Valdez v. People

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 538 11/30/13 9:15 PM
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 611

Valdez vs. People
*
G.R. No. 170180. November 23, 2007.
ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Searches and Seizures; Warrantless Arrests; The legality of an

arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person·his
warrantless arrest cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.·At
the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find any
objection by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. Considering this and his active participation in the
trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to
have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing
any defect in his arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
612
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Valdez vs. People
jurisdiction of the court over his person. PetitionerÊs warrantless

arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.
Same; Same; Arrests in Flagrante Delicto; Elements.·For the
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000142a9261caf326e5e35000a0082004500cc/p/p538scra9970611001/?username=Guest Page 1 of 27
exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled
that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested
must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. Here, petitionerÊs act of looking around after
getting off the bus was but natural as he was finding his way to his
destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as the
tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be
construed as adequate to charge the tanod with personal knowledge
that petitioner had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or
was attempting to engage in criminal activity. More importantly,
petitioner testified that he did not run away but in fact spoke with
the barangay tanod when they approached him.
Same; Criminal Law; Evidence; Flight; Flight alone is not a

reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances because
flight alone is inherently ambiguous.·Even taking the
prosecutionÊs version generally as the truth, in line with our
assumption from the start, the conclusion will not be any different.
It is not unreasonable to expect that petitioner, walking the street at
night, after being closely observed and then later tailed by three
unknown persons, would attempt to flee at their approach. Flight
per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be
attributed to oneÊs consciousness of guilt. Of persuasion was the
Michigan Supreme Court when it ruled in People v. Shabaz, 424
Mich. 42, 378 N.W. 2d 451 (1985), that „[f]light alone is not a
reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances because flight
alone is inherently ambiguous.‰ Alone, and under the circumstances
of this case, petitionerÊs flight lends itself just as easily to an
innocent explanation as it does to a nefarious one.
Same; Same; Stop-and-Frisk Searches; A stop-and-frisk

situation, following Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2nd 889
(1968), must precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the personÊs
outer clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in
light of the police officerÊs experience and surrounding conditions,
to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about
613
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 613
Valdez vs. People
him.·The supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they

appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion
of criminal activity enough to validate his warrantless arrest. If at
all, the search most permissible for the tanod to conduct under the
prevailing backdrop of the case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any
suspicion they have been harboring based on petitionerÊs behavior.
However, a stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2nd 889 (1968), must precede a warrantless arrest,
be limited to the personÊs outer clothing, and should be grounded
upon a genuine reason, in light of the police officerÊs experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him.
Same; Same; Waivers; A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest

does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during an illegal warrantless arrest.·PetitionerÊs waiver of his
right to question his arrest notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves
allegedly taken during the search cannot be admitted in evidence
against him as they were seized during a warrantless search which
was not lawful. As we pronounced in People v. Lapitaje, 397 SCRA
674 (2003)·A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does
not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The following
searches and seizures are deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1)
search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs
searches (4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations
(Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last
includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an
equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the
Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1)
arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and,
(3) arrests of escaped prisoners.
Same; Same; Consented Searches; Burden of Proof; The consent

to a warrantless search must be voluntary, that is, it must be
unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by
any duress or coercion; Consent to a search is not to be lightly
inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence; It is

the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive
testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was
freely and volun-
614
Valdez vs. People
tarily given.·In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General

posits that apart from the warrantless search being incidental to his
lawful arrest, petitioner had consented to the search. We are not
convinced. As we explained in Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 373
SCRA 221 (2002)·Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against
unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may
be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to
validate an otherwise illegal detention and search, i.e., the
consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Hence, consent to
a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear
and convincing evidence. The question whether a consent to a
search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined
from the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this
determination are the following characteristics of the person giving
consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age
of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded
location; (3) whether he objected to the search or passively looked
on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the
presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendantÊs belief that
no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took
place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear
and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained
and that it was freely and voluntarily given.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Chain of Custody; The

existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for
conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it being the very
corpus delicti of the crime; There can be no crime of illegal

possession of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on
whether the item confiscated was the same specimen examined and
established to be the prohibited drug.·In all prosecutions for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the following elements must
concur: (1) proof that the transaction took place; and (2)
presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as
evidence. The existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua
non for conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it being
the very corpus delicti of the crime. In a line of cases, we have ruled
as fatal to the prosecutionÊs case its failure to prove that the
specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the same one
allegedly seized from the accused. There can
615
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 615
Valdez vs. People
be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when nagging

