conscious that there is a difference. 58 It
cannot be argued that simply because a child witness is not examined on the nature of the oath and the need for her to tell
the whole truth, the competency of the witness and the truth of her testimony are impaired. If a party against whom a
witness is presented believes that the witness is incompetent or is not aware of his obligation and responsibility to tell the
truth and the consequence of him testifying falsely, such party may pray for leave to conduct a voire dire examination on
such witness to test his competency. 59 The court may motu proprio conduct the voir dire examination. In United States v.
Buncad,60 this Court held that when a child of tender age is presented as a witness, it is the duty of the judge to examine
the child to determine his competency. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,61 this Court held that:
[W]hen a witness is produced, it is a right and privilege accorded to the adverse party to object to his examination
on the ground of incompetency to testify. If a party knows before trial that a witness is incompetent, objection must
be made before trial that a witness is incompetent, objection must be made before he has given any testimony; if
the incompetency appears on the trial, it must be interposed as soon as it becomes apparent. 62

The competency of a person to take the prescribed oath is a question for the trial court to decide. 63
If a party admits proof to be taken in a case without an oath, after the testimony has been acted upon by the court, and
made the basis of a judgment, such party can no longer object to the admissibility of the said testimony. 64 He is estopped
from raising the issue in the appellate court. This was the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals,65 thus:
Simply put, any objection to the admissibility of evidence should be made at the time such evidence is offered or as
soon thereafter as the objection to its admissibility becomes apparent, otherwise the objection will be considered
waived and such evidence will form part of the records of the case as competent and admissible evidence. The
 failure of petitioner to interpose a timely objection to the presentation of Divinaflor's testimony results in the waiver
of any objection to the admissibility thereof and he is therefore barred from raising said issue on appeal.

In this case, Angela was six years old when she testified. 66 She took an oath to "tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth" before she testified on direct examination. There was nary a whimper of protest or objection on the part of the
appellants to Angela's competence as a witness and the prosecution's failure to propound questions to determine whether
Angela understood her obligation and responsibility of telling the truth respecting the matter of her testimony before the
court. The appellants did not even bother requesting the trial court for leave to conduct a voir dire examination of Angela.
After the prosecution terminated its direct examination, the appellants thereafter cross-examined Angela extensively and
intensively on the matter of her testimony on direct examination. It was only in this Court that the appellants raised the
matter for the first time, that there was failure on the part of the prosecution to examine Angela on the nature of her oath,
and to ascertain whether she had the capacity to distinguish right from wrong. It is too late in the day for the appellants to
raise the issue.

The determination of the competence and capability of a child as a witness rests primarily with the trial judge. 67 The trial
court correctly found Angela a competent witness and her testimony entitled to full probative weight. Any child regardless of
age, can be a competent witness if she can perceive and perceiving, can make known to others, and that she is capable of
relating truthfully facts for which she is examined. 68 In People v. Mendiola,69 this Court found the six-year-old victim
competent and her testimony credible. Also in Dulla v. Court of Appeals ,70 this Court gave credence to the testimony of a
three-year-old victim. It has been the consistent ruling of the Court that the findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration
of the testimonies of witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on
said findings are accorded by the appellate courts high respect if not conclusive effect absent clear and convincing evidence
that the trial court ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which if considered warrants a
reversal or modification of the outcome of the case. 71 In this case the Court finds no basis to deviate from the findings and
conclusions of the trial court on the competency of Angela, and the probative weight of her testimony.
Appellants must come to grips with case law that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit. The testimony
of children of sound mind is likewise to be more correct and truthful than that of older persons. 72 In People vs. Alba,73 this
Court ruled that children of sound mind are likely to be more observant of incidents which take place within their view than
older persons, and their testimonies are likely more correct in detail than that of older persons. Angela was barely six years
old when she testified. Considering her tender years, innocent and guileless, it is incredible that Angela would testify falsely
that the appellants took her from the school through threats and detained her in the "dirty house" for five days. In People v.
Dela Cruz,74 this Court also ruled that ample margin of error and understanding should be accorded to young witnesses who,
much more than adults, would be gripped with tension due to the novelty and the experience in testifying before the trial
court.
The credibility of Angela and the verisimilitude of her testimony is not impaired by her failure to shout for help when the
appellants took her, or to make any attempt to call her parents or to escape from her captors and to use the telephone to
call her parents. At five years old, she could not be expected to act and react to her kidnapping and detention like an adult
should. She did not shout and seek help from the school security guards because the appellants told Angela that her parents
were waiting for her. Appellant Basilan was the niece of Angela's yaya. She then believed that nothing was amiss. It was
only when she failed to see her parents that Angela blamed herself for going with the appellants in the first place.
Atty. Laracas:
Now, they told you that your parents were at Jollibee. When you did not see your parents, what did you
do?
Witness:
I told myself, why did I go with them.
Atty. Laracas:
So you just told that to yourself?
Witness:
Yes, ma'am.
Atty. Laracas:
So initially, Angela, you are not blaming yourself when you went with Jenny Rose?
Witness:

Yes, ma'am.75
The evidence on record shows that appellant Bisda poked a knife at Angela and her hands were held tightly by the
appellants as they proceeded to the restaurant from the school. Although the Soriano spouses were by Angela's side when
the latter gave her sworn statement 76 in the PAOCTF office, there is no showing on record that the spouses ever influenced
their daughter to prevaricate. Significantly, the appellants' counsel did not even cross-examine Angela on her sworn
statement.
In this case, appellant Bisda asserts that Angela's testimony contains four inconsistencies on material points; hence, is
incredible. First, Angela testified on cross-examination that the appellants approached her but she did not talk to them. 77 In
contrast, Angela testified on cross-examination that she saw appellant Basilan, and talked to her. 78 Second, Angela testified
on direct examination that she first came to know the identities of the kidnappers when she was brought to the "dirty
house."79 Angela contradicted herself when she testified on cross-examination that when she was brought to the said house,
she already knew appellant Basilan.80 Third, Angela testified on direct examination that she went with the appellants to the
Jollibee Restaurant when they held her hands firmly. 81 On cross-examination, Angela testified that the appellants threatened
her when they kidnapped her by pointing a knife at her which made her cry. 82 Angela further contradicted herself when she
testified on direct examination that the appellants pointed a knife at her "one night." 83 Fourth, Angela said that when she
was in the office of appellant Bisda in Paco, Manila, her feet were tied and her mouth was covered with scotch tape. 84
However, on cross-examination, Angela revealed that she was free to roam around and even watched television and made
drawings.85
Anent the first and second set of inconsistencies adverted to by the appellants, the same pertain only to minor and
peripheral matters and not to the principal occurrence or the elements of the crime charged, and the positive identification of
the appellants. Hence, the credibility of Angela, and that of her testimony were not impaired by the said inconsistencies. 86
The inscrutable fact is that the appellants took the victim from the school and detained her at the office of appellant Bisda at
No. 1258 Paz St., Paco, Manila, until she was rescued. Whether or not Angela talked with the appellants as she was being
brought to the restaurant or that she came to know of the identities of the kidnappers before or when she was brought to
the dirty house, are inconsequential. The overwhelming evidence on record is that no other than the appellants kidnapped
her from her school and illegally detained her from September 3 to 8, 1998. Indeed, when asked to point and identify her
kidnappers, Angela did so spontaneously and positively.87
Pros. Junio:
If you see. . . this Alma Besda ( sic), if you will be able to see her again, if you see her again, will you be
able to recognize her?
Witness:
Yes, ma'am.
Pros. Junio:
Will you point to her.
(The witness is pointing to a lady, seated at the second from the left at the corner at the last seat.)
Court:
Identify yourself.
(The person pointed to, stood up and identified herself as Alma Besda [sic]).
Pros. Junio:
What about Jenny Rose, will you be able to recognize her?
Witness:
Yes, ma'am.
Pros. Junio:
You point to her Angel.
(The witness is pointing to the first lady seated on the left side)
Court:
Stand up and identify yourself.
The lady stood up and identified herself as Jenny Rose Basilan. 88
Appellant Basilan did not controvert the evidence of the prosecution that she was the niece of the yaya of the victim, and
that the said appellant, at one time, went to the Soriano residence where Angela saw and met her. The victim was, thus,
acquainted with appellant Basilan even before the kidnapping.
Angela testified on direct examination, thus:
Atty. Junio:
So when Alma and Jenny Rose told you that Mommy and Daddy were at Jollibee, what did you do?
Witness:
I did not want to go with them but they held me firm.
Pros. Junio:
What part of the body did they hold firmly?
Witness:
My hands.
Pros. Junio:
After Alma and Jenny Rose held your hand firmly, what did, where did you go?
Witness:

To Jollibee.89
Angela was not asked by the public prosecutor whether or not the appellants threatened her with any weapon before
proceeding to the Jollibee Restaurant. The additional fact was revealed by Angela, ironically, on cross-examination:
Atty. Salamera:
Now, were you threatened on September 3 at around eleven in the morning when both accused allegedly
abducted you?
Witness:
Yes, sir.
Atty. Salamera:
There are two accused, who threatened you?
Witness:
They pointed knife against me.
Atty. Salamera:
Who pointed the knife upon your person?
Witness:
Alma, sir.
Atty. Salamera:
Did you cry?
Witness:
Yes, sir.
Atty. Salamera:
Did you also cry inside the Jollibee?
Witness:
No, sir.
Atty. Salamera:
Was Alma still holding a knife at the Jollibee?
Witness:

No, sir.90
The prosecutor tried on re-direct to take advantage of Angela's revelation but the appellants' counsel, realizing that he had
just committed a faux pas, objected to the questions of the public prosecutor. It turned out that the latter was himself
confused because instead of adverting to a knife, as testified to by Angela, he blurted that appellant Bisda used a gun in
intimidating the victim. Even Angela must have been bewildered by the repartees of the prosecution and the appellants'
counsel such that, instead of answering "one time," to the questions of the prosecutor, she said "one night."
Redirect:
Pros. Junio:
Angel, how many times did Alma and Jenny Rose point a knife at you?
Atty. Salamera:
Objection. Improper at this point in time. First it was not covered.
Pros. Junio:
How many times did Alma point a gun?
Atty. Salamera:
Knife, your Honor.
Pros. Junio:
It was covered on cross.
Court:
Objection denied. Overruled. Witness may answer.
Witness:

One night.91
There was, thus, no inconsistency in Angela's testimony on this point.
Angela's hands were tied, and her mouth was covered with scotch tape the day after she was brought to the dirty house.
Angela testified on direct examination, thus:
Pros. Junio:
Okay, where did you go?
Witness:
To the dirty house.
Pros. Junio:
Who was with you or who were with you at that time?
Witness:
Alma Besda (sic) and Jenny Rose, ma'am.
Pros. Junio:
Where is this dirty house located?
Witness:
I do not know, ma'am.
Pros. Junio:
Upon arriving at that dirty house, what did you do?
Witness:
They changed my clothes once.
Pros. Junio:
Do you remember the color of the dress?
Witness:
 No, ma'am.
Pros. Junio:
After they changed your dress or your clothes, what happened next? What did they do to you?
Witness:
They fed me, ma'am.
Pros. Junio:
After they fed you, what did you do?
Witness:
They send (sic) me to sleep.
Pros. Junio:
When you woke up, what did they do to you?
Witness:
They fed me (pinamiryenda) (sic)
Pros. Junio:
After you ate your "miryenda" (sic) what else did they do to you?
Witness:
They allowed me to watch tv, ma'am.
Pros. Junio:
What about your hands, your mouth, what did they do?
Witness:
They tied my hands.
Pros. Junio;
And your mouth?
Witness:
It was sealed with scotch tape.
Pros. Junio:
And your feet?
Witness:
They were also tied, ma'am.
Pros. Junio:
Who tied your hands?
Witness:
The two of them, ma'am.
Pros. Junio:
Will you mention their names again?
Witness:

Alma Besda (sic) and Jenny Rose.92

On cross-examination, Angela testified that on the day she was rescued, she could watch the television, make drawings and
roam around the room:
Atty. Larracas:
 You did . . . At that time you were allegedly rescued, Jenny Rose was not at the place where you were
rescued?
Witness:
She was not there, ma'am.
Atty. Larracas:
All along you were watching tv (sic) at the place where you were taken?
Witness:
Only once, ma'am.
Atty. Larracas:
And when you were not watching tv (sic), what were you doing Angela in that dirty house?
Witness:
I was drawing, ma'am.
Atty. Larracas:
So you watched tv once and the rest of the time you were drawing?
Witness:
Yes, ma'am.
Atty. Larracas:
Of course, you cannot draw if your hands were tied, Angela?
Witness:
Yes, ma'm.
Atty. Larracas:
So your hands were not tied?
Witness:
No, ma'am.
Atty. Larracas:
You can move along freely at that time?
Witness:
Yes, ma'am.
Atty. Larracas:
You can walk?
Witness:
Yes, ma'am.
Atty. Larracas:
You can drink?
Witness:
Yes, ma'am.
Atty. Larracas:
Of course, you cannot walk if your feet were tied and cannot drink if your mouth was sealed?
Witness:
Yes, ma'am
 Atty. Larracas:
When the police arrived, what were you doing?
Witness:

I cried, ma'am.93
It is not quite clear whether the counsel for the appellants were asking about Angela's activities during her detention, or
during her rescue. Taking into account Angela's answers, it is evident that her hands were tied and her mouth covered with
scotch tape the day after she was kidnapped, but that she was free to roam around the room, practice on her drawings and
watch television during the rest of the period of her detention.
PROPER PENALTIES
The appellants aver that the prosecution failed to prove that in kidnapping and illegally detaining the victim, they intended to
demand ransom from her parents. William Soriano, the victim's father, failed to prove that the appellants or any of them
called through the telephone demanding ransom. The collective testimonies of police operatives Tito Tuanggang, Ricardo
Dandan and George Torrente were hearsay evidence; hence, barren of probative weight. The trial court likewise failed to
take into account the voluntary surrender of appellant Basilan.
The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, posits the view that the prosecution mustered the requisite quantum of
evidence to prove that the appellants and no other demanded ransom from the parents of the victim.
The appellants' contention does not hold water. Admittedly, the prosecution failed to adduce direct evidence that the
appellants demanded ransom for the release of the victim. However, the prosecution adduced circumstantial evidence to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants, or at least one of them, demanded ransom from the Soriano spouses for
the release of their daughter.
To warrant the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom, the
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty;
(b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and (c) motive of the accused, which is ransom for the victim or other
person for the release of the victim. The purpose of the offender in extorting ransom is a qualifying circumstance which may
be proved by his words and overt acts before, during and after the kidnapping and detention of the victim. 94 Neither actual
demand for nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed. 95 Ransom as employed in the law is
so used in its common or ordinary sense; meaning, a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or consideration paid or
demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment that releases from captivity. 96 It may include
benefits not necessarily pecuniary which may accrue to the kidnapper as a condition for the release of the victim. 97
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove the qualifying circumstance if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
facts from which the inferences are proven; (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt. The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion of others as the one who demanded ransom. The
circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and that
at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. 98 The prosecution must rely on the strength of
its evidence and not on the weakness of that of the appellants.99
In this case, the chain of circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution proves that no one other than the appellants or
one of them called up the spouses Soriano through the telephone and demanded ransom of P5,000,000:
1. Appellant Basilan is the niece of Wendy Salingatog, who was for a time the housemaid of appellant Bisda;
2. The appellants kidnapped Angela shortly before noon on September 3, 1998, and detained her at No. 1258 Paz Street,
Paco, Manila, where appellant Bisda held office;
3. The following morning, William was informed by his landlady that a woman had earlier called up over the telephone
requesting her to inform William that she (the caller), would call again the next day, September 5, 1998;
4. On September 5, 1998, William received a telephone call from a woman demanding a ransom of P5,000,000 for Angela's
freedom. When William complained that he did not have the amount, she told William that she cannot be responsible for it
and that she would inquire from her bosses. William's testimony reads:
Pros. Junio:
And what did she tell you?
Witness:
She told me KUNG GUSTO MO PANG MAKITA IYONG ANAK MO, MAGHANDA KA NG FIVE MILLION PESOS.
 Pros. Junio:
What did you told (sic) her if any?
Witness:
SAAN AKO KUKUHA NG FIVE MILLION PESOS? ALAM MO NAMAN NA NAKATIRA LANG AKO SA
APARTMENT.
Pros. Junio:
What did she say?
Witness:
She answered, HINDI KO MASASAGOT YAN.
Pros. Junio:
Did she tell you why she could not respond to you?
Witness:

She continued to say "TATANUNGIN KO NA LANG SA AKING MGA BOSS." 100

5. In the morning of September 7, 1998, Inspector Ricardo Dandan and SPO4 Tito Tuanggang, acting on an anonymous tip,
rushed to the vicinity of No. 1303 Paz Street, Paco, Manila, the office of the MSC Freight Service, to conduct surveillance
operations. Later in the afternoon, they saw appellant Bisda emerging from a small house about fifty meters from the office
of the MSC Freight Service;
6. At about 3:40 p.m. on September 8, 1998, appellant Bisda emerged from the house at No. 1258 Paz Street, and went to
the small store near the house. Chief Inspector Dandan and Tito Tuanggang were about two meters from the store and saw
appellant Bisda enter the same, lift the telephone and talk to someone over the telephone;
7. At about the same time, William received a telephone call from a woman demanding where the money was and when
William replied that he was ready with P25,000, the woman replied: Hindi ko masasagot iyan, dadalhin na lang namin ang
Bata sa aking boss." When William intimated that he could raise P50,000 but pleaded for more time to produce the amount,
the woman retorted: "Hindi ko masasagot iyan." William's testimony reads:
Pros. Junio:
On September 8, 1998, at about 3:40 in the afternoon, what happened if any?
Witness:
At around 3:40 in the afternoon of September 8, a lady caller called again. I answered the telephone.
Pros. Junio:
Who was this lady caller?
Witness:
I would say, my perception is it was the same lady caller who called the first time I answered the
telephone.
Pros. Junio:
And what did she tell you?
Witness:
And she told me where is the money.
Pros. Junio:
And what did you tell her?
Witness:
And I also told her if its okey with you, my twenty-five is ready.
Pros. Junio:
Then what did she say?
Witness:
 She said "HINDI KO MASASAGOT IYAN, DADALIN NA LANG NAMIN ANG BATA SA AKING BOSS."
Pros. Junio:
What happened next after that?
Witness:
I would like to plead that I will make it fifty thousand, just give me ample time.
Pros. Junio:
How did she react to your suggestion?
Witness:

"HINDI KO MASASAGOT IYAN." Then she hanged (sic) the phone.101

8. After making the telephone call, appellant Bisda left the store and returned to the house at No. 1258 Paz Street, Paco,
Manila;
9. The operatives from the PAOCTF followed appellant Bisda and confronted her before she could enter the house. The
operatives then barged into the premises of No. 1258 Paz Street where they saw Angela in the room;
10. When William arrived at the PAOCTF office, with Angela that day, he inquired from appellant Bisda why she kidnapped
Angela and what she would do with the P5,000,000 ransom she was demanding, and the appellant replied: " Kuya, wag (sic)
kang nang maghusga, pareho lang tayong biktima ." When William asked Alma: " Biktima, saan?" The appellant replied: " Ang
anak ko, kinidnap din nila."
In light of the foregoing facts, there can be no other conclusion than that appellant Bisda demanded a ransom of P5,000,000
from William Soriano; hence, she is GUILTY of kidnapping for ransom. Being a conspirator, appellant Basilan is also guilty of
the said crime. The penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death, a single and indivisible penalty. The aggravating
circumstance of use of a motor vehicle under Article 14, paragraph 20 of the Revised Penal Code was attendant in the
commission of the crime.102 However, said circumstance, as well as the voluntary surrender of appellant Basilan, are
inconsequential in the penalties to be imposed on the said appellants, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code.103
CIVIL LIABILITIES OF THE APPELLANTS
The trial court awarded P100,000 moral damages to the spouses William and Marymae Soriano, the parents of the victim.
The trial court did not award any moral and exemplary damages to the victim. The decision of the trial court has to be
modified. Under Article 2219, paragraph 7, of the New Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded to a victim of illegal
arrest and detention. In this case, the appellants poked a knife on the victim as they took her from the school. The
appellants also tied her hands, and placed scotch tape on her mouth. The hapless victim was so shocked when operatives of
the PAOCTF barged into the office of appellant Bisda, and took custody of the victim that she cried profusely. The victim
suffered trauma, mental, physical and psychological ordeal. There is, thus, sufficient basis for an award of moral damages in
the amount of P300,000.104 Since there were demands for ransom, not to mention the use by the appellants of a vehicle to
transport the victim from the school to the Jollibee Restaurant and to the office of appellant Bisda, the victim is entitled to
exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000. 105 Although the victim claims that the appellants took her earrings, the
prosecution failed to prove the value of the same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 272, is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. The appellants, Alma Bisda and Generosa "Jenny Rose" Basilan, are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of kidnapping for ransom under paragraph 4 and the last paragraph of Article 267, of the Revised Penal Code, and are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. The appellants are hereby directed to pay jointly and severally to
the victim Angela Michelle Soriano the amount of P300,000 by way of moral damages and P100,000 by way of exemplary
damages. Costs against the appellants.
Three Justices of the Court maintain their position that Rep. Act No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional, and that the death
penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
In accordance with Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659 amending Section 83 of the Revised Penal Code, let the records of this
case be forthwith forwarded, upon finality of this Decision, to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the
pardoning power. Costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.
JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT RULE
• is intended to expedite court proceedings, is new and far from complete, necessitating an extensive discussion to
thresh out various issues. Lawyers could keep their observations to themselves and hope that the other party
commits a mistake, most likely gaining an edge by reason of technicality.
Reasons for the issuance of the rule:
Case congestion and delays

Applicable to all actions, proceedings, and incidents requiring the reception of evidence before

1. The Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, the
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and the Shari’ a Circuit Courts but shall not apply to small claims cases

2. The Regional Trial Courts and the Shari’a District Courts;

3. The Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Court of Appeals, and the Shari’a Appellate
Courts;
Courts applicable
4. The investigating officers and bodies authorized by the Supreme Court to receive evidence,
including the Integrated Bar of the Philippine (IBP);

5. quote The special courts and quasi-judicial bodies, whose rules of procedure are subject to
disapproval of the Supreme Court, insofar as their existing rules of procedure contravene the provisions
of this Rule

Submission of · parties are to file with the court and serve on the advere party, not later than 5 days before pre
judicial affidavits in trial or PC or scheduled hearing with respects to the motions and incidents
lieu of direct
testmonies · affidavits to be submitted

o The judicial affidavits of their witnesses, which shall take the place of such witnesses’ direct
testimonies; and

o The parties’ documentary or object evidence, if any, which shall be attached to the judicial affidavits
and marked as Exhibits A, B, C, and so on in the case of the complainant or the plaintiff, and as
Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on in the case of the respondent or the defendant.

