Marcel Mitrasca-Moldova - A Romanian Province Under Russian Rule - Diplomatic History From The Archives of The Great Powers-Algora Publishing (2002) PDF

MOLDOVA: A ROMANIAN PROVINCE
UNDER RUSSIAN RULE
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY FROM THE ARCHIVES OF

THE GREAT POWERS
MARCEL MITRASCA
Algora Publishing
New York
© 2002 by Algora Publishing.
All Rights Reserved.
www.algora.com
No portion of this book (beyond what is permitted by

Sections 107 or 108 of the United States Copyright Act of 1976)
may be reproduced by any process, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted in any form, or by any means, without the
express written permission of the publisher.
ISBN: 1-892941-86-4 (softcover)
ISBN: 1-892941-87-2 (hardcover)
Library of Congress Card Number: 2002-005746
Mitrasca, Marcel.
Moldova : a Romanian province under Russian rule : diplomatic history
from the archives of the great powers / by Marcel Mitrasca.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-892941-86-4 (alk. paper)
1. World War, 1914-1918—Territorial questions—Bessarabia (Moldova
and Ukraine) 2. Romania—Foreign relations—1914-1944. 3. Allied and
Associated Powers (1914-1920) Treaties, etc. 4. Bessarabia (Moldova and
Ukraine)—History—20th century. I. Title.
D651.B4 M55 2002
940.3'22—dc21
2002005746
Front Cover: Romania (1918—1940)
Printed in the United States

CONTENTS
CHRONOLOGIES:
1. Bessarabia until 1919 1
2. The Paris Peace Conference and the Bessarabian Question 3
3. The Bessarabian Question since 1920 6
INTRODUCTION 9
Opportunity from Crisis 9
Strategies 10
Terminology 10
Author’s Purpose 12
Resources 14
PART ONE - BESSARABIA AND THE UNION WITH ROMANIA 17
CHAPTER 1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BESSARABIA 17
CHAPTER 2. THE MAKING OF THE UNION 27

Background 27
Making the Union 31
Delays in Romania’s Ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty 39
The Aftermath of the Union 40
Comments 43
Annex:
Decree of the People’s Commissars, Breaking Relations 46
CHAPTER 3. THE MAKING OF THE BESSARABIAN TREATY 53

Shifting Positions in the First World War 54
Success at the Paris Peace Conference 60
The Paris Peace Conference and the Bessarabian Question 66
A Chronology 68
Annexes:
Bratianu and the Council of Ten, February 10, 1919 85
Bratianu and the Council of Five, July 2, 1919 86
The Council of Ten and the Bessarabian Question, August 1, 1919 89
The Romanian Action in Bessarabia at the Council of Heads of Delegations,
October 11, 1919 92
Al. Vaida-Voevod and the International Council of Premiers 93
The declaration adopted by the Representatives of The Principal Allied
Powers on March 3, 1920 96
PART TWO - THE GREAT POWERS AND THE BESSARABIAN TREATY 105
CHAPTER 4. THE SOVIET UNION 105

The Bessarabian Question and Soviet-Romanian Relations 105
Bilateral Relations Before and During the Paris Peace Conference 107
The Warsaw and Vienna Conferences 114
From 1924 to the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations 123
From the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations to the 1940 Crisis 132
The White Russians and the Bessarabian Question 142
Annex: Memorandum of the Bessarabian Delegates, August 1919 153
CHAPTER 5. THE UNITED KINGDOM 167

During the Paris Peace Conference 167
The UK’s Role in the Signing of the Bessarabian Treaty 170
Motivation 170
Reasons 172
Negotiations 174
The Ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty 186
The UK Position after the Ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty 190
Annex: Report, Frank Rattigan (Bucharest) to Lord Curzon 197
CHAPTER 6. FRANCE 203

Romanian-French Relations during the Peace Conference 205
The French Ratification 214
Conclusion — The French Position after Ratification 226
CHAPTER 7. ITALY 237

Romanian-Italian Relations Before and During the Peace Conference 237
The Ratification Question. First Phase, 1920-1926 240
The Ratification Question. Second Phase, 1926-1927 251
The Aftermath of the Ratification 260
CHAPTER 8. JAPAN 269

First Period: 1920 to 1927 270
Signing the Bessarabian Treaty 270
The “Passive” Period 272
The Ishii Note 276
The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between Japan and the Soviet
Union 280
From the Exchange of Letters to the Italian Ratification 287
Second Period: 1927 to 1932 289
The Ratification Question and the Fishery Negotiations 292
The Romanian Campaign for Ratification during the Ministry of Ion Aurel
Vassiliu 300
The Romanian Campaign for the Ratification during the Ministry of G.G.
Stoicescu 309
The Nakamura Interpellations 310
Charles Davila and the Japanese Ratification Question 312
The End of the Romanian Campaign for the Japanese Ratification 314
The Third Period: 1933 to 1940 316
The Mass Media and the Japanese Ratification Question 321
The Romanian Press 321
The Japanese Press 326
Conclusions 331
Romania’s Diplomatic Actions 331
Japan’s Relations with the Soviet Union 334
CHAPTER 9. THE UNITED STATES 345

Romanian-US relations during the War 346
Romanian-US relations during the Peace Conference 352
The Russian Question and the US Position on Bessarabia 361
Romanian-US Relations during the 1920s 366
Davila’s Campaign for US Recognition of the Bessarabian Union 372
Conclusions 389
PART THREE - TO CONCLUDE. . . 401
CHAPTER 10. SUMMARY 401

The Great Powers and the Bessarabian Treaty 401
Consequences of the Failure to Bring the Treaty to Force 411
APPENDICES
The Bessarabian Treaty of October 28, 1920 417
Bibliography 421
Index 437
IX
Acknowledgements
Many persons and institutions kindly supported me in my work, and I would like to
express my gratitude.
First among them is the Japanese Ministry of Education, who provided me the
necessary scholarship funding to conduct my research.
Dumitru Preda, the director of the Romanian Foreign Ministry Archives, was
unfailingly helpful both in granting me access to the files and in giving me advice in my
work, and his distinguished colleagues in the Archives were gracious in their support for
my research.
Mrs. Georgeta Anghel and her colleagues at the Romanian National Archives gave
me access to the microfilm collections of documents dealing with Romania that had been
identified in the French and British Archives.
I also enjoyed the privilege and pleasure of conducting research in the Archives of
the Japanese Foreign Minister in Tokyo, where I was accorded access to all the files that
were of interest to me and received guidance whenever needed.
I have received invaluable advice from my professors in Aoyama Gakuin University
of Tokyo, whom it is a great pleasure to thank here: Shigeki Hakamada, and Akio
Watanabe. The first is among the best-known Japanese scholars in Russian affairs and
was of great help to me especially for the chapters regarding the Soviet-Romanian and
Japanese-Romanian relations. Professor Akio Watanabe, a scholar in international
relations, pinpointed the correlations between the Bessarabian Treaty and the
international context. Taizo Watanabe, a former high-ranked Japanese diplomat, was
kind enough to give me insights into the workings of Japanese diplomacy.
Also, my deepest gratitude goes to my professors at Babes-Bolyai University of Cluj
Napoca for their professional guidance and advice regarding not only the present work
but also, generally speaking, my preparation as a historian. Among them Nicolae Bocsan,
Vasile Vesa, Marcel Stirban, George Cipaianu, Liviu Tarau, Nicolae Edroiu and Alexandru
Diaconescu, to mention only a few. Professor Gheorghe Iancu of the same university
played an important role in the making of the present book.
I would like to thank Miss Keiko Ito for her help in translating the Japanese
documents, and Algora Publishing for skilful editorial aid.
Last, but not least, great thanks to my wife, Delia, for her invaluable assistance in
every phase of the work.
Marcel Mitrasca
Japan, April 22, 2002
CHRONOLOGIES
Bessarabia until 1919
DATE (parens. = Old Calendar) EVENT

AD 101-102, 105-106 Roman Empire wars against Dacia
271-274 Evacuation of Dacia by the Roman Empire
14th century The making of the Romanian Principalities
1511 Moldavian first ahidnames
1775, May 7 (18) Annexation of Bukovina by the Habsburg Empire
1812, May 16 (28) Annexation of Bessarabia by Russia
1818, April 29 (May 11) Bessarabian autonomy proclaimed
1828, Feb. 29 (March 12) Revocation of Bessarabia autonomy
Paris Peace Treaty gives southern Bessarabia back
1856, March 18 (30)
to Moldavia
1859, Jan. 24 (Feb. 5) Unification of Moldavia and Wallachia
Transformation of the Bessarabian oblast into a
1871
Gubernija within Russia
1877, April 4 (16) Russo-Romanian Convention signed in Bucharest
1877, May 9 (21) Romanian declaration of independence
Berlin Peace Treaty gives southern Bessarabia
1878, July 1 (13)
back to Russia
1883, October 18 (30) Romania joins the Triple Alliance
Bucharest Peace Treaty – Romania acquires the
1913, July 28 (Aug 10)
Cadrilater from Bulgaria
The Revolution in Russia – first nationalistic
1905-1906
manifestations in Bessarabia
Festivities all over Bessarabia celebrating 100
1912
years since her annexation
1914, July 22 (Aug. 3) Romania proclaims her neutrality
1914, Sept. 18 (Oct. 1) Convention between Romania and Russia
Convention between Romania and Entente re-
1916, Aug. 4 (17) garding Romania’s entry into war in exchange for
territorial compensations
1916, Aug. 14 (27) Romania declares war on Austria-Hungary
1917, March 12 (25) Formation of a workers’ soviet in Chisinau
1917, March 20 (April 2) The making of the Moldavian National Party
Gathering in Odessa of Moldavian officers and
1917, May 1 (14)
soldiers
1917, May 21-24 (June 3-6) First Congress of Bessarabian peasants
1917, Aug. 27-31 (Sept. 9-11) Second Congress of Bessarabian peasants
1917, Sept. 8-14 (21-27) Kiev, Congress of the peoples living in Russia
Bessarabian Congress of workers’ and soldiers’
1917, Sept. 20-25 (Oct. 3-8)
soviets
1917, Oct. 20-27 (Nov. 2-9) Congress of the Moldavian soldiers
1917, Oct. 25 (Nov. 7) October Revolution in Russia
(Continued)
Bessarabia until 1919 (continuation)
Declaration regarding the rights of the peoples living

1917, Nov. 2 (15)
in Russia
1917, Nov. 21 (Dec. 4) First session of the Sfatul Tserii
1917, Nov. 22 (Dec. 5) Brest Armistice between Russia and Germany
Focsani Armistice between Romania and the Central
1917, Nov. 26 (Dec. 9)
Powers
1917 Nov. 28-30 (Dec. 11-13) Conference of Bolsheviks on the Romanian front
1917, Dec. 2 (15h) Proclamation of the Autonomous Moldavian Republic
1917, Dec. 10-23 (Dec. 23-Jan. 5) Second Congress of the Rumcerod
1917, Dec. 28 (1918, Jan. 10) Arrival in Chisinau of Rumcerod’s Frontotdel
The Bolsheviks arrest the Romanian Minister to
1917, Dec. 31 (1918, Jan. 13)
Russia, Constantin Diamandi
1918, Jan. 1 (14) Attempted Soviet coup in Bessarabia
Written guarantee by the Allied representatives in
1918, Jan. 2 (15) Jassy for the Bessarabian authorities regarding Ro-
manian military intervention
Romanian government decides to send Transylva-
1918, Jan. 6 (19)
nian troops to Bessarabia
1918, Jan. 7 (20) The Bolshevik “insurrection” starts in Chisinau
1918, Jan. 10 (23) Romanian army advances into Bessarabia
1918, Jan. 13 (26) The Bolsheviks break off relations with Romania
Declaration of independence of the Moldavian
1918, Jan. 24 (Feb. 5)
Republic
1918, Jan. 27 (Feb. 9) Ukrainian Rada signs peace with the Central Powers
Brest Litovsk Peace Treaty between Russia and the
1918, Feb. 18 (March 3)
Central Powers
1918, Feb. 20-24 (March 5-9) Averescu-Rakovsky Treaty
Buftea, preliminary Peace Treaty between Romania
1918, Feb. 20 (March 5)
and the Central Powers
Sfatul Tserii proclaims the conditioned Union of Bes-
1918, March 27 (April 9)
sarabia with Romania
King Ferdinand ratifies the Union of Bessarabia with
1918, April 4 (17)
Romania
Bolshevik Note of Protest against the incorporation
1918, April 5 (18)
of Bessarabia into Romania
Bucharest Peace Treaty between Romania and the
1918, April 24 (May 7)
Central Powers
President Woodrow Wilson analyzes the Bessara-
1918, April 18 (May 1)
bian issue for the first time
Romania decides to re-enter the war on the Entente’s
1918, Oct. 28 (Nov. 10)
side
1918, Nov. 15 (28) The Union of Bukovina with Romania
The Union of Transylvania, Banat, and Crisana with
1918, Nov. 18 (Dec. 1)
Romania
Sfatul Tserii proclaims the unconditional union of
1918, Nov. 27 (Dec. 10)
Bessarabia with Romania
The Romanian Parliament ratifies the Union of
1919, Dec. 20
Bessarabia with Romania
The Paris Peace Conference and the Bessarabian Question
DATE COMMISSION TOPIC

Bessarabian representation at the Prince’s
Jan. 27, 1919 Council of Ten
Island (Prinkipo Conference)
Presentation of Romanian territorial
Feb. 1 Council of Ten
claims
During its first meeting, the Commissions
Commission on Romanian
Feb. 8 considers that Bessarabia is Romanian
and Yugo-Slav Affairs
territory on of Bessarabia
Commission on Romanian Draft Article on Bessarabia – it should
March 5
and Yugo-Slav Affairs belong to Romania
Commission on Romanian Decision recommending the attachment
March 11
and Yugo-Slav Affairs of Bessarabia to Romania
Commission on Romanian
March 28 Final meeting of the Commission
and Yugo-Slav Affairs
Commission on Romanian The final report of the Commission is
April 6
and Yugo-Slav Affairs sent to the Supreme Council
Meeting between President Wilson and
April 11 Paris
Queen Marie of Romania
Council of Foreign Minis- American opposition to the attribution of
May 8
ters Bessarabia to Romania
Council of Foreign Minis- It is decided to postpone a solution to the
May 16
ters Bessarabian question
The “Bratianu guarantees” regarding the
May 17 Paris US investments in the exploitation of
Romanian oil
Bessarabian question in the dispatch sent
May 27 Council of Four
to Admiral Kolchak
Notes of Protest and ultimatums sent by
the Bolsheviks to Romania, demanding
May-June Bolshevik Government
the withdrawal of Romanian troops from
Bessarabia
Council of Heads of Delega- Bessarabia on the agenda for future meet-
July 1
tions ings
Question of Bessarabia – the hearing of
Council of Heads of Dele-
the Report prepared by the Territorial
July 2 gations of the Five Great
Commission and of the Russian and Ro-
Powers
manian representatives
Meetings of the US Com-
July 23 Elections to be held in Bessarabia
missioners
Meeting of the Steering Dobrudja and Bessarabia – a possible ter-
July 26
Committee ritorial exchange
Council of Heads of Delega-
Aug. 1 Debate over the Bessarabian Question
tions
Aug. 13 The European borders of Russia
missioners
Sept. 3 The frontier of Bulgaria in Dobrudja
missioners
Council of Heads of delega-
Sept. 5 Dobrudja and Bessarabia
tions
(Continued)
The Paris Peace Conference and the Bessarabian Question (continuation)
Date Commission Topic

Council of Heads of Italian proposal for a territorial exchange Do-
Sept. 8
Delegations brudja for Bessarabia
Meetings of the US The question of Romanian elections to be held
Oct. 8
Commissioners in Bessarabia
Council of Heads of The question of Romanian elections to be held
Oct. 10
Delegations in Bessarabia
Council of Heads of The question of Roumanian elections in Bessara-
Oct. 11
Delegations bia
Council of Heads of US opposition to settling the Bessarabian ques-
Oct. 30
Delegations tion.
Council of Heads of British insistence that Bessarabia should go to
Nov. 11
Delegations Romania
Council of Heads of French attempt to bring the Bessarabian ques-
Nov. 13
Delegations tion into the Council’s debate
The International Romanian affairs – the hearing of the Romanian
Jan. 20, 1920
Council of Premiers Prime Minister, Al. Vaida-Voevod
The International The Council declares itself in favor of Bessara-
March 3
Council of Premiers bia’s union with Romania
The Commission prepared a final Draft Treaty
Commission on Ro- between the Principal Allied and Associated
April 15
manian Affairs Powers and Romania concerning Bessarabia
(with 9 articles)
Secretariat General of The Secretariat General asked for the American
April 15
the Peace Conference opinion regarding the draft Bessarabian Treaty
Negotiations Titulescu – Alan Leeper regarding
April London
the Draft Treaty
British proposal to send the draft Treaty to the
April 25 Supreme Council
Conference of Ambassadors for final discussions
Negotiations between Frank Rattigan (British
April - May Bucharest minister) and the Romanian government regard-
ing the Bessarabian Treaty
Negotiations Titulescu-Laroche regarding the
June 7 Paris
draft Treaty
Conference of The US refuse to join in the signing of the Bes-
June 19
Ambassadors sarabian Treaty
The Romanian Government agrees with the
June 28 Bucharest British and French conditions for the signing of
the Bessarabian Treaty
The British government asks for the ratification
of the Minorities Treaty before the signing of the
Aug. London
Bessarabian Treaty – Romania does so in a mat-
ter of days
Aug. 10 Washington The Colby Note on Russia
French attempts to postpone indefinitely the
Aug. 18 and
Paris signing of the Bessarabian Treaty, blocked by
Sept. 16
the British.
Increasing British and Romanian pressure on
Sept. Paris
France for the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty
(Continued)
The Paris Peace Conference and the Bessarabian Question (continuation)
Date Commission Topic

Exchange of notes between Romania and France
(Great Britain) regarding the payment by the
Sept. 17
Paris Romanian government of increased compensa-
(Oct. 27)
tions to the French (British) landowners expro-
priated in Bessarabia
Conference of British pressure for urging the signing of the
Sept. 29
Ambassadors Bessarabian Treaty
Council of Heads of Italian proposal for a territorial exchange, Do-
Sept. 8
Delegations brudja for Bessarabia
Meetings of the US British pressure for urging the signing of the
Oct. 8
Commissioners Bessarabian Treaty
Increased British pressure for signing of the Bes-
Conference of sarabian Treaty – Romania is asked by the Con-
Oct. 2
Ambassadors ference to sign two more treaties as a precondi-
tion to the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty
The Italians announced their readiness to sign
Oct. 5 Bucharest
the Bessarabian Treaty
Conference of The US Ambassador expressed his view with
Oct. 8
Ambassadors regard to the Bessarabian Treaty.
Conference of The Romanian reply to the Draft Treaty regard-
Oct. 11
Ambassadors ing Bessarabia
Meetings Titulescu – Leeper regarding the Ro-
Oct. 18 London manian proposed modifications to the Draft
Treaty
Meeting Titulescu – Earl Curzon, pressure for
Oct. 20 London
the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty
Oct. 21 London Meeting Take Ionescu – Earl Curzon
Conference of The last modifications to the Draft Treaty are
Oct. 27
Ambassadors agreed upon
Conference of
Oct. 28 The signing of the Bessarabian Treaty
Ambassadors
The Bessarabian Question since 1920
Feb. 1920 Copenhagen, Romanian-Bolshevik negotiations
Oct. 28, 1920 The signing of the Bessarabian Treaty
British insistence for the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty, argu-
June 8, 1921 ing that they have already ratified the Treaty, during the meeting of
the Conference of Ambassadors
Sept. – Oct. 1921 Russian-Romanian Conference in Warsaw
Memorandums by the Bessarabian Russians to the League of Na-
Sept. – Oct. 1921
tions regarding the rights of the Russian minority in Bessarabia
Romanian Foreign Ministry’s first attempt to ratify the Bessarabian
Nov.-Dec. 1921
Treaty
Feb. 1922 Romania decides to close her Legation in Japan
Intensified British pressure for the ratification of the Bessarabian
Feb. 1922
Treaty
The French Government sends the Bessarabian Treaty to the Parlia-
March 14, 1922
ment for ratification
Conference of the Ambassadors (Paris) – the British and French
March 15, 1922 representatives asked Italy and Japan to take the necessary steps for
the ratification
April 3, 1922 The Romanian Senate ratifies the Bessarabian Treaty
April 7, 1922 The Romanian Chamber ratifies the Bessarabian Treaty
King Ferdinand signs the Law for the ratification of the Bessarabian
April 13, 1922
Treaty
Great Britain deposits the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty (in
April 14, 1922
Paris)
Romania deposits the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty (in
May 19, 1922
Paris)
April-May 1922 The Genoa Conference
French Parliamentary Commission on Foreign Affairs debates the
July 7, 1922
Project of Law for the Ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty
Note by the Romanian government to the British and French Lega-
Dec. 14, 1922 tions regarding the payment of indemnities to the British and
French landowners expropriated in Bessarabia
Talks between Cicerin and C. Diamandi regarding a possible solu-
Dec. 19, 1922
tion of the pending questions in the bilateral relations
Jan. – March Romanian pressure for the French ratification (negotiations Victor
1923 Antonescu – Peretti dela Rocca)
March-April Romanian-US negotiations regarding the Bessarabian immigration
1923 quota
The US Government decides to incorporate the Bessarabian immi-
June 1923 gration quota into the general Russian quota and to administer it
from Riga
Internal memorandum of the Romanian Foreign Ministry urging for
Oct. 1923
pressure in order to bring the Bessarabian Treaty into force
British pressure on France, Italy and Japan for the ratification of the
Nov. -Dec. 1923
Bessarabian Treaty
Japanese government states that it considers the Bessarabian treaty
Nov. 1923 ratification a European matter and, consequently, that it has no in-
tention to ratify at that moment
(Continued)
The Bessarabian Question since 1920 (continuation)
Romanian-Soviet Agreement regarding navigation on Dniestr and

Nov. 20, 1923
border incidents
The French government decides to increase the pressure on the Par-
Nov. 1923
liament for the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty.
Worsening US-Romanian relations due to the US policy on immigra-
Jan. -July 1924
tion and to Romanian economic policy
Italy recognizes the Soviet Government – secret verbal agreement on
Feb. 1924
Bessarabia
March 11, 1924 French Chamber ratifies the Bessarabian Treaty
March 16, 1924 French Senate ratifies the Bessarabian Treaty
Mussolini provokes a diplomatic incident with Romania by suggest-
March 1924
ing the postponement of the Romanian Royal Family’s visit to Italy
March-April 1924 Soviet-Romanian Conference in Vienna
April 2-4, 1924 Prince Naruhiko Higashi Kuni visits Romania
May 8, 1924 France deposits the instruments for the ratification
May 31, 1924 The Ishii Note
May 1924 Verbal statement by Yoshizawa (to Karakhan) on ratification
The ratification question is debated during the Yoshizawa-Karakhan
Aug. -Oct. 1924
negotiations
Romanian attempt to improve relations with Italy (the Constan-
Sept 1924
tinescu mission)
Oct. 12, 1924 The establishment of the Moldavian Autonomous SSR
Controversy in Italian press regarding the ratification of the Bessara-
Oct. - Nov. 1924
bian Treaty
The establishment of Soviets-Japanese diplomatic relations – the
Jan. 20, 1925
Karakhan–Yoshizawa exchange of letters on the ratification question
Feb. – March Worsening Italian-Romanian relations as a result of a new peak in
1925 the press campaign pro and contra ratification
Oct. 1925 Kopp-Shidehara negotiations in Tokyo regarding the ratification
Feb. 1926 Italia suggests to Romania the signing of a bilateral Alliance Treaty
June 10, 1926 The French-Romanian Friendship Treaty
Sept. 1926 Romanian-Italian negotiations for the ratification
Sept. 16, 1926 The Romanian-Italian Friendship Treaty
Oct. – Nov. 1926 Improvement in the Romanian-Italian relations
March 8, 1927 Italian Chamber ratifies the Bessarabian Treaty
King Victor Emmanuel and Mussolini sign the Royal Decree-Law for
March 9, 1927
the ratification
The Debuchi-Bessedovskii negotiations on the ratification resulting
March 1927
in a verbal agreement for the postponement of the ratification
April 3, 1927 The Italian Senate ratifies the Bessarabian Treaty
(Continued)
The Bessarabian Question since 1920 (continuation)
May 23, 1927 Italy deposits the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty
Soviet concessions to the Japanese regarding the Fishery talks going
May-July 1927 on in Moscow, in exchange for the postponement of the Japanese
ratification
Dec. 1927-Jan.
Romanian-Japanese negotiations for the ratification (Tokyo)
1928
Aug. 1928 Romania signs the Briand-Kelloq Pact
Feb. 1929 The “Litvinov Protocol”
Dec. 1929 Tokyo, Romanian-Japanese negotiations for ratification
The start of the Davila campaign for the US de facto recognition of
Feb. 1930
Bessarabia’s union
Feb. 3, 1931 The second Nakamura interpellation on Bessarabia
The US Government decides to take the Bessarabian immigration
June 1931 quota out of the Russian quota and to move its administration from
Riga to Bucharest
Charles Davila suggests a new approach in order to obtain the Japa-
July 1931
nese ratification
Jan. 1932 Riga, Romanian-Soviet negotiation for a non-aggression treaty
New round of Romanian-US negotiations in Washington regarding
Feb.-May 1932
the US de facto recognition of Bessarabia’s Union
Sept. 1932 Geneva, Romanian-Soviet negotiation for a non-aggression treaty
1932 The end of the Romanian campaign for the Japanese ratification
March 1933 Davila starts once more the campaign for the US de facto recognition
By the Presidential Proclamation establishing immigration quotas for
June 16, 1933 the coming year the Bessarabian quota area has been merged with the
Romanian quota area
Romanian-US Draft Declaration regarding the implications of the
July 1933
decision on the Bessarabian immigration quota
July 1933 Convention for the Definition of Aggression
The establishment of diplomatic relations between Romania and the
June 9, 1934
Soviet Union
The first Romanian Minister to the Soviet Union presents his letters
Dec. 1934
of accreditation
Feb. 8, 1935 Railway Convention between Romania and the Soviets
Montreaux, the Titulescu-Litvinov Draft of a Mutual Assistance Pact
July 21, 1936
between Romania and the Soviet Union
Aug. 29, 1936 Titulescu’s dismissal as Romanian Foreign Minister
Feb. 15 and Mamoru Shigemitsu suggests to the Romanians that Japan is ready to
July 30, 1938 ratify the Bessarabian Treaty
Aug. 23, 1939 The Ribbentrop - Molotov Pact
The Soviet Union takes Bessarabia and northern Bukovina from
June 1940
Romania
INTRODUCTION
Opportunity from Crisis
The world that came into being after the First World War was profoundly
different from the one that had existed before. Two of the most important changes
were the formation of the first communist state, and the use of the nationality prin-
ciple as the basis for the creation of new states (or for the enlargement of states al-
ready in existence).
The invocation of American idealism, with the famous Wilsonian points, pro-
voked such a revolution in international relations that even the United States re-
fused to approve the peace settlement, and in the end that “settlement” resulted in
another world war. Of course, there are many different theories regarding the evolu-
tion of international relations during the interwar period; this book will focus on the
Bessarabian Treaty and how the intricacies of the shifting international climate in-
fluenced Romania.
After the First World War, the Romanians saw their dreams becoming reality
through the creation of Greater Romania, by the union of Bessarabia, Bukovina,
Transylvania, Crisana, Maramures and Banat with the Old Kingdom. By these acqui-
sitions Romania more than doubled in size and emerged from the war with a popula-
tion of over 17,000,000 people (as against about 7,000,000 pre-war) and a territory of
295,049 square km (as compared to 137,000 before the war).1 Romania was trans-
formed almost overnight from a small country into the second largest state in eastern
Central Europe. The newly acquired territories transformed Romania from a nation-
state into a nationalities state, in which ethnic Romanians made up only 72% of the
population. The largest minority groups were the Hungarians, Jews, Germans, Rus-
sians, Ukrainians and Gypsies. These other nationalities posed serious problems,
especially in those parts of Romania where they outnumbered the Romanians (for
example, in southern Bessarabia or in some parts of Transylvania). Interwar Roma-
nia had to face the severe challenge of forging extremely diverse regions
(economically as well as culturally) into a unified and centralized state.
<9>
Moldova, a Romanian Province
Strategies
Therefore, after obtaining international recognition of its new borders, in all its
foreign policy Romania was dedicated to maintaining the territorial status quo. Ro-
manian foreign policy pursued three main strategies. The first was based on the idea
of collective security, promulgated by prominent Romanian diplomat Take Ionescu
(more or less as a result of French influence2) and continued by one of his disciples,
Nicolae Titulescu. An Eastern European bloc made of five states (Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia, Romania, Yugoslavia and Greece) was intended to forestall any aggression
from the west (Germany, Hungary, Austria), the east (the Soviet Union), or the
south (Bulgaria or Turkey) and help to maintain peace in Eastern Europe. Unfortu-
nately, because of the multiple contradictions existing in the Central European and
Balkan area, this plan partially failed. What was finally achieved in the 1920s was the
Little Entente, between Yugoslavia, Romania and Czechoslovakia. The Little En-
tente was intended to contain Hungary and Bulgaria (revisionist States), and to pre-
sent a unified voice for the three countries in order to strengthen their stature before
the Great Powers. Through a system of bilateral treaties, Romania also sought to
forge an alliance with Poland against their communist neighbor and, in the 1930s,
Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey founded the Balkan Entente, with the
more or less direct aim of controlling Bulgaria.
The second broad strategy was related to the League of Nations. Because one of
the League’s main purposes was to maintain the territorial status quo, Romania be-
came actively involved. International recognition of Romania’s new frontiers was of
critical importance and it is here that the Bessarabian Treaty shows its value for Ro-
mania, justifying the efforts made by the Romanian diplomacy in order to bring it
into force.
Third, Romania sought to forge an alliance with at least one of the Great Pow-
ers, an alliance that should contain a clear commitment from the Great Power in case
of an attack on Bessarabia. In this sense, Romania’s diplomatic success was only par-
tial (at best).
Terminology
First, what is Bessarabia? Second, what is Moldavia (or, in Romanian,

Moldova)?
Chapter 1 presents a brief history of the region. Essentially, Moldavia, one of
the three Romanian Principalities, came into being during the 14th century, between
the Carpathian Mountains and the Dniestr River. Over time, most of the this terri-
tory stayed together under the control of the Moldavian Voevods, with just a few
parts being taken away by the Ottomans. The southernmost of those was called Bes-
sarabia. Towards the end of the 18th century (1775), the Habsburgs took away the
northern part of Moldavia, called Bukovina; the Russians decided to follow suit and,
< 10 >
Introduction
by 1812, they carved off that piece of Moldavia between the Pruth and Dniestr Rivers,
and extended the name of Bessarabia over all this territory.
By 1859, what remained of Moldavia managed to effect a union with Walachia,
forming what came to be called the Old Kingdom, and laid the foundation of the pre-
sent Romania. By 1918, events in Russia allowed Bessarabia to unite with Romania.
But the union did not last long; by 1940, the Soviets already took back Bessarabia.
In the aftermath of World War II, the Soviets also took Bessarabia’s southern
and most of its northern parts, where the Romanians were not a substantial major-
ity, and incorporated them into Ukraine. Today’s republic of Moldavia, with its capi-
tal in Chisinau, occupies only what was left of Bessarabia after these territorial
modifications.3
But the people in the part of Moldavia that united with Walachia in 1859 to
form the Romanian Kingdom continued to call themselves Moldovans, and that re-
gion of Romania continues to be known as Moldova. Therefore, to a Romanian (or to
anyone living before World War I), the name Moldavia pertains to an integral part
of the Romanian territory and not to the former Soviet republic. Conversely, a per-
son whose frame of reference is the former Soviet Union will think of Soviet Molda-
via, currently the Moldovan Republic. In order to avoid confusion, and given the fact
that the treaty that is the focus of this book relates specifically to that region in its
interwar territorial limits (when it was known mainly as Bessarabia), the name of
Bessarabia will be mostly used.
During the entire interwar period, Bessarabia was the weakest point in Roma-
nian foreign policy. No Great Power was willing to defend Romania in case of a Rus-
sian attack on Bessarabia, and even among the small or secondary powers there was
only one possible ally, Poland. Because of the Soviet Union’s growing influence in
international affairs, as well as its continually growing military potential, Romania
stood alone on the Bessarabian issue.
Romanian diplomats had three options, each of them entailing serious risk: (1)
to ignore the Soviet Union in the hope that a non-Bolshevik government would take
power, sooner or later; (2) to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union; (3) to alter-
nate between the first two with the hope of securing the backing of a Great Power
before it was too late. It must be said that all the three approaches were tried, but
each of them fell short. Even today, when we have the perspective of many decades,
it is difficult to say what would have been the best approach for Romania.
Bessarabia was one of the less-known territories in Eastern Europe. Since the
fall of communism, things have started to change and gradually more and more pa-
pers have been published on various aspects of the region. Unfortunately, many of
these papers (including those published outside Romania or the former Soviet Un-
ion) still show the influence of political partisanship. Simply said, each side presents
its own version of the story, insisting on whatever arguments they may think of,
seeking to prove that their version is the only real or the most plausible one.4
After the collapse of communism, there was a publishing “boom” regarding the
< 11 >
history of Bessarabia, which had ceased to be taboo for historians both in Romania
and in the new Moldavian Republic. On one hand, Romanian historiography stands
by the old line, arguing that Bessarabia was (and still is) Romanian territory, that
the Union decision taken by the Sfatul Tserii (the Council of the Country — the rep-
resentative political body of all the people living in Bessarabia, discussed in Chapter
1), was a genuine expression of the national movement and that it was normal for the
Bessarabians to live together with their Romanian brothers. On the other hand, some
historians in the new created Moldavian republic follow the lead opened by a num-
ber of Soviet scholars in the 1920s, trying to demonstrate that, in fact, the Moldavi-
ans are a distinct population5 with their own Moldavian language.6 Continuing the
communist historiography, they refer to the interwar period as one of fierce exploita-
tion of the people by the Romanian bureaucracy (this complaint may have some jus-
tification, but that is true for any administration, anywhere in the world). Their
main purpose is to give a historical background to the newly proclaimed State, in
order to achieve a certain national cohesion in Bessarabia; the same phenomenon can
be observed in all the other post-Soviet republics. 7
Thus, “Moldavia” is the spelling most often used in English to designate what
the local people know as Moldova. Comparing the Romanians and the Moldavians
(or Moldovans), it becomes clear that there is no distinct literature, no separate lan-
guage, no history apart from that of the states and empires of which they have been a
part. Yet most Moldovans do feel themselves to be something other than simply Ro-
manians, and since 1991, they have had their own state to show for it.8 It should also
be pointed out that, while the Moldavians did not show themselves to be in much
hurry to get back together with Romania, preferring to have a state of their own,
neither have the Romanians made a concerted effort to convince them to unify. And,
as time passes, there is no sign of a change in Romanian public opinion that would
lead to stronger insistence on a union of Bessarabia with Romania. As for the Roma-
nian leadership, it seems to be so lost in the difficulties of the post-Ceausescu transi-
tion that it barely has the time and the will to work for such a union.9 In fact, it is
difficult to distinguish what exactly is the actual position of the Romanians regard-
ing a possible union of Moldavia with Romania: have they given up, or they are sim-
ply respecting the wish of the Moldavians?
Author’s Purpose
The aim of this book is to analyze the entire problem of the Bessarabian Treaty
of October 28, 1920,10 and through this analysis to offer a glimpse of Romanian foreign
policy in the 1920s. The Treaty was signed between Great Britain, France, Italy and
Japan, on one hand, and Romania on the other. Under that Treaty, the Great Powers
gave, two years after its de facto realization, an official recognition to the unification of
Bessarabia with Romania. The signing of the Treaty was a great success for Romania;
because of this de jure recognition of the union, Bessarabia was to be considered Roma-
nian territory, not a territory under the military occupation of Romania.
< 12 >
Introduction
But one of the five powers that signed the Treaty failed to ratify it, namely Ja-
pan. And because Japan failed to ratify the Treaty, it never came into force.
Why did the Romanian government fail to bring the Bessarabian Treaty into
force? How did they allow this foreign policy success to slide into failure? Was it
because Romania stood no chance, in the long run, against a Great Power like the
Soviet Union? Was it because the Romanian government was unwilling to pay eve-
rything the signatory Great Powers asked in exchange for the ratification? Was it a
reflection of the more general failure in Romania’s relations with the Soviet Union
during the interwar period, or a reflection of the Great Powers’ reluctance to upset
the Soviet Union? Did Romania mismanage the ratification process, or were they
simply undone by a very well organized Soviet campaign against the Treaty? Did the
Great Powers worry that, once the Treaty came into power, it would trigger a new
war in the Balkans?
Romanian historiography gives an oversimplified answer to our question: the
Treaty did not come into force because Japan failed to ratify it. This answer has two
major flows: it lays all the blame on Japan (failing to show what exactly was behind
Japan’s decision), and it makes no mention of the US position regarding Bessarabia.
Of course, it was as a result of Japan’s failure to ratify that the Bessarabian Treaty did
not come into force — but we cannot overlook the fact that the Treaty required five
ratifications and that in every case with the possible exception of Britain, the Roma-
nian government handled the situation in a poor manner. It took a year and a half to
finalize even the Romanian ratification, and seven years to convince Italy to ratify.
Even without the Japanese abstention, and as proven by the US position, the Roma-
nian campaign for the ratification was exceptionally lethargic, particularly if we con-
sider that the Treaty imposed no concrete obligations on its signatories (except for
Romania), so that they had nothing to lose by ratifying. The Japanese failure to ratify
came, in this author’s view, not only (or even principally) as a result of Soviet pres-
sure but also as a result of Romania’s feeble effort to secure the ratifications in gen-
eral. In order to find out why the Bessarabian Treaty failed to come into force, we
must analyze the entire campaign for ratification and not simply blame it on Japan.
The international context evolved rapidly after the War, with Soviet Russia
quickly getting back on its feet; Romania proved unable to fully appreciate the full
significance of this recovery and, instead of hurrying to secure the ratifications, it
entered into complicated negotiations regarding the concessions to be granted in
exchange. Romania gave the Soviets exactly what they needed most in their conflict
with Romania over Bessarabia: time. Romania also went on dreaming that it would
be possible to convince one of the Great Powers (most likely France) to offer mili-
tary guarantees against a possible Soviet attack. Even worse, they failed to compre-
hend the changing realities in the international arena and neglected the two non-
European Great Powers, the US and Japan, who were both won over by the Soviets
in their conflict with Romania.
The sad fact is that, in the end, Romania paid almost everything the Great
Powers asked for in exchange for the Bessarabian Treaty, and invested resources in
< 13 >
the ratification campaign, but never could use the Treaty. Romanian historiography
continues to argue in favor of the “great excuse” cherished by Romanian diplomacy
during the interwar period: although the Treaty had not actually come into force, the
States that had ratified it had a moral obligation towards Romania in case of a Soviet
attack. The situation was quite different and this book will show the real state of
affairs, with both the British and Italians arguing that the Bessarabian Treaty was
not binding on them until ratified by all the signatories and dismissing any so-called
“moral obligation”.
The same historiography continues to praise Romania for its successes in con-
vincing France and Italy to ratify, without recognizing that, in fact, apart from the
concessions Romania gave in exchange for those ratifications, a hidden price was
paid: the loss of Japan’s ratification. None of the scholars analyzing different aspects
of the negotiations for the Bessarabian Treaty makes the connection between the
time lost in order to achieve the French or Italian ratification and the change in Ja-
pan’s position towards the Soviets. As one Romanian scholar has said: “As long as
the final score was 3-1 for Romania, we could not consider the ratification campaign
a failure”. This is simply not so: the final score was 3-1, but Romania needed a 4-0 in
order to qualify.
This book will focus especially on the ratification process. Two Great Powers,
the Soviet Union and the United States, were not among the five signatories — but
they played significant roles in the Bessarabian Treaty question due to their influ-
ences on those who were.
Against the backdrop of a general description of Romanian foreign policy, the
book attempts to offer insight into the workings of diplomacy, and especially Roma-
nian diplomacy. Its purpose is to present a more realistic image of this process by
highlighting the different opinions expressed by those involved, by analyzing the
multitude of approaches open to each player in the field, by presenting behind-the-
scene events, and by demonstrating the extraordinary importance of the interna-
tional context. To achieve this deeper perspective, it was necessary to abandon the
analysis of the Bessarabian question in its entirety and to focus instead on the
Treaty — a topic not so vast, but sufficiently suggestive for the entire matter. The
saga of the Bessarabian Treaty shows the evolution of the Romanian approach to the
issue and the policies of each of the interested Great Powers (except for Germany).
It also illustrates the increasingly global ramifications of every international policy
issue, as far back as the 1920’s, with two non-European Powers taking active part in
European matters despite their proclaimed isolationism (the USA) or neutrality
(Japan). To our knowledge, this book is the most comprehensive treatment of the
Bessarabian Treaty, analyzing the implications for Romania of both the signing and
the ratification.
Resources
The book is based mainly on information provided by primary sources, espe-

cially documents, many of which have never before been published. The main
< 14 >
Introduction
sources for the unpublished documents are the Japanese and Romanian Foreign
Ministry Archives.
The Romanian orthography has been retained for most people and place
names.
Footnotes are in abbreviated format; for full citations, please refer to the Bibli-
ography at the back of the book.
The author has lived in Japan for five years and thus has had the opportunity to
conduct extensive research in the Japanese as well as the Romanian Archives. Nearly
all the relevant French and British documents (yet unpublished) were available on
microfilm in Bucharest, due to an arrangement spearheaded in the late 1970s by the
Romanian National Archives. The author also attempted to search for documents in
the former Soviet Archives, but was unable to secure the necessary support to access
unpublished documents. As for Italian and US documents, his research was based on
published collections of documents and other secondary sources. The ideal work,
from the standpoint of “archive equilibrium”, would be one in which all the subchap-
ters follow the model of the one on the Japanese ratification.
Published collections, including Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Documents on
British Foreign Policy, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), Documents Diplomatiques
Français, I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, and Romanian-Soviet Relations: Documents. 1918-
1934, provided further valuable information. Key portions of the citations will be
italicized to indicate this author’s emphasis.
The published documents are not necessarily complete, and they may also be
used (as will be shown) as propaganda tools. In recognition of this difficulty, the
author has sought to provide the reader with as complete a description of the events
as possible by comparing the documents published outside Romania with those
found in the Romanian Archives. On a different level, another source of information
was the mass media, especially the newspapers, from Romania but also from the ma-
jor capitals of the world.
One of the problems specific to the Bessarabian question is that anyone who
voices an opinion on historical, linguistic, demographic, or cultural developments in
Bessarabia (or Moldavia) inevitably becomes a party in the conflict. It is very diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to find a neutral stand and the only alternative is to present as
many documents as possible. A middle ground could be, at least theoretically, illus-
trated by the documents, which in the aggregate cannot be accused of being politi-
cized — even though, it is true, the selection process might be liable to charges of
subjectivity. The author has therefore relied to the greatest extent possible on offi-
cial documents rather than on papers written by various scholars. The author hopes
that, at some time in the future, he will have the opportunity to continue his work in
the other archives in order to round out the discussion.
< 15 >
Notes
1
Vlad Georgescu, The Romanians; A History, p. 189.
2
Six months before the end of the war Philippe Berthelot had envisaged an “anti-German barrier”
composed of Romania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, and Italy. Nicole Jordan, The Popular Front
and Central Europe, p. 15.
3
As for Moldavia’s population, the 1989 census shows that out of the about 4.5 million people,
roughly 65 % are Romanians, whilst the Russians represent 13 %, the Ukrainians 13 %, the rest being
made by other minorities, some of which still leave in compact areas (like the Gagauz minority).
Helen Fedor, William E. Crowther, Belarus and Moldova: Country Studies, p. 99.
4
The relatively recent book published by Wim Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question in Communist His-
toryography: Nationalist and Communist Politics and History-Writing, offers some excellent references to
many of those papers. Also, another interesting analyses of the existing bibliography on Bessarabia is
presented in Gheorghe I. Florescu, “Bessarabia: a topic of the American historiography, 1945-1995”,
Anuarul Institutului AD Xenopol, Iasi, 1996.
5
An excellent presentation of this tendency is made by one of the leading scholars in the field on
Bessarabian history, Michael Bruchis, in his article “Moldavian National History – Ancient and Mod-
ern – as Presented in the Moldavian Soviet Encyclopedia,” published in Studies in Moldovan …, p. 3-28.
6
For a concise comparison of the phonology, morphology and syntax of the “Moldavian” language
and the Romanian, see Donald L Dyer, “The Making of the Moldavian Language” in Studies in Molda-
vian…, p. 92-101.
7
A good analysis of this “policy” of creating a Moldavian nation, both during the interwar period and
also for the period after 1989 is presented in Charles King, The Moldavans, passim.
8
Charles King, The Moldovans, p. 7.
9
The only notable exception in this sense comes from the well-thought educational program for
Moldavians willing to come and study in Romania, which includes a high number of scholarships
and which seems to target the future Moldavian intellectual elite.
10
As a technical matter, it should be mentioned that historians and diplomats used many terms for
the act signed on October 28: Convention, Protocol, and Treaty. In fact, some scholars even use two
terms in one work (such as, for example, the “so-called Bessarabia convention” and the “so-called
Bessarabian protocol” in Magda Adam, The Little Entente …, p. 212, 304). To avoid confusion, the term
“treaty” will be used exclusively in this book.
< 16 >
PART ONE - BESSARABIA AND
THE UNION WITH ROMANIA
CHAPTER 1.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF BESSARABIA
This chapter presents a short history of Bessarabia until 1918, including the
decision to unite with Romania. Some Romanian historians argue that there is no
history of Bessarabia before 1812 — only a history of Moldavia, of which Bessarabia
was part. Generally speaking, they are right. However, from the viewpoint of local
history we can identify a Bessarabian history and even find some small differences
with the general history of Moldavia.
There are several theories regarding the name of Bessarabia and the territory
associated with it. We will consider it to encompass the territory bounded by the
Black Sea on the south, the Pruth River on the west, and the Dniestr River to the
east and north. The Moldavian republic of today occupies this territory, minus cer-
tain portions that came to be assigned to Ukraine.
Significant factors that determined the history of Bessarabia include its agri-
cultural potential and the importance of control over the northern parts of the Da-
nube estuary. The Danube was one of the most important commercial routes in
Europe (and will be again, after somebody cleans up the mess NATO made of it).
During the Middle Ages and later, Bessarabia also had considerable influence over
navigation on the Dniestr River which, as the main link between Poland and
Ukraine and the Black Sea, was also an important commercial route.
The first people to realize the commercial importance of the Bessarabian terri-
tories were the Greeks, who established a number of colonies along the Black Sea
during the 7th century BC; the largest in the Bessarabia lands was Tyras. At about the
middle of the 1st century BC, one of the local tribal chiefs, Burebista, unified all the
Daco-Gaetic populations situated north of the Danube into the Kingdom of Dacia.
He extended his domination from Bukovina and Pannonia to the Bug River, covering
both Bessarabia and Transdniestria. Some three centuries later, the Roman Empire
< 17 >
defeated the Kingdom of Dacia and transformed it into a colony. The southern part
of Bessarabia was incorporated into the Moesian province even before the defeat of
Dacia. People from all over the Roman Empire had come to colonize these rich terri-
tories. About two centuries later, however, because of pressure from neighboring
barbarian tribes, Emperor Aurelian decided to abandon the northern Danube prov-
inces in order to secure a defensive line on the Danube River. He ordered the retreat
of the army and administration, which was done during AD 271-274. However, a
good part of the Daco-Roman population preferred to stay. The Roman Empire con-
tinued to keep close relations with this population and maintained its influence over
it; but the great migrations precluded the creation of an organized Daco-Roman
state for more than a millennium.
During the 14th century, the descendants of the Daco-Romans, the Romanians,
organized themselves into two states, Walachia and Moldavia. They also made up
the majority population of the Transylvanian principality, which was under the
domination of the Hungarian Kingdom. Moldavia was created, according to Hungar-
ian sources, by Romanians who left the northern parts of Transylvania (Maramures),
during the sixth and seventh decades of the 14th century. They unified the people
living in Moldavia and organized that territory as a state.
Soon after their formation, both Walachia and Moldavia had to fight for their
independence, first against Hungary and later against the Turks and the Poles. Mol-
davia was situated on the principal commercial route that linked the Baltic Sea with
the Black Sea. The Great Powers’ rivalry over Moldavia is best illustrated during the
reigns of Moldavia’s most hallowed voevods, Alexander the Good (1400-1433) and
Stephen the Great (1457-1504). After many battles, a negotiated agreement was
reached; both Walachia (1422) and Moldavia (1512, 1529, 1634) agreed to pay trib-
ute5 to the Sultan and to assist him in time of war, but they were allowed to con-
tinue to elect their own prince — and no Turks were to be permitted to settle in the
principalities.6 This understanding was established through special conventions
(called hatisherifs or ahidnames7) with the Ottoman Empire, by which the Sultan
promised that “the Moldavian borders would remain entirely intact.” Officially, the
Romanian principalities were under Ottoman suzerainty,8 and these treaties regard-
ing Ottoman-Romanian relations were still in force as late as 1812.
For the next two centuries, the Romanian principalities enjoyed a special
status within the Ottoman Empire. At no point in time were they entirely subju-
gated and transformed into a pasalic (like Serbia, Hungary and Bulgaria). It was only
during the 18th century that the Turks eliminated some of their privileges, such as the
right to elect their own “voevod” (or Hospodar); now the Sultan named a leader for
them from among the Greeks living in Istanbul. The principalities had always been
distinguished from the other Balkan provinces by the survival of a powerful native
aristocracy. While in Serbia the nobles were exterminated and in Bosnia they saved
their property by surrendering their faith, in Romania they were able to retain both.
In accordance with Islamic law, the Ottomans regarded the principalities as some-
where between conquered territories (subject to direct Muslim rule) and areas out-
side the boundaries of Islam (hostile to the Muslim state, and with whom there
< 18 >
CHAPTER 1. BESSARABIA AND THE UNION WITH ROMANIA
could be only temporary peace). Moldavia and Walachia were thus ahd (treaty) terri-
tories and lay in the intermediate zone of peace (dar alsulh), since they had not been
occupied by Ottoman armies and had not been incorporated into the Ottoman
state.9 Consequently, since they were not Ottoman territories, the Sultan had no
right to give them away. The Moldavian voevods and the boyars played on the inter-
national situation: any time the position of the Ottoman Empire was weakened, they
sought to increase their privileges and independence, either by fighting or by paying
off corrupt Ottoman officials in Istanbul.
The large fortress and the Black Sea ports Chilia and Cetatea Alba (Tiraspol),
on Moldavian territory, were the first to be conquered and taken from Moldavia by
the Ottoman Empire. During the sultanate of Suleiman the Magnificent (mid-16th
century), a part of the territory in southern Bessarabia (at that time, incontestably
part of Moldavia), was taken away by the Turks and transformed into the Bugeac
raia or sanjak (Turkish-controlled province);10 it was colonized with Tatars, in order
to keep better control over any initiatives the Romanian principalities might take.
After a number of years, the Moldavian boyars succeeded in recovering a part of that
territory, albeit a small one.11 It was this territory in the south that initially had been
known as Bessarabia.
That was not the only case of Moldavian territory transformed into a Turkish
province. Practically the same thing happened to the territories around Tighina and,
almost two centuries later, around the Hotin fortress.12 After transforming this part
into a raia, the Sultan colonized it with Bulgarian and Tartar families. There were no
more territorial losses for Moldavia until the 18th century.
The 18th century is characterized in Central and Eastern Europe by the so-
called “Oriental problem”: the contest to fill the power vacuum left by the weakness
(or decadence) of the Ottoman Empire. The Romanian principalities were caught in
the middle. All the wars taking place between the three Great Powers in the area
(Austria, Russia and Turkey) directly affected Romanian territory; military occupa-
tion of the principalities became almost a rule and the Romanians lost some of their
own territory.
In May 1775, as a result of the Russo-Turkish war of 1768-1774, Moldavia lost
its northern part, Bukovina (with a territory of 4,000 square miles and a population
of 70,000 people — of whom 56,000 were Romanians)13 to the Habsburg Empire,
with the silent approval of Russia, who considerably improved her position in the
principalities after the war. The Habsburgs managed to secure both Ottoman and
Russian acceptance of their new territorial acquisition.14 But, at least from the juridi-
cal standpoint, according to the ahidnames or hatisherifs, the Ottoman Empire had no
right to give away parts of Moldavia.15
By the Sistov Peace of 1791, Russia gained from the Ottoman Empire the terri-
tory situated between the Dniepr and Dniestr Rivers, thus for the first time estab-
lishing a common border with Moldavia.
After a few years of war and negotiations (1806-1812)16 between the Ottoman
Empire and Russia, the Sultan decided to pay the price for making peace with Rus-
sia, and on May 28, 1812, a peace treaty was signed in Bucharest. By that treaty, Rus-
< 19 >
sia incorporated the territory belonging to Moldavia situated between the Pruth and
the Dniestr Rivers, known as Bessarabia: around 17,350 square miles and almost half
a million people, the majority of them Romanians (about 85%).17 Although at the
beginning of the war the Russians had asked for both the Romanian principalities, in
the end, they also failed to establish the Siret River as the border, and had to settle
for just the territory between the Pruth and the Dniestr.18
This was not so much a loss for the Ottoman Empire as for the future Romania.
Considering the events of 1812, many historians argue that the Ottoman Empire’s
cession had been illegal: the Turks could not cede something that did not belong to
them, and the Ottoman Empire had never ruled the Romanian principalities.19 In
Karl Marx’s opinion, even the Turks had acknowledged this fact.20 When pressed by
the Poles at Karlowitz21 to cede Moldavia and Walachia, they responded that the
Ottoman Empire did not believe itself to be entitled to make any cessions of territo-
ries since the capitulations (hatisherifs) conferred upon it only the right to suzerainty
(which is quite different from sovereignty).
At the beginning of Russia’s domination over Bessarabia, what with great
numbers of peasants fleeing over the Pruth, a war going on with France, the terri-
tory’s great distance from the capital, and the Empire’s inadequate finances, the Rus-
sian government decided to grant Bessarabia a privileged status; this meant a certain
autonomy, which included the continuation of former privileges and the application
of traditional Moldavian laws.22 Tsar Alexander’s attitude was a combination of lib-
eral sentiment and tactical calculation: he hoped that Bessarabia was but a foretaste
of future annexation and he desired to win over the inhabitants. He instructed the
first head of the provisional Bessarabian government, Romanian boyar Scarlat
Sturdza:
You must endeavor to lay the foundation for a larger building. Protect property
and its owners: make it as easy as possible for those who settle there to acquire
property. The public burdens must be equally distributed; the honesty of the
administrative officials must make the inhabitants forget the lack of a regular
system of laws. Let the inhabitants feel the advantage of a fatherly and liberal
administration. Draw the attention of neighboring people to this province by
making it happy.23
Unfortunately, only those parts of the program that were unfavorable to the
Moldavians were applied in practice. Even so, this policy of respect for the Bessara-
bians lasted only for a few years, until 1828. A policy of colonization (with Bulgari-
ans,24 Germans, Jews, Greeks and others)25 and Russification started soon after 1812,
and was continued for the next several decades with the purpose of increasing the
population26 and weakening the Romanian element in the province. From the Rus-
sian standpoint, Bessarabia was just another Christian territory to be “liberated”
from the Turks, while advancing Russia’s influence a step closer to the Straits and
securing control over the Danube estuary. Russian historiography during the 19th
and 20th centuries presented the 1812 act as a liberation of the Christian population
< 20 >
from the Turks, justified by the brotherhood of religion. As early as 1828, Bessarabian
autonomy was replaced by the implementation of Russian practices in the admini-
stration and a new constitution, ending most aspects of the province’s privileged
position inside the Russian Empire and aiming to establish a centralized administra-
tion for the province.
The privileges of Bessarabia and the Bessarabians were gradually limited and
finally, in 1871, all vestiges of their previous special position were abolished. Bessara-
bia became a regular gubernija (province). There was no more official bilingualism;
the use of the Romanian language in administration and education was forbidden
and Russification clearly became the key word for the administration.27
Romanian language speakers represented the bulk of the Bessarabian popula-
tion, as proved by Russian statistics. The 1856 official census shows a total popula-
tion of 990,000, of which 74% were Romanians. By comparison, in 1897, another offi-
cial statistic shows a total population of 1,935,000, of which 56% were Romanians. It
has been approximated that in 1918 the Bessarabian population was 2,725,000,
66.5% Romanian, 12% Russian, 10% Jewish, 7.7% Bulgarian and Gagauz, plus smaller
numbers of Germans, Greeks, Armenians and other nationalities.28
The ethnic mix was different in the rural and urban areas. While the cities
were almost entirely populated by Russians and Jews, with a strong anti-Romanian
tendency (which continued long after 1918), it was mainly Romanians who popu-
lated the villages. The rural character of the Romanian population explains the fail-
ure of the Russification process: Russian literature and education were never able to
reach the illiterate rural masses, which remained loyal to their folk culture and lan-
guage.29 This was an important factor in the 1917-1918 national movement and the
decision in favor of union, because the new administrators, Romanians, spoke the
same language as the villagers and thus were able to reach the rural areas and sway
the peasants with their propaganda effort.
The Crimean War of 1853-1856 opened a new chapter for the Romanian na-
tional movement.30 During the Paris peace negotiations the Romanians had, for the
first time, the opportunity to ask the Great Powers to intervene in their favor. They
asked for a political and institutional internationalization of their status as the prin-
cipalities of Moldavia and Walachia and for the retrocession of Bessarabia to Molda-
via by Russia. And indeed, their wishes were partially granted by the Great Powers.
It was decided that the principalities should be placed under the common guarantee
of the Great Powers — a decision which practically gave them independence, as it
was almost impossible for the seven Powers to come a complete agreement — but
the union between the two principalities was not approved. As for Bessarabia, after
prolonged negotiations, it was decided that Russia should return to Moldavia only
the southern part of that territory, plus the Danube Delta. But, as a result of the Ot-
toman intervention, the Danube Delta (which had been under Russian domination
before the war) was included in the Ottoman territory and not incorporated to Mol-
davia.31 In the end, a territory of about 2000 square miles, with modest economical
importance, was returned to Moldavia.
Therefore, as a result of the Crimean War, in 1856 Russia lost the southern part
< 21 >
of Bessarabia to the principality of Moldavia, because the Great Powers wished to

remove the Russian Empire from the mouth of the Danube and to give the Ottoman
Empire greater protection against an aggressive Russia. By an irony of fate, the three
southern districts which were now reunited with Moldavia were the very districts
where the Romanian population was the least numerous.32 This territory was later
incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, after the Second World War, and
has not been recovered by the Moldavian republic.
In 1859, Moldavia and Walachia both managed to elect Alexandru Ioan Cuza
as its domn (Hospodar), and a rapid process of unification of the two Principalities
ensued. By 1866, unhappy with some of the democratic reforms initiated by Cuza,
the political leadership decided to replace him. Still, they decided to keep the union
and, as the Ottomans had previously stated that they would admit the union only
during Cuza’s tenure as domn, they decided to replace him with a foreign prince.
Carol of Hohenzollern accepted the invitation, and became King. Their decision was
motivated by the need to avoid internal controversies regarding Cuza’s successor,
which could have endangered the union, by the need to have a neutral element arbi-
trating over internal politics, as well as in order to enhance the Principalities’ inter-
national status (since Carol had family ties with both the German Imperial House
and Emperor Napoleon III). In 1877, as a result of the war between Russia and the
Ottoman Empire, Romania became an independent state.
During the 1877-1878 war, Bessarabia came into the spotlight again. Before the
war started, the Romanian Prime Minister, Ion C. Bratianu, had worked hard to ne-
gotiate a military convention with Russia. Prolonged negotiations ended with the
signing of the Russo-Romanian Convention on April 4-16, 1877, by which the Rus-
sian Army was given permission to cross through Romanian territory but the Rus-
sian government explicitly agreed to defend the existing integrity of Romania.
There was great enthusiasm in Romania for the war and this was one of the
best moments in Romanian-Russian relations, with both countries fighting together
against their old enemy, the Ottoman Empire. Although, at the beginning of the mili-
tary operations, the Russians rejected Romania’s offer of military assistance, just a
few months later they became very keen to get it. The Romanian army fought with
the aim of gaining complete independence from the Ottoman Empire.33 The Serbs,
for various reasons, declined to declare war on the Ottomans, but Romania’s partici-
pation was valuable especially at Plevna.34
However, even before Russia entered the war against the Ottoman Empire, the
fate of southern Bessarabia had already been decided. Through secret agreements
with Austria-Hungary (at the Reichstadt, June 26, 1876 and in Budapest, January 3,
1877), Russia was to take back southern Bessarabia.35 The Romanians had no idea
about those agreements and they understood that they stood to benefit from the up-
coming war both by gaining independence from the Turks and also by acquiring
some territory in Dobrudja.36
As soon as the outcome of the war was decided, the Russians officially asked
the Romanian government for the retrocession of southern Bessarabia, in January
1878. This came as a shock to the Romanians, who had served Russia as an ally
< 22 >
throughout this conflict in return for the guarantee of safeguarding its territorial
integrity. The demand was presented as representing a matter of prestige for the
Czar.37 In order to make it easier for the Romanians to swallow the bitter pill, the
Russians offered to Romania the Danube Delta and a part of Dobrudja in exchange
for southern Bessarabia. Official (and unofficial) Romanian protest had no effect.38
Russia simply failed to keep her promise, access to Danube and the Czar’s pride be-
ing more important than Romania’s alliance. This was the first time that Bessarabia
became the most contentious issue between Russia and Romania (as a state).39 It
was also the first time that the Romanians, through the voice of Foreign Minister
Mihail Kogalniceanu (who was both a Moldavian and a historian), officially pro-
tested against the previous seizure of all of Bessarabia as a result of the 1812 Treaty.40
Thus both the San Stefano and later the Berlin Peace Treaties stated that
southern Bessarabia should revert to Russia, and offered to Romania “in exchange”
Dobrudja and the Danube Delta (which she had taken from the Ottoman Empire as
war compensation).41 Romania could do nothing but accept the deal proposed by the
Russians; there was no Great Power willing to back up Romania, and the Russian
Army was still on Romanian territory — making any resistance impossible. How-
ever, in fairness to Russia it should be mentioned that the Romanian leaders wel-
comed the acquisition of the Danube Delta and Dobrudja, although at the time it was
not considered that these territories were a fair exchange for southern Bessarabia.42
This Russian action had a great impact on Romanian foreign policy.
Actually, the Russian move was really a great success for the German Chancel-
lor Otto von Bismarck, who was able to kill two birds with one stone during the Ber-
lin Conference: Romania’s alliance (an important country for his policy in the Balkan
area), and Bulgaria’s alliance too (there had been a dispute between Romania and
Bulgaria over the city of Silistra, in southern Dobrudja; in 1880 it went to Bulgaria as
a result of Russian insistence and German approval).43 Bismarck also tried to obtain
Russia’s gratitude by supporting her claim to Bessarabia, but due to the other stipu-
lations in the Berlin Treaty, Russian public opinion — considering Germany the
main responsible for the Berlin Treaty — turned against him. Romanian distrust and
fear of the pan-Slav expansion only grew as a result of the Berlin Peace Treaty,44 and
ended up driving Romania away from Russia and into the arms of Austria-Hungary
and Germany.
In 1913, Romania took part in the Second Balkan War and, by the Peace signed
in Bucharest in 1913, acquired southern Dobrudja (Cadrilater) from Bulgaria.45
In 1916 Romania entered the war against Germany and the Austria-Hungarian
Empire with the purpose of unification with the Romanian territories controlled by
the former (Banat, Transylvania, Bukovina). In 1918, upon the unification of Bessara-
bia (April 9, 1918), Bukovina (November 28, 1918) Transylvania, Banat, Crisana and
Maramures (December 1, 1918) with the Old Kingdom, Romania became the state of
all Romanians.
< 23 >
Notes
1
Stefan Ciobanu, Basarabia. Populatia. Istoria. Cultura, p. 47; also A. Karetki, A. Pricop, Lacrima
Basarabiei, p. 7.
2
For historical details on the name “Bessarabia” see Mihai Eminescu, “Basarabia. Numele si intinde-
rea ei” in Basarabia Romana. Antologie, p. 3-6. Also, Dennis Deletant, “Language Policy and Linguistic
Trends in the Republic of Moldavia, 1924-1992” in Studies in Moldavian . . . . p. 54-55. For a different
opinion, much closer to the reality, see Charles King, The Moldovans, p. 20-21.
3
For details on Bessarabia under the rule of the Roman Empire, see A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 48,
53-61.
4
Most Romanian historians agree that these people were none other than the descendants of the
Daco-Romanian population, who never abandoned their territories; the same language, customs and
religion were prevalent all over the northern Danube territory. A somewhat different viewpoint is
presented in Boldur’s Istoria Basarabiei, p. 98-110, arguing that, in fact, the descendants of the Daco-
Romanian populations had already been politically organized, in the 11th and 12th centuries, into
what was known as the Countries of the Brodnics, and the Bolohovens. After the great Mongol inva-
sion, some of these people migrated southward, and made up the bulk of the population in the
northern parts of Moldavia, and had the main role in the making of the Moldavian state, p.124, 138-
145.
5
The economic and financial obligations of the Romanian principalities towards the Ottoman Em-
pire gradually grew, reaching their highest level during the 18th century. For a concise account of
these obligations, see Keith Hitchins, The Romanians. 1774-1866, p. 12-17.
6
The 1634 Treaty between Vasile Lupu, voevod of Moldavia, and the Ottoman Empire, states clearly
that Moldavia was to be recognized as an independent state; that any interference of the Turks in
the administration of the principality was forbidden; that the Moldavian borders would be kept
intact entirely. C.U. Clark, “Basarabia, Rusia . . .” in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 88.
7
The hatisherifs were rescripts issued by the Sultan, for example after the conclusion of the 1774
peace or in 1802, in response to Russian demands, which imposed drastic limits on Ottoman political
suzerainty and economic privileges, established through the earlier ahidnames. K. Hitchins, The Roma-
nians. 1774-1866, p. 15.
8
Tomasso Tittoni, “Basarabia, Romania si Italia”, in Convorbiri Literare, 1927, p.16. Tittoni presents a
good definition of suzerainty, which he correctly considers as being different from sovereignty.
9
K. Hitchins, The Romanians. 1774-1866, p. 7.
10
For details regarding the organization of a Turkish raia see K Hitchins, The Romanians. 1774-1866, p.
9-10.
11
I. Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 23.
12
Still, the Turks did not try to denationalize the population living in those territories being satisfied
to only exploit it economically. S. Ciobanu, Basarabia . . ., p. 49.
13
Paul Cernovodeanu, Basarabia. Drama unei provincii romanesti in context politic international, 1806-1920, p.
9. Also, R.W. Seton-Watson, The History of the Romanians, p. 555-560.
14
For details on the faith of Bukovina under the Austrian rule, see Ioan Capreanu, Bucovina. Isotrie si
cultura romaneasca, passim.
15
T. Tittoni, “Basarabia, Romania si Italia” in Convorbiri Literare, p.15
16
The complicated Franco-Russian and Franco-Ottoman negotiations during the first decade of the
19th century regarding the future position of the Romanian principalities are very clearly presented in
P. Cernovodeanu, Basarabia . . . , p. 12-63. Also, I. Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 29-32, or A. Boldur,
Istoria Basarabiei, p. 281-288.
17
Ion Gherman, Istoria tragica a Bucovinei, Basarabiei si tinutul Hertei, p. 109.
18
P. Cernovodeanu, Basarabia . . . , p. 38-40.
19
F.C. Nanu, Politica externa a Romaniei, 1919-1933, p.106.
< 24 >
20
Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question . . . , p. 235-242. Van Meurs makes a very good analyze of the
political motivations behind the publishing by the Romanians of Marx’s comments in 1964.
21
By the Karlowitz Peace of January 1699 between the Poles and the Ottomans, although the former
applied pressure on the Ottomans to cede the northern parts of Moldavia to them, they received only
the territory of Podolia. The Ottomans argued that Moldova was independent and not theirs; there-
fore they could not give it away. I. Frunza, The rights of the Romanians upon Bessarabia, p. 13. Unfortu-
nately they were not able to maintain that position a century later.
22
Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question . . . , p. 47. Also, George F. Jewsburry, The Russian Annexation of
Bessarabia, p. 55.
23
Quoted in R.W. Seton-Watson, The History of the Romanians, p. 561.
24
For details on the Bulgarian colonization see Th. Holban, “Numarul bulgarilor din Basarabia” in
Basarabia Romana. Antologie, p. 527-532.
25
Irina Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania, p.93-94; also I. Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p.
46-47.
26
The colonization was initially generated by the necessity to fill Bessarabia with people, in order to
make possible a better exploitation of the newly acquired territory, and not for depriving it of its
Romanian character. The Russian Empire appealed not only to people inside the Russian Empire but
also to any other people willing to work and live under its authority in exchange for a piece of land.
It was in this area that “the Russians registered their greatest success.” G.F. Jewsburry, The Rus-
sian . . . , p. 66-74. Also, A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 276.
27
For a fair and concise description of Bessarabia’s situation under the Russian administration see K
Hitchins, Romania, 1866-1947, p. 239-250.
28
I. Scurtu, et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 57, 88.
29
Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question . . . , p. 48.
30
For a concise presentation of the Romanian Principalities during the Crimean War see P. Cerno-
vodeanu, Basarabia … , p. 64-70.
31
P Cernovodeanu, “Basarabia . . .”, p. 71-78. Although P. Cernovodeanu considers that the retroces-
sion of the southern part of Bessarabia to Moldavia meant a partial international recognition of the
illegality done in 1812 when Bessarabia went under Russian rule, the author of the present paper
considers that the retrocession came as a result of strategic reasons and had little to do with the 1812
Bucharest Peace Treaty.
32
R.W. Seton-Watson, The History of the Romanians, p. 562.
33
The war also offered the opportunity of a first contact between the Bessarabian and the Romanian
soldiers fighting together. Nicolae Ciachir, Basarabia sub stapanire tarista, 1812-1917, p. 57.
34
David MacKenzie, “Russia’s Balkan policies Under Alexander II” in Imperial Russian Foreign Policy, p.
239.
35
P. Cernovodeanu, Basarabia . . . , p. 87, 90.
36
For details regarding the position of Romania before the start of the 1877 and of her difficult nego-
tiations with Russia and the other Great Powers see B. Jelavich, Russia and the Formation of the Romanian
National State, 1821-1878, p. 227-259.
37
P. Cernovodeanu, Basarabia . . . , p. 96.
38
The Russian action in southern Bessarabia did not come as much a surprise to the leading Roma-
nian political circles. During the bilateral negotiations in 1876-1877 Ion C. Bratianu had been told by
the Russians that they do intend to take back southern Bessarabia but, having no other available
options, he decided to go on the Russian’s hand, hoping probably in a more happier outcome. When
the things cleared and the Russians took southern Bessarabia the focus of the entire Romanian
propaganda was on the Russian betrayal and not at all on the territory offered in exchange to Roma-
nia. Pamfil Seicaru, Romania in marele razboi, p. 57. Also B. Jelavich, Russia and the Formation . . . , p. 242-
244.
39
Xenia J. Eudin, Harold H. Fischer, Soviet Russia and the West, 1920-1927, p. XXIV.
< 25 >
40
B. Jelavich, Russia and the Formation . . . , p. 273-274.
41
For details on the Romanian position at the Berlin Peace Treaty negotiations see P. Cernovodeanu,
Basarabia . . . , p. 103-107; Also, B. Jelavich, Russia and the Formation . . . , p. 277-286.
42
B. Jelavich, Russia and the Formation . . . , p. 285. Still, on the other hand, Romanian public opinion
showed little enthusiasm for the acquisition of Dobrudja and thought it an unfair exchange for
southern Bessarabia. It was only in time and as a direct result of Romanian investments that the area
brought economic benefits to Romania.
43
B. Jelavich, The Establishment of the Balkan National States, p. 178.
44
Andrew Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, p. 134.
45
More information on the Romanian implication in the First and Second Balkan Wars is available
in Andrew Rossos, Russia and the Balkans, p. 134-152. For the Romanian account of events see the
memoirs of the Romanian prime minister at that time, Titu Maiorescu, in his book Romania, razboaiele
balcanice si Cadrilaterul, passim.
< 26 >
CHAPTER 2.
THE MAKING OF THE UNION BETWEEN BESSARABIA AND ROMANIA
Background
There are two different viewpoints regarding the 1918 Union between Bessara-
bia and Romania. Romanian historiography places the event in the context of the
long expected Union of all the Romanians into one state, a Greater Romania. Soviet
historiography considers it a military annexation of Bessarabia by Romania, achieved
through military means and by taking advantage of the situation in Russia at the end
of the First World War.
The Romanians argue that historically and demographically Bessarabia is Ro-
manian territory — that the Bessarabian population was made up mainly of Romani-
ans; and that the Ottoman Empire had no right to give it away to any other country.
The Russians simply consider that Bessarabia was taken (liberated) from the Otto-
man Empire and had become a Russian territory; in 1812 Romania did not exist as a
state and therefore could not have controlled Bessarabia. During the Soviet years, a
third viewpoint came into being, which is still promulgated today by some scholars
in the new Moldavian Republic. They consider that the Moldavians are neither Ro-
manians nor Russians but Moldavians, and they (the historians) are working hard to
combine the first two theories in order to build a history and a national feeling for
their people. In the view of the post-1990 events in Moldavia it must be admitted
that “the Soviet attempt to create the most artificial nationality of the USSR, the
Moldavians, and thus to hide the fact that over 2.8 million Romanians lived under
Soviet rule in a territory that once was part of the ethnic Romanian principality of
Moldavia”1 was, indeed, quite successful.
A description of the events in Bessarabia during 1917-1918 cannot be given
without referring to the events happening in the other parts of the Russian Empire,
and especially in Russia and Ukraine. The Bessarabians were not the only nationality
under strict Russian rule. All the nationalities had great hopes for their future and, as
< 27 >
the Empire entered the 20th century, its cohesion was decreasing because of the
spread of new ideas and the development of non-Russian national consciences
amidst all these populations. It became more and more difficult for the Empire to
maintain its unity and cohesion.
Bessarabia’s evolution was in many respects similar to that of other provinces;
the only difference that it decided in favor of unification with a state that had al-
ready existed before the war. In fact, the decision for Union is the point most hotly
contested by Soviet, Russian (and, today, by Moldavian) historiography. They do not
contest Bessarabia’s right to autonomy within the Russian Empire, or even its deci-
sion for independence, achieved on January 24, 1918 (the anniversary of the Union of
Walachia and Moldavia, 59 years earlier), but they draw the line when it comes to
the Union with Romania.
The main question is who, or what force, was behind the political events of
1917-1918 in Bessarabia, and how it affected those events. One underlying factor was
the awakening of national movements all over the Russian Empire, starting more or
less at the beginning of the 20th century. Scholars agree that without the events in
Russia there would have been no national awakening in Bessarabia. A second and
more complex factor is that of the national movement in Bessarabia. What kind of
nationalism was instigating the “hostilities” in Bessarabia — a Bessarabian, a Roma-
nian, a Moldavian, a Moldovan, or a Moldovan-Romanian nationalism?2 What was
the evolution of this nationalism and what were the factors that influenced it (and in
what degree)? To these questions it is difficult, if not impossible, to find an answer
accepted by all the scholars in the field; in the chapters to come, we will try to pre-
sent all the factors leading to the Union, while refraining from the attempt to con-
duct another exhaustive analysis of them. A third factor is the role played by the
quite sudden contact between Bessarabians and the Romanians living in Romania
and in Austria-Hungary during 1917-1918, a contact that had a significant influence
over the course of events in Bessarabia.
Nationality in the Bessarabian province is difficult to label. The descendants of
the Daco-Romanian population, the Romanians, populated the territory north of the
Danube River, including Bessarabia; they spoke the same language and shared the
same religion and customs, but they were divided into different political formations
or geographical regions. Before the development of the Romanian national con-
science, during the 19th century, the Romanians used to characterize themselves first
and foremost by using the regional denomination (such as “Moldovan”, “Regateni”,
“Olteni”, or “Ardeleni”). Local subdivisions also exist within these regions. Even to-
day, they continue to proudly call themselves by these regional names, but they do
consider themselves Romanians.
Until 1812, Bessarabia was a part of Moldavia and, since at that time the Roma-
nian national conscience was only in its nascent stages, it was quite normal for the
people living in Bessarabia to call themselves Moldavians and not Romanians. Be-
cause of their isolation from the other Romanian territories, due to Russian policy,
they called themselves Moldavians until 1918.
< 28 >
CHAPTER 2. THE MAKING OF THE UNION BETWEEN BESSARABIA AND ROMANIA
The controversy over the degree to which the Romanian-speaking people liv-
ing in Bessarabia are Moldavians and the degree to which they are Romanians is far
more recent.3 During the Russification process, the most powerful ally of the admini-
stration was the community (or identity) of religion, which was fully exploited. Due
to Russia’s control over the province, some differences did evolve between Bessara-
bia and the other Romanian-populated territories, such as the continued use of the
old Orthodox calendar.4 At the local level, among the peasants (the majority of the
population), there had been no interest — at least before 1917 — in political or na-
tional matters and whatever came from the official propaganda, including that from
the Church, was accepted as true. Both the Russian and Soviet propaganda exagger-
ated the differences between the Moldavians and the Romanians, to the point that
they finally managed to convince some Moldavians that they are, indeed, a distinct
people.
Therefore, the main difference between the Bessarabian Romanians and the
Romanians in other provinces can be ascribed to the Russian control over Bessarabia
for more than a century. Nobody can argue convincingly that there was a great dif-
ference between the people living on the left and on the right sides of the Pruth River
before 1812. During the 19th century, the survival of the Moldavian identity was en-
sured by traditionalism, plus the isolation, backwardness, repressive character and
Russification policies of the Tsarist Empire.5
While during the first years after the annexation there were no notable differ-
ences, by about the middle of the 19th century the situation started to change, due to
the increasing Western, and especially French, influence over the Romanian princi-
palities — an influence that brought about reforms and development, a new ideol-
ogy, new customs and, finally, a state of all the Romanians.6
At the same time, Bessarabia was kept inside the Russian sphere and away
from Western influences. This gave the Bessarabians both advantages and disadvan-
tages. While in Romania there was a conflict between the government and the
Church, caused by the secularization of the land belonging to the churches and mon-
asteries, there was no such conflict in Bessarabia, and the Bessarabian priests were
more than happy with their situation. Russian propaganda was very successful in
convincing the Bessarabians that, in fact, they had a much better life under the rule
of the Czars than the peasants had in Romania.7
Before the beginning of the 20th century, there were manifestations of national
conscience among the Romanians living in Bessarabia — perhaps not very wide-
spread, but interestingly diverse: the Bessarabian boyars’ fight to maintaining their
privileges and autonomy during the first years after annexation;8 the books printed
in Romanian by Iacob Hanculov and by Ioan Doncev;9 the Moldavian boyars’ crea-
tion of a small political party during 1862-1863;10 the presentations made all over Bes-
sarabia by Romanian-language theatre groups; the movement of Bessarabian stu-
dents in Dorpat (1898-1902);11 the publication in Chisinau of a Romanian-language
newspaper called Mesajerul Basarabiei (The Bessarabian Messenger) in 1884;12 the smug-
gling of Romanian-language books and publications into Bessarabia; and, no less
< 29 >
significant, the printing of religious books in Romanian.13 Still, the most important
manifestation was the continuing usage of Romanian, not only in the administration,
schools (until 1867, when the official use of Romanian language was forbidden)14 and
Church, but also in the daily life, especially by the peasants. Directly connected to
this last factor was the enormous distance separating the intellectuals from the mass
of the people all over the Russian Empire, and Bessarabia was no exception. The very
low level of education in Bessarabia made the peasants incapable of receiving the
Russian culture, which thus had no influence over them.15 All these manifestations,
and the failure of the Russification process, point to the existence in Bessarabia at
the turn of the century of a pre-modern mass proto-nationalism.16
The 1905 Revolution in Russia signaled the awakening of all the nationalities
in the Empire. Political programs were launched all over the Empire, at first with the
idea of federalization of the nationalities in Russia and later with the idea of auton-
omy. The nascent Moldavian intelligentsia started to stir.17 Unfortunately there was
only a very small group of them fighting for the rights of the Romanians in Bessara-
bia. The most representative parts of the society (the boyars, the clergy, and the
peasants), for different reasons, had neither the interest nor the will to fight for na-
tional rights.
The first open manifestations of Bessarabian nationalism came in the form of
the Romanian-language press. A first such newspaper, significantly called Bessarabia
and using Latin, not Cyrillic, characters, was printed during 1905 in Switzerland by
Zamfir Arbore and Petre Cazacu, representing the views of the Romanian National
Party in Bessarabia.18 Although its focus was on universal suffrage and land reform, it
also called for the use of the Moldavian language in administration, education and
churches, and went as far as to ask for Bessarabian autonomy.19
A new step was taken in 1906 through the publication in Chisinau of a Roma-
nian newspaper called Bessarabia, edited by a group of Moldavian students and intel-
lectuals, under the leadership of E. Gavrilita. Their demands were, again, mostly of a
social character, but they also asked for the provincial autonomy of Bessarabia (as it
had enjoyed before 1869), and for the use of the Moldavian (actually Romanian) lan-
guage in schools, church, and administration. But the newspaper was published only
for a few months. During that time, the newspaper served as the basis for the forma-
tion of a small Democratic Moldavian Party, founded by the same E. Gavrilita.20
On a different level, but in connection with the revolution in Russia, comes the
movement to encourage the use of Moldavian language in churches. This was initi-
ated from within the Church, surprisingly, by the Russian high clergymen who real-
ized that, in fact, most of the Moldavian peasants were quite unable to understand
their sermons in Russian. Therefore, they took a number of measures to have their
message penetrate the minds of the peasants, allowing the local priests to use the
Moldavian language in churches and reopening the Eparchial Typography, which
started publishing religious literature translated into Romanian.21 It is important to
note that this movement continued after 1907 and had a certain influence over the
great mass of Bessarabian peasants (which was almost indifferent to appeals coming
< 30 >
from the intelligentsia), preparing it for the 1917-1918 events.

Overall, the Bessarabian national movement during the 1905-1907 revolution in
Russia can be characterized, at best, as a weak one both in its manifestations (only a
few newspapers) and its adherence (limited to a very small number of intellectuals
and not including the boyars, the priests and the peasants — with some notable ex-
ceptions).22 It was also more social or cultural in nature rather than political.23 And,
although there are not many Romanian scholars stressing this point, it had a very
weak echo in Romania itself, where few intellectuals or political leaders expressed
any interest in the fate of the Bessarabians. The weakness and lack of support for
Bessarabian nationalism is best illustrated by the fact that no Moldavian (or Roma-
nian) was among those elected in 1906 to the new Imperial Duma.24
Needless to say, after 1906 the Russian reaction destroyed any national move-
ment inside the Empire, and in a very short time Bessarabian nationalism became
only a distant dream as many of its promoters had to move to Jassy, in Romania.25
The festivities the Russian administration organized in Bessarabia in 1912 to cele-
brate the 100th anniversary of the annexation were full of pomp and very few (in Bes-
sarabia or in Romania) people could have had the courage to raise the national flag
for the Bessarabians. Then, during the war and until the peak of the 1917 Revolution,
there were no new manifestations of Bessarabian nationalism,26 everybody being far
more concerned with the fate of Great Russia than with that of Romania or of the
Bessarabians. Even in Romania, almost everybody was looking towards the west
(Transylvania) and not to the east.27 Only after the beginning of the World War
were any voices heard in Romania (the best known of them was that of Constantin
Stere), and in some European capitals,28 arguing that the main objective of Roma-
nia’s policy should be the recovery of Bessarabia. One of the best descriptions of the
Bessarabian national conscience is to be found on Emmanuel De Martonne’s Report on
Bessarabia, presented to the French Committee of Study in July 1919:
It is not possible to deny that the national conscience was numb in Bessarabia
in 1914. One could think that it was the right time for Romania’s intervention if
she did not want to lose all the hopes of recovering a territory that seemed to
be lost definitively. Still, the events proved that it was not too late.29
Making the Union
One Romanian historian, Stefan Ciobanu, in The Union of Bessarabia, distin-

guishes two phases in the nationalities movement inside the Russian Empire, with
different particularities: national romanticism and national realism — which existed
both generally in Russia and in Bessarabia.
The first phase was the moment when different nationalities came to believe in
the Revolution and in the Provisional Government. People from all over the Empire
started to claim some national rights, as they had done in 1905; this was limited to
provincial autonomy, cultural autonomy, and use of their mother tongues in educa-
< 31 >
tion, church and administration. They held congresses and organized themselves
into political parties and societies. Unfortunately, the Provisional Government had a
radical tendency in resolving social problems and continued the policy of centraliza-
tion and Russification.
The second phase started when the different nationalities that made up the
Empire, disappointed by the Provisional Government’s policy, made the transition
from the idea of federalization to the idea of “self determination” or separation from
Russia through the creation of new independent states and/or unification with other
states.
Although not all scholars agree,30 it is generally considered that in Bessarabia
the Moldavian National Party, founded on March 20 (April 2), 1917 under the leader-
ship of Bessarabian boyar Vasile Stroescu, guided the national movement. The press
was the favored tool for communicating with the people and for propaganda, espe-
cially the Moldavian Word (Cuvant Moldovenesc) newspaper, which was printed as early
as 1913.31 In the beginning they asked only for social, economical and political rights.
Their program was published on April 2 (15), 1917, in Moldavian Word, with the Na-
tional Moldavian Party specifying its objectives: Bessarabia’s autonomy, which
meant having their own government (self-government); use of the Moldavian lan-
guage in schools, church, and administration; and the right to live a Moldavian life,
with their own customs. Later, other objectives were included, like the national and
citizens’ rights established by the Russian revolution, for example universal suffrage,
and freedom of speech, printing, assembly and religion.32
More or less simultaneously with the founding of the Moldavian National
Party, local Soviets of soldiers, peasants, and workers were formed, initially in the
Russian garrisons of major Bessarabian cities and later in smaller towns as well. On
May 1 (14), 1917, a gathering of some 10,000 Moldavian officers and soldiers in
Odessa demanded political autonomy for Bessarabia and announced the formation of
separate Moldavian army units to maintain public order.33 Also, the Bessarabian stu-
dents and soldiers in Odessa and Kiev organized into groups and started working in
favor of the Bessarabian cause, editing Moldavian-language publications addressed
to the Bessarabian soldiers.34
One of the most important factors at this beginning was the contact between
the Bessarabians and the Transylvanian Romanians who, because of the war, were
present in great numbers all over the Russian Empire. It seems that under their im-
pulse and taking advantage of their experience in fighting for national rights, the
Bessarabian nationalist propaganda began to reach the masses.35
The first manifestation of Bessarabian nationalism among the peasants came
during the first meeting of the Soviet of Deputies of the Peasants in Chisinau, May
21-24 (June 3-6). After insisting on the right to speak their own language, and on
Bessarabian autonomy, the Moldavian deputies decided to leave the Congress and to
organize their own Moldavian Congress.36 It was an important step for the national
movement, although in the end the Moldavian peasants were brought back together
with the representatives of the other nationalities in Bessarabia (through the efforts
< 32 >
of I.D. Sokolov, the representative of the Petrograd Soviet of Soldiers and Workers)
and approved the Petrograd-made decisions regarding Bessarabia.37
During the first months of the Revolution propaganda played a very important
role. Because there were so many political and national orientations, there was a real
“boom” of publications printed in Bessarabia and, most important, in the Romanian
language. This proves that all the parties involved realized the importance of the
great mass represented by the Moldavian peasants and soldiers in the “sudden” birth
of Bessarabian nationalism. The use of Moldavian language in publications (even in
those published by the enemies of Bessarabian nationalism)38 and more and more
often in schools, church, army and even the administration, was a real boost for the
Bessarabian national feelings. Therefore, unlike during 1905-1907, the propaganda
was able to penetrate the masses.
The first enemy of Bessarabia’s autonomy was the Ukrainian Republic, which
was created in June 1917. Ukraine took the view that Bessarabia was part of Ukraine
and was especially opposed to the inclusion of the Hotin (in the north) and Acker-
man (south) districts within the Bessarabian territory.39
One by one, other organizations, like the National Peasants’ Party, the Molda-
vian Progressive Party, and professional leagues, were brought into existence and
they too argued in favor of the two main ideas of the Revolution — land reform and
autonomy — especially among the army and the intellectuals. It was not always a
fair fight, and intimidation by force and political assassinations were often used.40
The evolution toward autonomy was partially influenced by the Congress of
the Peoples Living in Russia, held in Kiev, September 8-14 (21-27); a Bessarabian
delegation leaded by Teofil Iancu and Vasile Cijevski took part. The Congress de-
cided in the favor of national autonomy for the nations living inside the Russian Em-
pire. It offered a good tribune for the Bessarabians to express their nationalist feel-
ings.41
Between October 20 and 27 (November 2-9), 1917, the “Congress of Moldavian
Soldiers” was held in Chisinau; about 900 delegates representing more than 250,000
people took part (including both officers and soldiers). The Congress took a number
of decisions, the most important being autonomy, the nationalization of the Molda-
vian army (fighting under the command of Russian general Scerbacev, together with
troops from other parts of the Empire), land reform and especially the convening of a
National Assembly.42 It should be mentioned that they considered as part of Bessara-
bia those territories east of Dniestr that were populated by Moldavians, and ac-
corded those Moldavians the right to send ten representatives to the future National
Assembly.
On November 2 (15), the Bolsheviks published the famous Declaration regard-
ing the rights of all the peoples in Russia, which was, together with the similar Proc-
lamation made by the Kerensky Government on September 25 (October 8), the legal
basis for the national movements all over the Russian Empire.
After the elections,43 the Sfatul Tserii (the Council of the Country), opened its
debates at Chisinau on November 21 (December 4), 1917. The Sfatul Tserii was an in-
< 33 >
stitution created and organized like an ordinary provincial Diet, with the duties of
coordinating the political and administrative life and, most important, preparing for
autonomy. There were 150 deputies in the newly made Council (105 Romanians, 15
Ukrainians, 14 Jewish, 7 Russians, 2 Germans, 2 Bulgarians, 2 Gagauz, 1 Polish, 1 Ar-
menian, 1 Greek). The Sfatul Tserii was proclaimed the highest institution in Bessara-
bia and then an executive body was elected from its members. The executive body
was named “The Council of the General Directors” and was composed of a President
Director and ten General Directors; it had the basic attributes of a government. It
also took a number of important decisions regarding other questions of immediate
interest, such as agrarian reform, universal suffrage, human rights, minorities’ rights,
workers’ rights, the national army, the death penalty and so on.44
The government in Petrograd recognized the newly elected body as representa-
tive for Bessarabia. Politically, in the new Parliament all the political forces were rep-
resented: the National Moldavian Bloc (with about 47%), the Peasant Faction
(20%), the social democrats, the social-revolutionaries, and the landowners.45
A dispute regarding the constitutionality of the Sfatul Tserii was generated by
Soviet historiography.46 But their arguments led to the conclusion that almost all the
other similarly constituted assemblies (the Ukrainian Rada, for example) on Russian
territory were unconstitutional. Given that the Sfatul Tserii was elected on a fair ba-
sis, representing not only the existing political groups but all the nationalities and
all the professions in Bessarabia, its constitutionality is beyond doubt.
On December 2, (15) 1917, in Chisinau, the Sfatul Tserii proclaimed the auton-
omy of the Moldavian Democratic Republic.
Bessarabia is proclaimed from today the Democratic Republic of Moldavia, as a

member with equal rights inside the Russian Federative Democratic Repub-
lic.47
On the basis of national self-determination, both the Petrograd Soviet and the
Council of People’s Commissars recognized the new Moldavian Republic, its gov-
ernment, and its Assembly.48
On December 8 (21), a delegation of the Sfatul Tserii went to Jassy to seek mili-
tary help from the Entente against the armed groups of cashiered soldiers. All they
received were promises.
Another important element in the equation was the state of war. In 1916, the
Russian and Romanian Armies were fighting together on the eastern front. Because
of events in Moscow, the problems inside the Russian Army deepened more and
more in 1917. There had been numerous riots and desertions caused by the lack of
provisions and the lack of will to fight. Soldiers started stealing food from the peas-
ants. Disorder was gaining in proportion along the eastern front (which crossed Ro-
manian territory). The Romanian authorities, with the approval of the Allied repre-
sentatives in Jassy, decided to take action against Bolshevik troops on Romanian
territory, at first by gradually arresting the members of the soldiers’ leading “Soviets”
< 34 >
and later by disarming the troops and preventing them from reaching the capital city
of Jassy.49 As a consequence, fighting broke out between the two armies that were
supposed to be collaborating against the Germans (as when the Russian attacked
Galatz, a Romanian city50). Unfortunately, Russian soldiers (or deserters) fleeing the
Romanians had to cross through Bessarabia, where they went on with their robbing
and pillaging.
The reaction in Moscow to the Romanian Army’s action against Russian
troops was very prompt. The entire personnel of the Romanian Legation in Moscow
was arrested and jailed on December 31, 1917 (January 13, 1918). As a result of the in-
tervention organized by other diplomats in Moscow, the Romanian representatives
were liberated after three days and were ejected from the country.51 Ten days later,
on January 13 (26), as a direct result of the Romanian Army entering Bessarabia, the
People’s Commissars decided to break off diplomatic relations with Romania (see
Annex No. 1). The only effective action it could take in this sense, due to its conflict
with the White Russians, was to seize the Romanian National Treasury in Moscow
(transported there for safekeeping during 1917), which it duly confiscated and sealed
on the same day. In fact, the Bolsheviks were so weak that, as one scholar presents it,
“Romania, herself defeated by Germany, still felt strong enough to encroach upon
Russian territory, a situation which would have seemed fantastic before 1917 or after
1921”.52
The Romanians argue that the Petrograd Government had no right to confis-
cate the Treasury in retaliation for their intervention in Bessarabia, after having sol-
emnly proclaimed that each of the nationalities living in the former Russian Empire
had the right to separate itself from the Russian Empire. Moreover, at Brest Litovsk,
they did not express any claims over Bessarabia.53
The situation in Bessarabia was worse than in Romania. The civil war between
the different military groups was bringing the population to a state of terror. Armed
robberies became a constant threat. The situation was such that, in mid-December,
in Chisinau there were no fewer than nine different committees, each one rejecting
the authority of the Sfatul Tserii.54 There was almost complete anarchy, fueled by the
Bolshevik propaganda and actions and by the Sfatul Tserii’s lack of the human and
material resources necessary to end the violence.
At the second congress of the RUMCEROD (the Central Executive Committee
of the Soviets of the Romanian Front, the Black Sea Fleet, and the Odessa Region —
a communist organization claiming control over southern Ukraine), a resolution
condemning the Sfatul Tserii was adopted and it was decided to take action against it
(December 27-January 9). The Front Section (Frontotdel), made up of hard-line Bol-
sheviks, was sent to Chisinau. On January 1 (14), 1918, the Frontotdel captured stra-
tegic locations and buildings in the city and proclaimed itself in command of the
Russian troops on the Romanian front and in Bessarabia, challenging the authority
of the Sfatul Tserii.55
The Bolsheviks attempted to take power for themselves by abolishing the Sfatul
Tserii and arresting the elected deputies, replacing it with a self-proclaimed Molda-
< 35 >
vian Soviet. None of its members were ethnic Moldavian; and this ethnic pattern
would repeat itself later, when the leadership of the Bessarabian communist party
mostly consisted of non-Moldavian individuals.56 However, the Bolshevik plan failed
when the Romanian Army intervened, at the request of the Sfatul Tserii.
The leaders of the Sfatul Tserii twice sent to Jassy for military assistance against
the Bolsheviks, but the Allies could do nothing and the only force able to intervene
efficiently in Bessarabia was the Romanian Army. At the time, as a result of both the
Russian and the Bolshevik propaganda, there were some reservations in Bessarabia
regarding the implication of a possible intervention by the Romanian Army. That
was seen as a potential first step towards union with Romania.57 In order to avoid
such a situation in the future, the Allied representatives in Jassy gave, on January 2
(15), a written guarantee to the Bessarabian authorities regarding Romanian military
intervention:
This is purely a military measure, as its only object is to guarantee the normal
functioning of service for the Russo-Romanian front, in conformity with the
rules established in the belligerent countries. Thus, this cannot affect in any
way the actual or future politics of Bessarabia.58
On January 6 (19), 1918, the Romanian government decided that a group of

Transylvanian former war prisoners in Russia, arriving from Kiev, should take up
positions in Chisinau in order to defend the storage houses from looting.59 As soon as
they arrived there, the Bolsheviks, who had launched their insurrection on January 7,
seized their guns and sent them back where they came from. On that insurrectional
day the Bolsheviks, under the leadership of Caabac, cracked down on the Sfatul Tserii,
arresting its deputies and all the Romanian officers they found in Chisinau.60
In order to stop the disorder, at the request of both the Bessarabian authorities
and the Entente Powers, with a written request from General Scerbacev, the Roma-
nian Army crossed the border into Bessarabia on January 10 (23).61 In a matter of
days, it had liberated Chisinau, and it defeated all the Bolshevik troops during the
following weeks, establishing peace (actually, the end of looting) in Bessarabia. The
military intervention was supposed to be temporary and was expected to end as
soon as the mission (defending the railway and the depots) was completed. But in
the larger scheme of things, Romania’s decision to intervene militarily in Bessarabia
is justified for another reason: during the 19th century, neither Bismarck nor Cavour
had hesitated to use military action as a complement to their diplomatic sallies in
order to achieve the unification of their states. It does not seem extraordinary that
the Romanians should do the same. They simply seized an opportunity and did what
other nations had done, trying to repeat their success.
Petrograd’s reaction to the Romanian action came the same day; the Russian
Government broke off diplomatic relations with Romania. It should be mentioned
that, although at the beginning the Romanian Army was not very welcome in Bes-
sarabia, the advantages of a return to relative peace and order, plus the continuing
< 36 >
assurances from the Romanian generals that they had no intention of interfering in
Bessarabia’s political life (and the Allied representatives’ assurances that it was only
a temporary intervention), made many Bessarabians — including Ion Inculet, the
president of the Sfatul Tserii — change their opinion.62
The Ukrainian Rada raised no claims over Bessarabia before or after the signing
of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty with the Central Powers on January 27, which was
understood by both the Bessarabians and the Romanians as a confirmation that it
did not consider Bessarabia to be a part of Ukraine.63
A new step was made on January 1918, the date when Ukraine was proclaimed
an independent state, breaking any direct connections between Bessarabia and
Petrograd. On January 24 (February 5), 1918 (a date chosen for its special signifi-
cance, as it was the date of the union between Moldavia and Walachia), the Sfatul
Tserii proclaimed, not without an intense debate between the pro-independence and
pro-autonomy groups, the independence of Moldavia.64 During the following weeks,
the question of unification with Romania became one of the most urgent topics of
debate. The Sfatul Tserii realized that it was less and less able to control the situation
and to organize itself as a real administration (it could not levy taxes or organize an
army), so it decided to convene the People’s Assembly to decide the “union” ques-
tion.
During February, the situation of the Romanian refugees in Odessa worsened
considerably as a result of aactions initiated by the Rumcerod, under the leadership of
Christian Rakovsky. A large number of Romanian refugees had been arrested, at
Rakovsky’s orders, and were being detained together with the Romanian officials
arrested in Chisinau at the beginning of January, in miserable conditions, in Odessa.
The Rumcerod sent a number of notes to the Romanian Government, asking for the
withdrawal of its Army from Bessarabia and for the Allies’ mediation in the conflict
between Romania and the Rumcerod.65
On February 18, 1918, Russia signed the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty with the
Central Powers. As a direct consequence, Romania remained alone on the eastern
front.
Important to our subject, because it was used as one of the main arguments in
favor of Soviet claims to Bessarabia, is the treaty regarding the end of the Russo-
Romanian conflict, signed on February 20 (March 5), 1918. By this treaty, Romania
undertook to evacuate Bessarabia during the following two months. Russian histori-
ography insists that Romania failed to respect this treaty by refusing to withdraw its
army and that, in order to find a justification to the continuous presence of the Ro-
manian Army in Bessarabia, the Romanian Government influenced the Sfatul Tserii to
declare the union of Bessarabia with Romania.
The Romanian Prime Minister at that time, General Al. Averescu, opened nego-
tiations with the Rumcerod through the offices of Italy’s representative in Jassy, Fas-
ciotti, who was the dean of the diplomatic missions. His aim was to improve the
general situation of Romania (by having peace at east), to secure the Romanian
< 37 >
army’s depots of materials and food in Bessarabia, and especially to help a great num-
ber of Romanian deputies and officers66 detained in Odessa by the Rumcerod.
Averescu accepted almost all of the conditions presented by Rakovsky, adding as a
preliminary condition the liberation of the Romanian prisoners.67 In addition to the
main agreement three protocols were signed, referring to an exchange of prisoners,
the return of Russian soldiers in Romania in case of Romania making peace, a gen-
eral political amnesty for Romanian political emigrants and deserters, and the
evacuation of the Ackerman district.68 But because the Rumcerod had to flee Odessa,
as soon as February 27, the exchange of prisoners did not take place and the treaty
was never applied.69 Adding to the controversy over this unimplemented agreement
is the fact that the independent Moldavian Republic was not invited to sign it.70
Therefore, the agreement was not binding on the Moldavian Republic, which was
free to decide her own future.
On March 27 (April 9), 1918, the Sfatul Tserii proclaimed, in a very festive atmos-
phere,70 the Union of Moldavia with Romania — but with conditions such as pro-
vincial autonomy for Bessarabia after incorporation, agrarian reform, and universal
suffrage, as well as a number of other political and social reforms.71 Some scholars
argue that the new relationship with Romania, as the Moldavians saw it, was to be
based upon federalist principles.72 The result of the vote for the Union was: in favor,
86 votes; against, 3 votes; abstentions, 36; and absentees 13 (of the 138 members).
The March 27 (April 9) resolution of the Sfatul Tserii that decided upon the un-
ion with Romania stated:
In the name of and on behalf of the people of Bessarabia, the Country’s Council
[Sfatul Tserii] declares that the Moldavian Democratic Republic [Bessarabia] —
within her boundaries formed by the Pruth, the Dniestr, the Black Sea and the
old frontiers with Austria — which had been cut off by Russia more than one
hundred years ago from the body of old Moldavia — in keeping with her his-
torical national rights, and on the principle that one nation alone should decide
upon her fate, decides to unite from now on with the motherland — Roma-
nia.73
On April 4 (17) 1918, Ferdinand, the King of Romania, ratified the unification of
Bessarabia with Romania.
The reasons for including the conditions were related to both the situation in
Bessarabia (where a land reform was underway, while in Romania it was still only
theoretical) and the dissatisfaction with the pro-German orientation of the Roma-
nian Government leaded by Alexandru Marghiloman. Although the Transylvanian,
Bukovina and Bessarabian nationalisms developed on different coordinates they
came to have a significant common feature: they made ratification of their own rights
and execution of the land reform (promised in the Old Kingdom in 1917) a prerequi-
site for union into a Greater Romania.74 However, on November 27 (December 10),
after implementing the land reform and because the war had ended, the Sfatul Tserii
< 38 >
renounced to these conditions and proclaimed the Union without conditions.75

When the Union was proclaimed, the Ukrainian government sent a number of
notes to Romania, asking at first for a plebiscite in those Bessarabian territories that
were populated mainly by Ukrainians, and then for the incorporation of the entire
Bessarabia to Ukraine.76 However, in just a few months, the Ukrainian government
ceased sending notes of protest, and its relations with Romania improved. Russian
Foreign Commissar Gheorghi Cicerin also sent a note to the Romanian authorities to
protest the incorporation of Bessarabia, accusing them of not respecting the will of
the masses and of acting in the interests of the landowners (it is interesting that he
mentions the same landowners who were permanently fighting against the Union).77
Nevertheless, both the Central Powers and the Entente Powers gave their approval
to the Union.
The last internal action regarding the Union was its ratification, on December
20, 1919, by the newly-elected Romanian Parliament, which was made up of deputies
representing all the regions of Greater Romania, including Bessarabia. International
recognition of Bessarabia’s union with Romania came on October 28, 1920 when Ro-
mania, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan signed the Bessarabian Treaty. That
document and the maneuverings that took place before and after its signing form the
central focus of the chapters to come.
Delays in Romania’s Ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty
Although the Bessarabian Treaty signified the much-desired international rec-

ognition of the union, the Romanian government was slow in ratifying it, and was, in
fact, not even the first of the signatories to do so.
The first attempt to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty was made on November 22,
1921, when the Romanian Foreign Minister, Take Ionescu, sent a report to the Coun-
cil of Ministers asking for the Council’s agreement for the draft law regarding ratifi-
cation. The Council decided, on December 2, 1921, that the draft should be sent to
the Parliament for the necessary debates. On the same day, King Ferdinand also ap-
proved the sending of the draft to the Parliament, together with a Message in which
the reasons for ratification were presented. After underscoring the historical argu-
ments and the way in which the union had been made, the Message presents the
Treaty itself, stating, “Through this Convention the international side of Bessarabia’s
union with Romania has been closed definitively . . . the Bessarabian question exists
no more for the Romanian government”.78 But due to political events in Romania —
the fall of the Averescu government, followed a short time later by that of the Take
Ionescu government — the first ratification attempt failed.
In January 1922, the Liberal Party came back to power in Romania. Among the
actions they took in an effort to boost their image, they ratified the Bessarabian
Treaty. Unfortunately, their action came only after the British government an-
nounced that it had already ratified theTreaty and, most probably, as a direct result
of the French and British insistence for the ratification by all the signatories during
< 39 >
the meetings of the Conference of Ambassadors (March 15). On March 27, 1922, I.G.
Duca, the new Foreign Minister, sent the draft law to the Council of Ministers and
the King, asking for the requisite approval before sending the draft to the Parlia-
ment. The very next day his request was approved and the draft law, together with a
Message, was sent to the Parliament.79 On April 3 and 7 respectively, the Senate and
the Chamber unanimously adopted the law for the ratification of the Bessarabian
Treaty.80 On April 13, King Ferdinand gave his approval. The last step was taken in
the second half of May, when the ratification was officially deposited in Paris. The
Romanian minister to France, Victor Antonescu, signed the procès verbal regarding
the deposit of the Romanian ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty on May 19, 1922.81
After the deposit of the ratification in Paris, the Treaty was published in the Official
Monitor on August 8, 1922.
The question is why, when it would only take two weeks to ratify the Bessara-
bian Treaty, and when all the political parties were in agreement that it must be rati-
fied, did it take so long to do so?
And even then, to what extent did the ratification come about as a normal ac-
tion for Romania? Was it a result of her finally understanding the need to have the
Treaty brought into force before the Genoa Conference? Or was it actually triggered
by the British ratification? For unknown reasons, Romanian historiography carefully
avoids mentioning the fact that Great Britain was the first signatory state to ratify
the Bessarabian Treaty.
The only reason that could have justified the delay of the Romanian ratification
is the controversy between Romania and the Great Powers, during 1921, regarding
the status of the Danube. As the Bessarabian Treaty weakened the Romanian posi-
tion regarding the control of navigation on the Danube, the government might have
postponed its ratification in order to be in a better position during the negotiations
over the future status of Danube. Another possible reason (but one that does not
justify the delay) might be related to the internal political situation in Romania —
especially with regard to the policy of the Liberal Party, which was more than will-
ing to use anything that might have a positive influence over public opinion
(including ratification) in order to boost its electoral chances.
The Aftermath of the Union
Not everyone in Bessarabia was happy about the Union. A number of groups
opposed it, the most important of them being that of the former Russian civil ser-
vants. They could not imagine relinquishing their jobs and privileges; and many of
them only spoke the Russian language. On the other hand, they were afraid of com-
munism, which probably would have had a similar effect on their jobs. They hoped
that the White Army would succeed in its fight against the communists, and they
kept close relations with General Denikin, offering him considerable financial sup-
port. They disliked the Romanian State and refused to be sworn in for Romania, but
they did not resign from their administrative positions (a good job is always hard to
< 40 >
find). They continued to use theRussian language in their official activity. The old
administrative system, based on the zemstvo system, was still working and tried to
take on some of the government’s powers by imposing special taxes.
The great landowners were another category. The General Land Committee
was overseeing the nationalization of the great estates, including Church properties,
and of the Moldavians’ wealth. The landowners later started a powerful action
against the Romanian State, requesting compensation for the land. While they were
grateful to the Romanian Army for saving their lives, they were also unhappy be-
cause they did not receive back their land.
In the beginning, the Romanian government did not intervene directly in Bes-
sarabia’s administration, because of the war. However, the situation changed in Oc-
tober 1918. Without too much noise, the zemstva were abolished. In just a few weeks,
the administrative powers were transferred from zemstvo to government, and the old
Russian civil servants were dismissed, with the exception of those who chose to be
sworn in for Romania.
The economic situation of Bessarabia was very difficult. Because of the war,
there was inflation and many goods were unavailable. Speculation in goods and
money became the norm. The Romanian currency (called the “leu”) was refused in
many places and the ruble-leu exchange rate was arbitrarily established. The central
authorities tried to stop the speculation, but it was very difficult. The local authori-
ties were constantly asking for more money from the Romanian government (and
not from the Russian representatives), but they were very nervous when Romanian
public servants made inquiries about how it was being spent.
Still, it should be acknowledged that, because of the war, the first months of
the Romanian administration in Bessarabia (where the agricultural base had not suf-
fered as it had in Romania proper), were not very “liberating” for the new province.
Requisitions by the Army (which was forced, in conformity with the Bucharest
Treaty, to make requisitions for the Germans) and some measures taken by the pro-
German government in Bucharest, were not received well at all in Bessarabia.82 The
situation was complicated by the German-sponsored Ukrainian propaganda that
emphasized that, unlike the Romanian Army, the German Army intended to pay
something in exchange for the requisitions, and that the Bessarabians would fare
better under German occupation.
The Romanian government did not impose its own legislation and administra-
tion on Bessarabia at once. Bessarabia was integrated into Romania step by step. The
administrative integration was completed in June 1925, when the Romanian Parlia-
ment voted the “Law of Administrative Unification”. Within a few years, Romanian
public servants filled the vacuum created by resignation of the former Russian civil
servants. However, their corruption and the fact that they were named from Bucha-
rest (some of them considered this assignment a punishment, and tried to take re-
venge on the Bessarabian population), and the difficulty for Bessarabians to obtain
jobs in the civil administration, certainly displeased the local population. Some
scholars consider that, for the Romanian administration, Bessarabia was quite the
< 41 >
opposite of Transylvania: a particularly backward, refractory, and incendiary region,

whose problems were then compounded by its use as a bureaucratic exile for incom-
petent, corrupt or politically out-of-favor administrators.83 They also argue that the
province had been perhaps the worst governed of all Romanian provinces in the
interwar years, which is to say that it was very badly governed indeed.84 Still, in fair-
ness to the Romanians, it should be noted that even with such bad administration,
the results were incomparably positive compared to those of the Russian admini-
stration. The Bessarabians’ living standard improved — and there had been plenty of
corruption in the Bessarabian administration even before 1918.
But not only the Bessarabians were not pleased with the new administration.
The Transylvanian leaders too were disappointed by the attitude of those from the
Old Kingdom.85 The army, the high administrative positions, and the Foreign Service
remained strongholds of the Walachians and Moldavians, with some notable excep-
tions.86 In a sense, it was the same situation as in the new Serbo-Croato-Sloven
Kingdom, with the “Regateni” (individuals from the Old Kingdom) playing the role
of the Serbs.87 The central government’s treatment of the new, and sometimes more
highly developed, provinces (like Transylvania) was one of the reasons behind the
permanent discontent in the newly acquired territories. Certainly, the root of the
problem lay not only the Romanian government’s attitude toward the newly ac-
quired territories but also in the expectations of the people living in those territories
regarding the changes the union would bring. Of course, those changes came at a
very slow pace and did not always coincide with what was expected. Today’s Roma-
nia, in which is not at all difficult to find people arguing that life was better during
the communist rule, offers an excellent example in this sense.
At the same time, the fear of communist propaganda spread by laborers influ-
enced the economic policy of the Romanian ruling circles. That policy had a deleteri-
ous effect on Bessarabia’s economic development and led to the stagnation of its in-
dustry and its agriculture.88 During the economic crisis of 1929-1933, which affected
agriculture especially, Bessarabia suffered more than Walachia and Transylvania,
contributing to the Bessarabians’ dissatisfaction with the Romanian administration.
The corruption and abuses, some of which had been remarked even by the Great
Powers’ representatives in Romania, were still present in Bessarabians’ memory (of
course, with a little help from communist propaganda) even as late as 1990.
In fairness to the Romanian Administration, it should be said that during the
fifty years of communism, Russia fully utilized the realm of propaganda to deter Bes-
sarabia from any possible future union with Romania, by exaggerating the negative
aspects of the Romanian Administration during the interwar period. Any possible
comparison with the situation in the aftermath of the 1812 Russian occupation of
Bessarabia was carefully avoided, and there was never any mention of the fact that
the first Russian officials, both military and civil, were incompetent and corrupt. As
Count Kiselev describes the situation: “Everything is for sale, and the prefects are
obliged to steal more than the rest, as they have paid 20,000 or 30,000 rubles apiece
for their nomination”.89 The Soviet propaganda also constantly avoided mentioning
< 42 >
the progress made during the new administration in many fields, especially in educa-
tion and transportation,90 and that, precisely because of this Romanian Administra-
tion, no Bessarabian peasant died of starvation during the great Soviet famine of
1929-1931.
In 1940, the situation of Bessarabia changed. On August 23, 1939, Germany and
the Soviet Union signed the famous Non-Aggression Pact and Secret Protocol, by
which the former received Germany’s “blessing” or neutrality regarding her claims
over Bessarabia. After a concerted military preparation, and taking advantage of the
disruptions in Europe at that time (France had been defeated by Germany), on June
26, 1940, Molotov gave Romania an ultimatum, demanding the total withdrawal of
the Romanian army and administration from Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. It
was only the German intervention that made the Russians stop short of taking all of
Bukovina. In the end, the Romanian government gave up Bessarabia and northern
Bukovina (plus the Herta territory, taken by the Russian army “by mistake”) with-
out fight. A very painful evacuation followed. One year later, Bessarabia was the mo-
tive for Romania to enter the war against the Soviet Union; and it was liberated in a
short time by the Romanian and German armies. But in 1944, the Soviets reoccupied
Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. During the Paris peace negotiations after the Sec-
ond World War, no voice in the international community rose to contest the “rights”
of the Soviet Union over these territories acquired from Romania.
Comments
Russian historians have found it easy to explain the vote in favor of union ac-
cording to the old official line (military aggression, oppression of the will of the peo-
ple); but, as previously stated, curiously enough they contested only the Union, not
the idea of autonomy within the Russian federation.
Perhaps the new communist government would have accepted (at least tempo-
rarily) independence for the Bessarabian territory, as it did for the Baltic States; but a
union of that territory with Romania was something else altogether. For a big power
like Russia to lose territory to a little country like Romania was unthinkable. And
the more powerful the Bolshevik government became, the more the Bessarabian
problem rankled. The Bessarabian situation went against everything in the Russian
tradition of foreign policy, a tradition in which Russia accepted the loss of territory
only when it was defeated by a coalition of great powers, and even then only as a
“temporary” setback. It was also a matter of international image for the Russians.
The best proof of this attitude was given to the Romanians in 1878, when the Rus-
sians took back southern Bessarabia, even though they had an alliance with Romania
(in a sense, Romania did the same to them in 1918). And they expressed this point of
view during the 1924 negotiations between the Soviets and Romania:
There is not the slightest analogy between the formation of new States on the
territory of the former Russian Empire [referring to the Baltic States] and the
< 43 >
seizure of Bessarabia by Romania. In the former case the Soviet Government, in

a number of peace treaties, voluntarily sanctioned the creation of these new
states and yielded to them a part of its own territory. In the latter case, a
neighboring State seized a part of Soviet territory by arms. . . 91
Russian Imperial pride was not abandoned or forgotten by the Soviets; indeed,
they went on developing their country until it became a superpower. The conse-
quences of their policy of territorial enlargement has impacted many of their
neighboring states.
Romanian historiography has analyzed the Union many times. The historical
and demographic arguments appear to offer the best background: before 1812, Bes-
sarabia belonged to the principality of Moldavia (which had a special status inside
the Ottoman Empire), and the majority of the Bessarabian population were Molda-
vian and spoke Romanian. Nonetheless, experts agree that without the Russian
Revolution, the Union never would have been possible. Events in Bessarabia paral-
leled those in Russia, and each phase of the Revolution had a similar phase in Bes-
sarabia. Early on, the revolution in Russia was social in nature, and later it became,
in part, a nationalities’ revolution: a revolution against Russian domination by non-
Russian peoples that had been incorporated into the Russian Empire. To some ex-
tent it was the same force that acted toward the dissolution of the Soviet Union at
the beginning of the 1990s.
Another important reason for the movement toward independence was the
fear of communism. The Bessarabian leaders were landowners and intellectuals, not
“workers”. Because industry was weak in Bessarabia, there was no working class.
The fearful image of a communist takeover had a certain influence over the Bessara-
bians’ decisions. The communist threat was one of the strongest impetuses for the
Romanian government to ask the Great Powers for help in making the Soviet Union
accept the Union.
Still, the most important factor to analyze is the national movement in Bessara-
bia. The transition from the pre-existing proto-nationalism to a modern nationalism
in such a short period of time requires some explaining. The factors driving the tran-
sition are clear enough; the challenge lies in establishing which were the dominant
factors and what role each of them played. The existence of pre-modern proto-
nationalism, fueled especially by the continuing use of Romanian language and cus-
toms92 in large parts of the society, is definitely a starting point. The roles of the
other factors have been analyzed at length, elsewhere, and for the present we will
simply enumerate them once again:
1. The failure of the Russification process;93

2. The fact that Romanian and Bessarabian soldiers fought side by side dur-
ing the First World War;
3. The development of a national conscience among the Bessarabian sol-
diers;94
< 44 >
4. The example of nationalist successes in other parts of the Russian Empire;

5. The activity in favor of the Romanian national cause, on the part of Tran-
sylvanians and Bukovinians acting in Bessarabia and in other parts of the
Russian Empire;95
6. Actions that favored the Bessarabian cause, in Romania, by personalities
like Nicolae Iorga and Constantin Stere.
7. The Bessarabian intelligentsia. Romanian intellectuals came from rural
areas and they were still strongly connected to the rural reality; this con-
nection proved to be their greatest advantage in promoting the national
idea. These “rural intellectuals” undertook to initiate the agrarian reform.
They understood that, for the peasants, land was the biggest issue; they
sought to implement agrarian reform, knowing that the peasants would
side with whoever gave them land.
8. The peasants — the majority of the Bessarabian people;96
9. Contact with the Romanian army and administration during 1918;97
10. The Bessarabian clergy and the movement within the Church;
11. Progressive ideas, coming from the Russian Revolution, which reverber-
ated strongly with the Bessarabian masses;
12. The “general mood” of the times, in which union was the ideal not only of
the Romanians but also of many other nations in the Central and Eastern
European area.
13. Finally, the notion that there was just an inkling of a national movement
at the time, and that Romania’s military intervention was the main factor
behind the events that took place.98
< 45 >
ANNEX
Decree of the People’s Commissars

Breaking Relations With Romania
January 26, 1918
The Romanian monarchy tried to save itself, its landowners and its bankers by
seizing Bessarabia and turning it into a rampart against the powerful torrent of the
Russian Revolution . . . In all these bloody crimes the Commander-in-Chief of the
Romanian front, General Scerbacev, takes one of the leading roles.
As a protest and a warning, the Council of People’s Commissars ordered the
short-term arrest of the Romanian Ambassador; this step proved ineffective.
1. All diplomatic relations with Romania are severed, and the Romanian rep-
resentatives are to leave the country by the shortest route.
2. The Romanian gold reserve held in Moscow is not to be touched by the
Romanian oligarchy. The Soviet Government assumes responsibility for the
safekeeping of this reserve and will hand it over to the Romanian nation.
3. The former Commander-in-Chief of the Romanian front, General Scer-
bacev, who has risen against the Revolution, is declared an enemy of the people
and an outlaw.99
< 46 >
Notes
1
Dennis Deletant, “Language Policy and Linguistic Trends in the Republic of Moldavia, 1924-1992”
in Studies in Moldovan . . . , p. 53-54.
2
The difficulties generated by the use of each of the mentioned terms are well illustrated by Dennis
Deletant in his article “Language Policy and Linguistic Trends in the Republic of Moldavia, 1924-
1992” in Studies in Moldovan . . . , p. 53. For technical reasons, during the following pages, the author of
the present paper will use the notion of Bessarabian nationalism in order to label what is known as
both Romanian or Moldavian nationalism in Bessarabia.
3
On the Romanian-Moldavian “controversy” see C.U. Clark, “Basarabia, Russia . . .” in Basarabia ro-
mana. Antologie, p. 99-100. Also, for a more recent and excellent illustration of the role played by the
Moldavian language in this context see Donald L. Dyer, “The making of the Moldavian Language” in
Studies in Moldovan . . ., p. 91-107.
4
For a concise account of the policy of Russification and centralization in the Bessarabian church
and the Moldavian answer to this tendencies see K. Hitchins, Romania, 1866-1947, p. 244-248.
5
Ionas Aurelian Rus, “The Roots and Early Development of Moldovan-Romanian Nationalism in
Bessarabia, 1900-1917” in Anuarul Institutului A.D. Xenopol, Iasi, no. 33, 1996, p. 288.
6
For a good comparison, although expressing a different opinion from that of the majority of Roma-
nian scholars, between the development of the national ideology in Moldavia, Walachia, Transylva-
nia and Bukovina (unfortunately with almost no reference to Bessarabia) see Stephen Fischer Galati,
“Romanian Nationalism” in Nationalism in Eastern Europe, p. 373-395.
7
Onisifor Ghibu, “De la Basarabia ruseasca la Basarabia romaneasca” in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p.
239. Ghibu also describes quite convincingly what were the main differences between Bessarabia
and Romania, concluding that there was almost no space for a “Bessarabian problem” both in Bes-
sarabia and in Romania, p. 226-230.
8
S. Ciobanu, Basarabia. Populatia . . . , p. 52-55.
9
The first one published a Romanian Chrestomathy in St. Petersburg in 1848; the second one published
A Primary Course of Romanian Language and The Romanian Primer in Chisinau (in Romanian) during 1864-
1866. O Ghibu, “De la Basarabia ruseasca . . .” in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 230.
10
A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 386-387.
11
I. Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 66-67.
12
N. Ciachir, Basarabia sub stapanire tarista, p. 69.
13
Paul Mihail, Marturii de spiritualitate romaneasca in Basarabia, p. 25-37, 142-152.
14
S. Ciobanu stresses that the continuing use of Romanian language in administration and schools
was, at least partially, the result of the Bessarabians’ efforts and not a gift from the Russian admini-
stration. S. Ciobanu, Basarabia. Populatia . . . , p. 55-57.
15
The high rate of illiteracy among the Bessarabian peasants, over 90%, was the direct result of the
educational policy promoted by the administration. For details on the cultural aspects of the Rus-
sian administration see C.U. Clark, “Basarabia, Rusia . . .” in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 102-104.
For a comparison with the measures in the same field taken during the Romanian administration see
S. Ciobanu, Basarabia. Populatia . . . , p. 73-83.
16
I.A. Rus, “The Roots and . . .” in Anuarul … , p. 293.
17
Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question, p 53.
18
I. Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 68-69.
19
In fact, the main orientation of the newspaper was of a social rather than national character, and
the idea of a possible union with Romania was inexistent. O. Ghibu, “De la Basarabia ruseasca . . .” in
Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 236-237.
20
I.A. Rus, “The Roots and . . .” in Anuarul … , p. 290.
21
P. Mihail, Marturii de spiritualitate … , p. 154-157. Also O. Ghibu, “De la Basarabia ruseasca …” in
Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 240-246.
22
Some scholars consider that the 1905-1907 had a more powerful impact over the development of
< 47 >
the national movement. S. Ciobanu, Basarabia. Populatia . . . , p. 62-63.

