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G.R. No. 148208. December 15, 2004.
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* EN BANC.
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which is the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not
be stressed that our public interest is distinct and different from
others.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Judicial Activism; The quest for a
better and more “equal” world calls for the use of equal protection
as a tool of effective judicial intervention.—Further, the quest for
a better and more “equal” world calls for the use of equal
protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention. Equality is
one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the
Constitution. The Preamble proclaims “equality” as an ideal
precisely in protest against crushing inequities in Philippine
society. The command to promote social justice in Article II,
Section 10, in “all phases of national development,” further
explicated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the State to take
affirmative action in the direction of greater equality . . . . [T]here
is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support
for a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable
measure of equality.
Same; Same; Social Justice; Under the policy of social justice,
the law bends over backward to accommodate the interests of the
working class on the humane justification that those with less
privilege in life should have more in law.—Our present
Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and
economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor.
Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to
accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane
justification that those with less privilege in life should have more
in law. And the obligation to afford protection to labor is
incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches but
also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living reality.
Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at
least be approximated.
Same; Same; Same; Under most circumstances, the Court will
exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of
constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to
Congress in exercising its legislative power.—Concerns have been
raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged
provision. It has been proffered that the remedy of petitioner is
not with this Court, but with Congress, which alone has the
power to erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed,
a bill proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-
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and-file from the SSL has supposedly been filed. Under most
circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in
deciding questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad
discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power.
Judicial scrutiny would be based on the “rational basis” test, and
the legislative discretion would be given deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a
fundamental right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against
persons favored by the Constitution with special protection,
judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered
down view would call for the abdication of this Court’s solemn
duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and
the rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing
the unconstitutional act is a private person or the government
itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be
struck down regardless of the character or nature of the actor.
Same; Same; Same; Considering that majority, if not all, the
rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and rank in
life are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it
is they—and not the officers—who have the real economic and
financial need for the adjustment.—In the case at bar, the
challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or
officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on
economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of
a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of
the BSP now receive higher compensation packages that are
competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-salaried
employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The
implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees
are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while employees
higher in rank—possessing higher and better education and
opportunities for career advancement—are given higher
compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that
majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people
whose status and rank in life are less and limited, especially in
terms of job marketability, it is they—and not the officers—who
have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment. This
is in accord with the policy of the Constitution “to free the people
from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a
decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all.”
Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional
desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can
pass muster.
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Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas
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Same; Same; Same; This Court should bide its time, for it has
neither the authority nor the competence to contemplate laws,
much less to create or amend them.—The congressional enactment
into law of pending bills on the compensation of BSP employees—
or even those related thereto—will certainly affect the assailed
provision. This Court should bide its time, for it has neither the
authority nor the competence to contemplate laws, much less to
create or amend them. Given the current status of these pending
bills, the arguments raised by petitioner against the assailed
provision become all the more tenuous and amorphous. I feel we
should leave that provision untouched, and instead just accord
proper courtesy to our legislators to determine at the proper time
and in the manner they deem best the appropriate content of any
modifications to it. Besides, there is an omnipresent presumption
of constitutionality in every legislative enactment. No confutation
of the proviso was ever shown before; none should be considered
now.
Same; Same; Same; A judicial determination is fallow when
inspired by purely cerebral casuistry or emotional puffery,
especially during rowelling times.—It would be wise “not to
anticipate the serious constitutional law problems that would arise
under situations where only a tentative judgment is dictated by
prudence.” Attempts “at abstraction could only lead to dialectics
and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.” A judicial determination is fallow when inspired by
purely cerebral casuistry or emotional puffery, especially during
rowelling times.
Same; Same; Standards of Review; Under the first tier or the
rational relationship or rational basis test, courts will uphold a
classification if it bears a rational relationship to an accepted
governmental end—it must be “rationally related to a legitimate
state interest.”—Under the first tier or the rational relationship or
rational basis test, courts will uphold a classification if it bears a
rational relationship to an accepted governmental end. In other
words, it must be “rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”
To be reasonable, such classification must be (1) based on
substantial distinction that makes for real differences; (2)
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all members of the
same class.
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Same; Same; Same; The retention of the best and the brightest
officials in an independent central monetary authority is a valid
governmental objective that can be reasonably met by a
corresponding exemption from a salary standardization scheme
that is based on graduated salary levels.—Murphy states that
when a governmental classification is attacked on equal
protection grounds, such classification is in most instances
reviewed under the standard rational basis test. Accordingly,
courts will not overturn that classification, unless the varying
treatments of different groups are so unrelated to the
achievement of any legitimate purpose that the courts can only
conclude that the governmental actions are irrational. A
classification must “be reasonable, not arbitrary, and x x x rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike.” All these conditions are met
in the present case. The retention of the best and the brightest
officials in an independent central monetary authority is a valid
governmental objective that can be reasonably met by a
corresponding exemption from a salary standardization scheme
that is based on graduated salary levels. The legislature in fact
enjoys a wide berth in continually classifying whenever it enacts a
law, provided that no persons similarly situated within a given
class are treated differently. To contend otherwise is to be
presumptuous about the legislative intent or lack of it.
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Comity with and
courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that our lawmakers be given
sufficient time and leeway to address the alleged problem of
differing pay scales—“Only by faithful adherence to this guiding
principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to
the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to
function.”—The Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC)
is also a government regulatory agency almost on the same level
of importance as the BSP. However, its charter was only amended
very recently—to be more precise, on July 27, 2004. Consequently,
it would be most unfair to implicitly accuse Congress of inaction,
discrimination and unequal treatment. Comity with and courtesy
to a coequal branch dictate that our lawmakers be given sufficient
time and leeway to address the alleged problem of differing pay
scales. “Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of
judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the
legislative branch its rightful independ-
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VOL. 446, DECEMBER 15, 2004 329
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PUNO, J.:
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1 Rollo, p. 7.
2 Id., p. 9.
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3
purpose of the law of establishing 4
professionalism and
excellence at all levels in the BSP; (emphasis supplied)
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3 i.e., (1) make the salary of the BSP personnel competitive to attract
highly competent personnel; (2) establish professionalism and excellence
at all levels in the BSP; and (3) ensure the administrative autonomy of the
BSP as the central monetary authority.
4 Rollo, pp. 8-10.
5 Id., pp. 10-12, quoting Former Senator Maceda, Record of the Senate,
First Regular Session, March 15 to June 10, 1993, Vol. IV, No. 86, p. 1087.
6 Id., pp. 12-14.
7 Id., p. 14.
8 Id., pp. 2-5.
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II. Issue
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III. Ruling
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Congress is allowed
15
a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification. The equal protection clause is not infringed
by legislation which applies
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only to those persons falling
within a specified class. If the groupings are characterized
by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
class may17
be treated and regulated differently from
another. The classification must also be germane to the
purpose of the law18
and must apply to all those belonging to
the same class.
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15 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary
of Agrarian Reform, G.R. Nos. 78742, 79310, 79744, and 79777, 175 SCRA
343 (July 14, 1989). See Tiu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127410, 301
SCRA 278 (January 20, 1999).
16 Ichong v. Hernandez, No. L-7995, 101 Phil. 1155 (May 31, 1957),
citing 2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, pp. 824-825.
17 Tiu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127410, 301 SCRA 278 (January 20,
1999); Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, No. L-52245, 95 SCRA 392,
404 (January 22, 1980); and Himagan v. People, G.R. No. 113811, 237
SCRA 538 (October 7, 1994). See also JMM Promotion and Management,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120095, 260 SCRA 319, 331-332 (August
5, 1996); The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. v. Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency, G.R. No. 114714, 243 SCRA 666, 677 (April
21, 1995); Ceniza v. Commission on Elections, No. L-52304, 95 SCRA 763,
772 (January 28, 1980); Vera v. Cuevas, Nos. L-33693-94, 90 SCRA 379
(May 31, 1979); and Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. Nos. 115455,
115525, 115543, 115544, 115754, 115781, 115852, 115873 and 115931,
235 SCRA 630 (August 25, 1994).
18 Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, No. L-52245, 95 SCRA 392, 405
(January 22, 1980), citing Peralta v. Commission on Elections, No. L-
47771, No. L-47803, No. L-47816, No. L-47767, No. L-47791 and No. L-
47827, 82 SCRA 30 (March 11, 1978); Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel
Control and Inspection Board, No. L-19978, 21 SCRA 336 (September 29,
1967); and Ichong, v. Hernandez, No. L-7995, 101 Phil. 1155 (May 31,
1957). See also JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 120095, 260 SCRA 319 (August 5, 1996); Philippine
Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, 227 SCRA 703 (November
11, 1993); and Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, No. L-29646, 86 SCRA
270, 275 (November 10, 1978).
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open to inquiry
26
and investigation in the light of changed
conditions.
Demonstrative of this27
doctrine is Vernon Park Realty v.
City of Mount Vernon, where the Court of Appeals of New
York declared as unreasonable and arbitrary a zoning
ordinance which placed the plaintiff's property in a
residential district, although it was located in the center of
a business area. Later amendments to the ordinance then
prohibited the use of the property except for parking and
storage of automobiles, and service station within a
parking area. The Court found the ordinance to constitute
an invasion of property rights which was contrary to
constitutional due process. It ruled:
While the common council has the unquestioned right to enact
zoning laws respecting the use of property in accordance with a
well-considered and comprehensive plan designed to promote
public health, safety and general welfare, such power is subject to
the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily
or unreasonably and this is so whenever the zoning ordinance
precludes the use of the property for any purpose for which it is
reasonably adapted. By the same token, an ordinance valid
when adopted will nevertheless be stricken down as
invalid when, at a later time, its operation under changed
conditions proves confiscatory such, for instance, as when the
greater part of its value is destroyed,
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for which the courts will
afford relief in an appropriate case. (citations omitted, emphasis
supplied)
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the State of its police power —but also ruled that the
continued enforcement of the otherwise valid law would be
unreasonable and oppressive. It noted the subsequent
changes in the country’s business, industry and agriculture.
Thus, the law was set aside because its continued operation
would be grossly discriminatory and lead to 31the oppression
of the creditors. The landmark ruling states:
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30 On the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 342, Section 2 provides that all
debts and other monetary obligations contracted before December 8, 1941, any
provision in the contract creating the same or in any subsequent agreement
affecting such obligation to the contrary notwithstanding, shall not be due and
demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the war
damage claim of the debtor by the Philippine War Damage Commission; and
Section 3 of said Act provides that should the provision of Section 2 be declared
void and unenforceable, then as regards the obligation affected thereby, the
provisions of Executive Order No. 25 dated November 18, 1944, as amended by
Executive Order No. 32, dated March 10, 1945, relative to debt moratorium, shall
continue to be in force and effect, any contract affecting the same to the contrary
notwithstanding, until subsequently repealed or amended by a legislative
enactment. It thus clearly appears in said Act that the nullification of its
provisions will have the effect of reviving the previous moratorium orders issued
by the President of the Philippines.
31 Rutter v. Esteban, G.R. No. L-3708, 93 Phil. 68 (May 18, 1953).
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34 Id.
35 People v. Dela Piedra, G.R. No. 121777, 350 SCRA 163 (January 24, 2001).
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x x x x x x x x x
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x x x x x x x x x
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x x x x x x x x x
(e) To create offices or positions necessary for the efficient
management, operation and administration of the Corporation: Provided,
That all positions in the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC) shall be
governed by a compensation and position classification system and
qualifications standards approved by the Corporation’s Board of
Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual
duties and responsibilities: Provided, further, That the compensation plan
shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private
sector and which shall be exempt from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise
known as the Salary Standardization Law, and from other laws, rules
and regulations on salaries and compensations; and to establish a
Provident Fund and determine the Corporation’s and the employee’s
contributions to the Fund; (emphasis supplied)
x x x x x x x x x
7. PDIC (R.A. No. 9302)
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39 R.A. No. 8799 (2000), Section 7.2 provides: All positions of the
Commission shall be governed by a compensation and position
classification systems and qualification standards approved by the
Commission based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual
duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable
with the prevailing compensation plan in the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
and other government financial institutions and shall be subject to
periodic review by the Commission no more than once every two (2) years
without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on
productivity and efficiency. The Commission shall, therefore, be exempt
from laws, rules, and regulations on compensation, position classification
and qualification standards. The Commission shall, however, endeavor to
make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758, as amended).
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40 People v. Dela Piedra, G.R. No. 121777, 350 SCRA 163 (January 24,
2001).
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43 R.A. No. 6758, Section 2, the policy of which is to “provide equal pay
for substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon
substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification
requirements of the positions.”
44 Section 3(a) provides that “All government personnel shall be paid
just and equitable wages; and while pay distinctions must necessarily
exist in keeping with work distinctions, the ratio of compensation for those
occupying higher ranks to those at lower ranks should be maintained at
equitable levels giving due consideration to higher percentages of
increases to lower level positions and lower percentage increases to higher
level positions.”