Ø If the party would want to keep the original document or object evidence, he may, after he has
identified it, marked as exhibit and authenticated, warrant in his judicial affidavit that the copy or
reproduction attached is a faithful copy

Ø The docs shall be brought during the preliminar conference with the attached copy and reproduction

Ø This is without prejudice to the introduction of secondary evidence in place of the original when
allowed by existing rules.

Services is personal or through licensed courier

 – The purpose of the Rule is to expedite cases and there can be no reliance on the presumptive
receipt by reason of registered mail.

· prepared in the language known to the witness and, if not in English or Filipino, accompanied by
a translation in English or Filipino,

Content:

1. The name, age, residence or business address, and occupation of the witness;

2. The name and address of the lawyer who conducts or supervises the examination of the witness
and the place where the examination is being held

3. A statement that the witness is answering the questions asked of him, fully conscious that he
does so under oath, and that he may face criminal liability for false testimony or perjury

4. Questions asked of the witness and his corresponding answers, consecutively numbered, that:

Contents (1) Show the circumstances under which the witness acquired the facts upon which he testifies;

(2) Elicit from him those facts which are relevant to the issues that the case presents; and

(3) Identify the attached documentary and object evidence and establish their authenticity in
accordance with the Rules of Court;

5. The signature of the witness over his printed name; and

6. A jurat with the signature of the notary public who administers the oath or an officer who is
authorized by law to administer the same.

– .

Ø At the end of the judicial affidavit by the lawyer who conducted or supervised the examination of
witness that:

(1) He faithfully recorded or caused to be recorded the questions he asked and the corresponding
answers that the witness gave; and

(2) Neither he nor any other person then present or assisting him coached the witness regarding the
Sworn attestation latter’s answers.
of the attorney
False attestation: disbarment

Purpose:

– Since the judge was not able to observe the witness while he was making his affidavit

Subpoena

Ø If the government employee or official, or the requested witness, who is neither the witness of the
 adverse party nor a hostile witness, unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial affidavit or refuses
without just cause to make the relevant books, documents, or other things under his control available
for copying, authentication, and eventual production in court, the requesting party may avail himself of
the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum or duces tecum under Rule 21 of the Rules of Court.

Ø The rules governing the issuance of a subpoena to the witness in this case shall be the same as
when taking his deposition except that the taking of a judicial affidavit shal1 be understood to be ex
parte.

Ø Shall state the purpose of such testi at the start of the presentation of witness

Ø Adverse party may move to disqualify the witness or strike out his affidavit or any of the answers on
Offer of and the ground of inadmissibility
objections to the
testimony in judicial
affidavit Ø Court will rule on the motion, if granted- marking of any excluded by placing brackets under the
initials of an authorized court personnel, without prejudice to a tender of excluded evidence under sec
40 rule 132

Ø Adverse party shall have the right to cross examine the witness on his JA and exhibits

Examination of Ø There can also be re direct

witness in his
judicial affidavit
Ø Court shall take active part in examining of the witness to determine his credibility and to the truth

(a) Upon the termination of the testimony of his last witness, a party shall immediately make an oral
offer of evidence of his documentary or object exhibits, piece by piece, in their chronological order,
stating the purpose or purposes for which he offers the particular exhibit.

(b) After each piece of exhibit is offered, the adverse party shall state the legal ground for his
objection, if any, to its admission, and the court shall immediately make its ruling respecting that
Oral offer of and exhibit.
objections to
exhibits
(c) Since the documentary or object exhibits form part of the judicial affidavits that describe and
authenticate them, it is sufficient that such exhibits are simply cited by their markings during the offers,
the objections, and the rulings, dispensing with the description of each exhibit.

Applicability to This rule shall apply to all criminal actions:

criminal actions
(1) Where the maximum of the imposable penalty does not exceed six years;

(2) Where the accused agrees to the use of judicial affidavits, irrespective of the penalty involved; or

(3) With respect to the civil aspect of the actions, whatever the penalties involved are.

Ø Prosecution to submit JA of its witnesses not later than 5 days before pre trial, serving copies to the
accused

Ø Complainant or prosi shall attach affidavits and evidence he may have and marking them as exhibits
a,b,c

Ø . No further judicial affidavit, documentary, or object evidence shall be admitted at the trial.
 Ø If the accused desires to be heard on his defense after receipt of the judicial affidavits of the
prosecution, he shall have the option to submit his judicial affidavit as well as those of his witnesses to
the court within ten days from receipt of such affidavits and serve a copy of each on the public and
private prosecutor, including his documentary and object evidence previously marked as Exhibits 1, 2,
3, and so on. These affidavits shall serve as direct testimonies of the accused and his witnesses when
they appear before the court to testify.

Failure to submit JA and exhibits on time:

Ø Waiver of submission

Ø Court may allow only once the late submission provided that the delay is:

o For a valid reason

o Not unduly prejudice the opposing party

o Defaulting party to pay fine of not less than 1k and not more than 5k at the discretion of the court

Ø The court shall not consider the affidavit of any witness who fails to appear at the scheduled hearing
of the case as required.

Effect with non

Ø Counsel who fails to appear without valid cause despite notice shall be deemed to have waived his
compliance to JAR
client’s right to confront by cross-examination the witnesses there present.

Ø The court shall not admit as evidence judicial affidavits that do not conform to the content
requirements of Section 3 and the attestation requirement of Section 4 above.

When may court allow the subsequent submission of compliant replacement affidavits:

o Before the hearing or trial

o Provided that delay is for a reason and not unduly prejudice the opposing party

o Fine for the public or private counsel not less than 1k or more than 5k

• Amended or supplemental affidavits, when allowed? – There may be instances when it is necessary to execute a
supplemental or amended affidavit, like in the case of newly-discovered evidence.
Judicial affidavits:

• If RTC- no, unless the accused consents, or unless if the subject of judicial affidavit is the civil aspect.
• In MTC- always judicial affidavit.
• S5 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule expressly excludes from its application adverse party and hostile witnesses. Enough
for the party calling the adverse party witness to serve beforehand written interrogatories pursuant to S6 R25. (Ng
Meng Tam v. China Banking Corp., 5 August 2015).
• In cases covered by the Judicial Affidavit Rule, the party presenting the judicial affidavit of his witness in place of
direct testimony shall state the purpose of such testimony at the start of the presentation of the witness.
•
Jurat:
• refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public and
presents an instrument or document; (b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; (c) signs the instrument or document in the
presence of the notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or
document
Acknowledgment:
• an act in which an individual on a single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an
integrally complete instrument or document; (b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified
by the notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by the notarial rules; and (c) represents to
the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes
stated in the instrument or document, declares that he has executed the instrument or document as his free and
voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in
that capacity.

Jurat:
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, this _____________, by _____________ who exhibited to me (his/her) Community
Tax Certificate No. _____________ issued at _____________ on _____________ and by _____________ who exhibited to
me (his/her) Community Tax Certificate No. _____________ issued at _____________ on _____________.

Acknowledgment:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF ______) SS.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the (Province/City/Municipality) of _____________, personally appeared
_____________ with Community Tax Certificate No. _____________ issued on _____________ at _____________ (and Tax
Identification No. (T.I.N.) _____________), known to me and to me known to be the same person who executed the
foregoing instrument which (he/she) acknowledged to me as (his/her) free and voluntary act and deed, consisting of only
______ (____) page/s, including this page in which this Acknowledgement is written, duly signed by (him/her) and (his/her)
instrumental witnesses on each and every page hereof.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this _____________ at _____________, Philippines.
NOTARY PUBLIC
Doc. No. ______;
Page No. ______;
Book No. ______;
JAR vs deposition
• Affidavits are formal requirements. Not admissible in evidence, except if it is a JA or it satisfies the requirement of
the judicial affidavit rule.
• Depostions- means to compel disclosure of facts of persons which are relevant.

A.M. No. 11-9-4-SC

EFFICIENT USE OF PAPER RULE
Whereas, to produce 500 reams of paper, twenty trees are cut and 100,000 liters of water are used, water that is no longer
reusable because it is laden with chemicals and is just released to the environment to poison our rivers and seas;
Whereas, there is a need to cut the judicial system’s use excessive quantities of costly paper, save our forests, avoid
landslides, and mitigate the worsening effects of climate change that the world is experiencing;
Whereas, the judiciary can play a big part in saving our trees, conserving precious water and helping mother earth;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Supreme Court En Banc hereby issues and promulgates the following:
Sec. 1. Title of the Rule– This rule shall be known and cited as the Efficient Use of Paper Rule.
Sec. 2. Applicability. – This rule shall apply to all courts and quasi-judicial bodies under the administrative supervision of the
Supreme Court.
Sec. 3. Format and Style. – a) All pleadings, motions and similar papers intended for the court and quasi-judicial body’s
consideration and action (court-bound papers) shall written in single space with one-and-a –half space between paragraphs,
using an easily readable font style of the party’s choice, of 14-size font, and on a 13 –inch by 8.5- inch white bond paper;
and
b) All decisions, resolutions and orders issued by courts and quasi-judicial bodies under the administrative supervision of the
Supreme Court shall comply with these requirements. Similarly covered are the reports submitted to the courts and
transcripts of stenographic notes.
Sec. 4. Margins and Prints .— The parties shall maintain the following margins on all court-bound papers: a left hand margin
of 1.5 inches from the edge; an upper margin of 1.2 inches from the edge; a right hand margin of 1.0 inch from the edge;
and a lower margin of 1.0 inch from the edge. Every page must be consecutively numbered.
Sec. 5. Copies to be filed. – Unless otherwise directed by the court, the number of court- bound papers that a party is
required or desires to file shall be as follows:
a. In the Supreme Court, one original (properly marked) and four copies, unless the case is referred to the Court En Banc, in
which event, the parties shall file ten additional copies. For the En Banc, the parties need to submit only two sets of annexes,
one attached to the original and an extra copy. For the Division, the parties need to submit also two sets of annexes, one
attached to the original and an extra copy. All members of the Court shall share the extra copies of annexes in the interest of
economy of paper.
Parties to cases before the Supreme Court are further required, on voluntary basis for the first six months following the
effectivity of this Rule and compulsorily afterwards unless the period is extended, to submit, simultaneously with their court-
bound papers, soft copies of the same and their annexes (the latter in PDF format) either by email to the Court’s e-mail
address or by compact disc (CD). This requirement is in preparation for the eventual establishment of an e-filing paperless
system in the judiciary.
b. In the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, one original (properly marked) and two copies with their annexes;
c. In the Court of Tax Appeals, one original (properly marked) and two copies with annexes. On appeal to the En Banc, one
Original (properly marked) and eight copies with annexes; and
d. In other courts, one original (properly marked) with the stated annexes attached to it.
Sec. 6. Annexes Served on Adverse Party. – A party required by the rules to serve a copy of his court-bound on the adverse
party need not enclose copies of those annexes that based on the record of the court such party already has in his
possession. In the event a party requests a set of the annexes actually filed with the court, the part who filed the paper shall
comply with the request within five days from receipt.
Sec. 7. Date of Effectivity. – This rule shall take effect on January 1, 2013 after publication in two newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines.
Manila, November 13, 2012.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEONARDO FABRE y VICENTE, accused-appellant.

DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Leonardo Fabre was adjudged guilty by the Regional Trial Court, Br. VI, of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, of raping his own
daughter Marilou Fabre, and he was sentenced to suffer the extreme penalty of death.
Fabre was indicted in an Information that read:[1]
That on or about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of April 26, 1995 in the house of the accused located at Manat, Trento,
Agusan del Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by force, threats
and intimidation, with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual
intercourse with his own daughter MARILOU FABRE, a girl thirteen (13) years of age, of good reputation, against her will and
consent to the damage and prejudice of the said victim consisting of moral, actual and compensatory damages.
Accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of Marilou, that of
Adela Fabre, her mother and the wife of the accused, and that of Dr. Reinerio Jalalon, the doctor who examined Marilou,
along with the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Jalalon, the sworn statement of Adela, and the criminal complaint signed
by both Marilou and Adela. The defense, during its turn in the presentation of evidence, countered with the testimony of the
accused himself. It also called Adela Fabre back to the witness stand.
The trial court gave credence to the evidence given by the prosecution, particularly to the narration of the young
complainant, expressing a quote from an observation once made by this Tribunal in one of its decision that even when
consumed with revenge, it (would) take a certain amount of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story
which (could) put her own father for the rest of his remaining life in jail and drag herself and the rest of her family to a
lifetime of shame.[2] Convinced that the accused committed the crime of rape on his own daughter, the trial judge disposed
of the case thusly:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused LEONARDO FABRE y VICENTE alias Nardo, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of the crime of RAPE as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No.
7659 Section 11 thereof and hereby imposes upon the accused Leonardo Fabre y Vicente alias Nardo the penalty of DEATH;
to pay the victim Marilou Fabre civil indemnity in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS and the costs.[3]
In this automatic review, the convicted accused assigned the following alleged errors committed by the court a quo.
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF ALIBI AND
DENIAL.
II
ASSUMING IN ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE
DEATH SENTENCE UPON ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ESTABLISH THE ACTUAL
AGE OF MARILOU FABRE AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE ALLEGED RAPE.[4]
The defense argues, rather desperately, that the testimony of appellant should acquire added strength for the failure of the
prosecution to conduct cross-examination on him and to present any rebuttal evidence. The cross-examination of a witness
is a prerogative of the party against whom the witness is called.[5] The purpose of cross-examination is to test the truth or
accuracy of the statements of a witness made on direct examination.[6] The party against whom the witness testifies may
deem any further examination unnecessary and instead rely on any other evidence theretofore adduced or thereafter to be
adduced or on what would be believed is the perception of the court thereon. Certainly, the trial court is not bound to give
full weight to the testimony of a witness on direct examination merely because he is not cross-examined by the other party.
The alibi of appellant itself would not appear to be deserving of serious consideration. His account that at the time of the
alleged rape he was working at a coconut plantation, just about one kilometer away from the place of the crime, hardly
would amount to much. Nor would the testimony of Adela Fabre, his wife, merit any better regard. At first, she testified that
on the day of the rape incident, she had left their house at four oclock in the afternoon. Later, however, she changed her
story by saying that she had left the house in the morning and returned only at ten oclock that same morning, staying home
the whole day thereafter. In any event, in order that alibi might prosper, it would not be enough for an accused to prove
that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he would have to demonstrate likewise that he could not have
been physically present at the place of the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.[7] Clearly, in the
instant case, it was not at all impossible nor even improbable for appellant to have been at the crime scene.
Upon the other hand, the evidently candid and straightforward testimony of Marilou should be more than enough to rebut
the claim of innocence made by appellant.[8]
On 26 April 1995, around four oclock in the afternoon, Marilou Fabre was alone in their house in Barangay Manat, Trento,
Agusan del Sur. Adela Fabre, her mother, had gone to Purok 4 to buy fish while her siblings were out strolling. After cleaning
their yard, Marilou went to the adjacent palm plantation, about fourteen to fifteen meters away from their house, to gather
palm oil. Marilou had been gathering palm oil for about a minute when her father, appellant Leonardo Fabre, arrived. He
suddenly gripped Marilous hands and forcibly dragged her towards the house. He closed the door and removed his
daughters underwear. He took off his pants and asked Marilou to hold his sex organ. In tears, Marilou obeyed her father. He
then began touching the girls breasts and vagina. He forced her to lie down, mounted her and sought to insert his penis into
her organ. Marilou cried in pain. When after some time he still could not insert his penis into Marilous vagina, he applied
coconut oil to lubricate his and his daughters sexual organs. He was finally able to penetrate her. Once inside her, appellant
made push and pull movements until he was through with her. Appellant threatened to kill her if she would tell anybody
about the sexual encounter. The young girls mother, Adela Fabre, arrived home about five oclock that afternoon but,
remembering her fathers threats, she kept mum about her ordeal.
The credibility of Marilou would not be all that difficult to discern from her narration that, as so described by the prosecution,
was full of graphic details which a young provincial girl could not possibly have concocted and which could only have come
from someone who must have personally experienced a brutal rape assault. She testified:
PROS. ENRIQUEZ:
Q Now, Miss Marilou, can you recall where were you on April 26, 1995 at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you that time?
A In our house, sir.
Q What were you doing in your house?
A I was cleaning our yard, sir.
Q How far is your yard where you were doing some works from your house?
A (Witness pointing a distance of around 2 to 3 meters.)
Q Now, while you were doing your work in your yard, can you recall if there was an incident that occurred?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that incident that occurred?
A While I was gathering a palm oil my father arrived and suddenly dragged me to our house, sir.
COURT:
Q Where is your house located?
A At Purok 4, Manat, Trento, Agusan del Sur, Your Honor.
PROS. ENRIQUEZ:
Q What did you do when your father dragged you to your house?
A Because I was dragged by my father to our house I just went with him, sir.
Q While you were in your house after having been dragged by your father, what happened if any?
A He closed our house and he removed my panty, sir.
Q And after removing your panty, what did your father do next?
A He removed his pants and he let me hold his penis, sir.
Q And what did you do next after holding his penis?
A I was crying, sir.
Q While you were crying what did your father do?
A He was touching my breast and my vagina, sir.
Q After that what did he do next?
A He let me lie down, sir.
Q And while lying down, what did your father do?
A He mounted me and he inserted his penis, to my vagina, sir.
Q And what did you feel while your father was inserting his penis to your vagina?
A Very painful, sir.
Q And what did you do while your father was inserting his penis to your vagina?
A I was crying, sir.
Q And while you were crying what did your father do if any?
A He told me not to tell anybody because if I will do it he will kill me, sir.
Q Now, did your father find it easy to insert his penis to your vagina?
A It [took] a long time, sir.
Q And did he use anything to facilitate the insertion of his penis to your vagina?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A He used coconut oil in his penis and also in my vagina so that his penis can easily insert my vagina, sir.
Q Now, while his penis was in your vagina, can you tell this Honorable Court if he did anything also on top of you and while
his penis was inside your vagina?
A None, sir.
Q Did he make any movement?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that movement?
A He made a push and pull movement on my body, sir.
Q Now, while your father was doing it to you where was your mother that time?
A She was in Purok 4, Manat, Trento, Agusan del Sur, sir.
Q And did you report this incident to your mother?
A Not yet sir because he told me not to tell anybody.
Q So when did you had a chance to tell your mother about this incident?
A On May 1, 1995, sir.
Q And what did your mother do after you reported to her this incident?
A She reported [the matter] to the Kagawad, sir.[9]
It has been stressed quite often enough that the testimony of a rape victim, who is young and still immature, deserves faith
and credence[10] for it simply would be unnatural for a young and innocent girl to invent a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and thereafter subject herself and her family to the trauma of a public trial unless she
indeed has spoken the truth.[11] Most especially, a daughter would not accuse her own father of such a serious offense or
allow herself to be perverted if she were not truly motivated by a desire to seek a just retribution for a violation brazenly
committed against her.[12]
Confirming Marilous story was the medical report and testimony of Dr. Reinerio Jalalon, the government physician stationed
at the Bunawan District Hospital in Agusan del Sur, who examined Marilou. Dr. Jalalon made these findings; viz:
Abrasion at (L) labia minora at 3:00 oclock position.
Vaginal smear (-) negative for spermatozoa.[13]
The doctor concluded that it was possible that genital penetration on the victim did occur and that a penis could have caused
the abrasion on the victims labia minora.
There is merit, however, in the plea of the defense, seconded by the prosecution, that the penalty of death imposed by the
trial court should be reduced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-
spouse of the parent of the victim.
While the father-daughter relationship between appellant and private complainant has been sufficiently established, the fact
of minority of the victim, although specifically averred in the information, has not been equally shown in evidence. These
qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority are twin requirements that should be both alleged in the information
and established beyond reasonable doubt during trial in order to sustain an imposition of the death penalty.[14] Neither an
obvious minority of the victim nor the failure of the defense to contest her real age always excuse the prosecution from the
desired proof required by law.[15] Judicial notice of the issue of age without the requisite hearing conducted under Section
3, Rule 129, of the Rules of Court, would not be considered sufficient compliance with the law. The birth certificate of the
victim or, in lieu thereof, any other documentary evidence, like a baptismal certificate, school records and documents of
similar nature, or credible testimonial evidence, that can help establish the age of the victim should be presented.[16] While
the declaration of a victim as to her age, being an exception to the hearsay proscription, would be admissible under the rule
on pedigree, the question on the relative weight that may be accorded to it is a totally different matter.[17]
In the case at bar, the complainant claimed that she was 13 years old at the time of the incident.[18] Her mother stated,
however, that she was 14.[19] The birth certificate of the victim, at least already in her teens, was not presented to
ascertain her true age on the bare allegation that the document was lost when their house burned down.[20] No other
document that could somehow help establish the real age of the victim was submitted.
The Court, in sum, upholds the decision of the trial court convicting Leonardo Fabre of the crime of rape but must reduce, on
account of insufficiency of proof on the qualifying circumstance of minority of the victim, the penalty of death to reclusion
perpetua. With respect to the civil liability, the Court sustains the award of P50,000.00 civil indemnity but, in keeping with
prevailing jurisprudence, must additionally order the payment of P50,000.00 moral damages[21] and P20,000.00 exemplary
damages.[22]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo finding LEONARDO FABRE guilty of rape is AFFIRMED but the sentence of
death therein imposed should be, as it is hereby so, reduced to reclusion perpetua. The award of P50,000.00 civil liability in
favor of victim, Marilou Fabre, is sustained; however, appellant is further ordered to pay to the victim the amounts of
P50,000.00 moral damages and P20,000.00 exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 125016 May 28, 1999

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NOMER VELASCO Y PANGILINAN, accused-appellant.

