TOPIC: PROCLAMATION

REFERENCE:
EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR. vs. HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P.
NAZARENO, in their official capacities as Speaker and Secretary-General of the House
of Representatives, respectively, and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent Locsin were candidates for the position of Representative of
the 4th legislative district of Leyte during the May 14, 2001 elections. At that time,
petitioner was the Mayor of Ormoc City while respondent Locsin was the sitting
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyt e. On May 8, 2001, one Josephine de
la Cruz, a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, filed directly with the COMELEC main office
a Petition for Disqualification1 against the petitioner for indirectly soliciting votes from the
registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, in violation of Section 68 (a) of the
Omnibus Election Code. It was alleged that the petitioner used the equipments and
vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel
and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing,
influencing or corrupting them to vote for him. Attached to the petition are the (a) Affidavits
of Basilio Bates,Danilo D. Maglasang,3 Cesar A. Laurente; (b) Joint Affidavit of Agripino
C. Alferez and Rogelio T. Salvera; (c) Extract Records from the Police Blotter executed
by Police Superintendent Elson G. Pecho; and (d) Photographs showing government
dump trucks, haulers and surfacers and portions of public roads allegedly filled-in and
surfaced through the intercession of the respondent. The case was docketed as SPA No.
01-208 and assigned to the COMELEC's Second Division.
On May 10, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order delegating the hearing
and reception of evidence on the disqualification case to the Office of the Regional
Director of Region VIII.8 On May 11, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division sent a
telegram informing the petitioner that a disqualification case was filed against him and
that the petition was remanded to the Regional Election Director for investigation.
At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the Regional Election Director had yet to
hear the disqualification case. Consequently, petitioner was included in the list of
candidates for district representative and was voted for. The initial results showed that
petitioner was the winning candidate.
On May 16, 2001, before the counting could be finished, respondent Locsin joined as
intervenor in SPA No. 128 and filed a "Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of
Respondent [herein petitioner]" with the COMELEC Second Division. Respondent Locsin
alleged that "the evidence on record against respondent is very strong and unless
rebutted remains." She urged the Commission to set the hearing of the disqualification
case and prayed for the suspension of the proclamation of the respondent "so as not to
render the present disqualification case moot and academic." A copy of the Motion was
allegedly served on petitioner by registered mail but no registry receipt was attached
thereto.
On May 18, 2001, respondent Locsin filed a "Second Most Urgent Motion to Suspend
Proclamation of Respondent" stating "there is clear and convincing evidence showing that
the respondent is undoubtedly guilty of the charges against him and this remains
unrebutted by the respondent." A copy of the Motion was sent to the petitioner and the
corresponding registry receipt was attached to the pleading. The records, however, do
not show the date the petitioner received the motion.
On May 30, 2001, an oral argument was conducted on the petitioner's Motion and the
parties were ordered to submit their respective memoranda.25 On June 4, 2001,
petitioner submitted his Memorandum26 in support of his Motion assailing the suspension
of his proclamation on the grounds that: (a) he was not afforded due process; (b) the
order has no legal and factual basis; and (c) evidence of his guilt is patently inexistent for
the purpose of suspending his proclamation. He prayed that his proclamation as winning
congressional candidate be expediently made, even while the disqualification case
against him continue upon due notice and hearing. He attached the following additional
evidence in his Memorandum: (a) Copy of certification issued by PNP Senior Inspector
Benjamin T. Gorre;27 (b) Certification issued by Elena S. Aviles, City Budget Officer;28
(c) Copy of certification issued by Wilfredo A. Fiel, City Engineer of Ormoc;29 (d) Joint
Affidavit of Antonio Patenio and Pepito Restituto;30 and (e) Affidavits of Demetrio
Brion,31 Igmedio Rita32 and Gerardo Monteza.33 Respondent Locsin's memorandum
also contained additional affidavits of his witnesses.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction to annul the proclamation of a Representative
2. Whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the House to recognize Codilla as the legally
elected Representative
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE:
The validity of the respondent’s proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for
Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner.
xxx
Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the
Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en
banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the
Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has
not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its
execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the
respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
FIRST ISSUE:
It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in
the instant case.
xxx
(a)The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not
yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the
petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume
jurisdiction over the matter.
