EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Adronico;[8] sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May
[G.R. No. 141066. February 17, 2005]
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision, [1] dated May 17,
1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443, affirming the Decision dated
August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Bohol, in Criminal Case
Nos. 7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as
The Bouncing Checks Law.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 27, 1991, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed with
the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 7068 - 7070. The Information in Criminal Case
No. 7068 alleges as follows:
That, sometime in May or June 1990, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating, and mutually helping with one another, knowing fully well that they did
not have sufficient funds deposited with the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB),
Tagbilaran Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, draw and
issue UCPB Check No. 284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the amount of NINE THOUSAND
SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS AND FIFTY-FIVE CENTAVOS (P9,075.55), payable to Alfredo
Oculam, and thereafter, without informing the latter that they did not have sufficient
funds deposited with the bank to cover up the amount of the check, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously pass on, indorse, give and deliver the said check to
Alfredo Oculam by way of rediscounting of the aforementioned checks; however, upon
presentation of the check to the drawee bank for encashment, the same was dishonored
for the reason that the account of the accused with the United Coconut Planters Bank,
Tagbilaran Branch, had already been closed, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Alfredo Oculam in the aforestated amount.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22.[2]
The accusatory portions of the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7069 and 7070
are similarly worded, except for the allegations concerning the number, date and amount
of each check, that is:
(a) Criminal Case No. 7069 - UCPB Check No. 284744 dated July 22, 1990 in
the amount of P12,730.00;[3]
(b) Criminal Case No. 7070 UCPB Check No. 106136 dated July 22, 1990 in the
amount of P8,496.55.[4]
The cases were consolidated and jointly tried. When arraigned on June 26, 1991,
the two accused pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.[5]
The prosecution presented as its lone witness complainant Alfredo Oculam. He
testified that: in 1989, spouses Adronico[6] and Evangeline Ladonga became his regular
customers in his pawnshop business in Tagbilaran City, Bohol;[7] sometime in May 1990,
the Ladonga spouses obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by
1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by
UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990 issued by
Adronico;[9] between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in
the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22,
1990 issued by Adronico;[10] the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason
CLOSED ACCOUNT;[11] when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite
repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them.[12]
While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no
sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the
checks were issued only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam
should not encash the checks when they mature;[13] and, that petitioner is not a signatory
of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.[14]
On August 24, 1996, the RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
Premises considered, this Court hereby renders judgment finding accused Adronico
Ladonga, alias Ronie, and Evangeline Ladonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the
aforesaid three (3) criminal cases, for which they stand charged before this Court, and
accordingly, sentences them to imprisonment and fine, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 7068, for (sic) an imprisonment of one (1) year for each of them,
and a fine in the amount of P9,075.55, equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No.
284743;
2. In Criminal Case No. 7069, for (sic) an imprisonment for each of them to one (1) year
and a fine of P12, 730.00, equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 284744; and,
3. In Criminal Case No. 7070, with (sic) an imprisonment of one year for each of them
and a fine of P8,496.55 equivalent to the amount of UCPB Check No. 106136;
4. That both accused are further ordered to jointly and solidarily pay and reimburse the
complainant, Mr. Alfredo Oculam, the sum of P15,000.00 representing actual expenses
incurred in prosecuting the instant cases; P10,000.00 as attorneys fee; and the amount
of P30,302.10 which is the total value of the three (3) subject checks which bounced; but
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
With Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Adronico applied for probation which was granted.[16] On the other hand,
petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in finding
her criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the principle of conspiracy is
inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22which is a special law; moreover, she is not a signatory of the
checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof.[17]
On May 17, 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner. [18] It
held that the provisions of the penal code were made applicable to special penal laws in
the decisions of this Court in People vs. Parel, [19] U.S. vs. Ponte, [20] and U.S. vs. Bruhez.[21] It
noted that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code itself provides that its provisions shall be
supplementary to special laws unless the latter provide the contrary. The Court of
Appeals stressed that since B.P. Blg. 22 does not prohibit the applicability in a suppletory
character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the principle of conspiracy
may be applied to cases involving violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Lastly, it ruled that the fact
that petitioner did not make and issue or sign the checks did not exculpate her from
criminal liability as it is not indispensable that a co-conspirator takes a direct part in
every act and knows the part which everyone performed. The Court of Appeals
underscored that in conspiracy the act of one conspirator could be held to be the act of
the other.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the decision but the Court of Appeals denied
the same in a Resolution dated November 16, 1999.[22]
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioner presents to the Court the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER WHO WAS NOT THE DRAWER OR ISSUER OF
THE THREE CHECKS THAT BOUNCED BUT HER CO-ACCUSED HUSBAND UNDER THE
LATTERS ACCOUNT COULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF BATAS PAMBANSA
BILANG22 AS CONSPIRATOR.
2. ANCILLARY TO THE MAIN ISSUE ARE THE FOLLOWING ISSUES:
A. WHETHER OR NOT CONSPIRACY IS APPLICABLE IN VIOLATIONS OF BATAS
PAMBANSA BILANG 22 BY INVOKING THE LAST SENTENCE OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH STATES:
Art. 10. Offenses not subject of the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the
future may be punished under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code.
This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide
the contrary.
B. WHETHER OR NOT THE CASES CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN
AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER AS CONSPIRATOR APPLYING
THE SUPPLETORY CHARACTER OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE TO SPECIAL LAWS
LIKEB.P. BLG. 22 IS APPLICABLE.[23]
Petitioner staunchly insists that she cannot be held criminally liable for violation
of B.P. Blg. 22 because she had no participation in the drawing and issuance of the three
checks subject of the three criminal cases, a fact proven by the checks themselves. She
contends that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in applying the principle of conspiracy,
as defined under the RPC, to violations of B.P. Blg. 22. She posits that the application of
the principle of conspiracy would enlarge the scope of the statute and include situations
not provided for or intended by the lawmakers, such as penalizing a person, like
petitioner, who had no participation in the drawing or issuance of checks.
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner and echoes the
declaration of the Court of Appeals that some provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
especially with the addition of the second sentence in Article 10, are applicable to special
laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any prohibition regarding the
applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code to it.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the
future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this
Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially
provide the contrary.
The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the
future are made punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the
RPC, while the second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws. While it seems that
the two clauses are contradictory, a sensible interpretation will show that they can
perfectly be reconciled.
The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are
controlling with regard to offenses therein specifically punished. Said clause only
restates the elemental rule of statutory construction that special legal provisions prevail
over general ones.[24]Lex specialis derogant generali. In fact, the clause can be considered
as a superfluity, and could have been eliminated altogether. The second clause contains
the soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the
provision that the "code shall be supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter should
specifically provide the contrary.
The appellate courts reliance on the cases of People vs. Parel,[25] U.S. vs.
Ponte,[26] and U.S. vs. Bruhez[27] rests on a firm basis. These cases involved the suppletory
application of principles under the then Penal Code to special laws. People vs. Parel is
concerned with the application of Article 22[28] of the Code to violations of Act No. 3030,
the Election Law, with reference to the retroactive effect of penal laws if they favor the
accused. U.S. vs. Ponte involved the application of Article 17[29] of the same Penal Code,
with reference to the participation of principals in the commission of the crime of
misappropriation of public funds as defined and penalized by Act No. 1740. U.S. vs.
Bruhez covered Article 45[30] of the same Code, with reference to the confiscation of the
instruments used in violation of Act No. 1461, the Opium Law.
B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the
provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the
general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be
applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs. People,[31] the Court applied
suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39[32] of the RPC
to B.P. Blg. 22.
The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous
to the application of the provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte. For
once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one
is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of
each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.[33]
All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner must be set aside.
Article 8 of the RPC provides that a conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. To
be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to
have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.[34] The overt
act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of
the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them
to execute or implement the criminal plan.[35]
 In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any
overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. As testified to by the lone prosecution
witness, complainant Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was merely present when her husband,
Adronico, signed the check subject of Criminal Case No. 7068.[36] With respect to
Criminal Case Nos. 7069-7070, Oculam also did not describe the details of petitioners
participation. He did not specify the nature of petitioners involvement in the commission
of the crime, either by a direct act of participation, a direct inducement of her co-
conspirator, or cooperating in the commission of the offense by another act without
which it would not have been accomplished. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act
that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was
issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the
criminal design.
Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive
evidence.[37] Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene
of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy.[38] Even knowledge, acquiescence in
or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy,
absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose.[39]
has not proven guilt with the requisite quantum of proof required in all criminal
cases. (Citations omitted)[41]
All told, the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the petitioner with moral
certainty. Its evidence falls short of the quantum of proof required for conviction.
Accordingly, the constitutional presumption of the petitioners innocence must be upheld
and she must be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision, dated May
17, 1999, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20443 affirming the Decision, dated
August 24, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 3), Bohol, in Criminal Case Nos.
7068, 7069 and 7070 convicting the petitioner of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges
against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

As the Court eloquently pronounced in a case of recent vintage, People vs.

Mandao:[40]

To be sure, conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at every

turn. It is a legal concept that imputes culpability under specific circumstances; as such, it
must be established as clearly as any element of the crime. Evidence to prove it must be
positive and convincing, considering that it is a convenient and simplistic device by
which the accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold.

Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of conspiracy, and a judgment

of conviction must always be founded on the strength of the prosecutions evidence. The
Court ruled thus in People v. Legaspi, from which we quote:

At most, the prosecution, realizing the weakness of its evidence against accused-
appellant Franco, merely relied and pegged the latters criminal liability on its sweeping
theory of conspiracy, which to us, was not attendant in the commission of the crime.
The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of conviction must be predicated on the
strength of the evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for
the defense. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that
on the defense could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did
he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is moral
certainty.

Verily, it is the role of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond
reasonable doubt in order to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.

In sum, conviction must rest on hard evidence showing that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged. In criminal cases, moral certainty -- not mere
possibility -- determines the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even when the
evidence for the defense is weak, the accused must be acquitted when the prosecution
[G.R. No. 129577-80. February 15, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BULU CHOWDURY, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
In November 1995, Bulu Chowdury and Josephine Ong were charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila with the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale committed as follows:
"That sometime between the period from August 1994 to October
1994 in the City of Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, representing
themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport
workers for employment abroad, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously recruit the herein complainants: Estrella B. Calleja,
Melvin C. Miranda and Aser S. Sasis, individually or as a group for
employment in Korea without first obtaining the required license
and/or authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration."[1]
They were likewise charged with three counts of estafa committed against private
complainants.[2] The State Prosecutor, however, later dismissed the estafa charges
against Chowdury[3] and filed an amended information indicting only Ong for the
offense.[4]
Chowdury was arraigned on April 16, 1996 while Ong remained at large. He pleaded "not
guilty" to the charge of illegal recruitment in large scale.[5]
Trial ensued.
The prosecution presented four witnesses: private complainants Aser Sasis, Estrella
Calleja and Melvin Miranda, and Labor Employment Officer Abbelyn Caguitla.
Sasis testified that he first met Chowdury in August 1994 when he applied with
Craftrade Overseas Developers (Craftrade) for employment as factory worker in South
Korea. Chowdury, a consultant of Craftrade, conducted the interview. During the
interview, Chowdury informed him about the requirements for employment. He told him
to submit his passport, NBI clearance, passport size picture and medical certificate. He
also required him to undergo a seminar. He advised him that placement would be on a
first-come-first-serve basis and urged him to complete the requirements immediately.
Sasis was also charged a processing fee of P25,000.00. Sasis completed all the
requirements in September 1994. He also paid a total amount of P16,000.00 to Craftrade
as processing fee. All payments were received by Ong for which she issued three
receipts.[6] Chowdury then processed his papers and convinced him to complete his
payment.[7]
Sasis further said that he went to the office of Craftrade three times to follow up his
application but he was always told to return some other day. In one of his visits to
Craftrades office, he was informed that he would no longer be deployed for employment
abroad. This prompted him to withdraw his payment but he could no longer find
Chowdury. After two unsuccessful attempts to contact him, he decided to file with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) a case for illegal recruitment
against Chowdury. Upon verification with the POEA, he learned that Craftrade's license
had already expired and has not been renewed and that Chowdury, in his personal
capacity, was not a licensed recruiter.[8]
Calleja testified that in June 1994, she applied with Craftrade for employment as factory
worker in South Korea. She was interviewed by Chowdury. During the interview, he
asked questions regarding her marital status, her age and her province. Toward the end
of the interview, Chowdury told her that she would be working in a factory in Korea. He
required her to submit her passport, NBI clearance, ID pictures, medical certificate and
birth certificate. He also obliged her to attend a seminar on overseas employment. After
she submitted all the documentary requirements, Chowdury required her to
pay P20,000.00 as placement fee. Calleja made the payment on August 11, 1994 to Ong
for which she was issued a receipt.[9] Chowdury assured her that she would be able to
leave on the first week of September but it proved to be an empty promise. Calleja was
not able to leave despite several follow-ups. Thus, she went to the POEA where she
discovered that Craftrade's license had already expired. She tried to withdraw her money
from Craftrade to no avail. Calleja filed a complaint for illegal recruitment against
Chowdury upon advice of POEA's legal counsel.[10]
Miranda testified that in September 1994, his cousin accompanied him to the office of
Craftrade in Ermita, Manila and introduced him to Chowdury who presented himself as
consultant and interviewer. Chowdury required him to fill out a bio-data sheet before
conducting the interview. Chowdury told Miranda during the interview that he would
send him to Korea for employment as factory worker. Then he asked him to submit the
following documents: passport, passport size picture, NBI clearance and medical
certificate. After he complied with the requirements, he was advised to wait for his visa
and to pay P25,000.00 as processing fee. He paid the amount of P25,000.00 to Ong who
issued receipts therefor.[11] Craftrade, however, failed to deploy him. Hence, Miranda
filed a complaint with the POEA against Chowdury for illegal recruitment.[12]
Labor Employment Officer Abbelyn Caguitla of the Licensing Branch of the POEA
testified that she prepared a certification on June 9, 1996 that Chowdury and his co-
accused, Ong, were not, in their personal capacities, licensed recruiters nor were they
connected with any licensed agency. She nonetheless stated that Craftrade was
previously licensed to recruit workers for abroad which expired on December 15, 1993.
It applied for renewal of its license but was only granted a temporary license effective
December 16, 1993 until September 11, 1994. From September 11, 1994, the POEA
granted Craftrade another temporary authority to process the expiring visas of overseas
workers who have already been deployed. The POEA suspended Craftrade's temporary
license on December 6, 1994.[13]
For his defense, Chowdury testified that he worked as interviewer at Craftrade from
1990 until 1994. His primary duty was to interview job applicants for abroad. As a mere
employee, he only followed the instructions given by his superiors, Mr. Emmanuel
Geslani, the agencys President and General Manager, and Mr. Utkal Chowdury, the
agency's Managing Director. Chowdury admitted that he interviewed private
complainants on different dates. Their office secretary handed him their bio-data and
thereafter he led them to his room where he conducted the interviews. During the
interviews, he had with him a form containing the qualifications for the job and he filled
out this form based on the applicant's responses to his questions. He then submitted
them to Mr. Utkal Chowdury who in turn evaluated his findings. He never received
money from the applicants. He resigned from Craftrade on November 12, 1994.[14]
Another defense witness, Emelita Masangkay who worked at the Accreditation Branch
of the POEA presented a list of the accredited principals of Craftrade Overseas
Developers[15] and a list of processed workers of Craftrade Overseas Developers from
1988 to 1994.[16]
The trial court found Chowdury guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale. It sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P100,000.00. It further ordered him to pay Aser Sasis the amount of P16,000.00,
Estrella Calleja,P20,000.00 and Melvin Miranda, P25,000.00. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the
prosecution having proved the guilt of the accused Bulu Chowdury
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large
scale, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00 under Art. 39 (b) of the New
Labor Code of the Philippines. The accused is ordered to pay the
complainants Aser Sasis the amount of P16,000.00; Estrella Calleja the
amount of P20,000.00; Melvin Miranda the amount of P25,000.00."[17]
Chowdury appealed.
The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are:
(1) The accused undertook any recruitment activity defined under
Article 13 (b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under Article 34
of the Labor Code;
(2) He did not have the license or authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; and
(3) He committed the same against three or more persons,
individually or as a group.[18]
The last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act (RA) 8042 [19] states who shall be held
liable for the offense, thus:
"The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the
principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons,
the officers having control, management or direction of their
business shall be liable."
The Revised Penal Code which supplements the law on illegal recruitment[20] defines
who are the principals, accomplices and accessories. The principals are: (1) those who
take a direct part in the execution of the act; (2) those who directly force or induce
others to commit it; and (3) those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by
another act without which it would not have been accomplished.[21] The accomplices are
those persons who may not be considered as principal as defined in Section 17 of the
Revised Penal Code but cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous act.[22] The accessories are those who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or
accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manner: (1)
by profiting themselves or assisting the offenders to profit by the effects of the crime; (2)
by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof,
in order to prevent its discovery; and (3) by harboring, concealing, or assisting in the
escape of the principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public
functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or
an attempt at the life of the chief executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some
other crime.[23]
Citing the second sentence of the last paragraph of Section 6 of RA 8042, accused-
appellant contends that he may not be held liable for the offense as he was merely an
employee of Craftrade and he only performed the tasks assigned to him by his superiors.
He argues that the ones who should be held liable for the offense are the officers having
control, management and direction of the agency.
As stated in the first sentence of Section 6 of RA 8042, the persons who may be held
liable for illegal recruitment are the principals, accomplices and accessories. An
employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable
as principal, together with his employer,[24] if it is shown that he actively and
consciously participated in illegal recruitment.[25] It has been held that the existence of
the corporate entity does not shield from prosecution the corporate agent who
knowingly and intentionally causes the corporation to commit a crime. The corporation
obviously acts, and can act, only by and through its human agents, and it is their conduct
which the law must deter. The employee or agent of a corporation engaged in unlawful
business naturally aids and abets in the carrying on of such business and will be
prosecuted as principal if, with knowledge of the business, its purpose and effect, he
consciously contributes his efforts to its conduct and promotion, however slight his
contribution may be.[26] The law of agency, as applied in civil cases, has no application in
criminal cases, and no man can escape punishment when he participates in the
commission of a crime upon the ground that he simply acted as an agent of any
party.[27] The culpability of the employee therefore hinges on his knowledge of the
offense and his active participation in its commission. Where it is shown that the
employee was merely acting under the direction of his superiors and was unaware that
his acts constituted a crime, he may not be held criminally liable for an act done for and
in behalf of his employer.[28]
The fundamental issue in this case, therefore, is whether accused-appellant knowingly SO ORDERED.
and intentionally participated in the commission of the crime charged.

We find that he did not.

Evidence shows that accused-appellant interviewed private complainants in the months

of June, August and September in 1994 at Craftrade's office. At that time, he was
employed as interviewer of Craftrade which was then operating under a temporary
authority given by the POEA pending renewal of its license.[29] The temporary license
included the authority to recruit workers.[30] He was convicted based on the fact that he
was not registered with the POEA as employee of Craftrade. Neither was he, in his
personal capacity, licensed to recruit overseas workers. Section 10 Rule II Book II of the
Rules and Regulation Governing Overseas Employment (1991) requires that every
change, termination or appointment of officers, representatives and personnel of
licensed agencies be registered with the POEA. Agents or representatives appointed by a
licensed recruitment agency whose appointments are not previously approved by the
POEA are considered "non-licensee " or "non-holder of authority" and therefore not
authorized to engage in recruitment activity.[31]

Upon examination of the records, however, we find that the prosecution failed to prove
that accused-appellant was aware of Craftrade's failure to register his name with the
POEA and that he actively engaged in recruitment despite this knowledge. The obligation
to register its personnel with the POEA belongs to the officers of the agency. [32] A mere
employee of the agency cannot be expected to know the legal requirements for its
operation. The evidence at hand shows that accused-appellant carried out his duties as
interviewer of Craftrade believing that the agency was duly licensed by the POEA and he,
in turn, was duly authorized by his agency to deal with the applicants in its behalf.
Accused-appellant in fact confined his actions to his job description. He merely
interviewed the applicants and informed them of the requirements for deployment but
he never received money from them. Their payments were received by the agency's
cashier, Josephine Ong. Furthermore, he performed his tasks under the supervision of its
president and managing director. Hence, we hold that the prosecution failed to prove
beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellant's conscious and active participation in the
commission of the crime of illegal recruitment. His conviction, therefore, is without basis.

This is not to say that private complainants are left with no remedy for the wrong
committed against them. The Department of Justice may still file a complaint against the
officers having control, management or direction of the business of Craftrade Overseas
Developers (Craftrade), so long as the offense has not yet prescribed. Illegal recruitment
is a crime of economic sabotage which need to be curbed by the strong arm of the law. It
is important, however, to stress that the government's action must be directed to the real
offenders, those who perpetrate the crime and benefit from it.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is ordered to RELEASE accused-appellant unless he is being held for some
other cause, and to REPORT to this Court compliance with this order within ten (10)
days from receipt of this decision. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Secretary
of the Department of Justice for his information and appropriate action.
G.R. No. L-18260 January 27, 1923
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NORBERTO PAREL, defendant-appellant.
OSTRAND, J.:
Upon an information filed nearly two years after the commission of the offense, the
defendant was found guilty of having, as an election inspector, aided illiterate voters in
preparing their ballots at the general election held June 3, 1919, without being
accompanied by an election inspector of the opposite political party and was sentenced
to suffer imprisonment for the term of three months under section 2639 of the
Administrative Code, which makes an election official "who wilfully declines or fails to
perform any duty or obligation imposed by the Election Law" criminally liable and
provides a penalty therefor of imprisonment for not less than one month and not more
than one year or a fine of not less than P200 and not more than P500 or both.
The case is now before us upon a motion to quash the proceedings on the ground that
the action is barred through the retroactive effect of section 71 of Act No. 3030, which
provides for a period of prescription of one year for offenses resulting from the Act.
The Election Law is contained in Chapter 18 and parts of Chapter 65 of the
Administrative Code. Act No. 3030 is entitled "An Act to amend certain sections and parts
of sections of chapter eighteen, known as the Election Law, and chapter sixty-five, on
penalties for violations of certain administrative laws, of Act Numbered Twenty-seven
hundred and eleven, entitled 'An Act amending the Administrative Code,' to make more
effective the provisions and purpose of said Election Law, and for the other purposes."
All of its sections, except the last two, are by their terms amendatory of the
corresponding sections of the Election I aw as embodied in the Administrative Code. The
last two sections of the Act read:
SEC. 71. Offenses resulting from violations of this Act shall prescribe one year
after their commission.
SEC. 72. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
Previously to the enactment of Act No. 3030 there was no limitation to action for
violations of the Election Law and the question presented for our consideration is
whether section 71 of the later Act is retroactive to the extent of making the period of
limitation or prescription there provided for applicable to violations of the Election Law
committed before March 9, 1922, the date upon which the later, or amendatory, Act No.
3030 went into effect.
In most states of the American Union the rule prevails that a statute of limitations of
criminal actions is on a parity with a similar statute for civil actions and has no
retroactive effect unless the statute itself expressly so provides, and practically all of the
authorities cited in support of the theory that such is also the rule here, are upon that
point. As from our point of view the rule stated does not obtain in the Philippine Islands,
these authorities have, in our opinion, no bearing whatever upon the question here at
issue and we shall therefore devote neither time nor space to their further discussion.
In our opinion, the determination of the present case clearly hinges upon the
construction of articel 22 of the Penal Code, which reads as follows:
Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person
guilty of a felony or misdemeanor, although at the time of the publication of
such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving
same.
This article is of Spanish origin, is based on Latin principles, and it seems, indeed, too
obvious for arguments that we, in its interpretation, must have recourse to Spanish or
Latin jurisprudence. In the case of United States vs. Cuna (12 Phil., 241), this court held
that "neither English nor American common law is in force in these Islands, nor are the
doctrines derived therefrom binding upon our courts, save only in so far as they are
founded on sound principles applicable to local conditions, and are not in conflict with
existing law." In that case the Spanish doctrine invoked was more unfavorable to the
accused that the common law rule, but was, nevertheless, adopted by the court. In the
present case, the Spanish doctrine is more favorable to the accused and considering the
well-known principle that penal laws are to be construed most liberally in favor of the
accused, we have stronger reasons here than existed in the Cuna casae for rejecting the
American doctrine as to the irretroactivity of penal statutes. Both consistency and sound
legal principles, therefore, demand that we, in this case, seek our precedents in Latin
rather than in American jurisprudence.
For a long period it has been the settled doctrine in countries whose criminal laws are
based on the Latin system that such laws are retroactive in so far as they favor the
accused. (Fiore, Irretroactividad e Interpretacion de las Leyes, p. 401.) In Spain and in the
Philippine Islands this doctrine is, as we have seen, re-inforced by statutory enactment,
and is even made applicable to cases where "final sentence has been pronounced and the
convict is serving same."
But it is argued (1) that the Election law is a special law to which the provisions of article
22 of the Penal Code are not applicable; (2) that the subject of prescription or limitation
of actions falls within the domain of adjective law and cannot be considered penal law
within the meaning of article 22, and (3) that the period of prescription provided for in
section 71 of Act No. 3030 is, by the terms of that section, limited to offenses resulting
from the violation of that Act and does not affect offenses made punishable by prior
legislation.
(1) The first point mentioned must be considered settled by previous decisions both of
this court and of the supreme court of Spain. In the case of United States vs. Hocbo (12
Phil., 304), article 22 was applied to Act No. 1773 of the Philippine Commission; in United
States vs. Parrone (24 Phil., 29) and United States vs. Almencion(25 Phil., 648), to Acts
Nos. 1189 and 2126; and in sentences of the supreme court of Spain of July 13, 1889 and
April 26, 1892, it was held applicable to the penal provisions in the Spanish Electoral
Law. All of these decisions are well supported both by reason and by authorities and
must now be regarded as the law of the land upon this subject.
(2) In regard to the second point that the subject of prescription of penalties and of penal
actions pertains to remedial and not to substantive law, it is to be observed that in the
Spanish legal system, provisions for limitation or prescription of actions are invariably
classified as substantive and not as remedial law; we thus find the provisions for the
prescription of criminal actions in the Penal Code and not in the Ley de Enjuiciamiento
Criminal. This is in reality a more logical classification than the one obtaining in the
American criminal law. In criminal cases prescription is not, strictly speaking, a matter of
procedure; it bars or cuts off the right to punish the crime and, consequently, goes
directly to the substance of the action. We are confident that no Spanish lawyer will be
found to assert that criminal procedure is not a branch of criminal or penal law.
Moreover, we might simply call attention to the fact that in the case of United States vs.
Hocbo, supra, article 22 of the Penal Code was applied to what, in the American law,
would be considered a remedial provisions, and there let the matter rest. But it is argued
that the decision in the case of United States vs. Hocbo, supra, is erroneous and that the
term "Leyes Penales" employed in article 22 of the Penal Code has reference merely to
laws providing for penalties, this contention being based largely on the fact that the
chapter in which article 22 is found bears the title or heading "Penalties in General," and
we shall therefore enter more fully into the discussion of this point, especially as it, in
our opinion, is the turning point of the case.
It may be conceded that if the arrangement of the various subjects or topics contained in
the Code were more logical or rigid, there might be some force in the contention that the
retroactivity provided for in article 22 relates only to penalties, and not to prescription,
in criminal cases. But examining the chapter embracing article 22, we find that of the
four articles therein contained, only one, article 24, relates expressly to penalties; article
21 provides that no crime shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribe by law prior
to its commission and is, in a certain sense, a limitation upon criminal actions; article 23
deals with the effect of pardons and with civil liability. Under these circumstance, it is
difficult to find room for the conclusion that the intermediate article 22 must relate only
to penalties and not to limitations upon the imposing of penalties or upon the bringing of
penal actions.
Fiore, whose work on the irretroactivity of statutes is regarded as a legal classic in Latin
countries, in discussing the question under consideration says:
Indeed when the new law reduces the period of prescription of criminal actions
or establishes easier requirements to give the prescription effect, it is event
that the reduction conceded by the new implies an acknowledgment on the part
of the sovereign power that the more severe requirements of the former law
were unjust in regard to the essence of the criminal action. Consequently, if the
sovereign power should enforce its right under the former law it would be
guilty of an inconsistency in view of its implied admission that the old law was
too severe and consequently unjust. The necessity therefore of applying the less
severe new law rests upon the principle that the sovereign power cannot
exercise its right to punish except only within those limits of justice which that
sovereign power has established as being just and equitable at the time of
exercising that right.
On the other hand, when the new prespective law is more rigid than the former,
whether as to the admissibility of the prescription itself or as to the conditions
and time required for its effectiveness, care must be taken that that law is not
applied to crimes committed before its enactment, not because the accused has
acquired any right so to prevent its application, but for the reasons that we
have already stated. What right right can the accused have to endeavor to
prevent that which the sovereign power has the right to do in order to preserve
public order? Let us not talk therefore of vested rights of the accused, but let us
say it, and with emphasis, that the reason for the irretroactivity of the more
severe law is found in the principle that the sovereign power cannot, without
committing an injustice, apply the more severe prescriptive provisions; and
those provisions cannot be justly applied if they have not been previously
promulgated. And the rights itself to punish does not arise except by virtue of a
law promulgated and in force at the time of the commission of the crime. The
more rigid the prescriptive law the more enlarged the field of criminal
prosecution and this affects the substance thereof, because it fixes the basis and
the sphere of the right to punish. And can all of these be done by the sovereign
power without any law? Can that power, without doing an injustice, extend the
effects of the new law to said acts committed before its enactment? For the
same reasons which prevent the sovereign power from punishing those acts
that have not expressly been made punishable as crimes by the former law or
from imposing the more severe penalties provided in the new law when such
acts have been committed before those penalties were established by
legislative enactment, so also it cannot enlarge the criminal action (that is to
say, its right to punish) by a subsequent law and apply to acts executed before
its enactment the less favorable provisions of prescription therein established. .
..
For the reasons stated, we come to the conclusion that, as a matter of justice
which must regulate all the elements of a criminal action, that the accused must
be given the benefit of the provisons of the new law when more favorable to
him and that, unless there should be final and conclusive judgment at the time,
we must also admit in matters of prescription that the new law, when less
severe, should be applied. The same principle applies when the modifications
introduced by the law refer to the prescription of the penalty, because in its
substance the prescription of the penalty is equivalent to the prescription of the
criminal action. (Fiore, Irretroactividad e Interpretacion de las Leyes, pp. 426-
428.)
We have here quoted the leading Latin authority on the retroactive of statutes and there
can be no doubt that the doctrine stated by him is of general acceptance in countries
whose legislation is founded on Latin principles; at least, we have found nothing to the
contrary. Considering that the men who prepared the Penal Code were steeped in the
principles of Latin law, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that they had these
principles in mind in formulating article 22 and intended it to apply to criminal law in
general and not merely to the branch thereof which deals with the duration or measure
of penalties. It is very true that due, perhaps, to the fact that there have been no changes
in the provisions of the Penal Code in regard to the prescription of actions, there are no
direct adjudications by the supreme court of Spain upon the subject and the Spanish
commentators on the Code have generally discussed article 22 in its relation to the
measure of penalties merely, but this circumstance does not, of course, affect the
principle involved and is not necessarily of any special significance.
It may be interesting to note in passing that the same principle has also met with the
approval of high American authority. Wharton, in his work on Criminal Pleading and
Practice, 9th ed., says in section 316:
While, as will be hereafter seen, courts look with disfavor on prosecutions that
have been unduly delayed, there is, at common law, no absolute limitation
which prevents the prosecution of offences after a specified time has arrived.
Statutes to this effect have been passed in Englang and in the United States,
which we now proceed to consider. We should at first observe that a mistake is
sometimes made in applying to statutes of limitations in criminal suits the
construction that has been given to statutes of limitation in civil suits. The two
classes of statutes, however, are essentially different. In civil suits the statute is
interposed by the legislature as an impartial arbiter between two contending
parties. In the construction of the statute, therefore, there is no intendment to
be made in favor of either party. Neither grants the right to the other; there is
therefore no grantor against whom the ordinary presumptions of construction
are to be made. But it is otherwise when a statute of limitation is granted by the
State. Here the State is the grantor, surrendering by act of grace its rights to
prosecute, and declaring the offence to be no longer the subject of prosecution.
The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but
an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the
offence; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and
resume his immunities as a citizen; and that from henceforth he may cease to
preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out.
Hence it is that statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the
defendant, not only because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of
amnesty and grace, but because the very existence of the statute is a
recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it
gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive
periods in which it destroy proofs of guilt. Independently of these views, it must
be remembered that delay in instituting prosecuting is not only productive of
expense to the State, but of peril to public justice in the attenuation and
distortion, even by mere natural lapse of memory, of testimony. It is the policy
of the law that prosecutions should be prompt, and that statutes enforcing such
promptitude should be vigorously maintained. They are not merely acts of
grace, but checks imposed by the State upon itself, to exact vigilant activity
from its subalterns, and to secure for criminal trials the best evidence that can
be obtained.
Now, considering the genesis of article 22 of the Penal Code and its underlying principles
as above stated, can there be any doubt as to its meaning in regard to any particular
offense? It can only mean what it in slightly different language says; namely, that
whenever a new statute dealing with crimes establishes conditions more lenient or
favorable to the accused in regard to a certain offense, the statute becomes retroactive as
to the offense and the accused must receive the benefit of the new conditions no matter
whether the offense was committed before or after the enactment of the new statute.
That the article is still in force is beyond question. As long as it so remains in force it is of
general application to all penal statutes, past, present, and future, and furnishes the rule
for determining to what extent they are retroactive or merely prospective. It follows that
unless a penal or criminal statute expressly, or by necessary implication, provides that it
shall not be regarded as retroactive, it becomes subject to the rule laid down by that
article.
(3) We will now turn to the third point raised, i. e., that section 71 of Act No. 3030 by its
terms is applicable only to offenses resulting from that Act and cannot be given
retroactive effect.
In view of the fact that Act No. 3030 is only amendatory of the Election Law, we think it is
fair to presume that section 71 was intended by the Legislature as an amendment to the
Election Law in order to remedy an obvious and quite serious defect in that law. From
this point of view, there can, of course, be no doubt that the period of prescription fixed
by the section applies to all election offenses alike whether committed before Act No.
3030 went into effect or not.
But it is vigorously argued that the language of the section is so plain as to make any
interpretation unnecessary and that when a section of the Act says "this Act" it means
the Act in which it occurs and no other. As far as the present case is concerned, both
theories will lead to the same result if article 22 of the Penla Code is taken into
consideration and we shall, therefore, for the purposes of the argument, take the
language of the section literally and assume that the period of prescription it establishes
relates only to offenses defined and penalized in Act No. 3030.
Comparing the penal provisions of the Election Law with those of Act No. 3030, it will be
found that practically all of the offenses defined in the former law are also defined in the
same language in Act No. 3030, the only difference being that the penalties have been
increased.
We repeat that article 22 of the Penal Code applies to all penal statutes alike and
furnishes our only guidance in determining the extent to which a penal statute is
retroactive. Unless the statute is taken out of its operation either by express provisions
of law or by necessary implication, the article applies. There is, as far as we can see,
absolutely nothing in Act No. 3030 indicating that it is not subject to exactly the same
measure of retroactivity as any other penal statute. Retroactivity, as we here speak of it,
means of course, retroactibity as to particular penal offenses, and bearing this in mind in
connection with the provisions of article 22, does it not, then, seem obvious that if an
offense was defined and made punishable by the Election Law as contained in the
Administrative Code and is defined in exactly the same language in the amendatory Act
No. 3030 with merely an increase in the penalty, article 22 of the Penal Code must be
held to be applicable and that in all in which the new law is more favorable to the
accused it becomes retroactive as to that offense?
An illustration, by way of analogy, may, perhaps, make this even clearer: Let us suppose
that a statute is enacted defining the crime of murder in the same language in which it is
defined in the Penal Code, but providing that the maximum penalty for the crime defined
in the new statute shall be life imprisonment, the statute containing no provision that it
shall not be retroactive in its effect. Would anyone then maintain that the death penalty
might still be imposed for murder committed before the new statute was enacted? For a
court to so hold would obviously amount to a judicial repeal of the article. And in this
respect there can be no difference in principle between the offense of murder and an
election offense.
In the present case we have a situation identical in principle with the state of facts we
have assumed in our illustration. The defendant was convicted by the Court of First
Instance under section 2639 of the Administrative Code of the offense of having failed, as
an election inspector, "to perform any duty or obligation imposed by the Election Law."
Section 49 of Act No. 3030, in amending section 2639 of the Administrative Code, defines
the offense in question in exactly the same language as failing "to perform any duty or
obligation imposed by the Election Law," and only increased the penalty; the offense is
exactly the same under both sections. Consequently, if we hold that the prescription
provided for in section 71 applies to all offenses defined and penalized in Act No. 3030
and not merely to offenses there defined and made punishable for the first time and we
further hold, as we must, that article 22 of the Penal Code is applicable to all penal
statutes, including those for the limitation of penal actions, and not merely to the
measure of the penalty, the conclusion is irresistible and unaviodable that the present
action, not having been instituted within the prespective period fixed by section 71 of Act
No. 3030, must be dismissed.
A strong appeal has been made to our emotions by describing in rather vivid colors the
disastrous consequences which will result from the dismissal of action in which the
accused have already been convicted of election offenses by the trial courts and it has
been intimated that for us to impute to the Legislature the intention of bringing about
such a state of affairs would constitute a serious reflection not only on the honor of the
Legislature but also on this court.
As to this we can only say that it is our duty to apply the law as we find it; that it is also
our duty to observe the rule that the defendant in a criminal case is entitled to the benefit
of all reasonable doubts, both as to the facts and as to the law; and that we believe that
the interests both of justice and of the public welfare will be best served by this court
doing its duty without fear or favor. We should, indeed, be recreant to that duty were we
to allow our zeal for the punishment of crime to lead us to distort the language of plain
provisions of the law in a sense adversely to the accused. In regard to the presents case,
we also believe that the disadvantages of the uncertainly and confusion which would
eventually result from a forced construction of the law would much more than offset the
advantages of securing the convictions and imprisonment for a few months of a
relatively small number of infractors of the Election Law. The decision of the United
States Supreme Court in the case of Weems vs. United States (217 U.S., 349) had much
more serious consequences in this respect, yet, that court did not hesitate there to
interpret the law according to its best judgment.
In the same connection, but speaking for myself only, I will frankly confess that not only
do I not share the gloomy forebodings of some of the members of this court as to the
practical effect of our interpretation of law, but that neither am I convinced that the
action of the Legislature in making the one year period of prescription retroactive was
wholly inadvisable.
Where political parties represent personal followings rather than divergent political
principles, changes in political allegiance are frequent and it is therefore especially
important that election offenses be brought before the courts promptly. If several years
are allowed to elapse before the prosecution is instituted, many of the voters may, in the
meantime, have become dissatisfied with their former party connections or, in effect,
resentful towards the leading members of the party. Such persons are usually willing
witnesses for the prosecution of their former party associates, are particularly
dangerous to the accused by reason of the inside information they are supposed to
possess, and their testimony is likely to be given greater credit than that of persons
known to have belonged to a party opposed to that of the accused. And it is no reflection
on the ability and integrity of the judiciary to say that judges, knowing as they do that
irregularities have, unfortunately, been quite common in past elections, are frequently
inclined to look with suspicion upon an election official accused of an infraction of the
Election Law and to turn the usual presumption of innocence into a presumption of guilt.
Under such circumstance it is not to be expected that the motives prompting the
witnesses for the prosecution will be very closely scrutinized. It therefore seems to me
that the Legislature has acted wisely in providing a short period of prescription of
elections offenses, so that unless the offense is sufficiently obvious and grave to attract
the attention of the prosecuting authorities within that period, the matter will be allowed
to rest. What is true as to future offenses is also, to some extent, true of similar offenses
in the past, and I can therefore see no very serious objections to the retroactivity of the
prescription. It is, of course, to be regretted if guilty persons escape well-deserved
punishment, but it is more important that no innocent man be made to suffer
punishment unjustly.
For an illustration I need not to go beyond the present case: The accused was an election
inspector in the elections of June, 1919. In the precinct where he was acting there were
two inspectors of the Partido Democrataand only one of the Partido Nacionalista. The law
required an inspector in writing the ballots of illiterate or incapacitated voters. The
defendant is accused of having written ballots without being so accompanied and is
prosecuted under section 2639 of the Administrative Code, which makes it a penal
offense "to wilfully decline or fail to perform any duty or obligation imposed by the
Election Law." As will be seen, in order to constitute a penal offense the refusal or failure
must be wilful. Wilfulness is therefore an element of the crime and must be alleged and
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
In penal statutes the word " 'wilfully' means with evil intent or with legal malice or with
a bad purpose" (Bouvier's Law Dictionary), and I have been unable to find anything in
the evidence which can even raise a presumption of that kind of wilfulness on the part of
the accused, though there is, perhaps, sufficient proof that each of the three inspectors
wrote ballots or parts of ballots for illiterate or disabled voters without being
accompanied by another inspector.
The principal witness for the prosecution is the Nacionalista inspector. He piously
asserts that he protested against the practice followed by the board of inspectors and
that he, for his part, always had Norberto Parel, the accused, accompany him in writing
ballots. He admits, however, that after having written, the first few names on the ballots,
Parel would leace with, but that he, the witness, continued to write the rest of the names
on the ballots unaccompanied. He further states that he did not offer to accompany the
other inspectors because he was too busy writing ballots himself and continued to be so
occupied until late in the afternoon. The protest he alleges to have made does not appear
upon the returns and the other inspectors deny that he made any protest whatever. The
testimony of the other witnesses for the prosecution is limited to statements that they
saw the two Democratainspectors write ballots for illiterate persons without being
accompanied by other inspectors. There is no evidence in the record that any frauds
were committed in the writing of the ballots.
opportunities for infractions of the law and rendered the placing of the responsibility for
such infractions difficult. Under the circumstances, it is by no means certain that the
Legislature has acted unwisely in wiping the state clean and casting oblivion over
election offenses the prosecution of which has not, after so many years, been brought to
a conclusion. In any event, the impending alleged calamity is not so grave a nature as to
justify a court in misinterpreting the law in order to avert it.

