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The Consumer
x2
x′′ = (3,13)
x′ = (5,10)
p1 / p 2 = 2 p1 / p2 = 1.5
x1
Outline Answer
At the original price ratio p1 =p2 = 2 the choice is x0 = (5; 10); but at those
prices the and with that budget the consumer could have a¤orded x00 = (3; 13):
x0 is revealed-preferred to x00 . But at the new price ratio p1 =p2 = 1:5 x00 is
chosen, although x0 is still a¤ordable: x00 is revealed-preferred to x0 . This
violates WARP –see Figure 4.1.
41
Microeconomics CHAPTER 4. THE CONSUMER
Exercise 4.2 Draw the indi¤ erence curves for the following four types of pref-
erences:
x2 x2
A B
x1 x1
x2 x2
C D
x1 x1
Use the fact that expenditure minimisation for the household and cost-
minimisation for the …rm are essentially the same problem. The indi¤erence
curves in Figure 4.2 are identical to the isoquants depicted in Exercises 2.4, 2.5.
So, substituting the notation in Exercise 2.4 and 2.5we get:
h i1
p1 p2
Case A: C(p; ) = C(p; ) = e 1 .
Outline Answer
The relevant Lagrangean is
n
" n
#
X X
i log xi + y pi xi (4.1)
i=1 i=1
ei := pi xi = i y; (4.5)
Exercise 4.4 The elasticity of demand for domestic heating oil is 0:5, and
for gasoline is 1:5. The price of both sorts of fuel is 60c/ per litre: included
in this price is an excise tax of 48c/ per litre. The government wants to reduce
energy consumption in the economy and to increase its tax revenue. Can it do
this (a) by taxing domestic heating oil? (b) by taxing gasoline?
Outline Answer
Let p be the untaxed price, and the excise tax. Government revenue
is T = x, and the purchase price is p + . Clearly an increase in would
reduce consumption, and =[ + p] = 0:8: The e¤ect on tax revenue is given by
@T =@ = x + @x=@ = x[1 + 0:8"]. If (a) " = 0:5 then this is positive. If (b)
" = 1:5 then it is negative.
Use the fact that each demand function Di is homogeneous of degree zero
in all prices and income. Then, using the standard lemma for homogenous
functions, we have for each i = 1; :::; n :
n
X @Di (p; y) @Di (p; y)
pj +y = 0 Di (p; y)
j=1
@pj @y
= 0
which implies
n
X
"ij + "iy = 0:
j=1
Exercise 4.6 You are planning a study of consumer demand. You have a data
set which gives the expenditure of individual consumers on each of n goods. It
is suggested to you that an appropriate model for consumer expenditure is the
Linear Expenditure System:
2 3
Xn
ei = i pi + i 4y pj j 5
j=1
1. Find the e¤ ect on xi , the demand for good i, of a change in the consumer’s
income and of an (uncompensated) change in any price pj .
2. Find the substitution e¤ ect of a change in price pj on the demand for good
i.
3. Explain how you could check that this demand system is consistent with
utility-maximisation and suggest the type of utility function which would
yield the demand functions implied by the above formula for consumer
expenditure. [Hint: compare this with Exercise 4.3]
Outline Answer
1. We have 2 3
n
X
i 4y
xi = i + pj j 5 (4.6)
pi j=1
@xi i
= (4.7)
@y pi
@xi i j
= if j 6= i (4.8)
@pj pi
" Pn #
@xi i y j=1 pj j
= i + (4.9)
@pi pi pi
dxi i xj j
= , if j 6= i (4.10)
dpj =con tant pi
Exercise 4.7 Suppose a consumer has a two-period utility function of the form
labelled type A in Exercise 4.2. where xi is the amount of consumption in period
i. The consumer’s resources consist just of inherited assets A in period 1, which
is partly spent on consumption in period 1 and the remainder invested in an
asset paying a rate of interest r.