doubts persist on whether the item confiscated was the same
specimen examined and established to be the prohibited drug.
Same; Same; The law enforcers and public officers who take
possession of the specimen is duty-bound to detail how it was cared
for, safeguarded and preserved while in his or her control to prevent
alteration or replacement while in custody.·The onus of proving
culpability in criminal indictment falls upon the State. In
conjunction with this, law enforcers and public officers alike have
the corollary duty to preserve the chain of custody over the seized
drugs. The chain of evidence is constructed by proper exhibit
handling, storage, labeling and recording, and must exist from the
time the evidence is found until the time it is offered in evidence.
Each person who takes possession of the specimen is duty-bound to
detail how it was cared for, safeguarded and preserved while in his
or her control to prevent alteration or replacement while in custody.
This guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be used against
an accused goes to the very heart of his fundamental rights.
Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; Presumption of
Regularity; The presumption of regularity in the performance of

official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence
nor constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.·The
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
invoked by the prosecution and relied upon by the courts a quo
cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor
constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Among the
constitutional rights enjoyed by an accused, the most primordial yet
often disregarded is the presumption of innocence. This elementary
principle accords every accused the right to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the
burden of proving the guilt of the accused rests upon the
prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; The prosecutionÊs evidence must stand or

fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from
the weakness of the defense.·The evidence of the defense is weak
and uncorroborated. Nevertheless, this „[c]annot be used to advance
the cause of the prosecution as its evidence must stand or fall on its
own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the defense.‰ Moreover, where the circumstances are
shown to yield two or more inferences, one inconsistent with the
presump-
616
Valdez vs. People
tion of innocence and the other compatible with the finding of guilt,
the court must acquit the accused for the reason that the evidence
does not satisfy the test of moral certainty and is inadequate to
support a judgment of conviction.
Same; Same; Same; In the rightfully vigorous campaign of the

government to eradicate the hazards of drug use and drug
trafficking, it cannot be permitted to run roughshod over an
accusedÊs right to be presumed innocent until proven to the contrary
and neither can it shirk from its corollary obligation to establish
such guilt beyond reasonable doubt.·Drug addiction has been
invariably denounced as „an especially vicious crime,‰ and „one of

the most pernicious evils that has ever crept into our society,‰ for
those who become addicted to it „not only slide into the ranks of the
living dead, what is worse, they become a grave menace to the
safety of law-abiding members of society,‰ whereas „peddlers of
drugs are actually agents of destruction.‰ Indeed, the havoc created
by the ruinous effects of prohibited drugs on the moral fiber of
society cannot be underscored enough. However, in the rightfully
vigorous campaign of the government to eradicate the hazards of
drug use and drug trafficking, it cannot be permitted to run
roughshod over an accusedÊs right to be presumed innocent until
proven to the contrary and neither can it shirk from its corollary
obligation to establish such guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Same; Same; Courts; Courts are duty-bound to be extra vigilant

in trying drug cases lest an innocent person be made to suffer the
unusually severe penalties for drug offenses·the Court is not
oblivious to the fact that in some instances, law enforcers resort to
the practice of planting evidence to extract information or even
harass civilians.·We find it fitting to take this occasion to remind
the courts to exercise the highest degree of diligence and prudence
in deliberating upon the guilt of accused persons brought before
them, especially in light of the fundamental rights at stake. Here,
we note that the courts a quo neglected to give more serious
consideration to certain material issues in the determination of the
merits of the case. We are not oblivious to the fact that in some
instances, law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to
extract information or even harass civilians. Accordingly, courts are
duty-bound to be „[e]xtra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an
innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties
for drug offenses.‰ In
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VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 617
Valdez vs. People
the same vein, let this serve as an admonition to police officers and
public officials alike to perform their mandated duties with
commitment to the highest degree of diligence, righteousness and
respect for the law.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Public AttorneyÊs Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
TINGA, J.:
The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure

without valid warrant is not only ancient. It is also
zealously safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and
1
effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said right
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Indeed, while the power to search and seize may at times be
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and
the law implemented without contravening the
constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of
no statute is of sufficient importance2 to justify indifference
to the basic principles of government.
3
On appeal is the Decision of the Court 4
of Appeals dated
28 July 2005, affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 31, Agoo, La Union dated 31 March
2004 finding petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11 of Republic
Act No.
_______________
1 1987 Const., Art. III, Sec. 2.