23
Although O Ghibu argues (quite convincingly) that Bessarabian nationalism at 1905-1907 was
clearly a social one, of Russian inspiration, fighting for social desiderata and not for nationalistic
aims, and considers that its failure to penetrate the masses was due to its lack of understanding that
the first thing to be done is to raise the cultural level of the peasants. On the other hand, Ionas
Aurelian Rus considers that it was actually a cultural nationalism.
24
K. Hitchins, Romania, 1866-1947, p. 250.
25
C. King, The Moldovans, p. 29.
26
With the exception of a few pamphlets published by the League for the Liberation of Bessarabia,
acting in Romania, among which we mention Zamfir C. Arbore, Liberarea Basarabiei; A. Frunza, Roma-
nia Mare; Gh. Dighis, Sub jug strain. To this list, the books published by Dimitrie C. Moruzi should
also be added: Basarabia si viitorul ei, Instrainatii, and Pribegi in tara rapita.
27
Romanian historian Nicolae Iorga makes a notable exception; some of his pre-war articles on Bes-
sarabia have been re-published in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 27-70. A different view on the activity
of the Bessarabians living in Romania is presented in I. Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 76-78.
28
One of the very few Romanians arguing for Romanian rights over Bessarabia, although he agreed
that Romania should join the Entente Powers, was Nicolae Basilescu. In an article entitled “The
Romanian claims” published in Journal de Genève, on July 1, 1915, he openly stated that “Russia should
return to Romania the entire Bessarabia up to the Dniestr River, that it took from the Turks in 1812”.
The article is published in Basilescu’s book, Romania during the War and Peace, p. 131-135.
29
Quoted in Jacques Bariety, “Le Comité d’Etudes du Quai d’Orsay et les frontières de la Grande
Romanie, 1918-1919” in Revue Roumaine d’Histoire, Bucharest, 1996, no. 1, p. 51.
30
One of the scholars belonging to the new generation argues, based on the data regarding the elec-
tions for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly held in November 1917, and on some other argu-
ments, that the influence of the MNP was not quite as high as it is largely believed, and that the So-
viet of the Deputies of the Peasants had a greater influence over the Moldavians. I.A. Rus, “The Roots
and . . .” in Anuarul … , p. 293-295.
31
The importance of printing the “Moldavian Word” and its influence over the masses is best de-
scribed in O. Ghibu, “De la Basarabia ruseasca . . .” in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 247-248.
32
Petre Cazacu, Moldova dintre Prut si Nistru, p. 255-258.
33
34
P. Cernovodeanu, Basarabia … , p. 138-139.
35
O. Ghibu, “De la Basarabia ruseasca . . .” in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 264-266. Also, I. Scurtu et.
al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 81.
36
For the events related to the Congress see P. Cazacu, “Moldova . . .”, p. 251-253.
37
The main decision was that of nationalizing the land, the forests, and the subsoil in order to give it
back to those who worked it, without any compensation. C.U. Clark, “Basarabia, Rusia, . . .” in
Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 115.
38
A list, together with short commentaries on those pamphlets, are presented in O. Ghibu, “De la
Basarabia ruseasca . . .” in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 268-276.
39
The best description of the reactions to Ukraine’s claims is presented in P. Cazacu, Moldova … , p.
276-281.
40
For example, on the evening of August 20 under the leadership of some Bolsheviks, two of the
most prominent Bessarabian leaders, A Hodorogea and S Murafa, were killed. C.U. Clark, “Basarabia,
Rusia . . .” in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 119.
41
P. Cazacu, Moldova . . . , p. 281-287. Also, P. Cernovodeanu, Basarabia . . . , p. 144-145.
42
A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 499.
43
For details on the structure of the electoral process and of the elected members of the Council, see
C.U. Clark, “Basarabia, Rusia . . .” in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 120-123.
44
I. Scurtu, et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 82. Also C.U. Clark, “Basarabia, Rusia . . .” in Basarabia … , p. 124.
45
A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 502.
< 48 >
46
A good discussion regarding the controversy over the constitutionality of the Sfatul Tserii may be
found in Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question, p. 354-360.
47
The text of the Resolution adopted on December 2 is published in A. Karetki, A. Pricop, Lacrima
Basarabiei, p. 105-108.
48
Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question, p 61.
49
DDI, Serie 5, Vol. 9, p. 553, Telegram addressed by the Ministers of United Kingdom, United
States, France and Italy, December 24, 1917. Also Glenn F. Torrey, General Henri Berthelot and Romania,
p. 133-137.
50
The Galatz battle was followed by the Reiney battle, in Bessarabia, both won by the Romanian
Army. Gogu Negulesco, Romania’s Sacrifice, p. 128.
51
An excellent account of the events related to Diamandy’s arrest and also of the harsh anti-
Romanian atmosphere in Moscow is presented in George F. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, vol. 1, p.
330-343. For details regarding the meeting between the foreign diplomats acting in Moscow and the
communist authorities, including Lenin, see Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 10-13.
52
Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence . . . , p. 80.
53
F.C. Nanu, Politica externa a Romaniei, p. 107.
54
P. Cazacu, Moldova . . . , p. 336.
55
Details on the attempted coup by the Bolsheviks and on the Frontotdel’s activity are presented in
M. Bruchis, A. Chiriac, Rusia, Romania si Basarabia, p. 176-179, 186-191. Also P. Cazacu, Moldova … , p.
343-345.
56
M. Bruchis, A. Chiriac, Rusia, Romania . . . , p. 200-205.
57
The Sfatul Tserii was actually divided regarding this matter. While Ion Inculet and Pantelimon
Erhan were negotiating with the Russian Chief of Staff in Odessa for the sending of two Kazakhs
Divisions in Bessarabia, Ion Pelivan and Vasile Cristi were negotiating in Jassy with general Scer-
bacev, the Entente representatives and the Romanian government. P. Cazacu, Moldova . . . , p. 338-343.
58
Charles Vopicka, Secrets of the Balkans, p. 159-160.
59
V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica pentru Basarabia, p. 75.
60
K Hitchins considers that the Bolshevik forces already dispersed the Sfatul Tserii as soon as January
4. K. Hitchins, Romania, 1866-1947, p. 273.
61
F.C. Nanu, Politica externa … , p. 59. Also FRUS, 1918, Russia, Vol. 2, p 708-710.
62
Of course, not all of the Bessarabians accepted the Romanian occupation without complains. As
soon as the end of January there had already been a number of complains against the policy of Gen-
eral Brosteanu, the commander of the Romanian troops in Bessarabia, of systematically replacing the
Russian officials and officers in Bessarabia’s administration. Glenn F. Torrey, General Henry
Berthelot . . . , p. 149.
63
DDI, Serie 5, Vol. 10, Telegram Tomasi to Sonnino, January 27 1918, p. 115.
64
For the Declaration of Independence see Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 17-19.
65
M. Musat, I. Ardeleanu, “Viata politica in Romania”, p 35
66
A very vivid description of the situation among the Romanian prisoners in Odessa is presented in
the report sent to the Foreign Ministry by George Lucasievicz, one of those who had to go through
this painful experience. RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 20, p. 80-84.
67
There are some controversies regarding Averescu’s agreement for the treaty. While some historians
affirm that he only agreed with the exchange of prisoners and not with the withdrawal of the Roma-
nian army, others are of the opinion that, indeed, Averescu agreed to the Treaty. However, in Roma-
nia this subject was kept out of the history books during the communist period and the majority of
the Romanian historians writing on Bessarabian history, until quite recently, either simply remind it
or avoid mentioning it at all. For more on this topic see Van Meurs, “The Bessarabian Question”, p.
68; or Marin C. Stanescu, “Acordul Averescu-Rakovsky”, in Revista de Istorie Militara, 1993, No. 2.
68
Robert M. Slusser, A Calendar of Soviet Treaties, 1917-1957, p. 4-5.
69
All the official documents illustrating the Romanian stand regarding the Averescu-Rakovsky
Agreement are published, together with some very useful commentaries, in Relatii romano-sovietice.
< 49 >
Documente, p. 19-27. The Agreement itself is also published in Jane Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign
Policy, Vol. I, p. 65-67.
70
The opinion of Romanian diplomacy regarding the Rakovsky-Averescu treaty is best presented in
the Geblescu memorandum. The Romanian arguments are: (1) the revolutionary organizations have
dissolved themselves before the expiration of the period shown by the Agreement; (2) with the ex-
ception of the Armistice, no other clause was executed; (3) the Agreement was of purely military and
not political nature; (4) by refusing to evacuate Tighina, the Romanian government implicitly re-
fused to evacuate the entire Bessarabia; (5) the Romanian troops did not go into Bessarabia with the
purpose of annexation, the Union was done by itself; (6) the revolutionary organizations in Odessa
had no right to deal in the name of those interested, whom clearly expressed their attitude. RFMA,
Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 20 bis, p. 29-36.
70
A very vivid description of the debates and of the enthusiastic atmosphere on March 27 1918 is
presented in M. Stefan, “Basarabia. Ziua intai a marii Uniri” in Magazin Istoric, 1991, No. 3. For the
other side of the story “with Romanian troops already in Chisinau, Romanian planes circling above
the meeting hall, and with the Romanian Prime Minister waiting in the foyer” [King forgot to say
that Marghiloman was waiting for no less than six hours outside the building of the Sfatul Tserii] see
Charles King, The Moldovans, p. 35.
71
Bessarabia’s union with Romania was proclaimed on March (April) 1918 and not on December
1918, as mistakenly is stated in British Encyclopedia, p. 1024.
72
Keith Hitchins, Romania, 1866-1947, p. 277.
73
Dinu C. Giurescu, Romania. A Historic Perspective, p. 275-276.
74
Stephen Fischer Galati, “Romanian Nationalism” in Nationalism in Eastern Europe, p. 390.
75
Again, this is a controversial issue; the legality of that vote was a really debated matter because
there were only a quarter of the deputies attending the session. For more, see C.U. Clark, “Basarabia,
Rusia, …” in Basarabia … , p. 134-145; also, Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question . . . , p. 70-71. A
“Declaration of Ten Deputies Against the Decision to Renounce to Bessarabia’s Autonomy” offering
details over the manner of the voting are published in Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 36-39.
76
V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica . . . , p. 79.
77
F.C. Nanu, Politica externa . . . , p. 111.
78
For the entire Message see RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, p. 116-121.
79
In fact, it was the draft law prepared by Take Ionescu, only the signature was changed, and the
Message was cut short (from three pages to only half a page). RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, p.
141-160.
80
The law and the Treaty have been recently published in A. Karetki, A. Pricop, Lacrima Basarabiei, p.
125-129.
81
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Antonescu to Duca, May 21, 1921. It was only on April
20 that the Romanian Legation in Paris was instructed to deposit the ratification instruments and,
somehow strangely (because the deposit was made on May 19) a report from the mentioned Lega-
tion states that the deposit has been made by May 1. RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram
Stoicescu to Duca, May 1, 1922. While a number of Romanian scholars give the date of April 11 or 14
for the deposit of the ratification, which are clearly mistaken (there was no way that the Decree law
signed by King Ferdinand on April 13 could have reached Paris in the morning of April 14), in order
to “cover-up” the fact that the UK was the first State that ratified the Bessarabian Treaty, British and
Japanese sources consider May 19, 1922, as the date when the deposit of the Romanian ratification
took place. DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 24, p. 168; or Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official
Report, Fifth Series, vol. 235, p. 2277.
82
Again, one of the few Romanian scholars expressing these unpopular aspects is O. Ghibu. He also
observes that, in fact, the decision of the Union taken by the Sfatul Tserii on March 27 was not the
best solution from the standpoint of the development of Romanian nationalism in Bessarabia and
that the best solution would have been a development similar with that of Transylvania and
Bukovina’s union. But on this later point it can be easily argued that there was no way to know the
direction of the events in March 1918 and that the Union was seen by the majority of the Romanians
< 50 >
as the best solution. O. Ghibu, “De la Basarabia ruseasca . . .” in Basarabia … , p. 294-295, 300-301.
83
Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe Between the Two World Wars, p. 286.
84
Robert Lee Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time, p. 145. Also, C. King, The Moldovans, p. 42-45. Still, both of
them, while deploring the situation of Bessarabia under Romanian administration, fail to compare it
to the situation under the previous Russian administration. For more details regarding the instaura-
tion of Russian administration in Bessarabia, presented in a fairly manner, and in which the similari-
ties with the 1918 instauration of Romanian administration are quite easy to spot, see George F.
Jewsburry, The Russian Annexation . . . , p. 58-60, 155-161.
85
Stefan Fischer Galati, Twentieth Century Romania, p. 31.
86
The correspondence between Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, one of the best known representatives of
the Transylvanian Romanians, a member in the Romanian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference,
and Iuliu Maniu, the leader of the Transylvanian Romanians, gives a good illustration of this frustra-
tion, especially during the first months of 1919. For example, the letter sent by Vaida-Voevod on
April 7, 1919, clearly points to his unhappiness regarding some of the practices used by the Regateni;
in 1920. Un act de justitie. Documente, p. 141-146.
87
B. Jelavich, The Establishment … , p.310.
88
M. Bruchis, A. Chiriac, Rusia, Romania . . . , p. 16.
89
R.W. Seton-Watson, The History of the Romanians, p. 561.
90
A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 507-512.
91
Jane Degras, Soviet Documents . . . , Vol. I, p. 440.
92
One of the most notable examples in this sense is the continuing practice of the Romanian local
civil law for the entire period of Russian administration. And not only was it kept but it was also
translated into Russian. A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 485-487.
93
The main factors behind this failure are presented in Petre Cazacu, Moldova . . . , p. 11-12.
94
A good account on the evolution and the importance of the national movement inside the army is
presented in P. Cazacu, Moldova . . . , p. 262-276.
95
While this influence is broadly considered to be of incontestable importance, O. Ghibu (a Transyl-
vanian himself, who played an important role during the events in Bessarabia) considers it the most
important one in reviving and organizing the national movement in Bessarabia.
96
At that time, laborers were an insignificant number of Bessarabia’s population, while people of
different ethnic origins, especially the Jews, made up the bourgeoisie — who had no interest in the
Bessarabian national movement. As for the landowners, they were negatively affected by the land
reform and, with few exceptions, all their efforts were directed at keeping their properties and not
toward nationalism.
97
A. Boldur considers the moment when the Romanian Army and the Bessarabian political society
interconnected, and the Bessarabian realized that there was no need to organize a new army because
there already was an Army — the army of all the Romanians — the most serious psychological step
taken towards the making of the Union. A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 505.
98
C. King argues that “the presence of the Romanian troops unquestionably augmented the power of
those groups looking to Romania for deliverance from the triple peril of Bolshevism, Ukrainian ex-
pansionism, and political anarchy”. C. King, The Moldovans, p. 33.
99
Jane Degras, “Soviet Documents . . .”, Vol. 1, p. 40
< 51 >
CHAPTER 3.
THE MAKING OF THE BESSARABIAN TREATY
The 1919-1920 Paris Peace Conference had the difficult mission of creating a
new order, one in which wars should come to an end. After the War, there was in-
deed a great deal of change; unfortunately, not all of it was in the desired direction.
The Treaty of Versailles, nominally made with the aim of establishing an everlasting
peace, was dead on arrival because most of the states that were supposed to protect
and defend the Treaty recognized it as unfair. US President Woodrow Wilson was
unable to convince his own fellow countrymen to ratify his work — the Paris Peace
Treaties. Add in the fact that the defeated bloc (or, at least, Germany) and Russia
(the greatest power in Europe) were left out of the negotiation process, and it is easy
to understand why such a brief period of peace ensued. This situation has been well
expressed by Carole Fink:
It is by now a truism that the Paris Peace Settlement lacked mechanisms for
adjustment and proper enforcement, because the victors in World War I had
neither the strength nor the cohesion to rule the postwar world and the de-
feated were still strong and unrepentant.1
When the peace negotiations began, a number of bases (often, mutually con-
tradictory) for the future settlement were already in place: secret treaties, the princi-
ple of self-determination of peoples, geo-strategic and economical factors. The de-
feated powers (and sometimes Woodrow Wilson, too) defended the self-
determination principle and the concept of justice.2 Romania and Italy tended to
favor the secret treaties and a policy of maximum territorial enlargement. One of the
biggest problems for the Peace Conference was that of arbitrating the territorial dis-
putes between the victorious or allied states in Eastern Europe, to the detriment of
< 53 >
the other interested parties; a prime example is that of dividing the territory of Banat
between Romania and Yugoslavia.
The Western Powers, France and Britain, were equally concerned about the
restoration of the balance of power, but they wished to go about it by different
means. While France had the idea of replacing the former Russian alliance with a
frontier of eastern states, and to use them to control Germany, the UK wished to
restore a balance of power and to avoid, in pure British tradition, a hegemonic posi-
tion for France on the continent.
Romania went to the Peace Conference with the aim of obtaining international
recognition of its new borders — difficult as that goal might be. Romania was the
only state that, during the war, acquired territories from both the defeated and the
Allied Powers.
Shifting Positions in the First World War
Since 1883, Romania had been a secret member of the Triple Alliance
(Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy). During the Balkan crisis of 1912-1913, Austria-
Hungary acted against Romanian interests (by supporting Bulgaria), while the Rus-
sians expressed their support for Romania.3 Therefore, at the beginning of what be-
came the World War, Romania stayed neutral for a while and used the time to im-
prove its military preparedness and shore up its international position. The main
role in directing Romania’s foreign policy was played by Ion I.C. Bratianu, the Roma-
nian Prime Minister. As it is not the purpose of the present book to deal exhaustively
with Romania’s implication into the war, especially as there are some very good
studies on the matter, the author will simply point the facts, without much insis-
tence on details.4
The first dilemma for the Romanian government was that, because of its mem-
bership in the Triple Alliance, it should have backed the Triple Alliance’s decision to
declare war on the Entente, but, because of the situation facing the Romanians living
in Austria-Hungary (a very intense policy of denationalization) Austria-Hungary
was seen as an enemy more than as a friend or ally. The dilemma was complicated by
the pro-German orientation of King Carol, who not only was honor-bound to re-
spect his signature but also was convinced that victory would be on Germany’s
side.5 At the same time, sensing the direction of the Romanian public opinion, the
Russians started an intense process of restoring friendly relations with Romania in
1913.6
First, Bratianu had to convince King Carol that neutrality was the best solu-
tion for Romania. Then, during the July 22 (August 3), 1914 Crown Council, to
which all the political leaders were invited, the great majority voted in favor of neu-
trality; it was justified on the same basis as Italy’s neutrality — the principle of casus
foederis was not valid in case of unprovoked aggression.7 This was a first victory for
Bratianu’s policy. In fact, in promoting this policy Bratianu gradually found himself
isolated, because of the increasingly powerful mood in favor of, and pressure for, in-
< 54 >
CHAPTER 3. THE MAKING OF THE BESSARABIAN TREATY
tervention in the war. But he was able to resist those pressures and to avoid engag-
ing the country until he had the necessary written guaranties regarding future terri-
torial gains for Romania.
After proclaiming neutrality, Bratianu launched intense negotiations with both
sides while, at the same time, he tried to improve the readiness of the Romanian
Army. During these negotiations Austria-Hungary offered to Romania “all of Bes-
sarabia and Odessa” if it would enter the war, but refused to make any concessions
toward improving life for the Romanians living in Transylvania.8 The Allied Powers
(in fact, Russia) were more generous, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonov, prom-
ising Transylvania in exchange only for Romania’s continued neutrality.9 Gradually,
Bratianu obtained written agreements on that from the Allied Powers. A first such
Agreement was signed in St. Petersburg on October 1, 1914, confirming Russia’s will-
ingness to recognize Romanian rights over Transylvania and part of Bukovina in ex-
change only for neutrality.10 In other words, “Sazonov promised Romania all that she
could hope to gain from Russia — Transylvania and an ‘ethnic frontier’ in
Bukovina — in return for Romanian neutrality. After this is was impossible to push
Bucharest into intervention without paying an exorbitant price for it.”11
Bratianu also had to face strong pressure from Romanian public opinion in fa-
vor of an alliance with the Entente. As suggested by Nicolae Basilescu, a member of
the Romanian Parliament, in a book published in 1919:
Yes, of course, Bessarabia is a Romanian land, essentially Romanian, and never,

never did the Romanian people renounce its duty to break her chains and bring
her back to the Mother Country. But the most urgent danger is not coming
from this direction: the Russians, rude and uneducated, were not able to dena-
tionalize Moldavian life in Bessarabia; even today they are still using the lan-
guage of Stephen the Great, the language they spoke in 1812, and they totally
ignore the Russian language. Therefore, the claim to Bessarabia could be post-
poned, without danger, for other times. The immediate danger, which must be
faced with no delay, comes from the excessive denationalization process car-
ried on by the Hungarians against the emancipation of the Romanians living in
Transylvania.12
For the next two years, Bratianu continued to negotiate with both sides while
maintaining friendly neutrality toward the Allied Powers. This was a delicate posi-
tion, and Bratianu’s conduct was read differently by different camps. In the Balkans,
everything was inextricably intertwined, and the situation was such that if one
country were to enter the war on one side, automatically one of her neighbors would
enter the war on the other side. The real issue for Romania was not which side to
join, or when, but under which conditions and with what guarantees. Bratianu had
every reason to ask for credible and secure guarantees.13 However, his caution and
secrecy caused him to be misunderstood by both groups of belligerents, and it infuri-
ated the Romanian interventionists.14 One of the best descriptions of Bratianu’s posi-
tion comes from the British representatives:
< 55 >
The enigma of the situation is Bratianu himself. His caution is so excessive as

to render him suspect in many quarters. . . . It is fairly certain, however, that
Bratianu believes in our ultimate success, and as long as he maintains that
opinion the position would seem to be negatively safe. . . . It is the general opin-
ion here that, should Bratianu resign, the military situation, being as it is, a po-
sition dangerous to the Allies might well ensue. The King would probably send
for Marghiloman or Maiorescu. . . . Neither Take Ionescu nor Filipescu have
sufficient power in the country . . . Under the circumstances there appears
nothing for it but to make the best of Bratianu. With him at least we are on a
rock, although an uncomfortable one. In the alternative we might find our-
selves on dangerous quicksands.15
Still, the Allied Powers failed to act decisively in order to influence the Roma-
nians to join the war in the autumn of 1915 when, after Italy entered the war, the
chances were better to convince the Romanian leadership that it was time to start a
military offensive.16
In fact, the Romanian leadership was divided into three camps: immediate in-
tervention on the Entente side, continued neutrality, or intervention on the Central
Powers’ side. The main problem for Bratianu was to avoid fighting on two fronts, one
in Transylvania or Bessarabia and one in Dobrudja (after the Second Balkan War, in
1913, Romania took the southern part of Dobrudja from Bulgaria), and to get written
guarantees of Romania’s territorial gains after the war. He negotiated stubbornly,
insisting on a few matters that were of great importance and that would prove es-
sential during the peace conference: a no-separate-peace clause (a separate peace
between the Entente and Austria-Hungary could have allowed Austria-Hungary to
keep Transylvania, rendering Romania’s engagement in the war pointless), equal
status at the future peace conference, Russian military assistance against Bulgaria,
an Allied offensive in the direction of Bulgaria, and the regular sending of Allied war
supplies.17
On August 17, 1916, as a result of a shift in the Entente’s position,18 Romania
and the Allied Powers signed the Political and Military Conventions, which were to
be kept secret; by these conventions, Romania undertook to enter the war against
the Central Powers. Article No. 1 stated that the four Allied Powers would defend
the territorial integrity of Romania (including southern Dobrudja). Article No. 2
stated that Romania would enter the war. No. 3 recognized Romania’s right to Tran-
sylvania and the Banat (up to the Theiss River, as far as Szeged) and Bukovina. Of
great importance was Article No. 5, by which Romania undertook not to sign a sepa-
rate peace with the enemy. Article No. 6 was interesting — here, the Allied Powers
promised Romania that during the peace negotiations after the war Romania would
have the same rights as themselves. In other words, Romania was to be on an equal
footing with the Great Powers. The fact that the Entente accepted Article No. 6,
which made Romania theoretically their equal, proves how badly they needed the
< 56 >
Romanian intervention.19 The Military Convention signed the same day stipulated
that France and England should start an offensive against Bulgaria and Turkey no
later than August;20 that Russia would send troops into Dobrudja; that the Allies
would send Romania at least 300 tons of provisions on a daily basis; that the Roma-
nian Army would not be subordinated to the Russian Army.21 During the war, most
of these clauses, with the exception of those imposed on Romania, failed to be re-
spected.
The August 27 Crown Council decided Romania’s entry into the war against
Austria-Hungary but the Romanian military campaign ended in disaster.22 Indeed,
the Romanians had had to fight on two fronts. In fact, Romania’s position was virtu-
ally indefensible without foreign aid: surrounded on three sides by mortal enemies,
with over 1,000 miles of frontier to defend, and linked to its allies only by an over-
burdened railroad through Russia, the chances for victory were slim.23 In fact, caught
between the Falkenhayn hammer and the Mackensen anvil, they were forced to flee
for their lives. The failure of the Allies to keep their promise and start an offensive
against Bulgaria left the Romanian southern front open to the latter’s attacks. At the
same time, the Russians failed to send the promised troops to fight the Bulgarians in
Dobrudja. The Romanian Army badly lacked arms and ammunition, and had no vi-
able war plan.24 One more cause of the Romanian defeat (one which the Romanians
carefully avoid mentioning) was their prolonged negotiations with the Allies. Had
they intervened at the height of the Russian offensive, the impact could have been
immense, but by August it was toolate.25 On the other hand, from the Romanian
standpoint, as stated by General Rudeanu at the time, “if it is regrettable that Roma-
nian intervention came late, it is also regrettable that the Allied Powers failed to pre-
pare the Romanian Army for the war any time earlier”.26
By the end of 1916, the Romanian government had to abandon more than half of
its territory and retreat into Moldavia, where the front was stabilized with the help
of the Russian Army. During the winter, the Romanians had to face not only the
Austrian-German-Bulgarian enemy but also a fierce frost, famine, and typhus (which
took more victims than the fighting), plus the attitude of the so-called Russian ally.27
Still, seemingly against the odds, the French Military Mission under the leadership
of General Berthelot was able to reorganize the Romanian Army so that, in the sum-
mer of 1917, with the help of a number of units of Transylvanian Romanian POWs
from Russia, it was able to stop the German counter-offensive in the direction of
Moldavia.
The revolution in Russia generated new problems for Romania. The Provi-
sional Government decided to continue fighting while the Bolsheviks favored peace
with the Central Powers. In just a few months, Romania’s position deteriorated to
the point at which any resistance against the Central Powers became almost impos-
sible.28 Russian troops on the Romanian front started deserting and looting, their
only goal being to get home. The Romanian Army found itself alone to defend the
eastern front. Charles Vopicka, the US Minister in Jassy, gives an account of the
Russian troops’ action:
< 57 >
“They are delivering their war material to our enemies in exchange for alcohol,
and they are committing murder, arson, robbery and unspeakable crimes against
women. Having used a great part of the resources of their country, they are extend-
ing famine conditions by wantonly destroying food depots in Moldavia and Bessara-
bia.”29
The Allied Powers asked Romania to continue fighting and suggested that, if
defeated, the government and the Romanian Army should withdraw through south-
ern Russia in order to make contact with the British troops in Mesopotamia. But
even in 1917 this plan was considered too hazardous by the Romanian government,
who realized that it would be impossible to cross through Russia because of the in-
certitude and the fighting that was taking place between the Bolsheviks and the
White Russians. The Allies realized quickly that, in order to keep the Romanian
Army in the field, it was essential to have free access to the food supplies of Ukraine
and have friendly forces at its rear.30 At the same time, due mainly to events in Russia
which added to the isolation of Romania, a pacifist campaign was initiated by cer-
tain political and military circles who quaked at Romania’s position between an vi-
cious enemy and an ally who behaved even worse.31
On December 9, 1917, with the approval of the Allied ministers in Jassy, the
Romanians signed, in Focsani, a three-month armistice with the Central Powers,
stopping any fighting in the area. The Allies acknowledged that it was not a separate
peace and decided to give Bratianu a grace period.32 The strongest opponent of the
Romanian armistice (and later separate peace) was the French Prime Minister,
George Clemenceau. Previously, he had clearly instructed both Berthelot and Saint-
Aulaire to do all in their power in order to keep Romania on the active front.33 Dur-
ing the next months, the situation worsened. The Allies insisted that the Romanian
Army should continue fighting and then withdraw through Russia, even as the re-
ports from some of their representatives in Romania argued for the contrary.34 Of
course, the continuing fighting on the Romanian front would have kept a sizeable
number of Central Powers troops away from the western front, making the Allies’
efforts easier. But the option of a retreat through Russia was definitively lost when
Romania intervened against the Soviets of soldiers leading the Russian Army in Ro-
mania, and later by the occupation of Bessarabia.
During the armistice period, Romanian political circles had fiercely debated an
eventual separate peace. There were strong arguments in favor of it: it was impossi-
ble to get more direct help from the Allies; Walachia would be recovered from the
Central Powers; Bessarabia would be recognized as a Romanian territory by the
Central Powers; Wilson refused to recognize the 1916 Treaty with Romania; Russia
imminent exit from the war, illustrated by the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations with
the Germans; and the fear that without a separate peace, all the country would be
occupied by the Central Powers.
On the other hand, there was increased pressure, both officially and through
the mass media, from the Western Allies, to keep Romania fighting.35 Those who
favored continued fighting were grouped around Take Ionescu, who preferred ca-
< 58 >
pitulation to negotiations with the enemy, arguing that only by continuing fighting
could Romania keep her mortgage over the Entente. General Berthelot was the only
Allied representative in Jassy who steadfastly opposed any negotiations between
Romania and the Central Powers, for either an armistice or a separate peace;36 his
opposition was based both on Clemenceau’s instructions and on military reasons
(the Germans, taking advantage of the armistice, had transferred a great part of their
military units to the western front, so they were far from having the necessary re-
sources to start a new offensive against the Romanians, and the heavy winter was
clearly on Romania’s side).37 At one point, due to the failure of the Allied action in
Ukraine and with the hope of increasing their influence over Ukraine, the British
leaders changed their position on the issue of a Romanian separate peace, and op-
posed it based on reasons similar to those of General Berthelot.38
Lloyd George’s speech of January 5, 1918, which mentioned reassessing the se-
cret treaties and stated, “the breakup of Austria-Hungary is not part of our war
aims”, together with President Wilson’s 14 Principles expressed on January 8, 1918
(which said the same thing regarding Austria-Hungary), had a serious impact on the
Romanians.39 The two statements gave a powerful argument to those favoring peace.
Bratianu argued, “There is no use for Romania to keep on fighting because, according
to the speeches of President Wilson and Lloyd George, even if the Allies win Roma-
nia is not to get any additional territory.”40 The Central Powers also understood that,
in order to soften the Romanians’ attitude, they should reassure King Ferdinand that
his abdication would not be demanded as a peace condition, and they offered assur-
ances to King Ferdinand in this sense at the beginning of February.41
The final decision was taken after the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty was signed
(March 3, 1918). A preliminary Peace Treaty was signed in Buftea, on March 5 and,
two months later, on May 7, 1918, the new pro-German Romanian government
headed by Alexandru Marghiloman signed the Peace Treaty in Bucharest.42 It was a
very difficult moment for Romania, which had to cede all of Dobrudja (but to the
Central Powers, and not directly to Bulgaria, as the latter had expected),43 and some
territories in the Carpathian Mountains (2,200 sq. miles with some 150,000 inhabi-
tants); and harsh economic conditions were imposed on Romania. Furthermore, Ro-
mania was required to improve the status of the Jews living in Romania (this same
point had been on the agenda of the Paris Peace Conference, in the form of the Mi-
norities Treaty). The only good outcome, one which no one had foreseen in 1914 or
1916, was that the Bucharest Treaty awarded Bessarabia to the Romanians by giving
them permission to occupy the area, in a move that was intended to avoid a possible
new Russo-Romanian alliance. This Treaty had a very short life, lasting only a few
months.44
In fairness to King Ferdinand and the liberal party, it should be mentioned that
they did everything possible in order to oppose the German pressure to ratify the
Bucharest Treaty, although ratifying it would have brought quite important material
(an end to the requisitions and to the unlimited issue of paper money authorized by
the Germans) and strategical (a confirmation of their position in Bessarabia) bene-
< 59 >
fits. Even as the newly elected Parliament, under the control of Marghiloman’s con-
servative pro-German party, ratified the Treaty, the King stubbornly refused to sign
it, preventing it from becoming a valid title.45 “By its human and material sacrifices,
as well as by its aspirations, Romania never considered itself outside the Entente,
but waited for the favorable time to rejoin it, in order to fight for a common cause”.46
The evolution of the military operations during 1918 changed the balance in
favor of the Allied Powers. On November 10, 1918 Romania declared war on the Cen-
tral Powers, reentering the war before the general armistice was signed, and an-
nounced the reopening of diplomatic relations with the Allies.
Success at the Paris Peace Conference
Sound analyses have already been published on the relations between Romania
and the Great Powers during the Paris Peace Conference;47 therefore, in this sub-
chapter we will merely outline the general problems related to Romania during the
Paris negotiations, and in the next subchapter we will focus on the making of the
Bessarabian Treaty, seeking to examine the Bessarabian question within, and outside
of, the general context of Romania.
Generally speaking, relations between Romania and the leadership of the Peace
Conference had been far from positive and during 1919 only grew worse. At one
point even Saint Aulaire, the French Minister to Romania, expressed his disappoint-
ment with the attitude of the Conference: “At the Supreme Council in Paris, this
Areopagus which, under the presidency of Clemenceau and Wilson’s inspiration,
promulgated the new chart of humanity, all the favors are for the Soviets and all the
rigors are for Romania, their main victim.”48
What the Romanian delegation was hoping to gain from the Conference was
international recognition that the newly unified territories belonged to Romania,
who was entitled to them according to the 1916 Treaty with the Entente. The main
difficulty lay in the fact that Romania had signed the Bucharest Peace Treaty with
the Central Powers, against the stipulations of the 1916 Treaty; the Romanian propa-
ganda therefore focused on justifying the need to sign a separate peace, pointing to
the Allies’ failure to keep their commitments towards Romania and making much of
what was called “the Russian betrayal” in Dobrudja.49 They based their action on the
following points: the validity of the 1916 Treaty with the Entente; the free will ex-
pressed by the majority of the people living in the newly acquired territories for a
union with Romania; and the great efforts made by the Romanians during their fight
against the Central Powers.
The Delegation emphasized these points in a different manner towards each of
the Powers. Seeking to obtain US backing for their territorial claims, the Romanians
relied on the nationality principle.50 When they had to deal with the Italians, they
always insisted on the validity of the 1916 Treaty. However, during the last month of
the war, the Romanians had sent mixed signals to the Entente Powers, due to Take
Ionescu’s activity in Paris — he had said that he considered the 1916 Treaty not valid,
< 60 >
and had tried to reach an agreement with the Yugoslav representatives, over the
head of the Romanian authorities.51
The biggest problem facing Romania at the beginning of the negotiations was
the Great Powers’ attitude toward the 1916 Treaty and the Bucharest Peace Treaty, an
attitude that would color everything regarding Romania. Both France and Great Brit-
ain seemed to be signaling that they did not consider the Treaty valid, while the US
clearly stated that it did not recognize any of the secret treaties; Bratianu tried to
make use of it nonetheless. However, Romania had two big advantages on her side:
Romanian armies were occupying many of the claimed territories (including all of
Transylvania, by April 1919); and the Allies were divided on at least some of the Ro-
manian demands. Another circumstance that worked in Romania’s favor was that the
Allies, tired after the war, could not or would not commit sufficient troops to Central
Europe to control the situation that had resulted from the disintegration of Austria-
Hungary. This allowed the Romanians, encouraged by the French government (more
or less openly), to extend progressively over the territory of Transylvania.
First, there was the question of Romania’s status at the Paris Peace Confer-
ence. Before the Conference began, a few debates were generated by the fact that
Romania had signed a peace treaty with the Central Powers; still, Romania was al-
lowed to participate as an Allied Power.52 Second (and this proved to be one of the
most painful questions for Romania) was the question of the role Romania would
play during the negotiations. Based on Article No. 6 of the 1916 Treaty and the posi-
tion Romania had held inside the Triple Alliance, before the war, Bratianu had imag-
ined some good could come out of the Peace Conference. On the other hand, he
knew that Romania would not be welcomed warmly. And indeed, the Great Powers
decided that the 1916 Treaty had been broken because Romania made a separate
peace with the enemy (no matter what the reasons for that), so that Article No. 6 did
not apply.
Therefore, events shaped up quite contrary to Romania’s interests. It was de-
cided that Romania should have only two plenipotentiaries at the Conference, the
same number as the newly created kingdoms of Hedjaz and Siam (the Serbs and Bel-
gians each had three). Bratianu felt betrayed by the Great Powers — they considered
Romania a “Power” with limited interests — and he decided to do everything he
could in order to obtain their recognition for the new Romanian boundaries by
adopting a policy of no compromise.53 This did not enhance his popularity at the
Conference (particularly with the Big Four). Even some Romanian politicians criti-
cized his position, too, but it proved to be quite effective.54
The most intense debates during the peace conference were related to territo-
rial issues. Romania was involved in five of them: Banat, Bukovina, Transylvania
(including Crisana and Maramures), Dobrudja and Bessarabia. Another problem,
directly connected to the territorial questions, was that of protecting the rights of
the national minorities existing in the newly acquired territories.
The Banat: The territory of Banat (formerly under Hungarian rule) was claimed
by both Romania and Serbia (in addition to Hungary). The Banat had around 11,000
< 61 >
square miles and a population of about 1.5 million, 600,000 of them Romanians,
385,000 Germans, 358,000 Serbians, and 240,000 Hungarians. During 1915, Serbian-
Romanian relations had been excellent, primarily because Romania had permitted
transit of supplies destined for Serbia.55 The Romanians asked for all the Banat terri-
tory, as the 1916 Treaty stipulated, arguing that the German population would prefer
Romanian rule, while the Serbs insisted that the territory should be divided. The
Serbs invoked the presence of a great Serbian majority in the western parts of the
Banat and the area’s strategic importance for the defense of Belgrade; they asked for
two thirds of the territory. The Serbs had the advantage of controlling the area mili-
tarily, for a period, and they had the Allies’ sympathy for their heroic fighting. The
first misunderstandings between Romania and Serbia took place at the end of 1918,
but it was believed that these differenced could be solved. As the US Minister to Ro-
mania, Charles J. Vopicka, put it on January 10, 1919:
“I am sure that this question can be settled between the Romanians and the
Serbians if the Romanians will receive a free hand regarding the northern portion of
Bukovina and Bessarabia.”56
Finally, after strenuous negotiations, the Great Powers divided the Banat be-
tween Romania (two thirds), and Serbia (the western third). Neither Romania nor
Serbia was satisfied, but they had to accept it.57 This left a shadow over Romanian-
Yugoslav relations so that, although both countries avoided open antagonism, they
still hoped to modify the new frontier in the Banat.
Bukovina (a former Romanian territory, occupied by the Habsburgs in 1775):
Apart from Romania and Ukraine, there was no other state to ask for this territory;
yet the Americans intended to create a Ruthenian state that would control the
northern part of Bukovina too. When the Americans realized that there was no sup-
port for the notion of a Ruthenian state (another blow to President Wilson’s princi-
ple of national self-determination), they agreed to consider Bukovina Romanian ter-
ritory, with the exception of a small part in the north, which was given to Poland.
Southern Dobrudja: One of the most controversial sections along the Romanian
border was that of southern Dobrudja. In 1913, at the end of the second Balkan War,
Romania acquired from Bulgaria a territory at the south of Dobrudja (Cadrilater).
The Bulgarians made up a good part of the Cadrilater’s population. During the First
World War, Bulgaria entered the war against Romania with the purpose of taking
back not only the Cadrilater but also all off Dobrudja. Based on ethnic criteria, the
American representatives considered that Bulgaria should have her frontier in south-
ern Dobrudja as it had been before the second Balkan War. Because of the American
interference the Cadrilater became a territorial question. The problem for the Ameri-
cans was that the Cadrilater belonged to an Allied state (Romania) and none of the
other Great Powers accepted the idea of a defeated state receiving territory that, be-
fore the war, had belonged to an Allied state. The Americans tried in vain to con-
vince the other representatives of their point, arguing that Dobrudja would be a fac-
tor of destabilization in the Balkan area. Romania eventually was to keep all of Do-
brudja, including the Cadrilater.
< 62 >
Transylvania: It was this question that generated the biggest problems between
Romania and the Great Powers. All of them agreed that Transylvania should belong
to Romania, but there were two problems: where to draw its western boundary, and
what to do with the Hungarian and German minorities in the region. The western
boundary of Transylvania would divide the territory called Crisana, between Roma-
nia and Hungary, which actually was not part of Transylvania proper but had a Ro-
manian majority. The territory bordering Transylvania to the north, Maramures, was
also populated by a Romanian majority in its central and southern parts; it belonged
to Hungary before 1918, but the Peace Conference divided it between Romania and
Czechoslovakia.
Making the situation more complicated was the Armistice signed on Novem-
ber 13, 1918, between the Allied Powers and Hungary (known as the D’Esperey Armi-
stice, after the name of General Franchet D’Esperey, at that time the Supreme Com-
mander of the Allied Army in the Orient), which established a demarcation line be-
tween the Hungarian and Allied troops that divided Transylvania in two. The Hun-
garians considered this line recognition of their rights to Transylvania; the Romani-
ans, of course, considered it temporary and did everything they could to erase it.
The main problem with Transylvania was (as it continues to be to this day)
that the Hungarian population is concentrated in the east central part of the terri-
tory. To the west, nearer the border with Hungary, the inhabitants are predomi-
nantly Romanian; and the main groups of Hungarians in Transylvania are thus cut
off from Hungary proper, making any partition of Transylvania on ethnic grounds
impossible. In the words of Winston Churchill:
The problem of Transylvania was insoluble by the principle of self-

determination. It presented the feature of a considerable Hungarian population
isolated within a Romanian border belt. The peoples of the Romanian zone
wished to join Romania; those of the Magyar nucleus [wished] to adhere to
their kinsmen in Hungary. Either decision would have conflicted with self-
determination.58
Another controversy developed over the lands in the west (Crisana), where the
Hungarian and Romanian population lived together, along the line formed by the
cities of Arad, Oradea, Carei and Satu Mare. Generally, the cities were predomi-
nantly Hungarian while the countryside (as in Bessarabia) was Romanian. An im-
portant railroad connected these cities; control of the railroads was a decisive eco-
nomic and strategic advantage. The problem was that a true ethnic line (requested
by the Americans) would bisect the rail line in several places, making it almost inop-
erable, so the solution pushed (especially by the French representatives) was to give
the entire railroad area to Romania. But even so, the borderline was about 40 miles
east of the one promised to Romania by the 1916 Treaty. Bratianu’s main advantage
in solving the Transylvania problem proved to be the communist regime that came
to power in Hungary; that was none too welcome to the Great Powers.
< 63 >
The Territorial Commission on Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs was the scene
where the representatives of the Big Four presented their proposals and decided Ro-
mania’s territorial future.59 (Clive Day and Charles Seymour represented the USA;
Sir Eyre Crow and Alan Leeper, Britain; André Tardieu and Guy Laroche, France;
Giacomo de Martino and Count Luigi Vannutelli Rey, Italy.) There were two camps:
the Americans, sometimes allied with the British representatives (as illustrated by
the February 1 Anglo-American Conference), and the French and Italians.60 Bessara-
bia was the only issue related to Romania that everyone had agreed upon since the
beginning of the Commission’s work; it was decided that Bessarabia should belong
to Romania. Controversy was sharp over all the other territories. In regard to
Bukovina, the Americans advocated the creation of a Ruthenian state; on Banat, they
(together with the French) were in favor of a cession of territory to Serbia; and the
same for Dobrudja. The most heated dispute by far was that of Transylvania’s west-
ern boundary. In April, the Territorial Commission decided to give all of Transylva-
nia to Romania, but the new borders were slightly smaller than what the 1916 Treaty
promised. Still, this partially contradicted the ethnic principle, because sizable ur-
ban centers populated mainly by the Magyars were given to Romania — a decision
based on strategic and economic grounds.
After some debate, the Supreme Council decided to establish a neutral zone
between the Romanian and Hungarian troops in Transylvania, but the communist
takeover of Hungary complicated the situation. Romania exploited the new situa-
tion by playing up the Bolshevik danger. President Wilson adopted a conciliatory
attitude toward the Hungarian communist government, but Bratianu was not about
to tolerate another communist threat at Romania’s borders. Bratianu had the moral
backing of the French military leaders. On April 16, the Romanian Army launched an
offensive, intending to occupy all those Transylvanian territories that had voted in
favor of the union with Romania on December 1, 1918; the goal was achieved in a
matter of weeks.61 The Great Powers were not at all satisfied with the Romanian
move and asked Bratianu to withdraw these forces behind the Arad-Oradea-Satu
Mare line; they made the mistake of not telling Bratianu that that line was actually
the newly-established border. Bratianu refused to withdraw. This was the beginning
of a fierce confrontation between the Supreme Council and Bratianu.
Thus, in May, while the Supreme Council was deciding (in secret) the new
Romanian border in Transylvania, Bratianu threatened to continue the offensive —
to capture Budapest and to establish a government favorable to Romania. The Great
Powers, and especially the Americans, were appalled, and demanded that the Roma-
nian army withdraw from Hungary. However, they were not disposed to send troops
to back up this demand.
By the end of May the situation worsened. The projected Treaty with Austria
provoked the bitter response of Romania and some other small states as well, espe-
cially on economic grounds. The Minorities Treaty was another irritant;62 elaborated
by the Great Powers, as a result of the Jewish influence, it allowed them to intervene
in favor of ethnic minorities. Ostensibly, the Treaty was prepared especially in order
< 64 >
to protect the Jewish minority, and it had the same purpose as the Bucharest Peace
Treaty between Romania and the Central Powers in this respect.
Bratianu considered the Minorities Treaty a form of foreign intervention into
the internal matters of an independent state, and refused to sign it. It was not easy
for the Romanians to understand why they, in the victorious camp, had to accept the
same conditions as in the camp of the defeated. Bratianu argued that, when the Ro-
manian representative in the Commission of the League had proposed inserting into
the statutes of the League some general clauses aimed at guaranteeing the rights of
minorities, the representatives of the Great Powers had opposed him, with the fatu-
ous argument that they were civilized states in which the rights of everyone are re-
spected. Bratianu objected to this discrimination against Romania and refused to
accept different treatment. Bratianu also observed that Germany, the “enemy”, had
not been obliged to sign a minorities’ treaty.63 This was one of the numerous reasons
behind Bratianu’s decision to leave Paris on July 2,64 and the Romanians’ refusal to
sign the Austrian Treaty on September 10. Unfortunately, all the other interested
States (except for Yugoslavia), being in no position to upset their powerful allies,
agreed to sign the Minorities and the Austrian Treaties; and Bratianu was almost
alone against the Big Four on this matter.
The Big Four countered Bratianu’s argument on May 31, deciding against any
possible Romanian occupation of Budapest and asking him to withdraw the army
from Hungary. Bratianu asked, in return, for some guarantee from the Great Powers
against a possible attack from Hungary. The guarantees were not forthcoming, and
President Wilson demanded immediate withdrawal. The Romanians (with unoffi-
cial French backing) refused, conditioning any such move on the disarmament of the
Hungarian Army. For, although the representatives of the Great Powers were preoc-
cupied with finding a way to eliminate the communist regime in Hungary, none of
them was disposed to send her own troops in and the Hungarians took the opportu-
nity to reorganize their army.
On July 20, Bela Kun (the communist leader of Hungary), encouraged by his
success against the Czechoslovaks, took a fatal decision and ordered an attack on
the Romanian Army. The Hungarian Army was defeated in just a few weeks. This
time the Romanian Army took Budapest, and eliminated the communist regime. The
Romanian occupation of Budapest created another nuisance for the Supreme Coun-
cil, who, during the next six months, would have to use everything in its power
(including even the threat of refusing Transylvania or other territories to Romania)
to induce the Romanians to withdraw from Hungary. Romanian requisitions in
Hungary aggravated the situation.65
At the same time, the scission within the Supreme Council — with France
adopting a pro Romanian stand and with the American influence diminishing —
worked in favor of Romania. The climax came when the Supreme Council sent an
ultimatum in the form of a Note to Romania on November 15, threatening to cut off
diplomatic relations if Romania refused to comply with the Supreme Council’s de-
mands. Romania accepted the ultimatum.
The new Romanian government, led by Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, signed the
< 65 >
Minorities Treaty (with modifications made at the insistence of the Romanians), the
Austrian Treaty and the Bulgarian Treaty on December 10, 1919. Since November, the
Romanians had gradually been withdrawing their army from Hungary. However,
Romanian troops were still kept on the Theiss line — not quite in accordance with
the Council’s expectations. In January 1920, Vaida-Voevod made a visit to Paris and
was received by the Supreme Council. The January 20 meeting, which will be dis-
cussed in the next subchapter, ended with the Romanian promise to withdraw its
army from Hungary, which actually happened during the following two months.
Overall, it should be stated that the Romanian occupation of Hungary lasted much
longer than necessary and that it failed to bring any service to Romania in doing so.
On June 4, 1920, the Treaty with Hungary was signed.
The Paris Peace Conference proved to be a great success for Romanian diplo-
macy, even though not all the Romanian territorial demands were met. These
achievements came as a result of a number of objective factors and not at all as a gift
from the Great Powers. Of course, there were some imperfections, such as the small
quota of war reparations to be paid, or the status of the Danube (given that some
portions of the River were entirely on Romanian territory, the Romanians expected
to have more control over its navigation, meaning the right to levy taxes; but the
Great Powers were unwilling to lose control over the Danube and insisted that it
should have an international status, giving Romania little voice on such matters)
but, on the whole, the Romanians had every reason to be satisfied with the results.
In the following years, Romanian diplomacy would focus mainly on the need to
guarantee that the decisions taken by the Peace Conference were respected, and to
prevent any possible revision of the borders established by those treaties.
It is interesting to note that, while in Paris many of the representatives of the
Great Powers had been against Romania, the same could not be said about the Great
Powers’ representatives in Bucharest (Charles J. Vopicka for the US, Saint-Aulaire
for France, Frank Rattigan for the UK, T. Franklin for Italy). Their superiors, in fact,
considered each of the four ministers to be too much in favor of the Romanian cause.
Their reports during the crises between Romania and the Supreme Council highlight
the differences in view from Bucharest and from Paris.
Frank Rattigan showed by far the clearest understanding of the Romanian
situation. His reports remain to this day valuable descriptions not only of Romanian
affairs but also of the Romanian people. This difference is really striking because
each of the Ministers represented the interests of his own country, which one would
suppose were the same whether seen from Paris or Bucharest, and yet the ministers
in Bucharest each fought, as much as possible, against the decisions taken by their
superiors to the detriment of Romanian interests.
The Paris Peace Conference and The Bessarabian Question
To bring some clarity to a complex situation as it unfolded, a chronological

presentation follows, outlining the evolution of the Bessarabian question during the
Paris Peace Conference. Clearly, events were taking place on two levels — an official
< 66 >
level (meaning everything that was presented during the meetings of the Peace Con-
ference) and an unofficial one (meaning the under-the-table direct negotiations be-
tween Romania and the Great Powers). The present chapter will analyze the Con-
ference as a whole, on only the official level; the role played by each Great Power in
the making of the Treaty, and their particular interests regarding the Treaty, repre-
senting the unofficial level, will be presented in subsequent chapters. Since the US
had been the biggest opponent to the Bessarabian treaty, and expressed their oppo-
sition officially, we will also go into a bit more detail on their position (the real moti-
vation behind their attitude will be analyzed in Chapter 9). At the end of this chap-
ter, we present the Foreign Relations of the United States collection (FRUS) record
of the conversations whenever the Bessarabian question was the subject of an in-
tense debate in one of the Conference’s commissions.
An intense propaganda campaign was undertaken at the Conference by the
Romanian government, both at the official and the unofficial levels, to convince the
public and the deciding Powers of the rightfulness of Romania’s territorial and eco-
nomic claims. Memorandums were sent to the various commissions of the Peace
Conference, unofficial contacts were made with the delegates to the Conference,
pamphlets were printed and articles and interviews were published in the mass me-
dia.
Although the Paris Peace Conference officially started in January 1919, its be-
ginnings should be traced to January of the prior year, when the famous 14 Wilson-
ian Points had been presented before the American Congress. The European situa-
tion changed considerably between the day the 14 Points were proclaimed and the
day the war ended; the points needed to be adjusted to the new situation. The Cobb-
Lippmann memorandum of October 29, 1918 achieved that task. In regard to Roma-
nia, the memorandum states:
The 6th point, referring to Russia, only makes indirect reference to Bessara-
bia. The only reference made to Romania is that the Bucharest Peace Treaty
must be canceled as palpably fraudulent.
The 10th point, referring to the peoples of Austria-Hungary, states,
“Transylvania will undoubtedly join Romania, but provisions must be made for
the protection of Magyars, Szeckelers and Germans who constitute a large mi-
nority”.
The 11th point, referring to Romania and Serbia, states, “the relations of the
several Balkan states to one another should be determined by friendly counsel
along the historically established lines of allegiance and nationality . . . Roma-
nia will have acquired the Dobrudja, Bessarabia and probably Transylvania . . .
Bulgaria should clearly have her frontier in the southern Dobrudja as it stood
before the second Balkan War”.66
< 67 >
A Chronology
February 1, 1919 – During the Council of Ten discussions of Romanian territo-

rial claims, Romanian Prime Minister Ion I.C. Bratianu, seeking to justify the armi-
stice Romania signed with the Central Powers, observed:
At the demand of the representatives of the Entente, who declared in writing

that this operation was the last military cooperation that they were entitled to
expect from Romania, the Romanian army commenced open hostilities with
the Bolshevist troops and then occupied the whole territory of Moldavia and
Bessarabia. It was thought that this supreme effort would at least ensure the
existence of an Ukraine friendly to the Allies.67
Bratianu presented, in an official manner for the first time, the justice of Roma-
nia’s claims to Bessarabia. In answer to a question from Lloyd George, he also main-
tained that “In Bessarabia, elections had taken place under the Russian Republican
government, and the Assembly thus elected had proclaimed the Union with Roma-
nia, subject to certain reservations which the Assembly had since withdrawn, on
condition that it should be granted a special Agrarian Law.”68
After the withdrawal of the Romanian representatives, the Council decided

that the Romanian Treaty of August 1916 should be considered annulled due to Ro-
mania’s signing the Bucharest Peace. However, they acknowledged that Romania
should have proper representation at the Peace Conference. After further delibera-
tions, the Council decided, “the Romanian territorial interests should be referred for
examination in the first instance by an expert committee, composed of two repre-
sentatives each of the USA, the British Empire, France and Italy.”69
Bratianu’s introductory remarks, made before presenting his report, were in-
dicative of his relationship with the other leaders, and characteristic of his personal-
ity; they were clearly directed against at least some of those in the room: “This is the
second time I have to take an oral examination in Paris. The first time was when I
took my engineering license; at that time, my examiners knew more than me.”70
February 8 – The first meeting of the Commission on Romanian and Yugo-Slav

Affairs.71 The Commission was the first of five territorial commissions that came into
being and the immediate reason for its creation was the Romanian-Yugoslav conflict
over the Banat. Much of its work would be focused on the Banat border and the bor-
der between Romania and Hungary. The Commission had no competence to pro-
nounce judgment on the validity or non-validity of the 1916 Treaty. Like the other
territorial commissions, its mandate was not to decide what the frontiers of Roma-
nia were to be, but to recommend to the Council of Ten what, in their opinion
(based on ethnic, geographic, and necessary economic grounds), those frontiers
ought to be. Strategic reasons, arising from temporary political exigencies, were not
permitted to influence their decision.72
< 68 >
André Tardieu was supposed to preside over this first meeting of the commit-
tee, but he suddenly left the meeting and Giacomo de Martino therefore led the dis-
cussion. This change altered the course of the debates, because Martino requested
that the discussion should start by discussing the validity of all the treaties invoked
by the Romanians in their favor (with a view to Italy’s own secret treaty with the
Entente). Although the French representatives agreed, the Americans flatly refused
to take into account any treaty of which they had no official knowledge; the British
considered that, if the cited treaties had still been valid, then they simply would have
been implemented by the Conference.73
As for Bessarabia, both the British (Eyre Crow) and American (Clive Day) rep-
resentatives asked that the ethnic and national principles be included in the future
treaty of Bessarabia. The French representative (Laroche) insisted on the ethnic and
historical arguments, which were the basis for the Union and for its international
recognition. Clive Day also raised the possibility of future difficulties with Russia
due to the Union’s recognition.74 In the end, Laroche, with the agreement of all the
other members in the Commission (including the Americans), stated that:
Of all the territories under discussion by the Committee, Bessarabia is . . . the

only one which, at a recent period, belonged to Romania, and to which Roma-
nia is able to make not only a national but a real historical claim. Bessarabia is a
definite province that has been removed from a definite State. As a result, its
return to this State could not create difficulties in the future with Russia.”75
The Commission met again, a number of times (the most important meetings
took place on February 11, 17, and 22), the main point of debate being that of Roma-
nia’s future western border, and there were some unofficial meetings as well. During
none of these meetings was Bessarabia mentioned, which would indicate that it was
not seen as a problem and that it was clearly accepted as Romanian territory.
March 5 – Meeting of the Commission on Romanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs.

The Romanian Commission took up the Bessarabian problem in order to prepare a
draft for the final decision of the Commission. In agreement with Laroche’s proposal,
the Commission decided in favor of the Union between Bessarabia and Romania.
March 11 – Meeting of the Commission on Romanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs.
The Commission in unanimity adopted its final decision on Bessarabia. The decision
reads:
The Commission, taking into consideration the general aspirations of the Bes-
sarabian populations, the Moldavian character of that region, both geographi-
cally and ethnographically, as well as the economic and historic arguments,
favors the attachment of Bessarabia to Romania. It believes that this attribu-
tion should take place under a form that will safeguard the general interests of
Bessarabia, notably as regards its relations with the neighboring countries, and
< 69 >
which will guarantee the rights of the minorities in accordance with the provi-
sions of the League of Nations.76
In fact, it was not only the Commission but also the “official” historians of the
Peace Conference who considered that Bessarabia rightfully belonged to Romania:
Geographically and historically a Romanian province with a predominantly

Romanian population, Bessarabia was clearly marked out for reunion with Ro-
mania. It was considered that any discontent that might have arisen during the
past year of Romanian occupation was due to personal mistakes or the general
hard times rather than to any deep distaste for union with Romania, in which,
it was felt, lay Bessarabia’s (and Romania’s) best hope of progress and peace.
Diplomatically, however, there was the difficulty of Russian susceptibilities,
and it was attempted to salve these by phrasing the decision in the most tactful
words.77
March 28 – Final meeting of the Commission on Romanian and Yugo-Slav Af-

fairs. This time, expert international jurists took part, in order to examine the legal-
ity of the articles included in the treaties establishing the future frontiers. The final
report of the Commission, together with a number of annexes, had been sent to the
Central Territorial Commission, which approved it and then sent it to the Council of
Foreign Ministers. As for the Bessarabian border, the American representative
Charles Seymour stated, privately, “it is rather embarrassing because part of the
frontiers abut on Russia and the Ukraine, but there is no one there with whom we
can sign a treaty.”78
April 6 – The final Report of the Committee for the Study of Territorial Ques-
tions Relating to Romania and Yugoslavia was presented to the Supreme Council.
After presenting a general outline of the future Romanian frontiers, including Bes-
sarabia, the Report presented six draft articles to be inserted in a treaty with Russia.
These articles would form the basis of the future Bessarabian treaty.79 On April 15,
the Central Committee on Territorial Questions approved the Report and sent it to
the Supreme Council.
May 8 – Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The recommendations of
the Romanian Territorial Commission, approved by the Central Territorial Commis-
sion, had been handed over to the Council of Foreign Ministers for debate.
At this meeting, the new American policy regarding Bessarabia was presented
for the first time by Secretary of State Robert Lansing:
After a short discussion it was decided not to consider the boundary of Roma-
nia on the Russian side, but only to deal with its boundary on the Hungarian
side. Mr. Lansing said that in his opinion when the delimitation of Romania
and Russia was made, it would be necessary that Russia should be represented.
The Peace Conference could not adjudicate on territory belonging to a state
with whom the Powers represented were not at war.”80
< 70 >
The proximate reason for this declaration was President Wilson’s intention to
recognize the White Russian Government headed by Admiral Kolchak as the official
government of Russia; Kolchak seemed willing to allow a plebiscite to take place in
the central parts of Bessarabia.81
And indeed, the change in US policy came at the height of the Kolchak cam-
paign when, as presented by Lloyd George on May 7, “we are witnessing the verita-
ble collapse of Bolshevism . . . according to our information Kolchak is about to join
his forces with those at Archangel; it is also possible that he will arrive in Moscow
soon and establish a new government”.82 The problem here is that, even after Kol-
chak’s defeat, the US position remained the same as expressed on May 7.
Lansing also asked for a plebiscite to be held in Bessarabia, knowing that it
would be unacceptable to the Romanian authorities (or to any other state in a simi-
lar situation) — because the plebiscite would have meant choosing between democ-
racy and communism, and even if the plebiscite should be in favor of union, the Rus-
sians would not accept it. Therefore, the only result of a plebiscite for Romania
would have been intensified communist propaganda and the possibility of losing its
military control in Bessarabia. Bratianu presented these arguments clearly, later on.
In fact, it was not only Bratianu who was concerned about the danger posed by Bol-
shevism. The Allies themselves considered the spread of Bolshevism toward Central
Europe as a real danger and took steps to counterbalance it.83
As early as May 1919, US Secretary Robert Lansing expressed a new position
toward the Bessarabian question, a position different from that expressed by the
American representatives in the Romanian and Central Territorial Commissions.
May 16 – The Council of the Foreign Ministers. During the debate over the fu-
ture Bulgarian frontier and in connection with the situation in Dobrudja, it was
pointed out that, “Romania’s frontier in Bessarabia had been left undecided, by rea-
son of Mr. Lansing’s remark that this frontier could not be decided in the absence of
Russia . . . Mr. Balfour observed that the objection to settling the frontier in Bessara-
bia, as involving a partial dealing with the Russian problem, was a sound one”.84 The
British sided with the Americans, clearly as a result of Kolchak’s military success,
but it was only temporary.
May 27 – The Council of Four. It was pointed that the question of Bessarabia
had been omitted from the dispatch to Admiral Kolchak, and that this would proba-
bly cause difficulties with Romania when the dispatch was eventually published.
After some discussions, the following addition to the dispatch was approved:
“Sixthly, the right of the Peace Conference to determine the future of the Romanian
part of Bessarabia shall be recognized.”85 In some diplomatic circles it was consid-
ered that, by this article, the Great Powers undertook to recognize Romanian rights
in Bessarabia.
July 1 – The Council of the Heads of Delegations. After some debate it was de-
cided, at Clemenceau’s suggestion, to take up the Bessarabian question. The Ameri-
can (Paul Eugene Dutasta) and British (Lord Balfour) representatives opposed dis-
< 71 >
cussing the Bessarabian problem on the grounds that “as this subject concerned Rus-
sia, no decision has been made” and that “no treaty has to be made either with Rus-
sia or with Romania”. But the Italian (Tittoni) and French representatives argued
that “the Council should make an effort to eliminate elements of disturbance and
[that] the area in question was very disturbed”. The final decision was that the next
day the Council should hear a report from André Tardieu (the President of the Com-
mission on Romanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs) and that Maklakoff and a Romanian
delegate would be heard separately on the same subject. 86
July 2 – The Council of the Heads of Delegations. The Bessarabian question
was discussed in the most official manner and at the highest level. Both the Russian
and Romanian opinions were heard, plus the conclusions reached by the Commis-
sion on Romanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs. Very important for the Bessarabian ques-
tion is the report presented by Tardieu, which reads:
The Committee had been unanimous in their wish to grant Bessarabia to Ro-
mania, but the Council had sent a telegram to Admiral Kolchak, which ap-
peared inconsistent with that decision. In the telegram in question the council
had only stated that the Romanians rights in Bessarabia should be preserved in
favor of that country. 87
It was only the American representative, Secretary of State Lansing, who ob-
jected to discussing the Bessarabian question, arguing that, as it was a conflict be-
tween two friendly states (toward the Entente), he did not have the necessary pow-
ers to deal with it. Still, the conflict between Romania and Yugoslavia was also one
between friendly States, but this did not stop the US representatives from directly
intervening.
Because of the importance of both the Russian and the Romanian reports, we
will present them entirely, as an Annex to the present chapter. The main points in
Bratianu’s presentation were the Sfatul Tserii’s decision for union, and the plebiscite.
Lansing had asked for a plebiscite in Bessarabia; that was adamantly rejected by Bra-
tianu, who said that neither now nor in the future would he accept the organization
of a plebiscite in Bessarabia. His reason was clear and simple: it would lead to an
onslaught of revolutionary and Bolshevik propaganda that could have a dire effect on
the future of Bessarabia and Romania.
July 23 – Meeting of the US Commissioners. The discussion started with the
problem of the elections to be held in all the Romanian territories, including Tran-
sylvania and Bessarabia, and the fact that the Bessarabian representatives, Kroupen-
ski (one of the richest Bessarabian landowners) and Schmidt (former mayor of Chisi-
nau), had protested that the Romanians were preparing to hold an election in Bes-
sarabia for members to the Romanian Parliament.
The entire meeting shows how much the US “specialists” relied on unverified
information. In Prof. Coolidge’s words: “There was to be an election in all the Roma-
nian territories, but in the new territories no one had a right to vote until he was
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forty years of age, which seemed to be an ingenious way of giving a majority to the
people in the older territories”.88 This is dead wrong; the Romanian electoral law
stipulated that the 40 years age limit referred only to the Senate, and was valid all
over Romania. The Romanians (and not only the minorities) living in the newly ac-
quired territories would hardly have sat still for such an arrangement as Coolidge
had dreamed up. In reality, this episode says much about Romania’s image with the
US delegates, who were ready to believe any such story without checking their
sources. Allen W. Dulles opposed sending the matter to the Committee on Minori-
ties, arguing that it was not a problem of minorities’ protection, as the minorities
were able to vote on the same conditions as the Romanians. Then, they remembered
that nothing was to be done in any of the territories that formed part of Russia, as
Secretary Lansing had previously stated. The discussion continued on the general
situation of Bessarabia, simply describing the positions previously expressed by Bra-
tianu and Lansing on July 2.
July 26 – Meeting of the American Steering Committee.89 This meeting is im-
portant because it was one of the few moments when some of the US representatives
seemed eager to “solve” the Bessarabian question. The Committee discussed the
situation of Dobrudja and Bessarabia. Dr. Johnson suggested that the two questions
might be taken up with Romania at the same time, with the idea that Romania’s as-
pirations in Bessarabia might be satisfied in case she would consent to certain con-
cessions in the Dobrudja.90 The suggestion was later abandoned, as the British posi-
tion regarding Dobrudja was opposed to that of the Americans, the British clearly
favoring the Romanians.
August 1 – Council of Heads of Delegations. Again, it was the French represen-
tative who reopened the Bessarabian question, saying that “it would be difficult to
settle the Romanian question as a whole, and to make that country accept clauses in
the Peace Treaty on the subject of minorities if, at the same time, its frontiers had not
been notified to it”. 91 Answering questions, Tardieu pointed out twice that the Com-
mittee had been unanimous in their wish to grant Bessarabia to Romania, but admit-
ted that some delegations (referring to the Americans) had altered their opinions
after the lapse of a few months. After more debate (presented in the Annex) it was
decided, in the same manner as before, to postpone the discussion on Bessarabia
(together with Bukovina and Dobrudja), this time the postponement being justified
by the need to wait until the formation of a new Romanian government.
August 13 – Meeting of the US Commissioners. During discussions regarding
Poland’s frontier with Russia, Bessarabia was mentioned. Again White pointed out,
“We have laid down the rule that we do not think that any of the territory that we
formerly called Russian territory should be disposed of until we know what the Rus-
sian situation will be.” The problem was that Lansing had admitted some exceptions
to this rule in regard to Finland and Poland; such exceptions might or might not ap-
ply to Bessarabia.
Dr. Lord: The nearest to a thoroughly official act is the note of the Council
of Four to Admiral Kolchak, in which they make a distinction between Bes-
< 73 >
sarabia and other parts of the former Russian Empire. They expressly reserve
the right of the Peace Conference here to settle the Bessarabian question. . . .
Colonel Grant: The Bessarabian question deserves a special settlement, for
it is very much mixed up by the Romanian situation at the present time.92
September 3 – Meeting of the US Commissioners. The main point of the dis-

cussion was the Bulgarian frontier in Dobrudja, and in that context the Bessarabian
question was mentioned. The American representatives had their own ideas regard-
ing Dobrudja and they went so far as to use the Transylvanian question in order to
strong-arm the Romanians. The following fragments illustrate that discussion:
Mr. Polk: Now the Dobrudja question is a question to be settled with a

friendly state — that is Romania — and therefore that could properly be in a
separate treaty. It is obvious at the present moment that Romania would not discuss that
question unless she were given compensations in Bessarabia (author’s emphasis). Now, I
understand the position of the Delegation has been that we could promise
them nothing in Bessarabia; that that is a part of Russia, and that therefore we
would not be a party to the disintegration of Russia. . .
Dr. Johnson: The position of the American Delegation on the Territorial
Commission was — and it was supported by Mr. Lansing and later by the
President — that although Romania was a friendly state we had a right to require the
cession of the Bulgarian portion of the Dobrudja to Bulgaria, in view of the fact that we
were giving Romania very large areas of territory which were acquired as the result of
the common victory of the Allies, not by the Romanians’ own efforts. The Brit-
ish and the Italians did not support that point of view, and took the position
that, Romania being a friendly state, we could require no cession of territory.
But our position has been that while we may not require outright cession of
territory, we will say “we will give you this territory if you cede that”.
Mr. Polk: Aren’t we more or less blocked? We cannot give them Bessarabia.
Dr. Johnson: But even outside the question of Bessarabia, there is Transylvania.
Mr. Polk: There is Transylvania, of course. . . .
Mr. Polk (concluding): Now, in view of the present attitude of Romania, it
would be a waste of time to attempt to draw the line (in Dobrudja).93
Still, Frank Polk did the opposite, and took the first opportunity to reopen the
Dobrudja question.
September 5 – Council of Heads of Delegations. Frank Polk insisted that the
Dobrudja question should be mentioned in the treaty withBulgaria, but the British
and French representatives were clearly opposed to this idea, only the Italian repre-
sentative trying to somehow back the US proposal.
Lord Balfour: [He] was ready to state that the attribution of southern Do-
brudja to Bulgaria would be conducive to a lasting peace in the Balkans. But he
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thought that it was impossible, as long as Romania remained an Allied Power,

or, at worst, a neutral, to insert any clause in the Treaty with Bulgaria requiring
a surrender of Romanian territory.
Mr. Polk: According to the future provisions of the Treaty with Hungary,
Romania stood a chance of receiving considerable accessions of territory in Tran-
sylvania and Bukovina. Her acquisition of these territories might be made contingent on her
yielding ground in the Dobrudja.
Mr. Balfour: The frontiers in Transylvania and Bukovina were drawn on
ethnological lines. It would be difficult to alter these frontiers without violat-
ing the principles of the Conference.
Mr. Pichon: A serious question of principle was involved. The Conference,
hitherto, had never attempted to revise Treaties anterior to the war. . . .
Mr. Tittoni: The question of Dobrudja could not be made corollary to the
question of Transylvania or Bukovina. The matter of Bessarabia, however, re-
mained. [He] would be inclined to ask Romania to make a concession in the
Dobrudja as a condition of obtaining what the Commission recommended in
Bessarabia. . . .
Mr. Polk: Nothing [he] said had committed him to an offer of Bessarabia to
Romania in exchange for southern Dobrudja.94
The Americans were not willing at that time to make any compromise in re-
gard to Bessarabia but they were disposed to do so regarding Transylvania. This is
interesting, because for everybody (including the Americans) it was not only quite
clear but also already agreed (based on a series of demographic, ethnic, historical,
economic and strategic facts) that all of Transylvania belonged to Romania.
So, Polk was willing to encroach upon at least few of the principles used as the
basis for the building of a new world by the Paris Peace Conference in order to
achieve his aim regarding southern Dobrudja. The question is, why did he use the
Transylvanian question and not the Bessarabian one, on which nothing had yet been
decided? And, in the first place, what was the reason behind the American insistence
in the cession of southern Dobrudja? The whole matter shows that Polk had clear
instructions from his superiors in Washington that the Bessarabian question was
untouchable, whatever the circumstances. This comes to support the view that, for
his superiors, Bessarabia had a different significance, as presented in a following
chapter, seemingly being considered as more important than the Transylvanian
question.
September 8 – Council of Heads of Delegations. During the discussions over
the Peace Treaty with Austria, one of the main objections the Romanians had raised
was in regard to the national minorities (Article 60). The Bessarabian question came
into discussion as the representatives were analyzing the implications of Romania’s
refusal to sign the Austrian Treaty.
Mr. Tittoni said that Romania might be satisfied with actual possession of
the Bukovina and Transylvania without a title de jure to either, because she
< 75 >
might argue that neither Austria nor Hungary would be able for a long time to
dispute her possessions. But in the case of Bessarabia, unless treaty rights were
acquired, it must be clear to Romania that Russia, once restored to power,
would certainly wish to regain the country. In this instance, Romania would
see that it required the assistance of the Allied and Associated Powers or the
League of Nations. This might be pointed out to Romania, perhaps becoming
influenced by this argument.
Mr. Polk said that he was not prepared to bribe Romania into good behav-
ior. He did not think that the Council had fallen so low as to be forced to resort
to such tactics. [Interesting, just a few days earlier, he had been willing to use
the Transylvanian question in order to obtain Romania’s cession of southern
Dobrudja to Bulgaria.]
Mr. Tittoni pointed out that he would not have made his proposal unless
he had regarded Romania as having a good title to Bessarabia.
Mr. Balfour said that he thought the proper course was to make no men-
tion of Bessarabia at all.95
October 7 – Meetings of the US Commissioners. It was decided to bring the

matter of the parliamentary elections to be held in Bessarabia to the attention of the
Supreme Council.96
October 10 – Council of Heads of Delegations. Frank Polk raised the problem
of the Romanian action in Bessarabian. He told the Council:
He wished to say that the conduct of the Romanians in Bessarabia had called
for strong adverse comment. He was informed that the Romanian authorities
were holding elections and enforcing conscription. He thought that the action
of the Romanian government in Bessarabia should be considered by the Coun-
cil.97
In fact, Polk was acting as a result of a new note sent by the so-called Bessara-
bian representatives in Paris, Kroupenski and Schmidt, in which they complained
once more against the Romanian authorities, proving quite successful in obtaining
the backing of the US delegates.
October 11 – Council of Heads of Delegations. The Bessarabian question had been
placed on the agenda by the American delegation on the previous day. At first, the
Council read a note (the same, or similar to, the one cited above). The point ex-
pressed by Mr. Polk was that:
He did not intend to ask the Council to take a decision. . . the fact that the Ro-
manians were exercising rights of sovereignty in Bessarabia, and that the si-
lence of the Conference in regard to this matter might give the Romanians
grounds for believing that the Council consented to their having assumed this
sovereignty.98
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He was afraid that the Romanians would present this as a fait accompli and, as
this policy was counter to his instructions regarding Bessarabia, he had to use any-
thing at hand in order to counter the Romanian move.
October 30 – Council of Heads of Delegations. The Americans tried again to
obtain the agreement of the other representatives for a settling of the southern Do-
brudja problem in favor of Bulgaria. Once more, the French representatives clearly
opposed any solution contemplating the transfer of parts of Dobrudja to Bulgaria
and tried to bring the Bessarabian question into discussion. But Polk argued again
that the question of Bessarabia should not be discussed at the present moment par-
ticularly on account of the situation in Russia. He also stated, “The chief trouble was
that Romania had been given everything she wanted in a territorial way without any
equivalent being demanded. The time to bargain would have been when Romania’s ter-
ritorial requests had been freely granted.”99 The question is, was Polk referring to the
1914 negotiations, when Romania decided to stay neutral, although it was a member
of the Triple Alliance, or to 1916, when Romania decided, under intense pressure
from the Entente, to enter the war against its former allies, placing all her resources
in the Entente’s service?
November 11 – Council of Heads of Delegations. The British representative, Sir
Eyre Crowe, tried to bring the Bessarabian question into the Council’s debate, but
was opposed by Frank Polk, who argued that, in his opinion, it was not possible for
the matter to be settled at that time. Notwithstanding Polk’s opposition, Sir Eyre
Crowe stated, “they were clearly of the opinion that Bessarabia should go to Roma-
nia”.100 The British position is significant for at least four reasons: (1) they clearly
backed the Romanian position regarding Bessarabia, even at a time when the rela-
tions between the Conference and Romania were really strained; (2) they under-
stood the influence that a solution in favor of Romania would have over the latter’s
cooperation with the Peace Conference; (3) it was the beginning of the British pres-
sure in favor of the Bessarabian Treaty, a pressure targeting at first the US but soon
the French representatives, too; (4) the British statement also shows the weakening
of the US delegation’s influence over the Conference.
November 13 – Council of Heads of Delegations. During the discussions regard-
ing the ultimate note to be sent to Romania, the French representative (Charles
Berthelot) opened the debate regarding Bessarabia: “The question certainly had been
discussed by a Commission which had come to the unanimous decision to give the
whole of Bessarabia to Romania, but the Council had not taken any decision to that
effect, and its liberty of action remained unimpaired”.101 It is interesting that at any
time when the Bessarabian question was discussed, the French kept reminding the
Americans about the unanimous decision (which means that the American represen-
tatives too agreed on the matter) taken by the Commission on Romanian and Yugo-
Slav Affairs.
January 20 – The International Council of Premiers. The main difference is that
now the Americans have no power to influence directly the decision on Bessarabia as
< 77 >
they decided to leave the Peace Conference. Still, the US Ambassador in Paris, An-
drew Wallace, was assisting the works of the Peace Conference. The new Romanian
Prime Minister, Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, had been invited to justify the Romanian
policy towards the Peace Conference, with a special accent on the Hungarian situa-
tion. The main point of the discussions regarding the Bessarabian question,
(presented in detail in the Annex), was the verbal agreement that the Conference
would give official recognition to the Romanian rights in Bessarabia as soon as the
Romanian Army will be withdrawn from Hungary. This deal is excellently expressed
by Lloyd George:
We are convinced of your intention to evacuate Hungary, but we think you

may be faced by certain difficulties from the military party and we think the
military party would be more willing to obey the order of the Conference to
evacuate Hungary immediately if you said to them: ‘The Conference is awaiting our
evacuation of Hungary before deciding that Bessarabia shall be definitely Romanian’. . .
The Council took note of the statement made by Vaida-Voevod; it acknowl-
edged that, although it had as yet come to no decision as to the attribution of
Bessarabia and could not do so until Romania had carried out the orders of the
Conference in Hungary, the Commission on Romanian Affairs was unanimously
of the opinion that this territory should be attributed to Romania.102
Still, it should be noted that the connection between the Bessarabian question
and the withdrawal of the Romanian Army from Hungary was only a temporary one.
After this meeting, Vaida-Voevod would continue his official visit in Paris and
London in order to influence the two Great Powers for signing a treaty regarding
Bessarabia.103 He also complied with the Conference’s request and ordered the com-
plete withdrawal of Romanian troops from Hungary. In fact, as soon as the commu-
nist regime was defeated and as it became clear that the new Hungarian government
had neither the will nor the necessary military power to attack Romania, plus the
fact that the Conference had clearly decided the new frontier in Transylvania, the
presence of the Romanian Army on Hungarian territory did not exactly help the Ro-
manian cause in Paris. At the same time, Vaida-Voevod started direct negotiations
with the Soviets, in order to solve the existing conflicts on a peaceful manner.
March 3 – The International Council of Premiers. The Romanians asked the
Supreme Council for its opinion about the opening of direct negotiations with the
Bolsheviks and obtained the approval. Vaida-Voevod asked the Council to take a
definitive decision in the Bessarabian question, which was, in his opinion, the only
problem between Romania and Russia. The Council decided to make a declaration
in this sense (presented in the Annex), which stipulates:
The Principal Allied Powers pronounce themselves in favor of the reunion of

Bessarabia with Romania . . . and it is their desire to conclude a treaty for the
recognition . . . The Allied Powers consider that by this annexation the general
< 78 >
and particular interests of Bessarabia are protected, especially those regarding

its reports with the neighboring states, and that the minorities rights must be
guaranteed.104
April 15 – The Commission on Romanian Affairs examined the Draft Treaty

prepared by the Drafting Committee to give effect to the Supreme Council’s recogni-
tion of Romania’s sovereignty over Bessarabia. To the initial six articles in the Draft
three others were added; two of them (Articles No. 7 and 9) were proposed by the
British delegate, Alan Leeper, while the third one (Article No. 8) came from the
French delegation. Although the French also insisted that a special clause regarding
the indemnification of the French subjects expropriated in Bessarabia by the new
agrarian law (amounting to about 10 million French francs) should be inserted in the
Draft Treaty, the British opposed this, considering that “it would be inconvenient to
introduce in a Treaty of this nature a clause relating to certain temporary private
interests and that it would be preferable for the French delegation to negotiate it
privately with the Romanian delegation”. 105
Two points should be made, here. Article No. 9 failed to mention that the
Treaty would come into force only after all its signatories ratified it; and second, it
was drafted in the name of the US too, with the hope that, in the end, the US govern-
ment would sign the Treaty. 106
April 15 – The Secretariat General of the Peace Conference forwarded the draft
Bessarabian Treaty to the American Ambassador in Paris, Andrew Wallace, asking
him to verify his government’s position regarding the Draft Treaty.107
April 25 – The British Secretary of foreign Affairs, Lord Curzon, proposed dur-
ing the San Remo meeting of the Supreme Council that the Bessarabian Treaty,
which was drafted already, should be referred to the Conference of Ambassadors in
Paris, which should be authorized to discuss and approve it finally. The Supreme
Council accepted in unanimity the British proposal.108
June 19 – The Conference of Ambassadors. Ambassador Wallace explained to
the Conference the official position of the US government regarding the Bessarabian
question, as it was expressed in the instructions received from his government:
This government has steadily refused to become involved in the discussion of

Romania’s claims in the province of Bessarabia, and at the meetings of Supreme
Council last autumn the attitude of the US was made entirely clear . . . the US
must again decline to become a party to any treaty tending to Russia’s dismem-
berment.109
The Romanians understood that the Conference was not yet prepared to sign
the Bessarabian treaty and they decided to increase their pressure. In this sense, and
bearing in mind their previous negotiations with the British representatives, they
took a decisive step to meet the British and French demands regarding the signing of
the Treaty. By a telegram sent to the Romanian Legation in Paris in June 1920, Take
< 79 >
Ionescu acknowledged the agreement of the Romanian government to pay equitable

compensations to 13 landowners in Bessarabia (9 French, 2 British, 2 Americans) in
exchange for their expropriated land. More concretely, the Romanian government
undertook to pay an amount of compensation higher than the one established by the
land reform law, an amount that was to be established through collaboration be-
tween the Romanian and the interested governments.110 Finally, after making a gen-
eral estimate regarding the amount of compensations to be paid,111 the Romanian
government undertook to embody in an exchange of letters the requested assurances
regarding the compensations.
The Romanian Agrarian Reform expropriated the lands of foreigners in order
to give them to the peasants in exchange for an amount of money to be paid during
the following 10-15 years. It was feared that the Romanian government would not
pay a satisfactory amount of money to the former landowners. The exchange of notes
took place on September 17 with France and on October 27 with the UK, and stated:
The Romanian government undertakes to pay directly to the British [and

respectively French] government on behalf of the British [and respectively
French] landowners in Bessarabia whose property has been expropriated by
virtue of the Romanian expropriation law, compensation which shall represent
the real value of the expropriated property. The amount of this compensation
shall be fixed by common agreement and without taking into account the rules
laid down by Romanian expropriation law.112
The Romanian government made a real concession in offering to pay foreign

citizens a different amount than it was paying its own citizens. But this was one of
the conditions set by both France and the UK in order to sign the Bessarabian treaty,
and it did not seem to be such a high price to pay. Of course, there were not many
British or French landowners in Bessarabia. The problem was to keep this arrange-
ment secret from the Romanian landowners, and in this aspect the Romanian gov-
ernment assumed a certain risk.
The Romanian government made the mistake of offering this advantage only to
France and the UK, and not to the other Signatory Powers too. Of course, Japan had
neither knowledge of nor interest (there were no Japanese citizens living in Bessara-
bia) in the mentioned exchange of notes; however, in a sense the Japanese could have
used it later in order to justify their failure to ratify, arguing that they had been
“humiliated” or “discriminated against” by not receiving the same treatment as the
other Powers.
The Italian government, though, took real offense. Even though there were few
Italians in Bessarabia, the Italian pride as a Great Power was at stake. Therefore, one
of the obstacles invoked by the Italian government when the Romanians pressed for
the Italian ratification was this exchange of notes.
Meanwhile, Romania stepped up its propaganda in Paris, London and Rome,
urging the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty. However, the French were waiting to
< 80 >
see how the Polish-Russo war developed, while the British seemed to be waiting for
the results of the negotiations between Lloyd George and the Soviets’ representative,
Krassin. Each government blamed the other for the delay in signing the Bessarabian
Treaty.113
The stabilization of the Russo-Polish front toward the end of September also
worked in favor of Romania. Both Britain and France were afraid that, due to the end
of the war with Poland, Bolshevik troops would become available for deployment
against the Romanians in Bessarabia. In order to boost the Romanian position and to
avoid the start of a new war in Eastern Europe, they understood that the interna-
tional recognition of Bessarabia’s union would provide a powerful deterrence against
any military action of the Bolsheviks regarding Bessarabia.114
Still, the Great Powers, and especially the British, wanted to use the Bessara-
bian question as leverage to induce the Romanian government to ratify the Minori-
ties Treaty. Once Romania ratified it, the ethnic and religious minorities living in
Bessarabia would automatically be under its protection. The Powers clearly stated to
the Romanians that the Bessarabian Treaty would be signed only after Romania rati-
fied the Minorities Treaty,115 which Romania actually did in August 1920.
September 29 – After sending a memorandum to the Secretary General of the

Conference of Ambassadors, stating that there were no more reasons for postponing
the signature,116 the British representative urged his counterparts to sign the Bessara-
bian Treaty. As Lord Derby presented his action:
I must insist on being allowed to sign the Bessarabian Treaty without delay,
and that I could not agree to further postponement pending discussion on the
subject with the United States government. My colleagues all agreed on princi-
ple to immediate signature, but Mr. Laroche, speaking on behalf of the French
government, urged that the Conference should ask the US Ambassador to
make a last appeal to his government in the hope that they might be induced to
sign with the other Powers. Mr. Wallace also urged that he should be given
time to consult his government after the Treaty was formally communicated to
the Romanian government. I objected to any such delay, and it was finally
agreed that the Treaty should be communicated officially on Monday next
(October 4) to the Romanian government, and that all arrangements should be
made for it to be signed on October 11, or as soon as possible after that date.
These dates will give sufficient time for Mr. Wallace to consult his govern-
ment, as he wishes to do, but it is understood that whatever the reply he re-
ceives the signature of the Treaty will be proceeded with.117
That same day, Ambassador Wallace sent a telegram to his government, asking
for instructions regarding the Bessarabian question.118 Secretary of State Colby’s an-
swer came after a few days and was in line with the previous instructions:
< 81 >
In view of the consistent refusal of this government to approve a policy which

tended toward the dismemberment of Russia, as so recently emphasized in the
note to the Italian Ambassador, you should inform your colleagues that you
have been instructed not to sign at this time any treaty disposing of Bessarabia.
You should add that it is the Department’s opinion that hasty action in this
matter would only tend to give the Bolsheviks another pretense for arousing
national spirit on the ground that the Allies were disposing of Russian terri-
tory at a time when a representative Russian government could not be heard.119
In fact, the Romanians already knew, prior to the Conference meeting, that the
French and British governments had decided to make a common appeal to Washing-
ton for signing the Bessarabian Treaty. They understood the reasons behind the new
postponement but had to agree with it as they were promised that the Treaty would
be signed no latter than October 25.120
October 2 – Conference of Ambassadors. The British pressure for signing the
Bessarabian Treaty continues. As Lord Derby reports,
The Secretariat General, having failed to report the resolution taken at the last
meeting with regard to the Bessarabian treaty, I thought it well to insist that
the Treaty was to be presented on the 4 instant to the Romanian government,
no matter whether the US, Japanese and the Italian Ambassadors were still
awaiting instructions from their governments or not. If necessary the treaty will be
presented in the name of Great Britain and France instead of in the name of the Conference of
Ambassadors. It was decided to take the opportunity of requesting the Roma-
nian government at the same time to sign the two treaties regarding (1) Central
European frontiers and (2) the obligations taken over by the inheriting States
of the ex-Austria-Hungarian monarchy, which were signed at Sevres on Au-
gust 10.121
October 5 – The Italian Legation in Bucharest announced that the Italian gov-
ernment had already given the necessary instructions to his Ambassador in Paris in
order to sign the Bessarabian Treaty.122
October 8 – During the 78 meeting of the Conference of Ambassadors the
American Ambassador, Andrew Wallace presented his government’s view regarding
the Bessarabian problem, insisting that it was not opportune to sign the treaty at
that moment because of the bolstering effect that it would have for the Bolsheviks’
cause. But the Americans not at all impressed the British representative. As Ambas-
sadors Wallace reported,
Derby, however, reiterated that he hoped the treaty could be signed at earliest
possible moment and that he was prepared to sign even if he was only one of my col-
leagues who could do so. It appeared that he was only one of my colleagues who
was not concerned over the statement made by me pursuant to Department’s
instructions. 123
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Britain’s position towards the Treaty is detailed in Lord Derby’s report regarding the
meeting:
The Italian Ambassador stated that he had meanwhile received authority to

sign the Bessarabian Treaty but, in view of Mr. Wallace’s statement, he sug-
gests that the actual signature should be postponed until the Allied govern-
ments had time to express an opinion on the view held by the US government.
I objected to any postponement, insisting that I must sign on October 11 or as
soon as possible afterwards.
As a matter of fact it is unlikely that the Treaty can be signed on 11 instant
as the Romanian government have not yet replied to the note addressed to
them by the Conference, still less have they appointed their plenipotentiaries. I
made it clear to the Conference that the Bessarabian Treaty is to be signed even
if the Romanian government refuses to sign the New States Treaty and the
Central European Frontiers Treaty.124
October 11 – The Romanian answer to the proposed Draft Treaty asked for two
modifications. First one referred to the first paragraph of Article No. 7 regarding the
Chilia arm of the Danube, which they wanted to be omitted and to be referred to the
Conference on the status of Danube. The second one was referring to the Article No.
9, asking for the addition of words “non prévus” after the words “details”,125 accord-
ing to the agreement reached by Titulescu in London in May 1920. At the same time,
the Romanians announced their decision to sign the other two Treaties. While for
the first demand there had been no concession from the Great Powers, the second
one was met by them. In the final form, the Article 9 included the sentence “It is well
understood that the boundaries in the present Treaty and the sovereignty of Roma-
nia over those territories are not included in this right.”
October 27 – The Conference of Ambassadors discussed again the Bessarabian
Treaty. The British Ambassador informed the Conference that, after negotiations in
London, the Romanian government agreed to withdraw his objections to Article No.
7 and also that the new amendment to Article No. 9 had been accepted. The Confer-
ence approved the amendment and decided that the treaty should be signed on the
next day.
Significantly, it was “stipulated that subject to necessary deposit of ratifica-
tion, treaty is to come into force simultaneous to Romanian minorities treaty. Such a
stipulation appears to be necessary in view of fact that Minorities treaty is referred
to in Article 3.” 126
In order to have the treaty signed by all the members in the Conference, it was
decided that the treaty should also contain a clause allowing for an extension,
namely until December 15, during which contracting parties could sign. The main
reasons behind the mentioned clause, which was not unusual, was a request from
the representatives of the British Dominions, who were not yet familiar with the ex-
< 83 >
act content of the Draft Treaty, as well as the fact that the Japanese Ambassador at
the Conference was not in Paris at that time.
October 28 – The Bessarabian Treaty was signed on behalf of the British Em-
pire, France, Italy and Romania. The Japanese Ambassador and the representatives
of the British Commonwealth signed a few days later. The Romanian plenipotentiar-
ies also signed act of adhesion to the New States Treaty and the Central European
Frontiers Treaty, made on August 10, 1920, in Sèvres.
Toward the end of the Peace Conference, Romania managed to obtain the
Great Powers’ official recognition of Bessarabia’s union with Romania. It was not
easy; the Great Powers still thought of Russia as the Ally that, for more than three
years, had fought for their cause; and they felt some compunction over giving away
territories that had belonged to the Russian Empire. On the other hand, they were
also worried about Russia’s potential renascence as a power and wanted to limit its
impact as much as possible. Thus, they resorted to the so-called “peeling the orange”
approach while, at the same time, keeping a door open for a future rapprochement
with Russia.
The delicate phrasing of the Bessarabian Treaty is a reflection of this desire to keep
the door open and to avoid future conflicts with Russia: while recognizing the union
of Bessarabia with Romania, the Treaty omits any obligation on the part of its signa-
tories to intervene in favor of Romania in case of a Russian attack on Bessarabia.
Romania seized the moment, and moved to keep Bessarabia for herself. Few
Romanian leaders at that time could foresee that Russia would regain its position as
a Great Power. All warnings coming from different parts of Europe were left unan-
swered by the Romanian leaders.
< 84 >
CCHAPTER 3. THE MAKING OF THE BESSARABIAN TREATY
Annex No. 1
Bratianu and the Council of Ten, February 1, 1919

In FRUS, PPC, Vol.3, p. 847-848
As regards Bessarabia, there were at the present moment some 500,000 Roma-
nians on the other side of the Dniestr, more than 100,000 in Bulgaria, more than
3000,000 in Serbia, and several hundred thousand in Macedonia, but they did not
form groups sufficiently compact for Romania to be able to claim them at present. It
was otherwise in Bessarabia, which was severed from Moldavia in 1812. Part of the
province was restored to Romania after the Crimean War, but after the war of 1878,
Russia took back this province, although admitting the integrity of Romania by a
formal treaty.
The Romanian claims had always extended to Bessarabia, but they would
probably not have been allowed if a great political event had not occurred; Tsarist
Russia collapsed and Bessarabia constituted itself an autonomous Republic, recog-
nized by the Russian Government under the presidency of Mr. Kerenski. The Bol-
shevist disturbances created a serious situation in Bessarabia, and the Government
there applied to Romania for help in maintaining order. Romania had refused until
she received similar requests from Jassy. The military occupation of Bessarabia by
Romanian troops only took place, therefore, with the consent of the local Govern-
ment and at the request of the Ukraine and the representatives of the Entente. Sub-
sequently, Bessarabia separated itself completely from Russia and, later, the Bessara-
bian Government declared its desire to unite with Romania, and united itself once
more to Moldavia, from which it had been severed in 1812.
Such was the history of the reunion of Bessarabia and Romania. A great injus-
tice had thus been righted. More than 72% of the inhabitants are Romanians, the
remainders are Slavs, Bulgarians, or Germans, and they did not represent even 15% of
the populations; therefore from every point of view Bessarabia was a Romanian
country.
The incorporation of Bessarabia with Russia was an anachronism which could
no longer be allowed to exist. Whatever may be the fate of Russia, she could and
must no longer exercise supremacy in the Balkans. This dream was perhaps cher-
ished by the Russian Government at the beginning of the 19th century, and the occu-
pation of Bessarabia was doubtless a first step towards the occupation of Moldavia,
Bulgaria and Constantinople, but it was a false political move. Bessarabia was, more-
over, of the importance to Russia, for there was scarcely a Russian in the country.
But after having once seized the country, it was difficult for Russia to restore it. As
soon as circumstances allowed, it returned to Romania who was able to prevent the
work of destruction, which the Bolsheviks had begun. It was far more advantageous
to have a friendly country as neighbor than a country foreign in her ideas and ways of
life. Now Bessarabia would possess community of ideas with Romanian national
consciousness.
< 85 >
For all these reasons, Romania believed that the Peace Conference would not
question the justification of the union of Bessarabia with Romania.
Annex No. 2
Bratianu and the Council of Five, July 2, 1919

FRUS, PPC, 1919, vol.7, p. 9-14
Mr. Tardieu said he had been asked to open the discussion on Bessarabia by
explaining the views of the Committee which had studied the question. He read the
Report made by the Committee:
“The Committee, after taking into consideration the general aspirations of the
population of Bessarabia and the Moldavian character of that region from the geo-
graphical and ethnical points of view, as well as the historical and economic argu-
ments, pronounces itself in favor of joining Bessarabia to Romania.
“It considers that this measure should be effected in a form which will safe-
guard the general interests of Bessarabia, more especially as concerns its relations
with the neighboring countries, and which will guarantee the rights of minorities in
conformity with the provisions of the League of Nations”.
Since the Committee had reported, a protest had been received from Mr.
Tchaikowsky1 on behalf of the Russian Committees in Paris, protesting against any
annexation by Romania, and stating that Russia could not recognize any such act,
and further alleging that the Romanian troops had behaved in a very arbitrary man-
ner in the country. Mr. Tchaikowsky ended by demanding a free plebiscite.
Mr. Lansing said that the practical question was to know whether a decision
regarding Bessarabia could find a place in any of the Treaties of Peace.
Mr. Balfour pointed out that he had made the same remark on the previous
day. He had thought it was important to do all that was necessary to complete the
Treaties first. Mr. Clemenceau, however, had thought the Bessarabian question
pressing and had therefore urged that it be taken up. Mr. Lansing, however, had
pointed out that no resolution could be adopted on the subject, and this statement
had not been met by any dissent.
Mr. Lansing observed that the powers accorded to him as plenipotentiary were
limited to the negotiation of Peace. They did not enable him to deal with a conflict
between two friendly powers. President Wilson, no doubt, might have been able to
deal with such a question. He himself was not in that position.
Mr. Tardieu said that it had been decided on the previous day to hear a Russian
and a Romanian representative. They had been asked to come, and each would
doubtless say what he thought should be the frontier line in Bessarabia. Should the
two agree, which he admitted was not likely, Mr. Lansing would not be placed in the
difficulty to which he alluded. Should they not agree, the Council would then be
forced to see what further action could be taken. He would point out, however, that
< 86 >
it was difficult to make a Treaty with Romania if one of her frontiers were left gap-
ing. He suggested that Mr. Maklakoff should be heard.
Mr. Lansing agreed to this, but pointed out, however, that if any resolution
were asked for, he could not take any share in it. He had given this warning in order
that no false impression should be produced.
(At this stage, Mr. Maklakoff entered the room, and was asked by Mr. Tardieu
to express his views of Bessarabia.)
Mr. Maklakoff said that two memoranda had already been sent to the Peace
Conference on the subject of Bessarabia: he would endeavor to give a gist of the argu-
ments. In the first place, he must point out that no portion of the domains of the
Russian State could be disposed of by third parties without the consent of that
State. Not even the Peace Conference could assume that power. He and his friends
had no authority to speak for any constituted Government of Russia. He wished to
make this point quite clear at the outset. As to the merits of the question, he would
observe that there had never been any agreement between Romania and Russia, au-
thorizing the former to demand Bessarabia. Romania had entered the war on certain
terms. Those terms had not touched the question of Bessarabia. Romania could
therefore base no claim on the right of conquest. . . .
It was the very statement that Bessarabia desired to join Romania that he chal-
lenged. Bessarabia was not a Romanian country as a whole. . . .
He would point out that the word Bessarabia was often wrongly used. He
would not go back to remote antiquity. In the eighteen century, Bessarabia had been
part of Moldavia, which was a Turkish province. The Christians in those parts had
always been under the moral protection of Russia. In 1812, a few months before the
Napoleonic invasion, Bessarabia became a Russian province, captured from Turkey.
There were at that time some 300,000 inhabitants. At the present time there were
some three millions. . . .
Ethnographically, the last census had not established a Moldavian majority in
the country. There was no reason to allege that the statistics had been falsified in any
manner. Parts of the country were completely Russian. There were, however, four
districts in the center that were mainly Moldavian. It was only in these districts that
the question of a referendum arose. These districts might be united to Romania
should the population really wish it. He would not, in principle, raise any objection.
The Romanians, however, declared that Bessarabia had already expressed its will.
This he denied. Immediately after the Russian revolution, municipalities elected by
universal suffrage had been set up. They were the best organs for the expression of
the popular will. They had not asked to be annexed to Romania. These municipali-
ties had since been dissolved by the Romanians, and their representatives had pro-
tested against the Romanian desire to annex the country. The vote, however, had
since been secured from the Sfatul Tserii, which was an emanation of the Council of
Workmen and Soldiers, the latter largely composed of Moldavian deserters. . . .
It was a matter for surprise that a revolutionary assembly should have voted in
favor of its inclusion in a Monarchy. The whole vote, he submitted, was open to sus-
< 87 >
picion. It had been given during a military occupation of the country, and it was a
minority vote of an arbitrarily self-appointed body. If he believed that the people
backed this vote, he might be disposed to acquiesce in it, but he felt quite sure that a
free plebiscite would yield a completely different result. . . .
Romania had got all she had fought for and all she had asked for before the
War. Therefore, he protested with the greatest force against the claim now made by
Romania, especially as it was not founded, as alleged, on the desire of the majority of
the population. Finally, he would say that if there were districts showing a small
Moldavian majority, wishing to join Romania, he would be disposed to let them go.
As it was, he constantly received complaints even from Moldavians in Bessarabia, of
the treatment they received at the hand of the Romanians. The vote of the Sfatul
Tserii was being used quite fallaciously to justify what a reasonable conducted plebi-
scite would undoubtedly upset. He pointed out that similar votes had been obtained
in Lithuania and in Latvia, in favor of annexation by Germany. Any decision annex-
ing Bessarabia to Romania would be source of permanent grievance, and would do
harm to Romania, which would not be in a position to absorb an unwilling popula-
tion. The most he could admit was a plebiscite in the district in which the Molda-
vian population was predominant. . . .
Mr. Tardieu suggested that Mr. Bratianu2 should only be questioned regarding
the vote alluded to by Mr. Maklakoff.
Mr. Tittoni said that the Council was in full possession of ethnical statistics
and that it was unnecessary to hear Mr. Bratianu on that subject.
(At the stage Mr. Bratianu, Mr. Misu3, Mr. Diamandy4 and Mr. Pellivan5 en-
tered the room).
Mr. Tardieu addressing Mr. Bratianu said that the members of the Council had
studied the ethnological question thoroughly. They would like to know what degree
of sincerity and authority Mr. Bratianu attributed to the vote obtained in the Sfatul
Tserii.
Mr. Lansing interposed that it mattered little how the vote had been obtained.
It was more important to know how the consultation of the people could be carried
out in the future.
Mr. Balfour said that he thought the question put by Mr. Tardieu arose from
the statement made by Mr. Maklakoff.
Mr. Tardieu said that there was a connection between the two. He therefore
asked Mr. Bratianu to reply.
Mr. Bratianu said that he believed the vote alluded to did express the will of
the people and had been given in full freedom. He admitted the assembly was a revo-
lutionary assembly but similar assemblies had expressed the will of the people in
Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and elsewhere. The Romanian occupation had found that
assembly in power and in control of the country. Its authority had resulted from the
various successive developments that had taken place in Russia since the downfall of
Czarism. Mr. Lansing suggested a plebiscite. Bessarabia, he would point out, was a
Romanian country attached by force to the Russian throne for over 100 years. When
< 88 >
Russian autocracy felt, Bessarabia had come back to Romania. The Romanians had
been called in by the people and even by the only recognized Russian authority at
the time, namely, the Ukrainian Government. Difficulties did not arise on the ques-
tion of nationality. It was the social question that caused all the trouble. The Bolshe-
viks were dissatisfied with the Romanian Government merely because it established
Governmental order. The agrarian reform introduced made the peasant pay for the
land obtained by the expropriation of the landowners. The landowners on their side
grumbled because they were expropriated.
Mr. Lansing said that he wished to put a plain question to Mr. Bratianu.
Would he object to a plebiscite?
Mr. Bratianu replied that he did. He did so because the choice offered the peo-
ple would be that between Bolshevism and order. It was dangerous to offer such a
choice to a country on the border of disturbed Russia. Should the Romanians with-
draw their troops there would be endless tumult in the country.
Mr. Lansing asked whether Mr. Bratianu, if given possession of the country,
would agree to a plebiscite in two years.
Mr. Bratianu said thatwould not as only revolutionary agitation would result
from the knowledge that a plebiscite would take place in that period.
Mr. Lansing asked whether Mr. Bratianu would object to a plebiscite at any
other specified time in the future.
Mr. Bratianu said that he would object still more strongly, as it would only
prolong the agitation. He further begged to be allowed to state that the possession of
Bessarabia by Russia was now an anachronism. It had been for the Russian Empire a
march on the road to Constantinople. It could no longer serve that purpose. Russia
owed Romania a great debt as being largely responsible for her misfortune. Circum-
stances pointed very clearly to the best way in which Russia could discharge that
debt. It would be by the cession of Bessarabia.
Annex No. 3
The Council of Ten and the Bessarabian Question, August 1, 1919

FRUS, PPC, 1919, VOL. 7, P. 457-459
Mr. Tardieu said he wished to draw attention to a question not on the order of
the day, but one demanding an early solution; the problem was that of Bessarabia, on
which the Council had taken no decision.
Mr. Maklakoff and Mr. Bratianu had expressed Russian and Romanian points
of view. After they had been heard, the Council had discussed the matter briefly
without coming to a decision. It remained to be known what solution the Council
would adopt, for it was difficult to settle the Romanian questions a whole, and to
make that country accept clauses in the Peace Treaty on the subject of minorities, if,
at same time, its frontiers had not been notified to it.
< 89 >
Mr. Pichon said that the question was particularly important, in that the mi-
norities question would arise in Bessarabia.
Mr. Tardieu said that the Committee had been unanimous in their wish to
grant Bessarabia to Romania, but the Council had sent a telegram to Admiral Kol-
chak, which appeared inconsistent with that decision. In the telegram in question
the council had only stated that the Romanian rights in Bessarabia should be pre-
served in favor of that country.
Mr. Clemenceau said that it was evidently important to be able to inform Ro-
mania what its frontiers exactly were.
Mr. Balfour asked whether Mr. Tardieu thought that the Committee
would remain of the same opinion if the question were referred back to it for
a further report.
Mr. Tardieu said that the Committee had been unanimous when it had
studied the problem. But they knew that certain Delegations had altered
their opinions after the lapse of a few months. The difficult point was the tele-
gram sent to Admiral Kolchak.
Mr. Pichon said that he did not think that the Council had been inconsistent,
since it had not stated to Admiral Kolchak that Bessarabia, as a whole, would be
granted to Romania.
Mr. Balfour asked whether M. Pichon thought the telegram to Admiral Kol-
chak was not binding on the Council.
Mr. Pichon said that Admiral Kolchak’s attention had only been drawn to the
fact that the Council upheld Romanian rights in Bessarabia.
Mr. Tittoni said that he wished to draw the attention of the Council to an im-
portant point, which was, that the Committee had justified its proposals by saying
that it wished to maintain the administrative and geographical unity of Bessarabia,
and that it would give to Romania, in compensation, a strip of territory in the Do-
brudja, which belonged properly to the Bulgarians. By such a measure Romania
would be compensated for the Northern portion of Bessarabia left to Russia..
Mr. Balfour said he did not think he could admit compensations, which con-
sisted in balancing the cession of groups of human beings, by the cession of others to
foreign sovereignties, as a matter of principle.
Mr. Tittoni remarked that the question had therefore still to be examined.
Mr. Clemenceau said that the problem ought to be solved rapidly, and he pro-
posed to put it on the Agenda for the following day.
Mr. Balfour said that he ought to call attention to the fact that Romania was
actually protesting strongly against the minority clauses. It would therefore be suffi-
cient to tell that country, that it would not receive the territory now being consid-
ered, unless it accepted the minority clauses and signed the Treaty. In addition to
this, Romanian Statesmen did not really deny that the Southern part of Dobrudja
should be granted to Bulgaria. Had Romania been our enemy during the war she
would have been obliged to cede the territory. By the fact that she had been our Ally,
< 90 >
she could only be persuaded to accept our solution. Was it therefore possible to say
to that country, that it was going to receive a great extension of territory, but only
under the condition that it would be willing to consent to the cession of the Do-
brudja, which had been seized in 1913, and which, if left in her hands, would be a
ceaseless cause of friction. The Romanians were difficult people to deal with, and
Mr. Bratianu was no exception.
Mr. Tittoni said that he had heard that a new ministry had been set up in Ro-
mania, and that the President of the High Court had been instructed to form it.
Mr. Balfour said that he had also heart that, but the Cabinet had not been
formed, and the Bessarabian question was so important that he hoped that each one
of his colleagues would give it his consideration.
Mr. Polk said the policy of the United States had been to oppose the division of
Russia. Admiral Kolchak in his reply had protested against his country being di-
vided. He thought that dividing Russia would have a bad effect in that country, and
was therefore of the opinion that it would be better not to settle the question
straight away, but to await the return of ordered government in Russia.
Mr. Tittoni remarked that Russia’s point of view had been presented to the
Council.
Mr. Polk said that the Romanians opposed any idea of a plebiscite in Bessarabia.
Mr. Tittoni said that that was so, because the result of a plebiscite would be
the establishment of Bolshevism.
Mr. Balfour said he did not desire to settle the question on that day, but that he
would be willing that it should be taken up again in a few days’ time, if it were possi-
ble to settle it then. He did not, however, believe that it would be. In his opinion, he
thought it better not to consider Russia, and to regard our hands as free. He was
willing to wait for the formation of the new Romanian Cabinet in the hope that it
would be possible to negotiate with it and to settle outstanding problems.
Mr. Tardieu said that it would undoubtedly be better to wait for the formation
of the new Government, but even if it were favorable to our point of view, we should
have to inform it of our opinions on the Bukovina, Bessarabian and Dobrudja prob-
lems. It was not possible to do this at present.
Mr. Balfour said that if the new Romanian Government proved satisfactory, it
would send a representative to the Conference with whom the Council could nego-
tiate. It would then be possible to tell this new representative that the Council was
favorably disposed towards territorial concessions advantageous to Romania, on the
condition that the Romanians themselves should give evidence of goodwill in the
discussion of problems not yet solved.
Mr. Clemenceau said that it should be remembered that the Bulgarian Delega-
tion was now actually waiting for the Conditions of Peace at Neuilly.
Mr. Balfour said that the Peace Treaty with the Bulgarians could be discussed
and settled whilst the present question remained open.
(It was decided to postpone the discussion on Bukovina, Bessarabia and the
< 91 >
Dobrudja until the formation of the new Romanian Government.

It was further decided that the above questions should be put on the Agenda as
soon as the new Government had been formed.)
Annex No. 4
The Romanian Action in Bessarabia at the

Council of Heads of Delegations, October 11, 1919
FRUS, PPC, 1919, Vol. 8, p 578-579
Mr. Berthelot said the question had been placed on the agenda by the Ameri-
can delegation.
Mr. Polk said that Mr. Misu had informed him on the previous day that the
Romanian Government was about to hold elections in Bessarabia.
Sir Eyre Crowe said that the Bessarabian question had not yet been settled. He
thought that the note of the Bessarabian delegates could be examined at the time
that the question of Bessarabia was discussed.
Mr. Polk pointed out that the question was somewhat important in view of the
fact that according to the information that he had received, the Romanians were
holding elections, applying conscription and confiscating large properties.
Mr. Laroche said that the Bessarabian question was somewhat peculiar. It was
at the request of the Russian General Scerbacev that the Romanians had been asked,
at the beginning of the Russian debacle, to occupy the country. In order to stop the
development of Bolshevism, it had appeared to be the simplest method to favor the
autonomist element in Bessarabia. Soon afterwards Bessarabia had declared herself
independent. Later the National Assembly pronounced itself in favor of a union with
Romania. The Council were now faced with the wish expressed by the population.
The Conference had not yet decided the Bessarabian question, but it should take
account of all that had occurred, for there was no doubt that “the journey which Mr.
de Martonne recently made in Bessarabia had brought new proofs” to show that the
country was really a Romanian land. As far as the agrarian question was concerned,
the matter was most important. The distribution of landed property was particularly
unequal in Bessarabia, and the majority of the population was in favor of the neces-
sary reform. The persons who protested were Russified landowners, whose interests
were menaced.
Mr. Polk said that he did not intend to ask the Council to take a decision. He
had simply wished to bring to the attention of the Council the fact that the Romanians were exercis-
ing rights of sovereignty in Bessarabia, and that the silence of the Conference in regard to
this matter might give the Romanians grounds for believing that the Council con-
sented to their having assumed this sovereignty. In a conversation which he had had
with Mr. Misu on the preceding day, he had pointed out the possible danger to Ro-
mania, if Romania tried to make a fait accompli. He had asked him what would hap-
< 92 >
pen when Russia was reconstituted and when she claimed Bessarabia. Romania
would have to rely upon a position of fact. In order to retain Bessarabia, Romania
depended upon the good will of the League of Nations and of the Conference. Roma-
nia should be discouraged from making any attempt, apart from the decision of the
Conference, to annex Bessarabia definitely. He thought that Mr. Misu would, in all
probability, transmit a communication to the Conference on this subject.
Annex No. 5
Al. Vaida-Voevod and the International Council of Premiers

January 20, 1920
FRUS, PPC, 1919, Vol. 9, 915-917
...
If it is the desire of the Council, the incident shall be considered closed, and the
Romanian President of the Council shall speak to us on the subject of Bessarabia. I
will now ask him to speak, but he must not forget that the Conference has already
come to a decision on that subject.
Mr. Vaida-Voevod: The Conference has in theory come to decision on this sub-
ject, which I have not forgotten; it has recognized Romania’s right to annex Bessara-
bia, but, without desiring to weary you a long statement, I should like to ask the
Conference to ensure the realization of that decision.
Mr. Clemenceau: Yes, but you must understand that your position is a false one: you do
not carry out certain decisions of the Conference while you ask it to carry out others. I know you
are not personally responsible for this. I have explained to you the state of mind of
the Conference.
Mr. Vaida-Voevod: After the ratification of the Treaty of Peace, the frontiers of
Romania on the Bessarabian side will be finally determined. The population of Bes-
sarabia has decided to join Romania, a decision which was proclaimed for the third
time by the deputies appointed at the last elections, without distinction of speech,
race or nationality; on December 29, 1919, they all voted for union with the mother
country. The Conference has virtually recognized this state of affairs, but it has not
actually proclaimed it, and our position is difficult in consequence since we are
neighbors of the Bolsheviks and have to live, not to philosophize. Bolshevist ideas
were spread among us, especially recently, by Russians who fled from Odessa when
the Bolsheviks again approached that town. We offered them generous hospitality,
but we could not distinguish among the refugees those who were Bolsheviks and
those who were not. The Conference has not yet fully granted us Bessarabia and, if
the Russians advance still more, the population will be in a state of great uncer-
tainty. Some people among them are in favor of the Bolsheviks because they hope to
render impossible the execution of the agrarian reform begun by us. Moreover, there
are Romanian priests who were brought up at Kiev and who long for the old regime
< 93 >
which gave them a position privileged in comparison with that which they now
have: they are pro-Russian agents. Such a state of affairs cannot come to an end until
you recognize that Bessarabia must be joined to Romania; until then it will be im-
possible to restore order in that part of our territory.
Mr. Clemenceau: Will you kindly summarize what you ask of us?
Mr.Vaida-Voevod: We have summarized our requests in a note that I have ven-
tured to transmit to the Conference. We want the Conference to recognize the un-
ion of Bessarabia with Romania de jure.
Mr. Clemenceau: Have we not already done so?
Mr. Vaida-Voevod: Yes, but that was at the time when it was still hoped that
Kolchak would defeat the Bolsheviks. That was some time ago, but if now the Con-
ference would proclaim the union of Bessarabia with Romania, the result would be a
legal position on which we could base the restoration of order.
Mr. Clemenceau: It is not the defeat of Kolchak which prevents us from giving
you satisfaction, but it is your disobedience of the unanimous wishes of the Confer-
ence. First of all we want the evacuation of those territories which are not given to
you by the Treaty of Peace and you talk of postponing the evacuation of Hungary
once more for a month or six weeks. That is what troubles us, although we are in
agreement in principle.
Mr. Vaida-Voevod: We will carry out that evacuation in the shortest possible
time.
Mr. Clemenceau: You say so, but we have been awaiting your evacuation for
months: I am explaining to you the difficulty by which we are confronted.
Mr. Vaida-Voevod: The two questions should not be connected, since the Mag-
yars attacked us.
Mr. Clemenceau: But you disobeyed the Conference from the very beginning. I
know that is not in the least your fault and I should like to satisfy you. Only a short
time ago we agreed not to give you Bessarabia because you constantly disobeyed the Conference.
Now your opinions are different, but we cannot reply unconditionally to your re-
quest; we are obliged to defer our reply because you yourselves deferred evacuation.
Mr. Vaida-Voevod: Sir, I undertake to wire this very day ordering evacuation as
soon as possible.
Mr. Clemenceau: Please believe that I am not hostile to you – quite the con-
trary.
Mr. Lloyd George: We cannot grant you what you ask if, when we take a deci-
sion in your favor, you accept it, but when we take a decision which is not beneficial
to Romania, Romania resists.
Mr. Vaida-Voevod: The engagement which we have taken to carry out the deci-
sion of the Conference shall, I assure you, be fulfilled. The present Romanian Gov-
ernment cannot be punished for the faults of the former regimes.
Mr. Clemenceau: We want to help, not to punish you.
Mr. Vaida-Voevod: I will give the order for the evacuation in conditions which
are considered practicable by the Conference, but I cannot give a promise which I
< 94 >
might be unable to keep.

Mr. Clemenceau: The Conference is in sympathy with your cause, but it has
been hindered by your predecessor for two years.
Mr. Lloyd George: We are convinced of your intention to evacuate Hungary,
but we think you may be faced by certain difficulties from the military party and we
think the military party would be more willing to obey the order of the Conference
to evacuate Hungary immediately if you said to them: “The Conference is waiting
our evacuation of Hungary before deciding that Bessarabia shall be definitely Roma-
nian.”
Mr. Vaida-Voevod: I thank you with all my heart. From that I conclude that the
Conference will acknowledge our claim to Bessarabia from the day evacuation is af-
fected. I may say that?
Mr. Clemenceau: Yes.
Mr. Lloyd George: We cannot now say that we undertake to recognize your
right: we can only say that we are going to discuss it as soon as you have evacuated
Hungary.
Mr. Vaida-Voevod: That does not give me the moral support which I require.
Mr. Clemenceau: I would willingly go further than Mr. Lloyd George: in my
name, and I think I can say in the name of France, I can state that we are prepared to
recognize Romania’s right to Bessarabia.
(Mr. Millerand made a sign of assent).
Mr. Lloyd George: As Mr. Berthelot pointed out, the Commission on Romanian
Affairs, on which all the Powers are represented, has unanimously decided to attrib-
ute Bessarabia to Romania. That is the actual position.
Mr. Clemenceau: We are all sincere in this matter.
Mr. Vaida-Voevod: Gentlemen, I thank you for the great concession you have
granted me; I will do my best to ensure the evacuation of Hungarian territories as
soon as possible and also the settlement of the question of Bessarabia.
(Mr. Vaida-Voevod and Mr. Cantacuzens withdrew.)
The Council took note of the statement of Mr. Vaida-Voevod; it acknowledged
that, although it had as yet come to no decision as to the attribution of Bessarabia
and could not do so until Romania had carried out the orders of the Conference in
Hungary, the Commission on Romanian Affairs was unanimously of opinion that
this territory should be attributed to Romania.
< 95 >
Annex No. 6
The Declaration Adopted by the Representatives of

The Principal Allied Powers on March 3, 1920
FRUS, 1920, Vol. 3, p. 430-431
The Principal Allied Powers have hitherto found themselves unable to make
any definite decision on the Bessarabian question both because they considered it a
part of the general Romanian question on which difficulties with the former Roma-
nian Government had impeded a settlement and because they had hoped that it
would be found possible to bring about a friendly arrangement between Romanian
and Russia. There appears to the Principal Allied Powers no reason any further to
delay a settlement. The Romanian Government have shown proof of their desire to
settle in the interest of Romania and Europe generally the outstanding questions at
issue and have submitted to the ruling of the Supreme Council on the question of the
withdrawal of their troops from Hungary, relying on the assurance of the Principal
Allied Powers. The Allied Governments moreover feel that in the best interest both
of the Romania and neighboring countries the Bessarabian questions should no
longer be left undecided.
After taking into full consideration the general aspiration of the population of
Bessarabia and the Moldavian character of that region from the geographical and
ethnographical points of view, as well as the historic and economic arguments, the
Principal Allied Powers pronounce themselves therefore, in favor of the reunion of
Bessarabia with Romania which has now been formally declared by the Bessarabian
representatives and are desirous to conclude a treaty in recognition of this as soon as
the conditions stated have been carried out. They consider that in this reunion the
general and particular interest of Bessarabia should be safeguarded, more especially
as regards its relations with the neighboring countries and that the rights of minori-
ties in it should be guaranteed on the same terms as those residing in other parts of
the Romanian Kingdom. The Principal Allied Powers reserve the right to refer any
future difficulties that might arise from either of these two questions to the arbitra-
tion of the League of Nations.
The President of the London Conference (Lloyd George)

To the Romanian Prime Minister (Vaida-Voevod)
London, March 3, 1920
Your Excellency: I have the honor to inform you, on behalf of the Peace Confer-
ence, that the Supreme Council have today considered the demands addressed to
them by Your Excellency touching the recognition by the Conference of the reunion
of Bessarabia with Romania. I take this opportunity of reminding Your Excellency
that the decision of this question by the Peace Conference was adjourned till the
Romanian government had carried out the evacuation of Hungary. The Supreme
< 96 >
Council have, however, taken note of the pledge given them by Your Excellency on
the February 26 that the evacuation of the Romanian troops should not be delayed
beyond the dates fixed by the Inter-Allied Mission to be dispatched on the spot. The
Council, therefore, in consideration of this, have agreed on the annexed formula [the
Draft Treaty concerning Bessarabia] in recognition of the reunion of Bessarabia with
Romania. This recognition cannot, however, be embodied into the legal form of the
treaty till such time as Romanian troops have completely evacuated Hungary.
In this connection I have to refer to the question raised by the Romanian Gov-
ernment of making peace with the Soviet Government of Russia. The Supreme
Council would refer in reply to the statement contained in their communiqué of the
February 24. From this will observe that the Supreme Council are agreed that they
cannot accept the responsibility of advising Romania to continue a war which may
be injurious to their interests. Still less could they advise Romania to adopt a policy
of aggression towards Russia. Should, however, Soviet Russia attack Romania
within its legitimate frontiers the Allies will give her every possible support. The
Conference consider that the present recognition by themselves of the reunion of
Bessarabia with Romania should remove the chief obstacle to any such negotiations
between the Government of Russia and Romania as the Government of Romania
may consider advisable.
< 97 >
Notes
1
Carole Fink, “1922-1923 From Illusion to Disillusion” in A Missed Opportunity … , p. 28.
2
B. Jelavich, The Establishment … , p. 299.
3
K. Hitchins, Romania, 1866-1947, p. 150-154.
4
For a bibliography of the main papers dealing with Romania’s policy during the war, see Dumitru
Preda, Romania si Antanta, p. 97-99.
5
HWV Temperley & Co, “History of the Paris Peace Conference”, Vol. 4, p. 214
6
P Seicaru, “Romania in marele razboi”, p. 62-64
7
Bratianu argued that Romania had been relieved of her treaty obligation to come to the aid of Aus-
tria-Hungary by the latter’s failure to consult the Romanian government before delivering its ultima-
tum to Serbia and by the character of the ultimatum itself, which had been formulated in such a way
as to force a war upon Serbia. K. Hitchins, Romania, 1866-1947, p. 252-253.
8
A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p.512. Also, Georges Castellan, A History of the Romanians, p. 153. Still,
there was one exception: on September 7, 1914, Ottokar Czernin was ready to also offer Bukovina to
Romania and Transylvania’s autonomy in return for Romania’s neutrality and possible future alli-
ance. Both the Romanian and Hungarian leaders rejected his proposal. Gheorghe Iancu, The Ruling
Council, p. 11.
9
It is argued, at least by the British scholars, that in Romania the British let the Russians to do the
bidding, British and French efforts being limited to the offers of financial assistance made in Septem-
ber 1914. Therefore, they blame Sazonov’s eagerness to obtain a signed assurance of Romanian neu-
trality for minimizing the chances of enlisting her into the war. L.H. Curtright, Muddle, Indecision … , p.
39-41.
10
While the Romanian sources consider the date of the agreement as being on October 1, some other
scholars use the date of October 2 (C.J. Lowe, M.L. Dockrill, British Foreign Policy, p. 186) or Septem-
ber 29 (L.H. Curtright, Muddle, Indecision … , p. 40).
11
C.J. Lowe, M.L. Dockrill, British Foreign Policy, p. 190.
12
Nicolae Basilescu, La Roumaine dans la Guerre et dans la Paix, p. 101.
13
George Cipaianu, “Dillemes, options et risques dans le relations internationals de la Romanie pen-
dant la Premiere Guerre mondiale” in La fin de la Premiere Guerre Mondiale … , p. 16-17.
14
At one point in 1915 the Russians and French even agreed to support the Serbian claims in the
Banat if Romania remained neutral throughout the war. Ivo J. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace
Conference, p. 18.
15
Telegram A.P. Bennett to T. Russell, November 6, 1915, FO 800/71, quoted in C.J. Lowe, M.L. Dock-
rill, British Foreign Policy, p. 518-520.
16
C.J. Lowe, M.L. Dockrill, British Foreign Policy, p. 202.
17
For a detailed account of the negotiations between Bratianu and the Entente, presenting the Ro-
manian view, see D. Preda, Romania si Antanta, p. 12-96.
18
At the beginning of July 1916 the Entente representatives declared to Bratianu that, in order for the
Romanian offensive to be of value for them it should start immediately. If Romania fails to intervene,
it is risking the withdrawal of all the advantages promised her by the Entente. Comte de Saint Au-
laire, Confession d’un vieux diplomate, p. 334.
19
What Bratianu failed to find out was that, on August 11, 1916, Sturmer (for Russia) and Briand (for
France) agreed privately that the gains promised to Romania would be conceded, “only to the extent
allowed by the general situation at the end of the war”. In particular, the Russian representative
reserved the right for his country to raise the question of the Serbs in the Banat should future cir-
cumstances require it. R.H. Johnston, Tradition versus Revolution, Russia and the Balkans in 1917, p. 71.
20
For details regarding the political, military and diplomatic implications for Romania of the pro-
< 98 >
jected Salonique offensive see David Dutton, The Politics of Diplomacy … , p. 100-107.
21
S.D. Spector, Romania la Conferinta de Pace … , p. 31-32.
22
Interesting details regarding the situation of Romania during the first months of fighting are pre-
sented in Charles Vopicka, Secrets of the Balkans, p. 89-97. Also Comte de Saint Aulaire, Confession d’un
… , p. 338-346.
23
G.E. Torrey, “The First World War and the Union of 1918” in Romania. A Historic Perspective, p. 284.
24
Keith Hitchins has a different opinion regarding the causes of the Romanian disaster, considering
that the Russian and Allied failure to keep the promises made to Romania were not the main cause
of the defeat, as it is considered by the majority of Romanian scholars and participants. “The main
causes of the defeat of the Romanian army were the industrial underdevelopment of the country and
the lack of adequate equipment for the army. In addition, the Romanian general staff had not pre-
pared a sufficiently comprehensive and detailed plan of operations, which was essential for the co-
ordination of forces dispersed over such a far-flung battlefront. As events showed, the improvised
shifting of units from one front to another weakened the offensive and defensive capabilities of the
army as a whole.” K. Hitchins, Romania, 1866-1947, p. 262-265.
25
Ivo J. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, p. 22. Also “the Romanian action coincided
with beginning of Brusilov’s retreat and proved to be more of a liability than Alekseev had originally
feared” in C.J. Lowe, M.L. Dockrill, British … , p. 204-205. On the other hand, it is argued that “the six
weeks it took to negotiate the details of the Treaty does not appear unreasonable, given that it in-
volved both a political and military convention.” G.E. Torrey, “The First World War …” in Romania … ,
p. 284.
26
General Vasile Rudeanu, at that time a colonel, was representing the Roumanian Army in Paris.
Quoted in D. Preda, Romania si Antanta, p. 152.
27
Saint Aulaire was so unpleased with the attitude of the Russians that he believed that there was a
secret understanding between Russia and the Central Powers with the aim of dividing Romania
between Russia and Austro-Hungary. Comte de Saint Aulaire, Confession d’un … , p. 349-353. General
Berthelot too was very disappointed (read displeased) with the fighting tactics of the Russian Army
and shared Saint Aulaire’s fears. Thierry Sarmat, “La desintegration de l’armee russe sur le front rou-
maine d’apres les rapports du general Berthelot, 1917-1918” in La fin de la Premiere Guerre mondiale … , p.
231-249.
28
For details see G.E. Torrey, General Henri Berthelot and Romania, p. 105-165. The title of the subchapter
dealing with the September 1917 – March 1918 period is significant: “The Russian Betrayal”.
29
G.E. Torrey, The Diplomatic Career of Charles J. Vopicka in Romania, 1913-1920, in Romania between
East and West, p. 327. For more details see C. Vopicka, Secrets of the Balkans, p. 137-139, 144-145.
30
Richard Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, vol. 1, p. 40.
31
In fact, General Berthelot was very unpleased by this campaign, attributed by him to Romanian
General Alexandru Averescu, whom he accused of coward ness and mismanagement in leading the
Romanian Army. Berthelot tried all he could to counter-balance this propaganda but with no suc-
cess in the end. G.E. Torrey, General Henri Berthelot … , p. 116.
32
DDI, Serie 5, Vol. 9, Telegram Sonnino to Bonin, Fasciotti and Catalani, December 11, 1917, p. 467.
33
As soon as November 1917 Clemenceau adopted a very decided position towards the Romanian
plans of signing a separate peace, arguing that there is no way for the Romanian Army, reorganized
with so many sacrifices, to be dismantled, even if the events in Russia worked in Romania’s disad-
vantage. G.E. Torrey, General Henri Berthelot … , p. 121-122.
34
C. Vopicka, Secrets of the Balkans, p. 150-151.
35
For a good selection of French press regarding the pressure on Romania to keep fighting, around
February 10-11, see Gogu Negulesco, Romania’s Sacrifice, p. 129-136.
36
According to the view of general Barter, the British military representative in Jassy, it would have
been impossible to continue fighting on the Romanian front, due mainly to the great difficulty of
sending supplies to the area in conditions of incertitude regarding Ukraine’s position. In fact, the
< 99 >
British War Cabinet agreed on December 10 that the situation of the Romanian Army was so help-
less that Romania should be allowed to make a separate peace. Michael Kettle, The Allies and the Rus-
sian Collapse: March 1917-March 1918, p. 169, 183.
37
Berthelot insisted repeatedly that Mackensen, the commander of the Central Powers armies on the
Romanian front, was simply bluffing, but his opinion had little echo with the Romanians. G.E. Tor-
rey, General Henri Berthelot … , p. 139-141, 151-154 As time passed, Berthelot’s position regarding the
Romanian separate peace became more and more radical, blaming the Romanian leadership
(excepting the King) and mainly Averescu for their weakness in dealing with the enemy.
38
The January 7 meeting of the British War Cabinet decided that all the measures necessary for
keeping Romania into war should be taken together with France and that Romania should be in-
formed of the British position. If during the next month the British would support Clemenceau’s
policy, as soon as February 11 it was clear for them that Romania was doomed. Michael Kettle, The
Allies and … , p. 183, 225, 229.
39
DDI, Serie 5, Vol. 10, Telegram Fasciotti to Sonnino, January 16, 1918, p. 62.
40
FRUS, 1918, Supplement I, Telegram Vopicka to the Secretary of State, February 9, 1918, p. 757.
41
V. Mamatey, The United States … , p. 206.
42
For the text of the Treaty see FRUS, 1918, Supplement I, p. 771-777.
43
The effects for Romania coming from the loss of Dobrudja, including no direct access to the sea,
are best presented in Gogu Negulesco, Romania’s Sacrifice, p. 141-145.
44
Pamfil Seicaru, one of Romania’s best known journalists argues that, in fact, the Romanians, con-
vinced that the Central Powers will finally loose the war and that they will have to justify the sepa-
rate peace, intentionally accepted the harshest conditions in order to point to Romania’s desperate
situation at the time. P. Seicaru, Romania in marele razboi, p. 333. Somehow arguing in favor of his opin-
ion is General Berthelot, who points that Romania could have obtained much better conditions if it
would have been willing to do so (by making use of her Army). G.E. Torrey, General Henri Berthelot … ,
p. 160-165.
45
The matter of the ratification is a disputed one. A number of historians (like H.W.V. Temperley)
argue that, in fact, the Treaty was not ratified by the Parliament. Others (like Keith Hitchins) cor-
rectly argue that the Romanian Parliament ratified the treaty. However, due to the King’s attitude,
the Bucharest Treaty failed to come into power.
46
G. Iancu, The Ruling Council, p. 14.
47
The best such book, although a bit “old”, is Sherman David Spector, Romania at the Paris Peace Confer-
ence. A Study of the Diplomacy of Ioan IC Bratianu, New York: Bookman, 1962.
48
Comte de Saint Aulaire, Confession d’un … , p. 484.
49
A number of papers on Romania during 1918-1920, especially those written by Romanians and the
Frenchmen were blaming the Russian passivity during the Bulgarian offensive in Dobrudja as the
main cause of Romania’s defeat, considering it as the Russian betrayal.
50
Boris Ranghet, Relatii romano-americane … , p. 181.
51
Eugene Boia, Romania’s Diplomatic … , p. 29-30. For details on the controversy between Take Ionescu
and Ion I.C. Bratianu and especially for the viewpoint of those defending Bratianu’s actions see best
Ghe. I. Bratianu, Actiunea politica si militara a Romaniei in lumina corespondentei diplomatice a lui Ion I.C. Bra-
tianu, passim.
52
D. Preda, In apararea Romaniei Mari … , p. 120-122.
53
A. Iordache, “Ion I.C. Bratianu la ...” in Revista istorica, 1993, No 9, p. 3.
54
The only territories the Romanians were entitled to, according to the 1916 Treaty, and were not
recognized to them were the Western Banat and a strip of territory about 60 km west of the actual
Hungarian-Romanian border. But in exchange Romania got the entire Bukovina, although it was
supposed to receive only two thirds of it, and Bessarabia.
55
E. Boia, Romania’s Diplomatic Relations with Yugoslavia, p. 23.
56
FRUS, PPC, Vol. 2, Telegram Vopicka to the Secretary of State, January 10 1919, p. 405.
< 100 >

57
For a concise presentation of the Romanian-Yugoslav controversy over the Banat ,see Ivo J.
Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, p. 97-100, 142-144, 172-182, 234-236.
58
Winston S. Churchill, “The World Crisis; the Territorial Settlements of 1919-1920” in The Versailles
Settlement: Was it Foredoomed to Failure?, p. 83.
59
A casual and interesting description of the atmosphere in the Commission and of its activity is
presented by one of its members, a number of years later. Charles Seymour, Letters from the Paris Peace
Conference, passim.
60
Ivo Lederer has a different theory “During its existence, the committee split into two factions,
with the French, British, and Americans constituting one and Italians the other. The Americans,
however, did not really act as part of a given bloc but pursued an independent line.” Ivo J. Lederer,
Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, p. 179.
61
For details regarding the Romanian military operations against Hungary see D. Preda, In apararea
Romaniei Mari … , passim.
62
See the Draft Treaty in FRUS, PPC, Vol. 7, p. 579-585.
63
S.D. Spector, Romania la … , p.180.
64
Bratianu’s decision to leave Paris remains controversial. On one hand, it is considered that he did
so in order to place more pressure on the Great Powers and to influence their decisions regarding
Romania. On the other hand, it might also be argued that, by doing so, he simply abandoned the
fight for Romania’s interests.
65
As for the Romanian requisitions there are mainly two different stories, first one belonging to the
Inter-Allied Military Commission acting in Budapest and representing the interests of the four Great
Powers, which describes the requisitions in a very negative color. The second one belongs to the
Romanian representatives and, whilst admitting that there had been requisitions argues that, in fact,
the Romanian Army did nothing else than to recover what was taken from Romania during the 1917-
1918 occupation and which things (especially the railway material, like wagons and engines) be-
longed clearly to Romania and had to be taken back. It also points that the stories presented by the
Commission are exaggerated and that, in fact, the Romanian Army used its provisions in order the
feet the Hungarian population in Budapest and other cities.
66
FRUS, 1918, Supplement I, The Cobb-Lippman Memorandum, p. 409-411.
67
FRUS, PPC, Vol. 3, p. 843.
68
FRUS, PPC, Vol. 3, p. 849. For the entire debate see Annex no. 1.
69
70
S.D. Spector, Romania la … , p. 105.
71
A good description of the meeting, including a confirmation of the understanding between the
British and US representatives is presented in Charles Seymour, Letters from the Paris Peace Conference,
p. 157-159. Very interesting is his remark referring to the viability of the 1916 Romanian Treaty: “the
only trouble was that I had to represent our side of the case and it was a side of which I personally
disapproved, but had been over persuaded by Day, Johnson, and Lord”.
72
H.W.V. Temperley et. al., The History of the Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 4, p. 227.
73
B. Ranghet, Relatii romano-americane … , p. 184-185.
74
V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica … , p. 79-80.
75
V.F. Dobrinescu, Ion Patroiu, “American Opinion on Bessarabia at the Paris Peace Conference”, in
“…” p. 7.
76
V.F. Dobrinescu, Ion Patroiu, “American Opinion …” in Revista de Istorie a Moldovei, 1991, p. 8.
77
H.W.V. Temperley, The History of the Paris Peace Conference, Vol. 4, p. 228-229.
78
C. Seymour, Letters from the Paris Peace Conference, p. 192.
79
For the Draft Articles see V.F. Dobrinescu, I. Patroiu, “American Opinion …” in … , p. 17-18
80
81
V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica … , p. 80.
82
Quoted in Louis Fischer, Russia’s Road from Peace to War, p. 38-39.
< 101 >

83
The immediate threat of revolutionary Bolshevism was on the French and British agenda even
before the war ended. In the spring of 1918 the Red Army existed only on paper or in the imagination
of L.D. Trotsky. The following autumn, it was becoming a formidable force, one that could spread
revolution into Europe. In these conditions, stopping the expansion of bolshevism became the prin-
cipal concern of the French government. M.J. Carley, Revolution and Intervention … , p. 110.
84
85
FRUS, PPC, Vol. 6, p. 72. It might be interesting to find out what exactly was meant by using the
formulation “the Romanian part of Bessarabia” instead of simply using Bessarabia.
86
87
88
For the entire debate, see FRUS, PPC, Vol. 11, p. 340-341.
89
The participants were Leland Harrison, Dr. James Brown Scott, Col. U.S. Grant, Douglas Johnson,
John Dulles, and Alan Foster Dulles. V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica … , p. 81.
90
91
For the entire debate see FRUS, PPC, Vol. 7, p. 457-459.
92
FRUS, PPC, Vol. 11, p. 382-383.
93
FRUS, PPC, Vol. 11, p. 406-407.
94
DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 1, p. 634-635.
95
96
97
98
FRUS, PPC, Vol. 8, p. 579. See the Annex for the entire debate.
99
100
101
FRUS, PPC, Vol. 9, p. 145-146.
102
103
104
FRUS, 1920, Vol. 3, p. 430-431.
105
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 394, Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, April 15, 1920, c. 368.
106
In this sense, it is important to note that Lord Derby, the British Ambassador to Paris, considered
(in the previously quoted telegram) that, even as the US delegation failed to respect their promise of
sending a representative to the Commission’s meeting, the US would sign the Treaty.
107
FRUS, 1920, Vol. 3, Telegram Wallace to the Secretary of State, April 15, p. 427.
108
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 394, Note by Lord Curzon, April 26, 1920, c. 386.
109
FRUS, 1920, Vol. 3, Telegram Secretary of State (Colby) to Wallace, June 12, 1920, p. 432.
110
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 20, Telegram Take Ionescu to Ghika, June 28, 1920. For more on
this problem see the chapter on the UK and the Bessarabian Treaty.
111
According to Ghika, the compensations to be paid to the French landowners were in amount of
around 20,000 crowns. RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Ghika to Averescu, June 19, 1920.
112
DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, October 14, 1920, p. 491.
113
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Ghika to Averescu, July 19, 1920.
114
T. Sandu, “La France et la Bessarabie roumaine de 1918 a 1920 …” in The Establishment of … , p. 381.
115
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Titulescu to Take Ionescu, August 5, 1920.
116
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, British Memorandum to Secretary General, September 14,
1920, c. 703.
117
DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, September 29, 1920, p. 477.
118
FRUS, 1920, Vol. 3, Telegram Wallace to the Secretary of State, September 29, 1920, p. 432.
119
FRUS, 1920, Vol. 3, Telegram Colby to Wallace, October 5, 1920, p. 433.
120
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Ghika to Averescu, September 25, 1920.
121
122
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Note from the Italian Legation to the RFM, October 5, 1920.
< 102 >

123
FRUS, 1920, Vol. 3, Telegram Wallace to Secretary of State, October 11, 1920, p. 434.
124
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, October 8, 1920, c.
107.
125
V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica … , p. 88. For the details see the chapter on the UK.
126
Annex Notes
1
N. V. Tchaikowsky, President of the Russian Provisional Government of the Northern Region
(Archangel) and a member of the Russian political Conference at Paris
2
Jean J. C. Bratiano, President of the Council and Minister of Foreign Affair of Romania; plenipoten-
tiary to the Peace Conference
3
Nicolae Misu, Romanian Minister at London, plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference
4
Constantin Diamandy, Romanian Minister at Petrograd; plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference
5
Jean Pellivan, Director of Justice in Bessarabia
< 103 >

PART TWO - THE GREAT POWERS
AND THE BESSARABIAN QUESTION
CHAPTER 4.
THE SOVIET UNION
The Bessarabian Question and Soviet-Romanian Relations
Over the last two centuries, Romanian-Russian relations have gone through
every possible permutation: good, bad, worst, excellent, and almost normal. What is
clear is that only when Russian interests conflict with those of a stronger coalition
of powers are manifestations of Romanian nationalism allowed to appear. This state-
ment is equally true for the events of 1856, 1918, 1941, 1964, the mid-1980s and 1990.
Romanian historiography, especially after the Second World War, gave a spe-
cial status to the two countries’ relationship. Although during the first years after
the war Romanian historiography was under Moscow’s control, and the accent was
placed on moments that illustrated good relations between the two States, starting
in the 1960s the situation changed and the much publicized “historical friendship”
between the two nations disappeared. Of course, the reason behind this disappear-
ance had to do with the emancipation of the Romanian communist regime from So-
viet dominance. Since 1989, an increased number of papers dealing with bilateral
relations have been published in Romania, including a very important, very solid
volume of documents regarding Romanian-Soviet relations. The present work will
only present the most important moments in Russo-Romanian relations and will
attempt to deal with a subject which has received almost no attention, that is, the
connection between the White Russians and the Bessarabian question.
It should be mentioned that there has been a unity in the views expressed by
different Romanian historians regarding bilateral relations, a unity which originated
from the fact that they all relied on the extant Romanian documents (official docu-
ments and the memoirs of Romanian diplomats) as their main source of information.1
A look into the Russian documents might confirm many of the viewpoints expressed
in Romanian historiography, but might also remodel some of them. For example, one
of the points most strongly emphasized in Romanian historiography regarding is the
“deal” proposed by Lev Karakhan during the Warsaw Conference: the Romanian
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National Treasury in exchange for recognition of Bessarabia’s union with Romania.