BUENA, J.:
Accused-appellant Nomer Velasco y Pangilinan together with Reynaldo Endrina y Roa and Ernesto Figueroa y Santos were
charged with the crime of Murder in an Information filed on March 2, 1994 (and docketed as Crim. Case No. I.S. Nos. 94-B-
05391-93) before Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region at Manila. The Information reads as
follows:
That on or about February 20, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
with intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation and with the use of their superior strenght,
attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one DANILO VALENCIA y MANZANO by then
and there stabbing him twice with a bladed weapon at the back and left side of his body thereby inflicting
upon the latter serious mortal stab wounds, which were the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter.
Contrary to law1
Upon arraignment on March 16, 1994, all three accused duly assisted by their counsel de parte pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged in the
Information.2
The testimony of prosecution witness SPO2 Jose Bagkus was dispensed with as the prosecution and defense agreed to
stipulate on the following facts which said witness will be testifying on, to wit:
(1) That SPO2 Jose Bagkus is an investigator assigned to the Crimes against Persons
Division, WPDC since 1991;
(2) That on February 21, 1994, he prepared an Advance Information Report regarding
the reported stabbing of a victim who he later identified as one Danilo Valencia and who
was allegedly stabbed on Capulong Extension, Tondo, Manila, on February 20, 1994
between 3:00 to 3:15 a.m.;
(3) That in the course of his investigation, he also prepared an Additional Information
Report dated February 22, 1994; and
 (4) That if SPO2 Jose Bagkus will take the witness stand, he will testify and affirm the
correctness of the contends of the Advance Information as well as the Additional
Information Report.3
There being no other facts proposed for further stipulation between the parties, trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
Pieced together from the testimony of Leonardo Lucaban, the lone eyewitness to the incident, is the following set of facts:
It appears that at around 3:30 o'clock in the morning of February 20, 1994, Leonardo Lucaban, as he was walking along
Capulong Highway, Tondo, Manila, saw a man whom he recognized as Danilo Valencia.4 He saw Valencia grab a man.5 This
person was about 5'4" in height and of medium build6 and was able to free himself from Valencia's hold.7
Danilo Valencia thereafter proceeded on his way. Two people approached him.8 One of the two was short but with a big
build while the other was tall but of a medium build.9 The smaller of the two asked Valencia why he did not shoot the
person he (Valencia) had eralier grabbed.10 Valencia replied, among other things, that he did not have a gun.11 He
continued to walk away.
The lone eyewitness, Leonardo Lucaban afterwards saw the person who moments ago had been questioning Valencia follow
the latter and stab him at the back.12 Lucaban was about six (6) armslength away from the victim.13 The companion of the
assailant confronted Lucaban as he shouted "ilag" (duck).14 Lucaban immediately ran towards a guardhouse.15 It was there
where he heard two gunshots.16 He saw the assailant and his companion running towards Happy Land, Tondo, Manila17
while the person whom Valencia grabbed was running towards Herbosa St., Tondo, Manila.18
The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, to wit: Carmencita Valencia, Dr. Florante Baltazar, SPO2 Alejandro Yanquiling,
Jr., and Leonardo Lucaban.
Camencita Valencia, the wife of the victim, testified that: Leonardo Lucaban went to her house to inform her that he
witnessed the incident; that he told her he will give a statement to the police;19 that Lucaban did so on February 22,
1994;20 that her statement was taken down in writing by the police; 21 that the reason why her husband was stabbed was
because he gave sanctuary and helped a certain Jude who had snitched on the "akyat barko" gang; 22 that attempts on the
lives of this Jude and his wife were made;23 that Nomer Velasco and Reynaldo Endrina were some of the people who were
trying to kill Jude and his wife:24 that she knows that it was the accused who stabbed her husband because they have a
grudge against him;25 that she did not actually see that it was the accused who stabbed her husband;26 that she was
sleeping when she heard her husband calling out to her;27 that he asked to be taken to the hospital because he had a
wound;28 that her husband was already dead when he reached the hospital.29
Dr. Florante Baltazar, Medico Legal Officer, conducted the autopsy examination on the cadaver of Danilo Valencia. 30 He
confirmed the injuries sustained by the decedent,31 the relative positions of the wound;32 the kind of instrument which
could have caused the stab wounds,33 and the cause of death of the victim.34
Leonardo Lucaban when he first testified on November 22, 1994 averred that "he cannot remember his (referring to the
person who stabbed Danilo Valencia) face because it was dark"35 contrary to the positive identification he made of the three
accused which were given in his Supplemental Statement dated February 24, 1994.36 He likewise testified that "because of
financial diffuculties he could not appear in court"37 and was only able to go when he was apprehended by the police a day
before the hearing.38 At first he said that "he was not threatened by anybody"39 but later admitted that he was being
threatened by the family of the accused but he was not bothered because he had not pointed to anyone yet.40
The fourth prosecution witnes is SPO2 Alejandro Yanquiling, Jr. He was the follow-up investigator in the stabbing incident of
Danilo Valencia. In the course of his investigation he took down the Supplemental Statement of Leonardo Lucaban;41 that in
a line-up of six person three (3) persons were identified by Leonardo Lucaban as the assailants of the victim; 42 that the said
persons were Nomer Velasco, Endrina, and Figueroa;43 that Lucaban identified these persons in the line-up by touching their
right shoulders;44 that Lucaban was able to identify the accused without wavering.45
Leonardo Lucaban was thereafter recalled to the witness stand. He testified that he pointed to only one suspect in the line-
up not three as testified to by SPO2 Alejandro Yanquiling, Jr.;46 that the suspect he pointed to as the assailant of the victim
Danilo Valencia is identified as Nomer Velasco; 47 that he saw the accused Nomer Velasco stab the victim by the light
coming from a passing jeepney and after that he screamed 'ilag' (duck) and he ran away;48 that he could not see very well
the other persons because of the darkness;49 that the reason why he denied having pointed to the suspects in the last
hearing was because of a threat he received and that a day before he was apprehended, a person named Peter almost
stabbed him because he was "nagpapakabayani" (pretending to be a hero);50 that he personally knows Nomer Velasco
because he recruited him before to be one of his workers 51 in the cutting of logs.52
The defense denied the accusation and raised the defense of alibi. Aside from accused-appellant Nomer Velasco three (3)
other witnesses were presented. The witnesses and their testimonies consisted of the following:
(1) Reynaldo Endrina was one of the accused. He testified that he and the other two accused were neighbors at Happy
Land;53 that they have known each other for, more or less, two years;54 that he knows Spouses Danilo Valencia and
Camencita Valencia;55 that Danilo Valencia is his "compadre" because the former is the godfather of his son; 56 that he was
at home sleeping at 3:30 o'clock in the morning of February 20, 1994; 57 that he did not go out of his house on or before
3:30 a.m. of February 20, 1994.58
(2) Ernesto Figueroa, the third accused in the case, testified, among other things, that he does not know the Spouses Danilo
and Carmencita Valencia;59 that he was also at home sleeping on that morning of February 20, 1994.60
(3) Nomer Velasco, the accused-appellant, likewise denied knowing the Spouses Danilo and Carmencita Valencia61 and
Leonardo Lucaban.62 He testified that he was also at home sleeping at 3:30 a.m. of February 20, 1994; 63 that he did not
go out of his house prior to or at 3:30 o'clock in the morning,64 that he and his co-accused were not friends but only
acquaintances,65 that he had last seen his co-accused in 1993;66 that he came to know that Danilo Valencia was killed only
after he and the other two accused were
apprehended;67 that it was a police officer who told them to admit that they killed Danilo Valencia.68
(4) Rosemarie Velasco, the wife of Nomer Velasco, corroborated her husband's testimony that he was sleeping at their
house69 on the morning of February 20, 1994. She testified, among others, that she had asked Leonardo Lucaban why he
should point to her husband as the assailant in the killing of Danilo Valencia and he told her that he was being threatened by
the police,70 that the scene of the crime (Capulong Highway) and the residence of the accused at Happy Land are twenty
(20) meters apart from each other.71
After the presentation of evidence, the trial court in its decision promulgated on February 19, 1996 found the accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt but ordered the acquittal of Reynaldo Endrina and Ernesto Figueroa. The
dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING accused Reynaldo Endrina
y Roa, and accused Ernesto Figueroa y Santos for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain their conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. Their immediate release from detention is hereby ordered unless their
continuous confinement is necessitated by other lawful orders.
Accused Nomer Velasco y Pangilinan is hereby declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessory penalties
provided by law. He is also condemned to pay the heirs of victim Danilo Valencia the amount of P50,000.00
as actual damages and the sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs. His immediate transfer to
the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa is hereby ordered
SO ORDERED.72
Accused Nomer Velasco comes to this Court on appeal praying that the decision of the trial court be reversed and set aside
and that a new one be entered acquitting him of the charge.
The accused-appellant assigns the following errors in his brief:
I. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT ACCUSED NOMER
VELASCO WAS NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE LONE EYEWITNESS, LEONARDO
LUCABAN.
II. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RELYING UPON THE TESTIMONY OF
LEONARDO LUCABAN, CONSIDERING THAT THE SAME IS REPLETE WITH
INCONSISTENCIES.
III. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO FAVORABLY CONSIDER THE
DEFENSE OF HEREIN PETITIONER.
IV. THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
The contentions are without merit.
In assailing the questioned decision the accused-appellant attacks the credibility of the lone eyewitness by pointing out that
when Leonardo Lucaban first testified on November 22, 1994 he failed to name the appellant as the assailant even though
the latter was in the courtroom at that time.73 But when he was recalled to the witness stand three (3) days thereafter or on
November 25, 1994, he was able to do so.74
This change of heart by the said witness is attributed by the appellant Nomer Velasco to the former being thoroughly
"prepared" by the police authorities when he was taken into custody for five (5) days.75
Accused-appellant likewise imputes that the "physical, emotional and psychological stress consequent to an apprehension of
a prolonged and indefinite detention"76 provoked the witness to testify "in the manner desired by the police or the
prosecution if only to win back his lift and freedom."77
The counsel for accused-appellant is trying to mislead us into thinking that the police authorities had a hand in the change of
the eyewitness' earlier testimony just because he was placed under detention. Or that the arrest was made as a result of a
whim.
We find that the deduction arrived at by the appellant is totally baseless. The police apprehended the eyewitness in
compliance with two lawful orders of the trial court. And for the accused-appellant to impute otherwise is uncalled for, as is
the implication that while under their custody the witness was coached into pointing an accusing finger at Nomer Velasco.
Quoted below in full are the orders of the court a quo dated October 12, 1994 and November 22, 1994 explicitly stating why
there was a need for the apprehension of the said witness, to wit:
ORDER
Considering the importance of the prosecution's intended witness Leonardo Lucaban, an eyewitness to the
incident who refused to obey the subpoena of this Court despite receipt thereof.
Order is hereby grven to the WPDC thru any police officer to arrest the person of said Leonardo Lucaban of
410 Radial 10 cor. Capulong St., Tondo, Manila, so that this court can secure his appearance on the next
scheduled hearing, which is reset to November 22, 1994, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
SO ORDERED.
Given in open court this 12th day of October 1994, at Manila, Phillippines. 78
ORDER
For disregarding the subpoena sent to him for several times despite receipt thereof, and if not for the
warrant issued against him, his attendance for today's hearing cannot be secured.
WHEREFORE, witness Leonardo Lucaban is declared guilty of indirect contempt of court and shall be held
in custody of SPO1 Pedro Justiniano and PO2 Ismael Velasco, for the continuation of his testimony which is
set on Friday, November 25, 1994, at 8:30 a.m.
SO ORDERED.
Given in open court this 22nd day of November 1994, at Manila, Philippines.79
It is not totally unheard of for a person who has witnessed a crime and recognized its perpetrators to deny knowledge of the
identity of these malefactors for fear of reprisals against his life or that of his family.
We have held in a number of cases that it is not uncommon for a witness to a crime to show some reluctance about getting
involved in a criminal case, as in fact the natural reticence of most people to get involved is of judicial
notice.80
Considering that it was the trial court which give the order to place Lucaban in the custody of the police for the continuation
of his testimony, mayhap the accused-appellants also infers that the trial court likewise wanted Lucaban to point to the
accused-appellant as the assailant?
Accused-appellant casts aspersion on (1) the ability of the witness to recognize him but failing to recognize his co-accused,
namely Endrina and Figueroa, when all three of them were at the scene of the crime, (2) the failure of the witness to shout
for help from vehicles passing by, and (3) the action of the witness in going to a remote tricyle spot to summon a rescue.
The accused-appellant considers these instances to be lapses and deficiencies that do not lend credence to the prosecution's
lone eyewitness.
In the case of People vs. Dones81 we held that there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is
confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience.
A person when faced with an out of the ordinary situation is not expected to act in a manner similar to another. The conduct
therefore of Lucaban should not be deemed suspect if the only person he recognized at the scene of the crime was Nomer
Velasco or if he fails to enlist the help of the drivers or passengers of passing vehicles or for going to a remote tricyle spot
instead of, for example, knowing on the doors of the houses in the neighborhood.
We do not deem the deficiencies of Lucaban in his testimonies so material as to put the trustworthiness of said witness open
to serious doubt. Minor inconsistencies do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecution's evidence as a whole. 82
Moreover discrepancies between sworn statements or affidavits and testimonies made at the witness stand do not
necessarily discredit the witnesses.83
This rule is well-settled that the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses presented before
it for it had occasion to observe the witnesses' deportment on the stand and the manner in which they gave their
testimonies. In fact, it has become a consistent and immutable rule, since more often than not, the appeals relate to the
credibility of witnesses, that we are bound by the prevailing doctrine, founded on a host of jurisprudential rulings, to the
effect that the matter is best determined at the trial court level where testimonies are "first hand given, received, assessed
and evaluated. 84 Thus in the absence of a showing that serious and substantial errors were committed by the lower court in
the appraisal of the evidence before it, factual findings, particularly, the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the
testimony of the witnesses are accorded great weight and respect 85 and treats it with finality.
We have perused the records of this case and we find, as the lower court did, that the testimony of the lone eyewitness
Leonardo Lucaban is clear, straightforward and worthy of belief.
It is a well-settled rule that the defense of alibi, admittedly, the weakest defense, cannot prevail over the positive
identification of the accused by prosecution witnesses.86
Leonardo Lucaban testified that he personally knows Nomer Velasco.
Q Prior to that incident, you know personally this Nomer Velasco?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Why do you know him?
A Because once I have recruited him as one of my workers
COURT
What is your work?
A Cutting of log, Your Honor.
Q You are really sure that it was this Nomer Velasco whom you saw stab the victim?
A It seems he was really the one. I saw his face.87
Accused-appellant contends that he was sleeping at his house at the time of the incident. His wife corroborates this.
However, in this instance, we have to take the word of his wife with a grain of salt for witnesses who are either wives or
mothers of the accused, in almost all instances, would freely perjure themselves for the sake of their loved ones.88
In the light of the positive identification made by an eyewitness who admittedly has no grudge against the accused-appellant
the defense of alibi put up by the latter does not hold water.
It is the burden of the accused not only to prove that he was not at the scene of the crime when it happened but also that it
was impossible for him to be there at the time of the commission of the offense.89
This test the accused-appellant failed. Rosemarie Velasco, the wife of the accused, testified that the distance of their house
from the scene of the crime is a mere twenty meters. The distance between these two locations is not so great that it would
have been impossible for the accused-appellant to be present at the scene of the crime.
Accused-appellant avers that the recall of the witness had no basis and was made with grave abuse of discretion.
We disagree. In the case of Arce, et al. vs. Arce, et al.,90 it was held that if, after hearing all the evidence adduced by the
parties, the trial Judge is not satisfied, he may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, on his own motion and in furtherance
of justice, call additional witnesses or recall some of the same witnesses, for the purpose of questioning them himself, in
order to satisfy his mind with reference to particular facts or issues involved in the case.
Treachery or alevosia qualified the killing of Danilo Valencia to murder committed by the accused. There is alevosia when a
person is unexpectedly attacked from behind, depriving him of any opportunity to defend himself. 91
The following circumstances show that the accused-appellant indeed committed the killing by treacherous means: He
engaged the victim into a conversation, brief though it may be. From that conversation he gleaned that the victim was not
carrying a weapon. Assured that the victim was unarmed the accused-appellant then followed the victim and stabbed him at
the back.
The assailant was known to the victim for he used to be under the latter's employ. 92 Unsuspecting of the assailant's evil
plans the latter continued to walk away. The attack was so sudden that it gave the victim no chance to defend himself or to
retaliate. Moreover the safety of the assailant from defensive or retaliatory attacks coming from the victim was ensured
because the latter was unarmed.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 142556 February 5, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JESUS PEREZ y SEBUNGA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For automatic review is the Decision1 dated October 26, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Iba,
Zambales, Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. RTC-2116-I, finding appellant Jesus S. Perez ("appellant"
for brevity), guilty of raping Mayia P. Ponseca ("Mayia" for brevity) and imposing on appellant the
death penalty.
On January 22, 1997, the Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor2 of Zambales filed an Information3
charging appellant with the crime of rape "penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610," committed as follows:
"That on or about the 17th day of January, 1997 at 12:00 noon at Sitio Baco, Brgy. Macarang, in the
Municipality of Palauig, Province of Zambales, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with lewd design and by means of coercion, inducement and other
consideration, did then and there, wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse
with one Mayia P. Ponseca, a minor of 6 years old, without her consent and against her will, to the
damage and prejudice of the latter."
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by counsel de officio Atty. Genaro N. Montefalcon, pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged.4 Subsequently, the trial court allowed the withdrawal of Atty.
Montefalcon as counsel for health reasons. The trial court appointed Atty. Roberto Blanco as
appellant’s counsel de oficio.5
At the pre-trial, the prosecution and defense stipulated on the following facts:
"1. The identity of the accused;
2. The accused was at the time of the incident in the vicinity thereof;
3. The victim in this case, Mayia P. Ponseca, was born on 23 May 1990 as evidenced by her
birth certificate;
4. That after the incident, the child was subjected to a medico-legal examination to which a
medico-legal certificate was issued by Dr. Editha Divino.
The prosecution marked in evidence the birth certificate of the victim Mayia O. Ponseca as Exhibit ‘A’,
and the medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Editha Divino as Exhibit ‘B’."6
Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented the following witnesses: the victim, Mayia Ponseca;
the victim’s mother, Hermie Ponseca; the victim’s father, Osias Ponseca; Virginia Espejo Giron; and
Dr. Editha dela Cruz Divino. On the other hand, the defense presented appellant and his employer,
Bartolome Tolentino.
The Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG" for brevity) summarized the prosecution’s version of the
incident in the appellee’s brief, to wit:
"On January 17, 1997, about noontime, in Sitio Baco, Barangay Macarang, Palauig, Zambales, six-year
old Mayia Ponseca was walking along Sulok on her way to her house in Sitio Camiling when appellant
Jesus Sebunga Perez approached her (pp. 7-8, TSN, December 15, 1998). Appellant introduced himself
as "Johnny" and immediately afterwards, strangled her neck and boxed her abdomen (p. 10, TSN,
December 15, 1998). Still in shock, Mayia fell down (id.). At that point, a dog arrived and barked at
them.
Appellant then proceeded to lower his black denim pants while simultaneously removing Mayia’s
panty. He then inserted his penis inside Mayia’s vagina (p. 11, id.). Mayia felt excruciating pain in her
private parts (sic) but was not able to repel her aggressor whose strength and weight totally engulfed
her. Her only recourse was to cry while her young body was being ravished (p. 13, id.).
After satisfying his beastly desires, appellant raised his pants and ran away (p. 14, id.). Notwithstanding
that her vagina was bleeding profusely and her dress now covered with her own blood, Mayia managed
to stand up and seek help. She ran to the house of Virginia Giron, which was only fifty (50) meters
away from the scene of the crime. In fact, Giron was outside when she heard her dog barking
(apparently, it was the same dog barking at appellant while he was consummating his lust on Mayia,
pp. 2-3, TSN, January 12, 1999; p. 11, TSN, December 15, 1998). Looking at the direction of the noise,
she saw a confused Mayia approaching her with blood dripping from her private parts and thighs.
When Giron asked Mayia what happened, the latter shouted "ni-rape ako, ni-rape ako" (p. 4, TSN,
January 4, 1999). Giron then summoned her husband and other companions to look for Mayia’s
attacker but was unable to find him. Giron then proceeded to Hermie Ponseca and Osias Ponseca,
Mayia’s parents, to inform them of what happened (p. 5, TSN, January 5, 1999; p. 2, TSN, January 19,
1999).
When her parents asked Mayia if she knew her assailant, the latter answered the name "Johnny." (id.)
The couple brought their daughter to the President Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital for medical
examination (p. 2, TSN, February 24, 1999). She was examined by Dra. Editha Dela Cruz Divino, who
issued a medico-legal certificate dated January 23, 1997 stating the following:
a. Bleeding of genitalia coming from median laceration at the vaginal floor around four (4)
centimeters in size. Possible cause, a fall and then hitting a sharp object and also an alleged
sexual assault (p. 4, TSN, February 24, 1999).

b. Genitalia had hymenal lacerations at 3, 6, 9 and 12 o’clock positions.

(pp. 4-6 id.)