2 People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868; 288 SCRA 626 (1998).
3 Rollo, pp. 76-89. Penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-
Fernando, and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosmari D.
Carandang and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa.
4 Id., at pp. 28-45. Penned by Executive Judge Clifton U. Ganaya.
618

Valdez vs. People
5
9165 (R.A. No. 9165) and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to fifteen
(15) years of reclusion temporal medium as maximum and
6
ordering him to pay a fine of P350,000.00.
I.
On 26 June 2003, petitioner was charged with violation of7

Section 11, par. 2(2) of R.A. No. 9165 in an Information
which reads:
„That on or about the 17th day of March 2003, in the Municipality

of Aringay, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, control and custody dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a
cellophane and newspaper page, weighing more or less twenty-five
(25) grams, without first securing the necessary permit, license or
prescription from the proper government agency.
8
CONTRARY TO LAW.‰
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter,

trial on the merits ensued with the prosecution presenting
the three (3) barangay tanods of San Benito Norte, Aringay,
La Union namely, Rogelio Bautista (Bautista), Nestor
Aratas (Aratas) and Eduardo Ordoño (Ordoño), who
arrested petitioner.
Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17
March 2003, he was conducting the routine patrol along the
National Highway in Barangay San Benito Norte, Aringay,
La Union together with Aratas and Ordoño when they
noticed petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus.
The tanods
_______________
5 Entitled Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

6 Id., at pp. 44-45.
7 Records, p. 1.
8 Id.
619
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 619

Valdez vs. People
observed that petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them,

seemed to be looking for something. They thus approached
him but the latter purportedly attempted to run away. They
chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter brought
him to the house of Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado
(Mercado) where he, as averred by Bautista, was ordered by
Mercado to open his bag. PetitionerÊs bag allegedly
contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant
and dried marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and
cellophane. It was then that petitioner 9
was taken to the
police station for further investigation.
Aratas and Ordoño corroborated BautistaÊs testimony on
most material points. On cross-examination, however,
Aratas admitted that he himself brought out the contents of
petitionerÊs
10
bag before petitioner was taken to the house of
Mercado. Nonetheless, he claimed that at MercadoÊs house,
it was petitioner himself who brought out the contents of his
bag upon orders from Mercado. For his part, Ordoño
testified that it was he who was ordered by Mercado to open
petitionerÊs bag and that 11it was then that they saw the
purported contents thereof.
The prosecution likewise presented Police Inspector
Valeriano Laya II (Laya), the forensic chemist who
conducted the examination of the marijuana allegedly
confiscated from petitioner. Laya maintained that the
specimen submitted to him for analysis, a sachet of the
substance weighing 23.10 grams and contained in a plastic
bag, tested positive of marijuana. He disclosed on cross-
examination, however, that he had knowledge neither of
how the marijuana was taken from petitioner nor of how the
said substance reached the police officers. Moreover, he
could not identify whose marking was
_______________
9 TSN, 24 February 2004, pp. 3-5, 7, 11-12. See also Records, p. 2.

10 TSN, 3 March 2004, p. 11.
11 Id., at p. 16.
620

Valdez vs. People
on the12inside of the cellophane wrapping the marijuana

leaves.
The charges were denied by petitioner. As the defenseÊs
sole witness, he testified that at around 8:30 p.m. on 17
March 2003, he arrived in Aringay from his place in Curro-
oy, Santol, La Union. After alighting from the bus,
petitioner claimed that he went to the house of a friend to
drink water and then proceeded to walk to his brotherÊs
house. As he was walking, prosecution witness Ordoño, a
cousin of his brotherÊs wife, allegedly approached him and
asked where he was going. Petitioner replied that he was
going to his brotherÊs house. Ordoño then purportedly
requested to see the contents of his bag and appellant
acceded. It was at this point that Bautista and Aratas joined
them. After inspecting all the contents of his bag, petitioner
testified that he was restrained by the tanod and taken to
the house of Mercado. It was Aratas 13
who carried the bag
until they reached their destination.
Petitioner maintained that at MercadoÊs house, his bag
was opened by the tanod and Mercado himself. They took
out an item wrapped in newspaper, which later turned out
to be marijuana leaves. Petitioner denied ownership thereof.
He claimed to have been threatened with imprisonment by
his arrestors if he did not give the prohibited drugs to
someone from the east in order for them to apprehend such
person. As petitioner declined, he was brought to the police
station and charged with the instant offense. Although
petitioner divulged that it was he who opened and took out
the contents of his bag at his friendÊs house, he averred that
it was one of the tanod who did so at MercadoÊs house and
that it was14
only there that they saw the marijuana for the
first time.
Finding that the prosecution had proven petitionerÊs
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment
against
_______________
12 TSN, 16 March 2004, pp. 4-7.