Outline Answer
x2
log x1 + [1 ] log x2 + A x1 (4.13)
1+r
=
x1
1 1
=
x2 1+r
x
x1 + 2 = A
1+r
1
From these we …nd = A and therefore optimum consumption in each
period is:
x1 = A (4.14)
x2 = [1 + r] [1 ]A (4.15)
So we can see that the smaller is (the lower is the level of impatience), or
the larger is r (the rate of interest), the more consumption will be “tilted”
toward period 2.
x2
x*
1+r
x1
A
Outline Answer
Use the standard analysis on the short-run for the …rm (see Chapter 2) to
get insight on the economics of the consumer under rationing. In the case of the
…rm has to cope with the side-constraint z3 = z3 in the short run; the consumer
has to cope with the rationing constraint x1 a: if the constraint is slack then
it is irrelevant (the consumer does not use all his ration); if it is binding, then
the problem is just like that of the …rm. The solution is at x0 in Figure 4.4
x2
x′
x1
a
1. Assuming that the person has a …xed money income y and can buy com-
modity i at price pi …nd the ordinary and compensated demand elasticities
for good 1 with respect to pj , j = 1; :::; n.
2. Suppose the consumer is legally precommitted to buying an amount An
of commodity n where pn An < y. Assuming that there are no additional
constraints on the choices of the other goods …nd the ordinary and com-
pensated elasticities for good 1 with respect to pj , j = 1; :::n. Compare
your answer to part 1.
3. Suppose the consumer is now legally precommitted to buying
Pn an amount Ak
of commodity k, k = n r; :::; n where 0 < r < n 2 and k=n r pk Ak < y.
Use the above argument to explain what will happen to the elasticity of good
1 with respect to pj as r increases. Comment on the result.
Outline Answer
1. For the speci…ed utility function it is clear that the indi¤erence curves do
not touch the axes for any …nite xi , so we cannot have a corner solution.
The budget constraint is
Xn
pi xi y:
i=1
and so, using the budget constraint, we …nd = n=y. Substituting the
value of into (4.23) we …nd:
The
Pn indirect utility function V is given by = V (p; y) = U (x ) =
i=1 log xi . So, from (4.25) we have:
yn
= log (4.26)
nn p1 p2 p3 :::pn
Inverting the relation (4.26) the cost function C is given by
1 1
y = C(p; ) = [nn p1 p2 p3 :::pn e ] n = n [p1 p2 p3 :::pn e ] n (4.27)
subject to
n
X1
pi xi y0 ;
i=1
The model can be used to illustrate in part the comparative statics of some-
one who is subject to a quota ration xi Ai where the rationing constraint
is assumed to be binding in the case of goods n r to n. However, it is not
rich enough to allow us to determine which commodities are consumed at a
conventional equilibrium with MRS =price ratio, like (4.29), and which will be
constrained by the ration. Parts 2 and 3 show clearly how the compensated
demand becomes “steeper” (less elastic with respect to its own price) the more
external constraints are imposed –as in the “short-run” problem of the …rm.
Exercise 4.10 Show that if the utility function is homothetic, then ICV = IEV
Outline Answer
Let x0 be optimal for p0 at 0
and x1 be optimal for p1 at 0
:
x2
αx1
x1
αx0
x0 υ1
υ0 x1
0
Outline Answer
This is su¢ cient. However, it may be useful to see the proof from …rst
principles. The relevant Lagrangean is
n
" n
#
X X
pi xi + i log xi (4.36)
i=1 i=1
This is the required cost function. The demand functions are known from
Exercise 4.2 or are obtained immediately from (4.37) and (4.39):
iy
xi = ; i = 1; 2; :::; n: (4.42)