Because of the extent of the damage on her genitals, Mayia undertook an IV sedation operation to
repair her lacerations (p. 6, id.) During her confinement at the hospital, the Ponseca couple reported the
incident to the Palauig PNP Police Station and recounted their daughter’s narration including the name
of the culprit as "Johnny" who, according to their neighbors, was a worker at the fishpond of Bartolome
Tolentino (pp. 11-12, TSN, January 5, 1999). Police operatives then proceeded to the said fishpond and
arrested appellant. After her discharge from the hospital, Mayia learned that appellant was already
apprehended (pp. 3-8, TSN, January 5, 1999). In the police station, she was able to positively identify
the appellant as the person who sexually assaulted her (p. 18, TSN, December 15, 1998)."7
Appellant denied raping Mayia. Appellant testified that on the date of the alleged rape incident, he was
working at a fishpond at Macarang, Zambales. He heard of the rape of a young girl from his manager,
Bartolome Tolentino ("Tolentino" for brevity).8 Appellant further testified that on January 25, 1997,
policemen went to the fishpond where he worked. The policemen arrested appellant and brought him to
the police station at Palauig. Later, the policemen took him to the municipal jail of Palauig.
On cross-examination, appellant testified that his nickname is not "Johnny" but "Jessie."9 He testified
that on January 17, 1997, at around 12 o’clock noon, he left the fishpond and walked home to Barangay
Alwa which was about thirty meters from the fishpond.10
The defense formally offered the testimony of witness Tolentino to prove that appellant was employed
as caretaker of Tolentino’s fishpond for almost two years before the alleged rape incident. Appellant
was purportedly of good moral character while employed as a fishpond caretaker. The prosecution
admitted the offer of testimony. Hence, the trial court dispensed with the testimony of Tolentino in open
court.11
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment12 on October 26, 1999, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, accused Jesus Perez y Sabung (SIC) is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutore Rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code with the qualifying circumstance that the victim was only 6 years old at the time of
the commission of the offense, in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III, Republic Act 7610, and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH. Jesus Perez is directed to pay to the private complainant the
amount of Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as and by way of civil indemnity and Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) as and by way of moral damages."
Hence, this automatic review.
In his brief, appellant raises the following lone assignment of error:
"THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE APPELLANT
HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT."
Appellant contends that his identification in open court by Mayia was highly irregular.l^vvphi1.net
Appellant points out that the prosecutor had already identified him as the man wearing an orange t-shirt
when the prosecutor asked Mayia to identify her alleged rapist. Appellant stresses that when Mayia
identified him in open court, she referred to him as a man named "Johnny" and did not give any
description or any identifying mark. Moreover, appellant claims he was alone in the cell when Mayia
identified him after the police arrested him. Appellant bewails that the identification was not done with
the usual police line-up.
Appellant’s contention is untenable.
As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions when the
witness is a child of tender years13 as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts without
prompting or suggestion.14 Leading questions are necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant
lips.15 In the case at bar, the trial court was justified in allowing leading questions to Mayia as she was
evidently young and unlettered, making the recall of events difficult, if not uncertain.16 As explained
in People v. Rodito Dagamos:17
"The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over the
questioning of a child witness. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule on Examination of a Child
Witness, which took effect on December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to facilitate the ascertainment of the
truth, (2) to ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the
child, (3) to protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time.
Leading questions in all stages of examination of a child are allowed if the same will further the
interests of justice."
The Court has repeatedly stated that it is highly inconceivable for a child of tender age, inexperienced
in the ways of the world, to fabricate a charge of defloration, undergo a medical examination of her
private part, subject herself to public trial, and tarnish her family’s honor and reputation, unless she was
motivated by a strong desire to seek justice for the wrong committed against her.18
Mayia recounted her harrowing experience, thus:
"Q What time was this when Johnny introduced himself to you?
A I do not recall, ma’m.
Q Was it in the morning, noontime or in the afternoon or in the evening?
A Noontime, ma’m.
Q So, when Johnny said, ‘Ako si Johnny,’ what did you do?
A None, ma’m.
Q After that when Johnny said, ‘Ako si Johnny’, what happened?
A He strangled (sinakal) me.
Q Were there persons around in the place when Johnny strangled you?
A None, ma’m.
Q So, what did he do then after he strangled you?
A He boxed me on my stomach, ma’m.
Q When he boxed you on your stomach, what happened to you?
A I was shocked, ma’m.
Q Did you fall down?
A Before that, I was already lying down, so when he boxed me, I was shocked.
Q You said that you were already lying down. Who made you lie down?
A The person, ma’m.
Q Why were you shocked, Mayia?
A Because he strangled me and boxed me.
Q After he boxed you on your abdomen, what happened? What else did he do to you?
A There was a dog that arrived in the place and it barked at us. Then Johnny moved in a hurry
by penetrating my private part and after he dressing (SIC) me, he ran away.
Q You said that Johnny penetrated your private part. With what instrument did he use in
penetrating your private part?
A His penis, ma’m.
Q What was he wearing at that time?
A A black denim, ma’m.
Q When he used his penis in entering your private part, did he remove his pants?
A No, ma’m.
Q What did he do with his pants?
A He brought out his penis, ma’m.
Q You mean to say Mayia, he lowered his pants?
A Yes, ma’m.
Q What about you, were you wearing any panty?
A Yes, ma’m.
Q What was your clothes at that time?
A A dress, ma’m.
Q When his penis entered your vagina Mayia, did he remove your panty?
A Yes, ma’m."19
The identity of appellant as the rapist has been established by the clear, convincing and
straightforward testimony of Mayia. During the trial, she testified as follows:
"Q Mayia, there is a man sitting wearing orange t-shirt, do you know this man?
A Yes, ma’m.
Q Do you know his name?
A Yes, ma’m.
Q What is his name?
A Johnny, ma’m.
Q Why do you know him?
A Because he introduced himself to me.
Q Where did he introduced himself to you?
A At Sulok, ma’m.
Q Sulok is a place?
A Yes, ma’m.
Q Do you have any companion when this man introduced himself to you?
A None, ma’m.
Q How did he introduce himself to you?
A The man introduced himself to me by saying, ‘Kilala mo ba ako? Hindi po. Ako si
Johnny.’"20
The trial court further asked Mayia:
"Q You were talking of a certain Johnny. s this Johnny in court now?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you point to him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Point to him.
A (Witness pointing to the person sitting at the accused bench and when asked of his name
answered Jesus Perez)
Q Is this Johnny whom you point to the person whom you saw in that ‘Sulok?’
A Yes, sir." 21
Mayia’s simple, positive and straightforward recounting on the witness stand of her harrowing
experience lends credence to her accusation. Her tender age belies any allegation that her accusation
was a mere invention impelled by some ill-motive. As the Court has stressed in numerous cases, when
a woman or a child victim says that she has been raped, she in effect says all that is necessary to show
that rape was indeed committed.22
Mayia had a clear sight of appellant’s face since the rape occurred at "noontime."23 Her proximity to
appellant during the sexual assault leaves no doubt as to the correctness of her identification for a man
and woman cannot be physically closer to each other than during the sexual act.24 Thus, even if Mayia
did not give the identifying marks of appellant, her positive identification of appellant sufficed to
establish clearly the identity of her sexual assailant.
Appellant’s claim that the police improperly suggested to Mayia to identify appellant is without basis.
True, Mayia did not identify appellant in a police line-up when Mayia identified appellant in his cell.
However, appellant, in his testimony admitted that he had two other companions in his cell.25
Moreover, the Court has held that there is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper
identification. Even without a police line-up, there could still be a proper identification as long as the
police did not suggest such identification to the witnesses.26 The records are bereft of any indication
that the police suggested to Mayia to identify appellant as the rapist.
Mayia’s identification in open court of appellant as her rapist dispels any doubt as to the proper
identification of appellant. Mayia positively identified and pointed to appellant as her rapist. We are
satisfied that her testimony, by itself, is sufficient identification of her rapist. As held in People v.
Marquez:27
"xxx. Indeed, the revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credit, as the
willingness of complainant to face police investigation and to undergo the trouble and humiliation of a
public trial is eloquent testimony of the truth of her complaint. Stated differently, it is most improbable
for a five-year old girl of tender years, so innocent and so guileless as the herein offended party, to
brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any man if it were not true."
In his Reply Brief, appellant contends that even assuming that the guilt of appellant has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty. Appellant maintains that
the death penalty cannot be imposed on him for failure of the prosecution to prove Mayia’s age by
independent evidence. Appellant points out that while Mayia’s birth certificate was duly marked during
the pre-trial, it was not presented and identified during the trial. Appellant asserts that Mayia’s minority
must not only be specifically alleged in the Information but must also be established beyond reasonable
doubt during the trial.1awphi1.nét
Appellant’s argument deserves scant consideration.
At the pre-trial, the parties mutually worked out a satisfactory disposition of the criminal case.
Appellant, assisted by counsel, signed a Pre-Trial Agreement28 which, as incorporated in the Pre-Trial
Order, stated that:
"x x x.
3. The victim in this case, Mayia P. Ponseca was born on 23 May 1990 as evidenced by her birth
certificate;
x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
During the pre-trial, the prosecution marked in evidence Mayia’s birth certificate as Exhibit "A".29 The
prosecution submitted its Offer of Evidence30 which included Exhibit "A", a certified true copy of
Mayia’s birth certificate. The trial court admitted Exhibit "A"31 without any objection from the
defense.
The purpose of pre-trial is to consider the following: (a) plea bargaining; (b) stipulation of facts; (c)
marking for identification of evidence of the parties; (d) waiver of objections to admissibility of
evidence; (e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes lawful
defenses; and (f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil
aspects of the case.32 Facts stipulated and evidence admitted during pre-trial bind the parties. Section
4, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure33 provides:
"SEC. 4. Pre-trial order. - After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the
actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the
trial to matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action during the trial, unless modified by
the court to prevent manifest injustice." (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Mayia herself testified in open court as to her age. During the trial on December 15, 1998,
which was about twenty-three (23) months after the rape incident occurred on January 17, 1997, Mayia
testified on cross-examination that she was "8 years old last May 23."34 Thus, by deduction, since
Mayia was born on May 23, 1990 as shown in her birth certificate, she was about six (6) years and
seven (7) months old on January 17, 1997, the day the crime took place. We rule that the prosecution
has indisputably proven that Mayia was below seven years old at the time appellant raped
her.1a\^/phi1.net
Finally, the trial court was correct in imposing the death penalty on appellant. Under Article 33535 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659,36 the death penalty shall
be imposed if the crime of rape is committed against a child below seven (7) years old. Mayia was six
(6) years and seven (7) months old when appellant raped her.
If rape is qualified by any of the circumstances37 warranting the imposition of the death penalty, the
civil indemnity for actual or compensatory damages is mandatory.38 Following prevailing
jurisprudence, the civil indemnity is fixed at P75,000.00. In addition, moral damages of P50,000.00
should also be awarded to the rape victim without need for pleading or proving it.39
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 26, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales,
Branch 69, in Criminal Case No. RTC-2116-I, finding appellant Jesus S. Perez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, sentencing him to suffer the death penalty,40 and
ordering him to pay the victim Mayia P. Ponseca the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages, is AFFIRMED in toto.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of the Republic
Act No. 7659, upon the finality of this Decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to
the Office of the President of the Philippines for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 193966, February 19, 2014

DESIGN SOURCES INTERNATIONAL INC. AND KENNETH SY, Petitioners, v. LOURDES L.

ERISTINGCOL, Respondent.
RE S O LUTI ON
SERENO, C.J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by Design Sources International, Inc. and Kenneth Sy
(petitioners) under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Petition assails the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated 1 June 2010 and Resolution 3 dated 30 September 2010 in CA G.R. SP
No. 98763. The assailed Decision and Resolution sustained the Orders dated 8 February 2006, 1 June
2006 and 26 February 2007 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in Civil Case No.
00–850.

Considering that there are no factual issues in this case, we adopt the findings of fact of the CA, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Design Sources International, Inc. (“Petitioner Corporation”) is a distributor of Pergo

flooring. Sometime in 1998, the Private Respondent bought the said brand of flooring of
the “Cherry Blocked” type from the Petitioner Corporation. The flooring was installed in
her house.

On February 24, 2000, the Private Respondent discovered that the Pergo flooring installed
had unsightly bulges at the joints and seams. The Private Respondent informed the
Petitioners of these defects and the former insisted on the repair or replacement of the
flooring at the expense of the latter.

After several inspections of the alleged defective flooring, meetings between the parties and
exchanges of correspondence, the Petitioner Corporation was given until May 31, 2000 to
replace the installed flooring. Nevertheless, on the deadline, the Petitioner Corporation did
not comply with the demand of the Private Respondent. A complaint for damages, docketed
as Civil Case No.00–850, was thus filed by the Private Respondent before the RTC on July
13, 2000.

On February 8, 2006, Kenneth Sy, one of the Petitioners’ witnesses, testified in open court.
Immediately after his testimony, the following occurred as evidenced by the transcript of
stenographic notes (“TSN”): chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

COURT : (To Atty. Posadas) Who will be your next witness?

ATTY. Your honor, my next witness will be Stephen Sy, also of Design Source.
POSADAS :

ATTY Your honor, may I know if Mr. Stephen Sy around [sic] the courtroom?
FORTUN :

ATTY. (Pointing to the said witness) He is here.

POSADAS :

ATTY. So the witness is actually inside the Courtroom.

FORTUN :

ATTY. But, your honor, please, I was asking about it, nahiya lang ako kay Atty. Fortun.
POSADAS :

ATTY. But I was [sic] asked of the exclusion of the witness.

 FORTUN :

COURT : (To Atty. Posadas) You shall [sic] have to tell the Court of your ready witness.

ATTY. He already heard the whole testimony of his colleague.

FORTUN :

ATTY. I’m sorry, your honor.

POSADAS :

COURT : All right. When were [sic] you present him, today or next time.

ATTY. Next time, your honor.

POSADAS :

COURT : All right. Next time, Atty. Posadas, if you have other witnesses present in Court inform
us.

ATTY. No, your honor, in fact I will object to the presentation of Mr. Stephen Sy, because his
FORTUN : [sic] here all the time when the witness was in [sic] cross–examined.

ATTY. Your honor, I will just preserve [sic] my right to present another witness on the
POSADAS : technical aspect of this case.

COURT : Okay. All right. Order. After the completion of the testimony of defendant’s second
witness in the person of Mr. Kenneth Sy, [A]tty. Benjamin Posadas, counsel for the
defendants, moved for continuance considering that he is not feeling well and that he
needs time to secure another witness to testify on the technical aspect, because of the
objection on the part of plaintiff’s counsel Atty. Philip Sigfrid Fortun on his plan of
presenting of Mr. Stephen Sy as their next witness due to his failure to inform the Court
and the said counsel of the presence of the said intended witness while Mr. Kenneth Sy
was testifying. There being no objection thereto on the part of Atty. Fortun, reset the
continuation of the presentation of defendant’s evidence to April 5, 2006 at 8:30 o’clock
in the morning.
x x x

SO ORDERED.4 ChanRobles Virtualawlibrary

On 22 March 2006, petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the Order, but their motion was denied
by the RTC on 1 June 2006 on the ground that “the Court deems it no longer necessary to allow
Stephen Sy from testifying [sic] when a different witness could testify on matters similar to the
intended testimony of the former.”5 The Order also stated that “to allow Stephen Sy from testifying
[sic] would work to the disadvantage of the plaintiff as he already heard the testimony of witness
Kenneth Sy.”6

Petitioners filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration (with Leave of Court) dated 19 June 2006, which
was likewise denied by the RTC in the assailed Order dated 26 February 2007. 7 cral awred
Petitioners sought recourse before the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. They raised the sole issue of whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
refused to allow architect Stephen Sy (Stephen) to testify as to material matters. 8 cralawl awlibrary

At the outset, the CA found no sufficient basis that herein respondent previously asked for the
exclusion of other witnesses. It was the duty of respondent’s counsel to ask for the exclusion of other
witnesses, without which, there was nothing to prevent Stephen from hearing the testimony of
petitioners’ other witnesses. Nevertheless, following the doctrine laid down in People v. Sandal
(Sandal),9 the appellate court ruled that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the assailed Orders considering that petitioners failed to show that Stephen’s testimony would bolster
their position. Moreover, from the Manifestation of petitioners’ counsel, it appears that petitioners had
another witness who could give a testimony similar to Stephen’s.

Petitioners elevated the case before us assailing the Decision of the CA. In the meantime, trial
proceeded in the lower court. On 11 February 2014, they filed a Motion for Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order either to allow the presentation of
Stephen as a witness or to suspend the trial proceedings pending the ruling in the instant Petition.
Assignment of Errors
Petitioners raise the following errors allegedly committed by the CA:

Finding that the preclusion of Stephen Sy from testifying as a witness in the trial of the case
did not amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Pozon.

Applying the case of People vs. Sandal in justifying the order of exclusion issued by Judge
Pozon, precluding Stephen Sy from testifying as witness.

Concluding that the petitioners had another witness that could have given a similar
testimony as that of Stephen Sy.10 ChanRoblesVirtual awlibrary

The Court’s Ruling

We find the Petition to be impressed with merit.

The principal issue is whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
Orders disallowing petitioners from presenting Stephen as their witness.

The controversy arose from the objection of respondent’s counsel to the presentation of Stephen as
petitioners’ witness considering that Stephen was already inside the courtroom during the presentation
of witness Kenneth Sy (Kenneth). However, as aptly found by the CA, respondent failed to substantiate
her claim that there was a prior request for the exclusion of other witnesses during the presentation of
Kenneth. Respondent did not even allege in her Comment11 that there was any such request.

Section 15, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 15.Exclusion and separation of witnesses. — On any trial or hearing, the judge may
exclude from the court any witness not at the time under examination, so that he may not
hear the testimony of other witnesses. The judge may also cause witnesses to be kept
separate and to be prevented from conversing with one another until all shall have been
 examined.

Excluding future witnesses from the courtroom at the time another witness is testifying, or ordering that
these witnesses be kept separate from one another, is primarily to prevent them from conversing with
one another. The purpose is to ensure that the witnesses testify to the truth by preventing them from
being influenced by the testimonies of the others. In other words, this measure is meant to prevent
connivance or collusion among witnesses. The efficacy of excluding or separating witnesses has long
been recognized as a means of discouraging fabrication, inaccuracy, and collusion. However, without
any motion from the opposing party or order from the court, there is nothing in the rules that prohibits a
witness from hearing the testimonies of other witnesses.

There is nothing in the records of this case that would show that there was an order of exclusion from
the RTC, or that there was any motion from respondent’s counsel to exclude other witnesses from the
courtroom prior to or even during the presentation of the testimony of Kenneth. We are one with the
CA in finding that under such circumstances, there was nothing to prevent Stephen from hearing the
testimony of Kenneth. Therefore, the RTC should have allowed Stephen to testify for petitioners.

The RTC and the CA, however, moved on to determine the materiality of the testimony of Stephen,
which became their basis for not allowing the latter to testify. Applying Sandal, the CA ruled that the
absence of a showing of how his testimony would bolster the position of petitioners saved the judgment
of the RTC in issuing the order of exclusion.

We agree with petitioners that the application of Sandal is misplaced. Contrary to the present case, in
Sandal there was a court order for exclusion which was disregarded by the witness. The defiance of the
order led to the exercise by the court of its discretion to admit or reject the testimony of the witness
who had defied its order. Again, in this case, there was no order or motion for exclusion that was defied
by petitioners and their witnesses. Thus, the determination of the materiality of Stephen’s testimony in
relation to the strengthening of petitioners’ defense was uncalled for.

Without any prior order or at least a motion for exclusion from any of the parties, a court cannot simply
allow or disallow the presentation of a witness solely on the ground that the latter heard the testimony
of another witness. It is the responsibility of respondent’s counsel to protect the interest of his client
during the presentation of other witnesses. If respondent actually believed that the testimony of
Kenneth would greatly affect that of Stephen’s, then respondent’s counsel was clearly remiss in his
duty to protect the interest of his client when he did not raise the issue of the exclusion of the witness in
a timely manner.

Respondent is bound by the acts of her counsel, including mistakes in the realm of procedural
techniques.12 The exception to the said rule does not apply herein, considering that there is no showing
that she was thereby deprived of due process. At any rate, respondent is not without recourse even if the
court allows the presentation of the testimony of Stephen, considering the availability of remedies
during or after the presentation of witnesses, including but not limited to the impeachment of
testimonies.

Therefore, this Court finds that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in not allowing Stephen
to testify notwithstanding the absence of any order for exclusion of other witnesses during the
presentation of Kenneth’s testimony.
In view thereof, the RTC is hereby ordered to allow the presentation of Stephen Sy as witness for
petitioners. Accordingly, petitioners’ Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order is now rendered moot.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. JAIME CASTILLANO, SR. alias Talino, RONALD CASTILLANO alias Nono and
JAIME CASTILLANO, JR. alias Junjun, accused,