45 Section 3(b) states that “Basic compensation for all personnel in the
government, and government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs)
and financial institutions (GFIs) shall generally be comparable with those
in the private sector doing comparable work, and must be in accordance
with prevailing laws on minimum wages.”
46 Id., Section 9.
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52 R.A. No. 8289 [SBGFC], Section 8; R.A. No. 9302 [PDIC], Section 2.
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plan in the [BSP] and other [GFIs],” then granted a
blanket exemption from the SSL, and its rank-and-file
endowed a more preferred treatment than the rank-and-file
of the BSP.
The violation to the equal protection clause becomes
even more pronounced when we are faced with this
undeniable truth: that if Congress had enacted a law for
the sole purpose of exempting the eight GFIs from the
coverage of the SSL, the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file
employees would have been devoid of any substantial or
material basis. It bears no moment, therefore, that the
unlawful discrimination was not a direct result arising
from one law. “Nemo potest facere per alium quod non
potest facere per directum.” No one is allowed to do
indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly.
It has also been proffered that “similarities alone are not
sufficient to support the conclusion that rank-and-file
employees of the BSP may be lumped together with similar
employees of the other GOCCs for purposes of
compensation, position classification and qualification
standards. The fact that certain persons have some
attributes in common does not automatically make them
members of the same class with respect to a legislative54
classification.” Cited is the ruling in Johnson v. Robinson:
“this finding of similarity ignores that a common
characteristic shared by beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries
alike, is not sufficient to invalidate a statute when other
characteristics peculiar to only one group rationally explain
the statute’s different treatment of the two groups.”
The reference to Johnson is inapropos. In Johnson, the
US Court sustained the validity of the classification as
there were quantitative and qualitative distinctions,
expressly recognized by Congress, which formed a rational
basis for the classification limiting educational benefits to
military service veterans as a means of helping them
readjust to civilian life. The Court listed the peculiar
characteristics as follows:
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55 Id.
56 Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, 227 SCRA
703 (November 11, 1993).
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A. Equal Protection
in the United States
372
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The Court apparently seeks to establish [that] equal protection cases fall
into one of two neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of
review—strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But this (sic) Court’s
[decisions] defy such easy categorization. A principled reading of what
this Court has done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards
in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the equal protection
clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of
care with which Court will scrutinize particular classification, depending,
I believe, on the constitutional and societal importance of the interests
adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon
which the particular classification is drawn.
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B. Equal Protection
in Europe
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C. Equality under
International Law
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“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination
to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”
377
VOL. 446, DECEMBER 15, 2004 377
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas
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“The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and
freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their
jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any
discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social
condition; . . .”
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a
national minority, property, birth or other status.”
378
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas
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379
83
down in the ICESCR and in a very large number of
Conventions administered by the International
84
Labour
Organisation, a United Nations body. Additionally, many
of the other international and regional human rights
instruments 85 have specific provisions relating to
employment.
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84 See Convention Nos. 100 of 1951, 103 of 1952, 111 of 1958, 118 of
1962 and 156 of 1981 which deal respectively with equal pay for men and
women; maternity rights; discrimination in employment and occupation;
equality of treatment in social security; and workers with family
responsibilities. Convention No. 100 has been ratified by no less than 159
countries and Convention No. 111 by 156 (these being two of the eight
fundamental Conventions the ratification of which is all but compulsory).
Conventions Nos. 103, 118 and 156 have been ratified by 40, 38 and 34
countries, respectively.
85 For example, Articles 11, 12 and 13 of CEDAW require the taking of
“all appropriate measures” to eliminate discrimination against women in
the fields of employment, health care, and other areas of economic life
including the right to benefits and financial services. Article 15 of the
African Charter provides a right for “every individual” to “equal pay for
equal work,” which, like Article 7 of the ICESCR, applies whether an
individual is employed by the state or by a private body. The Council of
Europe’s Revised Social Charter provides for the “right to equal
opportunities and equal treatment in matters of employment and
occupation without discrimination on the grounds of sex” and to the
protection of workers with family responsibilities. The Social Charter of
the Council of Europe also incorporates a commitment on the part of
Contracting States to “recognise the right of men and women workers to
equal pay for work of equal value” as well as that of children, young
persons and women to protection in employment (the latter group in
connection
380
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas
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with pregnancy and childbirth), and rights for migrant workers. Article 5 CERD
does not merely require Contracting States to eliminate race discrimination in
their own practices but also obliges them to prohibit race discrimination “in all its
forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour,
or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of
economic, social and cultural rights,” in particular, employment rights including
rights to “just and favourable conditions of work”, protection against
unemployment, “just and favourable remuneration” and to form and join trade
unions. See Aileen McColgan, Principles of Equality and Protection from
Discrimination, 2 E.H.R.L.R. 157 (2003).
86 Tufyal Choudhury, Interpreting the Right to Equality under Article 26 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1 E.H.R.L.R. 24-52 (2003).
87 SWM Broeks v. the Netherlands (172/1984).
88 F.H. Zwaan-de Vries v. the Netherlands (182/1984).
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PREAMBLE:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to
build a just and humane society and establish a Government that shall embody
our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our
patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings of independence
and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love,
equality and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
ARTICLE II: DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES:
PRINCIPLES
SECTION 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will
ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from
poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote
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full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
SECTION 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.
SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.
SECTION 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It
shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
ARTICLE III: BILL OF RIGHTS
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
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protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the
country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises,
including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall be
encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership.
SECTION 22. Acts which circumvent or negate any of the provisions of this
Article shall be considered inimical to the national interest and subject to criminal
and civil sanctions, as may be provided by law.
ARTICLE XIII: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities
by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and
disposition of property and its increments.
LABOR
SECTION 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right
to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure,
humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law.
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers
and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes,
including conciliation,
385
93
tional School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing:
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and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the
right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to
reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth.
386
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95 Republic v. MERALCO, G.R. Nos. 141314 and 141369, 401 SCRA 130
(April 9, 2003).
96 Sanders v. Veridiano II, No. L-46930, 162 SCRA 88 (June 10, 1988).
97 Republic v. MERALCO, G.R. Nos. 141314 and 141369, 401 SCRA 130
(April 9, 2003).
388
_______________
389
V. A Final Word
Finally, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a
ruling voiding the challenged provision. It has been
proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with this
Court, but with Congress, which alone has the power to
erase any inequity perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a
bill proposing the exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from
the SSL has supposedly been filed.
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise
judicial restraint in deciding questions of constitutionality,
recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in
exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be
based on the “rational basis” test, and the 105legislative
discretion would be given deferential treatment.
_______________
103 Ibid.
104 Calalang vs. Williams, No. 47800, 70 Phil. 726 (December 2, 1940).
105 See Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, No. L-52245, 95 SCRA 392,
404 (January 22, 1980); Peralta v. Commission on Elec-tions, Nos. L-
47771, L-47803, L-47816, L-47767, L-47791, and L-47827, 82 SCRA 30
(March 11, 1978); Felwa v. Salas, No. L-26511, 18 SCRA 606 (October 29,
1966); Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board,
No. L-19978, 21 SCRA 336, (September 29, 1967); People v. Carlos, No. L-
239, 78 Phil. 535 (June 30, 1947); and Ichong v. Hernandez, No. L-7995,
101 Phil. 1155 (May 31, 1957).
390
_______________
391
_______________
392
DISSENTING OPINION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
_______________
395
_______________
396
16
type of damages. Neither did it set any objective 17
criteria
by which the 18bankruptcy court may limit its size.
Nashville. The plaintiff in Nashville v. Walters
questioned the constitutionality of a Tennessee statute
imposing upon railroad companies one half of the total cost
of grade separation in every instance that the state’s
Highway Commission issued an order for the elimination of
a grade crossing. The plaintiff rested its contention not on
the exercise of police power that promoted the safety of
travel, but on the arbitrariness and unreasonableness of
the imposition19 that deprived it of property without due
process of law.
Reversing the judgment that the Supreme Court of
Tennessee had rendered against the plaintiff, the US
Supreme Court however did not declare the statute
20
20
unconstitutional. Instead, it remanded the case, because
the determination of facts showing arbitrariness and
unreasonableness should have been made
21
by the Tennessee
Supreme Court in the first place. It enumerated the
revolutionary changes incident to transportation wrought
in the 1930s by the widespread introduction of motor
vehicles; the assumption by the federal government of the
functions of a road builder; the resulting depletion of rail
revenues; the change in the character, construction and use
of highways; the change in the occasion for the elimination
of grade crossings, and in the purpose and beneficiaries of
such elimination; and the change in the relative
_______________
397
responsibility
22
of railroads and vehicles moving on the
highways. In addition, it held that the promotion of public
convenience did not justify requiring a railroad company—
any more than others—to spend money, unless it was
shown that the duty 23
to provide such convenience rested
upon that company. Providing an underpass at one’s own
expense for private convenience, and not 24primarily as a
safety measure,
25
was a denial of due process.
Atlantic. In Atlantic v. Ivey, the plaintiff filed an action
for damages against the railroad company for the killing of
a cow on an unfenced right of way of the railway. The
defendant pointed out that the original Florida Act of 1889
and its later amendments in the 1940s had required
railroad companies to fence their tracks for the protection
and safety of the traveling public and their property
against livestock roaming at large. Thus, the defendant
averred that—without imposing a similar fencing
requirement on the owners of automobiles, trucks and
buses that carry passengers upon unfenced public
highways of the state where such vehicles operated—the
equal protection guarantees 26of the state and federal
constitutions would be violated.
Reversing the lower court’s judgment for the plaintiff,
the Supreme Court of Florida held that the application of
the contested statutes under then existing 27
conditions was
violative of the equal protection clause. Citing Nashville,
that Court took judicial notice of the fact that there were no
motor carriers on public roads when the statutes were
originally enacted. It also reasoned that the statutes were
enacted in
_______________
398
28
the exercise of the state’s police power and were intended
for the protection of everyone against accidents involving
public transportation. Although motor-driven vehicles and
railroad carriers were under a similar obligation to protect
everyone against accidents to life and property when
conducting their respective businesses, the hazard of
accidents by reason of cattle straying onto the line of traffic
of motor-driven vehicles was greater than that which arose
when cattle
29
strayed onto the line of traffic of railroad
carriers. Yet the burden of expenses and penalties that
were rendered in favor of individuals who were neither
shippers30 nor passengers was imposed only on railroad
carriers.
In addition, the railroad carriers would be held liable for
attorney’s fees and double the value of the animals killed in
their railways, without even requiring the plaintiffs who
had sued them to prove the negligence of such carriers in
31
31
operating their equipment. Although it was argued that
motordriven vehicles had no authority to fence on state and
county highways over which they operated, the legislature
could nevertheless authorize and require them to provide
similar protection; or, in default thereof, to suffer similar
penalties that were incidental to using such 32
public roads
for generating33 profit and serving the public.
Louisville. The plaintiff in Louisville v. Faulkner also
filed an action against defendant-railroad company to
recover the value of her mule that had strayed from her 34
premises and got struck and killed by the company’s train.
The judgment of the lower court for the plaintiff was based
on the fact that the
_______________
28 Id., p. 246.
29 Ibid.
30 Id., p. 247.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Faulkner, 307 SW 2d. 196,
November 15, 1957.
34 Id., pp. 196-197.
399
_______________
35 Id., p. 197.
36 Id., p. 198.
37 Id., pp. 197-198.
38 Id., p. 197.
39 Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v. City of Mount Vernon, 121 N.E.2d 517,
307 NY 493, July 14, 1954.
40 Id., p. 518.
41 Id., pp. 520-521.
400
_______________
42 Id., p. 519.
43 Ibid., per Dye, J.
44 Ibid.
45 Id., pp. 518-519.
46 Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102, 325 Md. 342, February 7, 1992.
47 Id., p. 104.
401
_______________
402
55
lated to a legitimate legislative objective,” for it led to a
greater ease in the calculation of insurance premiums, thus
making the market more attractive to insurers. Also, it
ultimately reduced the cost of such premiums and made
insurance more affordable to individuals
56
and organizations
that perform needed medical services.
From the foregoing discussion, it is immediately evident
that not one of the above-cited cases is either applicable to
or in pari materia with the present case.
Medill not only upheld the constitutionality of the
contested provision therein, but also categorically stated
that the peculiar facts of the case prompted such
declaration. General damages were declared exempt; the
law allowing their exemption was constitutional. Cook
simply affirmed Medill when the same contested provision
was applied to an issue similar to that which was raised in
the latter case, but then declared that provision
unconstitutional when applied to another issue. Thus,
while general damages were also declared exempt, the
claims for special damages filed prior to the filing of a
petition for relief were not, and the law allowing the
latter’s exemption was unconstitutional.