In Puzon vs. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the “doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation
has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has
jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the House of Representatives,
could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the
very COMELEC pronouncements themselves.” This is because the HRET has no
jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a
division or en banc.
(b)The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent Locsin.
xxx
A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty
to the Republic of the Philippines. In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the
respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in question. There
is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office.
A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected
and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in
question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be
the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the
petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her premature
assumption to office as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from
the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner
Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.
Ministerial duty of the House to administer the oath of office of a winning but nevertheless
unproclaimed candidate
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts,
in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or
when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty
is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
discretion or judgment.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte
has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction
on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the
land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.
TOPIC: PROCLAMATION
REFERENCE:
BREN Z. GUIAO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ABER P. CANLAS, PROVINCIAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF PAMPANGA and MANUEL LUCERO
G.R. No. L-68056 July 5, 1985
FACTS:
On May 14, 1984, at seven o'clock in the evening, the Provincial Board of Canvassers
met at the Conference Hall, Provincial Capitol in San Fernando, Pampanga, to canvass
the election returns from the voting centers in the province. The contending political
parties, the KBL, and the UNIDO, were duly represented in the said Board as the election
returns were being canvassed. By 11:30 o'clock in the evening of May 16, 1984, the
canvass of all election returns from all the voting centers of Pampanga had been
completed without any objection raised by anyone to any of the canvassed returns.
Thereafter, the Board proceeded to tally the total number of votes received by each
candidate and the tabulation of the votes disclosed that the four candidates who received
the highest number of votes and won in the election for the Batasan were the following:
Juanita L. Nepomuceno
246,231 votes
Egmidio L. Lingad
227,111 votes
Rafael L. Lazatin
211,288 votes
Aber P. Canlas
203,856 votes
Petitioner Bren Z. Guiao garnered fifth place with 195,583 votes.
After the canvass was completed, and only at about 12:50 A.M. of May 17, 1984, did
petitioner submit to the Board of Canvassers his written objections to the inclusion in the
canvass of election returns from approximately 31 various voting centers of different
municipalities. Petitioner based his challenge on the following grounds:
Incomplete, duress, intimidation falsified obviously manufactured, threats, coercion,
Comelec's copy used not authentic, statistically improbable, and persons in Saudi Arabia
were made to appear as if they had voted.
The belatedness of the submission of these written objections of the petitioner
notwithstanding, the Board of Canvassers nevertheless set the same for hearing at
eleven thirty in the morning of that very date, May 17, 1984. The Chairman of the Board
of Canvassers, Atty. Manuel Lucero also sent to the Commission on Elections a
memorandum, stating and informing that the—
Objections were raised after the completion of the canvass and requesting that the
Provincial Board of Canvassers in Pampanga be authorized to proclaim the winning
candidate based on the results of the completed canvass without prejudice to the
outcome of the hearing on the objections.
In a resolution dated May 17, 1984, the COMELEC granted the aforestated request of the
Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers. The petitioner's objections were later
dismissed by the Board of Canvassers for failure to substantiate the same. It also appears
that at said hearing, there was presented to the Board the request of the petitioner, thru
his counsel Atty. Suarez, that subpoena be issued to the members of the Citizens Election
Committee from various voting centers enumerated in the written objections. Said request
was denied by the Board on the grounds that said petitioner's counsel should have been
ready with his evidence to support his objections, the hearing being summary in nature
and also to preclude further delay in the proclamation of the winning candidates. (Minutes
of the Meeting of the Provincial Board of Canvassers held on May 17, 1984).
On May 22, 1984, another verified petition was filed with the COMELEC for the annulment
of the proclamation of respondent Aber P. Canlas, on the ground that such was made in
violation of Section 54 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697, and consequently, premature and
with denial of petitioner's right to due process.
The case for annullment of the proceedings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers and
proclamation of Aber Canlas was docketed in the COMELEC as Case No. PPC 32-84. It
was heard by the First Division of the COMELEC and was considered submitted for
resolution after the submission of the respective Memorandum of the contending parties.
In its resolution dated June 28, 1984, by a vote of 2 to 1, the First Division of the
COMELEC dismissed petitioner's suit but without prejudice to the filing by the latter of an
election protest. Said resolution was appealed by the petitioner to the COMELEC en
banc.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the BOC should issue a subpoena.
