AGENCY FEES

Del Pilar Academy, et. al. vs. Del Pilar Academy Employees Union
G.R. No. 170112, April 30, 2008

FACTS:

The Union is the certified collective bargaining representative of teaching and

non-teaching personnel of Petitioner, an educational institution. In 1994, the
Union and Petitioner entered into a CBA granting salary increase and other
benefits to the teaching and non-teaching staff. The UNION then assessed
agency fees from non-union employees, and requested Petitioner to deduct
said assessment from the employees’ salaries and wages. Petitioner,
however, refused to effect deductions claiming that the non-union employees
were not amenable to it. When voluntary arbitration failed, the UNION filed a
ULP against the Petitioner. Petitioner denied committing unfair labor practices
against the UNION. It justified the non-deduction of the agency fees by the
absence of individual check off authorization from the non-union employees.

ISSUE:
Whether the UNION is entitled to collect agency fees from non-union
members and whether an individual written authorization is necessary for a
valid check-off.

RULING:

YES. The collection of agency fees in an amount equivalent to union dues

and fees, from employees who are not union members, is recognized by
Article 248(e) of the Labor Code. No requirement of written authorization from
the non-union employees is needed to effect a valid check off. Article 248(e)
makes it explicit that Article 241, paragraph (o), requiring written authorization
is inapplicable to non-union members, especially in this case where the non-
union employees receive several benefits under the CBA. The employee’s
acceptance of benefits resulting from a collective bargaining agreement
justifies the deduction of agency fees from his pay and the union’s entitlement
thereto.
PERFECTION OF APPEALS

Mindanao Times Corporation vs. Confesor

G.R. No. 183417, February 5, 2010

FACTS:
Confesor was employed by MTC on 1998. Confesor resigned from MTC on
2003. Thereafter, he filed a complaint before the LA against MTC for payment
of separation pay, and later amended the complaint from money claim to
illegal dismissal, alleging that the officers of MTC forced him to resign after he
published separate articles accusing several politicians of being involved in
some anomalies. The LA found for Confesor. MTC appealed the decision to
the NLRC and in compliance with the appeal bond requirement, surrendered
to the NLRC the passbook covering the deposit as well as a Deed of
Assignment assigning the proceeds of the deposit.

ISSUE:
Whether the Passbook and the Deed of Assignment constitute substantial
compliance with the rule on perfection of appeals.

RULING:
NO. Article 223 of the Labor Code provides that an appeal by the employer to
the NLRC from a judgment of a labor arbiter which involves a monetary award
may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the NLRC, in an amount
equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. In case the
decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of
a cash or surety bond. The posting of a bond is indispensable to the
perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decision
of the LA. The word "only" makes it perfectly plain that the lawmakers
intended the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the
essential and exclusive means by which an employer's appeal may be
perfected. The word "may" refers to the perfection of an appeal as optional on
the part of the defeated party, but not to the compulsory posting of an appeal
bond, if he desires to appeal.
APPEAL

AKLAN COLLEGE, INC. vs. PERPETUO ENERO, ARLYN CASTIGADOR,

NUENA SERMON and JOCELYN ZOLINA
G.R. No. 178309, January 27, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner is an education institution while respondents were high school
teachers of petitioner. Respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal against
petitioner before the Labor Arbiter (LA). They alleged that what took place was
a peaceful assembly wherein the students demonstrated their sympathy on
what they perceived to be wrongs committed by the high school principal
against some teachers. They maintained that they did not instigate the
students to rally. The LA absolved the respondents and held petitioner guilty of
illegal dismissal. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of LA, ruling that
the teachers instigated the mass action, but ordered petitioner to pay
respondents 13th month pay and SIL.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed error when it increased the monetary awards in
favor of non-appealing respondents.

RULING:
As a rule, a party who does not appeal from the decision may not obtain any
affirmative relief from the appellate court other than what he has obtained
from the lower tribunal, if any, whose decision is brought up on appeal. Due
process prevents the grant of additional awards to parties who did not appeal.
[27]
As an exception, he may assign an error where the purpose is to maintain
the judgment on other grounds, but he cannot seek modification or reversal of
the judgment or affirmative relief unless he has also appealed or filed a
separate petition. In this case, the CA is not precluded from affirming,
reversing or modifying the decision of the NLRC on the propriety of payment
of 13th month pay and SIL pay to the respondents. It is the propriety of the
award of these benefits which were precisely the issues raised by petitioner in
its appeal before the said appellate court. The appealing party is legally
required to indicate in his brief an assignment of errors, and only those
assigned shall be considered by the appellate court in deciding the case.
ASSUMPTION BY SECRETARY

MANILA HOTEL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION and its members, vs MANILA

HOTEL CORPORATION, G.R. No. 154591, March 5, 2007

FACTS:
In 1999, MHEA filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB against respondent on
grounds of ULP. Upon petition of respondent, the Secretary of Labor certified
the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and enjoined any
strike or lockout and ordered the parties to cease and desist from committing
any acts that may exacerbate the situation. However, MHEA conducted a
strike despite the Order. Now, MHEA members seek their reinstatement after
participating in an illegal strike, that is, a strike that was conducted after
receiving an Order of assumption by the SOLE certifying the dispute to the
NLRC for compulsory arbitration.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners-members of MHEA are entitled to reinstatement with
backwages.

RULING:
The Court has consistently ruled in a long line of cases spanning several
decades that once the SOLE assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute, such
jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive
processes of a strike or lockout. Defiance of the assumption order or a return-
to work order by a striking employee, whether a union officer or a member, is
an illegal act and, therefore, a valid ground for loss of employment status. The
assumption of jurisdiction by the SOLE over labor disputes causing or likely to
cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest is
in the nature of a police power measure. A return to work Order is
immediately executory notwithstanding the filing of a motion for
reconsideration. It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of
any petition questioning its validity.
Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but
of obligation.
ATTORNEY’S FEES

ERWIN H. REYES v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

G.R. No. 180551, February 10, 2009

FACTS:
The Petition arose from a Complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for moral
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees filed by petitioner against
respondents. The LA rendered his decision in favor of Petitioner and awarded
Attorney fees, among others, equivalent to 10% of the total sum of judgment.
However, on appeal, the NLRC deleted the award.

ISSUE:
Whether the NLRC erred in deleting the award of attorney’s fees.

RULING:
The Court overrules the deletion by the NLRC of the Labor Arbiter's award for
attorney's fees to petitioner. Petitioner is evidently entitled to attorney's fees,
since he was compelled to litigate2 to protect his interest by reason of
unjustified and unlawful termination of his employment by respondents CCBP
and Taguibao.
BACKWAGES

Nenuca A. Velez vs Shangri-la’sEdsa Plaza Hotel

G.R. No. 148261, October 9, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioner Velez was employed by respondent as an Executive Housekeeper,
the highest ranking executive of the Hotel's housekeeping department, from
1991 until her dismissal on 1995, due to loss of confidence. Petitioner then
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondents. The LA however
dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the NLRC found for petitioner and
ordered payment of backwages. But such was set aside by the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was illegally dismissed.

RULING:
An employer can terminate the services of an employee for just and valid
causes, which must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, and with
due process, meaning that the employee must be given notice with adequate
opportunity to be heard before he is notified of his actual dismissal for cause.
All were complied with by the respondents in this case. The Court came up
with the following guidelines for the application of the doctrine of loss of
confidence:

(a) the loss of confidence should not be simulated;

(b) it should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are

improper, illegal or unjustified;

(c) it should not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming

evidence to the contrary; and

(d) it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify an earlier

action taken in bad faith.
 SMART Communications, Inc., vs. Astorga
G.R. No. 148132, January 28, 2008

FACTS:
Astorga was employed by SMART as District Sales Manager. In 1998,
SMART launched an organizational realignment, part of which was the
outsourcing of the marketing and sales force. SMART entered into a JVA with
NTT of Japan and formed SNMI and thus, the division of Astorga was
abolished. Astorga was then terminated due to redundancy. Astorga then filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal against SMART.

ISSUE:
Whether Astorga was illegally dismissed.

RULING:
No. Except for her barefaced allegation, no convincing evidence was offered
to prove it. This Court finds it extremely difficult to believe that SMART would
enter into a joint venture agreement with NTT, form SNMI and abolish
CSMG/FSD simply for the sole purpose of easing out a particular employee,
such as Astorga. Moreover, Astorga never denied that SMART offered her a
supervisory position in the Customer Care Department, but she refused the
offer because the position carried a lower salary rank and rate. If indeed
SMART simply wanted to get rid of her, it would not have offered her a
position in any department in the enterprise.
POSTING OF APPEAL BOND

Accessories Specialist, Inc. vs. Alabanza

FACTS:
The CA issued the assailed Decision dismissing the Petition. The petitioners
posted the instant petition arguing that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion
when it dismissed the appeal of petitioners for failure to post the complete
amount of the appeal bond.

ISSUE:
Whether the posting of the complete amount of the bond in an appeal from
the decision of the LA to the NLRC is an indispensable requirement for the
perfection of the appeal despite the filing of a motion to reduce the amount of
the appeal bond.