The court’s action was to be expected, because the issue
on special damages in Cook was not at all raised in Medill,
and there was no precedent on the matter in Minnesota,
other than 57the obiter dictum—if it can be called one—in the
latter case. Had that issue been raised in Medill, a similar
conclusion would inevitably have been reached. In fact,
that case already stated that while the court “need not
decide whether special damages incurred prior to judgment 58
x x x [were] to be exempt in order to decide the question”
on general damages
_______________
403
_______________
404
Ponencia’s Reference to
“Changed Conditions” Misplaced
From Nashville to Murphy, it can be seen that all the
contested statutes were passed in the exercise of police
power—the inherent power of the State to regulate liberty
61
and property for the promotion of the general welfare. The
police
_______________
405
_______________
62 Id., p. 49.
63 Nashville, Chattanooga, & St. Louis Railway v. Walters; supra, p.
415.
64 Agpalo, Statutory Construction (2nd ed., 1990), p. 27.
406
_______________
65 Id., p. 78.
66 “In interpreting and applying the bulk of the written laws of this
jurisdiction, and in rendering its decisions in cases not covered by the letter
of the written law, this court relies upon the theories and
407
67
decisis.
68
These are not direct rulings of our Supreme
69
Court that form part of the Philippine legal system.
Granting gratia argumenti that the cited cases are to be
considered binding precedents in our jurisdiction, Nashville
—the only one federal in character—does not even make a
categorical declaration on constitutionality. Furthermore,
Murphy maintains that “[s]imply because a legal principle
is part of the common law x x x does not give it 70
any greater
degree of insulation from legislative change.” Common
law, after all, is “a growing and 71ever-changing system of
legal principles and theories x x x.” 72
Every statute is presumed constitutional. This axiom
reflects the respect that must be accorded to the wisdom,
integrity and patriotism of the legislature
73
that passed it
and to the executive who approved it. Understandably,
therefore,
74
the judiciary should be reluctant to invalidate
laws. Medill pre-
_______________
While it may be argued that we are not a common law country, our peculiar
national legal system has blended both civil and common law principles. Gamboa,
An Introduction to Philippine Law, 7th ed., 1969 p. 59.
72 Salas v. Jarencio, 150-B Phil. 670, 690; 46 SCRA 734, August 30,
1972.
73 Agpalo, supra, p. 20.
74 In re Cook; supra, p. 944.
408
Moreover, Executive Order Nos. 25 and 32, issued on November 18, 1944 and
March 10, 1945, were respectively voided. §1 of RA 342, 45 OG No. 4, p. 1680.
409
84
covery of the country’s general financial condition. The
forced vigil suffered by prewar creditors was not only
unwittingly extended from eight to twelve years, but was
also imposed without providing for 85the payment of the
corresponding interest in the interim.
Thus, the success of their collection efforts, especially86
when their credits were unsecured, was extremely remote.
Moreover, the settlement of claims filed with the United
States-Philippine War Damage Commission was not only
uncertain but was also practically futile, for it depended
entirely on the appropriations to be made by the US
Congress.
The contested clause in Rutter was definitely a remedial
measure passed to accord prewar debtors who suffered the
ravages of war an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves
within a reasonable time and to pay their prewar debts
thereafter, thus preventing them from being victimized in
the interim by their prewar creditors. The purpose having
been achieved during the eight-year period, there was
therefore no more reason for the law. Cessante ratione legis
cessat et ipsa lex. When the reason for the law ceases, the
law itself ceases. But it does not become unconstitutional.
The altered circumstances or changed conditions in
Rutter were specifically the very circumstances that the
law addressed at its passage; they were not at all
extraneous circumstances like subsequent laws or
executive pronouncements. The eight-year moratorium
period having lapsed, the debtors’ concerns had been
adequately addressed. It was now the turn of the creditors
to be protected for the pre-war loans they granted.
In stark contrast, the contested proviso in the instant
case is not a remedial measure. It is not subject to a period
_______________
410
Relative Constitutionality
Not Based on Positive Law
Applying the concept of relative constitutionality strongly
advocated in the ponencia, therefore, not only goes beyond
the parameters of traditional constitutionalism,
87
but also
finds no express basis in positive law. While it has been
asserted that “a statute valid when enacted may become 88
invalid by change in conditions to which it is applied,” the
present case has shown no such change in conditions that
would warrant the invalidation of the assailed provision if
applied under such conditions. Hence, no semblance of
constitutional impuissance, other than its conjured
possibility, can be seen. In a constitutional order that
commands respect for coequal branches of government,
speculation by the judiciary becomes incendiary and
deserves no respectable place in our judicial chronicles.
The ponencia further contends that the principles of
international law can operate to render a valid law
unconstitutional. The generally accepted definition states
that international law is a body of legal rules that apply
between sovereign states and such other entities as have
been granted in-
_______________
87 “Conventions and laws are x x x needed to join rights to duties and
refer justice to its object. x x x In the state of society all rights are fixed by
law x x x.” Rousseau, The Social Contract, 1762, translated by G.D.H.
Cole. http://www.constitution.org/jjr/socon.htm (Last visited September
16, 2004; 12:04:50 p.m. PST).
88 Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ivey; supra, per Buford, J. (citing
Nashville, Chattanooga, & St. Louis Railway v. Walters; supra, per
Brandeis, J.)
411
89
ternational personality. Government employees at the
BSP with salary grades 19 and below are not such entities
vested with international personality; any possible
discrimination as to them, in the light of the principles and
application of international law would be too far-fetched.
The dangerous consequences of the majority’s Decision
in the present case cannot and should not be ignored. Will
there now be an automatic SSL exemption for employees of
other GFIs and financial regulatory agencies? Will such
exemption not infringe on Congress’ prerogative? The
ponencia overlooks the fact that the Bangko Sentral is not
a GFI, but a regulatory body of GFIs and other
financial/banking institutions. Therefore, it should not be
compared with them. There is no parity. The Bangko
Sentral is more akin to the Insurance Commission, the
National Telecommunications Commission, and the Energy
Regulatory Commission. Should not more appropriate
comparisons be made with such regulatory bodies and their
employees?
_______________
Respect for
Coequal Branch
The trust reposed in this Court is “not to formulate policy
but to determine its legality as tested by the Constitution.”90
“It does not extend to an unwarranted intrusion into that
broad and legitimate sphere of discretion enjoyed by the
political branches to determine the policies to be pursued.
This Court should ever be on the alert lest, without design 91
or intent, it oversteps the boundary of judicial competence.”
Judicial activism should not be allowed to become judicial
exuberance. “As was so well put by Justice Malcolm: ‘Just
as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional
rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other
department of the government, so should it as strictly
confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly
92
or
by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act.’ ”
Since Congress itself did not commit any constitutional
violation or gravely abusive conduct when it enacted RA
7653, it should not be summarily blamed for what the
ponencia calls
_______________
413
VOL. 446, DECEMBER 15, 2004 413
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas
93
“altered circumstances.” Congress should be given the
opportunity to correct the problem, if any. I repeat, I am
not against exemption from the SSL of Bangko Sentral
employees with salary grades 19 and below. Neither am I
against increases in their pay. However, it is Congress, not
this Court, that should provide a solution to their
predicament, at least in the first instance.
The remedy against any perceived legislative failure to
enact corrective legislation is a resort, not to this Court,
but to the bar of public opinion. The electorate can refuse to
return to Congress members who, in their view, have94been
remiss in the discharge of their constitutional duties. Our
Constitution presumes that, absent any inference of
antipathy, improvident legislative decisions 95 “will
eventually be rectified by the democratic processes”; and
that judicial intervention is unwarranted, 96no matter how
unwisely a political branch may have acted.
It is only the legislature,97 not the courts, that “must be
appealed to for the change.” If, however, Congress decides
to act, the choice of appropriate measure lies within its
discretion. Once determined, the measure chosen cannot be
attacked on the ground that it is not the best solution, or
that it
_______________
93 See ponencia.
94 Cruz, Constitutional Law, supra, pp. 46-47.
“For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls,
not to the courts.” Munn v. Illinois; supra, 134, per Waite, CJ.
414
98
is unwise or inefficacious. A law that advances a
legitimate governmental interest will be sustained, even if
it “works to the disadvantage of a particular
99
group, or x x x
the rationale for it seems tenuous.” To compel this Court to
make a more decisive but unnecessary action in advance of
what Congress will do is a downright derogation of the
Constitution itself, for it converts the judiciary into a
super-legislature 100
and invests it with a power that to it has
never belonged.
In the words of the great Sir William Blackstone, “there
is no court that has power to defeat the intent of the
Legislature, when couched in such evident and express
words, as leave no doubt 101
whether it was the intent of the
Legislature, or no[t].” As Rousseau further puts it,
“according to the fundamental compact, only the general
will can bind the individuals, and there can be no
assurance that a particular will is in conformity with the
general 102will, until it has been put to the free vote of the
people.” Thus, instead of this Court invalidating a
sovereign act, Congress should be given the opportunity to
enact the appropriate measure to address the so-called
“changed conditions.”
We cannot second-guess the mind of the legislature as
the repository of the sovereign will. For all we know,
amidst the fiscal crisis and financial morass we are
experiencing, Congress may altogether remove the blanket 103
exemption, put a salary cap on the highest echelons,
lower the salary grade
_______________
415
_______________
Position Classification System [or the SSL] providing for the salary
standardization of government employees shall receive compensation of no
more than twice the salaries of equivalent ranks and positions in other
government agencies.” This proves that Congress can, inter alia, put a
statutory limit to the salaries currently being received by such officials
and employees.
104 §18 of Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.
105 Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications,
Inc.; supra, p. 316; supra, p. 2102 (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of
Oklahoma, Inc., 348 US 483, 489, 75 S.Ct. 461, 465, March 28, 1955).
106 City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center; supra, p. 445;
supra, p. 3257, per White, J.
107 Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications,
Inc.; supra, pp. 313-314; supra, p. 2101, per Thomas, J. (citing United
States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 US 166, 179, 101 S.Ct. 453,
461, December 9, 1980, per Rehnquist, J.).
416
_______________
108 This law was approved on June 14, 1993 and published on August 9,
1993. 89 OG 32, p. 4425. See also Villegas, Global Finance Capital and the
Philippine Financial System (2000), p. 48.
109 These GFIs are the LBP and DBP mentioned earlier, as well as the
Social Security System (SSS); the Small Business Guarantee and Finance
Corporation (SBGFC); the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS);
the Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC, formerly the Home Insurance and
Guaranty Corporation [HIGC]); and the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC). See ponencia.
110 See ponencia.
417
No Indicium of Urgency
Other than its bare assertion that 111the continued
implementation of the assailed provision112
would cause
“irreparable damage and prejudice” to its members,
petitioner also fails to show a minimum indicium of such
extreme urgency as would impel this Court to second-guess
Congress.
Briefly, petitioner contends that (1) the creation of two
classes of employees within the BSP based 113
on the salary
grade corresponding to their positions 114is unreasonable,
arbitrary and capricious class legislation; and (2) the law
itself discriminates against 115
rank and file employees of the
BSP vis-à-vis those of GFIs.
These contentions are utterly unsubstantiated. They
find no support in law for granting the relief prayed for.
While it is true that all employees of the BSP are
appointed under the authority of the Monetary Board,
observe the same set of office rules and regulations, 116
and
perform their work in practically the same offices, it is
equally true that the levels of difficulty and responsibility
for BSP employees with salary grades 19 and below are
different from those of other BSP
_______________
111 The last proviso of the 2nd paragraph of §15(c) of RA 7653, copied
verbatim including italics, provides:
418
_______________
419
_______________
420
_______________
125 See Workers Desk, IBON Databank and Research Center, IBON
Foundation, Inc., The Philippine Banking Sector; supra, p. 59.
126 Petition, p. 13; Rollo, p. 15.
127 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 US 288, 346-347, 56
S.Ct. 466, 483, February 17, 1936, per Brandeis, J.
128 Id., p. 347; Ibid., per Brandeis, J.
129 Munn v. Illinois; supra, per Waite, CJ.
421
_______________
(1) HB 00123 which was filed on July 1, 2004 by Rep. Joey Sarte
Salceda, entitled “An Act Amending Republic Act No. 7653,
otherwise known as The New Central Bank Act,” and pending
with the Committee on Banks and Financial Intermediaries since
July 27, 2004; and
(2) HB 02295 which was filed on August 10, 2004 by Rep. Monico O.
Puentebella, entitled “An Act Providing for the Rationalization of
Salaries, Allowances and Benefits of Offi-
422
_______________
There are also other pending bills advocating for similar exemption
from the Salary Standardization Law (SSL). These are:
(1) HB 01926 which was filed on July 29, 2004 by Rep. Robert Ace S.
Barbers, entitled “An Act Granting Exemption to the Public School
Teachers from the Coverage of Republic Act 6758, otherwise
known as the Salary Standardization Law and Authorizing the
Appropriation of Funds Therefor,” and pending with the
Committee on Appropriations since August 9, 2004;
(2) HB 01442 which was filed on July 14, 2004 by Rep. Hussin U.