RULING:
Petitioner cannot challenge the proclamation of any one of the candidates. The
proclamation cannot be void as to one and valid with respect to the others. The written
objection of the petitioner were not timely presented. The time to object in writing in any
election return is when it is being examined by the board of canvassers. The board of
canvassers was correct in refusing to subpoena the members of the citizen election
committee.
The function of the board of canvassers is purely ministerial. To have acceded to the
request of the petitioner would have made the board a hearing body to ascertain the issue
of duress and other irregularities alleged by petitioner.
TOPIC: PROCLAMATION
REFERENCE:
SALLY A. LEE vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LEOVIC R. DIONEDA
FACTS:
Sally A. Lee (petitioner) and Leovic R. Dioneda (private respondent) were candidates for
mayor of Sorsogon City, Sorsogon in the May 14, 2001 elections.
During the canvassing of the election returns, counsel for private respondent objected to
the inclusion of Election Return No. 41150266 for Precinct No. 28A2 in barangay
Bucalbucalan, Sorsogon City on the grounds that 1) no entries were made for the position
of congressman, and 2) Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) watchers were utilized
to fill up election returns.
In her opposition to private respondent’s objection, petitioner alleged that 1) the omitted
entry in the election return pertains to the position of congressman which cannot be a
subject of pre-proclamation controversy, 2) the utilization of the watchers, who were under
the direct supervision of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI), was limited only to the
filling up of the entries affecting the party-list and justified by the severe lack of personnel
to perform the task, and 3) the alleged defect does not affect the integrity of the election
return.
On May 18, 2001, the Board of Canvassers (BOC), finding that the 1) questioned election
return was clear and regular on its face, 2) there was no pre-proclamation for members
of the House of Representatives and party list, and 3) the grounds relied upon by private
respondent are all directed against the proceedings of the BEI and not the BOC, ruled for
the inclusion of the return. Private respondent thereupon filed on the same day a notice
of appeal of the BOC ruling.
In the meantime, or on May 19, 2001, the BOC proclaimed the winning candidates,
including petitioner as city mayor.
Private respondent thus filed on May 23, 2001 before the COMELEC a petition, docketed
as SPC No. 01-124, assailing the ruling of the BOC and praying for the exclusion of the
questioned election return and the annulment of petitioner’s proclamation.
Petitioner filed her answer to the COMELEC petition, praying for its dismissal.
By Resolution of January 10, 2003, the COMELEC Second Division granted the petition
of private respondent and accordingly excluded the questioned return from the canvass
and nullified the proclamation of petitioner.
ISSUE/S:
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in annulling Lee‘s
proclamation and excluded the questioned election return.
RULING:
Lee argues that as the case at bar is a pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC is
―restricted to an examination of the election returns and is without jurisdiction to go
[beyond] or behind them and investigate election irregularities,‖ citing the case of Loong
v. Commission on Elections.
The doctrine cited by Lee presupposes that the returns ―appear to be authentic and duly
accomplished on their face.‖ Where, as in the case at bar, there is a prima facie showing
that the return is not genuine, several entries having been omitted in the questioned
election return, the doctrine does not apply. The COMELEC is thus not powerless to
determine if there is basis for the exclusion of the questioned election return.
The doctrine that COMELEC is restricted to an examination of the election returns and is
without jurisdiction to go behind them and investigate election irregularities presupposes
that the returns “appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face” hence, if
there is a prima facie showing that the return is not genuine, several entries having been
omitted in the questioned election return, the doctrine does not apply.
TOPIC: PROCLAMATION; BLOCK VOTING; DOCTRINE OF STATISTICAL
IMPROBABILITY
REFERENCE:
WENCESLAO RANCAP LAGUMBAY vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
CESAR CLIMACO
G.R. No. L-25444 January 31, 1966
FACTS:
This petition prays for revision of an order of the Commission on Elections declining to
reject the returns of certain precincts of some municipalities in Mindanao. The
Constitution provides for review by this Court of the rulings of the said Commission.
The matter being urgent, and having reached the conclusion that the returns of certain
questioned precincts were "obviously manufactured" within the meaning of pertinent
jurisprudence, particularly Mitchell v. Stevens,1 we issued on December 24, 1965, a short
resolution upholding the Commission's power and duty to reject the returns of about fifty
precincts.