Exhibit D of the prosecution shows that there were 277 voters unable to write their
ballots, an unusually large number. In view of the fact that there was only one
Nacionalista inspector, a full compliance with the law would have required his presence
at the writing of every one of the 277 ballots, a practical impossibility when it is
considered that the writing of ballots did not commence until 8 a. m. (see testimony of
Justino Pre, witness for the prosecution) and that the polls must close at 6 p.m. Any
attempt to carry out the letter of the law would have led to the closing of the polls before
the termination of the voting. As far as the record shows this may very well have been
the reason for the failure of the inspectors to strictly observe the law and they may have
acted in good faith.
The trial court found the defendant guilty and in view of the fact that the word "wilfully,"
depending on the context, is sometimes used as a synonym for "intentionally" and that it,
in the Spanish text of the Election Law, is transfered into "voluntariamente," I am not so
sure but that this court would have affirmed the judgment. It may be noted that the facts
in case R.G. No. 182611 are exactly the same as in the present case. Personally, I view the
dismissal of the case with complete equanimity; we cannot purify elections by giving
penal statutes a harsher interpretation than evidently intended by the lawmakers. An
attempt on our part to do so may possibly have the opposite effect by making it more
difficult to secure competent election officials and will produce the inevitable reaction,
either in the form of executive clemency or in over-lenient legislation. We have had
instances of such reactions in the past.
For the reasons stated, the motion is granted and the present case is hereby dismissed,
with all costs de oficio. So ordered.
Separate Opinions
STREET, J., concurring:
When the question here presented was first brought before this court in another case the
undersigned, while admitting in a general way that article 22 of the Penal Code was
applicable to laws relating to election offences, yet he hesitated to adopt in their entirely
the conclusions now stated in the opinion of Mr. Justice Ostrand and suggested that
article 22 should be construed to apply only to such provisions of penal laws as define
the crimes or fix the penalties. After a full consideration of the matter, the majority of the
court do not accept this narrow view of the application of said article; and it is now to be
given effect in accordance with the literal meaning of the language used, without evasion
or qualification. To the position thus taken by the majority the undersigned is finally
constrained to accede, partly because the will of the majority must prevail and partly
because the position assumed in the opinion written by Mr. Justice Ostrand now appears
to the undersigned to be at least as sound as the position previously assumed by the
writter of this.

Including the present, there are eleven cases before this court which will be affected by
this decision; according to information furnished by the Attorney-General, there are also
three cases pending decision in the Courts of First Instance and fourteen cases pending
trial in which prosecution has not been instituted within a year from the date of the
discovery of the alleged offense. In some of these cases the prosecution is, no doubt,
meritorious, but, in view of the delay in presenting the complaints, it is not unreasonable
to assume that most of them are more or less of the character of the present case.

It may be stated, in this connection, that the accuracy of the figures here given as to cases
pending and involving the principle under discussion has been questioned on the
strength of a list of cases furnished Mr. Justice Malcolm by the Attorney-General. An
examination of the sources of this list, consisting of communications from the clerks of
the various Courts of First Instance, reveals, however, that the great majority of the cases
there enumerated involve prosecutions for offenses committed in connection with the
general elections of 1922 and are not affected by the present decision. Such examination
also shows that the figures here qouted are correct.

More than three years have passed since the elections of 1919 and the Election Law has
since been so amended as to remedy many of the defects which offered temptations and
G.R. No. 134172 September 20, 2004
MIRIAM ARMI JAO YU vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an accused found guilty of violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 1 be made
to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case he fails to pay the fines imposed by the trial
court for such violations? This is the lone issue raised in this petition for review on
certiorari.2
On March 25, 1991, petitioner was charged with 19 counts of violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 91, Quezon City, docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 19468 to 19486.
Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. After hearing, the trial court
rendered a Decision finding her guilty of the charges and imposing upon her the
following penalties:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused Miriam Armi Jao Yu guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and sentencing her as follows:
1. Crim. Case No. 19468 – to pay a fine of P200,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of P300,000.00;
2. Crim. Case No. 19469 – to pay a fine of P150,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of P150,000.00;
3. Crim. Case No. 19470 – to pay a fine of P200,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of P200,000.00;
4. Crim. Case No. 19471 – to pay a fine of P200,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of P385,000.00;
5. Crim. Case No. 19472 – to pay a fine of P15,000.00 and indemnify
Susan Andaya in the amount of P15,000.00;
6. Crim. Case No. 19473 – to pay a fine of P15,000.00 and indemnify
Susan Andaya in the amount of P300,000.00;
7. Crim. Case No. 19474 – to pay a fine of P200,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of P350,000.00;
8. Crim. Case No. 19475 – to pay a fine of P200,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of P385,000.00;
9. Crim. Case No. 19476 – to pay a fine of P200,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of P300,000.00;
10. Crim. Case No. 19477 – to pay a fine of P200,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of P300,000.00;
11. Crim. Case No. 19478 – to pay a fine of P15,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of P15,000.00;
12. Crim. Case No. 19479 – to pay a fine of P15,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of P15,000.00;
13. Crim. Case No. 19480 – to pay a fine of P200,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of P450,000.00;
14. Crim. Case No. 19481 – to pay a fine of P25,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of P25,000.00;
15. Crim. Case No. 19482 – to pay a fine of P200,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of P500,000.00;
16. Crim. Case No. 19483 – to pay a fine of P17,500.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of P17,500.00;
17. Crim. Case No. 19484 – to pay a fine of P13,475.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of P13,475.00;
18. Crim. Case No. 19485 – to pay a fine of P15,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of P15,000.00;
19. Crim. Case No. 19486 – to pay a fine of P15,000.00 and
indemnify Susan Andaya in the amount of P15,000.00;
to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of the fine in
each of the above-entitled cases and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED." (Underscoring ours)
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court’s Decision.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court
in its Resolution dated May 29, 1998.
In the instant petition, petitioner contends that Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
which reads:
"Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds. – Any person who makes or draws
and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more
than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the
check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine
and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check,
shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the
check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon,
for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. Where the check is drawn by a
corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in
behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or
persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this
Act." (Underscoring ours)
provides only the imposition of imprisonment or fine, or both, in cases of violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. Thus, she should not suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
non-payment of the fines imposed by the trial court.
The Solicitor General disagrees with petitioner and prays that the Decision of the Court
of Appeals be affirmed.
The petition must fail.
The imposition of subsidiary imprisonment is expressly provided under Articles 38 and
39 of the Revised Penal Code, thus:
"ART. 38. Pecuniary liabilities – Order of payment. – In case the property of the
offender should not be sufficient for the payment of all his pecuniary liabilities,
the same shall be met in the following order:
1. The preparation of the damage caused.
2. Indemnification of consequential damages.
3. The fine.
4. The costs of the proceedings. (Underscoring ours)
"ART. 39. Subsidiary penalty. – If the convict has no property with which to
meet the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article, he shall
be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight
pesos, subject to the following rules:
1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correccional or arresto
and fine, he shall remain under confinement until his fine referred in
the preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary imprisonment
shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case
shall it continue for more than one year, and no fraction or part of a
day shall be counted against the prisoner.
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary
imprisonment shall not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have
been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed
fifteen days, if for a light felony.
3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision
correccional no subsidiary imprisonment shall be imposed upon the
culprit.
4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by
confinement in a penal institution, but such penalty is of fixed
duration, the convict, during the period of time established in the
preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the same deprivation as those
of which the principal penalty consists.
5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have
suffered by reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him from the fine
in case his financial circumstances should improve." (Underscoring
ours)
We hold that the above provisions on subsidiary imprisonment can be applied
suppletorily to Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 pursuant to Article 10 of the same Code, which
provides:
"ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are
or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall besupplementary to such laws, unless
the latter should specially provide the contrary." (Underscoring ours)
As early as 1959, this Court, in People vs. Cubelo,3 held:
"Appellant’s contention that the trial court committed error in ordering him to
serve subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in the payment of fine with
the reason that Act No. 4003, which prohibits fishing with the use of explosive,
fails to provide for such subsidiary imprisonment, and that being a special law,
it is not subject to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, is untenable. The
second paragraph of Article 10 of the said Code provides that ‘this Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary.’ Articles 100 (civil liability) and 39 (subsidiary penalty) are applicable
to offenses under special laws (People vs. Moreno, 60 Phil. 178; Copiaco vs.
Luzon Brokerage, 66 Phil. 184)."
Indeed, the absence of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 does not and cannot preclude its imposition in cases involving its
violations.
It bears stressing that on February 14, 2001, we issued Administrative Circular No. 13-
2001 clarifying the imposition of imprisonment for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
and subsidiary imprisonment upon the accused found guilty but is unable to pay the fine
he is sentenced to pay. In clarifying the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment, the
Circular states that if the accused is unable to pay the fine imposed by the trial court,
"there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on
subsidiary imprisonment." The full text of the Circular reads:
"Administrative Circular No. 13-2001
To : All Judges
subject : clarification of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 on the penalty for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, Otherwise known as the bouncing checks
law
Clarification has been sought by concerned Judges and other parties regarding 3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the
the operation of Administrative Circular 12-2000 issued on 21 November 2000. fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal
In particular, queries have been made regarding the authority of Judges to Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment.

1. Impose the penalty of imprisonment for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. The issuance of this Administrative Circular was authorized by the Court En
22; and Banc in A.M. No. 00-11-01-SC at its session of 13 February 2001.

2. Impose subsidiary imprisonment in the event that the accused, who is found The Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court and the Court Administrator shall
guilty of violating the provisions of B.P. Blg. 22, is unable to pay the fine which immediately cause the implementation of this Administrative Circular.
he is sentenced to pay considering that Administrative Circular No. 12-2000
adopted the rulings in Eduardo Vaca v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 131714, 16 This Administrative Circular shall be published in a newspaper of general
November 1998, 298 SCRA 656) and Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines (G.R. circulation not later than 20 February 2001.
No. 130038, 18 September 2000) as a policy of the Supreme Court on the
matter of the imposition of penalties for violations of B.P. Blg. 22, without
mentioning whether subsidiary imprisonment could be resorted to in case of Issued this 14th day of February, 2001.
the accused’s inability to pay the fine.
(Sgd.)
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to
remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22. Chief Justice" (Underscoring ours)

The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of
imprisonment for violators of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative
intent behind the law.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in
the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the
circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or
a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone
should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the
determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine
alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that imprisonment is
the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not
be deemed a hindrance.
It is, therefore, understood that
In Felicito Abarquez vs. Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines promulgated on
August 7, 20034 – a case which involves the application of penalties for violations of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 – we did not only modify the amount of the fines imposed by the
Court of Appeals in Criminal Cases Nos. D-8137, D-8176 and D-8177, but also imposed
"subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in accordance with Article 39 of the
Revised Penal Code" in each case.
Administrative Circular No. 13-2001 and our Decision in Felicito Abarquez vs. Court of
Appeals and People of the Philippines should now lay to rest the controversy at bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

1. Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as

an alternative penalty for violations of B.P. Blg. 22;

2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and

taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case,
determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the
interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment
would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the
social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice;
G.R. No. L-9268 October 30, 1914
THE UNITED STATES vs FRED C. BRUHEZ, ET AL., defendants.
IGNACIO VELASCO, petitioner-apppellant.
MORELAND, J.:
This is a proceeding to recover from the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila the
sum of P3,500 consisting of seven P500 bills which had been used in that court by the
prosecution in the case of the United States vs. Joaquin Lorenzo Uy Yjo as evidence
tending to establish the crime of illegal importation of opium, said sum of money having
been delivered to a certain customs official by the accused as a bribe whereby the illegal
importation was effected.
The trial court, after a hearing at which considerable testimony was taken, denied the
return of the money to the applicant. This is an appeal from the order denying the
application.
Some time before the proceeding in question was instituted Joaquin Lorenzo Uy Yjo, by
bribing Fred C. Bruhez, at that time a customs inspector, by delivering to him P3,500,
consisting of seven P500 bills, obtained the importation of a considerable quantity of
opium into the Philippine Islands. The bribery and the consequent importation were
discovered and both parties were arrested charged with the illegal importation of opium.
The P3,500 was found in the possession of Bruhez, was seized by the customs officials
and was presented in the Court of First Instance as evidence upon the trial of Joaquin
Lorenzo Uy Yjo. He was duly convicted and sentenced, but the money was still left in
hands of the court to be used as evidence upon the trial of the other accused, Fred C.
Bruhez. He, however, eluded detention, escaped from the Philippine Islands and has
never been brought to trial. The information filed against him was later dismissed on the
application of the prosecuting attorney.
It was at this point that the present application was amde for the revoery of the P3,500.
Such application, however, was not made by Joaquin Lorenzo Uy Yjo, who delivered the
money to the customs official, but by one Ignacio Velasco, who asserts that Joaquin
Lorenzo Uy Yjo, at the time of the illegal importation complained of, was in his employ as
a trusted and confidential servant and that, during the absence of Velasco from Manila,
and without his knowledge or consent, Joquin Lorenxo Uy Yjo drew a check upon
Velasco's bank account for the sum of P3,500, by means of which there was turned over
to said Joaquin Lorenzo Uy Yjo by the bank seven P500 bills; that said bills belonged to
Velasco and the identical bills involved in this application were used in bribing Fred C.
Bruhez to permit the illegal importation of opium. He asserts that the identical money
belongs to him, and that he himself not having been in any wise engaged in the
commission of the crime, and being wholly ignorant of the fact of its commission, he is
entitled to recover possession of the money from the Court of First Instance under the
provisions of article 62 of the Penal Code.
This petition was denied by the court and application was made for a new trial. A new
trial was granted and a rehearing of the whole matter had. Upon that hearing testimony
was presented by Velasco for the purpose of demonstrating his ownership of the P3,500
in question. On the termination of the hearing the court denied the petition and refused
to deliver the money to Velasco but, instead, stated its determination to turn it over to
the Collector of Customs for confiscation. The court said:
I am of the opinion that my refusal to deliver it to the Insular Collector of
Customs after the complaint against Bruhez had been dismissed, because it
should be confiscated, was erroneous.
I am of opinion that the court has no authority to confiscate this money which
came in the possession of the court in the way in which this did. It was not
money used, or a part of the means used to procure an unlawful importation
inot the Philippine Islands. It having come in the hands of the Insular Collector
of Customs in the transactions of the business of the Customs Bureau it belongs
to that Bureau, and this court has no jurisdiction to determine in this action
that it be delivered to the pettioner.
Counsel for the petitioner insist that, the issue having been submitted to this
court in relation to the ownership of the money, that the court has jurisdcition
to dispose of it but I am unable to reach such conclusion.
While the proceedings to determine to whom the P3,500 should be delivered were
pending, it appears that there was also before the Insular Collector of Customs a
proceeding relative to the same subject manner. Certain custom officials having seized
the money, the Insular Collector of Customs sent to Fred C. Bruhez the following notice:
You are hereby informed that P3,500 Philippine currency, used by you in
attempting to bribe a customs officer, has this day been seized for violation of
section 333 of Act No. 355.
A hearing will be held at this customhouse at 10 o'clock a.m., Monday morning,
December 11, 1911. If you desire to make claim for same, you should be
present at that time in person or by attorney, with whatever relevant evidence
you may care to offer.1awphil.net
Nothing was ever done in this proceeding further than the giving of the notice referred to
and, so far as the record shows, it is still pending.
It is our opinion that the court below should have resolved all of the questions presented
by the issues, among them being the ownership of the P3,500. If that money was owned
by Joaquin Lorenzo Uy Yjo and was by him used to bribe a customs official to permit the
illegal importation of opium, it became an instrument used in the commission of that
crime and would be suspectible to the dispositions provided for in articles 25 and 62 of
the Penal Code. Article 25 provides, among other things, that, as an accessory penalty,
there shall be "a forfeiture of the provides that "every penalty imposed for the
commission of a felony shall carry with the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and
the instrument with which it was committed. Such proceeds and instruments shall be
forfeited unless they be the property of a third person not liable for the offense."
These articles constitute the law which governs the disposition of the money in question.
If Joaquin Lorenzo Uy Yjo had benen convicted of the crime of bribery, then the money
paid as a bribe would have been forfeited by virtue of article 389. The crime charged and
prosecuted, however, being that of illegal importation of opium, the money became an
instrument used in the commission of the crime and, therefore, became subject to the
articles of the Penal Code already referred to.

Under these articles of the Penal Code the court trying the cause has jurisdiction to
determine the ownership and disposition of the instrument used in the commission of
the crime, and any person claiming this instrument has a right to take his proceeding in
that court for the purpose of determining his rights in the premises.

We have been cited to no statute or other authority which gives the Insular Collector or
Customs any jurisdiction whatever over the money involved in this litigation. To be sure,
it was used in corrupting one of the officials of that bureau, but it is not subject to seizure
and confiscation by the Insular Collector of Customs for that reason. So far as we have
been able to ascertain from the meager citations and references presented on this
hearing, the right to seize property and declare it forfeited by the Insular Collector of
Customs is restricted to merchandise which is imported or which it is attempted to
import illegally and does not extend to the money which may be used as a bribe to
corrupt the officials of that bureau.