Amin, entitled “An Act Providing for a Separate Compensation
Scheme for Lawyer Positions in the Office of the Secretary of
Justice, Department of Justice, thereby Exempting The Said
Positions from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the
Salary Standardization Law,” and pending with the Committee on
Appropriations since August 3, 2004; and
(3) HB 00949 which was filed on July 1, 2004 by Rep. Judy J. Syjuco,
entitled “An Act Providing for a Salary Standardization for
Military and Police Personnel amending for the Purpose Republic
Act No. 6758 otherwise known as the ‘Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989’ and for other Purposes,” and also
pending with the Committee on Appropriations since August 28,
2004.
423
Congress Willing
to Perform Duty
Far from being remiss in its duty, Congress is in fact
presently deliberating upon HB 00123, which precisely
seeks
136
to amend RA 7653 by, inter
137
alia, exempting from the
SSL all positions in the BSP. Accordingly, this Court
should not
_______________
“Section 2. Section 15, paragraph (c) of the same Act is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“x x x x x x x x x
“A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys
and subject to the Board’s approval, shall be instituted as an integral component
of the Bangko Sentral’s human resource development program: x x x Provided,
that all position (sic) in the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas shall be governed by a
compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved
by the Monetary Board based on comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual
duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable with the
prevailing compensation plans of other government financial institutions and shall
be subject to review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years without
prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and
profitability. The Bangko Sentral shall therefore be exempt from existing laws,
rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification
standards. It shall however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as
possible with the principles under Republic Act No. 6758, as amended.”
424
_______________
138 See “Should The Supreme Court Presume that Congress Acts
Constitutionally?: The Role of the Canon of Avoidance and Reliance on
Early Legislative Practice in Constitutional Interpretation.” 116 Harv. L.
Rev. 1798, April 2003.
139 The 1st paragraph of §15(c) of RA 7653, copied verbatim including
italics, provides:
“Sec. 15. Exercise of Authority.—In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary
Board shall:
“x x x x x x x x x
“(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the
selection, hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel.
Such system shall aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of
the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles of management.
“x x x x x x x x x.”
140 §2 of RA 6758.
425
141
ing rates for comparable work in the private sector.
Furthermore, the reasonableness of such compensation
142
should be in proportion to the national budget and to the
possible erosion in143
purchasing power as a result of inflation
and other factors. It should also abide by the Index of
Occupational Services prepared by the Department of
Budget and Management in accordance with the
Benchmark 144 Position Schedule and other factors prescribed
thereunder.
This Court has not been apprised as to how precisely the
human resource management system of the BSP has been
misused. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary,145
it
is therefore presumed that the law has been obeyed, 146and
that official duty has been regularly performed in
implementing the said law. Where additional
implementing rules would still be necessary to put the
assailed provision into continued effect,
147
any “attack on their
constitutionality would be premature.”
Surely, it would be wise “not to anticipate the serious
constitutional law problems that would arise under
situations 148
where only a tentative judgment is dictated by
prudence.” Attempts “at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions 149and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities.” A judicial
determination is fallow when in-
_______________
426
_______________
150 §1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. See also Angara v. The
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158, July 15, 1936; and Marbury v.
Madison; supra, p. 178, per Marshall, CJ.
151 Arceta v. Hon. Mangrobang, G.R. No. 152895, 432 SCRA 136, 140,
June 15, 2004, per Quisumbing, J.
152 Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, supra, p. 222, per
separate opinion of Vitug, J.
153 Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary; supra, p. 14.
154 This was pronounced as early as 1947 in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78
Phil. 1, 3, 18-19, March 5, 1947. See Tatad v. Secretary of the Department
of Energy, 346 Phil. 321, 394; 281 SCRA 330, 385, November 5, 1997, per
dissenting opinion of Melo, J.
155 Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary; supra, p. 26.
427
156
visions but also of its due enactment.” It is therefore futile
to welter in the thought that the original and amended
versions of the corresponding
157
bill have no reference to the
proviso in question. Floor deliberations are either
expansive or restrictive. Bills filed cannot be expected to
remain static; they transmute in form and substance.
Whatever doubts there may be as to the validity of any
provision therein must necessarily be resolved in its favor.
_______________
428
the modern era did the United States Supreme Court give
it enduring constitutional significance.
From its inception, therefore, the equal protection clause
in “the broad 160
and benign provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment” already sought “to place all persons
similarly situated upon a plane of equality and to render161
it
161
impossible for any class to obtain preferred treatment.” Its
original understanding was the proscription
162
only of certain
discriminatory acts based on race, although its proper
construction, when called to the attention of the US
Supreme Court in the Slaughter-House163
Cases, first
involved exclusive privileges. Eventually, other
disfavored bases of governmental action were identified.
Labeled as morally irrelevant traits, gender, illegitimacy
and alienage were included in this list.
Today, this clause is “the single most important164
concept x
x x for the protection of individual rights.”
165
It does not,
however, create substantive rights. Its guaranty 166
is
merely “a pledge of the protection of equal laws.” Its
“promise that no person shall be denied the equal protection
of the laws must coexist with the practical necessity that
most legislation classi-
_______________
160 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356, 373, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1073, 30 L.ed.
220, 227, May 10, 1886, per Matthews, J.
161 Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Faulkner; supra, p. 198, per
Stanley, J.
162 Defensor-Santiago, The “New” Equal Protection, 58 Phil. Law
Journal 1, 3, March 1983.
163 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 US 537, 543, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 1140, May 18,
1896.
164 Defensor-Santiago, The “New” Equal Protection, supra, p. 1.
165 Vacco v. Quill, 521 US 793, 799, 117 S.Ct. 2293, 2297, June 26,
1997, per Rehnquist, CJ.
166 Romer v. Evans; supra, pp. 633-634; supra, p. 1628, per Kennedy, J.
(citing Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 US 535, 541, 62 S.Ct.
1110, 1113, June 1, 1942, per Douglas, J., quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins;
supra, p. 369; supra, p. 1070; supra, p. 226, per Matthews, J.).
429
_______________
430
172
States Constitution as a limitation upon the powers of the
military173 governor then in charge of the Philippine
Islands.
In a catena of constitutional cases decided after the
change in sovereignty, this Court consistently held that the
equal protection clause requires all persons or things
similarly situated to “be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects x x
x should not be treated differently, so as to give undue
174
favor
to some and unjustly discriminate against others.”
175
175
Being
176
a constitutional177limitation first recognized in
Rubi —citing Yick Wo —as one “derived from the
Fourteenth 178Amendment to the United States
Constitution,” this clause prescribes certain requirements
for validity: the challenged statute must be applicable to all
members of a class, reasonable, and enforced by the regular
methods of procedure
_______________
431
179
prescribed, rather than by purely arbitrary means. Its
reasonableness
180
must meet the requirements
181
enumerated in
Vera and later summarized in Cayat.
_______________
179 Rubi v. The Provincial Board of Mindoro; supra, pp. 707 and 718.
180 People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 126, November 16, 1937.
181 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, May 5, 1939.
182 Defensor-Santiago, The “New” Equal Protection, supra, p. 7.
432
_______________
184 People v. Vera; supra, p. 126. See People v. Cayat; supra, p. 18.
185 Murphy v. Edmonds; supra, p. 108.
186 Ibid.
187 Johnson v. Robison, 415 US 361, 374-375, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1169,
March 4, 1974, per Brennan, J. (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 US 71, 76, 92
S.Ct. 251, 254, November 22, 1971).
188 §20 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
189 Defensor-Santiago, The “New” Equal Protection, supra, p. 5.
433
_______________
190 International Harvester Co. of America v. Missouri, 234 US 199, 210,
34 S.Ct. 859, 863, June 8, 1914, per McKenna, J.
191 Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications,
Inc.; supra, p. 315; supra, p. 2102 (citing Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 US 1,
15, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2334, June 18, 1992).
192 Ibid., Ibid., per Thomas, J.
193 City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center; supra, p. 444;
supra, p. 3257, per White, J.
194 Murphy v. Edmonds; supra, p. 114.
195 These amendments as enumerated in the ponencia are:
434
_______________
196 In fact, as of April 1, 2002, the LBP and DBP already perform
universal banking functions, thus allowing them to combine their
resources with those of investment houses and to generate long-term
investment capital. As expanded commercial banks today, these two
institutions are certainly subject to the regulatory and supervisory powers
of the BSP. Workers Desk, IBON Databank and Research Center, IBON
Foundation, Inc., The Philippine Banking Sector, supra, pp. 17-18.
197 Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union, 59 SCRA 54, 77,
September 12, 1974, per Zaldivar, J.
198 Ibid.
199 Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications,
Inc.; supra, pp. 315-316; supra, p. 2102, per Thomas, J. (citing
435
_______________
436
_______________
437
208
tiny. It will be upheld only if it is shown209to be “suitably
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”
Therefore, all legal restrictions that curtail the civil
rights of a suspect class, like a single racial or ethnic group,
are immediately suspect. “That is not to say that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say 210 that courts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.” Pressing
public necessity, for instance, may justify the existence of
those restrictions, but antagonism toward such suspect
classes never can.
To date, no American case—federal or state—has yet
been decided involving equal pay schemes as applied either
to government employees vis-à-vis private ones, or within
the governmental ranks. Salary grade or class 211
of position 212
is
not a 213
fundamental
214
right like marriage, 215
procreation,
voting, speech and interstate travel. American courts
have in fact even refused 216 to declare government
employment a fundamental right.
_______________
438
_______________
217 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S.Ct. 2562, US
Mass., June 25, 1976, per curiam (citing San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez; supra, p. 28; supra, p. 40, per Powell, J.).
http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?SerialNum=
1976142431&FindType=Y&AP=&RS=WLW4.08&R=2.0&FN=_top&
S=Split&MT=WestlawInternational&RLT=CLID_FQRLT425229&n
=1 (Last visited September 2, 2004; 09:36:35 a.m. PST).
218 For instance, it has long been declared by the US Supreme Court
that “racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional.” Brown
v. Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas, 349 US 294,
298, 75 S.Ct. 753, 755, May 31, 1955, per Warren, CJ.
219 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 US 306, 326, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 2337-2338,
June 23, 2003.
220 In re Griffiths, 413 US 717, 721-724, 93 S.Ct. 2851, 2854-2856, June
25, 1973.
221 Larson v. Valente, 456 US 228, 246, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 1684, April 21,
1982.
222 City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center; supra, p. 440;
supra, p. 3254, per White, J.
223 See ponencia.
224 Yick Wo v. Hopkins; supra, p. 220; supra, p. 1064; supra, p. 356.
439
_______________
225 Id., pp. 373-374; Id., p. 1073; Id., p. 227, per Matthews, J.
226 Id., pp. 366, 368 and 374; Id., pp. 1069, 1070, and 1073; Id., pp. 225-
226, and 228.
227 Id., pp. 366 and 374; Id., pp. 1069 and 1073; Id., pp. 225 and 228.
228 Maher v. Roe, 432 US 464, 470-471, 97 S.Ct. 2376, 2380-2381, June
20, 1977.
229 San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriquez; supra, p. 24;
supra, p. 37, per Powell, J.
440
230
invalid “because of simple inequality,” financial or
otherwise.
Since employment in the government is not a
fundamental right and government employees below salary
grade 20 are not a suspect class, the government is not
required to present a compelling objective to justify a
possible infringement under the strict scrutiny test. The
assailed provision thus cannot be invalidated via the strict
scrutiny gauntlet. “In areas of social and economic policy, a
statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect
lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must
be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts 231
that could provide a
rational basis for the classification.”
_______________
In City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center; supra, p. 442; supra, p. 3255,
the Court implied that the rational basis test is the standard of judicial review
normally accorded economic and social legislation.
441
233
related to a sufficiently important governmental interest.”
Examples of these so-called “quasi-suspect”
234
classifications
are those based 235
on gender, legitimacy under certain
circumstances, legal residency with regard to availment
of free public education, civil service employment
preference for armed forces veterans who are state
residents upon entry to military service, and the right to
practice for compensation the profession236for which certain
persons have been qualified and licensed.
Non-exempt government employees may be a sensitive
but not a suspect class, and their employment status may
be important although not fundamental. Yet, the
enactment of the assailed provision is a reasonable237means
by which the State seeks to advance its interest. Since
such provision sufficiently serves important governmental
interests and is substantially related to the achievement
thereof, then, again it stands.
“In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the
classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the
classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend
the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not
made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it
238
238
results in some inequality.’ ” “The very idea of
classification is that of ine-
_______________
442
_______________
Visited September 3, 2004; 3:01:49 p.m. PST). See also Murphy v.
Edmonds, supra, p. 114.
239 International Harvester Co. of America v. Missouri; supra, p. 210;
supra, p. 862, per McKenna, J. (citing Atchison, T.& S.F.R. Co. v.
Matthews, 174 US 96, 106, 19 S.Ct. 609, 613, April 17, 1899, per Brewer,
J.).
240 Goesært v. Cleary, 335 US 464, 467, 69 S.Ct. 198, 200, December 20,
1948, per Frankfurter, J. (citing Roschen v. Ward, 279 US 337, 339, 49
S.Ct. 336, April 22, 1929, per Holmes, J.).