It appearing therein that — contrary to all statistical probabilities — in the first set, in each
precinct the number of registered voters equalled the number of ballots and the number
of votes reportedly cast and tallied for each and every candidate of the Liberal Party, the
party in power; whereas, all the candidates of the Nacionalista Party got exactly zero; and
in the second set, — again contrary to all statistical probabilities — all the reported votes
were for candidates of the Liberal Party, all of whom were credited with exactly the same
number of votes in each precinct, ranging from 240 in one precinct to 650 in another
precinct; whereas, all the candidates of the Nacionalista Party were given exactly zero in
all said precincts.
We opined that the election result to said precincts as reported, was utterly improbable
and clearly incredible. For it is not likely, in the ordinary course of things, that all the
electors of one precinct would, as one man, vote for all the eight candidates of the Liberal
Party, without giving a single vote to one of the eight candidates of the Nacionalista Party.
Such extraordinary coincidence was quite impossible to believe, knowing that the
Nacionalista Party had and has a nationwide organization, with branches in every
province, and was, in previous years, the party in power in these islands.
We also know from our experience in examining ballots in the three Electoral Tribunals
(Presidential, Senate, and House) that a large portion of the electors do not fill all the
blanks for senators in their ballots. Indeed, this observation is confirmed by the big
differences in the votes received by the eight winning senators in this as well as in
previous national elections; almost a million votes between the first place and the eight.
Furthermore, in 1965, the total number of electors who cast their votes was 6,833,369
(more or less). If every voter had written eight names on his ballot, the total number of
votes cast for all the candidates would be that number multiplied by 8, namely 54,666,952.
But the total number of the votes tallied for the candidates for senator amounted to
49,374,942 only. The difference between the two sums represents the number of ballots
that did not contain eight names for senators. In other words, some 5 million ballots did
not carry eight names. Of course, this is a rough estimate, because some ballots may
have omitted more names, in which case, the number of incomplete ballots would be less.
But the general idea and the statistical premise is there.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not a block voting or a zero vote is probable to be achieved in one precinct?
RULING: NO.
A block voting or zero voting is not probable. The Supreme Court has held that election
result showing no vote to any candidate was utterly improbable and clearly incredible. It
is not likely, in the ordinary course of things that all the electors of one precinct would, as
one man, vote for all the candidates of one party, without giving a single vote to one of
the candidates of the contending party. Here, it is clearly impossible and improbable that
no one from the eight candidates of the Nationalist Party received any vote from any voter
in the said precincts.
TOPIC: PROCLAMATION
REFERENCE:
G.R. No. 120426 November 23, 1995
NICOLAS C. CASTROMAYOR vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the MUNICIPAL
BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF CALINOG, ILOILO
FACTS:
Petitioner was a candidate for a seat in the eight-member Sangguniang Bayan of the
municipality of Calinog, Iloilo in the elections held on May 8, 1995.
After the votes had been cast, the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC) convened at
6:00 p.m. of that day and began the canvass of the election returns from the different
precincts in the municipality. The canvassing lasted well into the night of May 9, 1995.
The totals of the votes cast were checked by the Municipal Accountant who acted as
recorder of votes.
On May 10, 1995, the winners were proclaimed on the basis of the results of the canvass
which showed that petitioner received 5,419 votes and took eighth place in the election
for members of the Sangguniang Bayan.
However, when Alice M. Garin, Chairman of the MBC, rechecked the totals in the
Statement of Votes the following day, she discovered that the number of votes cast for
Nilda C. Demorito, as member of the Sangguniang Bayan, was 62 more than that credited
to her. As Garin later explained to the Provincial Election Supervisor, the returns from one
precinct had been overlooked in the computation of the totals.
Two employees of the Treasurer's Office, who were assigned to post the returns on the
tally board outside the municipal building, also discovered the error and reported it to
Garin.
As matters stood, therefore the total number of votes cast for Demorito was 5,470, or 51
more than the 5,419 votes cast for petitioner.
Garin reported the matter to the Regional Election Director, Atty. Rodolfo Sarroza, who
advised her to request authority from the COMELEC to reconvene for the purpose of
correcting the error.
On May 13, 1995, a fax letter was sent to the Law Department of the COMELEC in Manila.
The letter explained the problem and asked for authority for the MBC to reconvene in
order to correct the error, annul the proclamation of petitioner and proclaim Demorito as
the eighth member of the Sangguniang Bayan.