13 TSN, 17 March 2004, pp. 3-9.
14 Id., at pp. 10-12, 16-17.
621
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 621

Valdez vs. People
him and sentenced him to suffer indeterminate

imprisonment ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor medium as minimum to fifteen (15) years of
reclusion temporal medium as maximum and ordered him to
15
pay a fine of P350,000.00.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the decision of the RTC to
the Court of Appeals. On 28 July 2005, the appellate court
affirmed the challenged decision. The Court of Appeals,
finding no cogent reason to overturn the presumption of
regularity in favor of the barangay tanod in the absence of
evidence of ill-motive on their part, agreed with the trial
court that there was probable cause to arrest petitioner. It
observed further:
„That the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the

seized marijuana is of no moment. Such circumstance finds
prominence only when the existence of the seized prohibited drugs
is denied. In this case, accused-appellant himself testified that the
marijuana wrapped in a newspaper was taken from his bag. The
corpus delicti of the crime, i.e.[,] the existence of the marijuana and
his possession thereof, was amply proven by accused-appellant
16
ValdezÊs own testimony.‰
In this appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts

that his guilt of the crime charged had not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt. He argues, albeit for the first time
on appeal, that the warrantless arrest effected against him
by the barangay tanod was unlawful and that the
warrantless search of his bag that followed was likewise
contrary to law. Consequently, he maintains, the marijuana
leaves purportedly seized from him are inadmissible in
evidence for being the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of the trial court

on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are
accorded great respect and weight, in the absence of any
clear
_______________
15 Rollo, pp. 44-45.

16 Id., at p. 87.
622

Valdez vs. People
showing that some facts and circumstances of weight or

substance which could have affected the result of the 17
case
have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied.
After meticulous examination of the records and evidence
on hand, however, the Court finds and so holds that a
reversal of the decision a quo under review is in order.
II.
At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can

we find any objection by petitioner to the irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his
active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence
dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in
his arrest. The legality of an arrest affects 18
only the
jurisdiction of the court over his person. PetitionerÊs
warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of
his acquittal.
However, to determine the admissibility of the seized
drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain whether
or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was
lawful. The search, conducted as it was without a warrant, is19
justified only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest.
Evaluating the evidence on record in its totality, as earlier
intimated, the reasonable conclusion is that the arrest of
petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as well.
Petitioner maintains, in a nutshell, that after he was

approached by the tanod and asked to show the contents of
his
_______________
17 People v. Lapitaje, 445 Phil. 729, 746; 397 SCRA 674, 687 (2003),
citing People v. Mendoza, 327 SCRA 695 (2000). See also People v.
Sevilla, 394 Phil. 125; 339 SCRA 625 (2000).
18 See People v. Lapitaje, 445 Phil. 729, 748; 397 SCRA 674, 690 (2003)
citing People v. Lagarto, 326 SCRA 693 (2000) and People v. Nitcha, 240
SCRA 283 (1995). See also People v. Kimura, G.R. No. 130805, 27 April
2004, 428 SCRA 51.
19 People v. Sarap, 447 Phil. 642; 399 SCRA 503 (2003).
623
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 623

Valdez vs. People
bag, he was simply herded without explanation and taken to

the house of the barangay captain. On their way there, it
was Aratas who carried his bag. He denies ownership over
the contraband allegedly found in his bag and asserts that
he saw it for the first time at the barangay captainÊs house.
Even casting aside petitionerÊs version and basing the
resolution of this case on the general thrust of the
prosecution evidence, the unlawfulness of petitionerÊs arrest
stands out just the same.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides the only occasions on which a person may be
arrested without a warrant, to wit:
„Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.·A peace officer or

a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
xxx
It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting

barangay tanod, not one of these circumstances was
obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By their own
admission, petitioner was not committing an offense at the
time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be then
commit-
624