RONALD CASTILLANO alias Nono and JAIME CASTILLANO, JR. alias Junjun, appellants.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 31, in
Criminal Case No. P-2542, convicting appellants Ronald Castillano alias Nono and Jaime Castillano,
Jr. of murder, meting on each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering them to pay,
jointly and severally, damages to the heirs of the victim Diosdado Volante.
The Evidence or the Prosecution
Diosdado Volante, who eked out a living as a farmer, his wife Luz,[2] and their four children lived in
their farmland located in the outskirt of Sitio Danawan, Barangay Sagrada, Bula, Camarines Sur.
About 200 meters away from Diosdados farmland was the farmhouse of Jaime Castillano, Sr.[3] He
tasked his son, Jaime Castillano, Jr., to take care of the farmhouse and allowed him to reside there.[4]
Jaime, Sr., his wife Concepcion, their son Ronald (Nono) Castillano and other children lived at their
family residence in Sagrada, Bula, Camarines Sur, approximately three kilometers away from their
farmhouse in Sitio Danawan.[5]
Sometime in the early part of June 1996,[6] Jaime, Sr. fired his gun indiscriminately. Afraid that a stray
bullet might hit any member of his family, Diosdado accosted Jaime, Sr. and asked him to desist from
firing his gun indiscriminately. Jaime, Sr. resented the intrusion. He remonstrated that neighbors did not
even complain about him firing his gun. A heated altercation ensued. Jaime, Sr. then fired his gun
towards the house of Diosdado. The incident germinated deep animosity between the two and their
respective families.[7] Jaime, Sr. always carried a bolo whenever he passed by the house of Diosdado.
On July 8, 1996, between 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m., Levy Avila, a teacher, was in his house doing some
repairs. He noticed Jaime, Jr. and Ronald talking by the roadside near the gate of his (Levys) house.
Levy overheard the two planning to go to Diosdados house. Jaime, Jr. and Ronald even told Levy:
Ayaw namin kasing inaasar. Suspecting that the two were intending to harm Diosdado, Levy urged
them to amicably settle their differences with Diosdado.
At around 8:00 p.m., Luz and Diosdado were about to retire for the night. Their children were already
fast asleep. Diosdado was tired after a days work of spraying chemicals at the rice field. He reclined on
a bamboo bench near the main door of their house. A kerosene lamp lighted the house. Suddenly, Luz
heard voices near their house. She saw Jaime, Sr. holding a flashlight and his two sons, Jaime Jr. and
Ronald, on their way to the house. Luz immediately alerted her husband and told him that the
Castillanos were in their yard. However, Diosdado was nonchalant and simply told Luz not to mind
them. All of a sudden, Jaime, Sr. fired his gun at Diosdados house. Terrified, Luz hastily carried her
baby daughter Mary Jane, sought cover and hid near the rear door. She was about five meters away
from her husband when the Castillanos barged inside their house and ganged up on Diosdado. Jaime,
Jr. and Ronald, armed with bladed weapons, took turns in stabbing Diosdado. Ronald stabbed Diosdado
on the right side of his breast, right thigh and on the back. He also struck him with a one-meter long
pipe. Not satisfied, Jaime, Sr. fired his gun hitting the right thigh of Diosdado. Luz was so shocked by
the sudden turn of events. To silence her one year old baby, she breastfed her. As soon as she could,
Luz fled to the rice paddies where she hid for a time. The Castillanos fled on board a jeep parked in the
NIA road about 200 meters from the house of Diosdado. When Luz returned to their house, she saw her
husband sprawled on the ground in a pool of his own blood. Diosdado, at the point of death, asked her
for help. Not knowing what to do, Luz lost no time and ran to the house of their neighbor Celedonio
Espiritu for help. Celedonio rushed to the Bula Police Station and reported the incident.
A team composed of SPO4 Jaime Javier, SPO3 Jaime Bellano and SPO3 Nilo Fornillos,[8] the duty
investigator,[9] went to the crime scene[10] to conduct an on-the-spot investigation. Photographs were
taken of the cadaver.[11] SPO3 Fornillo drew rough sketch[12] of the scene. The policemen saw a bolo at
the place where Diosdado was sprawled near the door of their house. A scabbard of a bolo was found a
meter away from the house of Diosdado.[13] The policemen also found a bullet hole on the wall of the
house.[14] Thereafter, the cadaver was placed on a hamak [hammock] brought to the police station. The
police investigators turned over the scabbard and bolo to the desk officer of the police station.[15]
From the police station, SPO4 Javier, SPO3 Bellano and Sgt. Rogelio Palacio boarded their mobile
police car and set out a manhunt for the malefactors. They proceeded towards the boundary in Sto.
Domingo where they put up a checkpoint. The police officers inspected every vehicle that passed by. At
around 12:45 a.m., SPO4 Javier halted a passenger jeepney. On board were Jaime, Sr. and his two sons,
Jaime Jr. and Ronald, each of whom carried a bag containing their clothes. The policemen brought the
Castillanos to the police station.[16] The bags of Jaime, Jr. and Ronald were turned over to the police
investigators. The three were placed under arrest for the killing of Diosdado. The policemen submitted
their investigation report.[17]
In the meantime, at 7:00 a.m., Dr. Evangeline Consolacion, the Municipal Health Officer of Bula,
conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Diosdado. Her autopsy report revealed the following findings:
External Findings
1. Incise Wound 3 cm Superior pinna R ear
2. Incise woud (sic) 10 cm. from nasal bridge extending to mandible R
3. Stab wound 2 cm.x 5 cm. Epigastrium R
4. Stab wound 2 cm.x 4 cm. Epigastrium L
5. Stab wound 2.5 cm. Middle third Arm R
6. Stab wound 2cm x 5 cm. posterior Back.
7. Amputating middle third finger L
8. Hacked wound posterior ankle L
9. Gunshot wound POE 2 x 2cm. with contusion collar medial aspect middle third R thigh
No point of exit noted
Internal Findings:
Fracture femur with Foreign body bullet lodge in middle third femur with hematoma about about 100
cc R thigh
Cause of Death; Hypovolemia secondary to Multiple Stab Wound[18]
The doctor recovered a slug from the right thigh of Diosdado. She later signed the victims post-mortem
certificate of death.[19] Senior Inspector Edgardo B. Sambo, Chief of Police of Bula Police Station, filed
with the Municipal Trial Court of Bula, Camarines Sur, a criminal complaint[20] for murder against the
Castillano brothers.[21] Judge Francisco O. Tolentino conducted the preliminary examination and
thereafter issued an order of arrest against the Castillanos.[22] No bail was recommended for their
provisional release. On July 9, 1996, Luz gave a sworn statement to the police investigators.[23]
On July 10, 1996, the accused were transferred to the Tinangis Penal Farm. Senior Inspector Sambo
requested the PNP-CLRU5 Provincial Unit to conduct a paraffin test on the Castillanos.[24]
On July 12, 1997, Major Lorlie Arroyo, the Head Forensic Chemist of PNP-Region 5, conducted the
paraffin test on the Castillanos. Ronald was found positive for gunpowder residue.[25] Jaime, Sr. and
Jaime, Jr. were found negative for gunpowder residue.
The MTC issued a subpoena requiring the accused to submit their counter-affidavits from notice
thereof. However, the accused failed to submit any counter-affidavit.[26]
On August 2, 1996, an Information for murder was filed against Jaime, Sr., Ronald and Jaime Jr. with
the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 31. The accusatory portion of the Information
reads:
That on or about the 8th day of July 1996 at about 8:00 oclock in the evening at Barangay Sagrada,
Municipality of Bula, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another with intent to kill with treachery and evident premeditation armed with a handgun, bladed
weapon and piece of wood did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shot and stab one DIOSDADO VOLANTE y LOZANO inflicting upon the latter several mortal
wounds on the different parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of said Diosdado Volante the amount of which to be proven in Court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[27]
Upon their arraignment[28] on August 29, 1996, accused Jaime Sr., Jaime, Jr and Ronald, duly assisted
by counsel de parte, Atty. Avelino Sales Jr., pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Thereafter, trial
on the merits ensued.
Luz testified that when Diosdado was still alive, he had an annual income of over P65,000. She spent
P18,000 for the funeral services,[29] P300 for religious services,[30] P9,111 for food and other
expenses[31] during her husbands wake and funeral. She suffered sleepless nights and mental anguish
for his sudden death.
The Defenses and Evidence of the Accused
Ronald admitted when he testified that he killed Diosdado but insisted that he did so in self-defense and
in defense of his brother Jaime, Jr. He asserted that his father Jaime, Sr. and brother Jaime, Jr. had
nothing to do with Diosdados death. Ronald alleged that on September 8, 1996, at about 7:30 p.m., he
was driving a passenger jeepney on his way to the poblacion of Bula. Jaime, Jr. flagged down the
jeepney. He boarded the jeepney and told Ronald that he was instructed by their mother to go to the
house of Jose del Socorro to ask the latter to accompany them to their farmhouse in order to fetch Gilda
Albes. Ronald was armed with a .38 paltik gun, while Jaime, Jr. was armed with a bolo sheathed in a
scabbard. They fetched Jose and then Ronald parked the jeepney at the NIA road. Jaime, Jr., who was
holding a flashlight, walked along the footpath on top of a pilapil (a narrow earthen barrier between
two rice fields). Ronald and Jose walked behind Jaime, Jr. As they passed by the house of Diosdado, a
man suddenly shouted: you shit, I have await (sic) for you for a while, why just now. Surprised, Jaime,
Jr. forthwith focused his flashlight towards the man who shouted. He was aghast when he saw
Diosdado armed with a bolo running towards them and about to attack them with his bolo. Ronald
shoved Jaime, Jr. who fell on the muddy rice paddies below the pilapil. Ronald forthwith shot
Diosdado. Diosdado took a step but fell on a kneeling position. Diosdado brandished his bolo. Ronald
shot Diosdado once more but his gun misfired. To defend himself, Ronald took Jaime, Jr.s bolo and
hacked Diosdado to death.[32] Ronald then fled from the scene and ran to the jeepney at the NIA road.
Jaime, Jr. and Jose boarded the jeep and left the scene. Ronald threw the bolo along the way. He threw
his gun into a rice farm in Danawan.
Jaime, Jr. corroborated the testimony of his brother. He, however, testified that he did not see his
brother hack and kill Diosdado. He claimed that when Ronald got hold of his bolo, he ran away and
proceeded to their jeepney which was then parked at the roadside. Minutes later, Ronald followed.
They then hastily went home to Sagrada and told their father Jaime, Sr. of the incident.[33]
Jose Del Socorro corroborated the testimony of Ronald. He testified that on July 8, 1996, at about 5:00
p.m. he was on his way home when he met Diosdado whom he noticed to be inebriated and unruly
Diosdado was throwing dried mud at the farmhouse of the Castillanos and challenging the occupants of
the farmhouse to a fight. He advised Diosdado to stop what he was doing and warned him that he was
only inviting trouble. Diosdado told him to mind his own business and not to intervene. Jose thereafter
left Diosdado and went, home.[34] When Jose arrived home, Dominador Bria was waiting for him. He
and Dominador talked business for a while and subsequently had dinner. After some time, Jaime, Jr.
and Ronald arrived at Joses house.
Concepcion Castillano testified that on July 8, 1996 at around 5:00 a.m., her son Jaime, Jr. arrived
home and told her that Diosdado threw stones at their farmhouse and challenged everybody to a fight.
She felt nervous and reported the incident to the police and caused the same to be entered in the police
blotter.[35] Thereafter, she went home and told her sons Jaime, Jr. and Ronald to immediately fetch
Gilda. She, likewise, instructed her sons to first drop by the house of Jose so that the latter could
accompany them to the farmhouse.
Jaime, Sr. vehemently denied any participation in the killing of Diosdado. He claimed that at the time
of the alleged incident, he was at their house in Sagrada, bedridden due to his debilitating diabetes. He
narrated to the trial court his medical history and his confinement at the Mandaluyong Medical Center
sometime in 1994.[36] He presented documents and receipts showing that he had been and is still under
medication.[37] He declared that upon learning from his son Ronald that the latter killed Diosdado, he
advised his sons to look for a lawyer for legal representation. He told the trial court that at around 11:30
p.m., he and his two sons had decided to go to Andangnan in order to meet a cousin of his who knew of
a lawyer named Atty. Rotor. As they traversed the road to Andangan, they were stopped by some
policemen at a checkpoint and were invited to the police station where they were investigated and
eventually incarcerated.[38]
Gilda Abes, the last witness for the defense, affirmed that she was the girlfriend of Jaime, Jr. She told
the trial court that on July 8, 1996 she was at the farmhouse of the Castillanos. She corroborated the
testimony of Jose that Diosdado was combative and drunk. According to Gilda, Jaime, Jr. left the
farmhouse before sundown to go to his parents place at Sagrada. Jaime, Jr. never returned to the
farmhouse that night. Gilda learned of the incident the next morning when she went home.[39]
The Verdict of the Trial Court
On December 22, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision convicting Jaime, Jr. and Ronald of murder
qualified by evident premeditation and treachery. The trial court exonerated Jaime, Sr. of the crime on
reasonable doubt. The trial court gave no credence to Ronalds claim that he acted in self-defense. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the two (2) accused
RONALD CASTILLANO and JAIME CASTILLANO, JR. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of MURDER and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties imposed thereby. Further, as civil liability,
the said two (2) accused are hereby ordered to pay the legal heirs of the late Diosdado L. Volante,
through his widow Luz R. Volante, the total sum of ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY ONE PESOS (P177,421.00) Philippine Currency as
actual and moral damages including death indemnity, with costs against both accused.
The accused Jaime Castillano, Sr. is hereby acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.[40]
The accused, now appellants, interposed their appeal from the decision of the trial court contending that
it committed reversible errors:
(a) in rejecting appellant Ronalds plea of self-defense; and (b) in not acquitting appellant Jaime, Jr. of
the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Anent the first issue, appellant Ronald posits that he adduced proof that he acted in self-defense when
he stabbed the victim.
The Court disagrees with appellant Ronald. The Court has consistently held that like alibi, self-defense
is inherently weak because it is easy to fabricate.[41] In a case where self-defense and defense of
relatives is invoked by the accused, the burden of evidence is shifted to him to prove with clear and
convincing evidence the essential requisites of self-defense, namely (a) unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. There can be no complete or
incomplete self-defense or defense of relatives unless the accused proves unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim.[42] The accused must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of
the evidence of the prosecution for by pleading self-defense, the accused thereby admits having killed
the victim and he can no longer be exonerated of the crime charged if he fails to prove the confluence
of the essential requisites for self-defense and defense of a relative.[43]
Appellant Ronald failed to discharge his burden.
First. After shooting and stabbing Diosdado, appellant Ronald fled from the situs criminis. Flight from
the situs of the crime is a veritable badge of guilt and negates his plea of self-defense.[44]
Second. Appellant Ronald threw away his paltik .38 gun and the bolo he used in hacking Diosdado as
he fled from the scene of the crime instead of surrendering the same to the police authorities. Appellant
Ronald admitted that he had no license for the gun:
Q Where is that gun now that you use?
A I do not know, Your Honor, I think I was able to throw it away.
Q Where?
A At Danawan, Your Honor.
Q Danawan, is that a lake?
A No, Your Honor, it is a ricefarm.
Q What kind of gun is this?
A Paltik .38, Your Honor.[45]
ATTY. BALLEBAR:
q By the way, where is that bolo that you used in hacking and stabbing Diosdado Volante?
a I do not know anymore because I was able to throw it away also when I ran away.
q Where is that place where you throw it?
a It was by the NIA road.
q You mentioned also a while ago that this gun that you said is a paltik and you throw it away also, is it
not?
a Yes, Maam.
q And that gun had been in your possession the whole day that you are driving up to the time you shot
the victim, Diosdado Volante?
a Yes, Maam.
q Do you have license to possess that firearm?
a None, Maam.[46]
The failure of appellant Ronald to surrender the bolo and his gun to the police authorities belies his
claim of self-defense.
Third. Appellant Ronald failed to report the incident to the police authorities even when they arrested
him. Curiously, he failed to inform the police officers who arrested him that he acted in self-defense
when he shot and stabbed the victim The resounding silence of the appellant is another indicium of the
incredibility of his defense.[47] Moreover, the records show that the municipal trial court issued a
subpoena on July 9, 1996 requiring appellant Ronald to submit his counter-affidavit but he refused
and/or failed to submit the same despite service on him of the subpoena. It was only during the trial that
appellant Ronald, for the first time, invoked self-defense and defense of a relative.
Fourth. The cadaver of the victim was found inside his house when the police investigators arrived.[48]
This belies appellant Ronalds claim that he shot the victim in the rice paddies, near his house and that
he (appellant Ronald) took the bolo of appellant Jaime, Jr. and used it to stab the victim. Appellant
Ronald failed to prove his claim that when the police investigators arrived in the victims house, they
carried his (the victims) body from the rice paddies to the house. The only evidence adduced by
appellant Ronald was his testimony which is hearsay, and besides being hearsay, it is speculative and
mere conjecture.
Fifth. Appellant Ronald hacked the victim no less than five times. Two of the stab wounds sustained by
the victim were at his back and posterior portion of his left ankle. The number and nature of the
wounds of the victim negate the appellants claim that he shot the victim in self-defense. On the
contrary, they prove that appellant Ronald was determined to kill the victim.[49]
Appellant Jaime, Jr. avers that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged. He asserts that the testimony of Luz Volante, the widow of Diosdado, was inconsistent
with her testimony during the preliminary examination in the municipal trial court and her sworn
statement before the police investigators as well as the testimonies of SPO1 Fornillos and SPO4 Jaime
Favier, and the physical evidence on record. The appellant catalogued said inconsistencies, thus:
1. He was lying on the bench inside just upon entering. (Tsn p. 9, 2/17/97).
-I was lying down with my husband inside our house but we were still awake (9th Answer, Prel. Exam.
MTC, 7/9/96).
2. JCS fired towards our house hitting the wall (Tsn p. 11, 2/17/96).
JCS fired twice (16th answer, Prel. Exam. MTC, 7/9/96).
JCS kept on firing the gun pointing towards the body of my husband (9th Answer, Sworn Statement,
PNP, 7/9/96).
JCS shot my husband three (3) times (Tsn p. 16, 2/17/97)
3. My husband was shot and hit on the right thigh (Tsn p. 14, 2/17/97). He was hit on the left lap (23rd
Answer, Prel. Exam. MTC, 7/9/96). He was hit on his side (Tsn p. 43, 2/17/97).
4. RC struck my husband with a 1-meter long Pipe (Tsn p. 13, 2/17/97). RC & JCJ smashed my
husband with a hard object (5th Answer, Sworn Statement, 7/9/96).
RC smashed my husband (22nd Answer, Prel. Exam. MTC, 7/9/96).
5. He was not able to fight back (Tsn p. 43, 2/17/97). He was standing and was trying to parry the
attack of the accused (26th Answer, Prel. Exam. 7/9/96).
6. When I went back to the house, he was still alive (Tsn p. 19, 2/17/97). - LV Yes, the victim could
have died instantly (Tsn p. 35, 2/3/97) With wounds sustained, he could have died instantly (p. 8,
Complainants Memorandum).
7. It was bright inside our house with a kerosene and a bottle lamp (Tsn pp. 33-34, 2/17/97). Only
one kerosene lamp - bottle of gin with wick and light (Tsn p. 10, 4/1/97 - SPO1 Pornillos
Surrounding house, dark, total darkness (Tsn pp. 12-13, 4/1/97).
8. Scene Photography by Jaime Jornales (Tsn, p. 21, 2/17/97).
-do- by Mr. Lozano (Tsn., p. 12, 3/7/97).
9. SPO1 Nilo Pornillos learned of the incident at 8:00 oclock of July 8, 1996 (page 5 of
Complainants Memorandum.
SPO4 Jaime Javier received report at 9:00 oclock P.M. of July 8, 1996 of Complainants Memorandum.
SPO4 Jaime Javier received report at 8:00 P.M. (page 7 of Complainants Memorandum).[50]
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that the credibility of the testimony of
Luz, the prosecutions principal witness, cannot be impeached via her testimony during the preliminary
examination before the municipal trial court nor by her sworn statement given to the police
investigators for the reason that the transcripts and sworn statement were neither marked and offered in
evidence by the appellants nor admitted in evidence by the trial court. Moreover, the appellants did not
confront Luz with her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement to the
police investigators. Luz was not, therefore, accorded a chance to explain the purported inconsistencies,
as mandated by Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence which reads:
How witness is impeached by evidence of inconsistent statement. - Before a witness can be impeached
by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the
statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons
present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If
the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him
concerning them.
The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General. Before the credibility of a witness and the
truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence consisting of his prior statements which are
inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-examiner must lay the predicate or the foundation for
impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the witness being cross-examined. The witness must
be given a chance to recollect and to explain the apparent inconsistency between his two statements and
state the circumstances under which they were made.[51] This Court held in People v. Escosura[52] that
the statements of a witness prior to her present testimony cannot serve as basis for impeaching her
credibility unless her attention was directed to the inconsistencies or discrepancies and she was given
an opportunity to explain said inconsistencies. In a case where the cross-examiner tries to impeach the
credibility and truthfulness of a witness via her testimony during a preliminary examination, this Court
outlined the procedure in United States vs. Baluyot,[53] thus:
...For instance, if the attorney for the accused had information that a certain witness, say Pedro
Gonzales, had made and signed a sworn statement before the fiscal materially different from that given
in his testimony before the court, it was incumbent upon the attorney when cross-examining said
witness to direct his attention to the discrepancy and to ask him if he did not make such and such
statement before the fiscal or if he did not there make a statement different from that delivered in court.
If the witness admits the making of such contradictory statement, the accused has the benefit of the
admission, while the witness has the opportunity to explain the discrepancy, if he can. On the other
hand, if the witness denies making any such contradictory statement, the accused has the right to prove
that the witness did make such statement; and if the fiscal should refuse upon due notice to produce the
document, secondary evidence of the contents thereof would be admissible. This process of cross-
examining a witness upon the point of prior contradictory statements is called in the practice of the
American courts laying a predicate for the introduction of contradictory statements. It is almost
universally accepted that unless a ground is thus laid upon cross-examination, evidence of
contradictory statements are not admissible to impeach a witness; though undoubtedly the matter is to a
large extent in the discretion of the court.
In this case, the appellants never confronted Luz with her testimony during the preliminary
examination and her sworn statement. She was not afforded any chance to explain any discrepancies
between her present testimony and her testimony during the preliminary examination and her sworn
statement. The appellants did not even mark and offer in evidence the said transcript and sworn
statement for the specific purpose of impeaching her credibility and her present testimony. Unless so
marked and offered in evidence and accepted by the trial court, said transcript and sworn statement
cannot be considered by the court.[54]
On the purported inconsistencies or discrepancies catalogued by the appellants relating to the testimony
of Luz during the preliminary examination and her sworn statement, the Office of the Solicitor General
posits that:
Sixth, Volante indeed testified that when she returned to their house from the ricefield, after the three
accused had left the premises, her husband was still alive (TSN, February 17, 1997, p. 19) as he was
still able to ask for her assistance (Ibid, p. 20). But it is not inconsistent with the expert opinion of Dr.
Consolacion that by the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim, the latter could have died thereof
instantaneously (TSN, February 3, 1997, p. 35). It is clear that the said physician was merely stating a
possibility and not what happened in the instant case because in the first place, she was not present at
the scene right after the incident.
Seventh, Volante was insistent in her testimony that at the time of the commission of the subject crime,
it was bright inside their house because they had a kerosene lamp and a bottle lamp both lighted up, one
placed on the wall and the other on the ceiling (Ibid, pp. 33, 52-53). While it may appear contradictory
to SPO1 Pornillos testimony that there was only a kerosene lamp at the time, he could not have been
expected to notice all the things found inside the house, including the bottle lamp, because he might not
have been familiar with its interiors. Or, he could have focused his attention primarily on the body of
the fallen victim and the objects that may be used later as evidence against the perpetrators of the
crime.
Eight, it is admitted that the testimonies of Volante and SPO1 Pornillos as to who took pictures of the
crime scene including the lifeless body of the victim are contradictory. But again, such contradiction,
being only minor and irrelevant, does not affect the credibility of their testimonies.
And ninth, the apparently inconsistent statements of the prosecution witnesses (SPO1 Pornillos and
SPO4 Javier) as to the exact time the subject incident was reported to the police authorities are
similarly irrelevant to the matters in issue. Of consequence here is the fact that on the night the crime
was committed, it was reported to the authorities who later effected the arrest of the perpetrators
thereof.[55]
The Court fully agrees with the foregoing ruminations of the Office of the Solicitor General. The
inconsistencies adverted to by the appellants pertained only to minor and collateral matters and not to
the elements of the crime charged; hence, they do not dilute the probative weight of the testimony. It
bears stressing that even the most truthful witness can make mistakes but such innocent lapses do not
necessarily affect his credibility. The testimonies of witnesses must be considered and calibrated in
their entirety and not by their truncated portions or isolated passages.[56] And then again, minor
contradictions among several witnesses of a particular incident and aspect thereof which do not relate
to the gravamen of the crime charged are to be expected in view of their differences in impressions,
memory, vantage points and other related factors.[57]
Contrary to appellant Jaime, Jr.s claim, the prosecution adduced proof that he and appellant Ronald
conspired to kill and did kill Diosdado by their simultaneous acts of stabbing the victim. As narrated by
Luz:
ATTY. BALLEBAR:
Q Now after Jaime Castillano Sr. fired at your house, what happened next if any?
A They entered our house.
Q Now, when you say they to whom are you referring to?
A Jaime Castillano Sr., Jaime Castillano, Jr., and Ronald Castillano.
Q Now, where did they enter?
A In the other door.
Q Now at the time they entered your house was the door of your house closed or opened?
A It was closed.
Q Now, after the accused entered your house what happened next, if any?
A Jaime Castillano Jr. stabbed my husband and also Ronal Castillano stabbed my husband.
Q Now, was your husband hit by the stabbing of Ronald Castillano, Jr. (sic)?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you tell us on what part of his body was he hit?
A My husband was still struck by Ronald Castillano hitting him on his right side of his body including
on his right thigh and also on his back..
ATTY. BALLEBAR:
Q Now, you said Ronald Castillano struck your husband, now with what instrument did he use in
strucking (sic) your husband?
ATTY. BERNALES:
We object, misleading, your Honor.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
WITNESS:
A A pipe.
ATTY. BALLEBAR:
Q Now, will you tell us more or less how long was that pipe that was used by Ronald Castillano?
A About one (1) meter, Maam.[58]
Luz was merely five meters away from where Diosado was attacked and stabbed by the appellants.
Appellant Jaime, Jr. even tried to cut the ankle of the victim:
ATTY. BALLEBAR:
Q Now during this incident, how far were you from the accused and your husband?
A From where I am sitting up to that window which is about five (5) meters.
Q Now after the accused strucked (sic) and shot your husband, what else happened if any?
A Jaime Castillano Jr. stabbed my husband on his breast (Witness is pointing to her breast).
ATTY. BERNALES:
We will move that the answer be striken off from the records because it is not responsive to the
question. The question is after your husband has been stabbed strucked (sic) and shot.
COURT:
Q Your are being asked what happened after the accused was already stabbed, strucked (sic) and shot,
what happened next?
WITNESS:
Q Jaime Castillano Junior still stabbed my husband and try to cut his ankle, Your Honor.
COURT:
Strike our (sic) the previous answer of the witness.
ATTY. BALLEBAR:
Q By the way, will you tell us how many times did Ronald Castillano stab your husband?
A I cannot determine how many times he even stabbed my husband on his left eye.
Q How about Jaime Castillano Jr., how many times did he stab your husband?
A I cannot determine exactly how many times but he repeatedly stabbed my husband.[59]
The mere denial appellant Jaime, Jr. of the crime charged is but a negative self-serving which cannot
prevail over the positive and straightforward testimony of Luz and the physical evidence on record.[60]
The Crime Committed by Appellants
The trial court correctly convicted the appellants of murder, qualified by treachery, under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code. The Court, however, does not agree with the trial courts finding that evident
premeditation attended the commission of the crime.
Case law has it that the prosecution has the burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt qualifying
circumstances in the commission of the crime. For evident premeditation to qualify a crime, the
prosecution must prove the confluence of the essential requites thereof: (a) the time when the offender
has determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender has clung to his
determination; (c) an interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime enough
to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[61] There must be proof beyond cavil when and
how the offender planned to kill the victim and that sufficient time had elapsed between the time he had
decided to kill the victim and the actual killing of the victim, and that in the interim, the offender
performed overt acts positively and conclusively showing his determination to commit the said crime.
[62] In this case, the only evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove evident premeditation is the
testimony of Levy Avila that between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. on July 8, 1996, he heard the appellants
planning to go to the house of Diosdado and that he heard them say: Ayaw namin kasing inaasar, and
that at 8:00 p.m., the appellants arrived in the house of the victim and stabbed him to death. There is no
evidence of any overt acts of the appellants when they decided to kill Diosdado and how they would
consummate the crime. There is no evidence of any overt acts perpetrated by the appellants between
5:00 and 8:00 p.m. that they clung to their determination to kill Diosdado.
There is treachery in the commission of a crime when (a) at the time of attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; (b) the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means,
methods and forms of attack employed by him.[63] Even a frontal attack may be treacherous when
unexpected on an unarmed victim who would not be in a position to repel the attack or avoid it.[64] In
this case, the victim was unarmed and was supinely resting before sleeping after a hard days work.
Although Luz warned the victim that the appellants were already approaching their house, however, the
victim remained unperturbed when the appellants barged into the victims house. They stabbed him
repeatedly with diverse deadly weapons. The victim had nary a chance to defend himself and avoid the
fatal thrusts of the appellants.
The crime was committed in the house of the victim. There was no provocation on the part of the
victim. Dwelling thus aggravated the crime. However, dwelling was not alleged in the information, as
mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
The use by appellant Ronald of an unlicensed firearm to shoot Diosdado on the thigh is not an
aggravating circumstance because (1) there is no allegation in the information that said appellant had
no license to possess the firearm. That appellant lacked the license to possess the firearm is an essential
element of the crime and must be alleged in the information.[65] Although the crime was committed
before the new rule took effect on December 1, 2002, the rule should, however, be applied retroactively
as it is favorable to the appellants.[66]
The appellants are not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The evidence
shows that the appellants were arrested when the police officers manning the checkpoint stopped the
passenger jeepney driven by appellant Ronald and arrested the appellants. The fact that the appellants
did not resist but went peacefully with the peace officers does not mean that they surrendered
voluntarily.[67]
There being no mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the commission of the crime, the
appellants should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua conformably with Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The Civil Liabilities of the Appellants
The trial court awarded the total amount of P177,421 as civil indemnity, actual and moral damages in
favor of the heirs of the victim Diosdado. The Court has to modify the awards.
Appellants Ronald and Jaime, Jr. are obliged to pay jointly and severally the amount of P50,000 as civil
indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; P25,000 as exemplary damages in view of the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling;[68] and the amount of P18,300 for funeral and religious services. The heirs of
the victim failed to adduce in evidence any receipts or documentary evidence to prove their claim for
food and other expenses during the wake. However, they are entitled to temperate damages in the
amount of P5,000, conformably with the ruling of the Court in People v. dela Tongga.[69] His wife Luzs
testimony that the victim had an annual income of more than P65,000 is not sufficient as basis for an
award for unearned income for being self-serving. There was no proof of the average expense of the
victim and his family and his net income. In People v. Ereo,[70] this Court held that:
It bears stress that compensation for lost income is in the nature of damages and as such requires due
proof of the damage suffered; there must be unbiased proof of the deceaseds average income. In the
instant case, the victims mother, Lita Honrubia, gave only a self-serving hence unreliable statement of
her deceased daughters income. Moreover, the award for lost income refers to the net income of the
deceased, that is, her total income less her average expenses. No proof of the victims average expenses
was presented. Hence, there can be no reliable estimate of the deceaseds lost income.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur,
Branch 31 in Criminal Case No. P-2542 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Ronald
Castillano alias Nono and Jaime Castillano, Jr. alias Junjun are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of murder, qualified by treachery, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code. There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime, the
appellants are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, conformably with Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code. They are, likewise, ordered to pay jointly and severally to the heirs of the victim,
Diosdado Volante, the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity; P50,000 as moral damages; P18,300 as
actual damages; P25,000 as exemplary damages; and P5,000 as temperate damages. Costs against the
appellants.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

