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From: David Kelly

Sent: 04 March 2003 15 :25
To:
NOW
Subject : The first stab

Attached is a first attempt Let me know if it is what is required. It sneaked over a 1000 words,

Sorry it has taken a while but quiet time is at a premium

Best wishes,

David

Cc" I (+ (C((-(- C
29/08/2003
Iraq's Chemical and Biological Weapons Arsenal

Iraq has spent the past thirty years building up an arsenal of weapons of mass
destruction . It has suffered severe set backs m those years notably the successful
Israeli attack on the Ostrak reactor at Al-Tuwattha m 1981 and the years from 1991 to
1998 when UNSCOIVI and IAEA, tasked by UN Security Council Resolution (SCR)
687 which legalised the ceasefire arrangements with Iraq, destroyed or rendered
harmless all known weapons and capability Iraq has never given up its intent to
develop and stockpile such weapons for both military and terrorist use. During the
period from 1991 Iraq established and effective concealment and deception
organisation which protected many undisclosed assets. In 1999 SCR 1284 enabled
the United Nations to establish a new reinforced and integrated inspection regime
(U1s1MOVIC) and allowed to IAf A to continue its work with an enhanced mandate.
In October 2002 SCR 1441 presented Saddam Hussem an ultimatum to disclose his
arsenal within 30 days. Hussem adrmtted inspectors and with characteristic guile
offered superficial cooperation and provided some concessions but still defiantly will
not acknowledge the extent of his chemical and biological weapons and associated
military and industrial support orgamsations

World leaders state with monotonous regularity that 8500 litres of anthrax VX,
2160 kilograms of bacterial growth media, 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent,
6500 chemical bombs and 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical and
biological warfare agents remained accounted for from activities to 1991 . Less easy
to determine is the extent of activity undertaken since 1991 However there are
indications that the programmes continue. Iraq continues to develop rrnssile
technology especially fuel propellants and guidance systems for long range missiles
Iraq has recovered chemical reactors destroyed by UNSCOM for allegedly civilian
activity, built biological fermenters and agent dryers, and created transportable
production units for biological and chemical agents and the filling of weapons . It is
however assessed that Iraq is unable to manufacture nuclear weapons unless fissile
material is available but key research and design teams remain m place.

The UN has been attempting to dtsarm Iraq for 12 years and has failed to do
so . It is an abject failure of diplomacy with the well known split between France,
China and notably Russia, and the UK and the US creating lack of "permanent five"
unity and so resolve to deal with the problem of Iraq's unconventional weapons.
More recently Germany_ a temporary yet powerful current member of the Security
Council, has exacerbated the diplomatic split. The threat of credible military force
has forced Saddam Hussem to admit, but not cooperate with, the UN inspectorate. So
called concessions (U2 over flights, the right to interview) were all routine between
1991 and 1998. The start of the destruction of Al-Samoud II rmssiles is presented as
cooperation but Iraq always gave up materials once it was in its inteLest to do so The
failure of Iraq to declare in its December 2002 12,000 page disclosure any proscribed
activities after 1991 was a serious material breach of its obligations .

War may now be inevitable Regime change may be an effective means of

dtsartmng Iraq but that depends on the successor adramistration . The proportionality
and intensity of the conflict will depend on whether regime change or disarmament is
the true objective The current threat presented by Iraq militarily, with either
conventional or unconventional weapons, is modest and consequently the US and
whoever willingly assists it, should ensure that the force strength and strategy used is
appropriate . Since some WMD sites have not been unambiguously identified and
may not be neutralised until war is over a substantial hazard may be encountered The
threat from Iraq's chemical and biological weapons is however unlikely to
substantially affect the operational capabilities of US and British troops nor is likely
to create massive casualties in adjacent countries . Sites with manufacturing or storage
capabilities for chemical or biological weapons may present a hazard during any
forthcoming war and much will depend on the way that those facilities are militarily
cancelled and subsequently exploited . Perhaps the real threat comes from covert use
of such weapons against troops or by terrorists against civilian targets worldwide .
The link with AI-Qaeda is disputed but this is not the principal terrorist link of
concern. Iraq has long trained and supported terrorist activities and is quite capable of
initiating such activity using its §ecunty services . The possible use of chemical and
biological weapons by Saddam as a last ditch stand against liberating forces will
depend very much on their deployment and the effectiveness of his command and
control. Allegedly during the 1991 gulf war divisional commanders could authonse
their use.

Some of the chemical and biological weapons deployed m 1991 are still
available albeit on a reduced scale Aerial bombs and rockets are readily available to
be filled with sann, VX and mustard or botulmum toxin, anthrax spores and smallpox
More sophisticated weaponry such as spray devices associated with drones or missiles
with separating warheads may be limited m numbers but far more devastating if used

Iraq now shows superficial cooperation with the inspectorates . Recently it

agreed to destroy AI-Samoud II missiles and associated engines, components and
gyroscopes etc It has established two commissions under the direction of Rasheed
Amer (a former deputy director of Iraq's WMD programmes and Head of Iraq's
concealment activities) to search for documents and weapons (curiously Hans Blix
has not requested UNMOVIC representation on these commissions) and a
commission has started to recover weapons from Iraqi unilateral destruction sites of
1991 vintage . Amer Al-Sa adi, Iraq's principal spokesman on Iraq's weapons, was
also responsible for Iraq's WMD and conserving those assets, and he continues to
mislead the international community about Iraq's WMID . It is difficult to imagine
cooperation being properly established unless credible Iraqi officials are put into place
by a changed Saddam.

Some argue that inspections are working as evidenced by the discovery of

weapons (such as 122mm rockets specific for CBW use) and the start of the
destruction of proscribed missiles, and that more time :s required. It is further argued
that increasing the numbers of inspectors would enhance the effectiveness of IAEA
and LIIVMOViC particularly if they worked to a timetable to resolve key disanr~amznt
issues . Others argue that the process is inherently flawed and that without genuine
cooperation by Saddam that inspections are already a failure and that disarmament by
regime change is the only realistic way forward After 12 unsuccessful years of UN
supervision of the disarmament of Iraq by military force regrettably appears to the
only way of finally and conclusively disarming Iraq.