RULING:
Yes. The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in
cases involving monetary awards from the decision of the LA. The intention of
the lawmakers to make the bond a mandatory requisite for the perfection of
an appeal by the employer is clearly limned in the provision that an appeal by
the employer may be perfected "only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond." The word "only" makes it perfectly plain that the lawmakers intended
the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the essential and
exclusive means by which an employer's appeal may be perfected. The
word "may" refers to the perfection of an appeal as optional on the part of the
defeated party, but not to the compulsory posting of an appeal bond, if he
desires to appeal. The meaning and the intention of the legislature in enacting
a statute must be determined from the language employed; and where there
is no ambiguity in the words used, then there is no room for construction.
BOUNDARY SYSTEM

PAL vs. PALEA, GR No. 142399, March 12, 2008

FACTS:
PALEA filed a complaint for ULP against PAL postulating that the “cut-off
period for regularization should not be used as the parameter for granting the
13th month pay considering that the law does not distinguish the status of
employment and the law covers all employees.” PAL maintains that in
extending the grant of the 13 th month pay or mid-year bonus to employees
who are not covered by the CBA, the CA, in effect, modified or altered the
terms of said agreement and expanded its coverage to non-regular
employees who are not covered by the bargaining.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the payment of the 13 th month pay or mid-
year bonus to its employees regularized after 30 April 1998.

RULING:
Yes. All employees of PAL are entitled to the same benefit as they are within
the same collective bargaining unit and the entitlement to such benefit spills
over to even non-union members. It is a well-settled doctrine that the benefits
of a CBA extend to the laborers and employees in the collective bargaining
unit, including those who do not belong to the chosen bargaining labor
organization. Otherwise, it would be a clear case of discrimination. Hence, to
be entitled to the benefits under the CBA, the employees must be members of
the bargaining unit, but not necessarily of the labor organization designated
as the bargaining agent. At this point, the allegation of petitioner PAL that the
non-regular employees do not belong to the collective bargaining unit and are
thus not covered by the CBA is unjustified and unsubstantiated. It is apparent
to us that petitioner PAL excludes certain employees from the benefits of the
CBA only because they have not yet achieved regular status by the cut-off
date, 30 April 1988. There is no showing that the non-regular status of the
concerned employees by said cut-off date sufficiently distinguishes their
interests from those of the regular employees so as to exclude them from the
collective bargaining unit and the benefits of the CBA.
BURDEN OF PROOF

Seven Star Textile Company vs. Dy and Cahillo

GR No. 166846, January 24, 2007

FACTS:
The CA reiterated the rule that in termination cases, the burden of proving that
the dismissal of the employee is for a valid and authorized cause rests on the
employer. It explained that petitioner did not send any notice of dismissal to
respondents, let alone any notice requiring them to return to work. Thus, the
two-notice rule was not properly observed. The CA also found that petitioner
failed to prove its allegation that respondent Dy held a supervisory position,
since the policies that were supposed to be executed were not identified.
While respondent Dy supervised the packing, inventory and receiving of
garments, petitioner did not present any evidence to show that respondent Dy
had the authority to hire or fire employees of lower rank or that he had the
authority to make such recommendations. Not being a managerial employee,
respondent Dy was entitled to labor standard benefits under the Labor Code.

ISSUE:
Whether respondents were illegally dismissed.

RULING:
YES. The burden of proof to show that respondents dismissal from
employment was for a just cause falls on petitioner as employer. Petitioner
cannot discharge this burden by merely alleging that it did not dismiss
respondents; neither can it escape liability by claiming that respondents
abandoned their work. When there is no showing of a clear, valid and legal
cause for the termination of employment, the law considers it a case of illegal
dismissal. Petitioner desperately tries a convoluted, if not absurd, argument -
that it only raised abandonment as a defense and not as a ground for
dismissing respondents, and as such, is not bound to observe due process.
However, whether abandonment is alleged as a ground for dismissing an
employee or a mere defense, the employer has the legal duty to observe due
process.
 Godofredo Morales v. Skills International
GR No. 149285, August 30 2006

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent alleging
that he was illegally dismissed from service by his foreign employer, Al
Wallan. Respondent denied liability averring that it previously deployed
petitioner for work abroad in 1995 until he came home in July 1996. Later on,
petitioner met his new employer at respondent’s office. But, it claimed that Al
Wallan was not its accredited principal.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent can be held liable to petitioner.

RULING:
No. As earlier stated, in this case, the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court
of Appeals are unanimous in their factual conclusions that Wallan Al Wallan is
not an accredited principal of respondent Skills International and we sustain
said findings. Complainant failed to submit evidence to disprove the
allegations of the that they neither participated in the contract of employment
of complainant nor were they privy to the terms and conditions appearing
therein. The evidence submitted are not sufficient to hold respondent agency
liable. The copy of the receipt for the alleged placement fee was not issued by
the respondent agency but by the employer of complainant which is not its
accredited principal – another fact which was never controverted by the
complainant. This being the case, complainant has no cause of action against
herein respondent and therefore, his money claims could not prosper in the
instant case.
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

Pantoja vs. SCA Hygiene Products Corporation

GR No. 163554, April 23, 2010

FACTS:
In a Notice of Transfer, respondent informed petitioner of the former’s plan
and offered a position at Paper Mill No. 5 under the same terms and
conditions of employment in anticipation of the eventual and permanent
shutdown of Mill No. 5. The closure and concomitant reorganization is in line
with respondent’s decision to streamline and phase out the company’s
industrial paper manufacturing operations due to financial difficulties.
However, petitioner rejected the offer. Thus a notice of termination was served
on petitioner due to redundancy. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner was illegally dismissed.

RULING:
No. Respondent’s right of management prerogative was exercised in good
faith. Exercising its management prerogative and sound business judgment,
respondent decided to cut down on operational costs by shutting down one of its
paper mill. The determination of the need to phase out a particular department and
consequent reduction of personnel and reorganization as a labor and cost saving
device is a recognized management prerogative which the courts will not generally
interfere with.
CERTIORARI

Cabuyoc vs. Inter-Orient Navigation

GR No. 166649, November 24, 2006

FACTS:
The CA ratiocinated that because the enumeration of head injuries listed
under the category of HEAD includes only those mental conditions or
illnesses caused by external or physical force, it follows that mental disorders
which are not the direct consequence or effect of such external or physical
force were not intended by law to be compensable. And while the CA gives
judicial emphasis to the word traumatic, it did not bother to explain why
petitioners illness, classified as schizophrenia, should not be considered
traumatic and compensable. As it were, the foregoing observation of the
appellate court contradicts both the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
Thus, Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether the petition should be granted.

RULING:
Yes. To begin with, we must stress that herein respondents went to the CA
from the adverse decision of the NLRC thru the vehicle of certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Reviewing the records of this case, the Court is
convinced that at no time at all did the NLRC commit grave abuse of
discretion. Its affirmance of the Labor Arbiters award of disability benefits in
favor of the petitioner was based on the arbiters findings of facts which are
supported by substantial evidence. Such findings, therefore, cannot be made
the subject of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65. For it is
settled that in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the inquiry is confined to
issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Findings of facts of quasi-
judicial agencies, like the NLRC, which have acquired expertise in the specific
matters entrusted to their jurisdiction are accorded by this Court not only
respect but even finality if supported by substantial evidence.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT

Honda Cars Makati, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.

GR No 165359, July 14, 2008

FACTS:
Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner. Petitioner
accuses respondent of attempt to commit qualified theft in its premises. The
LA fount for respondent, and such was affirmed by the NLRC on appeal. On
its petition for certiorari to the CA, the CA dismissed the petition for petitioner’s
failure to append the complaint and decision of the LA.

ISSUE:
Whether CA abused its discretion.

RULING:
Yes. While the complaint, as well as the LA decision, is relevant to the petition,
as petitioner assailed the NLRC decision which affirmed the LA's decision
declaring private respondent's dismissal as illegal; petitioner's failure to
append them in its petition is not fatal, since their contents could be found in
petitioner's Notice and Memorandum on appeal filed with the NLRC.
Petitioner's memorandum tackled and disputed each factual finding of the LA
which was attached to the petition filed with the CA. The CA could determine
from this document, together with the other pleadings filed, whether the
Petition for Certiorari can make out a prima facie case.
 PICOP Resources, Inc. vs. Tañeca
GR No. 160828, August 9, 2010

FACTS:
Respondents were regular rank-and-file employees of PRI and bona
fide members of NAMAPRI-SPFL, which is the collective bargaining agent for
the rank-and-file employees of petitioner PRI. PRI has a CBA with NAMAPRI-
SPFL. The CBA contained the following union security clause. Atty. Fuentes
sent a letter to the management of PRI demanding the termination of
employees who allegedly campaigned for, supported and signed the Petition
for Certification Election of the Federation of FFW during the effectivity of the
CBA. NAMAPRI-SPFL considered said act of campaigning for and signing the
petition for certification election of FFW as an act of disloyalty and a valid
basis for termination for a cause in accordance with its Constitution and By-
Laws, and the terms and conditions of the CBA, specifically Article II, Sections
6.1 and 6.2 on Union Security Clause.

ISSUE:
Whether respondents were validly terminated.