- versus -
NESTOR BAJADA y BAUTISTA, VICTOR CALISAY y LOYAGA, and JOHN
DOE,
Accused-Appellants.

G.R. No. 180507

Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

November 20, 2008

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the February 7, 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01043 which affirmed the conviction of and death penalty for
accused-appellants for the crime of robbery with homicide. Said judgment was
originally handed down on October 30, 2001[2] by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 28 in Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Criminal Case No. SC-8076.
 The Facts

An information dated January 21, 2000 was filed against accused-appellants Nestor
Bajada y Bautista, Victor Calisay y Loyaga, and John Doe which accused them of
committing robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries, as follows:

That on or about 11:30 oclock in the evening of December 22, 1999, at Brgy. Calumpang, Municipality
of Liliw, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to gain, without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, and by means of
violence and intimidation upon person, enter the house of one ANTONIO C. VILLAMAYOR, and
once inside, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and carry away the
following valuables, to wit:

Cash Money -PhP 20,000.00;

Assorted jewelry - 80,000.00;
$500.00 (current rate $1.00=40.00)- 20,000.00; and
some pertinent documents

with the total amount of HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND (PhP 120,000.00) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, for their own personal use and benefit, owned and belonging to said Antonio C. Villamayor,
and in the course of the said occasion, above-named accused while conveniently armed with a handgun
and bladed weapon, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, kick, attack, assault and stab ANTONIO C.
VILLAMAYOR, resulting [in] his instantaneous death, and also inflicted upon ANABELLE
ASAYTONO, stab wound on her left chest, thus, accused had commenced all the acts of execution
which could have produced the crime of Homicide, as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce
it by reason/cause independent of the will of the accused, which prevented her death, to the damage and
prejudice of the herein surviving heirs of Antonio Villamayor and offended party, Anabelle Asaytono.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

Bajada and Calisay pleaded not guilty to the charge.

During trial, the prosecution sought to establish the following facts: Bajada and Calisay
were overseers at Antonio C. Villamayors farm in Bayate, Laguna. As overseers, they
visited Villamayors house in Liliw, Laguna at least four times a week to deliver
vegetables from the farm.[4]

On December 22, 1999, around 11:30 p.m., while 81-year old Villamayor was at home
with his 24 year-old live-in partner, Anabelle Asaytono, they heard someone call for
Villamayor asking for coffee. The caller introduced himself as Hector, Villamayors
grandson, but Asaytono recognized the voice as Bajadas. As Villamayor opened the
door, the caller, Hector, pushed the door open with the barrel of a two-foot long gun.
Asaytono recognized Hector as Bajada because of his average physique, repulsive smell,
the black bonnet which he often wore at work, the deep-set eyes, mouth, a lump on his
cheek, and the green shirt which was given to him by Villamayor. Asaytono likewise
recognized one of the men as Calisay, noting his hair cut, eye bags, and voice. Calisay
wore a red handkerchief across his face and carried a 14-inch knife in his right hand. The
third unidentified man, John Doe, wore a bonnet and carried a 2 foot long gun with a
magazine.[5]

Upon entering the house, John Doe said, There are many people in Calumpang who are
angry at you because you are a usurer engaged in 5-6, so give me PhP 100,000 right
now. John Doe made Villamayor sit down but when the latter refused, John Doe made
him lie face down on the floor and kicked his back several times. Meanwhile, Bajada
pointed his gun at Asaytono and demanded for money. Asaytono denied having any
money. She was then made to lie face down on the ground and was kicked. John Doe
asked from Villamayor the key to the cabinet which was a meter away from the latter.
Villamayor brought out a key from his pocket and handed it to Bajada. Asaytono, who
was able to stand up, saw the three accused unlock Villamayors cabinet and took out its
contents which consisted of documents and clothes. Accused-appellants also opened the
drawer and took jewelry valued at PhP 80,000 and the PhP 20,000 and USD 500 cash.[6]

Thereafter, Bajada pushed Asaytono towards Villamayor, laying her head sideways on
Villamayors head. In this position, Asaytono was able to see Calisay repeatedly stab
Villamayor on the back. Calisay then stabbed Asaytono on her left breast. Asaytono
pretended to be dead as she lied on Villamayor who was still moving. The three men
then hurriedly left the house. Asaytono stood up and saw through the three men move
towards the rice field. She noticed that Villamayors dog wagged its tail as it followed the
three men, the way it did when accused-appellants would visit Villamayor.[7]

Assured that the men had left the area, Asaytono ran to the house of her neighbor, Cristy
Samparada, for help. After telling about incident to her neighbor, Asaytono lost
consciousness and regained the same after two days at the Philippine General Hospital
(PGH) in Manila. Dr. Michael Baccay, the attending physician, testified that Asaytono
suffered pneumochemo thorax, or the presence of air and blood in the thoracic cavity of
the left lung, which could cause death in six to eight hours if left untreated. Dr. Marilou
Cordon, the medico-legal officer, testified that Villamayors death was caused by
hypovolemic shock secondary to stab wounds. She opined that the stab wounds may
have been caused by a single bladed knife inflicted by one person. She added that the
stab which pierced the right lung may have caused his instantaneous death due to blood
loss.[8]

The incident was reported to the police of Liliw, Laguna on December 22, 1999. Based
on the information given by Villamayors daughter, Perlita, PO2 Ronald Pana invited
Bajada for questioning on December 26. The following day, the police also invited
Calisay for questioning. Thereafter, PO2 Pana and his team went to PGH to interview
Asaytono. On December 28, 1999, Asaytono gave her sworn statement to the police
officers of Liliw, Laguna and identified Bajada and Calisay as the perpetrators of the
crime. The following day, she reiterated her statement during the preliminary
investigation conducted by Judge Renato Bercales of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) in Magdalena, Laguna.

The defense presented Bajada, Calisay, and Editha Loyaga Calisay as witnesses. Bajada
is Calisays stepfather, while Editha is Bajadas live-in partner and Calisays mother.
Bajada and Calisay denied committing the crime and offered an alibi. They said they
were husking coconuts until around 11:00 p.m. on December 22, 1999. They went to
sleep afterwards in view of the work they had to do at Villamayors farm on the
following day. Editha corroborated this alibi alleging that she helped accused-appellants
in gathering young coconuts on the night in question. Calisay testified that he learned
about the death of Villamayor from Villamayors nephew when he and Editha chanced
upon him in town. Calisay and his mother thereafter went to the funeral parlor to see the
body of Villamayor. When they got home, they informed Bajada of the news. Bajada
went to see the remains of Villamayor to know the circumstances surrounding the latters
death. Bajada was arrested in the wake, questioned by the police, and eventually charged
with the crime.[9]

Bajada testified that he had known Villamayor for two years and had a good relationship
with the latter and Asaytono. He believed that Asaytono accused him as the perpetrator
because he dissuaded Villamayor from visiting Asaytonos relatives in Bicol since
Villamayor was too old and frail to travel. This was allegedly overheard by Asaytono.
Bajada added that Villamayor fully trusted him with the secret that Asaytono will not
inherit any land from Villamayor. Bajada also alleged that Asaytono accused him of the
crime because he warned Villamayor not to leave money in the house because Bajada
suspected Asaytonos motives. Calisay added that Asaytono used to get angry whenever
Bajada would get money from Villamayor. Calisay, however, testified that he did not see
any ill motive on the part of Asaytono when she testified against accused-appellants.

On October 30, 2001, the RTC rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finds
both the accused NESTOR BAJADA and VICTOR CALISAY as GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT as co-principals of the offense of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE as
defined and punished under paragraph No. (1) of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
the Death Penalty Law (RA 7659) and as charged in the Information and taking into consideration the
two (2) aggravating circumstances enumerated hereinbefore without any mitigating circumstance that
would offset the same, hereby sentences both the said accused to suffer the SUPREME PENALTY OF
DEATH and to pay the heirs of the deceased Antonio Villamayor the sum of P50,000.00 as death
indemnity and the sum of P78,620.00 as reasonable expenses incurred by reasons of said death and to
pay the cost of the instant suit.[10]

Accused-appellants filed their brief before this Court on April 3, 2003, docketed as G.R.
No. 153218. On September 21, 2004, we transferred the case to the CA in accordance
with People v. Mateo.[11]

The Ruling of the CA

In their appeal before the CA, accused-appellants reiterated their defenses of denial and
alibi. They claimed that Asaytonos testimonies in court on March 30, 2000 and April 4
and 6, 2000 were inconsistent to the statements she gave to the police on December 28,
1999, and with the statements given to MCTC Judge Bercales on December 29, 1999.
These alleged inconsistencies referred to the identity of the caller, the state of
intoxication of accused-appellants, and the manner of identification of accused-
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.

The CA held that Asaytonos testimony was categorical and straightforward, and her
identification of accused-appellants was consistent. Having worked with accused-
appellants in the farm for a year, she can readily identify their facial features, voices,
physique, and smell. According to the CA, the details which were lacking in her sworn
statement but which she supplied in open court only served to strengthen her testimony.
The CA did not lend credence to accused-appellants defense of alibi since it was
possible for them to be at the crime scenethey claimed that they slept at 11:00 p.m. while
the incident happened at 11:30 p.m.; and the victims house was only 15 minutes away by
jeep from the farm.

The CA, however, disagreed with the trial courts finding of the aggravating
circumstances of dwelling and additional serious physical injury. It said that the
information failed to specifically allege the aggravating circumstance of dwelling;
hence, it cannot be appreciated even if proved during trial. Also, applying People v.
Abdul, the appellate court held that the homicides or murders and physical injuries
committed on occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged in the composite crime of
robbery with homicide.[12] It concluded that absent any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the penalty should be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The dispositive
portion of the CAs judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision, dated 30 October 2001, of the
Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with
homicide. Considering that there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance which attended
the commission of the crime, accused-appellants are, hereby, sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.[13]
Bajadas motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated July 24, 2007. The
Public Attorneys Office filed a Notice of Appeal; however, per verification, there was
neither a motion for reconsideration nor appeal on behalf of Calisay. Thus, on August
24, 2007, the CA granted Bajadas notice of appeal and entered judgment insofar as
Calisay was concerned.[14]

Assignment of Error

In the instant appeal, accused-appellant Bajada reiterates his defenses and assigns the
following error:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE WITHOUT THEIR
GUILT HAVING BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Bajada asserts that the lower court erred in convicting him and his co-accused based on
the testimony in open court of the prosecution witness, Asaytono. Such testimony is
allegedly inconsistent with the December 28, 1999 sworn statement given to the police
and the December 29, 1999 statement given before MCTC Judge Bercales during the
preliminary investigation. In her December 28, 1999 sworn statement, Asaytono
mentioned that she recognized Bajada as the caller though the latter misrepresented
himself as Hector. Asaytono also said that while the three accused were inside the house,
they smelled like they had lambanog, a native wine. These facts, Bajada alleges, were
never mentioned in the preliminary investigation and in court. Moreover, while
Asaytono told the police that she was able to identify the two accused because of the
fluorescent lamp at the kitchen, she failed to mention what parts of accused-appellants
faces were covered by the bonnet and kerchief. She supplied these details only during
the preliminary investigation and examination in open court. Furthermore, when
Asaytono sought the help of her neighbor, Samparada, she only told the latter that three
persons robbed their house and stabbed her and Villamayor, without identifying Bajada
and Calisay as the perpetrators. Bajada believes that the manner of identification is
suspicious since he and his co-accused were identified only after their arrest and
detention based on the statements of random witnesses and not by Asaytono.[15] Lastly,
Bajada tries to discredit Asaytono by pointing out that as a paramour of Villamayor, she
had no compunction about seducing an 81-year-old man to meet her financial needs. Her
alleged interest in inheriting from Villamayor led her to cause the latters death and find a
fall guy for it; hence, she accused Bajada and Calisay.[16] Bajada and Calisay also sent
a letter entitled Petition addressed to former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban. Said
letter alleged that an eyewitness who was afraid to testify revealed to Bajada that it was
Asaytonos live-in partner and the children of Villamayor who were responsible for the
crime. Two handwritten letters from the said eyewitness were attached to the Petition.

The Courts Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

The inconsistencies in the sworn statements and testimony of the prosecution witness,
Asaytono, referred to by accused-appellant Bajada do not affect her credibility. The
details which she supplied to the police and to the investigating judge are trivial
compared to the testimony she gave in open court. What is important is that in all three
statements, i.e., sworn statement before the police, sworn statement before Judge
Bercales, and testimony in open court, Asaytono consistently and clearly identified
accused-appellants as the perpetrators. The essential facts do not differ: three men
entered and robbed the house of Villamayor and stabbed him and Asaytono, and
Asaytono witnessed the stabbing and recognized two of the accused because she was
familiar with the latters physical attributes.

Also, the Solicitor General correctly pointed out that the defense counsel did not
confront Asaytono with these alleged inconsistencies. In People v. Castillano, Sr., we
held that:

Before the credibility of a witness and the truthfulness of his testimony can be impeached by evidence
consisting of his prior statements which are inconsistent with his present testimony, the cross-examiner
must lay the predicate or the foundation for impeachment and thereby prevent an injustice to the
witness being cross-examined. The witness must be given a chance to recollect and to explain the
apparent inconsistency between his two statements and state the circumstances under which they were
made. This Court held in People v. Escosura that the statements of a witness prior to her present
testimony cannot serve as basis for impeaching her credibility unless her attention was directed to the
inconsistencies or discrepancies and she was given an opportunity to explain said inconsistencies.[17]

This is in line with Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which states:

Section 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent statements.Before a witness can be
impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present
testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and the
persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain
them. If the statements be in writing, they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to
him concerning them.

More controlling is our ruling in People v. Alegado where we held that inconsistencies
between the sworn statement and the testimony in court do not militate against the
witness credibility since sworn statements are generally considered inferior to the
testimony in open court.[18]

In any case, Asaytono was able to sufficiently identify Bajada as one of the perpetrators
to the satisfaction of the trial court. Asaytonos familiarity with Bajada cannot be denied;
she has known Bajada and Calisay for more than a year prior to the incident. The two
accused were also frequent visitors at the victims house. Hence, Asaytono was
acquainted with Bajadas physical features. The trial court found her testimony to be
credible, frank, straightforward, and consistent throughout the trial. We see no reason to
disturb this finding since trial courts are in a unique position to observe the demeanor of
witnesses.[19] The trial courts findings regarding the witness credibility are accorded the
highest degree of respect.

Furthermore, Bajada could not ascribe any plausible ill motive against the witness. His
accusation against Asaytono that the latter was interested in inheriting from Villamayor
is self-serving and uncorroborated. Even Bajadas own stepson, Calisay, stated that there
was no prior misunderstanding between him and Asaytono and that he did not know any
reason why Asaytono would accuse them of a crime. The letters allegedly written by an
eyewitness who was afraid to testify in trial cannot be given probative value. The letters
accused Asaytono as one of the culpritsa defense which was already dismissed by the
courts a quo. There was no evidence to support such allegation. The said letters were
belatedly submitted, uncorroborated, and cannot be admitted in evidence.

Bajadas alibi likewise deserves no merit. For alibi to prosper, it must be shown that the
accused was somewhere else at the time of the commission of the offense and that it was
physically impossible for the accused to be present at the scene of the crime at the time
of its commission.[20] Bajada himself admitted, however, that the travel time from
Bayate, Liliw, Laguna to the crime scene is only 15 minutes by jeep. Hence, it was
possible for him to be at the crime scene at or around the time the offense was
committed.

The appellate court correctly reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua. The aggravating
circumstance of dwelling was not specifically alleged in the information. As regards the
additional charge of serious physical injuries, we held in Abdul[21] that this is merged in
the crime of robbery with homicide.

WHEREFORE, the February 7, 2006 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.

01043 is AFFIRMED IN TOTO. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE R. CATACUTAN, G.R. No. 175991

Petitioner,

Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO, and

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Promulgated:

Respondent. August 31, 2011

x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
 DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

It is well within the Courts discretion to reject the presentation of evidence which it
judiciously believes irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding on hand.

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Jose R. Catacutan

seeking to set aside and reverse the Decision[1] dated December 7, 2006 of the
Sandiganbayan which affirmed the Decision[2] dated July 25, 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, Surigao City convicting him of the crime of violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.

Factual Antecedents

The antecedent facts are clear and undisputed.