The judgment of the court below is hereby set aside and vacated and the cause returned
to the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, with instructions to determine the
questions presented by the issues framed with respect to the sum of P3,500 which is the
subject matter of the action.lawphil.net

This court expresses no opinion as to whom the said sum belongs. That is a matter which
is left to the judgment of the trial court from the evidence presented to it.
G.R. No. L-51206 August 25, 1989
NORBERTO MASIPEQUINA and JOVENCIO ALAMPAYAN, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
CORTES, J.:
The extent to which responding peace officers may defend themselves in the face of an
attack by the person sought to be apprehended is the subject of this petition for review.
Petitioners Patrolmen Norberto Mesipequina and Jovencio Alampayan, who were
members of the Integrated National Police (INP) of San Isidro, Bohol, were charged with
the crime of homicide for the death of Leopoldo Potane. They were convicted by the trial
court and sentenced to suffer imprisonment of from seven (7) years and one (1) day
of prison mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Leopoldo Potane in the amount of twelve thousand pesos (P12,000.00).
On appeal, the Solicitor General joined the petitioners in their prayer for acquittal on the
theory that petitioners are exempt from liability because they had acted in self-defense
when they shot and killed Leopoldo Potane. But, just the same, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but modified the penalty of imprisonment to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prison mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight
(8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Before this Court both the petitioners and the Solicitor General reassert that petitioners
should be acquitted because they acted in lawful self-defense.
There is no dispute about the following facts, which were quoted by the Court of Appeals
from the Solicitor General's presentation.
xxx
In the afternoon of December 21, 1976, Barangay Capt. Nicolas Potane
of Barrio Abehilan San Isidro, Bohol and his father, Pedro Potane
requested assistance from the Police Sub-station Commander of San
Isidro in apprehending Leopoldo Potane, son of Pedro Potane and
elder brother of Nicolas, who has begun to show signs of recurring
insanity. Since his arrival from Mindanao in 1974, Leopoldo had been
acting queerly and at times violent. On December 18, 1975, Leopoldo
chased the wife of Nicolas with a bolo and almost hacked her. He
always carried a bolo, and had threatened his own wife, daughter,
brothers, and even his parents with death. Fearing for their safety,
they transferred temporarily to the Home Economics building of the
barrio school and left Leopoldo alone in the house of his father.
Nicolas Potane and his immediate relatives wanted Leopoldo to be
examined and treated by the Provincial Health Officer for his mental
ailment (pp. 19-22, 26-32. t.s.n., Nov. 15, 1976; Exhs. C, C-1 to C-5-A,
Folder of Exhibits).
Patrolmen Norberto Masipequina and Jovencio Alampayan, the
former armed with a 38 cal. revolver and the latter with the
Thompson submachine gun, were ordered by the sub-station
commander to arrest Leopoldo. Before proceeding to the house where
Leopoldo was, the policemen passed the store of a certain Ismael
Balumia where they had a conference with Barrio Captain Nicolas
Potane; his father, Pedro Potane; his mother, Marganta Potane and
others. In said store a joint affidavit (Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2, Folder of
Exhibits), was prepared and signed by Nicolas Potane, Pedro Potane,
Margarita Potane, Clara Potane, Francisca Potane, and Emilia Potane,
wife of Leopoldo, authorizing the 'peace officer of the San Isidro Police
Dept. 'to apprehend Leopoldo Potane who was about to run amok.'
The document further stated that if Leopoldo would resist as he is
armed with a weapon, the policemen 'have the right to shoot him but
not to kill him ... but if such does not permit, if he resist(s) arrest they
have the right to resort to any manner to prevent the fearful outcome
from his running amok' and 'if he would be killed by the police officers
on account of his resistance, we, the parents, brother and sisters, and
wife would take no action if something untoward would occur. (pp. 4-
8, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1976).
Thereafter, the two policemen, accompanied by several persons,
among whom was Nicolas Potane, went to the house of Pedro Potane
where Leopoldo was. Upon arrival thereat, Pat. Masipequina, a
childhood friend of Leopoldo, called Leopoldo and urged him to come
out. He also asked Leopoldo for a drink, but Leopoldo refused to go
down the house. Pat. Masipequina then informed Leopoldo that his
father and brother had reported that he (Leopoldo) had chased his
sister-in-law with a bolo and their officer-in-charge sent him to
investigate the report. He told Leopoldo to come down so that they
could talk. Leopoldo instead told him to come up (pp. 10-11, t.s.n.,
Ibid).lâwphî1.ñèt
Pat. Masipequina went up the house followed by Nicolas Potane with a
petromax lamp. Patrolman Jovencio Alampayan and the rest stayed in
the yard Although in the yard, Patrolman Alampayan could see what
was going on inside the house because it was a single storey house
and had an elevation of only 4 feet (p. 56, t.s.n., Dec. 6, 1976). Nicolas
stayed on the door landing while Masipequina entered the sala and
was about to sit down on a rocking chair when Leopoldo suddenly
emerged from an adjacent room and rushed at him swinging a bolo.
Masipequina pushed the rocking chair towards Leopoldo. Leopoldo
hit Masipequina on the bridge of the nose (p. 23, t.s.n., Ibid). As the
latter retracted, he lost his balance and was hit on the right side of his
face. At this juncture, Masipequina drew his revolver and fired three
shots. One shot misfired but the other two hit Leopoldo on the chest.
Leopoldo continued to advance towards him. He pushed the rocking
 chair at Leopoldo and ran out of the house shouting for help. Leopoldo
ran after him. Pat. Masipequina jumped from the house and landed on
the ground. In the process he hit his shin on a piece of stone. Leopoldo
also jumped to the ground and continued to pursue Masipequina. As
Leopoldo poised to hack Pat. Masipequina, Pat. Alampayan fired his
gun hitting Leopoldo once at the thigh (pp. 25-26, Id., pp. 40, 71, t.s.n.,
Dec. 6, 1976).
xxx
[CA Decision, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 9-11].
Leopoldo Potane died some thirty (30) minutes later while being brought to the health
center for treatment.
The issue is readily apparent: whether or not, given the undisputed facts, petitioner
Masipequina had acted in lawful self-defense. (Petitioner Alampayan's conviction for the
crime charged hinges on that of Masipequina as the trial court had found that the two
conspired to kill Leopoldo Potane, as alleged in the information.).
The trial court, however, rejected the defense raised by petitioner. The following
reasons, which were cited by the trial court, were adopted and quoted with approval by
the Court of Appeals:
. . . (1) the fact that the accused persisted in their attempts to arrest
and/or pick up the victim for almost two (2) hours, culminating in the
tragedy at around nine o'clock that evening; (2) the fact that the
victim suffered three gunshot wounds, two of which were over the
heart and admittedly fatal, and the third on the left thigh which was
not fatal but sufficient to cripple him; (3) the fact that all three
gunshot wounds bore evidence of gunpowder signs, which is
indicative and conclusive of having been inflicted at close range; (4)
the fact that the victim had a 2-inch lacerated wound on his forehead
and another lacerated wound on his right leg which have not been
sufficiently explained but are also indicative of having been inflicted
by blunt instruments, like a flashlight or the butts of a revolver or a
submachine gun; and (5) the fact that the alleged injuries of accused
Masipequina could not, by any stretch of imagination, be inflicted by a
bolo allegedly wielded by the victim, since they are quite superficial in
degree, located in the most improbable places and may even have
been self-inflicted to justify a subsequent claim of self-defense.
xxx
[Rollo, p. 20.]
"The law on self-defense embodied in any penal system in the civilized world finds
justification in man's natural instinct to protect, repel, and save his person and rights
from impending danger and peril; it is based on that impulse of self-preservation born to
man and part of his nature as a human being." [People v. Boholst-Caballero, G.R. No. L-
23249 November 25,1974,61 SCRA 180, 1 85.] In our jurisdiction it is found in Article 11
of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any
criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided the
following circumstances concur:
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
xxx
It is settled jurisprudence that he who invokes the exempting circumstance of self-
defense must prove it during the trial [U.S. v. Coronel, 30 Phil. 112 (1915)]. He must
prove the elements enumerated in Article 11 by clear and convincing evidence, the
reason being that since he had admitted having killed or wounded another, which is an
act punishable by law, he shall be liable thereof unless he establishes a lawful defense
[People v. Boholst-Caballero, supra]. Thus, the determination of whether or not all the
three elements are present in the case.
1. That there was unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased
Leopoldo Potane is evident from the established facts. Leopoldo
Potane, who had showed signs of mental illness and had threatened
his immediate relatives with a bolo, suddenly and without
provocation attacked with a bolo Masipequina, whom he (Leopoldo
Potane) has asked to go inside the house.
2. That there was reasonable necessity of the means employed by
Masipequina to prevent or repel Leopoldo Potane's attack is also
supported by the evidence.
In the leading case of U.S. v. Mojica, 42 Phil. 784 (1922), where a policeman trying to
quell a disturbance shot with his revolver and fatally wounded a man who attacked him
with a knife, the Court laid down the following rule:
A police officer, in the performance of his duty, must stand his ground
and cannot, like a private individual, take refuge in flight; his duty
requires him to overcome his opponent. The force which he may exert
 therefore differs somewhat from that which may ordinarily be offered
in self-defense. Bearing this in mind, we do not think that the
appellant in using his revolver against the deceased can be said to
have employed unnecessary force. The deceased attacked him with a
deadly weapon; he might, perhaps, have saved himself by running
away, but this his duty forbade. Was he to allow himself to be stabbed
before using his arms? It may, perhaps, be argued that the appellant
might have used his club, but a policeman's club is not a very effective
weapon as against a drawn knife and a police officer is not required to
afford a person attacking him the opportunity for a fair and equal
struggle. (State vs. Phillips, 119 Iowa, 652; 67 L.R.A. 292; North
Carolina vs. Gosnell, 74 Fed., 734; Boykin vs. People, 22 Colo., 496; 45
Pac., 419; Adams vs. State, 72 Ga., 85.) And if it was necessary for the
appellant to use his revolver, he could hardly, under the
circumstances, be expected to take deliberate and careful aim so as to
strike a point less vulnerable than the body of his adversary. (U.S. vs.
Mack 8 Phil., 701; U.S. v. Domen 37 Phil., 57.) [Id., p. 787].
Tested by this standard, the means employed by Masipequina in repelling the attack
were, under the circumstances, both reasonable and necessary. He initially tried to
defend himself by pushing the rocking chair toward Leopoldo Potane but when that
proved futile and he (Masipequina) was caught in a very precarious position, i.e., his back
was on the floor and Leopoldo Potane kept flailing at him with the bolo, he had no other
choice but to use his revolver to defend himself against the attack. Under the
circumstances, there was no opportunity for Masipequina to carefully take aim. He just
discharged his weapon at the deceased in the hope that such would save him from any
further injury or death.
It must also be borne in mind that the rule is that the reasonable necessity of the means
employed to repel or prevent the attack depends upon the imminent danger of injury,
not on the harm actually done to the accused [U.S. v. Paras, 9 Phil. 367 (1907)]. Thus, that
Masipequina escaped serious injuries does not necessarily imply that the means he used
to repel the attack were unreasonable and excessive. The fact remains that the act of
Leopoldo Potane of attacking Masipequina with a bolo was a very real danger to his life
that the latter had to repel the best way he can. That the gunshot wounds he inflicted on
Leopoldo Potane proved to be fatal does not make the means he employed any less
reasonable under the circumstances.
3. Then, the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of Masipequina is too plain to even
doubt. He, together with Patrolman Alampayan had been tasked by his superior to
apprehend Leopoldo Potane upon complaint of his own father and brother. Thus,
petitioners herein, when they went to apprehend the deceased, were in the performance
of their official duties as peace officers. And when they reached the house where
Leopoldo Potane was hiding, Masipequina tried to coax Leopoldo Potane into coming out
of the house, but the latter would not. It was only when Leopoldo Potane asked
Masipequina, who was his childhood friend, to enter the house that he did, followed by
Nicolas Potane. Masipequina was about to take a seat, definitely a non-provocative act,
when he was suddenly attacked by Leopoldo Potane with a bolo.
As consistently argued by the Solicitor General before the Court of Appeals and this
Court, all the elements of self defense are present in the instant case:
... (a) [T]here was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim which
was a real and imminent threat to the life of Pat. Masipequina. The
victim was brandishing a bolo which he did use in fact to hit the latter;
(b) The use of his revolver to repel the aggression was a reasonable
necessity. His life already exposed to danger in the face of a
continuous assault, it is likely that had he not shot the victim, he
would have been killed, considering the deranged mind of the
aggressor. Moreover, after he shot the victim, he ran away to avoid
being hit farther (sic), an act obviously inconsistent with a deliberate
intent to kill; (c) Pat. Masipequina did not provoke the victim into
attacking him. In fact, before he went inside the house, he asked
Leopoldo to come out to talk things over. He even asked for a drink. It
was only when the victim himself asked Pat. Masipequina to go up the
house that the latter entered the sala.
xxx
[Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Respondent People's Brief, p. 12;
Rollo, p. 115].
We also hasten to add that, as in the case of People v. Boholst-Caballero, supra, we accord
special significance to the wounds inflicted on the deceased in finding that the elements
of self-defense had been established.
According to Dr. Julieta Melicor, who conducted the postmortem examination on the
body of the deceased, the trajectory of the two chest wounds indicate that the person
who fired the shots was in a lying and lower position while the deceased was then
standing [TSN, September 2, 1976, pp. 5-6, 10]. This corroborates petitioner
Masipequina's testimony that he had his back to the floor when he fired at the victim
who was attacking him with a bolo. The fact that the wounds bore traces of gunpowder,
indicating the proximity between the person who fired the shot and the deceased, also
support Masipequina's testimony.
After the elements of self-defense had been established to exculpate petitioners from the
charge of homicide, the next question that arises, albeit only incidentally, is whether or
not Alampayan could be separately convicted of the lesser offense of less serious or
slight physical injuries for the gunshot wound he inflicted on Leopoldo Potane's thigh.
Again, we refer to Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any
criminal liability:
xxx
 3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger,
provided that the first and second requisites mentioned in the first
circumstance of this article are present and that the person defending
be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.
xxx
Thus, the elements of defense of stranger are: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) the person defending be
not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.
1. In the instant case, that there was unlawful aggression on the part
of Leopoldo Potane had been adequately established, as discussed
earlier with regard to the circumstance of self-defense.
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack, was lacking. However,
after a careful consideration of the undisputed facts and the rule on self-defense by
police officers enunciated in Mojica, this Court is convinced that said element had been
established and that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it rejected
petitioners' defense and affirmed the trial court's judgment of conviction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED. Petitioners Patrolmen Norberto Masipequina and Jovencio Alampayan are
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.

2. Then, that the means employed by Alampayan in trying to prevent

Leopoldo Potane from further attacking Masipequina with a bolo were
reasonable is clearly evident, as Alampayan only shot at Leopoldo
Potane's thigh to prevent him from further pursuing Masipequina
who was trying to escape Leopoldo Potane's attack.

3. Finally, that Alampayan was not motivated by any evil motive is

shown by the fact that he, together with Masipequina, only proceeded
to the place where the incident happened to look for Leopoldo Potane
because they had been ordered by their substation commander to
apprehend Leopoldo Potane who had shown signs of mental
derangement and had threatened his relatives with a bolo. In short,
the two policemen were in the performance of their official and lawful
duties.

This, the performance of duties, brings to fore another circumstance that would justify
Alampayan's wounding of Leopoldo Potane, for the same Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code exempts from liability [a]ny person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office" [Art. 11, par. 5]. Thus, in one case, the Court acquitted
the accused police officers even if their acts constituted the crimes of discharge of
firearm and lesiones graves and menos graves, inflicted upon persons facing criminal
charges who were trying to resist arrest, because the accused officers were in the
performance of their official duties [U.S. v. Resaba, 1 Phil. 311 (1902)].

Finally, the small lacerated wounds on Leopoldo Potane's forehead and right leg, which
the trial court and the Court of Appeals found suspicious, can be explained by the fact
that Leopoldo Potane dropped to the ground after he was shot on the thigh by
Alampayan. There is nothing on the record to support the conclusion that the wounds
were inflicted by a flashlight or gun butt.

In fine, this Court, on the basis of the same facts found by the Court of Appeals, has
arrived at a different conclusion. Principally, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision after concluding that one of the elements of self-defense, i.e., reasonable
[G. R. No. 148724. October 15, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DOMINGO ARNANTE y DACPANO
VITUG, J.:
On 16 July 2000, Valentin Arnante, his son Domingo Arnante, and other relatives
were celebrating the birth anniversary of Christopher Arnante, another son of Valentin
and brother of Domingo, at their residence in Sto. Domingo, Iriga City. Shortly after
lunch, the group started having drinks in the living room of the Arnante residence. At
around six oclock in the evening, Valentin and his son Domingo, by then already both
drunk, came to a heated argument. Domingo told his father to stop embarrassing him in
front of guests but the latter still went on berating his son. Feeling ignored, Domingo
stood up, proceeded to his room, followed by his brother Christopher, and took hold of a
handgun. Domingo fired the gun towards the ground scaring the people in the house and
prompting them to rush out through the front door.Domingo went out of the house
through the kitchen door. His father Valentin followed until he was fired at and shot
twice by Domingo. The victim was not able to make it to the hospital.
Domingo Arnante y Dacpano was indicted for parricide in an information that read
That at about 6:00 oclock in the evening of July 16, 2000 at their residence at Zone 5,
Mabunga St., Sto. Domingo, Iriga City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill, shoot his own father, Valentin Arnante y Tabayag twice
with a handgun hitting his stomach and left arm which directly caused his instantaneous
death[1] -
to which charge he pleaded not guilty when arraigned.
Elena Arnante, the wife of the victim and mother of Domingo, testified that she was
in the living room when she heard two gunshots.She dashed out from the room and she
saw near the kitchen her husband down on the floor with gunshot wounds and her son
Domingo standing by the kitchen door still holding the handgun. She immediately called
for help and brought Valentin to the Our Lady of Mediatrix Hospital where her husband
was declared dead on arrival.
Christopher Arnante stated that he tried to caution his brother Domingo when the
latter got hold of the handgun but his brother would not hear of it. Domingo went out of
the house through the kitchen door. Valentin followed. Christopher then heard two
gunshots. He did not see where the first shot was directed at but he saw the second shot
being aimed at his father. Entering the house, he saw his father bleeding and about to fall
to the ground. When he tried to assist his father, Domingo also fired at him but
missed. Christopher hurriedly went to the house of a neighbor to call for help. Failing to
contact any police officer, he personally went to the police station where, not long after,
he was informed that his father was dead on arrival at the hospital.
Dr. Pablo Filio, Jr., the Assistant City Health Officer of Iriga City, conducted a
postmortem examination on the cadaver of Valentin Arnante about six hours after the
latters death. The physicians postmortem report indicated that the victim suffered two
(2) gunshot wounds one on the left arm which penetrated 2 inches below the armpit and
another gunshot wound on the umbilical region, 3 inches below the umbilicus the second
wound being fatal and the immediate cause of death of the victim. He also testified that
from the entry and direction of the wound, it would appear that the assailant was in front
of the victim.
Domingo Arnante admitted having shot his own father twice but sought to justify
his misdeed. He said that during the celebration of his brothers birthday, his father,
without any apparent reason, got mad at him and started scolding him. He told his father
to stop humiliating him in front of all the guests but the victim persisted. He left the
group and went to his room to get his gun. He fired the gun downwards to make his
father stop censuring him. He then went out of the house through the kitchen door but
his father still followed and threatened to hack him with a bolo. He was so embarrassed
that he lost control of himself and shot his father twice. He promptly left the scene but
soon thereafter surrendered to the police authorities.
The Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 35, which had tried the case,
rendered a decision, on 09 February 2001, rejecting the plea of self-defense and
convicting Domingo Arnante; it held:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused DOMINGO ARNANTE guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of parricide defined and penalized under Article 246 of the Revised Penal
Code, he is sentenced to a penalty of reclusion perpetua, pay the indemnity of P50,000.00
and to pay the costs.[2]
In its brief for appellant, the defense raised a lone assignment of error to the effect
that the the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant despite the fact that he
(had) acted in legitimate self-defense.[3]
The claim of self-defense is untenable. When an accused admits killing the victim
but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, he assumes the burden to establish
his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence.[4] In order that the plea of self-
defense can prevail, three basic conditions must concur, i.e., (1) unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.[5] Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or
imminent danger on the life and limb of a person defending himself [6] and not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude. The aggression must be real and not just
imaginary.[7]
The testimony of appellant himself easily negates any showing of unlawful
aggression on the part of his father. Observe his testimony -
Q. On July 16, 2000 at or about 6:00 oclock in the evening at Sto. Domingo,
Iriga City while you were at your house together with your father what
happened if any?
A. Now, there was a birthday celebration in connection of the birthday of my
brother and a drinking spree was held.
Q. What is the name of your brother?
A. Christopher.
Q. What happened between you and your father at around 6:00 oclock in the
evening on said date and time and year and place?
A. We had an altercation.
Q. And what is that altercation about between you and your father?
A. I cannot understand sir. He suddenly got mad at me. Q. For how many times did you shoot your father?
Q. And what happened when your father suddenly got mad at you? A. Two (2) times.
A. I told my father not to scold me anymore as there were very many people Q. Why two (2) shots?
there it was shameful on my part. A. I was not able to control myself.[8]
Q. Then what happened when you told that to your father?
A. He continued scolding me. Nothing in the testimony would suggest the attendance of a kind of unlawful
Q. By the way you mentioned papa, is that the way you call your father? aggression on the part of the victim that can justify appellants claim of self-defense. A
A. Yes, sir. mere perception of an impending attack is not sufficient to constitute unlawful
Q. So, what happened when your papa continued to scold you? aggression, and neither is an intimidating or threatening attitude.[9]
A. I left. The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
Q. Where did you proceed? surrender. Verily, appellant voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities shortly
A. I entered my room to put a stop to his scolding. after the shooting incident.
Q. And after you entered your room what happened next?
A. He continued scolding me so what I did was I took my gun and then fired Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
downward. prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of parricide. The
Q. Why did you fire your gun downward? attendance of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender justifies the imposition
A. In order for my father to stop scolding me as there were so many people I of the lesser penalty.[10]
was getting embarrassed.
Q. After firing your gun downward what happened next? In addition to the civil liability of P50,000.00, appellant must also be made to
A. I went out of the house through the kitchen. account for P50,000.00 moral damages for wounded feelings and moral shock suffered
Q. Why did you went out the house through the kitchen Mr. Witness? by the heirs of the victim and P25,000.00 exemplary damages on account of relationship,
A. So I could leave the place. a qualifying circumstance, which was alleged and proved, to the crime of parricide.
Q. Were you able to leave the house through the kitchen? WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iriga City, Branch 35, in
A. Yes, sir. Criminal Case No. IR-5300, finding DOMINGO ARNANTE y DACPANO guilty of the crime
Q. And what happened when you were able to go out the house? of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, as well as to
A. Now I went out of the house so I could leave the place but after I went out pay P50,000.00 civil indemnity, is AFFIRMED with modification in that appellant is
of the house I saw my father followed me closely. likewise hereby ordered to pay P50,000.00 moral damages and P25,000.00 exemplary
Q. And what happened when your father followed you closely? damages to the heirs of the victim. Costs against appellant.
A. He was still scolding me and he was carrying a bolo.
Q. What happened when you noticed that your father followed you closely SO ORDERED.
and he had a bolo?
A. He was about to hack me I told him not to do it because I was going to
leave.
PROS. TAGUM:
Your Honor, we will object to the testimony of this witness because it is not
one of those purposes for which this witness is being offered in
evidence.
ATTY. CABALTERA:
That is precisely Your Honor part of the mitigating circumstances of sufficient
provocation or threat on the part of the offended party that immediately
preceded the act.
COURT:
Let him answer.
ATTY. CABALTERA:
Okay.
Q. What happened next after that?
A. He was still scolding me. He threatened to hack me.
Q. After he threatened to hack you what did you do next if any?
A. Now as he was still scolding me and I was getting so much embarrassed
now I saw something dark and I shot my father. My vision darkened and
I was able to shoot my father.
G.R. No. L-14170 November 23, 1918
THE UNITED STATES vs CATALINO MERCED and APOLONIA PATRON
TORRES, J.:
Before the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros the defendants Catalino Merced and
Apolonia Patron were charged by the provincial fiscal with the crime of homicide, and
after the trial of this cause judgment was rendered on April 29th of the present year
whereby Catalino Merced was sentenced to fourteen years, eight months and one day
of reclusion temporal, with allowance of one-half of the time of preventive imprisonment
suffered, to the accessory penalties, and to pay, jointly and severally with the other
defendant, in indemnity of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, and also one-half of the
costs; and Apolonia Patron, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, to the accessory
penalties, to pay the heirs of Pantaleon Arabe, jointly and severally with the other
defendant, the same amount of indemnity fixed for the latter, and to the payment of the
other one-half of the costs. From this judgment defendants' counsel appealed.
On the night of March 4th of the present year, Catalino Merced went to the house of
Teodora Sarasin, situated in the barrio of Palimpinon of the town of Luzuriaga, and, at
the invitation of the mistress of the house, sat down to supper with her; a short while
afterwards Apolonia Patron also arrive, and, fetching some morisqueta or cooked rice
from her house nearby, likewise sat down to supper with the two other persons above-
mentioned. After supper Merced and Patron successively went down from the house, and
the former, upon his return to it and with the permission of its owner, went into the main
room thereof to rest. Apolonia Patron, who returned to the house a short while
afterwards, did likewise, and they both met in said room to lie down to sleep there. There
upon, the mistress of the house, Teodora Sarasin, went to bed with her children, and
while asleep was awakened by the noise caused by a struggle waged in the
aforementioned room. Just at that moment Sarasin heard Apolonia say to her (the
latter's) husband that she (Apolonia) was wounded, and heard the husband reply to her,
saying: "that is what you got." On account of these happenings, and out of fear, the owner
of the house left it, passing through the kitchen, and on her return a few moments
afterwards to get her children, she found Pantaleon Arabe, the husband of Apolonia
Patron, stretched out on the mat on which she had been sleeping; he was bloody and was
pressing in his stomach. This witness now found the light which had previously been put
out lit inside the house. When, several hours afterwards, the justice of the peace
proceeded with the investigation of the crime, he found Arabe's body on the river bank,
near the house of the deceased. Such was the testimony of Teodora Sarasin.
Upon the examination of Filomena Ago, the defendant Merced's sister-in-law, she
testified as follows: On the morning of March 2, 1918, two days prior to the crime,
Apolonia Patron went to witness' house and complained that her husband Pantaleon
Arabe had quarreled with her because he suspected that she was maintaining relation
with Catalino Merced, her brother-in-law. Witness Filomena replied to her, saying that, in
order to avoid such quarreling, she ought not to have any dealings with Merced. This
advice angered the defendant Patron and, at about 4 o'clock in the afternoon of that same
day, she again went to Ago's house; she had a dagger (Exhibit B) in her hand and showed
a disposition to quarrel with witness. Several days afterwards witness found this same
dagger on the floor of Patron's house, near the bed on which the defendant Merced lay
down on the night of the 4th of March of this year when he returned to the said house in
which he was living as a brother of witness' husband. When Merced was questioned as to
where he had been wounded, he replied that it was in the house of Teodora Sarasin, and
the witness learned of the occurrence, for it was told to her while Sarasin was in witness'
store. Ago had seen the dagger, Exhibit B, bathed in blood, and it was the same one that
Apolonia Patron was carrying two days before when she became angry in witness' house.
The health officer who examined Pantaleon Arabe's corpse testified that, as he had stated
in his certificate Exhibit A, the corpse bore a serious wound between two ribs of the left
side; that this wound ran obliquely from the left part of the shoulder toward the right
diaphragm and had been inflicted with a double-edged dagger.
The defendant Catalino Merced pleaded not guilty. He testified that while he was resting,
in company with Apolonia Patron, in the house of Teodora Sarasin, where he and
Apolonia had eaten their supper at Sarasin's invitation, Pantaleon Arabe entered the
place and, after telling the defendant to prepare himself because he, Arabe, was going to
kill him, put out the light and gave him several blows with the bolo, Exhibit B, with which
he was provided, inflicting three wounds in his right leg and one in his right arm; that
these wounds were inflicted while witness was lying on the floor of the house, wherefore
he arose to defend himself and a struggle ensued between them during which he
succeeded in snatching from Arabe's belt the dagger, Exhibit B, and with it wounded
Arabe in the back, as a result of which wound, he, Arabe, died. The defendant Apolonia
Patron, who also pleaded not guilty, did not testify at the trial.
The facts related above certainly constitute the crime of homicide comprised within
article 404 of the Penal Code. The record does not show that the violent death of
Pantaleon Arabe, as the result of one single serious and mortal would in the left side of
his back, was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances enumerated in article 503
of said code, for at the time of the struggle, no disinterested eye-witness was present
aside from the two defendants and the owner of the house, which latter person,
awakened by the fight waged between the deceased and his assailant within the main
room of the house, was unable to see and witness what occurred, on account of there
being no light in the house, and learned that one of the fighters was Pantaleon Arabe only
because, on returning to her house, which she had left through fear, to get her children,
she found the deceased, covered with blood, lying stretched out on the bed where she
had lain, and, from the presence of the deceased in her house, she deduced the
conclusion that the fight had been between the deceased and the defendant Merced.
Furthermore, with respect to the qualification of the crime, it may be held to have been
proven, there being no proof to the contrary, that the crime committed was only that of
homicide, for the reason that the mortal wound which caused Arabe's death was a
consequence of the struggle engaged in by the latter and the defendant Merced.
Aside from the fact that there is no proof in support of the statement made by the
defendant Merced to the effect that when Pantaleon Arabe entered the house in question,
he told the defendants to prepare himself for he, Arabe, was going to kill him, and that
immediately thereafter Arabe put out the light and assaulted him with the weapon which
he was carrying, on which account he claims it became necessary for him, in self-defense,
to wound Arabe with the dagger which he succeeded in snatching from the latter's belt,
this plea is unsustainable, because it is not true and because, even though it were true
and even if the deceased did succeed in entering the room in which the defendants
Merced and Patron were lying, and did immediately thereupon assault Merced, giving
him several blows with the bolo which he, Arabe, carried, that assault was natural and
lawful, for the reason that it was made by a deceived and offended husband in order to
defend his honor and rights by punishing the offender of his honor, and if he had killed
his wife and the other defendant, he would have exercised a lawful right and such acts
would have fallen within the sanction of article 423 of the Penal Code, and not of the
article thereof which penalizes the crime of homicide.lawphil.net
when he went to the house of the crime in agreement with his codefendant Patron;
besides, there is no proof that the latter carried the dagger that night, and therefore it
cannot be asserted that the unfaithful wife furnished the weapon with which her
codefendant Catalino Merced inflicted upon her husband a serious wound followed by
his death. For these reasons it must be concluded that the record does not show any
proof, circumstantial or other, that Apolonia Patron was at least an accomplice in the
commission of the punishable act of which her husband was the victim. The acquittal of
this defendant is all the more proper in that the complaint did not change her with
having taken any part as an accomplice in the commission of the crime.

Despite the testimony given by the defendant, it is unquestionable that Apolonia Patron,
the wife of the deceased, was that night in the room in which Catalino Merced was lying;
in fact he finally admitted that, on account of the illicit relations between himself and this
woman, they were in the habit of keeping trysts and meeting each other on other
occasions, and that, on the night in question, he was in the house where the crime was
committed, in company with his codefendant Patron, for, during the struggle, the owner
of the house Teodora Sarasin heard Patron say to her (Patron's) husband, the deceased,
that she herself was wounded.
For the foregoing reasons, and no generic extenuating or aggravating circumstance
having attended the execution of the crime, and the first error assigned to the judgment
appealed from being held to have been refuted, said judgment should be, as it hereby is,
affirmed, in so far as it concerns Catalino Merced, with the proviso, however, that he shall
pay P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, and one-half of the costs of both instances; and
the judgment appealed from is reversed in respect to Apolonia Patron, who should be,
and hereby is, absolved from this cause. The other one-half of the costs of both instances
shall be borne de officio. So ordered.

The defendants Merced well knew that, by maintaining unlawful relations with Apolonia
Patron, a married woman, he was performing an unlawful and criminal act and exposed
himself to the vengeance of the offended husband, and that, by the defendants' meeting
each other in the living room of said house, which was near the house in which the
offended husband was living, he was running the danger of the latter's surprising them
there, as in fact it did occur.

As regards the participation which the unfaithful wife may have had in the killing of her
husband, for she was present during the struggle that ensued between the deceased and
her codefendant, the record does not disclose conclusive proof that she cooperated with,
or aided, Catalino Merced when he assaulted her husband and inflicted upon him the
single mortal wound that produced his death, for the defendant Catalino Merced himself
confessed that he inflicted this wound upon the deceased with the dagger which he
succeeded in taking from the latter's belt.

It was not proven who was the real owner of the dagger, Exhibit B, and, notwithstanding
the defendant Merced's testimony, there is no circumstantial evidence in the record to
show that the weapon belonged to the deceased.

The witness Filomena Ago, a sister-in law of Catalino Merced, testified that several days
before the crime she had seen this dagger in the hands of Apolonia Patron, and that on
the night of the crime, upon the defendant Merced's return to her house where he was
living, she saw blood on his clothes, and noticed that he left the dagger on the floor
beside his bed, wherefore she picked it up and it was afterwards handed to the justice of
the peace.