Although on the basis of reports made by Filality (the Romanian representative at
the Conference) most Romanian scholars take this deal for granted, one could not
but express some doubt — not necessarily as to the existence of such a proposal, but
as to Russia’s readiness to actually back it (it could have been just a trial balloon to
test the Romanians’ reaction, the Russians having no intention of pursuing it).
Understanding this, a number of Romanian historians have undertaken the
difficult task of sorting through the relevant documents in the Russian (former So-
viet) Archives.2 But, for various reasons (such as the secrecy still maintained by the
Russians with regard to their documents,3 the large number of documents to be re-
viewed, the scarcity of financial resources) they have been only partially successful
in their attempt.
The relations between the two countries during the interwar period could be
characterized most simply by words like mistrust, fear, and suspicion on the Roma-
nian side and enmity and aggressiveness (to varying extents), on the Soviet side. Nei-
ther one trusted the other and each tried to lay the blame for the situation at the
other’s door. There are two explanations for this: the Bessarabian question, and the
fact that the Romanian ruling class deeply feared and hated communism.4 From the
Soviet viewpoint, “Our relations with Romania are in a class by themselves. They are
connected with the question of Bessarabia”.5 At every occasion, they contested
(directly or indirectly) the Union of Bessarabia. While Moscow recognized the inde-
pendence of the newly proclaimed republics and even accepted the inclusion into
Poland of some Russian territories, the case of Bessarabia was different. “[The] So-
viet doctrine of self-determination simply did not apply to this clearly non-Russian
and non-Slavic land. . . . Moreover, Soviet behavior toward Romania during the
interwar period was characterized by a strange arrogance that was not, on the sur-
face at least, directed toward other governments then administering ‘lost provinces’
of the Russian Empire.”6
On the other hand, the Romanians wanted the impossible: Russia’s blessing for
the Union. That was impossible because of two reasons. First, Romania was in no
position to deal on an equal footing with her giant neighbor. Second, the Russians
never would have accepted losing to a small State a territory that had belonged to
them for more than a century. That would have gone against all their history, tradi-
tions and, of course, pride — and the best proof in this sense is the Russian attitude
after the imposed cession of southern Bessarabia to Romania in 1856; the tension
reached a peak during the 1877-1878 War with the Ottoman Empire, with the Czar
mentioning repeatedly that the retrocession of that area was, more than anything
else, a question of Russia’s pride.7 In a sense, it can be argued that the interwar pe-
riod simply repeated the 1856-1877 epoch and that there was no difference between
the foreign policy of the communists and that of the Czars when it came to territo-
rial matters.
Any treaty or agreement the Soviets were disposed to sign would only have
been of temporary value because it became clear to everybody, as time passed, that it
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CHAPTER 4. THE SOVIET UNION
was out of the question for the Soviets to agree that Bessarabia should remain Roma-
nian territory. Of course, in hindsight it is patently clear; but nobody anticipated in
1918 that the communists not only would stay in power but would transform the old
Russian Empire in just a few decades into a superpower. In 1918 Romania saw a
great opportunity, a chance too good to turn down. At the same time it was a great
risk, and the stakes were not clear until it was too late to adjust or seek a compro-
mise solution. In 1940, Romania paid for taking this risk by losing half of Bukovina
(instead of only one third, as stipulated in the common agreements signed during the
war) and the Herta region (which had belonged to Romania before the World War
I) to the Soviet Union, plus a great part of Transylvania to Hungary (recovered after
World War II, as a result of the Soviets’ insistence at the Peace Conference) and the
southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria. And if we add to this the Romanian National Treas-
ury, moved to Moscow in 1916 for “safe-keeping” during the war and only partially
returned, we have a good sense of the scope of Romania’s losses (even after the fall of
communism, the Russians still refuse to return the Treasury to Romania, at least the
part of it still identifiable, as the gold and jewels vanished during the Russian Revo-
lution).8
Regarding diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the Romanian govern-
ments adopted an attitude based on the following principles: Romania was not at
war with the Soviet Union;9 there was no territorial dispute between the two, be-
cause Bessarabia was an old Romanian territory that had decided to unite with Ro-
mania; the Great Powers recognized the Union by the Bessarabian Treaty of October
28, 1920; the Romanian National Treasury should be returned intact to Romania;
and a policy of non-intervention in the political matters of another state.
On the other side, the Soviet government still contested the Romanian border
and refused to recognize the Union of Bessarabia, sometimes attacking the attitude
of the Romanian government in a very “noisy” and propagandistic manner, at other
times trying to reach an agreement with Romania regarding Bessarabia. For example,
at the beginning of 1920, they made efforts to avoid a common Polish-Romanian of-
fensive against the Soviet Union and were disposed to make concessions to Romania
regarding the Bessarabian question. Still, it is difficult to support the claim that they
were actually ready to sign an agreement regarding Bessarabia at any point during
the interwar period,10 and even more difficult to speculate what would have been the
validity of such an agreement in 1940.
Bilateral Relations Before and During the Paris Peace Conference
In 1916 Romania decided to enter the war on the Entente side. After a short,
victorious offensive, the Romanian Army was defeated, a great part of the country
including Bucharest was occupied, and the government relocated itself to Jassy, the
old capital of Moldavia. The front was stabilized in the Carpathian Mountains, and
in the summer of 1917 the Romanian Army was able to resist the German offensive
toward Moldavia. Still, relations between the Russians and the Romanians were far
< 107 >

from friendly: mutual suspicion was at its height. On the one hand, the Romanians
blamed Russia for their defeat while, on the other, the Russians were quite unhappy
with Romania’s hard bargaining.11 In this situation, it was quite difficult for the two
countries to support each other as reliable allies.
The situation became worse after the revolutionary events in Moscow, and the
Romanian Army found itself almost alone to defend its positions. This was the mo-
ment when the first armed incidents took place between Romanian authorities and
groups of Russian soldiers. The communist propaganda inside the Russian Army
was disturbing to the Romanian authorities, for two reasons: the troops became un-
willing to continue fighting against the Central Powers; and communist ideas could
also spread among the Romanian soldiers. As Romania was forced to exit the war in
May 1918, the Germans encouraged the actions of the Romanian Army in Bessarabia
(seen as a territory to be taken by Romania in exchange for the territories lost
through the Bucharest Peace Treaty). In fact, since 1914 the German leadership had
been offering Bessarabia to Romania — in order to win over Romania to their side
and to weaken Russia.
As previously mentioned, in January 1918 the communists broke off diplomatic
relations with Romania as a result of the Romanian Army entering Bessarabian terri-
tory. During the following weeks the Bolsheviks in southern Ukraine (organized as
RUMCEROD) sent a number of ultimatums to the Romanian government demand-
ing the immediate withdrawal of the Romanian Army from Bessarabia. The situation
was temporarily pacified by the March 5-9, 1918 Treaty between the two sides, by
which Romania undertook to withdraw its troops in the following two months. But
at the end of March, Sfatul Tserii voted the Union of Bessarabia with Romania, so there
was no withdrawal of Romanians troops from Bessarabia; it then became Romanian
territory. Due at first to the German occupation and later to the civil war and the war
with Poland, the Russians could not deploy their army to take back Bessarabia.
Inside the Russian leadership during the first years of communism there had
been three orientations regarding the Bessarabian question.12 Leon Trotsky and
Maksim Litvinov, who were prepared to give up Bessarabia and recognize Romanian
sovereignty in exchange for certain conditions, illustrate the first position. The sec-
ond, illustrated by the military men such as generals Mihail Frunse (born in Bessara-
bia) and Kliment Vorosilov, argued in favor of reconquering Bessarabia by military
force.13 Somewhere in the middle were Christian Rakovsky,14 the influential leader of
the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, and Gheorghi Cicerin, who constantly reminded the
Romanian Government of the Russian (later Soviet) view regarding Bessarabia
through diplomatic notes of protest, international and internal propaganda, military
maneuvers and border incidents staged along the Dniestr River. In other words, they
took a wait and see attitude, in which no major risks were taken but also no real
concessions were made. Not only did the last orientation prevail (although not quite
from the beginning)15 but it proved, over time, to be the best way of protecting So-
viet interests and weakening Romania’s international position.16 Romania was
among the few States towards which the Soviets adopted this strategy of opposing
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as much as possible economic-financial development and national consolidation by

means of propaganda and military threat. This strategy made Romania more vulner-
able in its relations with the other neighbors as well.
As for the Romanian policy towards Russia, there were at least three tenden-
cies: to negotiate with the Soviets in the hope of reaching some sort of agreement
regarding the Bessarabian question; to postpone any negotiations with the Soviets in
the hope that the communist regime would soon fail; to wait and see, while combin-
ing the previous two options. Alexandru Vaida-Voevod (Prime Minister during the
first months of 1920) best exemplified the first one, while Take Ionescu (Foreign
Minister during the second part of 1920 and 1921) the second. In the end, after using
each of the first two approaches, the Romanian side decided in favor of a compro-
mise solution: that it should continue negotiations but only at an unofficial or semi-
official level while opposing any discussion regarding the fate of Bessarabia. It was
finally on this line that an agreement, although a very limited one, was reached with
the Soviets and the bilateral relations restored in 1934.
On April 18, 1918, Gheorghi Cicerin, the Russian Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
sent the Romanian Prime Minister a note of protest against the incorporation of Bes-
sarabia into Romania.17 This formal protest, contesting especially the way in which
the union was proclaimed, was the only one to come as an immediate result of the
union. During the following period there were no more official threats ultimatum
notes from the Soviet power, and the reason for that is related to the internal power
struggle in Russia. At the same time, there were numerous border incidents in Bes-
sarabia between the Romanian troops and the Red Army.
It was only during the Paris Peace Conference that Cicerin sent a new telegram
on Bessarabia to the Romanian authorities, on May 1, 1919. This time the note was
sent in the name of Ukraine, too. The telegram is indicative of the Russian viewpoint
regarding events in Bessarabia: that it had been liberated from the Turks in 1812; that
it had been under Romanian military occupation since 1918; and that both the Sfatul
Tserii and the Union decision were non-representative in nature. The position ex-
pressed in the telegram has remained unchanged until today and those ideas still
form the basis of any Russian attempt to deal with the Bessarabian question. After
amply criticizing the Romanian position on Bessarabia, in very strong words, the
ultimatum demanded:
1. The immediate withdrawal of Romanian troops, officials, and agents from
the whole of Bessarabia, and full liberty for the workers and peasants of Bes-
sarabia freely to organize their own government.
2. That all those responsible for crimes against the Bessarabia workers and
peasants and against the entire population of Bessarabia be brought before
public tribunals.
3. The restitution of Russian arms and war material taken by Romania as
plunder.
4. The restitution to the inhabitants of Bessarabia of all the property of which
they have been deprived by plunder and confiscation.18
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The last request is peculiar at best, as the inhabitants of Bessarabia who were
deprived of their property were the landowners, the same landowners against whom
the communist revolution was directed and who were accused of being behind Bes-
sarabia’s decision to unite with Romania.
Soon after this telegram, a new ultimatum came from Christian Rakovsky, the
exiled leader of the Romanian communist movement and at that time the communist
leader of Ukraine, asking for the withdrawal of the Romanian Army from Bessarabia
in forty-eight hours. The exchange of notes between the Ukrainian and the Roma-
nian governments went on until June 19, 1919, each side arguing its thesis along the
lines already described.
The sudden reawakening of Russian interest in Bessarabia should be seen in
relation to Romania’s action against the Hungarian communist government. The
Moscow government tried to take advantage of Romania’s military conflict with
Hungary while, at the same time, offering brotherly help to the Hungarian commu-
nists in their fight against Romania. The development of events in Russia (the com-
bined White Army offensives) and the defeat of the Hungarian Army lay behind the
Bolshevik decision to stop threatening the Romanian government, given the risk that
Romania might join the offensive against them. Instead, they decided to try a more
conciliatory approach that might win some precious time, and starting in the late
summer 1919 they left aside any strong words — at least for a while.
As has been stressed by many scholars, time was what the Bolshevik govern-
ment needed most in order to consolidate its grip on power. To the Bolsheviks, that
was what mattered most during the first years. And, to obtain this precious time,
they were disposed to make all sorts of concessions — the best example being that
of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with the Central Powers. Through that Treaty they
bought breathing space that, in the circumstances, was worth more than any
amount of territory lost to the Germans.19 Their relations with Romania followed a
somewhat similar pattern for, as long as they needed time, they carefully avoided
provoking the Romanians; on the contrary, they tried to bribe them with the prom-
ise of concessions. On the other hand, the Romanian diplomacy failed to take advan-
tage of the Bolsheviks’ weakness and their indecision simply played on the Bolshe-
viks’ hands.
Alexandru Vaida-Voevod’s advent as leader of the Romanian Government
brought about a change in the Romanian foreign policy. Not only was he able to ob-
tain a number of concessions from the Peace Conference but he also agreed to insti-
tute direct negotiations with the communist Russians, which he believed would be
the best way to improve Romania’s relations with that nation. As a result, in Febru-
ary 1920, the first negotiations between Romania and the Bolshevik government
took place in Copenhagen (after the break in diplomatic relations, January 13-26,
1918), with the purpose of normalizing bilateral relations.20 The representatives were
D.N. Ciotori for Romania and Maxim Litvinov for the communists.
The main aim of the negotiations was to prepare the basis for a future confer-
ence on the re-establishment of bilateral relations. The principal Romanian requests
< 110 >

were the recognition of Bessarabia’s union; the restitution of the Romanian National
Treasury; and the liberation of the Romanian prisoners of war still held in Russia.21
Litvinov acknowledged that it was possible for Russia to recognize the Union of
Bessarabia and to resolve the problem of the Romanian National Treasury (although,
as far as the Treasury, the Russians were only prepared to propose that the Romani-
ans forgo their claim, as compensation for the military and other materials taken by
Romania in 1917-1918).22 As noted above, this sudden Russian readiness to resolve
her problems with Romania was due to the conflict with Poland and the fear that
Romania might join Poland in a military campaign against Russia. The Bolshevik
fears were amplified by the fact that the Romanian Army, withdrawn by now from
Hungary, was free to be employed against them. But when the government of Alex-
andru Vaida-Voevod resigned in March 1920, the new government terminated the
negotiations.
The war against Poland offered Russian diplomacy the best incentive to con-
tinue pressing for an agreement with Romania.23 And, in order to convince Romania
not to side with Poland, the Russians showed themselves ready to come to a resolu-
tion on all the points raised by the Romanians: the recognition of Bessarabia’s union;
the repatriation of the Romanian POW held in Russia; the restitution of the Roma-
nian National Treasury.24 Starting in July 1920, Cicerin made new proposals to the
Romanian government in order to restart the bilateral negotiations, but Take
Ionescu (Romanian Foreign Minister at the time) considered them inopportune and
insignificant compared to the official recognition of the Great Powers. Although Ro-
manian-Russian historiography argues that he believed that the communists would
be defeated and that, under these conditions, an agreement with them would com-
promise Romania, it seems that French opposition to the Russian-Romanian nego-
tiations was another major reason for his temporization or postponement of the ne-
gotiations.25 He adopted a policy of wait and see, postponing under various pretexts
any bilateral negotiations while the exchange of notes between Cicerin and Alexan-
dru Averescu, the Romanian Prime Minister, continued. Toward the end of October
the Soviets’ tone towards Romania changed, for a number of reasons: their discon-
tent over the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty (especially as they were not con-
sulted); the end of the Polish war; and the fact that the remnants of General
Wrangel’s Army found refuge in Romania.
As regards the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty, Cicerin and Rakovsky sent a
note to Romania on November 1, 1920, in the name of both Ukraine and Russia, de-
claring that they:
. . . could not recognize the validity of a treaty concerning Bessarabia, signed

without their participation, and [that they] were not bound in any way by an
agreement on this subject which was signed by foreign governments.26
However, it should be noted that, if this were true, the efforts and concessions
made by the Soviets to preclude the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty would
< 111 >

have been unnecessary.

On the other hand, during 1919 and 1920 the Romanian Government was firm
in its decision not to intervene against the Bolsheviks, even as France, a friend of Ro-
mania, insisted repeatedly that Romania join the war against Bolshevism (either at
the time of the French occupation of Odessa, or during the Polish-Russian war). Ro-
mania refused to give any kind of military assistance to the White Russians despite
France’s pressure.27 Even the French promise of Odessa in exchange for Romanian
help could not convince the Romanian Government to open hostilities against the
Bolsheviks. Romania’s only intervention in the war was indirect: it hosted the
French military command in Bucharest, as well as some French troops directed to
fight against the Bolsheviks, and provided Petliura’s Army with modest military sup-
plies.28 In fact, at least during 1919 the Romanian government had no real ability to
intervene militarily in Russia due to its war with Hungary. During 1920, the Army
was free to act in Russia but the scarcity of resources hampered any such initiative
in any case.
The Romanians tried throughout this period to maintain an attitude of neu-
trality towards the Soviets, although they won nothing by it and received only accu-
sations in exchange from the Russians. In fact, this neutrality became one of the leit-
motifs of Romanian diplomacy whenever they were dealing with the Soviets:
There had been so many situations in which Russia found herself implicated in
internal and external fights, but still Romania kept the same loyal attitude of
today. If we had had hostile intentions against you, we could have pursued
them at that time . . . 29
In the end, the Romanian neutrality (which was justified on economic

grounds, if not necessarily on moral or strategic grounds) only boosted the Russian
position and it proved to be quite a success for Russian diplomacy, as they did not
have to pay anything to secure Romania’s non-intervention in either the Civil War
or the war against Poland. The hypothesis that a show of power, even as a bluff,
might have had a certain influence on the Bolshevik leaders should not be excluded.
But by adopting a policy of neutrality instead of aggression (presumably more in
words than in practice, as the necessary resources were missing) the Romanian lead-
ership missed this chance, failing to understand one of the main characteristics of
Russian behavior: that the only argument they care about is force.
During 1920-1921, the communists were prepared for direct negotiations with
Romania and, in the view of many Romanian diplomats and scholars, were ready to
make certain concessions.30 The main question is how far they were prepared to go.31
The impetus included not only their war with Poland but their fear of an Western
military campaign against communism. Russia’s aims were to avoid an alliance (and
especially a military campaign) between Romania and Poland against them; to es-
cape the diplomatic isolation which had enveloped them; to win some precious time
to consolidate their power both internally and internationally; and to avoid the
< 112 >

transformation of Romania into a training base for counter-revolutionary groups.

The communist government hoped to achieve their purposes by using the Bessara-
bian question. Finally, even as the military alliance between Romania and Poland
came into being in March 1921, they still insisted on negotiations with Romania.
On the other side, the Romanian government expressed its intentions for the
negotiations: to obtain the recognition of the Union as a fait accompli and to discuss
only matters regarding the transfer of sovereignty between the two states; also, to
resolve the financial questions pending between the two states.
During the preparation period prior to these direct negotiations (August 1920-
September 1921), illustrated best by the Cicerin-Averescu correspondence, the dis-
pute between the two parties centered at first on where the negotiations should take
place and then on the topics that should or should not be discussed — especially,
what questions should be avoided.32 The communists intended to have all the exist-
ing problems between the two parties, including that of Bessarabia, on the negotia-
tion table:
The Russian Government sees no reason to persuade it to reduce the number of

questions which should be dealt with by Russia and Romania, to limit discus-
sions to those which are clearly defined and to exclude others. Your wireless of
10 November suggests that the Romanian Government will propose the limita-
tion of discussions to a certain group of questions. The Russian Government,
on the contrary, is of the opinion that in order to be able to establish lasting
pacific and friendly relations between the two countries, it is necessary to sub-
mit to the consideration of the conference proposed by us all questions of in-
terest to Romania and Russia without exception.”33
On January 15, 1921, a new note came from Cicerin, with a more conciliatory
tone that would characterize Russian correspondence with Romania until the end of
the Warsaw negotiations:
The Russian Republic is firmly determined not to permit the peaceful relations
now existing between Russia and Romania to be disturbed. In the opinion of
the Russian Government it would be highly desirable to enter into negotia-
tions with Romania for the purpose of establishing between our two countries
relations solidly based on a formal treaty. . . . We are ready, in the higher inter-
ests of peace, to limit the agenda of the future conference to those practical
questions whose solution is the most urgent, such as the re-establishment of
commercial relations and the regulation of navigation on the Dniestr.”34
What made the Russian side abandon its initial proposals and accept the Ro-
manian ones? The answer lies in the strengthening Romanian-Polish relations.
In 1921 the Russians had four main objectives in negotiating a treaty with Ro-
mania: to regulate navigation on the Dniestr; to oblige Romania to respect maximum
neutrality towards Russia; to provide for exchanges of goods; and to exchange repre-
< 113 >

sentatives (in order to use Bucharest as an observation point for the Balkans). To
these principal objectives should be added other less important ones, including an
exchange of war prisoners and the signing of sanitary, postal and railroads conven-
tions. However, any mention or suggestion in the treaty that Bessarabia was Roma-
nian territory had to be avoided, meaning that the articles of the treaty referring to
the common border were to be given only a provisory character.35
The Romanians centered their efforts, apart from seeking Russian recognition
of Bessarabia’s union with Romania, on resolving a number of outstanding financial
matters: the Romanian National Treasury in Moscow; the Romanian deposits of mu-
nitions, armament, and effects that were on Russian territory; the goods belonging to
the former Romanian Legation in Petrograd; the cash deposits belonging to the Ro-
manian Commission of Provisioning in Russia, moneys which were still in Russian
banks; and compensation for the damages done by the Russian troops during their
retreat from the Romanian territory.36
The Warsaw and Vienna Conferences
As a result of the exchange of notes between the Russians and the Romanians
during the beginning of 1921, it was decided that a preliminary conference between
the two states should take place in Reval, the two parties being represented by
Maxim Litvinov (initially, but replaced by Lev Karakhan) and Gheorghe Filality.37
But the Russians delayed the planned conference, focusing instead on a minor aspect
of the relationship, namely navigation and fishing on the Dniestr Liman. And, indeed,
a number of bilateral meetings took place between the two parties in July 1921, in
Cetatea Alba, but with no results.38
In September-October 1921, a preliminary conference between Russia and Ro-
mania took place in Warsaw with the aim of fixing the program of a future bilateral
conference having as its purpose the normalization of relations. There were six offi-
cial meetings, but with no result.39
The first two meetings were of a general nature, both sides expressing their
views regarding the future negotiations for the treaty. At the end of the second meet-
ing Lev Mikhailovici Karakhan, the Russian representative, privately proposed to
Filality a very interesting compromise solution between the two States. Justifying it
as a way to speed up the negotiations, Karakhan proposed, in his personal name:
Let’s take out of the next Conference’s program Bessarabia and the minorities
and, as compensation, you should agree not to include the question of the fi-
nancial matters between us. In this way we could explain to the masses that
these questions have remained en suspens. . . . This question of financial matters
is the most boring and it took us about six months to resolve these issues dur-
ing our negotiations with the Poles … If we do so, we would agree easily on the
other points and in 15 days we may even sign the agreement and re-establish
diplomatic relations.40
< 114 >

At Filality’s insistence on the National Treasury, Karakhan declared that as

soon as diplomatic relations were re-established, the papers included in it would be
returned to Romania — but that he could not guarantee the same for the gold.
Although many Romanian historians seem to lay particular emphasis on the
kind of “bribe” implicit in Karakhan’s proposal, this author considers that it had a
different significance. The proposal simply expressed the Russians’ main goal at the
conference: to come to some agreement with the Romanians without saying any-
thing that could result in a claim being made that they had recognized Bessarabia as
Romanian territory. From their viewpoint, they were not so much renouncing Bes-
sarabia as deferring the question (they were still playing desperately for time, in
1921). Karakhan wanted, according to his instructions, to avoid the negative influ-
ence of the Bessarabian question over the bilateral relationship, but he also wished
to make it look as though his side were making a great concession, and therefore he
asked the Romanians to defer their financial requests in exchange. In other words,
he was hoping to hit two rabbits with a single shot. In these conditions, it is not sur-
prising that the Romanians, having nothing to win from the Russian proposal, re-
jected it. It was only a few years later that certain Romanian diplomats and scholars
started arguing that Take Ionescu should have accepted the deal.
One other possible explanation for Karakhan’s proposal is that, realizing after
the first meetings that the negotiations would produce no results, he simply used the
“Bessarabia for the Treasury” deal as a trial balloon, in order to see what the Roma-
nian reaction would be. Arguing in favor of this reading is the fact that Karakhan
knew all too well that, while the Romanians would not agree with it, such a pro-
posal might win some time for him.
Filality declined the Russian offer at the insistence of the Romanian Foreign
Minister, Take Ionescu. The description of the main points of the debate and also
Take Ionescu’s views regarding relations with Russia are best expressed in the in-
structions he sent to Filality on October 17:
I never thought that our Treasury would be returned to us, just as I knew
that the Soviet Government has no other purpose than to re-establish diplo-
matic relations with Romania in order to poison our country with revolution-
ary propaganda, under the protection of diplomatic immunity. It is clear that
we would be making the gravest error to agree to such a proposal, in which we
would lose everything without gaining anything.
Karakhan’s claim that the Romanian state would have any interest whatso-
ever in getting the recognition of the Union from the Bolshevik government is
entirely groundless. . . . Moscow’s recognition of Bessarabia today could only
damage Romania’s interests vis-à-vis tomorrow’s Russia. The Bessarabian
question would become an internal affair for Russia instead of remaining
within the compass of international law.
My view is that, whatever the consequences, the Bessarabian question
< 115 >

should not be included as a discussion point between the two governments.

The same is valid for the Romanian-Ukrainian border and the minorities’ ques-
tion. . . .
We will never agree to first have diplomatic or even commercial relations
and only later to have the question of returning the Treasury negotiated with
our minister in Moscow. . . . The frightening responsibility of having a number
of Bolshevik officials in Romania. . . .
I hope that Karakhan did not ask you in writing for the famous declaration
of neutrality he requested from us, in case Russia came under attack.41 In fact,
we have decided to abstain from any attack against Russia, except for the
stipulations existing in our treaty of alliance with Poland, which is a defensive
alliance. But, to stipulate through a convention with a state that you would be
neutral, indifferent the circumstances, is a way of signing a small alliance with
it. And, it is against both Romania’s interest and dignity to have the honor of
being the second country after Kemal’s Turkey in a sui-generis alliance with the
Soviets. This request is inadmissible.
We must necessarily obtain the freedom of our hostages in Russia, who are
being kept through an abuse of power unknown in relations between civilized
states.42 If the Russians can point out any Russian citizens in our prisons we
will free them immediately. But the thought of talking about Romanian citi-
zens, condemned by our justice system, whom we would set free or send to
Russia at Moscow’s request seems to me so cynical that I could not honor it
with any response. . . .
We must stand by our position that we are not at war and, therefore, we
do not have to sign a peace treaty. . . .
During these negotiations it must not be forgotten that Romania has no
interest except for that of keeping the promise made by Prime Minister Vaida
in February 1920, while the Soviets have not only the interest of re-establishing
diplomatic relations with us but also to negotiate and sign something with an
organized State that has such a considerable past as ours.”43
In these circumstances, to which should be added the French opposition to the

re-establishment of Russo-Romanian relations, it is clear why the Warsaw Confer-
ence ended without any gain for the Romanians. For the Russians, on the other
hand, the Conference was not a complete failure because they were able to gain pre-
cious time. Time was on their side, and they took full advantage of it so that, more
than a decade later, the Romanians had to agree to many of the same points they had
opposed in 1921, in exchange for much less. The best example would be Titulescu’s
agreement to open diplomatic relations first and only later to negotiate the return of
any parts of the Treasury.
One other point characterizing the relationship before and after the Warsaw
Conference was the question of the White Russians who had found refuge on Roma-
< 116 >

nian soil. The Russians continuously protested the Romanian attitude towards those
fighting against the Red Army, people like General Wrangel’s or Petliura’s support-
ers. In a telegram sent on November 11, 1921, Cicerin asked again for Romania to take
measures against the activity of White Guards on Romanian territory, as proof of
Romania’s willingness to have peace with Russia and Ukraine. In fact, these con-
tinuous demands were made in order to justify a possible military intervention. By
this device, public opinion (and especially international opinion) would be led to
accept that Russian troops were entering Romania only in order to stop the bandits
based there from making incursions into Soviet territory, and not in order to retrieve
Bessarabia. Still, the Romanians always claimed that the border incidents were evi-
dence of Bolshevik attempts to penetrate into the Romanian territory.44
The telegram mentioned above points up one more characteristic of the bilat-
eral negotiations:
We were no less surprised to note in your statement that you appear to believe
that our consenting to discuss the question of navigation on the Dniestr im-
plied recognition of the incorporation of Bessarabia into Romania. On the con-
trary, in a whole series of statements made by the Russo-Ukrainian delegation
we made it clear in precise and unambiguous terms that the object of the con-
ference was not to fix the frontier between the two countries, but solely to es-
tablish a demarcation line, having regard to the de facto occupation of Bessara-
bia by Romanian troops.45
At every point when an agreement was reached between the two States, or
some negotiations took place, or when both of them were signing a multinational
treaty, the Romanians considered it a diplomatic victory signifying Russian recogni-
tion of Bessarabia’s union. They argued that, by agreeing to deal on an equal footing
with Romania as a state, the Soviets recognized its authority over all the territories it
controlled. The fact that their interpretation was a mistake is proven plainly by the
attitude of the US towards the Bessarabian question: the US had diplomatic rela-
tions and even signed a number of treaties with Romania without de facto recogniz-
ing her rights over Bessarabia. Of course, soon after the Romanian declarations, the
Russian side would make the necessary corrections, specifying that its position to-
wards Bessarabia remained unchanged, and the Romanians would argue back.46 The
same thing happened after the Briand-Kellogg pact was signed in 1928, and after the
London “Convention for the Definition of the Aggression” was signed in July 1933.
The moment when the Soviets’ international position clearly began to improve
came in 1922, as a result of signing the Rapallo Treaty with Germany (April 16, 1922),
by which the latter officially recognized the Soviet government and undertook to
help it reorganize its military and economic capacities. From then on, the Soviets
were no longer an isolated and unrecognized Government. The new Russian posi-
tion was apparent during the Genoa Conference (April-May 1922) that had been
called in order to address relations between the Soviets and the European Powers,
< 117 >

relations that had been poisoned by the difficult problem of recovering the goods
that belonged to Westerners in Russia and had been nationalized by the Soviets
(and the issue of responsibility for the public debt of the former Russian Empire).
The Rapallo Treaty was a slap in the face of the Great Powers and a great success for
both Germany and the Soviets, and it resulted in the failure of the Genoa Conference
to reach any agreement.
Just a few weeks after Rapallo, the Russians made it known to Romania that
their position regarding bilateral relations had changed. During the Genoa Confer-
ence, Cicerin openly expressed Russia’s policy toward Bessarabia. In connection
with the Romanian attempt to insert into the common memorandum of the Powers
negotiating with Russia the principle regarding the necessity of respecting the po-
litical and territorial status quo of the states involved, (May 17), Cicerin stated that:
“respect for the status quo between Ukraine and Romania, for example, does not at
all mean for Russia the recognition of the Romanian status quo and particularly, the
recognition of the present Romanian occupation of Bessarabia.”47 The same day, the
Romanian Prime Minister Ion I. C. Bratianu expressed Romania’s readiness to sign a
permanent non-aggression pact with Bolshevik Russia, based on respect for the ex-
isting status quo. As the Bolshevik representatives refused the Romanian proposal,
Bratianu undertook a unilateral obligation of non-aggression, stating that Romania
would abstain from any military operations directed against Bolshevik Russia.
Although their international position was improving, the Russians were still
cautious and preferred to continue the dialogue with the Romanians. A few weeks
later, during the Hague Conference (June-July 1922), the Russians indicated that
they were still inclined toward a compromise with Romania.48 The new element that
came out during the negotiations was a Russian proposal for a conference on disar-
mament, in Moscow, at which all the states bordering Russia in Europe should take
part. The Romanians conditioned their attendance, as they had the signing of any
pact of non-aggression, on the recognition of the existing frontiers; as the Bolsheviks
rejected their conditions, Romania was the only European state bordering Russia
that refused to send representatives to the Conference.49 The Conference on disar-
mament was a good propaganda move from the communists and the Romanian re-
fusal, which they probably anticipated, gave them new propaganda material — espe-
cially with regard to international public opinion. In September, Cicerin again sug-
gested the exchange Karakhan had proposed earlier: Bessarabia in exchange for the
Treasury.50
During the Lausanne Conference (December 1922), Cicerin proposed to the
Romanian Minister in Paris, Constantin Diamandi, the signing of a non-aggression
pact for two or five years. Insisting that it was only an exploratory proposal made by
him and not yet approved by his government, Cicerin suggested that the Pact should
be based on “the recognition of Bessarabia in exchange for the Romanian National
Treasury and the Crown Jewels, the complete liquidation of reciprocal debts and the
resolution of all the other pending matters”.51 The Romanian government rejected
the Russian proposal.
< 118 >

An important moment, and probably the only remarkable step in Russo-

Romanian relations during the first part of the 1920s, was the signing, after a few
months of negotiations in Tyraspol, on November 20, 1923, of a border agreement
between the two States, called “Statutes on Ways and Means for Prevention and
Solution of Conflicts that May Arise along the Dniestr River”.52 The agreement
stipulated the resolution of border incidents by a joint Soviet-Romanian commission
which, indeed, had held a number of meetings.53 Although initially the Romanians
had great hopes for the negotiations, in the end they had to accept only a very lim-
ited agreement, far less than they had expected.
Cicerin presented the new position of the Soviet government towards Romania:
In the portfolio of diplomatic instructions, approved by the Central Com-

mittee, it is shown that, for the moment, we must restrain our action to molli-
fying Romania through commercial negotiations, without signing a final treaty
with her.
Signing a navigation agreement on the Dniestr with the Romanians would
be equivalent, in fact, to recognizing the Dniestr as the border. At our request,
chief-commander Kamenev has shown that exactly for this reason he considers
a navigation agreement on the Dniestr to be undesirable. Continuing the bor-
der negotiations, we will avoid anything that could be understood as recogni-
tion of the Dniestr as the border. But, the initiation of commercial relations, in
a prudent and limited form, is possible without these negative consequences.
While a complete and definitive commercial treaty would help the consolida-
tion of Bessarabia inside Romania, a limited and provisory commercial agree-
ment, with the amendment that it is not resolving the question of the border
regulation, might be useful to us. This agreement would reduce the intensity of
relations between Romania and Poland and, in this way, would weaken the
international position of the latter. Such a step would be in conformity with
the line approved by the Central Committee.
For this reason, we propose to use now the existing contact points with
Romania in order to start the negotiation of the provisory agreement regarding
limited commercial relations between Romania and USSR.54 The negotiations
should go forward without any haste.55
As a result of the improvement in the bilateral relations after the Tyraspol ne-
gotiations it was decided that a new conference between Romania and the Soviet
Union should be called, the parties agreeing on Vienna as the host city.56 Constantin
Langa-Rascanu headed the Romanian delegation and Nikolai Nikolaievich Krestin-
sky the Soviets’. The objectives of the two parties, as presented in the instructions
sent by Bratianu and Cicerin, show the great distance separating the two sides and
the practical impossibility of reaching an agreement. Russia’s broad objectives re-
garding relations with Romania were in no way different from those already pre-
sented, except for the insistence on the idea of a plebiscite:
< 119 >

During the conference, the word plebiscite must be heard. It is probable that as
soon as you mention Bessarabia the Romanians will leave, therefore among
your first words in mentioning Bessarabia you should use plebiscite. Use this
word even in your first phrase.57
As for the Romanian aims at the conference, Ion I.C. Bratianu stated:
Your leading principle would be the separation of the Bessarabian question

from that of the Treasury, following our talks in Lausanne.
You should show, from the beginning, that in order to establish good
neighborly relations between the two countries such relations cannot exist
without the border being regulated; and, regulating the border means recogni-
tion of the union of Bessarabia, which is and must be ours, so that there can be
no discussion on this question.
The positive part for us would be to obtain the recognition of Bessarabia
and the return of the Treasury, at least the non-metallic part, meaning the pri-
vate deposits and the archives. You must remember that the Soviets have re-
turned numerous and valuable art works to the Poles . . . if the Bessarabian
question is untouchable, that of the metallic Treasury is touchable, in the sense
that it could be renounced but only after a prior liquidation of all the financial
matters between us. . . .
The Russian representatives should be shown that Bessarabia represents an
anachronism in Russian history: captured with a view toward conquering Con-
stantinople, which for Russia meant controlling the keys to the Black Sea, Bes-
sarabia was the first step towards the realization of this plan. But when the
Czars realized that it was impossible to make this dream of conquest come true,
they could only renounce Bessarabia. . . . No economic interest justifies ties be-
tween Bessarabia and Russia.58
To respond to Soviet claims over Bessarabia, Bratianu also instructed Langa-

Rascanu to insist on all the known arguments, including the Bessarabian Treaty, and
especially on the national and economic points. Although Bratianu agreed with the
idea of signing a non-aggression pact with the Soviets, he clearly rejected any plebi-
scite in Bessarabia, as he was aware the Soviets might propose.59
Between March 27 and April 2, 1924, four meetings between the two delega-
tions took place.60 But after a few consistent “theoretical” exchanges in which each
part demolished the other's arguments as to its rights over Bessarabia, the two
proved unable to reach a consensus over the Bessarabian question. The Soviets were
unwilling to make any real concessions; the only matter they were prepared to ad-
dress was that of a plebiscite in Bessarabia. Their thesis was that a plebiscite would
be the only way to resolve the Bessarabian problem once and for all. Of course, they
had not thought that way a few years earlier, regarding Georgia. More surprisingly,
< 120 >

they did not even mention a plebiscite as a way of resolving the Bessarabian question
in 1940 or after the Second World War. But in 1924 they were the most fervent par-
tisans of the plebiscite solution, and the reason was clear: propaganda. They wanted
to show the world that they are willing to resolve the Bessarabian question but that
the Romanian Government was opposed to any possible agreement. And indeed,
they were partly successful in propagating that view, as the international press did
pay attention to the negotiations, publishing almost daily dispatches from Vienna.61
The Vienna Conference was the last attempt of the two parties to settle the
Bessarabian dispute through negotiation, ending the bilateral negotiations that
started in February 1920. It was the last act in the bilateral On the Romanian side,
some voices had criticized the idea of participating in a conference in which the Bes-
sarabian question was to be discussed, considering that the best policy would have
been to keep quiet on the matter.62 The failure to reach an agreement, expected by
the Soviets, only gave them more reason to intensify their actions against Romania,
especially at the propaganda level. Border incidents in Bessarabia and the concentra-
tion of troops at the border were two other methods the Soviets used against Roma-
nia during the inter-war period. Any time the Soviets needed propaganda material, a
new border incident took place in Bessarabia.
In view of recently published Russian documents (in Relatii romano-sovietice.
Documente, 1917-1934), it can be clearly stated (and not only speculated, as has been
the case until now) that, in fact, the Soviet representatives came to the conference
knowing from the beginning that it would be impossible to reach an agreement, and
not only that, but with precise instructions against signing anything more than a
provisory commercial agreement. In 1924, as the communists consolidated their grip
on power as well as shoring up their international position, they were no more in
particular need of time; and as a result, they are not looking for a compromise agree-
ment with Romania, but for a chance to clearly state their position on Bessarabia as
territory belonging to the “Soviet peoples”. Their main intention for the conference
was propaganda-related and they plainly used the opportunity well, bringing the
Bessarabian question to the attention of the international public in a manner that
was as favorable to the Soviets as possible. Soviet diplomats placed great emphasis
at the time on the French ratification, presenting it as the main obstacle to a Roma-
nian-Soviet agreement (it had encouraged the Romanian hopes that France would
come to their help in a possible conflict with the Soviets) — although the situation
was clearly very different.
Propaganda is one of the most powerful weapons of any government, and the
Soviets knew very well how to use it in their conflict with Romania. The Soviets
used propaganda directed at international public opinion to justify their claim to
Bessarabia not only from the historical viewpoint (which could have been easily con-
tested by the Romanians) but from the viewpoint of self-determination.63 They
knew that the self-determination principle (based on statistical data that might eas-
ily be manipulated) is more popular in public opinion than historical considerations,
and so offered them a better position for anti-Romanian propaganda. The Soviets
< 121 >

insisted that the Romanian authorities were abusing the Bessarabians because they
refused to obey to Bucharest’s orders and that the only way to resolve the Romanian-
Soviet conflict over Bessarabia would be by organizing a plebiscite. The reaction in
some Western circles against the Romanian action in Bessarabia during the Tatar-
Bunar episode proves that the Soviet propaganda was quite effective. It was even
more successful in the case of Romania’s allies: in the aftermath of the Vienna Con-
ference, some Yugoslav and Czechoslovak newspapers argued that Romania should
return control over Bessarabia to Soviet Russia or at least accept the Soviet request
for a plebiscite in the region.64
Another way the Soviets acted against the Romanian authorities was through
communist organizations and infiltrators. These actions, planned even before the
start of the Vienna Conference, aimed at provoking land revolts in Bessarabia as a
way of boosting the Soviet position. But the Romanian authorities were prepared,
and acted to avoid that eventuality by outlawing the Communist Party in April 1924.
Still, those members of the Romanian Communist Party who were not in prison re-
ceived instructions from Moscow to organize peasant riots in Bessarabia and
Bukovina against the Romanian Government and thus to offer a rationale for a possi-
ble intervention by the Red Army. The more dramatic the riots, the more the West
would doubt the Romanian character of Bessarabia and the more they would sup-
port Soviet intervention. Such riots had taken place before, in January 1919 near
Hotin and May 1919 in Tighina, but had no lasting effects.65
In September 1924 Communist agents made a successful attempt to start a riot
in Bessarabia, at Tatar-Bunar, instating a self-proclaimed Moldavian Soviet Repub-
lic. But the Romanian Army quickly quelled the uprising, supported by the German
population in the area. A few hundred people were arrested.66 The Russian propa-
gandists used the occasion to mobilize the communist parties from all over the
world and public opinion in general against imperialist Romania.
As a follow-up to the September events in Bessarabia, the Moscow government
established the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, on the left bank of
the Dniestr River, on October 12, 1924. The newly created republic had an area of
about 3,000 square miles, with a population of more than 500,000 people, of which
the Moldavians (Romanians) represented 60%.67 The capital was initially at Balta but
in 1929 it was moved to Tyraspol. Thus, a territory that had never before been called
Moldavia nor had ever been part of the medieval principality of Moldavia (although it
was populated by Moldavians) was created, in an effort to lend credibility to the So-
viet government’s claim to Bessarabia and to provide a catalyst for the “reunification”
of the Moldavians on the left bank of the Dniestr with those on the right bank.68 In
1940, the eastern part of the MASSR was returned to the Ukrainian SSR, while the
rest was incorporated into the new Moldavian SSR. Nowadays part of this territory
makes up the self-proclaimed Transdniester Republic, with which the Moldavian
Republic had to fight a fierce war in recent years. Of great importance was the fact
that the Western frontier of the newly created republic was set at the Pruth River,
considerably farther west than the Dniestr. This action was considered to be an open
declaration of Soviet intentions towards Bessarabia.69
< 122 >

There are two other possible reasons for the Soviet decision to create a Molda-
vian Autonomous SSR. Its creation coincided with the advent of a number of other
autonomous republics (Turkmen, Uzbek) and it fit very well with the Kremlin’s
campaign against Ukrainian nationalism.70 Furthermore, it can be seen as an element
of the broader Soviet policy of using the logic of national liberation to draw border
regions away from neighboring states, illustrated by the formation of two other re-
publics in especially contentious border regions: the Karelian autonomous republic
(targeting Finland) in 1920 and the Buriat-Mongol autonomous republic (targeting
Mongolia) in 1923.71
The Romanians were puzzled by this action. Bratianu declared in the Roma-
nian Parliament that: “We can only be happy because one of our neighbors has ad-
mitted that in our territorial claims we did not go as far as necessary”.72 In other
words, this could have been used, under certain conditions, by Romania as a pretext
for new territorial gains from Russia, or in order to counterbalance Ukraine’s claims
over the Bessarabian areas of Hotin and Ackerman.73
From 1924 to the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
For the Soviet Government, 1924 was a year of great successes in the interna-
tional arena. Finally, the Government was officially recognized by Italy, Great Brit-
ain, France and, in January 1925, Japan. The same forward motion was not enjoyed
by Romania: apart from worsening relations with Italy, in the aftermath of the Vi-
enna Conference, during the Prague Conference of the Little Entente (July 11-12,
1924), both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia refused to promise any active support
over Bessarabia.74 Even more, while Czechoslovakia signed a Friendship Treaty with
France in 1924, Romania’s attempt had to be postponed until 1926.
After 1924, there was a period of relative silence regarding Bessarabia. From
1926, the Romanian position became somewhat stronger because of the treaty signed
with France and the improvement in her relations with Italy.
The Soviets took a wait-and-see approach to the Bessarabian question during
the years after the Vienna Conference, as illustrated by Maxim Litvinov:
In conditions of peace, an agreement should always be based on reciprocal ad-

vantage; therefore when the Romanian government is proposing an agreement
based on our renunciation to Bessarabia it should ask itself: what is such agree-
ment offering to the other part? Romania has almost one third of its borders
unrecognized neither by us nor at the international level. Our recognition of
the Bessarabian border would certainly be of great advantage to Romania but,
for us, it would mean the renunciation to one of our foreign policy basic princi-
ples and at the revolutionary slogans regarding the self-determination of the
peoples. Considering the great length of the USSR borders, the non-regulation
of the border question on a relatively small sector for us is not as important as
it is for Romania; even from the economic viewpoint we are only at a small loss
< 123 >

by having no relations with Romania. For these reasons, if the Romanian gov-
ernment is unwilling or unable to bring up acceptable proposals, we prefer to
keep the situation unchanged.75
And, as long as the Romanians did not come forward with any new proposal,
Soviet diplomacy held her course. It was only because of the German and Japanese
dangers a few years later that the Soviets became more malleable, so that a compro-
mise could be agreed with Romania.
However, it is possible that there was one departure from this Soviet policy.
According to Gregorij Bessedovskii, a high-ranking Soviet diplomat who defected in
1931, Stalin was ready in October 1927 to adopt a more conciliatory position with
regard to Bessarabia in order to both improve the Soviets’ international standing (by
overcoming the recent difficulties with Great Britain and France) and to boost his
internal position with a foreign policy success. Stalin’s purported attempt to initiate
negotiations was hampered by the intervention of the Commissariat on Foreign Af-
fairs against the initiative (of course, Stalin denied any involvement) and the Roma-
nians’ unwillingness to agree to Bessedovskii’s proposal. Indeed, the Romanians
were justified in rejecting the proposal, for it fell far short of what they were pre-
pared to accept: Bessedovskii mentioned not only the Romanian National Treasury
but also territorial modifications in northern Bessarabia as the price to be paid by
the Romanians.76 Still, as there are no other proofs to support Bessedovskii’s story
and as he has been found to have sometimes exaggerated, in his book and in the arti-
cles published in various newspapers after his defection, it is difficult to assess what
role, if any, Stalin played in this context.
During 1928, in an effort to strengthen relations between the Little Entente and
the Soviets, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Eduard Benes, attempted to jump-
start the Soviet-Romanian negotiations.77 But because neither of the two parties
seemed ready to move away from the positions expressed during the Vienna Confer-
ence, the proposed negotiations failed to materialize.
In August 1928 Romania signed the Briand-Kellogg Pact, renouncing war as a
means of exercising national policy. After a few months, in February 1929, Romania,
Poland, Estonia and Latvia signed the Moscow Protocol with the USSR, also known
as the Litvinov Protocol, for the application of the Briand-Kellogg Pact.78 Later,
Lithuania, Turkey and Iran signed the Litvinov Protocol too. Once again, the Roma-
nian Government considered that the problem of Bessarabia finally had been re-
solved; but Litvinov stated that while the signature eliminated the legal possibility of
resolving the Bessarabian dispute by force, neither the Pact nor the Protocol preju-
diced Soviet claims in any way. As stated by Litvinov, “the renunciation to war can
not mean a renunciation to our rights over the territory occupied by the Romani-
ans”.79 With the exception of Romania, USSR signed bilateral treaties with all its
European neighbors. After the signing of the Protocol, a meeting that was to be the
beginning of a new round of bilateral negotiations took place between Litvinov and
the Romanian representative, Charles A. Davila. Litvinov concluded the following,
regarding the meeting:
< 124 >

Although the war danger has been deferred to some extent through the signing
of the Protocol and the Briand-Kellogg Pact, Romania is still willing to come to
an agreement with us.
The division of Bessarabia would be refused as the basis for an agreement.
Contrary to the Bratianu government, which clearly rejected even a discussion
on the plebiscite, the actual government, through Davila’s person, raised the
question of plebiscite without theoretically rejecting it.80
In fact, Litvinov was so sure that the Romanians were ready to change their
position that he even proposed concrete ways for organizing the plebiscite. He ar-
gued to Stalin that a reopening of the bilateral negotiations might be used in order to
dissuade Romania from the Polish plan to transform the Polish-Romanian defensive
military alliance into an offensive one. He considered the main conditions for start-
ing the negotiations to be: the plebiscite question, which should materialize in ac-
tual fact; the reciprocal renunciation of all financial and material claims, with the
exception of returning the cultural assets still kept by one side (meaning the non-
metallic part of the Romanian National Treasury); the signing of a pact for non-
aggression and non-participation in hostile combination, following the example of
the Turkish-Soviets Treaty.81
During 1931, the two countries did re-open negotiations, in the hope of signing a
non-aggression pact. This new initiative was related mainly to European politics. Be-
cause of the increase in German revisionism, the Poles expressed their wish to have a
non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union (who welcomed the initiative, being
pressed in her turn by the Japanese action in Manchuria). France too was ready to
sign a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, but she was tied to Poland by a
mutual assistance treaty. The problem was that Poland had an alliance with Romania
that requested her to consult Romania before making any shift in her policy toward
the Soviets (and of course Romania had no interest in seeing Poland tied with the
Soviets). At the end of 1930, as a result of secret talks between Poland and the Soviet
Union, the Poles took the initiative of mediating a non-aggression pact between the
Soviets and Romania. At first, Litvinov was opposed to any Romanian-Soviet negotia-
tions, one of the reasons being Poland’s alliance with Romania. However, as the Japa-
nese advance in Manchuria became more menacing, Litvinov became more amenable
and in October 1931 he agreed to negotiate with the Romanians.82
More or less as a result of Polish mediation,83 as well as French pressure, both
parts agreed to start a new round of talks, this time with the purpose of signing a
non-aggression pact; but there was a clear lack of enthusiasm, as neither of them
expected any worthwhile results. In January 1932, the negotiations opened in Riga,
but things went much the same as on previous occasions and no agreement was
reached.84
Mihail Sturdza, the Romanian representative, was instructed not to allow any
mention of Bessarabia and to propose a Romanian draft of the non-aggression pact
< 125 >

based mainly on the Briand-Kellogg Pact. At the same time the Soviet representative,
Boris Spiridonovici Stomoniakov, asked that terms like integrity, inviolability, and
sovereignty be excluded from the Treaty but that the existence of a litigious ques-
tion between the two States (that of Bessarabia) should be mentioned. Sturdza
asked that no mention be made of a territorial controversy between the two states.
After six sessions in January 1932, the talks ended in failure. Mihail Sturdza tried to
alert those in Romanian diplomatic circles who believed that the Soviets might yet
be willing to renounce, in time, Bessarabia in exchange for whatever Romania was
prepared to offer:
The most elementary perspicacity, the lowest political sense should prove to
any Romanian in direct contact with the Soviet representatives that Bessarabia
is for them neither a simple question of prestige nor a minimal territorial ques-
tion. Bessarabia has remained until today for the Soviets one of the most im-
portant accessories, the first reserve of the drama that they are preparing in
detail.85
The Romanian Foreign Ministry’s readiness to negotiate with the Soviets was
amply criticized by Nicolae Titulescu:
It was a mistake to accept the opening of negotiations with the Soviets with-
out taking advantage of the precious occasion offered by the Soviet interest to
have the signature of our allies, France and Poland, in order to ask, in the com-
mon interest of all the parties implied, the definitive regulation of the Bessara-
bian question in our favor. I remind you especially of Romania’s mistake in ac-
cepting negotiations with the Soviets without having at least the certainty that
Poland would not sign without us.86
In the meanwhile, on July 25, 1932, the Polish-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was
concluded, but the Poles continued to promise Romania that they would not ratify it
until the completion of the Romanian-Soviet pact. The French were in a similar
situation, promising Romania that they would not sign their pact with the Soviets
before the achievement of a Romanian-Soviet accord.87 In exchange for these prom-
ises, they asked the Romanians to make some concessions to the Soviets and insisted
on the re-opening of Romanian-Soviet negotiations for a non-aggression pact. This
time Titulescu, who tried via French and Polish mediation to come to an agreement
with the Russians, played the leading role for the Romanians. But the Soviets were
unwilling to give up their main condition for signing such a pact: an explicit mention
of the existence of a litigious question between the two states.88 Their position was
clearly boosted by the Polish decision to go ahead and ratify the non-aggression pact
that November without waiting for a similar pact between Romania and the Soviets.
In fact, the Polish move came as an immediate result of a change in the Polish foreign
policy leadership (Joseph Beck replaced Auguste Zaleski as Foreign Minister),
< 126 >

which brought into place a new policy of preferring good relations with Poland’s
neighbors over its existing alliances.89
Thus, the new Polish Government signed the Polish-Soviet non-aggression
Pact while continuing to press, together with the French Government, for a similar
Romanian-Soviet pact. The Polish-Soviet Pact was a real blow to the Romanian se-
curity system, and many in Romania believed that the Romanian-Polish alliance had
collapsed. Although the Romanian government published a declaration stating that
Romania and Poland would go on working together with regard to foreign policy
and that the Polish government would not ratify the pact until the Romanians sign a
similar one, it was quite clear that the Soviets were able to provoke serious damage
to the Polish-Romanian alliance.90 And this was not the only problem for Romania
during 1932.
Another major blow to Romania’s security network was the failure of the
League of Nations to cope with the Japanese invasion in the Far East; the League was
severely discredited. Then, on November 29, 1932, France signed a non-aggression
pact with the Soviets, which led to the signing of the Mutual Assistance Treaty of
May 1935 between the two. Trying to take advantage of the new French interest, the
Soviets insisted that the Soviet-French pact and the Romanian-Soviet pact should
definitely not be presented as being interconnected.91
The improvement in French-Soviet relations was not at all in Romania’s inter-
est, and left Romania with three practical choices: to replace France with Germany
as her best ally (the only Power able and willing to fight against the Soviets); to con-
tinue her relationship with France while working diligently to reach an agreement
with the Soviets; or to pursue a policy of neutrality. Under the leadership of Nicolae
Titulescu it was decided that the second course was best;92 thus, they ignored not
only the German card (Germany had made a number of attempts to achieve closer
relations with Romania) but also the Italian one (due to the mistakes made by the
same Titulescu during the Italo-Abyssinian conflict).93
In September 1932 the negotiations began again in Geneva, and again failed.94
Litvinov and Victor Cadere, the Romanian representative, reached agreement on
every point except the protocol of signature, almost exactly as Sturdza and Stomoni-
akov had in January 1932. The debate centered around the word “existing” (the So-
viet proposed Draft stated “The establishment of such relations does not bring any
prejudice to the existing litigation between the two Contracting Parties about Bes-
sarabia”).95 Although at one point it seemed that the two parties had found a middle
course, using the word “conflicts” (referring to present and future conflicts) but
omitting “existing”, in the end the Romanians backed off from the new wording,
which the Soviets accepted, and no pact was signed.96
The Soviets’ main aim during the 1932 negotiations was to obtain Romanian
recognition of the existence of a conflict between them, and they were ready to offer
a number of different formulas in this sense, all with the same meaning. Conversely,
the Romanians refused to sign anything that used words like conflict, litigation, or
dispute — with one notable exception, justified by Romanian internal political ma-
< 127 >

neuvers.97 At the same time, in response to French and Polish pressure for an agree-
ment, both sides blamed each other for the failure to reach agreement. Litvinov re-
leased a polemical press account of the talks, charging that Bucharest had reneged
on an acceptable formula and was responsible for the failure. In an interview pub-
lished by Izvestia on October 16, 1932, he characterized the negotiations as follows:
Romania proposed formulas for the non-aggression undertaking which might

be interpreted as implicit recognition by the Soviet government of the occupa-
tion of Bessarabia. We emphatically rejected these formulas, and for our part
proposed others in which it was clearly stated that the USSR undertakes that
in any circumstances would not resort to force to settle any question in dis-
pute.98
Still, the truth was somewhat different, as presented by Jiri Hochman:
Nothing shows that at any point of these negotiations between July 1931 and
September 1932 the Soviets professed their willingness to sign with Romania a
pact similar to those signed with other countries, and no one can seriously
blame the Romanian government for striving for the same guarantees that were
not missing in other contemporary treaties of nonaggression”.99
In a certain sense, the 1931-1932 negotiations could be characterized as a “war

of words”. The main task of each side was to either avoid the inclusion of certain
words or to press for the inclusion of certain words. At least it was not a war of
guns.
By the beginning of 1933, Romanian Foreign Minister Nicolae Titulescu was
already considering that, in order to Romania’s improve her international position,
and to counter-balance her isolation in the Bessarabian question, it would be neces-
sary to improve relations with the Soviet Union. One reason was his fear of fas-
cism — not only in Europe (he clearly foresaw the danger that fascism and Nazism
posed to the Versailles Peace system) but also at home (represented by the Iron
Guard). He was quite concerned about the Romanian fascists, who considered him
among the persons most responsible for Romania’s crises; and it seems that this fear
influenced his policy of rapprochement with the Soviets: the only ones who could
counterbalance fascism. In a well-known remark, Titulescu said: “A telegram sent to
him by Litvinov, saying that the Soviet Union and Romania reciprocally guarantee
their borders by military means, would suffice to end fascism in Romania”.100 How-
ever, Titulescu (like many other leaders in his day) failed to take into account the
possibility of a Soviet-German alliance, which later materialized — proving that ide-
ology is much weaker than strategic needs or opportunities.
Titulescu was a famous Romanian diplomat and, because of his involvement
with the League of Nations (he had twice been its President), a first class interna-
tional personality. His approach to the Bessarabian question had been based, at least
< 128 >

theoretically, on staunch opposition to any political act by which the Romanians

would recognize the existence of a conflict between their country and the Soviet
Union. But this position did not mean that he was opposed to an agreement with the
Soviets, quite to the contrary. He knew that the international status of Bessarabia
was questionable because of the Soviets’ refusal to recognize the Union but also for
other reasons (he was not completely satisfied with the legality of Bessarabia’s deci-
sion for union, and the 1920 Treaty did not enter into force because Japan had not
ratified it).101 Understanding that a Soviet blessing of the union was not likely to
come without concessions from Romania, Titulescu tried to normalize relations
with the hope of at least limiting the Soviet propaganda.
It is also possible that Titulescu had a much greater aim in normalizing Soviet-
Romanian relations, namely that of fostering the alliance between France and the
Soviets against Germany. The main problem with such an alliance was that, in case
of a German attack against France, the Soviet troops had to cross through either Po-
land or Romania in order to effectively help France, but neither of the two was will-
ing to risk having the Red Army on her territory. This situation made the French-
Soviet alliance practically ineffective for the French, who could not benefit from So-
viet military aid (even if the Soviets were indeed willing to provide such aid). Still, as
a terrain for massive Soviet military movements westward to engage Germany in the
case of a Franco-German war, Romania was, for purely geographical reasons, of
rather limited importance. On the other hand, the Romanian territory would be very
important if Germany attacked Czechoslovakia, as it would provide an easy route
for Soviet troops going to support the Czechoslovaks.102 The normalization of So-
viet-Romanian relations might be seen as an important step in solving this problem,
although there was still a long way before convincing the Romanians, whom did not
forget the experience of 1877-1878, to agree to the transit of Soviet troops through
Romanian territory.103
One of the elements in Titulescu’s strategy for reaching an agreement with the
Soviets was to rely on the collective weight of the Little Entente, to whom he pro-
posed a common recognition of the Soviet Union, hoping to receive from the Soviets
(in exchange for greatly improving their security) certain concessions regarding Bes-
sarabia. He believed that he could take advantage of the new international situation,
which was not very favorable for the Soviet Union. The way for the Soviet Union to
improve its position in the world was to bolster her position in Europe. At the same
time, Czechoslovakia’s position also played an important role in the Soviet-
Romanian negotiations. Because of her conflict with Germany, Czechoslovakia real-
ized that normalizing relations with the Soviets had become more and more a neces-
sity. For that to happen, she needed the approval of both Romania and Yugoslavia,
the other two members of the Little Entente. The main obstacles were the Bessara-
bian question, in the case of Romania, and the help given to the White Russians, in
the case of Yugoslavia. The need for the Little Entente to show real solidarity regard-
ing her members’ foreign policy prevailed for a while over the Czechoslovak wish to
establish normal relations with the Soviets.
< 129 >

The first occasion Titulescu found for reaching any sort of agreement with the
Soviets was during the Geneva disarmament conference, in May 1933. The bridge
between the two sides had been the definition of aggression, where Titulescu and
Litvinov reached a compromise: Titulescu backed the Russian proposal after the
Russians agreed to his suggestion that “the territory covered by the new criteria of
aggression should be understood to be that over which a state exercised his de facto
authority”.104
On July 3, 1933 the Soviet Union and seven of her neighbors, including Roma-
nia, signed the “Convention for the Definition of Aggression” in London. The follow-
ing formula was adopted: “The act of invading the territory of a state constitutes es-
sentially an act of aggression, independently of any declaration of war. Territory
must be understood here to mean the territory over which a state exercises its au-
thority in fact.”105
According to the Conventions106 and based on the definition of aggression
agreed in Geneva, the violation of the Bessarabian frontier by the Soviets was to be
considered an act of aggression. Romanian scholars consider that, during the nego-
tiations leading up to the signing of the Convention, the Soviets agreed not to use
force against Romania.107 At the same time, Titulescu and Litvinov came to a verbal
agreement — a gentlemen’s agreement — by which they undertook not to raise pub-
licly, in any form, the question of Bessarabia. Titulescu describes the signification of
the Convention:
I want to let you know what Litvinov repeatedly declared to me during the
negotiations in London and in the presence of the Turkish Foreign Minister.
“I know that by signing this convention we gave you Bessarabia. It is only
because of the difficulties I would have to face with the public opinion in my
country, and especially in Ukraine, that I cannot recognize this fact officially.
But when I am obliging myself to never commit an aggressive act over Bessara-
bia and when I could not ask for a revision, and this is not only because the
Soviet Union is not a member of the League of Nations but also because we are,
in principle, opposed to revisionism, which means war, then what means could
I possibly still use to get Bessarabia back?” I answered to Litvinov that Bessara-
bia was given to us by God and not by him. Then we both agreed that the best
solution is to avoid any discussions on Bessarabia.108
The events of July 1940 show how much such a promise was worth. Litvinov
also confirmed the existence of the gentlemen’s agreement, although for him it had a
slightly different meaning:
During the talks for the re-establishment of relations, Titulescu asked for our
pledge that we would never raise the Bessarabian question by diplomatic
means, which would be equivalent to our unequivocal recognition of Bessara-
bia’s annexation. In my turn, I proposed him an amendment regarding the ex-
< 130 >

isting problems, which are still open. We both agreed to make no kind of
pledges regarding Bessarabia.109
Almost all of Romanian historiography has praised Titulescu for obtaining the
Soviets’ implicit recognition of the territorial integrity of Romania,110 but the situa-
tion was not that simple, as proved by the following two arguments. Firstly, during
the following period the Soviets stubbornly avoided any mention of the Dniestr as
the border between the two countries, indicating that, given the possibility of acting
in order to retrieve Bessarabia at a later stage, they had no intention of officially rec-
ognizing Romanian sovereignty over Bessarabia. The entire business was more a
matter of throwing dust in the eyes of the Romanian public (successfully, to be
sure), as the Soviets proved fully in 1940.
Secondly, the US example raises serious doubts over the Romanian thesis that,
by recognizing as Romanian territory the entire area over which Romania exercised
its administration, the Soviets would have to recognize Bessarabia as properly Ro-
manian territory, as well. The diplomatic, political and economic relations existing
between Romania and the US did not prevent the US government from considering
Bessarabia as territory under Romanian occupation (rather than Romanian terri-
tory) and from avoiding any action that might have been interpreted as de facto recog-
nition of Bessarabia’s union with Romania.
In January 1934, during the Zagreb meeting of the Little Entente, the three
member states decided that it would be opportune to establish diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Union as soon as the interests of each Member State, and especially
of Romania, were met. The decision was a normal development along the lines that
had been proposed during the Belgrade meeting and that had been followed closely
in Titulescu’s policy towards the Soviets; it was also a result of the pressure coming
from the French, and of the Hungarians’ eagerness to establish relations with the
Soviets.111 After a number of preparatory meetings between Romanian and Soviet
diplomats, Titulescu and Litvinov met in May 1934 with the purpose of reaching an
agreement regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations between USSR and
Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Referring to these negotiations, Titulescu
later wrote:
I talked with Litvinov about all the questions related to the establishment of
diplomatic relations. First, Bessarabia: “It is a question that you do not have to
raise; this is because of the non-aggression Convention, which defines the ter-
ritory of each signatory as being the territory presently under its authority,”
said Litvinov. Then I went further, asking “But what shall I do if the Soviet
minister comes into my office for a peaceful discussion regarding the return of
Bessarabia?” “You should simply kick him out.”112
Although Titulescu’s possible reaction to the Soviet ultimatum of June 26,

1940, remains simple speculation, it is patently clear that he could not have simply
“kicked out” the Soviet representative.
< 131 >

The negotiations between the two diplomats were not limited to the normali-
zation of diplomatic relations. They also discussed the accession of the Soviet Union
into the League of Nations and a mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union,
Romania and Poland. Titulescu also had to handle certain sensibilities coming from
the Little Entente: Czechoslovakia was pressing for the immediate opening of diplo-
matic relations with the Soviets, while Yugoslavia was still opposed to establishing
such relations at all.
Finally, on June 9, 1934 the official exchange of letters between Titulescu and
Litvinov regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations took place in Geneva,
including also a commitment to nonintervention in each other’s internal affairs and
an undertaking not to engage in propaganda activities counter to each other’s inter-
ests.113 Thus, the Romanians fell short of the goal of trading their recognition of the
Soviet Union for formal Soviet renunciation of Bessarabia, which they had been hop-
ing for since the early 1920s. In the end, Titulescu had to abandon his April 1933 po-
sition that “there could be no question of an exchange of diplomatic representatives
between Bucharest and Moscow until the Soviet government formally acquiesced in
Romania’s possession of Bessarabia”.114 On the other hand, a number of scholars con-
sider that the Soviets did have to make at least one important concession regarding
Bessarabia: according to Litvinov’s own interpretation, the Soviet passing over in
silence of the Bessarabian question constituted a de facto recognition of the province’s
possession by Romania.115
Still, as proved by later events, it was only a temporary solution, giving a sort of
win-win perspective to the deal. The Soviets, pressed between Germany and Japan,
were able to improve their position in Europe by establishing diplomatic relations
with Romania and Czechoslovakia, without making any important concessions. Al-
though they failed to get Romania’s official agreement regarding the existence of a
territorial conflict between the two, they only had to agree to keep silent over the
Bessarabian question and not to recognize Bessarabia’s union with Romania. On the
other hand, all the Romanians achieved was a temporary let up in the Soviet propa-
ganda regarding Bessarabia. As happens so many times in diplomacy, neither state
fully achieved its objectives and they had to come to a compromise, one that each of
them presented to the domestic audience in a different manner. The fact is that the
Soviets proved able, a few years later, to take full advantage of the standoff regarding
Bessarabia, while the Romanians went through the bitter experience of losing it
once again.
The final step in the establishment of diplomatic relations between Romania
and the Soviet Union took place in December 1934, when the first Romanian minis-
ter to Moscow officially presented his letters of accreditation.
From the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations to the 1940 Crisis
During the ensuing period, relations between the two states diversified and
improved. Leaving aside the Bessarabian question, papered over in diplomatic si-
< 132 >

lence, there was real progress in bilateral relations. The Romanians were able to re-
cover a part of the National Treasury from the Soviet authorities (the Archives, not
the gold reserves), and the border skirmishes along the Dniestr and the Soviet propa-
ganda offensives regarding Bessarabia came to an end.
The Soviet aims in Romania are best described in the instructions sent to Mi-
hail Semionovici Ostrovski, the Soviets’ first representative in Bucharest:
We will be awaiting from you characterizations of the political leaders and

information on the movements inside the political structure of certain parties
and groups.
Here, we are working hard for the re-establishment of direct railroad and
telegraphic connections with Romania. . . .
We have not yet taken a definitive official solution regarding the return of
the Archives, but the general mood in our People’s Soviet is that it should not
take too long for the Archives to be returned.
Ciuntu insists on the re-establishment of connections with Romania over
the Dniestr. He wishes to settle this question before the complete reconstruc-
tion of the bridge over the Dniestr. We have no objections regarding the estab-
lishment of connections over the Dniestr. I foresee that, when this happens, the
denomination of the Dniestr will become a problem. The Romanians would
insist that the Dniestr is the border between Romania and the Soviet Union.
We would not agree to call it border. The Romanians would not accept any
other denomination, as a demarcation line or administrative line. For this rea-
son, I think that in our documents we would simply use “the course of the Dni-
estr River” and “the right and the left bank of the Dniestr River”. . . .
In principle, we are connected with Romania by certain common objectives
regarding foreign affairs. Friendly relations might be established through these
common objectives and hopefully, the two parties will do their best in order
not to exaggerate or to aggravate the divergences regarding the regulation of
the pending matters.”116
The above instructions are among the best proofs that the Soviets were only
postponing the Bessarabian question and that they were not only far from recogniz-
ing Bessarabia as a Romanian territory but also from signing anything that the Ro-
manians might use in this sense, even after the re-establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions.
In September 1934, the USSR became a member of the League of Nations. The
famous Article No. 10 in the Status of the League of Nations (which refers to the
recognition of the territorial integrity and political independence of all members)
underscored the implied Russian recognition of the Romanian border. But, as will be
shown later, the same Article No. 10 could be understood in the case of Romania as
covering all her borders with the exception of Bessarabia.117
As early as February 8, 1935, a Railroad Convention for the re-establishment of
< 133 >

direct connections through Tighina and Tyraspol was signed in Moscow between
Romania and the Soviets.118 As a gesture of friendship, the Soviets on two occasions
returned to Romania (in February and May 1935) parts of the National Treasury,
namely the National and some private Archives, some of the documents and manu-
scripts belonging to the Romanian Academy, and the remains of Dimitrie Cantemir,
one of the most famous Romanian voevods, who had died two centuries earlier while
under forced exile to Russia.119 Also along the lines of collaboration, a Payment
Agreement was signed between the two states in Bucharest, on February 15, 1936.
The next step Titulescu took was to negotiate a Mutual Assistance Treaty
(MAT) with the Soviets, following the French example.120 Opposition to a Roma-
nian-Soviet pact was great, not only at the international level (Germany, Hungary
and Italy) but domestically, too. And, although Romanian scholars have avoided
stressing this point, the necessity of such a treaty for Romania remains doubtful:
against whom was it supposed to be directed, when the Soviet Union was Romania’s
principal enemy? Analyzing both Romania’s position and Titulescu’s possible goals,
Anthony Komjathy states:
Realistic political considerations thus deny that changes in the demands of

Romania’s security necessitated a mutual assistance treaty with the Soviet Un-
ion, unless Titulescu hoped that he could incorporate into the treaty Soviet
guarantees for Romania’s territorial integrity [which the Soviets clearly op-
posed]. The words “mutual assistance” are misleading, “non-aggression” truly
describes the purpose of the Titulescu-Litvinov negotiations. . . . If Titulescu
could have incorporated Soviet guarantees into any kind of treaty, he would
have done the greatest service to his country . . . He tried and failed.”121
The signing of the French-Soviet Mutual Assistance Treaty on May 2, 1935,

boosted Titulescu’s position.122 After long negotiations (i.e., internal political maneu-
vers) and pressure on the Romanian political establishment, on July 15, 1935 Tit-
ulescu received from the government (i.e., King Carol II) a first mandate to negotiate
and sign a Mutual Assistance Treaty with the Soviets, based on recognition of the
territorial status quo. Titulescu hoped for a French-sponsored accommodation with
the Soviets, so that he sought to underwrite his negotiations with Litvinov by a pre-
cise French commitment that would replace explicit Soviet recognition of the dis-
puted Bessarabian frontier.123 Still, in the end he achieved neither objective. As soon
as September 1935, during a series of meetings with Litvinov in Geneva, he expressed
Romania’s readiness to sign a MAT with the Soviets; but Litvinov not only gave him
a negative answer but also made a public statement to that effect on October 24,
placing Titulescu in a very awkward position at home.124 However, Litvinov’s refusal
was not due to the fact that, for him, the main obstacle in bilateral relations was Ro-
manian internal politics (meaning the growing popularity of the extreme right,
which openly criticized the communism),125 but a result of the general Soviet policy
towards Romania.
< 134 >

Although Titulescu was able to convince the King of the necessity of signing an
MAT with the Soviets, he did not persuade the Romanian public, which was aware
of the danger inherent in allowing the Red Army to cross through Romania. In order
to satisfy the public, the Romanian government had to issue a statement officially
declaring that there were no negotiations going on to that effect. By the same token
we have the answer Titulescu gave during the debates of the Romanian Parliament,
on December 13, 1935, to the interpellations made by Gheorghe Bratianu: he denied
the existence of any secret negotiations with the Soviets but insisted very convinc-
ingly on the necessity to maintain good relations with them.126 Still, it must have
been difficult indeed, even for a person of Titulescu’s abilities, to find any wriggle
room between the promises made to the French and to the Romanian public. It is
strange at the very least that Titulescu seemed inclined to trust the Soviets’ word
while most Romanians were against such a deal. Probably he was thinking of a So-
viet-Romanian alliance, which would be highly advantageous to Romania and was
quite possible at that time — if we omit the Bessarabian question. Speculating, of
course, the big question is: was he ready to give up Bessarabia (or at least, a part of
it) in order to greatly enhance Romania’s security? If so, could he really be blamed for
this initiative? And, first and foremost, could the Soviets be trusted to desist in their
claims over the rest of Bessarabia, once they had received part of it (either in the
south or north)?
During 1935 Titulescu took one more initiative that triggered a strong reaction
against him both at home and in Europe’s capitals: he pushed Romania into the fore-
front of the Ethiopian debate, becoming the greatest defender of the authority of the
League and promoting sanctions against Italy, although Romania had nothing to
gain from such a policy.127 It was one of the moments when Titulescu proved to be
too great an asset for Romanian foreign policy, indeed too heavy a one, simply pull-
ing her down.
Another element greatly complicating Romania’s situation was the possibility
that the Red Army would cross through Romanian territory without the agreement
of the Romanian government, in order to back Czechoslovakia or France. That
would place Romania in a very awkward position: to attack the Soviets would mean
to help Germany against France while, conversely, giving free access to the Red
Army would mean risking the loss of Bessarabia. In the words of the Czech foreign
minister, Kamil Krofta (on April 15, 1936), “The USSR made known to Prague that in
case of an attack on Czechoslovakia, the Russian Army would come to help, through
Romania, with or without the consent of the Cabinet in Bucharest”.128 The main
question for the Romanians was whether the Soviets were indeed prepared to offer
military support to France or Czechoslovakia, or if they were simply bluffing. Add-
ing to Romania’s woes was France’s failure to react to Germany’s remilitarization of
the Rhineland in March 1936 (in violation of the stipulation against remilitarization
in the Versailles Peace Treaty — France was neither prepared nor willing to start a
war with Germany). This failure to react caused deep concern in East Central
Europe and raised questions in Romania regarding the French ability to intervene in
her favor in case of war.
< 135 >

In order to have the solid support of the government in his negotiations with
the Soviets, Titulescu went to Bucharest in July 1936. After a meeting of the leading
ministers, on July 14, his mandate to negotiate the MAT with the Soviets was recon-
firmed. A number of other decisions were also taken, expressing the solidarity of the
entire government with the foreign policy promoted by Titulescu: the press attacks
against the Soviet Union should stop and articles favorable to the Soviet-Romanian
alliance should be published; the alliance would be officially backed at the meetings
of the National Liberal Party; and the influence of foreign representatives in Bucha-
rest over Romanian public opinion should be limited.129 It was more than enough for
Titulescu, and he went back to Montreaux to meet Litvinov and present him with a
concrete draft of the MAT.
On July 21, 1936, Titulescu and Litvinov (taking advantage of both countries’
participation in the Black Sea Straits Conference) signed a protocol containing the
basic principles of a mutual assistance pact. Romanian historiography considers
that, by this document, for the first time a Soviet official recognized explicitly that
the Romanian border was on the Dniestr, and considers it one of the greatest
achievements in Titulescu’s policy.130
The Soviet Government recognizes that by virtue of the these different ob-
ligations for assistance, the Soviet troops may never cross the Dniestr without a
formal request from the Romanian Royal Government and, at the same time,
the Romanian Government recognizes that Romanian troops may never cross
the Dniestr against the USSR without a formal request from the Soviet Gov-
ernment.
At the request of the Romanian Royal Government, Soviet troops would be
obliged to retreat immediately from the Romanian territory East of the Dniestr,
the same as, at the request of the Soviet Government, Romanian troops would
have to retreat immediately from the Russian territory West of the Dniestr. 131
Still, can we consider that the agreement provided for a Soviet guarantee to
Romania against any aggressor and settled the question of Soviet military presence
on Romanian territory in a manner compatible with Romania’s sovereignty? On the
one hand, the biggest threat to Romania was posed by the Soviet Union. Although
some scholars consider it “a great diplomatic victory for Romania”,132 it should be
clear that, in order to obtain satisfaction on these points, Titulescu again dropped
the demand for explicit Russian recognition of Bessarabia. On the other hand, the
Soviets kept to their course of signing nothing that might be interpreted as recogni-
tion of Bessarabia’s belonging to Romania. Words like border, frontier, integrity,
sovereignty are not to be found in the Draft. Litvinov simply decided to use the word
Dniestr, as suggested by Krestinsky after the re-establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions, with reference to the East and West banks of the Dniestr. He clearly did so in
order to avoid allowing the Romanians to claim that they had secured the Soviet rec-
ognition of Bessarabia’s union.
< 136 >

After signing the draft, Litvinov asked for the necessary time to get the ap-
proval of his superiors for the Pact, and the two agreed that the actual Pact should
be signed in September. When everything seemed to be on the right track, a sudden
modification in Romanian internal policy changed the situation: Titulescu was dis-
missed as foreign minister on August 29 and replaced by Victor Antonescu.133 It
seems that those who orchestrated his dismissal had no idea, at the time, of the exis-
tence of the aforementioned Draft and it would be interesting to speculate what
their position would have been, had they known about the Montreaux agreement.
As soon as Litvinov learned of Titulescu’s dismissal, he considered the MAT to be a
lost cause and canceled any new discussions, not only on the specific Draft but also
on the general idea of a Soviet-Romanian MAT. It may be that he thought he’d gone
too far in the Montreaux Draft and so took advantage of Titulescu’s dismissal in or-
der to save face in Moscow. It might also be that he considered Victor Antonescu’s
replacement of Titulescu as Foreign Minister (a replacement decided in Titulescu’s
absence) as the beginning of a new Romanian foreign policy (or as the end of the
new Romanian policy of promoting closer relations with the Soviets).134
After Titulescu’s replacement as foreign minister, the Romanians tried, or so
they claimed, to continue Titulescu’s orientation towards closer relations with the
Soviets, but without success.135 In practical terms, Romanian foreign policy took a
new direction: that of neutrality. Victor Antonescu tried to revive the old project of a
non-aggression pact between the two countries but the Soviets refused. Less than
one year after the Montreaux convention, the Russian representatives reopened the
discussion of the Bessarabian problem. During the Paris International Exposition,
inside the Soviet pavilion two big maps were presented on which Bessarabia was
shown not as a part of Romania but as separate territory. At the same time, Litvinov
publicly stated in July 1937 that:
We have to defend ourselves against the agreements Titulescu made us sign.

We want Bessarabia’s potential to become Russian, not German. I would also
like to let you know that we will try to retrieve Bessarabia by using every ju-
ridical and military means possible.136
The Soviet press broke its silence on Bessarabia, referring again to the exis-
tence of a territorial conflict. Significantly, the first border incidents in a long period
were again occurring along the Dniestr. It was definitely the end of Titulescu and
Litvinov’s gentlemen’s agreement. Still, in the following years the Soviets refrained
from putting out too much propaganda on the Bessarabian question, waiting to see
how the European events developed. The Romanians were, if not satisfied, at least
resigned to the situation along Bessarabia’s border and hoped that the situation
would remain fundamentally unchanged. They were mistaken.
Relations continued to oscillate during 1938. The main impetus for worsening
relations, apart from the Bessarabian question, was the anti-communist propaganda
of the Romanian Iron Guard, which was none too welcome to the Soviets. Another
< 137 >

event that had negative consequences was the Butenko affair, when the Soviet repre-
sentative in Bucharest defected and the Soviet government blamed the Romanian
authorities. However, due to the issue of Soviet aid to Czechoslovakia against Ger-
many, negotiations between Romania and the Soviet Union did take place and the
chances of reaching an agreement on the Bessarabian issue appeared to have im-
proved. France and Czechoslovakia pressed both parties to come to an agreement.137
On the other hand, they were both keen to avoid openly acting against Germany.
Romania’s position was even more complicated due to her alliance with Poland,
which was clearly opposed to any Romanian-Soviet rapprochement. The Poles en-
deavored to exact a promise from King Carol that he would never permit a Russian
crossing, even if Czechoslovakia might be vitally endangered.138 Meanwhile, an
agreement had practically been achieved to allow the crossing through Romanian
aerial space, during spring and summer 1938, of a number of Soviet military airplanes
that had been bought by the Czechs (it is unclear how many such airplanes there
were, in total; estimates range from 50 to 300).
A critical episode in Soviet-Romanian relations occurred in September 1938, on
the eve of the Munich Conference. Czechoslovakia was one of Romania’s allies and
the Romanian government tried to help her resist the German claims to a part of its
territory (the Sudeten region). As the Little Entente was not directed against Ger-
many, Romania was not committed to militarily helping Czechoslovakia in case of a
German attack but could offer protection in the event of a Hungarian attack (which
seemed probable), and that allowed the Czechs to concentrate their efforts on one
front. Romania also sought to ascertain the Yugoslav position regarding any poten-
tial aggression against Czechoslovakia (a position that was clearly more reserved,
due to the “real politik” promoted by the Yugoslav leaders), hoping not to find herself
alone against Germany.139 Still, at that time what seemed to be the biggest help Ro-
mania could offer Czechoslovakia was to allow the transit of Soviet troops through
its territory.
Granting passage to the Red Army posed a great threat to Bessarabia; it un-
doubtedly would have made Romania a target of the German air force and would
have incurred the risk of her involvement in the war much sooner than would hap-
pen otherwise.140 And, even worse, in case of a German victory on the Czechoslovak
front, Romania would have become a war theater as the Red Army retreated through
Romania with the Germans in close pursuit. Although all previous negotiations be-
tween the Soviets and Romania on this topic had failed due to the conflict over Bes-
sarabia, in the summer of 1938 the Romanian position changed considerably.
By the end of August, Litvinov had information regarding a possible change in
the Romanian attitude towards the transit of Soviet troops through her territory.
During a meeting between Litvinov and von Schulenburg, on August 27, the former
said, “Poland and Romania are unlikely to grant transit rights to Soviet troops”, but
Litvinov replied that Romania was “very greatly worried about the future, as she was
afraid of being next on the list”.141 In fact, Litvinov was not mistaken; during the Lit-
tle Entente Foreign Ministers Conference at Bled on August 22 the Romanian
< 138 >

Petrescu-Comnen told his Czech counterpart, Kamil Krofta, that he had decided to
inform Litvinov that Romania would not interfere with Soviet aircraft flying high
over her territory into Czechoslovakia.142 This was already a clear concession from
Romania, as the ramifications of Soviet military transit through Romanian air space
were many (supposing a Soviet airplane hit by the Germans landed on Romanian
territory; or supposing a dozen Soviet planes landed in Bessarabia, citing technical
failures).
In early September the Romanian government offered, during the talks in Ge-
neva between Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen and Litvinov, free passage for Soviet mili-
tary planes going to support the Czechoslovak army in case of a German attack.143
However, Litvinov insisted that he needed official Romanian consent for the transit
of Soviet troops, too. Also, in order to hamper the Czech and French efforts to soften
the Romanian position regarding the transit issue, Litvinov stated that Russia would
come in only after France did so, and that she would then request the League of Na-
tions Council to “recommend” Romania allow the passage of Russian planes and
troops.144
According to one source, it seems that, when the situation deteriorated for the
Czechs, Romania took the final step, agreeing on September 24 to the transit of So-
viet troops both via the Romanian railway system and its air space, and even more,
explicitly renouncing all conditions and Soviet guarantees.145 The Romanian pro-
posal confirms Louis Fischer’s statement that, “clearly neither Poland nor Romania
would make an ‘anticipatory’ engagement, but Romania might have consented at the
moment of the crisis by closing her eyes without an ‘engagement’”.146 However, dur-
ing September 1938, Moscow made no effort to open serious negotiations with Ro-
mania regarding troop transit, thus proving her disinterest in Czechoslovakia’s fate
and ignoring as well an opportunity of finding a diplomatic solution for the Bessara-
bian question.147
The main question is, why was Romania willing to allow transit for Soviet
planes and possibly troops? There was, of course, French and Czechoslovak pressure
on the Romanian government to do so, but this pressure had been in place for several
years, with no results. Besides, there was German and Polish pressure against such a
move. More probably, the Romanian leaders understood the danger of having
Czechoslovakia divided by the Germans and considered that, if this were permitted,
Romania would become next on the list, sooner or later. One more possibility, at
least theoretically, is that the Romanian leaders were simply bluffing in order to
please their allies, knowing that the Soviets were unwilling to go to war with Ger-
many on Czechoslovakia’s behalf. However, if we consider the Soviet propaganda
machine and the previous threats that the Soviet Army would cross through Roma-
nia with or without her agreement, seems unlikely that the Romanian leaders were
bluffing. Still, there were no reports of massive troop concentrations at the Soviet
western borders and Romanian anti-aerial artillery was scarce (if not non-existent),
so that that they could not effectively stop Soviet planes from crossing Romanian
territory in any event. Whatever the reasons behind the Romanian move and the
< 139 >

secrecy that surrounded it, one fact is clear: whatever the risks, the Romanian gov-
ernment was willing and ready to help their Czechoslovak ally in its conflict with
Germany.148
In 1939 Viaceslav Molotov, the new chief of the Commissariat for Foreign Af-
fairs, reaffirmed publicly the Russians’ claims over Bessarabia but this time he also
took decisive action. The famous Ribbentrop-Molotov Non-Aggression Pact of Au-
gust 23, 1939 was a great success for the Soviets and it meant the first firm step to-
ward retrieving Bessarabia.149 The additional Secret Protocol clearly stated the Soviet
“interest” in Bessarabia, meaning that when the Soviets moved to occupy it the Ger-
mans would do nothing to stop them.150 As an immediate result of the Pact, Romania
found herself in almost complete isolation, and what allies she had were in no posi-
tion to help her against a Soviet attack. In only a few days time, Romania’s position
became even worse, as Poland was attacked by Germany. The ensuing division of
Poland between Germany and the Soviets clearly indicated the future of Romania,
which was considered the next victim on the list. As the war went on, it became
more and more clear that Romania’s hopes for Western intervention in case of a So-
viet attack on Bessarabia were vain. The only Western power still fighting, Great
Britain, was more interested in provoking a war between Germany and the Soviets
over Romania than in defending Romania’s integrity, and so they tried to boost and
to bolster the Soviet territorial claims over Romanian land.
The Romanian government tried two approaches to counter-balance the Soviet
move. The first was to initiate closer relations with Germany, which they finally re-
alized was the only European power with the motivation and the ability to defend
Romanian interests at that time.151 However, because of the existing good relations
with France and Britain, the notion of a rapprochement with Germany was still con-
sidered with some restraint by many in the Foreign Ministry and by King Carol II;
therefore, there could be only a gradual rapprochement, built on a number of eco-
nomic, geopolitical and strategic factors.152 The second approach was to continue the
earlier policy of achieving a position of neutrality between the Great Powers, with
the risk of having no back-up in case of a possible Soviet attack.
In the aftermath of the French defeat, the Soviets took decisive action regard-
ing the Baltic States and Romania. The Soviets, after a series of negotiations with the
Germans regarding their territorial claims over Romania (which included not only
Bessarabia but also the entire Bukovina), received Germany’s blessing (with the no-
table exception of southern Bukovina, the Germans considering that only its north-
ern parts should go to the Soviets).
On June 26, 1940, Molotov handed over to Gheorghe Davidescu, the Romanian
minister to Moscow, an ultimatum demanding the evacuation of Bessarabia and
northern Bukovina. After two Crown Councils, in which all of Romania’s possible
alternatives were analyzed, the Romanians decided to accept the Soviet conditions
and to withdraw their army and administration from Bessarabia and northern
Bukovina, beginning on June 29. This was a profoundly painful experience for Roma-
< 140 >

nia, and the Red Army did everything possible to hinder the Romanian retreat in
order to capture as much matériel and as many people as possible.153 They also occu-
pied the Herta region (about 200 sq. miles, and a population of about 50,000 people
in 1940),154 which belonged to Romania long before 1918.
This seemed to close the Bessarabian question. Some scholars argue that, in
fact, the Soviets asked for more than Bessarabia in order to force a Romanian-Soviet
war that the Soviets could not lose, and at the end of which they could have won
control not only over Bessarabia and Bukovina but also over the Danube Delta and
probably gained a common border with Bulgaria too.155
Over the years many Romanians have asked themselves how it was possible for
Romania to give up Bessarabia, and a few weeks later, northwestern Transylvania
and southern Dobrudja, without a single gunshot.156 Many of them blame the former
playboy King Carol II (and the Royal camarilla, or private cabinet) for this situation.
And not without reason, as he did destroy the entire Romanian political system by
subordinating and later outlawing the political parties. Still, it was not only the
King’s fault. Although it was clear to everyone in the political establishment that
Carol lacked the skills and inclinations necessary to promote Romania’s interests
(although he seemed resourceful enough at promoting his own), it was the political
infighting that had allowed him to come back from exile and then promoted him to
the top rank in the country’s political and economic life. Thus, the political parties
and especially their leaders, with very few exceptions after the mid 1930’s,157 also
played a part in bringing Romania to disaster; instead of fighting for the well-being
of the country they focused on currying favor with the King and closed their eyes to
the illicit deals being made by the royal camarilla, deals that left the Romanian Army
in a deplorable state in 1940.158
In 1941 Romania declared war against the Soviet Union, in order to retrieve the
territories lost in June 1940 and to avenge the excessive harshness of Bessarabia’s
evacuation. (Even Hungary’s takeover of northwestern Transylvania and Bulgaria’s
of southern Dobrudja, painful as they were for the Romanians, were clearly less bar-
barous in execution.) The Romanians were shocked to find that their country’s
“powerful” or “stable” international position had been nothing but empty words
from the political leadership, and the Soviets amplified the Romanians’ bitterness.
They charged in, in advance of the agreed plan of deployment, and took or destroyed
everything they could. And, although not many scholars stress this point, the hu-
miliation and wish for revenge they inspired (along with military and political rea-
sons) fueled the Romanians’ drive forward in 1941, prompting them to cross the Dni-
estr after liberating Bessarabia and northern Bukovina.
Thus in 1941, after the Germans attacked the Soviet Union, Romania recovered
the territories lost in June 1940; then, in 1944, she lost them again, but this time for a
much longer period.
In conclusion it should be said that, although most Romanian historians con-
sider that it would have been possible to obtain Russian recognition of the Union in
1920-1921 in exchange for neutrality and recognition of the communist government,
< 141 >

or in exchange for a Treaty of Neutrality and the renunciation of Romanian financial

claims on the National Treasury in Moscow, this was never the case.159 The Soviets
had no intention, at any point, of relinquishing Bessarabia. All their suggestions of a
compromise during the early 1920s were simply efforts to stall for time, and they
succeeded. While the Soviets gradually consolidated their international position, the
Romanians were unable to keep the pace with them and failed to make the necessary
adjustments to their policy towards the Soviets. However, in fairness to the Roma-
nian government it should be said that, in fact, keeping pace with the Soviet Union
proved difficult even for the US some years later.
The Bessarabian Treaty, the only international document recognizing Roma-
nia’s rights over Bessarabia, offers one of the best illustrations of Romanian policy
towards the Soviets. It was a real diplomatic coup when it was signed, but Soviet
diplomatic successes prevented the Treaty from coming into force, so that the Roma-
nians were unable to use it. While the Romanian representatives had a great advan-
tage over the Soviets in 1919, some twenty years later the situation had changed com-
pletely. The only attempt to improve bilateral relations came from Titulescu, but it
was already too late to make a difference.
Even if Romania had signed a special Treaty with the Soviets for the recogni-
tion of the Bessarabian Union, or had accepted and won a plebiscite, for how long
would that have been respected? Stalin proved many times that there was no treaty
he could not break, and a treaty with Romania would not have been any different. As
for the plebiscite question, and the possibility of Romania voluntarily accepting a
partition of Bessarabia, this author’s opinion is that the Soviets almost certainly
would have contested the results of such a plebiscite in Bessarabia and would have
considered the division to be only temporary, taking advantage of the first opportu-
nity to retrieve all of Bessarabia plus a part of Bukovina.
The White Russians and the Bessarabian Question
One aspect that has been dealt with only tangentially, both in Romanian and
Soviet historiography, is the impact of the White Russians on the Bessarabian ques-
tion.160 During the period immediately following the union of Bessarabia and espe-
cially during the Paris Peace Conference, there was an intense lobbying and propa-
ganda campaign regarding Bessarabia waged by the White Russians. From their
viewpoint, Bessarabia was Russian territory and they almost completely agreed with
Moscow’s thesis. The White Russians had a number of other factors working
against them: at certain times, they needed Romania’s help in fighting the commu-
nists (and so they had to make concessions regarding Bessarabia); Bolshevik propa-
ganda underscored their non-representative status at Paris; and the great rivalry
within their own ranks.
For a better understanding of the activity of White Russians regarding Bes-
sarabia a distinction should be made between those originating from Bessarabia it-
self (for which the term “Bessarabian White Russians” will be used) and the others.
< 142 >

The former were, of course, the more active, especially at the propaganda level, hav-
ing clearly greater interests in Bessarabia and therefore more reason to be unhappy
with the Romanian administration. It should also be specified that the Bessarabian
White Russians and their comrades (those fighting the communists) was made up
not only of Russians but also of Ukrainians, Jews and, during 1918, even Romanians.
As for their social status, they were almost identical with those of the White Rus-
sians based in the other provinces of the former Russian Empire.
As already mentioned, after the Union and especially after the two very impor-
tant reforms that followed (the administrative and the land reform), the Russian
aristocracy and intellectuals living in Bessarabia had been hit hard and were left
with very few options: they could go back to Russia (and some of the intellectuals
actually did that); or accept the Romanian administration while retaining some of
their privileges and land properties; or fight together with the other White Russians
against the communist regime; or fight against the Romanian administration in Bes-
sarabia. While the majority chose to stay and tried to build a life under the Roma-
nian administration, accepting it at least theoretically, a number of them decided to
contest the Romanian administration in Bessarabia. At first they used the same argu-
ments as the Soviets but, at some point, understanding the international climate and
the special attention given to minorities, they switched to the rights of the Russian
minority living in Bessarabia, basing their action on the provisions inserted in the
Bessarabian Treaty.
As long as there was still some hope of defeating the communists, the White
Russians’ efforts to retrieve Bessarabia were both powerful and numerous. As soon
as it became clear that the Soviet regime could not be defeated, their actions (and
their international standing) decreased.
As soon as the Romanian troops entered Bessarabia in January 1918 and the
idea of a union with Romania began to gain ground, the Bessarabian White Rus-
sians’ actions against the Romanian administration began. In order to counter-
balance the Romanian intervention, many of them decided at first to collaborate ei-
ther with the communists or with the White Armies fighting against the commu-
nists. As time passed and it became clear that the Romanians were intent on install-
ing their administration in Bessarabia, the Bessarabian White Russians shifted their
action from the local to the international level. Their first complaints were directed
to General Scerbacev, the commander of the Russian troops on the Romanian front.
He was asked to represent their interests with the Romanian government, and to the
Allied representatives in Jassy, but without much success.161 Next, they acted in the
leading European capitals, organizing in March 1918 in Geneva a society for propa-
ganda against the Romanian annexation of Bessarabia. The founders of the Society
were M. Gassenko and Ukrainian Baron Tichkevitch, both considered by French
diplomats to be agents paid by Austria. They claimed the Society had about 100
members, all Ukrainians, and asked for an Austrian occupation of Bessarabia.162
The biggest move made by the Bessarabian White Russians in Romania took
place on November 28, 1918, after the Sfatul Tserii voted for an unconditioned union
< 143 >

with Romania. First came a Declaration of 10 deputies, limited to criticizing the

manner of voting.163 Next, 40 deputies in the Sfatul Tserii, under the leadership of
Vladimir Tsiganko, Ion Pascaluta and Nicolae Alexandru, sent a memorandum to the
Romanian government contesting the legality of the vote expressed by the Sfatul
Tserii and demanding the complete restoration of Bessarabia’s autonomy in ten days’
time.164 Their action, however justified it may have been, found no echo within the
Romanian government — which decided that the November 27 decision for uncon-
ditioned union was legal. This response by the Romanian government meant the end
of the very short-lived attempt to influence the fate of Bessarabia from within the
Romanian political establishment.
The opposition of the Bessarabian deputies, among whom were some Romani-
ans, to the unconditioned union is normal and understandable. The Romanians in
Transylvania felt the same way and held onto their autonomy for a period of time,
understanding that union with Romania was one way in which they could preserve
their values and choose the most suitable approach toward the process of legislative
and institutional unification.165 But the government defeated them, albeit more
gradually that was the case in Bessarabia. The main impetus driving the Bucharest
government in this action was its fear (still relevant) that any form of autonomy for
Transylvania or Bessarabia would harm the process of integrating the new provinces
into Greater Romania and undermine the unity of the state.
At the same time, those who were unhappy with the new Romanian admini-
stration in Bessarabia took refuge on Russian territory and organized themselves
into a Committee for the Salvation of Bessarabia (CSB), with its headquarters in
Odessa and under the leadership of Kroupenski, Schmidt, and Ion Pascaluta. Among
the members of the CSB, one was accorded the status of Governor of Bessarabia and
figured on the salary list for General Denikin’s staff.166 While maintaining close con-
tacts with the deputies in the Sfatul Tserii who were unhappy with the workings of
the Romanian administration, they also kept close relations with General Denikin’s
army. They even organized a volunteer-based military CSB, financed by the land-
owners expropriated in Bessarabia, with the purpose of attacking Tyraspol.167 Due to
the military operations in southern Russia, the CSB was short-lived and its leaders
moved to Paris, hoping to better support their cause there. As soon as the military
situation changed in favor of the White Army, during 1919, the CSB surfaced again in
Odessa.
The Bessarabian White Russians suffered from the same weakness as the rest
of the White Russians’ movement: no unity in action. They were divided into pro-
tsarist and irredentist camps, some of them helping Petliura while others sided with
Denikin, and so on. They were also divided over what should be the fate of Bessara-
bia, some of them wishing a return to the prewar situation while others wanted an
autonomous Bessarabia within Russia.
The Bessarabian Russians’ best-known action took place during the Paris
Peace Conference and its main protagonists were Alexander N. Kroupenski, former
marshal of the Bessarabian aristocracy,168 Alexander C. Schmidt, former mayor of
< 144 >

Chisinau, and Vladimir Tsiganko, former deputy in the Sfatul Tserii. During the Con-
ference, the Bessarabian White Russians and other White Russians (led by person-
alities like Maklakov, Sazonov, Ceaikovski, Count Lvov) who claimed to represent
the interests of Russia, acted together in reference to the Bessarabian question.
While the former were mainly in charge of anti-Romanian propaganda, writing a
number of articles, pamphlets and memoranda designed to sway public opinion, the
latter acted more in the direction of lobbying the representatives of the Great Pow-
ers taking part in the Conference.
At the same time, the Bessarabian White Russians kept pressuring the French
and British representatives in Odessa, constantly complaining about the Romanian
treatment of Bessarabians. The two representatives became the target for a number
of petitions, memoranda and complaints by all those unsatisfied with the Romanian
administration in Bessarabia: landowners, postal workers, officials in the admini-
stration. Their accusations went as far as to state that their experience during the
past months had done more for the Russification of Bessarabia than all the Russian
government’s efforts over the years.169 And indeed, their activity proved quite suc-
cessful in influencing the British representatives in Odessa, who were quick to blame
the Romanian administration for the difficult situation in Bessarabia.170 The Roma-
nian government needed the support of Frank Rattigan, the British Minister to Bu-
charest, to offset at least a part of this negative image.171
The White Russians succeeded in directing the attention of the Great Powers
to the Bessarabian question, but only during 1919, by stressing that the decision by
the Sfatul Tserii to unite with Romania had been non-representative. Further argu-
ments they used to shore up their thesis were the points that Bessarabia was Rus-
sian territory liberated from the Turks in 1812, when Romania did not exist as a state
(an argument making them unpopular with the Italians, who were claiming some
former Italian territories from Austria-Hungary, and whose claims could have been
rejected based on a similar argument); that Bessarabia became Russian territory ac-
cording to an internationally recognized Treaty between the Sultan and the Czar;
that the Romanians made up less than 50% of Bessarabia’s population; that the vote
for unconditioned union on November 27 was dubious in nature; that Romania’s
military occupation of Bessarabia was the only thing that made Bessarabia a part of
Romania; and that under Romanian rule, the Russian minority were oppressed.
As early as mid-January 1919, Sazonov, former Russian Foreign Minister, sent a
first memorandum to the French government announcing an anti-Romanian insur-
rection;172 this was followed by another one on February 2, 1919, in which he clearly
rejected the possibility of Romania taking part in the fight against the Bolsheviks in
exchange for Bessarabia.173 The representatives of the so-called Russian Conference
sent a new memorandum on Bessarabia to the Peace Conference on March 22, insist-
ing on historical and demographic arguments, while asking for the unlimited post-
ponement of a final decision regarding the fate of Bessarabia and defining as
“necessary” the consultation of the people living in that region before any decision
would be taken.174 Their position had been greatly improved by the successful begin-
< 145 >

nings of the Kolchak offensive in April 1919, which brought about a change in the
Great Powers’ attitude towards Bessarabia. Both France and the US became less
willing to settle Bessarabia’s fate definitively. In fact, the French position moved
from argumentation on ethnical and historical grounds to de facto negotiations with
the White Russians, making Bessarabia a counter-partite of the Western aid for
them.175
Even so, the decision by the Council of Four on May 27, 1919, to add a point to
the dispatch sent to Admiral Kolchak (considered to be the authorized representa-
tive of the Russian people) was none too welcome: “Sixthly, the right of the Peace
Conference to determine the future of the Romanian part of Bessarabia shall be rec-
ognized.”176 Still, this decision might be seen as both a win and a defeat for the Rus-
sians: a win because it referred to “the Romanian part of Bessarabia” instead of Bes-
sarabia, which seems to suggest agreement with the Russian theory that Bessarabia
was not entirely Romanian and that only a number of districts had a Romanian ma-
jority,177 and also because the fate of Bessarabia was to be decided by the Conference
and not by Romania, which would have offered little chance of overturning the un-
ion. But at the same time it was a defeat, because the fate of Bessarabia was to be
decided by the Peace Conference and not by its former holder, Russia.
The next and the most important action taken by the White Russians regard-
ing Bessarabia came on July 2, 1919, when one of their representatives (Maklakov)
was given the opportunity to officially present to the Council of Five (the highest
authority at the Conference) their view on Bessarabia.178 The biggest concession he
was willing to make in order to resolve the Bessarabian question was a plebiscite in
the districts in which the Moldavian population was predominant; these were iden-
tified in a later memorandum (July 24, 1919) as the four districts in the center of Bes-
sarabia. As for the rest of the territory, he considered that it should belong to Russia.
This compromise project was designed to satisfy the Western Allies, especially
France, in order to continue benefiting from their assistance. Later, the Soviets
would also use the idea of a plebiscite but they attached a slightly different meaning
to it.
Understanding that the US representatives were on their side and against the
Romanians, the White Russians tried to take full advantage of the situation by tar-
geting the American delegation (the only one willing to take action against the Ro-
manian administration in Bessarabia) with an increased number of written and ver-
bal protests. As an immediate result of one such protest, made by Kroupenski and
Schmidt, the US Commissioners debated the problem of the upcoming election in
Bessarabia for members to the Romanian Parliament; it was regarded as an act of
sovereignty over a territory that did not belong yet, at least officially, to Romania.179
Likewise the Hungarians living in Transylvania, while preferring to abstain from
voting altogether, tried to use the elections in the same sense. In fact, the problem of
holding Romanian Parliamentary elections in Bessarabia was used as a propaganda
tool not only in Paris but also in London, although with little success. As a result of
this propaganda, an interpellation took place in the House of Commons on August 5,
< 146 >

1919, by Sir Samuel Hoare, who observed that the British position of allowing the
elections to take place actually meant that Romanian elections would take place in a
country that was not yet ceded to Romania. The same Sir Hoare spoke out on No-
vember 27, 1919, but his initiative failed again to bear fruit.180
On July 24, 1919, the Russian delegation sent a new Note to the Peace Confer-
ence. After protesting once more against the actions of the Romanian government in
Bessarabia, they proposed a compromise solution: that a plebiscite should be held in
Bessarabia, but only in the four districts in which the Moldavian population made
up the majority (the other parts clearly belonging to Russia). In order for the plebi-
scite to be held, a special Commission should be organized which should install a
provisory regime in Bessarabia and which should oversee the execution of the plebi-
scite in the four districts.181
The greatest enemy of the White Russians’ diplomatic campaign was the de-
feat of their troops by the Bolsheviks. As soon as the Great Powers, and especially
France and Great Britain, understood that the White Russians’ fight against the Bol-
sheviks was a lost cause, they shifted again towards Romania. In July 1919, as a result
of the White Russians’ military defeat, France switched back to a more pro-
Romanian position, avoiding any opposition to the projected Romanian elections in
Bessarabia.182
However, it was not until the end of 1919, when their military situation wors-
ened considerably, that some of the White Russians expressed a willingness to cede
Bessarabia to Romania (albeit not for free). On September 29, 1919, through British
intermediaries, Denikin transmitted to Bratianu that he was ready to accept the de-
cision on Bessarabia taken by the Conference but that, in exchange, he required the
Romanians’ help, as they had helped Petliura. Bratianu expressed his willingness to
provide that help, but conditioned it on a formal agreement to that effect.183 How-
ever, due to the Red Army’s offensive, as well as the reticence of certain White Rus-
sian leaders (like General Wrangel) towards any deal that would exchange Bessara-
bia for Romanian military help, together with the Romanians’ unwillingness to in-
volve themselves directly in the Russian Civil War, it was impossible to reach a for-
mal agreement.
The Russians continued to send notes to the Peace Conference, directed
mostly to the American delegation, insisting on the danger posed by the upcoming
elections in Romania. As has been noted, their activity was not in vain. The Ameri-
can delegation appeared to take at face value every word in the Russian notes and
they brought the matter before the Peace Conference on October 10 and 11. (As an
illustration of the White Russian actions, one of the Notes they sent at the end of
August 1919 is presented at the end of this chapter as Annex No. 1.) It should be
mentioned that during 1919 the Russian delegation, together with the Bessarabian
Russians, sent some ten such notes or memoranda to the Peace Conference (the last
one on November 15) and were more or less successful in their efforts as long as the
American delegation was in Paris. Once the Americans left, the Bessarabian question
found a quick solution and the White Russian machinations in favor of a Russian
< 147 >

Bessarabia came to a clear failure. Of course, the events in Russia and the defeat of
the White Armies also greatly diminished the White Russians’ influence in Paris.
The most active party regarding the Bessarabian question during and after the
Peace Conference had been the Bessarabian White Russians. Not only did they pub-
lish a number of articles and pamphlets on the topic but they also took on the diffi-
cult task of addressing the Conference when the other representative of the White
Russians abandoned the Bessarabian cause. For example, only days after the signing
of the Bessarabian Treaty, they sent a comprehensive Memorandum to the Japanese
representatives at the Conference, entitled “Bessarabia; some thoughts on the occa-
sion of its attribution to Romania”. The memorandum presented all the known argu-
ments, and made much of the notion that Bessarabia had been given to Romania as
recompense for Prime Minister Vaida-Voevod’s docility in heeding the Conference’s
demands (in contrast to Bratianu), and asked for a plebiscite.184
Among the papers they printed, the best known are “Summary of Events in
Bessarabia 1917-1918” and “Bessarabia and Romania”, both written by Kroupenski
and Schmidt.185 Their main aim was to bring the Bessarabian question before the
court of international public opinion in order to contest Romania’s rights. They did
succeed in part, by laying down the foundation for future (more organized) propa-
ganda activities orchestrated from Moscow. They also maintained close ties with the
White Russians fighting in southern Russia, especially with General Denikin,
through the same CSB that was still active in Odessa.
During the military campaigns of 1919 and 1920, both Great Britain and France
tried to persuade the Romanian government to intervene militarily against the Sovi-
ets. The Romanians refused, since Romania already controlled Bessarabia and had no
other territorial claims in Russia; that disappointed the French, in particular. The
White Russians’ attitude towards Romania, considering it more as an enemy than a
potential ally, was one factor that influenced the latter to avoid any military inter-
vention. The Romanians understood clearly that, in the event of the White Russians’
victory, they would still have to fight for Bessarabia.
It was only as a result of French influence that the retreating White Russians
found refuge in Romania against the Red Army at the end of 1919. The Romanians
were not at all happy to have them on Romanian soil, and especially in Bessarabia.
The Russian military refugees were disarmed and interned in special camps near the
towns of Brasov and Oradea, some 300 miles from Bessarabia’s border, in order to
keep them away from the fighting. It was more difficult for the Romanian govern-
ment to deal with those White Russians who found refuge within Bessarabian terri-
tory. Not only were the Romanians subjected to the provocations of the Red Army
during 1919-1921, but they also had to avoid any attempt by the White Russians liv-
ing in Bessarabia to organize internal riots against the new administration. This task
proved so difficult that, at one point, the Romanian Minister of War, charged with
the internal security of Bessarabia, proposed that all foreigners be expelled — as
there was no practical way to organize new camps for the refugees (approximately
16,000 people).186 The request was rejected, since there was also no way to send the
< 148 >

refugees back to the east side of the Dniestr; and many of them either continued to
live in Bessarabia or left to seek refuge in other countries (mainly in Yugoslavia).
At the end of 1920, even after the Peace Conference took the final decision re-
garding the Bessarabian question and the White Russians were clearly defeated on
the battlefront, the Bessarabian White Russians decided to carry on their actions in
favor of a Russian Bessarabia. They organized secret societies and groups all across
Europe and tried to keep the Bessarabian matter at the forefront of the public dis-
course and with the League of Nations. Still, as time passed, their material resources
evaporated and their action weakened more and more.
The most important and successful action they were able to organize, apart
from publishing articles and books on Bessarabia, was to bring the Bessarabian mat-
ter into the debates at the League of Nations (late 1921). What is interesting is that,
unlike the Soviets, the Bessarabian White Russians centered their propaganda ef-
forts on the Romanian authorities’ treatment of the ethnic minorities in Bessarabia.
In other words, instead of contesting the possession of Bessarabia, they focused on a
more limited objective after 1920: that of improving the conditions of Russians living
in Bessarabia. Without deigning to recognize the validity of the Bessarabian Treaty,
they decided to take advantage of the stipulations in it. In fact, the idea of involving
the League of Nations in matters regarding the treatment of minorities in Eastern
Europe was picked up especially by the German (in the case of Poland) and Hungar-
ian (in the case of Romania) minorities,187 and its usage by the Bessarabian White
Russians was minor by comparison.
On September 25 and October 27, 1921, Kroupenski sent two memoranda to
the Secretary General of the League of Nations in Geneva. Calling himself president
of the Bessarabian delegation, Kroupenski tried to show that the Romanian govern-
ment was not respecting the stipulations of the Bessarabian and the Minorities Trea-
ties, and asked for the League’s intervention:
Romania actually takes advantage of all the stipulations included in the

Bessarabian Treaty, considering Bessarabia as Romanian territory, as results
from the vote of the Romanian Parliament in favor of Bessarabia’s annexation.
In these conditions it is clear that Romania is bound by all the stipulations in-
cluded in the Bessarabian treaty. By contrast, if Romania, taking advantage of
the non-ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty, considers that its stipulations
are not binding on her, all the humanitarian intentions of the Main Allied and
Associated Powers are reduced to nothing. . . .
Before the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty, the Bessarabian population
should have been consulted through plebiscite. . . .
As a result of the fact that there is no recognized and authorized represen-
tative of Russia in Romania, the interests of the Russians living in Bessarabia
cannot be protected, no one being authorized to intervene in favor of the Rus-
sian nationals. The Russian minority is deprived of any rights stipulated for her
in Art. No 3 of the Bessarabian Treaty. . . .
< 149 >

The language used in school is mainly Romanian and there is only one Rus-
sian secondary school. By the same token, only the Romanian language is used
in church, and only two Russian churches have been allowed to function in
Chisinau. . . .
Although the Russian nationals have the right to choose another citizen-
ship and to keep their real estate, in reality they are forced to accept Romanian
citizenship. The fact that the land reform was more radical in Bessarabia than
in the other Romanian provinces (the compensation to be paid to the expropri-
ated landowners is lower than in other provinces) is a means of discrimination
against the Russians and is contrary to the stipulations of Art. No 5. . . .
The League’s efforts should center on: the usage of Russian language in
schools and church; halting the sending of young men as military recruits until
they take their option for a citizenship; bringing an end to Romanian govern-
ment’s action directed at confiscating real estate properties belonging to the
Russian nationals and the return of those already expropriated.188
The two memoranda received a quick response from the League. Due to the
formulation of the memoranda (Kroupenski insisted that he was appealing to the
League only in order to find out if Romania had ratified the Bessarabian and the Mi-
norities Treaties, in other words more on juridical than humanitarian grounds), he
received an answer in a matter of days. Erik Colban answered the first memo on Oc-
tober 3, 1921, simply stating that the Bessarabian Treaty had not yet been ratified. As
a result, Kroupenski slightly changed the argumentation in his second memoran-
dum, focusing on the Minorities instead of the Bessarabian Treaty. On November 1,
1921, his second memorandum was answered, this time by Helmer Rosting, stating
that Romania had ratified the Minorities Treaty.
The action initiated by Kroupenski did have some consequences. On Novem-
ber 10, 1921, Helmer Rosting gave notice of the Russian action to the Romanian min-
ister at the League, stating that he had not yet submitted the matter to the members
of the League Council because he was waiting for the Romanians’ opinion regarding
the matter. And indeed, on December 5, 1921, the Romanian government answered
Rosting’s inquiry by sending a letter to Sir Eric Drummond, the Secretary General of
the League. The letter expresses the viewpoint of the Romanian government, focus-
ing on answers to Kroupenski’s accusations:
Even though the Romanian government has not yet ratified the Bessarabian
Treaty, it is scrupulously applying its provisions. . . .
Kroupenski represents nobody; he is self-appointed as the representative of
the Bessarabian people in Paris. . . .
Kroupenski refuses to recognize the validity of the March 1920 decision of
the Conference of Ambassadors and of the Bessarabian Treaty but he attempts
to make use of them. . . .
Not only the Russians but also all the other national minorities living in
< 150 >

Romania cannot be defended (protected) by the representatives of other states

accredited in Bucharest. . . .
The Bessarabian Treaty does not oblige the Romanian government to spon-
sor Russian-language schools, and the said government has nothing against
private schools. Still, at this time seven secondary schools for Russians and
Ukrainians are functioning (with grants from the government), plus a number
of secondary schools for Bulgarian, German, Armenian and Jewish students, as
well as a considerable number of such primary schools. . . .
As for the land reform, Romania could not treat representatives of an eth-
nic minority differently than Romanian subjects. [The land reform in Bessara-
bia was made by the Bessarabians and not by the Romanian government and
this is why it was more radical than in other parts of Romania] . . .
Why is Kroupenski complaining that the two Russian churches in Chisi-
nau are not enough, when everybody knows that the Jewish people make up
the majority of the city’s population? . . .189
The Secretary General of the League decided to address the matter and created
a committee of three with the purpose of analyzing the memoranda sent by Krou-
penski; the Chinese and Spanish representatives to the League’s Council, as well as
one of his secretaries, were appointed. After further studying the matter during
March 1922 the committee had been unanimous in deciding that there are no reasons
to send the case to the League’s Council.190
Kroupenski’s action could be considered the last initiative of the Bessarabian
White Russians that was not influenced by the Moscow government. Not only did
the communists contest the Bessarabian Treaty but they considered it an unaccept-
able foreign intervention into Russian matters; therefore they did not consider, at
any time, the possibility of using it the way Kroupenski did. The exploitation of the
Bessarabian Treaty in order to make propaganda in favor of an autonomous Bessara-
bia, together with the desire to improve the existing situation of the Russians living
in Bessarabia, were the main differences that set the White Russian propaganda
apart from that of the Soviets.
In the end Kroupenski’s actions felt short of achieving their purpose; the Bes-
sarabian White Russians kept on publishing articles and pamphlets and sending
memoranda to anyone they thought might help their cause, but with less and less
response.191 Even as the Soviets (more resourceful and better orchestrated) gradually
overshadowed their propaganda activities, they went on organizing Bessarabian so-
cieties in various European cities with the purpose of contesting Romanian author-
ity in Bessarabia. Those societies, generally speaking, did not have much impact, and
the only ones who paid them much heed were the representatives of the Romanian
government. For example, in order to respond to the actions of the so-called Union
of Bessarabian Emigrants, the Romanian government decided to organize a Bessara-
bian Club in Paris, on December 30, 1926.
The Bessarabian question continued to be a topic for all the White Russians
< 151 >

who found refuge in Europe or America. They insisted that Bessarabia was not Ro-
manian territory and that “once the Soviet regime [fell], the first duty of the new
Russia would be to modify the borders with Poland and to occupy Bessarabia, the
Russian province stolen by the Romanians”.192 Similar signals came from Prague,193
Berlin, Paris, Bucharest and Chisinau.
The trend of Bessarabian emigration went through a significant change during
1925, caused by the events related to the Tatar-Bunar uprising and the trial of those
who took part in it, and by a more decisive and better organized infiltration of the
White Russians by the communist machine (using money and political activists). A
number of societies were organized under names like the Czecho-Bessarabian or
Belgian-Bessarabian Friendship Society, made up mainly of Bessarabian students
who kept in close contact with the developing events at home. They acted mainly by
organizing congresses all over Europe, and at each one they demanded Bessarabia’s
autonomy, while keeping up a steady stream of publications complaining about Bes-
sarabia’s plight under Romanian administration.194 Their targets were the same as
those of the Soviet propaganda: left-wing politicians, especially in France (Paris was
where they were best organized), the intellectuals, and the workers. Such congresses
took place in Luxembourg (June 1927), Paris (December 6, 1928), and Seraing, in
Belgium (December 9, 1928).195
Although there had been countless misunderstandings between the White and
the Red Russians, they generally agreed on the Bessarabian question. The only differ-
ence comes in their attitude towards the Bessarabian Treaty, even as they both de-
nied its validity. While the Bessarabian White Russians used it, even while contest-
ing its legitimacy, the Soviets officially considered it a res inter alia treaty having no
value whatsoever, and unofficially they worked hard to prevent the Treaty from
coming into force.
Since they agreed that Bessarabia belonged to Russia, be it communist or czar-
ist, the gradual takeover of the Bessarabian White Russian emigré movement by the
Soviet propaganda machine should not come as a surprise. And there were a number
of other factors that gave Soviet propaganda the advantage: the Bessarabian White
Russians’ lack of material resources; the public’s gradual loss of interest in the White
Russians and the rapid waning of their influence — while the public interest in (and
sometimes admiration of) the new communist regime constantly grew; the sizable
Bessarabian emigration inside the Soviet Union, which was very easy for the commu-
nists to exploit for propagandistic purposes. The gradual takeover ensued without
much opposition from the Bessarabian White Russians. The Soviet activists under-
stood the importance and the influence of the emigré movement and successfully
subordinated it to their interests.196
The decision to establish the Moldavian Autonomous Republic on the left
bank of the Dniestr in 1924 might also be understood as an attempt to tighten the
control over Bessarabian emigration. Soon after this decision was made, a Society of
Bessarabian Refugees was organized in Moscow, with the aim of representing not
only the Bessarabians living in the Soviet Union but also the refugees living in other
< 152 >

foreign countries.197 According to Romanian sources, by 1927 they were able to infil-
trate the organizations of Bessarabians living overseas, taking on the coordinating
role in the actions initiated by the Bessarabian emigrés.198 As instruments of propa-
ganda they used two publications: Red Bessarabia (Moscow) and The Red Ploughman
(Odessa).
Concluding this attempt to bring to light one aspect of the Bessarabian ques-
tion, closely connected to the Bessarabian Treaty question, it must be stated that the
purpose of the present subchapter was not to treat this aspect in great detail but
simply to highlight its existence by presenting the main actions initiated by the Bes-
sarabian White Russians. A future study would be useful in giving a complete pres-
entation of their activity regarding Bessarabia.
ANNEX NO. 1
Memorandum of the Bessarabian Delegates, August 1919
FRUS, PPC, 1919, Vol. 8, p. 587-589
The delegates of Bessarabia for the President of the Peace Conference
In the official statement of the organ of the Romanian Government in Bessara-

bia, the Casa Noastra, published in the newspapers of Kishinev of August 10, 1919, the
Bessarabian landowners are informed that a time limit of one month has been fixed
to obtain their subjection to Romania, as well as to name Chargés d’Affaires to re-
place them to assist in the work of the Commission on the expropriation of their
lands.
The Bessarabian Delegation has already once before protested on this subject
before the Peace Conference on April 15, 1919. The Russian Political Conference ad-
dressed on April 20, 1919, a memorandum on this subject to the Peace Conference. At
the present moment we are forced to make another plea to the Peace Conference in
the hope of obtaining its support in the just cause which we are defending.
It is to be observed that the official statement, a translation of which is at-
tached, clearly indicates that those landowners who accept Romanian subjection
will be treated differently from those who refuse. The difference will evidently be in
favor of those who bow to the demands of the Romanian Government.
Speaking in the name of all our mandatories, we consider the exactions of the
Romanian Government as tending to force the landowners in Bessarabia to swear an
oath of allegiance to the King of Romania, an act profoundly unjust and outraging
their dignity of citizens of a country that does not form part of the Kingdom of Ro-
mania. It is also an outrage to international law as well as to the respect due to the
decisions of the Peace Conference that Romania has not been accorded the posses-
sion of this Russian province.
The regime established by the Romanian Government in Bessarabia is truly
intolerable for the population, and if the Peace Conference does not raise its voice
against the Romanian abuses of power in the name of justice and with the authority
< 153 >

that it alone possesses, bloody uprisings in the Bessarabian population will be inevi-
table.
In defiance of all justice and rights of peoples, the Romanian Government
forces all the population, under the penalty of heavy fines, to take part in the parlia-
mentary elections of Romania, that is to say of a country which, until today, was for-
eign to her.
Through you, Mr. President, we ask the Peace Conference to condemn the ille-
gal and unjust acts of the Romanian Government and to declare them as such before
the civilized world.
< 154 >

Notes
1
Mihail Sturdza, a former Romanian diplomat and member of the Iron Guard, in his memoirs Roma-
nia si sfarsitul Europei, makes a notable exception from this orientation, especially for the fourth dec-
ade. He blames Nicolae Titulescu and his followers for re-establishing diplomatic relations with the
Soviets; he considers that Titulescu had offered transit through Romanian territory to the Russian
Army and that his pro-Soviets and anti-German policy was very damaging to Romania. Although the
results for Romania of Titulescu’s policy, not to mention his personality, speak for themselves many
Romanian scholars are still quite far from criticizing him or his policies.
2
For details regarding the results of their research see Gheorghe Buzatu, Romanii in Arhivele Kremlinu-
lui, passim. However, the best presentation of documents existing in the former Soviet Archives and
referring to Romania has been published recently as a result of a collaboration project between the
Romanian and Russian Foreign Ministry Archives, in Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente 1917-1934. The
collaboration is supposed to continue so that, in the near future, two similar volumes of documents
are expected to be published, dealing with the 1935-1940 and 1941-1947 periods.
3
I experienced this closed-door policy myself when, during my attempts to study the Soviet docu-
ments on foreign policy, I was granted permission to study only those already published and kept in
the former Soviet Foreign Ministry’s Archives, and not the “confidential” (and more interesting)
ones, to which I could not gain access.
4
Dov B. Lungu, Romania and the Great Powers, 1933-1940, p. 53.
5
J. Degras, Soviet Documents . . ., Vol. 2, p. 378.
6
Jiri Hochman, The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, p. 62.
7
B. Jelavich, Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State, p. 62.
8
Michael Kettle argues, “Hill and Boyle somehow managed to take the Romanian gold reserve and
the Crown Jewels, which had been kept in the Kremlin since the fall of Bucharest, back to Romania”.
M. Kettle, The Road to Intervention: March-November 1918, p. 23. If this were so, then what sense would
there be in Karakhan’s proposed deal (Bessarabia for the National Treasury). In fact Kettle makes a
great mistake: what Colonel Boyle brought back to Romania by train was the paper money printed
in Moscow by the Romanian National Bank and not at all parts of the gold reserve or the Crown
Jewels; they have remained in the Kremlin.
9
This particular Romanian stand is arguable. The Russian Government was of the opposite opinion,
considering that, given the role played by Romania as the center of the counter-revolution in the
south, Russia was still at war with Romania. G Buzatu, Romanii in Arhivele Kremlinului, p. 107.
10
Charles King, along with a number of other scholars, asserts that it would have been both profit-
able and possible for Romania, in the early 1920s, to resolve the Bessarabian issue by reaching an
agreement with the Soviets, but it was because of Romania’s alliances with France and Poland (both
promoting an anti-Soviet policy) that Romania failed and was forced to normalize relations with the
Soviets at a less propitious juncture (in the mid 1930s). C King, The Moldovans, p. 40. In fact, things
were not that simple; even in the early 1920s the Soviets were not prepared, as this author will show
during the following pages, to give up Bessarabia and neither were the Romanians prepared to come
to a compromise regarding Bessarabia. However, the fact is that the theory regarding the possibility
of resolving the Soviet-Romanian dispute in the early 1920s came into being in the second half of the
1930s and was used in order to pass the blame for Romania’s difficult international situation onto
those who were unable to defend themselves.
11
Russia’s displeasure with Romania is presented in detail in R.H. Johnston, Tradition Versus Revolu-
tion . . ., p. 69-75. He argues, “Of all Russia’s allies it was Romania who bargained the hardest, was
promised the most, delivered the least and collapsed the quickest.”
12
Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question . . ., p.74.
13
On November 27, 1924, the Politburo of the Communist Party discussed a Memorandum prepared
by Frunse, in which it was argued that “the best solution to the present situation is to force a regu-
< 155 >

larization of the Bessarabian question by sending the Red Army into Bessarabia during May-August
1925”. Although the Memorandum was approved and the Politburo asked the Military General
Headquarters to prepare a plan accordingly, Frunse’s proposal was to be applied only 15 years later.
C. Iordan, Romania si relatiile internationale din sud estul European: modelul Locarno, p. 92.
14
A good discussion on Rakovsky’s opinion on Bessarabia, as expressed in his broadside on Bessara-
bia published in 1925, is presented in Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question . . ., p. 157-160.
15
In January 1919 the Bolshevik Ukraine launched a series of attacks along the Dniestr line, which
were stopped by the Romanian Army. For details regarding the military operations at the Bessara-
bian border during January-April 1919, see D. Preda, In apararea Romaniei Mari, p. 259-290.
16
For a glimpse of the struggle for influence between the different groups in charge of Soviet foreign
policy, and especially the Cicerin-Litvinov conflict, see G. Bessedovskii, The revelations . . ., passim.
17
J. Degras, Soviet Documents …, Vol. 1, p. 70.
18
J. Degras, Soviet Documents …, Vol. 1, p. 155-157.
19
Richard Ullman, Anglo-Soviet Relations, Vol. 1, p. 331.
20
V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica . . ., p. 86. Also M. Musat, I. Ardeleanu, Political Life in Romania, p.
36.
21
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 20 bis, The Geblescu Memorandum on Russo-Romanian Relations,
f. 37-38. During the second part of the 1930s Dan Geblescu was secretary of the Romanian Legation
in Belgrade.
22
Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente. 1917-1934, Telegram D.N. Ciotori to Vaida-Voevod, March 4, 1920,
p. 49. For the Romanian account of the negotiations see Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 43-51.
Also F.C. Nanu, Politica externa … , p. 113.
23
According to Giorgio Petracchi, the Polish attack on Ukraine in April 1920 only interrupted the
Soviets’ March preparations for an all-out offensive in the direction of Berlin. Giorgio Petracchi, “La
Russie Sovietique et L’Europe Occidentale” in A Missed Opportunity . . . , p. 284. In this context of
course they were interested in obtaining Romanian neutrality, and this justifies their readiness to
negotiate with the Romanians but also points to the fact that they were only playing for time, and
not ready for real concessions. A successful offensive on Berlin no doubt would have changed the
situation in Bessarabia.
24
Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Report D.N. Ciotori to Alexandru Averescu on his unofficial
meetings with the Russian representatives, Krassin and Klisco, July 1, 1920, p. 53-54.
25
In his instructions to the French representative in Bucharest, George Leygues expresses his total
opposition to the Soviet-Romanian negotiations and especially to a possible recognition of the Sovi-
ets, which would jeopardize the projected Polish-Romanian alliance. RNA, Fond France microfilm,
R 189, Telegram Leygues to Daeschner, December 21, 1920, c 345.
26
Quoted in Alfred L.P. Dennis, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, p. 171. Also M. Musat, I. Ardeleanu,
Political Life . . . , p. 37.
27
Alexandru Cretzianu, “Politica de pace a Romaniei fata de Uniunea Sovietica”, in Ocazia pierduta, p.
202. Still, the Romanian government delivered some military supplies to the Ukrainians who, led by
Petliura, were fighting the Bolsheviks and were willing to recognize Bessarabia as Romanian terri-
tory.
28
During October 1919, General Denikin, one of the White Army’s leaders, tried to use British media-
tion in order to obtain Romanian help against the Bolsheviks. Bratianu’s position was that, if Deni-
kin officially agreed to accept the decision on Bessarabia taken by the Conference, he would consider
Denikin an ally and stop the armament transports for Petliura in case of a conflict between the two
armies. In the end, no agreement was reached. The Romanians were also worried about the fighting
capability of Denikin’s army, which they considered to be clearly inferior to that of Petliura. RNA,
Fond France microfilm, R 226, Telegram Pichon to Magras, October 18, 1919, c. 651; also Report on
visit by Antonescu to Laroche, November 18, 1919, c. 660.
29
Telegram Take Ionescu to Cicerin, March 27, 1921, quoted in A. Cretzianu, “Politica de pace . . .”, in
< 156 >