241 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 US 641, 657, 16 L.Ed. 2d 828, 839, June
13, 1966, per Brennan, J. (citing Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental
Examiners, 294 US 608, 610, 55 S.Ct. 570, 571, 79 L.Ed. 1086, 1089, April
1, 1935, per Hughes, C.J.).
242 Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580, 611-612, December 21, 1915, per
Trent, J. (quoting Keokee Consolidated Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 US 224,
227, 34 S.Ct. 856, 857, June 8, 1914, per Holmes, J.).
243 International Harvester Co. of America v. Missouri; supra, p. 214;
supra, p. 864, per McKenna, J. (citing Missouri, Kansas, & Texas Railway
Co. of Texas v. May, 194 US 267, 269, 24 S.Ct. 638, 639, May 2, 1904, per
Holmes, J.).
244 Id., p. 215; Id., p. 865, per McKenna, J.
443
Epilogue
_______________
445
_______________
446
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.:
451
452
2
The majority opinion cites Rutter v. Esteban as precedent
for declaring the proviso in Section 15(c) of RA 7653
unconstitutional. Rutter is not applicable to the present
case. In Rutter, the Court declared on 18 May 1953 that
while the Debt Moratorium Law was valid when enacted on
26 July 1948, its “continued operation and enforcement x x
x is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be
prolonged a minute longer.” With the discontinuance of the
effectivity of the Debt Moratorium Law, the debtors who
benefited from the law were returned to their original
situation prior to the enactment of the law. This meant
that the creditors could resume collecting from the debtors
the debts the payment of which was suspended by the Debt
Moratorium Law. The creditors and debtors were restored
to their original situation before the enactment of the Debt
Moratorium Law. No debtor or creditor was placed in a new
situation that required the enactment of a new law.
In the present case, declaring the proviso in Section
15(c) of RA 7653 no longer legally effective does not restore
the BSP rank-and-file employees to their original situation,
which subjected them to the SSL. Instead, the
discontinuance of the validity of the proviso brings the BSP
rank-and-file employees to a new situation that they are
not entitled without the enactment of a new law. The effect
of the majority decision is to legislate a new law that brings
the BSP rank-and-file employees to a new situation.
Clearly, the Rutter doctrine does not apply to the present
case.
2 93 Phil. 68 (1953).
454
BSP and PDIC are GFIs but are also regulatory agencies
just like other governmental regulatory agencies. The
majority opinion is comparing apples with oranges. GFIs
that do not exercise regulatory functions operate just like
commercial financial institutions. However, GFIs that
exercise regulatory functions, like BSP and PDIC, are
unlike commercial financial institutions. BSP and PDIC
exercise sovereign functions unlike the other non-
regulatory GFIs.
Non-regulatory GFIs derive their income solely from
commercial transactions. They compete head on with
private financial institutions. Their operating expenses,
including employees’ salaries, come from their own self-
generated income from commercial activities. However,
regulatory GFIs like BSP and PDIC derive their income
from fees, charges and other impositions that all banks are
by law required to pay. Regulatory GFIs have no
competitors in the private sector. Obviously, BSP and PDIC
do not belong to the same class of GFIs as LBP, SSS, GSIS,
SBGFC, DBP and HGC.
Exempting non-regulatory GFIs from the SSL is
justified because these GFIs operate just like private
commercial entities. Their revenues, from which they pay
the salaries of their employees, come solely from
commercial operations. None of their revenues comes from
mandatory government exactions. This is not the case of
GFIs like BSP and PDIC which impose regulatory fees and
charges.
Conclusion
Under the Constitution, Congress is an independent
department that is a co-equal of the Supreme Court. This
Court has always accorded Congress the great respect that
it deserves under the Constitution. The power to legislate
belongs to Congress. The power to review enacted
legislation belongs to the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court has no power to declare a pending bill in Congress as
deemed enacted into law. That is not the power to review
legislation but the power to usurp a legislative function.
455
DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
_______________
1 Entitled “AN ACT PRESCRIBING A REVISED COMPENSATION
AND POSITION CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM IN THE GOVERNMENT
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.”
456
_______________
Sec. 23. Effectivity.—This Act shall take effect July 1, 1989. The DBM shall, within
sixty (60) days after its approval, allocate all positions in their appropriate
position titles and salary grades and prepare and issue the necessary guidelines to
implement the same.
457
_______________
458
459
xxx
460
461
_______________
462
_______________
463
_______________
10 Rollo at p. 6.
z
465
_______________
466
13 Id., at p. 7.
14 Id., at pp. 12-13.
15 Id., at p. 83.
16 Id., at pp. 79-80.
17 Id., at p. 84.
467
_______________
18 Id., at p. 65.
19 Id., at p. 63.
20 Ibid.
21 Id., at p. 69.
22 Id., at pp. 69-70.
468
Presumption of Constitutionality
It is a basic axiom of constitutional law that all
presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality and
a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the
constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. Thus, if
any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the
statute, the same should be upheld. Consequently, the
burden is squarely on the shoulders of the one alleging
unconstitutionality to prove invalidity beyond a reasonable
doubt by negating all possible 23
bases for the
constitutionality
24
of a statute. Verily, to doubt is to
sustain.
The rationale for this presumption in favor of
constitutionality and the corresponding restraint on the
part of the judicial branch was expounded
25
upon by Justice
Laurel in the case of People v. Vera, viz.:
_______________
470
_______________
26 Id., at p. 95; vide Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 159 (1936).
27 Vide Sison v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654, 662-663 (1984); Tolentino v. Secretary
of Finance, 249 SCRA 628, 663-664 (1995).
28 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
471
_______________
472
_______________
33 68 Phil. 12 (1939).
34 Id., at p. 18.
35 Supra.
473
474
37
UAW, where a statute providing that no household may
become eligible to participate in the food stamp program
while any of its members are on strike, or receive an
increase in the allotment of food stamps already being
received because the income of the striking member has
decreased, the U.S. Supreme Court held:
_______________
475
arise with respect to those who, for one reason or another, simply
quit their jobs. As we have stated in a related context, even if the
statute “provides only ‘rough justice,’ its treatment ... is far from
irrational.” Congress need not draw a statutory
classification to the satisfaction of the most sharp-eyed
observers in order to meet the limitations that the
Constitution imposes in this setting. And we are not
authorized to ignore Congress’ considered efforts to avoid
favoritism in labor disputes, which are evidenced also by
the two significant provisos contained in the statute. The
first proviso preserves eligibility for the program of any household
that was eligible to receive stamps “immediately prior to such
strike.” The second proviso makes clear that the statutory
ineligibility for food stamps does not apply “to any household that
does not contain a member on strike, if any of its members refuses
to accept employment at a plant or site because of a strike or
lockout.” In light of all this, the statute is rationally related to the
stated objective
38
of maintaining neutrality in private labor
disputes. (Emphasis and italics supplied; citations and footnotes
omitted)
_______________
476
477
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 510, 57
S.Ct. 868, 872, 81 L.Ed. 1245 (1937).
These restraints on judicial review have added force
“where the legislature must necessarily engage in a process
of line-drawing.” United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S., at 179, 101 S.Ct, at 461. Defining the class of
persons subject to a regulatory requirement—much like
classifying governmental beneficiaries—“inevitably
requires that some persons who have an almost equally
strong claim to favored treatment be placed on different
sides of the line, and the fact [that] the line might have
been drawn differently at some points is a matter for
legislative, rather than judicial, consideration.” Ibid.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The distinction
at issue here represents such a line: By excluding from the
definition of “cable system” those facilities that serve commonly
owned or managed buildings without using public rights-of-way, §
602(7)(B) delineates the bounds of the regulatory field. Such
scope-of-coverage provisions are unavoidable components of most
economic or social legislation. In establishing the franchise
requirement, Congress had to draw the line somewhere; it had to
choose which facilities to franchise. This necessity renders the
precise coordinates of the resulting legislative judgment
virtually unreviewable, since the legislature must be
allowed leeway to approach a perceived problem
incrementally. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc.,
348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955):
_______________
478
_______________
41 Supra.
42 Id., at p. 115.
43 Id., at p. 120.
44 Id., at p. 127.
45 Id., at p. 126.
46 Id., at p. 129.
47 20 SCRA 791 (1967).
479
_______________
48 Id., at p. 796.
49 Id., at pp. 796-797.
50 Supra.
51 “AN ACT CREATING THE PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION,
DEFINING ITS POWER, FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES,
PROVIDING FOR REGULATION OF THE INDUSTRY AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES CONNECTED THEREWITH.”
52 Id., at p. 711; the privilege was also withdrawn from the Office of
Adult Education; the Institute of National Language; the
Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation;
the National Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee; the City
and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special Prosecutor);
the Kabataang Barangay; the Com-
480
_______________
mission on the Filipino Language; the Provincial and City Assessors; and the
National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.
53 Ibid. The franking privilege was also retained for the Commission on
Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; widows of former Presidents of the
Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in
the filing of complaints against public offices or officers violated the guaranty of
equal protection.
54 Id., at p. 713.
481
_______________
482
58
Thus, in City of Cleburne Texas v. Cleburne Living Center,
a city’s zoning ordinance requiring a special permit for the
operation of a group home for the mentally retarded was
challenged on equal protection grounds. The American
Court, ruling that the Rational Basis Test was applicable
and limiting itself to the facts of the particular case, held
that there was no rational basis for believing that the
mentally retarded condition of those living in the affected
group home posed any special threat to the city’s legitimate
interests any more than those living in boarding houses,
nursing homes and hospitals, for which no special permit
was required. Thus, it concluded, the permit requirement
59
violated the respondent’s right to equal protection.
_______________
The constitutional issue is clearly posed. The city does not require a special use
permit in an R-3 zone for apartment houses, multiple dwellings, boarding and
lodging houses, fraternity or sorority houses, dormitories, apartment hotels,
hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes for convalescents or the aged (other than
for the insane or feebleminded or alcoholics or drug addicts), private clubs or
fraternal orders, and other specified uses. It does, however, insist on a special
permit for the Featherston home, and it does so, as the District Court found,
because it would be a facility for the mentally retarded. May the city require the
permit for this facility when other care and multiple-dwelling facilities are freely
permitted?
It is true, as already pointed out, that the mentally retarded as a group are
indeed different from others not sharing their misfortune, and in this respect they
may be different from those who would occupy other facilities that would be
permitted in an R-3 zone without a special permit. But this difference is largely
irrelevant unless the Featherston home and those who would occupy it would
threaten legitimate interests of the city in a way that other permitted uses such as
boarding houses and hospitals would not. Because in our view the record does not
reveal any rational basis for believing that the Featherston home would pose any
special threat to the city’s legiti-
484
60
And, in Romer v. Evans, the U.S. Supreme Court
invalidated Amendment 2 of the Colorado State
Constitution which precluded all legislative, executive, or
judicial action at any level of state or local government
designed to protect the status of persons based on their
homosexual 61 orientation, conduct, practices or
relationships.
_______________
mate interests, we affirm the judgment below insofar as it holds the ordinance
invalid as applied in this case.
xxx
The short of it is that requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on
an irrational prejudice against the mentally retarded, including those who would
occupy the Featherston facility and who would live under the closely supervised
and highly regulated conditions expressly provided for by state and federal law.
(At pp. 447-450; citations omitted)
485
Strict Scrutiny
While in the Philippines the Rational Basis Test has, so
far, served as a sufficient standard for evaluating
governmental actions against the Constitutional guaranty
of equal protection, the American Federal Supreme Court,
as pointed out in the main opinion, has developed a more
demanding standard as a complement to the traditional
deferential test, which it applies in certain well-defined
circumstances. This more demanding standard is often
referred to as Strict Scrutiny.
Briefly stated, Strict Scrutiny is applied when the
challenged statute either (1) classifies on the basis of an
inherently suspect characteristic 62
or (2) infringes
fundamental constitutional rights. With respect to such
classifications, the usual presumption of constitutionality is
reversed, and it is incumbent upon the government to
demonstrate that its classification has been narrowly 63
tailored to further compelling governmental interests,
otherwise the law shall be declared unconstitutional for
being violative of the Equal Protection Clause.
The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was
to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official
_______________
62 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-217 (1982); Clements v. Fashing, 457
U.S. 957, 963 (1982).
63 Mclaughlin v. State of Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
486
64
sources in the States. Like other rights guaranteed by the
post-Civil War Amendments, the Equal Protection Clause
(also known as the Fourteenth Amendment) was motivated
in large part by a desire to protect the civil rights of
African-Americans recently freed from slavery. Thus,
initially, the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to limit the
scope of the Equal Protection Clause 65
to discrimination
claims brought
66
by African-Americans. In Strauder v. West
Virginia, the American Supreme Court in striking down a
West Virginia statute which prohibited a “colored man”
from serving in a jury, traced the roots of the Equal
Protection Clause:
_______________
487
488
the law, as jurors, because of their color, though they are citizens,
and may be in other respects fully qualified, is practically a brand
upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority,
and a stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to
securing to individuals of the 67 race that equal justice which the
law aims to secure to all others.