Private complainant Georgito Posesano was an Instructor II with Salary Grade 13 while
private complainant Magdalena Divinagracia was an Education Program Specialist II
with Salary Grade 16, both at the Surigao del Norte School of Arts and Trades (SNSAT).
[3]

On June 2, 1997, the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Caraga Administrative

Region, appointed and promoted private complainants as Vocational Instruction
Supervisor III with Salary Grade 18 at SNSAT.[4] These promotional appointments were
duly approved and attested as permanent by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on
June 3, 1997.[5] Being then the Officer-In-Charge of SNSAT, the approved
appointments were formally transmitted to the petitioner on June 6, 1997,[6] copy
furnished the concerned appointees. Despite receipt of the appointment letter, the private
complainants were not able to assume their new position since petitioner made known
that he strongly opposed their appointments and that he would not implement them
despite written orders from CHED[7] and the CSC, Caraga Regional Office.[8] Thus, on
August 2, 1997, private complainants lodged a formal complaint against petitioner for
grave abuse of authority and disrespect of lawful orders before the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao.[9]

In an Information dated February 27, 1998, petitioner was charged before the RTC of
Surigao City with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 as amended, committed in the
following manner, to wit:

That in June 1997 or sometime thereafter, in Surigao City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused JOSE R. CATACUTAN, OIC Principal of Surigao del Norte School
of Arts and Trades (SNSAT), Surigao City, with salary grade below 27, while in the performance of his
official duties, thus committing the act in relation to his office, willfully, feloniously and unlawfully did
then and there, with grave abuse of authority and evident bad faith, refuse to implement the
promotion/appointments of Georgito Posesano and Magdalena A. Divinagracia as Vocational
Supervisors III notwithstanding the issuance of the valid appointments by the appointing authority and
despite the directive of the Regional Director of the Commission on Higher Education and the Civil
Service Commission in the region, thereby causing undue injury to complainants who were supposed to
receive a higher compensation for their promotion, as well as [to] the school and the students who were
deprived of the better services which could have been rendered by Georgito Posesano and Magdalena
A. Divinagracia as Vocational Instruction Supervisors [III].

CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]

During arraignment on September 22, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty.

For his defense, petitioner admitted that he did not implement the promotional
appointments of the private complainants because of some procedural lapses or
infirmities attending the preparation of the appointment papers. According to him, the
appointment papers were prepared by SNSAT Administrative Officer, Crispin Noguera,
using blank forms bearing the letterhead of SNSAT and not of the CHED Regional
Office who made the appointments. He also averred that the appointment papers cited
the entire plantilla[11] (1996 Plantilla-OSEC-DECSB-VOCIS3-19, Pages 1-16) instead
of only the particular page on which the vacant item occurs. He likewise claimed that he
received only the duplicate copies of the appointments contrary to the usual procedure
where the original appointment papers and other supporting documents are returned to
his office. Finally, he asserted that the transmittal letter from the CHED did not specify
the date of effectivity of the appointments. These alleged infirmities, he contended, were
formally brought to the attention of the CHED Regional Director on June 20, 1997[12]
who, however, informed him that the subject appointments were regular and valid and
directed him to implement the same. Still not satisfied, petitioner sought the intercession
of CHED Chairman Angel C. Alcala in the settlement of this administrative problem[13]
but the latter did not respond. Petitioner alleged that his refusal to implement the
appointments of the private complainants was not motivated by bad faith but he just
wanted to protect the interest of the government by following strict compliance in the
preparation of appointment papers.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 25, 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision[14] holding that the act of the
petitioner in defying the orders of the CHED and the CSC to implement the subject
promotional appointments despite the rejection of his opposition, demonstrates his
palpable and patent fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious
wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. The trial court ruled that petitioners
refusal to implement the appointments of the private complainants had caused undue
injury to them. Thus, it held petitioner guilty of the crime charged and accordingly
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month
and perpetual disqualification from public office.

The RTC disposed of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused JOSE R. CATACUTAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt [of]
VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(e) of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, this Court hereby imposes upon him the penalty of imprisonment [of] SIX (6) YEARS
and ONE (1) MONTH and PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION FROM PUBLIC OFFICE, and to pay
the costs.

The aforementioned accused is hereby ordered to pay private complainants Georgito Posesano and
Magdalena Divinagracia the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each, for moral damages.

SO ORDERED.[15]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration[16] but it was denied in an Order[17] dated

October 13, 2005.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

On appeal, petitioners conviction was affirmed in toto by the Sandiganbayan.[18] The

appellate court ruled that the Decision of the trial court, being supported by evidence
and firmly anchored in law and jurisprudence, is correct. It held that petitioner failed to
show that the trial court committed any reversible error in judgment.
Hence, this petition.

In the Courts Resolution[19] dated February 26, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) was required to file its Comment. The OSG filed its Comment[20] on
June 5, 2007 while the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed the Comment[21] for
respondent People of the Philippines on February 22, 2008.

Issue

The sole issue for consideration in this present petition is:

Whether the [petitioners] constitutional right[s] to due process x x x and x x x equal protection of [the]
law x x x were violated x x x [when he was denied] the opportunity to present [in] evidence [the Court
of Appeals] Decision dated April 18, 2001 x x x in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795 entitled Jose R. Catacutan,
petitioner, versus Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, et al., respondents.[22]

Invoking the constitutional provision on due process,[23] petitioner argues that the
Decision rendered by the trial court is flawed and is grossly violative of his right to be
heard and to present evidence. He contends that he was not able to controvert the
findings of the trial court since he was not able to present the Court of Appeals (CAs)
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795 which denied the administrative case filed against
him and declared that his intention in refusing to implement the promotions of the
private complainants falls short of malice or wrongful intent.

Our Ruling

The petition lacks of merit.

Petitioner was not deprived of his right to due
process.

Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard.[24] Due process is satisfied

when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
respective sides of the controversy.[25] Where an opportunity to be heard either through
oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.[26]

Guided by these established jurisprudential pronouncements, petitioner can hardly claim

denial of his fundamental right to due process. Records show that petitioner was able to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, argue his case vigorously, and
explain the merits of his defense. To reiterate, as long as a party was given the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied
due process of law for the opportunity to be heard is the better accepted norm of
procedural due process.

There is also no denial of due process when the trial court did not allow petitioner to
introduce as evidence the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795. It is well within the
courts discretion to reject the presentation of evidence which it judiciously believes
irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding on hand. This is specially true when the
evidence sought to be presented in a criminal proceeding as in this case, concerns an
administrative matter. As the Sandiganbayan aptly remarked:

The RTC committed no error in judgment when it did not allow the Accused-appellant to present the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795 (Jose R. Catacutan vs. Office of the
Ombudsman). The findings in administrative cases are not binding upon the court trying a criminal
case, even if the criminal proceedings are based on the same facts and incidents which gave rise to the
administrative matter. The dismissal of a criminal case does not foreclose administrative action or
necessarily gives the accused a clean bill of health in all respects. In the same way, the dismissal of an
administrative case does not operate to terminate a criminal proceeding with the same subject matter. x
x x[27]

This action undertaken by the trial court and sustained by the appellate court was not
without legal precedent. In Paredes v. Court of Appeals,[28] this Court ruled:

It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases are independent
from criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a
bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. One thing is administrative liability; quite another
thing is the criminal liability for the same act.

xxxx

Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the
sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one
should not necessarily be binding on the other. Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative
case may not necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal cases. x x x

In Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan,[29] the Court reiterated:

This Court is not unmindful of its rulings that the dismissal of an administrative case does not bar the
filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts subject of the administrative complaint and
that the disposition in one case does not inevitably govern the resolution of the other case/s and vice
versa. x x x

On the basis of the afore-mentioned precedents, the Court has no option but to declare
that the courts below correctly disallowed the introduction in evidence of the CA
Decision. Due process of law is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or
incompetent evidence, or testimony of an incompetent witness. It is not an error to
refuse evidence which although admissible for certain purposes, is not admissible for the
purpose which counsel states as the ground for offering it.[30]

At any rate, even assuming that the trial court erroneously rejected the introduction as
evidence of the CA Decision, petitioner is not left without legal recourse. Petitioner
could have availed of the remedy provided in Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
which provides:

Section 40. Tender of excluded evidence. If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by
the court, the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence
excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the
witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.

As observed by the appellate court, if the petitioner is keen on having the RTC admit the
CAs Decision for whatever it may be worth, he could have included the same in his offer
of exhibits. If an exhibit sought to be presented in evidence is rejected, the party
producing it should ask the courts permission to have the exhibit attached to the record.

As things stand, the CA Decision does not form part of the records of the case, thus it
has no probative weight. Any evidence that a party desires to submit for the
consideration of the court must be formally offered by him otherwise it is excluded and
rejected and cannot even be taken cognizance of on appeal. The rules of procedure and
jurisprudence do not sanction the grant of evidentiary value to evidence which was not
formally offered.

Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, provides:

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful.

xxxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.

Under said provision of law, three essential elements must thus be satisfied, viz:

1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official

functions;

2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and

3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government or gave any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.[31]

All the above enumerated elements of the offense charged have been successfully
proven by the prosecution.

First, petitioner could not have committed the acts imputed against him during the time
material to this case were it not for his being a public officer, that is, as the Officer-In-
Charge (Principal) of SNSAT. As such public officer, he exercised official duties and
functions, which include the exercise of administrative supervision over the school such
as taking charge of personnel management and finances, as well as implementing
instruction as far as appointment of teachers.[32]
Second, petitioner acted with evident bad faith in refusing to implement the
appointments of private complainants. As the Sandiganbayan aptly remarked:

The records clearly indicate that the refusal of Catacutan to implement the subject promotion was no
longer anchored on any law or civil service rule as early [as] the July 14, 1997 letter of the CHED
Regional Director addressing the four issues raised by the Accused-appellant in the latters protest letter.
x x x In light of the undisputed evidence presented to the trial court that Catacutans reason for not
implementing the appointments was a personal dislike or ill feelings towards Posesano, this Court
believes that Catacutans refusal was impelled by an ill motive or dishonest purpose characteristic of
bad faith. x x x

xxxx

In the August 1, 1997 [m]emorandum issued by the CHED Regional Director, Catacutan was once
again directed, in strong words, to cease and desist from further questioning what has been lawfully
acted upon by competent authorities. Catacutan deliberately ignored the memorandum and even
challenged the private complainants to file a case against him. Such arrogance is indicative of the bad
faith of the accused-appellant.

Yet again, the [CSC] Regional Director wrote the Accused-appellant on September 5, 1997, clarifying
with finality the validity of the appointment. Still, Accused-appellant failed to implement the subject
promotions. This stubborn refusal to implement the clear and repeated directive of competent
authorities established the evident bad faith of Catacutan and belies any of his claims to the contrary.
[33]

While petitioner may have laudable objectives in refusing the implementation of private
complainants valid appointments, the Court fails to see how he can still claim good faith
when no less than the higher authorities have already sustained the validity of the subject
appointments and have ordered him to proceed with the implementation. It is well to
remember that good intentions do not win cases, evidence does.[34]

Third, undue injury to the private complainants was duly proven to the point of moral
certainty. Here, the private complainants suffered undue injury when they were not able
to assume their official duties as Vocational Supervisors III despite the issuance of their
valid appointments. As borne out by the records, they were able to assume their new
positions only on November 19, 1997. So in the interregnum from June to November
1997, private complainants failed to enjoy the benefits of an increased salary
corresponding to their newly appointed positions. Likewise established is that as a result
of petitioners unjustified and inordinate refusal to implement their valid appointments
notwithstanding clear and mandatory directives from his superiors, the private
complainants suffered mental anguish, sleepless nights, serious anxiety warranting the
award of moral damages under Article 2217 of the New Civil Code.

At this point, the Court just needs to stress that the foregoing are factual matters that
were threshed out and decided upon by the trial court which were subsequently affirmed
by the Sandiganbayan. Where the factual findings of both the trial court and the
appellate court coincide, the same are binding on this Court. In any event, apart from
these factual findings of the lower courts, this Court in its own assessment and review of
the records considers the findings in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the

Sandiganbayan promulgated on December 7, 2006 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

UAN DELA RAMA and G.R. No. 142309

EUGENIA DELA RAMA,
Petitioners, Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CORONA,*
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
BRION, JJ.
OSCAR PAPA and AMEUERFINA Promulgated:
PAPA,
Respondents. January 30, 2009

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DECISION
Tinga, J.:

This petition allows us to reiterate some of the basic rules concerning the notarization of deeds of
conveyance involving real property. Such rules are important because an improperly notarized
document cannot be considered a public document and will not enjoy the presumption of its due
execution and authenticity.

I.

Petitioner spouses Juan and Eugenia dela Rama were the registered owners of a parcel of land situated
in Calamba, Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 91166 issued by the Registry
of Deeds of Laguna. The property was acquired for P96,000.00 by way of sale from Canlubang Sugar
Estate (CSE), as evidenced by a notarized Absolute Deed of Sale dated 10 July 1980 executed by Juan
dela Rama and CSE, as represented by Jesus de Veyra. Eugenia dela Rama also affixed her signature as
proof of her marital consent.[1]
According to Juan dela Rama, he became a resident of the United States by 1984 and would acquire
American citizenship by 1989.[2] In 1992, petitioners through their representative, were reminded to
pay the realty tax on the property, only to be informed by the assessors office that their title to the
property had in fact been cancelled, and a new title, TCT No. 102128, issued in favor of respondents
Oscar and Ameorfina Papa.[3]

Until 31 July 1985, Oscar Papa had been the Assistant Vice- President and Head of Marketing of the
Laguna Estate Development Corporation (LEDC), a marketing arm of CSE and the entity through
which the property had earlier been marketed and sold to petitioners. The property was transferred to
and retitled in the name of the spouses Papa pursuant to a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated 29
March 1985, covering the subject property, and identifying petitioners as the vendors and respondents
as the vendees. The 1985 deed of sale bears the signatures of petitioners and respondents, at least two
witnesses (whose identities are not spelled out or otherwise ascertainable on the face of the document),
and the notarial signature and seal of Atty. William Gumtang. The new title in the name of respondents
was issued on 21 June 1985.

Articulating the primary claim that their signatures on the 1985 deed of sale were forged, petitioners
filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Branch 92, for Cancellation of Title
Obtained Under Forged Deed of Sale.[4] They prayed for the declaration of nullity of the 1985 deed of
sale, the corresponding cancellation of TCT No. 102128 in the name of respondents and the issuance of
a new one in their names. Respondents counterposed in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim:
[5] (1) that the 1985 deed of sale had been duly executed; (2) that laches had barred the complaint
since they had obtained title and physical possession as far back as 1985; (3) that they had every reason
to believe that the person from whom they purchased the property was duly authorized to sell the same
given that such person was in possession of the owners duplicate TCT; and (4) that their purchase of
the property was in good faith and for value, thus even assuming that the forgery occurred, the action
should be directed against those who perpetrated the fraud.

During pre-trial, the following factual matters were stipulated upon: (1) that Juan dela Rama was the
registered owner of the property covered by TCT No. T-91166, which was subsequently cancelled; (2)
that TCT No. 102128 was issued in the name of respondents after they acquired the same for
P96,000.00; (3) that from 1974 to 1985 or thereabouts Oscar Papa was employed or connected with
LEDC, holding the position of Head of Marketing; (4) that LEDC was a developer and marketing arm
of CSE; and (5) that LEDC had developed the residential subdivision where the subject property is
located.

Petitioner Juan dela Rama and respondent Oscar Papa both testified in court. Dela Rama claimed
having religiously paid the property taxes since 1980. He denied that he or his wife executed the 1985
deed of sale or any other document that conveyed their interests or rights over the property. He even
denied having met Papa before he testified in court in 1995. Dela Rama also explained that he had
purchased the property in 1980 while a student at New York University, and that he had been a
permanent resident of California since 1984, and a United States citizen since 1989.

Oscar Papa testified that he was connected with LEDC from 1974 to 1985, where he marketed
residential, industrial and agricultural lots which belonged to the Canlubang Sugar Estates. He claimed
not to recall who had offered to him to buy the subject property, and that he had never met Juan Dela
Rama. He also admitted signing the deed of sale, such document being witnessed by two staff members
of LEDC, but he did not see dela Rama sign the same document. Neither could he remember signing
the deed of sale in front of the notary public who notarized the document.

Papa claimed that in real estate transactions, it was standard practice that the buyer first sign the
document before the seller did so. He also claimed that it was likewise standard practice in the real
estate industry that the buyer and seller did not necessarily have to meet face to face. Respondent
further alleged that at the time of the transaction, sales of real property was (sic) very bad with several
owners trying to sell back their property even at a price less than the purchase price, as this came
shortly after the assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr.

On 26 June 1986, the RTC promulgated a Decision [6] annulling the deed of sale, cancelling
respondents title and reinstating petitioners title to the subject property. The RTC said that the facts and
evidence presented indicated preponderating evidence that the plaintiffs signatures in the deed of sale x
x x are not their signatures,[7] such conclusion being corroborated by the admission of Papa that he did
not see petitioners sign the deed of sale. The RTC also disbelieved respondents contention that it was
standard practice in real estate transactions for the buyer to first affix his signature before the seller;
noting that [i]t must be that before a buyer would part with his money, he will first see to it that the
sellers [sic] signatures were already affixed and if possible, affixed in his presence.[8]
The RTC did not consider respondents as buyers in good faith, given their dubious assertion that it was
typical that the buyer signs the deed of sale before the seller, as well as such circumstances like the
failure of respondents to ever pay real estate taxes on the property and to assert possession or
occupancy over the property. Accordingly, it held that the cancellation of respondents title was proper.
In addition, the RTC discounted the claim of defendants that laches and estoppel had set in to bar the
action, pointing out that under Section 47 of Pres. Decree No. 1529, no title to registered land in
derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession,
and that under Article 1410 of the Civil Code, [t]he action of defense for the declaration of the
inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.[9]

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 7 September 1999, the appellate court rendered a
Decision reversing the RTC and upholding the validity of the deed of sale.[10]

The Court of Appeals considered the pivotal issue as whether the signatures of the petitioners on the
deed of sale were indeed forged, and ultimately concluded that there was no such evidence to support
the finding of forgery. It was observed that the burden of proving the forgery fell upon the petitioners,
yet they failed to present convincing evidence to establish the forgery. The only evidence presented to
establish the forgery was the oral testimony of Juan dela Rama himself, which according to the Court
of Appeals, was self-serving. The RTC was chided for not applying Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules
of Evidence, which provided in clear terms how handwriting must be proved. It was pointed out that
the Rule required that the handwriting of a person be proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be
his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the
handwriting of such person.[11]

Moreover, the Court of Appeals cited that neither one of the dela Ramas was confronted with their
signatures in the challenged deed of sale. Nor did they positively and unequivocally declare that the
signatures were not theirs or that these were forged.

II.

Hence, this petition for review. Petitioners devote considerable effort in highlighting facts and
admissions elicited from Oscar Papa himself to cast doubt on the validity of the deed of sale. Yet it
would be impertinent on our part to immediately dwell on such evidentiary matters without first
contending with the legal arguments cited by the Court of Appeals in dismissing the complaint. While
this Court is generally not a trier of fact, there are recognized exceptions to that rule, such as when the
findings of fact are conflicting, or when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
[12]
The petition hinges on a factual questionwhether the signatures of the petitioners as appearing on the
deed of sale were forged. The Court of Appeals correctly observed that petitioners had the onus
probandi to establish such forgery. In concluding that petitioners failed to discharge such burden, the
appellate court cited the rule upholding the presumption of regularity of a notarized document.
Applying that rule, it is necessary that the forgery must be established not merely by preponderance of
evidence, but by clear, positive and convincing evidence, and the Court of Appeals appears to have
applied that more exacting standard.

However, petitioners point out that respondent Papa had admitted before the Court that he did not sign
the deed of sale in front of the Notary Public. Based on the transcript of Papas testimony before the
RTC,[13] it is clear at least that the witness could not attest to the fact that he had signed the document
in front of the Notary Public.

Atty. Lizares:

Do you recall Mr. Witness if you sign[ed] this document in front of a Notary
Public?

[Papa]:

No[,] sir.

Atty. Lizares:

Do you know this Mr. William Gumtang?

Witness:

Yes
Atty. Lizares:

How do you know him Mr. Witness?

Witness:

Atty. Gumtang is one of the Notary Public of CSE.

Atty. Lizares:

He is one of the Notary Public of CSE?

Witness:
 Yes[,] sir.

Atty. Lizares:

So you do not recall if you signed this in front of Atty. Gumt[a]ng?

Witness:

I do not recall.

The deed was purportedly notarized by Atty. William Gumtang, who was personally known to Papa as
he was one of the notaries public of CSE. [14] Had Atty. Gumtang testified that Papa had signed the
deed of sale in his presence, Papas memory lapse would have had less relevance. Yet Atty. Gumtang
was never called on as a witness for the defense, nor was any other step taken by the respondents to
otherwise establish that Papa had signed the deed of sale in front of the notary public.

A.

Papas admissions, refreshing in their self-incriminatory candor, bear legal significance. With respect to
deeds of sale or conveyance, what spells the difference between a public document and a private
document is the acknowledgment in the former that the parties acknowledging the document appear
before the notary public and specifically manifest under oath that they are the persons who executed it,
and acknowledge that the same are their free act and deed. The Court, through Chief Justice Davide,
had previously explained:

A jurat which is normally in this form:

Subscribed and sworn to before me in ____________, this ____ day of

__________, affiant having exhibited to me his Community (before,
Residence) Tax Certificate No. __________ issued at __________ on
___________.

"is that part of an affidavit in which the officer certifies that the instrument was sworn to
before him. It is not a part of a pleading but merely evidences the fact that the affidavit was
properly made (Young vs. Wooden, 265 SW 24, 204 Ky. 694)." The jurat in the petition in
the case also begins with the words "subscribed and sworn to me."

To subscribe literally means to write underneath, as one's name; to sign at the end of a
document. To swear means to put on oath; to declare on oath the truth of a pleading, etc.
Accordingly, in a jurat, the affiant must sign the document in the presence of and take his
oath before a notary public or any other person authorized to administer oaths.

As to acknowledgment, Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:

 (a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer
duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary
public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person
acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the
same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act
and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law
required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.