G. Buzatu, Romania cu si fara Antonescu, p. 54.

30
F.C. Nanu, Politica externa . . . , p. 116-117.
31
According to Kalervo Hovi, the Bolsheviks’ position at the beginning of 1920 had been strengthen-
ing both at the international and the domestic level. The governments of England and Italy were
inclined to strive for practical, primarily economic relations with Soviet Russia. The return of peace
in the Baltic region, which made the blockade of Soviet Russia even more difficult to impose and the
Soviet-German negotiations in 1920 also point to the same fact. K. Hovi, Alliances de Revers . . . , p. 35-
40. In this situation, of course the Bolsheviks were not as ready to make concessions to the Romani-
ans as is assumed by the majority of Romanian scholars.
32
For details regarding Russo-Romanian correspondence see Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 57-
82. Also F.C. Nanu, Politica externa . . . , p. 117.
33
J. Degras, Soviet Documents . . . , Vol. 1, Telegram Cicerin to Take Ionescu, December 14, 1920, p. 224.
34
J. Degras, Soviet Documents . . . , Vol. 1, Telegram Cicerin to Take Ionescu, January 15, 1921, p. 230.
35
Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Telegram Rakovsky to Cicerin, February 17, 1921, p. 87-88.
36
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, R 1, Vol. 43, Telegram Diamandy to Filality, February 25, 1921.
37
Filality, the Romanian minister in Constantinople, was chosen only after a number of more quali-
fied personalities refused this task. Therefore, he was given very limited power and strict instruc-
tions. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 189, Telegram Daeschner for Paris, March 20, 1921, c. 396.
38
The minutes of the meetings are published in French in Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 104-
127. For more details see RFMA, Fond 71/1920-1944, Special Files, R 1, Vol. 44, passim.
39
F.C. Nanu, Politica externa … , p. 119-121. For the necessary details on the Warsaw Conference see
Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 135-169.
40
Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Report Filality to Averescu, September 26, 1921, p. 140.
41
He was referring to one of Karakhan’s proposals, that Romania should also sign a declaration of
neutrality towards Russia as a condition for signing a common treaty. Karakhan said “with such a
declaration we could go before the masses and explain why we gave away Bessarabia without dis-
cussion”. RFMA, Fond 71/1920-1944, Special Files, R 1, Vol. 43, Telegram Filality to Ionescu, October
7, 1921.
42
A description of the conditions in which the Romanian POW (mainly Transylvanians) were living
in Russia is presented by Vasile Suciu, the Bishop of Alba Iulia, in an attempt to sensitize the Roma-
nian government, asking for rapid intervention in their favor. RFMA, Fond 71/1920-1944, Special
Files, R 1, Vol. 45, Letter Vasile Suciu to Take Ionescu, February 1921. For a later account see G.
Iancu, “Dor de tara. Scrisoarea unui prizonier roman din Uniunea Sovietica din anul 1926” in Tribuna,
July 2000, p. 22.
43
Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Telegram, Take Ionescu to Filality, October 17, 1921, p. 155-159.
44
For the Romanian account of the border incidents during 1921 see the Reports prepared by the
Romanian Ministry of War to the Foreign Ministry in RFMA, Fond 71/1920-1924, Special Files, R 1,
Vol. 45, passim.
45
J. Degras, Soviet Documents . . . , Vol. 1, Telegram Cicerin to Take Ionescu, November 11, 1921, p. 275.
46
Still, in the case presented, Ionescu correctly argued, as even the Russians acknowledged later,
that it would not be possible for Romania to regulate the navigation on the Dniestr if she was not
considered to be a riparian State, which she became only as a result of Bessarabia’s union. Relatii
romano-sovietice. Documente, Telegram Take Ionescu to Cicerin, November 16, 1921, p. 174.
47
V. Moisuc, Premisele isolarii . . . , p. 132.
48
During the Hague Conference a private meeting between Litvinov and Diamandi took place on
July 19, 1922. The tone of the discussion was still conciliatory. Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Tele-
gram Diamandy to Duca, July 20, 1922, p. 184.
49
Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Telegram IG Duca to Constantin G. Nanu, August 8, 1922, p. 186.
50
F.C. Nanu, Politica externa . . . , p. 123.
51
I. Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei . . . , p. 183; also, Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Telegram I.G. Duca
< 157 >

to George Marzescu, December 20, 1922, p. 197-198. Still, it should be mentioned that these were not
actually Cicerin’s words but the interpretation given to them by I.G. Duca.
52
The 19 articles agreement is published in French in Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 207-212.
53
M. Bruchis, The Republic of Moldavia, p. 18
54
And indeed, in November 1923 negotiations for the signing of a commercial agreement between
the two states started in Tyraspol, but with no results. Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 212-218.
55
Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Letter Cicerin to the Political Bureau, September 3, 1922, p. 203-
204.
56
Therefore, the Vienna Conference came as a normal continuation of previous negotiations and not,
as argued by Magda Adam, “in spring 1924 … after long hesitation, even Romania began talks, not
least because of Hungary’s negotiations with the Soviet representatives about the development of
economic contacts and the establishment of diplomatic relations” or as a result of the pressure com-
ing from Czechoslovakia for the recognition of the Soviet Union. Magda Adam, The Little Entente … , p.
226.
57
Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Letter Cicerin to Krestinsky, March 24, 1924, p. 219-220.
58
Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Verbal instructions by Ion IC Bratianu to the Romanian delega-
tion at the Vienna Conference, p. 220-223. Still, judging by the last argument, one that Bratianu also
used during the Peace Conference, he was somewhat out of touch with reality. His line of argument
would have been unacceptable to any state in the world, especially to a proud state like the Soviet
Union. Bratianu also seems to forget the importance of controlling the Danube Estuary and the Bes-
sarabian agricultural potential when he insists on this idea.
59
He opposed the plebiscite for the following reasons: it would be harmful to the existing peace and
order in Bessarabia; it would mean a self-contradiction of Romania’s policy towards its allies, who
had admitted through a treaty that Bessarabia belonged to Romania; and of all the new states bor-
dering the Soviet Union, a plebiscite was requested only in the case of Bessarabia.
60
The protocols of the four meetings are published in French in Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p.
225-255.
61
The best such presentations were made in Times, on March 27, March 31, April 1, and April 3, 1924.
62
Such was the opinion of Nicolae Titulescu, mentioned by Ion M. Oprea, “Basarabia la conferinta
romano-sovietica de la Vienna, 1924”, in Revista istorica, 1992, No. 1, p. 5.
63
In his memorandum, while presenting a detailed account of the Vienna Conference, Geblescu
points up the Soviets renunciation of the historical claims over Bessarabia and their appeal instead
to the principle of self-determination as one of the main characteristics of the Soviet diplomatic ap-
proach during and in the aftermath of the Vienna Conference. RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 20 bis,
The Geblescu Memorandum on Russo-Romanian Relations, f. 78-104.
64
E. Boia, Romania’s Diplomatic . . . , p. 116.
65
Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question … , p. 76-77, 289-293. Also, for the Hotin riot, see General M.C.
Schina, “Basarabia, ianuarie 1918 - iunie 1919”, in Basarabia romana. Antologie, p. 203-204.
66
The great majority of them were not Moldavians, but belonged to other nationalities. M. Bruchis,
A. Chiriac, Rusia, Romania si Basarabia, p. 221-222. For the Romanian account of the events related to
the Tatar-Bunar episode see best Gheorghe Tatarescu, Marturii pentru istorie, p. 75-109.
67
A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 515; Also I Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 185-187.
68
Denis Deletant, “Language Policy and Linguistic Trends in the Republic of Moldavia, 1924-1992”,
in Studies in Moldovan . . . , p. 56.
69
Also, according to Charles King, “the establishment of MASSR signalized the crystallization of a
new argument against the Romanian occupation of Bessarabia that had began to develop shortly
after the end of the Russian civil war: the notion that the majority population in Bessarabia consti-
tuted an ethno-national group separate from the Romanians and that, therefore, their incorporation
into a unitary Romanian state had usurped their right to national self-determination”. C. King, The
Moldovans, p. 57.
< 158 >

70
Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question … , p. 38.
71
C. King, The Moldovans, p. 55.
72
A. Boldur, “Istoria Basarabiei”, p. 516.
73
F.C. Nanu, “Politica externa . . .”, p. 124.
74
E. Boia, “Romania’s . . .”, p. 119-120.
75
Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Report by Litvinov on Meeting with Charles Davila, February 9,
1928, p. 283.
76
G. Bessedovskii, Revelations . . . , p. 192, 212-216.
77
In fact it was with a view to open diplomatic relations between the Soviets and the Little Entente
member states at the same time. On the Romanian side, this idea (later used by Titulescu) seems to
have been expressed first by the Romanian minister in Prague, Theodor Emandi, who understood
that both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia would have to open diplomatic relations with the Soviets
in the not too distant future, and believed that Romania might take advantage of the situation and
finally gain the Soviet recognition of Bessarabia’s union. Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Report T.
Emandi to G.G. Mironescu, May 8, 1929, p. 293-296 and August 26, 1930, p. 303-307.
78
Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 278-281. Also Ion M. Oprea, “O etapa rodnica . . .”, p. 92.
79
I. Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei … , p. 189. Also, Walter M. Bacon, Behind Closed Doors, p. 7.
80
Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Litvinov’s Journal, February 9, 1929, p. 284. As for the plebiscite,
Davila states that he raised the question of the plebiscite only in order to prove to the Russians the
practical impossibility of holding a plebiscite in Bessarabia (for example, it would be very difficult to
find a neutral party to supervise the integrity of the plebiscite). Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente,
Report Davila to Mironescu, February 13, 1929, p. 286-290. However, Davila’s action was clearly
disapproved at home and he paid for it.
81
Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Letter Litvinov to Stalin, March 23, 1929, p. 291-292.
82
W.M. Bacon, Behind Closed Doors, p. 9.
83
In fact the Russians were keen to avoid Polish mediation and, as a result, they preferred to negoti-
ate, in December 1931, with the Romanian representative in Turkey regarding the time and place of
the future round of negotiations. Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 315-320.
84
Unlike the other rounds of bilateral negotiations, there are plenty of published materials regarding
the Riga negotiations. For this reason the present work will only summarily present the Riga nego-
tiations. For both the Romanian and Russian accounts see Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 319-
371; for the Romanian account, based mainly on documents belonging to Nicolae Titulescu, see W.
M. Bacon, Behind Closed Doors, p. 54-93; also for Sturdza’s account, together with some very interest-
ing comments on Romanian diplomats, see Romania si sfirsitul Europei, p. 65-77.
85
Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Report Sturdza to N. Iorga, January 30, 1932, p. 370.
86
Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Letter Titulescu to King Carol, July 24, 1932, p. 383-384. Although
Titulescu expressed this position during the summer of 1932 (and he was right about that), only one
year later he was ready to sign an agreement with the Soviets, in conditions that had not greatly
improved. Still, this seems to have been only one of Titulescu’s intrigues; he was upset that he was
not consulted about the negotiations, and he used the Soviet card only with the intent of becoming
Foreign Minister.
87
88
For details on Titulescu’s attempts see Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 375-388.
89
David E. Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy and . . . , p. 103.
90
Dov B. Lungu, Romania and the Great Powers, 1933-1940, p. 12.
91
Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Telegram Litvinov to Dovgalevski, August 20, 1932, p. 389.
92
Due to Titulescu’s influence, before signing the non-aggression pact with the Soviets, the French
government insisted that the Soviets give them a letter in which they undertook not to resolve their
conflict with Romania by force. In fact, it was a non-aggression pledge taken by the Soviets with the
advantage that the word “conflict” was not mentioned in a document addressed to Romania (which
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could not accept such a wording). RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 20 bis, The Geblescu Memoran-
dum, p. 289.
93
For Titulescu’s position regarding Romania’s relations with Germany, see M. Sturdza, Romania . . . ,
p. 79-99. Although Sturdza’s view towards Titulescu and other Romanian leaders is animated by
personal feelings generated by his membership in the Iron Guard, the fate of Romania during 1940
proves that his judgment of Titulescu’s policy was not far from the truth, and that Titulescu played
an important role in bringing on the bulk of the disaster that befell Romania in 1940. For a more
objective and fair presentation of Titulescu’s policy, without the exaggerations that still character-
izes many Romanian scholars, see Anthony Komjathy, The Crises of France’s . . . , p. 143-172.
94
After a preliminary meeting between Litvinov and Cadere on September 17 in Warsaw, it was
decided that the negotiations should take place in Geneva (September 26-October 8). V.F. Do-
brinescu, Batalia diplomatica . . . , p. 104-105; also F.C. Nanu, Politica externa . . . , p. 157-158.
95
For details on the Geneva negotiations, see Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 394-402.
96
97
It was almost a desperate attempt by Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, the Romanian Prime Minister, to
boost his position by reaching an agreement with the Soviets, which failed as a result of both Tit-
ulescu’s and the French intervention.
98
J. Degras, Soviet Documents . . . , Vol. 2, p. 546; also, Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 402-405.
99
J. Hochman, The Soviet Union and . . . , p. 65.
100
Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Note by M.I. Rozenberg (Soviet Chargé d’Affaires in Paris) re-
garding a conversation with Titulescu, April 18, 1934, p. 423. Still, the question remains: as the Soviet
Union was the main threat to Romania, against whom the Soviets were supposed to guarantee the
Romanian border, especially as the Little and Balkan Ententes protected her against Hungary and
Bulgaria while Germany was too far to pose a threat to Romanian territory?
101
Dov B. Lungu, Romania and . . . , p. 24-25.
102
103
M. Sturdza argues that, in fact, the French-Soviet alliance was of greater importance to Titulescu
than the safety of Romania and that he was planning to offer access through Romania for the Soviet
troops. M. Sturdza, Romania si . . . , p. 103-107.
104
Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 409; also, V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica . . . , p. 106-109.
105
A. Cretzianu, Captive Romania, p. 11. For the entire text of the Convention, see Relatii romano-
sovietice. Documente, p. 411-414.
106
In fact, two almost identical Conventions had been signed: the first one on July 3 by the USSR,
Romania, Poland, Afghanistan, Latvia, Estonia, Persia, Turkey, and ratified by Romania on October
16, 1933; the second one on July 4 between Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Turkey and the
USSR, ratified by Romania on February 17, 1934. The second had one more article indicating that it
remained open to any other state that would like to sign it.
107
V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica . . . , p. 108-109. Also I.M. Oprea, “O etapa . . . ”, p. 93-94.
108
Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Telegram Titulescu to Ion Lugosianu, July 19, 1933, p. 414-415.
Also Ion Constantin, Romania, marile puteri si problema Basarabiei, p. 31.
109
Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Telegram Litvinov to Potemkin, June 27, 1934, p. 430-431.
110
See, for example, A. Karetki, A. Pricop, Lacrima Basarabiei, p. 48.
111
Dov B. Lungu, Romania and . . . , p. 53.
112
113
V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica . . . , p. 110. For details, see Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p.
428-430. However, Yugoslavia decided to postpone official recognition of the Soviet Union for a
period, but gave a free hand to Romania and Czechoslovakia in recognizing the Soviets.
114
115
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116
Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, Letter Krestinsky to Ostrovski, December 26, 1934, p. 433-434.
117
For many Romanian scholars, there is no arguing that Art. No. 10 extends over Romania’s Bessara-
bian border too. See best A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 518-521; or V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica
… , p. 112. But because the Bessarabian Treaty failed to come into force, it might be argued that there
was no valid international treaty recognizing the union of Bessarabia with Romania; consequently
Art. No. 10 did not cover the Bessarabian border.
118
Many Romanian historians fail to mention the Railroad Convention, which could have been inter-
preted as a real improvement in the bilateral relations. M. Sturdza gives a possible reason for this
omission, considering that the wording of the Convention was clearly unsatisfactory to Romanian
interests. M. Sturdza, Romania si … , p. 107.
119
A. Karetki, A. Pricop, Lacrima Basarabiei, p. 50.
120
For the French-Soviet negotiation for a MAT see Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, Vol.
1, p. 138-161.
121
A. Komjathy, The Crises of France’s … , p. 146-149.
122
It seems that Titulescu played an important role in the signing of the mentioned Pact. In fact,
according to M. Sturdza, Titulescu used to pride himself with effectively preparing the Draft Treaty
(as a specialist in international law), in exchange for a considerable amount of money from the
French government. M. Sturdza, Romania si … , p. 103-106. On the other hand, as previously explained,
the French-Soviets pact was of no use to France as long as the Soviet troops could not cross through
either Poland or Romania, and Titulescu’s involvement meant that he would try to get the agreement
of his government in this sense.
123
Nicole Jordan, The Popular Front and Central Europe, p. 189.
124
Jiri Hochman attributes a special signification to the Soviet refuse, considering that it shows a
clear lack of interest from the Soviets in a course of action that would significantly facilitate the
resolution of the geographical asymmetry of the alliances with France and Czechoslovakia; he also
connects it to an improvement in Soviet-German relations. J. Hochman, The Soviet Union … , p. 67-69.
125
N. Jordan, The Popular Front … , p. 193.
126
127
A good analyses of Romania’s options during the Italian-Abyssinian conflict and of the effects of
Titulescu’s actions is presented in A. Komjathy, The Crises of France’s … , p. 154.
128
Quoted in J. Hochman, The Soviet Union … , p. 70.
129
Politica externa a Romaniei. Dictionar cronologic, p. 214-215.
130
For example V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica … , p. 114-115; A. Karetki, A. Pricop, Lacrima
Basarabiei, p. 50-51; I. Scurtu et. al. , Istoria Basarabiei, p. 195.
131
A copy of the Draft is published in A. Karetki, A. Pricop, Lacrima Basarabiei, p. 143-144.
132
133
Although there were quite a number of reasons behind Titulescu’s replacement, the proximate
cause was his intervention regarding the Spanish Civil War; he chose to disregard his instructions in
late August: “Deciding that Romania did not need the one hundred cannons and fifty airplanes
which she had ordered from France and were now ready for delivery, Titulescu directed this war
material to be transported to the Spanish republicans”. A. Komjathy, The Crises of France’s … , p. 170-
171.
134
Dov B. Lungu considers that, in fact, the Romanians were no longer interested to sign a MAT with
the Soviet Union. Dov B. Lungu, Roumania and … , p. 99.
135
Although Victor Antonescu took advantage of the first opportunity he had, on September 19, to
personally reassure Litvinov that there was no change in the Romanian foreign policy, he could not
convince Litvinov.
136
Quoted in I. Constantin, Romania, marile puteri …, p. 33.
137
As French General Gamelin recalls, “King Carol had told him [in 1937] that France could count on
< 161 >

his secret permission to let the Soviet troops pass”. Quoted in John Lukacs, The Great Powers … , p. 100.
138
J. Lukacs, The Great Powers … , p. 99-100.
139
For details see E. Boia, Roumania’s … , 242-245.
140
A. Komjathy, The Crises of France’s … , p. 219.
141
Quoted in Louis Fischer, Russia’s Road … , p. 312-313.
142
J. Lukacs, The Great Powers … , p. 144, 178-179.
143
Politica externa a Romaniei. Dictionar cronologic, p. 222-223.
144
J. Lukacs, The Great Powers … , p. 180.
145
Jiri Hochman published “Text of a Note from the Romanian Government to the Government of
the Soviet Union, September 24, 1938”, sent from Bucharest to Litvinov in Geneva, which he asserts
to have found in the RFMA (No. 71/1938 – C/8, vol. 3), a note that I was unable to find in the men-
tioned place and which is mentioned by no other Romanian scholar (raising some doubts as to its
existence). The Note shows the Romanian government offering transit through its territory for
100,000 Soviet troops (by land) and un unlimited number by aerial means, explicitly renouncing all
previous Soviet guarantees referring to the border in Bessarabia. It also presents a very detailed plan
of operations for the transit of Soviet troops. J. Hochman, The Soviet Union … , p. 194-201.
146
L. Fischer, Russia’s Road … , p. 312.
147
A good analysis of the Soviets ‘willingness’ or ‘unwillingness’ to go at war for Czechoslovakia is
presented in J. Lukacs, The Great Powers … , p. 172-182.
148
Even if we consider the document presented by Jiri Hochman as false (footnote 145), the Romani-
ans’ offer to grant passage for Soviet military aircraft and her action in order to restrain Hungary’s
intervention against Czechoslovakia should be enough proof in raising question marks over the ve-
racity of some comments made by Rebecca Haynes, in her attempt to analyze Romanian foreign
policy at the end of the 1930’s. For example: “in reality, the 1938 Czechoslovak crisis was marked by a
desperate attempt by Romania to evade her treaty obligations toward Czechoslovakia in order to
avoid the possibility of finding herself at war with Germany. … the Romanian government made
every effort to deny the right of passage through Romania to the Red Army to aid its Czechoslovak
ally … in mid-September, as the Sudeten crisis reached its climax, the Soviet Union was still pressur-
ing Romania to allow her right of passage … it was by now quite clear that the Romanians would not
allow Soviet right of passage … Romania has refused to bow to Soviet pressure to grant right of pas-
sage”. Rebecca Haynes, Romanian Policy towards Germany, 1936-40, p. 52-54. Haynes seems to forget
that the treaty obligations have been directed against Hungary and not against Germany and that,
with respect to a possible Hungarian military intervention against Czechoslovakia it was clearly
stated that it would bring Romania into the war. Just as the Little Entente treaties did not oblige
Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia to intervene in favor of Romania in case of a Soviet attack in Bessara-
bia neither was Romania obliged to intervene in case of a German attack on Czechoslovakia. And, as
previously presented, the transit of Soviet troops through Romanian territory signified war with
Germany, who most probably would have sent its airplanes to destroy the Romanian railway net-
work.
149
For a concise presentation of the Pact’s origins see R.H. Haigh, D.S. Morris, A.R. Peters, Soviet
Foreign Policy, the League of Nations and Europe, 1917-1939, p. 98-120. Also Edward H. Carr, “The Nazi-
Soviet Pact”, in Readings in Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 155-160.
150
Romanian historiography dealt in detail with the Pact’s consequences for Romania. See, for exam-
ple, I. Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 202-204; also A. Karetki, A. Pricop, Lacrima Basarabiei, p. 58-
62, 304-305. It should be mentioned that even nowadays the Russian leadership still refuses to de-
nounce the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and especially the Secret Protocol, although Romania repeat-
edly asked for this action, arguing that Hitler denounced the Pact on June 22, 1941.
151
Wishing to make full use of Romania’s resources, especially her petroleum and grains, the Ger-
mans started a powerful economic and diplomatic offensive in order to bring Romania into their
camp. Although they had a number of successes in the economic field, the same was not true in the
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diplomatic field. For details on the German economic penetration of Romania see, best, William S.
Grenzebach, Germany’s Informal Empire in East-Central Europe, p. 69-95, 173-208. Also, David E. Kaiser,
Economic Diplomacy … , p. 144-145, 158-159, 264-267.
152
R. Haynes considers that this shift also had ‘partly ideological’ reasons, pointing to anti-
bolshevism, anti-Semitism and fear of pan-Slavism common to both Nazism and Romanian right
wing. R. Haynes, Romanian policy … , p. 176. Still, if one compares the Carlist dictatorship with that of
Hitler what is striking is not the ideological similarities (supposed to foster a rapprochement be-
tween the two states), but the differences: one was characterized by order, planning and fuhrerprinzip,
the other by corruption, self-interest and leading by a mistress; one sought territorial expansion
while the other was simply trying to defend its territory; one sent the Jewish people to gas chambers,
the other kept them in influential positions, and so on.
153
For a glimpse at the events surrounding the evacuation of Bessarabia see A. Karetki, A. Pricop,
Lacrima Basarabiei, p. 70-86; also, I. Scurtu et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 202-224.
154
Ion Gherman, Istoria tragica a Bucovinei, Basarabiei si tinutul Hertei, p. 110.
155
J. Lukacs, The Great Powers … , p. 307.
156
With the notable exception of the resistance by the Romanian troops led by colonel Bota, at
about 11 km from the city of Herta, which opposed the Red Army’s marching into a territory that
belonged to Romania before 1918 and that was supposed to remain under Romanian rule. I. Scurtu
et. al., Istoria Basarabiei, p. 216.
157
One of the very few Romanian officials who openly expressed his opposition to King Carol Second
was Charles A Davila, one of the best Romanian diplomats, and for that action he lost his Romanian
citizenship. Corvin Lupu, Relatii diplomatice … , p. 150.
158
A good attempt to sort out who is to blame for the 1940 cession of Bessarabia is done by historian
Dinu C. Giurescu. Although he avoids clearly pointing the finger to the guilty ones, he mentions
some of the reasons behind the Bessarabian tragedy: the failure of the Bucharest government to take
the most elementary measures (like a limited evacuation or plans for a forced evacuation of Bessara-
bia), the underestimation of Soviet plans until September 1939, the poor material state of the Roma-
nian Army, the continuing internal political fight, and the influence of France’s collapse. Dinu C.
Giurescu, Romania in the Second World War, p. 24-33.
159
It is difficult to say who was the first diplomat or historian to present this opinion in writing:
probably Dan Geblescu or Frederic C. Nanu. However, this represents the opinion of an important
group in the Romanian Foreign Ministry and is to be found also in some of the more recent papers
on Romanian-Soviet relations.
160
The best description of the activity of the Bessarabian Russians, although limited to the Peace
Conference, is presented in Petre Cazacu, “Moldova dintre Prut si Nistru”, p. 425-433.
161
G.E. Torrey, General Henri Berthelot … , p. 149-150.
162
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Telegram from Geneva, May 19, 1918, c. 561.
163
For the memorandum, called “Declaration of Ten Deputies Against the Decision to Renounce to
Bessarabia’s Autonomy”, see Relatii romano-sovietice. Documente, p. 36-39.
164
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 29, Report by the General Police and Safety Inspectorate in Bes-
sarabia regarding the evolution of the Russian and pro-Russian groups in Bessarabia, February 23,
1923, p. 145.
165
For details on the Transylvanian’s attempt to maintain autonomy inside Romania see, best,
Gheorghe Iancu, The Ruling Council; the Integration of Transylvania into Romania, 1918-1922, pas-
sim.
166
P. Cazacu, Moldova dintre Prut si Nistru, p. 425. The CSB is also known as the League for the Libera-
tion of Bessarabia. G. Buzatu, Romanii in Arhivele Kremlinului, p. 102.
167
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 29, Report of the General Police and Safety Inspectorate in Bessara-
bia regarding the evolution of the Russian and pro-Russian groups in Bessarabia, February 23, 1923,
p. 146.
< 163 >

168
The influence of the Kroupenski family was so all pervading in Bessarabia at the beginning of the
20th century that liberal publicists gave Bessarabia the nickname of “the Kroupenskian Province”. R.
W. Seton Watson, The History of the Roumanians, p. 564.
169
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 394, Telegram Cooke (Odessa) to Lord Curzon, January 20,
1919, c. 36.
170
The best example in this sense comes from a report prepared by Major Barrat, in which he criti-
cizes almost everything done by the Romanian administration in Bessarabia. RNA, Fond England
microfilm, R 394, Report on Bessarabia, January 1919, c. 40-46.
171
Rattigan reported home of the high number of telegrams sent to him by Bessarabian peasants from
different counties, in order to reaffirm the desire of the districts concerned for the incorporation of
Bessarabia in Great Roumania. RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 394, Telegram Rattigan to Lord
Curzon, August 6, 1919, c. 110.
172
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Memorandum by Sazonov, January 18, 1919, c. 580.
173
Traian Sandu, “La France et la Bessarabie roumaine de 1918 a 1920…” in The Establishment …, p. 373.
174
P. Cazacu, Moldova dintre … , p. 425-427. For the memorandum see RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol.
25, p. 32-37.
175
T. Sandu, “La France et la Bessarabie roumaine de 1918 a 1920 …”, in The Establishment … , p. 376.
176
FRUS, PPC, vol. 6, p. 72.
177
And, indeed, in a later Memorandum, the White Russians stressed that the formula “the Roma-
nian part of Bessarabia” implied the existence of non-Romanian parts. RNA, Fond France microfilm,
R 226, Memorandum by Sazonov, Lwow, and Maklakov, September 24, 1919, c. 644.
178
For his speech see “The Making of the Bessarabian Treaty” chapter, Annex No 2.
179
180
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 119, p. 141-142 and
Vol. 121, p. 1883. Lloyd George’s answer to the second interpellation was very laconic “the question of
Bessarabia has still to be discussed by the Peace Conference”.
181
P. Cazacu, Moldova dintre Prut si Nistru, p. 427-428.
182
T. Sandu, “La France et la Bessarabie roumaine de 1918 a 1920 …”, in The Establishment … , p. 377.
183
Anne Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, Les Relations Franco-Sovietique, p. 146.
184
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Letter Ishii to Uchida, containing 17 pages Memorandum on Bes-
sarabia, November 5, 1920.
185
Until July 15, 1921, Kroupenski and Schmidt published a number of ten propagandistic brochures
in English and French. Among them: “The ‘Parliament’ of Bessarabia”, “Memoire sur la situation de le
Bessarabie” (the most comprehensive of all), “La question de la Bessarabie devant la conference de la
paix” (by Vladimir Tsiganko), and “Lettre de Bessarabie …”. To these should be added “The Case for
Bessarabia”, published by the Russian Liberation Committee, with a preface by historian Paul
Milioukow.
186
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, R 1, Vol. 45, p. 47-49.
187
On this topic see Gheorghe Iancu, “Problema minoritatilor etnice din Romania reflectata in docu-
mente ale Societatii Natiunilor” in Relatii interetnice … , p. 176-199.
188
For the two memorandums see. RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, p. 88-100.
189
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Letter Romanian Government to the Secretary General of the
League, December 5, 1921.
190
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Lahovary to I.G. Duca, April 28, 1922. The letter
through which Hymans informed the Romanian government of the events regarding the Bessarabian
question is also to be found in the same file, p. 169-170.
191
One example in this sense is the memorandum sent to the Italian Embassy in Vienna on April
1924, called “Questione della Bessarabia”, signed by a certain Filippani Poltoratzki, which found no
echo with the Italian authorities. RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 29, p. 157-162.
192
The quotation is from a description made by Georges Picot, the French representative in Sofia,
after a meeting with the White Russians. RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 29, Telegram Langa Ras-
< 164 >

canu to Take Ionescu, April 19, 1922.

193
In Prague, the Russian students were able to organize during 1921-1922 a society called “Oreste”
and to publish a newspaper called “The Student”, which, among other matters related to Russia,
took a decided stand against the Romanian administration of Bessarabia. RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2,
Vol. 29, Note on the Activity of the Bessarabian Emigration, December 1928, p. 207-208.
194
For example, in 1927 a brochure called “La probleme Bessarabien; memorandum” was published in
Paris by “The Conference of the Associations of Bessarabian Emigrants in France, Belgium, Germany,
Austria and Czechoslovakia”. They also printed some magazines, with significant titles, like “The
Voice of Bessarabia” or “The Oppressed Bessarabia” during 1928.
195
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 29, Note on Activities Initiated by the Bessarabian Emigration,
December 1928, p. 207-208.
196
G. Buzatu argues that, in fact, the Kremlin used the documents belonging to the White Russians
as very powerful arguments in order to support its claims over Bessarabia. He also points out that all
such existing documents in the Archives of the former Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs were filed
and organized in June 1940, just before the ultimatum sent to the Romanian government for the
evacuation of Bessarabia, and that this was by no means a mere coincidence. G. Buzatu, Romanii in
arhivele Kremlinului, p. 103.
197
The Society was conceived as a ‘reserve tool’ that was to be used only when necessary - this hap-
pened in 1938, when the Society was revived by the communists. Vitalie Varatic, Preliminarii la raptul
Basarabiei si Nordului Bucovinei, p. 51-54, 216-217.
198
The best available resources for the activity of Bessarabian emigration are those existing in the
RFMA, consisting on notes and reports regarding their activity. The reports cover the entire inter-
war period, sometimes (like the October 28, 1936, Report) providing detailed information on the
amounts of money and the strategy used by the communists for their propaganda, and also on the
people involved in these actions. RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 29, passim. Some of the documents
available in the RFMA and dealing with the activity of the Bessarabian emigration during 1938-1940
have been recently published in V. Varatic, Preliminarii la raptul Basarabiei si Nordului Bucovinei. Another
source of information on the activity of the Bessarabian emigration are the Russian archives, and the
existence of an organized and reach inventory of such information is confirmed in G. Buzatu, Romanii
in Arhivele Kremlinului, p. 102-103.
< 165 >

CHAPTER 5.
THE UNITED KINGDOM
The United Kingdom was the Great Power that insisted the most on signing
the Bessarabian Treaty and was the first of the five signatory countries to ratify it,
depositing the necessary instruments for ratification in Paris, on April 14, 1922.
There were two main reasons for the British position: (1) improving British-
Romanian relations; and (2) the general policy of the British Empire, and especially
of Lloyd George, towards Russia. One of the best presentations of this policy is
found in Richard Ullman’s comprehensive analysis of Anglo-Soviet relations:
In talking with Frank L. Polk [on November 24, 1919], Lloyd George did
not hide his strong feeling that a unified Russia would be a danger to Europe.
He hoped, he said, for Georgia, Azerbaijan, Bessarabia, the Ukraine, the Baltic
provinces, Finland, and perhaps even Siberia, all to be independent. Here was
the Prime Minister’s answer to Disraeli’s fear of ‘a great, gigantic, colossal,
growing Russia’. To John W. Davis, the American Ambassador in London, he
later [December 3] made the same statement: he favored the ultimate division
of Russia into a number of independent states, leaving none large enough to
threaten the peace; and he was not adverse to treating with the Soviet govern-
ment to achieve this goal.1
By contrast, France and the USA saw a powerful Russia as a necessity for their
foreign policy aims. In these conditions it comes as no surprise that the British lead-
ers were the friendliest toward the Romanian cause in Bessarabia, at least during the
Peace Conference and the first years thereafter.
During the Paris Peace Conference
During the war the UK’s attitude toward Romania underwent several changes.
At the beginning, it backed all the Romanian territorial claims by signing the 1916
Treaty. But by January 5, 1918, Lloyd George was insisting that the UK’s purpose was
< 167 >

not the dismemberment of the Habsburg Monarchy, but only to see that more rights
were given to the Romanians and other minorities living within the Empire. The idea
of autonomy for the Romanians in Transylvania, expressed in his speech, was con-
sidered incompatible with the 1916 Treaty between Romania and the Entente.2 This
idea was expressed once more in a telegram Lloyd George sent to Bratianu on Janu-
ary 24, 1918, which encouraged the Romanians to keep on fighting ¾ while making
no mention of their aspirations for national unification.3 Toward the end of the war,
when the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire became evident, the UK’s at-
titude shifted back to supporting the Romanian territorial claims.
Published in 1920 as the Peace Manuals, the final recommendations made by the
Department of Political Information in the Foreign Office (the British equivalent of the
Inquiry Commission) stated that: Transylvania should belong to Romania; the Banat
should be divided between Romania and Serbia;4 Bukovina should be divided between
Romania and a Ruthenian State; Romania should cede some territories to Bulgaria in
southern Dobrudja; the traffic on the Danube River should be placed under the super-
vision of an international commission; and that Bessarabia should belong to Romania.5 As
can be seen, the territorial recommendations were not that different from those stipu-
lated in the 1916 Treaty. Still, as for Bessarabia, not all the British officials agreed (at
least, not during the first months after the end of the war) that it should go to Roma-
nia. Some argued that Bessarabia should be taken under the protection of an interna-
tional commission for a number of years until a plebiscite could be held in the prov-
ince;6 others that only a part of the province should go to Romania:
It is therefore suggested that in the final settlement with Russia the whole
of Bessarabia should be acknowledged as Romanian, except for the Czerno-
vitz-Kiev railway, which, together with the strip of Bessarabia north of it,
should be given to Russia.7
During the Peace Conference the UK’s position toward Romania was some-
where in the middle, oscillating between the strong demands of the US and the com-
promise policy favored by France and Italy. The British diplomats took a wait-and-
see approach, skillfully maneuvering between the French and American proposals on
Romania.8 Their main purposes during the Peace Conference were to continue pro-
tecting British interests all over the world, and to temper the French influence on
the Continent, ruling out a possible French hegemony in Europe. As a result, they
sought both to reduce France’s influence in Romania and to increase their own.
As it did in France, the Romanian propaganda in London played a role in the
decisions taken by the UK Government: the Romanians attracted the sympathy of
some influential figures in London. Robert W. Seton-Watson published numerous
articles in favor of the Romanian claims in his influential weekly journal The New
Europe. A special mention should also be made of the role played by the British Min-
ister in Romania, Frank Rattigan, one of those who really understood Romanian re-
alities and politics.
< 168 >

CHAPTER 5. THE UNITED KINGDOM
The main controversies between Romania and the UK during the Peace Con-
ference were related to the situation in Hungary, the status of Bukovina, and the Da-
nube, with Hungary proving to be the most important. The British representatives,
like the US representatives, spoke in favor of Hungary and they had been on the US
side during the conflict over the withdrawal of Romanian troops, arguing in favor of
decisive measures against Romania. However, when it came to Bessarabia, the UK
representatives were on Romania’s side from beginning to the end, and it was a di-
rect result of their insistence in 1920 that the Bessarabian Treaty was signed.
The misadventures between Romania and the Peace Conference having been
presented in the previous chapter, we will not go into them again. The British policy
towards Romania is clear from the reports presented by George Clerk and Alain
Leeper at the end of their September 1919 mission to Romania. The latter presented a
very insightful “Memorandum on the Romanian Situation”, which reads:
Mr. Bratianu makes no secret of the fact that he expects to win in his pol-
icy of resistance.
Both in Paris and Bucharest he [Bratianu] continues to argue that the great
danger of the future is pan Slavism, and that it is necessary for Romania and for
Romania’s allies to take every step to prevent the resuscitation of Russia. For
this quadruple alliance [Romania, Poland, Ukraine, Hungary] Mr. Bratianu
confidently relies on securing the support of Italy and, less confidently, that of
France. Britain he regards as more or less disinterestedly neutral, and the US he
frankly considers Romania’s worst enemy.
The Government press at Bucharest is full every day of the differences of
opinion between the Great Powers at the Conference. . . .
In conclusion I would venture to urge that the only method of maintaining
Romania in the alliance, of preventing her from entering on a course of foreign
policy calamitous to herself and prejudicial to us, and of securing her a reform
of the present corrupt and inefficient administration which encumbers her, is
prompt and unequivocal action by the Peace Conference. I would venture to
urge that the best course would be that at such a moment as the Conference
considers opportune ¾ and the sooner that moment is chosen the more deci-
sive and beneficial will be the effect ¾ a firm but friendly demand should be
addressed to the Romanian Government calling on them within a delay of a
few days to decide whether or not they will sign the Treaty with Austria, in-
cluding the famous minority clause. In the same communication the Romanian
Government should be informed that the Conference would welcome a discus-
sion as to the exact wording and application of the Treaty. . .9
The course suggested in the Leeper Memorandum was adopted not only by the
British representatives but also by the other representatives at the Peace Conference
towards the end of 1919, and proved to be a success.
< 169 >

Regarding the Bessarabian question, since the beginning of the Peace Confer-
ence the British representatives had expressed the opinion that, based on ethnic,
economical, geographical, historical and political reasons, the province should be-
long to Romania. In the first phase, the British diplomatic team concluded that, in
order for the Union to be officially recognized, Romania should fulfill three condi-
tions: Bessarabia’s separation from Russia would be on the basis of the ethnic prin-
ciple and not a military occupation of the province in favor of Romania; nothing
should be done that could impinge on Russia’s economic or other vital interests in
Romania; the national minorities living in the area should receive internationally
guaranteed cultural and local autonomy.10
The British position on Bessarabia was presented officially during an interpel-
lation in the House of Commons, on December 4, 1919. Asked by Captain Moreing
whether HMG would regard with sympathy the desire of the inhabitants of Bessara-
bia to be reunited with Romania, Lloyd George answered “It had been the policy of
HMG, throughout the Peace Conference, to endeavour to unite national majorities
where ever it is practicable to do so. They will approach the consideration of Bes-
sarabia in this spirit.”11
The UK’s Role in the Signing of the Bessarabian Treaty
Motivation
In 1920, the UK was the Great Power pushing hardest for the official recogni-
tion of the union between Bessarabia and Romania. Why did they take such a
“friendly” attitude, why were the British so active in a matter that was not of any
direct interest to the British Empire? A “Memorandum on Bessarabia”, prepared at
the Foreign Office in January 1920, might give us a head start. The Memorandum
reads:
In June 1919 Admiral Kolchak’s Government declared that the principle of
ratification of covenants regarding national groups by a Russian Constituent
Assembly must be applied to the question of Bessarabia . . .
Mr. Bratianu invariably replied that the one deciding factor in his Russian
policy was the question of Bessarabia. Ukraine acknowledged the Romanian
claim to this province, while Denikin did not; therefore, until the latter did so,
Romania would withhold all real support from him and assist Ukraine.
During the last few days of November and the early part of December Petli-
ura seems to have been eliminated from Ukraine. General Denikin has since
been defeated everywhere and may lose Odessa. Before he does so the moment
seems appropriate for reaching a decision at Paris in regard to Bessarabia. The
Peace Conference noted on December 11 that this question has still to be dis-
cussed. . . . At the Bessarabian frontier trouble may arise in an acute form ow-
ing to the insecurity of the Vaida government in Romania and General Deni-
kin’s incapacity to hold the situation in South Russia.
< 170 >

It is suggested therefore that in addition to the encouragement of effective

cooperation between Poland, Romania and South Russia . . . a definite decision
should be reached by the Conference of Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretar-
ies in Paris as to the boundaries and sovereignty over Bessarabia. It is impor-
tant to strengthen the Vaida Government and at the same time to re-
move the principal obstacle to the co-operation of Romania in the re-
generation of Russia.12
As can be seen, by January 1920 one of the main reasons behind the UK’s inten-
tion to settle the Bessarabian question was the situation in Russia and the hope of
having Romania act in a more positive manner for the “regeneration of Russia”,
whatever was to be understood by this formula. On January 20, as previously shown,
according to the suggestion presented in the Memorandum, Lloyd George took a
decisive step regarding the Bessarabian question by promising the Conference’s offi-
cial recognition of its union with Romania. However, the Russian-Polish War
brought about a change in the British position by dimming their enthusiasm regard-
ing that regeneration of Russia.
The person who seems to have had the greatest influence over the formulation
of the British policy on Bessarabia, namely Alan W.A. Leeper, was a high-ranking
official in the Foreign Office. Whenever a matter regarding Bessarabia came up for
debate, his opinion was asked. The Report he prepared on February 28, 1920, offers
an example; his suggestions were clearly followed by Lloyd George during the March
3, 1920, meeting of the Peace Conference:
The Romanian Prime Minister, who has been urgently summoned by the
Romanian King, is most anxious to obtain from the Peace Conference a consid-
eration of the Bessarabian question. . . . It is therefore a question whether the
consideration of the recognition of Bessarabia’s reunion with Romania should
be postponed until the Romanian troops have finally left Hungarian territory
completely. If this is done it means that Vaida-Voevod will return to Bucharest
empty handed, his position becoming impossible from the view of Romanian
internal politics. In view of the fact that Vaida-Voevod represents and agrees
with precisely the policy of close alliance and friendship with this country, the
result of his defeat could not fail to be disastrous from the view of British-
Romanian relations.
I venture therefore to submit that Mr. Vaida-Voevod might be given an oppor-
tunity of stating briefly his proposals and that on condition of his accepting and
abiding by absolutely the ruling of the Allied Military Commission, as to the stages
of evacuating Hungary, the Supreme Council might furnish him with a decision on
the Bessarabian question in accordance with the terms of the draft that I venture to
annex hereto [presented as Annex No. 6 of Chapter 2].
It may be added that, if the reported offer of the Soviets to make peace with
Romania is authentic, the case for an immediate decision on the Bessarabian
< 171 >

question is strengthened.
There is no doubt, alike in the interests of the Bessarabian people them-
selves, who have already fully accepted union with Romania and in the interest
of peace and order throughout Romania and neighboring countries, that a set-
tlement of the Bessarabian question on the lines indicated is urgently needed.13
Reasons
The British insistence on the making of the Bessarabian Treaty was driven by
many factors.
(1) Preventing Russia from playing too important a role in European policy,
from becoming “a menace” to Europe, was a major British concern. The British gov-
ernment had no interest in seeing a powerful Russia. Similarly, they had no interest
in seeing France achieve a hegemonic position in Europe; and consequently the Brit-
ish chose to assist the revival of Germany. However perilous this policy proved to be
some two decades later, it was the choice of the British leadership; they had no use
for a strong Russia, one that would open the door to the French by keeping Germany
on her knees. The Bessarabian question was part and parcel of this policy, as ex-
pressed by Lloyd George during a parliamentary interpellation (March 1, 1920):
Lt-commander Kenworthy asked the Prime Minister whether any deci-

sion had been reached at the Peace Conference with regard to Bessarabia;
whether the Royal Romanian Government has been approached by the Soviet
Government with a view to the settlement of this question and the making of
peace; what advice has been tendered by HMG on this question; and whether
we have entered into any agreement with Romania to support it if peace with
Russia is not concluded.
The Prime Minister: . . . the future of Bessarabia has been subject of dis-
cussion between the Supreme Council and the Romanian Prime Minister.
The answer to the second part is in the affirmative. As for the third and fourth
parts, HMG have adopted the same attitude in this regard toward Romania as they had
already taken towards Poland and the Baltic States.14
What is important here is the fact that Bessarabia is considered to be in the

same category as the Baltic States and the Russian parts of Poland. This position was
exactly the opposite of that adopted by the US government, which clearly consid-
ered Bessarabia to be a special case, as shown in the Colby Note of August 10, 1920.
(2) The British government wanted to keep Romania out of the Polish-Russian
War.15 Of course, as Bessarabia was the main reason for Romania to intervene in the
war, offering the necessary international guarantees regarding her possession of Bes-
sarabia seemed to be the best option. As stated by Frank Rattigan:
In the view of Mr. Lloyd George . . . His Majesty’s Government were in no

sense prepared to advise Romania to take any action which would involve her
< 172 >

in active hostilities with the Bolsheviks. If she took such action, she must
clearly understand that she did so on her own responsibility and could not ex-
pect any assistance from Great Britain.16
Indeed, throughout the interwar period, one of the main aims of British foreign
policy was to avoid any new war; the fear of seeing the British Empire embroiled in a
new conflict in Europe was acute. The British leadership was active during the third
and fourth decades in seeking to resolve all conflicts at the negotiating table.
(3) Negatively influencing Romanian-British relations was the question of the
future status of the Danube. In accordance with its longstanding policy of control-
ling the principal navigable waterways, the UK had imposed, together with France,
the internationalization of the Danube and the establishment of a European Com-
mission on the Mouths of the Danube. The Danube River flows into the Black Sea
through a delta where it divides itself into three arms with the northernmost, the
Chilia Arm, being the most suited to navigation. The Chilia Arm had previously been
the border between Romania and Russia (and, therefore, had been considered inter-
national waters — or, under international control) but, as a result of the union, it
became exclusively Romanian territory. In order to preclude Romanian control of
the main navigable arm of the Danube (and to answer the propaganda campaign ini-
tiated by the Liberal Party, at that time in opposition, against the acceptance of the
decision taken by the Peace Conference on the status of Danube), the British govern-
ment decided to “weaken” the Romanian position. In April 1920, they added to the
initial draft of the Bessarabian Treaty a special article regarding navigation on the
Chilia Arm and control over the mouth of the Chilia (Article No. 7), protecting their
interests from any possibly costly Romanian decision (for example, the Romanians
could have imposed a new tax on navigation through the Danube Delta).17
(4) The British sought to consolidate the non-Bratianist Government (at that
time the Liberal Party, controlled by the Bratianu family, was the best-organized
political party in Romania) and to increase the British influence in Romania. With
no more US representatives in attendance to be blamed, and because of the Danube
question and certain other economic and political matters, Great Britain became “the
bête noire of the Bratianists”.18 As previously shown, the British intervened in favor
of the Romanian cause in Bessarabia during the January 20 and March 3, 1920 meet-
ings of the Peace Conference in part due to the need to strengthen the Vaida-Voevod
government. Even after that government was replaced with the one headed by Alex-
andru Averescu, they continued their support, with a view not only to counterbal-
ancing the anti-British propaganda initiated by the Liberals but also to increasing
their general influence in Romania.
(5) Conceivably, another reason would be the fact that Bessarabia was Roma-
nian territory according to the ethnographical and historical data. However, it is
difficult to ascertain how much that argument may have influenced the British posi-
tion on Bessarabia. The same point had no influence whatsoever on the US govern-
ment, which considered its strategic interests more important than any historical or
< 173 >

demographic realities. In the case of France, opinion was divided, some French
scholars arguing that economically Bessarabia would fare much better under Rus-
sian administration, which offered a huge market for its products, compared to Ro-
mania, which produced more or less the same goods as Bessarabia. Officially, the
British representatives stressed that their main reason for backing the union of Bes-
sarabia with Romania was based on clear demographical and historical realities, but
in British secret documents regarding Bessarabia there is almost no allusion to that.
(6) The Bessarabian Treaty stipulated no concrete obligations for its signato-
ries in case of a Russian-Romanian War over Bessarabia. Therefore, even when the
Treaty came into force, the signatory Great Powers would have only a moral obliga-
tion towards Romania, and even this obligation was not a direct one — it was the
League of Nations and not the signatory Powers that would be responsible for tak-
ing whatever measures were considered necessary in case of a Russian attack on Bes-
sarabia. This situation was clearly in agreement with the British policy of avoiding
any concrete obligations on the Continent.
During 1920, British interest in the Treaty shifted its accent from the negotia-
tions between Romania and the Conference of the Ambassadors to the bilateral Ro-
manian-British negotiations, the former simply confirming the agreements reached
by the latter. As a result, British diplomacy played the decisive role during the final
stages in the making of the Bessarabian Treaty.
However, while the British government had reason enough to act in favor of
the international recognition of Bessarabia’s union, it took the opportunity to link it
to other seemingly minor questions on which Romania seemed unwilling to listen to
British and French “advice”. There were at least three such questions: the with-
drawal of the Romanian Army from Hungarian territory; Romania’s signing and rati-
fication of the Minorities Treaty and other treaties; and increased compensations to
be paid by Romania to the foreign landowners expropriated in Bessarabia. It should
be noted that none of those matters was of long-term importance to the British; they
all came into play as a result of combined French-British pressure.
Involvement
British-Romanian negotiations regarding the Draft of the future Bessarabian

Treaty started in April 1920. The Romanian Prime Minister, Alexandru Averescu,
first named Take Ionescu as his representative in London but, the latter refusing the
assignment due to his being nominated as foreign minister, the task of negotiating
the new treaty passed to Nicolae Titulescu. Therefore, before becoming Finance
Minister (June 1920), Titulescu was responsible for negotiating, both in London and
Paris, the Draft Treaty.19 Years later he described the negotiations:
When, as a delegate of the Averescu Government at the Peace Conference, I

had to discuss the draft of the Treaty recognizing the union of Bessarabia to
Romania, obtained by the Vaida Government, the Allies proposed a formula
< 174 >

which was totally unacceptable and which admitted the Soviets’ right to make
appeal at the League of Nations against the decision of the Great Powers to
recognize the political union of Bessarabia with Romania. I had to fight for the
entire month of May in London in order to empty the proposed formulation of
any substance, clearly stipulating that the Romanian sovereignty over Bessara-
bia and her borders are exempted from the right to make appeal recognized to
the Soviets.20
The British government backed the French in insisting that the Romanian gov-
ernment offer substantial compensation to the foreign landowners who were expro-
priated in Bessarabia. Although there were only three (initially two) such British
landowners, HMG did whatever it could in order to offer them satisfaction. While it
opposed the French proposal to insert the matter into the draft of the Treaty itself,
considering that it would be inappropriate to introduce into a treaty of this nature a
clause related to temporary private interests,21 it clearly insisted on reaching another
type of agreement with the Romanian government in order to resolve the matter.
Frank Rattigan informed his Government of the need to make certain reserva-
tions in the application to British subjects of the Bessarabian agrarian law, before
signing the Bessarabian Treaty, but he considered it unnecessary to make any such
stipulation a part of the agreement itself.22 After all, it would have been unusual to
condition a treaty of such importance on a private financial matter that offered no
material advantages whatsoever to the British government. Therefore the British
government instructed him to approach the Romanian government and request the
necessary assurances, stating that the British delegation could not sign an agreement
on Bessarabia until these assurances were obtained.23 On the surface this instruc-
tion, as well as the ensuing negotiations, clearly shows the “materialistic” side of the
British foreign policy: British interests, however minor they might be, must be pro-
tected in any situation and at any price. On the other hand, when we consider the
reasons motivating the British to press for the Bessarabian Treaty, the same instruc-
tions take on a different light: they were either trying to please the French (who
were not very happy with this solution) or they were “playing tough” with the Ro-
manians.
A few days later, Rattigan reported home of his attempt to act, together with
the French minister in Bucharest, in order to resolve the matter of foreign subjects
expropriated in Bessarabia — an attempt that was motivated by the need to avoid
inspiring anti-British feelings but that failed as a result of the prolonged French de-
lays. Rattigan decided to send a separate note to the Romanian Foreign Affairs Min-
istry:
I have asked the Romanian Government.

1. To indemnify expropriated British subjects on the same basis as in force
in Old Kingdom.
< 175 >

2. To accord fair compensation for expropriation of rights in forests, town

property, quarries, fisheries etc.
3. To repay to proprietors all arrears of rent etc. collected by Romanian au-
thorities up to date of definitive expropriation.24
In Paris, the French were also negotiating with the matter of foreign subjects
expropriated in Bessarabia. Titulescu having expressed to Guy Laroche (under Sec-
retary for Europe in the French Foreign Ministry) his objections regarding Articles 7
and 9 in the draft treaty, articles added to the initial draft on Britain’s insistence,
Laroche expressed his discontent with the fact that the agrarian law was damaging
for the French subjects in Bessarabia. Titulescu answered that his government was
ready to indemnify the mentioned subjects and promised to study a procedure that
might confirm this undertaking.25
The British government was the first to be informed of the Romanian agree-
ment to resolve the matter. As reported by Rattigan after a meeting with Foreign
Minister Take Ionescu: “He gave me assurances that arrears of rent would be paid to
British proprietors and that they would be compensated for the rights confiscated”.26
The British government considered the assurances satisfactory, but insisted they be
put in writing as soon as possible in order to have the Bessarabian Treaty discussed
at an early date.27
The Romanian minister in France, Dimitrie Ion Ghika, also pressed the French
government into signing the Bessarabian Treaty.28 As soon as he received word of his
government’s resolution regarding the French interests in Bessarabia, he presented it
to the French government: nine French subjects had been identified and their re-
quests sent to the Public Works Ministry; also, as Titulescu had been named Fi-
nance Minister, there would be no problem with the payment, Titulescu having all
the necessary elements in order to ascertain the amounts and the modalities of pay-
ment.29
On June 28, 1920, the Romanian Government agreed to offer written assur-
ances to the British and French governments regarding the payment of increased
indemnities for their subjects expropriated in Bessarabia as a result of the agrarian
law. The modality proposed was an exchange of notes, embodying the assurances
required, between the Romanian Minister in Paris and the Conference of Ambassadors.30
Why did the Romanian government then change its decision, so that instead of
an exchange of notes with the Conference, there was an exchange of notes only with
France and Britain? Was it in order to keep the matter secret from the Romanian or
Russian landowners, who might have asked for the same increased compensations?
Or was it simply because the Romanians understood that the British-French Entente
was the main engine behind the Peace Conference, and no real influence was dis-
cernable from the other Great Powers? It is true that, as it turned out, the French
and British agreement was sufficient for the signing of the Treaty. Consequently,
when the Romanians decided to take the first practical steps in this direction, they
did not call on the Conference but on the British government:
< 176 >

The Romanian government will allow an indemnity to the 13 foreign land-

owners in Bessarabia. The Romanian government will fix the increase in allow-
ance, but we request the Foreign Office to ascertain from owners the value of
their properties. The Romanian government has taken this engagement hoping
that the treaty relating to Bessarabia will soon be signed.31
Satisfied with the proposal, the British government asked Rattigan to offer the
necessary information to the Romanian government, observing, “They are anxious to
push on with signature of treaty; such is also the desire of HMG”.32 Three weeks
later, Rattigan was able to report home that the Romanian government fully agreed
to the British demands: they would pay the two landowners for the expropriated
land, at a value to be established together by the two governments, and the money
would be paid directly to the British government; they would also pay the rent ar-
rears due to the landowners, starting at the moment of expropriation.33 The Roma-
nian willingness to resolve the matter so agreeably can be ascribed to their wish to
see the Bessarabian Treaty signed as soon as possible and the relatively limited
amount of money to be paid.
Anton Bibescu, the Romanian chargé d’affaires in London, continued to press
for the signing of the Treaty, as soon as possible. To strengthen his case and to over-
come the foot-dragging of the French, Bibescu insisted that postponing the Bessara-
bian question or linking it to the general peace negotiations to be opened eventually
with the Soviet government (as suggested by the French), would be considered by
the Romanian government as harmful to the preservation of order in Romania. The
last argument seemed to be convincing for the British: “There is great force in the
Romanian argument about the situation in the East, as the Soviet government may at
any moment make extravagant decisions about Bessarabia”.34
However, although the Romanians agreed to indemnify the British subjects
expropriated in Bessarabia and with all due consideration of the danger posed by the
Soviets, the British government still considered that the Bessarabian Treaty might
prove useful in settling another matter that had been left in suspense by the Romani-
ans: the Minorities Treaty. Therefore, by early August, Bucharest was informed that:
There is another question which obviously affects the Bessarabian settle-

ment, the Minorities Treaty. It is clearly desirable that Romania should facili-
tate the conclusion of the arrangement for the Bessarabian Treaty by ratifying
the Minorities Treaty as soon as possible.35
On August 4, 1920, Titulescu had a meeting with Harold Nicholson (of the
British Foreign Ministry) in which he presented the Romanian solution to the ex-
propriation question (the exchange of letters). He also tried to play on the British-
French competition for influence in Romania, by arguing that, when he visited Paris,
the French government had been very anxious to sign the Bessarabian Treaty but
< 177 >

told him that the British government was largely responsible for the continuing
postponement.36 As it was highly unlikely that the French had blamed the British for
the postponement, Titulescu’s argument was seen as a transparent diplomatic at-
tempt to intensify the pressure for ratification, and it seems to have failed to impress
the British. As stated by British officials:
If we give way over Bessarabia before the ratification of the Minorities

Treaty by Romania we lose a powerful lever without which she will probably
never ratify. I would suggest that the note to Mr. Boerescu [Romanian Minis-
ter to UK] should go forward despite any capital that our French allies may
make out of this at Bucharest. . . .
If the immediate solution of the Bessarabian question is so important to the
Romanians, they have it in their own hands to obtain it. If they will frankly
explain to their Chamber that the ratification of the Minorities Treaty is a con-
dition of obtaining the cession of Bessarabia, they ought to be able to have the
ratification voted at once.37
It should be admitted that, although the idea of tying the ratification of the
Minorities Treaty to the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty came up rather late, it was
immediately embraced by the British. This time, unlike in the case of compensation
for expropriated landowners, the British government, with the French government
immediately backing it, initiated the new condition imposed on the Romanians in
exchange for signing the Bessarabian Treaty.
On August 8, 1920, another meeting took place between Titulescu, Boerescu
and Lord Curzon, with the Romanians stating that the Senate had ratified the Mi-
norities Treaty unanimously and asking for the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty.38
The Romanian government had proven once again how much value it placed on the
Bessarabian Treaty, fulfilling the British condition in a matter of days. It is true the
law for the ratification of the Minorities Treaty (a part of the Peace Treaty with Aus-
tria) had already been slated for debate by the Romanian Parliament. In fact, most
probably the British insistence on the ratification of the Minorities Treaty came as a
result of Romanian internal politics, as the Liberal Party tried to use the Minorities
Treaty as a weapon against the Averescu government.
The Romanians having complied with both British demands, Lord Derby was
instructed to take the necessary action for the official recognition of Bessarabia’s
union with Romania:
His Majesty’s Government were unwilling to sign the Bessarabian Treaty

before Romania had:
a. Given certain assurances in regard to British property in Bessarabia;
b. Ratified the Minorities Treaty.
[Point] (a) has now been complied with and in regard to (b) the Romanian
Senate has ratified the Minorities Treaty.
< 178 >

Please, therefore, arrange with French Government for signature of Bes-

sarabian Treaty directly authoritative information is received as to ratification
by Romanian Chamber, which is daily expected. 39
It should also be noted that, in matters regarding the Bessarabian Treaty, the
British representatives were supposed to consult only their French counterparts and
not the Italians or the Japanese representatives, who were also members of the Con-
ference.
The Romanians understood that the British government was on their side and
they kept up the pressure, informing them of developments regarding the ratification
of the Minorities Treaty and asking for a quick resolution to the Bessarabian ques-
tion.40 Their efforts were successful: Minister Boerescu was informed that the British
government had already instructed his Ambassador in Paris to arrange for the sign-
ing of the Bessarabian Treaty with the least possible delay.41
According to his instructions, Lord Derby asked the French government when
they would be ready to sign, presenting the British view on the matter and dismiss-
ing the French “official” reason for the postponement:
As soon as the Romanians ratify the Minorities Treaty, the British Govern-
ment will be ready to sign the Bessarabian Treaty . . . HMG is of the opinion
that the adherence of the US government to the Treaty is of little real impor-
tance, since the Treaty contains reference to the League, which would make it
practically impossible to secure the ratification of the US. While regretting
therefore that the US government are unable to be a party to the Treaty, HMG
do not feel that their abstention can be adduced as a reason against the prompt
signature and ratification of the Treaty by the Principal Allied Powers.42
The British argument failed to impress the French, who tried to temporize,
maintaining that there was no urgency. They argued that between the ratification of
the Minorities Treaty by Romania and the deposit of that ratification in Paris there
would be a period of a few weeks during which they could easily analyze the situa-
tion. And, in order to completely dissipate the British pressure, after insisting again
on the US adhesion to the treaty, the French proposed waiting until the Soviets
should officially recognize Bessarabia’s union with Romania: “Do the HMG believe
that the Soviet government will accept the cession of Bessarabia and, if so, should we
not wait until the end of the Romanian-Soviet negotiations?43
Notwithstanding the French opposition, as soon as news of the Romanian rati-
fication of the Minorities Treaty reached Paris, Lord Derby insisted again on the
signing, suggesting the first week of September for this action. As he received no
answer from the French government, Lord Derby sent a new Note on September 8,
1920,44 only in order to receive an answer one week later, along the same lines as pre-
viously: we should wait for the US government’s agreement.45
The Romanian Crown Prince Carol visited the UK, and he met the Prime Min-
< 179 >

ister on September 11. During the meeting, Romanian foreign policy was among the
topics, with the Romanians insisting that they could not enter any negotiations with
the Soviets before the Bessarabian Treaty was signed.
Lloyd George: Romania should defend her own frontiers. If she limited her-
self to this she would receive the sympathy of Western Europe and, if attacked,
would probably receive such help as could be spared . . . [T]he difficulty with
the Poles was that they had so far antagonized public opinion that Parliament
had shown itself indisposed to help them . . . it was peace that the world
wanted. It would be an advantage to Romania to get a treaty conferring Bes-
sarabia upon her, signed by some de facto Russian Government. Once Romania
had got Bessarabia in this way it was unlikely that anyone would attack her.
M. Boerescu stated that the Bessarabian Treaty agreed to by the Powers
had not yet been signed. Lord Hardinge told him that the British Ambassador
in Paris had been given full powers to sign, and that there were no difficulties
as regards the British government. He was somewhat puzzled to know why
the signature had not taken place.
The Prime Minister undertook to make inquiries on this point, and in-
structed Sir Maurice Hankey to take the necessary action.46
M. Boerescu thanked the Prime Minister and stated that the Minorities
Treaty had been ratified and all formalities complied with, so that no obstacle
to the Bessarabian Treaty was to be found there.47
Lord Derby made the necessary inquiries again and presented the French posi-
tion, as well as his personal views, to his government:
Even as they did not change their position towards the Bessarabian Treaty,
they still believe it necessary to have the US signature and also to ensure Ro-
mania against troubles in the future with Russia . . . by having the recognition
of both the Soviets and the Southern Russian government for Bessarabia’s ces-
sion. As this is practically tantamount to an indefinite postponement of the
Treaty, I should be glad to know if HMG attach particular importance to its
early signature and if so on what grounds. The first thing to do is to induce the
US government to withdraw their objection and I venture to suggest that the
best way of doing this would be by direct representation at Washington.48
The French position, arguing that the treaty should be postponed for the
spring 1921 in view of the need to wait for the recognition of the union by the Soviets
as well as by the Southern Russian government, received a dim reception in London.
The British displeasure is clearly presented by Alan Leeper:
This new move on the part of the French is as dishonest as it is easily expli-
cable. They are anxious to stand well with General Wrangel and have obvi-
< 180 >

ously given him some assurances in regard to Bessarabia. To postpone signa-

ture of Bessarabian Treaty till Americans, Bolsheviks, General Wrangel’s con-
sent have been obtained is to postpone it till the Greek Calends. I have dis-
cussed this with Mr. Harrison, of the US Embassy in Paris, from every angle
and it is clear that the American consent is unattainable [it would contradict
the Colby Note]. If cession will be made dependent on their consent (Soviets,
General Wrangel) they will naturally attempt all sorts of blackmail at Roma-
nia’s expense (in the Copenhagen conversations, Litvinov agreed to cession).
The Romanians have loyally fulfilled the two preliminary conditions laid down
by HMG; our word is therefore pledged. Lord Derby should be informed that in
the opinion of HMG the Treaty should be signed at once and that in the event
of the Allied governments withholding their signature, HMG will have no
course open but to attach their signature alone.49
Following the line suggested by Leeper, Lord Derby received the necessary instruc-
tions:
. . . French attitude, which is presumably affected by obligations under-

taken towards General Wrangel, cannot be allowed to influence position of
HMG explained to you in my telegrams. On August 19 I informed Romanian
Chargé d’Affaires that I had “instructed HMG Ambassador at Paris to arrange
for the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty with the least possible delay”. I can-
not therefore agree to the indefinite postponement that would be required in
order to obtain American consent and that of the Soviet Government and Gen-
eral Wrangel.
Please therefore at next meeting propose to Ambassador’s Conference that
treaty should be signed next week and inform your colleagues that while strongly
hoping that they will sign the treaty you have instructions to attach your own signature to it
in any case.50
As can be seen, the British position was a decisive factor in signing the Bessara-
bian Treaty during 1920. The British pressure was very influential in convincing the
French that the time had come to sign the Bessarabian Treaty, even as they insisted
on further postponements — as they needed time to see how the things would
evolve in the Russian-Polish war. The British representatives found the best means
to modify this policy, by insisting that they were prepared to be the only Power to
sign the treaty. The last argument proved to make the difference for France, who was
unwilling to risk seeing all her influence in Romania disappear over night. The
French were also aware that, with the UK being the only Great Power pressing for
signature, the view from Bucharest could not be to France’s advantage.51 Therefore,
the French government finally came up with a time frame for the signing of the Bes-
sarabian Treaty: they insisted that the US government should be asked once more to
< 181 >

sign, but this time in common by all the members of the Conference, with October
25 as the deadline for their answer.52
Following his instructions, Lord Derby kept pressing the French government,
informing it that his government opposed any new postponement and that he was
quite prepared to be the only Ambassador to sign.53
The British held firm to their decision to sign the Bessarabian Treaty as soon as
possible. Just a few days later, the Ambassadors Conference suggested that, as a con-
dition for signing the Bessarabian Treaty, the Romanian Government should be
asked to sign two other treaties (Central European Frontiers Treaty and the Treaty
regarding the obligations taken over by the inheriting States of the ex-Austria-
Hungarian monarchy, signed at Sèvres on August 10, 1920), but the British govern-
ment opposed this suggestion as a new postponement. As noted by Alan Leeper: “I
submit that the willingness of HMG to sign the Bessarabian Treaty at once should
not be made conditional on Romania’s will to sign the other two treaties, although it
is well to press them to do so”.54 Once again, Lord Curzon entirely followed Leeper’s
opinion: “Desirable though it be that Romanian signature of other two treaties be
obtained now, it cannot be made a condition sine qua non of your signature of the Bes-
sarabian treaty to which . . . HMG are now unconditionally pledged.”55
Apart from pressuring the French, the British government was also taking
steps in order to obtain the adhesion of the British Dominions to the Bessarabian
Treaty. Although the representatives for the Dominions agreed in principle to sign
the Treaty, they asked for the Treaty to be left open for signature by them for a
month, as had been done in other cases. Their motivation was simple: they had not
been supplied with copies of the draft. The Dominions’ request was quickly ap-
proved by the Conference, and a protocol was drafted allowing the Dominions to
sign up to one month after the principal signatories.56
After the Romanian answer to the proposed Draft Treaty was received in Paris
(October 11), negotiations regarding the modification requested by the Romanian
Government took place in London, during the visit of the Romanian Foreign Minis-
ter, Take Ionescu. In Paris, Lord Derby considered the Romanian amendments in-
convenient and asked for instructions:
Failing agreement regarding Chilia mouth at the Danube Conference which

Romanians could block, the status quo would, according to new Romanian
draft, be maintained; i.e. the Romanian Government would evade the obliga-
tion which they contracted as a result of discussions in May which virtually
assured the placing of the Chilia mouth under the Danube Commission.57
Alan Leeper, who was in charge of negotiating the proposed modifications

with Romania, best expresses the British position:
This is most unfortunate as it may invoke further delay.

The Romanian proposal to omit paragraph 1 of Article 7 and simply to leave
< 182 >

the question to the general Danube Conference, without undertaking necessar-

ily to accept its decision, is quite unsatisfactory. The Romanian delegates are
quite incorrect in saying that when the question was discussed in London in
May 1920 it was laid down that the question of the Chilia Branch should be
settled by the Danube Conference. It was in fact agreed in the conversation
between Titulescu, General Mance and myself, and was afterwards approved,
that in any case the Chilia Branch should pass under the same regime as the
other mouths of the Danube, unless the Danube Conference took another deci-
sion. At the time the Romanians hoped that they might be able at the Confer-
ence to secure the merging of the European Commission of the Mouths of Da-
nube into the new international Commission for controlling the general course
of the river. This they failed to do and the European Commission remains in
existence according to the Treaty of Versailles. I do not see any way out of this
except to remind Titulescu of the agreement we made and to tell him that the
present formula suggested by the Romanian delegation is not at all the same
thing.
Secondly, the Romanian delegation proposes the addition in line 5 of Arti-
cle 9 of words “not provided for” (non prevus) after “details”. This entirely
changes the character of the article, which was deliberately drafted in order to
safeguard under the control of the signatory parties the rights of Russia to
state her case on the subject with regard to any violation of her interest, which
may have been committed owing to the fact that she has not been represented
in the negotiations. Still, this could be arranged somehow.58
The fact that the Romanians understood that their proposed amendments
would be negotiated in London and not in Paris might be considered as one more
proof of the leading role played by the UK in the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty.
On the other hand, as it was the British government that added Articles 7 and 9 to
the initial draft, it was normal for the Romanians to discuss them in London and not
in Paris.
In fact, the Danube question played an important role in the British decision
not only to sign but also to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty. It was this specific problem
in the Bessarabian Treaty that triggered the intervention of the British ambassadors
in Japan, France and Italy in asking for ratification at the end of 1923. Article No. 7 of
the Treaty in fact transferred the Mouth of Chilia Branch to the jurisdiction of the
European Commission.59 This proves once again the pragmatist British policy: while
they were against any French postponement in signing the treaty, they were unwill-
ing to sign a treaty in which their interests would be impinged. In fact the Romani-
ans were more concerned with the territorial questions and did not consider the Da-
nube a vital question during the Peace Conference; it was only later that they started
a forceful campaign to resolve the question in Romania’s favor.60
On October 18, 1920, Titulescu and Leeper met twice, focusing on the proposed
Romanian modifications to the draft treaty. Leeper said,
< 183 >

Titulescu willingly agreed to drop the words “non prevus” and to insert in-
stead of them, between “present treaty” and “as well as any difficulties”, the
words “with the exception of matters regarding the frontiers as defined by the
present Treaty and of Romania’s sovereignty”. I submit that this formula
should be accepted.
The Chilia question is much more difficult. Titulescu declared that he had
no intention, and I believe that this is true, of altering the agreement made in
London in May, except in so far as the Danube Conference has already altered
the position. All he wishes is to reserve the right to discuss the Chilia question
at the Conference, to whose decision, whatever it might be, he will bow. I
could not offer him any assurances, as we prefer the May 1920 formula. I do not
think we could accept Mr. Titulescu’s proposal without obtaining Colonel
Baldwin’s views first, for everything depends on whether we can feel sure of
the Danube Conference supporting our view. This means further delay, as it is
clear from Lord Derby’s telegram that General Mance is not satisfied.
The proposed note on the subject of compensations for British interests
seems quite satisfactory. . . .
Titulescu, in a further conversation with me yesterday evening agreed to go
a step further and add the words “and Romania will accept the decision of the
Conference”. If then we can rely on the Conference deciding in favor of our
viewpoint, there should be no further obstacle to signing.61
Describing the same meetings some 20 years later, Titulescu had a somewhat
different view of the proceedings. While making no mention of the Chilia question,
in which he failed, he stressed the opposition of the British diplomats to modifying
Article 9, as they considered the Russians to have an inalienable right to appeal in
questions regarding their former province, and presented the compromise formula
that had been reached for Article No 9:
The right to make appeal should be maintained but it must not extend to the
Romanian sovereignty over Bessarabia and to her borders. And the Englishmen
agreed with this last formula, as it would not have been equivalent to refusing
the right to appeal.62
Based on a letter written by Nicolae Titulescu to King Carol II in August 1939,

A. Karetki and A. Pricop consider that in fact it was Titulescu who initiated the pro-
posed modifications because he was dissatisfied with the wordings of Articles No. 7
and 9, and they praise him for defending Romanian interests.63 However, the matter
was not that simple. Whereas the above may be true for Article 9, the situation re-
garding Article 7 was quite different, as is shown by the British documents. Tit-
ulescu had already agreed in May 1920 with the British condition regarding the
Chilia Branch of Danube and, in October, he offered once again a compromise solu-
tion by offering Romania’s acceptance of the decision taken by the Danube Confer-
< 184 >

ence in Paris regarding the Chilia Branch. This compromise solution was already a
step back from the initial amendment asked by the Romanians for Article 7.
The question is, who or what was behind the proposed modification of Article
7, since neither Titulescu nor Ionescu seemed too keen to back it up? Was it sug-
gested in order to increase the chances for acceptance of the proposed modification
to Article 9, or only in order to quiet those among the political opposition who were
critical of their handling of the Danube question? The question remains particularly
opaque as the British government seemed willing to come to a compromise solution
regarding Article 7 on the line suggested by Titulescu during his second meeting
with Leeper on October 18, and was quite surprised when the Romanians decided to
entirely drop that proposed modification.64
Lord Derby received new instructions outlining the agreement that was
reached: the modification agreed with regard to Article 9, and the new solution
found for Article 7 (with the Draft Note prepared by Malkin); and the agreement of
the British Board of Trade for the proposed formula for indemnification of British
subjects in Bessarabia.65
A new conversation between Take Ionescu and Lord Curzon took place in
London on October 21, 1920. Although the main topic was the future Balkan Entente,
with the British favoring the creation of a Little Entente whereas the Romanians
wanted a larger one, the question of Bessarabia was also taken into discussion. The
Romanians asked the British opinion of the Romanian-Russian negotiations, and
Lord Curzon insisted again that an arrangement should be concluded without delay.
He also considered, unlike the Romanians or the French, that any agreement on Bes-
sarabia signed with the Soviet Government would in all probability have, after the
fall of the Soviets, a sort of binding force upon its successors and would not be detri-
mental to Romania’s long-term interests.66 The British insistence that the Romani-
ans secure an agreement with the Soviets was exactly the opposite of the French
position, with Take Ionescu clearly favoring the later.
The final British-Romanian negotiations regarding the signing of the Bessara-
bian Treaty took place in Paris, on October 26-27, 1920. The Romanian Minister to
France, Dimitrie Ion Ghika, handed over to Lord Derby the Note regarding the spe-
cial indemnification for British subjects expropriated in Bessarabia, on October 26,
to which Lord Derby answered on October 27. Then, as a result of a conversation
between Lord Derby and Take Ionescu, the latter agreed to withdraw the Romani-
ans’ proposed amendment to Article 7 of the Treaty.67
On October 28, 1920, Lord Derby was able to report to his Government that
the Bessarabian Treaty had been signed by the representatives of all the Great Pow-
ers with the exception of the Japanese Ambassador, who was not in Paris. He also
mentioned the only voice that raised objections to the signing of the Treaty: “The US
Ambassador took the opportunity to protest against what he described as the inop-
portune dismemberment of Russia”.68
< 185 >

The Ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty
And so the Bessarabian Treaty was signed. In the period that followed, British-
Romanian relations were not very different from before. Most of the diplomatic cor-
respondence between the two states was related to economic matters, the most im-
portant being those regarding the exploitation of Romanian petroleum, the repara-
tions by the UK and France for the destruction of the Romanian oil fields in 1916,69
Romania’s war and pre-war debt, the conditions for obtaining new loans in the UK,
and the negative consequences for British capital of the Romanian policy of eco-
nomic self-sufficiency, prin noi insine, or “doing it by ourselves”.
In the field of politics, the British government observed the relations between
Romania and her neighbors, the creation of the Little Entente, and the special rela-
tionship between Romania and Poland. Among the differences between the two
states were questions related to the evolution of the newly unified territories, and
especially Transylvania. The British Government had been quite open to the com-
plaints expressed by the ethnic Hungarians living in Romania (they even set out to
call the attention of the League of Nations to what appeared to be a violation of the
Minorities Treaty by Romania, in February 1923, but French opposition stopped
them), and public opinion in the UK slowly shifted in favor of Hungary in its conflict
with Romania.70 Regarding Bessarabia, the British Government continued to observe
and analyze the situation in the region. Herbert G. Dering, the UK Minister to Ro-
mania, sent this report in late February 1922:
There was probably a moment in the earlier days of the Averescu Admini-
stration when the menacing telegrams sent here by Cicerin were considered by
the Foreign Minister to be more formidable than he decided them to be later
[referring to the ultimatums sent to Romania during the summer of 1920]. For
that reason he studiously avoided their publication for fear of alarming the Ro-
manian public in regard to Bessarabia, where the internal conditions were, and
still remain, far from satisfactory. It is difficult to see how they could be other-
wise, with a population of so many of Russian origin, and when the Dniestr
frontier is as laxly guarded by the Romanian troops as it is known to be. Propa-
ganda is freely disseminated there by Jewish Bolshevik agents, who cross the
river by means of bribery, and the people are far from content with Roma-
nian rule.71
The UK had been the first of the signatory countries to both ask for the ratifi-
cation of the Bessarabian Treaty and to deposit the necessary instruments for the
ratification. As soon as June 8, 1921, during a meeting of the Ambassadors Confer-
ence, the British Ambassador suggested that it would be wise to have all the ratifica-
tions deposited at the same moment, informing the Conference that his government
had already taken the necessary steps for the ratification.72
The British government’s ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty was not wel-
< 186 >

come news to the British representatives in Romania. As they had to deal with the
question of Romanian indemnification for the British landowners expropriated in
Bessarabia (and with their complaints), they were afraid that ratification prior to the
fulfillment of the obligations assumed by the exchange of letters would result in Ro-
mania’s refusal to pay. Millington Drake, one of the British Legation’s secretaries,
sent the following telegram on August 1921:
I understand that we have ratified the Bessarabian Treaty. Have we depos-

ited the ratification? If so, does the Protocol refer to the exchange of notes in
Paris on October 26? Or, if the protocol of the ratification has not yet been
drawn up, is it intended that, when drawn up, it shall contain a reference to
this stipulation as a condition of ratification? I have been going thoroughly into
cases under this guarantee and they have received practically no satisfaction.
One of the lawyers of the “sinistres” has hinted that it is doubtful whether this
exchange of notes could not be repudiated on the ground that, though it in-
volves payment, it has not received sanction from the Romanian Chamber.73
After three weeks Drake received a reply from London:
The last we heard as to ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty is that on the

8th June last the Conference decided to invite the Allied Powers signatory of
the Treaty to proceed to immediate ratification. We are asking the Parliament
how the matter stands and requesting them to expedite ratification if the de-
posit has not yet taken place.
As regarding your suggestion that some conditions should be attached to
the deposit of the ratification providing for a reaffirmation of the Romanian
undertaking as to Bessarabian claims, we consider that as these notes were
sufficiently explicit, and as Mr. Take Ionescu has recently emphasized to you
his recognition of the fact, it would not be necessary to adopt so abnormal a proceeding
as to include in the final protocol a reference to this exchange of notes.74
The answer to Drake’s telegram is interesting for two reasons: it indicates

where the ratification process stood in August 1921; and it shows that there were
always differences in how that matter looked from Bucharest and from London. The
last comment shows that the suggestions coming from the British representatives
overseas were not always welcome in London.
The whole matter shows how much Romania’s image with the members of the
British Legation in Bucharest had changed since Frank Rattigan was recalled. In this
sense, it seems that at least Drake was completely under the influence of the three
expropriated landowners, and gave no credit to the Romanian government. His dis-
trust of Romania’s willingness to meet its international obligations was, as proven
by the final settlement of the matter, quite unjustified, especially as a quite limited
amount of money was at stake (some 300,000 Pounds Sterling). The British govern-
ment had been quite keen from the beginning to avoid inserting any mention of im-
< 187 >

mediate private interests into the Bessarabian Treaty; Drake’s suggestion was ex-
actly the opposite of this position. Trying to justify his mistake, and further illustrat-
ing his distrust of the Romanians, Drake sent a new letter home arguing his case:
My letter of August 10 was written just a few days before I saw Take
Ionescu at Sinaia, when he repeated his assurance that they would keep to
their bargain. There had been some rather disquieting indications and I must
say I was pleasantly surprised at the earnestness with which he said that they
would carry out their undertaking. All the same he then immediately tried to
put off the first step towards its fulfillment, regarding the counter-evaluation.
But what I had in mind in my letter to Malkin was the possible attitude of
another government or another Foreign Minister; say a year or two years
hence. The successors would probably be the Liberals and they are distinctly ill
disposed, especially as regards any obligations undertaken by Romania in
Paris.
I quite understand that, as you say, mention of the exchange of notes in the
ratification would be abnormal, but then it is also unusual that the signing of a
treaty should be so entirely conditional on an agreement contained in an ex-
change of notes, as was the Bessarabian Treaty. At least, so I understood.
We have seen that there is a long distance between Take Ionescu’s under-
taking and fulfillment of it by him. But the distance between Ionescu’s under-
taking and fulfillment by his successors would, I think, be infinite. My own
feeling is that once the Bessarabian Treaty is ratified in the ordinary way, our
chances of getting anything substantial out of the Romanian government
would be very thin. . . .
In any case, when the case comes for the deposit of ratification it would
perhaps be well that there should be a pause to see how far the Romanian gov-
ernment have, at that moment, fulfilled their obligation. If little or no further
progress has been made by then, ratification might perhaps be suspended for a
while; or it might be worth while your consulting French government whether
any stipulation could be put into the ratification.75
Notwithstanding Drake’s suggestions, the British government took the neces-

sary steps for the deposit of ratification and instructed Hardinge of Penhurst, the
new British Ambassador in Paris, in this sense:
My Lord, with reference to paragraph 8 of Your Excellency’s telegram of June 8,

I should be glad to learn whether the Protocol for the ratification of Bessara-
bian Treaty has yet been deposited. Should this not be the case, I would sug-
gest that the French government might be asked to expedite the process of this
ratification.76
Lord Hardinge answered as follows, giving the reasons for the British post-
ponement in depositing the ratification:
< 188 >

The French do not regard the matter as one of particular urgency, espe-
cially in view of the fact that none of the Signatories other than HMG are yet
ready to deposit their ratification, not even the Romanian government itself,
the only party which can have any special interest in the matter.77
In February 1922, with an eye on the upcoming Genoa Conference, the British
government decided to take the final step and to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty. A
memorandum on Bessarabia was prepared by the Foreign Office, presenting a review
of the main phases in the making of the treaty as well as some comments regarding
its actual situation:
The presence of a Russian delegation at the Genoa Conference will pre-

sumably entail the recognition of the Soviet government, provided they are pre-
pared to give satisfactory assurances regarding Russia’s debts . . . and a simple
way out of any difficulty would be to make their acceptance of the Bessarabian
Treaty one of the conditions for recognition. They will then under Article No. 9
be at liberty to appeal to the League of Nations in any smaller point they might
wish to raise. The Soviets have apparently tried to strike a bargain with Roma-
nia on this question . . . Romania would probably be wise to conclude a bargain
on these lines, as the gold is almost certainly spent, but I admit that we can
scarcely ask her to do so.
The US will probably maintain their attitude and France, provided she gets
assurances regarding Russian debts, will almost certainly be unwilling to risk
them for Romania by insisting on Russia’s adherence to the Treaty if the Sovi-
ets show great opposition.78
As anticipated at the Foreign Office, during the March 15, 1922 Conference of the
Ambassadors in Paris, the Bessarabian Treaty came again under debate:
Mr. Cambon [Jules Cambon, the French representative] pointed out the
desirability of bringing the Bessarabian Treaty into force before the meeting of
the Genoa Conference, so as to prevent any discussion at Genoa as regards the
validity of the transfer of Bessarabia to Romania. At present HMG alone has
ratified this treaty. The French Government are now taking measures to ratify
it in their turn, and it was decided to invite the Italian and Japanese Embassies
to urge their Governments to do likewise.79
In order to answer the French proposal, the British government instructed

Lord Hardinge as follows:
There may be some delay in depositing the King’s ratification of this instru-
ment, owing to the necessity of making arrangements to meet the position of
< 189 >

the Irish Free State. HMG have, however, no intention or desire to postpone
the deposit on its merits; on the contrary, they are of the opinion that the
treaty should, if possible, be ratified by all concerned before the opening of the
Genoa Conference.80
On March 28, 1922, Lord Curzon informed Lord Hardinge that there was no
longer any reason why the King’s ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty should not be
deposited.81 As a result, on April 14, a few days after the beginning of the Genoa Con-
ference, Hardinge of Penhurst, the British Ambassador in Paris, deposited the neces-
sary instruments for the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty. There was no imme-
diate reaction from the Soviet Union. In fact, the British ratification received little
space in the press at the time, passing almost unobserved.
The fact that the UK was the first signatory state to ratify the Bessarabian
Treaty (even while there were still some complaints regarding the property of Brit-
ish citizens in Bessarabia, as was the case with France) as well as the first state to
ask for ratification, shows that at least one of the four signatory Great Powers hon-
ored her signature without linking it to other new matters. The ratification was even
more significant if we consider that it comes from a State that was understood by
the Romanians as neutral towards them and not from France, whom the Romanians
had perceived as the friendliest Great Power. And more, although its deposit was
delayed, the British ratification preceded by almost one year the ratification of the
state with the greatest interest in the Treaty — namely, Romania.
One of the interesting aspects of the British ratification is that it was followed
by almost no reaction in the mass media, neither British nor Romanian nor Soviet.
There are three possible reasons for this silence: (1) the British were in the middle of
a new round of negotiations with the Soviets and they had no interest to advertise
their deposit of the ratification, as it would have influenced the mentioned negotia-
tions; (2) the Romanians avoided any publicity due to the fact that the British ratifi-
cation came ahead of theirs and it might have had a negative effect over the image of
the Romanian government; (3) the French and the Italians also had no interest in
advertising the British ratification, since the only result would have been to increase
the pressure for their ratification.
The UK Position after Ratifying the Bessarabian Treaty
Ratifying the Bessarabian Treaty did not mean that the British Government
would stop following the Bessarabian situation closely in the coming years. Any time
the Romanian Government was afraid of a possible communist invasion from the
East, the British representatives were informed and asked for their opinion. In the
reports prepared after such meetings, they usually made a careful analysis of the
situation, which proves that they were still collecting important information in the
area. Herbert Dering sent this report from Bucharest, in May 1922:
< 190 >

M. Duca [Romanian Foreign Minister] called on me . . . on the subject of

the concentration of Soviet troops which was alleged to be in progress in the
neighborhood of the Bessarabian frontier . . .
I am of the opinion that the Romanian authorities are quite capable of deal-
ing with local disturbances in that province, but that it is as well that they
should take in good time any military precautions which they consider neces-
sary, in view of limited means of transport, especially in Bessarabia . . . 82
On October 13, 1925, Dering presented another report after a meeting with
Walter Collins, an Intelligence officer who had just visited Bessarabia, describing
the situation in the province:
He could not report conditions in Bessarabia to be satisfactory, although

admitting that there had been no frontier disturbances during his tour.
The Romanian gendarmeries were, as everywhere, highly unpopular. The
Moldavian peasants in Bessarabia proclaimed themselves dissatisfied with
conditions under Romanian rule and many complaints were heard of corrupt
tax collectors, but the Romanian military authorities were, on the other hand,
he reported, popular now on all sides . . . He had gathered that a great amount
of Bolshevist propaganda was carried out and money distributed by resident
Jews and that arms could be smuggled across the Dniestr without much diffi-
culty . . . there was no particular cause to anticipate active unrest.
It might therefore be concluded that unless active encouragement were
afforded by the Soviet military aggression in Bessarabia there is not at present
much likelihood of disturbances in that province, which is subject to military
law, apparently rendered with good intent acceptable to the inhabitants.83
On the other hand, the British government continued pursuing the matter of
compensations for the British landowners expropriated in Bessarabia. In October
1922 an agreement was reached between the Romanian and British governments
regarding the amount to be paid and the mode of payment: 332,306 Sterling Lira pay-
able in consolidation bonds (made out in Sterling) and carrying 4% interest.84 On
December 14, 1922, the Romanian government sent a Note to the British and French
Legations by which they agreed to include the indemnities due by the Romanian
government to the French and British landowners expropriated in Bessarabia in the
law for consolidation of Romanian external debt, as suggested by the British and
French governments.85 This was quite the opposite of what Millington Drake had
envisaged one year earlier.
As the compensation issue seemed to be coming to an end, the British
government proved to be a very good manager of its resources and instructed
Dering to “ . . . ensure that the expenditure incurred in connection with the evalua-
tion of the properties is repaid by the claimants as soon as they receive payment from
the Romanian government.”86
< 191 >

In November-December 1923, the British Government took a last initiative in

order to bring the Bessarabian Treaty into force. This time it directly asked the Japa-
nese, French and Italian Governments to take the necessary steps for the ratification,
indicating that:
Difficulties have arisen with the Romanian representatives at the European
Commission of the Danube as to the application of Article No. 7 of the Treaty
regarding Bessarabia signed in Paris on October 28, 1920. The Romanian Gov-
ernment has declined to be bound by this Article so long as the Treaty is not
ratified by all its signatories.87
This initiative clearly shows one of the main reasons for Britain’s insistence on
bringing the Bessarabian Treaty into force. More or less coincidentally, at the end of
October a controversy came up between Romania and the other members in the Da-
nube Commission, and the Romanians decided to block navigation on the Chilia.
They argued that, as the Bessarabian Treaty had not been ratified, the Commission
could not use Article No. 7 regarding the Chilia mouth, at least not until France and
Italy had ratified. The Commission argued back that the Romanian position might
be presented to France or Italy, signatories of the Bessarabian Treaty, but not to the
Commission, which had a neutral status.88 However, the British government realized
that there was still a long way to go until that would happen, and they set out to
resolve the question of the status of the Danube by other means.
The British stance on Bessarabia seemed about to change in February 1924,
when the UK officially recognized the Soviet Union. At that time there was a small
diplomatic controversy around the Bessarabian question. The Soviet Government
considered that:
The British government has accorded de jure recognition to the Government
of the USSR, whose authority extends over the entire territory of the former
Russian Empire, with the exception of territories that have seceded by agree-
ment with it and have formed independent states.
By accepting this wording, Britain recognized the sovereignty of the Soviet
Government over the entire territory of the USSR as well as over territories
whose seizure had not been recognized by the Soviet Union, for example Bess-
arabia.89
The British thesis was different; while de jure recognizing the Soviet govern-
ment, the British government was very keen to note that it was referring to the
“former Russian territories that have accepted its authority”.90 In so doing, the Brit-
ish, even as they were making a “friendly” gesture towards the Soviets, did not hesi-
tate to confirm Bessarabia’s possession by Romania; the independent Moldavian re-
public was clearly a territory that refused to accept the Soviet authority.
The Bessarabian question continued to be scrutinized not only by the officials
of the Foreign Office but by British politicians as well. The Parliamentary interpella-
tions are significant in that they represent the official position of the British Govern-
ment towards the Bessarabian question.
While the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty by the British government
< 192 >

went almost unobserved by the British Parliament,91 the French ratification pro-
voked a number of interpellations in both Houses of the Parliament. One took place
on March 10, 1924:
Sir Archibald Sinclair: [asked] whether the Bessarabian Treaty has been
deposited with the League and, if not, when it is proposed to do so; and what
has been the cause of the delay?
The Prime Minister: The treaty has not yet been deposited with the League,
because the deposit of the ratification by all the signatory Powers has not yet
been completed in Paris, in accordance with Article No. 9 of the Treaty. The
only signatory powers which have ratified the Treaty so far are Great Britain
and Romania.92
On April 29, 1924 the Ormsby-Gore interpellation regarding the present stage
of negotiations between Romania and Russia, also touching the Bessarabian Treaty
question, took place in the House of Commons:
Ormsby-Gore: [asked] which other countries have ratified the Bessarabian
Treaty, and whether, both as a member of the League and on account of our
other treaty obligations, we are bound to support Romania in resisting any
attempt on the part of Russia to violate the frontier of Bessarabia?
Mr. Ponsonby: . . . only Great Britain and Romania have ratified. . . . As re-
gards the last part of the question, the Treaty is not yet in force, and therefore
HMG is not bound by its terms. Whether HMG would, as a member of the
League of Nations, be bound to take action in the event specified must natu-
rally depend upon the circumstances of the case.93
The British position was clearly expressed: until all the signatory Powers rati-
fied the Bessarabian Treaty, the treaty was not binding on the UK. This thesis is
definitely different from the one developed later by the Romanians, who considered
that the importance of the Bessarabian Treaty resides in the fact that three European
Great Powers had recognized de jure the union of Bessarabia with Romania.
Unfortunately, as the interpellation proves, the British government failed to
consider its ratification of the Treaty as sufficient to create specific obligations to-
wards Romania in case of a Russian attack, unless the Treaty came into force. How-
ever, even then, as the League of Nations was supposed to deal with all matters re-
lated to the Treaty, there were no special obligations stipulated in it for any of the
signatory Great Powers individually in case of a Soviet attack on Bessarabia.
That things were not in fact as the Romanians described them is proved by a
new interpellation in the House of Commons, on May 7, 1924:
Sir Archibald Sinclair: [asked] whether this Treaty is legally binding upon
those countries which have ratified it, or whether it will have to be ratified by
all the signatories before it will become binding upon those who have already
ratified?
< 193 >

Mr. Ponsonby: . . . The Treaty becomes binding when all the signatories
have ratified.94
The British position clearly shows that, as a direct consequence of the Japanese
failure to ratify, not even the UK government felt that the Bessarabian Treaty should
be binding on them despite their own efforts to have it signed and ratified. The indi-
rect consequence was that after the Second World War the UK and France had a
free hand in handling the Bessarabian problem, and neither of them took any step
against the Soviet seizure of the province. The Japanese government, in deciding not
to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty, were fully aware of the interpretation given by the
HMG to the ratification question, and in 1927 realized full well how important its
ratification (or, better said, non-ratification) was to the Soviet Union.
Another interpellation regarding Bessarabia took place in the House of Com-
mons on May 26, 1924, at the initiative of Lt-commander Kenworthy. This time the
British position on the Bessarabian Treaty was questioned from a different perspec-
tive, that of the Rakovsky-Averescu Treaty of March 1918. When Kenworthy asked
whether HMG was aware of this treaty when it agreed to recognize the Romanian
annexation of Bessarabia, he simply received an affirmative answer but nothing
more. Although Kenworthy insisted on more information regarding the actual Brit-
ish position towards the Bessarabian treaty he was denied an answer. Another mem-
ber of the Chamber, Sir Harry Britain, tried to respond, reminding him that the Brit-
ish position on Bessarabia when the treaty was signed was based on sound geo-
graphical and ethnic data proving that Bessarabia is Romanian territory.95
One week after this interpellation, on June 2, 1924, Kenworthy stood up again:
Kenworthy: [asked] what obligations HMG has entered into with regard
to the Romanian annexation of Bessarabia; whether this country guarantees
that annexation in any way; whether a treaty has been drawn up; whether it
has been ratified by HMG and by the other governments concerned; whether it
is now in operation; and whether it has been or will be laid before Parliament.
The Prime Minister: . . . the entire question of Bessarabia is to be found in
the treaties; that the Bessarabian Treaty had been ratified by Great Britain,
France and Romania but not by the Italian and Japanese governments and it is
therefore not yet in force. . . . In order to answer the point regarding the British
ratification, I would refer you to Command Paper 1747 of 1922. . . . I think that
it has been laid before Parliament. If it has been laid at all, it has been in the
ordinary form.
Captain Berkeley: . . . the attention drawn by the press to the very serious
situation on the Bessarabian border, and may we have an undertaking that no
obligations will be undertaken by this country in that connection without the
approval of the Parliament?
The Prime Minister: There are no obligations involved in the treaty.96
< 194 >

On June 18, 1924, Sir Harry Britain reopened the Bessarabian Treaty question,
asking again for information on the actual situation on the Bessarabian border, but
he too received no answer. However, unlike the previous cases, this time the initia-
tive was made in order to help the Romanian cause in Bessarabia:
Sir H. Britain: [stated that] in view of the fact that, with the exception of
the period of Russian occupation, Bessarabia has been for centuries Romanian
territory, that the majority of population is of Romanian stock speaking the
Romanian tongue, and seeing that any suggestion of a plebiscite at this date
would be both useless and dangerous, [he would] urge that no step in this di-
rection would be taken without the approval of the League of Nations.
M. Ponsonby: No, Sir. HMG are not directly concerned in this question,
and could not properly take the action suggested.
Sir H. Britain: Will they agree not to remain supine if the question devel-
ops, because it will have a most serious effect on the whole of the Balkans?97
Not one to give up easily, Sir Harry Britain asked again on June 23, 1924, for
official information regarding the situation on the Bessarabian border; but he was
once more denied an answer.98
As for the Bessarabian Treaty itself there had been two more interpellations, on
July 7, 1924 (Sir John Simon), and April 1, 1925 (Harry Britain), but with no particu-
lar significance since they only asked what was the actual status of the Treaty, and
received the answer that nothing had changed.99
One of the most curious things about the Bessarabian Treaty is that so few of
those who, at one point or another, referred to it had actually read the Treaty itself
(which they could easily have done, as the Treaty was not secret). There were not
only diplomats and political leaders but also journalists who had no idea of the
stipulations included in the Bessarabian Treaty and who simply fell victim to either
the Romanian or the Soviet propaganda. There can scarcely be any other explanation
for the failure of so many persons to understand that the treaty would come into
force only when all the signatories had ratified it. The mentioned exchanges in the
British Parliament, and the reaction of the press in the aftermath of the Italian ratifi-
cation, are illustrative.
In 1927, when Italy ratified the Treaty, the British government received the
ratification with pleasure. Still, that pleasure was caused more by the possibility of
drawing Italy much closer into its conflict with the Soviet Union and not by the rati-
fication itself. It was hoped that Mussolini’s decision to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty
meant a step toward a British-Italian alliance against the Soviets.
For the last time the Bessarabian Treaty came to the attention of the Chamber
on February 5 and 26, 1930. The first interpellation read:
< 195 >

Mr. Allen: [asked] whether, in accordance with Article No. 9 of the Bes-
sarabian Treaty, HMG, having recognized the government of the USSR, pro-
poses to consult with the other High Contracting Parties to the Treaty who
have pursued the same course with a view to inviting Russia to adhere to the
Treaty?
A. Henderson: No, Sir, this question does not arise, since the Treaty is not
yet in force.100
The second interpellation shows that not all of those with an interest in the
Bessarabian Treaty had failed to do their homework:
Mr. Allen: [asked] whether, in view of the ratification of the treaty respect-
ing Bessarabia, signed in Paris on October 28, 1920, by the governments of
Great Britain on April 14, 1922, Romania on May 19, 1922, France on April 30,
1924, and by Italy on March 8, 1927, HMG have received any communication
from the Japanese government stating the reasons for the non-ratification of
the Bessarabian Treaty.
A. Henderson: No, Sir, HMG have received no communication on this sub-
ject from the Japanese government.101
Although there had been a good number of reasons behind the British decision
to push for the signing and ratifying of the Bessarabian Treaty, by 1940, due to stra-
tegic considerations, the British position on Bessarabia had changed radically. The
British government tried to back the Soviet claims to Bessarabia, with a view to pro-
voking a conflict between Germany and the Soviets over Romania in order to take
the “German heat” off the British Isles. This plan failed, the Bessarabian question
having already been settled by the Soviet-German Pact of August 23, 1939, but dur-
ing the war the British government was clearly on the Soviets’ side regarding the
conflict over Bessarabia. With the Soviets emerging as a world power, the strategic
situation changed as much as it had when the peace was negotiated at the end of
World War Two. There were no British (or French) calls now for a Romanian Bes-
sarabia, nor even for a plebiscite in Bessarabia.
< 196 >

Annex
Report, Frank Rattigan (Bucharest) to Lord Curzon

DBFP, Series 1, Vol. 6, p.280-283
Bucharest, October 8, 1919

My Lord,
The relations between this country and the Allies appear to me to be reaching
so serious a state that I venture to draw the attention of your Lordship to certain
aspects of the situation which are perhaps easier to comprehend here than abroad.
I cannot help thinking that an atmosphere has been created by a chain of extra-
neous circumstances which is obscuring the main issue. It would seem that the first
question we should ask ourselves in deciding upon our policy in the Near East is
“What are the chief elements of order upon which we can rely to carry out that pol-
icy?” Romania is in my opinion the first of such elements, if not the only real one. The
fact that the country has for some time past been exploited by a gang of unscrupu-
lous politicians is apt to blind the eyes of the average foreign observer to the real
qualities of this people. The mass of the population, and especially the peasant
classes, are simple primitive people, with many of the virtues one would expect to
find in such conditions as exist here. They are, for example, sober, hard working,
easily contented, fairly honest, and above all orderly. These characteristics of the
population make Romania very unfruitful soil for the propagation of the new com-
muno-socialism. In fact the peasants are fiercely hostile to the idea and will oppose
with all their power any attempt to pool their small properties. In these circum-
stances there is little doubt that Romania may be relied on to resist any Bolshevist
wave which may advance from either East or West. A glance at the map will show
that she stands as a rock in a sea of actual or potential Bolshevism.
If therefore it is once admitted that Romania may be regarded as the most reli-
able weapon to our hand for the carrying out of a policy of law and order, based on
such ideas as the League of Nations, as opposed to the Bolshevist tendencies of the
surrounding Slav — and possibly Magyar — races, then it seems to me that we
should attempt to do all in our power to conciliate her and bring her back into the
fold from which she is in danger of being severed. She will then inevitably develop
into the outpost of western civilization against the disruptive tendencies of Bolshe-
vism.
I do not for a moment suggest that Romania has not brought upon herself
much of the treatment with which she has met. Her choice of representatives at the
Paris Conference was undoubtedly unfortunate. Mr. Bratianu is certainly a patriot,
but his character lacks the pliancy necessary for such work, and apparently suc-
ceeded in exasperating all those with whom he came in contact by the excessive na-
ture of these claims and the somewhat arrogant and unbending manner in which
they were presented. Naturally this state of things reacted very unfavorably upon the
Romanians’ case. Moreover it created an atmosphere of suspicion, in the light of
< 197 >

which the action of Romania, even when possibly of an innocent character, was
looked upon — not unnaturally — with grave mistrust.
To take a case in point, presumably no reasonable man would now maintain
that her action in resisting the Hungarian Bolshevists’ wanton attack upon her, de-
feating it, and pursuing the remnants of the beaten enemy to Budapest, was anything
but justifiable. Yet it must be admitted that at first, at any rate, the Conference was
inclined to take the view that she was entirely at fault, and that she was openly
flaunting the Allies. Surely nothing could have been further from the truth. She was
in fact accused of disregarding an armistice in which she had taken no part, which
had not protected her from attack, and which the Allies themselves could not have
regarded as still in existence by the fact that they had asked for Romanian co-
operation in the event of an Allied advance on Budapest. . . . From the moment of the
Romanian entry into Hungary proper the question entered on a new phase. Anyone
with knowledge of the Romanian character could not but be aware of the fact that
there would be abuses. . . .
Thus the elements of discord and suspicion were sown at the very outset. It
must be remembered that there is much of the naughty child in the Romanian char-
acter. Conscious that he is doing wrong, and frightened at the impending punish-
ment, he becomes almost impossible to deal with. In such conditions there is need of
the greatest tact to prevent the situation developing along fatal lines. Unfortunately
this tact has been throughout conspicuous by its absence. The Allied generals, with
all their many qualities, are necessarily inexperienced in diplomacy or statecraft. . . .
But I cannot help thinking that more could have been done to combat these by a
spirit of friendly advice and cooperation than by the methods employed.
I had the honor to recommend in my dispatch No. 168 that, in view of the above
circumstances, it might be advisable to replace the four Allied generals by one high
civil functionary representing the Conference. This would have the advantage of
making the Romanians understand that the Allies have one single policy. At present
it cannot be said that the four Allied generals are entirely “solidaires”, and the Roma-
nians are consequently inclined to try and play off one group against the other. As
your Lordship is aware, the French are really on their side, but are obliged to yield to
Anglo-American pressure. . . .
Whatever the real rights and wrongs of all these questions may be, they would
appear capable of adjustment if handled with tact and goodwill on both sides. In
Budapest, however, at present these qualities are, as I have said above, conspicuous
by their absence. I do not suggest that firmness is not also needed in our relations
with the Romanians. On the contrary, I consider that in dealing with them it is es-
sential to exercise great firmness so as to make them understand that no nonsense
will be tolerated. But it should be possible to combine firmness with an attitude of
friendliness and goodwill.
< 198 >

Notes
1
2
S.D. Spector, Romania la Conferinta de Pace, p. 43.
3
Telegram Lloyd George to Ion IC Bratianu, January 24, 1918, in 1920. Un act de justitie. Documente, p. 33.
4
During the debate in the territorial committee regarding the division of Banat between Romania
and Serbia the British representatives were actually more pro-Romanian than the French representa-
tives. Ivo J. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, p. 173-174.
5
S.D. Spector, Romania la . . . , p. 127.
6
In a comprehensive Report on Bessarabia found in the Foreign Office Archives, signed by a Captain
Hill, while criticizing the Romanian administration of Bessarabia its author comes up with three
proposals regarding the future of the province: an International Commission; Bessarabia to be given
by the Conference to Russia but only when a Russian government would be able to take it under its
protection, offering the widest form of local autonomy and protection of national interests in the
province; Romania to receive a protectorate over Bessarabia, for a number of years, under the condi-
tion that it totally change its policy in the province and name as Governor General a figure that all
the Bessarabians would agree on (e.g., General Averescu or Prince Carol). RNA, Fond England mi-
crofilm, R 394, Report on Bessarabia, August 20, 1919, c. 111-320.
7
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 394, Report “Notes on the Frontiers of Bessarabia”, prepared by
the War Office for the Russian Department of Foreign Office, December 20, 1918, c. 5.
8
D. Preda, In apararea Romaniei Mari, p. 121.
9
DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 6, Memorandum on the Romanian Situation, September 1919, p. 271-278.
10
V.F. Dobrinescu, Batalia diplomatica . . . , p. 79.
11
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Series, Vol. 122, p. 562.
12
DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Memorandum on Bessarabia, January 14, 1920, p. 364-365.
13
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 394, Memorandum on Bessarabia by Alan Leeper, February 28,
1920, c. 347-349.
14
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 196, p. 19.
15
Ozer Carmi, La Grande Bretagne et la Petite Entente, p. 29.
16
DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Rattigan to Lord Curzon, June 24, 1920, p. 422.
17
In 1920 England founded the Danube Navigation Company, with a capital of 1,200,000 pounds.
Spiridon G. Focas, The Lower Danube River, p. 439.
18
DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Rattigan to Lord Curzon, July 20, 1920, p. 435.
19
A. Karetki, A. Pricop, Lacrima Basarabiei, p. 31.
20
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Bessarabia 1917-1932, Vol. 20 bis, Telegram sent from Lausanne by N.
Titulescu, July 7, 1932.
21
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 394, Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, April 15, 1920, c. 368.
22
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 394, Telegrams Rattigan to Lord Curzon, April 15 and 23, 1920,
c. 368, 380.
23
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 394, Telegram Lord Curzon to Rattigan, April 27, 1920, c 382.
24
DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Rattigan to Lord Curzon, May 11, 1920, p. 393.
25
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note by Laroche, June 7, 1920, c. 683.
26
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 394, Telegram Rattigan to Lord Curzon, June 13, 1920, c 423.
27
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 394, Telegram Lord Curzon to Rattigan, June 21, 1920, c 425.
28
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Ghika to Take Ionescu, June 19, 1920.
29
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Letter Ghika to Laroche, June 21, 1920, c. 685.
30
DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Rattigan to Lord Curzon, June 28, 1920, p. 425.
31
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Letter Anton Bibescu to Lord Curzon, July 2, 1920, c 32.
32
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Telegram Lord Curzon to Rattigan, July 3, 1920, c. 33.
33
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Note Take Ionescu to Rattigan, July 26, 1920, c. 47.
< 199 >

34
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, ad noted (July 31) on Note Bibescu to Lord Curzon, July 29,
1920, c. 42.
35
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Note Lord Curzon to Bibescu, August 2, 1920, c. 40.
36
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Note of Conversation between H. Nicholson and Titulescu,
August 2, 1920, c. 50.
37
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, ad noted by Leeper (August 2) and by Earl Curzon (August
5) on Note of Conversation between H. Nicholson and Titulescu, August 2, 1920, c. 50.
38
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Minutes of Discussions, August 8, 1920, c. 55.
39
DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Lord Curzon to Lord Derby, August 14, 1920, p. 443.
40
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Telegrams Boerescu to Lord Curzon, August 9 and 19, 1920,
c. 60-63.
41
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Telegram Lord Curzon to Boerescu, August 19, 1920, c. 67.
Two weeks later, Boerescu’s insistence received one more answer: “You asked me today about the
position of the Bessarabian Treaty. I am sorry to say that we have heard nothing more since the in-
structions to Lord Derby. We are inquiring the reasons for the delay.” RNA, Fond England micro-
film, R 202, Note Hardinge of Penhurst to Boerescu, September 9, 1920, c. 68.
42
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Letter Lord Derby to Clemenceau, August 16, 1920, c. 690.
43
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Letter Clemenceau to Lord Derby, August 18, 1920, c. 692.
44
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Notes Lord Derby to Millerand, August 21 and September 8,
1920, c. 696-698.
45
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note Millerand to Derby, September 14, 1920, c. 699.
46
Which he actually did the same day: “a telegram should be sent to Lord Derby asking him why the
Treaty has not yet been signed and when he anticipates signature will take place”. RNA, Fond Eng-
land microfilm, R 202, Note Hankey to Hardinge of Penhurst, September 11, 1920, c. 72.
47
DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Lord Curzon to Rattigan, September 17, 1920, p. 465.
48
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, September 16, 1920,
c. 78-79.
49
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, ad noted by Leeper on Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Cur-
zon, September 16, 1920, c. 78-79.
50
DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Earl Curzon to Earl of Derby, September 19th 1920, p. 472-473.
51
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Telegram Daeschner to Millerand, September 23, 1920, c. 706.
In order to avoid such a situation, Daeschner was instructed to clearly explain to the Romanians that
the French decision to postpone the signature was the result of her wish to spare the US and not at
all subordinated to Wrangel’s agreement. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Telegram Millerand
to Daeschner, October 2, 1920, c. 713.
52
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note Millerand to Lord Derby, September 22, 1920, c. 705.
53
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note Lord Derby to Millerand, September 23, 1920, c. 710.
54
zon, October 2, 1920, c. 85.
55
DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Lord Curzon to Lord Derby, October 6, 1920, p. 482.
56
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Telegram Lord Curzon to Lord Derby, October 7, and Tele-
gram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, October 8, 1920, c. 101-103.
57
58
zon, October 14, 1920, c. 118.
59
S. Focas, The Lower Danube River, p. 443.
60
Richard C. Frucht, Dunarea noastra. Romania, the Great Powers and the Danube Question, p. 46. Also V.F.
Dobrinescu, Relatii romano-engleze, 1914-1933, p. 108-110.
61
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Meetings between Leeper and Titulescu, October 18 and 19,
1920, c. 119-120.
62
Letter Titulescu to King Carol, August 1939, in A. Karetki, A. Pricop, Lacrima Basarabiei, p. 31.
< 200 >

63
A Karetki, A Pricop, “Lacrima Basarabiei”, p. 31
64
They prepared a Note to be addressed by the Romanian Plenipotentiary while signing the Bessara-
bian Treaty: “the Romanian government agrees that the regime to be applied to the Chilia mouth of
Danube shall be determined by the Danube Conference now sitting in Paris, and hereby undertakes
to accept the decision of the said Conference, taken if need by a majority, in this respect.” RNA,
Fond England microfilm, R 202, Draft Note by Malkin, c. 122. When news of the Romanian decision
to withdraw their objection to Article 7 reached London, Leeper considered that “this is most sur-
prising but, of course, very satisfactory”. RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, ad noted by Leeper
on Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, October 27, 1920, c. 159.
65
DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Lord Curzon to Lord Derby, October 20th 1920, p. 493
66
DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, Telegram Lord Curzon to H. Dering, October 21, 1920, p. 494. For details
regarding the British policy towards the creation of the Little Entente see Ozer Carmi, La Grande
Bretagne et la Petite Entente, p. 28-32.
67
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, October 27,
1920, c. 160.
68
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 202, Telegram Lord Derby to Lord Curzon, October 28,
1920, c. 165.
69
The crux of the whole question for Romania was whether there would be a cancellation of war
debts . . . the Romanians were insistent in claiming that a debt that which was
‘liquide’ (compensation claims) could not be rightly set off against a debt which was not
‘liquide’ (war debts). DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 12, p. 418-420, 752.
70
DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 24, Telegram Lord Crewe to Marquis of Curzon, February 3, 1923, p. 498-450,
and Memorandum on the Hungarian Minority in Transylvania, April 9, 1923, p. 575-579.
71
DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 24, Report Dering to Marquis of Curzon, February 24, 1922, p. 155.
72
JFMA, Fond B 760.2, Vol. 1, Telegram Ishii to Uchida, June 8, 1921.
73
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 210, Telegram Millington Drake to Malkin, August 10, 1920, c. 33.
74
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 210, Telegram Harold Nicholson to Drake, August 30, 1920, c. 31.
75
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 210, Telegram Drake to Nicholson, September 7, 1921, c. 36-37.
76
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 210, Draft Telegram (signed by SP Waterlow) Secretary of State
to Lord Hardinge, August 30, 1921, c. 35.
77
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 210, Telegram Lord Hardinge to Lord Curzon, September
9, 1921, c. 39.
78
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 213, “Bessarabia” – memorandum prepared for Mr. Leeper, Feb-
ruary 22, 1922, c. 159.
79
DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 24, Telegram Lord Hardinge to Lord Curzon, March 15, 1922, p. 168.
80
DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 24, Telegram Lord Curzon to Lord Hardinge, March 22, 1922, p. 168.
81
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 213, Draft Telegram Lord Curzon to Lord Hardinge, March 28,
1922, c. 172.
82
DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 24, Report Dering to Lord Curzon, May 2, 1922, p. 197.
83
DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 27, Telegram Dering to Chamberlain, October 13, 1925, p. 253-254.
84
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 213, Note on Compensations for the Landowners Expropriated
in Bessarabia, October 1922, c. 1-20.
85
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 213, Telegram Drake to Lord Curzon, December 17,
1922, c. 76-78.
86
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 213, Telegram Secretary of State (signed Miles W. Lampson) to
Dering, November 29, 1922, c. 27.
87
JFMA, Fond B 760.2, Vol. 1, Letter British Embassy to Japanese Foreign Ministry, November 1923.
88
A. Gromyko, V. Ponomarenko, History of Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 206.
89
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note for the President of the Council, February 2,
1924, c. 787.
90
There is no mention of the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty by the British Government in the
< 201 >

“Parliamentary Debates” of 1921 or 1922. In 1924 there was a reference to a certain Command Paper
1747 of 1922 with regard to the ratification but nothing more.
91
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 170, p. 1944
92
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 172, p. 1580. The
interpellation is presented in a special Report sent to Tokyo by the Japanese representative in Lon-
don, proving the Japanese interest in anything related to the Bessarabian Treaty Question. JFMA,
Fond B 760.2, Vol. 1, Telegram from London, May 1924.
93
94
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 174, p. 18
95
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 174, p. 856 Also,
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, June 6th 1924
96
97
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 175, p. 68-69.
98
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 175, p. 1793 and Vol.
182, p. 1288.
99
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol. 173, p. 397. Also
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, February 1930
100
< 202 >

CHAPTER 6.
FRANCE
During the creation of the Romanian state in the mid-19th century, France
was the most influential and helpful of the Great Powers towards the Romanian
cause.1 However, due to her defeat in the 1871 war against Germany, before the
Great War France found herself playing second fiddle within Romania both eco-
nomically and politically. Then, during and after the war, France’s position in Ro-
mania improved again considerably. The Romanians were grateful for France’s war-
time help, particularly the radical reorganization of Romanian Army under the
leadership of the French Military Mission, and at the same time developed bitter
feelings against Germany. Soon after the war, the proportion of French capital in-
vested in the Romanian economy, and French political influence, grew. Between
1922 and 1937 the Romanians borrowed more than twice as much from Paris than
from London, while Berlin’s loans were negligible. As Romania’s first creditor, sec-
ond investor, and third trade partner, France played a considerable role in the eco-
nomic life of the country.2 Indeed, Romania served well not only the economic in-
terest of France, but the political and strategic interests too. Her strategic position
at the Black Sea made it possible to establish good communication/transport links;
she was rich in natural resources, including the petroleum that France sorely
lacked; and she had a vast reservoir of peasant soldiery.3
The French government thought that Romania could play a useful role in East-
ern Europe and be an important partner in opposing their rivals, namely Germany
(now defeated) and Italy. And such was the case. During the inter-war period Roma-
nia and France were among the countries most actively fighting against any revision-
ist tendencies. Still, France had to skillfully weigh the Romanian request for immedi-
ate recognition of the Bessarabian union against Russian sensibilities.
On the other hand, Romania had to compete with the other states in Central
Europe, especially Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, for French
“benevolence”.4 This competition was intensified by France’s paucity of resources in
< 203 >

the immediate and not so immediate aftermath of the war.5 While all the states vied
with each other over economic concessions, the Romanians’ “unique” propaganda
tool in this competition was the common Latin origins of the two nations. However,
shared cultural origins faded in significance compared to their competitors’ main
argument: a common border with Germany. Two years of difficult negotiations with
Romania (1914-1916) had proven that it is not easy to convince Romanians to go to
war, even when they are directly interested (unless something quite tangible is of-
fered as inducement). And, in the case of a French-German war there was nothing
territorially that could be offered to Romania to entice her to join the fray. Thus the
French policy towards Poland and Czechoslovakia was clearly friendlier and there
were times when Romania was seen only as a possible back up in the defense of the
two. The fact is that, during the Peace Conference, when Clemenceau talked of sur-
rounding Russia with a barbed wire entanglement, he was really only concerned
with building up Poland.6
The main enemy of improving French-Romanian relations during the interwar
period was the Soviet Union. Choosing between Romania — a faithful ally ready (at
least theoretically) to back up France in case of a war with Germany but lacking the
necessary material resources to make a difference, and the Soviet Union — a former
ally that had the resources but not necessarily the will to defend France, and who
still owed France a great deal of money: this was one of the biggest dilemmas facing
French policy makers. The economic aspects were clearly in favor of the Soviets.7 In a
sense, Romania’s case was similar to Poland’s, with one big difference: Romania had
neither a common border with nor a territorial conflict with Germany.
The only apparent solution would be to end the Soviet-Romanian conflict over
Bessarabia; then the French would avoid having to choose, and would be able to use
both of them at the same time. During Titulescu’s tenure as Foreign Minister in the
1930s, the French government seriously tried to mediate the Romanian-Soviet con-
flict, but without much success. However, during the 1920s, there was no solution in
sight that would be satisfactory to both parties, and French policy constantly shifted
between a pro-Romanian and a pro-Russian (later pro-Soviet) stance. In the end, the
French leadership’s failure to choose (and either forge a powerful alliance with the
Soviet regime at the expense of its neighboring states, or offer full guarantees to
those states against a Soviet attack), or to achieve a settlement of the territorial
questions between the Soviets and their neighbors, contributed to the French disas-
ter in 1941. As described by Kalervo Hovi:
The greatest practical problem . . . seemed to have been the fact that while
waiting for this new Russia (which would acknowledge France’s economic
claims and which could be used as an ally against Germany), it could not get
along without the new states springing up on its periphery. On the other hand,
they could not be fully supported, since their core national goals were in con-
flict with all possible Russian governments.8
< 204 >

CHAPTER 6. FRANCE
The French leaders understood the importance of having Romania in the

French sphere of interest at the end of the war. The idea was to make Romania an
outpost of “Latin” civilization, a bulwark against German and Slav expansionism,
while providing a counterweight to the growing Italian influence in the area. It was
considered that, “Romania, which was the last to join the Latin family and which,
through its geographic position, is also the most endangered branch, sought to at-
tach itself exclusively to the most illustrious member of the family”.9
The French representatives in Bucharest understood, as presented by Edouard
Tavernier, that if Romania entered the war it would be necessary to gear French
propaganda towards having France take the place of the Central Powers in the post-
war Romanian market and to make France’s future political influence a function of
French economic influence.10
One more reason for France’s desire to increase her influence in Romania was,
most definitely, her need of petroleum. With petroleum consumption increasing at
high speed, the French Government had been looking for a dependable source of oil,
independent of the British and American companies.11 Although Romania could not
supply all the French needs, it was an important target in the French quest for oil
supplies. However, the French were not the only ones aiming at the Romanian oil;
the British, the Americans and the Italians were competing as well.
Romanian-French Relations during the Peace Conference
The French Government prepared intensively for the Peace Conference. As

early as February 1917 (some might find that a little bit premature) the “Comité
d’Etudes” was created at the initiative of Aristide Briand, at that time the Prime Min-
ister of France. Its purpose was to reflect on the problems that might arise after the
war and to offer the necessary informational background to guide French diplomacy
during the future peace settlements. Among its members were mainly university
professors such as Charles Benoist, Ernest Lavisse, Charles Seignobos, Paul Vidal de
la Blanche and Emmanuel de Martonne.12 The latter was in charge of preparing the
reports regarding new frontiers for Romania, and he did it in a way that was gener-
ous towards the Romanians. Needless to say, there was some friction between this
ivory tower Committee and the “old hands” at the Foreign Ministry, who resented
the notion that academics would provide a more objective and accurate view of vari-
ous territorial matters (a similar dynamic was at work in the US).
During the Paris Peace Conference, France had been the friendliest Great
Power toward Romania, for reasons ranging from culture to security. The French
policy makers opposed President Wilson’s idealism as much as possible, giving pri-
ority to strategic and economical interests instead of ethnic reasons wherever a new
border was being drawn up. Romania was one of the countries that would benefit
from that approach.
However, not everything France did at the Peace Conference was in Romania’s
favor. It was impossible for France to influence every decision taken by the Confer-
< 205 >

ence with regard to Romania; besides, she was there to protect her own interests
and those were not always advantageous to Romania. Then there was the rivalry
between the French and the Romanian Prime Ministers, George Clemenceau and Ion
I. C. Bratianu, which played its part not only during the Peace Conference but also
during the war.13 As for the Bessarabian question, while they were helping the White
Russians against the Bolsheviks, the French leaders dangled it alternately before the
Romanians and the Russians — a policy which perhaps did not make anyone very
happy.
Romanian propaganda in Paris was clearly the best propaganda Romania had
abroad. Ion Pelivan, a former deputy in the Sfatul Tserii, coordinated the propaganda
on Bessarabia, skillfully counterbalancing the Russian propaganda against the un-
ion.14 Even if Clemenceau was somewhat reticent with regard to Romania, Romania
had numerous friends within the French Foreign Ministry, at high levels of the
French Army, and in the French media. 15 Her best friends in Paris were inside the
French General Military Headquarters, from where they contributed to policy deci-
sions on Romania both during the Peace Conference and later.16
French-Romanian relations during the war are best described by two of those
who had leading roles in improving them: General Henri Berthelot, head of the
French Military Mission to Romania, and Count Auguste Felix de Saint Aulaire,
French minister to Romania during 1916-1919.17 Their accounts are excellent presen-
tations of both the French policy towards Romania and the difficult situation of Ro-
mania during the war.
As long as Romania remained neutral, France was one of the countries that
insisted most vehemently that she enter the war on the Allied side, and promised in
exchange to help Romania acquire the territories that were populated by Romanians
but situated under Austria-Hungarian domination. As a result of Romania’s pro-
longed negotiations, in 1916 France decided to replace her Minister to Romania,
Camille Blondel, with the more experienced Count de Saint Aulaire, whose main
task was to bring Romania into the war by any possible means. He succeeded.18 Dur-
ing the winter of 1916-1917, the French Military Mission in Romania led by General
Berthelot helped reorganize the Romanian Army, preparing it for the victories of
1917. Although Clemenceau was the staunchest opponent of Romania’s decision to
make a separate peace with the Central Powers, France was the only Allied Power to
acknowledge Romania’s sacrifices during the war and to promise, when the Bucha-
rest Peace with the Central Powers was signed, that all the engagements taken to-
wards Romania when it entered war would be respected.19
As for the French policy on Bessarabia’s union with Romania, the opinion ex-
pressed by the end of January 1918 by General Berthelot, one of Romania’s support-
ers, is suggestive:
As for Bessarabia I am not too happy about the manner in which General
Brosteanu acts. It is not anymore an operation of military police but a political
< 206 >

CHAPTER 6. FRANCE
enterprise, which comes before its time. It is certain that the bulk of the popu-
lation is Moldavian and that it seems to be oriented toward Romania, but there
is a risk of compromising the harvest by collecting it too soon.20
Saint Aulaire shared Berthelot’s opinion. He prepared a very objective report

on Bessarabia (June 1918), presenting all the good and the bad points of the Roma-
nian administration and indicating the main reasons behind the French acceptance
of the union:
I advised them that the Union is the best solution against the Russian anarchy
but that it could not be definitive without the Entente’s official approval. . . .
The Allies must ratify the Union for a clear reason; Romania will always offer
them more certain guarantees than Russia. The Union is in conformity with
the general interest of order and equilibrium and the positive influence of
France in Romania will extend to Bessarabia too.21
This effort to stake out a middle way position between Romania and Russia
(or, this faint-hearted irresolution) comes to light once more during the Hotin riot in
February 1919, when, as argued by Michael Jabara Carley:
The Quai d’Orsay hastened to block the use of French troops in the suppres-
sion of this uprising. Pichon observed to Clemenceau that although the French
government could not oppose Romanian territorial aspirations “without risk-
ing the ruin of its influence” in that country, neither did it want to alienate
Russian elements sympathetic to France who opposed the cession of Bessara-
bia to Romania. “Our situation in this regard” commented Pichon “is particu-
larly delicate in the view of our long alliance with Russia”.22
The Romanians’ intransigence towards the Russians, particularly after the

start of the Peace Conference, irritated the French leaders; they felt that at least
those Russians fighting against the Bolsheviks deserved some consideration.23 Some
of them went so far as to suggest that the Romanian refusal to intervene in the Rus-
sian Civil War stemmed from the fact that the Romanian government preferred the
Bolshevik solution, which seemed to be less dangerous vis-à-vis Bessarabia than the
establishment of a conservative military regime. 24
The French dilemma of discerning which of the two possible allies (the Roma-
nians or the White Russians) would be the stronger at the end of the day, together
with that of choosing between the multiple factions representing the White move-
ment, was steadily growing more complex. In fact, between January 1918 and Octo-
ber 1920 the French position regarding Bessarabia had been continuously shifting,
tied as it was to the situation in Russia.25 Whenever the White Russians had the
upper hand in their conflict with the Bolsheviks, the French diplomats expressed
“neutrality” regarding Bessarabia, whereas when the Bolsheviks defeated them the
< 207 >