A formal letter was later sent to the COMELEC on May 17, 1995. On May 23, 1995, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 95-2414, directing the Municipal board of Canvassers
of said municipality to reconvene to annul the proclamation of Nicolas C. Castromayor for
the number 8 place for councilor; and to proclaim the winning number eight (8) councilor,
and to submit compliance hereof within five (5)days from receipt of notice.
Petitioner protested the proposed action in a letter dated June 5, 1995 to COMELEC
Executive Director Resurreccion A. Borra, questioning the legality of the actuations of
Garin. Hence, this petition to annul COMELEC Resolution No. 95-2414.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the MBC has the power to reconvene to annul a proclamation upon
prior authorization from the COMELEC.
RULING: YES.
It should be pointed out, in this connection, that what is involved here is a simple problem
of arithmetic. The Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per precinct of the votes
obtained by the candidates as reflected in the election returns. In making the correction
in computation, the MBC will be acting in an administrative capacity, under the control
and supervision of the COMELEC.
Hence any question pertaining to the proceedings of the MBC may be raised directly to
the COMELEC en banc in the exercise of its constitutional function to decide questions
affecting elections.
TOPIC: POST PROCLAMATION REMEDIES
REFERENCE:
EVELIO B. JAVIER vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F.
PACIFICADOR
G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986
FACTS:
The new Solicitor General has moved to dismiss this petition on the ground that as a
result of supervening events it has become moot and academic. It is not as simple as
that. Several lives have been lost in connection with this case, including that of the
petitioner himself. The private respondent is now in hiding. The purity of suffrage has
been defiled and the popular will scorned through a confabulation of those in authority.
This Court cannot keep silent in the face of these terrible facts. The motion is denied.
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang
Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The former appeared to enjoy more popular
support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its
perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between
the two came to a head when several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and
killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador,
are now facing trial for these murders. The incident naturally heightened tension in the
province and sharpened the climate of fear among the electorate. Conceivably, it
intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition candidate or into supporting the
candidate of the ruling party.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments
were to run true to form. Owing to what he claimed were attempts to railroad the private
respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to
question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the
private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body. The
petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because
made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by
the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent
took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.
The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, the
petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight. The nation, already
indignant over the obvious manipulation of the presidential elections in favor of Marcos,
was revolted by the killing, which flaunted a scornful disregard for the law by the assailants
who apparently believed they were above the law. This ruthless murder was possibly one
of the factors that strengthened the cause of the Opposition in the February revolution
that toppled the Marcos regime and installed the present government under President
Corazon C. Aquino.
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute
between the petitioner and the private respondent-both of whom have gone their separate
ways-could be a convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there are larger
issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal
ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest
possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the
simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the
conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also
give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant
the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according
to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this
case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only
for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as
a restraint upon the future.
It is a notorious fact decried by many people and even by the foreign press that elections
during the period of the Marcos dictatorship were in the main a desecration of the right of
suffrage. Vote-buying, intimidation and violence, illegal listing of voters, falsified returns,
and other elections anomalies misrepresented and vitiated the popular will and led to the
induction in office of persons who did not enjoy the confidence of the sovereign electorate.
Genuine elections were a rarity. The price at times was human lives. The rule was
chicanery and irregularity, and on all levels of the polls, from the barangay to the
presidential. This included the rigged plebiscites and referenda that also elicited the
derision and provoked the resentments of the people.
Antique in 1984 hewed to the line and equaled if it did not surpass the viciousness of
elections in other provinces dominated by the KBL. Terrorism was a special feature, as
demonstrated by the killings previously mentioned, which victimized no less than one of
the main protagonists and implicated his rival as a principal perpetrator. Opposition
leaders were in constant peril of their lives even as their supporters were gripped with
fear of violence at the hands of the party in power.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.
RULING:
The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen’s tenor. The SC has
repeatedly and consistently demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that
the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less
than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge
who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him
at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his
judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the
justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what
Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There
cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other
party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the
litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also
extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed
to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is
no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the
evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and
the pertinent law.
TOPIC: POST PROCLAMATION REMEDIES
REFERENCE:
JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE
OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE
G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon
on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League
of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its President,
Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the Commission
on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the
ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on
January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was
naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative
defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against
President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a
means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents
abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to
help in the restoration of democracy. He also argued that the challenge to his title should
be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed within
ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the Omnibus Election
Code. The League, moreover, was not a proper party because it was not a voter and so
could not sue under the said section.