RULING:
Yes. The mere signing of the authorization in support of the Petition for
Certification Election of FFW on March 19, 20 and 21, or before the “freedom
period,” is not sufficient ground to terminate the employment of respondents
inasmuch as the petition itself was actually filed during the freedom period.
Nothing in the records would show that respondents failed to maintain their
membership in good standing in the Union. Respondents did not resign or
withdraw their membership from the Union to which they belong.
Respondents continued to pay their union dues and never joined the FFW.
Administrative Due Process
Jackqui R. Moreno vs. San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila
G.R. No. 175283, March 28, 2008
FACTS:
Moreno insists that her right to security of tenure is a more significant
consideration in this case than the strict application of a school policy. She
laments that her dismissal from employment for failing to secure the
necessary permission is too harsh and undeserved a penalty.

ISSUE:
Whether Moreno was illegally dismissed.

RULING:
Yes. In termination cases, the burden of proof rests on the employer to show
that the dismissal is for just cause. When there is no showing of a clear, valid
and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the
matter a case of illegal dismissal and the burden is on the employer to prove
that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause. With regard to the
observance of procedural due process, neither of the parties has put the
same into issue. Indeed, based on the evidence on record, Moreno was
served with the required twin notices and was afforded the opportunity to be
heard. The first notice was embodied in the memorandum sent by her College
Dean, which required her to explain her unauthorized teaching assignments.
Moreno was also given the opportunity to explain her side when the special
grievance committee asked her a series of questions pertaining to their
investigation. In light of the foregoing, the Court holds that the dismissal of
petitioner Moreno failed to comply with the substantive aspect of due process.
Despite SSC-Rs observance of procedural due process, it nonetheless failed
to discharge its burden of proving the legality of Moreno’s termination from
employment. Thus, the imposed penalty of dismissal is hereby declared as
invalid.
Notice
WENSHA SPA CENTER, INC. v. LORETA T. YUNG
G.R. No. 185122, August 16, 2010

FACTS:
Complainant left the respondents premises when she was confronted with the
infractions imputed against her. Wenshas related that because of the gossips
perpetrated by Loreta, a certain Gonzalo resigned from Wensha. Because of
the incident, Gonzalo, whose father was a policeman, reportedly got angry
with complainant and of the management telling her friends at respondent
company that she would retaliate thus creating fear among those concerned.
As a result, Loreta was advised to take a paid leave of absence for one month
while Wensha conducted an investigation. According to Loreta, however, the
reason for her termination was her aura did not match that of Xu and the work
environment at Wensha.

ISSUE:
Whether Loreta was illegally dismissed.

RULING:
The records are bereft of evidence that Loreta was duly informed of the
charges against her and that she was given the opportunity to respond to
those charges prior to her dismissal. If there were indeed charges against
Loreta that Wensha had to investigate, then it should have informed her of
those charges and required her to explain her side. Wensha should also have
kept records of the investigation conducted while Loreta was on leave. The
law requires that two notices be given to an employee prior to a valid
termination: the first notice is to inform the employee of the charges against
her with a warning that she may be terminated from her employment and
giving her reasonable opportunity within which to explain her side, and the
second notice is the notice to the employee that upon due consideration of all
the circumstances, she is being terminated from her employment. This is a
requirement of due process and clearly, Loreta did not receive any of those
required notices.
Determination of Employer-Employee Relationship

Arsenio T. Mendiola vs Court of Appeals

G.R No. 159333,July 31, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioner argues that he is an industrial partner of the partnership he formed
with private respondent Pacfor, and also an employee of the partnership.
Petitioner insists that an industrial partner may at the same time be an
employee of the partnership, provided there is such an agreement, which, in
this case, is the "Side Agreement" and the "Revised Operating and Profit
Sharing Agreement." The Court of Appeals denied the appeal of petitioner,
holding that "the legal basis of the complaint is not employment but perhaps
partnership, co-ownership, or independent contractorship." Hence, the Labor
Code cannot apply.

ISSUE:
Whether there is employer-employee relationship

RULING:
Yes. Petitioner is an employee of private respondent Pacfor and that no
partnership or co-ownership exists between the parties. We hold that on the
basis of the evidence, an employer-employee relationship is present in the
case at bar. The elements to determine the existence of an employment
relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the
payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to
control the employee's conduct. The power of control refers merely to the
existence of the power, and not to the actual exercise thereof. The principal
consideration is whether the employer has the right to control the manner of
doing the work, and it is not the actual exercise of the right by interfering with
the work, but the right to control, which constitutes the test of the existence of
an employer-employee relationship. In the case at bar, private respondent
Pacfor, as employer, clearly possesses such right of control. Petitioner, as
private respondent Pacfor's resident agent in the Philippines, is, exactly so,
only an agent of the corporation, a representative of Pacfor, who transacts
business, and accepts service on its behalf.
Classification of Employment
Philips Semiconductors (Phils.), Inc., vs. Eloisa Fadriquela
G.R. No. 141717, April 14, 2004
FACTS:
The CA noted that the respondent had been performing activities that were
usually necessary and desirable to the petitioners business, and that she had
rendered thirteen months of service. It concluded that the respondent had
attained regular status and cannot, thus, be dismissed except for just cause
and only after due hearing. The appellate court further declared that the task
of the respondent was hardly specific or seasonal. The periods fixed in the
contracts of employment executed by the respondent were designed by the
petitioner to preclude the respondent from acquiring regular employment
status.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent is a regular employee.

RULING:
Yes. Article 280 of the Labor Code of the Philippines was emplaced in our
statute books to prevent the circumvention by unscrupulous employers of the
employees right to be secure in his tenure by indiscriminately and completely
ruling out all written and oral agreements inconsistent with the concept of
regular employment defined therein. The primary standard to determine a
regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular
activity performed by the employee in relation to the business or trade of the
employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in
the usual business or trade of the employer If the employee has been
performing the job for at least one year, even if the performance is not
continuous or merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated and continuing
need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not
indispensability of that activity to the business of the employer. Hence, the
employment is also considered regular, but only with respect to such activity
and while such activity exists. The law does not provide the qualification that
the employee must first be issued a regular appointment or must be declared
as such before he can acquire a regular employee status.
 PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, INC. vs LEON M. MAGTIBAY, JR. and
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER EMPLOYEES UNION (PDIEU) ,G.R. No.
164532,July 24, 2007

FACTS:
In claiming that it had adequately apprised Magtibay of the reasonable
standards against which his performance will be gauged for purposes of
permanent employment, PDI cited the one-on-one seminar between Magtibay
and its Personnel Assistant, Ms. Rachel Isip-Cuzio. PDI also pointed to
Magtibays direct superior, Benita del Rosario, who diligently briefed him about
his responsibilities in PDI.

ISSUE:
Whether probationary employees failure to follow an employers rules and
regulations cannot be deemed failure by said employee to meet the standards
of his employer.

RULING:
A probationary employee, as understood under the Labor Code, is one who is
on trial by an employer during which the employer determines whether or not
he is qualified for permanent employment. Within the limited legal six-month
probationary period, probationary employees are still entitled to security of
tenure. It is expressly provided in the afore-quoted Article 281 that a
probationary employee may be terminated only on two grounds: (a) for just
cause, or (b) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance
with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at
the time of his engagement. Due process of law for this second ground
consists of making the reasonable standards expected of the employee during
his probationary period known to him at the time of his probationary
employment. By the very nature of a probationary employment, the employee
knows from the very start that he will be under close observation and his
performance of his assigned duties and functions would be under continuous
scrutiny by his superiors. It is in apprising him of the standards against which
his performance shall be continuously assessed where due process regarding
the second ground lies, and not in notice and hearing as in the case of the
first ground.
Estoppel
Pamplona Plantation Company,vs Ramon Acosta, et al.
GR. No. 15319, December 6, 2006

FACTS:
The complainants claimed that they were regular rank and file employees of
the petitioner with different hiring periods, work designations, and salary rates.
Petitioner, however, denied this, alleging that some of the complainants are
seasonal employees, some are contractors, others were hired under the
pakyaw system, while the rest were hired by the Pamplona Plantation Leisure
Corporation, which has a separate and distinct entity from it. Petitioner
contests the CAs conclusion that the 22 respondents were its employees.
Petitioner insists that based on their affidavits, respondents admitted that they
were employees of the Pamplona Plantation Leisure Corporation, hence, their
complaint for illegal dismissal should have been directed against it.

ISSUE:
Whether respondents were employees of petitioner.

RULING:
Yes. Petitioner is estopped from denying that respondents worked for it. In the
first place, it never raised this defense in the proceedings before the Labor
Arbiter. Notably, the defense it raised pertained to the nature of respondents
employment, i.e., whether they are seasonal employees, contractors, or
worked under the pakyaw system. Thus, in its Position Paper, petitioner
alleged that some of the respondents are coconut filers and copra hookers or
sakadors; some are seasonal employees who worked as scoopers or
lugiteros; some are contractors; and some worked under the pakyaw system.
Evidence
LANDTEX INDUSTRIES vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 150278, August 9, 2007

FACTS:
Ayson received a letter from Landtex dated 16 March 1996 which stated that
Ayson committed acts contrary to company policies on 2 and 7 March 1996.
The letter required Ayson to explain in writing within 24 hours from receipt why
no disciplinary action should be taken against him for spreading damaging
rumors about the personal life of an unspecified person, and for having an
altercation with one of the companys owners when he was asked to submit an
ID picture.