Valdez vs. People
20
ting an offense. The tanod did not have probable cause
either to justify petitionerÊs warrantless arrest.
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate,
this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be present:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.21 Here, petitionerÊs act of looking around
after getting off the bus was but natural as he was finding
his way to his destination. That he purportedly attempted to
run away as the tanod approached him is irrelevant and
cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the
tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had just
engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to
engage in criminal activity. More importantly, petitioner
testified that he did not run away but in fact spoke with the
barangay tanod when they approached him.
Even taking the prosecutionÊs version generally as the
truth, in line with our assumption from the start, the
conclusion will not be any different. It is not unreasonable
to expect that petitioner, walking the street at night, after

being closely observed and then later tailed by three
unknown persons, would attempt to flee at their approach.
Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not
22
always be attributed to oneÊs consciousness of guilt. Of
persuasion was the Michigan Supreme Court when it ruled
23
in People v. Shabaz that „[f]light alone is not a reliable
indicator of guilt without other circumstances because flight
alone is inherently ambiguous.‰ Alone, and under the
circumstances of this case, petitionerÊs
_______________
20 TSN, 24 February 2004, p. 11; TSN, 3 March 2004, pp. 9, 19.

21 People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752, 775; 412 SCRA 142, 157 (2003),
citing People v. Chua, G.R. Nos. 136066-67, 4 February 2003, 396 SCRA
657.
22 People v. Lopez, 371 Phil. 852, 862; 313 SCRA 114, 122 (1999),
citing People v. Bawar, 262 SCRA 325 (1999).
23 424 Mich. 42, 378 N.W.2d 451 (1985).
625
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 625

Valdez vs. People
flight lends itself just as easily to an innocent explanation

as it does to a nefarious one. 24
Moreover, as we pointed out in People v. Tudtud, „[t]he
phrase Âin his presenceÊ therein, connot[es] penal knowledge
on the part of the arresting officer. The right of the accused
to be secure against any unreasonable searches on and
seizure of his own body and any deprivation of his liberty
being a most basic and fundamental one, the statute or rule
that allows exception to the requirement of a warrant of
arrest is strictly construed. Its application cannot25 be
extended beyond the cases specifically provided by law.‰
Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming
that they appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient
to incite suspicion of
26
criminal activity enough to validate his
warrantless arrest. If at all, the search most permissible for
the tanod to conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the
case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion they have

been harboring based on petitionerÊs behavior. However,
27
a
stopand-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio, must
precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the personÊs outer
clothing, and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in
light of the police officerÊs experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief 28
that the person detained
has weapons concealed about him.
Accordingly, petitionerÊs waiver of his right to question
his arrest notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly
taken during the search cannot be admitted in evidence
against him
_______________
24 458 Phil. 752; 412 SCRA 142 (2003).

25 Id., at p. 777; p. 158.
26 See People v. Mengote, G.R. No. 87059, 22 June 1992, 210 SCRA
174.
27 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2nd 889 [1968].
28 See People v. Chua, 444 Phil. 757; 396 SCRA 657 (2003).
626

Valdez vs. People
as they were seized during a warrantless search which was

29
not lawful. As we pronounced in People v. Lapitaje·
„A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also

mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during an illegal warrantless arrest. The following searches
and seizures are deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1) search of
moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches (4)
waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry
Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last
includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an
equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the
Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1)
arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and,
30
(3) arrests of escaped prisoners.‰
When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was

neither caught in flagrante delicto committing a crime nor
was the arrest effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot
therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless search
conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General posits
that apart from the warrantless search being incidental to
his lawful arrest, petitioner had consented to the search. We
are not convinced.
31
As we explained in Caballes v. Court of
Appeals ·
„Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable

searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. The
consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise
illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is
unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Hence, consent to
a search is not to be lightly
_______________
29 See People v. Lapitaje, supra note 17, citing People v. Chua Ho

San, 308 SCRA 42 (1999).
30 Id., at pp. 748-749; p. 690.
31 424 Phil. 263; 373 SCRA 221 (2002).
627
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 627

Valdez vs. People
inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The

question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in
which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he
was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the
search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of
the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the
defendantÊs belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7)

the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which
the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable
subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State which has
the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the
necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and
32
voluntarily given.‰
In the case at bar, following the theory of the prosecution·

albeit based on conflicting testimonies on when petitionerÊs
bag was actually opened, it is apparent that petitioner was
already under the coercive control of the public officials who
had custody of him when the search of his bag was
demanded. Moreover, the prosecution failed to prove any
specific statement as to how the consent was asked and how
it was given, nor the specific words spoken by petitioner
indicating his alleged „consent.‰ Even granting that
petitioner admitted to opening his bag when Ordoño asked
to see its contents, his implied acquiescence, if at all, could
not have been more than mere passive conformity given
under coercive or intimidating circumstances and hence, is
considered no consent at all within the contemplation of the
33
constitutional guarantee. As a result, petitionerÊs lack of
objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a
waiver of his constitutional right
_______________
32 Id., at p. 286; pp. 239-240.