_______________
489
490
177, 58 S.Ct. 510,7182 L.Ed. 734, decided February 14, 1938, note
2, and cases cited. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
_______________
71 Id., at p. 153
72 J. NOWAK & R. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 576 (4th Ed.,
1991).
73 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
74 Id., at p. 216.
75 Developments in the Law—Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1065, 1107-1108 (1969).
76 Loving v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Wygant
v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986).
491
_______________
492
_______________
84 In Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982), the Supreme Court
through Justice Brennan held that the Minnesota statute, in imposing
certain registration and reporting requirements upon only those religious
organizations that solicit more than 50% of their funds from nonmembers
discriminates against such organizations in
493
85 86 87
based on gender, illegitimacy, financial need, conscien-
_______________
Since Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947),
this Court has adhered to the principle, clearly manifested in the history and logic
of the Establishment Clause, that no State can “pass laws which aid one religion”
or that “prefer one religion over another.” Id., at pp. 15, 67 S.Ct., at 511. This
principle of denominational neutrality has been restated on many occasions. In
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 72 S.Ct. 679, 96 L.Ed. 954 (1952), we said that
“[t]he government must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects.”
Id., at 314, 72 S.Ct., at 684. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 89 S.Ct. 266, 21
L.Ed.2d 228 (1968), we stated unambiguously: “The First Amendment mandates
governmental neutrality between religion and religion . . . . The State may not
adopt programs or practices . . . which ‘aid or oppose’ any religion . . . . This
prohibition is absolute.” Id., at pp. 104, 106, 89 S.Ct., at 270, 271, citing Abington
School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1573, 10 L.Ed.2d 844
(1963). And Justice Goldberg cogently articulated the relationship between the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause when he said that “[t]he
fullest realization of true religious liberty requires that government . . . effect no
favoritism among sects . . . and that it work deterrence of no religious belief.”
Abington School District, supra, at 305, 81 S.Ct., at 1615. In short, when we are
presented with a state law granting a denominational preference, our
precedents demand that we treat the law as suspect and that we apply
strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality. (Emphasis and italics
supplied)
While the Court viewed the case from perspective of the Non-Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment, the principles on Equal Protection would also
apply since the Non-Establishment Clause stripped to its bare essentials is in
reality merely a more specific type of equal protection clause but with regards to
religion.
494
88 89
tious objection and age have been held not to constitute
suspect classifications.
_______________
so recognized by our cases. Nor does the fact that the impact of the regulation
falls upon those who cannot pay lead to a different conclusion. In a sense, every
denial of welfare to an indigent creates a wealth classification as compared to
nonindigents who are able to pay for the desired goods or services. But this Court
has never held that financial need alone identifies a suspect class for
purposes of equal protection analysis. See Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. at 29, 93
S.Ct., at 1294; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 SCt 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491
(1970). (Emphasis and italics supplied).
88 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 (1974), footnote number 14,
states:
Nor does the class of uniformed state police officers over 50 constitute a suspect
class for purposes of equal protection analysis. Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. at 28,
93 S.Ct. at 1294, observed that a
495
_______________
suspect class is one “saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history
of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process.” While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been
wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those who have been
discriminated against on the basis of race or national origin, have not experienced
a “history of purposeful unequal treatment” or been subjected to unique
disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their
abilities. The class subject to the compulsory retirement feature of the
Massachusetts statute consists of uniformed state police officers over the age of 50.
It cannot be said to discriminate only against the elderly. Rather, it draws the line
at a certain age in middle life. But even old age does not define a “discrete and
insular” group, United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-153, n. 4,
58 S.Ct. 778, 783, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938), in need of “extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process.” Instead, it marks a stage that each of us will
reach if we live out our normal span. Even if the statute could be said to impose a
penalty upon a class defined as the aged, it would not impose a distinction
sufficiently akin to those classifications that we have found suspect to call for
strict judicial scrutiny. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
496
_______________
But the instant legislation runs afoul of the equal protection clause, though we
give Oklahoma that large deference which the rule of the foregoing cases requires.
We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of
man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival
of the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far reaching and
devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are
inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear. There is no redemption
for the individual whom the law touches. Any experiment which the State
conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is forever deprived of a basic liberty. We
mention these matters not to reexamine the scope of the police power of the States.
We advert to them merely in emphasis of our view that strict scrutiny of
the classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential,
lest unwittingly or otherwise invidious discriminations are made against
groups or types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty
of just and equal laws . . . (Emphasis and italics supplied)
497
_______________
A state law implicates the right to travel when it actually deters such travel, see,
e.g., Crandall v. Nevada, supra, at 46; see also Shapiro, supra 394 U.S., at 629, 89
S.Ct., at 1328, when impeding travel is its primary objective, see Zobel supra 457
U.S., at 62, n. 9, 102 S.Ct., at 2314, n. 9; Shapiro, supra 394 U.S., at 628-631, 89
S.Ct., at 1328-1329, or when it uses “ ‘any classification which serves to penalize
the exercise of that right.’ ” Dunn, supra 405 U.S., at 340, 92 S.Ct., at 1002
(quoting Shapiro, supra 394 U.S., at 634, 89 S.Ct., at 1331). Our right-to-migrate
cases have principally involved the latter, indirect manner of burdening the right.
More particularly, our recent cases have dealt with state laws that, by classifying
residents according to the time they established residence, re-
498
96
and the right to vote.
_______________
sulted in the unequal distribution of rights and benefits among otherwise qualified
bona fide residents. Hooper, supra; Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 102 S.Ct. 2309,
72 L.Ed.2d 672 (1982); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S., 393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532
(1975); Memorial Hospital, supra; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995,
31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Shapiro, supra.
Because the creation of different classes of residents raises equal protection
concerns, we have also relied upon the Equal Protection Clause in these cases.
Whenever a state law infringes a constitutionally protected right, we undertake
intensified equal protection scrutiny of that law. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985);
Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328, n. 7, 103 S.Ct. 1838, 1842, n. 7, 75 L.Ed.2d
879 (1983); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-217 and n. 15, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2394-
2395 and n. 15, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982); Memorial Hospital, supra 415 U.S., at 258,
262, 94 S.Ct., at 1082, 1084; San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16 and n. 39, 30-32, 40, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1287 and n. 39, 1295-
1296, 1300, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
101, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2293, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); Dunn, supra 405 U.S., at 335,
342, 92 S.Ct., at 999, 1003; Shapiro, supra 394 U.S., at 634, 89 S.Ct., at 1331.
Thus, in several cases, we asked expressly whether the distinction drawn
by the State between older and newer residents burdens the right to
migrate. Where we found such a burden, we required the State to come
forward with a compelling justification. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra; Dunn,
supra; Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39
L.Ed.2d 306 (1974)... (Emphasis and italics supplied)
96 Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
‘In determining whether or not a state law violates the Equal Protection Clause,
we must consider the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which
the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of those who are disadvantaged
by the classification.’ Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
499
VOL. 446, DECEMBER 15, 2004 499
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas
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23, 30, 89 S.Ct. 5, 10, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). And, in this case, we must give the statute
a close and exacting examination. ‘(S)ince the right to exercise the franchise in a
free and unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political
rights, any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully
and meticulously scrutinized.’ Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1381,
12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). See Williams v. Rhodes, supra, 393 U.S. at 31, 89 S.Ct, at 10;
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S.Ct. 526, 535, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964). This careful
examination is necessary because statutes distributing the franchise constitute the
foundation of our representative society. Any unjustified discrimination in determining who
may participate in political affairs or in the selection of public officials undermines the
legitimacy of representative government.
x x x Statutes granting the franchise to residents on a selective basis always pose the
danger of denying some citizens any effective voice in the governmental affairs which
substantially affect their lives. Therefore, if a challenged state statute grants the right to
vote to some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to
others, the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a
compelling state interest. See Carrington v. Rash, supra, 380 U.S., at 96, 85 S.Ct., at 780.
(Emphasis and italics supplied)
500
Intermediate Scrutiny
The Rational Basis Test and Strict Scrutiny form what
Gerald Gunther termed as the two-tier approach to equal
protection analysis—the first tier consisting of the Rational
Basis Test (also called by Gunther as the old equal
protection) while
_______________
98 http://www.marquette.edu/polisci/wolfe/gunther.htm quoting
excerpts from Chapter 9 of G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(12th Ed., 1991).
99 Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21
(1972).
100 Vide Bautista v. Juinio, 121 SCRA 329, 341 (1984).
501
_______________
Finally, we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is “strict in theory, but
fatal in fact.” Fullilove, supra, at 519, 100 S.Ct., at 2795 (Marshall, J., concurring
in judgment). The unhappy persistence of both the practice and the lingering
effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an
unfortunate reality, and government is not disqualified from acting in response to
it. As recently as 1987, for example, every Justice of this Court agreed that the
Alabama Department of Public Safety’s “pervasive, systematic, and obstinate
discriminatory conduct” justified a narrowly tailored race-based remedy. See
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S., at 167, 107 S.Ct., at 1064 (plurality opinion of
Brennan, J.); id., at 190, 107 S.Ct., at 1076 (STEVENS, J., concurring in
judgment); id., at p. 196, 107 S.Ct., at 1079-1080 (O’CONNOR, J., dissenting).
When race-based action is necessary to further a compelling interest, such action
is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the “narrow tailoring” test this
Court has set out in previous cases.
And in Grutter v. Bollinger (539 U.S. 306, 326-327 [2003]), the same
Court said:
Strict scrutiny is not “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.” Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Peña, supra, at 237, 115 S.Ct. 2097 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Although all governmental uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not
all are invalidated by it. As we have explained, “whenever the government treats
any person unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury
that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the Constitution’s guarantee
of equal protection.” 515 U.S., at 229-230, 115
502
_______________
S.Ct. 2097. But that observation “says nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular
law; that determination is the job of the court applying strict scrutiny.” Id., at p. 230, 115
S.Ct. 2097. When race-based action is necessary to further a compelling governmental
interest, such action does not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection so
long as the narrow-tailoring requirement is also satisfied.
503
_______________
504
109
109
v. Cleburne Living Center, the United States Supreme
Court said:
_______________
505
_______________
507
_______________
509
_______________
117 Supra.
510
_______________
511
_______________
512
123
And in Peralta v. Commission on Elections, this Court
stated:
The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal
classifications. What [it] proscribes is a classification which is
arbitrary and unreasonable. It is not violated by a reasonable
classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the
classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies
equally to all those belonging to the same class. The equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only
to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within the class and
those who do not. There is, of course, no concise or easy
answer as to what an arbitrary classification is. No
definite rule has been or can be laid down on the basis of
which such question may be resolved. The determination
must be made in accordance with the facts presented by the
particular case. The general rule, which is well-settled by
the authorities, is that a classification, to be valid, must
rest upon material differences between the persons,
activities or things included and those excluded.’ There
must, in other words, be a basis for distinction.
Furthermore, such classification must be germane and pertinent
to the purpose of the law. And, finally, the basis of classification
must, in general, be so drawn that those who stand in
substantially the 124
same position with respect to the law are
treated alike. x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied)
A similar 125
thought was expressed in Medill
126
v. State of
Minnesota, cited in the main opinion, where the State
Supreme
_______________
Last, the Medill court found that “punitive damages are not in the nature of
compensatory damages and thus are not exempt from creditors.” While the Medill
opinion gave a clear answer, I am still confused. The opinion lacks any reasons for
513
_______________
the conclusion. I don’t know if the court’s decision was based on the Minnesota
Constitution, the exemption statute or both, i.e., Is the court saying that punitive
damages are not within the scope of § 550.37, subd. 22 or is it saying that the
statute is unconstitutional as applied to punitive damages. Once again, it does not
really matter. The result is clear. A claim for punitive damages is not exempt. (At
946)
127 Citing the earlier State case of Grobe v. Oak Center Creamery Co.,
113 N.W. 2d 458, where the Minnesota Supreme Court stated:
We cannot agree with the relators that a review of the facts bearing upon the
application of the statute is not necessary to determine the constitutional issue.
The constitutionality of a statute cannot in every instance be determined
by a mere comparison of its provisions with the applicable provisions of
the constitution. A statute may be constitutional and valid as applied to
one set of facts and invalid in its application to another. This is particularly
true of statutes granting the right of eminent domain. We have in recent years
considered a number of cases involving the constitutionality of such
statutes and have considered that question against the factual
background of each case. The records in each of these cases, including the
Dairyland case which was reviewed on certiorari, came to us with a settled case.
The legislation comes to this court with a presumption in favor of its
constitutionality. Where, as here, we cannot say the statute is inherently
unconstitutional, its validity must stand or fall upon the record before
the lower court and not upon assumptions this court might make in the
absence of proof incorporated in a settled case. This is not a case where
the constitutional facts are adequately ascertainable by judicial notice or
even judicial assumption. Because of the absence of a settled case or a
certificate of the trial judge as to the accuracy and completeness of the
record, we decline to pass upon the constitutionality of the act. (At 460;
emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
514
515
The pronouncement
129
in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’
Union, is also instructive:
_______________
516
_______________
517
The original Act of October 22, 1919, c. 80, tit. 2, 41 Stat. 297,
considered in Block v. Hirsh, was limited to expire in two years.