ISSUE:
Whether the employer has the burden of proof.

RULING:

Yes. Unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations, and conclusions of the

employer are not sufficient to justify an employees dismissal. The employer
must prove by substantial evidence the facts and incidents upon which the
accusations are made. We ruled that the mere conduct of an investigation and
the statements of the companys security guard are not enough to establish
the validity of the charge of wrongdoing against the dismissed employees. It is
not enough for an employer who wishes to dismiss an employee to charge
him with wrongdoing. The validity of the charge must be established in a
manner consistent with due process. A suspicion or belief no matter how
sincerely felt cannot substitute for factual findings carefully established
through an orderly procedure. Landtex and William Go failed to observe due
process in terminating Ayson. They likewise failed to establish that Aysons
termination was for a just cause. Thus, we rule that Landtex and William Go
illegally dismissed Ayson.
Burden of Proof
NFD International Manning Agents, et al. vs. NLRC, et al.
G.R. No. 165389, October 17, 2008

FACTS:
On March 3, 1997, NFD filed before the Adjudication Office of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), a disciplinary complaint against the 21 seamen
alleging that they were guilty of mutiny, insubordination, desertion/attempting to desert
the vessel and conspiracy. Subsequently, in an Order dated October 12, 1999, the
POEA Adjudication Office dismissed the disciplinary complaint filed by NFD, ordering
that the names of the 21 seamen be removed from the POEA watchlist.

ISSUE:
Whether the employer has met the quantum of proof.

RULING:
No. The Court finds that in their pleadings, petitioners failed to cite any direct and
substantial evidence to support their claim that private respondents and their
companions were guilty of mutiny and conspiracy. The minimum requirement of due
process in termination proceedings, which must be complied with even with respect to
seamen on board a vessel, consists of notice to the employees intended to be
dismissed and the grant to them of an opportunity to present their own side on the
alleged offense or misconduct, which led to the management’s decision to terminate.
To meet the requirements of due process, the employer must furnish the worker
sought to be dismissed with two written notices before termination of employment can
be legally effected, i.e., (1) a notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts
or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice after due
hearing which informs the employee of the employers' decision to dismiss him.
Fundamental Evidentiary Rules
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Moreno Dumapis, et. al.
G.R. No. 163210, August 13, 2008

FACTS:
In the afternoon of September 15, 2000, at 2:00 p.m., Chambers, one of its foreign
consultants who was then acting as Assistant Resident Manager of the Mine, went
underground at the 850 level to conduct a routinary inspection of the workers and the
working conditions therein. When he went to the various stopes of the said level, he
was surprised to see that nobody was there. However, when he went to the 8k stope,
he noticed a group of workers sitting, sorting, and washing ores believed to be
highgrade. Realizing that highgrading was being committed, Chambers shouted.
Upon hearing his angry voice, the workers scampered in different directions of the
stope. Chambers then reported the incident to the security investigation office.

ISSUE:
Whether strict application of hearsay rule is uncalled for.

RULING:
No. Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law
and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of
Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by
analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. This Court has construed Article 221
of the Labor Code as permitting the NLRC or the LA to decide a case on the basis of
position papers and other documents submitted without necessarily resorting to
technical rules of evidence as observed in the regular courts of justice. Rules of
evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the
NLRC.
Bad Faith
IRENE MARTEL FRANCISCO v. NUMERIANO MALLEN, JR
G.R. No. 173169, September 22, 2010

FACTS:
On 30 January 1998 to 1 February 1998, respondent took an approved sick
leave. On 15 February 1998, respondent took a vacation leave. Thereafter, he
availed of his paternity leave. On 18 April 1998, respondent suffered from
tonsillitis, forcing him to take a three-day sick leave from 18 April 1998 to 20
April 1998. However, instead of his applied three-day sick leave, respondent
was given three months leave. Sometime in June 1998, respondent reported
back to work with a medical certificate stating he was fit to work but he was
refused work. On 22 June 1998, the DOLE-NCR endorsed respondents
complaint to the NLRC when it determined that the issue of constructive
dismissal was involved. On 23 July 1998, respondent filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal before the NLRC-NCR. On 3 August 1998, respondent again
attempted to return to work but was refused again.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is personally liable for the monetary awards granted in
favor of respondent arising from his alleged illegal termination.

RULING:
The Court held that A corporation is a juridical entity with legal personality
separate and distinct from those acting for and in its behalf and, in general,
from the people comprising it. The rule is that obligations incurred by the
corporation, acting through its directors, officers and employees, are its sole
liabilities. To hold a director or officer personally liable for corporate
obligations, two requisites must concur: (1) complainant must allege in the
complaint that the director or officer assented to patently unlawful acts of the
corporation, or that the officer was guilty of gross negligence or bad faith ; and
(2) complainant must clearly and convincingly prove such unlawful acts,
negligence or bad faith.
Finality of Factual Findings
PILAR ESPINA vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. No. 164582, March 28, 2007

FACTS:
In a conciliation proceeding before the DOLE NCMB-NCR Director Leopoldo
de Jesus, the duly authorized representative of M.Y. San Workers Union-
PTGWO and M.Y. San Sales Force Union-PTGWO was informed of the
closure or cessation of business operations of respondent M.Y. San as a
result of the intended sale of the business and all the assets of respondent
M.Y. San to respondent Monde and was notified of their termination, effective
31 January 2001.

ISSUE:
Whether there was a valid ground for petitioners’ dismissal is factual in nature.

RULING:
Yes.
We have always held that factual findings of the NLRC affirming those of the
Labor Arbiter, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within
their jurisdiction, when sufficiently supported by evidence on record, are
accorded respect if not finality, and are considered binding on this Court. As
long as their Decisions are devoid of any unfairness or arbitrariness in the
process of their deduction from the evidence proffered by the parties before
them, all that is left is the Courts stamp of finality by affirming the factual
findings made by the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter. We find no reason to
depart from this Rule.
Four-Fold Test in Determining Employer-Employee Relationship
PAL, Inc. vs. Enrique Ligan
G.R. No. 146408, February 29, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner argues that the law does not prohibit an employer from engaging an
independent contractor, like Synergy, which has substantial capital in carrying
on an independent business of contracting, to perform specific jobs. Petitioner
further argues that its contracting out to Synergy various services like
janitorial, aircraft cleaning, baggage-handling, etc., which are directly related
to its business, does not make respondents its employees. Petitioner
furthermore argues that none of the four (4) elements of an employer-
employee relationship between petitioner and respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether Synergy is a mere job-only contractor or a legitimate contractor.

RULING:
No. For labor-only contracting to exist, Section 5 of D.O. No. 18-02 which
requires any of two elements to be present is, for convenience, re-quoted: (i)
The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or
investment which relates to the job, work or service to be performed and the
employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor
are performing activities which are directly related to the main business of
the principal, OR (ii) The contractor does not exercise the right to control
over the performance of the work of the contractual employee. Even if only
one of the two elements is present then, there is labor-only contracting. The
control test element under the immediately-quoted paragraph (ii), which was
not present in the old Implementing Rules (Department Order No. 10, Series
of 1997), echoes the prevailing jurisprudential trend elevating such element as
a primary determinant of employer-employee relationship in job contracting
agreements. One who claims to be an independent contractor has to prove
that he contracted to do the work according to his own methods and without
being subject to the employer's control except only as to the results.
Respondents having performed tasks which are usually necessary and
desirable in the air transportation business of petitioner, they should be
deemed its regular employees and Synergy as a labor-only contractor
Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping
Flavio S. Suarez, Jr. vs. National Steel Corporation
G.R. No.150180, October 17, 2008

FACTS:
The petition was filed by private respondents involved in CA-G.R. No. 51734.
After the filing of the parties memoranda in this case, two groups of other
private respondents in CA-G.R. No. filed separate motions for intervention.
These two groups of intervenors are petitioners in G.R. No. 150072 which
involved a petition for review of the same November 29, 2000 Decision of the
CA, Fifteenth Division, subject of this petition. However, the intervenors’ own
petition was already denied due to various procedural infirmities by this Courts
Third Division in a Resolution dated November 14, 2001 and their motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied with finality in a Resolution dated March
4, 2002. In their motion for intervention, Maria Theresa Labastida, et al.
prayed that should this Court decide in favor to (sic) the petitioners the same
award should also apply to other complainants-appellants before the 5 th
Division, NLRC while Alexander Bongcawel, et al. prayed that they be allowed
to intervene in the proceedings herein and/or be included as petitioners in this
case.

ISSUE:
Whether respondents committed forum shopping.

RULING:
No. Forum shopping is the act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment
has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another and possibly favorable
opinion in another forum by appeal or a special civil action of certiorari. Even
assuming that separate actions have been filed by two different parties
involving essentially the same subject matter, no forum shopping is committed
where the parties did not resort to multiple judicial remedies. The case
pending before the CA, Twelfth Division, was the petition for review filed by
NASLU-FFW wherein respondent was not impleaded as a party. Respondents
failure to disclose the existence of such a case in its certification against
forum shopping, assuming respondent already had notice of the filing of the
said case at the time it filed its own CA petition, is not fatal to its petition
before the CA.
Grave Abuse of Discretion
Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. and/or Enrique B. Lagdameo vs. Delia
V. Panado,G.R. No. 167118 ,June 15, 2006

FACTS:
The CA observed that the records are bereft of evidence indicating that
respondent appropriated for herself company money. In fact, according to the
CA, it was never proven that respondent even got hold of the money paid by
the Obice family as Aguilar claimed that he handed over the same to Brequillo
and not to respondent. The CA also held that while it agreed with petitioner
MMPCI with regard to respondents negligence in the performance of her duty,
still, such negligence did not amount to a willful breach of trust which could
justify her dismissal from service under Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion.