33 People v. Tudtud, 458 Phil. 752, 788; 412 SCRA 142, 168 (2003),
citing People v. Compacion, 414 Phil. 68; 361 SCRA 540 (2001).
628

Valdez vs. People
or a voluntary
34
submission to the warrantless search and
seizure.
III.
Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized

marijuana leaves for being the fruit of an unlawful search is
not the lone cause that militates against the case of the
prosecution. We likewise find that it has failed to
convincingly establish the identity of the marijuana leaves
purportedly taken from petitionerÊs bag.
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, the following elements must concur: (1) proof that the
transaction took place; and (2) presentation35in court of the
corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. The existence
of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for conviction
for the illegal sale of dangerous
36
drugs, it being the very
corpus delicti of the crime.
In a line of cases, we have ruled as fatal to the
prosecutionÊs case its failure to prove that the specimen
submitted for laboratory examination37
was the same one
allegedly seized from the accused. There can be no crime of
illegal possession
_______________
34 Id.
35 People v. Hajili, 447 Phil. 283, 295; 399 SCRA 188, 197 (2003).
36 People v. Almeida, 463 Phil. 637, 648; 418 SCRA 254, 263 (2003),
citing People v. Mendiola, 235 SCRA 116 (1994). See also People v.
Kimura, G.R. No. 130805, 27 April 2004, 428 SCRA 51, 61, citing People
v. Mendiola, supra, People v. Macuto, 176 SCRA 762 (1989), People v.
Vocente, 188 SCRA 100 (1990) and People v. Mariano, 191 SCRA 136
(1990).
37 See People v. Mapa, G.R. No. 91014, 31 March 1993, 220 SCRA 670
(1993), People v. Dismuke, G.R. No. 108453, 11 July 1994, 234 SCRA 51,
People v. Casimiro, 383 SCRA 400 (2002), People v. Pedronan, 452 Phil.
226; 404 SCRA 183 (2003), People v. Kimura, G.R. No. 130805, 27 April
2004, 428 SCRA 51, People v. Ong, G.R. No. 137348, 21 June 2004, 432
SCRA 470.
629
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 629

Valdez vs. People
of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on
whether the item confiscated was the same specimen

38
examined and established to be the prohibited drug. As we
39
discussed in People v. Orteza, where we deemed the
prosecution to have failed in establishing all the elements
necessary for conviction of appellant for illegal sale of
shabu·
„First, there appears nothing in the record showing that police

officers complied with the proper procedure in the custody of seized
drugs as specified in People v. Lim, i.e., any apprehending team
having initial control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia should,
immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically
inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused, if
there be any, and or his representative, who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The
failure of the agents to comply with the requirement raises doubt
whether what was submitted for laboratory examination and
presented in court was actually recovered from appellant. It negates
the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed
by the police officers.
In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the
confiscated marijuana immediately after the apprehension of the
accused, the Court held that the deviation from the standard
procedure in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the
origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that
the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti.
The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the
Narcom operatives failed to place markings on the seized marijuana
at the time the accused was arrested and to observe the procedure
and take custody of the drug.
More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the
material inconsistencies with regard to when and where the
markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the
seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the
corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the accused due to the
prosecutionÊs failure to indubitably show the identity of the shabu.‰
_______________
38 See People v. Ong, supra at p. 488.