French expressed their “agreement” that Bessarabia should belong to Romania. Dur-
ing 1918 the French government tried to stay away from any direct implication into
the Russo-Romanian conflict, ordering to all its representatives overseas to avoid
discussing it and to maintain clear neutrality.26 In December 1918, the French re-
ceived green light for Bessarabia, considered to be a part of the French “sphere of
action” in Russia; the British left all initiatives in the area in the hands of France. By
June 1919, some French diplomats were already arguing that the Peace Conference
should recognize Bessarabia’s union with Romania:
In my Department’s opinion, Bessarabia is totally Romanian; she is nothing else

than a part of Moldavia; the only convenient frontier on its territory is the Dni-
estr; in short, ethnically, historically and demographically this territory must
belong to Romania; at the same time, we are against a plebiscite, which is un-
necessary in view of the up-coming general elections.27
Still, the French aim in 1918 was to offer the province to that Ally most ready to
recommence the fight against the Central Powers and, after the end of the war, to
that Ally most willing to defend France against possible German revenge.
Regarding Romanian territorial claims, the biggest help came from two influ-
ential French personalities, André Tardieu (president of the Central Territorial
Commission) and Emmanuel de Martonne. While André Tardieu was in charge with
the diplomatic aspects of establishing the new Romanian borders, de Martonne's
task was to offer the necessary historical, geographical and ethnic background re-
garding the future borders of Romania.28 De Martonne, like the other French leaders,
preferred a division of the Banat, but was 100% on Romania’s side regarding Transyl-
vania, Crisana, Maramures and the southern Dobrudja (he calculated a 55% Roma-
nian majority in that region, a figure that differs substantially from the US experts’
claim of about 1%). Regarding Bessarabia, his opinion (which became the French
official position), was that the entire Bessarabia should belong to Romania, based on
the majority of the Romanian population in the area (72% in his opinion) and based
on the Romanians’ heroism during the war (both the Americans and the British
failed to take this factor into consideration in their recommendations). In De Mar-
tonne’s own words:
Romania had never raised any official claims to Bessarabia. She entered the war in order
to realize her national unity, without saying a word about Bessarabia. Bessarabia had been
given to Romania in a moment when she was conquered, suffocated by the enemy and forced to
sign a shameful peace, at a time when it seemed to her that will have to renounce for ever to
Transylvania, the land for which Romania decided to take up arms.29
The only point on which France did not support Romania’s territorial claims
was the Banat. The heroism of the Serbian Army during the war was still fresh in the
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CHAPTER 6. FRANCE
French imagination and many considered Bratianu’s demand of the entire Banat to
be exaggerated. Of course, Bratianu intended to have all the Banat for Romania and
was unwilling to make any compromise, knowing that, in any case, Italy would back
him on that question. On the other hand, France had been 100% on Romania’s side
on the question of the southern Dobrudja, French representatives blocking all con-
trary American proposals for a cession of territory to Bulgaria.
With all the sympathy for Romania expressed at so many different levels, it has
been argued that France had to bow before the pressures coming from her American
and British allies. Clemenceau continuously maintained a reserved attitude towards
Romania, pleasing the Americans but seriously disappointing the Romanians. Many
of the French diplomats posed as “victims” of American pressure: “Because of Amer-
ica’s intransigence towards us, France had to carry on this unfair policy towards Ro-
mania. They are so powerful and we need them so much.”30
However, although there were times when the French had to give in to the US,
it should be said that, in fact, the French took advantage of America’s inexperience
in world affairs and used them as a scapegoat to justify some of their own actions. As
the French intended to retain their influence over Romania, whenever a contentious
matter came up, they cleverly allowed the US representatives to come to the fore, all
too happy to pose as defenders of whatever rights. They also blamed some of the de-
cisions on the British or Italian representatives. At times, the British and Italians
used the same tactic. To these pressures, however powerful they may have been, we
must add the personal antipathy Clemenceau felt for Bratianu, the influence of Hun-
garian and Jewish propaganda in some political circles in France, and the Russian
question, when we seek an explanation for the French oscillations during 1918-1920.
The French policy towards Romania is presented in the Note sent by the
French Ambassador in the US (Jusserand) to the Secretary of State, indicating that
on December 26, 1918, the Romanians had published a Decree-Law uniting Transyl-
vania to Romania. He asked the Secretary of State to instruct the American Ambas-
sador in Bucharest to remind the Romanians that the Congress of Peace alone could
decide on such matters, and would do so taking into account the general situation
and the wishes of the populace. They asked the same from the British and Italians, so
that they were able to organize a common front of the Entente against territorial
modifications unilaterally made by the Romanians. This French request is consid-
ered to be the Allies’ first official sign of disapproval of the actions taken by Romania
to legalize the territorial unions.31 For the Great Powers it was more of a formal ges-
ture, aiming to show Romania that she would not be given a free hand in the men-
tioned territories. Although the idea of opposing the de facto territorial policy of the
Romanians came from the French, they were very keen to avoid being perceived as
enemies of Romania’s territorial unification and, as described above, tried to have
others appear to be the ones acting against the Romanians.
The main question was not French recognition of Romanian territorial expan-
sion, but how that expansion would be achieved. In order to boost her position in
Romania, France was very keen to show herself as Romania’s best ally and to keep
< 209 >

reminding the Romanians of her enormous support during the peace negotiations —
as long as the Romanians were confident they could do it by themselves, they
would have no need to make “under-the-table” concessions to win French support.
Therefore, while keeping quiet about Jusserand’s Note against her territorial moves,
the French insisted that Romania had been granted the status of an Ally during the
Peace Conference mainly as a result of their initiative and of their insistence with the
other Great Powers, at the end of December 1918.32
The Great Powers intended, after all, to keep the so-called Small Powers subor-
dinated, and the territorial questions were the best tools at hand. The French real-
ized that once Romania’s territorial claims were officially approved there would be
no more leverage with which to persuade Romania to heed French advice or, indeed,
the recommendations or decisions taken by the Conference. Also, it would have pro-
vided a very important basis for French propaganda in Romania if they could always
remind the Romanians that international recognition of the Union came only as a
result of France’s long efforts on her behalf. France had little to win by simply ap-
proving the Romanian territorial demands from the outset.
Fighting Bolshevism was one of the common goals of Romania and France; and
Marshal Foch considered Romania an important piece in his chess game for the
elimination of Bolshevism in Europe. In view of the French military withdrawal from
Odessa, he thought the Romanian Army would be a more reliable bulwark against
the Bolsheviks than Denikin’s army was proving to be.33 During the late March 1919
crises in Hungary, France therefore supported the Romanian view, and declared that
the Conference should not deal with Bela Kun (as proposed by US representatives).
They wanted to see Romania fighting, directly or indirectly, against the Bolsheviks
in Russia. However, Bratianu had two very good reasons to avoid any military adven-
ture in Russia: Romania already had control over the entire territory that it was
claiming from Russia; and the Romanian Army was in no condition to fight on two
fronts simultaneously. Although few Romanian scholars stress this point, the French
military planners were realistic enough to drop the idea of involving Romanian
troops in the planned intervention in southern Russia almost from the moment
when they were forced to whittle down the scale of the intervention, as they real-
ized that it would be almost impossible to convince the Romanians to cross the
Dniestr.34
During the summer of 1919, Clemenceau sensed the direction in which Ameri-
can policy was moving; and renewing the traditional French policy of encircling Ger-
many, France adjusted its policy towards Romania and the other Eastern European
states accordingly. Because of events in Russia (France’s traditional ally against Ger-
many), the only hope was in the new states in Central and Eastern Europe which
could, at least theoretically, replace Russia as an impediment to future German ex-
pansionism. Romania, as the second largest state in the region, could play an impor-
tant role in those plans, and it was no surprise that France then defended certain
Romanian actions against the decisions of the Conference. If, previously, the French
had tried to avoid anything that might strike the Romanians as being directed
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CHAPTER 6. FRANCE
against their interests, from now on they were twice as careful. By the time the
Americans understood the reasons behind French policy toward Romania, and the
extent to which this weakened the Peace Conference, the damage had already been
done.
After the Americans withdrew from the Peace Conference, the Romanian posi-
tion improved. Still, French diplomats continued to play the role of defenders of Ro-
manian interests against US and British subterfuge. As expressed by Saint Aulaire:
No doubt, in order not to expose Romania to the dirty maneuvers of the

British and the US . . . [Clemenceau] should take the initiative in this matter . . .
The US minister in Romania told me that . . . some circles in the US are press-
ing President Wilson in order to provoke, by any means, a split between the
Entente and Romania, and if these plans are not counterbalanced by the other
powers in the Entente, and especially France, Romania would no longer be
treated as an ally but as a rebel and it would be possible to exploit it without
any limits.35
One of the best presentations of France’s policy toward Romania is to be found

in the instructions sent by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Millerand, to the
newly appointed French Minister in Bucharest, Emile Daeschner, on March 6, 1920.
After describing the poor political relations between France and Romania before the
war, caused by German influence in Romania, Millerand observes:
Close relations had been established between the Romanian and the
French and British governments. But it was not the same with the Russian
government, where there still were some frictions. By her alliance with Russia,
Romania had to limit her claims to Bukovina and to abandon her claim to Bes-
sarabia. However, it is true that Romania had a free hand in Transylvania and
Banat. Still, the relations with Petrograd had no cordiality . . .
The tragic circumstances resulting from the Russian Revolution and the
Bolshevik betrayal gave way to Germany to impose on Romania the disastrous
Bucharest Peace. At the same time, the Romanian Government took its liberty
vis-à-vis Russia and occupied Bessarabia, which its troops saved from the Bol-
shevik tyranny. . . .
As soon as victory was clearly on the Allies’ side, the entire Romanian na-
tion, with the Berthelot Mission still fresh in their minds, had been animated
by the biggest enthusiasm for France. However, this enthusiasm failed little by
little because of a certain bitterness. . . .
In other questions we have been the most faithful defenders of Romania. It
is mainly because of us that they received the Hungarian counties bordering
Transylvania [Crisana]. And, if in the Banat case we backed the legitimate
claims of the Serbs, our allies, regarding the Bessarabian question, for example,
we have given Romania the most ardent assistance. . . .
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Romania is not the only one interested in herself. Placed at the mouth of
Danube, she is bound to become a warehouse for the riparian countries. This is
another reason for us to concentrate our efforts in order to dominate this mar-
ket. . . .
We have to deal in this context with a delicate question, that of the Da-
nube regime . . . The Commission of Danube . . . is a sort of state in state. It is
difficult for Romania to support this European servitude and she will make
every effort to replace it, by taking control of the international services on the
Danube. . . .
Regarding the delicate question of Romania’s relations with Russia, you
will receive, under the circumstances, the necessary specific instructions. As a
general manner, we advise the Romanian government to manifest great pru-
dence regarding everything that may touch the Russian national feelings. But,
regarding the Bessarabian question, France maintains the position favorable to
Romania that she already adopted and which has been confirmed by the deci-
sion of the Supreme Council.
On the other hand, you should stay away of any intervention, even an indi-
rect one, in the Dobrudja question.36
In just a few words, Millerand synthesized the past and future evolution of
French diplomatic relations with Romania. He also directed Daeschner to take ad-
vantage of France’s intellectual prestige and to act decisively in the economic field, in
which France was facing fierce competition from England and the US. In the next
few years French diplomacy would follow the directions outlined in the above-
mentioned document, with but one temporary exception: Bessarabia. A matter of
weeks after the instructions were sent to Daeschner, the French position on Bessara-
bia changed.
As a direct result of the Polish-Russian war in 1920, the situation was greatly
complicated for the French — just when it had seemed that there could be no fur-
ther reason to postpone international recognition of the union. France badly needed
Poland in order to encircle Germany and, when the Poles were on the brink of mili-
tary disaster, Romania’s help against the Bolsheviks was one of the few options
France had. The Romanians were quite set against entering war and the French lead-
ers had only one card to play that could induce them to change their minds: Bessara-
bia. If, from January to March 1920, French efforts came close to bringing the Bes-
sarabian question to a final resolution favorable to Romania, things changed during
March, once the Russo-Polish war started. Instead of openly supporting military
intervention against Russia, the Romanian Prime Minister Alexandru Vaida-Voevod
decided, with British approval, to open negotiations with the Soviets, dealing a seri-
ous blow to the French diplomacy. As a result, the French became even more de-
cided to use the Bessarabian question as a diplomatic pledge of Romania’s fidelity
towards Poland.37 Vaida-Voevod’s replacement as Prime Minister brought the Ro-
manian-Russian negotiations to an end, improving the French position, particularly
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CHAPTER 6. FRANCE
after the Francophile Take Ionescu took the lead in the Romanian Foreign Ministry
on June 13, 1920; but the Romanians stood by their decision not to intervene in the
Russo-Polish war.
The French position was complicated even more as a result of her relations
with the White Russians: as it was the French who were asking for a White Russian
offensive against the Bolsheviks, in order to ease the pressure on the Polish front,
they were in no position to tell the Russian generals that at the same time their gov-
ernment was supporting the Romanian claim to Bessarabia.
In order to put pressure on Romania by postponing the signing of the Bessara-
bian Treaty, the French once again enrolled the US as a scapegoat. The French ar-
gued to both the Romanians and the British that they were very keen to obtain the
US signature on the Bessarabian Treaty, and by so doing to give more power to the
Treaty. In fact, they knew that a US adhesion to the Treaty would be altogether im-
possible and furthermore that it would bring only a doubtful prestige since the US
Congress was refusing to ratify the Peace Treaties. This maneuver, however, allowed
the French to play for time, waiting for a clear signal in the Russo-Polish war. Tak-
ing into account the previous chapter it might be argued that, without the decisive
British pressure to sign, the French would have kept stalling indefinitely. Still, it
would be unfair to blame the French: they expected to recover quite an impressive
sum of money from Russia and they needed Russia as a potential ally against Ger-
many. By recognizing Bessarabia’s union with Romania they clearly would have for-
saken their chances of achieving either of the two objectives. As a poor consolation
for the funds lost in Russia, the French intended to resolve the matter of French
landowners expropriated in Bessarabia in a highly favorable manner and to ask Ro-
mania to assume part of the international debt of the former Russian Empire (by
adding Article No 8 to the projected draft Treaty).
The Colby Note (August 10, 1920) further complicated the situation, as the
French government stated its full support for the Note, provoking some uncertainty
in Romania.38 In August 1920, French uncertainty regarding the Bessarabian Treaty
was so high that they saw no alternative but to postpone the signing for an unlim-
ited period of time: by waiting until both the Soviets and Wrangel should accept
Bessarabia as Romanian territory and until the US joined in the Treaty.
It is difficult for us to decide on a certain line or position regarding Bessara-

bia. On one hand, the British are pressing for the signing of the Bessarabian
Treaty, insisting that the US approval is unnecessary. On the other, in the re-
cent telegram sent to Washington regarding our policy towards the Soviets,
the French government expressed its agreement with the US policy of not
sanctioning any territorial dismemberment of the Russian Empire without the
agreement of Russia.
Romania gives Bessarabia the highest importance. A postponement is not
good because it would generate a Russian-Romanian conflict, which must be
avoided, so that the only logical solution, in accordance with the ethnographi-
< 213 >

cal situation and the will of the people, is to leave Bessarabia to Romania. On
one hand, we must avoid taking a decision too early. On the other, we also have
to try and obtain a general agreement regarding the inclusion of Bessarabia in
Romania. The simplest solution would be to wait for the result of the Roma-
nian-Soviet negotiations, even as we cannot recognize the validity of a treaty
signed by the Soviets. But the Soviets’ agreement could, generally speaking, be
harmful for Romania in the future, in case the Romanian government should
try to negotiate a pact with a future Russian government. As for Wrangel, we
could obtain his recognition in exchange for our (and Romanian) help, espe-
cially after the Soviets’ agreement.
Once both Russian sides declare their agreement for an identical solution,
we can consider the signing of the treaty during the spring. Because these ne-
gotiations require time, it is clear that we should avoid an immediate solution,
which might embarrass us.39
By October 1920, as a result of combined British and Romanian pressure, and

particularly with a view to the fact that France would lose all sway in Bucharest if
the British were the only Great Power to sign the Bessarabian Treaty, and given that
a direction was becoming clear in the Polish-Russian war, the French decided in fa-
vor of Romania. Take Ionescu’s visit to Paris in mid-September gave them the neces-
sary assurances regarding both the indemnification of the French subjects expropri-
ated in Bessarabia and the attitude of Romania towards the Soviets. Ionescu asked
for the French opinion regarding the negotiations with the Bolsheviks, and agreed
with them that the recognition of the Soviets would only increase the Soviets’ inter-
national prestige and bolster the communists and anarchists acting inside Roma-
nia.40 On the other hand, the need to stop the growing anti-French movement in Ro-
mania, organized by the Liberal Party headed by Ion I. C. Bratianu (who could not
forget his failure in Paris) as well as some other political parties, also weighed in
the French decision.41 Signing the Bessarabian Treaty seemed the ideal solution in
order to counterbalance the anti-French propaganda and to enlist Romania among
France’s Eastern Allies.
The French Ratification
France regarded a strong Romania as an important political and military inter-

est. She conceived its strategic role as that of a rearguard charged with preventing
Soviet Russia, Hungary and Bulgaria from impeding the action of Poland and
Czechoslovakia, France’s only fully fledged allies in Eastern Europe, in a war against
Germany.42 At the same time, France had economic interests in Romania, seeing it as
both an important market for its products and as a supplier of raw materials
(especially petroleum).
During the first years after the war, economic matters seemed to prevail over
the strategic or political considerations. The French Government and businessmen
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CHAPTER 6. FRANCE
expected Romania to fulfill the financial obligations she had undertaken towards
France, such as repaying the war credits, and to also allow a growing penetration of
French capital into the Romanian markets. But the Romanian Government had dif-
ferent plans regarding the payment of foreign debts, and asked for a number of post-
ponements, justified by the difficult situation of the country after the war. By 1922,
soon after coming back into power, the Liberal Party was already elaborating plans
for its “by ourselves” economic policy that would limit the penetration of foreign
capital in key sectors of the economy. The French, dissatisfied with the Romanian
economic policy, looked upon the postponement of the Bessarabian Treaty ratifica-
tion as a useful tool in this regard as well.
In March 1922, the Romanian Minister in Paris described the bitter feelings
provoked among the Frenchmen by this Romanian policy:
The allusion made by the French President that “Romania is eluding” was
referring in ensemble to the non-execution of contracts like the ones for wheat
and petroleum, the contract for aviation and others, plus some other initial
proposals and promises that are not followed in practice. We are all having
here the feeling that these methods are not helping us in maintaining our es-
teem and trustworthy relations.43
Influenced by the British position and the suggestion that the Treaty should be
ratified before the meeting of the Genoa Conference, the first international confer-
ence in which Bolshevik representatives were invited to take part, the French took a
first step towards the ratification. On March 14, the French Government decided to
send the Bessarabian Treaty to the Parliament for ratification. The French action had
three purposes: first, to obtain the Romanian adhesion to the French proposals dur-
ing the Conference; second, to avoid offering the Soviets any possibility of raising the
Bessarabian question during the workings of the Genoa Conference; third, to pres-
sure the Romanian government into coming to an agreement regarding the payment
of indemnities for the French landowners expropriated in Bessarabia.
On March 21, 1922, the president of the Conference of Ambassadors, Jules
Cambon, following his March 15 proposal that all the signatories should ratify before
the beginning of the Genoa Conference, asked Georges Leygues, the president of the
French Parliament’s Commission of Foreign Affairs:
On the eve of the Genoa Conference it seems indispensable to me to avoid

the existence of any possible doubts regarding the will of France and her Allies
to recognize the rights of Romania over Bessarabia. It was in this spirit that the
Government deposited the Treaty in Parliament for ratification on March 14.44
A few weeks later, the Romanian representatives in Paris were notified that
the draft of a law for ratification had been deposited at the Chamber of Deputies but,
as the Chamber was in recess until May 25, the project would have to wait. Still, the
< 215 >

situation in the Chamber was far from favorable to the proposed ratification, so that
the Romanian representatives had to increase their efforts to gather the necessary
support in the Chamber. The difficulties are described in a report sent by Victor An-
tonescu, the Romanian minister in Paris:
Senator Helmer d’Alsace, whose wife is of Bessarabian origin and who

owns land properties in Bessarabia, is campaigning against the Treaty, a cam-
paign justified by the fact that the Romanian State did not keep its promises
towards the French citizens who had land properties in Bessarabia.
I recently met Peretti dela Rocca and Guy Laroche (sub-director for politi-
cal affairs in the French Foreign Ministry). They confirmed the campaign initi-
ated by Mr. Helmer and also by some other deputies interested in the Credit
du Levant et Bousac affair, which Vintila Bratianu knows well. I insisted on
them showing the bad impression a postponement of the ratification as a result
of protecting the interests of some French senators and deputies would have
over the Romanian public opinion, especially when the Soviets are contesting
in Genoa the Romanian rights over Bessarabia. I asked them if the French Gov-
ernment intends to connect the question of compensations for the French citi-
zens in Bessarabia with the draft of law [for the ratification]. They answered
that this was not the Government’s intention but, taking into account the
enormous difference between the 33 millions lei offered and the amount as-
sessed by the French experts (10 million gold rubles), it would be helpful that a
compromise formula should be reached before sending the draft for the Cham-
ber’s approval. In this sense the French Government would be satisfied by the
nomination of a Commission made of French and Romanian experts in order to
evaluate the mentioned properties, in agreement with Daeschner.
Forges is favorable to us and he insists on reaching a compromise before
May 23.45
The direct interest of certain influential French Parliamentarians in the matter

of land properties expropriated in Bessarabia explains France’s initial insistence that
the matter should be inserted in the draft Treaty. Their influence over French foreign
policy seems to have been quite powerful, since they were twice able to change the
government’s position regarding Bessarabia. This was a strange twist of fate that, of
just nine French landowners in Bessarabia, one should have had such a strong con-
nection to the French Parliament.
The answer from the Romanian Foreign Ministry came on the next day:
It is impossible to solve the question of evaluating the French possessions

in Bessarabia before May 24. The Council of Ministers tries to avoid the estab-
lishment of a connection between the ratification and this question. It is re-
grettable that the French Parliament could be so easily influenced by financial
questions when it comes to one of the main allies of France. I think that the
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CHAPTER 6. FRANCE
real solution is not a negotiation with Mr. Daeschner but an open discussion
between Bratianu and Poincare in Paris. Please let me know if Bratianu should
leave for Paris earlier.46
However, no government does a favor to another government based simply on

friendship. The best weapon in politics was (and remains) money. Unfortunately,
Bratianu apparently failed to understand that basic equation in international rela-
tions and over-estimated the French strategic interest in Romania.
The same day, Victor Antonescu communicated the Romanian response to the
French diplomats, only in order to have them restate their position:
I met Poincare. He told me that he has decided to pass the draft law for the
ratification of Bessarabia’s union through the Parliament but that it would be
helpful and useful to have the Romanian Government give him some explana-
tions and also some proofs regarding the payment of compensations to the
French subjects.47
Ion I. C. Bratianu, who was in Genoa at the time, also expressed his unhappi-
ness with Poincare’s position and, according to French sources, it seems that what
upset him most was the idea of subordinating the ratification to the interests of a
few landowners of French nationality.48
The French diplomats, not directly interested in the Romanian payment of
compensations, seemed to be on Romania’s side. Louis Barthou, the French Foreign
Minister, declared during a reception in the honor of Bratianu on May 24, that “the
French government has a strong desire to obtain the ratification of the Bessarabian
Treaty from the Parliament”.49 But in the absence of any new concessions from the
Romanians, the sympathy of Barthou was not enough to convince the Parliament.
Taking advantage of his visit to Paris during the second half of May 1922, Prime
Minister Bratianu raised the ratification question, with no results. Although the ne-
gotiations went on the problem remained the same, as well described in a British
report:
My French colleague informed me in a conversation that the French Govern-

ment intended to bring up a Bill in this sense for discussion in Parliament this
summer but desisted on being warned that it would meet with strong opposi-
tion in view of the non-payment of the compensation due to French landown-
ers expropriated in Bessarabia.50
On July 7, 1922, the Parliament’s Commission on Foreign Affairs debated the

Draft Law for the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty, presented by Mr. Forges.
The Draft contained a general description of Bessarabia’s geography, population,
industry, history, and economy, all the controversial matters being presented in a
fairly objective manner, without much Romanian bias.51 Although the Commission
< 217 >

adopted the Report presented by Forges, no further step was taken towards ratifica-
tion, and all that followed was a controversy between the Parliament and the Gov-
ernment as to whom to blame for the delay.
Poincare instructed the French minister in Bucharest:
Faced with the actual circumstances, the French Government is in fact obliged
to take into account general considerations that influence the sanction of Bes-
sarabia’s cession to Romania. . . . From this viewpoint comes the inconvenience
of expressly relating this question to that of French properties, but it is essen-
tial for us to take advantage of this occasion and to pressure the Romanian
Government to give us satisfactory guarantees regarding the conclusion of an
arrangement.52
The Romanian refusal to grant the French request for compensations (in part
because of the exaggerated evaluation presented by the Frenchmen, particularly as
they were being offered higher compensation than that offered to expropriated Ro-
manians), was the reason the French put forward to justify their failure to ratify in
1922. And it worked as the French intended: “The question of the French landown-
ers expropriated in Bessarabia is about to be resolved because we have a very effi-
cient means of pressuring the Romanians in order to give us satisfaction: our recog-
nition of Bessarabia’s annexation by Romania”.53
However, there were other reasons for the French to withhold their ratification
as well. Even after settling the compensation dispute, they stalled for another year.
The other financial questions pending also played a certain role regarding the French
delays.
Also playing into this process in the summer of 1922 was the French hope that
the Bolshevik Government, which was on the verge of being accepted as a member of
the international community, would be willing to pay back at least a part of the in-
ternational debt of the former Czarist Government. If that were the case, in order to
boost its position with the Soviet government the French would need bargaining
chips, and the Bessarabian Treaty was one. Soviet recognition of the Czarist debt
would have been a first serious step towards re-establishing the French-Russian alli-
ance, an alliance that would have greatly decreased the strategic importance of Ro-
mania vis-à-vis the French. In the meantime the compensations question gave the
French government an excuse to postpone the ratification.
Thus, the first opportunity to obtain the French ratification was lost by the
Romanians. While the French correlated ratification with payment, the Romanians
ostensibly expected the French ratification to come simply out of “friendship” from
their “best ally”. It probably would not have been all that difficult to come to terms
on the settlement for the French landowners, as the amount requested was not terri-
bly high and the French surely expected the Romanian government to negotiate the
amount downward. The Romanians misplayed their hand, and France refused to
ratify the Treaty in 1922.
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CHAPTER 6. FRANCE
In fairness, one might speculate on the French position regarding the Bessara-
bian Treaty if the Romanians had indeed accepted a compromise on the compensa-
tion question before the summer of 1922. The year that passed between the resolu-
tion of that matter and the French ratification certainly proves that the compensa-
tion was not necessarily the main reason for the French foot-dragging. It might also
be argued that, in fact, the French government was simply continuing its summer
1920 policy on Bessarabia.
In any event, following the Romanian refusal to pay a higher amount in com-
pensation, the ratification question was deferred for a period. Whether this issue
was real or just window-dressing, the logjam was broken when the Romanians de-
cided to offer satisfaction to the expropriated French landowners. In October 1922,
as a result of combined negotiations with the British and the French, Romanian For-
eign Minister I.G. Duca informed the French government that the payment to the
French landowners would be made in consolidation bonds (made out in French
Francs), carrying 4% interest. He also stated that, when the Romanian government
succeeded in contracting the projected loan that it was negotiating in France, it
would consider the modality of effectively paying these titles.54 By the end of the
year, the Romanian government agreed to include the indemnities due to the French
and British landowners expropriated in Bessarabia in the law for the consolidation
of the Romanian external debt.55
Once the compensations matter had been settled, by January 1923, the Romani-
ans raised again the question of ratification. During a meeting between Victor An-
tonescu and Peretti dela Rocca, among other topics, Antonescu asked Peretti to
speed up the ratification of the Treaty. All he got was a polite answer: “I will talk to
Poincare and he will take the necessary steps”.56 Two months later, after another
similar meeting, the Romanians were more successful, dela Rocca sending a letter to
Georges Leygues asking for the ratification in view of Russian war preparations.57
The answer from Georges Leygues (March 28) states that the Commission on For-
eign Affairs had already adopted the Report on the Draft Law for the ratification,
fulfilling its duty, and that the delay was not their fault as the Government would be
the one to take the next step, namely, to bring the Draft into the Chamber’s debate.58
This was the beginning of a Government-Commission controversy as to who should
take the next step for ratification. However, as soon as Poincare decided to take an
active interest in the matter, the Ratification Law was voted, so it can be seen that in
this round the blame for the delay resided with the Government.
In June 1923, in the context of the decision regarding the inclusion of a separate
immigration quota for Bessarabia into the general Russian immigration quota, ad-
ministered from Riga, the US government asked the French government what was
the actual situation of the Bessarabian Treaty. They had asked the Japanese govern-
ment the same question in May. As will be shown in a different chapter, the US used
the failure of the Bessarabian Treaty to come into force as their main justification for
the immigration quota decision. Arguing that the Romanian government had asked
the US to sign the Bessarabian Treaty, the US government stated that it remained
< 219 >

unwilling to sign it and that they would like to know whether France intended to
ratify the Treaty.59 While the French government officially responded that it had
sent the Treaty to the Parliament for ratification on March 14, 1922, unofficially it
ordered its representative in Washington to make inquiries regarding the US inten-
tions vis-à-vis the Treaty. The answer from Jusserand, the French Ambassador, was
clear: “The US government does not intend to adhere to the Bessarabian Treaty for
the moment”.60 (Traian Sandu argues that the US intervention came about as a result
of a Romanian initiative to increase the pressure for a French ratification, by signal-
ing to the French that while they were postponing the ratification, the US were will-
ing to sign; but this was not the case.61) In reality, the intervention was motivated
by the need to use the Romanian government’s failure to bring the Bessarabian
Treaty into force as a justification for the decision to merge the Bessarabian im-
migration quota with the Russian immigration quota (as presented in a follow-
ing chapter), although it was formulated in such a manner as to avoid raising
any suspicions from the French or the Japanese.
The Romanian Foreign Ministry officials charged with the execution of trea-
ties analyzed the situation in October 1923, asking for intervention in order to obtain
the ratification:
As until now only Great Britain has ratified, this treaty is not yet valid from the
international viewpoint and, as a result, a number of questions which devolve
from this ratification are pending, for example, the right to choose the desired
nationality, which covers a period of two years since the ratification. This delay
could cause certain prejudices to the Romanian State regarding the application
of the land reform in Bessarabia.62
More or less as a result of the aforementioned report, I.G. Duca decided to initi-
ate a new campaign in favor of ratification. The difference was that this time he in-
tended to put pressure on all the remaining signatory Powers. He sent telegrams to
Paris, Rome and Tokyo asking for ratification, and stepped up the pressure on the
three countries’ diplomatic representatives in Bucharest.63 At the same time, he used
the Danube question in order to speed up the French ratification, asking Antonescu
to remind the French how easily the workings of the Danube Commission would
proceed if the Bessarabian Treaty came into force.64
As proved by both the British (who undertook to ask the Japanese, Italian and
French governments to take the necessary steps for ratification) and French reac-
tion, the latter initiative was successful. Poincare sent a letter to Georges Leygues,
observing that the work of the Danube Commission was indeed being impeded, and
asking for the ratification. The answer from Leygues was almost identical to the one
sent on March 28, 1923, noting that, in fact, it was the duty of the Government and
not of the Commission to place the debate of the draft law for ratification on the Par-
liament’s agenda.65
Unhappy with the French Senate’s refusal to approve a credit for Romania’s
military needs, while Poland had received one that was four times higher than that
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CHAPTER 6. FRANCE
requested by the Romanians, I.G. Duca expressed his dissatisfaction with the French
attitude:
If there were anything to reproach the French with, we could talk about this
credit solemnly promised to us almost two years ago; also the non-ratification
of the Bessarabian Treaty in four years, or about the strange conditions im-
posed for the recognition of this Romanian province.66
Impressed by Duca’s position or simply by the possibility that French influence

over Romania was fading away, Poincare decided that the time to close the Bessara-
bian Treaty question had come. He instructed his subordinates to take the necessary
steps:
The Draft Law for the ratification has been approved by the Commission
on July 7, 1922, and placed on the Parliament’s agenda on July 12, 1923. Unfor-
tunately, it is among the last items and it will not be possible to have it voted
before the end of the year. This is a regrettable situation.
The fact that we keep postponing makes a poor impression in Romania,
especially as the Romanian government has scrupulously executed all our con-
ditions regarding the union, paying compensations for the expropriated French
landowners on bases clearly more advantageous than the ones used for Roma-
nian landowners. As a result of parliamentary interpellations regarding the
payment of compensations for British and French landowners in Bessarabia,
the Romanian government is in a delicate position, having to justify somehow
the very high level of those indemnizations. The non-ratification also influ-
ences the Danube Commission. . . .
I wonder if it is not possible for the ratification Law to avoid waiting its
turn and to come into debate ahead of other items.67
The answer to Poincare states:
Poincare suggested the Political Director to ask Forges to make possible

the voting of the draft law as soon as possible, without debate, in order to sat-
isfy the Romanians. But on November 23, 1922, an amendment was proposed
by the socialist deputies, with the purpose of subordinating the approval of the
treaty to the agreement of the Russian government. The existence of this
amendment makes a debate necessary and the project cannot be voted as asked
by the President [without debate]. Due to the objections coming from the same
opposition, the item could not be placed ahead of other projects.68
The British government joined the Romanian government in pressing for the
French ratification, arguing that ratification was necessary in order to bring an end
to the Romanian opposition to the Danube Commission’s activity on the Chilia Arm.
< 221 >

The British were informed that the French government had already taken all the nec-
essary measures for ratification, which probably would be done during the current
parliamentary session.69 The result of the British intervention was another exchange
of letters between Poincare and Leygues. It is interesting that, about a month later,
when the Italian government asked the French whether the British government had
pressed them to ratify, the answer was negative, indicating that, wishing to improve
her relations with Romania and to ease the traffic on Danube, France intended to
ratify anyway.70
Therefore, the French decision to place the ratification law on the Parliament’s
agenda at the end of November 1923 came as the combined result of a number of
facts: the Romanian government’s payment of a satisfactory amount for the French
landowners expropriated in Bessarabia; the new Romanian campaign for the ratifi-
cation; the Romanian leaders’ bitter feelings toward France as a result of the French
Senate’s refusal to grant the long-negotiated credit for armament; the Romanian ac-
tion regarding the Chilia Arm which prompted the British intervention; the appar-
ent improvement in Russo-Romanian relations; the still difficult diplomatic position
of France in the aftermath of the Ruhr occupation; and the benefits ratification
would bring by boosting French influence in Romania.71
In January 1924 France signed a Friendship Treaty with Czechoslovakia and,
with a view toward increasing her influence in Eastern Europe at the expense of It-
aly, Poincare planned to sign similar friendship treaties with Yugoslavia and Roma-
nia too. The conflict with the Soviets over Bessarabia stood in the way of signing
such a treaty with Romania. In this sense, Magda Adam argues, “It was obvious that
the struggle for influence in Romania would be won by the country which was pre-
pared to grant a loan and ratify the Bessarabian convention the soonest; the French
government promised both”.72
Still, the situation was not necessarily so simple: on one hand, the Romanians
wanted much more from France than ratification; on the other hand, Magda Adam
exaggerates Italy’s influence in Romania (even if Italy had ratified the Bessarabian
Treaty and offered a loan, the Liberal Party was neither ready nor willing to replace
France with Italy). Even more, by February 1924 Mussolini already had an agreement
with the Soviets regarding the postponement of ratification.
At the end of January 1924 Poincare pressed Leygues once again for ratification,
only to receive the same answer as before. However, this time Poincare was told that
it would be advisable to talk personally to the presidents of the Chambers and, in
agreement with them, to fix a date for debating the draft law.73 Poincare’s advisers
were already providing him with the necessary data in order to respond to the
amendment proposed by the socialist deputies. They emphasized historical and eth-
nographic arguments as well as the British “competition”: they had already ratified
the Bessarabian Treaty, but also were very keen to point out that, although they rec-
ognized the Soviet government, they considered Bessarabia to be Romanian terri-
tory.74
On March 11, 1924, the French Chamber ratified the Bessarabian Treaty by a
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CHAPTER 6. FRANCE
majority of 478 votes against 74. The votes against belonged to the leftist deputies. In
order to convince the Chamber to ratify the Treaty, the French Prime Minister Ray-
mond Poincare had presented a detailed and very passionate history of the Bessara-
bian question, noting that Bessarabia should under ordinary circumstances belong to
Romania. The counter arguments of the leftist opposition illustrate the degree of
influence the Soviet propaganda had in France, showing that the brotherhood of
“origins” did not stand up to the brotherhood of ideology (meaning socialism). The
fact that a number of French parliamentarians (bear in mind that the Romanians
considered France the friendliest Great Power) were clearly on the Soviet side in the
conflict proves that Romanian propaganda in France was none too effective.
Poincare’s opponents (the deputies of the Left), especially Marcel Cachin and
Mr. Morucci, presented a number of arguments in order to persuade the Chamber
not to ratify the Treaty, but to no avail. Even after the ratification, the leftist deputy
Ernest Lafont made a long speech asking that the article regarding ratification (“The
President of the French Republic is authorized to ratify and make executable the
Bessarabian Treaty . . .”) should be followed by the clause, “after agreement with the
Russian Government”. Of course, the result would have been another postponement.
A new vote took place and Ernest Lafont’s proposed amendment was rejected by a
majority of 415 votes against and 74 in favor. (The difference comes from the fact that
at the time of the second vote there were only 489 voters present, while at the first
vote there had been 552. The 63 missing voters were probably taking a break, due to
Lafont’s rather long speech).75
The following is a short excerpt of the French Parliamentary debate.
M. Morucci: Russia is unwilling to give up her territory, to be separated

from the Moldavian population. . . .
You know very well that, according to the treaties, Russia has the right to
Bessarabia. She pretends or claims that Moldavia is Ukrainian land. She also
states that Romania, by having received Dobrudja through the Berlin Treaty,
has no right to claim Bessarabia. . . .
Do not bring into being the risk of a new conflagration with Bessarabia. . . .
Poincare: In his remarkable report, Mr. Forges has clearly presented, in the
name, I think, of the entire Commission for Foreign Affairs, the reasons justify-
ing this treaty. He has made an impressive description of the geographical na-
ture and also of the ethnographical character of Bessarabia. He has proven that
the majority of the population there is Moldavian, from the standpoint of their
customs as well as their race. He has equally proven that Bessarabia is con-
nected to Romania by common geography as well as by economic, commercial
and banking interests. . . .
The fate of Moldavia, and especially of the territory between the two rivers,
worsened again at the end of the 18th century due to the rivalry between the
Ottomans and the Russia of Catherine II, whose legacy you demand today to
be restored. This is what the Bolsheviks are demanding from you today. . . .
< 223 >

The Romanian peasants had to bear with more and more requisitions and,
three years later, in 1809, the country had been virtually stripped clean when
the Russian army had to retreat to Odessa and cross the Dniestr. The Romani-
ans were condemned to carry out the most diverse duties; thousands of them
died as a result. A French Report, prepared in 1812, ascertained that the Rus-
sian exigencies had brought the exasperated inhabitants to the boiling point.
This is what one keeps on calling “a Russian province”.
Marcel Cachin: It is a hundred years since that happened.
Poincare: I think that justice is not a matter of years.
In the territory ceded to her, Russia felt herself the need to create a special
province, which it named Bessarabia, as a remembrance of the family of Prince
Bessarab, the Wallachian princes that once reigned over this territory.
During the last war, when the Russian defection took place . . . the Molda-
vians in Bessarabia started, as I said, by proclaiming their autonomy. Then, a
Parliament, a veritable Parliament, was organized and it decided to call in the
Romanian troops for defending the country against the Russians. On March 27,
1918, this Parliament proclaimed the union between Moldavia and Romania. . . .
It is by all means strange that the Bolsheviks are claiming today the legacy
of Russian Imperialism.
The British government, which is willing to de jure recognize the Soviets, as
you know, has ratified the treaty with no difficulties from Russia. It even rati-
fied it on April 14, 1922, which was exactly the moment when Lloyd George
was negotiating with the Russians, in Genoa and later in Hague.
I repeat that it is in the interest of improving our relations with Romania
that we quickly vote the Treaty. Our Romanian friends, and not only the Ro-
manian King but also the people all over Romania, are not favorably impressed
by the delay in the ratification. They accepted our conditions regarding the
payment of compensations for the French landowners expropriated in Bessara-
bia as a result of the agrarian reform. . . .
Ernest Lafont: In the report presented by Mr. Forges one can see that a
large part of the population is incontestably and exclusively Ruthenian . . . In
any case, Bessarabia has never been consulted. If we examine the question in
detail we demand you to consult the population of Bessarabia, which previ-
ously decided in the presence of soldiers and machine guns, but this time
through a referendum organized with all the necessary guarantees. . . .
Poincare: I will read again the Single Article — The President of the French
Republic is authorized to ratify and execute, if it is the case, the treaty regard-
ing Bessarabia signed in Paris on October 28, 1920, between France, the British
Empire, Italy and Japan, the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and Ro-
mania.76
Although by fall 1923 Poincare had already decided in favor of the ratification,
the moment chosen by the French government for the ratification had a special sig-
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CHAPTER 6. FRANCE
nificance. The Romanian Royal Family was preparing a visit to Paris, and the ratifi-
cation came as a welcome sign from the French, indicating a growing interest in Ro-
mania, with a view to a future Treaty of Friendship between the two states. Simulta-
neously, a new round of Russo-Romanian negotiations was about to start in Vienna.
Another factor that could have influenced the French decision, speeding it up, was
the improvement in Russo-Italian relations, which some French diplomatic circles
believed to be a threat to French influence in Eastern Europe. In order to counterbal-
ance the Italian move, Poincare sought to improve relations with Romania, and the
best way was by ratifying the Bessarabian Treaty.
The Romanian reaction was very positive and I.G. Duca intended to use it to
bolster the Romanian position during the up-coming Vienna Conference:
The actual circumstances make the ratification so welcome. Generally, the im-
pression produced on the public opinion by the ratification was very positive.
Still, the French Senate vote should be sped up so that everything will be fin-
ished before March 24 when the negotiations with the Russians start in
Vienna.77
On March 16, 1924, the French Senate voted unanimously in favor of ratifica-
tion and, two weeks later, France officially deposited the ratification instruments.
The ratification brought about a real improvement in French-Romanian rela-
tions, particularly regarding the Romanian government’s attitude towards France
(this time an attitude backed by all the Romanian political parties). The “chill” char-
acterizing the bilateral relations at the end of 1923 vanished overnight, so that both
governments felt the need to further improve their relations; consequently France
proposed the signing of a bilateral political treaty.78
The Soviet representatives reacted strongly to the French ratification. While
debating the ratification in the French Chamber, Poincare had presented Bessara-
bia’s history and the entire Bessarabian question from the Romanian viewpoint; he
was accused of making propaganda in favor of the Romanian cause exactly when a
new round of negotiations between the two countries was about to begin. In Ci-
cerin’s words, the French action was “a third party intervention which would inevi-
tably prevent the establishment of a lasting peace. The Soviet Government holds
France responsible for any damage it may suffer.”79
However, it should be clear that the stress Cicerin laid on the fact that the
French ratification came just weeks before the new Soviet-Romanian negotiation
was simply propaganda, since the French ratification had far less effect than sug-
gested on the final outcome of the Vienna Conference.80 At no point (including 1924)
had the Romanians been willing to accept the Russian conditions, which would
have meant recognizing the existence of a conflict over Bessarabia between the two
states, nor, certainly, the idea of a plebiscite. Neither were the Soviets, as previously
mentioned, prepared to make any significant concessions to the Romanians. If they
had been prepared to make concessions, as they claimed, there was nothing to stop
< 225 >

them from doing so after a few months, when everybody had forgotten about the
French ratification; instead they took a tougher line in their relations with Romania.
The fact that in a matter of weeks the Soviets seemed to have forgotten the French
ratification and failed to take any measures against France proves that, indeed, Ci-
cerin was simply bluffing for propaganda reasons. In a sense, it might be considered
that the French ratification matched quite well with the Bessarabian propaganda
campaign prepared by the Soviets during 1924 and with their change of policy to-
wards Romania.
But it was not only the Soviets who were upset by the French ratification. An
article published in The New York Times in March 1924 shows the American opinion
on the matter: “The recent vote in the French Parliament seems to have done Russia
greater service than Romania, inasmuch as it has spurred Russian nationalism and
reinforced the centripetal sentiment of the outlying elements of the Russian confed-
erated union, like the Ukraine and White Russia . . . ”81 This quotation (and indeed
the entire article) reminds us of the official American stance on the Bessarabian
question.
However sharp the initial Soviet reaction, in just a few weeks the Soviet repre-
sentatives changed their tactic and tried to downplay the importance of the ratifica-
tion. During the Soviet-Romanian negotiations in Vienna, Litvinov took the oppor-
tunity to express the view that the French ratification was far from a definitive solu-
tion to the Bessarabian question and that the Soviets still had sufficient means to
block the Bessarabian Treaty from coming into force:
It could scarcely be credited that Japan, which has offered to resume negotia-
tions with the Soviets, desires to aid new claims to the list already presented to
it by the Soviet Government. Similarly, Italy, which has begun friendly rela-
tions with the Soviet Union, cannot desire to compromise the results of the
Italo-Soviet commercial treaty for the beautiful eyes of Romania and France.
They will understand perfectly that any support given to Romania in the Bes-
sarabian question is considered by the Soviets as a direct act of hostility and an
indirect participation in the invasion of Soviet territory . . . 82
Conclusion — The French Position after Ratification
Although it came some two years later than the Romanians initially expected,
the French ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty was a Romanian diplomatic suc-
cess. It also boosted the Romanians’ hopes to get much more from France, namely,
guaranteed French military involvement in case of a Russian attack over Bessarabia.
While Romania alone or with the help of her neighbors was able to handle the
threats from Hungary or Bulgaria, the situation was quite different regarding the
Soviet Union. In order to counterbalance the huge military potential of the Soviets,
Romania had two choices: (1) to make peace with them at the price of returning at
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CHAPTER 6. FRANCE
least a part of Bessarabia; (2) to establish an alliance with a Great Power — and
there were only two states to choose from — France and Germany. (Italy was too
small for such a task; Great Britain was set on neutrality). The Romanians took the
second option and France, only to find themselves disappointed; and, in the end,
they lost all of Bessarabia plus northern Bukovina.
The two years France took to sign the Bessarabian Treaty and the additional
four years to ratify it exemplify both the failure of Romanian diplomacy to secure a
solid French support and the French vacillation with regard to Romania. In fact,
some scholars consider that, for a number of reasons, French political interest in Ro-
mania remained lukewarm until the late 1930s, even though she was a member of the
French-supported alliance system in Eastern Europe.83
One of the consequences of the French ratification was that it gave a real impe-
tus to the negotiations for a bilateral Friendship and Alliance Treaty. The Romani-
ans’ principal purpose was to obtain written guarantees of a French military inter-
vention in case the Soviets attacked Bessarabia; that is exactly what the French were
reluctant to offer. The negotiations for the Treaty started as early as March 1924,
influenced also by the signing of the French-Czechoslovak Friendship Treaty.84 But
the French failure to mention the Bessarabian question displeased the Romanians.
On March 28, during a meeting with Peretti dela Rocca, Antonescu expressed the
Romanian view: “Romania is strong enough to defeat Bulgaria or Hungary in a war.
The situation is different with Russia”.85 The Romanian request was perhaps unex-
pected for the French and it was not welcome:
The Romanian demand to expressly mention Bessarabia in the projected treaty

is inadmissible . . . our treaty with Poland has no similar clause. For us, the pur-
pose of the Treaties signed with Poland and the Little Entente is essentially
that of maintaining the political status established by the Peace Treaties. A
special clause regarding a territory that has not been liberated by the Allied
Armies from the enemy is unjustified, and a little bit imprudent from the view-
point of French interests.86
Further negotiations took place in Paris between Duca and the French leaders,
with the latter insisting on a general draft while the Romanians sought more con-
crete obligations, namely a military convention;87 but the French proved unwilling to
give in, arguing,
Why should we guarantee Bessarabia? We did not ask Romania to guarantee

us the province of Bretagne . . . What Duca wants is a military treaty and not a
general political treaty, which has an extraordinary moral value. Is it not clear
that the simple existence of a French-Czechoslovak Treaty is enough to make
Russia hesitate in attacking Czechoslovakia?”88
Duca decided to postpone any negotiations regarding the treaty at least until
< 227 >

the international situation would be more favorable to Romania.

In May 1924 the political situation in France changed and the new government
headed by Edouard Herriot decided on a different course for French foreign policy.
Herriot was not very favorable to the system of Eastern alliances and decided to
open diplomatic relation with the Soviets in October 1924.89 One of the immediate
consequences of the French recognition of the Soviets was that, according to a prom-
ise France had made during the war, she would return the Russian fleet (to “the first
recognized government of Russia”). For Romania, this meant facing the danger of a
very powerful Russian Black Sea Fleet. Under the circumstances, the Romanians
proposed the establishment of a common Anglo-French naval base on Romanian
territory, at Constanta, or asked that France refuse the Soviet request for the former
Russian fleet.90 The negotiations for the Alliance Treaty continued, the Romanians
insisting that it should stipulate the presence of a French military contingent in Ro-
mania in case of war with Russia. However, the French were opposed, Herriot justi-
fying his refusal by saying, “I am afraid that in a few years we will have a common
action of Germany against Danzig combined with a Russian action in Bessarabia”.91
During the negotiations for the Alliance Treaty, the French also pinned down
their real position regarding the Bessarabian Treaty: “Poincare declared that the Bes-
sarabian territory could not be guaranteed against an attack, the Bessarabian Treaty
being only a recognition of her annexation by Romania.” Quite upset by this inter-
pretation, Duca replied (written on the document) that “If France is not neighboring
Russia, neither are we Germany’s neighbor”.92
Trying to answer Poincare’s interpretation, during the same meeting Diamandi
raised the matter of the French position in case the Soviets, attacking Bessarabia,
should also attack a village on the territory of the Old Kingdom. He raised this point
in order to counterbalance the distinction made by Poincare between the Bessara-
bian Treaty and the Peace Treaties (a distinction probably, but not necessarily,
based on the fact that the Bessarabian Treaty had failed to come into force), showing
that the distinction could not stand up to a practical examination. However, worse
was still to come: the French “step back” regarding the Bessarabian Treaty. One and
a half years earlier, when the same Poincare had insisted on the ratification, he failed
to mention that he did not actually consider the treaty to be among the Peace Trea-
ties. This French position actually gives a different significance to the Treaty: if it
was not one of the Peace Treaties, France did not have to guarantee it in the same
manner. Simply said, the French indecision regarding the Bessarabian Treaty comes
to the surface once again in 1925, in a new way.
Although political reasons were important in delaying the signature of the Alli-
ance treaty, economical reasons also figured in. A Report prepared by the French
Finance Ministry in March 1925 identified no less than seven financial matters not
yet solved; only six such matters had been resolved after 1920.93 In fact, as remarked
in April 1925 by Constantin Diamandi, the Romanian Minister to France, the Roma-
nians were quite unhappy about the French policy of constantly giving priority to
economic matters in their bilateral relations:
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CHAPTER 6. FRANCE
I realized that, since 1919, there has been no kind of political collaboration with
us, no exchange of opinions; during different conferences, instead of looking for
our help and collaboration we are kept at a distance, suspected; the shadow of
the Supreme Council is still alive and, whenever we go to the Quai d’Orsay I
hear only requests regarding the payment of our debts; mercantilism.94
In fact, this French policy only points up France’s slender military and strate-
gic interest in Romania as compared to their economic interests. Since neither side
was willing to abandon her position, what followed was a new postponement in the
negotiations until the signing of the Locarno Agreement (meant to reinforce the
new European frontiers established at the end of World War I).
The Romanian Government, left out of the guarantees offered by the Locarno
agreements and sensing the need to strengthen its international position, insisted on
signing an alliance with France. However, the much-publicized “spirit of Locarno”
blocked France from undertaking any kind of concrete engagements outside the
League of Nations Pact. This was one of the reasons behind the continuous post-
ponement in signing the treaty with Romania, as well as in voiding it of concrete
military obligations and the attempt to keep it secret for as long as possible.95 On the
other hand, as stated by Poincare: “Whatever you might tell me and even adding in
the non-aggression pact, the Bessarabian question characterizes the treaty between
us as directed against Russia”.96
A major reason for the French postponement was the need to avoid exacerbat-
ing relations with Russia. As a result, they successfully kept on postponing the sig-
nature of the Treaty,97 even as the treaty was ready to be signed in September 1925,
when the Romanians abandoned their request regarding Bessarabia and accepted a
general Treaty with two annexes — a non-aggression statement by Romania to-
wards the Soviets and a military convention.98
On June 10, 1926, the long negotiated Friendship Treaty between Romania and
France was finally signed in Paris, prompted more or less directly by the Soviet sign-
ing of a political treaty with Germany (April 24, 1926) and by the ongoing Roma-
nian-Italian negotiations for an Alliance Treaty. However, it was quite short of what
the Romanians had hoped to achieve. It stipulated only that in case of an unpro-
voked attack upon one of its signatories, the two parties would consult, within the
framework of the League, as to the measures to be taken against the aggressor. In
order to please both signatories, it was completed with a Military Convention (to be
kept secret) and a Protocol. The Protocol reiterated Romania’s unilateral non-
aggression pact towards the Soviet Union, initially proposed during the Genoa Con-
ference of May 1922, offering in this way a written guarantee to the French that they
would not be dragged into a war started by Romania against the Soviets. On the
other hand, the Military Convention, although it was “secret”, was only of a general
nature, stipulating that the Military Headquarters of the two states should come
into contact in case of war but providing no clear obligations. The Treaty certainly
< 229 >

gave a moral boost to the Romanians, but it felt short of offering military guarantees
of the inviolability of the Romanian frontiers, particularly in Bessarabia.
The blame for the general nature of the Military Convention does not lie only
with France. One of the conditions for appropriate military collaboration would
have been for Romania to have a strong army and a firm High Command. Unfortu-
nately, in the Romanian High Command there were too many generals, and the war
preparedness of the Romanian Army was low.99 The French were eager to rectify
this situation, and offered to send a new military mission to Romania with the pur-
pose of reorganizing the Romanian High Command, and also to cover the ammuni-
tion needs of the Romanian Army; but they had to abandon their plans due to the
Romanians’ opposition.100
Somewhat worse for the Romanian government was the French insistence on
keeping the signing of the Treaty secret for as long as possible, a secrecy determined
by the need to avoid setting off Soviet and Italian reactions. On August 13, when the
Romanian government officially confirmed the news of the treaty, the press in the
main European capitals took up positions against it, considering it proof of a Roma-
nian-Polish-French military block.
Yet, there are scholars who, due to the common interest of maintaining the
existing European order, consider that “the French and the Romanians regarded
themselves as allies even without a formal treaty”.101 The other side of the story, more
“pessimistic” is:
The attachment of Romania, a state without border on Germany, to the Polish-

Czech nucleus of the French eastern system introduced the complexities of
Bucharest’s relations with USSR . . . the meagerness of France’s obligations
under the 1926 treaty — consultation at the outbreak of a conflict — also re-
stricted the chance of French embroilment in what internal memoranda, in a
reference to antecedents of the First World War, called “obscure Balkan quar-
rels”.102
Overall, the Friendship Treaty offers one of the best illustration of the French
foreign policy dilemma of choosing between the Soviet Union and the Eastern Euro-
pean countries, as well as of the failure of Romanian attempts to secure the help of a
Great Power against her powerful neighbor in the East.
A small controversy between the French representatives in Moscow and Bu-
charest regarding the Bessarabian question and Soviet-Romanian relations comes as
an excellent illustration of both the French dilemma and the Romanian failure. After
a meeting with Litvinov (May 1927), in which the Soviet position on Bessarabia and
the idea of a Romanian-Soviet non-aggression pact were discussed, the French Am-
bassador to the Soviets, Jean Herbette, argued:
It is not in Romania’s interest to put the Soviet recognition of Bessarabia’s un-

ion as a necessary and preliminary condition for a Soviet-Romanian rapproche-
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CHAPTER 6. FRANCE
ment. . . . The de facto situation is clearly in Romania’s advantage and she has all
the interest to prolong and use it in order to gain the sympathy of all the people
living in Bessarabia (not only a majority). . . . Instead, Romania chose to aban-
don her favorable position as a defendant and to pose as a plaintiff, and by do-
ing so has offered the Soviets an opportunity to challenge her title [to Bessara-
bia].”103
The answer to Herbette’s comments came from the French Minister to Roma-
nia, George Clinchant:
Romania is asking the Soviets to recognize her rights over Bessarabia because
she feels that time is working against her. In my view, Odessa is the natural
outlet for Bessarabian agricultural products, because they do not have to com-
pete with the similar Romanian products; the day when Russia will inspire
enough confidence for commerce will be the day when a plebiscite in Bessara-
bia will definitely be detrimental for Romania. From the Soviet view, time
would be used for a better internal organization and an increase in its interna-
tional prestige; therefore the Soviets have all the interest to leave the Bessara-
bian question open. . . . I think that, while we have to watch closely the evolu-
tion of Romanian-Soviet relations, we do not have, at least for the moment, any
interest to either interfere with the manner in which Romania intends to con-
duct her policy regarding Bessarabia or to give her any advice on this topic.104
< 231 >

Notes
1
For the French intervention in Romania’s favor during the 1856 Paris Peace negotiations see Barbara
Jelavich, Russia and the Formation of the Romanian National State, p. 68.
2
3
4
For a glimpse at the competition for influence existing inside the Little Entente, with insistence on
the more favorable position of Czechoslovakia in this contest, see Magda Adam, “The Genoa Confer-
ence and the Little Entente”, in Genoa, Rapallo, . . . , p. 187-199.
5
“The record of French diplomacy in Eastern Europe from 1935 through 1937 shows a strong connec-
tion between economic and political developments; because the French government could not meet
its eastern allies’ economic needs, it found it increasingly difficult to maintain its political relations
with them”. David E. Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy . . . , p. 216-217.
6
7
During the Genoa Conference “there was evidence that France tried seriously to establish a satis-
factory de facto relationship with Russia that met France’s specific needs, even if it did bypass the
multilateral negotiations then under way”. Anne Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, “French Plans for the Re-
construction of Russia”, in Genoa, Rapallo, . . . , p. 134.
8
K. Hovi, Alliance de Revers . . . , p. 36.
9
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 168, Report by Saint Aulaire, April 18, 1919, c. 687-694.
10
David Dutton, The Politics of Diplomacy . . . , p. 151.
11
Anne Hogenhuis-Seliverstoff, “French Plans for the Reconstruction of Russia”, in Genoa, Rapallo, . . . ,
p. 139.
12
For details on the making and the composition of the Committee see Jacques Bariety “Le Comite
d’etudes du Quai d’Orsay et la frontiere rhenane (1917-1919)” in The Establishment of Frontiers . . . , p. 251-
254.
13
A look at Clemenceau’s newspaper, “L’Homme Enchaine”, gives a good illustration of his opinions
and especially of his attitude towards Bratianu.
14
Armand Gosu, “Ion Pelivan la Conferinta de pace de la Paris”, in Revista istorica, 1993, no. 9, p. 1-17.
15
At one point, the British and American representatives were so disgruntled with the pro-
Romanian attitude of French Foreign Ministry officials that they asked for the sessions of the Coun-
cil of Ten and Council of Four to be moved from Quai d’Orsay to another place. S.D. Spector, Romania
la . . . , p. 225.
16
During the war, the most numerous of the French Military Missions was in Romania. Of course
that the war camaraderie established between the French officers and the Romanian military and
civil leaders lasted long after the war and had a benefic effect on the bilateral relations. Jean Noel
Grandhomme, “Le general Berthelot auxiliaire de la diplomatie francaise en Romanie, 1922-1930” in
La fin de la Premiere Guerre mondiale . . . , p. 107-126.
17
Glenn E. Torrey, General Henri Berthelot and Romania . . . , passim. Comte de Saint Aulaire, Confession
d’un vieux diplomate, p. 301-496.
18
He was instructed to do everything necessary, including encouragement for those in opposition
that were in favor of an immediate intervention, at Bratianu’s expense. Comte de Saint Aulaire, Con-
fession d’un . . . , p. 307, 331.
19
Comte de Saint Aulaire, Confession d’un . . . , p. 461.
20
He also points out the difficult position for the French in front of their Russian Allies, the Roma-
nian intervention in Bessarabia being heavily used by the German propaganda in Russia. G.E. Torrey,
General Henri Berthelot …, p. 150.
21
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Telegram Saint Aulaire to Clemenceau, June 20, 1918, c. 562.
22
M.J. Carley, Revolution and Intervention . . . , p. 166.
23
Admiral de Bou, Commander of the Naval Army, presents this opinion in a Report prepared on
March 1, 1920, also pointing the underestimation by the Romanians of the Bolshevik danger. RNA,
Fond France microfilm, R 189, Report on Romania, March 1, 1920, c. 256-258.
24
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 189, Report by Jules Cambon on “Romania and the Soviet Govern-
ment”, October 12, 1920, c. 289-290.
25
T. Sandu, “La France et la Bessarabie romaine de 1918 a 1920 …” in “The Establishment of …”, p. 369.
26
“Until the Conference will take a decision we must avoid, in our quality of old allies of Russia,
< 232 >

CHAPTER 6. FRANCE
which places us in a special situation, any armed action against the Russian population in this re-
gion”. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Instructions by Stephen Pichon, February 17, 1919, c. 584.
27
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Telegram Pichon to Saint Aulaire, July 13, 1919, c. 626-627.
28
He was one of Romania’s best friends in Paris. Professor of geography at Sorbonne University he
wrote a few brochures in favor of Romania’s territorial claims, including one on Bessarabia. As a
member in the Committee d’Etudes, De Martonne presented four reports on Romania, all based on
geographical, ethnic, demographical, economical and strategical considerations: Dobrudja on May 6,
1918; Transylvania on May 22, 1918; Banat on February 3, 1919; and Bessarabia on July 1919. It is im-
portant to show that the first two reports were presented at a time when Romania was in the most
difficult situation, after the Bucharest Peace, showing a continuing French solidarity with the Roma-
nian cause. For a resume of the four reports see J. Bariety, “Le Comite d’Etudes du Quai d’Orsay et …”
in Revue Romaine d’Histoire, 1996, no. 1, p. 43-51.
29
Quoted in S.D. Spector, Romania la . . . , p.127.
30
The declaration belongs to Philippe Berthelot and was made in September 1919 during a conversa-
tion with the Romanian representatives in Paris. Quoted in D. Preda, In apararea . . . , p. 123, 301.
31
DDI, Serie 6, Vol. 1, p. 430-431. Also S.D. Spector, Romania la . . . , p. 92.
32
Telegram Stephen Pichon (French Foreign Minister) to French representatives in Bucharest, Lon-
don, Washington and Brussels, December 28, 1918, quoted in 1920. Un act de justitie. Documente,
p. 101-102.
32
Maxime Mourin, Les Relations Franco-Sovietique, p. 105.
33
M.J. Carley, Revolution and Intervention . . . , p. 111-113.
35
DDF, 1920, Telegram Saint Aulaire for Paris, January 14, 1920, p. 17.
36
DDF, 1920, Letter Millerand to Daeschner, March 6th 1920, p. 309-312
37
T. Sandu, “La France et la Bessarabie romaine de 1918 a 1920…”in The Establishment of . . . , p. 379-380.
38
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Telegram Daeschner to Millerand, August 27, 1920, c. 697.
39
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note for the President of the Council, August 20, 1920, c. 694.
40
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 183, Telegram Pichon to Daeschner, September 14, 1920, c. 147.
41
General Petin, the French military attaché to Romania, prepared a very comprehensive report on
the anti-French campaign in Romania in September 1920, stressing both the causes and the main
actors in the campaign. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 183, Report by General Petin, September 29,
1920, c. 153-160.
42
43
RFMA, Fond 71/France, Vol. 63, 1920-1926, Telegram Diamandi to Duca, March 1, 1922.
44
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note Cambon to Leygues, March 21, 1922, c. 727.
45
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Antonescu to Duca, May 15, 1922.
46
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Duca to Antonescu, May 16, 1922.
47
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Antonescu to Duca, May 16, 1922.
48
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 189, Telegram Barrere (in Genoa) to Barthou, May 17, 1922, c. 478-
479.
49
RFMA, Fond 71/France, Vol. 63, 1920-1926, Telegram Antonescu to Duca, May 26, 1922.
50
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 213, Telegram Dering to Lord Curzon, August 9, 1922, c. 197.
51
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Report French Chamber of Deputies, 1922, No. 4752, c.
730-750.
52
Quoted in T. Sandu, “Les avatars de la ratification …”, in Revue Romaine d’Histoire, p. 64.
53
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 183, Report of French-Romanian relations, December 26,
1922, c. 441.
54
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 213, Note Duca to the French Legation, October 25, 1922, c. 25.
55
RNA, Fond England microfilm, R 213, Telegram Drake to Lord Curzon, December 17, 1922,
c. 76-78.
56
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Antonescu to Duca, January 16, 1923.
57
T. Sandu, “Les avatars de la ratification …”, in Revue Romaine d’Histoire, p. 65.
58
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Letter Leygues to Poincare, November 14, 1923, c. 774.
59
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note by de la Baume, June 21, 1923, c 758.
60
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Telegram Jusserand to Poincare, July 13, 1923, c. 760.
61
T. Sandu, “Les avatars de la ratification …”, in Revue Romaine d’Histoire, p. 65.
62
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Report prepared by the Department for the Implementation of
Treaties, October 24, 1923.
63
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Notes by Duca to the French, Italian, and Japanese Legations in
< 233 >

Bucharest, October 26, 1923.

64
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note on visit by Antonescu to Peretti, November 6,
1923, c. 766.
65
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Letter Poincare to Leygues, November 10, 1923, and Leygues
to Poincare, November 14, 1923, c. c. 773-774.
66
RFMA, Fond 71/France, Vol. 63, 1920-1926, Telegram Duca to Antonescu, November 18, 1923.
67
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note Poincare to the Political Director, November
23, 1923, c. 775.
68
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note Political Director to Poincare, November 27,
1923, c. 777.
69
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Letter Lord Derby to Poincare and Letter Poincare to
Lord Derby, December 12 and 20, 1923, c. 780-781.
70
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note on Visit by Count Vanutelly to Peretti, January
9, 1924, c. 784.
71
As for this last matter, “an immediate ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty by our Parliament
would be really welcomed in here”. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 189, Telegram Maneville to Poin-
care, February 1, 1924, c. 544.
72
M. Adam, The Little Entente . . . , p. 210.
73
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note Leygues to Poincare, January 30, 1924, c. 785.
74
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Note for the President of the Council, February 2nd
1924, c 787
75
French Chamber of Deputies, Debates, 1924, Vol. 2, p. 1204-1211.
76
French Chamber of Deputies, Debates, 1924, Vol. 2, p. 1204-1211.
77
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Duca to Antonescu, March 15, 1924.
78
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 183, Note on matters regarding Romania, April 8, 1924, c. 566-578.
79
The Times, March 20, 1924.
80
There are scholars arguing that, in fact, the French ratification was one of the main causes
for the failure of the Romanian-Soviets Conference in Vienna. T. Sandu, “Les avatars de la
ratification …”, p. 68.
81
The New York Times, March 17, 1924.
82
The Manchester Guardian, April 10, 1924.
83
Keith Hitchins argues that the French government was not interested in a military alliance with
Romania because it considered the latter’s army incapacity to undertake a serious military campaign.
84
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Report by Peretti on his meeting with I.G. Duca, March 14,
1924, c. 20.
85
Quoted in M. Adam, The Little Entente . . . , p. 213.
86
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Note by Guy Laroche, March 28, 1924, c. 29-31.
87
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Report by Peretti on his meeting with Duca, April 15,
1924, c. 37.
88
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191 (c. 64) and R 183 (c. 614), Report by Peretti on his meeting
with Duca, April 27, 1924. On the other hand, referring to the same meeting, Magda Adam mistak-
enly argues, “Duca accepted that the political agreement should include no military clauses”. M.
Adam, The Little Entente . . . , p. 214.
89
Although Magda Adam argues that “the Franco-Yugoslav and Franco-Romanian agreements were
removed from the agenda for a number of years”, as proved by the documents in the RFMA, the ne-
gotiations for a treaty continued even under Herriot’s government. M. Adam, The Little En-
tente . . . , p. 223.
90
The French position on the proposed naval base was that it would be of great utility but against
Turkey and not against Russia, also realizing that the Romanian condition for such a base would be
the signing of an Alliance Treaty. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Report by Laroche on his
meeting with Diamandi, February 20, 1925, c. 108. On the other hand, considering the limits of the
French War Navy, Briand was against the projected naval base. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191,
Report on Briand-Diamandi meeting, April 25, 1925, c. 120.
91
RFMA, Fond 71/France, Vol. 63, 1920-1926, Telegram Diamandi to Duca, January 12, 1925.
92
RFMA, Fond 71/France, Vol. 63, 1920-1926, Telegram Diamandi to Duca, July 24, 1925.
93
RFMA, Fond 71/France, Vol. 63, 1920-1926, Note by the French Finance Ministry on French-
Romanian financial matters, March 1925.
< 234 >

CHAPTER 6. FRANCE
94
Telegram Diamandi to Duca, April 28, 1925, quoted in C. Iordan, Romania si relatiile internationale din
sud estul Europei: modelul Locarno, p. 35.
955
C. Iordan, Romania si relatiile internationale din sud estul European; modelul Locarno, p. 131.
96
RFMA, Fond 71/France, Vol. 63, 1920-1926, Telegrams Diamandi to Duca, December 18 and 23,
1925.
97
“The postponement in the signing of the French-Romanian Treaty comes in order to avoid any
false interpretations and it is necessary due to our Locarno negotiations and the talks with the Sovi-
ets.” RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Telegram Berthelot to de Billly, February 17, 1926, c. 528.
98
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Telegram Briand to de Billy, September 10, 1925. Briand in-
structs de Billy that “although the drafts are ready, the signing is not opportune yet, due to France’s
image”.
99
An excellent report on Romanian Army’s situation was prepared by the French military attaché to
Romania, lt. colonel Thierry, pointing to its insufficient preparedness for war, due mainly to the
inexistence of adequate supplies of war materials. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Report by
Thierry, July 1, 1926, c. 236-250. In fact, although not too many Romanians are eager to say it, the
poor state of the Army continues today, being one of the main reasons why Romania, with all her
strategic potential, has been left out of NATO.
100
Jean Noel Granhomme, “Le general Berthelot …” in La fin de la Premiere Guerre . . . , p. 122-123.
101
102
103
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 189, Telegram Herbette to Briand, May 4, 1927, c. 718-719.
104
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 189, Telegram Clinchant to Briand, June 3, 1927, c. 729-730.
< 235 >

CHAPTER 7.
ITALY
Romanian-Italian Relations Before and During the Peace Conference
Italy’s role in the Bessarabian Treaty process, and especially in connection with
the ratification, offers an interesting insight into Italian foreign policy. Romania’s
efforts to obtain Italy’s ratification, although they came a little late, illustrate the
Treaty’s importance for Romania and its international impact.
Before the World War, Italy and Romania had been, at least theoretically, on
Germany’s side. When the war started, they proclaimed their neutrality and started
negotiations with both sides in the conflict. They each had misgivings about the
Austria-Hungarian Empire, which they had considered their principal enemy. And
also, as a condition for going to war, both states had signed secret treaties with the
Entente Powers in an effort to guarantee the fulfillment of their territorial aspira-
tions.
Soon after the war began, a secret agreement was reached between Italy and
Romania, by which the two countries undertook to communicate each other their
future intentions regarding the war.1
During the Paris Peace Conference afterward, Italy’s main concern was to see
that the secret treaty signed with the Entente Powers would be respected; that
would ensure her territorial ambitions and it was also likely to help produce a close
relationship between Italy and Romania. As a result, Italy was the country that in-
sisted most in favor of the validity of the 1916 Entente Treaty with Romania, consid-
ering that if the Romanian Treaty were respected, the Italian Treaty would be also.
On a general plan, the Italians had been disappointed with the attitude taken
by the other Powers at the Conference. They were admitted to the Council of Five
and, at least theoretically, had the status of a Great Power, but their real influence
and territorial gains were reduced as a result of French and US policies. When the
Conference ended, Italy was disappointed with its results, even though it had
achieved a great part of its territorial aspirations; this discontent would have pro-
< 237 >

found consequences for Italian foreign policy during the interwar period. Many
scholars also blame what they consider to be the utterly misguided policies of V.E.
Orlando and Sidney Sonnino for the Italian cry of la vittoria mutilata.2
Italy’s staunchest opponent during and after the Peace Conference was France.
Both Italy and France had their own plans regarding the future of Europe and they
each considered the Balkan area vital to their interests. The French influence in East-
ern Europe was a threat to Italy’s plans, especially because of the sympathy France
showed to the Serbs. One other country in which the fast-growing French influence
was worrisome was Romania, as described in a February 1919 Report from Bucha-
rest:
Romania seems almost completely subordinated to the French, who keep in-
creasing their influence by systematically imposing it over all the state admini-
stration. Nothing moves without French authorization and the French also
dominate the Romanian Supreme Military Headquarters. The Romanian peo-
ple, having had enough Gallicism, would like to end this situation but cannot
liberate itself.3
Italy’s attitude, backing up Romania’s territorial claims at the Conference, was

clearly expressed by the Italian Foreign Minister, Sidney Sonnino:
For the Oriental boundaries: we recognize the complete annexation of Bessarabia.

For Dobrudja we defend the 1913 Treaty but we recognize that for ethnic rea-
sons proposed by other delegations it is possible to give Bulgaria a partial recti-
fication of the border South of the Silistria-Mangalia line. [Actually, it was not
for ethnic reasons but for strategic reasons that Italy pronounced itself in favor
of Bulgaria, which was supposed to have an important role in the Italian strat-
egy of containing Yugo-Slavia.]
For the Occidental boundaries: we recognize the plain validity of the 1916
Treaty of Alliance. Because of the fierce opposition of the French, English and
American delegations, caused for the first two by the concept of favoring the
Slavs at any costs, and for the last by a meticulous appreciation of the ethnic
situation, the Italian delegation had to renounce that first scope, which left her
in an isolation that could prejudice her more vital interests.4 However, the Ital-
ian delegation, in order to adhere to the restrictive modifications of the line
established by the 1916 Treaty, made a verbal statement that it considers such a
solution not to be the best.
Regarding particularly the Banat, the Italian delegation, failing to give all of
it to Romania, proposed the division of the remaining region between Serbia
and Hungary. [In essence, this equates to an admission that the Banat could be
Romanian or Hungarian territory, as long as it is kept away from the Serbs.]
The Italian delegation made another proposal that provoked a powerful
reaction from the other three delegations, for the attribution to Romania of
< 238 >

CHAPTER 7. ITALY
Ruthenian territories situated between the Carpathian Mountains and the

Theiss as a way to give Transylvania a direct communication route with Poland
on the railway running from Jablonitza.5
Things did not go their way during the Peace Conference, which eventually led
the Italian representatives abruptly to leave the Conference. The more Italian inter-
ests were dismissed by the Conference, the fiercer was the Italian opposition to the
decisions taken by the other delegations — especially regarding territorial modifica-
tions. Whenever the Conference came to a conclusion regarding Romania’s borders,
the Italian delegation argued for something different (particularly during the debates
in the Territorial Commission);6 and Romania’s affairs were only one area where this
opposition was shown.
During the Hungarian crisis, Romanian-Italian relations took a turn for the
worse as a secondary effect of the Italian attempt to isolate Yugoslavia. The union of
the Croats and Slovenes with the Serbs was an unexpected and worrying develop-
ment for the Italians. Their initial plans had been to obtain territorial claims from
the Habsburg Empire and to use Austria as a bulwark against Slavdom in the Bal-
kans; Croatia and Slovenia were to remain parts of a reduced Habsburg Empire,
which would naturally retain Fiume as its only outlet to the sea. Instead, a vigorous
unitary Slav state had emerged, and claimed Dalmatia, the Islands and Fiume, and
also Istria, Gorizia and Trieste.7 As a result, Serbia grew to a degree where it could
contend with Italy, and it offered refuge to the Croats and Slovenes, whom Italy had
always considered enemies. (Croat troops fought for the Monarchy until the last
days of the war, hoping to achieve a better position inside the Empire afterward.)
Italy wanted to isolate Yugoslavia, and for that it needed to have Austria, Ro-
mania, Bulgaria and Hungary on her side. However, Romania had territorial disputes
with both Hungary and Bulgaria, disputes that made any diplomatic arrangement
between them impossible.
Still, Bratianu agreed during 1919 with the Italian policy of isolating the Yugo-
slavs, hoping to get all of Banat for Romania. But Italy’s move toward closer relations
with Hungary during the summer of 1919 (by supplying armament to the Hungari-
ans), and Italy’s attitude on the South Dobrudja question (in which they proposed
negotiations between Romania and Bulgaria) won them no friends in Romania.
The worst part for the Italian side was the military and diplomatic conflict be-
tween Romania and Hungary over Transylvania, which proved to be an insurmount-
able barrier to any possible alliance between the two countries. In June 1919,
Sonnino instructed Prince Borghese, in Budapest, to support a projected Romanian-
Hungarian alliance; the thought was that some form of agreement could be built on
the basis of a common understanding to weaken and isolate Yugoslavia.8 The Italians
had already started to put into practice their dream of completely isolating the
Yugoslavs, but their policy of helping Hungary clearly displeased the Romanians.
They remembered clearly that, when the Romanian Army had entered Budapest in
pursuit of Bela Kun’s army, it was an Italian colonel who came to negotiate in the
< 239 >

name of the Hungarian communist government — proving that it was Italy who had
supported Hungary’s war against Romania with weapons and ammunition.
During the debates over the ultimatum sent to Romania on November 15, 1920,
the Italians supported the Romanian cause, convincing the other delegates to make
some modifications and agreeing only at the last moment to play a part in delivering
it to the Romanians.9 This attitude was dictated by the Fiume crisis, which had
some similarities with the Hungarian crisis; the Italians were aware that an action
such as this one against Romania would create a precedent that might someday be
used against Italy. As stated by one of the British representatives in Paris:
I called the attention to the necessity for making the most exact arrangements
for the immediate delivery of this note by all the Allied representatives in Bu-
charest. I quoted some of the information which has reached me as to the ex-
traordinary maneuvers of the Italian Minister at Bucharest and his insertion in
the Romanian press of statements that Italy disagreed with the decisions of the
Supreme Council, and that Romania could rely on Italian support in a policy of
resistance to the Council’s notes.10
As previously noted, after the American withdrawal, the Peace Conference de-
cided to recognize de jure and not only de facto the union of Bessarabia with Romania.
Italy too signed the Bessarabian Treaty of October 28, 1920. The only difference be-
tween Italy, on the one hand, and the UK and France, on the other, while negotiating
for the Treaty, was that the Romanian Government did not propose to the former an
exchange of notes regarding compensation for land expropriated in Bessarabia. Al-
though initially the Romanians had in view an exchange of notes with the Peace
Conference, they changed their position and left out Italy and Japan. This decision
was probably related to the more and more passive attitude taken by the Italian for-
eign policy team with regard to the Peace Conference, the need to keep the exchange
secret from Romanian landowners, and the discontent regarding some of Italy’s ac-
tions. The Romanian Government understood that the real forces at the Conference
were the UK and France, and considered that Italy and Japan were almost powerless
to resist those two. A few years later, in the context created by Mussolini’s foreign
policy, the Romanians had to pay a certain price for under-estimating Italy.
The Ratification Question. First Phase, 1920-1926
During the inter-war period, Romanian-Italian relations had not, with one ex-
ception, been very friendly. Despite their shared Latin roots, as with France, political
and strategic factors complicated the situation. The Italian drive to isolate Yugosla-
via was thwarted by the establishment of the Little Entente (Romania, Czechoslova-
kia, Yugoslavia), and by France’s influence in the area. To counterbalance the Little
Entente, Italy tried to increase its influence in Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria. How-
ever, in each of its actions in the Balkan area, Italy was confronted with the Little
< 240 >

CHAPTER 7. ITALY
Entente. Putting a definitive chill on Romanian-Italian relations were Italy’s actions

in favor of Hungary, especially arms deliveries, and interventions in favor of the eth-
nic Hungarians in Romania; the leaders of the Romanian National Party (one of Ro-
mania’s biggest, based in Transylvania), expressed their discontent with the pro-
Hungarian policy of Italy,11 and Bratianu noted both that and Italy’s opposition to
the Little Entente.12 A number of open economic issues also had a negative influence.
It is difficult to take the Bessarabian Treaty ratification out of the context of
Italian-Romanian relations in general. Ratification was among Romania’s main goals
with Italy, especially between 1924 and 1927. Economic matters were more at issue
for the Italians, who hoped for a favorable solution to a number of pending financial
questions and also for a larger share of the Romanian market.
The Italian Minister in Bucharest, Martin Franklin, analyzed Romanian-Italian
relations in January 1923 in a memorandum to the Romanian Foreign Minister, I.G.
Duca, noting the problems en suspens between the two countries:
In order to give a greater intimacy to Romanian-Italian relations it is first nec-

essary that the Romanian Government gives a satisfactory solution to the question
of equality of treatment regarding the expropriations in Bessarabia and a liberal ap-
plication for the other expropriations [of land/property in areas other than Bessara-
bia].
The Romanian Government should take measures to solve the financial

problems in order to dissipate the unfavorable atmosphere produced by the
grave consequences of its actions in this field. These questions . . . have been:
the war debts; the Treasury Bonds; Stamps; credits for the payment of the de-
stroyers; credits from the Bank of Italy for the Romanian Legation in Rome;
payment of the interest for the Romanian public debt in Italy. . . .
The most delicate and gravest question is that of Italian properties in Bes-
sarabia. The Italian Government cannot admit that the Italians are not treated
in the same manner as the English and the French just because the Italian Gov-
ernment had recognized the annexation of Bessarabia with brotherhood zeal
and without conditions.13
As for the last matter, the accent placed on it comes at the beginning of 1923 as
a result of the Romanian payment of compensations to the expropriated French and
British landowners, when the news of the 1920 exchange of letters “transpired”, infu-
riating the Italians. However, for Italy it was more a matter of prestige than money,
and that is why Mussolini reacted to it so strongly. As there was only one Italian
landowner in question, it is difficult to understand why Romania waited another
year before solving this minor problem.
When Mussolini came to power, he carefully avoided any action that could
encourage Hungarian or Bulgarian revisionism and, most important for Romania, in
1923 Italy showed no sympathy for Hungary’s claim to Transylvania.14 During his
< 241 >

first months in office Mussolini preferred a rapprochement with the Little Entente
rather than with Hungary and Bulgaria. And, as proved by the signing of the Pact of
Rome with Yugoslavia and by on-going negotiations with the Czechoslovaks, he
seemed to be successful in this approach. The Italian-Czechoslovak negotiations
offer an interesting comparison to Romanian-Italian negotiations, as Mussolini was
trying to settle war debts with both Romania and Czechoslovakia, and the latter
both sought to have Italy more concretely committed to guaranteeing their borders.
Of the three members in the Little Entente, Romania would have appeared to
be the most open to an understanding with Italy, as they had no territorial problems
between them and they had the cultural bridge created by their common Latin ori-
gins. However, the Romanians were clearly much closer to the French and even to
the British than to the Italians, as they doubted Italy’s ability to impose her ideas or
interests at the international level; they considered that Italy lacked the military and
economic might necessary to enforce her international status. In fact, during the en-
tire interwar period, and especially during Titulescu’s tenure as the Foreign Minister
the Romanians, following in the footprints of French diplomacy, were very keen to
avoid any reference to Italy as a Great Power. The failure of Bratianu’s plan to obtain
for Romania a position similar Italy’s at the end of the war also played a role. So that,
adding up the two political sore points (the Italian-Hungarian partnership and the
Bessarabian Treaty ratification) with the French influence, skepticism and a few
financial issues, there were plenty of obstacles.
Soon after Mussolini came to power, the Romanians tried to improve their re-
lations, hoping for an Italian military guarantee of Romania’s borders both in Tran-
sylvania and Bessarabia. However, as soon as January 1923 Mussolini had already
expressed his view, using his famous formula that a political agreement should be
preceded by increased economic cooperation, hinting especially at the newly-opened
oilfields in Romania.15 Mussolini’s proposal not only failed to make a good impres-
sion in Bucharest but also coincided with the Liberal Party’s campaign for the imple-
mentation of the so-called “by ourselves” economic policy, aimed at reducing the
control of Romanian economy by foreign investors. The Italian quest for Romanian
oil also collided with French, British and American interests in the area. As a result,
Romania decided to slow down the economic negotiations (particularly over the
treasury bonds controversy) initiated by Pompeo Aloisi, the new Italian Minister to
Romania.16
In October 1923, the Romanian Foreign Ministry opened a discussion regard-
ing ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty with the Italian representatives, only to be
disappointed. One might ask why Romania waited three years to ask; there were at
least four reasons. First, it took Romania herself about a year and a half to ratify the
Treaty (and even then, with a little British “help”); how, then, could she ask the Ital-
ians to ratify? Second, as the Romanians considered the French guarantees to be
worth far more than the Italian or Japanese, it is possible that they focused only on
France. In a sense, that would mean a continuation of the 1920 policy of neglecting
Italy and over-evaluating France and Great Britain. Then, there were the unresolved
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CHAPTER 7. ITALY
economic issues existing between the two states, and the Italian attitude towards
Hungary. Unfortunately, while the Romanians were placing all their bets on France,
Italy was won over by one of Romania’s adversaries, the Soviet Union.
In February 1924 Italy gave official recognition to the Soviet Union, at the same
time as Great Britain, but without having ratified the Bessarabian Treaty.17 There
were rumors at the time that Mussolini had agreed not to ratify the treaty in ex-
change for economic benefits from the Soviets, and subsequent events suggest that
there was some truth to that. Regardless, Italy’s recognition was bad news for Ro-
mania, as it further decreased the number of possible allies against the Soviets.
That spring, a potential crisis emerged in the form of the Treasury Bonds dis-
pute.18 Mussolini had been personally insisting, for over a year, that the Romanian
authorities should solve this problem as soon as possible. Perhaps coincidentally, in
early March 1924, just a few weeks after the recognition of the Soviet Union, Musso-
lini suggested putting off the planned visit of the Romanian Royal Family to Italy
due to the bad press Romania was given for the Treasury Bonds question19 and the
different treatment accorded Italian landlords expropriated in Bessarabia.20 This
suggestion was received in Bucharest as a slap, and the Royal Family rescinded its
decision to visit Rome. The King found it inappropriate that a manifestation of
friendship between sovereigns should be obstructed by mere financial considera-
tions.21 With the honor of the Romanian Royal Family at stake, there was a risk of
eroding Romanian-Italian relations to a dangerous level. Realizing that he may have
over-stepped, Mussolini tried to soften the message a little, suggesting that he had
only asked for the postponement because the Italian public opinion had become hos-
tile to Romania as a result of her economic policy. However, he adamantly repeated
that the Romanian Government should solve the Treasury Bonds problem.22
The worst aspect of the crisis was that it came at a time when the French Par-
liament had ratified the Bessarabian Treaty and negotiations between Romania and
Russia were about to begin in Vienna. In other words, Mussolini’s action vitiated the
advantage given by the French ratification, giving an advantage to the Soviet delega-
tion.23 Mussolini was not about to allow the French influence in the Balkans to in-
crease; with this gesture, Mussolini was able to improve his relations with the Sovi-
ets while giving a warning to Romania as to Italy’s importance in Balkan politics.
And it seems that, indeed, the Romanians changed their policy towards Italy. As for
Soviet-Italian relations, there is every indication that indeed Mussolini had come to a
verbal agreement to delay ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty.24 But did Mussolini
have another agreement with the Soviets, promising to provoke a brief crisis in Ital-
ian-Romanian relations in order to offset the effect of the French ratification and
thereby shift the balance at the Vienna negotiations?
Only a few weeks later, the whole incident was forgotten. As Alan Cassels ex-
pressed it: “After the storm blew over, the stalemate remained as before; the Romani-
ans sought political assurances and the Italians economic assurances, with both
sides reluctant to equate one set of desiderata with the other”.25
Later that March, the Italians indicated that they would ratify as soon as the
< 243 >

Italian landowners expropriated in Bessarabia had been compensated, at the same

level as for the French and British subjects.26 This time, the Romanian government
set out to give satisfaction, and the results proved that, in fact, the Italians had been
exaggerating the compensation question in order to use it as a cover for other exist-
ing motives, as France did in 1922:
We took the decision long ago to compensate the Italian landowners in Bes-
sarabia in the same way as the French and English. Until today Malabassi is
the only case we know of, and his rights we have already estimated. I do not
have to add what a good impression would be made, in these conditions, espe-
cially today, by a quick ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty.27
Understanding the real importance of the Italian ratification, the Romanian

side took action to improve the bilateral relations, and the problem of Treasury
Bonds was partially solved. At the beginning of August 1924 the Romanian Foreign
Minister, I.G. Duca, had a meeting with Pompeo Aloisi, the Italian Minister in Bu-
charest. Duca proposed that the two countries sign a Treaty similar to the Italo-
Czechoslovak Treaty, with a special emphasis on Italy’s ratification of the Bessara-
bian Treaty. When the Italian Minister expressed his opinion that the ratification
could not be considered, for the moment, because of its implications for Italian-
Soviet relations, Duca offered the necessary “incentives”, suggesting that the political
accord could be followed by oil concessions, contracts for the Romanian Railways
System, and so on. In fact the Romanians, whenever the Italians delayed, tried to
induce them with the kind of economic arguments that Mussolini sought with his
favorite slogan, niente per niente. Concluding his report, Aloisi stated:
It is clear that the Romanian Government, after the spring incidents, and
especially during the last few months, has demonstrated and continues to dem-
onstrate greater willingness for a rapprochement with Italy, for two reasons:
improving its foreign credit; solving the Bessarabian question and finding a
more stable asset for its foreign policy.28
However, Mussolini was unwilling to abandon his position:
On diverse occasions, Lahovary [Romanian Minister in Rome] asked me

about the Italian ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty and I tried to avoid giv-
ing him an explicit answer. I am still waiting for the Romanian-Russian nego-
tiations to continue, wishing that they would end with a satisfactory result.
You should make Duca understand that, in any case, our accord with Romania
should coincide with a commercial treaty. . .29
As a sign of good faith on the part of the Romanian Government, on September

1924 the Minister of Agriculture, Alexandru Constantinescu, went to Italy. The ne-
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CHAPTER 7. ITALY
gotiations focused mainly on economic issues, the ratification being put off again by
Mussolini’s proposal to start conversations with the Soviet Ambassador in Rome for
an amicable solution to the Bessarabian question.30 On the same day, Mussolini had
a conversation on the same matter with the leader of the People’s Party, Alexandru
Averescu (former Romanian Prime Minister). Although the Romanians had not
asked for Mussolini’s intervention in improving Romanian-Soviet relations, he was
all too glad to undertake this task, for two reasons. One, he could pose as someone
doing everything for the Romanian cause in Bessarabia by exerting his influence over
the Soviets — while justifying the delay in the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty.
And two, this offer fit well with Mussolini’s more general objective in recognizing
the Soviets: his dream of mediating between Bolshevism and the West.31
Although it seemed that Romanian-Italian relations were on the right path, in
just a few days a new crises erupted, provoked by information published by the
semi-official Stefani Agency: that the Italian Government was about to ratify the
Bessarabian Treaty. This generated a polemic in the Italian press, with arguments
pro and con.32 While Il Mondo, opposed to Mussolini, was on the Romanians’ side
and pleaded in favor of ratification, a number of other newspapers expressing the
official government viewpoint (such as Il Popolo d’Italia), argued the contrary. And
worse, pleading against ratification, they used the Russian thesis regarding Bessara-
bia, calling for a plebiscite and claiming that, in fact, the Italian non-ratification had
spared Romania from a Soviet military campaign. The Romanian press hit back, as
soon as the word spread.33
In this context Mussolini’s secret agreement with the Soviets on ratification
became a leitmotiv of the mass media. The Romanian side officially concluded that
no such secret agreement existed:
There is no proof of the existence of such an agreement; the only indications

come through its effects:
1. The mild tone used by the Soviet press towards Mussolini;
2. During the Matteoti affair, Moscow simply kept complete silence, fail-
ing to protest in any way;
3. The attitude of the Italian communist party is more and more strange
(they oppose the boycott of the Chamber initiated by the opposition par-
ties as a result of the Matteoti affair);
4. The existence of a reciprocal agreement between the Rosta (Russian)
and Stefani Press Agencies regarding the publication of news;
5. Mussolini’s attitude regarding the Bessarabian question;
6. The existing affinities between the Soviet and the Mussolini regimes.34
The question is, what kind of proof was Cretzianu looking for? If it was a verbal
agreement, no signed papers could be expected. And, as it was supposedly a secret
that neither Mussolini nor the Soviets would have an interest in leaking, it would be
surprising to find any concrete proof. Still, in this author’s view, it does appear, from
< 245 >

published Italian documents, that a secret verbal agreement on the ratification did
exist.
Realizing that the press campaign both in Italy and Romania was not at all
benefiting the Romanian cause, Duca instructed Alexandru E. Lahovary, the Roma-
nian minister to Italy, to take action in order to put an end to it:
I think that it is necessary to end this campaign because, as you know,

Mussolini is unwilling yet to make known his intentions, of which he assured
us, so that the actual dispute could only place him in an unpleasant situation.35
Still, the campaign went on and, as a result, relations between the two states
once again froze. The troubles were discussed during a meeting between I.G. Duca
and H. Dering, the British Minister in Romania, in December 1924. As Dering re-
ports:
I asked whether Italy showed any signs of ratifying the Treaty recognizing Ro-
mania’s sovereignty over Bessarabia. Duca replied, not yet, but that Mussolini
still declared that he was trying to induce the Soviet Government to give simi-
lar recognition, when he, Duca, supposed Italian ratification would, in that
rather unlikely contingency, follow. I expressed wonder over what Italy ex-
pected to be the outcome of her negotiations with the Soviet Government . . . I
merely remarked that Italy generally expected something in exchange for fa-
vors. Duca agreed with a smile, remarking, “a policy of du ut des”.36
The press campaign continued, reaching a new peak in February-March 1925.

One of the most controversial moments came as the Italian press published passages
taken from Cicerin’s speech in Tiflis regarding the Bessarabian question. The Roma-
nians were outraged and asked the Italian government for explanations, arguing that
the sentiment of the Romanian public could only become anti-Italian as a result of
this kind of article. After a meeting with Contarini, Lahovary reports:
Contarini declared that he does not know exactly the declaration made by
Cicerin; that Mussolini has not lost his hope that, in time, the Soviets would
recognize the Bessarabian Treaty; that the articles published in Il Mondo could
only harm the Romanian cause. He advised us [nonetheless] to have patience
because time is a great master and that by insisting we only risk to infuriate Mussolini
and he might even decide to take the Italian signature off the Bessarabian Treaty. That, in
the end, a Government, the same as an individual, is free to change his opinions
and decisions as he wishes. . . .
Finally he asked me what was the situation of the commercial negotiations
between us. I told him honestly that Italian economic interests could not ex-
pect to be welcome in Romania as long as the Italian ratification is missing.”37
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CHAPTER 7. ITALY
This position suggests that Contarini (and probably Mussolini as well) was
either really upset about the articles published in Il Mondo or that he had no idea how
international customs or procedures work; these might be the only explanations as
to why did he came with such an aberrant idea of taking Italy’s signature off the Bes-
sarabian Treaty. Even if this had been possible, at that stage it actually would have
offered a small advantage to Romania, at least logically, because if the Italians were
no longer party to the Treaty, their ratification would become unnecessary. More
probably, as Mussolini had no interest to completely alienate Romania (and even he
realized this), it was only the usual Italian bluffing.
Unsatisfied that the press campaign kept on going, Duca insisted again:
You have done well in answering immediately the Russian Ambassador [in the
press] . . . Still, I believe that it would be better to end this campaign. While
the interest of the Soviets is to agitate the Bessarabian question, we do not
have such interest. Therefore, as this depends on us, it would be necessary to
exercise our influence in order to stop this campaign . . . in this moment a press
campaign regarding the Bessarabian question is more inopportune than ever,
so I ask you to take the necessary measures.38
It should be noted that the Romanian representatives in Italy did not actively
sponsor the pro-Romanian writings. Of course, they were happy to publish informa-
tion on Bessarabia when asked by journalists but there were no payments made by
the Legation in order to publish articles favorable to Romania, precisely because
Duca was clearly against the campaign.
However, the ratification question offered a good weapon for those who
wished to use foreign policy controversies to weaken Mussolini. In a sense, the Bes-
sarabian issue was more of a weapon against Mussolini than a manifestation of
friendship towards Romania. A similar attempt was made in Japan, initiated not by
the press but by members of another political party, when the postponement of the
ratification was used in order to criticize the foreign policy of Baron Shidehara.
Aloisi analyzed the Romanian political circles in April 1925 and concluded that
the Bessarabian question was the main reason for the existing chill in Romanian-
Italian relations; a chill that could affect the economic interests of Italy in Romania:
I do not think that for the moment any special demonstrations are necessary,
but with the purpose of maintaining firm the principles regarding our Bessara-
bian policy, I find it opportune that, in order to clarify the situation, something
favorable for Romania should be done in other field.39
Romania’s representatives also consulted with leaders of the remaining Italian

opposition in an attempt to obtain the ratification. However, Don Sturdzo, one of
Mussolini’s political enemies, blamed them squarely for the failure:
< 247 >

As for the Bessarabian question he said, why have you been so late with your
request? Italy would have ratified much more easily three years ago. But today I
can see no possibility, none.40
Summing the result of his negotiations during 1925 Lahovary concludes: “After
prolonged talks I came to the belief that, in the current circumstances, it is not pos-
sible to obtain, either directly or indirectly, the much desired Italian ratification of
the Bessarabian Treaty.”41 Still, as he had clear instructions, Lahovary continued to
pursue the matter by initiating new negotiations with the Italians and trying to in-
duce them to ratify:
Contarini declared: it seems to me that you have forgotten that Constan-

tinescu has made a number of promises which have failed yet to became reality,
and which were in a sense the preliminary conditions asked for by Mussolini.
You must not think that we have been inactive since that time; it is just that
our interventions could not greatly modify the Soviets attitude.
I answered by showing him the great opportunities for investment offered
by Romania, especially in mining and oil extraction, and gave him the example
of French investments in Romania, suggesting the sending of an Italian eco-
nomic delegation to Romania.42
In December 1925 the new Italian Minister in Romania, Marquis Durazzo,

tried to defuse the situation. After a number of meetings with Romanian policy mak-
ers, he sent an impressive report to Mussolini, making a case that Romania was im-
portant for Italy and stressing the need to improve bilateral relations. He understood
clearly, the same as his predecessor had, that the main holdback, in the Romanian
view, was Bessarabia.
In his report, Durazzo gave an excellent review of both the Romanian and Ital-
ian positions on the Bessarabian question:
The Romanian arguments were:

1. The obligation assumed by Italy in signing the treaty;
2. By not fulfilling her obligation Italy is siding with Romania’s enemies in
a question that is vital for Romania;
3. Assurances given by us in the past indicating that the ratification
would come soon after solving the questions en suspens;
4. The grave consequences resulting for Romania from the postponement
of the ratification — it only prolongs the situation existing in Bessara-
bia by the fact that there is no definitive sanction of Romanian rights in
there, which can only serve the Russian attempts at disturbing the re-
gion;
5. Only if the Treaty is ratified by all signatory powers can the annexation
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CHAPTER 7. ITALY
of Bessarabia to Romania be considered on the same footing with the

other territorial modifications made after the war, sanctioned by trea-
ties;
6. The Italian postponement of the ratification represents one of the main
arguments of the Bolshevik agents . . . in showing that the Romanian
administration in the area is only temporary.
The Italian arguments were:

1. The Romanian government should not understand our attitude as an
unfriendly one;
2. The Treaty was signed when Russia was completely excluded from the
European international community, but even when the Treaty is rati-
fied by all the signatories it will have no practical value, [if that were so,
then why did Romanian, British and French governments insist on the
ratification?] while the ratification can influence our relations, which
already have promising practical results, with Moscow;
3. Above all, Romania should understand that Bessarabia is and will re-
main under her possession, and should not believe the illusion that one
international sanction can in any case change the situation, which is in
the end a matter of opposed interests and forces and not one of rights
that are more or less recognized by others;
4. I consider that it is in the interest of Romania and in the general inter-
est of peace to postpone the ratification, because it could generate a
violent reaction from Russia.
5. Because of its position in the Bessarabian question and of its good rela-
tions with the Moscow Government, the Italian Government has the
best position to act as a moderator in the difficult Romanian-Russo
relations. . . .
I have to insist that, if we cannot repair somehow the still actual repercus-
sions of the postponed ratification not only with the Government but also with
the public opinion, we will continue to be practically excluded from any advan-
tageous economic or political collaboration that we can hope for in this coun-
try . . .
By continuing to postpone the ratification we will be in no position to es-
tablish profitable relations with this country. . . .
Italy could give Romania an assurance, bound to remain secret, that in case
of Russia opening the discussion over Bessarabia, whether by guns or only dip-
lomatically, the Italian Government would offer Romania all the necessary sup-
port, both moral and diplomatic. . . . Mussolini could play the role of mediator
between Romania and Russia in order to make them sign a non-aggression
pact. . . . [and extend] an official invitation for the Romanian Royal Family to
visit Italy and a great reception while they are there.43
< 249 >

Durazzo’s Report had no effect on Mussolini, who simply answered that he

might take the initiative for the non-aggression pact and that “as regards the visit of
the Romanian Royal Family, it should be preceded by progress in the commercial
negotiations or by some other concrete manifestation of goodwill.”44
As for the idea of mediating the conflict over Bessarabia, a leitmotiv of Musso-
lini’s diplomacy, it seems that he actually took it seriously and came up with a com-
promise solution based on the idea of self-determination for Bessarabia: that the So-
viets should recognize Romanian sovereignty over Bessarabia, and the Romanian
government should offer the greatest possible autonomy to the province, under the
leadership of a General Governor named by a local Council.45
By February 1926 the Italian government suggested signing an Alliance Treaty
with Romania, in a formula that guaranteed the Romanian borders.46 Although it
failed to mention the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty, the Italian move seemed
to signal a shift in policy towards Romania. Of course, it is possible that the main
impetus behind this proposal was the news of the ongoing French-Romanian nego-
tiations for an Alliance Treaty. Mussolini understood that, in order to counterbal-
ance the French influence, he would have to come up with something. Still, Musso-
lini insisted, in his characteristic manner, that a commercial treaty should precede
the military one.
Although the Romanians were dissatisfied with the Italian draft, Mussolini
took the opportunity to express his displeasure with the French-Romanian negotia-
tions, arguing that it was unfair for the Romanians to play at two different tables at
the same time (a peculiar complaint, given that Mussolini was constantly negotiat-
ing with both the Romanians and the Soviets). He claimed that an Italian-Romanian
alliance should actually preclude a Franco-Romanian alliance.47 Since Romania was
by no means willing to renounce to the nearly complete draft Treaty with France for
a speculative one with Italy, the negotiations came to a halt.
Not every Romanian diplomat agreed with the line suggested from Bucharest
and particularly with the necessity of immediate Italian ratification. Illustrative in
this sense is the opinion expressed by Langa-Rascanu, one of Romania’s representa-
tives in Italy, in a report sent to Bucharest in May 1926:
It will be a great deception to believe that the Italian ratification would

solve the Bessarabian question or would lead to the establishment of Russo-
Romanian relations.
Let’s suppose that Italy gives us the ratification. What would be the re-
sult — a freeze in Russo-Italian relations and an increase in the animosity of
the Soviet government against us. Thus, no practical results. By contrast, the
Italian ratification could postpone even longer the day of reestablishing normal
relations with Russia. It would also generate a freeze in Romanian-Italian rela-
tions, as a result of Romania’s insistence.
Our intervention in Rome would face increased difficulties because Musso-
lini would try to take advantage, especially in the economic field, of the recent
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CHAPTER 7. ITALY
break-off in Russo-British relations.

Romania needs not Italian ratification but Italian mediation, because Ro-
mania needs not the Italian ratification regarding Bessarabia but the Russian
ratification. And only Italy could reconcile us with the Russians and of course
Mussolini would be very happy to elevate himself with this achievement. Still,
the most difficult problem is to find a reconciliation formula between Romania
and Russia.48
The Ratification Question. Second Phase, 1926-1927
During the second half of the 1920s, Italian foreign policy became even more
aggressive and Mussolini’s hostile attitude towards the Little Entente more acute.
His aim was to weaken or even liquidate both the Little Entente and the French in-
fluence in Eastern Europe.49
The best period for Romanian-Italian relations was during the Alexandru
Averescu Government (March 1926-June 1927). Averescu, the hero of the Romanian
Army, had close personal ties with Italy (he had studied at Turin Military School, his
wife was Italian, and in 1926 he became a Marshall in the Italian Army), ties which
would prove to have a powerful influence on the bilateral relations.
It was in February 1926, before Averescu came to power, that Italy had pro-
posed to Romania a treaty of alliance with the purpose of maintaining the territorial
status quo. The Romanians had welcomed the Italian proposal and tried to use it to
boost their negotiating position with the French. Analyzing the Italian proposal dur-
ing a meeting with Austin Chamberlain on February 18, Nicolae Titulescu observed
that it was motivated by the current impossibility of the Italian government to ratify
the Bessarabian Treaty. He believed that the Italian government had committed not
to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty and that, to the eventual reaction of the Soviets re-
garding the alliance treaty with Romania, Mussolini could answer: “It is a purely
defensive agreement, conceived in the spirit of Locarno, which would come into
power only in case of an unprovoked Russian attack”.50 But what was behind Tit-
ulescu’s remarks: did he have any firm evidence of the existence of a Soviet-Italian
agreement on the Bessarabian Treaty (which had been clearly dismissed earlier by
Cretzianu) or it was only an expression of his Italo-phobia?
Initially, Mussolini insisted that the French-Romanian negotiations should be
suspended but the Romanians refused. The French-Romanian negotiations did
stimulate Italy to reach some accord with Bucharest, lest Romania slip completely
into the French orbit; and Averescu was willing to balance his Francophile gesture
by an agreement with Italy.51
Averescu understood that in order to improve relations, he would have to start
in the economic field. Therefore, he sent Mihail Manoilescu, undersecretary at the
Ministry of Finance, to Rome in June, where he signed an agreement regarding the
consolidation of the Romanian war debt in Italy52 and accepted a credit of 200 mil-
lions Italian lira that Romania would use to buy Italian products.
< 251 >

But Romania’s commercial concessions were not enough for Mussolini. Un-
happy about the French-Romanian Treaty, Mussolini changed his projected draft
Treaty with Romania, proposing in July 1926 only a Friendship Pact with a more
circumscribed character than had initially been proposed. Although the Romanians
were disappointed, Averescu agreed to drop the formula proposed by the Bratianu
government — that Italy should guarantee Romania in its current (existing) bor-
ders. The political opposition accused Averescu of being unable, with all his friend-
ship for Italy, to obtain at least a treaty similar to that proposed to the previous Gov-
ernment.53 Mussolini reiterated that he had no intention of damaging his relations
with the Soviets because of the Romanians’ wish to see the Bessarabian Treaty rati-
fied.54
Meanwhile, the French, too, were unhappy to see Romania negotiating with
the Italians.55 Why did the Romanian Government not abandon the projected Treaty
since, demoted to a statement of “Friendship” it represented a refusal to follow
through on Italy’s de jure recognition of Romania’s borders, acting against Romanian
interests in a vital question? There is only one answer: the Italophile Averescu was
heading the government.
Even though there was talk only of a friendship treaty, Cicerin expressed con-
cern that a military one might follow. Mussolini had Manzoni, the Italian Ambassa-
dor in Moscow, declare to Cicerin that it was only an “absolutely platonic friendship
treaty” and that a military treaty had been just signed between France and Roma-
nia.56
In August 1926 Averescu went to Italy, for private reasons, and also met Mus-
solini. By August 31, Mussolini had clarified his position on the ratification question
and presented it to the Romanians a few days later:
There is no doubt that a ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty by Italy

would provoke a crisis in Italian-Russian relations, relations that have impor-
tance especially from the economic viewpoint, because the Italian economy
needs raw materials.
1. The amplitude and character of this crisis cannot be determined.
2. Italy is not afraid of the crisis from the political viewpoint. . . . .
3. The problem is only from the economic viewpoint.
The Italian ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty, of great importance for

Romania, must be met by a counterproposal:
1. One of political nature, which should consist in an Italian-Bulgarian-
Romanian pact or a Romanian-Bulgarian pact made under Italy’s aegis;
2. One of economic nature, which should be a written obligation from
Romania to help Italy through whatever economic difficulties with
Russia result from the ratification;
3. One of moral nature, which should be the obligation taken by the Ro-
manian Government to introduce the Italian language into Romanian
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CHAPTER 7. ITALY
secondary schools.
All this can be done by exchange of letters.57
Underlying Mussolini’s demands was the argument of the presumed Russian

reaction, especially in the economic field (which did not prohibit him from request-
ing favors also in the political field). Still, as Mussolini knew that Italy’s commerce
with the Soviets was more advantageous to the latter, who therefore did not have an
interest to cut economic relations, we can fairly conclude that he was bluffing. Ap-
parently the Romanians were less familiar with the state of affairs, so that by exag-
gerating the possible Russian reaction, Mussolini had another useful bargaining
chip.58
While the Romanians had expected the second of Mussolini’s requests, the
other two were something of a surprise. The most interesting of the three requests
was definitely the first one, as it highlights one of Mussolini’s greatest dreams for the
future of Central Europe and his over-estimation of his influence over both Bulgaria
and Romania. The last request was easy to meet, and could have been of concern
only to a hyper nationalist like Mussolini.59
Mussolini’s next step was to find out what the real Soviet attitude would be in
case Italy ratified the Bessarabian Treaty and, like any good merchant, to find out
whether they would be willing to offer him a better deal. Therefore on September 7,
1926, before the signing of Romanian-Italian Friendship Treaty, he asked Manzoni to
make the necessary inquiries and gave Manzoni the necessary means to bargain with
the Soviets:
The treaty between Romania and Italy is ready; the difficult question of
Bessarabia is en suspens for the moment and Averescu did not insist. But in the
meanwhile I have come to the decision to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty if the
Romanians offer a convenient counterproposal. . . .
More than anything, this is a question of international sincerity. When a rep-
resentative of Italy signed a treaty it should honor this signature by making the necessary
ratification. It is possible to postpone it but the ratification cannot be avoided. Second, if
Averescu goes back to Romania with my promise to ratify, it will be a great
success and his political and personal position will be more powerful. This is
convenient for us because Averescu is a real friend of Italy.
In our relations with Russia there are verbal assurances but no formal obligations
[regarding the Bessarabian Treaty]; the delay in the ratification was a proof of
our friendship towards Russia but Russia has proven that it was not worthy.
During the recent past Russia has intensified the propaganda hostile to the
fascist regime [Mussolini was especially upset by the discovery that Russian
diplomats in Milan had sponsored the Italian communist party]. The Italian
ratification is an act of international sincerity . . . and would not change in any
way the actual situation in Bessarabia.60
The important element is Mussolini’s mention of what he calls “verbal assur-
< 253 >

ances” with the Soviets. At the beginning of 1924, when Italy recognized the Soviet
Union, Mussolini needed to avoid any propaganda against his regime, both inside
and outside Italy. His political enemies were the communists and, if a verbal agree-
ment had indeed been reached, swapping non-ratification for non-disparagement, it
was a great victory for Mussolini. According to a number of references in Italian
documents, such an agreement was reached and this is supported by the facts as pre-
sented in the Cretzianu Report plus Mussolini’s willingness to act precisely when
the Soviets broke their promise regarding the propaganda. Documents also prove
that the Soviets had insisted on having a similar agreement on the postponement of
ratification during their negotiations for the Basic Treaty in 1924 with the Japanese.
Moscow did not show much eagerness to go back to the negotiating table; they
answered that the Italian ratification would be considered a hostile act, which
would provoke a crisis not only with the Bolsheviks but also with all the Russian
people.61 Mussolini also tried to strike an agreement with the Soviets back in Rome.
During a meeting with the Soviet Ambassador, Mussolini touted the sincere Italian
friendship toward Russia and called for a similar friendship in response. He cited his
reasons for disappointment with the Soviet attitude but still he showed himself will-
ing to postpone ratification if the Soviets should offer a viable quid pro quo.62 No
counterproposal was forthcoming from the Soviets.
On September 16, Mussolini and Averescu signed the Pact of Friendship and
Collaboration between Romania and Italy. The Pact had six articles of a very general
nature; a Protocol by which the two parties undertook to develop mutual economic
relations, a secret exchange of letters providing for consultation between the Mili-
tary Headquarters in case of unprovoked aggression, and an exchange of letters by
which Mussolini promised to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty were also annexed to the
Pact.
In Romania, the Pact had been amply criticized, almost the entire mass media
speaking out against the idea of signing a friendship treaty with a country that was
obstructing the consolidation of Romania’s international position by publicly post-
poning ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty. However, Averescu had a plan regard-
ing that ratification; but he preferred to keep it secret from the media and many of
the political leaders, so that only the King and Bratianu knew about it. In order to
convince the King to approve the Friendship Treaty, Averescu told him that his
move was based on the engagement assumed by Mussolini that, in case the Soviets
should express any opposition towards the Friendship Treaty, he would ratify the
Bessarabian Treaty.63 The above-cited telegram from Mussolini to Manzoni
(September 7) argues in favor of the fact that, indeed, Mussolini promised the ratifi-
cation to Averescu, although he did it in a very private and secretive manner.
The international press gave different interpretations to the Pact. The Soviet
reaction came only after a few weeks and took the form of a vigorous protest against
the Pact and against the exchange of letters regarding Bessarabia. The Soviet Note,
which was not anticipated, puzzled Mussolini. All the previous signals had sug-
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CHAPTER 7. ITALY
gested that the Soviets had accepted the Pact and had no special comments to make,
particularly as Mussolini had done his best to draw it up in such a manner as to
avoid any such comments. Mussolini instructed Manzoni:
The Moscow’s protest and especially its tone cannot be justified and are
inadmissible because, as an act of respect toward the Soviet Government and
not without great resistance [from the Romanians] we made the Treaty with
Romania without mentioning Bessarabia. The quasi-unanimous hostility with
which the Pact was received in Romania because of this exclusion should be
the best proof of the difficulty that we faced.”64
The Soviet Note caused the opposite of the intended reaction: Mussolini was
simply infuriated and indeed decided to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty as soon as pos-
sible. His reaction bears out the supposition that indeed he had an agreement with
Averescu. This is one of the very few examples of a failure in the Soviet strategy to-
wards Romania: constantly raising the Bessarabian question at every possible level
of propaganda. Although in the end this strategy proved successful, in the immediate
aftermath of the Italian-Romanian Pact it harmed the Soviet interests. On the other
hand, the three weeks that passed between the signing of the Pact and the Soviet
reaction would seem to indicate that the Soviets were actually undecided as to how
to respond, and that it was only after some internal debate that they chose to take
the tough line.
Mussolini was not ready to give up so easily. He made one more attempt to
mediate the Bessarabian question: “He suggested to the Soviets a plebiscite under
Italian control or an arbitration to be entrusted to a person favorable to the Soviets,
like Nansen”.65 The Soviets rejected the Italian proposals.
Soon after signing the Friendship Pact, Romanian-Italian relations enjoyed a
balmy period during which the Duke of Spoleto, the Italian Royal Family, and Mar-
shall Badoglio (the Chief of the Italian Military Staff) all made visits to Romania.
Badoglio visited not only Bucharest but Chisinau, Bessarabia’s capital, where he de-
clared in a public discourse, “My brothers . . . if there ever comes a day when you will
be in danger, I will be together with you.”66 For many observers, Badoglio’s declara-
tions announced a change in the Italian position towards Bessarabia, as they could
not have been made without Mussolini’s approval.67 Even more, some Italian news-
papers published a number of articles in support of the Romanian cause, one of
which clearly stated, “the boundary of Bessarabia is the boundary of the Latinity”.68
In January 1927, Italy’s position improved as a result of signing the Rapallo
treaty with Germany, and Averescu took advantage by reopening the ratification
question. He argued that Italy was in a better position now to support the possible
Soviet reaction.69 Mussolini’s answer proves his character once again and, at the
same time, his misunderstanding of the real situation in the Balkan area. Mussolini
simply repeated his old refrain, that the ratification would cause a break-off in So-
viet-Italian relations, this time adding a new argument: the ratification would open
< 255 >

an opportunity for improved relations between the Soviets and Yugoslavia. He also
tried to win more time, stating that the treaty with Germany had to be ratified first
(and that would require a few more weeks). Therefore, Romania should offer a
counter-partite (one of Mussolini’s characteristic terms — contropartita), and should
do so in the next few weeks.
It would not be sufficient to make concessions in the economic treaty that is

negotiated between the two. The counter-partite capable of compensating a
break in Russo-Italian diplomatic relations should be an offer from Romania in
the Danubian political sphere. Under the coordination and eventually with the
participation of Italy, Romania should move toward realizing an accord with
Hungary, on one side, and with Bulgaria, on the other. Only by realizing, under
the Italian inspiration and guidance, a quadruple Italian-Romanian-
Hungarian-Bulgarian alliance, can the Italian Government face easily the inevi-
table crisis with Russia.70
Mussolini had returned to his August 31, 1926, position. He dreamed of having
Romania and Hungary on the same side, during peacetime, and less than ten years
after a war in which the two countries had fought each other bitterly. Even in the
21st century, more than 80 years after the First World War, the two countries are in
opposition. Mussolini’s plan was bound to fail. Romania could not join the camp of
revisionist countries, when the basis of her entire foreign policy was to seek the rec-
ognition and respect of the new boundaries established by the Paris Peace Confer-
ence. Unlike Italy, Romania had no further territorial requests that would have the
backing of public opinion. Mussolini seemed to have misunderstood the entire
course of Romania’s foreign policy. Durazzo understood better, and clearly stated
that there was no chance for improvement in Romanian-Hungarian or Romanian-
Bulgarian relations in the near future.
In fact, as explained by Alan Cassels:
Mussolini’s game was to break the Little Entente, . . . by the detachment of Ro-
mania. . . . While Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were allowed to drift into
Italo-phobia, all the eggs were put in the Romanian basket. As for the alien-
ation of Russia by ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty, this was entirely satis-
factory to Mussolini’s ideology. . . . By far the greatest departure from conven-
tional Italian diplomacy in Mussolini’s strategy was the proposal to cut across
the line between victors and vanquished by associating Italy and Romania
with Hungary and Bulgaria. The entire scheme turned on Mussolini’s ability to
convince Bucharest to follow this new and radical path.71
Averescu did not openly refuse Mussolini’s conditions, but he insisted on the
ratification. He tried to appeal to Mussolini’s ego, declaring to Durazzo, “Mussolini’s
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CHAPTER 7. ITALY
word is more than enough for me” (referring to the ratification).72 Durazzo also in-
sisted on ratification, indicating to Mussolini that all the Italian achievements in
Romania, including some important economic contracts, had come as a result of
Averescu’s friendship for Italy. As Averescu was confronted every day with the po-
litical opposition, his position (and implicitly that of Italy’s interests in Romania)
was gradually eroding. Durazzo believed that the Italian ratification would bolster
Averescu’s position.73 By early February, Mussolini had decided to ratify, but he pre-
ferred to wait for the end of the bilateral negotiations for a commercial treaty before
making that public.74
On February 28, 1927, Mussolini asked Durazzo to secretly inform Averescu
that he had decided to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty in the following days. Averescu
responded, along the same lines as before: “[He] never had any doubt in Mussolini’s
word.”75 The Romanians continued pressing for the ratification in Rome, insisting
that there was no reason for new postponements.76
It is difficult to know how much weight to give to each of the possible reasons
for Mussolini’s change of mind regarding ratification. There are quite a number of
possibilities: the existence of the previously mentioned secret agreement between
him and Averescu (ratification if the Soviets should protest against the Italian-
Romanian Friendship Treaty); a real improvement in Romanian-Italian relations,
particularly in the economic field; the prospect of transforming Averescu into a Mus-
solini of Romania (due to the illness of the Romanian King); the worsening relations
with the Soviets as a result of the Soviet intervention in Italian politics; the Italian-
French rivalry for influence in Eastern Europe; the improvement in British-Italian
relations in tandem with the worsening British-Soviets relations;77 and the need to
counter-balance the Romanian reaction to the improvement in Italian-Hungarian
relations.
On the other hand, how can Averescu’s action be justified: was he so Italophile
as to be ready to sacrifice the Bessarabian Treaty in exchange for closer relations
with Italy, or was he ready to sacrifice his political career just to have Italy ratify the
treaty? The fact is that he did get Mussolini to ratify, and he did pay heavily for this:
his party won only 2% of votes in the June 1927 elections and it was the end of his
political career.
Once Mussolini had made up his mind, another hold-up occurred. Mussolini
wanted the ratification to take place only after Count Manzoni, the Italian Ambassa-
dor, had left Russia, so that the Soviet Government’s eventual protests would be ad-
dressed only to a Chargé d’affaires, thus reducing the political repercussions. Unfor-
tunately, despite Mussolini’s urging, Count Manzoni could not leave Russia immedi-
ately because of illness and, as a result, the ratification was delayed for another
month.78
The Bessarabian Treaty question had been well analyzed in a comprehensive
memorandum prepared for Mussolini before March 7 by Guariglia, the Chief of the
Department for Europe and the Levant in the Italian Foreign Ministry. The report
confirmed that during the negotiations in Rome for the recognition of the Soviet Gov-
< 257 >

ernment, the Italian Government had given verbal guarantees that they had no inten-
tion, at that time, of ratifying the Bessarabian Treaty.79 The Soviet Government con-
sidered these verbal guarantees as a firm obligation undertaken by the Italian Govern-
ment. To assuage both the Romanian and the world public, Guariglia advised that
Italy justify the delay in ratifying by citing her action seeking a mediated and peaceful
solution of the Bessarabian question between Romania and the Soviet Union.
Guariglia presented a good analysis of possible international implications of
the Italian ratification: the UK Government would be pleased, because its own rela-
tions with the Soviets had taken a turn for the worse; France would also be pleased,
because tension between Italy and Russia would create opportunities for French
policy; Germany would remain neutral; in Yugoslavia there would be a higher ten-
dency toward a rapprochement with the Soviet Union; and the biggest problems
would be in Turkey, a country that feared possible Italian aggression and that
would probably move toward closer relations with the Soviets. Therefore, he ad-
vised Mussolini to look for a way to use the ratification in order to improve Italian-
British relations.
Guariglia singled out the fact that commerce between Italy and the Soviet Un-
ion was more favorable to the latter, but also noted that Romania was not capable of
replacing the Soviet Union as a market for raw materials.80
On March 7, 1927, Mussolini informed the Italian representatives overseas that
the Italian Chamber would ratify the Bessarabian Treaty the following day, justify-
ing the past delay by Italy’s hope to mediate an agreement between the two con-
cerned parties. On the same day he also gave news of the ratification to both the Ro-
manian and Soviet representatives in Rome.81 On March 9, King Victor Emmanuel
and Mussolini signed the Royal Decree-Law for the ratification. On April 3, the Ital-
ian Senate ratified the Treaty. Finally, on May 23, the Italian Ambassador in Paris
deposited the necessary instruments for the ratification.
The Romanian reaction was enthusiastic to say the least, at all levels. The Ro-
manian representatives overseas sent numerous congratulatory telegrams to Bucha-
rest,82 and the Romanian mass media expressed the country’s gratitude towards It-
aly, taking the Italian ratification as a gesture of friendship and a prelude to much
closer relations between the two sister-nations. The strongest reaction came, of
course, from Bessarabia. Alexandru Averescu was congratulated by people from all
over the province and was made an honorary citizen of some Bessarabian cities
(Soroca, Tighina, Cahul).83 This moment (brief though it was) was a high point in
Romanian-Italian relations.
Meanwhile, the international press cast the Italian ratification in a different
light, seeing it much more as a move closer to Great Britain and against the Soviets
than as a move towards a closer alliance with Romania.84 In practical terms, this
connection was caused by the continuing improvement in British-Italian relations
(illustrated by the September 30, 1926, meeting in Livorno between Austin Cham-
berlain and Benito Mussolini85); and a sudden worsening in British-Soviet relations
prior to the Italian ratification. This linkage more or less eclipsed all the other com-
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CHAPTER 7. ITALY
ments about the ratification. Still, the Italian press was very keen to avoid presenting
the ratification as an act made in order to please Great Britain.
The bulk of the press reported that, as a result of the Italian ratification, the
Bessarabian Treaty finally had come into force. Even such a well-respected newspa-
per as The Manchester Guardian initially failed to realize that the Treaty still required
one more ratification: “until Tuesday, the treaty was inoperative, because only two
Powers had ratified it, and consequently there existed only a de facto situation. It is
held, however, in certain quarters that Romania’s title to Bessarabia is now de
jure . . .”86
By March 11, the Romanians had made the necessary correction, announcing
that the treaty still needed Japan’s ratification. This was the moment when the at-
tention focused on Japan’s position:
The Romanian spokesman today explained that the treaty still needs ratifi-
cation by Japan, the fourth signatory. They said that Italy’s ratification gave
weight to the treaty, which already had been ratified by Great Britain and
France, but the Japanese ratification was still needed in order to make it offi-
cially operative.
The re-establishment of the Romanian Legation in Tokyo, from this view-
point, is very significant. The Japanese spokesman here [Geneva] said that
Japan has been awaiting definite action by the European powers before tak-
ing her position.87
The Soviet propaganda machine tried to follow the same path as in spring 1924
and to downplay the importance of the Italian ratification. Their best argument was
to stress that Japan had no interest in ratifying the Bessarabian Treaty:
Following the Italian ratification of the Bessarabian Protocol, despite the

strenuous effort of Soviet diplomacy, the hope is expressed in political quarters
here that Japan will continue to withhold her ratification. Japan’s attitude is of
special interest because the Bessarabian Protocol requires confirmation by all
signatory Powers before acquiring full legal validity, and Japan is the only sig-
natory who has not ratified.
In reporting alleged Romanian efforts to obtain Japanese ratification,
Izvestia couples a warning that the Soviet Government would regard such a
step as a definitely unfriendly act, and suggests that Japan cannot have any
interests in connection with Romania that would suffer from non-
ratification.88
< 259 >

The Aftermath of the Ratification
In the end, Mussolini was unable to gain any new advantages from Romania as
a result of ratification and he had to settle for the economic concessions he had se-
cured beforehand. The only positive result he obtained after the ratification was that
it partially offset the extremely negative effect produced in Bucharest by his Treaty
with the Hungarians:89 soon after the ratification, Mussolini announced that Italy
was negotiating with Hungary for a friendship treaty. He instructed Durazzo to ex-
plain to Averescu that the rapprochement between Italy and Hungary could be an
element favorable even for Romania, a country encircled by the Slav race. Mussolini
would persist in his plan of developing close ties with both Romania and Hungary,
but the Romanians were quite unprepared for such a step. The Romanian press be-
came quite vocal, decrying Mussolini’s plans and especially the Pact of Amity, Con-
ciliation, and Arbitration signed with Hungary on April 5, 1927, in Rome. Although
he had expected a certain reaction in Romanian circles, Mussolini was really dis-
pleased with the vehement attacks by the Romanian press.90 As a result, in a rela-
tively short period of time, Romania’s enthusiasm for Italy decreased dramatically
and soon after Averescu’s dismissal the political relations between the two countries
were frozen again.
When the Averescu government failed, Mussolini was convinced that it was
because there was no sense for the Liberal Party to keep Averescu in power once the
Italian ratification was finalized. In Mussolini’s words,
With that ratification, Averescu gave everybody all that his sincere Italophilia
permitted him to obtain. Once the ratification was achieved there was no rea-
son to have a Prime Minister so pro-Italian; therefore, at the proper moment, he
was dismissed.91
However, Mussolini was wrong again; his own minister to Bucharest clearly
demonstrated in one of his reports that the reason for Averescu’s dismissal was re-
lated to internal politics and not the ratification.92
The ratification also impacted Italian-Soviet relations, although not to the ex-
tent that Mussolini had suggested would be the case. Throughout the entire period,
Mussolini used the same arguments in an effort to obtain a better contra-partite
from the Romanians: once Italy would ratify, Russia would sever (or, at least, de-
crease) her economic relations with Italy and would launch military operations
against Romania. However, as the Italian ratification was not enough to make the
Treaty come into force, the Italian ratification alone could not justify the Soviets in
starting a war.
Other than the usual value of a bluff, if successful, we must consider that Mus-
solini and other Italian diplomats were using this argument on the assumption that
as soon as Italy had ratified, Japan would do so. As detailed in the next chapter, the
Japanese had clearly stated in 1924 that they had no reason not to ratify, except for
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CHAPTER 7. ITALY
the fact that it was a European matter and that the interested European Powers
should deal with it before asking Japan to intervene. Japan had never before failed to
ratify a political treaty once it had signed it, even if it was quite damaging to Japa-
nese interests, so that it was widely believed in some circles that the Japanese would
ratify automatically. This presumption supports Manzoni’s and Mussolini’s fear that
the Italian ratification would produce a diplomatic break off between Italy and the
Soviet Union.
The importance of the Italian ratification for Italian-Soviet relations is also
stressed by Allan Cassels, who considers that:
So long as Mussolini withheld it, and thereby also withheld Romania’s full le-
gal title to the region, the Soviets would endure much at Italian hands and pre-
serve at least the semblance of friendship between Moscow and Rome. But
Mussolini was less concerned with ratification as a means of maintaining a tie
with Russia than he was with ratification as a bribe to entice Romania to join
his grand design in the Danube valley.93
The only flaw in Allan Cassels’s analysis, which leads him to somewhat exag-
gerate the importance of the ratification issue for Soviet-Italian relations, comes
from his failure to read the Bessarabian Treaty itself. Cassels’s assumptions that “the
agreement was not valid until ratified by three of the four signatories” and that
“Romania’s legal title to Bessarabia awaited only Italian ratification of the Allied pro-
tocol of 1920”94 are equally mistaken and fit into a more general pattern regarding
the Bessarabian Treaty. The weak Soviet response to the Italian ratification also
shows that the ratification was not as important for the Soviets as it was believed at
the time or as was argued by Cassels a few decades later.
The Soviet reaction was quite far from breaking off relations with Italy, despite
the latter’s fears. It was limited to the sending a number of diplomatic notes to Mus-
solini and a relative cooling in bilateral relations. Indeed, the reaction was much
more connected to the moment when the ratification came than to the ratification
itself. In March 1927, Soviet-British relations were at a dangerous level because of
certain encounters in China. The Italian move to ratify was considered more as an
attempt by Mussolini to get closer to Britain and to snub the Soviets than as a move
in favor of the Romanians. Italy could anticipate two main international outcomes
from ratification: a British-Italian alliance against the Soviets, or an improvement of
Italy’s position in the Balkan area by creating a new system of alliances; the first
proved to be the more important.
The Soviet response was largely limited to propaganda, protesting the Italian
government’s action. For example, during the fourth Congress of the Soviets, Com-
missar Rykov made a formal protest:
In the light of this anti-Soviet campaign and this public bidding, the Italian
government’s ratification of the protocol legalizing Romania’s seizure of a part
< 261 >

of Soviet territory — Bessarabia — is distinctly significant. For a long time the

Italian Government considered it unnecessary and untimely to ratify this pro-
tocol, but just now, during the anti-Soviet campaign, it renounces this point if
view. With regard to the Bessarabian protocol and annexation of Bessarabia by
Romania, we must say once and for all that no papers, notes, ratifications or
affirmations have any significance whatsoever, nor can they have, unless the
Soviet Government participates in them.95
And by July of that year, Soviet-Italian relations were back on track. Why was
the Soviet response so muted? As has been mentioned, just a few months before, the
Soviets had responded vigorously to the signing of the Friendship Treaty between
Romania and Italy. But the situation had changed in various ways:
1. Because the Soviet Union was experiencing difficulties at that time with
Great Britain, difficulties that led to a break in British-Soviet relations
during May, it could not afford to break off relations with Italy. Even so,
Italy’s ratification had been interpreted by the press in the sense of a pos-
sible Italian-British rapprochement, and was very well received in British
circles. A strong anti-Italian reaction only would have fuelled an improve-
ment in Italian-British relations.
2. During 1926, Russian exports to Italy were valued at an equivalent of some
300 million Italian lire, while the Italians exported to Russia only about
130 million worth of goods. The Soviet Government was restricting im-
ports while trying to boost its exports, and Italy was an excellent market
for Russian raw materials.96
3. The ratification’s impact on Romanian-Italian relations had not been as
feared, because Italy’s action in Hungary gave a real blow to Italy’s popu-
larity in Romania. This was obvious in just a few weeks, and it soon be-
came clear that Italy would not be a new ally in Romania’s defensive sys-
tem. In fact, realizing that as soon as Averescu was gone, the Italian influ-
ence in Romania was decreasing very rapidly in favor of France, Mussolini
clearly switched his policy in favor of Hungary.97
4. The negotiations initiated with the Japanese Government on the Bessara-
bian Treaty ratification question indicated that the Japanese Government
had no intention of taking the necessary steps for ratification. And the
Soviets knew all too well that, while Romania was able to offer something
to Italy in exchange for ratification, they had nothing to offer Japan —
certainly, nothing that would stack up against Japan’s numerous eco-
nomic and political interests in the Soviet Union. The Russian diplomats
were very prompt and proactive, obtaining before the end of March a con-
firmation of the Japanese policy of postponing the ratification question.
The Italian ratification not only presents a useful insight into the Italian-
Romanian relations but also offers a good comparison for the Romanian-Japanese
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CHAPTER 7. ITALY
negotiations. Italy’s case is more similar to that of Japan than were the cases of
France or the UK, due to the fact that, for both, ratification became a serious prob-
lem after their recognition of the Soviet Government. The most common element
invoked by both Italy and Japan as a reason for delaying the ratification was their
fear of Soviet reaction, specifically against their economic interests. Another similar-
ity is that both Japan and Italy promised officially (more or less) to postpone the
ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty when they recognized the Soviet Government.
The greatest difference between the two cases, in fact between the case of Japan and
all the other signatories, resides in the fact that Japan had no real interests in Roma-
nia at all, so that there was very little the Romanian Government could do after 1925
in order to influence the Japanese decision.
< 263 >

Notes
1
Tomasso Tittoni, “Basarabia, Romania si Italia”, in Convorbiri Literare, 1927, p. 25. Tittoni’s pamphlet
was first published in the aftermath of the Italian ratification. Tittoni was Foreign Minister of Italy
in the autumn of 1919 and was one of the members of the Council of Ten and Council of Foreign
Ministers.
2
C.J. Lowe, F. Marzari, Italian Foreign Policy, p. 160.
3
DDI, Serie 6, Vol. 2, Telegram Olivotto to Grazioli, February 25, 1919, p. 365.
4
In fact, there are accounts arguing to the contrary. According to Seymour’s account of events in the
territorial commission, it was the Italian representatives that, after keeping silence for a while, came
to the American representatives and told them that they had decided to support unequivocally the
American-drawn border line in Transylvania and not the French or the British, which were more
advantageous for Romania. C.Seymour, Letters from the Paris Peace Conference, p. 172-173. The Italian
plan to weave the powerful Hungary into an alliance against Yugoslavia explains this position, par-
ticularly as the Italians might have realized that it would be difficult to diminish the French influ-
ence over Romania.
5
DDI, Serie 6, Vol. 2, Letter Sonnino to Fasciotti, March 3, 1919, p. 447-448.
6
S.D. Spector, Romania la . . . , p. 148.
7
8
9
FRUS, PPC, Vol. 9, p. 176-179.
10
DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 6, Lord Crowe to Lord Curzon, December 3, 1919, p. 489.
11
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 1, Telegram Franklin to Mussolini, January 28, 1923, p. 296.
12
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 2, Telegram Aloisi to Mussolini, November 17, 1923, p. 322.
13
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 1, Telegram Franklin to Duca, January 26, 1923, p. 295-296.
14
Alan Cassels, Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy, p. 176.
15
A. Cassels, Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy, p. 182.
16
C. Iordan, Romania si relatiile internationale din sud estul European: 1919-1924, p. 91.
17
For details regarding the Italian recognition of the Soviet Union see, best, A. Cassels, Mussolini’s
Early Diplomacy, p. 184-193.
18
The Romanians, when they decided to pay, offered only a 4% return on those bonds while the
Italians asked for more, arguing that the Italian State offered a 5% premium for its own bonds. DDI,
Serie 7, Vol. 3, Telegram Mussolini to Aloisi, April 8, 1924, p. 81.
19
Actually, because Bratianu refused to pay the Italian holders of Treasury Bonds, they asked Carlo
Bazzi (of the Nuovo Paese newspaper) to initiate a press campaign directed against the Romanian
government and Royal Family, which Bazzi did successfully, pressuring Mussolini to act on the
matter. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Telegrams Rene Hesnard to Poincare, March 20 and
May 3, 1924, c. 507, 512.
20
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 3, Telegram Mussolini to Aloisi, March 5, 1924, p. 32.
21
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 3, Telegram Savona to Mussolini, March 7, 1924, p. 37.
22
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 3, Telegram Mussolini to Savona, March 20, 1924, p. 60.
23
RFMA, Fond 71/1920, R 6, vol. 46/6, Telegram Titulescu (probably) to Duca, May 20, 1924.
24
The Italian opposition was convinced that, indeed, Mussolini had concluded a secret agreement
with the Soviets: that in exchange for the non-ratification, Moscow would influence the Italian com-
munist deputies to split from the opposition block, which was boycotting the activities of the Italian
Parliament, and to go back into the Chamber. RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Telegram Cretzianu
to Duca, October 25, 1924.
25
26
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Telegram Lahovary to Duca, March 19, 1924.
27
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Telegram Duca to Lahovary, March 19, 1924.
< 264 >