Section 122. The Act of August 24, 1921, c. 91, 42 Stat. 200,
purported to continue it in force, with some amendments, until
May 22, 1922. On that day a new act declared that the emergency
described in the original title 2 still existed, reenacted with
further amendments the amended Act of 1919, and provided that
it was continued until May 22, 1924. Act of May 22, 1922, c. 197,
42 Stat. 543.
We repeat what was stated in Block v. Hirsh, as to the respect
due to a declaration of this kind by the Legislature so far as it
relates to present facts. But even as to them a Court is not at
liberty to shut its eyes to an obvious mistake, when the validity of
the law depends upon the truth of what is declared. And still more
obviously so far as this declaration looks to the future it can be no
more than prophecy and is liable to be controlled by events. A law
depending upon the existence of an emergency or other
certain state of facts to uphold it may cease to operate if
the emergency ceases or the 140
facts change even though
valid when passed. x x x (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)
141
Indeed, this appears to be the thrust of the cases cited by
the main opinion to illustrate relative constitutionality:
_______________
We reject the plaintiffs’ contention that the classification created by § 11-108 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article is subject to any level of scrutiny higher
than the traditional, def-
518
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas
142
The case of Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon
concerned a parcel of land adjacent to a railroad station
and located in the middle of a highly developed business
district had continually been used as a car park. In 1927 it
was placed in a Residence ‘B’ district under a zoning
ordinance under
_______________
erential rational basis test. Moreover, we disagree with the holdings in the above-
cited cases applying heightened scrutiny to legislative caps upon recoverable
damages. Whatever may be the appropriate mode of equal protection analysis for
some other statutory classifications, in our view a legislative cap of $350,000 upon
the amount of noneconomic damages which can be awarded to a tort plaintiff does
not implicate such an important “right” as to trigger any enhanced scrutiny.
Instead, the statute represents the type of economic regulation which has
regularly been reviewed under the traditional rational basis test by this Court and
by the Supreme Court.
xxx
The General Assembly’s objective in enacting the cap was to assure the
availability of sufficient liability insurance, at a reasonable cost, in order to cover
claims for personal injuries to members of the public. This is obviously a
legitimate legislative objective. A cap on noneconomic damages may lead to
greater ease in calculating premiums, thus making the market more attractive to
insurers, and ultimately may lead to reduced premiums, making insurance more
affordable for individuals and organizations performing needed services. The cap,
therefore, is reasonably related to a legitimate legislative objective.
Since, the General Assembly had before it several studies which concluded that
$250,000 would cover most noneconomic damage claims, the Legislature did not
act arbitrarily in enacting the cap at $350,000. It is also significant that the cap
applies to all personal injury claimants equally rather than singling out one
category of claimants. Therefore, we hold that the legislative classification drawn
by § 11-108 between tort claimants whose noneconomic damages are less that
$350,000 and tort claimants whose noneconomic damages are greater than
$350,000, and who are thus subject to the cap, is not irrational or arbitrary. It does
not violate the equal protection component of Article 24 of the Declaration of
Rights. (At 115-116; citations omitted).
519
In Nashville,
144
Chatanooga & St. Louise Railways v.
Walters, the petitioners questioned the constitutionality
of a provision of the Tennessee Public Acts of 1921, which
authorized the state highway commissioner to require the
separation of grades whenever a state highway crosses a
railroad if in its discretion “the elimination of such grade
crossing is necessary for the protection of persons traveling
on any such highway or any such railroad” and requiring
the railroad company to pay in every case, one-half of the
total cost of the separation of grades. In remanding the
case to the Supreme
_______________
520
521
VOL. 446, DECEMBER 15, 2004 521
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas
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“In the year 1899 when said statutes were passed, there were no paved highways
in the State of Florida, no automobiles, no motor busses, no motor trucks, and
substantially all the freight and passenger traffic into, in and out of the State of
Florida was transported by railroads; today there are many thousands of paved
highways in Florida, thousands of automobiles, and hundreds of motor busses and
motor trucks carrying and transporting daily, besides their operators, property of
great value and thousands of passengers at rates of speed fairly comparable to,
and in many instances exceeding, the rate of speed at which the Defendant
operates its trains; much of said freight and passenger transportation is for hire
and is in competition with the transportation of passengers and freight by the
defendant and other railroad companies in the State, and at some seasons of the
year more passengers in number are carried by said automobile, bus and truck
transportation upon the paved highways of the State than by all the railroads
operating within said State; whatever hazard, jeopardy or danger there now may
be to property or to passengers on railroad trains from the failure to fence the
railroad tracks, exists to an equal, and in many instances, to a greater degree in
re-
522
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spect to the property and passengers carried in such automobiles, trucks and
busses; since the year 1889, the numbers of domestic livestock roaming at large in
Florida have continuously decreased so that at all times mentioned in the
Declaration herein approximately 70% of the domestic livestock in Florida does
not and did not roam at large, whereas in 1889 practically all domestic live stock
in Florida did roam at large, and by consequence of such changed conditions the
burden placed by said statutes upon this Defendant as a railroad company has
become and is greatly disproportionate to the public good or benefit, and an
unreasonable expense on this Defendant; it has been many years since any
property being carried by a railroad train in Florida has been damaged, injured or
destroyed, or any persons being so carried killed or injured, as a result of a
collision between a railroad train and domestic live stock; but injury to and death
of persons being carried in automobiles and trucks upon the public highways of the
State resulting in collisions between motor driven vehicles and domestic live stock
are a matter of almost daily occurrence, and in each of the years 1937, 1938 and
1939, from 20 to 25 persons were so killed; x x x (at pp. 245-246).
523
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524
525
VOL. 446, DECEMBER 15, 2004 525
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas
had killed the same animal, the owner would have been
required to prove negligence in the operation of its
equipment. Said the court, ‘This certainly is not equal
protection of the law.’
As stated in Markendorf v. Friedman, 280 Ky. 484, 133 S.W.2d
516, 127 A.L.R. 416, appeal dismissed Friedman v. Markendorf,
309 U.S. 627, 60 S.Ct. 610, 84 L.Ed. 987, the purpose of the
provisions of §§ 3 and 59 of the Kentucky Constitution and
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution
is to place all persons similarly situated upon a plane of
equality and to render it impossible for any class to obtain
preferred treatment. Applying this proscription of inequality
and unreasonable discrimination, we held invalid an amendment
to a statute regulating motor transportation for hire which
exempted from the operation of the statute such vehicles engaged
in transporting farm products. Priest v. State Tax Commission,
258 Ky. 391, 80 S.W.2d 43.
We, therefore, hold that the part of KRS 277.330 which
imposes a duty upon a railroad company of proving that it was
free from negligence in the killing or injury
150
of cattle by its engine
or cars is invalid and unconstitutional. (Emphasis supplied;
italics in the original)
151
Finally, in Rutter v. Esteban, this Court invalidated
Section 2 of R.A. No. 342 providing for an eight-year
moratorium period within which a creditor could not
demand payment of a monetary obligation contracted
before December 8, 1941 (counted from the settlement of
the war damage claim of the debtor) after taking judicial
notice of the significant change in the nation’s economic
circumstances in 1953, thus it held:
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526
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas
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153 Supra.
154 Notably, the application of “rigid scrutiny” in equal protection
analysis was espoused as early as 1944 in the case of Korematsu v. U.S.,
supra.
155 I.e. relating to the same matter.
156 71 SCRA 176 (1976).
528
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas
_______________
_______________
158 Rollo at p. 5.
530
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas
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531
VOL. 446, DECEMBER 15, 2004 531
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas
PREAMBLE:
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532
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas
SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights.
SECTION 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social
economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote
their welfare.
ARTICLE III: Bill of Rights
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.
ARTICLE IX: Constitutional Commissions
B. The Civil Service Commission
SECTION 5. The Congress shall provide for the
standardization of compensation of government officials,
including those in government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters, taking into account the nature of the
responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for
their positions.
ARTICLE XII: National Economy and Patrimony
SECTION 1. The goals of the national economy are a more
equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a
sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced
by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding
productivity as the key raising the quality of life for all, especially
the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment
based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform,
through industries that make full and efficient use of human and
natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic
and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade
practices.
In pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all
regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to
develop. Private enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives,
and similar collective organizations, shall be encouraged to
broaden the base of their ownership.
SECTION 22. Acts which circumvent or negate any of the
provisions of this Article shall be considered inimical to the
national interest and subject to criminal and civil sanctions, as
may be provided by law.
533
Labor
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163 It should be noted however that not all rights enumerated in the
Constitution are found in the Bill of Rights. Though the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is found under the Declaration of
Principles and States Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, this Court
in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. (224 SCRA 792, 804-805 [1993]) held
534
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas
_______________
that the said right was legally enforceable without need for further
legislation—a self-executing provision.
535
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536
_______________
537
538
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas
539
VOL. 446, DECEMBER 15, 2004 539
Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas
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540
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541
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542
544
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545
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546
Senator Maceda. x x x
We have a salary grade range, if I am not
mistaken, Mr. President, up to Grade 32.
Those executive
types are probably between Grade 23 to
Grade 32.
If we really want to make sure that the
vice-
president types of the banks will come
in, it should
be cut off at around Grade 23 level and
that the
Standardization Act should still refer to
those
around Grade 22 and below. But if we cut
it off at
Grade 9 and below, we are just hitting only
the drivers,
the janitors, the filing clerks, the messengers.
The Gentleman will only be cutting off a part
of my
heart again if he does that. My heart
bleeds for this people, Mr. President.
Senator If that is an amendment, Mr. President, I
Osmeña. move that we reconsider the prior approval of
my
amendment which was accepted by the
Sponsor, and I
will accept the amendment of Senator
Maceda that the
grade level should not be Grade 9 but Grade
22 instead.
Senator After consulting the principal Author
Maceda. of the Standardization Law, the
distinguished
Majority Leader, he confirms that the
executive group
_______________
177 IV Record of the Senate, 9th Congress, 1st Session 1986-1987 (June
5, 1993).
548
_______________
549
_______________
550
551
Salary Grades
President of the Philippines 33
_______________
182 Vide: Section 3 (h), P.D. 995, viz.:
552
553
554
555
Nurse I 10
Teacher I 10
Agrarian Reform Program Technologist 10
Budget Officer I 11
Chemist I 11
Agriculturist I 11
Social Welfare Officer I 11
Engineer I 12
Veterinarian I 13
Legal Officer I 14
Administrative Officer II 15
Dentist II 16
Postmaster IV 17
Forester III 18
Associate Professor I 19
Rural Health Physician 20
_______________
183 Supra.
184 Id., at p. 1176.
557
between the officers and the rank and file in Section 15(c)
is based on such economic, status.
What is more, the foregoing statement flies in the face of
a basis of classification well-established in our law and
jurisprudence.
Indeed, the distinction between “officers” and
“employees” in the government service was clearly
established as early as 1917 with the enactment of the Old
Revised Administrative Code and later incorporated into
the language of the Constitution:
_______________
558
_______________
186 303 SCRA 309 (1999).
559
560
_______________
561
_______________
562
This Honorable Court may take judicial notice of the fact that the
rank-and-file employees of the other government financial
institutions, such as the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Development Bank
of the Philippines (DBP), and the Social Security System (SSS),
together with the officers of such institutions, are exempted from
the coverage of the SSL under their respective charters x x x Thus,
within the class of rank-and-file employees of the government
financial institutions, the192 rank-and-file employees of the BSP are
also discriminated upon. (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
563
Section 3. x x x
(c) The Commission, upon the recommendation of the SSS
President, shall appoint an actuary and such other personnel as
may be deemed necessary; fix their reasonable compensation,
allowances and other benefits, prescribe, their duties and
establish such methods and procedures as may be necessary to
insure the efficient, honest and economical administration of the
provisions and purposes of this Act: Provided, however, That the
personnel of the SSS below the rank of Vice-President shall be
appointed by the SSS President: Provided, further, That the
personnel appointed by the SSS Presi-
564
565
_______________
567
_______________
568
569
_______________
570
_______________
571
tiate the BSP rank and file from the other rank and file of
the [other] GFIs.”
The foregoing tacitly rests on the assumptions that, with
respect to their compensation, position classification and
qualifications standards, (1) the rank-and-file employees of
the BSP together with the rank-and-file employees of the
LBP, SSS, GSIS and DBP belong to a single class; and (2)
there are no reasonable distinctions between the rank-and-
file employees of the BSP and the exempted employees of
the other GOCCs/GFIs.
However, these assumptions are unfounded, and the
assertion that “GFIs have long been recognized as one
distinct class, separate from other governmental entities” is
demonstrably false. 200
As previously discussed, Section 2 of P.D. 985 cited in
support of the foregoing proposition has been expressly
repealed by Section 16 of Salary Standardization Law.