RULING:
No. There is grave abuse of discretion when there is a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as to
amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. For a Petition for Certiorari to
prosper, the following requisites must be present: (1) the writ is directed
against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions: (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. As will be shown later, the NLRCs
Resolution dated 18 June 2002 finds no substantial support in the evidence
on record. It was only proper, therefore, for the Court of Appeals to give due
course to the Petition for Certiorari filed by respondent herein.
Job Contracting vs. Labor-Only Contracting
Purefoods Corporation vs. NLRC, et al.
G.R. No. 172241, November 20, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner claims that the other complainants in this case are not entitled to
the avails of the suit because they failed to verify the position paper and the
memorandum on appeal. Purefoods maintains that Neri and the complainants
are not employees of Purefoods, but of D.L. Admark, an independent job
contractor. Thus, it cannot be held liable for illegal dismissal. Finally, it claims
that Article 280 of the Labor Code is not applicable in a trilateral relationship
involving a principal, an independent job contractor, and the latters
employees.

ISSUE:
Whether DL Admark is an independent contractor.

RULING:
Yes. The agreements confirm that D.L. Admark is an independent contractor
which Purefoods had engaged to supply general promotion services, and not
mere manpower services, to it. The provisions expressly permit D.L. Admark
to handle and implement Purefoods project, and categorically state that there
shall be no employer-employee relationship between D.L. Admarks
employees and Purefoods. While it may be true that complainants were
required to submit regular reports and were introduced as Purefoods
merchandisers, these are not enough to establish Purefoods control over
them. Even if the report requirements are somehow considered as control
measures, they were imposed only to ensure the effectiveness of the
promotion services rendered by D.L. Admark. It would be a rare contract of
service that gives untrammelled freedom to the party hired and eschews any
intervention whatsoever in his performance of the engagement.
Jurisdiction
Jaguar Security & Investigation Agency vs. Rodolfo Sales, et. al.
G.R. No. 162420, April 22, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner insists that its cross-claim should have been ruled upon in the labor case as
the filing of a cross-claim is allowed under Section 3 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure
which provides for the suppletory application of the Rules of Court. Petitioner argues
that the claim arose out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the original action.

ISSUE:
Whether the LA has jurisdiction over the cross-claim of Petitioner.

RULING:
No. The RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case. It is well-
settled in law and jurisprudence that where no employer-employee relationship exists
between the parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved by reference to
the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the
Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction. In its complaint, private respondent is not
seeking any relief under the Labor Code but seeks payment of a sum of money and
damages on account of petitioners alleged breach of its obligation under their Guard
Service Contract. The action is within the realm of civil law hence jurisdiction over the
case belongs to the regular courts. While the resolution of the issue involves the
application of labor laws, reference to the labor code was only for the determination of
the solidary liability of the petitioner to the respondent where no employer-employee
relation exists. The jurisdiction of labor courts extends only to cases where an
employer-employee relationship exists. In the present case, there exists no employer-
employee relationship between petitioner and Delta Milling. In its cross-claim,
petitioner is not seeking any relief under the Labor Code but merely reimbursement of
the monetary benefits claims awarded and to be paid to the guard employees. There
is no labor dispute involved in the cross-claim against Delta Milling. Rather, the cross-
claim involves a civil dispute between petitioner and Delta Milling. Petitioner's cross-
claim is within the realm of civil law, and jurisdiction over it belongs to the regular
courts.
Law of the Case
Meralco Industrial Engineering Services Corporation vs. NLRC, et al.
G.R. 145402, March 14, 2008

FACTS:
In view of the enactment of RA No. 6727, the contract between the petitioner
and the private respondents was amended to increase the minimum daily
wage per employee. Petitioner then sent a letter to private respondents
informing them that effective at the close of business hours on 31 January
1990, petitioner was terminating Contract Order No. 166-84. Accordingly, at
the end of the business hours on 31 January 1990, the complainants were
pulled out from their work at the petitioners Rockwell Thermal Plant. Thus, on
27 February 1990, complainants amended their Complaint to include the
charge of illegal dismissal and to implead the petitioner as a party respondent
therein.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA went beyond the issues of the case as it modified the factual
findings of the Labor Arbiter which attained finality after it was affirmed by
NLRC and by the SC which can no longer be disturbed as it became the law
of the case.

RULING:
No. Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former
appeal. It is a term applied to an established rule that when an appellate
court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for
further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the
case upon subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties
in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on
general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.
Liberal Application of the Rules of Court
Woodridge School vs. Joanne C. Pebenito
G.R. No. 160240, October 29, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioner sent two separate Memoranda to respondents placing them under
preventive suspension for a period of thirty days. In the same memoranda,
respondents were required to explain in writing within 72 hours why they
should not be terminated from their employment. This prompted respondents
to commence an action for illegal suspension before the NLRC. On March 19,
2001, petitioner issued respondents their Notice of Termination, each to take
effect similarly on March 31, 2001. In addition, petitioner informed
respondents that they did not qualify as regular employees for their failure to
meet the performance standards made known to them at the start of their
probationary period. In the present Petition, they assert that the CA should
have outrightly dismissed the petition, because the verification and certificate
of non-forum shopping was signed by only one of the respondents, without
the authority of the other.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed serious error.

RULING:
No. Time and again, we have said that the lack of verification is merely a
formal defect that is neither jurisdictional nor fatal. In a proper case, the court
may order the correction of the pleading, or act on the unverified pleading, if
the attending circumstances are such that the rule may be dispensed with in
order to serve the ends of justice. It should be stressed that rules of procedure
were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the
dispensation of justice. Verification is mainly intended to secure the assurance
that the allegations in the petition are done in good faith or are true and
correct and not mere speculation. Strict compliance with the provisions
regarding the certificate of non-forum shopping merely underscores its
mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with
or its requirements completely disregarded. It does not, however, interdict
substantial compliance with its provisions under justifiable circumstances.

Management Prerogative
RURAL BANK OF CANTILAN, INC. vs ARJAY RONNEL H. JULVE
G.R. No. 169750, February 27, 2007

FACTS:
On June 18, 2001, petitioner, president of petitioner bank, issued a
memorandum addressed to all its branch managers informing them of the
abolition of the positions of planning and marketing officer and remedial
officer; that this was undertaken in accordance with the banks Personnel
Streamlining Program; and that the operations officer shall absorb the
functions of the abolished offices.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was
constructively dismissed from employment.

RULING:
No. Under the doctrine of management prerogative, every employer has the
inherent right to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all
aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods,
the time, place and manner of work, work supervision, transfer of employees,
lay-off of workers, and discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees. The only
limitations to the exercise of this prerogative are those imposed by labor laws
and the principles of equity and substantial justice. While the law imposes
many obligations upon the employer, nonetheless, it also protects the
employers’ right to expect from its employees not only good performance,
adequate work, and diligence, but also good conduct and loyalty. In fact, the
Labor Code does not excuse employees from complying with valid company
policies and reasonable regulations for their governance and guidance.
Right to Discipline Employees
Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, et al. vs. NLRC, et al.
G.R. No. 154503, February 29, 2008

FACTS:
Respondent was a Manager at Uniwide. Later, Uniwide issued a
Memorandum addressed to Kawada summarizing the various reported
incidents signifying unsatisfactory performance on the latter’s part which
include the commingling of good and damaged items, sale of a voluminous
quantity of damaged toys and ready-to-wear items at unreasonable prices,
and failure to submit inventory reports. On an earlier setting on the
investigation of her case, Kawada filed a sick leave, thus causing the
hearing/investigation to be rescheduled. Again, upon rescheduling, Kawada,
despite notice and warning that failure to appear would mean abandonment of
her work, did not appear, this time coming up with the excuse that she had
been already “constructively dismissed”. Uniwide terminated her work.

ISSUE:
Whether as a managerial employee, one may be dismissed by reason of
mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the
trust of his employer.

RULING:
Yes. With respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence as
ground for valid dismissal requires proof of involvement in the alleged events
in question, and that mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the
employer will not be sufficient. But, as regards a managerial employee, mere
existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust
of his employer would suffice for his dismissal. Hence, in the case of
managerial employees, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, it
being sufficient that there is some basis for such loss of confidence, such as
when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee
concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his
participation therein renders him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded
by his position.

Money Claims
Skippers United Pacific, Inc. and J.P. Samartzsis Maritime Enterprises Co.,
S.A., vs. Jerry Maguad and PorferioCeudadano, G.R. No. 166363,August 15,
2006

FACTS:
Petitioner Skippers United Pacific, Inc.s claim that it is exempted from liability
because it is no longer the manning agency responsible to the respondents
since Sea Power Shipping Enterprises, Inc. and Evic Human Resources
Management, Inc. had executed Affidavits of Assumption of Responsibility.