Notwithstanding the testimony just alluded to, it cannot be affirmed that the dagger
belonged to the defendant Patron, because, for the very reason that the defendant
Merced admitted and confessed that he seriously wounded the deceased with this
dagger, it is to be presumed that Merced was its owner, and that he carried it with him
G.R. No. L-12963 October 25, 1917
THE UNITED STATES vs URBANO DOMEN
MALCOLM, J.:
The defendant and appellant frankly admits that a wound inflicted by him with
a tuba knife on the right arm of Victoriano Gadlit caused the death of the latter. The
appellant, however, advances the claim, that he should be exempted from criminal
liability because of having acted in defense of his person. Let us, therefore, examine the
evidence to ascertain if the decision of the trial court finding the defendant and appellant
guilty of homicide should be sustained or whether as contended by counsel and as
recommended by the Attorney-General the defendant should be acquitted.
The widow took the stand for the prosecution and testified that the accused
made an unprovoked attack upon her husband at the foot of the stairway leading up into
their house, and that this attack was also witnessed by a neighbor, Angel Pocong. But
Angel Pocong testified that he was absent from home at the time in question, and that all
that he knew of the fight was what was told him by the widow. The court found that the
widow was mistaken in her testimony. Not considering, therefore, her testimony, the
prosecution has in addition only the testimony of Filomeno Antipuesto, who told of the
accused having admitted that he had wounded the deceased, and the testimony of Angel
Pocong as to the death of the deceased while being carried in a hammock. We must then
perforce rely on the evidence for the defense. From the testimony of two witnesses who
claimed to have seen what occurred and the testimony of the defendant, it appears that
the defendant and the deceased quarrelled about a carabao of the defendant, which the
deceased said had gotten into his corn patch; that the deceased attacked the defendant
and struck him with a piece of wood called "Japanese," about a vara in length and about
the size of one's wrist; that the deceased struck at the accused four or five times; and that
the accused did not retreat but struck back wounding the deceased on the forearm.
The facts stated present a close question for the decision. Admitting that there
was unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased, the doubt centers around the point
as to whether there was reasonable necessity for the means employed by the defendant
to repel the attack. Resolving, as it is our duty to do, any doubt in favor of the accused,
and passing by well known principles of the criminal law, we come to the case of United
States vs. Molina ([1911] 19 Phil., 227), and the doctrines therein enunciated. In the
opinion handed down in this case by Mr. Justice Mapa, it is held that: (1) During an
unlawful attack by another and while a struggle is going on and the danger to his person
or to his life continues, the party assaulted has a right to repel the danger by wounding
his adversary, and if, necessary, to disable him; (2) the fact that a person when assaulted
does not flee from his assailant is not sufficient reason for declining in a proper case to
uphold the rational necessity of the means employed in repelling the illegal attack.
The first proposition of the Molina opinion is in accord with the settled
jurisprudence of this court. (See U. S. vs. Laurel [1912], 22 Phil., 252; U. S. vs. Patoto
[1914], 28 Phil., 535.) The second proposition dealing with the necessity of retreat by the
accused can be further examined in the light of controlling authorities. The ancient
common law rule in homicide was denominated "retreat to the wall." This doctrine
makes it the duty of a person assailed to retreat as far as he can before he is justified in
meeting force with force. This principle has now given way in the United States to the
"stand ground when in the right" rule. The Supreme Court of the United States carefully
examined the application of the two doctrines in Beard vs. United States ([1894] 158 U.
S., 550). In the opinion handed down by Mr. Justice Harlan reference is made approvingly
to the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio in Erwin vs. State ([1876] 29 Ohio St., 186)
in which it is said:
It is true that all authorities agree that the taking of life in defense of one's
person cannot be either justified or excused, except on the ground of necessity;
and that such necessity must be imminent at the time; and they also agree that
no man can avail himself of such necessity if he brings it upon himself. The
question, then, is simply this: Does the law hold a man who is violently and
feloniously assaulted responsible for having brought such necessity upon
himself, on the sole ground that he failed to fly from his assailant when he
might safely have done so? The law, out of tenderness for human life and the
frailties of human nature, will not permit the taking of it to repel a mere
trespass, or even to save life where the assault is provoked; but a true man,
who is without fault, is not obliged to fly from an assailant, who, by violence or
surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life or do him enormous bodily harm.
Justice Harlan then concludes his opinion with these words:
The defendant was where he had the right to be, when the deceased advanced
upon him in a threatening manner, and with a deadly weapon; and if the
accused did not provoked the assault and had at the time reasonable grounds to
believe and in good faith believed, that the deceased intended to take his life or
do him great bodily harm, he was not obliged to retreat, nor consider whether
he could safely retreat, but was entitled to stand his ground and meet any
attack made upon him with a deadly weapon, in such way and with such force
as, under all circumstances, he, at the moment, honestly believed, and had
reasonable grounds to believe, was necessary to save his own life or to protect
himself from great bodily injury.
The same Court reexamined and reaffirmed the doctrine in Rowe vs. United
States ([1896] 164 U. S., 546).
We can do no better than to paraphrase the language of these well considered
opinions for our present purpose. The accused did not provoke the assault. The accused
was where he had a right to be. The law did not require him to retreat when his assailant
was rapidly advancing upon him in a threatening manner with a deadly weapon. The
accused was entitled to do whatever he had reasonable grounds to believe at the time
was necessary to save his life or to protect himself from great bodily harm. The element
of practicability made it impossible for him to determine during the heat of a sudden
attack whether he would increase or diminish the risk to which exposed by standing his
ground or stepping aside. His resistance was not disproportionate to the assault. The
wound was inflicted, not on what is usually a vital part of the body but on the arm as one
would naturally strike to defend himself. Viewed from all angles, we believe this is a
"proper case" for the exemption of the accused from criminal liability because of having
acted in legitimate defense of his person.
Agreeable to the recommendation of the Attorney-General and in conformity
with the proof, judged in connection with the principles just stated, we must reverse the
judgment of the trial court and acquit the defendant and appellant of the crime charged,
with the costs of both instances de officio. So ordered.
 [G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIVIC GENOSA
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Admitting she killed her husband, appellant anchors her prayer for acquittal on a
novel theory -- the battered woman syndrome (BWS), which allegedly constitutes self-
defense. Under the proven facts, however, she is not entitled to complete exoneration
because there was no unlawful aggression -- no immediate and unexpected attack on her
by her batterer-husband at the time she shot him.
Absent unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.
But all is not lost. The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted
a form of cumulative provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and self-
control. This psychological paralysis she suffered diminished her will power, thereby
entitling her to the mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code.
In addition, appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of
having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and
obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-
spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight months pregnant with their child,
overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which
overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her unborn childs.
Considering the presence of these two mitigating circumstances arising from BWS,
as well as the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she may now apply for and be
released from custody on parole, because she has already served the minimum period of
her penalty while under detention during the pendency of this case.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the September 25, 1998 Decision [1] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City (Branch 35) in Criminal Case No. 5016-0,
finding Marivic Genosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide. The decretal portion
of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the accused,
Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide as
provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659,
and after finding treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating
circumstance, hereby sentences the accused with the penalty of DEATH.
The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral damages.[2]
The Information[3] charged appellant with parricide as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of
Isabel, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one
BEN GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the
accused had provided herself for the purpose, [causing] the following wounds, to wit:
Cadaveric spasm.
Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.
Face, black, blownup & swollen w/ evident post-mortem lividity. Eyes
protruding from its sockets and tongue slightly protrudes out of the mouth.
Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head,
resulting [in] laceration of the brain, spontaneous rupture of the blood
vessels on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration of the dura and
meningeal vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.
Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the
epidermis.
Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.
which caused his death.[4]
With the assistance of her counsel,[5] appellant pleaded not guilty during her
arraignment on March 3, 1997.[6] In due course, she was tried for and convicted of
parricide.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecutions version of
the facts in this wise:
Appellant and Ben Genosa were united in marriage on November 19, 1983 in Ormoc City.
Thereafter, they lived with the parents of Ben in their house at Isabel, Leyte. For a time,
Bens younger brother, Alex, and his wife lived with them too. Sometime in 1995,
however, appellant and Ben rented from Steban Matiga a house at Barangay Bilwang,
Isabel, Leyte where they lived with their two children, namely: John Marben and Earl
Pierre.
On November 15, 1995, Ben and Arturo Basobas went to a cockfight after receiving their
salary. They each had two (2) bottles of beer before heading home. Arturo would pass
Bens house before reaching his. When they arrived at the house of Ben, he found out that
appellant had gone to Isabel, Leyte to look for him. Ben went inside his house, while
Arturo went to a store across it, waiting until 9:00 in the evening for the masiao runner
to place a bet. Arturo did not see appellant arrive but on his way home passing the side of
the Genosas rented house, he heard her say I wont hesitate to kill you to which Ben
replied Why kill me when I am innocent? That was the last time Arturo saw Ben alive.
Arturo also noticed that since then, the Genosas rented house appeared uninhabited and
was always closed.
On November 16, 1995, appellant asked Erlinda Paderog, her close friend and neighbor
living about fifty (50) meters from her house, to look after her pig because she was going
to Cebu for a pregnancy check-up. Appellant likewise asked Erlinda to sell her
motorcycle to their neighbor Ronnie Dayandayan who unfortunately had no money to
buy it.
That same day, about 12:15 in the afternoon, Joseph Valida was waiting for a bus going to
Ormoc when he saw appellant going out of their house with her two kids in tow, each
one carrying a bag, locking the gate and taking her children to the waiting area where he
was. Joseph lived about fifty (50) meters behind the Genosas rented house. Joseph,
appellant and her children rode the same bus to Ormoc. They had no conversation as
Joseph noticed that appellant did not want to talk to him.
On November 18, 1995, the neighbors of Steban Matiga told him about the foul odor
emanating from his house being rented by Ben and appellant. Steban went there to find
out the cause of the stench but the house was locked from the inside. Since he did not
have a duplicate key with him, Steban destroyed the gate padlock with a borrowed steel
saw. He was able to get inside through the kitchen door but only after destroying a
window to reach a hook that locked it. Alone, Steban went inside the unlocked bedroom
where the offensive smell was coming from. There, he saw the lifeless body of Ben lying
on his side on the bed covered with a blanket. He was only in his briefs with injuries at
the back of his head. Seeing this, Steban went out of the house and sent word to the
mother of Ben about his sons misfortune. Later that day, Iluminada Genosa, the mother
of Ben, identified the dead body as that of [her] son.
Meanwhile, in the morning of the same day, SPO3 Leo Acodesin, then assigned at the
police station at Isabel, Leyte, received a report regarding the foul smell at the Genosas
rented house. Together with SPO1 Millares, SPO1 Colon, and Dr. Refelina Cerillo, SPO3
Acodesin proceeded to the house and went inside the bedroom where they found the
dead body of Ben lying on his side wrapped with a bedsheet. There was blood at the nape
of Ben who only had his briefs on. SPO3 Acodesin found in one corner at the side of
an aparador a metal pipe about two (2) meters from where Ben was, leaning against a
wall. The metal pipe measured three (3) feet and six (6) inches long with a diameter of
one and half (1 1/2) inches. It had an open end without a stop valve with a red stain at
one end. The bedroom was not in disarray.
About 10:00 that same morning, the cadaver of Ben, because of its stench, had to be
taken outside at the back of the house before the postmortem examination was
conducted by Dr. Cerillo in the presence of the police. A municipal health officer at Isabel,
Leyte responsible for medico-legal cases, Dr. Cerillo found that Ben had been dead for
two to three days and his body was already decomposing. The postmortem examination
of Dr. Cerillo yielded the findings quoted in the Information for parricide later filed
against appellant. She concluded that the cause of Bens death was cardiopulmonary
arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to a depressed fracture of the
occipital [bone].
Appellant admitted killing Ben. She testified that going home after work on November
15, 1995, she got worried that her husband who was not home yet might have gone
gambling since it was a payday. With her cousin Ecel Arao, appellant went to look for Ben
at the marketplace and taverns at Isabel, Leyte but did not find him there. They found
Ben drunk upon their return at the Genosas house. Ecel went home despite appellants
request for her to sleep in their house.
Then, Ben purportedly nagged appellant for following him, even challenging her to a
fight. She allegedly ignored him and instead attended to their children who were doing
their homework. Apparently disappointed with her reaction, Ben switched off the light
and, with the use of a chopping knife, cut the television antenna or wire to keep her from
watching television. According to appellant, Ben was about to attack her so she ran to the
bedroom, but he got hold of her hands and whirled her around. She fell on the side of the
bed and screamed for help. Ben left. At this point, appellant packed his clothes because
she wanted him to leave. Seeing his packed clothes upon his return home, Ben allegedly
flew into a rage, dragged appellant outside of the bedroom towards a drawer holding her
by the neck, and told her You might as well be killed so nobody would nag me. Appellant
testified that she was aware that there was a gun inside the drawer but since Ben did not
have the key to it, he got a three-inch long blade cutter from his wallet. She however,
smashed the arm of Ben with a pipe, causing him to drop the blade and his wallet.
Appellant then smashed Ben at his nape with the pipe as he was about to pick up the
blade and his wallet. She thereafter ran inside the bedroom.
Appellant, however, insisted that she ended the life of her husband by shooting him. She
supposedly distorted the drawer where the gun was and shot Ben. He did not die on the
spot, though, but in the bedroom.[7] (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant relates her version of the facts in this manner:
1. Marivic and Ben Genosa were allegedly married on November 19, 1983. Prior to her
marriage, Marivic had graduated from San Carlos, Cebu City, obtaining a degree of
Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, and was working, at the time of her
husbands death, as a Secretary to the Port Managers in Ormoc City. The couple had three
(3) children: John Marben, Earl Pierre and Marie Bianca.
2. Marivic and Ben had known each other since elementary school; they were neighbors
in Bilwang; they were classmates; and they were third degree cousins. Both sets of
parents were against their relationship, but Ben was persistent and tried to stop other
suitors from courting her. Their closeness developed as he was her constant partner at
fiestas.
3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Bens parents, together with Bens
brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily.
But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would quarrel often and their fights would
become violent.
 4. Bens brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not remember when
Ben and Marivic married. He said that when Ben and Marivic quarreled, generally when
Ben would come home drunk, Marivic would inflict injuries on him. He said that in one
incident in 1993 he saw Marivic holding a kitchen knife after Ben had shouted for help as
his left hand was covered with blood. Marivic left the house but after a week, she
returned apparently having asked for Bens forgiveness. In another incident in May 22,
1994, early morning, Alex and his father apparently rushed to Bens aid again and saw
blood from Bens forehead and Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben and Marivic
reconciled after Marivic had apparently again asked for Bens forgiveness.
Mrs. Iluminada Genosa, Marivics mother-in-law, testified too, saying that Ben and
Marivic married in 1986 or 1985 more or less here in Fatima, Ormoc City. She said as the
marriage went along, Marivic became already very demanding. Mrs. Iluminada Genosa
said that after the birth of Marivics two sons, there were three (3) misunderstandings.
The first was when Marivic stabbed Ben with a table knife through his left arm; the
second incident was on November 15, 1994, when Marivic struck Ben on the
forehead using a sharp instrument until the eye was also affected. It was wounded and
also the ear and her husband went to Ben to help; and the third incident was in 1995
when the couple had already transferred to the house in Bilwang and she saw that Bens
hand was plastered as the bone cracked.
Both mother and son claimed they brought Ben to a Pasar clinic for medical intervention.
5. Arturo Basobas, a co-worker of Ben, testified that on November 15, 1995 After we
collected our salary, we went to the cock-fighting place of ISCO. They stayed there for
three (3) hours, after which they went to Uniloks and drank beer allegedly only two (2)
bottles each. After drinking they bought barbeque and went to the Genosa
residence. Marivic was not there. He stayed a while talking with Ben, after which he went
across the road to wait for the runner and the usher of the masiao game because during
that time, the hearing on masiao numbers was rampant. I was waiting for the ushers and
runners so that I can place my bet. On his way home at about 9:00 in the evening, he
heard the Genosas arguing. They were quarreling loudly. Outside their house was one
Fredo who is used by Ben to feed his fighting cocks. Basobas testimony on the root of the
quarrel, conveniently overheard by him was Marivic saying I will never hesitate to kill
you, whilst Ben replied Why kill me when I am innocent. Basobas thought they were
joking.
He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the Genosa
residence. Basobas admitted that he and Ben were always at the cockpits every Saturday
and Sunday. He claims that he once told Ben before when he was stricken with a bottle
by Marivic Genosa that he should leave her and that Ben would always take her back
after she would leave him so many times.
Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long time that they
had been quarreling. He said Ben even had a wound on the right forehead. He had known
the couple for only one (1) year.
6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to her and was
a habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her, sometimes he would pin
her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
These incidents happened several times and she would often run home to her parents,
but Ben would follow her and seek her out, promising to change and would ask for her
forgiveness. She said after she would be beaten, she would seek medical help from Dr.
Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo. These doctors would enter the injuries inflicted
upon her by Ben into their reports. Marivic said Ben would beat her or quarrel with her
every time he was drunk, at least three times a week.
7. In her defense, witnesses who were not so closely related to Marivic, testified as to the
abuse and violence she received at the hands of Ben.
7.1. Mr. Joe Barrientos, a fisherman, who was a [neighbor] of the Genosas, testified that
on November 15, 1995, he overheard a quarrel between Ben and Marivic. Marivic was
shouting for help and through the open jalousies, he saw the spouses grappling with each
other. Ben had Marivic in a choke hold. He did not do anything, but had come voluntarily
to testify. (Please note this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Busabos.[8])
7.2. Mr. Junnie Barrientos, also a fisherman, and the brother of Mr. Joe Barrientos,
testified that he heard his neighbor Marivic shouting on the night of November 15, 1995.
He peeped through the window of his hut which is located beside the Genosa house and
saw the spouses grappling with each other then Ben Genosa was holding with his both
hands the neck of the accused, Marivic Genosa. He said after a while, Marivic was able to
extricate he[r]self and enter the room of the children. After that, he went back to work as
he was to go fishing that evening. He returned at 8:00 the next morning. (Again, please
note that this was the same night as that testified to by Arturo Basobas).
7.3. Mr. Teodoro Sarabia was a former neighbor of the Genosas while they were living in
Isabel, Leyte. His house was located about fifty (50) meters from theirs. Marivic is his
niece and he knew them to be living together for 13 or 14 years. He said the couple was
always quarreling. Marivic confided in him that Ben would pawn items and then would
use the money to gamble. One time, he went to their house and they were quarreling.
Ben was so angry, but would be pacified if somebody would come. He testified that while
Ben was alive he used to gamble and when he became drunk, he would go to our house
and he will say, Teody because that was what he used to call me, mokimas ta, which
means lets go and look for a whore. Mr. Sarabia further testified that Ben would box his
wife and I would see bruises and one time she ran to me, I noticed a wound (the witness
pointed to his right breast) as according to her a knife was stricken to her. Mr. Sarabia
also said that once he saw Ben had been injured too. He said he voluntarily testified only
that morning.
7.4. Miss Ecel Arano, an 18-year old student, who is a cousin of Marivic, testified that in
the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic went to her house and asked her help to
look for Ben. They searched in the market place, several taverns and some other places,
but could not find him. She accompanied Marivic home. Marivic wanted her to sleep with
her in the Genosa house because she might be battered by her husband. When they got to
the Genosa house at about 7:00 in the evening, Miss Arano said that her husband was
already there and was drunk. Miss Arano knew he was drunk because of his staggering
walking and I can also detect his face. Marivic entered the house and she heard them
quarrel noisily. (Again, please note that this is the same night as that testified to by
Arturo Basobas) Miss Arano testified that this was not the first time Marivic had asked
her to sleep in the house as Marivic would be afraid every time her husband would come
home drunk. At one time when she did sleep over, she was awakened at 10:00 in the
evening when Ben arrived because the couple were very noisy in the sala and I had heard
something was broken like a vase. She said Marivic ran into her room and they locked
the door. When Ben couldnt get in he got a chair and a knife and showed us the knife
through the window grill and he scared us. She said that Marivic shouted for help, but no
one came. On cross-examination, she said that when she left Marivics house on
November 15, 1995, the couple were still quarreling.
7.5. Dr. Dino Caing, a physician testified that he and Marivic were co-employees at
PHILPHOS, Isabel, Leyte. Marivic was his patient many times and had also received
treatment from other doctors. Dr. Caing testified that from July 6, 1989 until November
9, 1995, there were six (6) episodes of physical injuries inflicted upon Marivic. These
injuries were reported in his Out-Patient Chart at the PHILPHOS Hospital. The
prosecution admitted the qualifications of Dr. Caing and considered him an expert
witness.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Caings clinical history of the tension headache and hypertention of Marivic on
twenty-three (23) separate occasions was marked at Exhibits 2 and 2-B. The OPD Chart
of Marivic at the Philphos Clinic which reflected all the consultations made by Marivic
and the six (6) incidents of physical injuries reported was marked as Exhibit 3.
On cross-examination, Dr. Caing said that he is not a psychiatrist, he could not say
whether the injuries were directly related to the crime committed. He said it is only a
psychiatrist who is qualified to examine the psychological make-up of the patient,
whether she is capable of committing a crime or not.
7.6 Mr. Panfilo Tero, the barangay captain in the place where the Genosas resided,
testified that about two (2) months before Ben died, Marivic went to his office past 8:00
in the evening. She sought his help to settle or confront the Genosa couple who were
experiencing family troubles. He told Marivic to return in the morning, but he did not
hear from her again and assumed that they might have settled with each other or they
might have forgiven with each other.
xxxxxxxxx
Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her
husband who began the provocation. Marivic said she was frightened that her husband
would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely. In fact,
Marivic had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from
eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.
Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five
(5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. Marivic said
that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because he
was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu x x x Rubillos.
On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said that he died in
the bedroom; that their quarrels could be heard by anyone passing their house; that
Basobas lied in his testimony; that she left for Manila the next day, November 16, 1995;
that she did not bother anyone in Manila, rented herself a room, and got herself a job as a
field researcher under the alias Marvelous Isidro; she did not tell anyone that she was
leaving Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and that she was
arrested in San Pablo, Laguna.
Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun away; that she
did not know what happened to the pipe she used to smash him once; that she was
wounded by Ben on her wrist with the bolo; and that two (2) hours after she was whirled
by Ben, he kicked her ass and dragged her towards the drawer when he saw that she had
packed his things.
9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an investigation was
made of the foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence. This fact was testified to by all
the prosecution witnesses and some defense witnesses during the trial.
10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of Isabel, Leyte
at the time of the incident, and among her responsibilities as such was to take charge of
all medico-legal cases, such as the examination of cadavers and the autopsy of
cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic pathologist. She merely took the medical board
exams and passed in 1986. She was called by the police to go to the Genosa residence and
when she got there, she saw some police officer and neighbor around. She saw Ben
Genosa, covered by a blanket, lying in a semi-prone position with his back to the door. He
was wearing only a brief.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Cerillo said that there is only one injury and that is the injury involving the skeletal
area of the head which she described as a fracture. And that based on her examination,
Ben had been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did not testify as to what caused his death.
Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa charged
her with the crime of PARRICIDE committed with intent to kill, with treachery and
evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and
wound x x x her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which
caused his death.
 12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17, 22 and 23
September 1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997, 22 May 1998, and 5
and 6 August 1998.
13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last trial date, the
Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City, rendered a
JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide, and
further found treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus sentencing her to the
ultimate penalty of DEATH.
14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review and, under
date of 24 January 2000, Marivics trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P. Tabucanon, filed a
Motion to Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a precautionary measure, two (2)
drafts of Appellants Briefs he had prepared for Marivic which, for reasons of her own,
were not conformed to by her.
The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and permitted the
entry of appearance of undersigned counsel.
15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated 20 January
2000, to the Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty. Teresita G. Dimaisip, Deputy
Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial Records Office, wherein she submitted her Brief without
counsels to the Court.
This letter was stamp-received by the Honorable Court on 4 February 2000.
16. In the meantime, under date of 17 February 2000, and stamp-received by the
Honorable Court on 19 February 2000, undersigned counsel filed an URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the
re-examination of the cause of his death; allow the examination of Marivic Genosa by
qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she
killed her husband; and finally, to allow a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the
testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.
Attached to the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION was a letter of Dr. Raquel Fortun, then the
only qualified forensic pathologist in the country, who opined that the description of the
death wound (as culled from the post-mortem findings, Exhibit A) is more akin to a
gunshot wound than a beating with a lead pipe.
17. In a RESOLUTION dated 29 September 2000, the Honorable Court partly granted
Marivics URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION and remanded the case to the trial court for the
reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman
syndrome plea, within ninety (90) days from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report
to this Court the proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and relevant
documentary evidence, if any, submitted.
18. On 15 January 2001, Dra. Natividad A. Dayan appeared and testified before the Hon.
Fortunito L. Madrona, RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
Immediately before Dra. Dayan was sworn, the Court a quo asked if she had interviewed
Marivic Genosa. Dra. Dayan informed the Court that interviews were done at the Penal
Institution in 1999, but that the clinical interviews and psychological assessment were
done at her clinic.
Dra. Dayan testified that she has been a clinical psychologist for twenty (20) years with
her own private clinic and connected presently to the De La Salle University as a
professor. Before this, she was the Head of the Psychology Department of the
Assumption College; a member of the faculty of Psychology at the Ateneo de Manila
University and St. Josephs College; and was the counseling psychologist of the National
Defense College. She has an AB in Psychology from the University of the Philippines, a
Master of Arts in Clinical [Counseling], Psychology from the Ateneo, and a PhD from the
U.P. She was the past president of the Psychological Association of the Philippines and is
a member of the American Psychological Association. She is the secretary of the
International Council of Psychologists from about 68 countries; a member of the
Forensic Psychology Association; and a member of the ASEAN [Counseling] Association.
She is actively involved with the Philippine Judicial Academy, recently lecturing on the
socio-demographic and psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence
and nullity cases. She was with the Davide Commission doing research about Military
Psychology. She has written a book entitled Energy Global Psychology (together with
Drs. Allan Tan and Allan Bernardo). The Genosa case is the first time she has testified as
an expert on battered women as this is the first case of that nature.
Dra. Dayan testified that for the research she conducted, on the socio-demographic and
psychological profile of families involved in domestic violence, and nullity cases, she
looked at about 500 cases over a period of ten (10) years and discovered that there are
lots of variables that cause all of this marital conflicts, from domestic violence to
infidelity, to psychiatric disorder.
Dra. Dayan described domestic violence to comprise of a lot of incidents of psychological
abuse, verbal abuse, and emotional abuse to physical abuse and also sexual abuse.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan testified that in her studies, the battered woman usually has a very low
opinion of herself. She has a self-defeating and self-sacrificing characteristics. x x x they
usually think very lowly of themselves and so when the violence would happen, they
usually think that they provoke it, that they were the one who precipitated the violence,
they provoke their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them.
Dra. Dayan said that usually a battered x x x comes from a dysfunctional family or from
broken homes.
Dra. Dayan said that the batterer, just like the battered woman, also has a very low
opinion of himself. But then emerges to have superiority complex and it comes out as
being very arrogant, very hostile, very aggressive and very angry. They also had (sic) a
very low tolerance for frustrations. A lot of times they are involved in vices like gambling,
drinking and drugs. And they become violent. The batterer also usually comes from a
dysfunctional family which over-pampers them and makes them feel entitled to do
anything. Also, they see often how their parents abused each other so there is a lot of
modeling of aggression in the family.
Dra. Dayan testified that there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not leave
her husband: poverty, self-blame and guilt that she provoked the violence, the cycle itself
which makes her hope her husband will change, the belief in her obligations to keep the
family intact at all costs for the sake of the children.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said that abused wives react differently to the violence: some leave the house,
or lock themselves in another room, or sometimes try to fight back triggering physical
violence on both of them. She said that in a normal marital relationship, abuses also
happen, but these are not consistent, not chronic, are not happening day in [and] day out.
In an abnormal marital relationship, the abuse occurs day in and day out, is long lasting
and even would cause hospitalization on the victim and even death on the victim.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said that as a result of the battery of psychological tests she administered, it
was her opinion that Marivic fits the profile of a battered woman because inspite of her
feeling of self-confidence which we can see at times there are really feeling (sic) of loss,
such feelings of humiliation which she sees herself as damaged and as a broken person.
And at the same time she still has the imprint of all the abuses that she had experienced
in the past.
xxxxxxxxx
Dra. Dayan said Marivic thought of herself as a loving wife and did not even consider
filing for nullity or legal separation inspite of the abuses. It was at the time of the tragedy
that Marivic then thought of herself as a victim.
xxxxxxxxx
19. On 9 February 2001, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, a physician, who has since passed away,
appeared and testified before RTC-Branch 35, Ormoc City.
Dr. Pajarillo was a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Psychiatry; a Fellow of the
Philippine Board of Psychiatry and a Fellow of the Philippine Psychiatry Association. He
was in the practice of psychiatry for thirty-eight (38) years. Prior to being in private
practice, he was connected with the Veterans Memorial Medical Centre where he gained
his training on psychiatry and neurology. After that, he was called to active duty in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, assigned to the V. Luna Medical Center for twenty six
(26) years. Prior to his retirement from government service, he obtained the rank of
Brigadier General. He obtained his medical degree from the University of Santo Tomas.
He was also a member of the World Association of Military Surgeons; the Quezon City
Medical Society; the Cagayan Medical Society; and the Philippine Association of Military
Surgeons.
He authored The Comparative Analysis of Nervous Breakdown in the Philippine Military
Academy from the Period 1954 1978 which was presented twice in international
congresses. He also authored The Mental Health of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
2000, which was likewise published internationally and locally. He had a medical
textbook published on the use of Prasepam on a Parke-Davis grant; was the first to use
Enanthate (siquiline), on an E.R. Squibb grant; and he published the use of the drug
Zopiclom in 1985-86.
Dr. Pajarillo explained that psychiatry deals with the functional disorder of the mind and
neurology deals with the ailment of the brain and spinal cord enlarged. Psychology, on
the other hand, is a bachelor degree and a doctorate degree; while one has to finish
medicine to become a specialist in psychiatry.
Even only in his 7th year as a resident in V. Luna Medical Centre, Dr. Pajarillo had already
encountered a suit involving violent family relations, and testified in a case in 1964. In
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, violent family disputes abound, and he has seen
probably ten to twenty thousand cases. In those days, the primordial intention of therapy
was reconciliation. As a result of his experience with domestic violence cases, he became
a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City under Atty. Nenita Deproza.
As such consultant, he had seen around forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence,
where there is physical abuse: such as slapping, pushing, verbal abuse, battering and
boxing a woman even to an unconscious state such that the woman is sometimes
confined. The affliction of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder depends on the vulnerability
of the victim. Dr. Pajarillo said that if the victim is not very healthy, perhaps one episode
of violence may induce the disorder; if the psychological stamina and physiologic
constitutional stamina of the victim is stronger, it will take more repetitive trauma to
precipitate the post-traumatic stress disorder and this x x x is very dangerous.
In psychiatry, the post-traumatic stress disorder is incorporated under the anxiety
neurosis or neurologic anxcietism. It is produced by overwhelming brutality, trauma.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo explained that with neurotic anxiety, the victim relives the beating or
trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten at that time. She thinks
of nothing but the suffering.
xxxxxxxxx
A woman who suffers battery has a tendency to become neurotic, her emotional tone is
unstable, and she is irritable and restless. She tends to become hard-headed and
persistent. She has higher sensitivity and her self-world is damaged.
 Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an individuals illness,
such as the deprivation of the continuous care and love of the parents. As to the batterer,
he normally internalizes what is around him within the environment. And it becomes his
own personality. He is very competitive; he is aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he
shows his strong faade but in it there are doubts in himself and prone to act without
thinking.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that even though without the presence of the precipator (sic) or
the one who administered the battering, that re-experiencing of the trauma occurred
(sic) because the individual cannot control it. It will just come up in her mind or in his
mind.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to defend
themselves, and primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or any weapon that is
available in the immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x x because that abound in the
household. He said a victim resorts to weapons when she has reached the lowest rock
bottom of her life and there is no other recourse left on her but to act decisively.
xxxxxxxxx
Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview he
conducted for two (2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the psychological
evaluation and social case studies as a help in forming his diagnosis. He came out with a
Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.
xxxxxxxxx
On cross-examination by the private prosecutor, Dr. Pajarillo said that at the time she
killed her husband Marivicc mental condition was that she was re-experiencing the
trauma. He said that we are trying to explain scientifically that the re-experiencing of the
trauma is not controlled by Marivic. It will just come in flashes and probably at that point
in time that things happened when the re-experiencing of the trauma flashed in her
mind. At the time he interviewed Marivic she was more subdued, she was not super alert
anymore x x x she is mentally stress (sic) because of the predicament she is involved.
xxxxxxxxx
20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or the public
prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable Court, the records of
the partially re-opened trial a quo were elevated.[9]
Ruling of the Trial Court
Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave credence to
the prosecution evidence that appellant had killed the deceased while he was in bed
sleeping. Further, the trial court appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of
treachery, because Ben Genosa was supposedly defenseless when he was killed -- lying in
bed asleep when Marivic smashed him with a pipe at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this Court for
automatic review.
Supervening Circumstances
On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying that this
Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of his
death; (2) the examination of appellant by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to
determine her state of mind at the time she had killed her spouse; and (3) the inclusion
of the said experts reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic
review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case for the lower court to admit
the experts testimonies.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part appellants
Motion, remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological
and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome plea; and requiring the
lower court to report thereafter to this Court the proceedings taken as well as to submit
copies of the TSN and additional evidence, if any.
Acting on the Courts Resolution, the trial judge authorized the examination of
Marivic by two clinical psychologists, Drs. Natividad Dayan[10] and Alfredo
Pajarillo,[11] supposedly experts on domestic violence. Their testimonies, along with their
documentary evidence, were then presented to and admitted by the lower court before
finally being submitted to this Court to form part of the records of the case.[12]
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this Courts
consideration:
1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision without
reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.
2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic Genosa were
legally married and that she was therefore liable for parricide.
3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating with a pipe.
 4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence adduced from
impartial and unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a drunk, a gambler, a womanizer
and wife-beater; and further gravely erred in concluding that Ben Genosa was a battered
husband.
5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of Marivic
Genosa.
6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivics flight to Manila and her
subsequent apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt to save the life of
her unborn child.
7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating
circumstance of treachery.
8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional elements in
determining the existence of self-defense and defense of foetus in this case, thereby
erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of parricide and condemning her to
the ultimate penalty of death.[13]
In the main, the following are the essential legal issues: (1) whether appellant acted
in self-defense and in defense of her fetus; and (2) whether treachery attended the killing
of Ben Genosa.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Collateral Factual Issues
The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not
collateral to the resolution of the principal issues. As consistently held by this Court, the
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are
entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of
any showing that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion or overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied material facts or circumstances of weight and substance
that could affect the outcome of the case.[14]
In appellants first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of discretion,
reversible error or misappreciation of material facts that would reverse or modify the
trial courts disposition of the case. In any event, we will now briefly dispose of these
alleged errors of the trial court.
First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated an obviously hasty decision
without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense. We note that in his 17-
page Decision, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona summarized the testimonies of both the
prosecution and the defense witnesses and -- on the basis of those and of the
documentary evidence on record -- made his evaluation, findings and conclusions. He
wrote a 3-page discourse assessing the testimony and the self-defense theory of the
accused. While she, or even this Court, may not agree with the trial judges conclusions,
we cannot peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence, that he failed to reflect on
the evidence presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an obviously hasty
manner. The Information had been filed with the lower court on November 14, 1996.
Thereafter, trial began and at least 13 hearings were held for over a year. It took the trial
judge about two months from the conclusion of trial to promulgate his judgment. That he
conducted the trial and resolved the case with dispatch should not be taken against him,
much less used to condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all, the dispatch with which
he handled the case should be lauded. In any case, we find his actions in substantial
compliance with his constitutional obligation.[15]
Second, the lower court did not err in finding as a fact that Ben Genosa and
appellant had been legally married, despite the non-presentation of their marriage
contract. In People v. Malabago,[16] this Court held:
The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the
case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and
the deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage certificate,
however, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial court if
such proof is not objected to.
Two of the prosecution witnesses -- namely, the mother and the brother of
appellants deceased spouse -- attested in court that Ben had been married to
Marivic.[17] The defense raised no objection to these testimonies. Moreover, during her
direct examination, appellant herself made a judicial admission of her marriage to
Ben.[18] Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party
making it, except only when there is a showing that (1) the admission was made through
a palpable mistake, or (2) no admission was in fact made.[19] Other than merely attacking
the non-presentation of the marriage contract, the defense offered no proof that the
admission made by appellant in court as to the fact of her marriage to the deceased was
made through a palpable mistake.
Third, under the circumstances of this case, the specific or direct cause of Bens
death -- whether by a gunshot or by beating with a pipe -- has no legal consequence. As
the Court elucidated in its September 29, 2000 Resolution, [c]onsidering that the
appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting his nape
with a metal pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head, the Court believes that
exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to determine which of said acts actually
caused the victims death. Determining which of these admitted acts caused the death is
not dispositive of the guilt or defense of appellant.
Fourth, we cannot fault the trial court for not fully appreciating evidence that Ben was a
drunk, gambler, womanizer and wife-beater. Until this case came to us for automatic review,
appellant had not raised the novel defense of battered woman syndrome, for which such
evidence may have been relevant. Her theory of self-defense was then the crucial issue before
the trial court. As will be discussed shortly, the legal requisites of self-defense under
prevailing jurisprudence ostensibly appear inconsistent with the surrounding facts that led to
the death of the victim. Hence, his personal character, especially his past behavior, did not
constitute vital evidence at the time.
 Fifth, the trial court surely committed no error in not requiring testimony from
appellants children. As correctly elucidated by the solicitor general, all criminal actions
are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor, in whom lies the
discretion to determine which witnesses and evidence are necessary to present. [20] As
the former further points out, neither the trial court nor the prosecution prevented
appellant from presenting her children as witnesses. Thus, she cannot now fault the
lower court for not requiring them to testify.
Finally, merely collateral or corroborative is the matter of whether the flight of
Marivic to Manila and her subsequent apologies to her brother-in-law are indicia of her
guilt or are attempts to save the life of her unborn child. Any reversible error as to the
trial courts appreciation of these circumstances has little bearing on the final resolution
of the case.
First Legal Issue:
Self-Defense and Defense of a Fetus
Appellant admits killing Ben Genosa but, to avoid criminal liability, invokes self-
defense and/or defense of her unborn child. When the accused admits killing the victim,
it is incumbent upon her to prove any claimed justifying circumstance by clear and
convincing evidence.[21] Well-settled is the rule that in criminal cases, self-defense (and
similarly, defense of a stranger or third person) shifts the burden of proof from the
prosecution to the defense.
The Battered Woman Syndrome
In claiming self-defense, appellant raises the novel theory of the battered woman
syndrome. While new in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in
foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the least, incomplete self-
defense.[23] By appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted with the
syndrome, foreign courts convey their understanding of the justifiably fearful state of
mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a period of time. [24]
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any
forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do
something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include
wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to
be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least
twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it
occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered
woman.[25]
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem,
traditional beliefs about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional
dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the
batterers actions; and false hopes that the relationship will improve.[26]
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called
cycle of violence,[27] which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute
battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase. [28]
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or
slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to
pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out
of his way. What actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to
her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the escalation of the violence
exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged, because her
placatory and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse her in
the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him are not
usually successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each partner senses
the imminent loss of control and the growing tension and despair. Exhausted from the
persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws emotionally. But the more she
becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the batterer becomes angry, oppressive and
abusive. Often, at some unpredictable point, the violence spirals out of control and leads
to an acute battering incident.[29]
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality,
destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this incident as
unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only the batterer
may put an end to the violence. Its nature can be as unpredictable as the time of its
explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it. The battered woman usually realizes that
she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would only exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the terrible pain,
although she may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent passivity in the face
of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is almost always much stronger
physically, and she knows from her past painful experience that it is futile to fight back.
Acute battering incidents are often very savage and out of control, such that innocent
bystanders or intervenors are likely to get hurt.[30]
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident
ends. During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound relief. On the one
hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He
knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her
forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand, the battered
woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that her
partner will change for the better; and that this good, gentle and caring man is the real
person whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the emotional
stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels responsible for his
well-being. The truth, though, is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or receiving
professional help, are very slim, especially if she remains with him. Generally, only after
she leaves him does he seek professional help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in
this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most thoroughly tormented
psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered womans
psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally dependent on each
other -- she for his nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this miserable
cycle of tension, violence and forgiveness, each partner may believe that it is better to die
than to be separated. Neither one may really feel independent, capable of functioning Q Who inflicted these injuries?
without the other.[31]
A Of course my husband.
History of Abuse Q You mean Ben Genosa?
in the Present Case
A Yes, sir.