39 G.R. No. 173051, 31 July 2007, 528 SCRA 750.
630

Valdez vs. People
In the case at bar, after the arrest of petitioner by the

barangay tanod, the records only show that he was taken to
the house of the barangay captain 40
and thereafter to the
police station. The Joint Affidavit executed by the tanod
merely states that they confiscated the marijuana leaves
which they brought to the police 41
station together with
petitioner. Likewise, the Receipt issued by the Aringay
Police Station merely acknowledged receipt of the suspected
drugs supposedly confiscated from petitioner.
Not only did the three tanod contradict each other on the
matter of when petitionerÊs bag was opened, they also gave
conflicting testimony on who actually opened the same. The
prosecution, despite these material inconsistencies,
neglected to explain the discrepancies. Even more damning
to its cause was the admission by Laya, the forensic chemist,
that he did not know how the specimen was taken from
petitioner, how it reached the police authorities or whose
marking was on the cellophane wrapping of the marijuana.
The non-presentation, without justifiable reason, of the
police officers who conducted the inquest proceedings and
marked the seized drugs, if such was the case, is fatal to the
case. Plainly, the prosecution neglected to establish the
crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized marijuana
leaves from the time they were first allegedly discovered
until they were brought for examination by Laya.
The Court of Appeals found as irrelevant the failure of
the prosecution to establish the chain of custody over the
seized marijuana as such „[f]inds prominence only when 42
the
existence of the seized prohibited drug is denied.‰ We
cannot agree.
To buttress its ratiocination, the appellate court
narrowed on petitionerÊs testimony that the marijuana was
taken from
_______________
40 Records, p. 2.
41 Id., at p. 5.
42 Rollo, p. 87.
631
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 631

Valdez vs. People
43
his bag, without taking the statement in full context.
Contrary to the Court of AppealsÊ findings, although
petitioner testified that the marijuana was taken from his 44
bag, he consistently denied ownership thereof.
Furthermore, it defies logic to require a denial of ownership
of the seized drugs before the principle of chain of custody
comes into play.
The onus of proving culpability in criminal indictment
falls upon the State. In conjunction with this, law enforcers
and public officers alike have the corollary duty to preserve
the chain of custody over the seized drugs. The chain of
evidence is constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage,
labeling and recording, and must exist from the time the
evidence is found until the time it is offered in evidence.
Each person who takes possession of the specimen is duty-
bound to detail how it was cared for, safeguarded and
preserved while in his or her control to prevent alteration or
replacement while in custody. This guarantee of the
integrity of the evidence to be used against an accused goes
to the very heart of his fundamental rights.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty invoked by the prosecution and relied upon by
the courts a quo cannot by itself overcome the presumption
of innocence
45
nor constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Among the constitutional rights enjoyed by an
accused, the most primordial yet often disregarded is the
presumption of innocence. This elementary principle
accords every accused the right to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Thus,
the burden of proving the guilt of the accused rests upon the
prosecution.
_______________
43 Id.
44 TSN, 17 March 2004, pp. 11-13.
45 People v. Sevilla, 394 Phil. 125, 158; 339 SCRA 625, 652 (2000),
citing People v. Pagaura, 267 SCRA 17 (1997), People v. De los Santos,

314 SCRA 303 (1999).
632

Valdez vs. People
Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and

uncorroborated. Nevertheless, this „[c]annot be used to
advance the cause of the prosecution as its evidence must
stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to 46
draw strength from the weakness of the defense.‰
Moreover, where the circumstances are shown to yield two
or more inferences, one inconsistent with the presumption of
innocence and the other compatible with the finding of guilt,
the court must acquit the accused for the reason that the
evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty
47
and is
inadequate to support a judgment of conviction.
Drug addiction has been48
invariably denounced as „an
especially vicious crime,‰ and „one of the 49most pernicious
evils that has ever crept into our society,‰ for those who
become addicted to it „not only slide into the ranks of the
living dead, what is worse, they become a grave 50menace to
the safety of law-abiding members of society,‰ whereas 51
„peddlers of drugs are actually agents of destruction.‰
Indeed, the havoc created by the ruinous effects of
prohibited drugs on the moral fiber of society cannot be
underscored enough. However, in the rightfully vigorous
campaign of the government to eradicate the hazards of
drug use and drug trafficking, it cannot be permitted to run
roughshod over an accusedÊs right to be presumed innocent
until proven to the contrary and neither can it shirk
_______________
46 People v. Santos, Jr., G.R. No. 175593, 17 October 2007, 536 SCRA
489, citing People v. Samson, 421 Phil. 104; 369 SCRA 229 (2001).
47 People v. Sapal, 385 Phil. 109, 126; 328 SCRA 417, 432 (2000), citing
People v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 126998, 14 September 1999, 314 SCRA
303 and People v. Fider, 223 SCRA 117 (1993).
48 Office of the Court Administrator v. Librado, 329 Phil. 432, 435;
260 SCRA 624, 628 (1996), citing People v. Nario, 224 SCRA 647 (1993).
49 Id., citing People v. Policarpio, 158 SCRA 85 (1988).
50 Id., at p. 436, citing People v. Bati, 189 SCRA 95 (1990), citing
People v. Lamug, 172 SCRA 349 (1989).
51 Id., citing People v. Policarpio, supra.
633
VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 633