CHAPTER 7. ITALY
28
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 3, Telegram Aloisi to Mussolini, August 5, 1924, p. 249.
29
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 3, Telegram Mussolini to Aloisi, August 14, 1924, p. 257.
30
At first, Mussolini declared that he intended to ratify the Treaty but that it was not yet clear what
legal procedure should be followed (by Decree-Law, or by Decree). He told Constantinescu that he
had suggested to the Soviet Government, in his name, to recognize the union of Bessarabia in ex-
change for the abandonment of the Romanian Treasury and the other existing Romanian valuables
in Russia. RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 20 and Vol. 22, Resume of the negotiations between Musso-
lini and Al Constantinescu, September 5, 1924.
31
32
On the other hand, the Volta Agency published a communiqué stating that Constantinescu did
not obtain the Italian ratification. Ioan Chiper, “Italia si ratificarea tratatului din 28 octombrie”, in
Revista Romana de Studii Istorice, 1992, No 2, p. 9.
33
For excerpts from the Romanian press, see DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 3, Telegrams Aloisi to Mussolini, Oc-
tober 14 and November 12, 1924, p. 324-325, 336.
34
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Telegrams Cretzianu to Duca, October 25 and 28, 1924.
35
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Telegram Duca to Lahovary, November 8, 1924.
36
DBFP, Serie 1, Vol. 26, Telegram Dering to Lord Curzon, December 30, 1924, p. 474.
37
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Telegrams Lahovary to Duca, March 10 and March 13, 1925.
38
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Telegrams Duca to Lahovary, February 20 (Vol. 21) and March 18, 1925
(Vol. 22).
39
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 3, Telegram Aloisi to Mussolini, April 13, 1924, p. 518.
40
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Telegram Ciotori to Duca, August 1925.
41
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Telegram Lahovary to Duca, December 11, 1925.
42
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Report Lahovary to Duca, December 11, 1925.
43
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Durazzo to Mussolini, December 13, 1925, p. 143-147.
44
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Mussolini to Durazzo, January 2, 1926, p. 158.
45
The information comes from a secret agent working in the service of the US Legation in Riga, but
neither in the Romanian nor Italian Archives has it been possible to confirm it, at least not yet. Re-
port Coleman (in Riga) to the Secretary of State, September 9, 1926, quoted in C. Iordan, Romania si
relatiile internationale din sud estul european: modelul Locarno, p. 215.
46
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Telegram Berthelot to de Billy, February 16, 1926, c. 528.
47
I. Chiper, “Italia si . . . ”, in Revista Romana de Studii Istorice, 1992, No 2, p. 11-13.
48
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Telegram Langa Rascanu to Mitilineu, May 20, 1926. On the
other hand, this position is expressed only after the Italophile Averescu came to power.
49
M. Adam, The Little Entente . . . , p. 296-297.
50
Telegram Chamberlain to Herbert Dering, February 19, 1926, quoted in C. Iordan, Romania si relatiile
internationale din sud estul European: modelul Locarno, p. 160.
51
52
C. Iordan, Romania si relatiile internationale din sud estul European: modelul Locarno, p. 189.
53
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Durazzo to Mussolini, July 20, 1926, p. 286.
54
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Mussolini to Durazzo, July 23, 1926, p. 286-288.
55
C. Iordan-Sima, “La Romanie et les relations Franco-Italiennes dans les années 1926-1927”, in Re-
vista Romana de Istorie, tome XIV, 1975, No 2, p. 330, 336.
56
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Mussolini to Manzoni, July 24, 1926, p. 288.
57
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Note by Mussolini, August 31, 1926, p. 310.
58
In fact, as soon as March 1925 Mussolini openly admitted that the commercial treaty with the
Soviets failed to bring startling results. A. Cassels, Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy, p. 192-193, 341.
59
60
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Mussolini to Manzoni, September 7, 1926, p. 315.
61
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Manzoni to Mussolini, September 8, 1926, p. 317.
< 265 >

62
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Mussolini to Manzoni, September 12, 1926, p. 321.
63
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Telegram de Billy to Briand, September 27, 1926, c. 578.
64
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Mussolini to Manzoni, October 7, 1926, p. 351.
65
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Telegram Herbette to Briand, October 16, 1926, c. 587.
66
Adevarul, Bucharest, November 19, 1926.
67
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Telegram de Billy to Briand, November 13, 1926, c. 607-608.
68
Tribuna, Roma, quoted in DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Manzoni to Mussolini, November 20, 1926,
p. 381.
69
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Durazzo to Mussolini, January 7, 1927, p. 449.
70
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Mussolini to Durazzo, January 16, 1927, p. 452-453.
71
A. Cassels, Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy, p. 341-342.
72
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Durazzo to Mussolini, January 25, 1927, p. 459.
73
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Durazzo to Mussolini, January 30, 1927, p. 465
74
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 191, Confidential Note from the Secretariat General (Geneva),
February 11, 1927, c. 640. The mentioned note (signed by Clauzel) also states that the ratification is
motivated by Italy’s policy of strengthening her relations with Great Britain.
75
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 5, Telegram Durazzo to Mussolini, March 6, 1927, p. 52.
76
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Telegram Lahovary to Mitilineu, March 4, 1927.
77
According to C. Iordan, Mussolini’s decision came as a result of an action initiated by the British
Ambassador, Sir Ronald Graham, at the request of his superiors in London, under the influence of
Nicolae Titulescu. C. Iordan, Romania si relatiile internationale din sud estul European: modelul Locarno, p.
292. Still, if this is true, some questions need an answer: why did Mussolini fail to follow the British
example in breaking off relations with the Soviets (if British-Italian relations were so good), what
did Mussolini gain from the British in exchange for ratifying (niente per niente must also apply here,
but there are no British documents to indicate that they bought Mussolini’s ratification); why this
sudden British interest in the ratification (they having abandoned the matter by the end of 1923);
was Titulescu quite so influential in London and, if so, why he did fail to act sooner?
78
RFMA, Fond71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Telegram Lahovary to Mitilineu, March 30, 1927.
79
The Guariglia Report proves once again that, indeed, a verbal and secret agreement was reached
between Mussolini and the Soviets regarding the postponement of the Italian ratification. And, ac-
cording to Mussolini’s slogan niente per niente, he definitely received something in exchange from the
Soviets. Therefore, as the agreement is confirmed by Italian official documents, it is mistaken to ar-
gue against its existence based on the assumption that all the affair comes as a result of the anti-
Russian bent of the Romanian press during the interwar period, as expressed by C.I. Stan,
“Recunoasterea . . . ”, in Sargetia, 1995-1996, p. 424.
80
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 5, Report by Guariglia to Mussolini, February 1927, p. 58-66.
81
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, Telegram Lahovary to Mitilineu, March 7, 1927.
82
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 22, March 1927, passim.
83
C.I. Stan, “Recunoasterea . . . ” in Sargetia, 1995-1996, p. 427-429.
84
“Italy Slaps Soviet by Bessarabia Deal”, in New York Times, March 9, 1927; also “Italy, Romania, Rus-
sia”, in New York Times, March 10, 1927.
85
C. Iordan, Romania si relatiile internationale din sud estul European; modelul Locarno, p. 122-124.
86
Manchester Guardian, March 10, 1927.
87
Times, March 12, 1927.
88
Manchester Guardian, March 21, 1927. For Soviet press see best Izvestia of March 17, 18 and 20, 1927.
89
A treaty with Hungary while still postponing the ratification of the Bessarabian treaty would have
meant the end of any Italian influence over Romania. Mussolini was smart enough to give the Roma-
nians a spoonful of sugar in order to make them swallow the bitter pill of the Italian-Hungarian
Treaty, the first bilateral agreement signed by Hungary with any of the victors in the World War
One. A. Cassels, Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy, p. 346.
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CHAPTER 7. ITALY
90
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 5, Telegram Mussolini to Durazzo, April 11, 1927, p. 143.
91
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 5, Telegram Mussolini to Durazzo, June 7, 1927, p. 250.
92
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 5, Telegram Durazzo to Mussolini, June 12, 1927, p. 263-269.
93
A. Cassels, Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy, p. 350-351.
94
A. Cassels, Mussolini’s Early Diplomacy, p. 182, 338.
95
Xenia J Eudin, Harold H Fischer, Soviet Russia and the West, p. 374.
96
T. Tittoni, “Basarabia, . . . ” in Convorbiri literare, 1927, p. 37.
97
During August, 1927, Mussolini took a position on the side of the Hungarian optants in their con-
flict with the Romanian State at the League of Nations, instructing the Italian representative at the
League, Vittorio Sciajola, to back the Hungarian thesis. C. Iordan, Romania si relatiile internationale din
sud estul european: modelul Locarno, p. 344.
< 267 >

CHAPTER 8.
JAPAN
Japan’s great importance in the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty resides in

Article No. 9, which stipulates that all the signatory states must ratify it in order for
the treaty to come into force. In the end, Japan failed to ratify, and the Treaty re-
mained moot. After all the efforts made by the Romanians (as well as the British and
French), the Japanese handed the Soviets a victory. This obliged Romania to seek
other diplomatic instruments to take the place of the Bessarabian Treaty; unfortu-
nately, this search proved unsuccessful and, in 1940 or in 1945, they had to pay the
price. Of course, it is arguable whether a valid international agreement would have
stopped the Soviets, but it certainly would have made some difference to the attitude
of the other Great Powers.
The issue of Japan’s involvement in European matters during and especially in
the aftermath of the Paris Peace Conference has been much neglected by scholars of
Japan; instead, they have focused on the Washington Naval Conference.1 And, if rela-
tions with Western Europe (which is what most of the mentioned scholars under-
stand by “Europe”) have been neglected then those with Eastern Europe (excepting
the Soviet Union) have been ignored. The reason invoked for this “neglect” is simple:
Japan was neutral and took no part in European affairs, particularly after the end of
the Peace Conference. However, the Bessarabian Treaty question is only one exam-
ple proving that matters were not so simple and that Japan, under the façade of neu-
trality, did indeed take an active part in European affairs.
In order to ascertain Japan’s position, the author had recourse to numerous
original documents in the Japanese and Romanian archives. As very little research
has been done on the relations between the two countries during the interwar pe-
riod, most of these documents remain unpublished.
The Archives of the Japanese Foreign Ministry (or Gaimusho) show that the
Ministry officials carefully followed the evolution of the Bessarabian question. There
< 269 >

are many documents sent from Bucharest, the USSR, and many other places dealing
with the Bessarabian question; every time something happened, the Japanese repre-
sentatives overseas sent a report to Tokyo. Japanese interest was not limited to the
Bessarabian Treaty; they collected all possible facts and data on Bessarabia (history,
population, geography, economy) to aid their analysis.2
Nineteen syntheses (ranging from 15 to 80 pages in length) on the Bessarabian
question were prepared; Gaimusho officials were keenly interested in the matter.3 In
addition, two booklets on Bessarabia were published by Gaimusho in 1940. Six of
the analyses were prepared during 1927 when, after Italy ratified, Japan remained the
only signatory state that had not yet moved to ratification. The syntheses are fairly
similar in structure and content; mainly, they describe Bessarabia’s history, going as
far back as the Roman period, and emphasize the Russian administration and the
events of 1917-1918. Also considered in depth is the drafting, the content and the im-
plications of the Bessarabian Treaty (the Japanese translation of the Treaty being
presented not once but seven times). Economic, demographic and ethnographic mat-
ters are dealt with in separate chapters, and are quite exact in data. The last topic in
almost all the syntheses deals with Japan’s attitude toward the ratification up to the
moment the synthesis was written. They also contain maps and some pamphlets on
Bessarabia.
One may distinguish three chronological phases in the Romanian-Japanese rela-
tions regarding the ratification problem. The first extends from the moment the
Treaty was signed until the Italian ratification. The second period lasts until the end
of 1932, when Nicolae Titulescu came to the fore in Romanian foreign policy decision-
making and he decided to abandon the Bessarabian Treaty question. During this pe-
riod Japan was the only State that had failed to ratify. The third period covers 1933-
1940, ending with the Soviets taking back Bessarabia (plus northern Bukovina and
the Herta region), during which there were no more attempts to obtain the Japanese
ratification. Of course, one could also say there were just two phases: before and after
the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Japan.
FIRST PERIOD: 1920 TO 1927
Signing the Bessarabian Treaty
The first period is characterized by poor diplomatic relations between the two
states. In 1922 Japan opened a Legation in Bucharest, but for budgetary reasons the
Romanian Legation in Tokyo was closed in 1922 (together with several others) and
was re-opened only in 1927.
During the Paris Peace Conference, Japan was represented in both the Council
of Five and the Council of Ten. But during the Conference the Japanese representa-
tives showed little or no interest in Romanian or Balkan matters (nor did anyone
really expect them to, since Japan had neither economic nor strategic interests
< 270 >

CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
there). During the Romanian-Hungarian conflict, for a period, the Japanese repre-
sentative even decided to leave the Council of Five. The Romanian representatives
made no effort to lobby the Japanese delegation. As one of the Romanian delegates
put it bluntly: “Japan? You can imagine how troubled she is on our behalf.”4
Only once, in November 1919, was the Japanese opinion asked regarding a mat-
ter concerning Romania. During the debates on the Ultimatum Note to be sent to
the Romanian Government by the Peace Conference, the American representative,
Frank Polk, in order to give more weight to the Note, asked Japanese representative
Tetsuku Matsui, if he too was prepared to sign it. The answer was that he first
would have to consult his Government, having no instructions on the matter5
(which meant, in fact, that he wished to abstain from that particular conflict).
During 1920 Japan took part, as a member of the Conference of Ambassadors,
in the negotiations for the drafting of the Bessarabian Treaty. But the Japanese par-
ticipation was basically neutral; the Japanese representatives attended, rather than
participating in, the discussions, and took no initiative. Regarding the negotiations
for the Bessarabian Treaty, the documents in Gaimusho’s Archive simply record the
events, present the Draft Treaty, the American opposition to any dismemberment of
Russia, Romania’s proposed modifications and the final Treaty.6
The Japanese representatives had no knowledge of the exchange of letters
(regarding the payment of special compensations for the foreign landowners expro-
priated in Bessarabia) between Romania and France and Britain. Even when the Ital-
ians found out about the exchange of letters later on, there still is no documentary
evidence to show that the Japanese representatives heard about them.7 This is im-
portant because, as in the case of Italy, it could have served as a good argument to
justify Japan’s continued postponement of the ratification before and especially after
1927.
The first question that comes to mind nowadays (especially for a Japanese
scholar) is why Japan signed the Treaty in the first place? Japan had few interests in
the Balkan area and almost none in Romania. Why did not Japan simply follow the
US example and avoid signing? Theoretically, it would have been easy for the Japa-
nese representative to justify a refusal to sign the Bessarabian Treaty or, at least, so it
appears from today’s perspective. However, as Japan signed all the other treaties pre-
pared by the Peace Conference during 1919-1920, even if it had no direct interest in
them, the answer is simple: Japan had to fulfill her Great Power “duty” of signing the
Peace Treaties; and Japan shared with the United States neither the geographical
position nor the willingness to stay out of world affairs. And indeed, in retrospective,
at least in the case of the Bessarabian Treaty, Japan had something material to gain
as a result of her acting as a Great Power.
In fact, unlike the US, Japan continued to play a certain role in European poli-
tics even during 1921, getting involved in questions like the settlement of the Upper
Silesia dispute between Poland and Germany. As stated by Viscount Ishii, the Japa-
nese Ambassador to France, he “believed that Japan as a major Allied power should
play an active part in solving this problem [of Upper Silesia] because Japan was free
< 271 >

from direct interests in this region. He suggested that if Japan could settle this dis-
pute, it could consolidate its future status and enhance its prestige”.8 Japan’s reasons
for intervening into matters in which she had no direct or immediate interest can
hardly be more clearly presented.
Of course, there are plenty of additional possible reasons. The Japanese-British
alliance of 1902 was still in place, Russia being one of the countries with which both
had conflicts, and the British were the ones pressing hardest for the Bessarabian
Treaty. The old strategic principle that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” seemed
to apply in Romania’s case. It would be advantageous to keep some of the Soviet
troops engaged at the Bessarabian border instead of having them sent to the Far
East. The Treaty imposed no concrete military or economic obligations on the signa-
tories (apart from Romania herself), so there was nothing to lose. And the visit made
by the Romanian Crown Prince Carol to Japan in 1920 (the first European Crown
Prince to visit Japan) might have had an effect.9
In fact, the Bessarabian Treaty was not the only one regarding the Balkans to
be signed by the Japanese government. The Treaty establishing the borders in Cen-
tral Europe, signed on August 10, 1920, in Sèvres, between Great Britain, France, It-
aly, Japan, on one side, and Czechoslovakia, Romania, Poland, and the Serbo-Croato-
Sloven Kingdom on the other, would have been assessed in a similar way, from the
Japanese perspective.
Soon after Japan signed the Bessarabian Treaty, the international situation
changed, to Japan’s disadvantage, at the Washington Conference of 1921. In that
sense, the Bessarabian Treaty was among the last to be signed by the powerful and
victorious Japan that attended the Paris Peace Conference. As time went on, all Ja-
pan’s plans regarding Russian territory had to be altered and the Japanese were
forced to improve their relations with the Soviet Union. During the Washington
Conference, the Japanese leaders came to understand that the Americans would op-
pose any further Japanese territorial gains in Asia, and they realized that, sooner or
later, they would have to start negotiating with the Soviets to normalize relations.
With that in mind, their interest in ratifying the Bessarabian Treaty clearly dimin-
ished; it only would have introduced new complications into the already troubled
Japanese-Russian relationship.
The “Passive” Period
The so-called “passive” period goes from the moment of the treaty signing until
the French ratification. During this period the Japanese refrained from taking any
action regarding ratification.
During the immediate period after the Bessarabian Treaty was signed, there
was no pressure on Japan to ratify; nobody expected Japan to be the first State to do
it. Quite to the contrary, Japanese officials became the target of White Russian
propaganda. One memorandum, signed by Kroupenski, contains a plea from the
White Russians in favor of a Russian Bessarabia.10 The Japanese Government
< 272 >

CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
adopted a passive attitude and decided to wait and see, keeping a close eye on events
related to Bessarabia, and especially to Romanian-Soviet relations. They continued
to receive notes and memos from both parties. The Russian interests were repre-
sented by the White Russians, who continued to be heard in Tokyo, and not by the
Soviet Government. On the other side, in one of the few actions taken by the Roma-
nian Government, by a Mémoire dated July 24, 1922, the Japanese were informed of
the numerous military incidents at the Bessarabian border; but they were not asked
to ratify.11
Regarding the Romanian action in Japan before closing the Romanian Legation
in 1922, it must be said that the first Romanian minister to Japan, Nicolae Xenopol,
died soon after arriving in Tokyo (at the end of 1918) and until the visit of Prince
Carol, the Legation was actually unstaffed. During his visit to Japan in July 1920
(during his tour around the world — Egypt, India, Japan), Prince Carol decided to
leave Colonel Nicolae Arion, a member of his retinue, as a temporary representative
of Romania to Tokyo. Arion joined Prince Carol when he was already in Egypt, and
he had a special mission. His instructions from Prime Minister Alexandru Averescu
state, “You should search for all the necessary data in order to judge the financial
situation of Japan and also try to speed up the opening of financial and economic
relations between Japan and Romania”.12
Arion advised the Romanian Foreign Ministry on Japan’s situation and took
the initiative in organizing some common business in which Romania would import
certain Japanese products; but his efforts to mediate a bilateral transaction eventu-
ally failed. After arriving back in Romania, in January 1921, Arion presented a de-
tailed report. He argued that the campaign he initiated had positive results, the Japa-
nese businessmen showing interest in offering their products to Romania, and the
difficulty lay in Japan’s mistrust in the Romanian modality of payment. He set up a
Committee including a number of financial and industrial leaders through which he
provided the necessary explanations on the Romanian economy and the opportuni-
ties for doing business with Romania. He also received guarantees from the Japanese
Foreign Minister that a Japanese Legation would be opened in Bucharest during the
following year, that a Japanese economic delegation would visit Romania (referring
to the visit of the Japanese consul in Hamburg), and that the date of July 24 would
be remembered as an anniversary day for the establishment of relations between the
two States. Arion also took the initiative of giving a few suggestions regarding the
future representation of Romania in Japan:
Meanwhile I realized that Romania was totally unknown in Japan and that
the first thing to do was to begin a propaganda campaign, by holding a number
of conferences, publishing articles in the Japanese press, offering post cards
and brochures. . . .
The Japanese are waiting for the arrival of our Minister. Due to the expen-
sive life in Tokyo it would be advisable that the Legation’s personnel be lim-
ited, only a minister and a commercial attaché, with no secretary, military atta-
< 273 >

ché, consul. It would be wise to nominate a Japanese honorary consul in the

main Japanese industrial and commercial centers. For Osaka I recommend Ina-
bata, a businessman from Osaka, vice-president of Osaka’s Chamber of Com-
merce, who is personally known by Prince Carol and kindly helped me during
the propaganda activity.”13
The Foreign Ministry took Arion’s suggestions and the Romanian Legation
reopened in 1921, under the leadership of Edgard Mavrocordat. Little data exists on
Mavrocordat’s activity while in Japan, and none of them mentions the ratification
question. He probably continued the public relations efforts initiated by Arion.
Whatever results he may have achieved, the Legation was closed in March 1922, ex-
actly when it was most needed, without asking even once for the Japanese ratifi-
cation.
The first Power to ask the Japanese government to take the necessary steps to
ratify the Bessarabian Treaty was Great Britain. During a meeting of the Ambassa-
dors Conference on June 8, 1921, the British Ambassador notified the other Ambassa-
dors that his Government was ready to ratify, and asked them to take similar steps
so that all the ratification letters would be deposited at the same time.14 Ambassador
Ishii asked for instructions from his government but all he received from Tokyo was
a request to send a copy of the Treaty as soon as possible, and nothing more.15 As the
British government did not insist on ratification during the following months, the
Japanese government made no attempt to consider ratifying.
During the March 15, 1922, Conference of Ambassadors in Paris, the Bessara-
bian Treaty came under debate as the French Ambassador asked the other Ambassa-
dors to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty. Ishii informed his government of the French
and British request16 and later of the British and Romanian ratifications, but he re-
ceived no instructions on the matter. As the French Chamber failed to ratify in 1922,
the Conference did not insist any more on the Japanese ratification.
A new official inquiry into Japan’s stance on ratification came about one year
later, this time from the US. On May 10, 1923, the US Ambassador to Japan, Hugh R.
Wilson, made an official inquiry at the Japanese Foreign Ministry. The Japanese an-
swer came after two days and simply stated that Japan had not ratified the Treaty.17
For Gaimusho, the American intervention was a simple question and they gave a
clear answer; for the US it had a different implication: it gave them a green light to
use the Bessarabian Treaty to justify their decision to merge the Bessarabian immi-
gration quota with the general Russian immigration quota.
The first Romanian intervention pressing the Japanese Government to ratify
came in 1923. Taking advantage of the establishment of Japan’s Legation in Bucha-
rest, the Romanian Foreign Minister, I.G. Duca, repeatedly asked the Japanese min-
ister to press his Government on this matter, but with no success. The first time he
officially invited Genshiro Nishi, the first Japanese Minister to Romania, to suggest
his Government take the necessary steps for ratification was on October 26, in con-
nection with the intensification of the campaign for the French and Italian ratifica-
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
tions.18 Duca’s main argument was the plight of the Bessarabians, whose unclear in-
ternational position was prolonged by the delayed ratification.19 The Japanese Gov-
ernment responded that it would take the necessary measures for ratification after
the French and Italian ratifications, without giving any explanation.20
A new invitation for the Japanese Government to ratify came from the British
Government in November 1923. The British preferred to ask the Japanese Govern-
ment directly and not the Japanese representatives overseas. The British Ambassador
in Tokyo justified his request by saying that:
Difficulties have arisen with the Romanian representatives at the European

Commission of the Danube as to the application of Article No. 7 of the Treaty
regarding Bessarabia signed in Paris on October 28, 1920. The Romanian Gov-
ernment declined to be bound by this Article so long as the Treaty is not rati-
fied by all its signatories.21
The Japanese answer to the British initiative was the same as for Duca; first, let
France and Italy ratify and then Japan would take the necessary steps.22
Unfortunately, the Romanian Government was unaware of the British inter-
vention in their favor and, consequently, was unable to use it to further press the
Japanese. While Romania had almost nothing to offer to Japan in exchange for ratifi-
cation (except for Romanian oil),23 it had enough to offer to Great Britain in ex-
change for common pressure on the Japanese Government. The fact that Romania
had no representative in Tokyo at that time, and therefore no way to find out about
the British request, meant that the possibility of leveraging British support in favor
of the ratification evaporated.
It should be mentioned that the term “passive” refers to the Japanese attitude
towards the Bessarabian Treaty alone and not towards other treaties involving Euro-
pean matters in which Japan had no direct interest. A good comparison for the Bes-
sarabian Treaty is that of the Central European Frontiers Treaty. Known also as the
Treaty for the Establishment of Frontiers in Central Europe, the treaty was signed in
Sèvres on August 10, 1920, initially by France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan and Czecho-
slovakia. Later on, Romania (on October 28, 1920), Poland and Yugoslavia also
signed it. Art. No. 3 of the Treaty referred to Romania but left out her border with
Russia, as that border was to be covered by the Bessarabian Treaty. Great Britain,
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia ratified the Treaty in 1921. On March 25 and April
22, 1922, during the Conference of Ambassadors, the British representative asked the
other signatory states to take the necessary steps in order to ratify the treaty but,
due to the Czech-Polish conflict over the Teschen region, progress was stalled. How-
ever, on May 2, 1922, Japan decided to ratify the treaty and even though it had no
direct interest in it, during the next period Japan together with Great Britain would
urge the other signatory Powers to ratify the Treaty.24
< 275 >

The Ishii Note
The correspondence received at the Japanese Foreign Ministry regarding the

Bessarabian Treaty intensified in 1924 as a result of the French ratification. There are
many reports regarding the course of events in France, the implications of the French
ratification, the conflict between Poincare and Cicerin, the attitude of Italy, the Vi-
enna Conference, the evolution of Soviet-Romanian relations during 1924, events in
Bessarabia,25 reactions in press and so on. Reports on the Bessarabian question come
from Romania, the Soviet Union and France but also from Poland and Czechoslova-
kia, so that we may gauge the Romanian-Soviet conflict as perceived by public opin-
ion in those countries.26 The Ministry officials started showing interest in the Bes-
sarabian question and, for the first time after 1921, a comprehensive synthesis on the
matter was prepared in order to familiarize them with it.
Once France had ratified, there were only two other ratifications pending, the
Italian and the Japanese. The Romanians took steps to obtain both. The reasons for
Italy’s hesitance were clear, but not for Japan’s. Although since 1923 I.G. Duca had
been asking the Japanese minister to Bucharest to press his government on the ques-
tion, it was only in the aftermath of the French ratification that a more serious cam-
paign was launched. At first, Duca tried again to use the Japanese minister to Bucha-
rest, Kumaichi Horiguchi, and took advantage of the bilateral commercial negotia-
tions going on in Bucharest in order to ask him to intercede with his government,
but to no avail.27
Romanian hopes for Japanese ratification were advanced by a rather unex-
pected event: the visit of Japanese Prince Naruhiko Higashi Kuni to Romania in early
April. The timing of the visit was ideal for Romania: exactly when the Vienna nego-
tiations broke down and Soviet propaganda was at its peak. The visit was part of a
larger European tour by Prince Naruhiko and had been planned well ahead of the
March-April events regarding Bessarabia, so the Japanese side was taken by surprise
by the high level of publicity. Even if they had anticipated this situation, it would
have been almost impossible to cancel the visit due to the reaction in Romania and in
the international press, which would have colored it as a gesture of protest and a
win for the Soviets.
In the end, the visit produced only a propaganda coup. As stated by the French
minister in Bucharest: “The visit had no political consequences; the Romanian offi-
cials hoped that the Prince, even as he was not bringing the ratification, would at
least give some formal assurances in that regard, but Naruhiko avoided any conver-
sation on political topics.”28
A few weeks after the Imperial visit, the German press was spreading a strange
rumor: during the visit, a treaty of alliance directed against Russia had been signed
between Japan and Romania, according to French instructions. The Japanese Am-
bassador in Berlin denied it, stating that Japan has no political treaty with any Euro-
pean state. Interestingly enough, for unknown reasons, Ambassador Honda blamed
the Romanians for the rumor, although it could have come from others:
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
Mr. Honda told me that this dubious information seems to be originating with
the Romanians. He thinks that the Romanian government is very much preoc-
cupied with the Bessarabian question. During conversations with Japanese
diplomats accompanying Prince Naruhiko, Bratianu and the others insisted on
the community of interest between Japan and Romania vis-à-vis the Soviet
danger, with an insistence that was clearly hiding certain intentions. Because
these apropos had no effect, the Romanian government tried to improve the
people’s morale by giving the visit an ostensible political character when it was
in fact only a protocol visit [answering Romanian Crown Prince Carol’s visit to
Japan in 1920]. Japan is constantly represented in the German press as the nec-
essary partner for France in order to realize, in collaboration with Poland and
Romania, the encirclement of the Soviets.29
Duca understood that the Japanese representative in Bucharest did not have
much influence on Japanese policy in general, and decided to go a step further. In
April 1924 the Romanian campaign targeted Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, Japan’s Ambas-
sador to France and one of the best-known Japanese diplomats.30 During the visit of
the Romanian royal family to Paris, in April 1924, Ambassador Ishii had a number of
meetings with I.G. Duca, Prime Minister Ion Bratianu, and King Ferdinand (April
12). The Romanians stressed the common fight against their communist neighbor,
pointing to Romania’s efforts to reach an agreement with the Soviets, and insisted on
the need to have the Japanese Diet ratify the Bessarabian Treaty.31
During April and May 1924, Duca kept pressuring Horiguchi, but this time he
changed his tactic. He understood that his previous line of argument (the plight of
the Bessarabian people) was not working and switched to something that he be-
lieved would be more effective with the Japanese: their pride. He maintained that by
failing to ratify, Japan would dishonor her signature and consequently damage her
international position.32 Following his lead, the entire Romanian campaign will fo-
cus on the damage to Japan’s international image that would follow non-ratification.
This line of argument was bolstered by the fact that the Bessarabian Treaty was the
first such treaty that Japan signed but failed to ratify. In fact, Horiguchi himself was
trying to get a clear image of the Bessarabian issue, as demonstrated by the compre-
hensive report he prepared in May 1924, which makes much of Bessarabia’s history
and her union with Romania, presenting the events not entirely from the Romanian
view but from a neutral stand.33
As a result of the intensified Romanian pressure, as well as in order to respond
to the Soviet campaign against ratification, the Japanese government decided to
make official its position on the Bessarabian Treaty. This time Foreign Minister Ma-
tsui not only stated Japan’s position but gave a reason for it. On May 8, 1924, he in-
structed the Japanese representatives in Paris, London and Bucharest that his Gov-
ernment’s view on the matter was that, as the Bessarabian question was a European
matter, it would be difficult for Japan to take any action before all the European
< 277 >

Powers had made their decisions.34 According to his instructions, Ishii took the first
opportunity to send a Note to the Romanian Foreign Ministry regarding the Japa-
nese position on the ratification question:
The Japanese Government has really no objections to the ratification of the

Bessarabian Treaty, except for the fact that this question is one of the most
important ones en suspense in Europe, so it is difficult to take a decision before
all the European powers, directly interested in the matter, have taken a deci-
sion regarding this subject.
Also, the Japanese Government considers that since the mentioned Treaty
could not come into force before the ratification of all the signatory states, the
Japanese ratification would not be sufficient to solve the matter in question.35
In other words, until Italy ratified the Treaty, there would be no purpose in
expecting Japan to do so. This was almost the same position as that adopted a few
months earlier. In the meanwhile, because the French had finally ratified, Italy had
become the only European Power still holding back. However, the justification given
by the Japanese represents an innovation on their part, given they had supported the
Central European Frontiers Treaty. In that case Japan ratified before France, Roma-
nia or Italy, and it encouraged the other signatories to ratify the Treaty. What made
the Japanese change their position in the case of the Bessarabian Treaty was, most
definitely, the Soviet factor.
By the Ishii Note what had been unofficial became official. The Japanese had
found a polite line of reasoning by which to postpone the ratification, while avoiding
upsetting either the Soviet Union or Romania. They were, in a manner of speaking,
passing the buck to the Italians, while keeping their image clean vis-à-vis the Sovi-
ets, the Romanians, and the other signatory Powers. And, with a little bit of luck (at
that time Italy had good relations with the Soviets and poor relations with Romania)
the problem might have been solved for the Japanese. We should also not exclude
the possibility that the Japanese understood very well how powerful a weapon the
ratification question could become in their negotiations with the Soviets, if the Ital-
ians should ratify — particularly since they had nothing to lose if the Italians kept
on stalling.
This maneuver strongly suggests that the Japanese were already aware of the
Soviets’ special “weakness” regarding the Bessarabian Treaty. However, they did a
small favor to the Soviet Union by announcing their decision to postpone the ratifi-
cation. In Romania and in the other European countries, the Japanese note was ac-
cepted at face value, the Romanians considering only its good part: that Japan really
had no other reason to avoid ratification except for her policy of non-intervention in
European affairs. And the Note by itself did not bind Japan to the Italian ratification.
The Japanese could, at any moment, declare that they are ready to ratify and the
Note would not stop them from doing so.
The real game was being played quite far away from Europe. In 1924, the Japa-
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
nese-Soviet negotiations for the normalization of diplomatic relations were at an

advanced stage. Since 1921 they had held a few rounds of negotiations, but with un-
certain results. The fact that by the beginning of 1924 the Soviet Government had
been officially recognized by three of Europe’s main Powers (Germany, Italy and
Great Britain) and, before the end of the year, by France, certainly influenced Japan’s
decision to improve their mutual relations. On March 19, 1924, a new round of nego-
tiations begun in Peking between Kenkichi Yoshizawa and Lev Mikhailovici Kara-
khan, which would successfully lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations
between the Soviets and Japan in January 1925.
Only days after the negotiations started, probably under pressure since the
French ratification, Karakhan was already declaring that Japan should avoid follow-
ing the French example.36 During a meeting on March 26 Karakhan insisted that Ja-
pan should not ratify because it would endanger the negotiations. And, in order to
shore up his position, he used the mass media, presenting the Soviet position on Bes-
sarabia during a press conference and also claiming that it would be highly inoppor-
tune for Japan to ratify. He knew the newspapers in Japan would publish his decla-
rations.37 This was the beginning of Soviet Bessarabian propaganda on Japanese soil,
propaganda that would prove quite successful in influencing Japanese public opin-
ion in favor of the Soviet thesis.
During May 1924, Karakhan kept pressing Yoshizawa on the ratification ques-
tion (mainly by continually asking what was the Japanese position) so that, at one
point, the Japanese government decided to give an answer to his requests. On May
24 Yoshizawa was instructed to present his Government’s position, that “until all
the European Powers interested in the Bessarabian Treaty complete the ratification,
the Japanese Government will not start the procedures for ratification.”38 Although
that was the same as the position expressed by the Ishii Note, there is one important
difference: the instructions to Yoshizawa clearly state that he should present the
Japanese position in a verbal manner and not in writing. All the other documents in
the Gaimusho Archives stress that the answer given to Karakhan’s request was ver-
bal. The question is, why? Was it because there were no diplomatic relations with
the Soviets or in order to boost the Japanese position at a later stage?
The following salient points should be weighed. First, the Japanese expressed
their position regarding the Bessarabian question directly to the Soviet representa-
tives, in an official manner. Second, the fact that the Japanese position was ex-
pressed only verbally and not in a written form reminds us of the Italians, who did
the same in February 1924, when they established diplomatic relations with the So-
viets and Mussolini undertook not to ratify in exchange for a “contropartita” (counter-
partite). Third, the Japanese could have argued that Yoshizawa’s statement was only
an expression of good intentions towards the Soviets and not binding, at least as
long as it was not followed by any quid pro quo from the Soviets. Fourth, as shown by
later events, the Soviets were not completely satisfied with the Japanese answer and
continued their campaign against Japanese ratification. The Yoshizawa statement,
although it simply presents to the Soviets the Japanese position regarding ratifica-
tion, was a clear step towards non-ratification.
< 279 >

The Japanese action was motivated by their growing interest in establishing

normal relations with the Soviets, which ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty
would have jeopardized. Karakhan already failed once in the Bessarabian question
(during the Warsaw Conference of 1921) and a second failure, meaning the Japanese
ratification, would have clearly influenced the negotiations and not in the way
wanted by the Japanese. And, once again, by 1924 the Japanese government realized
that it had nothing to win by ratifying the Treaty, particularly as there was not much
pressure on it in order to do so; it could only lose by arousing new tensions with the
Soviets. Thus, the Ishii Note and the Yoshizawa verbal statement did not come as a
direct consequence of the French ratification; they simply made official a position
taken a few months earlier.
The Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between Japan and the Soviet Union
Of great importance to our topic is the establishment of diplomatic relations

between Japan and the Soviet Union in January 1925. At that time there had been
speculations both in the press and in diplomatic circles that Japan had undertaken
not to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty. Speculation went so far as to consider the Japa-
nese non-ratification as proof of a possible Japanese-Soviet alliance against the inter-
ests of other powers in the Far East. Was there truth in these speculations? If we
only consider that finally Japan failed to ratify the treaty, the answer appears posi-
tive. But if we consider the reopening of the ratification question in March 1927 by
the Soviets, then the answer is no: there was no definitive agreement regarding Bes-
sarabia. Why would the Soviet representatives raise the Bessarabian Treaty question
again in March 1927, if they already had Japan’s secret agreement not to ratify?
The Bessarabian question had been a topic in Japanese-Soviet negotiations
since March 1924. After Yoshizawa gave his verbal statement, the next step for Kara-
khan was to get a written declaration from the Japanese that would confirm it. As
the Romans used to say, verba volant, scripta manent. Unfortunately, few Soviet docu-
ments have been published on the Karakhan-Yoshizawa talks and this author has
had only limited access to the Soviet Foreign Ministry Archives, so that it has not yet
been possible to compare the Japanese account of events with the Soviets’.39
At first, Karakhan sought to have the Bessarabian question inserted into the
general agreement. The best he could have achieved in that sense was that the Japa-
nese government would have assumed an obligation regarding its recognition of the
Soviet borders, including those territories disputed with other states. The Soviets
tried to obtain the same from the British government but failed. In the Draft Treaty
handed to Yoshizawa in May 1924, one of the articles stated:
Each of the Contracting Parties agrees to annul, upon the signing of the pre-
sent agreement, any treaties or agreements of any kind that may have been con-
cluded between itself and third parties, prejudicing sovereign or territorial
rights of the other party, or constituting a menace to the safety of the latter.40
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
Had Japan agreed to this article, there would have been no possibility of Japan
ratifying the Bessarabian Treaty. The Draft article proposed by Karakhan was clearly
directed at Bessarabia, although not only Bessarabia, as the Soviet Union had other
territorial problems too. The Japanese proposed a different Draft for the article:
At the time of signing the basic convention both contracting parties should de-
clare that neither had any treaty or agreement about a military alliance or a se-
cret agreement, concluded with any third power, in violation of the sovereign or
territorial rights of the other side or threatening the security of the other side.41
The Japanese draft limited the scope of the article; as the Bessarabian Treaty
was neither secret nor a military alliance, Japan would retain the right to ratify it at
any time.
Karakhan attempted to revise the article in his favor on August 4, proposing
another version to Yoshizawa, but Yoshizawa again refused to accept Karakhan’s
terms. That the difference between the two drafts was directed specifically toward
the Bessarabian Treaty is proven by a top-secret Japanese document that describes
the evolution of negotiations regarding the future Article No. 4 of Protocol A in rela-
tion to the treaty.
On October 9, 1924, Karakhan told Yoshizawa that because Art. 4 of the Proto-
col A did not cover the Bessarabian Treaty, he wanted a note from the Japanese side
in which the Japanese would bind themselves not to ratify it. This was his only con-
dition in order to accept the Japanese proposed draft of the article. The Japanese an-
swered that they could not promise not to ratify.
When the negotiations reopened after a two-week hiatus, October 24, Kara-
khan insisted again, declaring that the Japanese Government’s refusal to promise not
to ratify would offend Moscow. Karakhan stated that Moscow would consider this
not simply as a ratification question but as a sign of Japanese bad intentions (the
same argument that the Soviets had used with the French and Italians). The next
day Karakhan expressed his dissatisfaction with the Japanese answer and suggested,
“We should make a secret document by which the Japanese Government indicates
that it will not attempt to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty”.42 This proposal formed the
basis for a future exchange of letters.
What should be stressed in here is that Karakhan’s pressure came exactly at
the time when the Bessarabian question was again on the front pages in Europe, this
time as a result of unfolding events in Italy and of the Tatar-Bunar uprising. As previ-
ously mentioned, October 1924 was the peak of the controversy in the Italian press
regarding the Italian ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty. In order to counterbal-
ance a possible Italian move closer to Romania, a move that might have led to the
ratification, the Soviets did all they could to prevent Japan from ratifying.
On October 30 Karakhan handed to Yoshizawa the full text of the revised
Draft Treaty, with all the protocols and notes. As for Protocol A, Art. 4, Karakhan
< 281 >

said that Russia would accept the Japanese draft, but that he wanted the Japanese
Government to indicate (in writing) that it had no intention of ratifying the Bessara-
bian Treaty.
On January 9, 1925, Karakhan spoke with Yoshizawa again on the Bessarabian
question. “I have the honor to bring to Your Excellency’s knowledge that the ratifica-
tion of the said Treaty by Japan could not be construed by my Government other-
wise than an unfriendly act.”43 Karakhan’s threat was nothing new. The Soviet Gov-
ernment had used it before with France — but nothing happened, as the Japanese
were well aware. However, this time the Japanese decided to grant the Soviet re-
quest and to offer them a written guarantee. Still, they were unwilling to go as far as
the Soviets requested and simply decided to bind their decision on that of Italy
(meaning that they would not ratify before Italy did so).
The Yoshizawa-Karakhan talks were supposed to be confidential. However,
from time to time, both camps leaked information to the press. It is interesting to
note that Karakhan did so in regard to the ratification question too. The first public
information that connects the Bessarabian Treaty question with the establishment
of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union was published on Janu-
ary 16, 1925, in The New York Times, when an article headed “Japan and Soviet Near
Agreement” presented the text of the draft agreement between the two, as taken
from the Japanese press by the newspaper’s correspondent in Tokyo, and noting that
“Japan states that she will not ratify the protocol on Bessarabia, signed in Paris in
1921 [this is a mistake, it should be 1920] by the Ambassadors of four powers.”44
The New York Times article was based on information from Tokyo and not from
Peking, where the negotiations took place. Since the Japanese Government had no
interest in making this matter public, it is logical to assume that the leak was made
by Karakhan. Aware of the implications of such information, he probably used one of
the Japanese correspondents in Peking (the New York Times journalist took the
information from the Japanese press, as I said, but the information got into the Japa-
nese press through one of the Japanese journalists working in Shanghai – how can
we say this in fewer words?), in order to keep up the pressure on the Japanese Gov-
ernment. The article does not say that the Japanese ratification was connected with
that of Italy, as was actually the case, and this fact also points to Karakhan as the
source. This interpretation provoked a powerful reaction in Romanian press. Soon
after this article was published, the Japanese diplomatic circles denied having under-
taken any obligation towards the Soviets regarding the Bessarabian Treaty.
After signing the Basic Convention, Karakhan leaked new information regard-
ing the secret exchange of letters between him and Yoshizawa:
In an interview with Karakhan, the Soviet representative in Peking, he re-

ferred to his complete understanding with Yoshizawa, the Japanese Ambassa-
dor, that Japan would not ratify the inter-Allied decision giving Bessarabia to
Romania.
Although this was not in the text of the recent agreement, said the Soviet
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
Ambassador, it was implicit in the renewal of relations between the two coun-
tries. He did not doubt it would be respected, as the understanding was as binding as
if it had been written.45
Of course, the Japanese government again rushed to deny this information.

Still, the press made one more interesting association: “In a series of declara-
tions the Soviet Government expresses regret for the Nicolaievsk Incident and Japan
agrees not to ratify the Bessarabian Convention until all the other powers have rati-
fied.”46
In the Basic Convention, Article No. 4 of Protocol A used the wording pro-
posed by the Japanese, but Yoshizawa had to make a certain concession to Karakhan
regarding the Bessarabian Treaty. This concession was made in the form of a private
exchange of letters that would be kept secret (out of respect for the Japanese Gov-
ernment’s considerations — avoiding adverse reactions from the other signatory
countries and obviating any negative press that could portray them as unscrupulous
merchants willing to bend international engagements in order to promote trade), on
the day when the Basic Convention was signed.
Finally, on January 20, 1925, the long-awaited written guarantee came from the
Japanese side. In response to an inquiry made by Karakhan, in a letter addressed to
Yoshizawa and asking for the Japanese non-ratification, the latter signed a letter on
the same day, stating:
Unless and until the said Treaty shall have been ratified by all the European
signatory Powers, the Japanese Government has no intention of proceeding to
the steps required for its ratification, considering that it deals with an essen-
tially European question.47
The exchange of letters was both secret and private, and this is stressed in all
the Japanes documents. That was for two reasons; first, that it was the wish of the
Japanese Government to keep the matter secret quite from the beginning, given the
reaction such an agreement might provoke overseas.48 Second, as a “private” letter,
there was no need to make it public; and therefore the exchange of letters is not to
be found among the documents mentioned in the Protocol of Signature made on
January 20, 1925, between Yoshizawa and Karakhan.49
The private character of the letter means that it was binding only on Yoshi-
zawa, as a private person, at least in the Gaimusho’s view. On the other hand, from
the Soviet viewpoint, Yoshizawa was at that time the representative of Japan, having
full powers to sign the Basic Convention, which means that he was representing Ja-
pan when he signed the letter (on the same day as the Basic Convention); therefore
the letter could not be considered as having only a private character. The truth must
lie somewhere in the middle. The exchange of letters was a compromise solution,
made in such a way that both parts could claim a victory. Of course the Japanese
representatives were aware of the Soviet interpretation, and vice versa. While Japan
< 283 >

retained the liberty of ratifying if Italy should do so, Karakhan was able to claim that
the Japanese had undertaken, in writing, not to ratify the Treaty. In actuality, it was
only a partial victory for him because all he managed to secure was a written form of
Japan’s previous verbal declarations, but the Japanese ratification was still tied to
the Italian one.50
Bruce A. Eleman, one of the few scholars to study the Japanese implications of
the Bessarabian Treaty, based his research mainly on Gaimusho’s Archives (his
chronological errors would seem to indicate that he has never cast eyes on a single
book on Bessarabia), argues that the exchange of letters was a “secret agreement”. In
diplomatic and juridical circles it is considered that there are important differences
between an agreement and an exchange of letters as diplomatic instruments. The
signatories must ratify a written agreement, while an exchange of letters is not sup-
posed to be ratified. In other words, a written agreement is a much powerful diplo-
matic instrument, clearly binding on its signatories, and that is not the case with an
exchange of letters. In fact, Eleman tries to make a point not so much about the
Japanese position on ratification as on the means used by Soviet diplomacy, namely
that even while they were loudly proclaiming against the use of secret treaties, they
were making full use of them. He comes to the conclusion that the Karakhan-
Yoshizawa “secret agreement” is the first example of secret Soviet diplomacy in the
1920s. As the secrecy issue was explained before, what remains is the term
“agreement” (considering that Eleman was referring to a written agreement and not
to a verbal one, as he uses the exchange of letters as the agreement). Even Eleman
notes the fact that the matter was later (after the Italian ratification) re-opened by
the Soviet side in connection to fishery negotiations, but he fails to explain. If a se-
cret agreement had been in place, why should the Soviets bring it up again? Eleman
had no knowledge of the Ishii Note and Yoshizawa’s verbal statement, which radi-
cally change the circumstances, and therefore he jumped to his conclusion.
Professor Shigeo Mutsushika (the only Japanese scholar who has attempted to
study the Bessarabian Treaty question) also published the exchange of letters and he
too considered the exchange as the reason for the eventual Japanese demurral. But
Prof. Mutsushika does not consider the exchange of letters to be a secret agreement.
He considers that the two letters are attachments or attached notes (fuzoku bunsho, in
Japanese) to the Basic Convention.51 But in the Protocol of Signature of January 20
only one set of notes and one annexed note are mentioned, and there is no mention of
the exchange of letters regarding the Bessarabian Treaty.52 If had been attached to
the Basic Convention, as Prof. Mutsushika suggests, the exchange of letters would
have lost at least the private character, which was clearly not the intention of the
Japanese government. In this case, if the Japanese ratified before Italy did, that could
be considered, in the Russian view, as encroaching upon the Basic Convention; the
implications of such an encroachment are obvious. Therefore, the letters could not
have been considered as annexed notes to the Basic Convention, which had by no
means a private or secret character. Of course, from the Soviet view, presented
above, this opinion is at least debatable but the fact that the letters were not men-
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
tioned in the Protocol of Signature considerably weakens their case.

Nevertheless, there is nothing new in the content of this document. The only
difference was that now the Japanese position was made in a written form addressed
to the Soviets. The Japanese Government in January 1925 used the same solution as
in May 1924, when it answered the pressures coming from Romania to ratify the
treaty, but this time in order to meet the opposite pressures and with different im-
plications. The Japanese liberty of movement regarding the ratification was limited
by the exchange of letters, as compared to the Ishii Note, but Japan lost nothing be-
cause it kept the door open.
It did give the Soviets a small advantage over the Romanians, however, so that
at least some of the anxiety generated by Japan’s latest move was justified. They had
gone one step further toward non-ratification; and even in the event of a sudden im-
provement in Japanese-Romanian relations, the Soviets had a written assurance that
Japan would not ratify before Italy did so. Considering only the Ishii Note, the Japa-
nese could have simply informed the Romanian government of their decision to rat-
ify without waiting for the Italian ratification. This alternative was no longer a pos-
sibility. The only problem for the Soviets could have come from Italy, and that is
what in fact happened.
When Italy announced her intention in 1926 to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty,
the Soviets understood that the exchange of letters would not be enough to hold the
Japanese back. At the same time, the Japanese understood that their patience was
about to be rewarded.
As previously mentioned, some international newspapers knew that the Bes-
sarabian Treaty had been debated during the Japanese-Soviet negotiations. Two
opinions had been expressed: first, that Japan would not ratify at all, and second,
that Japan would not ratify until Italy had done so. The biggest reaction was in Ro-
mania, where the press made numerous comments connecting Japan’s delay in rati-
fying the Treaty with her de jure recognition of the Soviet Union. In order to respond
to these allegations the Japanese Legation in Bucharest issued a statement to the
effect that:
The Japanese Government cannot perfidiously dishonor its signature of the

Bessarabian Treaty and attributes the delay in ratifying to the fact that the
Japanese government is still waiting for the European signatory powers to de-
cide first in questions regarding Europe.53
Still, as can be seen, this statement did not contradict the rumors that the Japa-
nese Government had framed the ratification as a secret stipulation of the Soviet-
Japanese treaty, at least as regards Japan’s decision (or engagement) not to ratify the
Bessarabian Treaty until all the other signatory Powers had done so. Although the
Japanese government informed many of its representatives in Europe of the content
and character of the exchange of letters,54 Romania’s diplomats apparently knew
only what was published in the mass media.
Even without the mentioned exchange of letters, the establishment of diplo-
< 285 >

matic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan in itself weakened Romania’s
chances of obtaining the Japanese ratification. While Romania had almost nothing
to bargain with (except for its oil resources), the Soviets had plenty of “carrots” and
“sticks” as well. It is clear that for the Romanian cause the establishment of diplo-
matic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union was a defeat (albeit one that it
could by no means have prevented). But even at this moment, Bucharest failed to
grasp the situation; the Romanian Foreign Ministry officials were still dreaming that
Japan would automatically ratify after Italy. The least they could have done was to
reopen the Romanian Legation in Tokyo and to intensify the Romanian propaganda
in Japan.
Another significant episode related to the Romanian attitude towards the
Japanese ratification came during 1924. A new round of negotiations for a Commer-
cial Treaty between Romania and Japan took place, only to fail in November 1924.55
It was a lost opportunity to increase Japan’s interest in Romania. If the Romanian
representatives at the negotiations had been more accommodating to the Japanese
proposals, which were not in any case exaggerated, the Treaty could have become
reality. Yugoslavia managed, where Romania failed. Theoretically, at least, by signing
a Commercial Treaty Japanese interest in Romania would have been increased. Ro-
mania could have given something to Japan, as they did in case of the other signato-
ries, although much less, and start building a base for a future offensive in favor of
ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty. Unfortunately, nobody in the RFM saw the
possible correlation between the Commercial Treaty and the ratification question.56
Also influencing the atmosphere in Bucharest in the aftermath of the Japanese
recognition of the Soviet Union is the Gaimusho’s decision to replace the Japanese
minister to Romania, Kumaichi Horiguchi. In fact, it seems to have been more than a
simple replacement. Horiguchi was, at that time, Japan’s Plenipotentiary Minister
for both Romania and Yugoslavia, with his permanent office in Romania. At the be-
ginning of February 1925, Horiguchi officially announced that he was taking an
unlimited leave. Surprisingly, he also announced that he was going on leave only for
Romania and that he was removing his residence to Belgrade. He was to be replaced
in Romania by a Chargé d’affaires (a lower diplomatic rank) who would have less
authority.
The justification provided by the Japanese Government for this action was in-
genious. In 1922 the Japanese had opened their Legation in Bucharest, based on con-
ditions of reciprocity. But the Romanians failed to open a legation in Tokyo, due to
budgetary constraints (although there had been plenty of funds for Titulescu, who
had the highest salary of all the acting foreign representatives in London). At first,
the Japanese decided to wait until the Romanian economy recovered. By 1923 the
Romanian economy was already coming back, and the Japanese expected to see the
reopening of the Romanian Legation in Tokyo; but this did not take place. This was,
at least theoretically, a perfectly valid reason for the Japanese to express their dissat-
isfaction and withdraw Horiguchi. However, the reciprocity invoked by the Japa-
nese Government was first broken by the Japanese themselves, during the 1917-1922
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
period (in which a Romanian Legation was operating in Tokyo).

That Horiguchi’s departure coincided with the establishment of Soviet-
Japanese relations was not lost on anyone. And if we think of the Italian example,
with Mussolini taking steps against Romania soon after his recognition of the Sovi-
ets, the similarity is striking. Had the Japanese decision come at another time, there
would have been probably no reaction; and in the end, the Japanese government de-
cided that the replacement of Horiguchi was in fact not opportune and they kept
him on as representative to Romania until July 1925. Still, the question of a possible
link between the establishment of Soviet-Japanese relations and Horiguchi’s depar-
ture remains.57
However, it is true that Japan had been renewing its invitation to the Roma-
nian Government to reopen its Legation in Tokyo, and it is an open question why.
Did the Japanese Government want a Romanian representative in Tokyo at all, or
was it only bluffing in order to justify Horiguchi’s departure? Did they feel that hav-
ing a Romanian representative in Tokyo, promoting the Bessarabian Treaty, would
give them some small leverage in their negotiations with the Soviets? In any case, the
Romanians failed to follow through. How could they fail to appreciate the Japanese
suggestion, when it was so desirable to secure Japan’s ratification?
The need for a Romanian Legation in Tokyo was expressed in the press as early
as April 1924, but the appeal had no practical consequences. The courtesy shown by
the Japanese Government in maintaining its Bucharest Legation was also men-
tioned.58
Holland’s Foreign Minister, Mr. de Karnebeek, expressed this opinion for the
first time in December 1925, during a discussion with the Romanian representative
in Holland, P.P. Carp. He suggested that Japan’s stated motive for non-ratification
was inadequate and that the real reason must be a different one. In his opinion, Japa-
nese foreign policy was taking on a new, more aggressive orientation in the Extreme
Orient against the other Powers engaged there (including Holland), based on a se-
cret agreement with the Soviet Union; and one of the best proofs in this sense was
the Japanese failure to ratify.59 This opinion suggests a possible motive for the US
position on Bessarabia as well, namely the fear of Japanese expansionism in the Far
East. The same fear existed, to a certain degree, in Europe. The idea of an alliance in
the Far East between Japan and the Soviets must have alarmed many diplomats and
politicians. De Karnebeek’s opinion proves once again the importance of the Bessara-
bian Treaty for the international community. The reaction in Britain after the Italian
ratification would be another example in this sense.
From the Exchange of Letters to the Italian Ratification
The establishment of Soviet-Japanese relations evoked an official reaction from

Italy, as well. On February 1925, the Italian government sent a note to the Japanese
Ambassador in Rome, Ochiai, arguing that, as Italy and Japan had the same attitude
toward the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty, if in the future one of them in-
< 287 >

tended to take a step in this matter, they should communicate before taking such
steps.60 The Japanese answer was:
We said that we took the decision that until all the European states finish the
ratification procedures we will not take any steps toward the ratification. But if
interested European countries do not ratify, we will freely decide whether to ratify or not. So,
we have instructed Ochiai not to go deeply into this problem.61
The Japanese answer seems to show the real position taken by the Japanese
representatives. It is the first time they clearly stated that their ratification was not
bound by the Italian one. In other words, they understood that the ratification might
prove useful with the Soviets, sooner or later, and they wanted to preserve their right
to use it even if the Italians never did ratify. The answer also indicates that the Japa-
nese saw the exchange of letters as no real barrier to ratifying before Italy. On the
other hand, it shows that the Japanese, although closely following the events in Italy,
were unwilling to be influenced or used by the Italians in relation to the ratification.
They were aware of Mussolini’s intentions in the Balkans and did not plan to play
along.
The Soviet diplomats had been very active in Japan. In October 1925, the Soviet
Ambassador to Japan, Joseph Kopp, visited Baron Shidehara, Japanese Foreign Min-
ister at the time, and handed him a memorandum in which he expressed the Soviet
discontent over the Bessarabian Treaty question. He inquired once again about the
Japanese Government’s attitude toward ratification and asked whether it would be
possible to send a telegram to Moscow regarding these talks.
The Soviet memorandum argues against the ratification and states once more
the Soviets position: the Treaty violates important international human rights; its
ratification would be a very unfriendly act towards the Soviet Union; the text of the
treaty shows clearly the impossibility of its application at the present moment; the
ratification of the Treaty would contradict Art. Y of the Peking Treaty between Ja-
pan and the Soviet Union (actually Art. 4 of Protocol A). The Soviet Government
calls Japan’s attention to the uncomfortable effect that the ratification and subse-
quent activation of the Treaty would create; they hope that the illegal engagements
of 1920 cannot be accepted by a State that formally recognized the Soviet Union, and
suggest that the latter would have to consider ratification as impinging its sovereign
rights.62
The Japanese answer was conciliatory:
Regarding the Bessarabian Treaty, the Japanese Government will not go beyond
the statement made in Peking. That statement is the secret and private letter
from Yoshizawa to Karakhan. The Japanese Government did not promise to the
Romanian Government that after the Italian ratification we would soon ratify. Even if Italy
ratifies, the Japanese Government will decide whether to ratify or not only after
a substantial study of this matter, so we will not ratify automatically.63
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
The answer given to Kopp seems to be the opposite of that given to the Ital-
ians. Still, a new element comes into being: the interpretation given to the Ishii note
(and to the Japanese declarations before and after January 20, 1925) by the Romani-
ans, and not only by them, that the only reason for the Japanese postponement of the
ratification was Italy and that, as soon as Italy ratified, Japan would do the same. It
was widely considered that the Japanese ratification would come automatically after
that of Italy. The Soviets had become aware of this interpretation and probed to as-
certain what was the Japanese position. The Japanese answer was the one they ex-
pected, and expressed the Japanese readiness to negotiate with the Soviets if Italy
ratified. In fact, the Japanese were simply showing the Soviets that, in the end, their
readiness to ratify or not to ratify was a function of what the Soviets would be will-
ing to offer in exchange.
While the Soviets were sending official memoranda against ratification, the
Romanians tried to obtain the Japanese ratification, but by using propaganda in-
stead of negotiations. Relying on historical and demographic arguments in favor of
Bessarabia’s union with Romania, they sent to Gaimusho a big map of Bessarabia
and two books: La Romanie et les Provinces Romaines by Prof. A.D. Athanasiu (Paris,
1919) and Chronology of the Most Important Events in the Life of Bessarabia, by Ion G. Peli-
van, former member in the Sfatul Tserii (Paris, 1920). The books expressed very well
the Romanian argumentation in favor of the Union — a nice gesture, but hardly
likely to outweigh the Soviet action. Unfortunately, Romania had little to offer to
Japan in exchange for ratification and, even worse, she had no idea of the Soviet dip-
lomatic action in Tokyo. Closing her Tokyo Legation seems, in the end, to have cost
more than maintaining it would have done.
THE SECOND PERIOD: 1927 TO 1932
The ratification question had the greatest implications for Japan in the year
1927. Japan remained the only state that had failed to ratify. Six out of the 19 synthe-
ses on the Bessarabian Treaty question prepared at the Gaimusho were made that
year, and three of them were among the lengthiest, proving that the Japanese govern-
ment was studying the ratification question closely.
In 1926 the relations between Romania and Italy improved quickly and in Sep-
tember a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Collaboration was signed, followed by the
Italian ratification on March 8, 1927. Japan was now in a difficult position, having
lost one more excuse for delay. If she refrained from the ratification, she would be
going against all the official statements and declarations made previously by Japa-
nese diplomats; Japan’s credibility in the international arena was at stake. But the
Soviet diplomats (ironically, representing a communist country) knew that
“everything has a price” in “capitalist” countries, and they made known their willing-
ness to pay. While the Romanian government and the other three signatories were
convinced that the Japanese ratification would come very soon, and automatically,
their expectations were mistaken.
< 289 >

The Japanese diplomats were not taken by surprise by the Italian move. More
than six months had passed between the signing of the Friendship Treaty and the
Italian ratification. By November 1926, the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow was
already asking the Italian Ambassador what effect the Italian-Romanian Pact would
have on Russo-Italian relations.64 The Gaimusho received a great deal of information
regarding the Bessarabian Treaty question during this period, including numerous
reports, articles from newspapers all over the world (especially from Italy and the
Soviet Union), telegrams and memorandums regarding Bessarabia. Quite active were
the Japanese representatives in Italy and Odessa (any article about Bessarabia pub-
lished in Izvestia was translated and sent home).
The Italian decision to ratify specified: “Japan declared that it will ratify the
Treaty only after all the other signatory States ratified it”.65 In other words, in order
to give more weight to their ratification, the Italians were the first to invite Japan to
ratify. All over the world the press focused on the situation created by the Italian
ratification, many of them pointing out Japan’s difficult situation while guessing that
Japan would soon ratify, because she had thus far respected every diplomatic en-
gagement she had undertaken. One such article stated:
The ratification by Italy of the Treaty . . . leaves Japan the only signatory which
has not yet ratified it and obliges the Government to make a decision on a
somewhat embarrassing question, which it has hitherto postponed. Soviet
Russia opposes the ratification and Japan has too many points of contact with
Russia to risk having differences over matters that do not affect Japanese inter-
ests. Action has been delayed in the meantime till the adjournment of the Diet
a fortnight hence, and this gives Ministers more leisure to come to a decision.
The probable decision was indicated by Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister,
in Diet recently, when he said that Japan had no vital interest in the matter and
would be guided by the action of the European signatories.66
Among the first reactions to the Italian ratification coming from a Japanese
diplomat and registered in the Romanian Foreign Ministry’s Archives was that of
the Japanese representative in Athens, on March 16, 1927. According to the Roma-
nian representative in Greece, Constantin Langa-Rascanu: “Japan’s Minister [to Ath-
ens] declared that his Government’s ratification would come without any doubt, the
delay in the ratification being caused by the fact that Japan has the rule of not taking
any decisions towards the European affairs while the European Powers have not yet
pronounced themselves.67
Another reaction, more indirect, came from the Hague, where the Romanian
representative P.P. Carp considered that, if Japan failed to ratify, the fears expressed
by De Karnebeek would be confirmed.68
Based on Japan’s earlier declarations (indicating that it would ratify if Italy did
so), the Romanian Foreign Minister, I.G. Mitilineu, announced officially on March 9
that Japan was now on the verge of ratifying the Treaty,69 and at the same time asked
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
the Japanese government, through its representative in Bucharest, Kintomo

Mushanokoji, to take the necessary steps. At that very moment Mushanokoji was
doing exactly the contrary, expressing his personal opinion in a telegram sent to his
superiors and asking them not to ratify automatically but to first analyze all the im-
plications that such a move would have for Japanese foreign policy.70 It seems that he
was somewhat concerned by what he heard in Bucharest, where the Japanese ratifi-
cation was regarded as a certainty. His position shows the weakness of the Roma-
nian campaign for ratification: if they were unable to convince the Japanese minister
to Romania of the necessity for Japan to ratify, how could they imagine that they
would be able to convince the Japanese government in Tokyo?
The answer from Gaimusho came very quickly, and it was in line with
Mushanokoji’s suggestion. The official position was that the Romanians had based
their announcement only on suppositions, as there was no intention of immediate
ratification due to ongoing negotiations with the Soviet Union — although the ques-
tion was “receiving attention”.71 And indeed, that was the case, as proved by a Report
called “Matters regarding the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty”, prepared by
Gaimusho’s Treaty Department on March 11. The Report presents the positions pre-
viously taken by Gaimusho regarding the ratification, emphasizing the Yoshizawa-
Karakhan negotiations, and carefully analyzes Japan’s choices after the Italian ratifi-
cation. It identifies four such options, presenting the advantages and disadvantages
of each one: to ratify; not to ratify; to remain silent; and to ratify after obtaining So-
viet approval.72
Japan was in a tight spot. At a first glance, Japan had nothing to gain by the
Bessarabian Treaty. If she ratified it, the Soviet Union would not simply swallow its
displeasure. If she failed to ratify it, Great Britain, France, Italy and Romania would
be displeased, as their efforts to resolve the Bessarabian problem would be nullified.
However, Japan was less concerned with the reaction in Romania than in the rest of
Europe, and tried to gauge what possible consequences her non-ratification might
have for her relations with the other Powers. At that time there was serious talk of a
possible confrontation between Britain and the Soviet Union. If Japan announced
publicly her intention not to ratify, this could have been understood as a defeat for
the British policy towards the Soviets, who would now be seen as having Japan as
their newest ally. That would not be in Japan’s interest, and the Japanese Govern-
ment tried to avoid any possible suggestion that it would not ratify. This situation
explains the Japanese permanent insistence on postponing the matter while refusing
to make any declaration stating that it would not ratify.
< 291 >

The Ratification Question and the Fishery Negotiations
At this moment, the Soviets took action to resolve Japan’s dilemma. The Soviet
propaganda machine insisted that Japan had nothing to win from Romania, politi-
cally or economically, and that ratification would only damage her relations with the
Soviets.73 At the same time they used the lure of the fishery negotiations taking place
in Moscow (the sixth plenary session of the fishery talks) between Japan and the
Soviet Union. In Tokyo, the Soviets’ representative Gregorij Bessedovskii (Chargé
d’affaires ad interim since Kopp’s recall in June 1926) had a number of meetings with
the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Katsuji Debuchi. The following account of ne-
gotiations is based mainly on documents in the Gaimusho Archives.74
On March 10, 1927, Bessedovskii visited Debuchi and the following conversa-
tion took place:
Bessedovskii: According to the newspapers, Italy is about to ratify the Bes-

sarabian Treaty. I was born in Ukraine and I have a high interest in Bessarabia,
so I was very surprised. Even if Italy ratifies, I hope that the Japanese Govern-
ment would not ratify because of the friendly relations it has with Russia.
Debuchi: Two years ago, in Peking, Japan signed the Basic Convention with
the Soviet Union. At that time, Japan promised that until Italy ratified it would
not take the necessary steps for the ratification. This also means that Japan did
not promise that it would not ratify after all the other European signatories
finish ratifying. Therefore, Japan has a free hand for the ratification. But if Italy rati-
fies, we will be in a very difficult position because we have friendly relations
with Russia. In fact, since this morning, we had a hard time with this matter. It
is not clear yet what the Japanese Government should do; I cannot find an an-
swer to this. . . .
Debuchi: Gaimusho shows a very friendly attitude towards Russia and,
during the last Parliament, as Bessedovskii knows, the Foreign Minister had
such a friendly speech towards Russia that the Russian Government and the
intellectuals were very pleased. Regarding the friendly relations with Russia,
the Government and the intellectuals have the correct opinion, but the usual
people offer many criticisms towards Russia, as you know. Some people attacked
the government for the slow pace of the fishery negotiations, so if we cannot sign that treaty
until the beginning of the fishery season this year, the fishermen are of the opinion that
they will have to go fishing under the protection of military vessels. [He was
referring to the crab and herring fishing season].
Japan has the idea that fishing rights on the Russian coast are a correct re-
sult of the Russo-Japanese war. So, if we limit the fishing rights [as asked by
the Soviet Government during the Moscow fishery negotiations] it will be a
violation of previous rights. Of course, we have to think whether this under-
standing is right or not, but if Russia will suddenly change its customs, the Japanese will
have an unpleasant feeling.
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
I wish that fishing along the Russian coasts might be open for Japan, con-
sidering every situation. If you fail to do that, it is only natural for Japan’s un-
pleasant feelings towards Russia to increase.75
Debuchi also considered that this was a good time to discuss other problems
that were complicating relations between the two countries and told Bessedovskii
that Japan was unhappy with some of the actions initiated by Michael Borodin in
China, actions that could harm the Japanese feelings toward Russia. The Kremlin
had sent Borodin to China in September 1923 as Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s chief adviser, with
the purpose of stirring up a Chinese revolution that would bring China much closer
to the Soviets. Although things did not go as planned by the Soviets, Borodin repeat-
edly came into conflict with the Japanese, who had every reason to wish that the
Soviet presence and influence in China would be diminished. Borodin was the best-
known Soviet revolutionary in China, and he exerted a great influence over a number
of Chinese warlords and political leaders including Chang Kai-Shek. Around the end
of 1926 and early 1927 Borodin’s activities became more and more irritating to the
Japanese government, threatening its position in Manchuria.76
In asking for Borodin’s removal from China in exchange for the non-
ratification, Debuchi seems to have overestimated his advantage, or he may have
been ready to use the Borodin question in order to reinforce his position regarding
the fishery negotiations (which in the end seems to have succeeded). More or less
coincidentally, at the end of July 1927 Borodin and his staff did leave China;77 still,
their withdrawal seems to have been related more to the failure to organize a Chi-
nese revolution and create a unified China, and to Soviet internal politics, than to the
Japanese request.78 The fact that during the subsequent Soviet-Japanese negotiations
Borodin’s name was not mentioned, except for the Solf-Debuchi meeting of March
10, seems to indicate that the Japanese dropped this demand and that Borodin’s re-
turn to Moscow in July 1927 was unrelated to the Bessarabian Treaty. However, the
fact remains that Japan attempted to use the ratification question in order to obtain
a change in the Soviet policy toward China.
Toward the end of the March 10 meeting, Bessedovskii told Debuchi that he
already had sent a telegram to his Government about the fishery problem but they
could not come to a resolution as yet, and that he also had asked his Government to
stop supporting Borodin too.
Soon after Bessedovskii’s visit, Debuchi had another guest who manifested in-
terest in the Bessarabian question. The German Ambassador, Walter Solf (former
Foreign Secretary during October-November 1918), came to see Debuchi and they
talked about the Bessarabian question and the Chinese problem (regarding
Borodin). According to Debuchi:
I told Solf that the Japanese Government has not decided yet regarding the
ratification, but the activities of Borodin’s group and the slow pace of the fishery negotia-
tions are offending the Japanese feelings towards Russia. The German Ambas-
< 293 >

sador answered that he understands perfectly well that Japan is in a difficult

situation between England and Russia, and that Germany too has to face a
similar dilemma of choosing between Russia and England.79
The document barely needs any comments. It is clear that Debuchi proposed,
in an indirect manner of course, to solve some of the problems existing between the
two states by compromise: Japan would not ratify (or would actually postpone the
ratification) if the Soviets increased the speed of the fishery negotiations (by aban-
doning some points that the Japanese were unwilling to concede), especially regard-
ing the opening of the fishing season for herring and crab, and stop helping Borodin’s
group. He did not suggest the exchange explicitly because of possible later implica-
tions, but his apropos were quite clear.
In a telegram sent from Moscow on March 22, Ambassador Tanaka describes
his last meeting with Karakhan. When Karakhan brought up the ratification ques-
tion, asking the position of the Japanese government, Tanaka told him (insisting that
this was only his personal opinion) that the fishery talks and the ratification ques-
tion should not be connected. When Karakhan answered that for him the two prob-
lems were clearly connected, Tanaka said that he did not care whether Karakhan
connected them or not, but that his personal opinion remained unchanged.80
In the meanwhile the difficult fishery negotiations in Moscow started to bear
fruit. On March 17, Stomoniakov, the chief Soviet negotiator, cabled to Bessedovskii
that agreement had been reached on a series of problems, but there still were some
important matters in disagreement.81
On March 18 Debuchi and Bessedovskii had a new meeting, the main theme
being the stagnation in the fishery negotiations. Bessedovskii informed Debuchi of
the latest developments. After their previous meeting, he had sent a Telegram to his
Government and now he was in possession of Karakhan’s answer. Karakhan trans-
mitted to Debuchi:
It is difficult for the Japanese Government to state that it will not ratify the
Bessarabian Treaty. The Russian Government understands very well this diffi-
culty, but in order to show the friendly feelings that Japan has toward Russia,
for the time being he would like the Japanese Government to make a statement that it
regards the Bessarabian question as purely a European problem that is not connected with
Japan’s interests. The Soviet peoples would welcome such a statement.82
Now the Soviets were not asking the Japanese government for a declaration of
non-ratification but simply for a statement that it regarded the Bessarabian question
as purely a European problem, not connected with Japan’s interests. The result
would have been the same, except that the Japanese position was to be presented in
a more “diplomatic” manner. Debuchi’s response was that the Japanese Government
could not state whether it would or would not ratify the Bessarabian Treaty. He ex-
plained that, for well-known reasons, it would be difficult for the Japanese side to
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
state that it had no interests in the Bessarabian question at that time.

The same document also describes a meeting that took place at the German
Embassy between Walter Solf and Bessedovskii, at which the Bessarabian question
was discussed, both agreeing that it was difficult for Japan to make a statement on
the Bessarabian question. The two also discussed the implications of the Italian pol-
icy toward the Near East and the Balkan area.83 It would be interesting to know how
the Japanese were able to obtain reliable information so quickly on what was hap-
pening inside the German Embassy.
On March 23 Debuchi was discussing the Bessarabian problem with Walter
Solf. Debuchi commented that:
. . . theoretically, the Japanese plenipotentiary had signed that Treaty and

all European Associated Powers have already ratified, so that if only Japan fails
to ratify, the Treaty will fail to come into force. And, as [he remembered], there
is no example of a treaty signed by a Japanese plenipotentiary and not ratified later by the
Japanese Government. So, there is no other way for Japan except to ratify the
treaty.
On the other hand, from the practical point of view, how to handle the Bes-
sarabian question is purely a European problem. At the time of signing, the
Russian Government was not included. Now Japan has already recognized
Russia as a friendly nation so, if she ratifies, it will offend the Russian Govern-
ment.
This is not the kind of matter that we should decide quickly. The ratifica-
tion question brings Japan a dilemma [giri in Japanese]. The Japanese Govern-
ment should consider it very seriously and decide the course slowly. [This is al-
ready a concession made to the Russians, as everybody was expecting Japan to
ratify automatically.] Therefore, we cannot answer now whether we will ratify
or not.84
Next, Solf opened the discussion on fishing rights, giving Debuchi the opportu-
nity to express his harsh feelings on the slow pace of the negotiations, caused by the
new rules and institutions established in the Soviet Russia. Both agreed that Russia
should make some more concessions to Japan regarding fishery rights and thus im-
prove the friendly relations between the two countries. After describing the meeting,
Debuchi made some statements in the same document:
According to the talks it seems that Ambassador Solf has been paying seri-
ous attention to the Bessarabian and fishing questions for some time. He is one
of those who insist that the four countries (Japan, China, Russia, Germany) should be con-
nected by friendship. He asked about the problem of the East Manchurian Rail-
way, over which there is a conflict between Japan and Russia. This time he
heard that the two countries have different opinions about the fishery question
and he hopes that smooth results will be reached. It is recognized that he advised
< 295 >

Bessedovskii to solve the problem smoothly.

Incidentally, yesterday [23], Ambassador Nagaoka [in Berlin] sent me a
personal telegram. According to the talks he had with officials in the German
Foreign Ministry, it seems that Solf had sent a telegram with the following in-
formation: “Debuchi told me that Japan will bargain the problem of the Bessarabian treaty
for the fishery agreement. I secretly told the Russian Minister in Tokyo about this”.
I have never said such words to Solf as described by him in the telegram and there is
no way for me to say those words. Until now I have spoken to Ambassador Solf
in a fragmentary way about the fishery problem and the Bessarabian problem.
All the time I have shown him a “non-committal” attitude about the Bessara-
bian and the fishery problems. I have always insisted that Russia should accept
Japan’s principal requests. He summed up these talks and sent the telegram to
his country.
This matter alone is enough to show how much attention the German Ambassador pays
to Russian-Japanese relations.85
The German interest in Japanese-Russian relations is, of course, an important

point; the Germans were interested not only in the said relations but in the Bessara-
bian question too. They had been following the events related to the Bessarabian
problem quite closely everywhere that they had representatives.86 Their interest in
the Bessarabian question is not surprising, in the light of their general policy to-
wards the Balkans. Following the line opened by Bismarck at the Berlin Peace of
1878, the Germans were interested in preserving Bessarabia as a disputed territory
between Russia and Romania. And, in 1927, it was the Soviets who were Germany’s
allies and not the Romanians. Therefore, Solf’s action regarding the ratification
should not come as a surprise. Of course, his main objective was, at least nominally,
or in Debuchi’s opinion, to improve the Russian-Japanese relations, but the German
policy regarding Bessarabia offered another reason for him to serve as intermediary
between the Soviet Union and Japan. Another point of interest that comes from the
above-mentioned documents is the influence Solf seems to have had on Besse-
dovskii.87
As a sign of goodwill, the Soviets announced on March 22 that the auction of
fishery lots for the catching of herrings and crabs would be fixed as soon as possible,
expressing confidence that the fishery convention too would be signed very soon.88
The date of the auction had not been established until that moment in order to pres-
sure the Japanese negotiators to be more conciliatory, as the fishing season was fast
approaching and no fishing would be possible without an agreement. This time, the
Soviets made a real concession to the Japanese.
On March 25 Bessedovskii visited Debuchi once again. Carrying a new tele-
gram from Karakhan, he informed Debuchi that Karakhan, in spite of fierce opposi-
tion from the Ministry of Economy and Agriculture, had decided to accept the re-
quest of the Japanese government and, under the same conditions as the previous
year, would allow Japan to fish in the same fishery lots. Debuchi expressed his satis-
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
faction with Karakhan’s decision and then continued the talks with Bessedovskii on
fishery matters that had not yet been solved.
At last, Bessedovskii opened again the Bessarabian question, indicating that
British-Soviet relations were delicate at the moment and that a Japanese move to-
ward ratification would not be welcomed in Russia. He mentioned the Soviet-British
relations in connection with the effect that the Italian ratification had had on these
relations. Karakhan’s opinion, as expressed by Bessedovskii, was that:
Now the Japanese opinion is moving toward opposition to the ratification of

the Bessarabian Treaty and [he is] very pleased. For Japan it is difficult to
promise not to ratify and the Russian Government understands this very
well . . . So, instead of promising that they will not ratify [he asked] if there is any possibility
that, under certain conditions, the Japanese Government might promise the postponement of
the ratification.89
Bessedovskii suggested that the postponement could be limited to a certain

period, for example until the establishment of Romanian-Russian diplomatic rela-
tions.
This shows a change in the Soviet position. The Soviets understood that a
postponement that might last forever was better than nothing. As their main inter-
est was to avoid the ratification at any cost, they realized that their objective could
be achieved even without forcing the Japanese Government into the difficult posi-
tion that could result from a public declaration of non-ratification.
Debuchi: the Japanese Government is now considering the ratification

question and they cannot commit anything as yet. But my opinion is that as
long as you [Bessedovskii] are working in Japan, the Japanese Government
should not ratify and postpone the ratification, under the condition that you
will remain in Japan. [Bessedovskii thanked him for the compliment and
smiled.] Now we can stop joking. Tell me what are the prospects for Russo-
Romanian relations in the near future.
Bessedovskii: Actually, soon after the beginning of the European War, Im-
perial Russia took the Romanian National Treasury, equivalent of about 400
millions JY, which had been sent to Russia and taken [spent] by the Soviet
Government. The Romanians require the return of the Treasury. But it is im-
possible for Russia to repay such an amount of money today,90 and there is an
opinion within the Russian Government that they should offset the Bessara-
bian problem with the Romanian National Treasury. Probably, after two or
three years, I think that the situation will be solved in this manner. It is really
painful for Russia not to have diplomatic relations with such a country as Ro-
mania. Anyway, in the near future, we would begin talks with the Romanian
Government.”91
< 297 >

On May 24, 1927, Debuchi met Valerii Dovgalevskii, the newly appointed So-
viet Ambassador to Japan, who said that he hoped Japan will not offend the Russian
feelings in vain by ratifying, repeating that Japan had no interests in Bessarabia. On
June 16 Prime Minister Tanaka told Dovgalevskii, “as regards the ratification of the
Bessarabian Treaty, Japan should be faithful to France, Great Britain, Italy and Ro-
mania, so at the moment I could not promise anything to the Russian side and I
would like Russia to understand my position”.92 And the Russians understood, so
that only a few days later, on June 30, the Soviets made further concessions to the
Japanese on the fishery negotiations.93 Finally, the Fishery Convention was signed in
Moscow on January 23, 1928. Before signing the Convention Cicerin declared that:
It was the same thing all the time. We made concessions and the ambassador
thereafter came and said that we must take another little step. Finally after so
many efforts the treaty was concluded. It contains a mass of concessions on our
part. The population of the Russian Far East is outraged by our concessions.94
Were the Japanese diplomats hoping to extract more from the Soviets by play-
ing the Bessarabian card for as long as possible, or this was just Soviet propaganda?
What the documents prove is that the Bessarabian Treaty played a part in the fish-
ery negotiations and that the Japanese side gained certain advantages in exchange
for postponing the ratification. Still, it did not lead to the immediate signing of the
fishing Convention, seemingly because the Japanese increased their demands once
more after June 1927, but it certainly speeded the reaching of an agreement. Debuchi
and German Ambassador Solf also tried, although it seems without much success, to
connect the ratification with the conflict in China between the Japanese and the
Soviets over the activities of the Borodin group.
These documents, as well as the fact that the Japanese Government postponed
the ratification until it was too late for Romania, clearly show that there was an un-
derstanding between the two sides. It was definitely not put explicitly in writing,
but a verbal understanding was reached, Debuchi promising to postpone the ratifi-
cation. It would be difficult to pinpoint who initiated this solution. On the one hand,
as the March 10 document shows, Debuchi was the first who tried to link the Bes-
sarabian and fishery questions; on the other he insistently denies taking any initia-
tive in this sense. It could have been the Soviets who first tied the two issues to-
gether, as suggested by Debuchi’s denial and by Ambassador Tanaka’s letter. At the
same time, it might have come up through German efforts to mediate between Japan
and the Soviets, with the purpose of keeping Romania in a bind regarding Bessarabia
or with a more general plan for a German-Japanese-Soviet coalition. Either way, the
agreement to postpone the ratification in exchange for concessions regarding Japa-
nese fishery rights remains, and this author therefore has decided to refer to it as the
Debuchi-Bessedovskii verbal agreement.
A number of years later, Bessedovskii “defected” from the Soviet camp and
wrote a number of articles and a book on his experience as a Soviet diplomat. Unfor-
tunately, many of his comments are colored by personal feeling and bias and it is dif-
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
ficult to distinguish the truth. For example, when he states that after a few months
in Japan he was able to read the news in Japanese, he does more than stretch our
credulity. He mentions the Bessarabian Treaty ratification question but fails to make
any mention of his March 1927 negotiations with Debuchi. Even more, the only time
he mentions the Bessarabian Treaty, he mistakenly states that the Treaty would
come into force when three of its signatories ratified it (page 127 in his book). On the
other hand, he insists on his friendship with Debuchi, describing him very vividly as
“one of Japan’s most brilliant diplomats . . . he had immense vitality and vast experi-
ence . . . his logic was marvelous” (page 136-137). He also mentions a verbal agree-
ment between him and Debuchi, an agreement that in his view was equivalent to a
signed treaty, regarding a non-aggression pact between Japan and the Soviets (page
157-160) but makes no mention at all of the similar verbal agreement regarding the
ratification.
It is difficult to explain exactly why Bessedovskii makes no mention of the 1927
negotiations regarding the ratification. One reason might be that, due to his friend-
ship for Debuchi, at that time (1931) Japan’s Ambassador in the US, he intended to
avoid placing his friend in a difficult position (although the Japanese could have de-
nied any implications). On the other hand, his statement that the Treaty would
come into force if only three states ratified is even more puzzling, as he must have
known what the real situation was. One further reason could be that, although he
defected, he was still trying to protect the interests of the Soviet Union (in his book
he directs his attacks at different persons inside the Soviet nomenclature and not at
the Soviet system as a whole) and he understood that it would not serve Soviet in-
terests to have the ratification question coming again into the spotlight.
A few months after the March 1927 negotiations, the Japanese presented their
new position on the ratification question to France, one of the European Powers di-
rectly interested in the Bessarabian Treaty:
Japan’s Ambassador (Viscount Goto) told me that the Soviet government tried
to obtain assurances that the Japanese government would not ratify the Bes-
sarabian Treaty, but the Japanese government was unwilling to give this prom-
ise, neither was it intending to encourage the Romanians’ hopes for ratifica-
tion. In Japan’s eyes, the Bessarabian question should be regulated one day by a direct agree-
ment between Romania and the Soviets. Viscount Goto’s visit to Moscow has nothing
to do with the ratification, his purpose here being related to the Fishery Con-
vention and Soviet policy in China.95
Although Viscount Goto denied any connection between the ratification and
the Fishery Convention, he clearly confirms the Japanese obligation taken as a result
of the Bessedovskii-Debuchi agreement: that they would postpone the ratification at
least until the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Romania and the
Soviet Union (by that time the necessary and preliminary condition before reaching
any bilateral agreement on Bessarabia).
< 299 >

The Romanian Campaign for Ratification

during the Ministry of Ion Aurel Vassiliu
In the meanwhile, the Romanian Foreign Ministry had finally recognized that
the Japanese ratification would not come automatically or for free. The first step
they took was to reopen the Romanian Legation in Tokyo, informing the Japanese
government of their decision on March 9, 1927 and asking their agreement for the
nomination of Ion Aurel Vassiliu as Romanian Minister to Japan.96 In fact, as the
new Romanian Foreign Minister, Nicolae Titulescu, stressed, one of the three main
directions for the Romanian foreign policy was:
To have even more cordial relations with the countries that helped us in
achieving our national unity. Our gratitude towards the US will always form
the basis of our policy towards the Great American Republic. The reopening of
our Tokyo Legation shows our wish to cultivate Japan’s friendship.97
Having little enough to use as leverage, the Romanians’ main tool for encourag-
ing the ratification was Japan’s moral obligation to ratify the Treaty. At every oppor-
tunity, the Romanian diplomats asked the Japanese what their Government was
doing about the ratification. Of course, to appeal to a nation’s honor, with nothing
concrete or material to support one’s claims, can backfire if used too much. And al-
though there had been some speculation at the time, the Romanian side seems to
have been totally unaware that the ratification was indeed being linked to the Japa-
nese-Soviet Fishery Talks.98
A starting point for the Romanian campaign was a declaration made by the
Japanese Minister in Geneva, M. Sato, who declared: “This is the first time that Ja-
pan does not immediately honor an international engagement . . . It depends on the
activity and ability of the Romanian representative in Tokyo and on the understand-
ing that the Japanese representative in Bucharest has about the solidarity of interests
between our countries.”99 Unfortunately, Romania clearly failed in both places.
Before going to Tokyo, the newly appointed Romanian Minister to Tokyo, Ion
Aurel Vassiliu (unfortunately, not one of Romania’s best prepared diplomats)100 had
a discussion with the Japanese Ambassador in Paris, Viscount Kikujiro Ishii. Ishii
was considered to be supportive of the Bessarabian cause because of his role in the
matter and, for this reason, Vassiliu decided to talk to him before going to Tokyo. He
argued that:
1. Romania does not give the Paris Treaty a determinate character because
that Treaty did not give Bessarabia to Romania. It is the decision of union
taken by the Sfatul Tserii in March 1918 and the incontestable historical rights
that are the bases of the Romanian rights.
2. Romania waited confidently for the Japanese ratification and still has no
idea what are the reasons for the non-ratification. The public opinion too is
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
very concerned because of this inexplicable delay, the Bessarabian Treaty being
the only international act signed by Japan and not ratified yet.
Twice Viscount Ishii signed the Bessarabian Treaty, the first time in 1920
on the original act, and second time on the Note sent in 1924 to the Romanian
Foreign Ministry. Unfortunately the ratification of the Treaty remains on the
international political market as a political bill made by Japan but with the
signature still not honored.
The answer given by Viscount Ishii justified the Japanese postponement of

ratification based on the following reasons:
1. The difficult financial situation of Japan and the poverty of the northern
Japan population that lives only from fishing and for the preservation of
whom it was more than necessary to sign the fishery convention with the
Soviet Union. [He was honest in mentioning the connection between the
Bessarabian question and the fishery talks, but Vassiliu was unable to
make the necessary connection.]
2. Therefore, because of Japan’s special situation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union,
Japan cannot take any steps against the former.
3. For the same reason, it would be difficult to make the ratification question
a popular one with Japanese public opinion.
At the same time, Vassiliu answered Ishii’s inquiries about the economic re-
sults of the Russian manifestations at the preceding ratifications: “Threats followed
by no actions, because Russia needs money and because all the Soviet missions are
their principal centers of Bolsheviks propaganda.”101
Vassiliu ended his report with an interesting conclusion: “On the other hand, it
is believed that the fishery convention would be signed in September. I doubt that
the preparation of this convention is the only obstacle to the ratification.” He seems
to have been gravely mistaken.
From March 1927 the official Japanese position, at least towards the Romani-
ans, would be that they would like to ratify the Treaty, the first international en-
gagement that Japan had assumed and failed to honor, but that there were many un-
solved problems with the Soviet Union and a deterioration in relations must be
avoided.
Soon after his arrival in Tokyo, the new Romanian Minister started his cam-
paign for ratification. Unfortunately the events were such that he had to start his
campaign on the wrong footing. One day before his arrival in Tokyo, on July 21, 1927,
King Ferdinand of Romania died. According to diplomatic custom, before being offi-
cially recognized as Romania’s representative, he had to present his Letters of Ac-
creditation, which had to be in original and signed by the King. The Japanese offi-
cials took the position that Vassiliu’s Letters were not valid anymore and they re-
quired that he obtain new ones signed by the Romanian Regency. Both Vassiliu and
< 301 >

the Japanese representative in Bucharest, Kintomo Mushanokoji, argued with

Gaimusho’s officials that the Letters might be easily reconfirmed by telegraph, but to
no avail.102 Gaimusho claimed that this was a new situation for them, and that there
was no precedent for admitting a confirmation by telegraph regarding a letter sent
by one Sovereign to another Sovereign.103 Vassiliu was forced to ask his superiors to
send him new Letters of Accreditation.
In the meantime, Vassiliu continued to press the Gaimusho to accept the Let-
ters he had, but they were unyielding.104 The RFM transmitted his new Letters by
the longest instead of the shortest route, so that Vassiliu received them only on Oc-
tober 25, 1927.105 His disappointment is clear in his telegrams: “People have started
asking me questions with an irony that I suppose you understand. The situation be-
gins to take on an aspect of ridicule, which unfortunately is spreading not only over
my person.”106 Finally, on November 9, 1927, Vassiliu was received by the Emperor
and tendered the Letters of Accreditation so that he could enter into his full attribu-
tions as Plenipotentiary Minister and Special Envoy to Japan.107 In the end, the entire
affair with the Letters of Accreditation cost Vassiliu three valuable months of action
for the ratification but also introduced him to Gaimusho officials as a not very
“sociable” person, even though it was not his fault, and surely delighted Soviet repre-
sentatives in Tokyo, who were well aware of Vassiliu’s mission.
More or less coincidentally, the only financial matter poisoning the Romanian-
Japanese relations came to light for the second time during 1926-1927. On March 2,
1918, a certain G. Kawaguchi, a Japanese citizen living in Vladivostock, had made a
contract to supply the Romanian Ministry of War with 959 pounds of biscuits. Ka-
waguchi delivered the biscuits and the Romanians made the payment to the Petro-
grad branch of the Russo-Asiatic Bank of Vladivostock. But due to the war, the
Petrograd branch seemed unable to transfer the money to Vladivostock and the Bank
refused to make any payment to Kawaguchi. Kawaguchi complained to the Japanese
authorities, asking them to intervene in his interest by pressing the Romanian gov-
ernment to make a new payment, this time directly to him. Soon after the Japanese
Legation opened in Bucharest, the Japanese representatives started making the nec-
essary interventions, but with no success. Although the amount concerned was re-
duced, the question dragged on until 1933.
On September 22, 1927, the Japanese representative in Bucharest, Kintomo
Mushanokoji, reopened the question by sending a detailed report to the RFM, ask-
ing for payment.108 I.G. Duca conducted the necessary inquiries and answered the
Japanese request through a verbal note, stating that as far as the Romanian Ministry
of War was concerned, the payment for Kawaguchi had been made. But, proving
itself reasonable, the Romanian side declared that, in case the situation were such as
described by Kawaguchi, he should return the check he had received as payment and
the Romanian Ministry of War would analyze the situation anew.109 However, this
was not directly connected to the ratification question, and the Japanese did not
mention the Kawaguchi matter at any point during the Romanian-Japanese negotia-
tions for ratification, so that chances are that the reopening of the Kawaguchi affair
in 1927 was only a coincidence.
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
The first place Vassiliu went in order to launch his campaign for the ratifica-
tion was the Imperial Palace, where he met with Prince Higashi Kuni, the Emperor’s
father-in-law,110 who had three years earlier visited Romania. But Vassiliu had no
idea that the Prince held no political power, and came back empty handed.
December 1927 was the peak of the Romanian campaign for the ratification.
Vassiliu had a number of meetings with high officials from the Gaimusho, as well as
with Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi. The Japanese tried to build a credible case
against ratification, offering various superficial arguments to justify their attitude.
The first meeting on the ratification question took place between Vassiliu and
the Japanese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Debuchi, at Vassiliu’s request, on De-
cember 13, 1927. As presented by Vassiliu:
Vassiliu: When is Japan going to ratify?

Debuchi: Well, not at the present moment, because now we have too many
problems under discussion with Russia. . . . The treaty was signed when Japan
was not on friendly terms with Russia and, actually, had no relations at all
with Russia.
Vassiliu: Then, why did you fail to ratify it immediately?
Debuchi: Italy only ratified after seven years.
Vassiliu: Between Italy and Romania there had been some big economic
misunderstandings, while the Japanese situation is not similar at all. . . .
Vassiliu [concluding, the report, noted that] He knew nothing about the
Bessarabian question, he used the words occupation and annexation instead of
Union, above all he did not know about the existence of the Romanian-
Russian Commission on the Dniestr for dealing with border incidents.111
It should not be understood from Vassiliu’s comments that the Japanese repre-
sentative knew nothing about the Bessarabian problem: this was the same Debuchi
who had negotiated with Bessedovskii and he surely had read at least one of the
many reports prepared by Gaimusho officials. Rather, his opinions were based
mainly on the Soviet thesis. In other words, either the Soviets were way ahead in
their propaganda in Japan or Debuchi was using the Soviet thesis in order to defend
Japan’s failure to ratify. It is also clear that Vassiliu’s attitude during the meeting
betrayed his poor knowledge of Japan: “I engaged the fight . . . I stopped and cor-
rected him . . . I corrected him again”. This is exactly the wrong approach to take in
Japanese politics, which is known for its tatemae or “under the table” way of dealing
with problems, particularly when there is no mass media involved.
Two days later, Vassiliu met the Prime Minister, Tanaka Giichi, and heard an-
other denial regarding the existence of a Soviet-Japanese agreement dealing with the
Bessarabian Treaty, this time from Tanaka. He asked Vassiliu to hold more talks
with Gaimusho officials but to keep them secret, telling him that Japan could not
ratify at the present moment due to its negotiations with the Soviets. Tanaka also
< 303 >

said that he could not control the Parliament because his Government did not hold
the majority of seats, so that even if he would propose the ratification, it would be
very difficult to convince the opposition to vote in favor of it.112
Vassiliu’s talks with representatives of the Gaimusho continued, the Japanese
presenting their main arguments for delaying the ratification as follows:
1. The special relations then existing with the Soviet Union because of the
Fishery talks, Siberian concessions, and the Manchurian railways.
2. The different situation since 1920. Still, Japan had made no promise of non-
ratification to Russia, only stating that she would ratify when she liked.
3. The fear of Russian economic reprisals.
4. Japanese public opinion. Having long been prepared for a close friendship
with the Soviets, they would not accept very easily an action directed
against the Soviets, particularly one that it would fail to understand (as
Japan had nothing to do with Bessarabia).
5. Italy had ratified quite late, after seven years. It would require much time
and patience before the Bessarabian Treaty could be ratified.
6. The Japanese Government’s lack of a majority in Parliament.
Other objections raised by the Japanese were related to the juridical validity of
the ratification. If Russia considered the Bessarabian treaty res inter alia, why was she
so firmly opposed to its ratification? And vice versa: the Treaty not being juridically
accepted by the Soviets (meaning that they would not recognize the Dniestr border),
why did Romania want it to come into force?113
And, trying to find a way to definitively vitiate the Romanian requests, the
Japanese officials were as “ingenious” at one point, according to Vassiliu’s reports, as
to declare that Japan had made a mistake by signing the Treaty. It would have been
much better if Japan had followed the US attitude of leaving the European matters
to the Europeans, because Japan had nothing to win from an involvement in Euro-
pean affairs. The parallel between the actions of Japan and that of the US towards
the Bessarabian Treaty would be made again in the following years. Ironically, as
argued in the next chapter, it was exactly because of Japan that the US not only
failed to sign the Treaty but also to de facto recognize the union between Bessarabia
and Romania. And, if the Japanese diplomats truly appreciated the US position, then
what happened in 1938 when the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union, in a
time of tense relations with the Soviets (and experiencing difficulties with the fish-
ery concessions) suddenly proposed to the Romanians to ratify? The comparison
with the US attitude was only dust in Romanian’s eyes.
During the December 20, 1927, meeting, Debuchi added one more argument to
his thesis: he told Vassiliu that until now Japan had only heard Russia’s voice and
nothing from Romania.114 This was not far from the truth and highlighted Romania’s
diplomatic default in failing to take concerted action to seek the Japanese ratifica-
tion, and to do so especially in Tokyo.
On January 1, 1928, Vassiliu sent a new telegram home, this time asking for a
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
number of papers and documents related to Soviet-Romanian relations, which might

help him raise doubts among the Japanese as to how much importance the Soviets
ascribed to the ratification. The comments written on the telegram by a staff mem-
ber in the RFM (N. Stoica) are significant: “Then, did Mr. Vassiliu go to Tokyo with
only a tourist manual in his luggage?”115 However, in response to Vassiliu’s request,
the RFM sent him a number of books and brochures on Bessarabia and Soviet-
Romanian relations in February.
The Romanian campaign was not limited to Tokyo, the Romanians also trying
to pressure the Japanese Minister to Bucharest, Kintomo Mushanokoji, into influ-
encing his government in favor of the ratification. However, the effort fared no better
than in Tokyo, as proven by the January 18, 1928, meeting between Mushanokoji and
I.G. Duca, at that time Home Affairs Minister.116 Duca expressed his regret that Japan
had prolonged the ratification for so long after that of Italy’s and he asked when Ja-
pan would fulfill her international duty. Unfortunately, as the Japanese document
states, Duca asked this question “with ironic sarcasm”. The answer Duca received
from Mushanokoji is thus predictably frosty:
Japanese foreign policy does not consist of Japanese-Romanian relations alone;

bear in mind that Japan has relations with the Soviet Union and all other im-
portant states and also has domestic affairs. If you do so, you will understand
that this problem is not so easy for us as you see it. And you have already
worked a long period of time for the Romanian Foreign Ministry, so you
should have the necessary experience to understand that it is not easy at all to
solve one foreign issue because of the influence it has over both domestic affairs
and relations with third countries.117
Which provoked Mushanokoji more: Duca’s irony, the Romanians’ persistence

on the matter, or the fact that Duca was in the right? Surprisingly, although the way
in which Mushanokoji (a middle-ranking official in Gaimusho) addressed Duca, a
Foreign Minister and one of the most important Romanian political figures, might be
considered from the standpoint of diplomatic conduct (as well as Japanese customs)
as quite impolite, his superiors did not disavow his action. What remains from this
incident, about which Duca took great care to avoid any mention, is the fact that the
RFM proved unable to convince the Japanese representatives in Romania of how
necessary the ratification was for Romania; even more, it seems that they could not
even induce those representatives to take a friendly attitude towards Romania. Un-
der such conditions, the failure of the Romanian campaign in Tokyo does not come
as a surprise at all.
After the December 1927 meetings, Vassiliu understood that there was no
chance of obtaining the Japanese ratification anytime soon, and that he had to set to
work at the propaganda level. He thought one good approach would be to diminish
Japan’s assessment of the value the Soviets would give to the ratification, and con-
vince the Japanese that the Russians would not be overly offended if Japan ratified.
< 305 >

Of course, he had no idea how important the friendship of the Soviets was for the
Japanese. He decided to start with what he could achieve easily, to make known in
Japan that Bessarabia’s Union with Romania was justified by both history and de-
mography.
In March 1928, at Duca’s request,118 Vassiliu analyzed how the results of the
recent elections in Japan would influence the attitude of the Japanese Government
towards ratification. Vassiliu considered that:
Regarding the Bessarabian question, the political situation after the elec-
tions has, for the moment, no immediate positive or negative influence. And this
is especially so because it is not the Parliament that would be called to ratify
but the Privy Council. I have targeted my activity especially towards the most
influential personality in the Privy Council [perhaps Prince Saionji] . . . Because
of the difficult situation that I found here, I had to choose the path of close per-
sonal relations and to avoid firm action in order not to receive an open re-
fusal. . . .
I have acting against me not only a pro-Russian policy, based on economic
reasons, but the Soviet Embassy too, with an official staff of 14 persons that or-
ganizes anti-Romanian propaganda.119
From the telegram we can see that by March 1928 Vassiliu understood that he
had no chance of obtaining the ratification and was already trying to justify his fu-
ture inactivity on the ratification front: because of the risk of an open refusal, and
more efficient Soviet propaganda.
In the same telegram he asks once again to have the public relations material
sent to him. “I have with me no publication on Bessarabia;” to which his colleagues
at the RFM have replied, in the margins, “Way to go, rookie” [Bravos, bobocule in Ro-
manian] and from Duca himself, “I am surprised that, knowing that the Bessarabian
question is the main aim of your mission in Japan, you left without the necessary
instruments in order to defend this great national interest”.120
On March 16, 1928 Vassiliu met again with Debuchi. His conclusion was:
“Because of the unclear political situation resulting after the elections, the Bessara-
bian question requires a new postponement and further patience.”121 Here, he is con-
tradicting himself. In the preceding report he states that it was not the Parliament
that would decide whether to ratify but the Privy Council, which is not elected.
Which is right?
At the end of May 1928, Vassiliu gave a comprehensive report on his activity in
Japan. He presented again his tactic and the main arguments used during the bilat-
eral negotiations, coming again to his March conclusion that the Japanese ratifica-
tion risked being blocked by a non-possumus. He also observes,
[That:]
1. The Government is taking the Bessarabian question into serious consid-
eration.
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
2. No commitment had been made by Japan toward the Soviets to not rat-
ify. The ratification will be done, but it is not known when because of
Japan’s special interests in China, Siberia, and Manchuria and because of
governmental instability. The same reasons made Japan avoid taking
harsh actions against the communist threat inside Japan. . . .
All my attention is now focused toward the least problem that could come
up in Russo-Japanese relations and, on the other hand, toward the difficulties
that Japan could face in China and Manchuria, regarding which Romania, as a
member of the League of Nations’ Council, might someday have an important
word to say.122
After almost one year in Japan, he finally came up with something that could,
given certain conditions, help the Romanian cause, although it would mean passing
the ball to other Romanian representatives overseas. In hindsight we can say that his
anticipations proved correct in this respect and that Romania could have played an
important role during the League of Nations debates over the 1931-1932 Sino-
Japanese conflicts. However, when this happened Titulescu failed to use the occa-
sion in order to press for Japanese ratification. Unfortunately, this was the only
really promising idea, and not necessarily an original one, that Vassiliu offered on
how to change the Japanese position.
The only answer he received from Bucharest indicates the kind of support he
received from the RFM during his campaign: “We will immediately send the new
documents asked for. I regret the length of this expensive telegram. When Mr. Tit-
ulescu comes back you will receive the necessary instructions.”123
On a different plane, one suggestion made by the Romanian representative in
Poland, G. Davidescu, in April 1929, seems interesting: “Because of the current ten-
sion between Japan and Russia provoked by the problem of fishing in Soviet waters,
a new test in Tokyo regarding the question interesting us [Bessarabia] could have a
positive result.”124 The question is: did he know something about the “ratification vs.
fishing rights” deal, or was it just a coincidence? In March 1929 the Japanese fishing
companies were boycotting the auctions for fishery lots, and the misunderstandings
between the two parties came to dangerous levels. It seems probable that Davidescu
had knowledge about these complications, and not about the role played by the rati-
fication question during the fishery talks. But either way, the RFM failed to follow
his suggestion.
Before going back home, Vassiliu had a meeting with the Chief of the Ameri-
can-European Division in the Gaimusho. Vassiliu asked what the Japanese attitude
was toward the ratification and he was answered that Japan would not ratify very
soon (this declaration of postponement takes us to the March 25, 1927, meeting be-
tween Debuchi and Bessedovskii). Vassiliu asked if there were any possibility, given
that he would soon be going back home, to see the Prime Minister; he received an
affirmative answer. On May 31, 1929, Vassiliu met Tanaka Giichi and asked again
about ratification. The meeting is described in the Japanese documents as follows:
< 307 >

Tanaka: We have not decided not to ratify but it is difficult to ratify right
now for a number of reasons. This is not because of the request coming from
another country, if we say it straightly, the Soviet Union.
Vassiliu: I understand that you could not ratify right now, but we imagine
that you will ratify in the future. Can we hope for ratification?
Tanaka: When the time comes, we will have to solve this problem, but we
cannot make it clear when this time will be.
Vassiliu: I understand the difficulties faced by the Japanese Government,
but Romania would not understand this situation, so I will work with all my
power to make them understand. [And he asked for some words from Tanaka
in order to relieve the Romanian government.]
Tanaka: They should not be worried, because we will not be against Roma-
nia.125
Vassiliu too reported the meeting with Tanaka to his superiors in Bucharest.
His conclusion at the end of his mission is significant for all his activity after March
1928: “The situation here is such that an intervention by our adversaries could pro-
voke a decision in a definitive sense, detrimental to our interests, which until now I
have been able to avoid.”126 In other words, he failed to understand the Japanese way
of playing in the international arena. The Soviets had no interest in insisting on an
official declaration from the Japanese Government, and the Japanese had no interest
to make one (and not out of concern for Romania’s reaction but out of concern for
the reaction that it could provoke in the other signatory countries). The Gaimusho
would never have declared outright that it would not ratify the treaty at all. The rea-
sons are simple: they could still use the Treaty in their negotiations with the Soviets;
they were still somewhat reticent to risk offending the other signatory Powers; and
it could tarnish Japan’s international image by publicly showing that Japan had
failed to honor her international obligations.
Because of Japanese tradition (to say “no” continues to be considered very im-
polite in Japan) and interests too, even if Vassiliu had continued pressing for ratifica-
tion, the Japanese answer would not have been a non-possumus, as Vassiliu was afraid.
Instead of keeping up the pressure on the Japanese Government to ratify, he acted
unnecessarily to avoid an imaginary definitive decision of non-ratification from the
Japanese. He hoped that it would be possible in the future, if the Soviet-Japanese
relations took a turn for the worse, to obtain the Japanese ratification. He was right
in this prediction; only in 1938 it was Romania who could not afford to have the Bes-
sarabian question reopened.
The main problem Vassiliu and his successor had to face was that Romania
represented almost no interest to Japan because it could offer almost nothing in ex-
change for the ratification. In fairness to Vassiliu, we should add that he had, apart
for a few books and brochures, no help from the RFM. And, even more important, by
the time Vassiliu reached Tokyo, the Japanese government had already decided, due
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
to the material advantages, to postpone ratification at least until the establishment

of diplomatic relations between Romania and the Soviets.
The Romanian Campaign for Ratification during the Ministry of G.G. Stoicescu
G.G. Stoicescu replaced Ion Aurel Vassiliu as Romanian representative to Ja-

pan in June 1929. Although he met the Japanese Foreign Minister, Baron Kijuro Shi-
dehara, at the beginning of his ministry (July 19), he avoided (or failed) raising the
ratification question.127 He made a first report on the Bessarabian Treaty ratification
as late as December 4, 1929, after a meeting with Kenkichi Yoshizawa, the former
Japanese Ambassador to China. This report brings nothing about Vassiliu’s activity,
but the comments made by the person who read it in Bucharest (perhaps the Foreign
Minister or a high ranked official) are interesting:
“Japan could not ratify at this time because of her relations with Russia” — com-
ments: “same tune!!! This has been going on for years”
“From what Mr. Yoshizawa said, I did not have the impression that Japan was
involved in a certain agreement, a written one, regarding the non-
ratification” — comments: “So why is the treaty not ratified?”
“In conclusion, in the current circumstances it is difficult for us to obtain the
ratification and if we push too hard on the Japanese government we risk to
receive a negative answer, a non-possumus, which must be avoided.” — com-
ments: “They all said the same thing.”128
The new Romanian representative was not much above his predecessor, at
least regarding his activity to promote Japan’s ratification. At first he was only ap-
pointed as a Chargé d’affaires, and he was of lower rank than Vassiliu in the RFM.129
His lack of diplomatic knowledge shows in the fact that he simply borrowed Vas-
siliu’s words in the reports sent home. He tried to improve Romanian-Japanese rela-
tions in the economic and cultural areas but he did almost nothing for the most im-
portant point in the bilateral relations, the Bessarabian Treaty ratification.
In the same report, Stoicescu mentions Yoshizawa’s suggestion that he would
view with sympathy the signing of a friendship pact between Romania and Japan.
The RFM thoroughly analyzed the new Japanese proposal, while also reviewing the
status of the ratification question. Pointing once again to the Japanese postpone-
ment, it concluded that the opening of negotiations for a friendship treaty was not
opportune. The signing of a friendship pact between two countries implies that
there are no problems en suspense between the two countries; thus a friendship pact
with Japan could be interpreted as a formal renunciation to the ratification and con-
sequently, to the Bessarabian Treaty entirely. And how would Japan, knowing that
any Friendship Treaty implies the recognition of each one’s borders, recognize the
Romanian border when that was exactly what she was refusing to do by postponing
the ratification? Even if the Japanese had in mind a friendship pact in which there
< 309 >

might be no reference to the borders, that would have been interpreted as a formal
renunciation by Romania to the Bessarabian Treaty.130 The same arguments were
used against Averescu by the opposition parties after the signing of the Friendship
Treaty with Italy in September 1926.
On December 15, 1930, Stoicescu had a meeting with the new Vice-Minister for
Foreign Affairs, Ryutaro Nagai, who expressed once again the impossibility for Ja-
pan to ratify the treaty at that moment. As a result of the meeting, Stoicescu came
up with a new idea: what if Nicolae Titulescu would try to use his personal relations
with M. Adachi, the Japanese representative at the League of Nations131 in order to
influence the Japanese Government?132 Perhaps not the most original thought.
Stoicescu kept a lower profile than Vassiliu had done, while trying to press the
Japanese for ratification. His attitude during the negotiations with Japanese repre-
sentatives was clearly different, and this difference is illustrated in one of his reports:
“He took my hand and told me in English: do not insist; you only embarrass us and
all we can do is to apologize”.133 At least he avoided antagonizing the Gaimusho offi-
cials; but he certainly did nothing to advance the cause of ratification. Still, in fair-
ness to Stoicescu, it must be pointed that it was already too late to obtain the ratifi-
cation and, at the same time, that his activity in improving Romania’s general image
in Japan, centered more on cultural and economic aspects, was more successful than
that of his predecessor.134
The Nakamura Interpellations
What Stoicescu and Vassiliu had to do while they were in Tokyo was to raise
again and again the Bessarabian question. As long as this question was in the public
eyes, there was a chance, although a very small one, for a change in the Japanese atti-
tude. There was no way to say at that time whether Soviet-Japanese relations would
improve or deteriorate in the future and, in this case of the latter, an opportunity for
ratification could appear unexpectedly. It was thus necessary that a certain basis for
Romanian action be prepared. Unfortunately, both Vassiliu and Stoicescu failed to
use public opinion to keep on pressing for ratification. In this sense, the activity of
Kaju Nakamura, a member of the Japanese Lower Chamber, is important for our
topic.
During the October 1925 inter-Parliamentary Conference in Washington the
Romanian delegation initiated contacts with the Japanese delegation. When the
Bessarabian question came into discussion, the Romanians presented their version of
the story to the Japanese and in a friendly way asked them to influence their govern-
ment in favor of the ratification. The Japanese deputies agreed to raise the Bessara-
bian Treaty question in Parliament. In order to pursue the matter, the chief of the
Japanese delegation, Kaju Nakamura, of the Seiyukai party, a former minister, visited
Romania (including Bessarabia) in January 1926, with the purpose of collecting the
necessary information.
In March 1926 Nakamura took the Bessarabian question to the Parliamentary
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
Commission on Foreign Affairs. During his interpellation he presented a short his-

tory of Bessarabia and the importance of the Bessarabian Treaty for Romania, asking
when Japan would ratify the treaty. The answer was that Japan, even while it had at
one point taken an active part in European affairs, in order to contribute to the es-
tablishment of world peace, did not intend to continue interfering into European
politics. As long as all the interested European powers had failed to ratify, Japan
would not take any step toward ratification.135
The second interpellation on the ratification question was made in Parliament
on February 3, 1931. This came after the signing of the London Naval Treaty, at a mo-
ment when there was a great dissatisfaction among Japanese politicians, especially
those in the opposition, with the foreign policy promoted by Baron Shidehara, and
particularly with his pro-Soviet policy.
Even though Nakamura considered the Bessarabian question to be in the cate-
gory of relatively unimportant relations with various countries in Europe, he gave a
good presentation:
Nakamura: There is a minor Power in Europe, known as Romania, and after

the war there was a question known as the Bessarabian question . . . Japan has
now become inextricably involved in this question. A long time has now
passed since Italy took action and it seems to me that the Japanese government
must be considerably perplexed as to what it should do. It is only natural that
the Romanian people should be indignant. The fact that Japan has reserved its
action is probably due to considerations rising out of its relations with Russia,
but I think it is very doubtful whether the reservation of action because of Rus-
sia is of equal importance to the loss of Japan’s international good faith.
Ryutaro Nagai: Even if we were to suppose that all the European Powers
acted in concert with regard to the Bessarabian question, it must be remem-
bered that Japan has its own individual position to maintain. This example
may be advanced as proof of the fact that Japan is not following the leadership of the Euro-
pean Powers.
Nakamura: The fact of the matter is that Baron Shidehara said in reply to a
question of mine a few years ago that, if Italy gave her recognition, Japan would
be obliged also to give her recognition. If it is impossible for Japan to give her
recognition, is it not reasonable to assume that there must be some reason? I do
not intend to pursue the matter further, but it seems to me that the position
which we are in is due to pressure brought to bear by Russia.136
What was Nakamura’s purpose in making the second interpellation? If it was

only to criticize Baron Shidehara’s foreign policy, he found a good example. It was
definitely not the first time when an issue of foreign policy was used by the Japanese
opposition as ammunition in order to attack the government. If he did it because he
thought that Japan needed a much stronger policy against the Soviets, which could
be achieved by a show of force, then he found a good example too. By ratifying the
< 311 >

Treaty, Japan would have shown the Soviets that she was not afraid of their reaction
and that she could be tough if necessary. But this was not the Japanese diplomatic
style in dealing with her muscular neighbor. Another possibility is that he made
these interpellations because he was a friend of Romania (or an enemy of the Soviet
Union). This view is supported by the fact that it was not the first time he had raised
the Bessarabian question, and by the tenor of his declarations when he visited Roma-
nia. Whatever Nakamura’s reasons, nothing came out of his intervention.
Stoicescu found out about the interpellation from the US representatives in
Japan, who provided him with the text. For the official version, he had to wait two
weeks until Vice-Minister Nagai gave him the text of Nakamura’s interpellation.
Although he tried to take advantage of the context and raise again the ratification
question, he received the same answer as before: no ratification because of Japan’s
complex relations with the Soviets.137
Unfortunately, there does not seem to have been any coordination between
Nakamura’s interpellation and an action in favor of the ratification coming from the
Romanian representative in Tokyo. As Stoicescu found about the matter only as a
result of US courtesy, it is clear that he had not contacted Kaju Nakamura before the
interpellation and asked him to use his influence in favor of the ratification. As for
later contacts with Nakamura, I found no trace in the Romanian or Japanese ar-
chives regarding any meeting between Romanian diplomats and Kaju Nakamura.
Charles Davila and the Japanese Ratification Question
One of the most interesting reports on the Japanese ratification found in the
Romanian Foreign Ministry’s Archives came from Charles A. Davila, at that time
(July 1931) Romania’s Minister to the USA. His theory not only offers a good argu-
ment for influencing the Japanese decision but goes as far as to connect the Bessara-
bian question with Japan-USA relations. He states in his report:
Studying the US policy in the Far East he [Davila was referring to Frederic
C. Nanu] could closely follow the American consequence in constantly trying
to stop the Japanese from making territorial acquisition from China or espe-
cially from Russia. Between us, this policy is really difficult to understand.
Taking into account the growing overpopulation in Japan, it would be in
America’s interest to channel Japanese overpopulation to the less populated
territories of Siberia instead of risking the yellow torrent going East. However,
America was alarmed when the Japanese took advantage of the unclear situa-
tion in Russia after the Revolution and started, under various pretexts, to en-
ter into Siberia and later to occupy, after the Nicolaievsk massacre, the Mari-
time Provinces and the Northern Sakhalin. It was only logical for the Ameri-
cans to proclaim the principles enunciated in the Colby Note (August 1920)
and later, under the pretext of their friendship toward the Russian people, to
take an anti-Japanese attitude and to refuse to recognize any definitive an-
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
nexation of territory belonging to the former Russian Empire, if Japan would

have gone to that point. Even today America is worried about Japan’s inten-
tions, and this gives us probably the key to the American attitude towards Bes-
sarabia’s Union: it would create a precedent that the Japanese could call in
their favor.
I wonder if we can use this argument towards the Japanese, by convincing
them that they have all the interest to create a precedent that, at some point,
might prove very useful for them.138
The new idea comes from the same person who was able to convince the
Americans to stop the “public discrimination” against Romania and to influence
their position on the Bessarabian question. He understood America’s guiding reasons
for its policy (their fear of Japan and Japan’s possible use of the precedent Bessarabia
creates) and tried to use them in Romania’s favor. He believed that what was work-
ing against Romania in the US might well be working in her favor in Japan.
A few months after the start of the Manchurian War, in February 1932, Davila
made a new report insisting that now would be a good moment to ask for the Japa-
nese ratification.139 Theoretically, he was right, but practically speaking, at that time
Japan had to avoid any action that could upset the Soviets, since her troops were
engaged in Manchuria and Shanghai.
However, Romanian diplomacy followed none of Davila’s suggestions for ob-
taining the ratification. There were no instructions sent to Stoicescu in this sense.
The reason for their inactivity remains a mystery.
In a new report sent in April 1932, a frustrated Davila tried again to press for
action:
A few months ago the Japanese occupied Manchuria and, if they had rati-
fied the Bessarabian Treaty before this action, they could, in the case of China
and the Great Powers not recognizing the independence of Manchuria, oppose
them with the case of Bessarabia. This case was, from the juridical viewpoint,
quite similar with that of Manchuria. In Bessarabia’s case, without the agree-
ment of Russia, certain Powers recognized the free re-unification of Bessarabia
with Romania. . . .
The precedent created by the fact that the signature of the mother country
(Russia) was not indispensable could be used by Japan against England,
France and Italy in the question of the Manchurian independence.140
Davila did more, taking the initiative of talking with the Japanese Ambassador
to the US, by coincidence the same Katsuji Debuchi. He told Debuchi that Japan
could only gain by ratifying the Bessarabian Treaty because of the precedent it
would create (at any point, a representative Assembly of Manchuria or Sakhalin
could decide the unification with Japan). Debuchi simply declared to Davila that the
Tokyo Government had so far failed to realize this aspect of the ratification question.
< 313 >

It is difficult to know whether Debuchi was telling the truth. Based on the docu-
ments detailing his negotiations with both the Soviets and Romanians, it seems that
the Japanese had been unaware of this juridical implication of the Bessarabian
Treaty. In fact, even the Romanians failed to realize this juridical aspect for at least
ten years, so it would not be surprising if the Japanese had failed to notice, as well.
Concluding with Davila’s theory, it should be said that, for two reasons, it
came a little too late. First, the Japanese were compelled to avoid stirring up any new
tensions with the Soviets in order to have their hands free in Manchuria. And the
possible (and not necessarily automatic) recognition of the Manchurian state or of a
union between Manchuria (or Sakhalin) and Japan by England, France or Italy by
virtue of an existing international precedent was not worth the risk of increasing
frictions. Second, in 1932 Japan was no longer preoccupied with the international
treaty system and her decision to leave the League of Nations one year later proves
that she did not give much credit to the international community. In other words,
the international recognition of Manchuria was immaterial, as long as they under-
stood that the international community was unable to do anything to stop them.
In order to gain the theoretical advantage provided by the existence of a prece-
dent to her action in Manchuria, or to back a possible Japanese action in Sakhalin,
Japan would best have ratified the Bessarabian Treaty in 1921-1922, hoping that it
would come into force. Unfortunately, at that time, neither the RFM nor Gaimusho
had any idea about this juridical implication.
The End of the Romanian Campaign for the Japanese Ratification
By 1932, more or less as a result of Davila’s insistence, the RFM reopened its
campaign for the Japanese ratification. In a report sent by the Romanian representa-
tive to the Hague, in September 1932, a declaration regarding Bessarabia made by the
Japanese representative there, Adachi Mineichiro, says, “We are still ‘defaillants’ on
the Bessarabian question. We are the only ‘defaillant’ State. We did not ratify the
Bessarabian Treaty until now because we thought that we should spare some com-
mon interests with Russia.”141
On November 14, 1932, Stoicescu had a meeting with vice-minister of Foreign
Affairs, Arita, the last one in which the ratification question was discussed.
Stoicescu asked the Japanese position on ratification and the following discussion
took place:
Arita: Japan has a very important relationship with the Soviet Union, so the
ratification question has serious implications for us. We definitely want to
keep our promise but it cannot proceed very quickly.
Stoicescu: Romania has a great interest in this problem, so we hope that
Japan will ratify quickly.
Arita: We will discuss this problem after studying the recent developments
related to it.142
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
And indeed, Arita kept his word and ordered one of his subordinates to pre-
pare a report on the evolution of the ratification question. The report, after reviewing
the important moments in the evolution of the mentioned matter, presents once
again the official Japanese position on the matter:
The Bessarabian Treaty ratification question did not develop after the meeting
between Tanaka and Vassiliu on May 11, 1929. Japan considers that the ratifica-
tion is a problem of faith for such countries as France, England, and Italy but,
to say it openly, the Bessarabian question is a European problem. On the other
hand, Japan has a very important economic and politic relationship with the
Soviet Union, so this ratification question is very important and complicated.
Therefore we cannot decide it quickly. And, in addition, Japan’s international
position caused by the Manchurian conflict has made us think very seriously
regarding the ratification. For these reasons Japan cannot state whether it will
ratify or not for the time being. And we will add that Japan’s failure to ratify is
not the result of a request coming from another country.143
In other words, the solution is to simply continue the policy of endless post-
ponement initiated in March 1927 as a result of the Bessedovskii-Debuchi verbal
agreement, while closely following the new developments in Soviet-Romanian rela-
tions.144
The end of 1932 signified the beginning of a new orientation in the Romanian
policy towards the Soviet Union, due to the nomination of Nicolae Titulescu as For-
eign Minister. Seeking to normalize Romanian-Soviet relations, Titulescu aimed to
avoid any actions that might upset the Soviet representatives. Japan’s ratification of
the Bessarabian Treaty would have been one such event, as it would have re-opened
the debate on Bessarabia. Consequently, starting with 1933, the Romanian Foreign
Ministry abandoned any campaign for Japanese ratification, motivated by the previ-
ous failure and the new necessity to avoid ruffling Russia’s feathers (especially after
the Titulescu-Litvinov gentlemen’s agreement).
In 1933 the Little Entente and the Soviets signed the Convention for the Defini-
tion of the Aggressor. This act was interpreted in Japan as a success for both Soviet
diplomacy and the Romanians. Some newspapers considered that now the thorny
issue of the Bessarabian Treaty had been resolved and that, because her international
credibility was at stake, Japan would ratify (assuming that the Soviets recognized
Bessarabia as Romanian territory and would not object to the ratification). But
Gaimusho understood that the Convention did not address the Bessarabian question
and was reluctant to take any action. To the contrary, they continued to play the old
leitmotiv: “we would like to ratify but we have too many questions en suspense in our
relations with Russia, so we must wait for a better moment”.
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THE THIRD PERIOD: 1933 TO 1940
After the improvement in Soviet-Romanian relations in 1933, no more calls

were made for the Japanese ratification. In other words, the Romanian Government
considered the ratification question closed. In fact, there is one instance that shows
Nicolae Titulescu being quite keen to avoid anything that might be understood as a
campaign for the Japanese ratification.
In August 1936 a group of about 20 Japanese businessmen, under the leader-
ship of O. Kinoshita, administrator of the Japanese Association for Encouragement of
Foreign Trade, visited Romania, at the well-intended suggestion of G.G. Stoicescu,
who insisted that they should include Romania as a part of their visit to Europe,
staying in Romania for about three days.145 Although it was only a simple visit, with
the purpose of forging commercial ties, it provoked a strange reaction from Nicolae
Titulescu, Romania’s Foreign Minister at the time, proving once again that his dis-
missal three weeks later was neither an accident nor a mistake:
The Romanian Minister to Tokyo cannot take the initiative and invite the
Japanese delegation to Romania without the previous approval of the Govern-
ment. I sense that I will have difficulties from the Soviet Union because of this
visit. Therefore I suggest that the visit should be given a normal (protocol)
character, we the Romanians being good friends with the Japanese, but we
have no interest to stir against us those who are Japan’s enemies.146
If Titulescu was so set against a simple visit by a Japanese economic delega-

tion, it becomes clear why there were no more Romanian calls for the Japanese ratifi-
cation after he took office as Foreign Minister. Titulescu’s position towards the visit
by the Japanese delegation is even more significant if we consider that, years earlier,
during the drafting of the Lytton Report, he held a different position regarding the
Japanese. In 1931 Titulescu declined the seat as president of the 19-person Commit-
tee for investigating the causes of the Japanese-Chinese conflict in Manchuria (the
future Lytton Commission) and in February 1932 he also declined the German-
backed proposal to preside over the coming General Assembly that was to deal with
the conflict. In his words:
I replied to the German secretary that it is impossible for me to accept their

proposal, due to the fact that I am too busy with the Disarmament Conference.
However, I want to let Your Majesty know my real reasons for refusing: . . . I
consider that the duty of Romania is to win the benevolence of the other Great
Powers for the great interests of the country and not for honors . . . taking into
account the special geographical situation of Romania (sic) it is our duty to
avoid being placed into a position that might justify later a resentment or even
a Japanese hostility.147
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
This is from the same Titulescu who believed in the values and the force of the
League of Nations and who, a few years later, in a very similar situation, proposed
strong economic sanctions against Italy (as a result of Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia),
in order to protect the credibility of the League.
During this period, the much-prolonged Bessarabian Treaty ratification proc-
ess underwent an unexpected development. The Japanese Government suddenly
remembered that Japan still had an obligation toward Romania, and announced to
the Romanian Government their intention of ratifying.148 Mamoru Shigemitsu, the
Japanese Ambassador to the Soviet Union, twice contacted the Romanian represen-
tatives and asked for their opinion regarding Japanese ratification. Had they taken
such an initiative ten years earlier, they would have earned Romania’s unending loy-
alty. Unfortunately, in 1938 it was Romania’s turn to avoid any possible difficulties
in her relations with the Soviets, and she had to decline the Japanese offer.
Why were the Japanese suddenly ready to ratify? Since 1932, nobody had asked
them to do so. As there is no information in the Archives regarding Shigemitsu’s mo-
tivation, we can only speculate:
1. Was it because of the worsening Soviet-Japanese relations? (The second

proposal was made during the Changkufeng Incident.) Japan needed allies
against the Soviets. However, it was well known that Romania was in no
position to fight the Soviets.
2. More probable is that the Japanese were looking for a means to press
Moscow in some way, to stop the Soviet aid to the Chinese Army. Perhaps
they remembered their success in playing the Bessarabian card in March
1927, when the Japanese insisted the Soviets recall Borodin, and wanted to
do it again.
3. Economics could have played a part, as it usually does. At that time Japan
lacked oil and Romania was one of the biggest petroleum exporting coun-
tries in Europe. There had been contacts between Japanese and Romanian
authorities regarding the possibility of exporting Romanian petroleum to
Japan, which would have reduced Japan’s dependence on the Soviets and
the US. The best way to obtain the Romanian oil, at a favorable price,
would be by obtaining Romania’s benevolence by ratifying the Bessara-
bian Treaty.
4. The Japanese were again experiencing troubles regarding their fishery
rights in the Northern Waters and, as the two questions were related,
they understood that, if the Soviets failed to keep their end of the bargain,
they could do so too.
However, in the author’s opinion, Shigemitsu only intended to use the ratifica-
tion question as a trial balloon in order to enhance his position during negotiations
with the Soviets (by leaking this information and creating a rumor that the Japanese
government was about to ratify the treaty), and not to ratify in fact. If he could get
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something in exchange from the Soviets, it was a victory, and if not he would have
lost nothing because he knew that the Romanians were in such a position that they
would avoid anything that might provoke the Soviets.
Mamoru Shigemitsu took the initiative of suggesting the reopening of the rati-
fication question on February 15, 1938, when he approached the Romanian represen-
tative in Moscow, Edmond Ciuntu, declaring that: “There was a time when you [the
Romanians] wanted Japan to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty. What I do not know is
whether you are still interested in ratification, because Japan could be determined
today to take this action.”149
The Romanian side concluded that Japan wished to win Romania’s benevo-
lence for political or economical reasons, and thought that the best way to do this
would be by ratifying the Bessarabian Treaty. But now Romania was neither in a
position to reopen the Bessarabian question nor to offend Japan through a refusal of
the overture, so they gave no answer.
On July 30, 1938, during a conversation with N. Dianu, the Romanian Minister
to Moscow, Shigemitsu suggested again that in case Romania still wanted it, Japan
would ratify the Bessarabian Treaty without any difficulty. And more, that he per-
sonally would like to act as an intermediary for obtaining the ratification.150 The pro-
posal came just as tension was mounting between the Soviet and Japanese Armies in
the Changkufeng Hills area. Some time after the end of the Changkufeng incident,
Shigemitsu politely withdrew the ratification proposal.
On November 2, 1938, he declared to Dianu that: “The Japanese minister in Bu-
charest made some indirect inquiries but he came to the conclusion that any Japa-
nese manifestation regarding the ratification would not be welcomed by the Roma-
nian government”.151 It is impossible to say whether the Japanese would have gone
forward with the ratification if Romania had agreed or if the Changkufeng incident
had not ended.
In order to clarify the situation, earlier that year, Alexandru Cretzianu, secre-
tary general of the Romanian Foreign Ministry, prepared a report (one of the most
interesting on the Bessarabian Treaty ratification question) in September 1938 re-
garding the new Japanese proposals. His starting point was that “We should ask
first if the proposal made by the Ambassador [Mamoru Shigemitsu] was authorized
by his Government or is just his personal idea. . . Why did Japan fail to go through
official channels, through our minister in Tokyo or through the Japanese representa-
tive in Bucharest?”152 Cretzianu was suspicious about Shigemitsu’s intentions; still,
such a proposal could not have come from the Japanese representative in Bucharest
because he was not of high enough rank to deal with such an important matter.
It should be mentioned that this was not the only time the Romanians sus-
pected that a Japanese proposal lacked the approval of the Japanese Government. As
early as 1910, after repeated proposals for a Commercial Treaty between the two
countries made by the Japanese Ambassador to Vienna, Count Makino,153 the Roma-
nian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reached the conclusion that, in fact, Ambassador
Makino did not have the approval of his Government for the proposals he made. This
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
belief surfaces only when the Romanian Foreign Ministry decides to refuse a Japa-
nese proposal. The Romanians failed to understand that it would be highly unusual
for Japanese diplomats to act without the agreement of their superiors.
Cretzianu clearly states in his report that since the establishment of diplomatic
relations between Romania and the Soviet Union, the Romanian Government had
refrained from asking for the Japanese ratification. Then, he shows both the advan-
tages and disadvantages for Romania in case Japan ratified:
Advantages:
After the Japanese ratification, the treaty would come into force, so the four
Great Powers would be definitively bound by Article No. 1 of the Treaty to rec-
ognize our sovereignty over Bessarabia.
These stipulations would have a special significance in regard to Great
Britain and France, members of the League of Nations, because of Article No. 10
from the Pact [of the League of Nations]. If the guarantees provided by Article
No. 10 still have value today, it is useful that there be no doubts regarding the
territories covered by this guarantee.
A document like this could be important for us should the Great Powers
try to make any territorial adjustments. It should be observed that, by virtue of
the fact that France, England and Italy ratified the Bessarabian Treaty, they
cannot debate our rights to Bessarabia regardless whether the treaty comes
into force [was that so?].
Generally, we must accentuate that, if we look at the question from the
standpoint of international law, the Bessarabian Treaty has more of a moral
value over each signatory, but it is not a juridical title because for Russia this
Treaty represents a res inter alias acta. [This was not the view taken by the Ro-
manian Foreign Ministry some ten years earlier]. . . .
Disadvantages:
It would provoke an official protest from Russia, which would reopen the
entire question of Bessarabia, silently avoided by both parties. The result
would be a return to the situation existing before 1934. [The Russians re-
opened the Bessarabian question just a year later, anyway; the Romanian Gov-
ernment should have been expecting them to do so.]
Because of Article No. 2 (the Common Commission for fixing the border)
and No. 9 (the arbitrage of the Council of the League of Nations regarding liti-
gious questions) ratification is not indicated. As the Soviet Union is a member
in that Council it is clear that it would take advantage and discuss the juridical
value of the treaty and of Romanian rights over Bessarabia.
The Soviet representative would no doubt show that, in order to obtain the
signature of France, England and Italy we had to pay considerable compensa-
tions to their citizens expropriated in Bessarabia. Would we welcome such a
discussion?
It would reopen the debate over the respect accorded by Romania towards
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the Minorities Treaty (see Article No. 3), always considered by the Romanian
Government as a threat to national sovereignty.
Through Article No. 8 of the treaty we assume the obligations of paying a
proportional part of the public debt of the Russian state. Therefore, soon after
the Treaty’s coming into force, the French creditors of Russian rent would
start pressing over their Government to make us pay those moneys.
[Surprisingly, both the Romanians and the French had failed to stress this as-
pect during 1922-1924]. . .
[Concluding]: At the present moment it would not be opportune for us to
insist on the Japanese ratification . . . but if the Japanese government decides to
ratify, we cannot ask them not to do so. All we can do is to ask them to keep
the ratification secret and to deposit the ratification instruments only at the
moment decided by us. We would then have an instrument of pressure over
the Soviets that could prove useful at some point.154
Cretzianu’s last conclusion was exactly the opposite of what Shigemitsu in-
tended by raising the ratification problem. The Romanian government followed
Cretzianu’s conclusions and made no intervention for ratification.
Analyzing the disadvantages presented above, we have a possible explanation
for the Romanian Foreign Ministry’s general attitude, at least during the fourth dec-
ade. Cretzianu’s arguments, coupled with the changes taking place in the interna-
tional balance of power, partially justify the Foreign Ministry’s silence over the rati-
fication question after 1934.
Although their attempt failed, the Japanese did not abandon the Bessarabian
question. During June 1939, one of the Japanese representatives in Romania made a
visit to the northern parts of Bessarabia, in order to assess the actual condition of the
region. Following his visit, he sent a detailed report to Gaimusho in October 1939,
together with a number of photographs.155
The Bessarabian question last came to Gaimusho’s attention during 1939-1940,
when two of its Departments published booklets on Bessarabia (in Japanese). Why
Gaimusho expended resources, extremely scarce due to the war with China, in order
to publish brochures on Bessarabia remains a matter of conjecture.
The first booklet, “Report on the Soviet Foreign Policy under Molotov and on
Bessarabia’s Situation” was published in December 1939 by the Department of Inves-
tigation. As its title suggests, the first half describes Soviet policy in Europe, making
much of the consequences of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact: the situation in Poland,
the war in Europe and the relations between the Great Powers, the Soviet interven-
tion in Poland and in the Baltic States, the war with Finland over Karelia, the Soviet
claims to the islands in the Baltic Sea, and the territorial controversy with Turkey.
The second part deals with the Bessarabian question, making a detailed presentation
of the province (including population, industry, history, and the Romanian govern-
ment’s policy towards Bessarabia) and in the end analyses the Romanian-Soviet con-
flict over Bessarabia. The information is quite similar with that existing in the syn-
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
thesis prepared by Gaimusho’s officials in connection with the ratification question.