To show the history of violence inflicted upon appellant, the defense presented
xxxxxxxxx
several witnesses. She herself described her heart-rending experience as follows:
ATTY. TABUCANON [Court] /to the witness
Q How did you describe your marriage with Ben Genosa? Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said?
A In the first year, I lived with him happily but in the subsequent year he was A Everytime he got drunk.
cruel to me and a behavior of habitual drinker.
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of injury
Q You said that in the subsequent year of your marriage, your husband was inflicted on your occurred, after your marriage, from that time on, how
abusive to you and cruel. In what way was this abusive and cruelty frequent was the occurrence?
manifested to you?
A Everytime he got drunk.
A He always provoke me in everything, he always slap me and sometimes he
pinned me down on the bed and sometimes beat me. Q Is it daily, weekly, monthly or how many times in a month or in a week?

Q How many times did this happen? A Three times a week.

A Several times already. Q Do you mean three times a week he would beat you?

Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
A I went away to my mother and I ran to my father and we separate each
other.
Dr. Dino D. Caing bolstered her foregoing testimony on chronic battery in this manner:
Q What was the action of Ben Genosa towards you leaving home?
A He is following me, after that he sought after me.
Q What will happen when he follow you?
A He said he changed, he asked for forgiveness and I was convinced and after
that I go to him and he said sorry.
Q During those times that you were the recipient of such cruelty and abusive
behavior by your husband, were you able to see a doctor?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who are these doctors?
A The company physician, Dr. Dino Caing, Dr. Lucero and Dra. Cerillo.
xxxxxxxxx
A Not necessarily that he would beat me but sometimes he will just quarrel
me. [32]
Referring to his Out-Patient Chart[33] on Marivic Genosa at the Philphos Hospital,
Q So, do you have a summary of those six (6) incidents which are found in the
chart of your clinic?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who prepared the list of six (6) incidents, Doctor?
A I did.
Q Will you please read the physical findings together with the dates for the
record.
A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R) lower
eyelid and redness of eye. Attending physician: Dr. Lucero;
2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital area, pain
and contusion (R) breast. Attending physician: Dr. Canora;
3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;

Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries? 4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2o to trauma. Attending
physician: Dr. Caing;
A Yes, sir.
 5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder. Attending A As per record, yes.
physician: Dr. Canora; and
Q What was the date?
6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion
Pregnancy. Attending physician: Dr. Canora. A It was on November 6, 1995.

Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you were the Q So, did you actually see the accused physically?
attending physician, is that correct? A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir. Q On November 6, 1995, will you please tell this Honorable Court, was the
Q Did you actually physical examine the accused? patient pregnant?

A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir.

Q Now, going to your finding no. 3 where you were the one who attended the Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of pregnancy was she?
patient. What do you mean by abrasion furuncle left axilla? A Eight (8) months pregnant.
A Abrasion is a skin wound usually when it comes in contact with something Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?
rough substance if force is applied.
A Yes, sir.
Q What is meant by furuncle axilla?
Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an examination
A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion. about her pregnancy or for some other findings?
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma? A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which complicates her
A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an inflammation of left pregnancy.
breast. So, [pain] meaning there is tenderness. When your breast is Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?
traumatized, there is tenderness pain.
A Yes, sir.
Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor?
Q For how many days?
xxxxxxxxx A One day.

Q Were you able to talk with the patient? Q Where?

A Yes, sir. A At PHILPHOS Hospital.

Q What did she tell you? xxxxxxxxx

A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of these
injuries. And she told me that it was done to her by her husband.
Q You mean, Ben Genosa?
A Yes, sir.
Q Lets go back to the clinical history of Marivic Genosa. You said that you
were able to examine her personally on November 6, 1995 and she was
8 months pregnant.
What is this all about?

xxxxxxxxx A Because she has this problem of tension headache secondary to

hypertension and I think I have a record here, also the same period from
1989 to 1995, she had a consultation for twenty-three (23) times.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q For what?
Q By the way Doctor, were you able to physical examine the accused
sometime in the month of November, 1995 when this incident A Tension headache.
happened?
 Q Can we say that specially during the latter consultation, that the patient had
hypertension?
A The patient definitely had hypertension. It was refractory to our treatment.
She does not response when the medication was given to her, because
tension headache is more or less stress related and emotional in nature.
Q What did you deduce of tension headache when you said is emotional in
nature?
A From what I deduced as part of our physical examination of the patient is
the family history in line of giving the root cause of what is causing this
disease. So, from the moment you ask to the patient all comes from the
domestic problem.
Q You mean problem in her household?
A Probably.
Q Can family trouble cause elevation of blood pressure, Doctor?
A Yes, if it is emotionally related and stressful it can cause increases in
hypertension which is unfortunately does not response to the
medication.
Q In November 6, 1995, the date of the incident, did you take the blood
pressure of the accused?
A On November 6, 1995 consultation, the blood pressure was 180/120.
Q Is this considered hypertension?
A Yes, sir, severe.
Q Considering that she was 8 months pregnant, you mean this is dangerous
level of blood pressure?
A It was dangerous to the child or to the fetus. [34]
Another defense witness, Teodoro Sarabia, a former neighbor of the Genosas in
Isabel, Leyte, testified that he had seen the couple quarreling several times; and that on
some occasions Marivic would run to him with bruises, confiding that the injuries were
inflicted upon her by Ben.[35]
Ecel Arano also testified[36] that for a number of times she had been asked by
Marivic to sleep at the Genosa house, because the latter feared that Ben would come
home drunk and hurt her. On one occasion that Ecel did sleep over, she was awakened
about ten oclock at night, because the couple were very noisy and I heard something was
broken like a vase. Then Marivic came running into Ecels room and locked the door. Ben
showed up by the window grill atop a chair, scaring them with a knife.
On the afternoon of November 15, 1995, Marivic again asked her help -- this time to
find Ben -- but they were unable to. They returned to the Genosa home, where they found
him already drunk. Again afraid that he might hurt her, Marivic asked her to sleep at
their house. Seeing his state of drunkenness, Ecel hesitated; and when she heard the
couple start arguing, she decided to leave.
On that same night that culminated in the death of Ben Genosa, at least three other
witnesses saw or heard the couple quarreling.[37]Marivic relates in detail the following
backdrop of the fateful night when life was snuffed out of him, showing in the process a
vivid picture of his cruelty towards her:
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Please tell this Court, can you recall the incident in November 15, 1995 in
the evening?
A Whole morning and in the afternoon, I was in the office working then after
office hours, I boarded the service bus and went to Bilwang. When I
reached Bilwang, I immediately asked my son, where was his father,
then my second child said, he was not home yet. I was worried because
that was payday, I was anticipating that he was gambling. So while
waiting for him, my eldest son arrived from school, I prepared dinner
for my children.
Q This is evening of November 15, 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time did Ben Genosa arrive?
A When he arrived, I was not there, I was in Isabel looking for him.
Q So when he arrived you were in Isabel looking for him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you come back to your house?
A Yes, sir.
Q By the way, where was your conjugal residence situated this time?
A Bilwang.
Q Is this your house or you are renting?
A Renting.
Q What time were you able to come back in your residence at Bilwang?
A I went back around almost 8:00 oclock.
Q What happened when you arrived in your residence?
A When I arrived home with my cousin Ecel whom I requested to sleep with
me at that time because I had fears that he was again drunk and I was
worried that he would again beat me so I requested my cousin to sleep
with me, but she resisted because she had fears that the same thing will
happen again last year.
Q Who was this cousin of yours who you requested to sleep with you?
A Ecel Arao, the one who testified.
Q Did Ecel sleep with you in your house on that evening?
A No, because she expressed fears, she said her father would not allow her
because of Ben.
Q During this period November 15, 1995, were you pregnant?
A Yes, 8 months.
Q How advance was your pregnancy?
A Eight (8) months.
Q Was the baby subsequently born?
A Yes, sir.
Q Whats the name of the baby you were carrying at that time?
A Marie Bianca.
Q What time were you able to meet personally your husband?
A Yes, sir.
Q What time?
A When I arrived home, he was there already in his usual behavior.
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition?
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior.
Q What was he yelling all about?
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at you? What else
did he do if any?
A He is nagging at me for following him and he dared me to quarrel him.
Q What was the cause of his nagging or quarreling at you if you know?
A He was angry at me because I was following x x x him, looking for him. I was
just worried he might be overly drunk and he would beat me again.
Q You said that he was yelling at you, what else, did he do to you if any?
A He was nagging at me at that time and I just ignore him because I want to
avoid trouble for fear that he will beat me again. Perhaps he was
disappointed because I just ignore him of his provocation and he switch
off the light and I said to him, why did you switch off the light when the
children were there. At that time I was also attending to my children
who were doing their assignments. He was angry with me for not
answering his challenge, so he went to the kitchen and [got] a bolo and
cut the antenna wire to stop me from watching television.
Q What did he do with the bolo?
A He cut the antenna wire to keep me from watching T.V.
Q What else happened after he cut the wire?
A He switch off the light and the children were shouting because they were
scared and he was already holding the bolo.
Q How do you described this bolo?
A 1 1/2 feet.
Q What was the bolo used for usually?
A For chopping meat.
Q You said the children were scared, what else happened as Ben was carrying
that bolo?
A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.
Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I fell to the
bedside.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
A I screamed for help and then he left.
Q You said earlier that he whirled you and you fell on the bedside?
A Yes, sir.
Q You screamed for help and he left, do you know where he was going?
A Outside perhaps to drink more.
Q When he left what did you do in that particular time?
A I packed all his clothes.
Q What was your reason in packing his clothes?
A I wanted him to leave us.
Q During this time, where were your children, what were their reactions?
A After a couple of hours, he went back again and he got angry with me for
packing his clothes, then he dragged me again of the bedroom holding
my neck.
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did
he drag you?
COURT INTERPRETER:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly
in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on
shouting at me that you might as well be killed so there will be nobody
to nag me.
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(At this juncture the witness started crying).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer
but he could not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled
his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware
that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet
and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a
pipe about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and
the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that very
moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I
had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Talking of drawer, is this drawer outside your room?
A Outside.
Q In what part of the house?
A Dining.
Q Where were the children during that time?
A My children were already asleep.
Q You mean they were inside the room?
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe
this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q Is it a flexible blade?
A Its a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me. [38]
In addition, Dra. Natividad Dayan was called by the RTC to testify as an expert
witness to assist it in understanding the psyche of a battered person. She had met with
Marivic Genosa for five sessions totaling about seventeen hours. Based on their talks, the
former briefly related the latters ordeal to the court a quo as follows:
Q: What can you say, that you found Marivic as a battered wife? Could you in
laymans term describe to this Court what her life was like as said to
you?
A: What I remember happened then was it was more than ten years, that she
was suffering emotional anguish. There were a lot of instances of
abuses, to emotional abuse, to verbal abuse and to physical abuse. The
husband had a very meager income, she was the one who was
practically the bread earner of the family. The husband was involved in
a lot of vices, going out with barkadas, drinking, even womanizing being
involved in cockfight and going home very angry and which will trigger
a lot of physical abuse. She also had the experience a lot of taunting
from the husband for the reason that the husband even accused her of
infidelity, the husband was saying that the child she was carrying was
not his own. So she was very angry, she was at the same time very
depressed because she was also aware, almost like living in purgatory
or even hell when it was happening day in and day out. [39]
 In cross-examining Dra. Dayan, the public prosecutor not merely elicited, but
wittingly or unwittingly put forward, additional supporting evidence as shown below:
Q In your first encounter with the appellant in this case in 1999, where you
talked to her about three hours, what was the most relevant
information did you gather?
A The most relevant information was the tragedy that happened. The most
important information were escalating abuses that she had experienced
during her marital life.
Q Before you met her in 1999 for three hours, we presume that you already
knew of the facts of the case or at least you have substantial knowledge
of the facts of the case?
A I believe I had an idea of the case, but I do not know whether I can consider
them as substantial.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Did you gather an information from Marivic that on the side of her husband
they were fond of battering their wives?
A I also heard that from her?
Q You heard that from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you ask for a complete example who are the relatives of her husband
that were fond of battering their wives?
A What I remember that there were brothers of her husband who are also
battering their wives.
Q Did she not inform you that there was an instance that she stayed in a hotel
in Ormoc where her husband followed her and battered [her] several
times in that room?
A She told me about that.
Q Did she inform you in what hotel in Ormoc?
A Sir, I could not remember but I was told that she was battered in that room.
Q Several times in that room?
A Yes, sir. What I remember was that there is no problem about being
battered, it really happened.
Q Being an expert witness, our jurisprudence is not complete on saying this
matter. I think that is the first time that we have this in the Philippines,
what is your opinion?
A Sir, my opinion is, she is really a battered wife and in this kind happened, it
was really a self-defense. I also believe that there had been provocation
and I also believe that she became a disordered person. She had to
suffer anxiety reaction because of all the battering that happened and so
she became an abnormal person who had lost shes not during the time
and that is why it happened because of all the physical battering,
emotional battering, all the psychological abuses that she had
experienced from her husband.
Q I do believe that she is a battered wife. Was she extremely battered?
A Sir, it is an extreme form of battering. Yes.[40]
Parenthetically, the credibility of appellant was demonstrated as follows:
Q And you also said that you administered [the] objective personality test,
what x x x [is this] all about?
A The objective personality test is the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory.
The purpose of that test is to find out about the lying prone[ne]ss of the
person.
Q What do you mean by that?
A Meaning, am I dealing with a client who is telling me the truth, or is she
someone who can exaggerate or x x x [will] tell a lie[?]
Q And what did you discover on the basis of this objective personality test?
A She was a person who passed the honesty test. Meaning she is a person that
I can trust. That the data that Im gathering from her are the truth.[41]
The other expert witness presented by the defense, Dr. Alfredo Pajarillo, testified
on his Psychiatric Report,[42] which was based on his interview and examination of
Marivic Genosa. The Report said that during the first three years of her marriage to Ben,
everything looked good -- the atmosphere was fine, normal and happy -- until Ben
started to be attracted to other girls and was also enticed in[to] gambling[,] especially
cockfighting. x x x. At the same time Ben was often joining his barkada in drinking sprees.
The drinking sprees of Ben greatly changed the attitude he showed toward his
family, particularly to his wife. The Report continued: At first, it was verbal and
emotional abuses but as time passed, he became physically abusive. Marivic claimed that
the viciousness of her husband was progressive every time he got drunk. It was a painful
ordeal Marivic had to anticipate whenever she suspected that her husband went for a
drinking [spree]. They had been married for twelve years[;] and practically more than
eight years, she was battered and maltreated relentlessly and mercilessly by her
husband whenever he was drunk.
Marivic sought the help of her mother-in-law, but her efforts were in vain. Further
quoting from the Report, [s]he also sought the advice and help of close relatives and
well-meaning friends in spite of her feeling ashamed of what was happening to her. But
incessant battering became more and more frequent and more severe. x x x.[43]
From the totality of evidence presented, there is indeed no doubt in the Courts
mind that Appellant Marivic Genosa was a severely abused person.
Effect of Battery on Appellant
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused woman, her
state of mind metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we cannot rely merely
on the judgment of an ordinary, reasonable person who is evaluating the events
immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian court has aptly pointed out that
expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering on wives and common law
partners are both relevant and necessary. How can the mental state of the appellant be
appreciated without it? The average member of the public may ask: Why would a woman
put up with this kind of treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man?
How could she love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We
would expect the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does
she not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is the reaction of the average
person confronted with the so-called battered wife syndrome.[44]
To understand the syndrome properly, however, ones viewpoint should not be
drawn from that of an ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind of a person
who has been subjected to repeated, severe beatings may not be consistent with -- nay,
comprehensible to -- those who have not been through a similar experience. Expert
opinion is essential to clarify and refute common myths and misconceptions about
battered women.[45]
The theory of BWS formulated by Lenore Walker, as well as her research on
domestic violence, has had a significant impact in the United States and the United
Kingdom on the treatment and prosecution of cases, in which a battered woman is
charged with the killing of her violent partner. The psychologist explains that the cyclical
nature of the violence inflicted upon the battered woman immobilizes the latters ability
to act decisively in her own interests, making her feel trapped in the relationship with no
means of escape.[46] In her years of research, Dr. Walker found that the abuse often
escalates at the point of separation and battered women are in greater danger of dying
then.[47]
Corroborating these research findings, Dra. Dayan said that the battered woman
usually has a very low opinion of herself. She has x x x self-defeating and self-sacrificing
characteristics. x x x [W]hen the violence would happen, they usually think that they
provoke[d] it, that they were the one[s] who precipitated the violence[; that] they
provoke[d] their spouse to be physically, verbally and even sexually abusive to them.[48]
According to Dra. Dayan, there are a lot of reasons why a battered woman does not
readily leave an abusive partner -- poverty, self-blame and guilt arising from the latters
belief that she provoked the violence, that she has an obligation to keep the family intact
at all cost for the sake of their children, and that she is the only hope for her spouse to
change.[49]
The testimony of another expert witness, Dr. Pajarillo, is also helpful. He had
previously testified in suits involving violent family relations, having evaluated probably
ten to twenty thousand violent family disputes within the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, wherein such cases abounded. As a result of his experience with domestic
violence cases, he became a consultant of the Battered Woman Office in Quezon City. As
such, he got involved in about forty (40) cases of severe domestic violence, in which the
physical abuse on the woman would sometimes even lead to her loss of
consciousness.[50]
Dr. Pajarillo explained that overwhelming brutality, trauma could result in
posttraumatic stress disorder, a form of anxiety neurosis or neurologic
anxietism.[51] After being repeatedly and severely abused, battered persons may believe
that they are essentially helpless, lacking power to change their situation. x x x [A]cute
battering incidents can have the effect of stimulating the development of coping
responses to the trauma at the expense of the victims ability to muster an active
response to try to escape further trauma. Furthermore, x x x the victim ceases to believe
that anything she can do will have a predictable positive effect.[52]
A study[53] conducted by Martin Seligman, a psychologist at the University of
Pennsylvania, found that even if a person has control over a situation, but believes that
she does not, she will be more likely to respond to that situation with coping responses
rather than trying to escape. He said that it was the cognitive aspect -- the individuals
thoughts -- that proved all-important. He referred to this phenomenon as learned
helplessness. [T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less important than the
individuals set of beliefs or perceptions concerning the situation. Battered women dont
attempt to leave the battering situation, even when it may seem to outsiders that escape
is possible, because they cannot predict their own safety; they believe that nothing they
or anyone else does will alter their terrible circumstances.[54]
Thus, just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for the
violent behavior of her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing her, and that
there is no escape.[55] Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from pervasive anxiety, and
usually fail to leave the relationship.[56] Unless a shelter is available, she stays with her
husband, not only because she typically lacks a means of self-support, but also because
she fears that if she leaves she would be found and hurt even more.[57]
In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence
establishing that appellant, due to the repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse
over a long period of time, became afflicted with the battered woman syndrome. We,
however, failed to find sufficient evidence that would support such a conclusion. More
specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would confirm the presence of the
essential characteristics of BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence
supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there
were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the fatal incident that
led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase of
the cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical characteristics of this
stage. However, that single incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome. In
other words, she failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she
had gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute
battering? How did Marivic normally respond to Bens relatively minor abuses? What
means did she employ to try to prevent the situation from developing into the next
(more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the
cycle. She simply mentioned that she would usually run away to her mothers or fathers
house;[58] that Ben would seek her out, ask for her forgiveness and promise to change;
and that believing his words, she would return to their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her
spouse? Did she believe that she was the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was
the sole support of his emotional stability and well-being? Conversely, how dependent
was she on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped in their relationship? Did both of them
regard death as preferable to separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and
thoughts that would clearly and fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the
syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the
defense. Indeed, they were able to explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and
scientifically, how the personality of the battered woman usually evolved or deteriorated
as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her partner or spouse.
They corroborated each others testimonies, which were culled from their numerous
studies of hundreds of actual cases. However, they failed to present in court the factual
experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to them -- if at all -- based on which
they concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance
must be proven in order to be appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting
evidence that would establish all the essentials of the battered woman syndrome as
manifested specifically in the case of the Genosas.
BWS as Self-Defense
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself
establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be
considered in the context of self-defense.[59]
From the expert opinions discussed earlier, the Court reckons further that crucial
to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered woman at the time of the
offense[60] -- she must have actually feared imminent harm from her batterer and
honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life.
Settled in our jurisprudence, however, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-
defense must face a real threat on ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided must
be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.[61] Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides
the following requisites and effect of self-defense:[62]
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. -- The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following
circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.[63] It presupposes
actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or
safety of a person.[64] In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic
herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and
her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent
behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased
his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had
ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her
life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their childrens bedroom
-- and based on past violent incidents, there was a great probability that he would still
have pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat
upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already suffering
from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is not
required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the
battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life would
amount to sentencing her to murder by installment.[65] Still, impending danger (based on
the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendants use of
deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the
required imminence of danger.[66] Considering such circumstances and the existence of
BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-
defense.[67] In the absence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or
incomplete -- on the part of the victim.[68] Thus, Marivics killing of Ben was not
completely justified under the circumstances.
Mitigating Circumstances Present
In any event, all is not lost for appellant. While she did not raise any other
modifying circumstances that would alter her penalty, we deem it proper to evaluate and
appreciate in her favor circumstances that mitigate her criminal liability. It is a hornbook
doctrine that an appeal in a criminal case opens it wholly for review on any issue,
including that which has not been raised by the parties.[69]
From several psychological tests she had administered to Marivic, Dra. Dayan, in
her Psychological Evaluation Report dated November 29, 2000, opined as follows:
This is a classic case of a Battered Woman Syndrome. The repeated battering Marivic
experienced with her husband constitutes a form of [cumulative] provocation which
broke down her psychological resistance and natural self-control. It is very clear that she
developed heightened sensitivity to sight of impending danger her husband posed
continuously. Marivic truly experienced at the hands of her abuser husband a state of
psychological paralysis which can only be ended by an act of violence on her part. [70]
 Dr. Pajarillo corroborates the findings of Dra. Dayan. He explained that the effect of
repetitious pain taking, repetitious battering, [and] repetitious maltreatment as well as
the severity and the prolonged administration of the battering is posttraumatic stress
disorder.[71]Expounding thereon, he said:
Q What causes the trauma, Mr. Witness?
A What causes the trauma is probably the repetitious battering. Second, the
severity of the battering. Third, the prolonged administration of
battering or the prolonged commission of the battering and the
psychological and constitutional stamina of the victim and another one
is the public and social support available to the victim. If nobody is
interceding, the more she will go to that disorder....
xxxxxxxxx
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications in terms of
severity of the postraumatic stress disorder, Dr. Pajarillo?
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this
post[t]raumatic stress disorder is injury to the head, banging of the
head like that. It is usually the very very severe stimulus that precipitate
this post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others are suffocating the victim
like holding a pillow on the face, strangulating the individual,
suffocating the individual, and boxing the individual. In this situation
therefore, the victim is heightened to painful stimulus, like for example
she is pregnant, she is very susceptible because the woman will not only
protect herself, she is also to protect the fetus. So the anxiety is
heightened to the end [sic] degree.
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do you
classify?
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or [a]typical.
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called delayed or
[atypical]?
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and the
individual will manifest now a severe emotional instability, higher
irritability remorse, restlessness, and fear and probably in most [acute]
cases the first thing will be happened to the individual will be thinking
of suicide.
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness?
A The chronic cases is this repetitious battering, repetitious maltreatment,
any prolonged, it is longer than six (6) months. The [acute] is only the
first day to six (6) months. After this six (6) months you become
chronic. It is stated in the book specifically that after six (6) months is
chronic. The [a]typical one is the repetitious battering but the individual
who is abnormal and then become normal. This is how you get neurosis
from neurotic personality of these cases of post[t]raumatic stress
disorder. [72]
Answering the questions propounded by the trial judge, the expert witness clarified
further:
Q But just the same[,] neurosis especially on battered woman syndrome x x x
affects x x x his or her mental capacity?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
A Of course obfuscated.[73]
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon appellant
resulted in cumulative provocation which broke down her psychological resistance and
natural self-control, psychological paralysis, and difficulty in concentrating or
impairment of memory.
Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations were
analogous to an illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her will power without,
however, depriving her of consciousness of her acts. There was, thus, a resulting
diminution of her freedom of action, intelligence or intent. Pursuant to paragraphs
9[74] and 10[75] of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, this circumstance should be taken
in her favor and considered as a mitigating factor. [76]
In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating circumstance of
having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and
obfuscation. It has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed
as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper
acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason.[77]To appreciate this
circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful
and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed
from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the
accused might recover her normal equanimity.[78]
Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful aggressor,
preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to kill her while dragging
her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had kept a gun. It should also be recalled
that she was eight months pregnant at the time. The attempt on her life was likewise on
that of her fetus.[79] His abusive and violent acts, an aggression which was directed at the
lives of both Marivic and her unborn child, naturally produced passion and obfuscation
overcoming her reason. Even though she was able to retreat to a separate room, her
emotional and mental state continued. According to her, she felt her blood pressure rise;
she was filled with feelings of self-pity and of fear that she and her baby were about to
die. In a fit of indignation, she pried open the cabinet drawer where Ben kept a gun, then
she took the weapon and used it to shoot him.
The confluence of these events brings us to the conclusion that there was no
considerable period of time within which Marivic could have recovered her normal
equanimity. Helpful is Dr. Pajarillos testimony[80] that with neurotic anxiety -- a
psychological effect on a victim of overwhelming brutality [or] trauma -- the victim
relives the beating or trauma as if it were real, although she is not actually being beaten
at the time. She cannot control re-experiencing the whole thing, the most vicious and the
trauma that she suffered. She thinks of nothing but the suffering. Such reliving which is
beyond the control of a person under similar circumstances, must have been what
Marivic experienced during the brief time interval and prevented her from recovering
her normal equanimity. Accordingly, she should further be credited with the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well
as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.
On the one hand, the first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the
severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the
repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which
was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving
her of consciousness of her acts.
The second circumstance, on the other hand, resulted from the violent aggression
he had inflicted on her prior to the killing. That the incident occurred when she was eight
months pregnant with their child was deemed by her as an attempt not only on her life,
but likewise on that of their unborn child. Such perception naturally produced passion
and obfuscation on her part.
Second Legal Issue:
Treachery
There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself
arising from the defense that the offended party might make.[81] In order to qualify an act
as treacherous, the circumstances invoked must be proven as indubitably as the killing
itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or conjectures, which have no place
in the appreciation of evidence.[82] Because of the gravity of the resulting offense,
treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself.[83]
Ruling that treachery was present in the instant case, the trial court imposed the
penalty of death upon appellant. It inferred this qualifying circumstances merely from
the fact that the lifeless body of Ben had been found lying in bed with an open,
depressed, circular fracture located at the back of his head. As to exactly how and when
he had been fatally attacked, however, the prosecution failed to establish indubitably.
Only the following testimony of appellant leads us to the events surrounding his death:
Q You said that when Ben came back to your house, he dragged you? How did
he drag you?
COURT:
The witness demonstrated to the Court by using her right hand flexed forcibly
in her front neck)
A And he dragged me towards the door backward.
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Where did he bring you?
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then he kept on
shouting at me that you might as well be killed so there will be nobody
to nag me
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is there in the drawer?
A I was aware that it was a gun.
COURT INTERPRETER
(At this juncture the witness started crying)
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q Were you actually brought to the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when you were brought to that drawer?
A He dragged me towards the drawer and he was about to open the drawer
but he could not open it because he did not have the key then he pulled
his wallet which contained a blade about 3 inches long and I was aware
that he was going to kill me and I smashed his arm and then the wallet
and the blade fell. The one he used to open the drawer I saw, it was a
pipe about that long, and when he was about to pick-up the wallet and
the blade, I smashed him then I ran to the other room, and on that very
moment everything on my mind was to pity on myself, then the feeling I
had on that very moment was the same when I was admitted in
PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit.
COURT INTERPRETER
(The witness at this juncture is crying intensely).
xxxxxxxxx
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you please describe
this blade about 3 inches long, how does it look like?
A Three (3) inches long and inch wide.
Q It is a flexible blade?
A Its a cutter.
Q How do you describe the blade, is it sharp both edges?
A Yes, because he once used it to me.
Q How did he do it?
 A He wanted to cut my throat.
Q With the same blade?
A Yes, sir, that was the object used when he intimidate me.
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said that this blade fell from his grip, is it correct?
A Yes, because I smashed him.
Q What happened?
A Ben tried to pick-up the wallet and the blade, I pick-up the pipe and I
smashed him and I ran to the other room.
Q What else happened?
A When I was in the other room, I felt the same thing like what happened
before when I was admitted in PHILPHOS Clinic, I was about to vomit. I
know my blood pressure was raised. I was frightened I was about to die
because of my blood pressure.
COURT INTERPRETER:
(Upon the answer of the witness getting the pipe and smashed him, the
witness at the same time pointed at the back of her neck or the nape).
ATTY. TABUCANON:
Q You said you went to the room, what else happened?
A Considering all the physical sufferings that Ive been through with him, I
took pity on myself and I felt I was about to die also because of my blood
pressure and the baby, so I got that gun and I shot him.
COURT
/to Atty. Tabucanon
Q You shot him?
A Yes, I distorted the drawer.[84]
The above testimony is insufficient to establish the presence of treachery. There is
no showing of the victims position relative to appellants at the time of the shooting.
Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a
quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the
deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from
the assailant.[85]
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the
aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of
accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by
the party attacked.[86] There is no showing, though, that the present appellant
intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband without any
risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears
that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when
she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that she
consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in
order to ensure its execution, this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.[87]
Proper Penalty
The penalty for parricide imposed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code
is reclusion perpetua to death. Since two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance have been found to have attended the commission of the offense, the
penalty shall be lowered by one (1) degree, pursuant to Article 64 of paragraph 5 [88] of
the same Code.[89] The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period is imposable,
considering that two mitigating circumstances are to be taken into account in reducing
the penalty by one degree, and no other modifying circumstances were shown to have
attended the commission of the offense.[90] Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum of the penalty shall be within the range of that which is next lower in degree --
prision mayor -- and the maximum shall be within the range of the medium period
of reclusion temporal.
Considering all the circumstances of the instant case, we deem it just and proper to
impose the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period, or six (6) years and one (1)
day in prison as minimum; to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or 14 years 8
months and 1 day as maximum. Noting that appellant has already served the minimum
period, she may now apply for and be released from detention on parole.[91]
Epilogue
Being a novel concept in our jurisprudence, the battered woman syndrome was
neither easy nor simple to analyze and recognize vis--vis the given set of facts in the
present case. The Court agonized on how to apply the theory as a modern-day reality. It
took great effort beyond the normal manner in which decisions are made -- on the basis
of existing law and jurisprudence applicable to the proven facts. To give a just and
proper resolution of the case, it endeavored to take a good look at studies conducted
here and abroad in order to understand the intricacies of the syndrome and the distinct
personality of the chronically abused person. Certainly, the Court has learned much. And
definitely, the solicitor general and appellants counsel, Atty. Katrina Legarda, have
helped it in such learning process.
While our hearts empathize with recurrently battered persons, we can only work
within the limits of law, jurisprudence and given facts. We cannot make or invent them.
Neither can we amend the Revised Penal Code. Only Congress, in its wisdom, may do so.
 The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from
the battered woman syndrome. We now sum up our main points. First, each of the
phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two
battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final
acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the
battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an
honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of
the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and
actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the
former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the
requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of
these elements were duly established.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is
hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her penalty
is REDUCED to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8
months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby
imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her
from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being
held for some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 29396. November 9, 1928.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
PRAXEDES AYAYA,Defendant-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; PARRICIDE; INJURY CAUSED BY MERE ACCIDENT WITHOUT
FAULT OR INTENTION OF CAUSING IT. — A married woman who, to free her
son from the imminent danger of being strangled by the door which her
husband was attempting to shut, thrust her umbrella in the opening of said
door and jabbed her husband with the point thereof, thereby causing an injury
to his left eye, which is supposed to have been the cause of his death, is not
criminally liable, pursuant to article 8 of the Penal Code, because the act
performed by her does not involve any criminal liability. (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of November 30, 1888.)
VILLAMOR, J.:
The appellant was tried in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas upon the
following information:
jg c:chan roble s.com.p h
"That on or about January 15, 1928, in the municipality of Pagbilao, Province of
Tayabas, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-
named accused, with the intent to kill her husband Benito de la Cruz, with
whom she was united in lawful marriage, with treachery and by means of an
umbrella, did voluntarily, unlawfully, and feloniously assault and attack her
said husband Benito de la Cruz, inflicting a mortal wound in the upper left
eyelid, as a result of which said Benito de la Cruz died five (5) days thereafter.
In violation of article 402 of the Penal Code."
cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry
It appears from the record that at about 1 o’clock in the morning of January
16, 1928, Jose Fajardo, the chief of police of Pagbilao, Tayabas, was informed
by a policeman that one Benito de la Cruz was drunk, wounded, and vomiting
in his house in said municipality. Said chief of police went to the place and
found Benito, the deceased, lying in bed with a wound on his left eyelid, and
unconscious, for he did not answer the questions put to him. When his wife,
the defendant Praxedes Ayaya, was questioned as to the cause of that wound,
she replied that it was due to the fact that she herself had jabbed her husband
with an umbrella. Health officer Victoriano Litonjua was then called, and upon
examining Benito, found he had a wound on the left upper eyelid which was
bleeding; that his pupils were dilated and, from the odor of his breath and from
his vomiting, it appeared that Benito was drunk. In view of the wounded man’s
condition he was later taken to the provincial hospital of Tayabas, where he
died four days after the incident.
Health officer Litonjua and Dr. G. Santos Cuyugan, the director of the
provincial hospital of Tayabas, who treated the wounded man, expressed
different opinions as to the cause of the death of Benito de la Cruz. Health
officer Litonjua believes that the deceased’s cerebral hemorrhage was due to
his alcoholic excesses, whereas Doctor Cuyugan, who performed the autopsy,
declared that the wound was caused by some blunt instrument and that his
death was caused by the cerebral hemorrhage produced by the wound he had
received in the forehead, and that health officer Litonjua’s statement as to said
hemorrhage being due to the alcohol is erroneous. The trial court found the
defendant guilty of the crime alleged in the information, and taking into
account that the defendant did not intend to inflict so grave an injury as she
did, and that there had been provocation on the part of the offended party,
sentenced her to fourteen years, eight months and one day reclusion temporal,
with the accessories of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum
of P500 by way of indemnity, plus the costs of the action.
The defendant appealed from this judgment, and her attorney, in support of
the petition that the judgment appealed from be reversed and the appellant
acquitted with costs de oficio, assigns the following errors: (l) The trial court
erred in holding that the deceased’s wound on the left upper eyelid was caused
by the appellant; (2) supposing, without admitting, that said wound was really
caused by the herein appellant, the lower court erred in concluding that said
wound was the immediate cause of the death of the deceased and
consequently, in convicting the appellant; and (3) the lower court erred in not
acquitting the appellant. at least, for reasonable doubt.
The evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the crime charged,
consists of the following: Exhibit A, which is the sworn statement filed by the
accused with the justice of the peace of Pagbilao; Exhibit B, which is the
umbrella used by the defendant and with which she jabbed the deceased;
Exhibit C, which is the report of the autopsy of Benito de la Cruz signed by
Doctor Cuyugan; and Exhibit D, which is the death certificate.
In the defendant’s sworn statement she states, among other things, that at
about 8 o’clock at night on January 15, 1928, she, with her husband Benito de
la Cruz, and her son Emilio, drank tuba in the store of one Felicidad Losloso;
that afterwards they went to a cinema; that while returning home and without
any warning, her husband, who was drunk, gave her a blow which she dodged;
that then her husband went home, preceding her and her son and when they
arrived at the house they found the door closed; that she and her son pushed
the door and attempted to open it, but her husband, who was inside,
prevented it; that then the door gave way somewhat and her son Emilio
succeeded in putting his head between the opening of the door and the wall
and;n order to prevent the door from crushing him, she pushed it; that Benito
then poked his head out of the opening of the door and when she saw him, she
jabbed him with the umbrella she carried; that she does not know where she
jabbed him although she thinks it was in the body; and that when she and her
son finally succeeded in entering the house, they found that Benito was already
in bed with a wound in the forehead. The accused herself, in her testimony in
her own behalf, substantially repeated what she had declared before the justice
of the peace of Pagbilao, stating, however, that when the door was opened and
her son put his head between the opening of the door and the wall, in order to
prevent the door from crushing her son’s head, she jabbed her husband with
her umbrella with a downward motion, though she could not tell if she touched
him or not. She stated, furthermore, that she did not know how the wound in
her husband’s forehead was caused. This point of the defendant’s testimony
has not been contradicted by any evidence to the contrary; rather it has been
corroborated by her son Emilio de la Cruz who also testified at the trial.