_______________
572
573
574
_______________
575
_______________
576
_______________
577
208
ernment agencies have been exempted from the same.
Hence, GFI employment, as advocated by the main opinion,
cannot be reasonably considered to be the basis for
exemption for the Compensation Classification System of
the Salary Standardization Law.
Curiously, how could the exemption of the SEC
personnel “add insult to petitioner’s injury” when, going by
what the main opinion holds to be the defining
characteristic of the class to which petitioner’s members
belong—that is, employment in a GFI, the two groups of
employees would obviously not be comparable?
_______________
578
_______________
209 III Records of the Senate, 9th Congress, 806 (January 16, 1995).
579
_______________
580
_______________
581
The bottom line of this bill which seeks to amend the existing
charter of the Development Bank of the Philippines is to enable
the DBP as the country’s premier development bank to effectively
contribute to the nation’s attainment of its socio-economic
objectives, such as the alleviation of poverty, creation of
employment opportunities, and provision of basic needs such as
food, shelter, health and education.
Given the present state of financial intermediation and capital
markets in the Philippines, economic activities and projects still
remain which private financial institutions may not be willing to
finance because of the risks involves. And even if some of these
private institutions are willing to do so, they may not have the
capability to assist such projects and activities. Development
lending is much more than simply providing medium to long-term
funds to economically viable projects.
The proposed DBP charter amendment will help remodel DBP
in the financial community as a predominantly development bank
that works closely with individuals, institutions and associations
which can provide resources and other types of 212
assistance to
projects with clearly-defined development impact.
_______________
582
583
_______________
584
_______________
585
There are real differences between the Rank & File of the
BSP and the Exempted Rank & File Employees of the other
GOCCs/GFIs
There can be no doubt that the employees of the BSP share
a common attribute with the employees of the LBP, SSS,
GSIS and DBP in that all are employees of GOCCs
performing fiduciary functions. It may also be reasonable to
assume that BSP employees with SG 19 and below perform
functions analogous to those carried out by employees of
the other GOCCs with the corresponding salary grades.
Nonetheless, these similarities alone are not sufficient to
support the conclusion that rank-and-file employees of the
BSP may be lumped together with similar employees of the
other GOCCs for purposes of compensation, position
classification and qualifications standards. The fact that
certain persons have some attributes in common does not
automatically make them members of the same class with
respect to a legislative
216
classification. Thus, in Johnson, et
al. v. Robison, et al., involving the alleged violation of a
conscientious objector’s right to equal protection, the U.S.
Supreme Court had occasion to observe:
_______________
586
_______________
Sec. 1. The State shall maintain a central monetary, authority that shall function
and operate as an independent and accountable body corporate in the discharge of
its mandated responsibilities concerning money, banking and credit. In line with
this policy, and considering its unique functions and responsibilities, the central
monetary authority established under this Act, while being a government-owned
corporation, shall enjoy fiscal and administrative autonomy.
587
_______________
219 House Bill No. 1833 containing similar provisions was filed with the
Twelfth Congress; House Bill No. 9427 containing similar provisions was
filed with the Eleventh Congress.
588
_______________
589
same time, in line with its duty to determine the proper 221
allocation of powers between the several departments,
this Court is naturally hesitant to intrude too readily into
the domain of another co-equal branch of government
where the absence of reason and the vice of arbitrariness
are not clearly and unmistakably established.
The contention in the main opinion that herein
petitioner represents the “politically powerless,” and
therefore should not be compelled to seek a political
solution, rings hollow.
First, as pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court 222
in City
of Cleburne Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, “[a]ny
minority can be said to be powerless to assert direct control
over the legislature, but if that were a criterion for higher
level scrutiny by the courts, much 223
economic and social
legislation would now be suspect.”
Second, there is nothing of record which would explain
why the rank and file employees of the BSP in particular
should be considered more “powerless” than the rank and
file employees of the other GOCCs and GFIs, particularly
those to whom Congress has granted exemption.
Third, as already mentioned, House Bill 123, providing
for, among others, the exemption of all BSP employees
from the coverage of the Compensation Classification
System of the Salary Standardization Law is already
pending in Congress. Thus, it would seem that the
petitioner and its members are not without any support
from within that legislative body.
Moreover, in view of the tight fiscal and budgetary
situation confronting the national government, both the
executive and legislative branches of the government are
actively reassessing the statutes which have exempted
certain GOCCs and
_______________
590
_______________
224 Vide: “Pay Cuts for Gov’t Fat Cats: GSIS, SSS heads vow to back
austerity plan,” Philippine Daily Inquirer at A1, September 17, 2004;
“Gov’t Fat Cats Under Fire, Boncodin: Perks, pay of execs not illegal”
Philippine Daily Inquirer at A1, September 16, 2004; “GOCC Execs Get
P5M to P9M in pay, Boncodin tells Senators” Philippine Daily Inquirer at
A1, September 15, 2004; “Senate ‘WMD’ to hit GOCCs” The Philippines
Star, September 17, 2004; “Gov’t Execs Get Top, P9.85M a year for ex-
PCSO chief” The Manila Times, September 15, 2004; “Gov’t Execs Told To
Cut Salaries, GOCCs & GFIs ordered to help in austerity campaign” The
Manila Bulletin, http://www.mb.com.ph/MAIN2004091118212.html;
“Clamor for GOCC pay cuts spreads to the House” The Manila Times,
September 9, 2004; “GOCCs Carry bulk of R5.4-T National Debt, The
Manila Bulletin, http://www.mb.com.ph/MTNN2004090817955.html;
“State Firms Fuel Crisis, Senators blame GOCC officials,” The Manila
Times, September 8, 2004.
225 “GMA: GOCCs wiped into line, Retain your fat paychecks and get
fired, GOCC execs warned,” Manila Bulletin at 1, 6, September 17, 2004.
226 “Poor provinces protest decrease in pork barrel, GOCC pay cut plan
“Manila Bulletin at A1, A4, September 16, 2004.
227 “GOCC execs agree to pay cut,” Manila Times, September 17, 2004
(http://manila times.net/national/2004/sept/17/yehey/top_
stories/20040927top3.html).
591
228 “Budget dept eyes cut in pay of GOCC officials,” September 11, 2004
(http://money.inq7.net/topstories/view_topstories.php?
yyy=2004&mon=09&dd=11&file=3.
229 “GOCC execs agree to pay cut,” Manila Times, September 17, 2004
(http://manilatimes.net/national/2004/sept/17/yehey/top_stories/20040927top3.html).
230 “Gov’t fat cats under fire,” Philippine Daily Inquirer at A1.
September 16, 2004.
231 “Pay cuts for gov’t fat cats, GSIS, SEC heads vow to back austerity
plan,” Philippine Daily Inquirer at A1, September 17, 2004.
232 “GMA: GOCC wiped into line, Retain your fat paychecks and get
fired, GOCC execs warned,” Manila Bulletin at 1, 6, September 17, 2004.
233 “GOCC execs agree to pay cut,” Manila Times, September 17, 2004
(http.//manilatimes.net/national/2004/sept/17/yehey/top_stories/20040917top3.html.
592
_______________
234 Gov’t fat cats under fire, Boncodin: Perks, pay of execs not illegal,”
Philippine Daily Inquirer at A1, September 16, 2004.
235 Supra.
593
_______________
594
_______________
595
_______________
240 Ibid.
596
The general rule in the past and up to the present is that “the
terms and conditions of employment in the Government,
including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are
governed by law” (Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act, R.A. No.
875, as amended and Article, 277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442,
as amended). Since the terms and conditions of government
employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot
use the same weapons employed by workers in the private
sector to secure concessions from their employers. The
principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that
industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by
law. Relations between private employers and their
employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject
to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other
labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of
employment in the unionized private sector are settled
through the process of collective bargaining. In
government employment, however, it is the legislature and,
where properly given delegated power, the administrative
heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of
employment. And this is effected through statutes or
administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not
through collective bargaining agreements.
_______________
597
xxx
Personnel of government-owned or controlled
corporations are now part of the civil service. It would not
be fair to allow them to engage in concerted activities to
wring higher salaries or fringe benefits from Government
even as other civil service personnel such as the hundreds
of thousands of public school teachers, soldiers,
policemen, health personnel, and other government
workers are denied the right to engage in similar
activities.
To say that the words “all employers” in P.D. No. 851 includes
the Government and all its agencies, instrumentalities, and
government-owned or controlled corporations would also result in
nightmarish budgetary problems.
For instance, the Supreme Court is trying its best to alleviate
the financial difficulties of courts, judges, and court personnel in
the entire country but it can do so only within the limits of
budgetary appropriations. Public school teachers have been
resorting to what was formerly unthinkable, to mass leaves and
demonstrations, to get not a 13th-month pay but promised
increases in basic salaries and small allowances for school
uniforms. The budget of the Ministry of Education, Culture and
Sports has to be supplemented every now and then for this
purpose. The point is, salaries and fringe benefits of those
embraced by the civil service are fixed by law. Any increases must
come from law, from appropriations or savings under the law, and
not from concerted activity.
The Government Corporate Counsel, Justice Manuel Lazaro, in
his consolidated comment for respondents GSIS, MWSS, and
PVTA gives the background of the amendment which includes
every government-owned or controlled corporation in the embrace
of the civil service:
xxx
598
personnel took orders from union leaders or put solidarity with members
of the working class above solidarity with the Government. This would be
inimical to the public interest.
xxx
“Similarly, Delegate Leandro P. Garcia, expressing support for the
inclusion of government-owned or controlled corporations in the Civil
Service, argued:
“‘It is meretricious to contend that because Government-owned or
controlled corporations yield profits, their employees are entitled to better
wages and fringe benefits than employees of Government other than
Government-owned and controlled corporations which are not making
profits. There is no gainsaying the fact that the capital they use is the
people’s money.’ (see: Records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention).
“Summarizing the deliberations of the 1971 Constitutional Convention
on the inclusion of Government-owned or controlled corporations, Dean
Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ., of the Ateneo de Manila University Professional
School of Law, stated that government-owned corporations came
under attack as milking cows of a privileged few enjoying
salaries far higher than their counterparts in the various
branches of government, while the capital of these corporations
belongs to the Government and government money is pumped
into them whenever on the brink of disaster, and they should
therefore come under the stric[t] surveillance of the Civil Service
System. (Bernas, The 1973 Philippine Constitution, Notes and Cases,
1974 ed., p. 524).”
xxx
599
ties pertaining to, and the qualifications required for the positions
concerned.”
_______________
600
Postscript
I agree wholeheartedly with the main opinion’s statement
that “[t]here should be no hesitation in using the equal
protection clause as a major cutting edge to eliminate every
conceivable irrational discrimination in our society.”
However, because I find that the classification contained
in the questioned proviso is based on real differences
between the executive level and the rank and file of the
BSP; is rationally related to the attainment of the
objectives of the new Central Bank Act; and, further, that
the subsequent amendments to the charters of certain
other GOCCs and GFIs did not materially affect the
rational basis for this classification, I do not believe that
the classification in the case at bar is impressed with the
vice of irrationality.
The mere fact that petitioner’s members are employees
of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, admittedly perhaps the
biggest among the GFIs, does not, to my mind,
automatically justify their exemption provided for by the
Salary Standardization Law. In my humble view, the equal
protection clause ought not to be used as a means of
“reserving greener pastures to sacred cows” in
contravention of the Constitutional mandate to “provide for
the standardization of compensation of government officials
and employees, including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters, taking into
account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and
the qualifications required for their positions.”
WHEREFORE, I vote to deny the instant petition.
_______________
601
CONCURRING OPINION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
1
Does Sec. 15(c), Article II, Republic Act No. 6753, which
allows the exemption of BSP employees occupying salary
grade2 (SG) 20 and above from the coverage of Rep. Act No.
6758 result in a denial of petitioner’s constitutional right
to equal protection of the law?
I submit that it does and said provision should therefore
be declared unconstitutional on the ground that the
division between BSP employees covered from SG 19 down
and from SG 20 up is purely arbitrary. Even given the wide
discretion vested in Congress to make classifications, it is
nonetheless clear that the lawmaking body abused its
discretion in making such classification.
It is not disputed that all that is required for a valid
classification is that it must be reasonable, i.e., that it must
be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences; it must be germane to the purpose of the law; it
must not be limited to existing conditions
3
and it must apply
equally to each member of the class.
In the instant case, the classification was justified on the
need of the BSP to compete in the labor market for
economists, accountants, lawyers, experts in security,
printing, commercial and rural banking, financial
intermediation fund management, and other highly
4
4
technical and professional personnel, which it could not do
unless personnel occupying top positions are exempted
from the coverage of Rep. Act No. 6758, the Salary
Standardization Law.
_______________
602
_______________
603
_______________
7 IV Records of the Senate, 9th Congress, 1st Session 1086-87 (05 June
1993).
604
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