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondent
Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the
case for hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration was denied in another Order
dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition to ask that the said orders be set aside on the ground that they had been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion. Pending resolution of the petition, we issued a
temporary order against the hearing on the merits scheduled by the COMELEC and at
the same time required comments from the respondents.
In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a
naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of
the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected
governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not
really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate
purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election
being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Even if their petition were to be
considered as one for quo warranto, it could not have been filed within ten days from
Frivaldo's proclamation because it was only in September 1988 that they received proof
of his naturalization. And assuming that the League itself was not a proper party, Estuye
himself, who was suing not only for the League but also in his personal capacity, could
nevertheless institute the suit by himself alone.
Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that
Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his
naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office
in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon
could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election
Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were
seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He
agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as
governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
RULING: NO.
Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among
other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement
for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He
claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited
American citizenship under the laws of the United States of America. The Court stated
that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop
his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by
CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
TOPIC: POST PROCLAMATION REMEDIES
REFERENCE:
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL
ONGPIN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA &
CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative
for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA)
G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997
FACTS:
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public
respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter,
Delfin Petition) wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist
Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's
Initiative,6 a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize
people power; that he and the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to
exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be
conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the COMELEC; that, as
required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all
over the country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the
signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and other
volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated
for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to
adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary
that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be
published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections
4 and 7 of Article VI,7 Section 4 of Article VII,8 and Section 8 of Article X9 of the
Constitution. Attached to the petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987
Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed amendments which consist in the deletion from
the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and with the following
proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE
1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and
after it is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the
country it will be formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037
(INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a) directing
Delfin "to cause the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the proposal, proposed constitutional
amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily
newspapers of general circulation at his own expense" not later than 9 December 1996;
and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin
and Atty. Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together
with his two other lawyers, and representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest
Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN). Senator Roco, on that same
day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory
petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file
their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot and academic
by her election as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her assumption of office as
such on the 30th of June in the year 1995.
RULING: YES.
The Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been abandoned or
considered withdrawn as a consequence of her election and assumption of office as
Senator and her discharge of the duties and functions thereof.
The protestant abandoned her “determination to protest and pursue the public interest
involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.
Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it would dissipate
the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential elections, thereby
enhancing the all too crucial political stability of the nation during this period of national
recovery.
Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the protestant to inform the PET within 10 days
if after the completion of the revision of the ballots from her pilot areas, she still wishes to
present evidence. Since DS has not informed the Tribunal of any such intention, such is
a manifest indication that she no longer intends to do so.
TOPIC: POST PROCLAMATION REMEDIES
REFERENCE:
PERLA GARCIA, PAZ CRUZ and GERALDINE PADERNAL vs. THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) and REP. HARRY ANGPING
(3rd DISTRICT MANILA)
G.R. No. 134792 August 12, 1999
FACTS:
On May 29, 1998, within the prescribed ten (10) day period from respondent Harry
Angping's proclamation as duly elected Representative for the 3rd District of Manila,
petitioners, all duly registered voters in the district, filed a petition for quo warranto1 before
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) against Congressman Harry
Angping. Petitioners questioned the eligibility of Congressman Angping to hold office in
the House of Representatives, claiming that the latter was not a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a constitutional requirement. They prayed that Congressman Angping be
declared ineligible to assume or hold office as member of the House of Representatives
and for the candidate who received the highest number of votes from among the qualified
candidates to be proclaimed the winner.
Upon filing of their petition, petitioners duly paid the required P5,000.00 filing fee.
On June 10, 1998, however the HRET issued a Resolution3 dismissing the petition for
quo warranto for failure to pay the P5,000.00 cash deposit required by its Rules. After
recieving a copy of the aforesaid Resolution, petitioners paid the P5,000.00 cash deposit4
on June 26, 1998 and attached the corresponding receipt to the Motion for
Reconsideration5 they filed with the HRET on the same day. Petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration was, however, denied, in view of Rule 32 of the 1998 HRET Rules which
required a P5,000.00 cash deposit in addition to filing fees for quo warranto cases.6
Hence, the instant Petition,7 filed on August 14, 1998, anchored upon the following
grounds —
THE RESPONDENT HRET COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
DENYING THE PETITION BELOW DESPITE ACTUAL PAYMENT BY HEREIN
PETITIONER (ALBEIT LATE) OF THE REQUIRED CASH DEPOSIT OF P5,000.00,
THEREBY STRICTLY AND LITERALLY CONSTRUING THE HRET RULES IN
CONTRAVENTION OF RULE 2 (OF THE SAME RULES) ENJOINING A LIBERAL
CONSTRUCTION THEREOF.