On the other hand, it appears from the testimony of the defendant and of her
son that the husband and wife did not quarrel in the street while returning
home on the night in question, and, moreover, that during the marriage they
lived together in peace with no disagreements between them, either on or
before the date of the incident.

In view of the fact that there is no eyewitness of the act herein prosecuted,
with the exception of the defendant and her son Emilio de la Cruz, we are
compelled to accept the declaration of the defendant that she jabbed her
husband with her umbrella in order to prevent the door from closing and
crushing her son’s head which was inserted between said door and the wall of
the house. Said defendant, explaining what took place, says in part: "When the
door was ajar my son went in, and then my husband pushed it and as I saw
that he was about to crush my son’s head, I jabbed my husband with the point
of the umbrella downwards to prevent him from crushing my son’s head." We
find nothing improbable in this statement and if we add to this the absence of
any reasonable motive to prompt said defendant to injure her husband, we are
compelled to conclude that in thrusting her umbrella in the opening of the door
in question, she did so to free her son from the imminent danger of having his
head crushed or being strangled; and if she thus caused her husband’s injury,
it was by a mere accident, without any fault or intention to cause it. This being
so, we believe that she incurred no criminal liability in accordance with article
8, No. 8, of the Penal Code, because, it being a licit act to free her son from
the grave danger threatening him, and the fact of having touched the left eye
of her husband, who was behind the door, with the end of her umbrella, does
not make her criminally liable. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of
November 30, 1888.)

Wherefore the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the appellant

Praxedes Ayaya must be, as she hereby is, acquitted, with costs de oficio. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-65762 June 23, 1984
JOSE FRIAS, JR. and GERVACIO TACAS, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents-appellees.
RELOVA, J.:
In this petition for review by certiorari, petition appellants seek reversal of the decision
of the Sandiganbayan, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, accused P/Cpl. GERVACIO TACAS and JOSE FRIAS, JR.
are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the
crime of Murder, qualified by taking advantage of superior strength,
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Taking into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same
and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, both accused are each
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from ELEVEN (11)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum to EIGHTEEN
(18) YEARS and SIX (6) MONTHS of reclusion temporal as maximum;
to pay to the heirs of the deceased Bartolome Arellano, jointly and
severally, P15,000.00 for the death of said victim; P5,311.45 as actual
damages; P15,000.00 as moral damages; compensatory damages of
P40,000.00, by way of unrealized earnings; and to pay the costs.
Subject homemade "bulldog" gin marked Exhibit 1-a is hereby
confiscated in favor of the state; but let the armalite marked Exhibit 1-
a which was issued as official service firearm of P/Cpl. Gervacio Tacas
be returned to Sta. Teresita, Cagayan police station for proper
disposition. (pp. 96-97, Rollo)
Appellant Gervacio Tacas is a member of the police force of Sta. Teresita, Cagayan; has
been a policeman for 24 years and was on duty on August 3, 1980. He admitted having
shot Bartolome Arellano on August 3, 1980. However, he claims that he did so in self-
defense and/or in the fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right or office. As aptly
stated by respondent court, "[t]o avoid criminal liability therefor, he has to show to the
satisfaction of the Court the attendance of justifying circumstance or circumstances and
must rely on the strength of his own evidence. He can not depend on the weakness of the
prosecution's evidence for even if weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused
himself owned the killing." (p. 81, Rollo)
Respondent court based its finding of guilt of herein appellants on the testimony of Edita
Arellano, daughter of the deceased, and the testimonies of Francisco Arellano and
Ricardo Bilag who both claimed to have witnessed the killing. Their testimonies, as
summarized by the trial court, are as follows:
Testimony of Edita Arellano
"Second witness for the People was Edita Arellano y Pajela, daughter of the deceased
Bartolome Arellano. She testified that her father was a farmer by occupation, planting
rice to a 3 hectare land with an average yield of 80 sacks per harvest every semester at
P50.00 per sack. According to her, her late father was an early riser. On August 3, 1980,
he was up at 4:00 in the morning and after preparing food, he went out to the field, as he
usually did, to see his carabao. He was in short pants and sweater and unarmed.
"Then, at around 5:30 that fateful morning, she heard a single gunfire followed by three
'bang, bang, bang' and a series of gunshots thereafter, after which somebody who was
running told her that her father was dead. So, she rushed to the highway and found her
dead father lying face down with hands and feet stretched and right forearm supporting
the forehead. Many people were around the cadaver and even as she went nearer, she
saw policemen taking photographs of the deceased. Then, Cpl. Tabarrejo turned the
cadaver face upward and placed over the abdomen a gun and knife afterwhich pictures
thereof were again taken; but she did not see where Cpl. Tabarrejo got the said gun and
knife.
"Pointing to accused Gervacio Tacas in Court, this prosecution witness also testified that
she did not know what to do and was crying hysterically in front of Tabarrejo when the
aforementioned acts were being done with her dead father. She was the only one left at
home because her mother went to Laoag City. Ignorant, helpless, shocked, and
speechless, she just. watched what the policemen were doing to the mortal body of her
late 56 year-old father." (pp. 38-39, Rollo)
Testimony of Francisco Arellano
"According to him, on the night of August 2, 1980, he was in the dance hall within the
poblacion of Sta. Teresita, Cagayan. He slept there and went home at about 5:00 the
following morning, reaching Simpatuyo by jeep an hour later. He met accused Gervacio
Tacas on the bridge. Tacas, in under wears, was holding an armalite and was with Jose
Frias, Jr. who was armed with a carbine. Being still a second cousin of Tacas, he was not
afraid. He trailed Tacas just one and a half meter on the same side of the barangay road
while Frias walked eight meters from them on the other side of the road. From such
vantage position, he saw Frias aiming a carbine at Bartolome Arellano who was then
facing Tacas and eight meters from Frias. Bartolome Arellano was unarmed and was
walking slowly in a stooping manner at the place reflected in the sketch (Exhibit F). It
was Tacas who first shot Arellano before Frias also fired at the latter but he could not ten
if Bartolome was hit then. Thereafter, Bartolome Arellano ran and Tacas moved such that
the latter was about to meet the former. However, when Bartolome Arellano noticed the
approaching Tacas, Arellano turned around and ran back to where he was formerly (the
spot marked B. Arellano in Exhibit F) even as Frias moved to the 'RIC' which is made of
hollow blocks and Tacas returned to the edge of the LB canteen. He was beside Tacas
when Tacas and Frias fired. Both Tacas and Frias fired twice but more reports came from
Tacas who touched the automatic lever of his gun. After the firing was over, Arellano
whirled around and fell face down in the place where there is a palm tree, witness
recounted.
"Elaborating on how he managed to observe the happening in question, he explained that
he was only a meter away from Tacas and five to six meters from Frias when the
assailants shot the victim. Being still a second cousin to Tacas, he even commented to
Tacas 'No more, Manong' but this was after the victim fell and was dead already. Upon
seeing his dead cousin, fear seized him because Tacas might also turn against him. Before
leaving the scene, however, he tried to go closer to the fallen victim but only to be told by
Tacas 'Get away from there; otherwise, I will pulverize your face.' Apprehensive of what
could happen to him in such a perilous situation, he left, witness narrated.
"This prosecution witness also identified Exhibits E and E-1 to be the pictures of the
deceased Bartolome Arellano, a first cousin of his. He admitted that he was never
investigated by the police and did not present himself to the PC authorities in Aparri or
elsewhere for investigation in connection with the incident under inquiry; and that it
was only before Fiscal Ferrer the day before he testified in court that he executed an
affidavit for the first time in relation to this case. He never moved to another place since
the time of the shooting at bar took place but he was not able to present himself as a
witness earlier for the reason that some people in their locality made him understand
that he is disqualified to be a witness in the case involving a first cousin of his. He was
still at the scene of the crime when police probers arrived but because he was never
asked, he did not volunteer any information. However, he told Edita, daughter of the
deceased, that he witnessed the shooting but she said 'Never mind, Tatang.' During the
burial, he also informed other relatives, like his Uncles Mando Arellano and Tolentino
Arellano, of what he saw in the same way that he told the bereaved widow of the victim.
During the wake, there were also police investigators but inasmuch as nobody inquired
as to who shot the victim, he did not tell anything to the investigators; besides, he was
out for work, witness who insisted that he witnessed the shooting complained of,
pointed out.
"Finally, this witness divulged that the victim was not carrying anything at the time the
two accused shot him (victim).lwphl@itç In fact, the victim was only wearing short pants
and 'bad shirt,' he added." (pp. 40-43, Rollo)
Testimony of Ricardo Bilag
"Ricardo Bilag y Sotelo, security guard by occupation and who stayed in barangay
Simpatuyo, Sta. Teresita, Cagayan from July 23, 1980 to January 1981, was the fourth
People's witness in this case. Among other things, he declared that during the aforesaid
period, he sojourned with his cousin, Ernesto Lazo, whose house is located in the place
indicated with initial 'EL' (Exhibit F-1) in Exhibit F. On August 3, 1980, he was, therefore,
in the house of Ernesto Lazo. Waking up at 5:45 a.m. on Id date, he was by the window
facing the national road to San Vicente when he witnessed the unusual incident wherein
Bartolome Arellano was killed. Before Bartolome Arellano was fatally shot, the latter was
walking on the national road and was being followed by accused Gervacio Tacas who
was with an armalite. Tacas was wearing brief and sleeveless shirt. Standing by the road
behind Tacas was accused Jose Frias, Jr. who was with a carbine. At the far end of the
barangay road walking to and fro around four meters from Tacas was Francisco
Arellano. Bartolome Arellano was without any weapon. He was wearing dark shoes and
brown long sleeves shirt.
"According to this witness, when Tacas was following Bartolome Arellano, the latter
went to hide behind the 'RIC' concrete marker even as Tacas was aiming the gun at him
(Bartolome Arellano). After Tacas fired twice, Bartolome Arellano ran towards a 'silag'
tree about 12 meters from the 'RIC' concrete market but he was again followed by Tacas
who crossed the national road and went near the same 'silag' tree; and when Bartolome
Arellano tried to go to the national road and was passing by the store, the latter was shot
by Tacas, at which precise time, Frias was at the roadside, lying with stomach down and
aiming also his gun at Bartolome Arellano. Frias maintained such position while
Bartolome Arellano was behind the 'RIC' concrete marker and fired once at the latter.
Then, when Bartolome Arellano went to the place of the 'silag' tree, Frias remained
thereat and when Bartolome Arellano was moving to the national road, Frias stood in the
middle of the road and fired again but he (witness) could not tell if the victim was hit.
After Bartolome Arellano was shot by Tacas, said victim slowly slumped to the ground
and thereafter, Frias went home. It was Tacas who first fired at the victim where the
victim was passing near the store. Frias fired later at the victim who was then slowly
slumping to the ground. He subsequently saw Edita, daughter of the deceased, crying by
the side of her fallen father, so this witness recollected.
"He likewise divulged that he executed his affidavit (Exhibit G) on September 14, 1980
before Provincial Fiscal Bello in Aparri, Cagayan. Afraid that the culprits might kin him,
he motored 30 kilometers to Aparri subscribe and swear to such sworn statement of his.
He is not related in anyway to the. deceased. He actually saw Francisco Arellano at the
crime scene. He even told Sianing Arellano, a brother. of the deceased, of that fact.
"On cross-examination, this prosecution witness testified further that his permanent
place of abode is Dapdap, Amulong, Cagayan, more or less 80 kilometers from
Simpatuyo, Sta. Teresita. However, he used to go to Sta. Teresita for vacation. He only
does not know if the people of said place know him well. In the last week of July 1980, he
was staying in the house of his cousin, Ernesto Lazo, four houses from Gervacio Tacas'
house. Before July 23, 1980, he did not personally know Bartolome Arellano. Although he
knows Raymundo Arellano, supposed to be one of the richest resident in the place, he
was not aware that Raymundo is the father of Bartolome. Reminiscing how he happened
to be a witness in the case, this witness disclosed that upon the request of Sianing
Arellano, Ernesto Lazo asked him if he was really present during the happening of the
incident in question and he answered his cousin affirmatively. He admitted, however,
that he was never investigated by the police. Not having been asked by the police officers
who were at the crime scene, he did not volunteer any information. Neither did he let
Edita, daughter of the deceased, know what he saw. He only decided to give his written
statement on September 14, 1980 in Aparri in which statement he was not able to
mention the presence of Francisco Arellano at the crime scene. Said affidavit of his was
made by Atty. Jose Brillantes in Bugey, Cagayan in the presence of another witness and a
brother of the deceased. Prior thereto, he was also called once by Mayor Bernoli Arquero
of Sta. Teresita and requested by the Mayor to testify for the prosecution; but the sole
reason for him to testify in court is to help the court gather the truth regarding the
shooting incident under inquiry.
"This witness also narrated that it was only after the incident at bar that he learned that
Jaime Yerre, Jr. and Manuel Pajela were also shot on August 3, 1980 and he heard that it
was Bartolome Arellano who shot the two during a mahjong game; but he does not know
if the buckshot used by Bartolome Arellano in shooting said victims was recovered by
the police authorities. According to him, Bartolome Arellano was not carrying anything
when he saw him after hearing the first burst of gunfire." (pp. 43-47, Rollo) The trial
court said:
Obviously, unlawful aggression is the main ingredient of self-defense.
Without unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense, complete
or incomplete. And it is unlawful aggression which imperils one's life,
limb or right either actually or imminently, that makes the invocation
of self-defense feasible. In short, before he was shot to death, did the
victim create or constitute any menace to the accused? Painstakingly
evaluating the gamut of evidence at hand, We can not divine how an
unarmed person could have done unlawful aggression against two
heavily armed men. To be sure, the showing that Bartolome Arellano
was without any deadly weapon when he met his violent death is too
overwhelming to be overlooked. Waking up at 4:00 in the morning of
August 3, 1980, as was his daily routine, he cooked food for his family
after which, with short pants and "bad shirt" to cover his body, he
went down for the nearby ricefield to attend to his working animal. It
does not appear that he had any gun or even a bolo. Indeed, from all
appearances, he did not go out to do violence against anybody. In fact,
he was seen later by the prosecution witnesses, notably Francisco
Arellano, Jr. and Ricardo Bilag, going from one place to another in a
determined effort to save dear life from the advancing Gervacio Tacas
and Jose Frias, Jr. who were combat-ready and armed to the teeth.
Said prosecution witnesses succinctly testified that Bartolome
Arellano was not holding anything at that unlucky moment. If he had a
bulldog gun and a bolo tucked to the waist, considering that it was
already 6:00 in the morning at the time, bright enough for everybody
to observe the happening under inquiry, it would be easy for the
prosecution witnesses to detect any weapon in the possession of the
victim but the truth is he had none and could not have been a real to
the life and limb of Tacas and Frias who were respectively armed with
an armalite and a carbine. As a matter of fact, the victim was actually
running away. Then, too, if there was any cap for him to sender by the
heavily armed Tacas who was assisted by Frias, Bartolome Arellano
would have meekly heeded the same, no doubt.
All things considered, We find the victim incapable of unlawful
aggression. The situation he was in belies self-defense.
Absent unlawful aggression on the part of the victim it is needless for
Us to discuss lengthily the other requirements for valid self-defense.
As aptly held in a recent decision of Ours, when there is no unlawful
aggression to speak of, there is nothing to defend against or repel And
the requisites that there be reasonable necessity in the means
employed to repel unlawful aggression and lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself have no room
for application.
Neither is the justifying circumstance of fulfilment of duty under
paragraph 5 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code availing, it
appearing that the victim was truly unarmed and it was not necessary
to shoot him. Peace officers are never justified in using unnecessary
force, wanton violence or dangerous means. Not even a hardened
criminal should be handled in the manner complained of. (pp. 82-84,
Rollo)
However, the Solicitor General, in his Comment, said that the findings of the trial court
are not supported by the evidence; that an objective analysis of the evidence in fact
discloses overwhelming proof that Bartolome Arellano was armed and shot certain
persons, including appellant Tacas. He recommends acquittal of petitioners-appellants.
Manuel Pajela and Jaime Yerre, Jr. testified that while they were playing mahjong at
about 5:30 in the morning of August 3, 1980, they were fired at with a shotgun by
Bartolome Arellano. Prosecution witness Ricardo Bilag confirms the version of the
defense that Bartolome Arellano shot and wounded Pajela and Yerre with a shotgun.
Hereunder is Bilag's testimony on this point —
ATTY. PAZ:
Q And you heard that first shot before you saw Jose
Frias, is that right?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. PAZ:
Q Now, tell the truth Mr. witness. Did you come to
know that on the morning of August 3, 1980,
BARTOLOME Arellano shot at the persons who
were playing mahjong at Simpatuyo and wounded
two of them?
WITNESS:
A After the incident I came to know there were two
persons hit.
ATTY. PAZ:
Q And these persons whom you came to know who
were hurt were Jaime Yerre, Jr. and Manuel Pajela?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. PAZ:
Q And you even heard after the incident that it was
Bartolome Arellano who shot Jaime Yerre and
Manuel Pajela which cause their injury?
WITNESS:
A After that incident I also heard the same thing
that he shot Jaime Yerre and Manuel Pajela.
ATTY. PAZ:
Q And you heard also that Bartolome Arellano shot
them on August 3, 1980 with a buckshot?
PRESIDING JUSTICE PAMARAN:
 You are assuming that he knows
what a buckshot is.
ATTY. PAZ:
I will lay the basis.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
Q Do you know what a buckshot is known in
Cagayan?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
Q What is it?
WITNESS:
A A gun with 13 cage bullets.
JUSTICE ESCAREAL:
Q Meaning a shotgun using 12 bullets that is
usually used in some parts of Cagayan even before
Martial Law?
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir. (pp. 50-62, tsn., hearing November 19,
1981)
Further, he admitted that when he (Bilag) saw appellant Tacas that early morning, the
latter was wearing only a brief and sleeveless shirt. This supports the testimony of Tacas
that he was sleeping when he was suddenly awakened by the sound of gunfire followed
by cries of Pajela's wife for help; that looking at the window, he saw Pajela bleeding and
about to be carried inside his house; and that he then grabbed his service armalite and
went down in his brief and undershirt. As observed by the Solicitor General, if Tacas did
plan the killing of Arellano, he would have put on a more respectable attire. The fact that
he went out in the street in his brief confirms the truth of his testimony that he merely
responded to an urgent call for help.
Dr. Ferdinand Cariño of the Ponce Enrile Memorial Hospital testified that on August 3,
1980 he treated Manuel Pajela and Jaime Yerre for gunshot wounds and were thereafter
confined at the hospital.
With respect to the testimony of Francisco Arellano, the Solicitor General claims that the
same is "so unbelievable that no one hardly knows where to begin in pointing out the
falsity of his declaration. Thus:
1. The improbability of F. Arellano's testimony is no more manifest
than from his claim that he was present when the crane was
committed. Could it be believed that Tacas, a veteran policeman for 24
years would be so rash as to ambush the deceased in the presence of
his first degree cousin? (pp. 22-24, tsn., October 28, 1981).
2. The testimony of F. Arellano that Bartolome Arellano was shot
while unarmed and in coldblood is rendered more improbable by the
time and place of the incident. The road is hardly the place to court
murder, especially when it is 'already bright.' (pp. 20, 27, tsn., October
29, 1981).
3. F. Arellano testified that before the shooting, there were many
people near the bridge who witnessed the shooting. They were
"Edring, Dianong, Mr. Consejal Pagarigan, Macario Soliven, Ernesto
Gallardo" and the father of the victim (pp. 32-34, tsn, October 29,
1981). Why would Tacas kill B. Arellano under the circumstances
depicted by the prosecution? Common sense dictates against
acceptance of a story that pictures a lawman killing an old and
defenseless man for no apparent reason and in the presence of so
many witnesses.
4. F. Arellano could not even be consistent. On direct examination, he
declared that he was beside Tacas when the latter shot and killed B.
Arellano (p. 8, Decision).lwphl@itç On cross-examination,. he was no
longer beside Tacas but five to six meters away (p. 9, Decision).
5. F. Arellano declared that Tacas was wearing 'short pants (P. 11,
Decision). What the other eyewitness for the prosecution saw was
something else. According to Bilag, Tacas was wearing only a "brief"
(p. 11, Decision). If indeed Tacas was wearing a brief, Bilag's
testimony complements the testimony of Tacas that he was sleeping
when awakened by the sound of gunfire and hurriedly went down ' to
investigate. Either F. Arellano or Bilag is lying. Both can not be right.
6. F. Arellano's testimony was that Tacas and Frias were walking
when they met B. Arellano (p. 8, Decision). What Bilag saw was B.
Arellano being followed by Tacas (p. 11, Decision).
7. F. Arellano declared that Tacas shot B. Arellano upon seeing him (p.
8, Decision appended to Petition). Bilag's testimony is different.
Although on direct examination, Bilag declared that Tacas fired two
shots when B. Arellano hid behind the 'RIC' concrete marker, he
clarified this on cross-examination, declaring that when Tacas fired
his first shot, the gun was aimed upwards (p. 64, tsn., November 19,
1981). Bilag further testified that when B. Arellano reached the silag
tree, Tacas fired another shot aimed "upwards" (p. 69, Id.)
xxx xxx xxx
8. F. Arellano was not listed as one of the prosecution witnesses. He
simply appeared out of the blue as a witness for the prosecution on
October 28, 1981, one year, two months after the incident and while
the trial was in progress. In fact, his affidavit was executed only the
day before he testified, or on October 27, 1981.
 His appearance only at the trial is unnatural because, according to
him, he had told the widow of the victim and his uncles, Raymundo
and Tolentino Arellano at the wake that he witnessed the incident (p.
33, tsn., October 28, 1981; pp. 12-15, tsn., October 29, 1981). He also
claims to have told Edita, the victim's daughter, after the burial (p. 32,
tsn., October 28 , 1981). And yet he was not investigated. Nor did he
present himself for investigation to the police, PC or fiscal. Plainly, he
was a conjured witness for the prosecution.
xxx xxx xxx
9. There is paucity of material details in the testimony of F. Arellano.
Thus, Bilag who was farther away from Tacas heard more of Tacas'
words and saw more of Tacas' movements and actions than F.
Arellano who claims to have been only a few meters distant from
Tacas.
10. F. Arellano testified that he saw Ricardo Bilag before and after the
shooting near or at the scene of the crime (pp. 30-34, tsn., October 29,
1981).
According to Bilag, he was not investigated by the police; because he
"did not get near the scene of the crime" (p. 38, tsn., November 19,
1981).
11. The testimony of F. Arellano starts only from. the time Tacas and
Frias were about to shoot B. Arellano. It does not therefore refute the
testimony of the defense witnesses that before Arellano was killed, he
shot Manuel Pajela and Jaime Yerre Jr. with a shotgun. (pp. 129-131,
134-135, Rollo)
On the other hand, appellant Gervacio Tacas testified that at about 5:00 in the morning of
August 3, 1980, he was awakened from his sleep by the sound of gunfire, that hearing a
woman shouting for help east of his house, he opened the window and saw Pajela
slumped on a table, blood oozing from his body, that he grabbed his armalite rifle, went
out and saw Bartolome Arellano with a gun proceeding towards the RIC marker (p. 20-
26, tsn., January 11, 1983." (pp. 126-127, Rollo)
Appellant Jose Frias testified that "at about 5:30 in the morning of August 3, 1980, he
was awakened when he heard a loud explosion coming from the eastern side of his
house. that he looked out of the window and saw Pajela lying on a table, bleeding, that he
went down and saw Tacas, his father-in-law, calling upon Bartolome Arellano to
surrender; and that Bartolome Arellano was in the street proceeding towards the RIC
marker, and that Bartolome Arellano was armed with a "bulldog" shotgun (pp. 5-9, tsn.,
March 14, 1983)." (p. 127, Rollo)
The testimonies of petitioners-appellants were corroborated by Teodoro Paguirigan, a
nephew of Bartolome Arellano; Modesto Macarubbo, Station Commander of Sta. Teresita
Police Station, and Cpl. Silvino Tabarrejo.
Teodoro Paguirigan declared that when he heard gunfires at about 5:00 in the morning
of August 3, 1980, he stood-up, looked out of the window and saw Bartolome Arellano
leaving the house of Pajela with a shotgun on his hand and a bolo on his waist. Later,
Paguirigan saw Bartolome Arellano point his gun and shot at Tacas.
Modesto Macarubbo testified that when he arrived at the scene of the incident, he
recovered a shotgun and a bolo from under the body of Bartolome Arellano. The gun had
one (1) empty shell in its chamber,
Corporal Silvino Tabarrejo, who arrived at the place with Commander Macarubbo, said
Bartolome Arellano's right hand was holding a homemade shot gun while on his waist
was tucked a knife.
The above testimonies find corroboration on the fact that pellets, gauge 12 (Exhibits 1b2
and 1b3 were extracted by the police from one of the posts of Eny Peralta's store where
appellant Tacas sought cover. These pellets match the empty shell, which is also gauge
12, found in the shotgun's chamber (Exhibit 1b As correctly observed by the Solicitor
General, "these items, taken together with the testimonies of both the defense and
prosecution witnesses, indubitably prove that Bartolome Arellano was armed and he
shot at appellant Tacas." (p, 128, Rollo)
The law recognizes the non-existence of a crime when it expressly stated in the opening
sentence of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code that the persons therein mentioned "do
4 not incur any criminal liability." If there is a circumstance justifying the defendant's act,
he is exempt from both criminal and civil liability, except in paragraph 4 of this Article
11, where the civil liability is borne by the persons benefited by the act.
The fifth justifying circumstance which exempts a person from criminal liability is found
in this provision: "Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office." The requisites of the defense of fulfillment of duty are: (1)
that the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or
duty; (2) that the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence
of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right.
The Solicitor General expressed the view, with reason, that Tacas acted in the
performance of his duty. Again, We quote from the brief of the Solicitor General:
... The information clearly states so, thus: "That the crime was
committed by the accused Gervacio Tacas in relation to his office as a
policeman" (p. 2, Decision). And so do the facts — he was awakened
from his sleep by the sound of gunfire followed by cries of a neighbor
for help; he stood up, look out of the window, saw Pajela bleeding on
top of a table about to be carried to his house; he grabbed his armalite
rifle, went out of the house, saw Bartolome Arellano with a shotgun
 leaving Pajela's yard, went after him, fired warning shots and asked 4. The relationship of Frias and Tacas is no proof of conspiracy
him to surrender — undisputed facts which clearly show that Tacas (People vs. Geronimo, 53 SCRA 246). (p. 156, Rollo)
acted in the performance of his duty.
It is settled rule that conspiracy can not be presumed, but must be
Anent the second requisite — that the injury caused or the offense proven as convincingly as the crane itself. The crime of murder has
committed be the necessary consequence of duty or the lawful not beer proven. There is therefore hardly any reason to convict Frias
exercise of right or office — it is difficult not to give Tacas the benefit as a co-conspirator of Tacas. (p. 157, Rollo)
of the doubt. It is shown by the evidence that B. Arellano was armed
with a shotgun. It is undisputed that Tacas fired a warning shot, asked ACCORDINGLY, as recommended by the Solicitor General on the ground that Gervacio
B. Arellano to surrender, and then fired another warning shot. So Tacas acted in the fulfillment of a duty and in the legitimate exercise of his authority, said
when B. Arellano refused to surrender but tried to elude arrest and appellant is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
pointed his gun at Tacas, first at the RIC marker and then at the silag
tree, Tacas had very little choice but to use his weapon. In fact,
according to Paguirigan, B. Arellano and Tacas fired "simultaneously" For insufficiency of evidence, appellant Jose Frias, Jr. is also ACQUITTED.
(p. 24, Decision).lwphl@itç
SO ORDERED.
While there are limits to the lawful exercise of a right or duty, at the
same time, it should not be required of a policeman to unnecessarily
expose himself to peril. In this case, B. Arellano was armed, refused to
surrender, tried to elude arrest, pointed his shotgun at Tacas and later
shot at him. As it was the duty of Tacas to arrest B. Arellano and to
prevent him from escaping, sooner or later, it would come to the point
where the lawman and the suspect had to face each other. In that
crucial moment when Tacas and B. Arellano, both armed, faced each
other, they had to make a split decision of putting their guns down or
firing. They both elected to fire and B. Arellano was killed while Tacas
survived. Under these circumstances, it can hardly be said that Tacas
should not have fired at all. As his life was in peril, his judgment can
not be questioned. (pp. 148-149, Rollo)