ISSUE:
Whether Petitioner is exempted from liability.

RULING:
No. Despite the execution of the Affidavits of Assumption of Responsibility by
other manning agencies, the petitioner cannot exempt itself from all the claims
and liabilities arising from the implementation of the contract executed
between the said petitioner and the respondents. It is very clear that the Rules
and Regulations of the POEA provide that the manning agency shall assume
joint and solidary liability with the employer. Joint and solidary liability is meant
to assure aggrieved workers of immediate and sufficient payment of what is
due them. Also, according to RA No. 8042, the agency which deployed the
employees whose employment contract were adjudged illegally terminated,
shall be jointly and solidarily liable with the principal for the money claims
awarded to the aforesaid employees. Therefore, petitioner as the manning
agency which hired the respondents is jointly and solidarily liable with its
principal and co-petitioner for the money claims of the respondents. The
Affidavits, though valid as between petitioner and the other two manning
agencies, are not enforceable as against the respondents because the latter
were not parties to those agreements. The provisions of the POEA Rules and
Regulations are clear enough that the manning agreement extends up to and
until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited
and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement.

Motion for Reconsideration

Crystal Shipping Inc., and/or A/S Stein Line Bergen vs. Deo P. Natividad,
G.R. No. 154798, October 20, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioners seasonably filed a motion for extension of time to file their petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On July 2, 2002, the appellate court
denied the motion on the ground that pressure of work is not a compelling
reason for the grant of an extension. Prior to the receipt of the appellate
courts denial, petitioners filed the petition. It was noted without action in view
of the July 2, 2002 Resolution. Subsequently, petitioners moved for
reconsideration of the resolution, but it was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether CA erred in denying the Motion for Extension of Time to file Petition
for Certiorari.

RULING:
Yes. On several occasions, we relaxed the rigid application of the rules of
procedure to afford the parties opportunity to fully ventilate the merits of their
cases. This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be
decided only after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and
defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should thus not serve as
basis of decisions. The reason for requiring a motion for reconsideration is to
make sure that administrative remedies have been exhausted before a case
is appealed to a higher court. It allows the adjudicator a second opportunity to
review the case, to grapple with the issues therein, and to decide anew a
question previously raised. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if
afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same correctly,
or correct any previous error committed in its forum. With the first motion for
reconsideration which the NLRC granted, there is no need for the parties to
file another motion for reconsideration before bringing up the matter to the
Court of Appeals. The NLRC was already given the opportunity to pass upon
and correct its mistakes. Moreover, it would be absurd to ask the NLRC to
keep on reversing itself.

Liberal Application of the Rules

Amelia R. Enriquez, et al. vs. BPI, et al.
G.R. No. 172812, February 12, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioners maintain that the Memorandum of Appeal filed by respondents
before the NLRC should have been dismissed due to a defect in its
verification. In particular, petitioners assert that the document was signed by
Puentevella alone, who did not show any board resolution authorizing him to
represent the corporation on appeal, in violation of Rule VI, Section 4 of the
NLRC Rules of Procedure. For their part, respondents argue that the board of
directors of a corporation, in vesting authority to another person or body, does
not necessarily have to be express and in writing at all times.

ISSUE:
Whether there was substantial compliance.

RULING:
Yes. We find that a liberal construction of the rules is in order. To serve the
interest of justice, compelling reason obtains to address respondents’
arguments and brush aside technicality. The Court frowns upon the practice of
dismissing cases purely on procedural grounds. Verification is simply intended
to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and
correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and
that the pleading is filed in good faith. x x x We see no circumvention of
these objectives by the vice presidents signing the verification and
certification without express authorization from any existing board
resolution. The rules of procedure are mere tools aimed at facilitating the
attainment of justice, rather than its frustration. A strict and rigid application of
the rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the primary
objective of the rules, that is, to enhance fair trials and expedite justice.
Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the
other party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for
the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.

Payslips
Emelita Leonardo, et. al. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 152459 ,June 15, 2006

FACTS:
BALTEL hired petitioners for various positions in the company. BALTEL and
DIGITEL entered into a management contract whereby DIGITEL was to
provide personnel, consultancy and technical expertise in the management,
administration, and operation of BALTELs telephone service in Balagtas,
Bulacan. BALTEL informed the NTC that it would cease to operate effective
28 February 1994 because it was no longer in a financial position to continue
its operations. On 17 February 1994, BALTEL assigned to DIGITEL its
buildings and other improvements on a parcel of land in Balagtas, Bulacan
covered by OCT No. O-7280 where BALTEL conducted its business
operations. Petitioners’ employment ceased.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners were employees of DIGITEL.

RULING:
No. To determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the
Court has to resolve who has the power to select the employees, who pays
for their wages, who has the power to dismiss them, and who exercises
control in the methods and the results by which the work is accomplished. The
most important element of an employer-employee relationship is the control
test. Under the control test, there is an employer-employee relationship when
the person for whom the services are performed reserves the right to control
not only the end achieved but also the manner and means used to achieve
that end. The fact that DIGITEL uses its payslips does not necessarily imply
that DIGITEL pays petitioners salaries. DIGITEL introduced its own financial
and accounting systems to BALTEL and it included the use of DIGITELs
payslips for accounting purposes. The management contract provides that
BALTEL shall reimburse DIGITEL for all expenses incurred in the performance
of its services and this includes reimbursement of whatever amount DIGITEL
paid or advanced to BALTELs employees.

Prescriptive Period for Money Claims

JANUARIA A. RIVERA v. UNITED LABORATORIES, INC.
G.R. No. 155639 April 22, 2009
FACTS:
The petition then proceeds to show that Rivera's claim for unpaid retirement
benefits differential should have been disposed of by the CA on the basis of
the records before it, considering that the appellate court made specific
factual findings culled from the parties' respective submissions in resolving the
prescription issue.

ISSUE:
Whether the money claim of Petitioner has prescribed.

RULING:
No. In labor cases, the special law on prescription is Article 291 of the Labor
Code which provides:
Article 291. Money Claims. – All money claims arising from employer-
employee relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed
within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise
they shall be barred forever.
The Labor Code has no specific provision on when a monetary claim accrues.
Thus, again the general law on prescription applies. Article 1150 of the Civil
Code provides that –
Article 1150. The time for prescription for all kinds of actions, when there is no
special provision which ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they
may be brought.
The day the action may be brought is the day a claim started as a legal
possibility. For the petitioner in the present case, this date came when she
learned that she was being paid on the basis of her December 31, 1988
retirement computations for the retirement that she claimed to have occurred
on December 31, 1992. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they
are filed with the court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the
creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the
debtor.

Protection to Labor
Remington Industrial Sales Corporation, vs Erlinda Castaneda
G.R. Nos. 169295-96, November 20, 2006
FACTS:
Remington denied that it dismissed Erlinda illegally. It posited that
Erlinda was a domestic helper, not a regular employee; Erlinda worked as
a cook and this job had nothing to do with Remington’s business of trading in
construction or hardware materials, steel plates and wire rope products. The
LA dismissed the complaint, finding that her work as a cook was not usually
necessary and desirable in the ordinary course of trade and business of the
petitioner corporation, and that the latter did not exercise control over her
functions. Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic
servant is assigned to certain aspects of the business of the employer that
such househelper or domestic servant may be considered as such an
employee.

ISSUE:
Whether Castaneda is a regular employee.

RULING:
Yes. The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within
the premises of the business of the employer and in relation to or in
connection with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its
officers and employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or
domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular employee of the
employer and NOT as a mere family househelper or domestic servant. Here,
the petitioner itself admits in its position paper that respondent worked at the
company premises and her duty was to cook and prepare its employees’
lunch and merienda. Clearly, the situs, as well as the nature of respondent’s
work as a cook, who caters not only to the needs of Mr. Tan and his family but
also to that of the petitioner’s employees, makes her fall squarely within the
definition of a regular employee under the doctrine enunciated in the Apex
Mining case. That she works within company premises, and that she does
not cater exclusively to the personal comfort of Mr. Tan and his family, is
reflective of the existence of the petitioner’s right of CONTROL over her
functions, which is the PRIMARY indicator of the existence of an employer-
employee.
Quitclaims
EDI-STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC., vs NATIONAL LABOR
ELATIONS COMMISSION, G.R. No. 145587, October 26, 2007

FACTS:
After being terminated by OAB, his employer in Saudi Arabia, Gran received
his final pay and executed a Declaration releasing OAB from any financial
obligation towards him. Upon arrival in the Philippines, he instituted a
complaint and the NLRC ruled that the dismissal was invalid. Respondents
were ordered jointly and severally liable to pay Gran for this salaries for the
unexpired portion of the contract.

ISSUE:
Whether the Declaration signed by Gran barred him from demanding benefits
to which he was entitled.