THE RESPONDENT HRET COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
DISMISSING THE PETITION BELOW UPON A MERE TECHNICALITY EVEN AS THE
EVIDENCE AND/OR DOCUMENTS ATTACHED THEREIN CLEARLY SHOW THE
INELIGIBILITY OF RESPONDENT ANGPING TO HOLD AND/OR CONTINUE TO
ASSUME OFFICE AS MEMBER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
On September 24, 1998, Congressman Angping filed his Comment9 to the petition
arguing that there was no grave abuse of discretion committed as the dismissal of the
petition below was based on clear and unambiguous provisions of the HRET which leave
no room for liberal construction. Furthermore, Congressman Angping argued that this
Court is not a trier of facts and that all election contests lie within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the HRET.
Prior to that, on September 18, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation to the effect that under the terms of this Court's Resolution dated August
25, 1998 requiring only respondent Rep. Harry Angping to comment, the Office of the
Solicitor General is not required to file a comment on the petition on behalf of the HRET.
This Manifestation was noted by this Court in its Resolution dated October 13, 1998.
On October 15, 1998, petitioners filed their Reply10 stressing that according to Rule 21
of the 1998 Rules of the HRET, summary dismissals may be ordered by the HRET in
case of non-payment of the required cash deposit within the prescribed time only in
election protest cases and not in quo warranto proceedings. Petitioners also assert that
this Court can very well resolve the merits of their petition for quo warranto in as much as
the Alien Certificate of Registration attached to their petition, being a public document, is
admissible as proof of Congressman Angping's ineligibility to hold office, without need for
proof as to its authenticity and due execution.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not this Court can take cognizance of the instant petition for certiorari.
2. Whether or not the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion in summarily
dismissing the petition for quo warranto of petitioners and in refusing to reinstate the same
even after the payment of the required Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) cash deposit
RULING:
The Constitution, the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of its members. This does not, however, bar us from
entertaining petitions which charge the HRET with grave abuse of discretion.
That this Court may very well inquire into the issue of whether the complained act of the
HRET has been made with grave abuse of discretion may be inferred from Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution which has expanded judicial power to include the
determination of "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
It is not disputed that petitioners did not initially pay the required cash deposit; but after
their petition was summarily dismissed by the HRET for such non-payment, petitioners
rectified their inadvertence and paid the Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) required cash
deposit, at the same time seeking a reconsideration of the dismissal.
Petitioners herein, Perla Garcia, Pat Cruz and Geraldine Padernal, filed their petition for
quo warranto on May 29, 1998. However, the required cash deposit of P5,000.00 was
paid only on June 26, 1998, which was after the dismissal of the petition and only after
an unreasonable delay of twenty-eight (28) days. Indeed, in dismissing the petition the
HRET acted judiciously, correctly and certainly within its jurisdiction. It was a judgment
call of the HRET which is clearly authorized under its Rules. As long as the exercise of
discretion is based on well-founded factual and legal basis, as in this case, no abuse of
discretion can be imputed to the Tribunal.
The petition for quo warranto attacks the ineligibility of Congressman Angping to hold
office as a Member of the House of Representatives, not being a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines. This is a serious charge which, if true, renders Congressman Angping
disqualified from such office. In view of the delicate nature and importance of this charge,
the observance of the HRET Rules of Procedure must be taken seriously if they are to
attain their objective, i.e., the speedy and orderly determination of the true will of the
electorate. Correlatively, party litigants appearing before the HRET or to be more precise,
their lawyers are duty bound to know and are expected to properly comply with the
procedural requirements laid down by the Tribunal without being formally ordered to do
so. They cannot righteously impute abuse of discretion to the Tribunal if by reason of the
non-observance of those requirements it decides to dismiss their petition. Imperative
justice requires the proper observance of technicalities precisely designed to ensure its
proper and swift dispensation.