With respect to the case of appellant Frias, the Solicitor General submits that "apart from
the dubious and false testimonies of F. Arellano and Bilag, the prosecution has not shown
any positive and convincing evidence of conspiracy." He divulged that —

1. There is total absence of motive for Frias to shoot B. Arellano, a fact

plainly overlooked by the trial court. In the absence of motive, it is
difficult to assume that Frias conspired with Tacas in murdering B.
Arellano.

2. There is total absence of evidence that Frias and Tacas planned to

kill B. Arellano. In fact, the circumstances surrounding the death of B.
Arellano simply point only to one question, that is, whether the killing
was justified by the defense of fulfillment of duty.

3. Assuming arguendo that Frias also shot at B. Arellano, his

participation in the incident was purely accidental and unforeseen,
geared most probably to the protection of Tacas, his father-in-law, as
the trial court itself assumed (p. 58. Decision). That negates
conspiracy.
R.A. 9344 (Juvenile Justice Welfare Act)

SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age or
under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to
Section 20 of this Act.

A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless
he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the
appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.

The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption
from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.

SEC. 7. Determination ofAge. - The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the
presumption of minority. He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the
law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child may
be determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other
pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on
information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical
appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the
child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.

Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to the filing of the
information in any appropriate court may file a case in a summary proceeding for the
determination of age before the Family Court which shall decide the case within twenty-
four (24) hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of all interested parties.

If a case has been fiied against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in the
appropriate court, the person shall file a motion to determine the age of the child in the
same court where the case is pending. Pending hearing on the said motion, proceedings
on the main case shall be suspended.

In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other government
officials concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the child in conflict
with the law.
G.R. No. L-30801 March 27, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs DOMINGO URAL
AQUINO, J.:p
This is an appeal of defendant Domingo Ural from the decision of Judge Vicente G. Ericta
of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, convicting him of murder, sentencing
him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Felix Napola in the
sum of twelve thousand pesos and to pay the costs (Criminal Case No. 3280).
The judgment of conviction was based on the testimony of Brigido Alberto, a twenty-six
year old former detention prisoner in Buug, Zamboanga del Sur. He had been accused of
murder and then set at liberty on June 9, 1966 after posting bail. He went to Barrio
Camongo, Dumalinao where his father resided. On July 31, 1966, he intended to go to his
residence at Barrio Upper Lamari, Buug but night overtook him in the town. He decided
to sleep in the Buug municipal building where there would be more security.
Upon arrival in the municipal building at around eight o'clock, he witnessed an
extraordinary occurrence. He saw Policeman Ural (with whom he was already
acquainted) inside the jail. Ural was boxing the detention prisoner, Felix Napola. As a
consequence of the fistic blows, Napola collapsed on the floor. Ural, the tormentor,
stepped on his prostrate body.
Ural went out of the cell. After a short interval, he returned with a bottle. He poured its
contents on Napola's recumbent body. Then, he ignited it with a match and left the cell.
Napola screamed in agony. He shouted for help. Nobody came to succor him.
Much perturbed by the barbarity which he had just seen, Alberto left the municipal
building. Before his departure, Ural cautioned him: "You better keep quiet of what I have
done" (sic). Alberto did not sleep anymore that night. From the municipal building, he
went to the crossing, where the cargo trucks passed. He hitchhiked in a truck hauling
iron ore and went home.
Doctor Luzonia R. Bakil, the municipal health officer, certified that the thirty-year old
victim, whom she treated twice, sustained second-degree burns on the arms, neck, left
side of the face and one-half of the body including the back (Exh. A). She testified that his
dermis and epidermis were burned. If the burns were not properly treated, death would
unsue from toxemia and tetanus infection. "Without any medical intervention", the burns
would cause death", she said. She explained that, because there was water in the burnt
area, secondary infection would set in, or there would be complications.
Napola died on August 25, 1966. The sanitary inspector issued a certificate of death
indicating "burn" as the cause of death (Exh. B).
The trial court fittingly deplored the half-hearted manner in which the prosecution
(represented by Fiscal Roque and the private prosecutor, Delfin Agbu) handled the case.
It bewailed the prosecution's failure to present as witnesses Juanito de la Serna and
Ernesto Ogoc, the detention prisoners who saw the burning of Napola. They had
executed a joint affidavit which was one of the bases of the information for murder. 1
It noted that Rufina Paler, the victim's widow, who was present in court, was a vital
witness who should have been presented as a witness to prove the victim's dying
declaration or his statements which were part of the res gestae. 2
In this appeal appellant's three assignment of error may be condensed into the issue of
credibility or the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
His story is that at around nine o'clock in the evening of July 31, 1966 he was in the
municipal jail on guard duty. He heard a scream for help from Napola. He entered the cell
and found Napola's shirt in flames. With the assistance of Ernesto Ogoc and Anecio Siton,
Ural removed Napola's shirt. Ural did not summon a doctor because, according to Napola,
the burns were not serious. Besides, he (Ural) was alone in the municipal building.
Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's common-law wife, whom the trial court branded "as a
complete liar", testified that she heard Napola's scream for help. She saw that Napola's
shirt was burning but she did not know how it happened to be burned. She said that Ural
and Siton removed the shirt of Napola and put out the fire.
Teofilo Matugas, a policeman, declared that he was relieved as guard by Ural at eight-
thirty in the evening of July 31st. Matugas denied that Alberio was in the municipal
building at eight o'clock.
The trial court held that Ural's denials cannot prevail over the positive testimony of
Alberio. It observed that Ural's alleged act of removing Napola's burning shirt was at
most an indication that he was "belatedly alarmed by the consequence of his evil act" but
would not mean that he was not the incendiary.
Appellant Ural (he was thirty-four years old in March, 1969), in assailing the credibility
of Alberio, pointed out that he was not listed as a prosecution witness and that he was
convicted of murder.
Those circumstances would not preclude Alberio from being a credible witness. It should
be noted that the accused was a policeman. Ordinarily, a crime should be investigated by
the police. In this case, there was no police investigation. The crime was investigated by a
special counsel of the fiscal's office. That might explain why it was not immediately
discovered that Alberio was an eyewitness of the atrocity perpetrated by Ural.
The testimonies of Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's common-law wife, and Policeman Matugas
are compatible with the prosecution's theory that Ural burned Napola's shirt. Ultimately,
the factual issue is: who should be given credence, Alberio or Ural? As already stated, the
trial court which had the advantage of seeing their demeanor and behavior on the
witness stand, chose to believe Alberio. This Court, after a searching scrutiny of the
whole record, does not find any justification for disbelieving Alberio.
This case is covered by article 4 of the Revised Penal code which provides that "criminal was making a nuisance of himself inside the detention cell. When Ural realized the fearful
liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the consequences of his felonious act, he allowed Napola to secure medical treatment at the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended". The presumption is "that a municipal dispensary.
person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule 131,
Rules of Court). Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic aggravating, circumstance
of abuse of his official position. The trial court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion
The rationale of the rule in article 4 is found in the doctrine that "el que es causa de la perpetua which is the medium period of the penalty for murder (Arts. 64[4] and 248,
causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil Revised Penal Code).
caused)."Conforme a dicha doctrina no alteran la relacion de causalidad las condiciones
preexistentes (como las condiciones patologicasdel lesionado, la predisposicion del Finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the same is affirmed with costs against the
ofendido, la constitucion fisica del herido, etc.); ni las condiciones sobrevenidas (como el appellant.
tetanos, la pulmonia, o la gangrena sobrevenidos a consequencia de la herida)" (1 Cuello
Calon, Codigo Penal, 12th Ed., 1968, p. 335-336).
So ordered.
The similar rule in American jurisprudence is that "if the act of the accused was the cause
of the cause of death, no more is required" (40 C.J.S. 854). So, where during a quarrel, the
accused struck the victim with a lighted lamp, which broke and fell to the floor, causing
the oil to ignite and set fire to the rug, and, in the course of the scuffle, which ensued on
the floor, the victim's clothes caught fire, resulting in burns from which he died, there
was a sufficient causal relation between the death and the acts of the accused to warrant
a conviction of homicide (Williams vs. U.S., 20 Fed. 2nd 269, 40 C.J.S. 854, note 90).

There is a rule that "an individual who unlawfully inflicts wounds upon another person,
which result in the death of the latter, is guilty of the crime of homicide, and the fact that
the injured person did not receive proper medical attendance does not affect the
criminal responsibility" (U.S. vs. Escalona, 12 Phil. 54). In the Escalona case, the victim
was wounded on the wrist. It would not have caused death had it been properly treated.
The victim died sixty days after the infliction of the wound. It was held that lack of
medical care could not be attributed to the wounded man. The person who inflicted the
wound was responsible for the result thereof.

The crime committed by appellant Ural was murder by means of fire (incendio) (Par. 3,
Art. 248, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Masin, 64 Phil. 757; U.S. vs. Burns, 41 Phil. 418,
432, 440). 3

The trial court correctly held that the accused took advantage of his public position (Par.
1, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code). He could not have maltreated Napola if he was not a
policeman on guard duty. Because of his position, he had access to the cell where Napola
was confined. The prisoner was under his custody. "The policeman, who taking
advantage of his public position maltreats a private citizen, merits no judicial leniency.
The methods sanctioned by medieval practice are surely not appropriate for an
enlightened democratic civilization. While the law protects the police officer in the
proper discharge of his duties, it must at the same time just as effectively protect the
individual from the abuse of the police." U.S. vs. Pabalan, 37 Phil. 352).