The most interesting part comes toward the end, when it is suggested that Bessara-
bia is the next target for the Soviets, and Romania’s difficult position is analyzed, in
case the Soviets did attempt to retrieve Bessarabia.
The publishing of this booklet is proof enough of Japan’s continuing interest in
the Bessarabian question, and Japan’s growing interest in European affairs (it also
underscores the fact that Bucharest ought to have known the Soviets’ intentions).
The second booklet, called “The Bessarabian Question and the Division of Oil; Ro-
mania and the German-Soviet Relations”, was published in 1940 by Gaimusho’s De-
partment of Information.
THE MASS MEDIA AND THE JAPANESE RATIFICATION QUESTION
A more complete picture of the entire Bessarabian Treaty question might in-
clude a detailed analysis not only of official documents but the mass media as well.
The press played an important role in this saga, illustrated best during the Roma-
nian-Italian negotiations for the ratification. As for Romania’s failure to convince
Japan to ratify, the press, and particularly the Romanian press, also played a role: by
constantly pointing out the positive character of the Japanese people and of their
traditions, and suggesting that the notion that Japan might fail to ratify was simply
unrealistic.156
The Romanian Press
A comprehensive survey of the Romanian press in the first half of the 20th cen-
tury reveals how Japan was seen in Romania. Here we will be concerned only with
the perception of the Japanese attitude regarding the Bessarabian question, which is
addressed only in a small percentage of the articles that actually appeared.
The Romanian press expressed a different opinion from that of the foreign
press, which was not necessarily preoccupied with the consequences of the ratifica-
tions for Romania but with their international significance. Both in 1924 and in 1927
the accent in the international press was on French-Soviet, and respectively British-
Italian relations and not on Romania. It was these broad international implications
that lent the Bessarabian Treaty such importance worldwide.
Japan’s unofficial and real image was very positive. There were many articles
regarding political events but also many on the process of modernization in Japan.
Japan’s development was given as an example that merited attention: they adopted
new technologies and theories while, at the same time, preserving their own way of
living, their traditions. Romania had more or less the same problem as Japan: how to
modernize its economy and structures without destroying the traditional customs
and the spirit of the nation. The peak of Japan’s good image was in 1904, when she
went to war against the common neighbor, Russia; Romanian sympathy for Japan
was at its height in the aftermath of the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923.
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The public’s expectations were high and everybody was convinced that Japan
would ratify the Treaty. The representatives of the Foreign Ministry shared that
view. Interestingly enough, although Japan failed to ratify the Treaty, its image in
Romania did not change significantly. From 1928 onward there were articles ex-
pressing admiration for the Japanese culture and economic development, and even
during the fourth decade the topic of modernization and tradition in Japan can be
found throughout the Romanian press. In a sense, it could be said that the press
“forgot” about the ratification question.
Regarding the ratification question itself, there were only three periods when
the Romanian press focused on the Japanese position.
The first was March-April 1924, spurred by the coincidence of the French rati-
fication, the Vienna negotiations and Prince Naruhiko Higashi Kuni’s visit to Roma-
nia. Even though the Japanese side had not intended to give the visit any political
connotations, it was thought to be no accident that the visit coincided in time with
the failure of the Vienna Conference, since it was known that Japan too had some
unresolved issues in her relations with the Soviet Union.157 And just a few days be-
fore the Conference, France ratified the treaty, so that Italy and Japan were the only
two states left to ratify.
It was assumed that the Imperial Family had as much power in Japan, if not
more, as the Royal Family had in Romania; therefore the press understood the visit
as a sign of goodwill and a demonstration of Japan’s intentions.158 It was thought
that the Prince must have brought with him good news. The visit received wide pub-
licity, and Prince Naruhiko was welcomed by the Romanian Royal Family and by all
the high officials.159 The Prince was evidently surprised to be received in such an offi-
cial and pleasant manner but he was even more surprised to find himself having to
fend off all the questions regarding the exact moment when the Japanese would rat-
ify — a question he was not at all prepared to deal with. He took the position that he
had no idea of when Japan would ratify and that he did not have the mission of
bringing the ratification to the Romanians.160 Nonetheless, some newspapers de-
clared that, in fact, the Prince had promised that Japan would ratify, and such a
promise, coming from a member of the Imperial Family, certainly affected Romanian
public opinion.
The press had been talking up the good bilateral relations and even a possible
alliance between Romania and Japan, an alliance directed against their common
neighbor, touting Japan’s interest in Romania as a future ally. But as soon as the
prince left, there was no more talk of the Japanese ratification.
In view of the timing of the visit and their misconception of the Prince’s influ-
ence, the Romanians’ confusion is no surprise. Nonetheless, it is also conceivable
that this confusion was to some extent consciously manufactured through a
“publicity campaign” initiated by the Romanian government, with the purpose of
raising the people’s morale.161 The Japanese were caught; by the time they realized
how the visit would be interpreted, it was too late to cancel.
One of the indirect results of the visit was the Soviet insistence on the Bessara-
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
bian question during the Karakhan-Yoshizawa talks. The intense publicity given to
the Japanese visit (and not only in the Romanian press) and to the possibility of a
Japan-Romania alliance was not well received by the Soviets. As a result, the Soviets
pushed hard to prevent the Japanese ratification. Of course, they were probably al-
ready moving in that direction, long before the imperial visit, but the visit definitely
gave the matter a new sense of urgency.
The Romanian press focused on the Japanese ratification again in January 1925,
when the Japanese recognized the Soviet Government. There were strong mixed re-
actions in the Romanian press, ranging from accusations that Japan was selling off
the ratification against economic concessions from the Soviets, to wishful assertions
that Japan, by virtue of the secular tradition of her famous samurai, could never be-
tray her word — and Japan had promised Romania to ratify.
The first, and not the most reliable, news item that connected the Japanese-
Soviet negotiations with the ratification was this:
Because of Bessarabia, Japan has decided to break off negotiations with the
Soviet Union. Karakhan’s call, expressly presented, for Japan to desist from
ratifying in exchange for economic advantages had been categorically refused
by Japan. The Japanese representative stated that Japan does not obey orders
or suggestions coming from a foreign government. Japan said that she recog-
nized the Bessarabian Treaty and that would not allow the Soviet Union to
exert any kind of pressures over her in this matter. The Russo-Japanese nego-
tiations are definitely broken off.162
This is an interesting account of the Karakhan-Yoshizawa negotiations. Even

though the negotiations were secret, even in Romania it was supposedly known that
Karakhan had made an express demand related to the ratification. However, Japan is
portrayed in bright colors, staunchly rejecting any deal.
The debate over Japan’s attitude was rekindled in January. The ratification was
presented as a problem in Romania’s relations with both Italy and Japan, but the
accent was on Italy, which was blamed for asking more and more concessions from
Romania. The press suggested that the Romanian diplomatic leadership should take
action first in Italy’s direction. This article, reviewing the developments in the Bes-
sarabian question during the previous year, after criticizing Mussolini’s attitude,
goes to Japan:
In these moments our eyes turned to Japan. It is characteristic for the excessive com-
plexity existing nowadays in international relations that for putting one of our diplomatic
problems in order we need the cooperation of a state in the Far East. For a moment, last
year, during the visit of the Japanese Prince, it was considered that Japan’s col-
laboration was assured. But this affirmation came too early and was not true.
The Prince had no political or diplomatic mission. Now, this perspective, of the
Japanese ratification, seems to be more and more excluded. The Government in
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Tokyo is on the verge not only of recognizing the Soviet Union but also of en-
tering into an alliance with it . . . Anyway, even if this is not true, it should be
understood that Japan cannot afford to make gestures or to take measures that
will displease the Russians, even though there could be willingness to show
the Russians that she might take that kind of step.163
On January 23, the day when the news of the signing of the Russo-Japanese
Basic Convention reached Bucharest, all the newspapers carried comments regard-
ing the Japanese position on Bessarabia. Some of the newspapers expressed the offi-
cial Japanese position, following a declaration made the Japanese representative in
Romania, Kumaichi Horiguchi, on January 22.164 Horiguchi, following his instruc-
tions, had made a declaration one day before the press found out about the Basic
Convention, and in this way took the opportunity of “preparing” public opinion. In
this manner, he was able to avoid quite a difficult situation.
Among the articles favorable to Japan one stated:
Japan signed the Bessarabian treaty . . . the noble character and the history of
the Nippon race are the best proofs that Japan will respect her signature. If the
ratification has not come yet, this is because the Japanese Government is wait-
ing for the European Powers to be the first to take action, and only then will
Japan give her ratification.165
A more realistic view, showing the main disadvantage of the Romanian cam-
paign for the Japanese ratification, is expressed by another newspaper:
Even while we have no word to cause worry for the moment, we should
pay the closest attention to events. Especially if the news that Japan gave private
assurances that it would not ratify is false.
But it is quite clear that, while Italy has difficulties in ratifying, in the case
of Japan, after she signed with the Soviets a treaty giving her considerable ma-
terial and strategic advantages for the defense of her national security, advan-
tages which are the basis of stable relations with the Russian Government —
we are talking about the oil and coal concessions in Sakhalin — it will be very
difficult for the Japanese Government to take a decision that would indispose
the Russian government without having assured, and this is the truth and we
have to say it, a certain material advantage somewhere else.166
Another similar article in the same newspaper states:
It should be clear to everybody that, even if Japan did not assume any engage-
ment [towards the Russians] regarding ratification, the recognition of the So-
viet Union will make the Japanese Government more reserved in the case of an
action that can only displease the Russians.167
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
As time passed, some Romanians became more and more convinced that the
Japanese ratification would come. One such expression of trust comes in an article
significantly entitled, “We must trust Japan’s word”:
The Prince from the famous country of Japan declared, “the Imperial Par-
liament will soon ratify the union of Bessarabia with Romania”. Since then we
have waited for the ratification.
The delay in the ratification, and the unpleasant news that the economic
treaty signed between Japan and Russia has a special clause regarding the Bes-
sarabian Treaty ratification, made my trust go down, but not my spirit, which
continues to refuse to believe that the word of a “Cherry’s knight”, son of Ja-
pan’s emperor, could not be honored . . . I hope that the 1904-born sympathy of
the entire Romanian people for the Japanese cause will always grow.168
The Japanese question came to the fore for a third time in March 1927, as a re-
sult of the Italian ratification. The tenor of the Romanian press was, at that time,
optimistic. It was believed that Japan would now take the necessary steps for ratifi-
cation. However, the press focused mainly on the Italian ratification, with only brief
comments on Japan: “Japan will soon follow Italy’s example” or “The Japanese Gov-
ernment is already considering the necessary steps for the ratification”.169 The press
invoked the promises made by all the Japanese representatives, including Horiguchi,
Prince Naruhiko, and Kaju Nakamura, that as soon as Italy ratified they would ratify
too: “Today we have the right to consider Japan’s ratification as imminent.”170
Japan’s official position was soon made known to the Romanians, the Japanese
representatives repeating that the ratification would definitely come — but not yet,
due to the fact that, at the moment, there were some complicated problems with
Russia and they would like to avoid complicating them further. At first, there was
talk of only a few weeks’ delay, stressing that Japan had no vital interest against the
ratification and that it would go along with the other signatories.171 The few weeks
became a few months. This 1927 window was closed by the Romanian Government’s
announcement of the reopening of the Romanian Legation in Tokyo, and the hope
that the Japanese Government would give the ratification to the new Romanian
Minister the moment he reached Tokyo.172
Even as the Japanese ratification failed to materialize, Japan’s positive image in
Romania remained in place. Articles about Japanese life and customs,173 or about the
Japanese successes on their way toward modernization continued to be published.
During the next years there was almost no trace of a harsh attitude against Japan in
relation to the ratification question. Articles published as early as 1931 tried to justify
the Japanese action in China by demographic considerations and not at all to blame
Japan for opening the war against China.
Although the Romanian government exerted a great deal of control and censor-
ship over the mass media, it does not seem to have been any intervention in regard to
< 325 >

articles on Japan. Japan’s positive image in Romania was not a result of government
intervention (which supposedly would have had the aim of improving bilateral rela-
tions), nor was it a result of a Japanese propaganda campaign. It stemmed from a
general feeling of sympathy and esteem for the Japanese people and for its impressive
progress. Indeed, it seems that the press influenced the actions of the Romanian
Government and not vice versa.
The Japanese Press
If we set out to examine parallel developments in the Japanese media regarding

Romania (and particularly regarding Bessarabia), anyone who is familiar with the
style of the Japanese media would first suppose that there would be no material to
examine. Still, there were a number of articles regarding both Romania and the Bes-
sarabian question. In a way, the Japanese press was on the same footing with the
press overseas. Whenever the Bessarabian question captured the attention of the
public internationally, there were articles in the Japanese press too. Interest in the
Bessarabian question starts as early as 1920, when the Bessarabian Treaty was signed
in Paris.174
The Japanese press focused on the ratification question twice: March-April
1924 and March 1927. Although there were some short comments on the Karakhan-
Yoshizawa deal on Bessarabia, the problem did not have the same resonance as it had
in the foreign or Romanian press.
Quite surprising is the attention given to the Bessarabian problem in March
1924. There were numerous articles on the French ratification,175 the consequences of
this act, the Soviet reaction and, a few days later, the failure of the Russo-Romanian
negotiations in Vienna.176 Mainly, these were short articles dealing with the implica-
tions of the ratification, and none of them addressed the question of Japanese ratifi-
cation. Their subject was the union between Bessarabia and Romania, offering some
data on how the union was made, or the Poincare-Cicerin controversy.177
Tokyo Nichi Nichi on March 29, 1924 stated that Karakhan had asked Yoshizawa
a problematic question on Japan’s stand regarding the ratification. The article re-
ports Karakhan’s question and his plea against a Japanese ratification, which would
be considered a blow to the improving relations between Japan and the Soviet Un-
ion.178 By March 1924, as we know, Karakhan was already taking action in order to
avoid Japanese ratification, and the press soon became aware of his intentions —
which indicates that Karakhan was using the Japanese mass media to spread propa-
ganda against the ratification. Over the next few days, several other articles dealt
with the same problem.179
The ratification question received the greatest attention in March 1927. All the
newspapers stressed the difficult situation in which the Japanese Government found
itself, between the two choices. There were some simple presentations of the events,
of Italy’s ratification and Moscow’s reaction,180 and also some lengthier discussions
of the implications of the Italian ratification for British-Russian relations (although
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
not as much as in the European press):
[Talking about the Italian ratification] To account for such extraordinary sen-
sation intelligently, we must look into the relations between Great Britain and
Soviet Russia, the aggravation of which has no doubt brought the former
Power and Italy closer together in order to bear down upon Russia.181
At the same time, some articles were asking the Japanese Government not to
ratify. If we judge by the few articles that can be found, the conclusion is that the
current against ratification prevailed in March 1927. Had the Romanians been ade-
quately represented in Tokyo, perhaps the situation might have been different. There
is no way to gauge whether public opinion could have been swayed in Romania’s
favor, and whether that would have made a critical difference. While there were
some predictions that Japan would choose to ratify, other articles clearly called for
the Government not to do so. The pro-Soviet camp used some translations from Iz-
vestia, highlighting the good relations between Japan and the Soviets, but there was
no corresponding propaganda on behalf of the Romanians. The Nippon Dempo United
Press presented such an article on March 19:
Izvestia — Proceeds to point out that Japan does not have, nor can have, any
political or economical interest in binding it to Romania and that Japan’s re-
fusal to ratify would not sacrifice any interest in this part of East Europe. But
the Japanese ratification would give the document legal force . . . a definitely
hostile act toward the Soviets peoples on the part of Japan.”182
Somewhat unexpected was the attitude of The Japan Times, the biggest English
newspaper in Japan, which instead of focusing on the ratification published two
long (and solid) articles regarding the possible evolution in the Romanian political
arena as a result of the approaching death of King Ferdinand (who was very ill at the
time); neither of the two articles mentions the Bessarabian question.183
Of the articles asking the Japanese Government not to ratify, the two most in-
teresting were published in Osaka Mainichi and Yamato. The first one supports the
Soviet viewpoint and expresses considerations in favor of Japan avoiding the ratifi-
cation.184 Along the same lines was the following article published by Yamato, under
the headline, “Bessarabia”:
Now that France, Great Britain and Italy have ratified the Bessarabian
Treaty, it is a very delicate problem for Japan to consider the ratification of this
Treaty, because Soviet Russia is determined to keep the territory by all means.
The decision to give Bessarabia to Romania was made during the world war,
when the Allies were sure of victory, but Russia does not recognize such an
international pact.
Great Britain and the two other European states persuaded Romania to
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join the Allies on condition that she should obtain Bessarabia after the war.
[This is actually erroneous, and it is probable that the author of the article had
no real idea what had happened in Bessarabia.] It may be necessary for these
European nations to keep their pledge, but Japan’s position is entirely differ-
ent. She has nothing to do with the matter, which is purely European. She
ought not to involve herself in such a complication. When this Treaty was signed,
Japan was to receive Shantung, but subsequently she gave up this Chinese territory, so that her
obligation to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty is no longer binding upon her.
Soviet Russia is willing to fight for her right to retain Bessarabia, so that
Japan will injure her sentiment by giving ratification to the Treaty in question.
Non-ratification does not, however, mean support given to Russia. The position Japan
ought to uphold is perfect neutrality. Europe will take proper care of its own
problems like this, without bothering a country outside of the European Com-
monwealth.
Considering the matter in its essential character, however, we doubt whether
the ratification of the Bessarabia Treaty will help Great Britain, France and Italy. None of
these Powers will get any share in the territory, but their support of Romania’s
claim will only increase Russia’s hatred toward these three Powers. To make
matters worse, the support given to Romania against Russia may lead to actual
war between Russia and the three other European Powers. The latter will suf-
fer terribly from a joint expedition against Soviet Russia. In all probability they
will find it impossible to carry on such a warlike policy. If they are not fully
prepared to support Romania by arms, their ratification of the Treaty will not
be worth much. Under such circumstance it will be wise for the Japanese Government
to take no positive steps in respect to the ratification of the Bessarabia Treaty.185
This is an excellent proof of the success of Soviet propaganda in Japan. It also

fits into a more general pattern: that many of those writing about the Bessarabian
Treaty actually knew little of what the Treaty’s stipulations actually were, and pre-
sented a purely propagandistic view. Still, the message was clear: Japan should not
ratify.
Some of the most cogent comments in connection with the ratification ques-
tion were made in The Japan Advertiser. At first, the newspaper only presented the Ital-
ian ratification and its consequences:
It is said that Italy had delayed the ratification in the hope of mediating
between Romania and the Soviets. Italy has understood that Japan made her
ratification of the treaty dependent on ratification by the other three Powers
who now have all ratified.
Diplomatic circles in Berlin believe, however, that even now Japan will not
ratify the Treaty [this takes us back to Ambassador Solf’s role in the Besse-
dovskii-Debuchi negotiations] as she is not interested any longer in siding
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
with anti-Russian powers on such an issue, inasmuch as the belief prevails that
at the conclusion of the treaty recognizing the Soviet Union she definitely
agreed not to ratify.
Speculation is active in Paris too regarding the probable attitude
of Japan.186
A few days later:
Japan’s problem concerns Britain. London newspapers think Tokyo may

not act on Bessarabian Pact.
In the Daily Telegraph it is pointed out that Moscow, after Italy’s ratification,
will be able to remind Tokyo that under the Soviet-Japanese treaties of 1925
Japan undertook not to enter any agreement contrary to the interests of the co-
signatory, and will call attention to the fact that Bessarabia is a sore point with
the Soviet. Tokyo may possibly content itself with the assertion that Italy hav-
ing already made the Bessarabian Treaty valid by her ratification, that of Japan
is unnecessary to Romania.187
And on March 23, clearly expressing the Japanese dilemma:
Japan’s obligations as one of the Big Four have involved her in questions of
South Eastern Europe in which she has no material interest and which have, in
consequence, given her government a somewhat delicate question to deal
with . . .
Although it is true that Japan has but little direct interest in ownership of
Bessarabia, it is equally true that the question of ratifying the treaty handing
that territory over to Romania places her in a somewhat awkward predica-
ment. If she ratifies it, she offends the Soviet Union; if she withholds her ratifi-
cation she nullifies the action of Britain, France, and Italy.
In the case of Bessarabia, however, Japan has nothing but a negative gain in pros-
pect; namely avoidance of causing annoyance to Britain and France and avoid-
ance of giving offense to Moscow’s wishes. But it is, nevertheless, a gain of
seemingly greater importance politically than the mere avoidance of giving of-
fense to Moscow, as that is too of a political rather than a material nature.
It is, in fact, a case of choosing the lesser of two political evils rather than,
as in the instance of Toonan-Tsitsihar Railway, choosing between giving up a
definite political-strategic-economic gain and causing annoyance of a purely
political nature. As, therefore, the lesser of the two evils in the case of Bessarabia appears
to be Soviet displeasure, the likelihood is that ratification will be forthcoming in due course.
This whole question of Bessarabia, however, brings two important points
into prominence. The first of them is that Japan, by taking a hand in European
politics, may be playing her part in the lime-light as one of the Big Four but, in
< 329 >

doing so, she is running the risk of involving herself in political difficulties
without any chance of compensation in the way of material gain.
The second point brought out by this question of ratification is that the
catch-phrase “rights of smaller nations” is still bringing untold trouble in its
train and has been twisted and distorted in a most unscrupulous manner, even
more so, in fact, than that other parrot-cry “the white man’s burden”. The
“rights of the smaller nations” and “the white man’s burden” had been both
invoked almost as frequently and hypocritically as “liberty”.
Bessarabia, Lithuania, Estonia and Finland, to name but a few, were each
brought into being as independent states as a result of that unfortunately in-
terpreted catch phrase, and what do we find? For the time being they act as
break waters to check the spread of Bolshevism into other parts of Europe.
Sooner or later, however, the time will come when the Powers renew their for-
mer friendly relations with Russia. When this time comes about, they will lose
their interest in all these minor states, which in reality are only in existence of
sufferance and entirely dependent on the good will of the Powers and would
be unable to stand without their active support.
In the case of Bessarabia it was claimed that the native inhabitants of Bes-
sarabia desired to break away from Russia and to return to the benevolent rule
of Romania. From the accounts given by independent foreign investigators,
however, it would seem that the native inhabitants, so called, have no more
love for the one than for the other. In fairness to Soviet Russia it must be ad-
mitted that Romania’s refusal to submit the question to the test of a plebiscite
would seem to indicate that she feels not too sure of her ground in the matter,
and the Powers, in ratifying the Treaty, can hardly withstand the charge of
hypocrisy if they continue to talk about the rights of small nations. Like the
Japanese Government Earthquake Bill, the Bessarabian Treaty may be an emi-
nently practical measure but, like the same piece of legislation, it contains dis-
tinct elements of injustice.”188
The Bessarabian question continued to surface in the Japanese press during the
coming years, but no reference was made to the ratification question. Quite to the
contrary, the attention shifted to the Russo-Romanian negotiations, pointing up the
significance of moments such as February 1929 (the Litvinov Protocol), July 1933
(The Convention for the Definition of the Aggression), when the Bessarabian ques-
tion had been considered finally closed,189 and June 1934 (the establishment of
Russo-Romanian relations).
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
CONCLUSIONS
The Bessarabian Treaty question is a good example of Japanese involvement in

European affairs, and underscores the need for a more detailed study of Japan’s pol-
icy towards Europe during the interwar period. As Ian Nish states:
As a Great Power and as a founding-member of the League of Nations, Japan

had to play a part in Europe. There has been a tendency among historians of
modern Japan to focus attention on her relations with China and the US. This
is not necessarily wrong; but it may be a distortion to exclude Europe [and
particularly Eastern Europe, as we might add] to the extent that is commonly
done.190
It was only a few years after the Bessarabian Treaty was signed, when the So-
viet Government started acting as a powerful force in the international arena, that
the international implications and real importance of the Bessarabian Treaty
emerged. As the increasingly fierce Soviet opposition became highly publicized, the
Japanese government understood that ratification was no longer a simple act, and
that the possible consequences of the ratification could affect Japan directly.
The ability to take advantage of the Bessarabian Treaty even as the interna-
tional situation was changing proves the adaptability of Japanese diplomacy to new
situations. The only price Japan had to pay in exchange for the commercial advan-
tages obtained from the Soviets was a moral one, a slight dimming of Japan’s interna-
tional image and credibility. During the interwar period the Japanese Diet did indeed
ratify a great number of international treaties, including some that were not at all
helpful to the interests of the Empire, adhering to a “rule” that, no matter how harsh
the conditions were for Japan, once they had signed a treaty they proceeded to ratify
it. The case of the Bessarabian Treaty, even though it contained no concrete military
or economic obligations for its signatories, was a notable exception.
Still, Gaimusho acted carefully enough to avoid setting off any press campaign
that would capitalize on its failure to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty in order to attack
different aspects of Japanese foreign policy. On the other hand, it is difficult to be-
lieve that any Japanese diplomat was thinking in 1920 that the Bessarabian Treaty
would produce benefits for Japanese fishermen (which translates into important
votes during the Parliamentary elections), although they might have had in mind
using the Bessarabian Treaty as a bargaining chip with the Soviet Union.
In conclusion, the Japanese failure to ratify can be ascribed principally to Ja-
pan’s relations with Russia, and secondarily, to Romania’s failure to do what it could
on the diplomatic front.
Romania’s Diplomatic Actions
As detailed above, Romania had closed her Tokyo Legation in February 1922;
but although the Legation was still functional during 1921, with not only a Chargé
< 331 >

d’affaires but also a military attaché, nothing was done to encourage the Japanese
ratification. The reason is simple: none of the signatory states, including Romania,
deposited the ratification instruments before April 1922.
Instead of pressing for ratification in Japan, the Romanian Government sought
to preserve resources: in the end, it was a poor bargain. Of course, apart from this
treaty, Romania had few interests in Japan, and in any case they did not realize that
Japan’s ratification was questionable. On the other hand, the first official attempt to
obtain the Japanese ratification, in 1923, three years after signing the treaty, was
tardy at best, especially as the Romanians already knew how large a role the ratifica-
tion played in their dispute with the Soviet Union.
The decision to close the Legation had important consequences later. Having
no diplomatic representative in Japan at the moment when the Japanese could have
been convinced to ratify, during 1922 or even 1923, may have cost them exactly the
chance they needed. The Romanians failed to analyze Japanese-Soviet relations and
exploit their misunderstandings. In 1922, after the UK’s ratification, when Russo-
Japanese relations were far from normal,191 and when Japan was still taking an active
part in European affairs (as proved by her participation in the Genoa Conference),
the Japanese ratification seems to have been attainable. The Japanese ratification of
the Central European Frontiers Treaty in May 1922, ahead of other signatories,
proves that Japan was still interested in events taking place in Europe. Even during
1923 there may have been real chances of convincing the Japanese Government to
ratify, especially by obtaining direct British help.
The importance of having a representative in Japan was also demonstrated
during the settlement of the Upper Silesia question in 1921. The Polish Chargé d’Af-
faires sent several Aide-Memoires to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, presenting the
Polish case, and was able to influence (more or less) the final Japanese decision on
the Upper Silesia border. When the Japanese Ambassador in London expressed an
opinion contrary to that of Poland, he was able to quickly send a note of protest to
Gaimusho, which immediately disapproved the action of Ambassador Hayashi.192
At the beginning of 1924, when the Japanese proposed signing a Commercial
Treaty with Romania, the Romanians had in hand a powerful argument in favor of
ratification. But they did not use the proposed Commercial Treaty to their advantage
and the negotiations ended in failure. The Japanese conditions for the Commercial
Treaty could have been accepted entirely, without any fear that they would damage
the Romanian economy (Japan was too far away to be able to act influentially on the
Romanian market) — in exchange for ratification. Unfortunately, all the Romanians
had in mind was the famous “by ourselves” economic policy, aimed at limiting the
control of foreign capital over the Romanian economy. Given that the negotiations
for the Commercial Treaty started in January 1924, before the Yoshizawa-Karakhan
talks in Peking, the argument of better commercial relations stood a chance of suc-
cess.
The Ishii Note clearly presented the Japanese position: because Japan is not a
European Power and it had no (direct) interest in the Bessarabian question, she had
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
decided to wait until all the interested European Powers had ratified. Ishii told Duca
that Japan really had no other reason not to ratify (at that time). In this situation,
Duca had two alternatives: to continue pressing for the Japanese ratification, or to
believe what Ishii said and to consider that after the Italian ratification Japan would
automatically ratify. Since the Italian ratification was not in sight, he preferred the
second alternative. In a vital oversight, no one in the RFM made the connection with
the Japanese attitude regarding the Central European Frontiers Treaty.
During the following years the idea that Japan would automatically ratify after
Italy did so became more and more accepted, not only in Romania but in other Euro-
pean countries too, except for the Soviet Union. Romania’s “passivity” should also be
seen as more or less related to the positive image Japan had in the Romanian press;
with so many articles praising Japan for its achievements and for its moral values it
should not come as a surprise that the officials in the Foreign Ministry failed to ap-
ply any pressure for the Japanese ratification. Still, all the Romanians did to encour-
age the Japanese ratification after 1924 was to send some books on Bessarabia to
Gaimusho — a lackluster performance, indeed.
Even worse, when there were signs that the Japanese ratification might never
be obtained, when in January 1925 the press was full of articles showing that Japan
had traded the ratification in exchange for economic concessions in Sakhalin, the
RFM did almost nothing and continued, blindly, to believe that the Japanese ratifi-
cation would definitely come as soon as Italy ratified.
January 1925 was the moment when the Japanese foreign policy changed
clearly in favor of the Soviet Union and against Romania. If, up to that point, there
had been some chance of obtaining Japan’s ratification (because Japan had not offi-
cially recognized the Soviet Government), after that moment Romania stood no
chance.
The RFM finally realized that it would have to fight for Japanese ratification
only in the aftermath of the Italian ratification. They proudly announced that Japan
too was taking the necessary steps for ratification, but the Japanese representative in
Bucharest gave them a cold shower, declaring that Japan was not even remotely
planning to ratify.
The Romanian reaction was to reopen the Romanian Legation in Tokyo and, in
this way, to press for ratification. Too little, and far too late. Besides the fact that the
Soviets held all the cards to influence the Japanese by then, Romania shot herself in
the foot by sending a representative who promptly acquired a poor image for himself
(and implicitly Romania) at Gaimusho. Whatever positive influence the Legation
might have had was annihilated by the inexperience of its leader. Even in later stages,
during 1930-1932, when new events (like the Nakamura interpellation or the Davila
juridical hypothesis) might have helped the Romanian cause, the Romanian represen-
tatives in Japan failed to take any new steps regarding the ratification. On the other
hand, it seems that the RFM expected a miracle from its representatives to Japan and
offered almost no backing to their campaign, proving unable to convince even the
Japanese minister in Bucharest of the desirability and necessity of ratification.
< 333 >

Romanian Foreign Ministry might invoke, in its defense, the fact that Romania
had nothing to offer to Japan in exchange for ratification, except for petroleum. In
the French or Italian cases, they had plenty of “material” for negotiations. However,
the Polish had nothing to offer to the Japanese in 1921 either, but they were able to
convince them at least not to side with Germany.
In conclusion, the gravest error made by Romania with respect to the Japanese
ratification was that of not taking decisive action when Soviet-Japanese relations
were still tense. In 1921-1923, it seems that the ratification could have been obtained
(although not necessarily easily) by using the same arguments that were tried in
1927 (the moral need for Japan to honor her signature), and when additional advan-
tages were provided by England’s intervention or by the Commercial Treaty. By the
time the Romanian officials finally understood that they must take action in Tokyo,
it was too late, the Soviets already being active in Japan — so active that they had
already reached a deal ensuring the postponement of the Japanese ratification.
Japan’s Relations with the Soviet Union
Like the other signatory Great Powers, Japan sought to take advantage of the
ratification. But, in contrast to France and England, who obtained benefits from Ro-
mania, or to Italy, which had finagled advantages from both Romania and the Sovi-
ets, Japan took her part of the pie from the Soviets.
At first, the Japanese did not intend to use the ratification problem in order to
gain commercial advantages from Russia. Perhaps they did not even think of that.
But, as time passed and the Soviet campaign against ratification grew more insistent,
Japan saw herself in a dilemma. On the one hand, if she were to ratify, relations with
Russia would suffer a serious blow. On the other hand, if she failed to ratify, her rela-
tions with the other signatory Powers might be affected. These were the relations
that the Japanese really cared about and not their relations with Romania, a country
in which they had almost no interest.
By autumn 1923, there was no longer an Anglo-Japanese alliance, no longer a
“Conference of the Ambassadors”, and Japan’s role in European and world politics
had, indeed, dramatically decreased. On the other hand, there was the continuing
consolidation of the new Russia. At this juncture, Japanese expressed a new position
on the matter: we are not a European power, so we have decided to wait until the
European Powers decide. It was a good compromise solution.
By May 1924, the Japanese government officially expressed its position to the
Romanians, via the Ishii Note, the first concession made to the Soviets, in order to
avoid a possible blow to the talks going on in Peking.
Following the French ratification, the Japanese understood how significant the
ratification was for the Soviets. During the Karakhan-Yoshizawa talks in Peking, the
ratification was an important topic and, following the same reasoning behind the
Ishii Note, a compromise solution was reached. The Japanese carefully avoided
promising not to ratify. Nevertheless, they made a second concession to the Rus-
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CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
sians, in two steps: the Yoshizawa verbal statement of May 1924 (not to ratify before
the European Powers) and the Yoshizawa-Karakhan exchange of letters, stating the
same facts in writing. The Soviets could claim that Japan had undertaken not to rat-
ify, and their propaganda made full use of this. But the Japanese did not give the So-
viets all they wanted: the secret and private exchange of letters specified only that
Japan would not ratify before Italy did so.
Nevertheless, the Soviets were satisfied, firstly because they could focus their
efforts only on Italy; and secondly, because they understood that the Japanese could
be convinced not to ratify, especially as time was working in the Soviets’ favor.
The next and the most important moment for Japan was March 1927 when the
Italians ratified. The pressure was great, both for and against ratification. The pres-
sure in favor was operated more at the moral level, while the second worked at the
material level. Japanese officials seized the Italian ratification as an opportunity to
extract Soviet concessions in the fishery negotiations.193 In fact, Debuchi gave Besse-
dovskii a choice of inducements to offer the Japanese for non-ratification: accommo-
dation in the fishery talks, or withdrawing Borodin from China. Bessedovskii chose
the former.
As proved by both the documents and history (the failure to ratify), the two
parties finally came to a verbal understanding, the Japanese simply postponing the
ratification until at least the establishment of Romanian-Soviet relations. The Sovi-
ets understood very well the difficult position Japan was in, and renounced their
initial insistence that Japan declare outright its non-intent to ratify. Even though
Romania or another Power might insist on ratification, they could at any time take
action against the Japanese fishery industry or bring other pressures to bear. Both
the Soviets and Japan were satisfied with the solution. Japan even tried, during 1938,
to make use of the ratification question again in order to solve some of her problems
with the Soviets, coincidentally exactly at a time when there were intense discus-
sions over fishery rights.
Summing up, the Japanese attitude toward the ratification and the influence of
the Soviets over Japan’s failure to ratify could be reduced to six key moments: the
Ishii Note (May 1924), the Yoshizawa verbal statement (May 1924), the secret and
private exchange of letters between Karakhan and Yoshizawa (January 1925), the
Shidehara-Kopp meeting in October 1925 (and the campaign initiated by Kopp for
the non-ratification), the Debuchi-Bessedovskii verbal agreement (March 1927), and
the Shigemitsu trial balloon (1938).
< 335 >

Notes
1
Takako Ueta, “The Genoa Conference and Japan: A Lesson in Great-Power Diplomacy” in Genoa,
Rapallo, and European Reconstruction in 1922, p. 217.
2
There is also an important amount of information regarding the evolution of Russo-Romanian rela-
tions even before the start of the war (JFMA, Fond 1.2.3, 1-82, passim), and on the Bessarabian ques-
tion and the worsening Russo-Romanian relations during 1917 (JFMA, Fond 5.2.15, 35, passim),
proving Japan’s interest with European matters years before achieving its Great Power status.
3
The mentioned 19 syntheses are all located in the file dealing with the Bessarabian Treaty ratifica-
tion question, B 7.6.0, 2. There are a number of similar descriptions of Bessarabia located in other
files too, but the former ones make no reference to the ratification question.
4
Letter Alexandru Vaida-Voevod to Iuliu Maniu, February 20, 1919, quoted in 1920. Un act de justitie.
Documente, p. 111.
5
6
See, for example, JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Telegram Matsui to Uchida, June 24, 1920, in which
the US official position regarding the signing of a Bessarabian Treaty is presented in details. Or Tele-
gram Ishii to Uchida, October 15, 1920, which reviews the entire matter while insisting on the nego-
tiations between Take Ionescu and the French diplomats regarding the final form of the Treaty.
7
Although some reports sent by the Japanese representatives in Italy during 1924 mentioned, while
describing the press campaign pro and against the ratification, the problem of the Italians landlords
expropriated in Bessarabia, there is no connection made to the exchange of letters. JFMA, Fond 1.2.3,
1-147, Report from Rome, March 26, 1924; also JFMA, Fond 1.2.3, 1-151, Telegram from Rome, Octo-
ber 8, 1924.
8
Quoted from the report prepared by Viscount Ishii for Gaimusho during September 1921, in Takako
Ueta, “The Upper Silesia question and Japan” in The Establishment of European Frontiers after the Two
World Wars, p. 171.
9
For details on his visit to Japan and the numerous festivities organized in his honor see RFMA,
Fond 71/1914, Special Files, Vol. 46/2, R 2 and JFMA, Fond L 1.3.0, 2-8. Also, an excellent description
of the visit, made by one of those accompanying Prince Carol, is presented in C. Gavanescul, Ocolul
lumii in sapte luni si o saptamana, Volume 5, “Japonia”, passim.
10
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Memorandum by Kroupenski, November 1920.
11
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Memoire by the Romanian Government regarding Events in Bessara-
bia, July 24, 1922.
12
RFMA, Fond 71, Special Files, R2, Vol. 46/2, Telegram Averescu to Arion, April 7, 1920.
13
RFMA, Fond 71, Special Files, R2, Vol. 46/2, Report Arion to Prince Carol, January 4, 1921.
14
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Telegram Ishii to Uchida, June 8, 1921.
15
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Telegram Uchida to Ishii, June 23, 1921.
16
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Telegram Ishii to Uchida, March 15, 1922.
17
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Note Hugh Wilson to Tanaka, May 10 and answer from Tanaka, May
12, 1922.
18
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 24, Letter Duca to Genshiro Nishi, October 26, 1923.
19
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Telegram from Bucharest containing a Memoire by Duca on the im-
portance the ratification has over the development of Bessarabia, October 30, 1923.
20
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, E 2, Vol. 24, Letter Nishi to Duca, October 31, 1923.
21
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Letter British Embassy to Gaimusho, November 1923.
22
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Instructions for Ishii, November 27, 1923.
23
The Japanese government seriously analyzed the possibility of acquiring oil from Romania. As
soon as 1921, the Japanese Consul General in Hamburg, Morie Ohno, presented a very comprehen-
sive report on Romania, as a result of his trip to Romania during the fall of 1920, in which a really
large part is dedicated to the Romanian oil industry (reserves, exploitations, legislation, export).
< 336 >

CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
JFMA, Fond 1.6.3, 17-17, Report on Romania, February 26, 1921. Another proof of Japan’s interest is
given by the huge report on the Romanian oil industry (460 pages full of data, statistics, photo-
graphs and comments) sent at the end of 1924 from Bucharest. JFMA, Fond 1.7.6, 4-3, Report from
Bucharest, December 17, 1924. The main obstacle for the Japanese was the huge transportation cost.
24
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 8, passim. Also, as the Treaty came before the Privy Council, the entire ques-
tion regarding Japan’s involvement with the Treaty, including the Treaty itself translated into Japa-
nese, is presented in “Records of the Meetings of the Privy Council”, vol. 43 (1927), p. 151-215
25
For example, the Japanese representatives also closely watched the Tatar-Bunar episode or the
making of the Autonomous Moldavian SSR. JFMA, Fond 1.6.3, 2-34, November 1924.
26
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Telegrams Tamura (Prague) to Matsui, March 24 and April 3, 1924.
27
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Telegram Horiguchi to Matsui, April 9, 1924.
28
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 183, Telegram de Maneville to Poincare, April 10, 1924, c. 582.
29
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 183, Telegram Pierre de Margerie (Berlin) to Poincare, May 2,
1924, c. 615.
30
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kikujiro Ishii was Ambassador of Japan to France and also the
Japanese representative in the Council of the League of Nations. Later on he published an interesting
account of his diplomatic activity, “Diplomatic Commentaries”.
31
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Note by Matsui, April 17, 1924.
32
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Telegrams Horiguchi to Matsui, May 6 and 12, 1924.
33
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Report Horiguchi to Matsui, May 29, 1924.
34
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Telegram Matsui to Ishii, May 8, 1924.
35
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Note Ishii to Duca, May 31, 1924.
36
The Tokyo Nichi Nichi, March 29, 1924.
37
And indeed, his declarations insisting that Japan should not ratify, were published in a number of
Japanese newspapers, among which the most influential were Asahi Shinbun and Osaka Maininchi Shin-
bun, March 31, 1924.
38
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Telegram Matsui to Yoshizawa, May 24, 1924.
39
Although I was not granted access to secret documents existing in the former Soviet Foreign Min-
istry Archives, Mr. Pavlov, the Chief of the Lecture Hall at the mentioned Archives, was kind enough
to look for any documents that might relate the Karakhan-Yoshizawa negotiations with the Bessara-
bian Treaty question. Unfortunately, the result of his search was a negative one, both him and the
person in charge with keeping the archives for the Japanese-Soviet relations stressing out that there
were no such documents.
40
A.G. Lensen, Japanese Recognition of the USSR. Soviet-Japanese Relations 1921-1930, p.155.
41
A.G. Lensen, Japanese Recognition . . . , p. 160.
42
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 1, Top secret document on the negotiations for the Article no 4 of Pro-
tocol A, not dated, attached to the December 1924 Report on the Bessarabian question.
43
Quoted in Bruce A. Eleman, “The 1925 Soviet-Japanese Secret Agreement on Bessarabia”, in Diplo-
macy & Statecraft, July 1994, p. 290.
44
The New York Times, January 15, 1925.
45
The Manchester Guardian, January 29, 1925.
46
The Times, January 21, 1925.
47
For the letters see Shigeo Mutsushika, “The Second World War and the Balkans” in Nobuyuki
Shiba, Barukan shi, p. 332.
48
However secret was the understanding between Yoshizawa and Karakhan, as soon as 1934 histo-
rian P. Milioukow mentions that in 1925, reaching agreement with the Soviet Union on the Sakhalin
question, Japan undertook by a secret agreement not to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty, probably
based on information he obtained from Bessedovskii. P. Milioukow, La politique exterieure des Soviets,
quoted in A. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei, p. 514.
49
For the Basic Convention and the other documents signed on January 20, 1925, see A.G. Lensen,
< 337 >

Japanese Recognition . . . , p. 177-191.

50
Less than a month after signing the Basic Convention, unhappy with the turn of events, the Japa-
nese government asked Yoshizawa to remind Karakhan of both the exact content and the private
character of the exchange of letters. JFMA, Fond 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 2, Telegram Shidehara to Yoshizawa,
February 15, 1925.
51
Shigeo Mutsushika, “The Second …” in Nobuyuki Shiba, Barukan shi, p. 332-333.
52
A.G. Lensen, Japanese Recognition . . . , p. 191. On the other hand, it is a little bit surprising that A.G.
Lensen, who had seen the Japanese documents, fails to mention in his book the exchange of letters,
as well as the entire Bessarabian question as part of the Russo-Japanese negotiations.
53
Neamul Romanesc, January 22, 1925.
54
JFMA, Fond 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 2, Telegrams Shidehara to Horiguchi, January 22 and 23, 1925. Also Tele-
gram Shidehara to Ishii, February 16, 1925.
55
Actually, the Japanese were preparing a commercial treaty with Romania as soon as 1917, due to
the opening of the Romanian Legation in Japan, when they thought that Romania intends to sign a
commercial treaty. Their efforts had been canceled by Romania’s armistice with the Central Powers.
Before the visit of Prince Carol to Japan, again a new draft for a commercial treaty was prepared, but
they were wrong about Carol’s attributions while in Japan. For details see JFMA, Fond 2.5.1, 67, Vol.
1, passim.
56
For the Japanese account of the 1924 negotiations see JFMA, Fond 2.5.1, 67, Vol. 2, passim. For the
Romanian account see RFMA, Fond Conventions 2, J 2, Vol. 1, passim.
57
During my research in both, RFMA and JFMA, I found no documents connecting the two events.
However, until the Soviet documents are available for study, the possibility that Horiguchi’s in-
tended leave was caused by the events related to the ratification question (not a simple coincidence)
should not be excluded.
58
Adevarul, April 6, 1924.
59
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Carp to Duca, December 3, 1925.
60
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 2, Telegram Ochiai to Shidehara, February 23, 1925.
61
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, The November 1932 Report.
62
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 2, Memorandum by Kopp, October 1925.
63
64
DDI, Serie 7, Vol. 4, Telegram Manzoni for Mussolini, November 20, 1926, p. 380.
65
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, Report from the Japanese Embassy in Rome, March 16, 1927.
66
The Times, March 18, 1927.
67
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Langa Rascanu to Mitilineu, March 16, 1927.
68
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Carp to Mitilineu, March 19, 1927.
69
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 189, Telegram Clinchant to Briand, March 8, 1927, c. 701.
70
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, Telegram Mushanokoji to Shidehara, March 9, 1927. A few years
later, when Mushanokoji was named Japan’s Ambassador to Berlin, his pro-German sympathies
came into light, somehow pointing the reasons for his action against the ratification.
71
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, Telegram Shidehara to Mushanokoji, March 11, 1927.
72
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, Report on matters regarding the Bessarabian Treaty ratification,
March 11, 1927.
73
Ambassador Tanaka sent to Tokyo a number of translations from articles published in Izvestia that
were dealing with Japan’s attitude towards the ratification, presenting the main Soviet arguments.
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Telegrams Tanaka to Shidehara, March 20 and March 21, 1927.
74
While in Russia, the author of the present paper informally asked the people in charge of the for-
mer Soviet Foreign Ministry Archives about the existence of documents pointing to the Besse-
dovskii-Debuchi or Dovgalevski-Debuchi negotiations, but the answer was the same as regarding
the 1925 exchange of letters.
75
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, “The visit of the Russian representative in connection to the Bessara-
bian Treaty Problem”, March 10, 1927.
< 338 >

CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
76
G. Bessedovskii, Revelations . . . , p. 151-152.
77
For details on Borodin’s activity in China see Louis Fischer, Russia’s Road from Peace to War, p. 119-
120, 125-130, 136-139. Also, for a different and more critical, although not necessarily objective view
on Borodin’s activities see G. Bessedovskii, Revelations . . . , p. 99, 118-168.
78
According to Fischer, Borodin’s decision to leave China was due to his controversy with Manaben-
dra Nath Roy, the new emissary sent by the Kremlin to China, and due to his frustration over the
impasse at Wuhan in July, which permitted neither military success nor revolutionary progress.
Louis Fischer, Russia’s Road . . . , p. 139.
79
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, “The visit of the Russian representative in connection to the Bessara-
bian Treaty Problem”, March 10, 1927.
80
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, Telegram Tanaka to Shidehara, March 22, 1927.
81
A.G. Lensen, Japanese Recognition . . . , p. 257. Interesting is that the agreements had been reached,
according to Stomoniakov, because the Japanese decided to accept some of the Russian proposals
and renounced to some of their demands, and not vice versa. The fact that the agreements had been
reached in favor of the Soviet Union is a little bit troubling and makes us think that Stomoniakov’s
letter was simply overstating the real situation, fact proved by the continuation of the Bessedovskii-
Debuchi negotiations.
82
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, “The visit of the Russian Chargé d’affaires and the fishery question”,
not dated but probably March 25, 1927.
83
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, “The visit of the Russian Chargé d’affaires and the fishery question”,
not dated but probably March 25, 1927.
84
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, “Discussions with the German Ambassador Regarding the Bessara-
bian and Fishery Problems”, March 24, 1927.
85
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, “Discussions with the German Ambassador Regarding the Bessara-
bian and Fishery Problems”, March 24, 1927.
86
See the documents published by Dumitru Hincu in “Problema Basarabiei in arhivele diplomatice
germane si austriece. Un tratat uitat”, in Magazin Istoric, 1994.
87
A somehow similar example of friendship between Soviet and German diplomats is that between
Brockdorf-Rantzau, the German ambassador in Moscow, and Gheorghi Cicerin. Louis Fischer, Rus-
sia’s Road . . . , p. 84. Bessedovskii himself also confirms his friendship with Solf, stating that Solf “was
a good friend . . . he did me many services” which means that, indeed, Solf might have acted as an
intermediary between Bessedovskii and Debuchi. G. Bessedovskii, Revelations . . . , p. 135.
88
A.G. Lensen, Japanese Recognition . . . , p. 259. The Soviets had clearly opposed the opening of the fish-
ing season on the conditions presented by the Japanese one week earlier, but they suddenly changed
their position. Lensen fails to give any explanation for this change, but there can be only one: the
ratification question.
89
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, “The visit of the Russian representative and the fishery problem”, not
dated but probably March 25, 1927.
90
Interesting is that the treasury was made of gold and the Crown’s Jewels, and not paper money, so
that the Soviets did not have to pay back anything to the Romanians, they simply had to return the
gold and the jewelries. Problem was that they already spent the gold and sold the jewelries overseas.
91
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, “The visit of the Russian representative and the fishery problem”, not
dated but probably March 25, 1927.
92
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, Telegram Tanaka Giichi to Ambassador Tanaka, June 20, 1927.
93
The concessions are detailed in A.G. Lensen, Japanese Recognition . . . , p. 259-260. The Soviet Union
agreed to give to the Japanese the right to build and operate an unlimited number of factories for the
period of the lease of the respective fishery lots, going further than the Japanese demand that permis-
sion be granted for 25 factories; the Soviet Union agreed to exclude the point about labor from Pro-
tocol 3 and to delete the demand about the relief of workers in factories; the Soviet Union was low-
ering considerably the amount deducted per crate of canned goods and was prepared to decrease the
< 339 >

total sum of duties on fish to 30% of the lease fee; limiting the participation of the cooperative and of
enterprises with a minority of state capital to the auctions for the fishery lots; the Tsentrosoiuz (the
central union of consumers’ cooperative) did not intend to include the fishery in the convention
region during the period that the convention was in effect.
94
A.G. Lensen, Japanese Recognition . . . , p. 266.
95
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 189, Telegram Herbette to Briand, January 26, 1928, c. 745.
96
JFMA, Fond M 2.5.0, 4-43, Telegram Mushanokoji to Tanaka, March 9, 1927.
97
L’Independence Romaine, Bucharest, July 13, 1927.
98
As an interesting aspect it should be noted that on September 24, 1935, Radu Flondor, secretary of
the Romanian Legation, wrote a paper (necessary in order to be promoted) called “The Japanese
Fishing Industry and the Japanese-Russian Controversy over the Fishing Rights in Northern Wa-
ters”. The paper proves that, although he studied this topic, he was completely unaware of the con-
nection between the fishing rights and the ratification, meaning that even as the Romanians opened
their Legation in Tokyo the information they were able to gather on the ratification question was
quite poor.
99
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Petrescu Comnen to Mitilineu, April 26, 1927.
100
Before being named as Romania’s minister to Japan, Vassiliu’s career was spent mostly in the cen-
tral administration of the Romanian Foreign Ministry. Although he was promoted to a high rank in
the ministry, his international experience was very limited and he also had no particular knowledge
of Japan. This situation greatly influenced his actions during the first months in Tokyo.
101
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Vassiliu to Titulescu, August 13, 1927.
102
JFMA, Fond M 2.5.0, 4-43, Telegram Mushanokoji to Tanaka, July 26, 1927.
103
RFMA, Personal Files, Ion Aurel Vassiliu, Telegram Vassiliu to Titulescu, July 30, 1927. Also
JFMA, Fond M 2.5.0, 4-43, Meeting between Vassiliu and Tanaka, July 28, 1927.
104
RFMA, Personal Files, Ion Aurel Vassiliu, Telegram Vassiliu for Bucharest, August 28, 1927. It is
quite known, even nowadays, that when a Japanese official or bureaucrat tells you that your request
has been rejected due to existing regulations, any more insisting would only embarrass him. This is
one of the first rules any foreigner coming to Japan has to learn (be it the easy or the hard way) and it
seems that Vassiliu failed to do his homework. He did not learn much about the Japanese ways of
handling different things before and even after coming to Tokyo. On the other hand, if we compare
Vassiliu’s accommodation period with that of Bessedovskii (as presented by him in his book and
probably exaggerated) the difference is striking. Although this situation might happen to anyone,
Vassiliu was supposed to represent Romania in Tokyo and to do it in an honorable manner, particu-
larly since honor was his only argument towards the Japanese.
105
JFMA, Fond 2.5.0, 4-43, Letter Vassiliu to Tanaka, October 25, 1927.
106
RFMA, Personal Files, I.A. Vassiliu, Telegram Vassiliu for Bucharest, October 15, 1927.
107
JFMA, Fond M 2.5.0, 4-43, Invitation for Vassiliu, November 7, 1927.
108
JFMA, E 2-9-0, 1-6-1, Telegram Mushanokoji to Tanaka, September 22, 1927.
109
JFMA, E 2-9-0, 1-6-1, Telegram Mushanokoji reporting on Duca’s note, December 30, 1927.
110
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Vassiliu to Titulescu, November 30, 1927.
111
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Vassiliu to Titulescu, December 13, 1927.
112
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Vassiliu to Titulescu, December 16, 1927. Still, this last
argument is at least strange if we consider that the Government was able to convince the Parliament
to ratify all the other treaties that it signed, including those imposed on Japan on arms limitation.
113
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegrams Vassiliu to Titulescu, December 18 and 20, 1927.
114
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Vassiliu to Titulescu, December 20, 1927.
115
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Vassiliu to Titulescu, January 1, 1928.
116
Actually Duca met Mushanokoji in a different quality: due to the absence from the country of
Foreign Minister Nicolae Titulescu, Duca was also acting Foreign Minister.
117
JFMA, Fond B7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, Telegram Mushanokoji to Tanaka, January 18, 1928.
118
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Duca to Vassiliu, February 27, 1928.
< 340 >

CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
119
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Vassiliu to Duca, March 6, 1928.
120
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Vassiliu to Duca, March 6, 1928. Still, if we remember the
Duca-Mushanokoji incident, Duca’s comments are a little bit too harsh on Vassiliu.
121
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Vassiliu for Bucharest, March 16th 1928
122
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Vassiliu to Titulescu, May 31, 1928.
123
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Ad notated on the Telegram Vassiliu to Titulescu, May 31, 1928.
124
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Davidescu to Mironescu, April 14, 1929.
125
126
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Vassiliu to Mironescu, June 15, 1929.
127
JFMA, Fond M 5.2.0, 4-43, Invitation for Stoicescu, July 17, 1929.
128
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Report by Stoicescu, December 4, 1929.
129
In fact, the Foreign Ministry justified Vassiliu’s change on budgetary reasons, sending in a re-
placement with a lower salary. The same happened in a number of Romanian Legations throughout
June: Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Turkey, and Egypt. RFMA, Personal Files, I.A. Vassiliu, Telegram
Mironescu to Vassiliu, May 9, 1929.
130
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, “Report on the Opportunity of the Signing a Friendship Treaty
between Romania and Japan”, January 31, 1930.
131
Count Adachi Mineichiro arbitrated the Hungarian Optants conflict between Romania
(represented by Titulescu) and Hungary in 1923, which ended in a Convention favorable to Roma-
nia, and later on he was considered as a friend of Titulescu. For details on the 1923 events see M.
Matsushita, Japan in the League of Nations, p. 104-109. Also JFMA, Fond 1.2.3, 1-144, Telegram from Lon-
don, June 29, 1923.
132
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Stoicescu to Mironescu, December 15, 1930.
133
The Japanese official was the Vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, Yoshida. RFMA, Fond 71/Japan,
Vol. 12, Telegram Stoicescu to Mironescu, June 21, 1930.
134
In fact, when he left Japan, he donated the house and land he bought for himself in the famous
Nikko resort to the Japanese government, in order to transform it into a Romanian house in Japan,
generously offering to continue support a part of the expenses with the house after leaving Japan. It
must be admitted that not many diplomats would be willing to do such a gesture. JFMA, Fond M
1.5.0, 3-37, July 1939.
135
Universul, Bucharest, March 11, 1927. The article, published in the aftermath of Italy’s ratification,
presents a number of previous Japanese statements regarding the ratification, including Nakamura’s
interpellation.
136
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Report on Japan and the Bessarabian Treaty Ratification Problem,
February 28, 1931.
137
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Stoicescu to Mironescu, Report on Japan and the Bessarabian
Treaty Ratification Question, February 28, 1931.
138
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Report from the Romanian Legation in Washington, July 21, 1931.
139
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Davila to Ghika, February 20, 1932.
140
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Davila to Ghika, April 15, 1932.
141
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Visoianu to Vaida-Voevod, September 9, 1932.
142
143
144
For example, during 1932 a number of telegrams and reports were sent from Riga, Bucharest and
Warsaw regarding the Soviet-Romanian negotiations for a non-aggression pact. JFMA, Fond B 1.0.0,
R-RU1, passim.
145
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Stoicescu to Titulescu, July 1, 1936.
146
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Titulescu for Bucharest, August 7, 1936.
147
Telegram Titulescu to King Carol, Geneva, February 25, 1932, quoted in Nicolae Titulescu, Diplo-
matic Documents, p. 395.
148
JFMA, Fond B 7.6.0, 2, Vol. 3, Final Report regarding “The Bessarabian Treaty Ratification Problem”.
< 341 >

149
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Ciuntu to Tatarescu, February 15, 1938.
150
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Dianu to Petrescu-Comnen, July 30, 1938.
151
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, Telegram Dianu to Petrescu-Comnen, November 3, 1938.
152
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, “Report on the Opportunity of Obtaining an Eventual Japanese
Ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty”, September 2, 1938.
153
As soon as 1902, the Japanese representative in Vienna asked his Romanian counterpart of the
possibility of signing a commercial treaty between Japan and Romania. In 1904 the Romanians de-
clined the Japanese proposal, arguing that they are not prepared to upset Russia by signing a treaty
with Japan. In 1906 and 1910, Count Makino suggested again negotiations for the signing of a com-
mercial treaty, as a result of clear instructions received from Tokyo, only in order to be refused by the
Romanians. JFMA, Fond 2.5.1, 67, passim.
154
RFMA, Fond 71/Japan, Vol. 12, “Report on the Opportunity of Obtaining an Eventual Japanese
Ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty”, September 2, 1938.
155
JFMA, Fond A 6.0.0, 6-5, Report from Bucharest, October 26, 1939.
156
The author of the present paper is the beneficiary of a very generous scholarship from the Japa-
nese Ministry of Education. During his period as a student, both in Romania and Japan he has fo-
cused much of his efforts on the Romanian-Japanese relations making a thorough survey of the Japa-
nese and Romanian mass media and also of historical archives. It is for this particular reason that a
detailed survey of Romanian and Japanese press related to the Bessarabian Treaty is presented in the
following pages while there are no similar presentations for the relations between Romania and
France, Britain or Italy.
157
Neamul Romanesc, Bucharest, April 6, 1924.
158
Argus, Bucharest, April 4, 1924.
159
The visit was described by all the Romanian press, making the first page of the newspapers like
Universul, Adevarul, or Neamul Romanesc during the first days of April 1924.
160
Adevarul, Bucharest, April 5, 1924.
161
The Japanese Ambassador to Berlin expresses this opinion during a conversation with his French
counterpart. RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 183, Telegram Pierre de Margerie to Poincare, May 2,
1924, c. 615.
162
Universul, December 25, 1924.
163
Adevarul, January 8, 1925.
164
Neamul Romanesc, January 22, 1925.
165
Universul, January 23, 1925.
166
167
168
Adevarul, February 21, 1925.
169
Adevarul, March 10, 1927. Also, Argus, March 20, 1927.
170
Universul, March 11, 1927.
171
Universul, March 26, 1927.
172
Adevarul, June 1, 1927.
173
For example “The Christening in Japan”, published in Universul, March 11, 1927.
174
The Japan Times, October 30, 1920.
175
The Japan Times, March 18, 1924.
176
Tokyo Nichi Nichi, Asahi Shinbun, April 4, 1924.
177
Asahi Shinbun, March 19 and April 1, 1924. Tokyo Nichi Nichi, April 11, 1924.
178
Tokyo Nichi Nichi, March 29, 1924.
179
For example, “Russia’s Manner. The Bessarabian Question and Karakhan’s Request”, in Asahi Shin-
bun, March 31, 1924.
180
Tokiji (Jiji) Shinbun, March, 21, 1927. Tokyo Nichi Nichi, March 22, 1927.
< 342 >

CHAPTER 8. JAPAN
181
Tokyo Nichi Nichi, March 20, 1927.
182
Nippon Dempo United Press, March 19, 1927.
183
“Romania Marches Toward Republicanism”, by Karl H. Von Wiegand on March 13, and “What
Romania Needs” by C.A. Macartney, reproduced from Foreign Affairs, on March 17, 1927.
184
Osaka Mainichi, March 28, 1927.
185
Yamato Shinbun, March 16, 1927.
186
“Japanese Treaty Action” in The Japan Advertiser, March 10, 1927.
187
The Japan Advertiser, March 23, 1927.
188
“Japan and Bessarabia” in The Japan Advertiser, March 23, 1927.
189
See, for example, Tokyo Nichi Nichi, July 21, 1933. Also Asahi Shinbun, July 21, 1933.
190
Ian Nish, “A Japanese Diplomat Looks at Europe, 1920-39” in European Studies on Japan, p. 135.
191
According to the instructions sent by Uchida, the Foreign Minister at the time, “the Japanese
delegates were to oppose any recognition of the Bolshevik government or any financial assistance
until Moscow accepted the repayment of its debts”. Quoted in Takako Ueta, “The Genoa Conference
and Japan” in A Missed Opportunity . . . , p. 222-223.
192
Takako Ueta, “The Upper Silesia Question and Japan” in The Establishment of Frontiers . . . , p. 172-174.
193
The increasing pressure coming from the Japanese fishermen over the Government for obtaining
the Soviet agreement regarding the opening of the new fishing season was difficult to bear by the
Government. During the fishery negotiations, aimed at reaching a broader agreement, the Soviets
had successfully used their opposition to the opening of a new fishing season, arguing that at first a
new Fishing Agreement should be reached. As the negotiations moved on quite slowly and the be-
ginning of the fishing season was closer and closer, the Japanese were able to obtain a change in the
Soviet diplomacy, which allowed the fishermen to start fishing on the same conditions as during the
previous year (meaning no new auctions for the fishing lots – less money to be paid by the Japanese
fishing companies), and by this taking off some of the pressure the Government had to bear from the
fishermen.
< 343 >

CHAPTER 9.
THE UNITED STATES
Of all the Great Powers that played a direct or indirect role in the Bessarabian
question, except for the Soviet Union, the United States was by far the biggest ob-
stacle to Romania during the interwar period. It is by no means easy to ascertain the
reasons behind the US policy, and many previous scholars for various reasons have
preferred to either portray it in brighter colors than seems appropriate to this writer,
or have failed to mention it at all. Therefore, in order to articulate a different opinion
regarding the US policy on Bessarabian, this chapter will go into considerable detail
(despite the topic’s slight removal from the question of the Treaty itself).1
The US followed two distinct policies on the Bessarabian question before
World War Two. The first (chronologically) approved Romania’s action in Bessara-
bia and acknowledged that Bessarabia should belong to Romania. The second was
expressed for the first time in May 1919 when the US Secretary of State, Robert
Lansing, announced that, in the view of President Wilson, there should be no modi-
fication regarding the territory belonging to the former Russian Empire without the
approval of a recognized Russian government.
The new policy not only blocked any recognition by the Peace Conference of
Romania’s rights to Bessarabia but also, after the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty,
was directed against Romanian interests by clearly indicating the US refusal to even
de facto recognize Bessarabia’s union (through the inclusion of Bessarabia into the
general Russian immigration quota). It was only in 1931 that the US Government,
pressured by the Romanians, decided to create a special immigration quota for Bes-
sarabia. And in 1933, in a very secretive and disputable manner, the immigration
quota for Bessarabia was incorporated into the general quota for Romania.
Therefore, we are left with three main questions. What was behind the sudden
change in the American position regarding the Bessarabian question in May 1919?
Why did it take the US fifteen years to recognize a de facto situation2 or, in other
words, to end a situation of “public discrimination” against Romania, and even then
< 345 >

in such a way that it might have been turned against Romania at any time? And fi-
nally, how is it that the Romanian government accepted this situation without a
struggle, for years?
Romanian-US Relations During the War
Before the war, the Romanian government had no representative in the US; it
was only in 1917 that a Romanian Legation was established in Washington (by the
same decree law a Romanian Legation was established in Tokyo). By contrast, the
US already had a Minister in Romania at the beginning of the war.3 During 1913-
1920, the US Minister to Romania was Charles J. Vopicka. His activities were clearly
directed in favor of Romanian interests. Born in Bohemia, he had a deep-seated hos-
tility toward the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the sympathy he expressed for the
achievement of the Romanian national aspirations in Transylvania made him genu-
inely popular with the Romanian people.4 He had a positive influence on the devel-
opment of bilateral relations and left an interesting account of his mission to Roma-
nia and Serbia in a book of memoirs published in 1921 and tellingly titled, Secrets of the
Balkans. Acting in more or less the opposite direction were the efforts of William H.
Andrews, the US Chargé d’affaires in Jassy while Vopicka was absent.5
During his forced return to the US at the beginning of 1917 (as a result of Ger-
man complaints), Vopicka worked intensely on behalf of Romania. When he went
back to Romania and saw the disastrous effects of the Russian Revolution on the
Romanian front, during the fall and winter 1917-18, he did everything possible to
keep Romania in the war and to revitalize the Russian Army (what remained of it)
on the Eastern front.
Starting with the summer of 1917, American relief funds were available for Ro-
mania. A number of groups and associations had been established in the US, com-
prised of Romanian-Americans or of Americans willing to help Romania. Romania
had received, by March 1918, the third largest allocation of American assistance, ex-
ceeded only by France and Armenia.6 In addition, considerable propaganda was pro-
duced in favor of the Romanian cause. It is not a surprise that members of the In-
quiry panel held numerous consultations during 1918 with Vasile Stoica, the Transyl-
vanian emissary sent to US by the Romanian government.7 Part of the American
press was on Romania’s side in 1918, and showed a clear understanding of the trap
Romania was in that forced her to sign a separate peace. As a result of this propa-
ganda, by the time of the Paris Peace Conference, American public opinion generally
lay with Romania.8 However, pro-Romanian sympathies in the US were at a much
lower level than those reserved for the Polish, Serb, or Czech peoples.
The US policy played an indirect but important role in the Romanian decision
to make peace with the Central Powers. At first, the American entry into war was
received with great enthusiasm, Bratianu considering that the US policy towards
Austria-Hungary was in line with the opinions expressed by Vopicka. He decided to
open a Romanian Legation in the US but, due to the difficulty of transportation, it
< 346 >

CHAPTER 9. THE UNITED STATES
was only in January 1918 that the first Romanian minister, Dr. Constantin Angelescu,
was able to present his credentials.
Of course, the Romanians’ first objective was to obtain the US approval, if not
signature, for the Romanian territorial claims comprised in the August 1916 Treaty
between Romania and the Entente. But in this question they were to be disap-
pointed; the Americans were unprepared to agree to those claims, especially as they
were not at war with Austria-Hungary. All they were willing to offer Romania dur-
ing 1917 was a loan of some five million dollars, which Romania was not able to avail
herself of due to the absence of a Romanian Minister in Washington to sign for it.9
The Romanian hopes of obtaining the US blessing for their territorial claims
received quite a cold shower at the end of November 1917, in the message sent by
President Wilson to King Ferdinand. He stated, “I wish to assure Your Majesty that
the US will support Romania after the war to the best of its ability and that, in any
final negotiations for peace, it will use its constant efforts to see to it that the integ-
rity of Romania as a free and independent nation is adequately safeguarded”.10 In the
Romanian view, that fell far short of what the occasion required, and their decision
to sign the armistice at the beginning of December 1917 was at least indirectly influ-
enced by the American position.
The timing was particularly bad when the Romanians received news of Presi-
dent Wilson’s famous speech of January 1918. When the Wilsonian points reached
the Romanian government, Vopicka reported the reaction: “The Romanian govern-
ment proclaims that if Romania should now have her occupied territory returned,
without occupying Transylvania, there is no necessity to stay in the war any fur-
ther”.11
One of the controversies regarding the US position towards the future peace
has to do with the process of the crafting of the 14 Wilsonian points, with an accent
on both the influence of the Inquiry12 and on President Wilson’s own position, with
Colonel House somewhere in the middle. Still, although the American literature
agrees that the 14 points were definitely the result of American thinking, the view
differs among scholars of different origins.13 It is not the purpose of the work to ana-
lyze either the degree of influence the Inquiry had over the President in preparing
the speech or the conflict between the State Department and the President on this
matter.14
Among the 14 Wilsonian points, the two referring to Austria-Hungary and the
Balkans were of particular interest for Romania. The first, actually Point No. 10, em-
phasized that the peoples of Austria-Hungary should be accorded the freest oppor-
tunity of autonomous development.15 There was no suggestion either of breaking up
Austria-Hungary, or of making any territorial adjustment with its neighbors. This
was a serious blow for the Romanians.
Point No. 11 was along the same lines, simply stating that Romania should be
evacuated, her territory restored and that “the relationship among of the several Bal-
kan states to one another should be determined by friendly counsel along historically
established lines of allegiance and nationality”.16 As there are no such lines in the
< 347 >

Balkans, the last phrase really meant nothing. In these conditions any incentive for
the Romanians to keep on fighting had been lost, their main aim in the war being
clearly wiped out by the American peace proposal. From the viewpoint of the French
and British governments the President had put his foot into the Romanian situation
at a most inopportune time, when, even after the Romanian armistice of December 9,
1917, they were still battling to keep Romania in the war. The implications of Presi-
dent Wilson’s decision to plead for the integrity of Austria-Hungary instead of giv-
ing a free hand to the nationalities living in the Empire have been presented by many
scholars and what becomes clear is that the only concrete result was the prolonga-
tion of the war by at least a few months.17
The proposals made by the Inquiry were even worse for Romania than the
presidential points. The Inquiry Report stated: “No just or lasting settlement of the
tangled problems confronting the deeply wronged peoples of the Balkans can be
based upon the arbitrary Treaty of Bucharest [of 1913] . . . the area annexed by Roma-
nia in the Dobrudja is almost surely Bulgarian in character and should be returned.”18
Apart from the fact that the history of the US itself contravenes such argumentation
(when Texas was taken from Mexico it was almost surely Mexican in character), it
seems that the Inquiry members were not really aware who were the US allies
(Romania, Serbia, Greece) and who were the US enemies in the war. Realizing how
the Balkans might react to such a proposal, President Wilson was wise enough not
to take the advice of the Inquiry on this matter.
The US insisted that Romania should not make a separate peace, suggesting
the evacuation of the Romanian authorities and army in Russia. However, the 1916
Treaty with Romania did not bind the US, so they had no obligations toward the
Romanians.
While Dr. Constantin Angelescu was presenting his credentials as the first
Romanian Minister to the US, Wilson showed his opinion once more. When Ange-
lescu tried to raise the issue of Romanians living under foreign rule, the President
simply ignored his attmept.19
Still, as a result of French pressure, generated by the need to keep Romania in
war, the US representatives had to soften their position. Although they remained
unbending in their refusal to join the other Great Powers in guaranteeing Romania’s
territorial claims, they made a statement to the French Ambassador, later forwarded
to the Romanians too, on February 21, 1918, offering to help Romania maintain her
political and territorial integrity and to provide the necessary means to maintain the
Romanian government and army, whether located within or outside the national
territorial limits of Romania.20 In view of the traditional American aloofness from
East European affairs, this declaration was a far-reaching commitment, but it failed
to impress the Romanians.21
Regarding the Bessarabian question, the President took a position for the first
time in early May 1918. As a reaction to a rumor spread by the Central Powers, that
the US had given Austria a free hand in the Balkans, a denial was prepared by Presi-
dent Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing. They said, “The government of the
< 348 >

United States has not and will not commit itself to a policy which denies the rights
of small nations and recognizes in Austria-Hungary a supremacy which it does not
and ought not to possess.”22 In the same context, the Allied Ministers in Jassy ad-
vised their governments to welcome sympathetically the union of Bessarabia with
Romania. But when the President analyzed the matter on May 1, 1918, he was not
ready to approve the union of Bessarabia with Romania, at least not before he had
more information available on the matter. In his words, “I would very much like to
know whether there are not some serious complications involved in the case. Are we
sure that Bessarabia is willing and that the union is one which we should wish in
any case to advocate and approve?”23 His position was reinforced a few days later by
the decision of the other Entente Powers to postpone a final decision regarding Bes-
sarabia’s union, although they had different reasons for this postponement.
After the signing of the Peace Treaty between Romania and the Central Powers
in Bucharest (May 7, 1918) the State Department deferred consideration of the ques-
tion of Romanian national unification until the end of the war, even while it recog-
nized the claims of other subject peoples of Austria-Hungary and encouraged their
movements for freedom or unification.24 Apart from the appeals made by Vopicka,
the only intervention in favor of the Romanian cause came from George D. Herror, a
confidant of President Wilson. On May 25, 1918, he sent a memorandum to the State
Department in which he blamed the Bucharest Peace on the Allied failure to ade-
quately assist Romania.25
The Romanians did not abandon their cause with the US representatives. On
July 5, 1918, Vasile Stoica founded the Romanian National League of America and
intensified his pressure on both the War Department (for a Transylvanian Legion)
and the State Department. He was joined in his pressure by the Romanian Chargé
d’affaires, Alexandru Lahovary.26
Starting in October 1918, Vopicka intensified his efforts to convince his Gov-
ernment that it was necessary to adopt a policy favorable to the Romanians in Tran-
sylvania.27 In accordance with the Cobb-Lippman Memorandum of October 29, 1918,
and also already having the backing of Vaida-Voevod’s statement in the Hungarian
Parliament (made in the name of the Romanians living in Transylvania and asking
for their independence),28 Secretary of State Lansing sent a message stating the offi-
cial position of the US towards Romania, on November 5, 1918:
The Government of the US is not unmindful of the aspirations of the Romanian

people without as well as within the boundaries of the Kingdom. It has wit-
nessed their struggles and sufferings and sacrifices in the cause of freedom
from their enemies and their oppressors. With the spirit of national unity and
the aspirations of the Romanians everywhere the Government of the US deeply
sympathizes and will not neglect at the proper time to exert its influence so
that the just political and territorial rights of the Romanian people may be ob-
tained and made secure from all foreign aggression.29
< 349 >

The Romanian reaction to the American position was one of joy and gratitude.
November 1918 was, in a way, the beginning of a short honeymoon in the Romanian-
US relations. And there is nothing more appropriate to describe the Romanian feel-
ings toward the US than the letter sent by Queen Marie of Romania to Vopicka:
I saw with the greatest satisfaction the message issued at Washington by Mr.
Lansing, concerning the fulfillment of the aspirations of the Romanian Nation.
The terms of this message are what we always expected from the noble Ameri-
can people and Mr. Wilson, their eminent President, who have entered this
war for the rights and liberties of all nations, small and great, in order to estab-
lish a new order of things in this world on a humanitarian and righteous ba-
sis . . . I beg you to convey also on my behalf to the President and Mr. Lansing,
my heartfelt thanks . . . for their interest in the justice of the Romanian cause.30
The aforementioned Cobb-Lippman Memorandum of October 29, 1918, pre-

pared in order to readjust the 14 points, states for Romania:
In any case the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest must be cancelled as

palpably fraudulent . . . Transylvania will undoubtedly join Romania, but pro-
visions must be made for the protection of Magyars, Szeklers and Germans
who constitute a large minority . . . Romania will have acquired the Dobrudja,
Bessarabia and probably Transylvania . . . Bulgaria should clearly have her fron-
tier in the Southern Dobrudja as it stood before the Second Balkan War. . . .
[As to Russia] The first question is whether Russian territory is synony-
mous with territory belonging to the former Russian Empire. This is clearly not
so . . . what is recognized as valid for the Poles will certainly have to be recog-
nized for the Finns, the Lithuanians, the Letts and perhaps also for the
Ukrainians . . . the recognition by the Peace Conference of a series of de facto
governments representing Finns, Esths, Lithuanians, Ukrainians. This primary
act of recognition should be conditional upon the calling of national assemblies
for the creation of de facto governments, as soon as the peace conference has
drawn frontiers for these new states.31
The final recommendations regarding Romania made by the Inquiry Commis-

sion and handed to President Wilson in January 1919 stipulated that:
1. Transylvania should be accorded to Romania, with the exception of

the cities where the majority of the population was Magyar (Arad, Oradea,
Satu Mare).
2. The Banat should be divided on an ethnic basis, with the necessary
accent on economic and political criteria.
3. Romania should cede the southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria.32 This was
< 350 >

the most unsuccessful point on the American agenda. There was no way
to convince Romania to simply give away a part of the territory it had al-
ready possessed before the war.
4. Certain ethnic Romanian parts of Crisana (northwest of Transylva-
nia) and Bukovina should belong to Romania. In the end, because of the
failure to establish a so-called Ruthenian state, Romania acquired almost
all of Bukovina.
5. International control would be established over the Danube and over
the railroads crossing Hungary. The discussions regarding the status of
the Danube continued long after the Peace Conference ended.
6. All of Bessarabia should belong to Romania.33
It was stated that:
Bessarabia was once part of Romania (14th century to 1812; 1856-1878) and is
quite predominantly Romanian in its character. The idea of detaching the
northern and southeastern corners (Hotin and Ackerman respectively) and
giving them to the Ukraine is unwise, since it would break up an historic prov-
ince and abandon a good natural frontier, the River Dniestr, on account of rela-
tively new Ukrainian colonies.34
One other Inquiry document asserted: “The outstanding fact of the Bessarabian
issue is unquestionably the close racial and linguistic connection of a large and fairly
well-defined part of the population with Romania”.35 This was the only point where
the American policy changed radically during the Peace Conference without any
overt pressure from the other Powers.
These proposals show that the US intention was to simply ignore the 1916
Treaty with Romania and to make peace based on other considerations. When the
Romanians realized what stance the Americans were taking at the Peace Confer-
ence, it was the end of a very brief honeymoon. The first disappointment for Roma-
nia was her placement among states with limited interests. But as for Bessarabia, at
the beginning of the Peace Conference and during the deliberations of the Territorial
Commission on Romania, the American experts agreed that Bessarabia should be-
long to Romania.
After the hostilities had ended, Vopicka worked tirelessly to get American re-
lief supplies sent to Romania; he was so effective that Acting Secretary of State
Frank Lyon Polk recalled him to Paris in 1919 for consultations over what he consid-
ered an excessively pro-Romanian attitude. Polk wrote: “Vopicka is far too enthusi-
astic in his admiration for the Romanians; I may let him go next week, but by that
time he will be sufficiently educated not to be too enthusiastic every time the Roma-
nians’ name is mentioned.”36
< 351 >

Romanian-US Relations During the Peace Conference
Relations between Romania and the Peace Conference were severely strained
starting in April, as a direct result of the Hungarian crisis, and it was in this context
that the American policy on Bessarabia shifted. The declaration made by Secretary of
State Robert Lansing during a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on May 8,
1919, signaled the change. What inspired this policy shift, and why was the US so
adamant in adhering to the new view, considering Bessarabia as Russian territory for
the entire interwar period?
The US position regarding Bessarabia was affected by Romania’s attitude to-
wards the Peace Conference and, implicitly, the US representatives; but even more
so by the Russian question in broader terms, including the conflict between the
White Russians and the Bolsheviks, and the Japanese factor. But before examining
these questions, we must consider the relationships within the US delegation at the
Peace Conference, representing the US in the different commissions, and President
Wilson.
Before the May 8 declaration on Bessarabia, the American experts had always
agreed that Bessarabia should belong to Romania and that, in exchange, Romania
need only offer sufficient guarantees to the minorities living there. On the other
hand, neither President Wilson nor Secretary Lansing had declared, at any point,
that Bessarabia should belong to Romania; they had kept silent on that question.
That might lead to the conclusion that there was no change of policy regarding Bes-
sarabia, rather that perhaps the President never had considered the territory as be-
longing to Romania. Some scholars argue that Wilson took the important decisions
by himself and that, in fact, the experts had little or no influence over him. On the
other hand, members of the American peace delegation said that the President asked
for their advice repeatedly and made his decisions based on that advice.37 In that
case, Bessarabia would be one of the very few cases in which the President not only
refused to follow the advice of his experts but directly interfered, canceling their
previous decisions in the territorial commissions.
Still, whatever the differences between President Wilson and his advisors, this
author finds it quite unlikely that the experts could have voted twice in favor of Bes-
sarabia’s union with Romania without having at least the tacit agreement of the
President. But when Wilson realized that it was no longer in the American interest
to have Bessarabia joined to Romania, he simply opposed the union. Wilson’s ap-
proach to the peacemaking process set its stamp on the American delegation at the
Peace Conference. Although he proclaimed the need for open discussions, in his wish
to bring about a real peace, based on the ideals of democracy and self-determination,
Wilson found himself in a more or less dictatorial position.38
As for the real influence of the territorial committees on the final settlement,
opinions are divided. As Ivo J. Lederer states:
< 352 >

The territorial committees were created on the theory that territorial disputes
not directly involving immediate Great Power interests should be submitted to
the judgment of technical experts in the interest of objectivity. . . . When fi-
nally approved, however, the committees were haphazardly appointed (and
subsequently treated) and their work suffered from imprecise instructions as
to their tasks and methods. The experts were naively enjoined to disregard po-
litical considerations in all their proceedings, a lofty objective which, as the
Italians realistically warned, was quite impossible to fulfill.39
The way the US delegation was formed caused many problems. Not only did
Wilson refuse to allow Republican members of the Congress to attend the Peace
Conference (a refusal that later cost him dearly, when the Congress decided not to
ratify the Peace Treaties), but he also alienated the officials of the State Department,
who expected to lead the peace negotiations. In his favor Charles Seymour, a mem-
ber of one of the committees, noted, “The State Department people are much vexed
to see these jobs go to the amateurs, but really our system of government is such that
there are no State Department people who could hold their own when it comes to
command of facts; this sounds rather egotistic, but the small roster of regulars sim-
ply doesn’t know enough”.40 Instead, Wilson used the members of the Inquiry,
whom he could control much more easily than the Republicans or the officials in the
State Department. These experts were to provide him with information — but they
also had to represent US interests at the Conference, which they were not necessar-
ily the best prepared to do.41 And, indeed, the case of Bessarabia proves it: they made
no protest over the President’s decision canceling their efforts to attribute Bessara-
bia to Romania.42 Taking all the decisions on himself, Wilson alienated not only a
great part of the European public opinion (blaming him for the failures of the peace
conference) but also the American public opinion.
Analyzing the May 8 change of policy from the standpoint of US-Romanian

relations, we will begin by looking at the Romanian attitude towards the Peace Con-
ference. Seeking to bring Romania to heel, the Great Powers seized on Bessarabia as
an excellent tool; for before May 8, there were two events that may have turned the
balance against the Romanians. On May 6, Romania sent an ultimatum to Bela Kun,
calling for an armistice between the two armies; this was refused by the Hungarians
but it provoked the Great Powers who had no desire to see Romania imposing her
own terms on her neighbor. The other event was related to the question of oil.
It was the French representatives brought the oil question up for debate, ask-
ing for a privileged position in the exploitation of Romanian resources, but the US
representatives were very keen to have a similar position. In the words of Bratianu,
one of the US representatives, Baruch, said:
His country could not agree that, through agreements directed against her in-
terests, we shall give to other countries exclusive concession over the petro-
< 353 >

leum and that, in such a case, their relief funds for Romania would cease and
that they will also stop helping us on any other matters.43
This was the beginning of a new controversy between Romania and the Great
Powers, this time one in which the US intended to take an active part.
However, although one Romanian historian argues, “this question of petro-
leum . . . is the key to all the events that followed”,44 the Romanian oil question had
only just surfaced and the chances that it could have influenced the May 8 change
are scant, even though it certainly played a role during the following months. On the
other hand, the ultimatum and subsequent action in Hungary are not enough to ex-
plain the US change of policy; therefore, we must also consider it from a broader per-
spective, that of US-Russian relations.
Since the beginning of the Peace Conference, relations between Romania and
the Supreme Council had slipped from good to bad to worse. The American repre-
sentatives became, for many reasons, Romania’s stiffest opponents at the Peace Con-
ference. Their inexperience in the ways of European diplomacy played a role: France
and Great Britain, even when they agreed with the US stand against Romanian in-
terests, were wise enough to stay in the shadows and let the US bear the brunt of
Romania’s discontent. Therefore, whenever the Council decided something against
the Romanian interests, it was always the American representatives who seemed to
be in the fore. The French, British and Italian representatives knew that they need
Romania much more than the Americans did, and they were too canny to join them
openly in statements regarding decisions against Romania. This relationship be-
tween Romania and the Conference changed in December 1919, when a new Roma-
nian government came into power and Romania decided to comply with some of the
Council’s demands. Coincidentally, this was exactly the same moment when the
American delegation was about to leave the Peace Conference. Less than two weeks
after the American withdrawal, the Conference decided to authorize the resumption
of commercial relations with Romania.
Romanian-US relations at the beginning of the Peace Conference had not been
bad at all. To the contrary: the Romanians, like many other European nations, hoped
that the US representatives would bring the necessary support for their territorial
claims, which were based on the principle of self-determination. The first contacts
between the American delegates and the Romanians went quite well and it seemed
that there would be a good collaboration. Still, the Romanians sized up the Ameri-
cans based on Vopicka’s attitude, but (due to the very recent opening of a Romanian
Legation in the US and to its minimal activity) lacked a clear image of the real pur-
poses of, and the relations within, the US delegation. On the other hand, the Ameri-
can delegation had no broad understanding of the genesis of the terms “Balkanism”
and “Balkanization”, failing to appreciate just how complicated the situation really
was in the area. The Romanians were but one of the very proud Balkan nations and
had in mind only one thought: Greater Romania. One more fact greatly influencing
Romanian-US relations was the conflict of interests between the Great Powers
< 354 >

themselves with regard to different aspects of the peace settlement.

A good account of the first private meetings between members of the Roma-
nian delegation and US representatives is presented by one of those who took an
active part in the events, Charles Seymour. Starting in January, the Americans had
already been invited to a number of receptions by the Romanians and they took ad-
vantage of those meetings in order to better understand the Romanian position at
the Conference.45 Unfortunately, only the low-level members of the American dele-
gation took part in these informal meetings and the three most powerful members of
the US delegation (Wilson, Lansing and Colonel House), with very few exceptions,
did not take the time for a private discussion with Romanian representatives. Still, it
was exactly these low-level American delegates that represented the US in the terri-
torial commissions and who decided in favor of Bessarabia’s union with Romania.
Although at the beginning the US representatives initiated contacts with Take
Ionescu, the leader of the Romanian Conservative Party and one of Romania’s lead-
ing diplomats (but not a member of the official Romanian delegation), soon after the
arrival of the delegation they met with Ion I.C. Bratianu a few times.46 Still, there
were only a limited number of meetings and, as soon as each side understood what
the other side’s position was, these private meetings became more and more infre-
quent. It would be hard to say how much influence these contacts had on the general
attitude of the US delegation towards the Romanian position. However, at the time
of those meetings, Romanian-US relations were still friendly, even though there
were some differences of opinion on various matters. But, once the serious business
began, with the drawing of new borders, the Hungarian question and so on, the at-
mosphere between the two delegations changed dramatically.
A clear sign of this cooling in relations came during the meetings of Romania’s
Queen Marie with President Wilson and Secretary Lansing.47 Upset that the meet-
ings did not go as she had hoped, Queen Marie gave a very interesting characteriza-
tion of President Wilson, after they had dinner together on April 11 (one of the very
few occasions in which President Wilson met a Romanian representative in a pri-
vate setting):
He is always convinced that he is right [not unlike many another American

president]. He preached to me how to deal with the minorities. I was especially
surprised by the pleasure he had in listening to himself. I timidly suggested
that he must be familiar with these difficulties because of the presence of
Blacks and Japanese in the US. To this, he smiled politely and declared that he
has no knowledge whatsoever of the existence of a Japanese problem in the
US.48
Still, the best illustration of the cooling relations between the Romanian and
the US delegations belongs to President Wilson. Annoyed by what was called the
“little revolution” initiated by the representatives of the so-called “states with lim-
ited interests”,49 during the debate regarding the Minorities Treaty, on May 31, 1918,
President Wilson stated:
< 355 >

In those circumstances is it unreasonable that the US should insist upon being

satisfied that the settlements are correct? Mr. Bratianu — and I speak of his
suggestions with utmost respect — suggested that we could not, so to say,
invade the sovereignty of Romania, an ancient sovereignty, and make certain
prescriptions with regard to the rights of minorities. But I beg him to observe
that he is overlooking the fact that he is asking the sanction of the Allied and
Associated Powers for great additions of territory which come to Romania by
the common victory of arms, and that, therefore, we are entitled to say, “If we
agree to these additions of territory, we have the right to insist upon certain
guarantees of peace”.50
Even in the 21st century, it would be difficult to find a Romanian who could
agree with President Wilson’s statement. Even now, as in 1919, it insults Romania’s
sovereignty. The statement clearly cut off anything that may have been left of Roma-
nia’s hopes for American receptivity. It comes as no surprise that the Romanians saw
the US representatives as their chief adversaries in Paris, with President Wilson as
quarterback. Even Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, a moderate political leader, character-
ized Wilson in the aftermath of the May 31 speech, as “the most hypocritical politi-
cal impostor”.51 The US attitude towards Romania continued to erode during 1919.
Still, during the months to come, despite the temptation, the Americans unlike
the other Great Powers steadfastly refused to use the Bessarabian question in order
to prod the Romanians into compliance with the Peace Conference. They tried every
other ploy to persuade them to get in line, while protecting their own interests in
Romania. They tried:
1. A commercial blockade. Polk had no doubt that the Romanians

would “behave” as long as the embargo was enforced,52 but even that
was not so.
2. Continuous propaganda favoring the cession of southern Dobrudja to
Bulgaria.
3. Territorial blackmail, by threatening to block the return of Bukovina
and even Transylvania to Romania.
There are many examples of these intentions. On November 12, 1919, after the
Romanian reply to the Note of October 20 was received, Frank Polk “said that he
had always felt that if Romania refused to accede to the very reasonable demands of
the Council, she should not have Transylvania given to her. He thought that such
action was entirely too generous.”53 This remark is at best strange, as it means that
Romania would receive Transylvania as a bonus for good behavior and not because
of the existing realities in that province.
They also tried:
< 356 >

4. Threatening to send the US Fleet to the Black Sea, in order to make a

show of force against Romania.
5. Opposition to any modifications regarding the Minorities Treaty.54
6. Threatening to break off diplomatic relations, by the ultimatum Note
of November 15, 1919.
7. Threatening to cut the American relief funds and products for Roma-
nia. In fact, on July 1919 the ARA’s assistance to Romania ceased, while
continuing for other European countries until 1921.55
8. Leveraging the Romanian war debt to the US to enhance the future
position of the American economic interests in Romania, by demand-
ing the “Bratianu guarantees” of May 17, 1919. These stipulate that the
Romanian government would not offer any concession that might
prejudice the US government or the US citizens to other governments
and their subjects until the Romanian government had liquidated its
entire debt to the US government.56
Additionally, when the other Great Powers suggested the use of Bessarabia as a
mean of influencing Romania (for example, the Italian proposal to recognize Roma-
nian rights in Bessarabia if Romania would agree to the cession of southern Do-
brudja), the American representatives were the only ones opposed to such a plan,
although they clearly realized that Bessarabia would be an effective tool.57 The fact
that the US representatives were willing to make use of all the means at their dis-
posal in order to press the Romanians into agreeing to the decisions taken by the
Conference except for Bessarabia suggests that the US saw Bessarabia as relating to a
different part of the game, to something beyond Romania.
One of the main reasons for the rapid decline in relations between Romania
and the Peace Conference, particularly the US delegation, was the Romanian Army’s
attitude during the occupation of Hungary. The American representatives became
the champions defending Hungarian interests, which certainly added to the anti-
American feeling in Romania. The reports sent by the American representative in the
Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control in Budapest, General Bandholtz, are the
best illustration of their much-exaggerated preoccupation with the Romanian requi-
sitions in Hungary.58
The American representatives, headed by Frank Lyon Polk,59 took at face value
any information coming from Hungarian sources. They failed to understand that the
power of the Conference derived from its unity, which was more and more difficult
to achieve. The Romanians knew that the military power of the Conference in Cen-
tral Europe was weak and they exploited the contradictions between the Great
Powers to promote their own interests. They also had the backing of at least a part
of the French team, and of Italy. Whenever a new report on the Hungarian situation
came before the Conference, the American representatives were the first to ask for
measures against Romania, while both France and Italy sought to weaken the pro-
posed American measures. It should not come as a surprise that the Romanian pub-
< 357 >

lic soon lost all enthusiasm for the Americans, especially as the Romanian press was
almost entirely under the control of the leading Liberal Party (Bratianu’s party). It’s
no wonder that, in this situation, “the US delegation, increasingly impatient to be
through with its work, manifested growing anger toward Romania, if that were pos-
sible, and impatience with the Allies. . . . Bratianu for his part hoped to delay until
the exasperated Americans withdrew, leaving a much more pliable, diminished,
Council behind”.60
At last, during September 1919, the American Commissioner in Paris finally
began to understand how things were working regarding Romania and expressed
his frustration. During the September 2, 1919, meeting of the Council of Heads of
Delegations, Polk said that:
The Romanians had now been defying the Conference for an entire three
weeks, and had given no answer to the numerous communications sent to
them. Every kind of Note had been sent to them . . . Each style had failed to
produce any result, and he thought that the time for sending notes was now
over . . . It was inconceivable to [him] that Romania should defy the Council,
which had behind it the support of three Great European Powers, without re-
ceiving encouragement from some quarter or another.61
The next day, September 3, Polk complained again:
The Romanians regard America as their number one enemy. A distinguished

Romanian has informed an American of this. When told that all the communi-
cations sent to the Romanian Government had been sent collectively from all
the Allied and Associated Powers, in reply he drew attention to the views ex-
pressed in the French Press.62
However, it was not only the Hungarians or Jews that had the protection of
the American representatives. Polk expressed his “friendly” position on certain other
matters relating to Romania too, and made himself the first to listen to complaints
expressed by the Bessarabian Russians and placing them on the agenda for the
Council of Heads of Delegations.
Another factor wearing on relations between the US representatives in Paris
and the Romanians was the Minorities Treaty. In November, the Romanians finally
agreed to sign the Treaty, but attached a number of conditions. They asked for the
elimination from the preamble of all references to the 1878 Treaty of Berlin (by which
the Great Powers recognized Romania’s independence, but in which special articles
referring to the treatment of the Jewish population had been inserted). The United
States alone was opposed to this request. Going further, when the Romanians
seemed ready a sign a modified Minorities Treaty, they asked for the suppression of
articles 10 and 11, granting special protection to the Jews, arguing that the Jews liv-
ing in Romania have the same rights as all the other Romanian citizens and that
< 358 >

there is no need for the Great Powers to interfere in Romanian internal matters in
order to protect the Jews. The majority in the Committee of New States, charged
with negotiating with the Romanian representatives, was in favor of the elimination
of both articles; the American Delegation alone reserved judgment on this point.63
Finally, and only as a result of the pressure exercised by the other Powers and be-
cause of their withdrawal from the Conference, the American delegation agreed with
the Romanian requests and signed the Treaty in a modified form, on December 9,
1919.
Still, the most eloquent expression of the 1919 collapse of US-Romanian rela-
tions is found in the correspondence between Frank Lyon Polk and the Secretary of
State, Robert Lansing, in the weeks prior to the American withdrawal from the
Peace Conference. In one of his telegrams, Polk states:
As to Bessarabia, the British and French showed a disposition to discuss the

matter and in some way to hand over this territory to Romania. I made two
objections to this plan. First, that I do not think now is the time to discuss the dismem-
berment of the Russian Empire and, second, that I think it would be a fatal mistake to
consider giving Romania any more territory in view of its defiant attitude. I think the
European Governments will agree with me on the first point, but if Romania
by any chance shows itself to be more reasonable, which I very much doubt, it
may be that the question of their being given some sort of a mandate on Bes-
sarabia will come up.64
And in another telegram, November 30:
Treaty with Hungary . . . You could also state with some emphasis that if the
Supreme Council had only taken a firm stand with Romania in August, as had
been urged by the US Government, the Hungarian and Romanian questions
would have been settled long ago; that the US Government thoroughly ap-
proves the stand now taken by the Supreme Council, but that it is regretted
that it was not taken sooner; that undoubtedly D’Annunzio had been encour-
aged to defy the Supreme Council on account of the consideration shown for
the feelings of Romania.65
Polk mentions that the main problems with the Romanians arose in August,
some three months after the change in the American policy regarding Bessarabia.
This substantiates the idea that it was not Romania’s attitude toward the Supreme
Council that caused the mentioned change but that the real reason was something
quite different. August also coincides with the Romanian occupation of Budapest
and with the beginning of the debate over the requisitions made by the Romanian
Army in Hungary. The passage has another significance too; not only were relations
between the Romanians and the Conference suffering due to the situation in Hun-
gary, now Romania was blamed for other failures of the Conference as well.
< 359 >

In another telegram sent on the same day, Polk said:
Our relations with Romania. It would not be possible, to my mind, particularly

in connection with the Romanian matter, for us to withdraw entirely. It will
therefore be necessary for the Ambassador, in order to complete these meas-
ures, to sit in the Supreme Council for a short time. The matters are routine in
character and have been practically settled but could not be handled by the
Allies with Washington. This is particularly true in the case of Romania; and,
as we have been taking a firm and consistent stand from the first, our withdrawal would be a
great embarrassment to the Allies, and would be great benefit to Romania and would hurt our
prestige.66
As Polk himself recognized, the US withdrawal from the Conference would

make things much easier for the Romanian diplomatic team. Why did he have such
harsh feelings against the Romanians? Did these feelings have a lasting effect on the
US policy on Romania, explaining at least partially the US attitude of discrimination
against Romania on the Bessarabian question? As Polk retired from politics by 1920,
it would be difficult to say whether he had a real influence over the State Depart-
ment’s officials, particularly as many of them were excluded from direct participa-
tion in the workings of the Peace Conference.
On the other hand, in mid-November the Romanians were still hoping to ob-
tain the US backing regarding Bessarabia’s Union. As presented by the French,
Romania seems to be hesitating between two possible attitudes: to obtain the

US agreement, at the price of sacrificing southern Dobrudja, in a manner that
should bring an end to the Bessarabian question before the recognition of a
Russian government; or to wait for the US retreat from the Conference and to
deal only with the European Allies, even if they have to pay them for their sup-
port, especially the English, while trying to come to terms with Denikin.67
Polk continued to press Washington in the direction already mentioned. He

states, in another telegram:
I would like to urge most earnestly that Ambassador Wallace be directed to

represent the US Government in Paris in the negotiations with Romania and in
connection with the Hungarian Treaty. All along, as you know, we have taken the
very strongest position regarding Romania and the US Government was responsible in the
main for the minorities’ treaties . . . we could say nothing which would justify our
withdrawing from all of these negotiations at this time. In addition the Romani-
ans are already making use of the rumor of our withdrawal as an excuse for resisting the or-
ders of the Supreme Council.68
< 360 >

After the US withdrew, the policy of concessions promoted by the European

Great Powers toward the Romanians proved to be more successful than the policy of
a firm stand taken by the Americans. In just a few months, relations between the
Conference and Romania improved considerably; the Romanians proved more malle-
able (they signed the Austrian and the Minorities treaties) and the frictions between
the two sides had been considerably reduced.
Concluding this concise presentation of Romanian-US relations during the
Peace Conference it should be noted that the US position presented on May 8 with
regard to Bessarabia had little, if anything, to do with Romania’s conduct vis-à-vis
the Peace Conference; it must have been motivated by other reasons. However, it is
quite possible that, during the following months, the worsening US-Romanian rela-
tions had an influence, at least indirectly, on the American stance regarding Bessara-
bia. Most probably, the American decision was shaped by events in Russia, namely
Admiral Kolchak’s offensive (indeed, this was the official American explanation), as
well as by the Japanese military presence in Far Eastern Russia.
The Russian Question and the US Position on Bessarabia
If it was not the Romanian attitude toward the Peace Conference that trig-
gered the sudden change in American policy regarding Bessarabia, then to seek the
reasons behind that change one might look from a more broader perspective, namely
that of America’s relations with Russia. Like the British leaders, the Americans be-
lieved that Kolchak had a real chance of success and, in order to support him, they
declared that they would not recognize the union of Bessarabia with Romania. The
US declaration was intended as a blow to the Bolshevik propaganda campaign that
claimed the Powers in Paris were ready to dispose of Russian territory, without Rus-
sian input, and claimed that Kolchak had sold Bessarabia to Romania in exchange
for Western help. The problem is that, even when it became clear that the Kolchak
offensive had become a lost cause, following the trend established by the other
White Armies, the US position on Bessarabia remained unchanged. And, if the Kol-
chak offensive was the real reason behind the May 8 decision on Bessarabia, then
why did the US continue supporting that decision even after his defeat? Was it the
worsening Romanian-US relations, propaganda reasons, or the fear of Japanese ex-
pansion into Russia?
The famous Colby Note of August 10, 1920, could offer a key to the change in
the American policy regarding Bessarabia. There has been much talk about the Colby
Note, the reasons behind it, and the consequences it had for US-Soviet relations. Of
interest here is what the Note states in connection with Bessarabia or, better said,
its influence on the future US policy on Bessarabia.
This Government believes in a united, free and autonomous Polish govern-

ment . . . in its reply to the Lithuanian National Council on October 15, 1919, in
its persistent refusal to recognize the Baltic States as separate nations inde-
pendent of Russia . . .
< 361 >

In line with these important declarations of policy, the US withheld its

approval from the decision of the Supreme Council at Paris recognizing the
independence of the so-called republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan. Finally,
while gladly giving recognition to the independence of Armenia, the Govern-
ment of the US has taken the position that the final determination of its
boundaries must not be made without Russia’s cooperation and agreement. . . .
It is not possible for the Government of the US to recognize the present
rulers of Russia as a government with which the relations common to friendly
governments can be maintained. . . .
This Government would regard with satisfaction a declaration by the Al-
lied and Associated Powers, that the territorial integrity and the true bounda-
ries of Russia shall be respected. These boundaries should properly include the
whole of the former Russian Empire, with the exception of Finland proper,
ethnic Poland, and such territory as may by agreement form a part of the Arme-
nian state. The aspirations of these nations for independence are legitimate.
Each was forcibly annexed and their liberation from oppressive alien rule involves
no aggression against Russia’s territorial rights, and has received the sanction of the
public opinion of all free peoples. Such a declaration presupposes the withdrawal of
all foreign troops from the territory embraced by these boundaries, and in the
opinion of this Government should be accompanied by the announcement that
no transgression by Poland, Finland or any other Power, of the line so drawn
and proclaimed will be permitted.
Thus only can the Bolshevik regime be deprived of its false, but effective,
appeal to Russian nationalism. . . . 69
The Colby Note is striking, from the Romanian viewpoint, in its failure to men-
tion Bessarabia. It should be clear to anyone that Bessarabia was also forcibly an-
nexed by Russia and that its aspirations to independence were legitimate, involving
no aggression against the Russian territory. Even the Soviet propaganda indirectly
admitted that Bessarabia was not necessarily Russian territory, by contesting its
union with Romania and not her declaration of independence or her autonomy. Of
all the territorial annexations by Russia, Bessarabia was the most recent. It is un-
doubtedly for these reasons that the Principal Allied Powers had agreed in the first
place to recognize the union between Bessarabia and Romania. The American ex-
perts representing the US at the Peace Conference and taking part in the delibera-
tions of the Territorial Commission also shared in this view and had been convinced
that Bessarabia should belong to Romania. Therefore, the question of why there was
no mention of Bessarabia in the Colby Note remains a difficult one.
The Bolshevik reaction to the Note soon was heard. The answer takes an inter-
esting line of argument; would that the Bolsheviks had respected their own prem-
ise — the world probably would have looked different today.
< 362 >

M. Colby imagines that the other oppressed nationalities of Tsarist Russia

were not annexed by force and that the aspirations of the Georgian, Azerbai-
jan, Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian and Ukrainian peoples for independence in
the form of either secession or state sovereignty and federation with Russia are
illegal. The discrimination on the part of the American Government in favor of some of these
nationalities as against the others is unintelligible, being probably due to lack of infor-
mation concerning national conditions in Eastern Europe.70
The Bolshevik answer also fails to mention Bessarabia. The American opinion
on Bessarabia could have provided an excellent example of American “friendship”
toward the Russian people, so it is surprising that Colby omitted mentioning it. It is
not our objective to analyze in detail the thinking behind the Colby Note. But the
Note was made in close connection with the Japanese invasion of Russia, as was
thought at the time.
The fact that the Note was issued just a few weeks after the Japanese occupa-
tion of the Sakhalin (in retaliation for the Nicolaievsk Incident) could not have been
simple coincidence. America’s annoyance with Japan’s action in Sakhalin is clearly
expressed in the US-Japanese correspondence regarding Russian affairs.71
In 1918, taking advantage of the situation in Russia, the Japanese decided to
intervene in Siberia. They were not the only Great Power to have that thought —
France, US and Great Britain did the same. The Allies wanted to stop Bolshevism
and were willing to compensate Japan for helping them in this matter.72 The US at
first tried to oppose an intervention, but President Wilson finally decided that it
would be better to go ahead. Some scholars argue that the Americans sent troops
into Russia only in order to limit Japan’s influence and to avoid any territorial loss to
Russia in favor of Japan, and not for other reaons.73 Even after the American inter-
vention at Murmansk, Wilson continued to object to the Japanese occupation of
Siberia. Within a few months Japan had several times as many soldiers in Siberia as
all the other nations combined (of course, this was partly a result of their geographi-
cal proximity and the scarcity of troops in Europe due to the war). Sharp conflicts
developed between the American and Japanese chiefs in Siberia. The Americans
made representations against the size of the Japanese force and the degree of control
they had assumed in Manchuria and Siberia, but to no avail. The Japanese were not
the only ones with whom the American military chiefs were displeased; there had
been misunderstandings with the British generals too. But the Japanese were by far
the biggest threat to the balance of power in the Far East.
The scope of the Japanese intervention in Russia touched off strategic concerns
in the US: Japanese control of Siberia would inevitably lead to a growing Japanese
influence over China. And while the US had only limited economic interests in Rus-
sia, in China the situation was different. In addition, a Japan that dominated China
would dominate over all the other territories in Southeast Asia as well. One of the
best means of keeping the Japanese expansionism under control was to have a pow-
erful Russia (the same is true today vis-à-vis China). Therefore, the US considered it
< 363 >

preferable to have a strong Russia, even it were a communist one, rather than a dis-
membered Russia, in order to keep Japan in check.74 Thus the Japanese policy of ter-
ritorial expansionism fueled the need to have a powerful Russia the interwar period.
Can a connection be established between the Japanese expansion into Siberia
(and the Maritime Provinces) and the Bessarabian question? There are some similari-
ties:
1. The interventions in Bessarabia and Siberia were impelled by similar

proximate motives: the need to protect the railways, so crucial during war,
against any possible threat (such as the actions of either Bolsheviks or
bandits).
2. Both interventions had the approval of the Great Powers at first and
were opposed by the US after a period of time.
3. Both shortly evolved into direct, open opposition to the Bolsheviks.
4. Military troops were kept in the areas for a prolonged period of time.
5. Although Romania and Japan had a number of conflicts and unsolved
territorial issues with Russia, they both had been Russia’s allies during the
war. Still, that temporary ally status did not prevent them from taking
advantage of Russia's weakness during its Revolution and the Civil War.
6. As Russia’s neighbors, they had nationals living in Russia. This
meant, at least in the case of Romania, that those nationals should be pro-
tected, and it also gave them a good justification for acting against their
former ally.
7. Japan and Romania were Russia’s only neighboring states that had
existed before the war and decided to act militarily against their common
neighbor. Japan and Romania were the only monarchies surrounding the
new communist regime, whose communist republican propaganda was
not at all welcome.
8. Both Romania and Japan had to pay, at the end of World War II and
ever since, for their 1918 intervention against Russia.
It is very possible that these similarities (except for the last one), explain the
change in the American policy regarding Bessarabia in May 1919. They boil down to
two overarching phenomena: the Kolchak offensive (which may have been the main
cause, but it also provided an excellent justification for a change that might have
been driven by other motives) and the increasing anxiety over Japan’s military occu-
pation of Far Eastern Russia (perhaps this was the moment when the Americans
understood that they could no longer control the Japanese advance into Russia). The
other Great Powers and Romania did not contest America’s changed policy at the
time, which seems to indicate that they accepted the Kolchak offensive as the reason
behind it. In fact, France and Great Britain too were hoping that the Bolsheviks
would be defeated, and they agreed with the US stance. However, unwilling to see
their relations with Romania deteriorate, they let the US take the lead. It was only
< 364 >

later, when Kolchak had been defeated, that the representatives of the other Great
Powers, trying to solve the Bessarabian question, realized that the US stand on Bes-
sarabia had remained unchanged. However, this became clear at a moment when the
US was losing influence over the Conference, due to the Senate’s refusal to ratify the
Versailles Treaty. All attempts to remind the US representatives of their initial
agreement on Bessarabia’s going to Romania failed.
What is certain is that, at some point during Spring 1919, the Americans be-
came aware that recognition of Bessarabia’s union with Romania could have certain
implications for the situation in the Far East, due to the precedent that it would cre-
ate. As presented in the previous chapter, that would have been a precedent that
Japan could use to their own advantage in order to acquire new territories from Rus-
sia. Why did the Americans fail to realize the implications of the Bessarabian ques-
tion earlier? Or, were they simply waiting for an opportunity to establish their posi-
tion without raising suspicions? During the debates in the Territorial Commissions,
they easily could have expressed their opposition to the recognition of Bessarabia’s
union, but they approved it.
In addition, why did the Japanese fail to realize the possible implications of the
Bessarabian question, even as late as 1922 or 1923, when they could have ratified the
Bessarabian Treaty and make use of the Bessarabian precedent?
In conclusion, the May 8 decision to oppose the recognition of Bessarabia’s
union with Romania demarcated a clear change in the US policy towards Bessarabia.
From that time onward, the new US stance on Bessarabia was kept in place; only the
justifications changed over time. The main (though unspoken) reason became that of
avoiding the possibility of offering a precedent or example that could justify a Japa-
nese seizure of Russian territory, such as a staged union of Sakhalin with Japan, fol-
lowed by the recognition of that union. In close connection with this was the need
to keep Russia strong in order to counter Japan’s further expansionism into Asia, a
need that remained in place during at least the 1930s. And apart from Japan, by rec-
ognizing Bessarabia’s union, the US would have agreed to yet one more dismember-
ment of Russia, setting a precedent that other Russian-controlled territories might
have used in order to break away, particularly in the long run.
On another level, there was the need to counter the communist propaganda.
Taking away parts of Russia would actually strengthen the Bolshevik regime, by
heightening its appeal to Russian national feelings.
It might also be argued that the US took a different view of the realities exist-
ing in Bessarabia (they probably had different data regarding the ethnic distribution
of the population, different from those used by the other Great Powers, which
clearly showed Bessarabia to be Romanian territory). Still, if that were the case, it is
surprising that the US experts (and not politicians) twice voted in favor of recogniz-
ing the union (the second time, less than a month before the May 8 change of policy),
based on statistical, demographic and ethnic data.
< 365 >

Romanian-US Relations during the 1920s
During the 1920s, a number of questions were pending between Romania and
the USA, including that of Bessarabia. Economic and political relations between the
two suffered as a result of Romania’s policy regarding the repayment of war debts
and its controversial attitude towards foreign investments in exploitation of natural
resources. The Romanian “by ourselves” economic policy, illustrated by the Mining
Law of 1924, limited the participation of foreign capital in the exploitation of both
coal and oil. The Americans, as well as others, had investments in the Romanian pe-
troleum industry and were dissatisfied with the new legislation and with the conse-
quences it had for American investments in Romania.
On February 26, 1926, the two countries signed an Agreement according mu-
tual, unconditional, most-favored-nation treatment in customs matters, followed by
a Provisional Commercial Agreement providing for the most-favored-nation treat-
ment, signed on August 20, 1930. On March 21, 1929, Romania and the US signed a
Treaty of Arbitration and a Treaty of Conciliation.75
Apart from economic matters, another issue that came to the State Depart-
ment’s attention was the treatment of Jews in Romania. The State Department had
to answer, on more than one occasion, to pressures from American Jews. Each time,
the State Department had shown that it had no power to interfere with the internal
matters of a sovereign state and the only measures it took were some unofficial con-
sultations with the Romanian Minister in Washington. Later on, in 1938, when the
situation of the Romanian Jews seemed to be worsening, the State Department took
the same position, avoiding any interference in Romanian internal matters.76
The Bessarabian question had been, from the political viewpoint, the most im-
portant issue in the bilateral relations. The Romanian government failed not only to
obtain the US signature on the Bessarabian Treaty but even to obtain a simple de
facto recognition of Bessarabia’s union, the US being the only state to go on maintain-
ing relations with Romania but openly considering that Bessarabia was not Roma-
nian territory.
The first duty of the Romanian representatives in the US was to improve Ro-
mania’s general image. They had to counter two very powerful enemies: the Jewish
media and the White Russians. As early as March 1921 they already had focused on
the necessity of counterbalancing the Russian propaganda and had asked Bucharest
for instructions regarding the opportunity to apply pressure on the new US govern-
ment to obtain the recognition of Bessarabia’s union. As presented by Minister
Bibescu,
I understood that a serious press campaign had been prepared in order to pre-
sent the situation of Bessarabia in very dark colors. I think that efforts are
made over at the State Department by my Russian colleagues in order to block
an eventual recognition of Bessarabia’s union by the US.77
< 366 >

The Romanian Foreign Ministry was cautious at first, instructing Bibescu to

refrain from starting official negotiations regarding the Bessarabian question unless
he was certain of a positive result. As for the propaganda campaign, Bibescu received
clear instructions:
You could definitely argue that Bessarabia’s situation is good, the people are
calm, and the administration had made real progress. It is the great landowners
who are complaining, seeming to forget how the expropriation was conducted
on the other side of the Dniestr, and also the Bolshevik revolutionaries, who are
still hoping. The American government made the mistake of not recognizing
the union, and by doing so they gave hopes to these Bolshevik elements.78
While continuing to press for Bessarabia’s recognition by the US, Bibescu was
aware that the US policy remained where Secretary of State Robert Lansing had
placed it some two years earlier: “While the US have a traditional sympathy for the
aspirations of the people oppressed, it also considers that it would be unfair and un-
just to make a prejudgment regarding the fate of the Russian Constitutional Govern-
ment and of the principle regarding Russia’s unity as a whole.”79 Bibescu considered
that Secretary of State Hughes simply continued that line, convinced that, when
Russia rid itself of the Bolsheviks, a very fragmented Russia would result (about 70
regions).
During his meetings with influential persons in Washington Bibescu explained
again and again the real situation of Bessarabia, although without much success in
convincing the Americans. He also tried to use the mass media, and one of his
achievements was the publication of a pamphlet in 1921, called “Redeeming Bessara-
bia”. By 1921, Bibescu came to two important conclusions: that an improvement in
economic relations could bring about a change in the US attitude; and that the US
policy towards Bessarabia would be cleared the day a New Russia became a real-
ity — but he was certain that, in the eyes of the Americans, that day was gradually
fading.80
During the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, the Romanians were faced
with the possibility of a new American declaration regarding the principle of main-
taining Russia’s integrity. Alarmed, Bibescu successfully contacted the British and
French delegations at the Conference, asking for their intervention against any dec-
laration that could contradict Romania’s rights to Bessarabia, rights which had been
recognized by their governments. Take Ionescu congratulated Bibescu for his suc-
cess in warding off the new declaration.81
The Bessarabian question remained a thorn in Romanian-US relations during the
summer of 1922, as the US government announced that it would recognize the govern-
ments of Albania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but failed to do the same for Bessara-
bia’s union with Romania. The only action initiated by the Romanians was to present
the official Romanian theses regarding the union of Bessarabia; Frederic C. Nanu asked
his superiors in Bucharest to send him propaganda material for this task.82
< 367 >

The controversy over the recognition of Bessarabia’s union by the US govern-

ment became heated up in 1923, due to America’s recognition of the Baltic States and
the question of the immigration quota for Bessarabia. The US government’s decision
to recognize the Baltic States in 1923 contradicted the policy enunciated by the
Colby Note, signaling a change in the US policy towards Russia’s territorial integ-
rity. Since it was the same Colby Note that opposed the recognition of Bessarabia’s
union, the Romanians hoped that the US would change their position on Bessarabia
too. However, this was not the case, the US representatives insisting that, as Bes-
sarabia was not an independent state but a territory under Romanian military occu-
pation, its case was clearly different. Therefore, they decided not only to maintain
their policy on Bessarabia but also to make it even clearer to the Romanians that
they opposed the union.
In order to do so, they used the immigration quota for Bessarabia. This ques-
tion was raised for the first time in 1923:
As a result of information received from the US Legation regarding the dis-

tinction made between the emigrants coming from the Old Kingdom and those
coming from Bessarabia, I understood that this distinction is due to the fact
that the US government does not recognize Bessarabia’s union. Of course we
could not admit either this viewpoint nor its consequences . . . we could not
admit a distinction between the citizens of different provinces, we can only
admit a distinction between different social categories of emigrants.83
The Romanian Foreign Minister, I.G. Duca, instructed Bibescu to take all
possible actions in order to obtain the US recognition of the union. The latter
asked that information regarding the ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty as
well as the history of the Soviet-Romanian negotiations be forwarded to him,
arguing, “I realize that a slow but progressive modification in favor of our view-
point is underway in here”.84 Bibescu met again the US Secretary of State, us-
ing every argument he could think of in order to influence him. He also ob-
served that the Bessarabian question would be examined during the June meet-
ing of the State, Commerce and Labor Secretaries, which is supposed to deal
with the litigious questions regarding the immigration. He anticipated that,
during the mentioned meeting, the immigration quota for Bessarabia and that
for Romania would be probably unified, which would mean the recognition of
Bessarabia’s union with Romania. Bibescu insisted that “he gave me the precise
impression that all my arguments were taken . . . The American government
would not come to a decision, which I have every reason to believe would be
favorable for us, until the end of June.85
The Romanians’ efforts in Washington did not pass unobserved. A telegram

sent by the German Ambassador in the US, Dr. Wiedfelt, to the German Foreign
Ministry on April 23, 1923, stated:
< 368 >

From a well-informed source I found confidentially that Romania is now trying

to obtain an American recognition for the annexation of Bessarabia . . . I do not
think that the US Government will take position in this conflict, excepting the
case of Romania making some very advantageous proposals regarding the pe-
troleum exploitations.86
Unfortunately, the outcome in 1923 was negative: the US Government decided

to incorporate the Bessarabian immigration quota into the general Russian immigra-
tion quota, administered from Riga, in Latvia, exactly the opposite of what Minister
Bibescu had anticipated. This incorporation could be related to the stand taken by
the US Government in recognizing the Baltic States, namely that parts of the Rus-
sian territory could be taken under a different sovereignty only with Russian recog-
nition, which the Soviet Government (a government that, according to the Colby
Note, could not be recognized by the US) had just done for the Baltic States. This
theory was very influential in regard to the territory of Russia — so much so that it
was decided that a separate Bessarabian immigration quota did not conform to the
US policy and thought it best to eliminate it by inclusion in the Russian immigration
quota. In other words, Bibescu’s efforts resulted not in an improvement in the US
posture on Bessarabia but a significant worsening.
The bad news was confirmed during a meeting between Bibescu and the Secre-
tary of State.87 Bibescu describes the meeting:
The Secretary of State told me that the US would not take the necessary measures to
recognize the union of Bessarabia with Romania before all the signatory states of the Bessara-
bian Treaty decided to ratify it. I asked the Secretary if he had any other reasons
and the answer was negative. Please let me know when the Japanese and Ital-
ian ratifications will be made, in order to take the necessary action. . . . At my
question regarding the connection between the Bessarabian recognition and
the resolution of some of the Romanian-US financial disputes, the answer was
absolutely negative. There is no way that such a deal might become reality. The
reasons mentioned previously are the only available ones in order to explain
the delay in recognizing Bessarabia’s union.88
I.G. Duca commented, in response to Bibescu’s telegram: “I regret that your

prediction failed to come true, but I am less surprised than you are. I will intervene
to press for the ratifications by France, Italy, Japan.”89 Duca probably already knew
of the US decision from the representatives in Bucharest, or he somehow may have
anticipated the US decision. Still, for a number of years, there was almost no attempt
to change the US position.
Why were no such attempts made? The Romanian government failed to take a
decided stand against the quota decision; what persuaded them that it would not be
productive to engage the battle? One possibility is that the Romanian Government
either did not much care about the US position (and America’s isolationism might
< 369 >

justify that); another is that Romania simply believed that whatever they did, they
could not change the US position (or more precisely, that changing the American
position towards Bessarabia was not considered worth the intense diplomatic cam-
paign and economic or financial concessions that it would require). Other possible
reasons, at least theoretical, are that they failed to understand the significance of the
structure of the US immigration quota or that they wished at least to avoid goading
the US into taking further actions against Bessarabia’s union (for example, making
public statements favoring the Bolsheviks). Even if the Romanian Foreign Ministry
probably would have failed to sway the United States, at least they could have
changed the US decision to incorporate the Bessarabian immigration quota into the
general Russia quota. This was, in this author’s view, attainable during the 1920s as
it was some ten years later, by using the same means (economic measures against US
interests and an able and targeted propaganda campaign in the US).
Bibescu noted another US maneuver: “The American administration, preoccu-
pied with the well-being of American citizens, is searching to find out whether there
are any American citizens expropriated in Bessarabia, in order to obtain for them the
same favorable treatment as for the British and French landowners”.90 If this is true,
it means that the Americans, after refusing to sign and actively opposing the Bessara-
bian Treaty, were looking to have the benefits paid by the Romanian government to
those States that had signed the treaty extend to US too. The only state opposed to
even a de facto recognition of Bessarabia’s union, they were ready to ask for what the
Romanian government had refused to offer Italy and Japan, states that had signed
the treaty. Did Bibescu invent the American interest in landowners expropriated in
Bessarabia, or was he trying to use it as a suggestion in order to allow for a bribe to
the Americans? Whatever was behind it, the fact is that during 1920 the Romanian
government was considering the possibility of paying compensation to US landown-
ers expropriated in Bessarabia (there were indeed two such cases); but, as the US
opposed the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty, the Romanians simply dropped the
matter.
The only attempt to prod the US came soon after the French ratification of the
Bessarabian Treaty, when Duca instructed Bibescu to take action: “Now, when Eng-
land and France have ratified, could you try to obtain from Harding a change in the
US attitude?”91 Bibescu took the necessary steps; the only encouraging hint he could
find was the example of a book on the Romanian economy published by the US
Commerce Department, in which both the statistical data and the maps showed Bes-
sarabia as a part of Romania. He used this example to argue that the US attitude was
gradually becoming more positive towards Romania. As for Bessarabia: “My greatest
wish is to see the American recognition of Bessarabia’s union, but I know from a
well-placed source that at this moment my intervention would fail to have the result
we hope for. It might be possible that we will have to wait until after the presiden-
tial elections.”92 Bibescu’s statement takes us back to some similar statements by his
colleagues in Tokyo, who feared that by keeping up the pressure they would receive
a non-possumus from the Japanese government.
< 370 >

The question of the new immigration quotas, revised in 1924 by the American
government in order to reduce the number of immigrants coming from southern and
eastern Europe and also from Asia, hurt US-Romanian relations further. The new
Immigration Law, which replaced the 1910 census with the 1890 census as the basis
for establishing immigration quotas for each nationality, reduced the Romanian
quota by about 90%, provoking a vehement reaction from Nanu. Italy and Japan, too,
sent powerful protests to the US government regarding the new Immigration Law.
But the State Department, discounting diplomatic customs and norms (at least in
Nanu’s opinion), published Nanu’s note, in this way creating an unpleasant situation
for the Romanians.93 Although Nanu’s protest was justified, and he would continue
to argue his case to the Romanian Foreign Ministry,94 bolstered by the Japanese re-
action to the Immigration Law, Romanian-US relations were irretrievably damaged.
The US officials considered Romania as a secondary Power and they took exception
to the Romanians reacting to something they claimed was an internal matter.
Nanu’s protest in 1924 came during a context of deteriorating relations caused
by the Liberal Government’s economic policy. To the unsolved financial matters, a
new element was added: the proposed Mining Law, which would hurt the American
interests in Romania, especially the capital invested in the oil industry. The misun-
derstandings went as far as the US government sending a strongly worded Note of
Protest on July 10, 1924, accusing the Romanian government of a number of bad in-
tentions, and also called back their minister to Romania, Peter A. Jay, for consulta-
tions.95 What is puzzling is that, during the entire controversy with the Americans
over the effects of the Mining Law, at no time did the Romanians mention what
Davila later used to call “the US discriminatory policy towards Romania”, avoiding
any mention of the Bessarabian immigration quota. The probable justification is that
the Mining Law involved Romania’s relations with all the Great Powers and not only
with the US so that, if they had made a concession to US capital (in exchange for a
modification regarding the Bessarabian immigration quota), the other Powers would
have asked for the same concession.
The US representatives to Romania continued to follow the evolution of the
Bessarabian question. W.S. Culbertson, the US minister to Romania, sent a report
on the opinions expressed by Pan Halippa (a Bessarabian leader and member of the
opposition) regarding the present and future status of Bessarabia. Relevant to our
topic is Culbertson’s own remark that even after the ratification of the Bessarabian
Treaty by Italy and Japan, the Bessarabian question would remain open; that its so-
lution could be obtained only through direct negotiations.96
During the following years, the Romanian representatives in the US limited
their action to propaganda in favor of the Romanian cause in general, and no attempt
was made to pressure the US government to change its position regarding Bessara-
bia. The only exception was in January-February 1925 when, as a result of the estab-
lishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviets, Frederic Nanu had a
conversation with the Japanese Ambassador to the US regarding the Japanese ratifi-
cation, only in order to find out that Japan would not ratify until all the European
< 371 >

powers did so. The Romanian Foreign Ministry kept a tight lid on the Bessarabian
immigration quota question.
Davila’s Campaign for the US Recognition of the Bessarabian Union
The Romanian approach to the US regarding the Bessarabian union changed in