RULING:
No. The salary paid to Gran is unreasonably low which is lower than his
monthly salary. The declaration reveals that the payment is actually the
payment for his salary for the services he rendered to OAB as computer
specialist. The factual circumstances surrounding the execution of the
declaration would show that Gran did not voluntarily and freely execute the
document. He was just forced as he was told to leave the country and he
needed the money. Lastly, being a contract of adhesion, it should be
construed against the employer, OAB. The contract is contrary to public policy
as it leaves the weaker party, the employee, in a take-it-or-leave-it situation.
 FRANCIS RAY TALAM V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
G.R. No.175040, April 6, 2010

FACTS:
Respondent, TSFI's Office Manager, and Hermle, Chief Executive Officer,
verbally informed Talam that his services with the company would be
terminated thirty (30) days after September 27, 2002. Thereafter, TSFI notified
Talam in writing of the termination of his employment. The notice was dated
October 1, 2002, but received by Talam on October 4, 2002. On November 6,
2002, or after a month, Talam signed a Release and Quitclaim in
consideration and receipt of P89,954.00 in compensation and other benefits.

ISSUE:
Whether the quitclaim is valid.

RULING:
While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and quitclaims by employees
who are inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers
seeking to evade their legal responsibilities, a legitimate waiver representing a
voluntary settlement of a laborer's claims should be respected by the courts
as the law between the parties. In our view, Talam's release and quitclaim fall
into the category of legitimate waivers as defined by the Court.
Reinstatement
JUANITO A. GARCIA and ALBERTO J. DUMAGO vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES,
INC., G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009

FACTS:
The case stemmed from the administrative charge filed by Philippine Airlines
(PAL) against its employees-herein petitioners after they were allegedly
caught in the act of sniffing shabu when a team of company security
personnel and law enforcers raided the PAL Technical Center’s Toolroom
Section on July 24, 1995. After due notice, PAL dismissed petitioners for
transgressing the PAL Code of Discipline, prompting them to file a complaint
for illegal dismissal and damages which was resolved by the Labor Arbiter in
their favor, thus ordering PAL to, inter alia, immediately comply with the
reinstatement aspect of the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether reinstatement is proper.

RULING:
The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if the order of
reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the
part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed
employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. It
settles the view that the Labor Arbiter’s order of reinstatement is immediately
executory and the employer has to either re-admit them to work under the
same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or to reinstate
them in the payroll, and that failing to exercise the options in the alternative,
employer must pay the employee’s salaries. The Court sustains the appellate
court’s finding that the peculiar predicament of a corporate rehabilitation
rendered it impossible for respondent to exercise its option under the
circumstances. The test is two-fold: (1) there must be actual delay or the fact
that the order of reinstatement pending appeal was not executed prior to its
reversal; and (2) the delay must not be due to the employer’s unjustified act or
omission. If the delay is due to the employer’s unjustified refusal, the
employer may still be required to pay the salaries notwithstanding the reversal
of the Labor Arbiter’s decision

Resignation
RODELIA S. FUNGO, vs LOURDES SCHOOL OF MANDALUYONG, G.R.
No. 152531, July 27, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioner alleged therein that she was forced to resign and to accept her
separation pay; and that Fr. Remirez took advantage of her economic plight,
compelling her to submit her resignation letter within 30 minutes.
Respondents, denied the allegations in the complaint, contending that
petitioner voluntarily submitted her resignation letter. She even filed with the
school an application for benefits under the Retirement Plan of the CEAP
which was granted. Then she executed a waiver of her claims for benefits
from the school and the CEAP board of trustees. Respondents thus prayed
that the complaint be dismissed for being malicious and baseless.

ISSUE:
Whether Petitioner was constructively dismissed.

RULING:
Yes. Resignation is the voluntary act of employees who are compelled by
personal reasons to disassociate themselves from their employment. It must
be done with the intention of relinquishing an office, accompanied by the act
of abandonment. It would have been illogical therefore for the petitioner to
resign and then file a complaint for illegal dismissal. Resignation is
inconsistent with the filing of the complaint. We rule that petitioner was
constructively dismissed from her employment. There is constructive
dismissal if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an
employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it would
foreclose any choice by him except to forego her continued employment
RES JUDICATA

Lady Lydia Cornista-Domingo,et al. vs.NLRC

G.R. No. 156761,October 17, 2006

FACTS:
The union filed a petition charging the Bank with ULP. The LA dismissed the
cases for lack of merit, but was reversed by the NLRC on appeal. While the
resolution of the appeal was pending, the parties entered into Compromise
Agreement. A substantial majority of the members of the Union ratified the
compromise agreement, which agreement was also approved by the LA. A
number of the employees, in separate appeals to the NLRC, contested the
foregoing Order of the LA. They argued that the compromise agreement is
contrary to law and jurisprudence. The CA denied the appeal on the ground of
res judicata.

ISSUE:
Whether the compromise agreement constitutes res judicata.

RULING:
YES. Here, the petitioners and other employees legally separated were in fact
given termination or separation pay despite the staggering loss sustained by
the Bank. They were given a very good bargain in the compromise
agreement. They, therefore, have no reason to complain. Without the subject
compromise agreement, they would not have received any separation pay.
Records reveal that when the Bank offered termination or separation pay to its
remaining employees by way of a compromise agreement, a great majority
of them accepted the amount as justifiable settlement of their claims. Like
these quitclaims and releases, there are voluntary agreements which
represent reasonable settlements and are considered binding on the parties.
In law, a compromise agreement, once approved, has the effect of res
judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of
consent, forgery, fraud, misrepresentation and coercion none of which exists
in this case. The Compromise Agreement between the Union and the Bank
binds the minority Union members.

ABANDONMENT

Aboitiz Haulers, Inc., vs Monaorai Dimapatoi, et al.

G. R. No. 148619, September 19, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioner alleges that on 9 May 1996, the respondents left the warehouse
and did not report to work thereafter. As a result of the respondents’ sudden
abandonment of their work, there was no orderly and proper turnover of
papers and other company property in connection with the termination of the
Written Contract for Services. Respondents allege that on 15 May 1996,
petitioner dismissed them on the pretext that the Written Contract of Service
between Grigio and the petitioner had been terminated. To controvert the
allegations of the petitioner that respondents did not report for work starting 9
May 1996, the respondents presented a copy of the pertinent pages of the
logbook which served as their daily time record.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondents were lawfully dismissed due to abandonment

RULING:
Petitioner’s allegation that respondents abandoned their work is therefore
devoid of legal and factual bases. The Court has repeatedly held that
abandonment as a just and valid ground for dismissal requires the deliberate
and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. Mere
absence of failure to report for work, after notice to return, is not enough to
amount to such abandonment. For a valid finding of abandonment, two factors
must be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee
relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor being
manifested by some overt acts. In abandonment, there must be a
concurrence of the intention to abandon and some overt acts from which an
employee may be deduced as having no more intention to work. The burden
of proof to show that there was unjustified refusal to return to work rests on
the employer. Petitioner, however, failed to prove this.

DISTINCTION ON THE TREATMENT OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE ON

MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEE/S AND RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES

Felix M. Cruz, Jr., vs Court of Appeals,

G.R. NO. 148544, July 12, 2006
FACTS:
Cruz, an employee of private respondent Citytrust, held the confidential
position therein. Due to feedbacks of certain irregularities being committed in
the bidding and purchase of computers, an area within his responsibilities. A
special investigation was conducted and it was found out that indeed there
were unauthorized and unreported commissions and rebates given out by
one of its computer suppliers for purchases made by Citytrust. Citytrust sent a
show-cause memorandum to Cruz placing him under a 30-day preventive
suspension, and the Ad Hoc Committee heard the matter, and found Cruz
guilty of fraud, serious misconduct, gross dishonesty. Aggrieved, Cruz filed
before the LA an action for Illegal Dismissal.

ISSUE:
Whether there is illegal dismissal.

RULING:
YES. Petitioner was dismissed from employment on the ground, among
others, of loss of trust and confidence. Loss of trust and confidence, as a valid
ground for dismissal, must be substantiated by evidence. With respect to
rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence as ground for valid
dismissal requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in question, and
that mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not
be sufficient. But as regards a managerial employee, the mere existence of a
basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer
would suffice for his dismissal. Hence, in the case of managerial employees,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, it being sufficient that there is
some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the employer has
reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for
the purported misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein renders
him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. There is
no dispute that petitioner is a confidential employee.

Serious Misconduct
Lakpue Drug Inc., et. al. vs. Ma. Lourdes Belga
G.R. No. 166379, October 20, 2005

FACTS:
Tropical hired Belga as bookkeeper and subsequently promoted as assistant
cashier. Belga brought her daughter to the PGH for treatment. While at the
PGH, Belga who was pregnant experienced labor pains and gave birth on the
same day. Two days after giving birth, Tropical summoned Belga to report for
work but the latter replied that she could not comply because of her situation.
On March 30, 2001, Tropical sent Belga another memorandum ordering her to
report for work and also informing her of the clarificatory conference
scheduled on April 2, 2001. Belga requested that the conference be moved to
April 4, 2001 as her newborn was scheduled for check-up on April 2, 2001.
When Belga attended the clarificatory conference on April 4, 2001, she was
informed of her dismissal effective that day.