But the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance "that the offender had
no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed" (Par. 3, Art. 13, Revised
Penal Code). It is manifest from the proven facts that appellant Ural had no intent to kill
Napola. His design was only to maltreat him may be because in his drunken condition he
 [G.R. No. 130708. October 22, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARLITO ARIZALA y VALDEZ
GONZAGA_REYES, J.:
Before us by way of automatic review is the judgment of conviction imposing the
death penalty upon CARLITO ARIZALA y VALDEZ for the killing of SGT. ROLANDO CARA.
The Information dated February 17, 1997 states:
That on or about 5:00 oclock in the evening of February 14, 1997, along Cabarroguiz
Street, District IV, municipality of Bayombong, province of Nueva Vizcaya, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent
to kill and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stabbed from behind SPO4 Rolando Cara y Roduta for several times, thereby
inflicting mortal wounds on the different parts of the body which directly caused his
death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
Upon arraignment on February 28, 1997, herein accused-appellant, duly assisted
by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter trial on the merits ensued.
The Office of the Solicitor General summarized the facts as viewed by the
prosecution witnesses, to wit:
At around 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of February 14, 1997, when Sgt. Rolando Cara
saw Manolito de Guzman on a street in Barangay Salvacion, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya,
the former asked if they could both go to the latters house to talk about
something. Manolito acceded and they went to his house. They had just entered the place
when Sgt. Cara saw some women on the road and decided to talk to them first. Their
conversation lasted for quite sometime, and when Manolito could no longer wait he went
out to the street to call back Sgt. Cara. At this point, Manolito saw Reynaldo Barut, Marco
Barut and Carlito Arizala approaching (TSN, 4/15/97, pp. 2-3; 4/23/97, pp.l 6-7). The
men had just come from the cemetery where they were contracted to demolish a tomb
and were on their way home (TSN, 7/23/97, pp. 2-3). Sgt. Cara called Reynaldo Barut, a
former chief of the Bantay Bayan, to join him and Manolito in the latters house as he
wanted to talk to both of them (TSN, 4/15/97, p. 4; 7/23/97, p. 6). Meanwhile, Carlito,
who appeared drunk, directly proceeded to his house which he rented from Manolito
(TSN, 7/23/97, pp. 7, 10). It was actually a room in the latters house with its own
entrance which was at the edge of the road facing east, while the gate leading to the
entrance of the main house occupied by Manolito was situated on the northern side
(TSN, 7/24/97, pp. 6-8).
Manolito walked ahead of Sgt. Cara and Reynaldo, and when he was about to enter the
gate of his house he turned to Sgt. Cara who was about three (3) meters behind and told
him to come inside (id., pp. 4-7). Just then Manolito saw Carlito suddenly rush out of the
door of his house which was about 2.5 meters away from where Sgt. Cara was, saying,
Vulva of your mother you policemen, I hate all of you and at the same time pushed and
stabbed the latter at the back with a knife (hinalong) about 10 inches long (TSN, 4/5/97,
p. 4; 4/29/97, p. 4; 5/6/97, p. 2). Sgt. Cara fell prone on the ground. Manolito was taken
aback and when Carlito made a motion to thrust at him he ran away. He saw Carlito stab
Sgt. Cara three (3) times before running away for safety (TSN, 4/15/97, p. 5 4/29/97, pp.
4-5). Manolito then reported the incident to Sgt. Mario Lopez who immediately
proceeded to the crime scene. Later when he returned to the place of the incident,
Manolito saw that Sgt. Cara was already loaded in the police vehicle, while Carlito was
lying on the ground in a prone position about 18 meters away from where he attacked
Sgt. Cara (TSN, 4/30/97, pp. 2-4).
Dr. Nestor Domingo, Municipal Health Officer of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya who
conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Sgt. Cara, found that he sustained fourteen (14)
stab wounds, nine (9) of which were fatal. Of the nine fatal wounds, seven (7) were at the
back and two (2) were on the left lateral side of his body. Dr. Domingo testified that only
one type of weapon was used to inflict them, which was a single bladed weapon (TSN,
6/3/97, pp. 7-11).[2]
On the other hand, accused-appellant presented his own account of the incident in
his brief, to wit:
Accused-appellant CARLITO ARIZALA admitted having inflicted the injuries sustained by
Sgt. Rolando Cara in self-defense. He said that on February 14, 1997, from morning til
afternoon, they (he, Reynaldo and Marco Barut) were in the cemetery of Bayombong to
gather the bones belonging to a certain Mr. La Corda so that a new body could be
interred in the tomb. Before they started working, they consumed a bottle of San Miguel
Gin. At around 5:00 p.m., they left the cemetery and went to La Cordas house to return
the tools used in the cemetery. Then, they proceeded home after receiving their
compensation for the job. On their way home, they passed at a store to have
their P1,000.00 bill changed into smaller denominations. When he was already near his
house, he noticed Sgt. Cara at the place of Manolito de Guzman. He entered his house,
gave his earning to his wife and rested for a while.Afterwards, he assisted his wife to
cook by slicing meat. He was not able to finish slicing meat as Sgt. Cara was shouting at
him and ordering him to get out of his house. At first, he was reluctant to go out as Sgt.
Cara appeared to be mad but later on he did come out. Sgt. Cara scolded and uttered
invectives at him blaming him for the illegal logging activities in Salvacion,
Bayombong. His repeated denial of the said accusation made Sgt. Cara uttered the words
"I will shoot you"and acted as if he would make true of his words by trying to draw
something from his left waist. Alarmed, he embraced Sgt. Cara and struggled with him as
he (Cara) was trying to draw his gun from his waist. The knife he was using in slicing
meat was unconsciously carried by him when he went out. While struggling with Sgt.
Cara, somebody hit his head. He unconsciously thrusted the knife at Sgt. Cara in reaction
to the blow he received. Afterwards, Sgt. Cara fell on the ground. He went near the house
of his parents-in-law and waited for policemen who later handcuffed him. He was
brought to the hospital for the treatment of his injured head.[3]
On September 3, 1997 the trial court promulgated its judgment of conviction and
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Carlito Arizala y Valdez, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of Murder, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the capital punishment
of DEATH by lethal injection, to pay the heirs of Sgt. Rolando Cara the sums of
P51,000.00 as actual damages, of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.[4]
In this automatic review, herein accused-appellant raised the following assignment
of errors, to wit:
I 6). The force of the attack caused Sgt. Cara to fall on the ground but appellant continued
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE
OF SELF-DEFENSE IN FAVOR OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II
GRANTING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT ACT IN SELF-DEFENSE, THE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE ATTACK UPON THE VICTIM WAS
PERPETRATED WITH TREACHERY, THUS, QUALIFYING THE KILLING TO MURDER.
We find no merit in this appeal.
We have carefully reviewed the testimonies of both witnesses for the prosecution
and the defense and we are convinced that the guilt of herein accused-appellant has been
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
It is axiomatic that where an accused pleads self-defense, he thereby admits
authorship of the crime, as in this case. Consequently, the burden of proving the guilt of
the accused which lies upon the prosecution is shifted to the accused who must prove
the elements of his defense.[5] He has to justify the taking of the victims life by the
standards of the law for such absolution.[6] Otherwise, having admitted the killing,
conviction is inescapable.[7] It is necessary that self-defense must be alleged with
certainty coupled with a strong, clear, sufficient and convincing proof that the killing is
justified.Accordingly, the accused-appellant must convincingly prove the essential
elements of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person defending himself.[8] Although all three elements must concur,
self-defense must rest on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. [9] If no
unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, there can be no self-defense,
complete or incomplete.[10] Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the
justifying circumstance of self-defense to apply.
In pleading self-defense, accused-appellant argues that since the victim is a Senior
Police Officer 4 of the P.N.P. of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, the latters act of attempting
to draw his gun from his waist was not just a mere threatening stance or posture or
intimidating attitude. It already posed an imminent danger to his life and limb that
caused him to react immediately, otherwise he would have been the victim. There was
also a reasonable necessity to defend himself because when he stabbed the late Sgt. Cara,
he only acted according to what an ordinary prudent and reasonable man would do. It
was the deceased who provoked accused-appellant to defend himself when the former
uttered invectives implicating him in the illegal logging activities in Salvacion,
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.
The claim has no merit. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in the
Peoples Brief:
Two witnesses to the incident, namely, Manolito de Guzman and Reynaldo Barut whose
testimonies have not been validly assailed on the ground of improper motive,
controverted appellants version of the incident as they both testified that the stabbing of
Sgt. Cara by appellant was not preceded by any argument or even conversation between
them (TSN, 4/23/97, p. 8; 7/23/97, p. 9). According to the witnesses, they and Sgt. Cara
were closely following each other on the way to Manolitos house when appellant
suddenly appeared from behind and stabbed Sgt. Cara at the back as he said, I hate all
policemen in Ilocano (Kagura kayo amin nga polis) (TSN, 4/15/97, p. 4; 7/30/97, p.
to stab him at the back (TSN, 7/23/97, p. 8), inflicting upon him no less that fourteen
(14) stab wounds. Nine (9) of these were fatal, of which seven (7) were inflicted at the
back.[11]
Even if we give credence to accused-appellants version of the events, specifically
that the deceased Sgt. Cara hurled invectives at him and moved as if to draw something
from his waist, we are unable to establish a finding of unlawful aggression on the victims
part. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent
danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude and the accused must
present proof of positively strong act of real aggression.[12] Here, aside from the accused-
appellants uncorroborated and self-serving claims, the unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim was not proven. For one, the locus criminis was a public street where people
came and went about freely. Thus, it would seem unusual that the victim, who was then
the deputy chief of police in their place, would openly accuse the appellant without
resorting to normal police procedure in apprehending purported violators of the
law. More importantly, other than accused-appellants self-serving allegation, the latter
failed to prove that the victim was armed with his service firearm. The prosecution
witness Manolito de Guzman positively testified that though the deceased Sgt. Cara was
in police uniform the latter did not have a firearm or a holster for the same[13] and,
indeed, none was retrieved from the scene of the crime. Finally, as pointed out in the
Peoples Brief, the nature and the location of the wounds sustained by the deceased,
numbering 14 stab wounds, nine (9) of which were fatal and of the nine (9) fatal wounds,
seven (7) were found at the back, constitute physical evidence that strongly militates
against accused-appellants pretensions of the incident.[14] The presence of the large
number of wounds inflicted on the victim clearly indicates a determined effort on the
part of the accused-appellant to kill his prey[15] and belies the reasonableness of the
means adopted to prevent or repel an unlawful act of an aggressor which is an element of
self-defense.
Accused-appellant could not even explain why he had to inflict 14 stab wounds on
the body of the deceased. His vain effort to exculpate himself from the consequences of
his act can be gleaned from his own evasive testimony on the witness stand, viz:
CONTINUATION OF THE CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. ORDOEZ:
Q. Were you drunk after the 5 bottles were consumed together with the others
mentioned by you?
A. Just moderate, sir.
Q. Are you saying that after consuming 5 bottles of gin you were still in your right
senses?
A. I could still think normally. Notwithstanding the fact that herein accused-appellant exhibited a small scar (1
1/2 inches long) caused by an instrument on his head shortly after the stabbing incident,
Q. Considering that you have drunk moderately and that you were still feeling normal the trial court did not believe that it was inflicted by the deceased Cara. It held that:
as you have stated, you knew what you were doing, is it not?
A. Yes, sir. True, the accused claimed to have been hit on his head while he was allegedly struggling
with the victim. How the victim was able to do so with the number of fatal wounds
Q. How many times did you stab the late Mr. Cara? sustained by him had not been explained. The Court cannot believe that Sgt. Cara had any
ATTY. CORNEJO: opportunity to retaliate due to the sudden, unexpected and overpowering attack
launched by the accused against him. Had the victim been able to use a hand to hit the
The best evidence is the medical certificate. accuseds head, he would have been able to draw the alleged gun and use it to fire at the
accused, if, indeed, he had a gun. There is thus the possibility that (1) the accused
COURT: inflicted self-injury or (2) his wound was inflicted by policemen who responded to the
reports of De Guzman and Reynaldo Barut. The latter is more probable because when De
He is on cross-examination, let him answer.
Guzman returned to the locus criminis after running away, he saw the accused already
A. I do not know how many times, sir because I was mixed with nervousness. lying on the ground in a prone position.Watching him were Maj. Sta. Ines of the P.N.P.
and SPO1 Mario Lopez. (TSN, April 30, 1997, p. 2-3) As the accused was said to have
Q. You do not know that you stabbed Mr. Rolando Cara once? uttered his hatred at policemen before stabbing Sgt. Cara, it is not improbable that he
resisted arrest and incurred the wound while resisting. He is now taking advantage of
A. I do not know, sir.
the wound not inflicted by Cara to sell the theory of self-defense.[17]
Q. You also did not know if you have stabbed him several times?
From the foregoing considerations, we do not doubt that herein accused-appellants
A. Yes, sir.
narration of the incident deserves scant consideration from this Court. Like alibi, self-
Q. You do not know that you stabbed him at his back? defense is inherently a weak defense which, as experience has demonstrated, can easily
be concocted.[18]
A. How could I stab him at the back when we were facing with each other as we were
confronting? In support of his second assigned error, accused-appellant claims that even
assuming that he did not act in self-defense, his act of stabbing the victim without giving
Q. With that statement you want to impress the court that you only stabbed him the latter the opportunity to undertake any form of defense or evasion did not justify the
frontally? finding of alevosia. It contended that there was no evidence that he consciously and
deliberately adopted such mode of assault to insure its execution without risk to himself;
ATTY. CORNEJO: and the fact that the fatal wounds were found at the back of the deceased does not by
Objection. itself compel a finding of treachery; for the circumstances that would qualify a killing to
murder must be proven as indubitably as the crime itself.
COURT:
Accused-appellant also imputes doubt as to whether Manolito De Guzman, one of
Let it be translated first. the prosecutions eyewitnesses, really witnessed the commencement of the attack against
the victim since it was not farfetched to conclude that before the actual attack De
A. When I embraced him in order to prevent him to draw his gun I did not know if I Guzmans attention was somewhere else. He asserts that if an eyewitness did not see how
was able to stab him at the back or in front, sir. the attack commenced treachery cannot be considered against him; for where an
PROSECUTOR: eyewitness saw the incident already in progress, said eyewitness cannot be considered
as having testified as to how it begun.
Q. Are you claiming that you still entertain doubts up to now as to whether you
stabbed him frontally or at his back? Anent this issue, we uphold the trial courts finding that Sgt. Cara was killed with
treachery, thus qualifying the crime to murder. Settled is the rule that an unexpected and
A. I was not sure whether I stabbed him at the back or in front, sir. sudden attack under circumstances which render the victim unable and unprepared to
defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack,
Q. But you are sure that you were able to stab him, is it not? constitutes alevosia.[19] So that even if a victim was face to face with his assailant, if the
A. In order to save my life because he might kill me what I did was to stab him, sir.[16] attack was so sudden and unexpected and the victim was not in a position to offer an
effective defense, alevosia can still be taken against the accused.[20] The essence of
treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest
provocation on the part of the latter.[21]
 Here, not only was it not proven that there was provocation on the part of the
hapless victim but the attack at the back of the victim was made in such a manner that
would make it difficult for the deceased to offer an effective defense against his
aggressor. As aptly observed by the trial court Sgt. Cara had (no) opportunity to retaliate
due to the sudden, unexpected and overpowering attack launched by the accused.[22] The
manner of attack afforded the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to
resist or to escape. The fact that the attack was preceded by the statement vulva of your
mother you policemen, I hate all of you, cannot be considered a sufficient warning for the
deceased to offer adequate defense for the treacherous attack. For even when the victim
is warned of the danger to his person if the execution of the attack made it impossible for
the victim to defend himself or to retaliate, treachery can still be appreciated, [23] as in
this case. The prosecution clearly established the manner by which accused-appellant
commenced his murderous attack on the unsuspecting victim, as testified to by Manolito
De Guzman thus:
Q Did I get you right last hearing when you said that you saw the accused
thrushed(sic) a bladed weapon on the deceased you just looked back at the
deceased Cara?
A Yes, sir.
Q That moment or immediately when you looked back at the deceased Cara you
called him inside your house, is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q Before looking back at the deceased, what were you looking at?
A In front of me, sir.
Q You were then looking at the door, is that right?
A No, sir.
Q What were you looking at that time?
A The path going to the door, sir.
Q And according to you while in that position and before looking back at the
deceased Cara and before the incident you did not notice accused Arizala came
out of his house, is that right?
A Yes, sir because it was so sudden that he came out from his house.
Q What you noticed of the accused was when he entered his house and arrived in his
house?
A Yes, sir. When he arrived he went directly inside his house.
Q You did not notice him anymore when he entered his house, is that right?
A When we were about to enter the house it was so sudden as if he jumped.
Q That was the last moment you saw him after he entered his house, is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q When he entered his house, he was so fast in entering his house, is that correct?
A No, sir.
Q You want us to understand that he was just walking in entering his house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did I get you right when you said that prior to the arrival of the deceased Cara and
the accused you never saw them looking at each other face to face?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the deceased Cara was in uniform, is that right?
A Yes, sir, he was in uniform with a cap.
Q And he was with him his firearm, is that right?
A No, sir.
Q Are you sure of that that he was not armed at that time?
A Yes, sir.
Q You are certain that the deceased and the accused never looked at each other eye
to eye?
A I did not see them see eye to eye, sir.
Q Neither did you notice that the deceased looked at the accused when the latter
arrived and went inside his house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Neither did you see the accused looked at the deceased when he arrived and before
entering his house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you know whether the accused and the deceased know each other?
A I do not know, sir.
Q Do you know the purpose of the deceased in going to the house to your house at
that time?
A No, sir because we did not talk with each other.
xxx
COURT:
xxx
Q Before the incident took place did you have a talk with the deceased Cara?
A None, sir.
ATTY. CORNEJO:
Q You want us to understand that it was only at that time that he called upon you that
you talked on something?
A Yes, sir.
Q The deceased ordered you to look on some activities of the accused at that time?
A No, sir because we did not yet talk.
Q According to you it was at that moment when you looked back at the deceased to call
him to go with you that you saw Arizala thrushed(sic) a weapon on the deceased,
is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mentioned the accused even pushed the deceased, did you see that?
A Yes, he pushed him, sir.
Q Which came ahead the pushing or the thrushing of the bladed weapon on the
deceased?
A The pushing, sir, (witness demonstrating the act of pushing).
Q The deceased being pushed by the accused fell down on the ground, is that right?
A Yes, sir. He fell. (witness demonstrating a stooping position).
Q That was the first thrushed(sic) done by the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q What happened when the deceased fell on his back?
A He fell like this (witness turned his body towards the left as if making a thrust with
his right hand), sir.
Q Did the deceased never try to defend himself while the accused was thrushing the
weapon at him while the deceased fell on his back?
A He could not defend himself because the thrush was at his back, sir. (witness is
pointing at his back right side just below the right shoulder).
Q Did you not help the deceased while he was on that position?
A I did not help him because I was taken a back, sir.
Q That made you run away, is that right?
A When I said, Why did you do that to my visitor? he made a motion of thrushing and
I ran away, sir.
 Q But the accused never ran after you? murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended is AFFIRMED with the
A No, sir.[24] MODIFICATION that he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
and is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00
In convicting herein accused-appellant, the trial court imposed the maximum as death indemnity and P51,000.00 for actual damages.
penalty of death by lethal injection. It opined that the generic aggravating circumstance
of with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank SO ORDERED.
as a police sergeant or Senior Police Officer 4 attended the commission of the crime of
murder. It held that the presence of the aggravating circumstance was proven by the fact
that accused-appellant Arizala knew that the deceased was a police sergeant; that such
knowledge of the rank of the victim is further shown by his utterance that he hated
policemen before he stabbed the deceased Cara; and that since both of them were
residents of the same barangay, accused-appellant could be presumed to have known the
presence and the rank of the victim as police sergeant for said victim would often wear
his uniform and carry a gun.
We are not persuaded. For the generic aggravating circumstance of with insult or in
disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank to aggravate a
penalty in the commission of a crime there must be proof which would clearly
demonstrate that the accused deliberately intended to act with insult or in disregard of
the respect due the victim on account of his rank, which is the essence of said
aggravating circumstance.[25] There must be proof of the specific fact or circumstance
that the accused deliberately intended to insult the rank of the victim. [26] Otherwise this
generic aggravating circumstance may not be taken into consideration to aggravate the
penalty. Courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its
severest form death - for the reason that the execution of such sentence is irrevocable.[27]
The fact that herein accused-appellant could not credibly feign ignorance of the
rank of the deceased or that he articulated his hatred against all policemen in general
does not by itself suffice to prove that indeed accused-appellant deliberately intended to
act with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party by reason of his rank
as a police officer. It cannot just be demonstrated on circumstances that accused-
appellant knew the rank or office of the victim especially so when no prior facts were
established to show why accused-appellant would harbor so grave a grudge against the
victim simply because he was a man in police uniform. A spontaneous utterance of anger
or hate, which is naturally harbored by any assailant, is not necessarily an expression of
insult or disregard owing to a victims rank. The circumstances aggravating the penalty of
a crime must be proved as conclusively as the act itself, mere suppositions or
presumptions being insufficient to establish their presence.[28] Any doubt must be
resolved in favor of the accused-appellant.
There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance that attended the
commission of the crime of murder, a modification of the penalty of death to reclusion
perpetua is in order.
Relative to the monetary liability of accused-appellant, the Court in line with
prevailing jurisprudence,[29] finds the award of P50,000.00 as death indemnity in
order. The award of P51,000.00 for the burial and other expenses relative to the death of
the victim in this case which were not objected to by the opposing counsel for the
accused-appellant,[30] may be deemed reasonable.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of September 3, 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 3161 finding
accused-appellant CARLITO ARIZALA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
G.R. No. 77284 July 19, 1990
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BONIFACIO BALANSI alias "BAN-OS"
SARMIENTO, J.:
The accused-appellant stands charged with the murder of Elpidio Dalsen on January 30,
1982 at Balinciagao, Pasil, Kalinga-Apayao. The Information alleged that he, armed with
a Garand rifle, went inside the house of the victim, then allegedly fast asleep, where he
shot him twice and killed him. Treachery was held to be present, and so were evident
premeditation and employment of means to weaken the defense of the victim. 1
The accused-appellant was then the Barangay Captain of Balinciagao Norte, Pasil,
Kalinga-Apayao, and a member of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF), while the
victim was the Provincial Development Officer of Kalinga-Apayao. 2 The incident took
place during a wedding celebration at Balinciagao Sur, Pasil, at or about 5:30 or 6:00
o'clock in the afternoon. The prosecution presented eight witnesses. The defense placed
two on the stand.
The trial court found the accused guilty as charged and sentenced him to die and to pay a
total of P590,000.00 in actual (P540,000.00 for loss of the victim's earning capacity) and
moral damages, plus costs. 3
It appears that the victim, a nephew of the appellant, was then sleeping at the house of
his parents located opposite the house where the wedding celebration was being held. At
or about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Beatrice Canao, a Balinciagao resident, saw the
accused, her uncle, standing at the door of the house of the victim's parents, also her
relatives, armed with a gun. She inquired what he was doing there and he allegedly
replied that he was waiting for the victim. She then entered the premises to locate an old
newspaper with which to wrap food, a rice cake, when she saw the victim asleep. When
she left, she saw the accused at the doorway. After disposing of her rice cake (which she
gave to a certain Fr. Medina), she heard two gunshots, fired at an interval of two or three
seconds, emanating apparently from the house, to which she shortly rushed. She
allegedly met the accused at the steps leading to the second floor, brandishing his rifle. 4
She allegedly shouted "putok, putok!" 5 She then reported the matter to the police.
Yulo Asbok a fellow CHDF member of the accused and likewise a Balinciagao resident,
also heard two gunshots ring that afternoon. He said that he was three meters from the
house where the gunshot sounds seemed to have originated. He allegedly proceeded
there but was met by the accused at the steps. They allegedly grappled for possession of
the rifle, which, he alleged, was still warm and reeked of gunpowder. He was able to
wrest possession, after which, the accused allegedly ran away and fled to Pogon, also in
Balinciagao. He later learned that the victim had been shot and that he died at Lubuagan
Hospital. 6
Rosalina Dalsen, the victim's wife was enjoying the wedding celebration when she heard
two gunshots. She made inquiries subsequently and was informed that the victim was
her husband. She claimed that she saw the accused standing at the entrance of her
parents- in-law's house prior thereto. 7
Dr. Nicolas Balais, a dentist by profession, was also at that celebration when he heard the
shots. He then went to the victim's parent's house where they, the shots, rang out from.
He did not allegedly have in mind that somebody had actually been fired upon but
thought that may be there had been a burglary. He ascended the steps of the house
where the accused earlier met Beatrice Candao and Yulo Asbok, and entered the second
floor. He saw the victim lying in his room, whom he initially believed to be merely
sleeping, but who was, in fact, dead. 8
The prosecution also presented Simeon Valera, principal of Pasil Central School, and
Artemio Dalsen the victim's brother, who sought to establish a motive for the killing of
the victim, a motive they imputed to the accused. Valera testified that revenge was
supposedly a tradition among Kalingas (of which both the accused and victim were
members), which, however, could be prevented by the dusa, meaning, apparently,
intervention and mediation by community elders. 9 Meanwhile, Dalsen claimed that the
accused had nursed along- standing grudge against the victim, whom he accused of
delaying on alleged award for the construction of a bridge in Balinciagao in 1979. 10
After the prosecution rested, the defense presented its evidence. It presented two
witnesses, the accused himself and Masadao Jose, who lived in Samangana, Balinciagao.
The accused claimed that he was also at the wedding celebration on that fateful
afternoon when he too heard two gunshots break in the air. As a member of the CHDF, he
allegedly took it upon himself to investigate the matter. He said that he went to the
direction where the shots came from and was on his way to the entrance of the house
when Yulo Asbok allegedly prevented him from doing so, who grabbed the firearm he
was carrying. He did not allegedly know at that time that the victim had been shot and
allegedly learned of it only on the following day. He admitted having ran away but
allegedly because he had been implicated. Four days later, he voluntarily turned himself
in to the police. Masadao Jose corroborated his statement. 11
In returning a verdict of guilty, the trial judge observed: "While there is no eye witness
who testified to having seen the accused Bonifacio Balansi shoot the victim, yet all the
circumstances pointed to him as the perpetrator of the crime." 12
The circumstantial evidence referred to came primarily from the lips of Yulo Asbok and
Beatrice Candao as well as the accused himself, who admitted having been at the scene of
the crime. Obviously, the judge did not lend credence to the accused's defense.
The accused-appellant now contends that the judge erred, first, in appreciating
circumstantial evidence, second, in appreciating treachery, and third, in rejecting his
defense of alibi.
We affirm, with modification, the decision appealed from.
While there was no eyewitness account, the web of circumstantial evidence points to no
other conclusion than that the accused was guilty of shooting the victim, Elpidio Dalsen
to death in the afternoon of January 30, 1982. These circumstances are as follows: (1) He
was seen standing by the entrance of the house where the victim had sojourned, armed
with a long rifle, minutes before gunshots were heard. Three witnesses saw him:
Beatrice Canao, Yulo Asbok, and Rosalina Dalsen. (2) Moments later, two shots rang out,
one after the other. Four witnesses heard them: Canao, Asbok, Dalsen and Nicolas Balais.
(3) Thereafter, Canao saw him descending from the steps of the house. Asbok also saw
him there, whom he wrestled for the possession of the rifle. (4) He fled and hid for four
days.
Under Rule 133, Section 5, of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if.
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 13
As we glean from the evidence, there is no one, other than the accused-appellant, who
could have perpetrated the offense.
The accused-appellant, as we said, disagrees. He insists that he was there, precisely, to
investigate the matter, and armed himself for the purpose, but was stopped by Yulo
Asbok. His protests notwithstanding, we too must reject this defense. Two reasons
persuade us. First, he has not ascribed any motive to Yulo Asbok as to why he, Asbok
should testify falsely against him. Second, he admits having fled immediately thereafter.
If he were truly innocent, he would not have done so. We have held time and again that
flight is a silent admission of guilt. 14 As aptly put "The righteous is brave as a lion, but
the wicked man fleeth." 15
If he were moreover truly innocent, and that it was Yulo Asbok who had something to do
with the killing and who had meanwhile tried to stop him from conducting an inquiry, it
would have been he, the accused, to be the first to make a report to the authorities so
that Asbok could be brought to the bar of justice. If the latter did try to prevent him from
performing his duties, as he claimed, 16 he should have gone to lengths to implicate
Asbok because that too was his duty.
We also reject his claims of inconsistency on the part of the prosecution's witnesses,
notably Asbok who stated that he was the first to be in the victim's house after the
shooting (aside from the accused), in the face of Canao's testimony that she also had
been there. The Court is not convinced that an inconsistency exists. For obviously, Asbok
had been mistaken. Canao had earlier been there.
The Court sees no need to make an inquiry on the admissibility of testimonies attributing
motive to the accused-appellant. We are sufficiently persuaded that even without any
successful showing of a motive, the circumstantial evidence on hand nevertheless
suffices to warrant a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court, however, is not convinced that the accused-appellant had committed murder
arising from treachery, evident premeditation, and means employed to weaken the
defense of the victim. As to treachery, jurisprudence is ample that the manner of attack
must be shown. While there are testimonies to the effect that the victim was "fast
asleep", we can not safely presume that he was still in that condition when the accused
sprung his attack. And since nobody saw the actual shooting, we can not justifiably say
that the victim was still actually still asleep at that time. 17
Neither is evident premeditation a qualifying circumstance. In appreciating evident
premeditation, it is necessary to show: (1) the time when the offender determined to
commit the offense; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his
determination; and (3) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and
execution. 18 The prior determination of the accused to do away with the victim has not
been sufficiently demonstrated by the prosecution.
That the accused also employed means to weaken the victim's defenses is likewise
missing in this case. As we said, there was no actual eyewitness to the killing and hence,
we can not say for sure, based on the evidence before us, that the appellant did employ
means to weaken the defense of the victim.
We, however, affirm the trial court insofar as it appreciated dwelling. Although the victim
was not shot in his house (his parents owned it) it has been held that the dwelling place
need not be owned by the victim. 19 In that case, it was held:
La circunstancia agravante de morada, aunque no fuese la casa propia
de los occisos, debe estimarse porque — segun el Tribunal Supremo
de España — " no solo por el respeto que el domicilio ajeno merece,
como especie de complements de la personalidad, y por el que es
debido al hogar de la familia, sino por el no menor de que es digna la
residencia privada de cualquier ciudadano, y por el mayor grado de
malicia que revela quien busca a su victima alli en donde se encuentra
con la confianza y abandono propios del lugar elegido para el
descanso y las intimidades de la vida: razon por la cual habla el Codigo
penal en el art. 10, no de domicillo en sentido legal, sino de morada en
su acepcion real, que no es otra que la del paraje en donde una
persona hace estancia de asiento. ... a titulo de nuesped, o por otro
cualquiera.i•t•c-aüsl (S. de 25 de Junio de 1886, 2 Viada., 5 ed., 329.) 20
In the Basa case, the victims were killed while sleeping as guests in the house of another.
Dwelling there was held to be aggravating.
According to earlier cases, including U.S. v. Bredejo, 21 our ruling was that the dwelling
place must be owned by the offended party. In another decision, People v.
Celespara, 22 dwelling was not appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in the absence
of proof that the victim owned the dwelling place where he was killed. In People v.
Guhiting, 23 morada was not likewise considered for the same reasons.

However, more recent cases have since followed the lead of Basa, notably People v.
Galapia 24 and People v. Sto. Tomas. 25

"Dwelling" is considered an aggravating circumstance because primarily of the sanctity

of privacy the law accords to human abode. According to one commentator, one's
dwelling place is a "sanctuary worthy of respect" 26 and that one who slanders another in
the latter's house is more guilty than if he who offends him elsewhere. However, one
does not lose his right of privacy where he is offended in the house of another because as
his invited guest, he, the stranger, is sheltered by the same roof and protected by the
same intimacy of life it affords. It may not be his house, but it is, even for a brief moment,
"home" to him. He is entitled to respect even for that short moment.

It is with more reason in this case. The late Elpidio Dalsen died in the house of his very
parents. who raised him until he could be on his own.

Under the circumstances, we affirm the lower court, but only insofar as it held the
accused-appellant responsible for taking the life of Elpidio Dalsen. We hold him liable for
simple homicide aggravated by dwelling. Under the Revised Penal Code, he must
suffer reclusion temporal in its maximum period, there being no mitigating circumstances
and one aggravating circumstance. 27

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The accused-appellant is sentenced to an

indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to seventeen
(17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day ofreclusion temporal. The grant of damages
is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 131734. March 7, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PEPITO (Piting) SEBASTIAN y SINDOL
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan, Branch
9, in Criminal Case No. 09-700, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of Murder and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the
deceased the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity.
The facts as narrated by the prosecution witnesses are as follows: On the night of
June 3, 1991, a certain Cesar Dumaoal hosted a pre-wedding celebration in his house in
Buguey, Cagayan. The victim and the accused-appellant were among those invited to
attend the celebration. At about 8:00 oclock of the same evening, when the victim and his
companions were about to enter the gate of the hosts house, accused-appellant
approached them and told the victim that he had been wanting to see him. Thereafter,
accused-appellant entered the house of Cesar Dumaoal. The victim sensed danger, thus
he was advised by his friends to go home. When the victims group was about to go home,
however, accused-appellant and his cohorts blocked their way. The victims group
decided to stay inside the house of Cesar Dumaoal, and they were told to stay in the mess
hall. In the course of the celebration, the operator played a loud rock song. At that
instant, accused-appellant rushed to the victim and shot him. The bullet tore through the
abdomen of the victim, causing his death. Then, accused-appellant fled.[2]
On the other hand, accused-appellant denied the accusation against him. He
testified that he was on the dance floor with a lady companion when he heard that
somebody was shot. When he ran towards the scene of the disturbance, he saw the
wounded victim being carried by a certain Celso Upano. He thereafter entered and
sought cover inside the house of Cesar Dumaoal.[3]
On March 14, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion
thereof states:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby finds the accused
guilty beyond any reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentences him to reclusion
perpetua. He is further directed to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P50,000.00.
No costs.[4]
In the instant appeal, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in
appreciating the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation and
that he should be convicted only of homicide.
It is well settled that there is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons, employing means, method or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the
person being attacked. [5]
In the case at bar, the sudden and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim clearly
shows that the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The
alleged animosity between the victim and accused-appellant, as well as their encounter
which preceded the shooting incident, will not preclude treachery because said
qualifying circumstance may still be considered even when the victim was forewarned of
danger to his person. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.[6] Here, accused-appellant
evidently timed his attack with the sudden blast of music. The shot was therefore a
complete surprise to the victim, rendering him utterly defenseless at the time of the
assault. Hence, the trial court correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.
However, as to the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, there is
merit in accused-appellants contention that said circumstance should not have been
considered in the case at bar. The elements of evident premeditation are: (1) a previous
decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2) an overt act or acts manifestly
indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; (3) a lapse of time between
the decision to commit the crime and its actual execution enough to allow the accused to
reflect upon the consequences of his acts.[7] As there is neither evidence of planning or
preparation to kill nor of the time when the plot was conceived, evident premeditation
cannot be considered in the instant case.[8]
Nevertheless, the crime committed is still murder in view of the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. At the time of the commission of the crime on June
3, 1991, murder was punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death. Since neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances were proved, the penalty
should be imposed in its medium period,[9] i.e., reclusion perpetua.
In addition to the civil indemnity of P50,000.00, the heirs of the deceased are
entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, which needs no proof
considering that the conviction of accused-appellant for the crime charged is sufficient to
justify said award.[10]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Cagayan, Branch 9, in Criminal Case No. 09-700, finding accused-appellant Pepito
(Piting) Sebastian y Sindol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the
heirs of the deceased the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is further ordered to pay moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 183706, April 25, 2012
People of the Philippines vs Samson Escleto
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On appeal is the Decision[1] dated December 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01003, which affirmed an earlier Decision[2] dated March 2, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 63, of Calauag, Quezon in Criminal Case No. 3471-
C, finding accused-appellant Samson Escleto (Samson) guilty of murder under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code.
In an Information dated January 7, 2000,[3] Samson was charged with the crime
of murder committed as follows:
That on or about the 4th day of November 1999, at sitio
Maligasang, Brgy. Villahermosa, Municipality of Lopez, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Hon. Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill, and with evident pre-
meditation and treachery, armed with a fan knife, (balisong), did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab
with the said balisong one ALFREDO MARCHAN, thereby inflicting
upon the latter a stab wound on his body, which directly cause his
death.
When arraigned on January 23, 2001, Samson pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.[4]
During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: (a) Merly
Marchan (Merly), the widow of the victim Alfredo Marchan (Alfredo); (b) Benjamin
Austria (Benjamin), a barangay tanod, who was personally present during the stabbing;
and (c) Dr. Jose Mercado (Mercado), who conducted the postmortem examination of
Alfredos body.
According to the prosecution, Alfredo and Merly attended the birthday party of
the son of Jaime Austria (Jaime) onNovember 4, 1999. Samson was also at the party.
While engaged in a drinking spree, Samson drew out a knife (balisong or beinte-
nueve), which he also later hid upon someones advice. Samson thereafter left the party,
followed by Merly and Alfredo less than an hour later. On their way home on their
carabao, Merly and Alfredo passed by Benjamins house at around 11:00 p.m. Benjamin
and Samson were drinking wine at the balcony of said house. Samson called Alfredo,
saying pare, pwede kang makausap. Samson went down from the balcony of Benjamins
house as Alfredo dismounted from the carabao and approached Samson. However, once
Samson and Alfredo were facing one another, Samson suddenly stabbed Alfredo in the
chest, thus, causing Alfredos death. Samson fled right after the stabbing. Neither Merly
nor Benjamin was aware of any previous argument or ill feelings between Alfredo and
Samson. Dr. Mercados postmortem examination of Alfredos body conducted
on November 5, 1999 revealed the following:
FINDINGS:
- Stab wound 2.5 cm. 4th Intercoastal Space (L) midclavicular line
penetrating directed downward.
CAUSE OF DEATH
Cartio-Respiratory Arrest
2o Severe hemorrhage
Due to stab wound[5]
Samson and his wife Florentina Escleto (Florentina) testified for the defense.
The defense presented a totally different version of the events that took place
on November 4, 1999. Samson and Florentina arrived at Jaimes house at around 5:30
p.m. to attend a birthday party. A group of people were already drinking wine at the
party.Eddie Marchan (Eddie) offered a jigger of wine to Samson but Samson refused to
drink. While Florentina was in the kitchen, she heard a commotion among the men who
were drinking. Florentina then saw Eddie and Alfredo talking to Samson. To prevent any
trouble, Benjamin invited Samson to leave the party. Benjamin and Samson proceeded to
Benjamins house where they drank wine.Alfredo arrived at Benjamins house and called
Samson to go outside to talk. Samson complied but when he got outside, Alfredo met him
carrying a weapon. While Samson and Alfredo grappled with each other, Benjamin
approached them. Benjamin tried to stab Samson but accidentally hit Alfredo in the chest
instead. Benjamin was also able to stab Samsons hand so Samson ran away. One Dr.
Enrique Agra sutured the wound on Samsons hand. Both Samson and Florentina did not
divulge anything to the police.Florentina, for her part, explained that she did not tell the
police about Benjamin stabbing Alfredo because she thought that a wife could not testify
in her husbands (Samsons) favor. Florentina still did not disclose anything to the police
authorities as she visited Samson in prison because the police officers did not ask her
about the stabbing.
The RTC promulgated its Decision on March 2, 2005, finding Samson guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.The RTC gave full credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which were given in clear, straightforward
manner and have the ring of truth[;] " as opposed to Samsons testimony which was was
self-serving, a pure hogwash and evidently a concoction in order to exculpate himself
from criminal liability.[6] The RTC further found that Samson employed treachery in
killing Alfredo, therefore, qualifying the crime committed to murder. The disposition
portion of said RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations,
this Court finds the accused Samson Escleto GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and in the absence of any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the heirs of
the victim Alfredo Merchan the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as moral damages.
The accused is to be credited of his preventive
imprisonment, if proper and any, pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 6127 and E.O. No. 214.[7]

Insisting on his innocence, Samson appealed to the Court of Appeals.[8] In a
Decision dated December 13, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
conviction rendered against Samson by the RTC. The Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the March 2,
2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calauag, Quezon,
Branch 63, in Criminal Case No. 3471-C, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to Section 13 (c), Rule 124 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC dated
September 28, 2004, which became effective on October 15, 2004, this
judgment of the Court of Appeals may be appealed to the Supreme
Court by notice of appeal filed with the Clerk of Court of the Court of
Appeals.[9]
Refusing to accept the verdict of the RTC and Court of Appeals, Samson comes
before this Court via the instant appeal. Both the People[10] and Samson[11] waived the
filing of supplemental briefs and stood by the briefs they had already filed before the
Court of Appeals.
Samson made the following assignment of errors in his appeal:
I Q After you left the house of Jaime Austria, what happened next?
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3471-C, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF
MURDER.
III
ASSUMING FURTHER THAT A CRIME WAS COMMITTED, THE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SAME WAS QUALIFIED BY
TREACHERY.
Samsons appeal has no merit.
There are two entirely different versions of the events of November 4,
1999: The prosecution asserts that it was Samson who stabbed Alfredo, while the
defense maintains that it was Benjamin who actually stabbed Alfredo. The RTC, affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, gave credence to the evidence of the prosecution, mainly
consisting of witnesses testimonies, and found Samson guilty of murdering Alfredo.
We emphasize that the assessment by the trial court of a witness' credibility,
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is conclusive and binding, if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight or influence. This is so
because of the judicial experience that trial courts are in a better position to decide the
question of credibility, having heard the witnesses themselves and having observed
firsthand their deportment and manner of testifying under grueling examination. [12]
When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the guiding
rules, some of which are that (1) the appellate court will not disturb the factual findings
of the lower court, unless there is a showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected
the result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of a
witness is entitled to great respect since it had the opportunity to examine his demeanor
as he testified on the witness stand, and, therefore, can discern if such witness is telling
the truth or not; and (3) a witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent on cross-examination is a
credible witness.[13]
There is no compelling reason for us to depart from the foregoing rules. We are
bound by the factual findings of the RTC absent any showing that it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that
would have affected the result of the case. The prosecution witnesses positively and
categorically identified Samson as the person who stabbed Alfredo to death.
Merly candidly recounted the stabbing incident on the witness stand:
A We passed in front of the house of Benjamin Austria and Samson
Escleto was there and he called my husband.
Q According to you, Samson Escleto was in the house of Benjamin
Austria, was Samson Escleto inside the house of Benjamin
Austria?
A He was in the balcony.
Q When your husband was called by Samson Escleto, what did your
husband do, it he did anything?
A He approached Samson Escleto.
Q At the time he approached Samson Escleto, was this Samson Escleto
stayed (sic) in the balcony of the house of Benjamin Austria?
A He was already downstairs.
Q What happened when Samson Escleto and your husband met?
A Samson Escleto stabbed my husband.[14] (Emphasis ours.)
Benjamin corroborated Merlys testimony:
Q At that date and time and place at your house at Brgy. Villahermosa,
Lopez, Quezon, was there any unusual incident that happened?
xxxx
 A Aflredo Marchan and his wife passed by. They were riding in a
carabao.
Q When the husband and wife passed by in your house, was there any
incident that happened?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that?
A Samson Escleto called the couple that was in front of our house and
Alfredo Marchan went down in the carabao and he just would
like to talk with Samson Escleto.
Q What was the respon[se] of Aflredo Marchan?
A He approached Samson Escleto and Samson Escleto went down
from the balcony.
Q When Alfredo Marchan wait (sic) to Escleto and Escleto went
down from your house, what happened next?
A Samson Escleto suddenly stabbed Alfredo Marchan in his
chest.[15] (Emphasis ours.)
In contrast, Samsons defense rests on his allegation that it was Benjamin who
stabbed Alfredo. We agree with the RTC that the defenses version of the events of
November 4, 1999 was a mere concoction meant to exculpate Samson from criminal
liability. It was against human nature for Samson to endure his arrest and imprisonment
without informing police authorities at all that it was actually Benjamin who stabbed
Alfredo. It was just as unusual for Florentina, who visited her husband Samson several
times in prison, to withhold from police authorities such a significant fact that supports
her husbands innocence. Samson further failed to take any action, such as the filing of a
complaint against Benjamin to hold the latter liable for the formers alleged injury (i.e.,
hand wound) and Alfredos death. Lastly, although Samson claimed that he sought
medical assistance for his wound, which he also sustained from Benjamins blow, Samson
did not present as evidence the attending physicians testimony and/or medical
certification.
We likewise affirm the finding of the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the
stabbing of Alfredo by Samson was qualified by treachery. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.[16] We have also held that: [i]n order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two
elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular
means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the
latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk
of himself.[17]
While it is true that in this case the attack on Alfredo was frontal, the same was
so sudden and unexpected. Alfredo was completely unaware of the imminent peril to his
life. Alfredo was walking to meet Samson, expecting that they would only talk.Alfredo
was unarmed while Samson had a knife. Alfredo was deprived of the opportunity to
defend himself and repel Samsons attack. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
The victim was not even able to offer any form of
resistance. He never saw it coming that he would be stabbed. He
alighted from his carabao and even waited for a while for assailant to
come down the balcony only to be surprised that the handshake was
in the form of a knife being plunged towards his chest that he could
not even block the blow or dodge it. He just stood there in surprise as
assailant suddenly hacked him.[18]
Clearly, treachery attended Samsons stabbing to death of Alfredo, hence,
qualifying the crime to murder.
Article 248[19] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. There
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63,
paragraph 2,[20] of the Revised Penal Code.
As to damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be
awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory
damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.[21]
Civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is mandatory and is granted
without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime. Moral damages in the
sum of P50,000.00 shall be awarded despite the absence of proof of mental and
emotional suffering of the victims heirs. As borne out by human nature and experience, a
violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the
part of the victims family. Also under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages
may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances, like treachery, as in this case. Thus, the award of P30,000.00 for
exemplary damages is in order.[22]
As regards actual damages, Merly, Alfredos widow, testified that she and her
family incurred expenses for Alfredos burial and wake; however, Merly failed to present
receipts to substantiate her claim. Where the amount of actual damages for funeral
expenses cannot be ascertained due to the absence of receipts to prove them, temperate
damages in the sum of P25,000.00 may be granted in lieu thereof. Under Article 2224 of
the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered as it cannot be denied that the heirs
of the victim suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved.[23]
In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the
monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of 6% from date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.[24]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated December 13, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01003
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Samson Escleto is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of MURDER, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Appellant Samson Escleto is further ordered to pay the heirs of ALFREDO
MARCHAN the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages. All
monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from
date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.