1930. A new Romanian minister to the US had been nominated in 1929, and this time
it was one of Romania’s finest diplomats, Charles A. Davila. He was the first Roma-
nian diplomat to officially visit the Soviet Union after 1918, when he signed for Ro-
mania the Litvinov Protocol in Moscow, in February 1929. Soon after his arrival in
the US, Davila started a veritable campaign in favor of Bessarabia directed at the
State Department, using a two-pronged approach: direct meetings with State De-
partment officials and a barrage of memoranda sent to the State Department. As of
his first meeting with President Hoover, he opened his campaign: “The President
asked me, among other things, about the Russian viewpoint regarding Bessarabia. I
told him that, due to the signatures exchanged in Moscow, there was no more war
danger coming from Russia.” He also had to answer once again the American sugges-
tion of a plebiscite in Bessarabia, presenting the Romanian arguments against the
idea.97
His first Aide-Memoire on Bessarabia was handed to the State Department in
February 1930. After a brief history of the Bessarabian Question, it goes straight to
the point, questioning the US policy on Bessarabia. Davila presents his arguments in
a very precise manner, and his points would all prove to be justified:
“It is to be deeply regretted that, judging from certain information, one

would reach the conclusion that the Government of the US does not recognize
that Bessarabia is an integral part of the Kingdom of Romania.
One of those indications is the fact that on the official maps of the State Depart-
ment this territory is designated as being “under Romanian occupation”. [NB: i.e., State
Dept. maps from 1924, not Commerce Dept. 1930, which are cited in another
context.] Another indication is that the immigration quota for Bessarabia is at present
incorporated into the Russian quota, although when the quota system was first adopted the
Bessarabian quota was included in the quota allotted to Romania. Later, a separate Bes-
sarabian quota was established but, since July 1, 1923, this was merged with
the Russian quota so that Romanian citizens residing in Bessarabia and desir-
ous of immigrating to the US have to obtain their visa from the quantum allot-
ted to Russia. . . .
Representatives of the State Department . . . claimed that the attitude of
the US Government in regard to Bessarabia was in conformity with the princi-
ples laid down in the Colby Note . . . When it was pointed out that Lithuania,
Latvia, Estonia . . . were taken from Russia and that the US Government ac-
corded them recognition, a fact which sanctioned a diminution of Russian ter-
ritory — representatives of the State Department replied that the case of Bes-
< 372 >

sarabia is not identical, as the Soviet government had concurred in the above-
mentioned territorial changes but not in the loss of Bessarabia. However, it is
difficult to understand how such recognition by the Soviet Government might affect the situa-
tion inasmuch as this is exactly the same Russian Government which the Colby Note disquali-
fies from having the right to voice the will of the Russian people and which is still not
recognized by the USA. . . .
The de facto situation is that for over ten years Bessarabia is an integral part
of the Kingdom of Romania, a country with which the USA is on friendly
terms. . . . The Romanians cannot but be painfully impressed by the fact that
the USA seems to have adopted the Russian point of view . . . Apart from the
three Great European Powers who have solemnly and explicitly recognized de
jure the reunion of Bessarabia to Romania, all other countries have tacitly acquiesced
in the de facto situation as it now exists, with the sole exception of the USA.98
(This is hardly the first time that the clause, “with the sole exception of the
US”, cropped up in policy discussions relating to Romania. During the Paris Peace
Conference, as previously noted, it came up many times.)
Davila also reported home of his action:
Until today the US has maintained the immigration quota for Bessarabia as a
part of the Russian quota. Even today, on the official American maps, Bessara-
bia is described as belonging to Russia, with the mention label “under Roma-
nian occupation”. Until now, no written approaches were made [by the Roma-
nians] regarding this matter. Therefore, I sent an aide-memoire to the US sub-
Secretary of State, Cotton. Due to the attitude adopted by the US after the
Colby Note, I do not have too many hopes. . . . Of course, in case we come to an
agreement, this must be done without publicity, because the American govern-
ment might have difficulties with the pro-Russians members of the Congress.99
The letter sent by Davila struck a chord with the Romanian Foreign Ministry,
and a report was made on the matter, stating:
From the history of the matter it results that, in 1923, under the Republican regime,
the American government invoked as the only available reason in order to justify the delay in
recognizing Bessarabia’s union the ratification by all signatories of the Bessarabian
Treaty. . . . Instructions should be sent to Washington that, as soon as an op-
portunity comes, they should remind State Department of their stand in 1923
and, at the same time, they should make it plain that, in the meanwhile, all the
European Powers have ratified.100
After receiving the instructions, F.C. Nanu (as Davila was out of Washington)
sent a telegram to his superiors, indicating one of the reasons for his failure to act
< 373 >

sooner on the matter: “I thought that the Bessarabian Treaty would not come into
force unless all the signatories had ratified it, but the Japanese ratification is still
missing. Please let me know if I am mistaken.101 The Ministry answered, indicating
its own interpretation of the actual situation regarding the Bessarabian Treaty:
You are not mistaken but it must be emphasized that all the Powers with in-
terests in the area have ratified. . . . The coming into force of the Treaty regards
only the signatory Powers. . . . It must be taken into consideration that this is a
situation that is, in fact, admitted by all the Powers, due to the fact that they
signed so many Conventions and treaties with Romania in her actual bor-
ders.102
Nanu took the first opportunity and raised the Bessarabian question during a
meeting with Wallace Murray, the Chief of the Division for Near Eastern Affairs,
arguing the Romanian case:
I reminded him that Romania too had signed no treaty with Russia recognizing
the 1878 occupation of three Bessarabian counties; therefore the principle in-
voked by the Americans, of acknowledging only the territorial modifications
approved by the both sides, simply turns against them. He believes that the
American formal recognition would be given implicitly as soon as Japan ratifies
the Bessarabian Treaty, and asked what was the probability of a Japanese rati-
fication.103
The RFM informed Nanu, “We have no guarantee that the Japanese govern-
ment will ratify in the near future”.104
It can be seen that the US representatives were ready to use the Bessarabian
Treaty in their favor whenever they had the opportunity, although they were the
only State (except for Bolshevik Russia) that had opposed the Treaty altogether.
Whatever the reasons, contradictory, opportunistic, or cynical, the US government
made full use of the Bessarabian Treaty in order to justify their failure to de facto rec-
ognize Bessarabia’s union.
The State Department did not bother to answer the Aide Memoire, so that
Davila had to insist in August on receiving a response. Finally, on October 1, 1930,
the State Department responded, verbally, during a meeting between Wallace
Murray and the Romanian Chargé d’affaires, Frederic Nanu.
Nanu made it clear that a formal recognition of Bessarabia’s union would be
welcome, but that his government would be pleased even with as less as a correction
to the external signs of the US policy (the maps and the immigration quota). Murray
rationalized the US stand once again, indicating that is was not his Department’s
fault how the maps were drawn, and saying that the question of the immigration
quota could not be solved because it would go against the Immigration Law of 1924.
This was not a satisfactory answer, and Nanu countered with some interesting argu-
ments, which appear to have an effect on Murray, who wrote:
< 374 >

It might be difficult for the Romanian Government to secure from the Romanian Parlia-
ment ratification of the American-Romanian treaties [including the one according the
most-favored-nation treatment to the USA] since the deputies from Bessarabia might
obstruct it on the ground that this Government had refused to recognize the Romanian an-
nexation of Bessarabia. . . . I hope that what Mr. Nanu said in the above connec-
tion is not true, since we shall only be negotiating a new treaty of commerce
and navigation with Romania and it would be unfortunate to have the treaty
defeated because of the opposition of Bessarabian deputies. . . .
He expressed himself as unable to understand how this government could
take cognizance of any act of the Soviet Government, which this Government
refuses to recognize as the proper spokesman for the Russian people. I must
confess that there is a good deal in what Mr. Nanu says in the above connec-
tion.105
After describing the meeting to his superiors in Bucharest, Nanu concludes by

indicating yet one more reason for his inactivity prior to Davila’s arrival:
I think that it would be futile to ask for more because we would only give them (the
Americans) the impression that no territorial modification in Europe has value without their
express ratification, which would be insulting for us, and in the current political situa-
tion I find it impossible to obtain . . . except for the case of worsening Russo-
American relations.106
In March 1931 Davila sent a telegram to Bucharest, presenting the success of his
efforts:
As a result of the action initiated by me through the February 18, 1930, memo-
randum for the State Department, the immigration quota for Bessarabia was
taken out from the Russian quota and its administration moved from Riga to
Bucharest. Also, on the American maps Bessarabia is today simply included
inside the Romanian borders. Murray told me that the matter is resolved ac-
cording to our wish, and that the future Presidential Proclamation would in-
clude it. Until then the matter must be kept completely secret, in order to
avoid any discussions.107
The State Department’s action answered only half of the Romanians’ concerns
and they saw it as a compromise, at best. In Davila’s words:
I am glad to publicly announce that on July 1 the Presidential Proclamation was

published, through which the immigration quota for Bessarabia was taken out
of the Russian quota and will be administered in Bucharest as a special quota. I
beg you not to give this news to the newspapers; any political aspects must be
< 375 >

avoided. I hope that, through new arguments, I will be able to obtain the inclu-
sion of the Bessarabian quota in that for Romania, which would mean the de-
finitive recognition of the de facto situation.108
On July 21, 1931, Davila sent a very detailed report to Bucharest, a report in
which he presents once again all the arguments he had used in favor of the Romanian
thesis, together with the American counter-arguments:
The fact that the State Department had finally adopted a neutral attitude in
our dispute with Russia, after so many years of being clearly pro-Russian, is an
incontestable success for us. . . . They invoked the principles established by the
Colby Note in 1920, which they are still following . . . There is still some doubt
over the fact that this decision [of the union] was taken under foreign pressure,
which could not be the case when the state remains independent . . . And, as a
last resort, the American diplomats invoked another argument: the US are not
interested in territorial modifications taking place in Europe. At best, they are
ready to ratify territorial modifications approved and ratified by the interested
Powers. Our Treaty of 1920, through which our possession of Bessarabia was
recognized, failed to come into force, Japan still delaying the ratification. Why
would they decide before the Great Powers more closely interested in the
question do so? Once the Treaty comes into power, the question would be re-
examined.
I must point out, here, that it is not historical or juridical arguments, much
used in the past, that have determined the change in the State Department’s
attitude towards us, but practical arguments, like the presence of Bessarabian
representatives in Romania’s Parliament, which votes the conventions signed
with the US, etc., and especially the argument that the American option to
choose between the two theses (one belonging to Romania, her former war
ally, regarding the free union of Bessarabia, and the other belonging to the Sovi-
ets, not recognized by the US, regarding the military occupation of Bessara-
bia) . . . the Soviet one is an inimical act towards us. . . .
My opinion is that, except for the case of an unexpected worsening in
Russo-American relations, America would not be in a hurry to make disappear
the last signs showing that she failed as yet to de facto recognize Bessarabia’s
union with Romania, at least for as long as she can invoke the welcome pretext
of the Bessarabian Treaty’s failure to come into force. Of course, it might be
argued whether the US failure to de facto recognize the existing situation has
any significance for us, leaving aside the question of our self-esteem. Still, if
obtaining it would not cost us more than a few diplomatic approaches, I think
that it would be worth trying, especially now when America has to be more
and more interested in European matters, including territorial matters . . .
However convinced are we of the justice in our thesis, I think that it would be
an advantage to eliminate the possibility for our enemies to use in their deal-
< 376 >

ings with the Americans the fact that for them the juridical borders of Romania
starts only at the Pruth River.109
All the arguments used by Davila could have been easily used a few years ear-
lier, by any of the other Romanian representatives in the US, including the same F.C.
Nanu, even if they had no instructions from Bucharest in this sense. And there was
no new development, except maybe for the Litvinov Protocol, that would justify a
sudden American interest in Bessarabia. From the documents studied, it seems that
Davila actually took the initiative for this action, without having special instructions
from the RFM. If this was the case, it means that, indeed, the RFM was simply ig-
noring the American failure to de facto recognize the union. The least they could have
done between 1924 and 1929 was to reopen the Bessarabian question after the Italian
ratification, but there is no evidence of any such effort. In this respect Davila’s merits
are great, as he was able not only to convince the US government to take some steps
in Romania’s favor, but also to change the previous “immobility” of the RFM regard-
ing the US position towards Bessarabia.
In February 1932, encouraged by his success, Davila came up with a more ambi-
tious plan; he set out to attract the US to Romania’s side in the dispute with the So-
viet Union regarding Bessarabia. This time, he intended to use America’s willingness
to facilitate the success of the Geneva Disarmament Conference. Accordingly, in
February 1932 Davila asked the Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, if he would be
willing, should the need arise, to authorize the American delegates in Geneva to ex-
press approval of the Romanian contention that Soviet Russia should agree to refrain
from any acts of aggression beyond the Dniestr River (in the non-aggression pact
under negotiation between the two states at that time). Davila avoided raising the
question of recognizing the annexation of Bessarabia. However, the Secretary of
State refused to interfere in the Romanian-Soviet negotiations, and Davila’s plan
failed.110
In March 1932, Davila reopened the question of Bessarabia. He took as his
opening the Secretary of State’s February 23, 1932, letter addressed to Senator Borah,
in which the Secretary expressed his agreement not to recognize territorial changes
resulting from the use of force.111 During a meeting with the Under Secretary of State,
William R. Castle, Davila asked if the letter applied to a de facto as well as a de jure
situation. Castle answered:
It is impossible for me to forecast what attitude we might take if Russia merely

took back Bessarabia, which we have never recognized as an integral part of Romania. I
pointed out to [Davila] that the situation was made even more complicated by
the fact that we had not recognized Russia. . . . I am afraid the only point he
definitely got before the end of his call was that I did not propose to commit
myself as to probable American action in case of a very hypothetical and im-
probable attack on the part of Russia.112
< 377 >

As can be seen, the US government did not accept that its 1931 action regarding
the Bessarabian immigration quota equated to a tacit recognition of Bessarabia’s un-
ion.
In April 1932 Davila sent another Memoire to the State Department. The new
element presented was a comparison between the case of Bessarabia and that of
Texas.113 This time Davila asked for the inclusion of the Bessarabian immigration
quota in the Romanian immigration quota.114
Describing one of his meetings with State Department officials, Davila presents
the reasons why he avoided asking for express American recognition of Bessarabia’s
union:
I know the Americans’ abhorrence for such acts and their attitude in similar
cases (like Vilna); because the recently formulated principle in the Stimson-
Borah Letter could impede them; because I do not know if the Romanian gov-
ernment has the intention of asking all the other governments for such a recog-
nition; because what I want to obtain now is the implicit recognition, through
the elimination of the existing discrimination. Our chances to succeed are truly
favorable.115
On May 13, 1932, Wallace Murray prepared a report for William Castle regard-
ing the status of the Bessarabian question. He made a complete review of arguments
previously used by Davila in favor of an American recognition of the de facto situation
of Bessarabia: the US recognition of the possession of Vilna by Poland, despite the
dispute that still existed between Poland and Lithuania; the temporary nature as-
cribed to the Bolshevist regime in the Colby Note (it was expected to last for only a
few more months); that the inclusion of Bessarabia in the consular jurisdiction of the
American Consulate in Bucharest might mean a de facto recognition of the status quo;
the desirability of settling this matter in some fashion prior to American recognition
of Soviet Russia. Concluding his report, Murray states that:
I may add, in conclusion, that Mr. Flournoy [another official of the State
Department] feels that this matter could be settled in a purely administrative
way by including the Bessarabian quota in the Romanian quota, such a procedure constitut-
ing ipso facto a recognition of that territory as Romanian soil. Mr. Flournoy further-
more feels that if the matter were ever raised we could easily justify our action
not only on the grounds of an administration of a quota but also because of the
necessity of regularizing our consular jurisdiction in the disputed province.
This question has dragged along now for well over a decade and I, for one,
would welcome an opportunity to bring it to a close if this could be done with-
out causing any injury to American interests. I do not see that we gain anything par-
ticularly by upholding the Colby principle so rigidly in the case of Bessarabia when it has
been treated somewhat lightly in other instances of the alienation of Russian
territory.116
< 378 >

Unfortunately, Murray’s opinion was not enough to convince his superiors

that the time had come for a new change in their policy towards Bessarabia.
Having in view the possible US recognition of Soviet Russia, Nicolae Titulescu,
Romania’s new Foreign Ministry, tried to avoid an implicit recognition by the US of
the Bessarabian conflict. He instructed Davila and Nanu to act accordingly:
I will remind you that, when Great Britain recognized the Soviets, she ex-
pressly declared that she was recognizing their sovereignty only over the terri-
tories that recognize Moscow’s authority, which clearly excludes Bessarabia.
Also, in the declaration made by Prime Minister Herriot in 1924 it was ex-
pressly stated that the recognition of the Soviets is made on the conditions im-
posed by France, meaning the respect of France’s previous treaties, including
our treaty with France regarding Bessarabia’s recognition.117
Titulescu’s intervention shows that, for the first time in a long period, a Roma-
nian Foreign Minster was interested in the US policy towards Bessarabia and
seemed to care about its implications. Davila answered Titulescu’s request only on
January 31, asking that the history of the Russo-Romanian negotiations be sent to
him before the end of February. Davila’s answer provoked Titulescu’s anger, particu-
larly as he was not one of Titulescu’s favorites:
Taking into account the pressing terms in which I asked you to take care of the
Bessarabian question in the case of an eventual recognition of the Soviets by
the US, we can not but express our surprise at the fact that only as late as
January 31, meaning more than one and a half months since you received your
instructions, you ask for the missing data and even mention that you need this
data before the end of February.118
Davila was quick to answer Titulescu’s criticism. After observing that there
were actually two very different aspects to the Bessarabian question, that of the im-
migration quota and that of possible US actions to influence the Soviet stance vis-à-
vis Romania as a result of their recognition of the former, Davila noted the Ministry’s
silence regarding his actions on the immigration quota question. He complained that
no instructions were sent to him regarding what actions he should take and what
liberty he had in his actions regarding this question. He also spelled out his cam-
paign plan:
In 1932 the resolution of the Bessarabian question was suspended due to

presidential elections. Until March 4 no action can be taken because it is un-
certain who will form the Cabinet of President Roosevelt. Public debates or
discussions with senators and deputies are unwelcome because this is a ques-
tion that might be resolved simply with the help of the State Department. . . .
< 379 >

By recognizing the Soviets, the State Department could act in Romania’s

favor, pressing the Soviets to drop the thesis of existing litigation with Roma-
nia. . . . However, I do not have too high hopes of being able to orchestrate such
an action. As the litigation does not exist for us, it is only by indirect means
that I might suggest such an action. . . .
The question regarding the quota inclusion and the definitive recognition is
different. The general mood is favorable to us but they often point to their dis-
satisfaction regarding the treatment of the American interests in Romania (the
new import quotas, the Thompson-Houston auction). Until now I have de-
clined any discussions on those points. I ask your Excellency to be kind enough
and let me know what are the limits of my actions in the possible case of diffi-
culties with the new administration.119
By March 6, 1933, Davila had already started up his diplomatic campaign again,
meeting with Wallace Murray and presenting again his arguments in favor of set-
tling the Bessarabian question, along with some new ideas. Murray reported that:
The Romanian minister asserts that the US is the only country besides the
Soviet Union that has refused to recognize the annexation by Romania of Bes-
sarabia. . . . As a special concession to Romanian sensibilities on this subject, the De-
partment, in June 1931, separated the Bessarabian immigration quota from the
Russian quota and set up an independent Bessarabian quota. The Romanians
have since that time urged that the Department go one step further and include
the Bessarabian quota in the Romanian quota. This cannot be done without at
the same time tacitly recognizing Bessarabia as a part of Romania. . . .
The Romanian Minister emphasized the viewpoint of Mr. Titulescu, the
Romanian Foreign Minister, that if we recognize the Soviet regime without
modifying our position on the Bessarabian question we shall be recognizing at
the same time that a dispute — question litigieuse — exists between Romania
and the Soviet Union. . . . The Romanian Minister described our position on
the Bessarabian question as a “public discrimination” against Romania. He said
that while it had been possible hitherto to suppress discussions of this ques-
tion in the Romanian press, it would not be possible to do so in the future; that
Romanian official opinion is aroused at our attitude and that public opinion
will be much more so once the question is discussed in the Romanian
press.120 . . .
The US position is that governments or regimes are recognized, not the
specific territories over which they exercise control. . . . I contested his statement
that a commercial treaty between two countries necessarily implied a recognition by each
other of the boundaries of the other.121
Davila also reported home, in a way that must have pleased Titulescu, stating,
“I have the State Department’s promise that no decision would be taken regarding
< 380 >

Russia’s recognition before a preliminary discussion on the Bessarabian question.”122

On March 16, 1933, Robert F. Kelley, Chief of the Division for Eastern European
Affairs, had an extended conversation with members of the Romanian Legation in
Washington. On this occasion, Davila gave an excellent presentation of the evolu-
tion of Russo-Romanian relations after the war, as well as of the current situation
existing between the two countries. As reported by Kelley:
Davila also advanced the argument that the settlement of the Bessarabian ques-
tion would tend to strengthen Russia’s position in the Far East, and he thought
that this was a factor which would be of interest for us. . . . He devoted the
greater part of his remarks to urging that the US, in its discussions with the
Soviet authorities preceding recognition, intimate that it would be pleased if a
settlement were reached between Romania and Russia with respect to Bes-
sarabia.123
In other words, Davila came back to his February 1932 idea of having the
Americans suggest to the Soviets that they reach an agreement with Romania re-
garding Bessarabia before the establishment of US-Soviets diplomatic relations.
However, at that time the State Department was not really eager to establish diplo-
matic relations with the Soviet Union and it would take the direct intervention of
President Roosevelt, bypassing the State Department, in November the same year, to
establish them.124
On March 22 Davila received new instructions regarding the possible US rec-
ognition of the Soviets: “The formula of an eventual recognition of the Soviets by the
US must be the same as in England’s case: the US recognizes as Soviet territory only
those territories that are today under Soviet authority.”125 Davila made the necessary
inquiries and reported home, stating, “I warn you that the American traditional pol-
icy is to recognize governments through the simple nomination of ambassadors,
without any act in which conditions or explanations might be inserted”.126
By far the most important paper presented by the Romanians to the State De-
partment was the Aide-Memoire delivered by Davila on March 29, 1933. It is remark-
able in that it comes in “American language”, in other words, it conforms to the
American way of arguing a legal case. In its twenty pages, the Memoire refers to fa-
vorable precedents existing in US history and in US law for the settlement of the
Bessarabian question, while also presenting the international implications of the
American position. Even more, it comes with a clear solution for the unsettled ques-
tion of US recognition for Bessarabia’s union.
While we can only concentrate on a few of its highlights, this memo is a prime
example of how a case should be argued in order to be convincing to American diplo-
mats. It starts with a brief history of Bessarabia, underscoring the fact that Turkey
could never have ceded territories that did not belong to her, and then presents the
Soviet-Romanian negotiations regarding the Bessarabian question and the actual
stage of these discussions. Later it reveals what would be the benefits for the US in
case the two neighbors should reach an agreement on Bessarabia:
< 381 >

The US might have now a unique opportunity to interpose their good of-
fices in case, of course, they do begin conversations with Russia on the subject
of recognition. The image of the US as a promoter of peace would be clearly
enhanced as a result of a possible success. . . .
The fascist victory in Germany. This event might easily hasten a rapproche-
ment between the USSR and the democratic states of the world and prove to
be an important milestone on the path of Russian evolution towards Western
ideals.
A further practical benefit for the US, which would result from successful
mediation in this controversy, would undoubtedly be improved trade with Ro-
mania.
In order to convince the US representatives that it was possible for them to

mediate in the Soviet-Romanian dispute, Davila offers the example of US mediation
in the conflict between Spain and Mexico in 1823.
Davila’s main argument centers on the question of immigration quotas, going
back to ideas expressed in the February 1930 memorandum:
Among all the countries in the world, excepting of course Russia, which
tacitly or formally have recognized that Bessarabia is a territorial part of Roma-
nia, the US maintain an overt discrimination intended to show that they still consider this
matter unsettled. This discrimination is to be found in the immigration quotas, which provide
a separate quota for Bessarabia.
The question can well be raised whether there is any justification for the
maintenance of this double anomaly, if there ever was one. . . . The feeling ex-
ists among Romanians that it is hard to see why Romania should grant the most favor-
able treatment to American trade, when in the only important matter in which the US so far
had occasion to discriminate against Romania, they have chosen to do it.
America is not only the only country which adopted this attitude, but it is only with re-
gard to Romania that it is maintaining it, whereas it has long since given it up in all
similar cases involving other countries (the Baltic States, Vilna, etc.). . . .
It is an anomaly that one of two states enjoying normal and friendly rela-
tions should not recognize the sovereignty of the other over its entire terri-
tory. . . . The only conclusion to be drawn is that the Colby doctrine was aban-
doned as far back as 1922, in so far as former Russian territories were con-
cerned, with but one sole exception, Bessarabia. . . .
The fact that Romania has, since 1918, exercised continuous and undis-
turbed sovereignty over Bessarabia, is undisputed. . . . As an independent state
[Bessarabia] had the further right to dispose of its sovereignty as it thought fit,
in this case to merge it with Romanian sovereignty. . .
The reason usually advanced by the Department of State to justify its ex-
ceptional attitude in case of Romania has been that the independence of Bes-
< 382 >

sarabia had been of too short duration to satisfy the traditional (but by no
means invariable, as the case of Panama proves) requirement of proof of stabil-
ity before recognizing a new state.
The well established American doctrine in the matter of changes of sover-
eignty is to make recognition conditional on: a reasonable period of stability of
the new situation; acquiescence, even tacit, of the population; willingness and
ability of the new government to discharge its obligations. The case of Bessara-
bia meets all these tests. . . .
The above considerations are believed to show that there is no reason for
the US not to recognize the de facto situation and continue to discriminate
against a Romanian territory . . . Any international agreement between the US
and Romania, ratified by the Parliament of the latter, in which sit the represen-
tatives of Bessarabia, would be of doubtful validity if America does not recog-
nize even tacitly that Bessarabia is an integral part of Romania. . . .
If the immigration quotas had not existed, the whole question would not
have arisen. America would have been in the same position as the majority of
the other countries. . . . Unfortunately, an American Law, the Immigration Act,
establishes geographical quotas that can reflect overt discriminations against
certain territories. . . .
Romania has always granted and still grants the most favored nation treat-
ment to American imports, without demanding any compensation. The tre-
mendous advantage for America is clear, as in normal times America’s exports
to Romania reached a substantial sum, whereas Romania could never expect to
sell any of her agricultural products to America in more than negligible quanti-
ties. For the five-year period (1926-1930), American exports to Romania were
valued at $32,182,000 while Romanian exports to America were valued at
$3,297,000, according to American statistics. The Romanian statistics are even
more favorable to America.
In conclusion, Davila insisted on the necessity for the US to recognize Bessara-

bia as a Romanian territory as soon as possible and definitely before the US recog-
nized the Russian Government: “When the immigration quotas are established
sometime in June, the Bessarabian quota [should] merely be omitted and the Roma-
nian one slightly augmented.”
And what better end to his Memoire could Davila have found than by making a
reference to one of the most famous American presidents (ironically, the one who
initiated this US policy on Bessarabia):
The reunion of Bessarabia with her mother country should not only not be
frowned upon by the US, but should be eagerly welcomed. For it constitutes
the perfection, as far as Romania is concerned, of the principle of self-
determination, so ardently championed by Woodrow Wilson.127
< 383 >

It was a masterfully written memorandum, crafted in the American style, rich

with references to supporting precedents (Texas, Panama, Vilna), and showing
clearly the possible advantages, and especially the economic ones, that would result
from American recognition of Bessarabia as Romanian territory. Davila also knew
that the argument to which the US was the most sensitive and to which they would
pay the greatest attention was money, and he highlighted the large positive balance
trade. His timing was good, too, at the end of March — just a few weeks before the
establishment of the new immigration quotas.
Unfortunately, Davila’s diplomatic acumen was not rivaled by any of his prede-
cessors in Washington or by his colleagues in Tokyo, whether or not they had ade-
quate backing from Bucharest. Bibescu’s and Vassiliu’s actions were negligible, com-
pared with Davila’s campaign, and the results each produced show the difference.
Less than two weeks after the Memoire had been handed in, the Secretary of
State, Cordell Hull, asked for President Roosevelt’s permission to resolve the prob-
lem:
There is no longer any reason why we should continue to adhere to the doc-
trine enunciated by Mr. Colby in 1920. On the contrary, I feel that we should
now recognize the de facto situation. This can be accomplished by a simple ad-
ministrative act. . . . It would be my idea to omit any reference to Bessarabia in
this Proclamation. The elimination of the Bessarabian quota and the inclusion of the terri-
tory within the Romanian quota area would have the result of according American recogni-
tion to Romanian sovereignty over Bessarabia and would set at rest the contention of
Romania that the existence of the Bessarabian quota constitutes a “public dis-
crimination” against that country.128
Hull’s telegram is important because, unlike all the other US documents, par-
ticularly those sent to the Romanians, it clearly states that the disappearance of the
quota meant US recognition of Romania’s sovereignty over Bessarabia. On April 15,
1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved the inclusion of the Bessarabian
quota in the Romanian quota.
Still, even after the President had approved the settlement of the Bessarabian
immigration quota question, the American diplomats did not find it necessary to
change their position. While informing Davila that the Romanian request had been
approved by the President, the acting Secretary of State William Phillips stated that
the American move was to take place only “provided that the Romanian Government
did not continue its policy of discrimination against American trade”.129 In other
words, it was indeed money that made the difference. Davila also reported the meet-
ing home asking that, in order to boost his position, some pressure should be
brought upon the Finance Ministry:
The State Department’s decision regarding the implicit recognition of Bessara-

bia’s union must be taken soon. The representative of the State Department
< 384 >

gave me a memorandum with secret documents regarding discrimination in

various areas of Romanian imports of American goods. The State Department
complains that the way in which the import quotas are applied is highly ineq-
uitable for them.130
In 1933 as a result of the economic crisis, the Romanian Government, like other
governments, introduced a system of import quotas in order to equilibrate the trade
balance. This proved to be detrimental to American interests and, although it was
not intended as a mean of pressuring the US into a more pro-Romanian policy re-
garding Bessarabia, it seems to have had that effect. Davila defended the Romanian
commercial policy, indicating that “Romania was in such a precarious situation at
that time that she was obliged to trade primarily with countries that purchased from
her.”131 Toward the end of 1933, as the world economy and the Romanian economy
climbed out of the crises, the Romanians ceased to discriminate against American
imports.
On May 31 Davila was officially informed that the decision to merge the immi-
gration quotas for Bessarabia and Romania had been taken and would be published
in the Presidential Proclamation to be made in June. Still, unlike the aforementioned
letter from Secretary Hull to the President, there was no suggestion or mention that
this meant the US de facto recognition of Bessarabia’s union. The State Department
asked, in exchange, for an improvement regarding the import quotas, and Davila
noted that “a certain improvement would be enough”.132 Another meeting between
Davila and Murray took place on June 8, focusing on the Romanian import quotas.
Murray explained that:
What we are protesting against is therefore not the establishment of import

quotas by Romania, but the arbitrary administration of those quotas which
threatens to shut us out of the Romanian market altogether. . . . What the Ro-
manians are actually doing at the present time is to refuse to grant permits to
importers of American goods and to grant such permits to importers of goods
from other countries on the score that Romania’s trade with each and every
country should be made to balance.133
Davila had to insist again with his superiors to make some commercial concessions
to the Americans:
Please transmit my gratitude to Mr. Madgearu [Romanian Finance Minister]

and my request that the he should decide the necessary measures in order to
satisfy the Americans before he leaves for London, because if the Bessarabian
question is not solved here before the end of June, it will be postponed for the
next year. I would also like to remind you that I promised State Department
that, for the moment, no publicity will be made regarding the recognition of
Bessarabia.134
< 385 >

Finally, by Presidential Proclamation No. 2048 of June 16, 1933, establishing

immigration quotas for the year beginning July 1, the Bessarabian quota area was
included with the Romanian quota area. Wilbur J. Carr, the Assistant Secretary of
State, sent the proclamation to Davila, together with the following comments:
As you will observe this Proclamation omits any reference to Bessarabia. The
effect of this omission is to abolish the Bessarabian quota established under
Executive Order no 1952 of June 19, 1931. The Bessarabian quota area has been
included within the Romanian quota area and, as you will note upon compar-
ing the new order with that of June 19, 1931, the Romanian quota has been in-
creased from 295 to 377.135
It was considered that, by the Presidential Proclamation, the US had de facto

recognized the union of Bessarabia with Romania.136 The Romanian Foreign Minis-
try congratulated Davila for the results of his campaign137 and Davila sent one last
report reviewing the entire campaign and underscoring again Murray’s opinion that
it was an implicit recognition of Bessarabia’s union.138
Still, judging by the content of Carr’s message, or by the Presidential Proclama-
tion, there was no mention by the Americans of a de facto recognition of Bessarabia’s
union. It was clearly specified that the US saw the matter as a purely technical one
having no political implications whatsoever for the US. In case complications should
arise, they could back off easily, explaining the entire matter on administrative
grounds and rejecting any political connection between the inclusion of the immi-
gration quota and the official American policy on Bessarabia. On the other hand, it
might be argued that, since the discrimination had disappeared, there was no need
to have the matter expressly presented in writing. No official statement regarding a
change in US policy regarding Bessarabia followed the quota decision; and events in
fact shifted the other way again.
In order to maintain confidentiality with regard to the American decision and
to avoid a possible Soviet reaction, both governments kept the issue quiet, at least
for the moment. Still, as a precaution the State Department drafted a declaration,
with the agreement of the Romanian Legation in Washington, to be published by
the Romanian government (and not by the US government, which gives it a different
meaning) in case the decision should come to light.139 After presenting a short over-
view of the Bessarabian immigration quota question, the draft specified:
Although the Romanian government understands that, from the American

viewpoint, these decisions concerning the Bessarabian quota were taken pri-
marily for reasons of administrative convenience, the Romanian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs considers that the inclusion of the Bessarabian quota area
within the quota area of Romania may properly be interpreted as recognition
by the US of the de facto situation in Bessarabia.140
< 386 >

The draft declaration, although it seems to acknowledge the US de facto recog-

nition of the situation in Bessarabia (without mentioning the words union or sover-
eignty, like all the other US documents addressed to the Romanians), falls short of
acknowledging it in clear terms. This draft casts the US recognition in a different
light. Of course, with the elimination of the special Bessarabian quota, the US dis-
crimination against Romania ceased — which means that there were no more out-
ward signs to show the US opposition to the union and that the US finally had done
what all the other states entertaining relations with Romania had done since 1920:
acknowledge a de facto situation. But the Draft, as well as the other documents ad-
dressed to the Romanians, stress that it was done only for reasons of administra-
tive convenience and not as in response to historical, demographic or juridical argu-
ments proving that Bessarabia was indeed Romanian territory. Then, was it recogni-
tion?
The US officials left themselves an escape hatch: they could go back to impos-
ing a new Bessarabian quota at any time later, and the Draft might be interpreted in
the sense that the US was still opposed to the union between Bessarabia and Roma-
nia. For this reason the Draft could have been used, at any point, against Romania.
The secretive manner in which the quota inclusion was made supports that view, as
the US would be able to deny at any point a so-called de facto recognition of Bessara-
bia’s union. And so they actually did.
In fact, it might be argued that the Draft and the secrecy surrounding the Bes-
sarabian quota cancelled out any positive effects that should have redounded from
the US decision to merge the two immigration quotas. The Romanians were unable,
at any time, to use the 1933 Presidential Proclamation for propaganda, although it
would have been a real boost for the Romanian position; to the contrary, they had to
avoid any reference to it. Their win was more of a private than a public nature and it
could have been turned against them by the Americans at any time.
Titulescu’s reaction to the draft declaration, although initially based on a dif-
ferent reasoning, further supports this notion. Soon after learning of it, he vocally
opposed its publication. “I see that Davila is talking about a communiqué to be given
by the Romanian government regarding the Bessarabian quota. Please stop any com-
muniqué on this question. For us it is important to have the thing in fact and not to
advertise it. This is my line of action regarding these kind of matters.”141 Although
Titulescu was not aware at that moment of the content of the draft he considered it
wiser to keep it under wraps, particularly as it could have interfered with his policy
moves towards the Soviets. After he learned of its contents, he was even more op-
posed to publishing it, correctly stating, “The communiqué is in total contradiction
to all his previous telegrams and is inadmissible for me.”142
Although both States tried to keep the quota inclusion secret, someone at the
Romanian Legation in Washington leaked it to the Romanian press. As a result, one
Romanian newspaper published a small notice on the matter.143 As the article was
more favorable to Romania than reality would have suggested was actually the case,
< 387 >

and as the matter was also supposed to be kept secret, the US minister in Bucharest
immediately contacted the Romanian Foreign Ministry expressing his surprise and
reminding of the commitment to avoid any publicity. The ministry made the neces-
sary interventions so that the news published in Argus would not be published in any
other Romanian newspaper.143
In order to justify their implication in the making of the draft declaration,
Nanu clarified that the communiqué was to be published only in the case of a violent
press campaign or of a parliamentary interpellation. He also pointed that “the State
Department wishes to continue keeping the secret regarding the Bessarabian
quota”.144 Titulescu was very keen to end the discussions regarding the Draft decla-
ration, perfectly understanding its real significance, and instructed Nanu:
We refuse, whatever the situation might be, the publication of the commu-
niqué regarding the Bessarabian quota, the text of which is not satisfactory for
us, as I telegraphed you. We are astonished that, although you had clear in-
structions in the past, you exceeded them once again.145
Taking into account the short period of time between the US decision to merge
the immigration quotas in 1933 and the US recognition of the Soviets, one might well
argue that the two decisions were connected. Still, although the Romanians made
that argument during their campaign there is nothing, at least in the available docu-
ments, that would indicate a connection between the quota merger and the recogni-
tion of the Soviet Union. The main argument against such a connection is the fact
that the Romanians were negotiating with the State Department (which was still
opposed to recognition of the Soviets in 1933) and not with President Roosevelt,
who made up his own mind to improve relations with the Soviets.146 Under these
conditions, the decision to merge the immigration quotas had little if anything to do
with the US recognition of the Soviets.
In 1938 the immigration quota question was mentioned for the last time. The
Romanian Legation in the US sent a telegram stating:
With this inclusion of the immigration quota for Austria in that for Germany,
the State Department acknowledged publicly for the first time that a similar
operation took place in 1933, when the Bessarabian quota was added to that of
Romania. I remind you that State Department insisted five years ago that this
action should not be advertised. . . . By the publication of the State Depart-
ment’s declaration on April 28 any possibility that the State Department will
ask us to publish the draft communiqué is definitively eliminated.147
In July 1940, when the Soviets took Bessarabia from Romania, the US govern-
ment made no attempt to help Romania. As Irimescu has observed:
< 388 >

The commentaries here show the occupation of Bessarabia and Northern

Bukovina as a move against Germany. Therefore, the Soviet action finds not
only understanding but also tacit approval. . . . In private conversations they
show me sympathy but they also add that what is of most importance is the
defeat of Germany and the contribution which the Soviet Union might make in
this sense. From the Jewish and the left wing circles we face, of course, pro-
nounced hostility.148
As an interesting detail, on June 24, 1941, a State Department official informed

the Romanian Chargé d’affaires in Washington that “as long as the Romanian Army
does not cross the old Romanian border [the border before the territorial losses suf-
fered in 1940, including Bessarabia], the US has no reason to criticize the Romanian
action [against the Soviet Union].”149
After the US entered the war, by 1942 the US was solidly supporting the future
of Bessarabia as a part of the Soviet Union. The only reservations expressed by the
Americans referred to northern Bukovina, which had never belonged to Russia; but
they dropped those objections shortly.150 In February 1944, when the Soviet Army
was about to re-occupy Bessarabia, a new debate sprang up between the US and
Great Britain regarding the fate of Bessarabia. According to a telegram sent to the
British Foreign Office by George Kennan, from Moscow, “The State Department
considers that they [the Russians] could occupy Bessarabia, as its annexation by Romania
had never been recognized by the Soviet and US governments.”151 In fact, the US terms for the
Romanian surrender, approved by the Joint Chief of Staff in February 1944, called
not only for the incorporation of northern Bukovina and Bessarabia into the Soviet
Union but also for an adjustment of the Hungarian-Romanian frontier in Transylva-
nia, along ethnic lines.152
Conclusions
There are several key episodes to consider in analyzing the connection to the
Bessarabian question in the context of Romanian-US relations:
1. President Wilson’s first analysis of the Bessarabian question, in May
1918, which did not inspire him to agree that it should automatically be-
long to Romania;
2. The recognition of Romanian rights in Bessarabia, clearly expressed
in the final recommendations of the Inquiry Commission and by the vote
of the American representatives in the Territorial Commissions. It seems
improbable that this was done without the knowledge and approval of
President Wilson.
3. The May 8, 1919, declaration by Secretary of State Robert Lansing,
that no modifications should be made regarding the territory belonging to
the former Russian Empire without the approval of a recognized Russian
government (presumably, a White Russian government).
< 389 >

As we have shown, the change in the American policy toward the Bessara-
bian question did not come as a result of Romania’s “uncooperative” attitude
toward the Peace Conference but more probably was due to the Great Powers’
hopes in a victorious Kolchak offensive, and also to increased American anxiety
regarding Japan’s military intervention in Russia. The change in the US stance
was intended to support Kolchak (at least, that was the official story) but was
kept in place even after Kolchak’s defeat, as a warning to the Japanese that the
US would oppose by any means to a Japanese attempt to take away any Rus-
sian territories. The US policymakers sacrificed the interests of Romania while
going after bigger fish in the Far East. Together with Bessarabia (which was
the first to pay the price), the interests of the Baltic States were sacrificed too,
although only for a short period. However, Bessarabia’s case shows some clear
similarities to that of the Japanese intervention in Siberia, while the Baltic
States had none.
The main argument for the May 8 decision was the possibly impending
recognition of Kolchak’s Government. But if that had been the point, a similar
action could have been taken earlier, at the start of the Kolchak offensive. Lans-
ing’s insistence on a plebiscite in Bessarabia also points to one more possible
reason behind that decision: the US delegates were not convinced that the de-
cision of union taken by the Sfatul Tserii was really representative. Still, in that
case, they could have argued so during the debates in the territorial commis-
sions; but they did not. Lansing knew all too well that, by conditioning the
recognition of Bessarabia’s union on the question of a plebiscite in Bessarabia,
he could defend his position before the other Powers and public opinion. He
also understood very well why the Romanian government was opposed to the
idea of a plebiscite in Bessarabia (their fear of communist agitation) and he
took advantage of the Romanians’ position in order to justify the US policy
towards Bessarabia. Still, the question remains: if the US representatives were
so convinced of the necessity of a plebiscite, why had none of them said any-
thing about it during the debates in the territorial commissions, or some
twenty years later?
The Colby Note acknowledges the American policy toward Russia, stress-
ing two aspects: that no more territory of Russia would be taken away from
her (this was justified on the basis of the Bolsheviks’ success in appealing to
the national feelings of the Russians, and not at all on the basis of concerns
over Japanese action in Siberia and Sakhalin), and that there could be no diplo-
matic relations with a communist government.
1. 1922-1923, when the Baltic States were recognized by the US.
2. Instead of recognizing Bessarabia as Romanian territory, the US gov-
ernment did the opposite: by July 1, 1923, the Bessarabian immigration
quota was included in the Russian immigration quota. They rationalized
this by noting that there was as yet no valid international act recognizing
Bessarabia as Romanian territory.
< 390 >

3. 1931, when the US representatives agreed to reintroduce a distinct

Bessarabian immigration quota, as a result of Romanian Minister Charles
A. Davila’s campaign. The question remains, why did they choose a com-
promise over a definitive solution?
4. 1933, when the US government merged the Bessarabian immigration
quota into the Romanian quota.
The American decision should be seen through the lens of Davila’s cam-
paign, with an eye on the coincidence between the first Romanian economic
discriminatory measures against American interests and the speed with which
the Americans resolved the Bessarabian quota issue.
The Second World War, during which the US did not oppose the Soviet
occupation of Bessarabia but argued that the US government had never recog-
nized Bessarabia’s union with Romania.
In the end, many questions remain open regarding the US policy on Bessarabia
during the interwar period. Why was the US so eager to highlight its refusal to rec-
ognize Bessarabia’s union and, unlike any other state, to take steps clearly indicating
their decision? Why was the US so set against Romania in the Bessarabian question,
since Romania was a “friendly” country with whom it had not only political but also
economic relations? What was the Soviet Union’s role in this; were they aware of
(and, if so, did they fully appreciate) the Bessarabian immigration quota and the US
maps?153
Before ending the chapter, we will pose one more riddle. Did the US recognize the
union of Bessarabia with Romania?
There are two ways to recognize a territorial modification: de jure (as France or
Great Britain did) and de facto (as Holland, Belgium and other states did). The US
clearly did not recognize it de jure, as it refused to sign the Bessarabian Treaty. But by
de facto recognition, the existing situation is acknowledged without any special
treaty or convention required.
The US is a special case; it failed to deliver, in the 1920s or later, even a de facto
recognition of Bessarabia’s union. But later, after World War II, it changed its tune
once again — and retroactively, at that.
By the way they drew the maps and set the immigration quotas, they made
sure to indicate that in America’s view Bessarabia was “under Romanian occupa-
tion”. And, although the US had signed a number of treaties with Romania, they
avoided any reference to Romania’s borders in Bessarabia.
As a result of Romanian pressure, in 1931 the maps were changed and a distinct
Bessarabian immigration quota was restored, but the Americans explained this move
on administrative grounds and said they did not consider it a de facto recognition of
Bessarabia’s union. In 1933, the US went a step further and included the Bessarabian
quota in the Romanian quota. Theoretically, there is nothing in the way of interpret-
ing this move as a de facto recognition of the union.154 Practically, the secretive man-
< 391 >

ner in which it was done, and its justification (administrative reasons and not the
Romanian character of Bessarabia), plus the Draft declaration to be published in
case the affair became public, prevent that interpretation.
First, as Davila clearly understood, it was only an implicit and not an explicit
recognition. The US could, at any point, back off, which they actually did during the
war. And the US attitude towards Bessarabia during World War II clearly shows
that the reality behind the de facto recognition (if we choose to consider it so) was
not what the Romanians had hoped.
It must be admitted that, after May 8, 1919, no US representative officially de-
clared that Bessarabia belonged to Romania or that the US recognized, even de facto,
Bessarabia’s union, although they knew that the Romanians would interpret their
decision to merge the Bessarabian and Romanian immigration quotas in this sense.
The US attitude towards Bessarabia changed in the aftermath of the Second
World War, when the Cold War started. At that moment they decided to make use
of the Bessarabian question in order to damage Soviet-Romanian relations, a plan
that, at one point, worked quite well.
However, before giving any support to the Romanians in their claims to Bes-
sarabia, the US had to show that they had recognized Bessarabia’s union with Ro-
mania before 1940. In order to do so, they gave a free hand to US scholars in publish-
ing a number of papers arguing in favor of the Romanian view on Bessarabia.155
One other method, closely related to this propaganda, was the selective pub-
lishing of State Department documents, in the “Foreign Relations of the United
States” collection. In the volumes of documents published during the 1930s and re-
ferring to US foreign policy in the 1920s, there had been no mention at all regarding
the US policy towards Bessarabia after the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty, al-
though there had been Romanian-US negotiations on the matter during 1921-1924.156
By contrast, the documents published during the 1950s and referring to the 1930s do
mention the Bessarabian question. In fact, they not only mention it but, in order to
assist the reader to frame it all properly, the chapter is titled: “Recognition by the US
of Romania’s de facto sovereignty over Bessarabia”.157 After such a formulation and
based on the documents published in the volume, who could argue that the US had
failed to de facto recognize Bessarabia’s union? They omitted to publish or even to
mention the Draft declaration of July 1933, which, taken at face value, suggested a
conclusion that directly contradicts the title of the chapter.158 This maneuver was so
successful that in Romania nowadays it is considered that the US did give de facto
recognition of Bessarabia’s union, and most scholarly papers published after 1990
take this recognition for granted.
Still, let’s consider that, indeed, the US did give de facto recognition of Bessara-
bia’s union with Romania, although the Americans carefully avoided the word
“union”. How much of a success was this for Romanian diplomacy? The US merely
brought itself in line with all the other countries maintaining relations with Roma-
nia, except for the Soviets. It should be added that the US only became neutral in the
Soviet-Romanian dispute, after so many years of pro-Soviet policy. The Romanian
< 392 >

government might have expected more from a country with which they had consid-
erable economic relations, in fact an impressive negative trade balance at a time
when every state was taking measures to reduce imports and boost exports. At least,
as Davila said, at one point, by having the US adopting a neutral position regarding
Bessarabia, the Romanians might avoid the possibility of the Soviets taking advan-
tage of the situation. Taking into account the fact that the 1933 quota merger ended
the discrimination against Romania, it might be considered that it was a success for
Romania (although it came a little late in the game). But, in the general picture,
given the way in which the “recognition” was given and the fact that the US only
became neutral to Romania in her conflict with the Soviets, the 1933 maneuver seems
to be only at best a “semi-success” or a step in the right direction (one that should
have come a few good years earlier) — but it was the last such step until the end of
World War II.
We should also compare the US attitude toward Bessarabia with the US posi-
tion during the Second World War regarding other territories of Russia that under-
went a similar fate. In fact, if one considers Poland and the help it received from the
US during the war, there are barely terms for comparison with the case of Bessara-
bia. Even more crushing is the example of the Baltic States. Although the US ac-
cepted with almost no comment their re-annexation by the USSR, juridically, Wash-
ington did not recognize this annexation. The Legations of Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania continued to exist de jure in the USA until the three states regained their
independence in 1991.159
And, once again, it should be noted that Romanian diplomacy also played a
role in the entire affair. How was it possible that for more than five years there was
no call for a change in the US policy towards Bessarabia? Even if we know of a few
contributing factors, the whole situation is odd.160 This writer considers that the
Romanians could have done much more to obtain a change in the US attitude to-
wards Bessarabia.
The present chapter has offered a different image, a darker one but, in our opin-
ion, closer to the reality. It also presents a number of new documents to support this
view. As with any new viewpoint, this one will be heavily criticized by some and,
hopefully, accepted by others. In a sense, we might call it “The Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe: Tweaking the Nose of the Romanians — Thirty Years of American-
Romanian Relations, 1919-1948”.161 We should also keep in mind that many docu-
ments remain out of reach that might cast a new light on the entire affair. Most pal-
pably missing are the Soviet documents relating to the US policy on the Bessarabian
question.
< 393 >

Notes
1
In the chapters on the other countries (except for Russia) that played a role in the saga of the Bes-
sarabian Treaty, the accent was mostly on the Treaty question and not on the Bessarabian question
as a whole; the present chapter focuses much more on the US attitude towards the Bessarabian
question broadly than on the Treaty itself.
2
A distinction should be made regarding the two possible levels of recognition, de facto and de jure, let
alone the option of refusing recognition outright. Still, there are scholars who make no such distinc-
tion, simply considering that Bessarabia’s union was recognized only by the states that ratified the
Bessarabian Treaty, arguing that “in fact, Romania’s allies within the Little Entente refused even to
recognize the annexation of Bessarabia”. M. Adam, The Little Entente . . . , p. 222, 303, 305. A compari-
son between the US position towards Bessarabia’s union with that of, say, Czechoslovakia should be
enough to illustrate the need to make the distinction.
3
The Romanian government had sent a number of diplomatic missions to the US starting in 1868,
but a Legation was opened only in 1917. On the other hand, the US government opened a Consular
Agency in Galati in 1858, and in 1880 a Legation in Bucharest. Stelian Popescu-Boteni, Relatii intre
Romania si SUA pana in 1914, p. 49-52.
4
G.E. Torrey, “The Diplomatic Career of Charles J Vopicka in Romania, 1913-1920,” in Romania be-
tween East and West, p. 322.
5
Mamatey, who offers the example of Andrews’s attitude towards the Transylvanian Mission to the
US headed by Vasile Stoica, castigates his attitude and lack of objectivity. After failing to inform his
government of the coming of the mission he tried to make up for his mistake by belittling the pur-
pose and personnel of the Mission and by proceeding to demolish the ideal of Romanian unity.
Mamatey is so revolted at the anomalies written by Andrews that he states, “for malice, bias, and
ignorance, Andrew’s report is unique among the hundreds of such reports in the files of the State
Department sifted by this author”. Victor S. Mamatey, The US and East Central Europe 1914-1918, p. 124-
125.
6
G. Bobango, I. Stanciu, “Romanian-Americans and the Union of 1918” in Romania between East and
West, p. 349.
7
Details on the activity of the Transylvanian Mission in the US are available in Vasile Stoica’s own
book In America pentru cauza romaneasca, passim. Also Boris Ranghet, Relatii romano-americane . . . , p. 30-
44, and V. Mamatey, The United States and . . . , p. 123-126.
8
G. Bobango, I. Stanciu, “Romanian-Americans . . .” in Romania between East and West, p. 351.
9
V. Mamatey, The United States and . . . , p. 127. In fact, this was the price the Romanian government
paid for its failure to open a Legation in the US before or during the first years of the war.
10
FRUS, 1917, Supplement 2, Vol. 1, p. 309.
11
FRUS, 1918, Supplement 1, Vol. 1, Telegram Vopicka to the Secretary of State, January 19, 1918, p.
752.
12
For a concise presentation on the making and the activity of the Inquiry see Sidney Edward Mezes,
“The Inquiry” in What Really Happened at Paris . . . , p. I-VIII.
13
For example, Saint Aulaire considers that Wilson was only the “step father” of the 14 points, which
in fact had been suggested to him from Moscow. Saint Aulaire, Confession d’un . . . , p. 454-455. While
mentioning that, in fact, one of the main purposes of President Wilson’s 14 points was to answer the
Bolsheviks’s demand for an explanation of the war aims, an answer that might persuade Russia to
stand by the Allies in their fight against the Central Powers, American scholars insist that he also
had two other clear purposes in mind: an appeal to German socialists, and a notice to the Entente
that there must be a revision in a liberal sense of the war aims which had been crystallized in the
secret treaties. C. Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, p. 331.
14
While the majority of Inquiry members have been very keen to point out their positive contribu-
tion to the establishment of a “lasting peace”, not every scholar agrees with this viewpoint. Mamatey
< 394 >

offers the best example: “In historical perspective it cannot be said that the Inquiry’s blueprint for
victory and peace was either wise or noble. Blinded by a doctrinaire economic determinism, the In-
quiry greatly overestimated the importance of economic and geographic factors and grossly underes-
timated the dynamism of nationalistic and social movements. Their recommendation to stir up a
nationalist revolution in Austria and then deny the revolutionaries the fruits of their battles revealed
an opportunism and irresponsibility which harmonized ill with the usually straightforward and
honest methods of American diplomacy”. V. Mamatey, The US and . . . , p. 183. Mamatey is referring to
the following 1917 recommendation of the Inquiry, with regard to Austria-Hungary: “Our policy
must therefore consist first in a stirring up of nationalist discontent and then in refusing to accept
the extreme logic of this discontent, which would be the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary”, C.
Seymour, The Intimate Papers . . . , Vol. 3, p. 343.
15
C. Seymour, Woodrow Wilson and the Word War, p. 236.
16
C Seymour, The Intimate Papers . . . , Vol. 3, p. 342.
17
C Seymour, The Intimate Papers . . . , Vol. 3, p. 347.
18
C. Seymour, The Intimate Papers . . . , Vol. 3, p. 342-343.
19
V. Mamatey, The United States and . . . , p. 204.
20
FRUS, 1918, Supplement 1, Telegram Secretary of State to Vopicka, February 21, 1918, p. 758-759.
21
V. Mamatey, The United States and . . . , p. 208. Mamatey also points out (p. 209) that it would be erro-
neous to suppose that, if the President had sanctioned the Romanian territorial claims they would
have kept on fighting. They were thoroughly weary of the war and appeared glad for an excuse to get
out of it.
22
FRUS, 1918, Supplement 1, Telegram Secretary of State to Vopicka, May 3, 1918, p. 770-771.
23
Letter Wilson to Lansing, May 1, 1918, State Department Files, quoted in V. Mamatey, The US
and . . . , p. 251.
24
V. Mamatey, The United States and . . . , p. 252.
25
Bernard Cook, “The US and Romania during World War I and Peace Settlement” in La fin de la
Premiere Guerre . . . , p. 50.
26
V. Mamatey, The United States and . . . , p. 376-377.
27
FRUS, 1918, Supplement 1, Telegrams Vopicka to Secretary of State, October 21 and 26, 1918, p.
783-784.
28
Mamatey considers that the action of the Transylvanian Romanians was decisive in changing
Lansing’s attitude toward the Romanian cause in Transylvania. V. Mamatey, The United States and . . . ,
p. 377-378.
29
FRUS, 1918, Supplement 1, Telegram Secretary of State to Vopicka, November 5, 1918, p. 785.
30
FRUS, PPC, Vol. 2, Telegram Vopicka to Secretary of State, November 9, 1918, p. 386.
31
FRUS, 1918, Supplement 1, The Cobb-Lippman Memorandum, October 29, 1918, p. 407-411.
32
For details on Inquiry’s position on Dobrudja see in B. Cook, “The US and Romania . . .” in La fin de
la . . . , p. 52-53.
33
S.D. Spector, Romania la . . . , p.126.
34
Miller, Diary IV, p. 233 in VF Dobrinescu, Ion Patroiu, “American Opinion on Bessarabia at the
Paris Peace Conference” in . . ..
35
William Howell Reed, “Bessarabia”, The Inquiry, Document 478, quoted in B. Cook, “The US and
Romania” in La fin de la . . . , p. 57.
36
G.E. Torrey, “The Diplomatic Career of . . .” in Romania between East and West, p. 327.
37
It is argued, “the staff of the Inquiry were concerned in Paris, as members of commissions, with
delicate questions of policy, and it may be noted that the decisions which they had a part in negoti-
ating were only in the rarest instances modified by the supreme council”. S.E. Mezes, “The Inquiry”
in What Really Happened at Paris, p. VIII.
3
8 For an old presentation of the complex relations inside the US delegation, illustrating the commu-
nist view on the matter, see B. Ranghet, Relatii romano-americane . . . , p. 155-159.
< 395 >

3
9. Ivo J. Lederer, Yugoslavia at the Paris Peace Conference, p. 172.
40
For a glimpse at the conflict between the Inquiry members and the State Department: C. Seymour,
Letters from . . . , p. 163.
41
The members of the Inquiry were very keen to stress their role during the peace conference, only a
number of years later admitting that they had to suffer in Paris as a result of two outstanding de-
fects: their amateur status that made them hesitate to stand up to their European opposites with
determination (in a dozen spots along the Czech or the Romanian border, the Americans were too
polite or too timid to quarrel) and they were also unorganized as a group, so that their judgment was
never effectively concentrated or forcefully exercised. C. Seymour, Letters from . . . , p. XXIX-XXX.
42
If instead of the experts (by experts we mean the former members of the Inquiry) there had been
US politicians in the territorial commissions, they probably would have contested Wilson’s decision
to cancel the agreement reached by them, be it only from vanity or self-respect. But the experts
would have had much more to lose than the politicians by contesting the President’s decision. In
fact, during the entire peace conference, the experts simply applied the President’s decisions, and
this brings us once more to their attitude in the territorial commissions.
43
Telegram Ion I.C. Bratianu (in Paris) to Pherekide (in Bucharest), April 23 (May 6), 1919, quoted in
Ghe. I. Bratianu, Actiunea politica . . . , p. 54.
44
Ghe. I. Bratianu, Actiunea politica . . . , p. 56. G. Bratianu also argues (p. 63) that the minorities ques-
tion was in close connection with the petroleum question.
45
In fact, Seymour states it clearly: “so apparently it is up to us to play around with the Czechs and
Romanians, even more than we have done, and see what is on their mind”. C Seymour, Letters from . . . ,
p. 131.
46
One such meeting, of January 31, 1919, in the aftermath of the Council’s hearing on the Romanian-
Yugoslav conflict over the Banat, when Bratianu tried the “flattery method” for improving Romania’s
relations with the US representatives, is well described, together with a concise presentation of the
Romanian thesis, in C. Seymour, Letters from . . . , p. 144-148.
47
Ion I.C. Bratianu invited the Queen to Paris in order to improve Romania’s image. A. Iordache, “Ion
I.C. Bratianu la . . .” in Revista Istorica, 1993, No. 9, p. 7.
48
S.D. Spector, Romania la . . . , p. 139. For more details on Queen Marie’s visits to Paris and London
during the Paris Peace Conference, see Queen Marie, “My Mission” in The Cornhill Magazine, 1939.
49
A very interesting account of the role played by Romania on this occasion is the report sent by
Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, a member of the Romanian delegation, to Iuliu Maniu, published by
Gheorghe Iancu in Romania si relatiile internationale in secolul XX, p. 9-43.
50
Quoted in Manley O. Hudson, “The Protection of Minorities and Natives in Transferred Territo-
ries” in “What Really Happened at Paris . . .”, p. 214
51
Quoted in Gheorghe Iancu, “Conferinta de pace de la Paris. Alexandru Vaida-Voevod catre Iuliu
Maniu” in Romania si relatiile internationale in secolul XX, p. 34.
52
FRUS, PPC, Vol. 11, p. 441
53
54
For the opinion of the US representatives regarding the minorities question, and especially that of
the treatment of Jewish population in Romania (a first official US inquiry into the treatment of Jew-
ish people in Romania, based on the Berlin Treaty of 1878, was made as early as 1902 by Secretary
John Hay) see M. Hudson, “The Protection of . . .” in What Really Happened at Paris, p. 204-231.
55
The war relief for Romania was based on the agreement signed by Ion I.C. Bratianu and Herbert
Hoover, the chief of the ARA on February 28, 1919. In a letter sent to Romanian King Ferdinand on
May 22, Hoover stated that if the oil question were not resolved in the Americans’ favor, they would
not only cut off any relief but also refuse to grant any credits in the future for Romania. B. Ranghet,
Relatii romano-americane . . . , p. 193-194.
56
The US representatives asked for similar guarantees from Yugoslavia and Poland too but the Ro-
manians agreed to sign the guarantees only after they had been threatened with cutting off Roma-
< 396 >

nia’s supplies. In fact, there was a small conflict between Herbert Hoover and the Romanians regard-
ing the guarantees, due to the fact that the Romanians connected the threat of cutting supplies with
the interests of American oil companies in Romania. Hoover asked the Romanian government to
apologize for this incident. Ion Ciuperca, “Bucuresti-Washington, diplomatie si petrol” in Relatii
Romano-Americane in timpurile moderne, p. 161-184.
57
As shown by the meeting of the Steering Committee on July 26, 1919 (FRUS, PPC, Vol. 8, p. 838)
and by a telegram sent by White to Lansing, on July 23, 1919, “if we assent to giving Bessarabia to
Romania, our position regarding the Dobrudja would be strengthened”. V.F. Dobrinescu, Ion Pa-
troiu, “American Opinion . . .”, p. 12.
58
FRUS, PPC, Vol. 12, The Bandholtz Mission, p. 635-670.
59
Frank Lyon Polk became Under-Secretary of State in 1919 and was appointed Commissioner to
head the US delegation during the six months of negotiations with the lesser Central Powers, after
President Wilson left Paris following the signing of the Versailles Treaty.
60
B. Cook, “The US and Romania” in La fin de la Premiere Guerre . . . , p. 58-59.
61
62
63
64
FRUS, PPC, Vol. 11, The Commission to Negotiate Peace (signed Polk) to the Secretary of State
(Lansing), November 15, p. 664
65
FRUS, PPC, Vol. 11, Telegram Polk to Lansing, November 30, 1919, p. 677.
66
FRUS, PPC, Vol. 11, Telegram Polk to Lansing, November 30, 1919, p. 679.
67
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Report on visit by Antonescu to Laroche, November 18, 1919,
c. 660-662.
68
FRUS, PPC, Vol. 11, Telegram Polk to Lansing, December 4, 1919, p. 688
69
FRUS, 1920, Vol. 3, Telegram Secretary of State to Avezzana, August 20, 1920, p. 463-468.
70
FRUS, 1920, Vol. 3, Telegram Martens to Avezzana, October 4, 1920, p. 474.
71
FRUS, 1920, Vol. 3, p. 514-524.
72
George Bronson Rea, “The Great Mistake” in Readings in Russian Foreign Policy, p. 22.
73
Louis Fisher, “Woodrow Wilson and Intervention” in Readings in Russian Foreign Policy, p. 7.
74
L. Fisher, “Woodrow Wilson and Intervention”, in Readings . . . , p. 14.
75
FRUS, 1926, Vol. 2, p. 898-901; 1930, Vol. 3, p. 798-800; 1929, Vol. 3, p.747-754.
76
FRUS, 1928, Vol. 2, p. 819-821; 1938, Vol. 2, p. 672-683.
77
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegrams Bibescu to Ionescu, March 15 and April
11, 1921.
78
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegrams Ionescu to Bibescu, April 12 and 15, 1921.
79
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Bibescu to Ionescu, May 27, 1921.
80
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Bibescu to Ionescu, May 15, 1921.
81
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 21, ad noted by Take Ionescu on Telegram Bibescu to
Ionescu, December 21, 1921.
82
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Nanu to Duca, July 30, 1922.
83
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegrams Duca to Bibescu, March 27 and 28, 1923.
84
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Bibescu to Duca, April 2, 1923.
85
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegrams Bibescu to Duca, April 6 and 18, 1923.
Unfortunately, based on this supposition, Bibescu decided to go and inspect the other Romanian
centers and consulates in the US, leaving F.C. Nanu in charge of the correspondence, instead of stay-
ing in Washington and continuing to lobby for a favorable decision.
86
Quoted in Dumitru Hincu, “Problema Basarabiei . . .” in Magazin Istoric, 1994.
87
It is interesting that the FRUS collection fails, for reasons that will be presented at the end of the
chapter, to mention any of the 1923 events related to the US position regarding the Bessarabian ques-
tion.
88
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegrams Bibescu to Duca, June 22 and 24, 1923.
< 397 >

89
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, ad noted on Telegram Bibescu to Duca, June 22,
1923.
90
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Bibescu to Duca, June 24, 1923.
91
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Duca to Bibescu, March 15, 1924.
92
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Bibescu to Duca, March 24, 1924.
93
RFMA, Fond 71/1920-1944, Special Files, S 18, Vol. 81, Telegram Nanu to Duca, January 15, 1924.
94
RFMA, Fond 71/1920-1944, Special Files, S 18, Vol. 81, Memorandum Nanu to Duca, June 17, 1924.
95
For details on this controversy see FRUS, 1924, Vol. 2, p. 597-647. The Romanian viewpoint is best
presented in the Memorandum handed to the US Legation in Bucharest on July 21, 1924 (p. 621-626).
96
Report Culbertson to Secretary of State, November 9, 1925, quoted in C. Iordan, Romania si relatiile
internationale din sud estul European: modelul Locarno, p. 161-162.
97
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Davila to Mironescu, October 17, 1929.
98
FRUS, 1930, Vol. 3, Aide-Memoire on Bessarabia, February 18, 1930, p. 801-805.
99
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Davila to Mironescu, February 20, 1930.
100
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 21, Report on the US and the Bessarabian Question,
March 1930, p. 249.
101
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Nanu to Mironescu, April 5, 1930.
102
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Mironescu to Nanu, April 7, 1930.
103
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Nanu to Mironescu, April 28, 1930.
104
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 21, Telegram Mironescu to Nanu, April 29, 1930.
105
FRUS, 1930, Vol. 3, Report by Murray on his meeting with Nanu, October 1, 1930, p. 806-807.
106
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Nanu to Mironescu, October 3, 1930.
107
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Davila to Mironescu, March 14, 1931.
108
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Davila to Ghika, July 7, 1931.
109
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Report Davila to Ghika, July 21, 1931.
110
FRUS, 1932, Vol. 2, Memorandum by Murray for Stimson before the latter’s meeting with Davila
(February 4) and Memorandum by Secretary of State, February 4, 1932, p. 504-505.
111
The letter referred to the situation in China after the opening of the Sino-Japanese war. It is prob-
able that this letter prompted Davila to insist again that the RFM take action for the Japanese ratifi-
cation.
112
FRUS, 1932, Vol. 2, Memorandum by Castle of Conversation with Davila, March 24, 1932, p. 506.
113
FRUS, 1933, Vol. 2, Memorandum by Davila to Secretary of State, March 29, 1932, p. 671.
114
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Davila to Ghika, April 18, 1932.
115
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Davila to Ghika, April 30, 1932.
116
FRUS, 1932, Vol. 2, Memorandum by Murray to Castle, May 13, 1932, p. 507-508.
117
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Titulescu to Davila and Nanu, December
9, 1932.
118
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Titulescu to Davila, February 2, 1933.
119
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Davila to Titulescu, February 7, 1933.
120
The last argument clearly shows a more confident and decided manner in approaching the Bes-
sarabian question, justified by the fact that this time Davila had the backing of the RFM. If, up to
this point, Davila tried to use more peaceful arguments, this time he used the threat of anti-American
public opinion in Romania.
121
FRUS, 1933, Vol.2, Memorandum by Murray to Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State,
March 6, 1934, p. 657.
122
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Davila to Titulescu, March 6, 1933.
123
FRUS, 1933, Vol. 2, Memorandum by Kelley, March 16, 1933, p. 659-661.
124
L. Fischer, Russia’s Road from peace to War, p. 215-217.
125
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Savel Radescu to Davila, March 22, 1933.
126
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Davila for Bucharest, April 14,1933.
127
FRUS, 1933, Vol. 2, Aide Memoire by Davila, March 29, 1933, p. 662-680. For the Romanian trans-
< 398 >

lation of the Memorandum see RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, p. 253-283.
128
FRUS, 1933, Vol. 2, Telegram Secretary of State to Roosevelt, April 12, 1933, p. 681.
129
FRUS, 1933, Vol. 2, Memorandum by Phillips, May 31, 1933, p. 682.
130
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Davila to Titulescu, April 31, 1933.
131
FRUS, 1933, Vol. 2, Report by Murray to Acting Secretary of State, June 8, 1933, p. 689.
132
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Davila to Titulescu, May 31, 1933.
133
FRUS, 1933, Vol. 2, Report by Murray to Acting Secretary of State, June 8, 1933, p. 689.
134
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Davila to Titulescu, June 8, 1933.
135
FRUS, 1933, Vol. 2, Telegram Carr to Davila, June 21, 1933, p. 682.
136
Whereas many Romanian scholars clearly state that it was a de facto recognition, some mistakenly
argue that the US recognized the Union de jure too. I. Constantin, Romania, Marile Puteri . . . , p. 27.
137
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Mironescu to Davila, June 20, 1933.
138
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Davila to Titulescu, June 28, 1933.
139
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 21, Report on Positions Taken by Different Powers
Regarding the Recognition of Bessarabia, by D.G. Popescu, September 7, 1937, p. 288.
140
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, p. 383-384, not dated — but no later than mid-
July 1933.
141
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Titulescu for Bucharest, July 29, 1933.
142
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Titulescu for Bucharest, October 7, 1933.
143
“The negotiations undertaken by M. Davila with the US government resulted in the US recogni-
tion of Bessarabia’s union with Romania. As a consequence of this ratification, the immigration
quota for the US includes, from today on, the Bessarabian territory too, which used to have a sepa-
rate quota, added to the Soviet quota.” Argus, Bucharest, September 29, 1933.
143
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Radescu to Titulescu, October 5, 1933.
144
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegrams Nanu to Bucharest, October 7 and De-
cember 13, 1933.
145
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Titulescu to Nanu, January 16, 1934.
146
L. Fischer, Russia’s Road from Peace to War, p. 212-218.
147
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Irimescu to Petrescu-Comnen, May 3,
1938.
148
RFMA, Fond 71/1920-1944, USA, Vol. 39, Telegram Irimescu to Gigurtu, July 1, 1940.
149
A. Cretzianu, Captive Romania, p. 66.
150
V.F. Dobrinescu, I. Constantin, Basarabia in anii celui de-al doilea razboi mondial, p. 254-255.
151
Quoted in V.F. Dobrinescu, I. Constantin, Basarabia in anii. . . , p. 270.
152
J.F. Harrington, B.J. Courtney, The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe . . . , p. 4.
153
Unfortunately, going back to the secrecy still maintained at the former Soviet Foreign Ministry
Archives, the answer to this last question will have to wait a few good years. So far, the author has
found no comments or documents pointing to this aspect of the US-Soviet relations.
154
Most Romanian scholars, starting with G. Buzatu, V.F. Dobrinescu, I. Constantin, A. Karetki, and
many others dealing with this aspect consider that it was clearly a de facto recognition and celebrate
it as a great success for Romanian foreign policy. They do so based mainly on the US published docu-
ments and, although those documents were published a long time ago, it was only after 1990 (due to
the communist regime) that the scholars were able to present those documents to the Romanian
public.
155
In this sense see the excellent article published by Gheorghe I. Florescu, “Bessarabia, a Subject of
American Historiography, 1945-1995”, in Anuarul Institutului de Istorie AD Xenopol, 1996. While during
the interwar period there was only one book published by an American scholar on the Bessarabian
question, that of Charles Upson Clark in 1927, things clearly changed starting with the 1950s, an
increased number of papers pointing to the rightfulness of the Romanian claims to Bessarabia.
156
The argument that the Bessarabian question was not an important matter in US foreign policy
and that this is why one can find no mention of it is a very fragile hypothesis. As the US was the only
< 399 >

Power, besides the Soviets, clearly refusing (de jure and de facto) to recognize the union of Bessarabia
with Romania, it could not be argued that this was of no significance for US policy.
157
FRUS, 1933, Vol. 2, p. 656.
158
It is interesting that the Romanian scholars who had direct access to the American archives, for
example Gheorghe Buzatu, failed to find any trace of the Draft declaration.
159
Dinu C. Giurescu, Romania in the Second World War, p. 417.
160
And we have identified two of them: lack of first-class diplomats representing Romania in the US;
and Romania’s general attitude towards the US, dismissing it as isolationist, not interested in Euro-
pean affairs, and not worth the effort of pursuing. There is also the hypothesis that there are docu-
ments proving the contrary, although the author has found none that indicates a Romanian interven-
tion between 1925 and 1929.
161
The title is taken from a paper written by J.F. Harrington and B.J. Courtney, “The Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe. Tweaking the Nose of the Russians: Fifty Years of American-Romanian Rela-
tions, 1940-1990”.
< 400 >

PART THREE - TO CONCLUDE . . .
CHAPTER 10.
SUMMARY
THE GREAT POWERS AND THE BESSARABIAN TREATY
The Bessarabian Treaty, signed on October 28, 1920 by Romania on one side
and France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan on the other, had as its main objective to
give official de jure recognition to a de facto situation. More than two years had passed
since Bessarabia had voted to unite with Romanian and it was about time that the
international community should grant recognition to the union. However, even
though at first all parties at the peace conference (excepting the White Russians)
had agreed that Bessarabia properly belonged to Romania, in the interim the situa-
tion had become more and more complex, so that recognition of the union had to be
postponed. The main reason for the delay was the fact that, in the period just before
the war, Bessarabia had belonged to Russia: an ally that had made numerous sacri-
fices for the cause of Entente, and not an enemy state. As long as there was a hope of
bringing that old Russia back, the Great Powers preferred to postpone a definitive
decision on Bessarabia.
In October 1920, four of the five Great Powers agreed to officially recognize the
Union and, by this gesture, to offer Romania a guarantee against any future claims to
Bessarabia coming from Russia. They did so not only because they were convinced
that Bessarabia belonged to Romania but (perhaps more so) because they had their
own interests to protect, and the Bessarabian Treaty offered them some bargaining
power. Romania obtained from the Great Powers a very watered-down treaty that
specified no direct or concrete obligations for the signatories in case of a Soviet at-
tack on Bessarabia. And it is clear that, even without such guarantees, the Treaty did
not come for free.
The Bessarabian question was used as a mean of pressuring the Romanians
into becoming more “obedient” towards the wishes of the Great Powers. The pres-
sure applied to two main points: one regarding the Bessarabian question in general,
and one regarding the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty specifically. The general ru-
< 401 >

bric included matters like the Hungarian conflict, the attitude towards the Civil
War in Russia, and the Minorities Treaty controversy. The specific one refers to
matters directly connected to the Bessarabian Treaty, including the future status of
the Danube, the engagement to take on part of the former Russian Empire’s interna-
tional debt, and compensations for foreign landowners expropriated in Bessarabia.
The Romanian government understood that it would have to pay a price in exchange
for international recognition of the union, and it did so, although not without nego-
tiating the price. The only Great Power opposing the Romanian efforts to obtain a
Bessarabian Treaty was the USA.
However, as history proved, getting the Bessarabian Treaty signed was not
enough. In order to bring it into force it was necessary, as stipulated by Article No. 9,
that all signatory States ratify it — and here began a new struggle for the Romanian
Government. Almost none of the signatory Powers agreed to ratify the Treaty simply
in order to honor its signature. They wanted something in exchange; some of them
settled for less (like Great Britain) while others wanted quite a lot (Italy). In the
end, the Romanian Government had no other option except to pay, by making eco-
nomic and political concessions. But the Romanian government was not disposed to
pay everything the Great Powers asked in exchange for the ratification, and compli-
cated negotiations ensued. As these negotiations dragged on, the Romanians lost
their main advantage over the Soviets: time. The longer the negotiations went on, the
lower were the chances of having the treaty come into force.
While Russia was weak, the Romanian government was neither ready nor
willing to pay a high price in exchange for the ratification. As soon as it became clear
that Bolshevik Russia was starting to recover, after 1922, and the danger coming
from this reconstructed neighbor grew greater and greater, the necessity to counter-
balance it made Romania adopt a more accommodating position in the negotiations
for the ratifications. Step by step, Romania was able to convince both France and
Italy to ratify. But all these efforts and concessions made by Romania were voided by
the action of Japan, which — claiming to have no interests in Europe, meaning no
interests in Romania — decided that, for the sake of her relations with the Soviets
(and in exchange for some material advantages), it would be better not to ratify.
The Romanian campaign for the ratification could be characterized as poor, at
best. There was no concerted action from the Romanian Foreign Ministry in order to
obtain the ratifications. It simply went on a case-by-case basis, one at a time, instead
of trying to pressure all the signatories to ratify as soon as possible and at the same
time, by keeping up constant pressure over at least one (if not all) of the signatories.
Only when pressed from the outside did the RFM act to secure the ratification. In
fact, the Romanian government needed “foreign help” (if not pressure) in order to
send the Treaty to its own Parliament for ratification. The one and a half years Ro-
mania dawdled before ratifying its only international act supporting its position in
Bessarabia is emblematic of the entire campaign for ratification. In fact, it seems that
the Romanian ratification came in response to the British ratification more than
from any perception of the need to get the job done. This situation more or less re-
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CHAPTER 10. SUMMARY
peated itself in 1927, when the Romanian government opened the campaign for the
Japanese ratification only as a result of the Italian ratification. The inability of the
RFM to obtain the French ratification in 1922, which meant missing the best oppor-
tunity of bringing the Treaty into force, only points to the same conclusion: miscal-
culation (or lack of interest) or shortsightedness regarding the ratification.
By the time the French ratification finally came, in 1924, the RFM was in a dif-
ficult situation regarding the remaining two ratifications since both Italy and Japan
had improved their relations with the Soviets. As a result of the Soviet propaganda
surrounding the ratification, what previously could have been obtained in exchange
for a few million lei (the difference between what the French landowners had asked
for in 1922 and the Romanian government offered to pay — thereby holding up the
ratification) now became much more expensive. Even worse, at the first clear sign
that there would be problems with Japan, it was decided to simply abandon the
Japanese cause and focus only on Italy. In other words, after losing the first battle
they quit the war; after the Ishii Note of May 1924 no effort was made to secure the
Japanese ratification until 1927.
The only exception to this strategy (if we may call it so) was in October 1923,
when Foreign Minister I.G. Duca tried to put pressure for ratification on all three
remaining signatories. More or less coincidentally, at the end of October a contro-
versy came up between Romania and the other members in the Danube Commission,
and the Romanians decided to block navigation on the Chilia arm of the Danube.
They argued that, as the Bessarabian Treaty was not ratified, the Commission could
not use Article No. 7 regarding the Chilia, at least until France and Italy ratified. The
Commission argued back that the Romanian position might be presented to France
or Italy, signatories of the Bessarabian Treaty, but not to the Commission, which had
a neutral status.1 However, more or less according to the RFM’s expectations, the
Romanian position did put pressure on the British government, which initiated a
number of actions in order to influence France, Italy and Japan to ratify. But, as at-
tention shifted to France and as that the RFM was apparently quite unaware of the
British actions (and therefore missed any opportunity to use them to press Italy and
Japan), this concerted campaign was short lived.
In hindsight, it might be stated that the best occasion the Romanian govern-
ment had to bring the Bessarabian Treaty into force was in 1922 and that it lost this
opportunity due to the failure to persuade the French to ratify. The Japanese ratifica-
tion could have become reality in 1922, as proved by the Japanese ratification of the
Central European Frontiers Treaty, ahead of other European signatories, in the cli-
mate of still-troubled Soviet-Japanese relations. Even in 1923 and at the beginning of
1924 there were still real chances for the Romanian government to obtain the Japa-
nese ratification, with a little help from the British. As for the Italian ratification, it
was “all about money”, which means that it was a reachable target in 1922 or 1923.
And in the end, Romania had to pay the asking price for ratification by France and
Italy, but by then it was too late.
The RFM’s campaign to change the US position regarding Bessarabia is similar
< 403 >

to the campaign for ratification. The aim of the campaign was to induce the US to
renounce its policy of “public discrimination” against Romania and to recognize the
union, at least de facto if not de jure. How the Romanians, a very proud nation, could
accept a policy of discrimination from the US and to do nothing about it for years is
difficult to understand. The success of the efforts made by Charles A. Davila proves
that even some of Romania’s opponents on the Bessarabian question could be con-
vinced of the necessity to adjust their position, at least partially. And Davila’s suc-
cess came at a relatively low price, raising further questions as to the inability of the
Romanian government to act sooner and more decisively with regard to the US rec-
ognition. As they paid for the French and the Italian ratifications, they could have
paid for the US recognition, and with the US they had plenty of bargaining power.
The only possible justification for the RFM’s failure to take action for so long is that
the US had proclaimed an attitude of isolationism. Still, even when it took action, it
seems to have been at Davila’s personal initiative rather than as part of a carefully
orchestrated campaign by the RFM.
Overall, it should be said that the Romanian government failed to grasp the
new realities in international relations, and the need to “think globally”. The fact
that itIt was in the US and Japan that they lost their battle with the Soviets illus-
trates that clearly. Opening Legations in the US and Japan only by the end of 1917
proved a little bit too late, preventing them from obtaining the backing of US and
Japan during the Peace Conference. Even when the Conference was over, the RFM
failed to learn the lesson and either closed its Legations in the US and Japan, or
staffed them with second-rate personnel. They were oblivious to the long-term
trends in world policy, with more and more influence going to Powers outside
Europe. They could have done much more to promote the Romanian interests if they
had adjusted their thinking, and the Polish case offers a good example. This author
believes that a strong and continuous propaganda campaign in the US would have
had a real chance of changing the US policy on Romania, whereas ignoring the US
(or considering it insignificant for Romanian interests) was a clear mistake.
Ironically, the best illustration of this mistake comes from Frederic C. Nanu, one of those
representing Romania in the US during the interwar period, and who should have understood (as he
was actually living in the US for so long) the new realities in world politics:
I think that it would be futile to ask for more because we would only give them (the
Americans) the impression that no territorial modification in Europe has value without their
express ratification, which would be insulting for us. . . [my emphasis]. 2
Closely connected to this we have Bibescu’s comment (that it would be impos-

sible to change the US policy on Bessarabia, at least for the time being) and the simi-
lar non-possumus mentioned by I.A. Vassiliu, the Romanian minister in Japan, a few
years later; there were no such comments coming from France or Italy. The connec-
tion has to do with the diplomatic skills of the Romanian representatives in Japan
and the US. Although there were a number of capable and well-prepared diplomats
< 404 >

CHAPTER 10. SUMMARY
in the service of the RFM, at that time diplomatic positions outside of Europe were
not appealing to the best-qualified candidates. For example, Warsaw was consid-
ered much more important than Washington. In fact, the RFM considered it unwise
to send its best diplomats, who were needed at Legations situated in Europe’s main
capitals, to posts in America or Asia. Therefore, the only diplomats representing Ro-
mania outside of Europe were either junior or inferior. There were some exceptions
from this rule, in the persons of those diplomats who were “exiled” outside Europe
due to their political views and had no choice but to accept their new posts, as was
Davila’s case.
The result of this misguided RFM policy was that it simply left the US and
Japan to the influence of Soviet propaganda regarding the Bessarabian question.
Even more, although a number of Romanian diplomats understood the need for
closer relations with Japan and the US (as proved by Nicolae Titulescu’s July 1927
presentation on Romanian foreign policy), they failed to follow through. Unlike Ro-
mania, other East European states, among which Poland offers the best example,
clearly realized the importance of globalization during the interwar period — even
though they were new states with almost no international experience.
The United Kingdom
Of the five Great Powers that came to the Paris Peace Conference, the United
Kingdom was the friendliest toward the Bessarabian Treaty. Not only was the
Treaty signed at the UK’s insistence, but the UK was the first Power to ratify it.
The importance of the Bessarabian Treaty for the UK stems from the fact that
the Treaty, by Article No. 7, gave the UK and the other Great control over the navi-
gation on the Danube mouths, although it was Romanian territory.
At the time of signing, they did obtain a special policy regarding the status of
the Danube — the internationalization of Europe’s great river; Romanian Govern-
ment guarantees for British interests and properties in Bessarabia; plus the protec-
tion of the minorities living in Bessarabia. But when it came to ratification, the UK
did not ask for any additional concessions.
In fact, even though the British ratification passed almost unobserved in the
press at that time, it had a great influence over the coming events. The only nation to
take it very seriously was Romania, who realized that, although the Bessarabian
Treaty was in their interests far more than anyone else’s, they had not yet ratified
themselves.
However, the British government was keen to state that, although it had rati-
fied the Bessarabian Treaty it did not consider itself bound to help Romania in case
of an attack on Bessarabia. During a number of Parliamentary interpellations, the
British stated clearly that as long as the treaty was not ratified the UK had no special
obligations toward Romania regarding Bessarabia. Even if the Treaty should come
into force, the UK would only help Romania in her capacity as a member of the
League of Nations. This attitude, although it was in complete agreement with the
< 405 >

stipulations in the Bessarabian Treaty, was not good news for the Romanians who
had hoped that the UK would do more. However, if we take into account Britain’s
self-proclaimed neutrality regarding the Balkans, it was a success for the Romanians
to have their rights over Bessarabia clearly recognized by the UK government.
France
The First World War radically changed relations between France and Roma-
nia. During the inter-war period the two countries became more and more con-
nected, both politically and economically. Romania played an important role in the
postwar French system of alliances in Eastern Europe. Taking advantage of the cul-
tural affinities and their military prestige, the French increased considerably their
influence in Romania by using both economic and political means. The Bessarabian
question offered France a chance to increase her influence, being the only Great
Power seemingly disposed to come to a deal with Romania and offer help against the
Soviets in exchange for similar help from Romania against Germany.
The French policy on Bessarabia was an oscillating and undecided one and
they had one good reason for this: their relations with Russia. On one hand, they
needed Russia as an ally against Germany; on the other they hoped to recover their
pre-war Russian investments and, if possible, to have full access on the huge Russian
market. From the French view, Romania was only a surrogate solution of replacing
Russia strategically and economically, particularly as Romania had no common bor-
der with Germany. The key to the French indecision between Romania and Russia
was the difficult question of Bessarabia, one that obliged her to choose only one of
the two potential allies.
The French failure to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty during 1922 gave a real blow
to the Romanian chances of bringing the Treaty into power, although nobody real-
ized this as that moment. On the other hand, the French decision to ratify came at an
important moment for Romania, just a few days before the beginning of the Vienna
Conference with the Soviets, offering the Romanians the necessary moral backing in
those negotiations.
Italy
During the Peace Conference, Italy too expressed the opinion that Bessarabia
belonged to Romania and it did sign the Bessarabian Treaty. The issue of Italian-
Yugoslav relations dominated relations between Italy and Romania; Italy’s Balkan
policy after the war was subordinated to the task of isolating Yugoslavia, which
meant good relations with Bulgaria, Hungary, Austria and Romania. However, since
Romania had territorial conflicts with both Bulgaria and Hungary, any Italian initia-
tive directed toward closer relations with Hungary was received in Romania as a
threat, and starting in 1920 there were quite a number of such initiatives. While Ro-
mania was one of the most active members of the anti-revisionist camp, her main ob-
< 406 >

CHAPTER 10. SUMMARY
jective being the defense of the territorial status quo that was in place after the Peace
Conference, Italy became an active member of the revisionist camp. The more active
Italy was in this sense, the greater was the wedge between herself and Romania.
Starting in 1920, for political reasons (mainly due to Romania’s membership in
the “Little Entente” —Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Romania, which opposed Italy’s
initiatives in both Hungary and Bulgaria), as well as for economic reasons (there
were a number of financial matters pending between the two states), Romanian-
Italian relations tended more and more toward competition instead of friendship.
There was only one exception to this trend, during the premiership of Alexandru
Averescu, Italy’s best friend in Romania.
The campaign initiated by the Romanian Government to obtain the Italian
ratification was very difficult. Italy demanded economic and political concessions.
Mussolini’s favorite word during this campaign was contropartita (quid pro quo),
which says it all. And, with the Italian recognition of the Soviet Union (including a
verbal agreement offering non-ratification in exchange for an end to Soviet support
for the Italian communists) everything became twice as difficult. The Italian exam-
ple illustrates how many international ramifications there were to the ratification
question. Finally, the success in obtaining the ratification proved to be the work of
one person, Averescu, who had working against him not only the exaggerated Italian
claims but also a great part of the Romanian public opinion, which was quiet put off
by the Italian attitude.
Japan
The only signatory Power that failed to ratify the Bessarabian Treaty, prevent-
ing it from ever coming into force, was Japan. It might seem strange that Japan, a
country so far from Europe, was able to have a decisive influence over the fate of one
European territory. It offers an excellent example of the new global implications of
every move in the area of foreign relations, as early as the 1920s. Even more, it stands
as an exception to the assumption of many scholars in the field of Japanese foreign
policy, who argue that Japan held to a position of isolation or neutrality towards
European affairs after the Peace Conference (except for those related to war repara-
tions). The saga of the Bessarabian Treaty stands out in contrast; by failing to ratify
the Treaty, Japan did take a position on a European matter, and it was clearly not a
neutral one.
What would have been a neutral policy for Japan? Was there any other option?
If the Bessarabian Treaty had omitted the clause stipulating that all the signatory
powers had to ratify in order for the treaty to come into force, it might be argued
that a neutral position for Japan would have been to abstain from ratifying. How-
ever, this was not the case.
Taking into account the fact that the Treaty involved no special or concrete
obligations for its signatories, Japan did not have to worry about being dragged into
a conflict after the ratification, and no one could have said that Japan had failed to
< 407 >

respect its neutrality in European matters. On the other hand, by failing to ratify, not
only did Japan cancel the ratifications of the other Powers but it harmed the Roma-
nian position regarding the Bessarabian question. In this situation, a neutral position
for Japan would have been to ratify the Treaty.
The direct consequence of the Japanese failure to ratify was that Romania had
no international instrument to support or justify Bessarabia’s union. By failing to
ratify, in exchange for Soviet concessions, the Japanese were clearly supporting the
Soviets against Romania, definitely not a neutral policy as they claimed. And, as for
the claim of having no interest in European matters, they proved the contrary: by
skillfully exploiting a European issue they were able to win a number of economic
advantages from the Soviets. They were so satisfied with their success that, a num-
ber of years later, they reopened the question to see if they could get more.
The Japanese attitude towards the Bessarabian Treaty ratification question
was influenced by two main factors: strong Soviet pressure against ratification and a
weak Romanian campaign for it. The Japanese foreign policy makers decided that
the honor of Japanese diplomacy was not worth upsetting her powerful neighbor.
Conversely, when they discovered that it might even bring them some material
(fishery concessions) or strategic (an end to the activity of Borodin’s group in China)
advantages from the Soviets, they decided to postpone the ratification until Romania
and the Soviets reached an agreement on Bessarabia (in practical terms, this meant
postponing indefinitely, as the Soviets and the Japanese were well aware). However,
it should be clear that the Japanese, under the cover of neutrality, observed the same
policy as the representatives of every other State (abandoning matters of image in
exchange for concrete material gains) and they could not really be blamed for this.
The lackluster Romanian campaign also contributed to the success of the So-
viet pressure on Japan. Romania closed its Legation in Tokyo exactly at the moment
when it was most needed, and took almost no action before 1927. Then, when it was
already extremely late in the game, the Romanians did launch a campaign but only
under the leadership of an individual who was in no way up to the task. He had no
knowledge of the Japanese policy-making process, and only turned the effects of the
campaign against Romanian interests. Although a number of factors contributed to
Romania’s decision not to pursue this goal more aggressively (such as the impossi-
bility of competing with the economic concessions made by the Soviets) it should be
clear that more could have been done.
The Soviet Union
Even though the Soviet Union was not a signatory to the Bessarabian Treaty, it
was directly interested in the Bessarabian question. Before the Russian Revolution,
nobody in Romania thought that, at the end of the war, Romania could have both
Transylvania and Bessarabia. In 1914, the Romanians had had to choose Transylvania
and Bukovina (offered by the Entente Powers) versus Bessarabia (offered by the
Central Powers).
< 408 >

CHAPTER 10. SUMMARY
Following the lead of the other nations in the Russian Empire, the Bessarabi-
ans declared their autonomy, then, a few weeks later, their independence, followed
in March 1918 by a decision to unite with Romania. It was not an easy decision for
Bessarabia and Russia contested it relentlessly. The Russians were not pleased to
lose Bessarabia and during the entire inter-war period, with a brief exception, they
raised claims over Bessarabia. By constantly raising the question of Bessarabia and
forcing Romania to keep a large number of men under arms, the Soviets hampered
any Romanian investment in the economic or social fields while, at the same time,
any increase in military expenses provoked further protests from the Soviets. In the
long run, the Soviet policy proved successful, and the beginning of the Second World
War found a weak Romania both economically and militarily (although not only
because of the Soviet policy).
Romania and the Soviet Union made a number of attempts to reach a consen-
sus over the Bessarabian issue but with no lasting results. In 1934 the two opened
diplomatic relations and the Bessarabian question was, for a while, avoided. The Ro-
manian position of considering the matter to have been resolved was optimistic and
unjustified. As soon as an opportunity arose, the Soviets clearly expressed their view
and in 1940 took back Bessarabia.
The Bessarabian Treaty played a very important role in bilateral relations. The
Soviets did their best to keep the treaty from coming into force, all the while repeat-
edly declaring it res inter alia treaty. In the end, they proved successful, and their big-
gest help came from Japan.
The United States
The representatives of the United States were largely responsible for the post-
ponement of the international recognition of Bessarabia’s Union in 1919. When they
came to the Peace Conference, they had nothing against the Union; indeed, they said
they considered that Bessarabia should go to Romania. Suddenly, their opinion
changed radically and they opposed by every possible means the recognition of the
Union. And, since this opposition alone was not enough, long after the end of the
Peace Conference they continued to refuse even a de facto recognition of the existing
situation, acknowledged by all the other countries in the world (except for the So-
viet Union).
For the sudden change in American policy, one possible explanation would be
the successful Kolchak offensive against the Bolsheviks. Second, we have the theory
that taking territories from Russia would only strengthen the hand of the Bolshevik
Government, giving them an excellent propaganda advantage and enabling them to
stir up the national feelings of the Russian people in their own advantage. How
much truth there was in this theory, and how much the Americans believed in it, is
debatable. In the end, they had to pay with fifty years of Cold War for their short-
sighted protection of communism during its first years.3 Another possible contribut-
ing factor, although it is hard to say whether or how much it influenced the US pol-
< 409 >

icy, is the worsening relations between Romania and the US representatives at the
Peace Conference.
However, there was one more reason behind the US attitude, one that all the
representatives avoided discussing. While Europe was still far from the US and the
events on the old continent could not really affect those in America, the situation
was different in the Far East. The Americans had a special fear of Japan, a feeling that
continued to preoccupy them during the entire inter-war period. Only this feeling
can explain the American policy toward Japanese immigration and the incarceration
of US citizens of Japanese heritage during the Second World War: a shocking move
in a state that claimed to be a pioneer of democracy. This sentiment was especially
heightened toward the end of the war when Japan, becoming more and more power-
ful, expressed its desire for territorial expansionism. The Washington Conference
showed clearly the American discontent with Japan’s territorial aggrandizement.
The Americans realized that a weak Russia would be highly vulnerable to Ja-
pan, and saw that the consequences would include Japanese domination in Siberia.
Of course they did not intend to foster (nor could they have conceived of) a commu-
nist Russia that would become so powerful that it would shortly be their main com-
petitor. But they did want to avoid any territorial gains by Japan at the expense of
Russia. As an unassailable motive, they hit upon opposition to the dismemberment
of the former Russian Empire.
In this context, the case of Bessarabia acquires a particular significance, as Bes-
sarabia was the only European territory of Russia that was to be granted a state that
had existed before the war. This could offer a tempting example for Japan, and the
precedent it would create in international law, by the recognition of a territorial
modification made without the consent of the mother country, was unacceptable to
some in the US. Unfortunately for Romania, this meant that recognition of Bessara-
bia’s Union, however justified by historical and demographic arguments, might
work against US interests. Therefore, Bessarabia (together with the Baltic States)
became a European victim of the American policy in Asia.
Was the idea that Bessarabia offered an excellent example for a Japanese action
in Siberia behind the American policy of avoiding even de facto recognizing the Un-
ion? In this author’s opinion, the answer is: yes, it was one of the main reasons.
Were the Americans really afraid that Japan would use the juridical precedent
created by the Bessarabian case in Sakhalin or in Siberia or was it seen only as a part
of a more general problem (the fate of the Russian Empire) and they were afraid that
by compromising on the Bessarabian question they would trigger a chain reaction
leading to the dismemberment of the Russian Empire? The signs are unclear. The
only fact that seems to indicate a positive answer to the first part of the question is
the long period during which the American Government accepted the view of a gov-
ernment that it considered to be an aberration, instead of listening to a government
with which it was on good terms and to publicly discriminate against the latter.
During the entire inter-war period, not only did US officials steer clear of giving any
hint that they might recognize Bessarabia’s union, they were very keen to emphasize
< 410 >

CHAPTER 10. SUMMARY
the contrary (describing Bessarabia as “under Romanian occupation” on official

maps, and setting a separate immigration quota). Even in 1933, when they aban-
doned these tools, the US failed to do so in a public or explicit manner and consider-
ing that the de facto recognition of Bessarabia’s union was only a Romanian interpre-
tation of their action and not their own interpretation.
Although the US opposed the signing of the Bessarabian Treaty and delayed its
signature for as long as possible, they made full use of the Treaty’s failure to come
into force in order to justify their policy on Bessarabia and to answer the Romanian
requests for US recognition of Bessarabia’s union.
Only during the Cold War did the US position towards the recognition of Bes-
sarabia’s union change. Starting in the 1950s the US started using Bessarabia, with
varying degrees of success, as a tool in the old divide et impera principle behind the
Iron Curtain.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE FAILURE TO BRING THE TREATY INTO FORCE
Since the Bessarabian Treaty never came into force, the Romanians had no
valid International Act to justify their possession of Bessarabia.
Although the Bessarabian Treaty granted Romania sovereignty over Bessarabia,
the signatories did not assume any obligations towards Romania; nothing obliged
them to intervene directly in case of a conflict over Bessarabia. In such a case, they
were free to respond however they deemed best, depending on the situation and ac-
cording to their own interests, under the leadership of the League of Nations.
The importance of the treaty comes from the fact that, the moment it came into
force, the dispositions of Article No. 10 of the League of Nations Pact would auto-
matically apply to Bessarabia. That article obliges the members of the League to re-
spect and maintain the territorial integrity of its members against any foreign ag-
gression. The article provides that “the members of the League undertake to respect
and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing po-
litical independence of all Members of the League”.4 Some scholars have suggested
that the article refers to the existing integrity at the date when the League Covenant
was signed (June 28, 1919), the date of the Versailles Pact, of which the League’s Pact
was an integral part. Article No. 10 is completed by Articles 117 and 134, which rec-
ognize the full validity of those future treaties that would regulate the yet undecided
fate of territories that belonged to Imperial Russia, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and
Turkey. As a result, Article 10 would apply to those territories too.5
According to this interpretation — contested by the Romanians — the fact
that the Bessarabian Treaty did not come into force produced a situation in which
Romania’s possession of Bessarabia was recognized only de facto and not de jure.6 The
first consequence was that, in the case of Soviet aggression against Bessarabia, the
League had no obligations toward Romania. This placed Romania in a very awkward
situation: on one hand, as an active member of the League (one of her firmest allies
against revisionism), Romania hoped for the League’s assistance in case of an act of
< 411 >

aggression coming from the Soviet Union. On the other hand, if the aggression was
limited to Bessarabia, which was only de facto a part of Romania, the League had no
juridical obligation to intervene in favor of Romania.7 Of course, it would have a
moral one, but as history shows, such values often pale beside a physical threat such
as that which the Soviet Union might bring to bear. Thus, full ratification of the Bess-
arabian Treaty was absolutely essential for Romania, and it is unthinkable that she
failed to pursue it full force and at full speed. And even more, it means that when the
Soviet Union was admitted as a member of the League, it was under no obligation to
automatically recognize Bessarabia as Romanian territory, as was argued by the Ro-
manians.
Nevertheless, the Romanians had a different theory. Their main line of argu-
ment was to prove that “territory” should be understood to indicate the territory
over which a state exercises its control and administration. Therefore, when Roma-
nia became a member of the League, since she had full control over Bessarabia, the
province ought to have been considered a part of Romania and therefore guaranteed
under Article No. 10 of the League’s Pact.
The point here is that the mere existence of an alternative theory, contrary to
Romanian interests and based on the non-ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty,
could have given Romania a rude shock in case of a Soviet aggression against Bes-
sarabia. The Italians, for example, could have argued that based on the fact that the
Bessarabian Treaty was not in force, they had no obligation to intervene in Roma-
nia’s favor, even as members of the League and quite apart from the Bessarabian
Treaty. Certain other countries having friendly relations with the Soviets, most
probably including Germany, would have followed suit. It would have also offered
an excellent pretext for many of Romania’s allies to avoid taking an anti-Soviet posi-
tion and to settle some of their own disputes with the Soviets at Bessarabia’s ex-
pense.
The Romanians argued that in fact, by ratifying, the UK, France, and Italy had
recognized de jure the Bessarabian Union with Romania, and because of their ratifica-
tion they could not join the other camp but had a “moral obligation” to help Roma-
nia. As Japan failed to ratify and the Treaty did not come into force, this “moral obli-
gation” was all the Romanian government could cling to. But they were unsuccessful
in imposing this idea at the international level, and “moral obligations” are of no use
in countering strategic or political considerations.
A third theory that represents a pro-Soviet view was expressed in an article
published by the Manchester Guardian in the aftermath of the Italian ratification:
It is held, however, in certain quarters that Romania’s title to Bessarabia is now

a de jure one, with the consequence that, in the event of a Russian attack on that
province, she could claim the assistance of all her fellow-members of the
League of Nations under Articles 10 and 17 of the Covenant. It is with this con-
tention, if justified, that the danger lies. Surely, however, it may be held that
the treaty of 1920 does not confer a de jure right, but merely accepts a de facto
< 412 >

CHAPTER 10. SUMMARY
situation. The Allied Powers accepted the Romanian solution of the Bessara-
bian question. Whether they did so rightly or wrongly is a matter of argument,
but they could not render that solution legal, any more than any other self-
appointed committee could make legal the possession by one of their members
of a watch forcibly abstracted from someone else. A de jure title, it would seem,
must depend solely on a Russo-Romanian treaty in which that title is stated
and admitted, just as Poland’s right to her White Russian provinces — but not
to Vilna — is not conferred by the recognition by the Conference of Ambassa-
dors, but by the Treaty of Riga. A legal title to Russian territory without Rus-
sian consent is surely unthinkable, and Bessarabia, however wrongfully ac-
quired, was in 1918 legally Russian territory. Only a de jure frontier can be the
subject of aggression such as would compel League intervention. It would be
well to know just where we stand by having the legal point authoritatively
settled.8
According to this last theory, even if Japan had ratified, the treaty would have
had no value in legally designating Bessarabia as Romanian territory. That is exactly
the Soviet attitude towards the ratifications; but their fierce opposition to and harsh
reaction after each of them raises doubts over the validity of this theory. Would they
have initiated such intense pressures and so many bilateral agreements, and even
offer material advantages in exchange for the promise of non-ratification, if they
were confident that the Treaty could not influence Romania’s rights over Bessarabia?
Perhaps they would, as a precaution — given the slippery nature of diplomatic
honor, but not to this degree.
One more “if” has to do with the possibility that the US attitude towards the
Bessarabian question would have changed if the treaty had come into force. An ex-
plicit recognition of Bessarabia’s union might have made a difference during World
War Two, when the Allies decided the future of Bessarabia.
The main consequence of the Bessarabian Treaty’s failure to come into force
was that Romania had no valid international document to justify her rights in Bes-
sarabia. The only juridical arguments to prove the Romanian rights over Bessarabia
were the Decision of Union taken by the Sfatul Tserii, and the Declaration of Novem-
ber 2, 1917, regarding the rights of all the peoples in Russia. The Japanese abstention
clearly limited Romania’s ability to use the Bessarabian Treaty in order to justify the
status of Bessarabia.
In the end, even though historians are not supposed to indulge in conjecture,
knowing how events unfolded we might ask one rhetorical question: supposing that
Japan had ratified, and the Treaty had come into force — would the situation of Bes-
sarabia have been different in 1940, in 1945 or in the 1990s?
Most probably, not very different. Definitely, a piece of paper would not have
stopped Stalin from taking Bessarabia back — especially a piece of paper without
Russia’s signature on it. Poland found herself in the opposite corner, from the stand-
point of international recognition of her borders: the Riga Treaty granted Soviet rec-
< 413 >

ognition of her new Eastern borders in 1922 and the Allied Powers too had accepted
those borders, plus they had signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviets. Even so,
in 1939 Stalin decided to launch an attack on Poland and at the end of the war Po-
land’s eastern borders were greatly modified, with the consent of the Western pow-
ers (it is true that the Poles received some territorial compensations in the West).
The saga of the Bessarabian Treaty is a lesson in diplomatic history during an
early phase of the globalization of international relations, and is a caution to any
who fail to appreciate the its implications: economical, political, ethnic, strategic,
and social. It is the saga of a small State vying with a Great Power, of democracy
against communism, of historical rights and demographic realities against material
interests, of honor and friendship against economic and strategic realities.
< 414 >

CHAPTER 10. SUMMARY
Notes
1
RNA, Fond France microfilm, R 226, Telegram Roux to William Martin, November 7, 1923, c. 769.
2
RFMA, Fond 71/1914, Special Files, E 2, Vol. 23, Telegram Nanu to Mironescu, October 3, 1930.
3
As a Romanian professor says: “they (the US) paid, but we (and all the other countries in the area)
suffered” as a result of the US policy of encouraging the Soviet Union during the interwar period.
4
A. Cretzianu, Captive Romania, p. 8.
5
T. Tittoni, “Basarabia, Romania …” in Convorbiri Literare, 1927, p. 34-35.
6
In fact, as becomes clear from the answer to an interpellation in the British Parliament, the Bessara-
bian Treaty was not even deposited with the League, since full ratification was a pre-condition for
making the deposit. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Official Report, Fifth Series, Vol.
170, p. 1944.
7
And indeed, during the January 1926 negotiations for the renewal of the Polish-Romanian Alliance
Treaty, in order to justify his reluctance to intervene automatically in case of a Soviet attack on Bes-
sarabia, Count Skrzynski, the Polish Premier and Foreign Minister, cited the consequences of the
Bessarabian Treaty’s still inactive state: that Poland retained the right to choose in which ways to
help Romania. C. Iordan, Romania si relatiile internationale din sud estul european: modelul Locarno, p. 164.
8
The Manchester Guardian, March 10, 1927.
< 415 >

APPENDICES
THE BESSARABIAN TREATY1
THE BRITISH EMPIRE, FRANCE, ITALY, JAPAN, THE PRINCIPAL ALLIED

POWERS, AND ROUMANIA:
Whereas in the interest of general peace in Europe it is of importance to assure

henceforth a sovereignty over Bessarabia consistent with the aspirations of the
population and guaranteeing to racial, religious and linguistic minorities the protec-
tion which is due to them;
Whereas from geographic, ethnographic, historic, and economic points of
view, the reunion of Bessarabia with Romania is fully justified;
Whereas the population of Bessarabia has given proof of its desire to see Bes-
sarabia reunited with Romania;
In fine, whereas Romania, of her own free will, desires to give positive guaran-
tees of liberty and justice to the inhabitants of the former Kingdom of Roumania,
and also to those of the territories newly transferred, irrespective of race, religion or
language, in conformity with the Treaty signed at Paris on 9th December 1919:
Have decided to conclude the present Treaty and, to this end, have the follow-
ing as their Plenipotentiaries, reserving the right to appoint others to sign it:
- For the United Kingdom: the Honorable Edward George Villiers, Earl of
Derby, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of His Britannic
Majesty to Paris;
- For the Canadian Dominion: Sir G. Foster, Minister of Commerce;
- For the Australian Commonwealth: Honorable Andrew Fisher, High Com-
missioner for Australia in the United Kingdom;
- For the New Zealand Dominion: Edward George Villiers, Earl of Derby;
- For the South African Union: Edward George Villiers, Earl of Derby;
- For India: Edward George Villiers, Earl of Derby;
- The president of the French Republic:
- M. George Leygues, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
- M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador of France;
- His Majesty, the King of Italy: Count Lelio Bonin Longare, Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary Ambassador of his Majesty the King of Italy at Paris;
- His Majesty, the Emperor of Japan: Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at Paris;
- His Majesty, the King of Romania:
- M. Take Ionescu, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
- Prince Dimitrie Ghika, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Envoy of his Maj-
esty the King of Romania at Paris;
< 417 >

Who have agreed on the following stipulations:
Article No. 1
The High Contracting Parties declare that they recognize the sovereignty of
Romania over the territory of Bessarabia comprised between the present frontier of
Romania, the Black Sea, the course of the Dniestr River from its mouth to the point
where it meets the old boundary between Bessarabia and Bukovina, and that old
boundary.
Article No. 2
A Commission consisting of three members, one of whom should be appointed
by the Principal Allied Powers, one by Romania, and one by the League of Nations
on the part of Russia shall be constituted within 15 days following the coming into
force of the present Treaty, in order to trace on the spot the new frontier of Romania.
Article No. 3
Romania undertakes to observe the stipulations of the Treaty signed at Paris
on 9th December 1919, by the principal Allied and Associated Powers and Romania
[the Treaty of the Minorities] and to ensure their rigorous observance in the terri-
tory of Bessarabia as defined in Article 1, and particularly to assure to its inhabitants,
without distinction of race, language or religion, the same guarantees of liberty and
justice as to the inhabitants of all other territories forming part of the Kingdom of
Romania.
Article No. 4
Romanian nationality, to the exclusion of any other nationality, shall be ac-
corded ipso facto to the nationals of the former Russian Empire settled in the territory
of Bessarabia, as defined in Article 1.
Article No. 5
Within a period of two years from the date of the coming into force of the pre-
sent treaty, nationals of the former Russian Empire over the age of eighteen years
and settled in the territory of Bessarabia, as defined in Article 1, shall be allowed to
opt for any other nationality which may be open to them.
Option by the husband will include that by the wife, and option by the parents
will include that by their children under the age of 18 years.
Persons who have exercised the right of option above provided must within the en-
suing twelve months transfer their place of residence to the State for which they
have opted.
They shall be at liberty to retain the immovable property which they possess in
Romanian territory. They may carry away their personal property of every descrip-
tion. No export duties shall be imposed on them on account of this removal.
< 418 >

APPENDICES
Article No. 6
Roumania recognizes as Romanian nationals, ipso facto and without any formal-
ity, nationals of the former Russian Empire who were born on the territory of Bes-
sarabia, as described in Article 1, of parents having their domicile there, although at
the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty they may not themselves be
domiciled there.
Nevertheless, within two years from the coming into force of the present
Treaty, these persons may make a declaration before the competent Romanian au-
thorities in the country in which they reside, that they renounce to the Romanian
nationality, and they will then cease to be considered as Romanian nationals. In this
respect, the declaration of the husband will be held valid for the wife, and that of the
parents will be held valid for children under the age of 18 years.
Article No. 7
The High Contracting Parties recognize that the mouth of Danube, called the
Kilia mouth, must pass under the jurisdiction of the European Commission of the
Danube.
Pending the conclusion of a general convention for the international control of
waterways, Romania undertakes to apply to the sections of the river system of the
Dniestr comprised between her territory or constituting its frontiers, the regime pro-
vided in the paragraph 1 of Article 332 and in Articles 333 to 338 of the Treaty of
Peace with Germany of June 28, 1919.
Article No. 8
Romania shall assume responsibility for the share of the Russian public debt
and all other financial obligations of the Russian state allotted to Bessarabia, which
shall be fixed by a special Convention between the Principal Allied and Associated
Powers on the one part and Romania on the other part. A Commission appointed by
the aforesaid Powers shall draw up this Convention. Should the Commission not
come to an agreement within a period of two years, the questions in dispute shall be
at once submitted to the arbitration of the Council of the League of Nations.
Article No. 9
The High Contracting Parties will invite Russia to adhere to the present Treaty
as soon as a Russian Government recognized by them shall be in existence. They
reserve the right to submit to the arbitration of the Council of the League of Nations
all questions which the Russian Government may raise respecting the details of this
Treaty, it being understood that the frontiers defined in the present Treaty, as well
as the sovereignty of Romania over the territories therein comprised, cannot be
called in question. The same procedure applies to all difficulties that may subse-
quently arise from the carrying out of the treaty.
The signatory Powers shall ratify the present Treaty. It shall not come into
force until after the deposit of these ratifications and not before the coming into
< 419 >

force of the Treaty signed by the Principal Allied and Associate Powers and Romania
on the 9th December 1919.
The deposit of ratifications shall take place in Paris.
Powers of which the seat of the government is outside Europe will be entitled
merely to inform the Government of the French Republic, through their diplomatic
representative at Paris, that their ratification has been given; in that case they must
transmit the instrument of ratification as soon as possible.
A proces-verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up.
The French Government will transmit to all the signatory Powers a certified
copy of the proces-verbal of the deposit of ratifications.
Done at Paris, October 28th 1920.

The plenipotentiaries who, owing to their temporary absence from Paris, are
unable to attach their signature to the present treaty, will be allowed to do so until
the 15th December 1920.
The present plenipotentiaries, whose plain powers have been recognized, have
signed the present Treaty.
Notes
1
The original of this treaty was written in French, and there is no official authenti-
cated English translation of it; the above translation was published in The American
Journal of Law, New York, 1923, Suppl., v. 17.
< 420 >

APPENDICES
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Although comprehensive bibliographies regarding the Bessarabian question (or Roma-

nian foreign policy in general) are still wanting, a number of papers have made the attempt.
The best one on the Bessarabian issue, comprising not only Romanian but also Russian and
foreign language papers, although limited to publications printed before 1944, is to be found in
Alexandru Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei. Two other good bibliographies are presented in Wim Van
Meurs, The Bessarabian Question in Communist Historiography and Charles King, The Moldovans. As for
Romanian foreign policy, the most comprehensive source of bibliographical information is
Bibliografia istorica a Romaniei.
However, the best bibliography for both topics can be found at www.newfirstsearch.
oclc.org or OPAC, a site that lists the inventories of the largest university libraries in the world
(access might not be for free).
The following resources were consulted for the present work.
A. Primary Sources
1. Unpublished Sources
Japan, Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (JFMA)

Romania, Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (RFMA)
Romanian National Archives, Central Historical Archives (RNA)
- microfilms from France, Great Britain
2. Published Sources
Berciu Draghicescu, Adina, Branceanu, Lidia, Unirea Basarabiei cu Romania 1918-1927. Documente [The
Union of Bessarabia with Romania 1918-1927. Documents] Bucharest: Globus, 1994
Boga, Leon, Documente Basarabene, [Bessarabian Documents], Chisinau: Tip. CCPC, 1928
Calafeteanu, Ion, Moisuc, Viorica, Unirea Basarabiei si a Bucovinei cu Romania, 1917-1918: documente, Chisi-
nau: Hyperion, 1995
Degras, Jane, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1951-1953, Vol. I-III
Documente privind relatiile romano-sovietice 1917-1924, [Documents on Romanian-Soviet Relations] Bucha-
rest, 1928
Documents Diplomatiques Francais, (DDF), Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Commission de publica-
tion des Documents diplomatiques Francais, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1997-
Documents on British Foreign Policy, (DBFP), London, First Series, 1982-
Eudin, Xenia J, Fischer, Harold H, Soviet Russia and the West, 1920-1927: A Documentary Survey, London:
Oxford University, 1957
Eudin, Xenia J, Slusser, Robert M, Soviet Foreign Policy, 1928-1934: Documents and Materials, Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1967
French Chamber of Deputies, Debates, 1924
Gheorghe, Gheorghe, Tratatele internationale ale Romaniei, Vol. 2, 1921-1939, Bucharest: Stiintifica si Peda-
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I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, (DDI), Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Commissione per la publicatione
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< 421 >

5th Serie 1914-1918

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< 422 >

APPENDICES
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APPENDICES
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< 435 >

Index
Adachi, Mineichiro, 313, 317, 345 99, 100, 108, 110, 207-210, 341, 350,
Aloisi, Pompeo, 244, 246, 249, 266, 267 352, 353, 398, 401, 413
Angelescu, Constantin, 351, 352 Chamberlain, Austin, 203, 253, 261,
Arion, Nicolae, 276, 277, 339 267
Averescu, Alexandru, 99, 111, 156, 173, Cicerin, Gheorghi, 39, 108- 111, 113,
174, 247, 253, 260, 276, 412 117—119, 156- 158, 186, 227, 248, 254,
Badoglio, Marshall, 257 279, 301, 329, 342
Balfour, Lord, 71, 74, 75, 76, 86, 88, 90, Ciotori, D.N., 110, 156, 267
91 Ciuntu, Edmond, 133, 321, 346
Barthou, Louis, 219, 235 Clemenceau, George, 58-60, 71, 86,
Benes, Edouard, 124 90—95, 99, 201, 206- 213, 234
Berthelot, Charles, 77 Clerk, George, 169
Bessedovskii, Gregorij, 124, 156, 159, Clinchant, George, 233, 237, 341
295-302, 306, 310, 318, 338, 340, 341, Cobb-Lippman Memorandum, 101,
342, 343, 428 353, 354, 399
Bibescu, Anton, 177, 199, 201, 370, 371, Colby Note, 172, 181, 215, 315, 365, 366,
372, 373, 374, 388, 401, 402, 409 367, 372, 373, 376, 377, 380, 382, 394
Boerescu, V., 178, 179, 180, 201 Contarini, A., 248, 249, 250
Bratianu, Ion C., 22, 25 Cretzianu, Alexandru, 156, 160, 247,
Bratianu, Ion I.C., 54, 68, 100, 120, 359, 253, 256, 266, 267, 321- 323, 404,
400, 428, 439 420, 429, 430
Bratianu, Vintila, 218 Crow, Sir Eyre, 64, 69
Briand-Kellogg Pact, 124, 125, 126 Culbertson, W.S., 375, 402
Britain, Sir Harry, 194, 195 Curzon, Lord, 79, 102, 103, 164, 178,
Cachin, Marcel, 225, 226 182, 185, 190, 197, 199-203, 235, 266,
Cadere, Victor, 127, 160 267
Cambon, Jules, 189, 217, 234, 235, 422 Daeschner, Emile, 156, 157, 201, 213,
Carol II, King of Romania, 134, 140, 141, 214, 218, 219, 235
185 Davidescu, Gheorghe, 140, 310, 345
Carp, Petre P., 290, 293, 341 Davila, Charles A., 124, 125, 159, 163,
Carr, Wilbur J., 162, 390, 404 315-317, 336, 345, 375- 391, 395-397,
Castle, William R., 381, 382, 402 402-404, 409, 410
Central Powers, 37, 39, 56-61, 65, 68, De Martonne, Emmanuel, 31, 210, 235
< 437 >

Debuchi, Katsuji, 295-302, 306, 307, 309, 365, 368, 394, 414
310, 316, 318, 332, 338, 341, 342 Kopp, Joseph, 291, 292, 295, 338, 341
Denikin, General, 40, 144, 147, 148, 156, 170, Krestinsky, Nikolai Nikolaievich, 119, 136,
212, 364 158, 161
Derby, Lord, 81- 83, 102, 103, 178-186, 199, Krofta, Kamil, 135, 139
201-203, 236, 422 Kroupenski, Alexander N., 72, 76, 144, 146,
Dering, Herbert G., 186, 190, 191, 203, 235, 148, 149, 150, 151, 164, 275, 339, 433
248, 267 Lafont, Ernest, 225, 226
Diamandi, Constantin, 118, 157, 230, 235, Lahovary, Alexandru, 164, 246, 248, 250,
236, 237 266, 267, 269, 353
Dianu, Nicolae, 321, 346 Langa-Rascanu, Constantin, 119, 120, 252,
Dovgalevskii, Valerii, 301 293
Drake, Millington, 187, 188, 191, 203, 235 Lansing, Robert, 70- 74, 86-89, 349, 352-
Drummond, Sir Eric, 150 354, 356, 359, 363, 371, 393, 394, 399, 401,
Duca, Ion Gheorghe, 40, 50, 157, 158, 164, 427
191, 221-223, 227, 229, 230, 235-237, 243, Laroche, Guy, 64, 69, 81, 92, 156, 176, 199,
246, 248, 249, 266, 267, 277-280, 305, 218, 236, 401
308, 309, 336, 339, 340-345, 372-374, 401, Leeper, Allan W.A., 64, 79, 169, 171, 181, 182,
402, 408, 431 183, 184, 185, 199, 201, 202, 203
Dulles, Allen W., 73, 102, 431 Leygues, George, 156, 217, 221, 222, 224,
Durazzo, Marquis, 250, 252, 258, 259, 262, 235, 236, 422
267, 269, 270 Little Entente, 10, 16, 123, 124, 129, 131, 132,
Dutasta, Paul Eugene, 71 138, 158, 159, 162, 185, 186, 203, 229, 234,
Ferdinand, King of Romania, 38-40, 50, 59, 236, 242, 244, 253, 258, 267, 318, 398, 412,
280, 304, 330, 351, 400 427, 434, 438
Filality, Gheorghe, 105, 114, 115, 157 Litvinov, Maxim, 108, 110, 111, 114, 123, 124,
Forges, A., 218, 219, 223, 226 125, 127, 128, 130, 131, 132, 134, 136, 137,
Franklin, Martin, 66, 243, 266, 388 138, 139, 156, 157, 159-162, 181, 228, 232,
Frontotdel, 35, 49 318, 333, 375, 381
Ghika, Dimitrie Ion, 102, 176, 185, 199, 345, Lloyd George, David, 59, 68, 71, 78, 81, 94,
402, 422 95, 96, 164, 167, 170-173, 180, 199, 226
Grant, Colonel U.S., 74, 102 Manzoni, Count, 254, 255, 256, 257, 259,
Hardinge, Lord, 180, 188, 189, 190, 201, 203 263, 267, 268, 269, 341
Herbette, Jean, 232, 233, 237, 269, 343 Marie, Queen, 354, 359, 400
Herriot, Edouard, 230, 236, 383 Martino, Giacomo de, 64, 69
Hoover, Herbert, 375, 400, 401, 428, 433 Matsui, Tetsuku, 274, 280, 339, 340
Horiguchi, Kumaichi, 279, 280, 289, 290, Millerand, Alexandre, 95, 201, 213, 214, 235
327, 328, 340, 341 Molotov, Viaceslav, 43, 140, 162, 323, 427,
Hull, Cordell, 388, 389 437
Ionescu, Take, 10, 39, 50, 56, 58, 80, 100, 102, Murray, Wallace, 377, 378, 379, 382-384,
109, 111, 115, 156, 157, 165, 174, 176, 182, 389, 390, 402, 403, 404
185, 186, 187, 188, 199, 200, 215, 216, 339, Mushanokoji, Kintomo, 294, 305, 308, 341,
359, 371, 401, 422 343, 344, 345
Iorga, Nicolae, 45, 48, 159, 432 Mussolini, Benito, 195, 224, 242-260, 262-
Ishii, Viscount Kikujiro, 280, 303, 340, 422 264, 266-270, 282, 290, 291, 326, 341, 412,
Karakhan, Lev Mikhailovici, 105, 114, 115, 429
116, 118, 155, 157, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, Nagai, Ryutaro, 313, 314, 315
287, 291, 294, 297, 299, 300, 326, 329, 335, Nakamura, Kaju, 313, 314, 315, 328, 336, 345
337, 338, 340, 341, 346 Nanu, Frederic C., 24, 49, 50, 156, 157, 159,
Kelley, Robert F., 385, 403 160, 163, 315, 371, 375, 377-381, 383, 392,
Kenworthy, Lt-commander, 172, 194 401, 402, 404, 409, 420, 434
Kolchak, Admiral, 71-73, 90, 91, 94, 146, 170, Naruhiko, Prince, 279, 280, 325, 328
< 438 >

APPENDICES
Nishi, Genshiro, 277, 339 Stalin, I.V., 124, 125, 142, 159, 418, 430
Orlando, V.E., 240 Stimson, Henry L., 381, 382, 402
Ostrovski, Mihail S., 133, 161 Stoicescu, George G., 50, 312, 313, 315, 316,
Peretti, dela Rocca, 218, 221, 229, 236 317, 319, 345
Petliura, Simion, 112, 117, 144, 147, 156, 170 Stomoniakov, Boris Spiridonovici, 126, 127,
Petrescu-Comnen, Nicolae, 139, 346, 404 297, 342
Phillips, William, 388, 404 Sturdza, Mihail, 20, 125, 127, 155, 159, 160,
Pichon, Stephen, 75, 90, 156, 209, 235 161, 437
Poincare, Raymond, 219, 220-227, 230, 231, Tanaka, Giichi, 297, 301, 306, 310, 311, 318,
235, 236, 266, 279, 329, 340, 346 339, 341-344
Polk, Frank Lyon, 74-77, 91, 92, 167, 274, Tardieu, Andre, 64, 69, 72, 73, 86-91, 210
355, 360-364, 401 Tavernier, Edouard, 207
Ponsonby, M., 193, 194, 195 Tittoni, Tomasso, 24, 72, 75, 76, 88, 90, 91,
Rakovsky, Christian, 37, 38, 49, 50, 108, 110, 266, 270, 420, 440
111, 156, 157, 194, 430, 439 Titulescu, Nicolae, 10, 83, 102, 116, 126-137,
Rattigan, Frank, 66, 145, 164, 168, 172, 175, 142, 155, 158-161, 174, 176, 178, 183-185,
176-188, 197, 199, 200, 201 199, 201, 202, 206, 244, 253, 266, 269,
Romanian National Treasury, 35, 105, 107, 273, 289, 303, 310, 313, 318, 319, 320, 343,
111, 114, 118, 124, 125, 300 345, 383, 384, 391, 392, 402-404, 410, 438
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 383, 385, 388, 392, Ukrainian Rada, 34, 37
404 Vaida-Voevod, Alexandru, 51, 66, 78, 93, 94,
RUMCEROD, 35, 108 95, 96, 109, 110, 111, 148, 156, 160, 171, 173,
Saint Aulaire, Count Felix August de, 60, 214, 339, 345, 353, 360, 400
98, 99, 100, 208, 209, 213, 234, 235, 398, Vannutelli Rey, Count Luigi, 64
436 Vassiliu, Ion Aurel, 303-313, 318, 343-345,
Scerbacev, General, 33, 36, 46, 49, 92, 143 388, 409
Schmidt, Alexander C., 72, 76, 144, 146, 148, Vopicka, Charles J., 49, 57, 62, 66, 99, 101,
164, 433 350, 351, 353, 354, 355, 358, 398, 399, 438
Seymour, Charles, 64, 70, 101, 266, 357, 359, Wallace, Andrew, 78, 79, 81-83, 102, 103,
398, 399, 400, 436, 437, 438 364, 377, 378, 382, 384
Sfatul Tserii, 12, 33-50, 72, 87, 88, 108, 109, Wilson, Woodrow, 53, 58-60, 62, 64, 65, 71,
143, 144, 145, 208, 292, 303, 394, 418, 428, 86, 207, 213, 277, 339, 349, 351-354, 356,
430 357, 359, 360, 367, 387, 393, 398-401, 428,
Shidehara, Baron Kijuro, 249, 291, 293, 312, 432, 436, 437
314, 338, 341, 342 Wrangel, General, 111, 117, 147, 181, 201, 215,
Shigemitsu, Mamoru, 320, 321, 323, 338 216
Sinclair, Sir Archibald, 193 Yoshizawa, Kenkichi, 282-287, 291, 294,
Solf, Walter, 296, 298, 299, 301, 331, 342 312, 326, 329, 335, 337, 338, 340, 341
Sonnino, Sidney, 49, 99, 240, 241, 266
< 439 >

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MOLDOVA: A ROMANIAN PROVINCE

UNDER RUSSIAN RULE

DIPLOMATIC HISTORY FROM THE ARCHIVES OF

No portion of this book (beyond what is permitted by

Library of Congress Card Number: 2002-005746

Front Cover: Romania (1918—1940)

Printed in the United States

PART ONE - BESSARABIA AND THE UNION WITH ROMANIA 17

CHAPTER 1. A BRIEF HISTORY OF BESSARABIA 17

CHAPTER 2. THE MAKING OF THE UNION 27

CHAPTER 3. THE MAKING OF THE BESSARABIAN TREATY 53

CHAPTER 4. THE SOVIET UNION 105

CHAPTER 5. THE UNITED KINGDOM 167

CHAPTER 6. FRANCE 203

CHAPTER 7. ITALY 237

CHAPTER 8. JAPAN 269

CHAPTER 9. THE UNITED STATES 345

PART THREE - TO CONCLUDE. . . 401

CHAPTER 10. SUMMARY 401

Bessarabia until 1919

DATE (parens. = Old Calendar) EVENT

Declaration regarding the rights of the peoples living

DATE COMMISSION TOPIC

Date Commission Topic

Date Commission Topic

Romanian-Soviet Agreement regarding navigation on Dniestr and

Opportunity from Crisis

First, what is Bessarabia? Second, what is Moldavia (or, in Romanian,

The book is based mainly on information provided by primary sources, espe-

of Bessarabia to the principality of Moldavia, because the Great Powers wished to

from the intelligentsia), preparing it for the 1917-1918 events.

Making the Union

One Romanian historian, Stefan Ciobanu, in The Union of Bessarabia, distin-

Bessarabia is proclaimed from today the Democratic Republic of Moldavia, as a

On January 6 (19), 1918, the Romanian government decided that a group of

renounced to these conditions and proclaimed the Union without conditions.75

Delays in Romania’s Ratification of the Bessarabian Treaty

Although the Bessarabian Treaty signified the much-desired international rec-

The Aftermath of the Union

opposite of Transylvania: a particularly backward, refractory, and incendiary region,

seizure of Bessarabia by Romania. In the former case the Soviet Government, in

1. The failure of the Russification process;93

4. The example of nationalist successes in other parts of the Russian Empire;

Decree of the People’s Commissars

the national movement. S. Ciobanu, Basarabia. Populatia . . . , p. 62-63.

Shifting Positions in the First World War

Yes, of course, Bessarabia is a Romanian land, essentially Romanian, and never,

The enigma of the situation is Bratianu himself. His caution is so excessive as

Success at the Paris Peace Conference

The problem of Transylvania was insoluble by the principle of self-

The Paris Peace Conference and The Bessarabian Question

To bring some clarity to a complex situation as it unfolded, a chronological

February 1, 1919 – During the Council of Ten discussions of Romanian territo-

At the demand of the representatives of the Entente, who declared in writing

After the withdrawal of the Romanian representatives, the Council decided

February 8 – The first meeting of the Commission on Romanian and Yugo-Slav

Of all the territories under discussion by the Committee, Bessarabia is . . . the

March 5 – Meeting of the Commission on Romanian and Yugo-Slav Affairs.

Geographically and historically a Romanian province with a predominantly

March 28 – Final meeting of the Commission on Romanian and Yugo-Slav Af-

September 3 – Meeting of the US Commissioners. The main point of the dis-

Mr. Polk: Now the Dobrudja question is a question to be settled with a

thought that it was impossible, as long as Romania remained an Allied Power,