Therefore, this court finds that the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
applying its Rules strictly and in dismissing the petition for quo warranto. Accordingly, the
instant petition for certiorari cannot prosper
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence of the
essential requisites, to wit: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion to lack or
in excess or jurisdiction, (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the
proceeding. There must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it
to prosper.
In fine, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or
mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. As long as a court acts within
its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount
to nothing more than errors of judgment which are reviewable by appeal and not by
special civil action for certiorari.
TOPIC: POST PROCLAMATION REMEDIES
REFERENCE
ARNOLD V. GUERRERO vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. MANUEL B.
VILLAR, JR., as the Speaker of the House of Representatives, 11th Congress, HON.
ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, as the Secretary General of the House of Representatives,
11th Congress, RODOLFO C. FARIÑAS and GUILLERMO R. RUIZ
G.R. No. 137004 July 26, 2000
FACTS:
In the Second Division of the COMELEC, Ruiz sought to perpetually disqualify respondent
Fariñas as a candidate for the position of Congressman.1 Ruiz alleged that Fariñas had
been campaigning as a candidate for Congressman in the May 11, 1998 polls, despite
his failure to file a Certificate of Candidacy for said office. Ruiz averred that Fariñas’ failure
to file said Certificate violated Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code2 in relation to
COMELEC Resolution No. 2577, dated January 15, 1998. Ruiz asked the COMELEC to
declare Fariñas as a "nuisance candidate" pursuant to Section 69 of the Omnibus Election
Code3 and to disqualify him from running in the May 11, 1998 elections, as well as in all
future polls.
On May 8, 1998, Fariñas filed his Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC,
substituting candidate Chevylle V. Fariñas who withdrew on April 3, 1998.
On May 9, 1998, Ruiz filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion To Resolve Petition" with the
COMELEC, attaching thereto a copy of the Certificate of Candidacy of Fariñas.
On May 10, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC decided Case No. SPA 98-227,
disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (Second Division) RESOLVES to
DISMISS the instant petition for utter lack of merit.
"SO ORDERED."
In dismissing Ruiz’s petition, the Second Division of the COMELEC stated, "[T]here is
none (sic) in the records to consider respondent an official candidate to speak of without
the filing of said certificate. Hence, there is no certificate of candidacy to be cancelled,
consequently, no candidate to be disqualified."
On May 11, 1998, the elections pushed through as scheduled. The post-election tally of
votes in Ilocos Norte showed that Fariñas got a total of 56,369 votes representing the
highest number of votes received in the first district. Fariñas was duly proclaimed winner.
On May 16, 1998, Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that Fariñas could
not validly substitute for Chevylle V. Fariñas, since the latter was not the official candidate
of the Lakas ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino (LAMMP), but was an independent
candidate. Another person cannot substitute for an independent candidate. Thus, Fariñas’
certificate of candidacy claiming to be the official candidate of LAMMP in lieu of Chevylle
V. Fariñas was fatally defective, according to Ruiz.
On June 3, 1998, Fariñas took his oath of office as a member of the House of
Representatives.
On June 10, 1998, petitioner herein filed his "Petition-In-Intervention" in COMELEC Case
No. SPA 98-227. Petitioner averred that he was the official candidate of the Liberal Party
(LP) in said elections for Congressman, and stood to be adversely affected by Case No.
SPA 98-227. Guerrero contended that Fariñas, having failed to file his Certificate of
Candidacy on or before the last day therefor, being midnight of March 27, 1998, Fariñas
illegally resorted to the remedy of substitution provided for under Section 77 of the
Omnibus Election Code and thus, Fariñas’ disqualification was in order. Guerrero then
asked that the position of Representative of the first district of Ilocos Norte be declared
vacant and special elections called for, but disallowing the candidacy of Fariñas.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that
the determination of the validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent Farinas is
already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET).
RULING:
There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it held that its
jurisdiction over the case had ceased with the assumption of office of respondent Farinas
as Representative for the first district of Ilocos Norte. While COMELEC is vested with the
power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that
power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by Farinas is a
recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the HRET.
Under Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction
over all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives.
Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office
as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins. Thus, the COMELEC’s decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction
over the case is justifiable, in deference to the HRET’s own jurisdiction and functions.