It is obvious that the party acknowledging must likewise appear before the notary
public or any other person authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments or
documents.(Emphasis supplied)[15]

The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond
dispute that the notarization was regular. We cannot ascribe that conclusion at bar to the deed of sale.
Respondent failed to confirm before the RTC that he had actually appeared before the notary public, a
bare minimum requirement under Public Act No. 2103. Such defect will not ipso facto void the deed of
sale. However, it eliminates the presumptions that are carried by notarized public documents and
subject the deed of sale to a different level of scrutiny than that relied on by the Court of Appeals. This
consequence is with precedent. In Tigno v. Sps. Aquino,[16] where the public document in question
had been notarized by a judge who had no authority to do so, the Court dispensed with the clear and
convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to duly notarized documents, and instead applied
preponderance of evidence as the measure to test the validity of that document.

It appears that respondents had previously laid stress on the claim that it is a common practice in real
estate transactions that deeds of conveyance are signed on separate occasions by the vendor and the
vendee, and not necessarily in the presence of the notary public who notarizes the document but they
adduced nothing to support their claim but their mere say-so. Assuming arguendo that is indeed the
common practice in the business, we quite frankly do not care. The clear requirements of law for a
proper acknowledgment may not be dispensed with simply because generations of transactions have
blithely ignored such requirements. If it is physically impossible for the vendor and the vendee to meet
and sign the deed in the presence of one notary public, there is no impediment to having two or more
different notaries ratifying the document for each party that respectively appears before them. This is
the prudent practice adopted by professional law enterprises, and it is a correct measure in consonance
with the law.

B.

There is another implication under our rules of evidence. Under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court, documents acknowledged before a notary public except for last wills and testaments are deemed
as public documents, and as such, under Section 23 of the same Rule, they are evidence of the fact
which gave rise to its execution and as to its date. [17] Excepting the other public documents
enumerated in Section 19, all other writings are private, and before such private document is offered as
authentic, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) by anyone who saw the
document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the maker.[18] Accordingly, in order that the challenged deed of sale may be accepted by the Court as
genuine, we must be satisfied by the evidence on record establishing that its genuineness was proved
by anyone who saw the document executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness or
handwriting of the maker.

This shift in perspectives relieves petitioners of an extraordinary burden to prove with clear and
convincing evidence that the deed of sale was forged, as well as any presumption that the said
document is genuine as to its due execution. The question now is thus whether they were able to
establish the fact of forgery through a preponderance of evidence.

III.

It is now upon this Court to ascertain whether the genuineness and due execution of the deed of sale
have been duly proven, there being no presumption that it was. In doing so, we continue to recognize
that it remains incumbent on the petitioners to prove their allegation that the deed of sale was forged
even though that document no longer enjoys any significantly weighted presumption as to its validity
since it cannot be considered as a public document. The properly applicable standard of preponderance
of evidence necessitates that the court counterweigh the respective evidence submitted by the litigants
to test whether the plaintiffs claims are actionable. Accordingly, in this case if the evidence presented
by the petitioners that the deed of sale is a forgery is greater or more convincing than that presented by
the respondents, then favorable relief may be granted to petitioners.

The evidence-in-chief presented by petitioners to prove that the deed of sale was fraudulent consists of
the testimony of two witnesses for the plaintiff petitioner Juan dela Rama, and respondent Oscar Papa,
who called as a hostile witness for the plaintiff.

A.

We begin with Juan dela Ramas testimony. Petitioners assert that Juan dela Rama expressly denied in
open court his signature on the deed of sale, and such denial is made plain in the transcript of his
testimony of 25 July 1995.

Atty. Lizares:

Mr. Witness I am showing to you the document mark[ed] as plaintiff[s] exhibit which is
the Deed of [A]bsolute Sale
which is also the Annex C of complaint purportedly executed on March 29, 1985 by
Juan Eugenio dela Rama and Eugenia dela Rama in favor of Mr. Oscar Papa, did you
execut[e] the document?
[dela Rama]:

I did not.

Court:

What exhibit is that.

Atty. Lizares:

Exhibit 1 your Honor is defendant marking the same document that is mark as exhibit
M and M-1 for the plaintiff this a common exhibit. This is a 2 pag[e] document. Did
you execute the document?

Witness:

No [I] did not.

Atty. Fortun:

May I know the date?

Atty. Lizares:

March 29, 1985. Did you execute any document whatsoever M[r]. Witness
disposing or transferring any interest or right over the property which was earlier
evidence[d] by your TCT No. T-91166?

Witness:

No such document was ever executed by me or my wife.

xxx

[On cross examination]

Atty. Fortun:

You declare that when you [were] shown that contract, it Appears that between you and
Mr. Papa you stated that was not your signature?

Witness:

Yes Maam.[19]
 [On redirect]

Atty. Lizares: So you never executed any Deed of Absolute Sale on any
document transferring your right or interest of the property covered by TCT No.
T-91166.

Witness:

No sir.[20]

The Court of Appeals noted that his testimony was not corroborated, thus, self-serving, and further
castigated the trial court for failing to apply Section 22 of Rule 132, which establishes how the
genuineness of handwriting must be proved. The provision reads:

SEC. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved.The handwriting of a person may be

proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he
has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting
of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as
genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to
the satisfaction of the judge.

Petitioners argue that our ruling in Emas v. De Zuzuarregui and Aguilar[21] is in point. Emas involved
a plaintiff who sought annulment of title on the ground that his signature on the contract of mortgage
on which the conveyance of the property was based had been forged. In explaining that the plaintiffs
testimony on the forgery of his signature sufficed to debunk the genuineness of the contract, we held:

The proof adduced before the trial court shows, we think, beyond any doubt,
that the deed, original of Exhibit A, which purports to show a conveyance of the
property in which purports to show a conveyance of the property in question from the
plaintiff, Lucio Emas, to the defendant De Zuzuarregui, is a forgery, and that the fraud
was consummated substantially in the manner above described. The plaintiff in this
action (the real Lucio Emas) testified unequivocally that he had never taken any part in
the creation of the deed in question, and his testimony, in our opinion, leaves no room to
doubt that he was speaking the truth. As evidence of the crime of forgery, the plaintiff's
attorney submitted in the trial court certified copies of the judgments entered in the
Court of First Instance of Manila and afterwards in the Supreme Court in the criminal
 case convicting Ortega of the crime of estafa by falsification of a public document.
These certified copies were admitted by the trial court as competent proof and the
attorney for the defendants objected on the ground that said judgments are inadmissible
in this civil action, being res inter alios acta. As an abstract point of law the assignment
of error based on this exception is perhaps well taken; but we are of the opinion that,
apart from said certified judgments, the record contains ample evidence to support the
finding of the trial court that the original of the Exhibit A is a forged document, and that
the present plaintiff, Lucio Emas, was not a party thereto.[22]

Does Section 22 of Rule 132 accommodate the testimony of the very person whose signature is
disputed as a means to establish the genuineness of handwriting? We believe that it does, and Emas
remains a good law notwithstanding the subsequent enactment of the Rules of Court. After all, the
owner of such disputed signature may fall within the category of any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write and has thus acquired knowledge of
the handwriting of such person. In Alo v. Rocamora,[23] plaintiff Alo presented in evidence a deed of
sale establishing that he, and not the defendant, was the prior purchaser of the land in question. Alo
himself testified as to the authenticity of the deed of sale. In discussing whether the genuineness of
such document was proved, we cited the then Section 324 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
provides any writing may be proved, either by anyone who saw the writing executed; or by evidence of
the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or by a subscribing witness. The Court then
pronounced:

As to the authenticity of Exhibit A, introduced by the plaintiff, it may be said

that it was fully established by the testimony of the plaintiff himself and by that of the
witness, Vicente Alquizola, who signed the same together with the gobernadorcillo and
who testified under oath that he was present when the document was executed and
signed by those whose names are subscribed thereto. x x x
Telesforo Alo and Vicente Alquizola witnessed the execution of the said
instrument, the latter having been one of the accompanying witnesses of the local
authority before whom it was executed. Consequently there is no doubt as to the
authenticity of the said document, nor as to the truth of the contents thereof, nor is there
anything in the record, or any legal reason, that would justify this court in holding that
the said document was false.[24]

Section 324 of the Code of Civil Procedure is substantially similar to Section 22 of Rule 132, so our
application of the former rule in Alo remains appropriate today. At the very least, Section 22 of Rule
132 does not exclude such testimony from consideration. It is in fact well-established in the law of
evidence that the testimony of the very person whose signature is disputed is more than competent
proof on the genuineness of such signature. According to Wigmore on Evidence, there even was once
thought that for proving the genuineness of a document the alleged writer was a preferred witness,
though it is now believed that no such rule of preference exists.[25] At the same time, there really is no
rule that automatically discounts the testimony of the alleged writer as to the genuineness or
spuriousness of his own signature. In enumerating the methods of authentication of a handwriting,
Professor Herrera actually designates as the first method, the testimony of the purported writer:
 I. Proof of the Genuineness of a handwriting

A. Methods of Authentication

1. The Testimony of the purported writer

Except to the extent that certain formalities of proof are required by the rules
relating to attesting witnesses or rules requiring formal certification, and the like,
various means are available for proving the authenticity of a document as a
prerequisite to its admission in evidence. Under ordinary circumstances, it would
seem that the testimony of the purported writer would be the most satisfactory
authentication, where it is available.

While this is generally true, it is not necessarily so in all cases. There is no

preferential rule requiring the testimony of the writer on the ground that it is the
best evidence; the fact that the best available evidence is not used being
significant only in so far as it affects the weight. Thus evidence of handwriting
may be admissible even though the person whose writing it is claimed to be in
available as a witness.

xxx

When the testimony of the writer is not available it may be said that the next best
evidence in quality would be in the testimony of a witness who had seen the
writer sign his name or actually make the writing x x x (Citations omitted)[26]

We acknowledge the general premise that the testimony of the very person whose signature is put in
question has probative value, whether such testimony is offered to affirm or dispute the genuineness of
his signature. That testimony satisfies the requirements under Section 22 of Rule 132 on how
handwriting must be proved. At the same time, the evidentiary weight of such testimony wholly
depends on the strength of the particular witnesss testimony viewed in conjunction with the totality of
the evidence at hand.

It may be possible, as the Court of Appeals did in this case, to discount the testimony of a plaintiff
disavowing the authenticity of his purported signature as self-serving, but such posture can only be
warranted if the self-serving assertion is negated by other evidence or legal presumptions. If the
challenged deed of sale were considered by us as a public document, then dela Ramas mere testimonial
disavowal of his signature would be insufficient to rebut the presumptive due execution of that writing.
However, since we cannot consider the deed of sale as a public document owing to its improper
acknowledgment, Dela Ramas denial that the signature was his gains greater weight for evidentiary
purposes.

B.

Counter-intuitively perhaps, the petitioners as plaintiffs called on Oscar Papa to testify in their behalf
as a hostile witness. This he did on 25 July 1995. It was an impressive gambit on the part of counsel for
the petitioners that produced spectacular results.

Papa testified for the petitioners that he did not sign the document in the presence of the dela Ramas.

Atty. Lizares:

But you do not (sic) meet the person. Who signed as Juan
Eugenio dela Rama?

[Papa]:

No I did not see him sign.

Atty. Lizares:

So you did not see him signing?

Witness:

Yes.

Atty. Lizares:

But you said you sign[ed] this document?

Witness:

Yes.

Atty. Lizares:

When you sign[ed] this document did Mr. dela Rama were [sic] the person who
purportedly signed in his behalf?
 Atty. Fortun:

Your Honor he had repeatedly answered that he signed it without seeing him.[27]

A contrary admission on Oscar Papas part would have allowed the Court cause to believe that the
petitioners had consented to the sale.

As a witness for the petitioners, Oscar Papa admitted that he had not never met Juan dela Rama before
and during the sale, and until 1995 or ten years after the sale.

Atty. Lizares:

Have you ever met Juan Eugenio dela Rama?

[Papa]:

No sir.

Atty. Lizares:

He is not the one Juan Eugenio dela Rama who testified a while ago?

Atty. Fortun:

Already answered your Honor witness cannot recall.

Court:

Sustain[ed].

Atty. Lizares:

At the time you acquire[d] the property supposedly from Mr. dela Rama you
were the Head [of the] Marketing Department?

Witness:

Yes sir.

Atty. Lizares:

Who introduce[d] you to Mr. Juan Eugenio dela Rama?

Atty. Fortun:
 Misleading your Honor.

Court:

Sustain[ed].

Atty. Lizares:

So you mean you never met the person who execute[d] this document?

Witness:

Yes sir.[28]

As a witness for the petitioners, Papa could not recall who exactly had offered the subject
property to him.

Atty. Lizares:

Who offer[ed] you this property which is the subject matter of this case?

[Papa]:

I could not specifically recall who in particular offer[ed] the property, it could
have been one of my staff, or brokers at the time because aside from my job I am
handling several construction not only this subdivision, not only Ceres I, there is
Ceres II and Ceres III and all the industrial lots.[29]

xxx

Atty. Lizares:

You dont recall who offer[ed] this property?

Witness:

At this moment specifically I cannot recall.[30]

 As a witness for the petitioners, Papa admitted he could not recall whether or not any of the dela
Ramas had already signed the deed of sale when he signed the same:

Atty. Lizares:

When you signed the document was it already signed by the suppose[d] vendor?

[Papa]:

I could not really recall right now but the fact is at the time
for the buyer to sign it first and then give it [to] the seller
seller and then the seller signed it afterwards.[31]

xxx

Atty. Lizares:

And you also dont recall whether the signature Juan Eugenio dela Rama was
already in this document when you
sign this document?

Witness:

I do not specifically recall now as I have said earlier the practice was for the
buyer to sign first and then the seller signed afterwards.[32]

As a witness for the petitioners, Papa admitted he could not remember where and how he signed
the deed of sale.

Atty. Lizares:

Now so who presented this document to you for your signature?

[Papa]:

My either (sic) my staff or agent who told me that such property is for sale.
 Atty. Lizares:

When the staff or agent told you that the property is for sale what document did
you ask from agent or staff?

Witness:

Deed of Absolute sale and I presume at the time whoever was selling it inform
me that the title is available.

Atty. Lizares:

Now when you sign[ed] this document where did you [sign] it?

Witness:

I could have signed it in the office or in our house.

Atty. Lizares:

You dont recall where?

Witness:

Yes I cannot recall.

Atty. Lizares:

When you signed it were you alone?

Witness:

I could not even recall where I signed it.

Atty. Lizares:

Or perhaps with your wife?

Atty. Fortun:

Already answered your Honor he does not know.[33]

Had counsel for petitioners been content with relying singly on dela Ramas testimony, there would
have been a good chance that the complaint would not have survived. His move to call in Papa as a
hostile witness allowed the above-cited testimony to form part of the evidence for the plaintiffs. The
trial court correctly appreciated Papas testimony on 25 July 1995 (as distinguished from his subsequent
testimony as a witness for the defense) as part of the evidence for the petitioners.[34]

In addition, another corroborative piece of evidence of the petitioners, as found by the trial
court, lay in the fact that the dela Ramas had paid real estate taxes on the property until about 1993,
[35] or eight (8) years after the purported sale. Any reasonable person who had sold his property
would not undertake the unnecessary burden of continuing to pay real property taxes on the same.

That piece in evidence should be taken into account together with petitioners presentation of Papas
clear-cut and unrebutted testimony of as well as the evasive and ambivalent testimony of Papa. The
totality of the evidence for the petitioners established a prima facie case that the deed of sale was not
genuine. Even as the burden of proof may have initially lain with petitioners in establishing the forgery
of what is a private document, their evidence was sufficient to shift the burden of evidence to
respondents to establish the authenticity and due execution of said private document, especially as it is
they who rely on the same in their defense.

III.

There are a myriad of ways respondents could have swayed the case then in their behalf after
the burden of evidence had shifted to them. Most pertinently, they could have presented the two
persons whom Oscar Papa had identified as witnesses to the deed of sale, Mrs. Galeos and Mrs. Reyes,
as well as Atty. Gumtang, to whom the deed was referred to for notarization. All three persons were
personally known to Papa. Galeos and Reyes were, according to Papa, staff of LEDCwho finalize[d]
the document,[36] while Atty. Gumtang was one of the notaries public of CSE. [37] Yet none of them
testified in respondents behalf.

Respondents had initially manifested to the trial court that they were to present Gales and
Reyes as witnesses in their behalf,[38] yet only Papa ultimately testified for the defense. Assuming
that the deed of sale was prepared, signed and notarized according to Papas version of events, any of
these three witnesses could have easily bolstered the evidence in favor of the genuineness of the deed
since Papa himself attested to their personal knowledge of these events. That they were not presented
by Papa in his behalf speaks poorly of the veracity of his tale.

When Papa did testify in behalf of the defense on 26 March 1996, his counsel adopted in full his
earlier 25 July 1995 testimony as a hostile witness. [39] That earlier testimony unfortunately was quite
incriminatory. To make matters worse, his own testimony in his defense poked even more holes to his
version of events. On cross-examination, he made it clear that he had no particular interest in meeting
the petitioners for the purposes of negotiating or consummating the sale.

Atty. Lizares:

In your previous testimony Mr. Witness you testified that you never met Mr. Dela
Rama do you confirm that?

[Papa]:

Yes sir.

Atty. Lizares:

And you never had a chance to speak with him?

Witness:

Yes sir.

Atty. Lizares:

And neither his wife?

Witness:

Yes sir.

Atty. Lizares:

Did you ever ha[ve] a chance to ask the broker or the person facilitating this
whoever he was that you want to meet Mr. dela Rama?

Atty. Fortun:
 Objection your Honor. Misleading.

Atty. Lizares:

No Im just asking whether he had a chance to ask.

Court:

Reform your question.

Atty. Lizares:

Did you ever make a request in connection with this Transaction to meet with Mr.
dela Rama?

Witness:

I cannot answer because I cannot recall.[40]

Most incredibly, Papa revealed he could not even remember to whom he tendered the purchase
price of P96,000.00.

Atty. Lizares:

Mr. Witness, you or do you recall to whom did you made paid (sic) of the
P96,000.00 that you said you paid to whoever who effected or facilitate[d] the
sale?

[Papa]:

Unfortunately I cannot recall at this time because it was on 1985 and this is not
the only transaction I am handling at that time being in sales I am also handling
the same of companys commercial lots, also handling the industrial lots the golf
shares, Ive been meeting a lot of people, I could not really recall how this
particular transaction happen.

Atty. Lizares:

So you do not remember to whom you pay the money?

 Witness:

Yes sir.

Atty. Lizares:

Do you remember if there is only one or two or three person[s] who arrange[d]
with you for the sale of the property?

Witness:

I cannot recall but as I am trying to recall the numerous transaction handled at

that time, normally with this kind of transaction it will involv[e] some person, or
some broker or even some agent.

Atty. Lizares:

But for this particular transaction you can tell exactly how many?

Witness:

No sir.[41]

In the context of trying to establish the authenticity and due execution of the deed of sale,
Papas testimony proves woefully insufficient. It must be remembered that the transaction was personal
to Papa, and he was not conducting in behalf of his employers. It was his own money, and not the
companys, that he was tendering. Thus, it is highly incredulous that Papa could not recall even the
most basic details over his own personal transaction, in fact the only one he had during his stint at the
LEDC, that involved a then princely sum of P96,000.00 of his own money.

Papa did testify in court that he had signed the deed of sale, [42] and that assertion by itself has about
as much weight as dela Ramas claim that he did not. At the same time, that statement even if true does
not conclusively prove the validity of the sale as it does not establish mutual consent as to the putative
vendors and vendees to the sale. That point is especially salient since Papa admitted that he did not
sign the document in the presence of the petitioners.

IV.

We are cognizant that the Court of Appeals approached its analysis of the case from a wholly different,
and ultimately erroneous perspective. We are unable to utilize its appreciation of the facts. The Court of
Appeals was unable to advert to anything on record as to how the deed of sale was substantiated during
trial by Papa. Respondents, before this Court, are likewise unable to offer any convincing argument
tending to verify the deed of sale that is independent of the now-debunked legal presumption that the
document was duly executed.

The reversal of the Court of Appeals decision is clearly warranted. We do not discount the fact
that the petitioners could have further bolstered their case either by presenting a handwriting expert, or
Amuerfina dela Rama as a witness. Still, their failure to do so is not fatal as the document in question
is a private document, one which carries no presumption as to its authenticity and due execution. All
told, the findings and conclusions of the trial court are correct and credible, compared to those of the
Court of Appeals hence, reinstatement of the lower courts decision is in order.

At the same time, we wish to impart a few more observations.

Given that the deed of sale has been proven as false, is there still any basis for which the
respondents can retain title to their property? We observe that at the respective levels of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, respondents had argued that they should be considered as purchasers in good
faith, especially since the complaint had adverted to certain unscrupulous persons illegally representing
themselves to be the plaintiffs and illicitly forging plaintiffs signatures sold to herein defendants. [43]
We are unable to agree. By the very version of facts submitted by the respondents, there are enough
circumstances to discount good faith on their part. Papa never bothered to communicate directly with
the petitioners to ascertain whether the persons claiming to be their representatives persons Papa could
not even identify were indeed authorized by the petitioners. Papas inability to remember to whom he
tendered payment for the property likewise reveals utter apathy on his part as to the circumstances of
the sale.

In Abad v. Guimba,[44] we ruled that a party was not an innocent mortgagee in good faith
because he neglected to check if the person he was dealing with had any authority to mortgage the
property. The rules on ascertaining mortgagee in good faith are the same as those for purchasers in
good faith. Without directly communicating with the petitioners, how could have Papa been certain that
the persons apparently unknown to him were indeed duly authorized by the petitioners to sell the
property.

The following observation of the trial court is also pertinent in this regard:

The defendants said that it is the practice in real estate transaction for the buyer to first
affixed his signature and then the seller. This asseverations cannot be accepted as
ordinary. It must be that before a buyer would part with his money, he will first see to it
that the sellers signatures were already affixed and if possible, affixed in his presence.
Intriguing also is the failure of the defendants to assert their right of ownership over the
land by actually entering and occupying the premises and their failure at any moment
the real estate taxes since 1985 when they allegedly purchased the property. xxx[45]

Finally, the Court of Appeals had observed that upon close comparison of the signatures on the
questioned deed of sale and that earlier executed between the petitioners and CSE and in petitioners
passport, the challenged signatures appeared very similar with each other. We have examined the
signatures in the two deeds of sale, and in fact noticed distinct differences, and varying writing styles.
The signatures of the petitioners on the 1980 deed of sale are smooth and smaller than their purported
signatures on the 1985 deed of sale. Moreover, the signature of Juan dela Rama in the deed of sale
appears hesitant and non-fluid. The signature Eugenia dela Rama on the two deeds betray their very
distinctive angles or slants.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 7
September 1999 and the Resolution dated 1 March 2000 in CA G.R. CV No. 53914 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Branch 92 dated 26 June 1996
is REINSTATED. Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.