pi
2. Let p denote the original price vector, p ^ the price vector after entry.
Observe that p^milk = 8pmilk ; p^wine = 12 pwine . So, using (4.41):
C(^
p; ) = Ae p^1 1 p^2 2 :::^
pnn = Ae p1 1 p2 2 :::pnn b = bC(p; ): (4.43)
where
1
b := [8] [ ] wine = 23 milk wine
milk
(4.44)
2
Using the de…nition in the notes the compensating variation is therefore
CV(p ! p
^ ) := C(p; ) C(^
p; ) = [1 b] C(p; ) (4.45)
Clearly, the consumer will bene…t from p ! p ^ if CV(p ! p ^ ) > 0: the cost
of living – interpreted as the cost of hitting the original level of utility –
goes down. This condition is satis…ed if, and only if, b < 1.
3. Notice that, from (4.42), i = pi xi =y – the budget share of commodity
i. So, since we are told that wine > 3 milk it is clear that b < 1. The
economists are right!
where (x1 ; x2 ) represent the quantities consumed of the two goods and is a
non-negative parameter.
Outline Answer
x2
x1
First sketch the utility function. Note that the indi¤erence curves touch
the axes – it is possible that one or other commodity is not consumed at the
optimum – See Figure 4.6. In this case it is easiest to substitute directly from
the budget constraint (binding at the optimum)
p1 x1 + p2 x2 = y
into the utility function. The consumer will then choose x1 to maximise
1 y p 1 x1
x12 +
p2
The FOC is 1 p1
[x1 ] 2
=0
2 p2
which suggests that demands are
2 h i2 3
1 p2
x1 D (p1 ; p2 ; y)
= =4 2p1 5
x2 D2 (p1 ; p2 ; y) y 2 p2
p2 4 p1
But this neglects the possibility that we may be at a corner. Note that a strictly
positive amount of good 2 requires
2
p22
p1 > p1 :=
4 y
So demand functions are given by
8 h i2
>
< 2pp12 if p1 > p1
x1 = D1 (p1 ; p2 ; y) = (4.46)
>
: y
p1 otherwise
8 y 2 p
< p2 4 p1
2
if p1 > p1
x2 = D2 (p1 ; p2 ; y) = (4.47)
:
0 otherwise
Also, if p1 > p1 , maximised utility is
V (p1 ; p2 ; y) = U (x1 ; x2 )
2 2
p2 y p2
= +
2p1 p2 4p1
2
p2 y
= + (4.48)
4p1 p2
q
y
Otherwise V (p1 ; p2 ; y) = p1 : Also note ( for the case p1 > p1 ) that (4.48)
implies:
2
p2 x1
V1 (p1 ; p2 ; y) = = <0
4p21 p2
2
y x2
V2 (p1 ; p2 ; y) = = <0
4p1 p22 p2
1
Vy (p1 ; p2 ; y) = >0
p2
so that we immediately see that Roy’s identity holds. To …nd the cost function
write = V (p; y) and solve for y in terms of p and . This gives
2
p2 C(p; )
= +
4p1 p2
2 2
p2
C(p; ) = p2 (4.49)
4p1
otherwise.
Outline Answer
1. It is easy to see that the cost function is subadditive and therefore the
…rm is a natural monopoly.
2. Because consumers are identical we can just multiply the demand of one
consumer by N to get the market aggregates. We use this throughout the
answer.
If p2 is normalized to 1 then, given that there are N identical consumers
the market demand curve is given by
2
q = N x1 = N
2p1
which on rearranging gives
s
N
p1 = (4.51)
2 q
p
This gives the average revenue curve. So total revenue is 2 N q. Given
the structure of costs speci…ed in the question the monopolist’s pro…ts are
p
p1 q [C0 + cq] = N q C0 cq (4.52)
2
Di¤erentiating (4.52) we …nd the FOC characterising the monopolist’s
optimum as s
N
c= (4.53)
4 q
and so
h i2
q = N >q
2c
p1 = c < p1
Of course this is just the solution “price equal to marginal cost.”The bonus
scheme has made the monopolist simulate the outcome of a competitive
industry.