Valdez vs. People
from its corollary obligation to establish such guilt beyond

reasonable doubt.
In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly
fails to overcome the presumption of innocence which
petitioner enjoys. The failure of the prosecution to prove all
the elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt must
perforce result in petitionerÊs exoneration from criminal
liability.
IV.
A final word. We find it fitting to take this occasion to

remind the courts to exercise the highest degree of diligence
and prudence in deliberating upon the guilt of accused
persons brought before them, especially in light of the
fundamental rights at stake. Here, we note that the courts a
quo neglected to give more serious consideration to certain
material issues in the determination of the merits of the
case. We are not oblivious to the fact that in some instances,
law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to
extract information or even harass civilians. Accordingly,
courts are dutybound to be „[e]xtra vigilant in trying drug
cases lest an innocent person be made to suffer the
52
unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.‰ In the same
vein, let this serve as an admonition to police officers and
public officials alike to perform their mandated duties with
commitment to the highest degree of diligence,
righteousness and respect for the law.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez is
ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. The Director of the

Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate
release of petitioner, unless the latter is being lawfully held
for another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of his
release, or
_______________
52 People v. Sevilla, 394 Phil. 125, 159; 339 SCRA 625, 653 (2000),
citing People v. Pagaura, supra. See also People v. Sapal, supra.
634

LCK Industries Inc. vs. Planters Development Bank
the reasons for his continued confinement, within ten (10)

days from notice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio, Carpio-Morales

and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Assailed decision reversed and set aside. Petitioner

Arsenio Vergara Valdez acquitted.
Notes.·When the prosecution itself says it failed to

prove a personÊs guilt, the Court should listen and listen
hard, lest it locks up a person who has done no wrong.
(People vs. Que Ming Kha alias Alfonso Go, 382 SCRA 480
[2002])
The required probable cause that will justify a
warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a fixed
formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.
(Caballes vs. Court of Appeals, 373 SCRA 221 [2002])
The person who is the subject of the search must be the
one who should give the consent to a search, not anybody
else present. (People vs. Asis, 391 SCRA 108 [2002])
··o0o··
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 538 11/30/13 9:15 PM

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 611

ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE

Searches and Seizures; Warrantless Arrests; The legality of an

612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Valdez vs. People

jurisdiction of the court over his person. PetitionerÊs warrantless

Same; Same; Arrests in Flagrante Delicto; Elements.·For the

Same; Criminal Law; Evidence; Flight; Flight alone is not a

Same; Same; Stop-and-Frisk Searches; A stop-and-frisk

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 613

Valdez vs. People

him.·The supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they

Same; Same; Waivers; A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest

Same; Same; Consented Searches; Burden of Proof; The consent

inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence; It is

614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Valdez vs. People

tarily given.·In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Chain of Custody; The

corpus delicti of the crime; There can be no crime of illegal

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 615

Valdez vs. People

be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when nagging

Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; Presumption of

Regularity; The presumption of regularity in the performance of

Same; Same; Same; The prosecutionÊs evidence must stand or

616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Valdez vs. People

Same; Same; Same; In the rightfully vigorous campaign of the

invariably denounced as „an especially vicious crime,‰ and „one of

Same; Same; Courts; Courts are duty-bound to be extra vigilant

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 617

Valdez vs. People

respect for the law.

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure

1 1987 Const., Art. III, Sec. 2.

618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On 26 June 2003, petitioner was charged with violation of7

„That on or about the 17th day of March 2003, in the Municipality

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter,

5 Entitled Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 619

observed that petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them,

9 TSN, 24 February 2004, pp. 3-5, 7, 11-12. See also Records, p. 2.

620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

on the12inside of the cellophane wrapping the marijuana

12 TSN, 16 March 2004, pp. 4-7.

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 621

him and sentenced him to suffer indeterminate

„That the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the

In this appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts

Well-settled is the rule that the findings of the trial court

15 Rollo, pp. 44-45.

622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

showing that some facts and circumstances of weight or

At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can

Petitioner maintains, in a nutshell, that after he was

VOL. 538, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 623

bag, he was simply herded without explanation and taken to

„Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.·A peace officer or

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has