Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 5

FEMININE METANARRATIVES AND WHAT’S

WRONG WITH THEM

Swastika Thourwal
I.D. No 2343
I Year B.A. L.L.B. (Hons.)

NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA UNIVERSITY

BANGALORE

1
INTRODUCTION

The world is currently witnessing the third wave of feminism. What stands about this new wave
is its repudiation of the multiple “redescriptions” of “woman” and “feminine” qualities, as we
know them. Questions are being raised such as are women are different from men? Does the
difference issue entail more than just biological constitution? Are women conventionally
supposed to be caring and compassionate? This makes us think if there be an all-encompassing,
universal “metanarrative” of sexual difference. This paper tries to argue against such broad
explanatory metanarratives that are based on biology, social norms and stereotypes. In this paper,
the researcher speaks in favour of adopting an anti-foundationalist approach towards feminism
and abandoning the established metanarratives. In short, questioning the stories that have been
told so far and coming up with our own.

Sex and Gender Identity


The law divides sex into two legal categories of man and woman. For doing so, they view
biological traits—independent of legal and cultural norms—as an incontestable guide to gender
differences. However, it is highly doubtful if such a justificatory theory of gender based purely
on biological traits is reliable. It must be noted that sexual orientation is not the same as gender
identity. Where sexual orientation is due to immutable genetic differences, gender is a more
expansive in its usage. Many cultural and social forces help an individual to build and adopt a
certain gender identity. Unlike sex, gender is constructed. It is interesting to note that such an
argument has been used by same-sex couples in India to justify their homosexual marriages.1 For
instance, under Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, there has been made specific use of
the terms ‘bride’ and ‘bridegroom’. A certain lesbian couple argued that such words are not
necessarily indicative of sexual orientation, but of the gender roles that people assume in
marriages. The couple presented themselves in the role of a bride and bridegroom and performed
their marriage with Hindu customary rites.2 The example illustrates a simple fact, the law cannot

1
N. Ravichandran, Legal Recognition of Same Sex Relationships in India, 5 JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY 103,
(2014).
2
R. Vanita, “Weddings of Two Souls”: Same Sex Marriage and Hindu Traditions, 20(2) JOURNAL OF FEMINIST
STUDIES IN RELIGION 123, (2004).

2
rely on privileging of biological difference for forming legislations. The category “woman” is
open to redescription and intervention and thus should not be used for legislations on pay,
labour, differential treatment or marriage. After all, in the words of Simone De Beauvoir, “one is
not born, rather one becomes, a woman.” 3

By Reason of Their Sex: Dealing With Outmoded Stereotypes


Third wave feminists are trying to question the outmoded stereotypes about women. Beliefs like
teenage girls are less likely than teenage boys to drink and drive or that female jurors are more
likely to sympathise with a victim are being challenged. Feminist theorists, as a result of
stereotypes like these, are being compelled to develop an idea of womanhood that are free of
such general stereotypes or “metanarratives”.

For instance, Robin West, a legal theorist suggested that women, “are more nurturant, caring,
loving and responsible to other than are men.” 4 These traits are associated with motherhood.
However, not all women have common feelings towards the experience. Firstly, all women do
not wish to be mothers and thus claim that “feminine qualities” do not reflect their experiences.
Second, all women may not experience motherhood in the same manner. The experience may
differ for different race, class, sex or marital status. Lastly, some feminists believe that
associating the category of woman as a derivative of her role as a mother reinforces traditional
beliefs about woman’s role in a society. 5 Other than motherhood, there is another major
constituent of a feminist metanarrative of gender difference. This is linking sexual violence to
gender inequality. Catharine MacKinnon, for example, articulates a theory of sexual oppression
that defines women’s sexuality through experiences like rape, molestation and sexual
harassment. In her analysis, she assumes women to be victims of male power, male definitions
and male sexuality.6

Questioning the Metanarratives


Stereotypes such as the ones discussed above are accepted to the extent that one account or the

3
Simone De Beauvoir, THE SECOND SEX, 267 (1953).
4
Tracy E. Higgins, “By Reason of Their Sex”: Feminist Theory, Postmodernism, and Justice, 80(6) CORNELL LAW
REVIEW 1573, (1995).
5
Id, at 1566.
6
Shannon Gilreath, Feminism and Gay Liberation: Together in Struggle, 91 DUKE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 131,
(2014).

3
other becomes the “official feminist theory of gender difference” and constitutes the category
woman in a particular way, accepting some experiences as definitive while excluding others.
This is the reason that many feminists and legal theorists have widely criticised the common
legal approach to gender. They have made attempts to bring to light the partiality of common
assumptions, and have frequently offered fuller theories of gender differences. The feminists of
the contemporary age have argued for the rejection of metanarratives that rely on biological
differences and pervasive norms. The postmodernist skepticism of such grand theories resonates
with feminist theories’ increasing distrust of claims and perceptions about women. 7 This
involves surrendering the modernist conceptions of objective truths, and instead giving liberty to
all women to come up with a multiplicity of accounts.

CONCLUSION

Law and society in general assume the conventional definitions of woman. A postmodernist
conception requires feminists to relinquish pre-conceived claims and tell truer and better stories
of women’s lives. The postmodern methodology will help them to discard the biased
metanarratives and formulate stories that can reflect women’s experiences more completely, in a
form undistorted by patriarchy and stereotypes. This will provide them with an opportunity to
come up with their own multiple stories instead of accepting one authoritative account of women
and their experiences.

7
Tracy E. Higgins, supra note 4, at 1570.

4
REFERENCES

 N. Ravichandran, Legal Recognition of Same Sex Relationships in India, 5 JOURNAL OF


LAW AND SOCIETY, (2014).

 R. Vanita, “Weddings of Two Souls”: Same Sex Marriage and Hindu Traditions, 20(2)
JOURNAL OF FEMINIST STUDIES IN RELIGION, (2004).

 Simone De Beauvoir, THE SECOND SEX, (1953).

 Tracy E. Higgins, “By Reason of Their Sex”: Feminist Theory, Postmodernism, and
Justice, 80(6) CORNELL LAW REVIEW, (1995).

 Shannon Gilreath, Feminism and Gay Liberation: Together in Struggle, 91 DUKE


UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, (2014).

Вам также может понравиться