THE COURT SHOULD REVISIT ITS DECISION IN G.R.

L-11959
I. When the issue of administrative pardon was raised in Arturo Pascual vs.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, in G.R. L-11959, in 1959, the Court failed to
recognize the constitutional power of the President to grant pardon in
administrative cases.
It was not until Llamas vs. Orbos, G.R. 99031, on October 15, 1991 that the Court
finally recognized that presidential power. Yet the constitutional provisions from
which the Court based its decision are present in both the 1935 and 1987
Constitutions.
The failure of the Court to recognize that presidential power of pardon resulted in
its invocation of the condonation doctrine in addressing the issue of pardon in
administrative cases.
II. The Court used the condonation doctrine in the absence of prior conviction.
Using the condonation doctrine from American jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
quoted as follows:
“The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present
term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect
their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed
that they did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is
not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the
will of the people.”
The key element in the condonation doctrine is prior conviction – “if he had been
guilty of any.”
It has been a widely held judicial principle that pardon can be given only after final
conviction.
This principle is consistent with the language of both the 1935 and 1987
Constitutions declaring that conviction is a prerequisite of pardon.
Whereas the 1935 Constitution referred only to pardon “after conviction”, the 1987
Constitution clarified it to “after conviction by final judgment.” In Llamas vs.
Orbos, the Court also emphasized that pardon shall be granted “after conviction by
final judgment.” This makes more sense because a preliminary conviction can be
appealed and can be reversed on appeal.
In Arturo Pascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija the Court erred by using the
condonation doctrine although Arturo Pascual had not yet been convicted by final
judgment.
III. The Court used a weak interpretation of the condonation doctrine that is
inconsistent with our stated national principles and policies.
The Supreme Court, itself, appeared to be uncertain on the condonation doctrine
when it wrote:
“We now come to the main issue of the controversy — the legality of disciplining
an elective municipal official for a wrongful act committed by him during his
immediately preceding term of office.”
“In the absence of any precedent in this jurisdiction, we have resorted to American
authorities. We found that cases on the matter are conflicting due in part, probably,
to differences in statutes and constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a
divergence of views with respect to the question of whether the subsequent election
or appointment condones the prior misconduct. “
The court noted that there was no “precedent”, that “cases on the matter are
conflicting”, and that there was a “divergence of views”. Yet the Court adapted a
view with dubious character as opposed to a view that is on stronger ground and is
more consistent with our national principles and policies.
An analysis of the condonation doctrine made by the Louisiana Law Review,
Volume 4, Number 1, November 1941, states:
“A(n) issue presented was whether or not a public official might be removed for
misconduct in a prior term. Although the decisions in other states conflict on this
question, Louisiana has consistently held to the view which permits removal for
misconduct in a prior term. Some courts reason that by re-election the public has
condoned the fault of the official, whether such shortcomings were known or
not; while other tribunals reach the dubious conclusion that permitting a public
official to be removed for his misconduct in a prior term is depriving the citizenry
of its sacred right of selecting its own officials; and still other courts treat each
term as a separate entity in itself, permitting removal only for acts done within the
current term.”
“The most serious objection to the theory of condonation of past offenses lies in the
ever present possibility that re-election may not constitute condonation either
because the facts were not known or because the election was corrupt.”