ISSUE:
Whether there was illegal dismissal

RULING:
Yes. We have defined misconduct as a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character,
and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. The misconduct to
be serious must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely
trivial and unimportant. Such misconduct, however serious, must,
nevertheless, be in connection with the employees work to constitute just
cause for his separation.
Belgas failure to formally inform Tropical of her pregnancy cannot be
considered as grave misconduct directly connected to her work as to
constitute just cause for her separation.
Employee’s Absence
ALBERTO NAVARRO vs COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS
G.R. No. 162583, June 8, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioner did not report to work because of heavy rains which flooded the
entire barangay where he resided. In a Memorandum, he was required to
explain in writing within 24 hours why no disciplinary action should be
imposed on him for his tenth absence without permission. In response,
petitioner submitted a written explanation accompanied by a Certification from
his Barangay Captain, stating that his absence was due to heavy rains and
subsequent flooding that hit his barangay. Despite his compliance and
explanation, petitioner was dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether there was illegal dismissal.

RULING:
Yes. His absence was due to a fortuitous event outside of petitioner’s control.
Petitioner had no wrongful, perverse or even negligent attitude, intended to
defy the order of his employer when he absented himself. He did so because
heavy rains flooded their residential area which was along the railroad. A
worker cannot be reasonably expected to anticipate times of sickness nor
emergency. Hence, to require prior notice of such times would be absurd. He
can only give proper notice after the occurrence of the event which is what
petitioner did in this case.
Submission of Medical Certificate
ROQUE S. DUTERTE vs KINGSWOOD TRADING CO., INC., FILEMON LIM
and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION G.R. No. 160325,
October 4, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioner had his first heart attack and was confined for two weeks at the
PHC. This was confirmed by KTC which admitted that petitioner was declared
on sick leave with corresponding notification. A month later, petitioner returned
to work armed with a medical certificate signed by his attending physician at
the PHC, attesting to petitioner’s fitness to work. However, said certificate was
not honored by the respondents who refused to allow petitioner to work.

ISSUE:
Whether there was illegal dismissal.

RULING:

Yes. The law is unequivocal: the employer, before it can legally dismiss its
employee on the ground of disease, must adduce a certification from a
competent public authority that the disease of which its employee is suffering
is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of
six months even with proper treatment. Here, the record does not contain the
required certification. And when the respondents asked the petitioner to look
for another job because he was unfit to work, such unilateral declaration, even
if backed up by the findings of its company doctors, did not meet the quantum
requirement mandated by the law, i.e., there must be a certification by
a competent public authority.
Just Causes – Abandonment

VICTORY LINER, INC vs PABLO M. RACE

G.R. No. 164820, March 28, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioner insisted that respondent had already abandoned his work and
ceased to be its employee since November 1994; that the alleged "pay slip"
for the period August 1-15, 1998 was not actually a pay slip but a mere cash
advance/monetary aid extended to the respondent as the large amount of
₱65,000.00 stated therein was clearly inconsistent and disproportionate to the
respondent’s low salary of ₱192.00 a day; that the petitioner merely
accommodated the respondent as its former employee when the latter
consulted the petitioner’s physician on 28 October 1996 and 21 July 1997;
that the respondent’s letter dated 18 March 1996 to the petitioner’s Vice-
President was only an application for the position of dispatcher or conductor
and that such application was not granted; and that the foregoing
circumstances cannot be considered as an indication of employer-employee
relationship between the petitioner and respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether there was illegal dismissal.

RULING:
Yes. As to the alleged abandonment of work by the respondent on 10
November 1994, it should be emphasized that two factors must be present in
order to constitute an abandonment: (a) the failure to report for work or
absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever
employer-employee relationship. The second factor is the more determinative
factor and is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the
employee has no more intention to work. The intent to discontinue the
employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and
unjustified. Mere absence from work does not imply abandonment.
Dishonesty
ARLYN D. BAGO vs NLRC
G.R. No. 170001, April 4, 2007

FACTS:
Arlyn raises in her petition the lack of "further" investigation "despite her
insistent denial of the charge," and the lack of opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses whose statements were submitted by Celia to prove her charge
of rumor-mongering. Furthermore, Arlyn complains that after the NLRC
reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision, respondents "unilaterally discontinued
her reinstatement pending appeal contrary to prevailing laws and
jurisprudence."

ISSUE:
Whether Arlyn was illegally dismissed.

RULING:
No. employers are allowed a wide latitude of discretion in terminating the
employment of managerial personnel or those who, while not of similar rank,
perform functions which by their nature require the employer’s full trust and
confidence. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. It is sufficient that
there is some basis for loss of confidence, such as when the employer has
reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for
the purported misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein renders
him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position. This must
be distinguished from the case of ordinary rank-and-file employees, whose
termination on the basis of these same grounds requires a higher proof of
involvement in the events in question; mere uncorroborated assertions and
accusations by the employer will not suffice.
Constructive Dismissal
MERCK SHARP AND DOHME (PHILIPPINES) v. JONAR P. ROBLES, et al.,
G.R. No. 176506, November 25, 2009

FACTS:
MSD is adamant that the CA erred in not characterizing the work
reassignment of respondent Cristobal as falling within the ambit of
management prerogative and, thus, beyond challenge. In addition, MSD
postulates that the work reassignment of medical representatives, such as
respondent Cristobal, is not only dictated by the nature of the work, but is,
more importantly, written in the employment contract.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent Cristobal was constructively dismissed by petitioner
MSD.

RULING:
Yes. Time and again we have ruled that in constructive dismissal cases, the
employer has the burden of proving that the transfer of an employee is for just
and valid grounds, such as genuine business necessity. The employer must
demonstrate that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial
to the employee and that the transfer does not involve a demotion in rank or a
diminution of salary and other benefits. If the employer fails to overcome this
burden of proof, the employees transfer is tantamount to unlawful constructive
dismissal.
 Arsenio T. Mendiola vs CA
G.R. No. 159333,July 31, 2006

FACTS:
Petitioner argues that he is an industrial partner of the partnership he formed
with private respondent Pacfor, and also an employee of the partnership.
Petitioner insists that an industrial partner may at the same time be an
employee of the partnership, provided there is such an agreement, which, in
this case, is the "Side Agreement" and the "Revised Operating and Profit
Sharing Agreement." The Court of Appeals denied the appeal of petitioner,
holding that "the legal basis of the complaint is not employment but perhaps
partnership, co-ownership, or independent contractorship." Hence, the Labor
Code cannot apply.

ISSUE:
Whether Petitioner was constructively dismissed.

RULING:
Yes. Although there is no reduction of the salary of petitioner, constructive
dismissal is still present because continued employment of petitioner is
rendered, at the very least, unreasonable. There is an act of clear
discrimination, insensibility or disdain by the employer that continued
employment may become so unbearable on the part of the employee so as to
foreclose any choice on his part except to resign from such employment.
Illegal Dismissal
ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER, INC v. ESTRELITO NOTARIO
G.R. No. 152166, October 20, 2010

FACTS:
Petitioners allege that, by not focusing the CCTV cameras on the different
areas of the hospital, respondent committed gross negligence which warrants
his dismissal. According to them, there was no need to prove that the act
done was habitual, as the occurrence of the theft exposed them to possible
law suit and, additionally, there might be a repetition of a similar incident in the
future if respondent would remain in their employ. Respondent maintains that
he was not negligent in the discharge of his duties. He said that there was no
actual loss to petitioner hospital as no complaint or legal action was taken
against them and that the supposed complainant, Tibon, did not even report
the matter to the police authorities.

Issue:
Whether Notario was illegally dismissed.

RULING:
Yes. To effectuate a valid dismissal from employment by the employer, the
Labor Code has set twin requirements, namely: (1) the dismissal must be for
any of the causes provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code; and (2) the
employee must be given an opportunity to be heard and defend himself. This
first requisite is referred to as the substantive aspect, while the second is
deemed as the procedural aspect. An employer can terminate the services of
an employee only for valid and just causes which must be supported by clear
and convincing evidence. The employer has the burden of proving that the
dismissal was indeed for a valid and just cause.
Procedural Due Process

Romeo C. Cadiz, CarlitoBongkingki and Prisco Gloria IV vs. Court of Appeals

and Philippine Commercial International Bank (Now Equitable PCIBank)
G. R. No. 153784, October 25, 2005

FACTS:
Cadiz et al ere employed as signature verifier, bookkeeper, and foreign
currency denomination clerk/bookkeeper-reliever, respectively, in respondent
bank. Alqueza filed a complaint with PCIB for the alleged non-receipt of a
$600.00 emand draft drawn against it which was purchased by her husband
from Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Cadiz et al verbally
admitted their participation in a scheme to divert funds intended for other
accounts using the Savings Account of Alfiscar. The bank after notices and
hearing dismissed petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether Petitioners were illegally dismissed.

RULING:
No. Records show that respondent bank complied with the two-notice rule
prescribed in Article 277(b) of the Labor Code. The bank had reason to
conclude that the imminence of the threat posed by the employees was not as
vital as it would have been had the dubious account still been open. we affirm
the conclusion that petitioners were dismissed for just cause. Loss of trust and
confidence is one of the just causes for termination by employer under Article
282 of the Labor Code. The breach of trust must be willful, meaning it must be
done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse.
Ideally, loss of confidence applies only to cases involving employees
occupying positions of trust and confidence or to those situations where the
employee is routinely charged with the care and custody of the employers
money or property. Utmost trust and confidence are deemed to have been
reposed on petitioners by virtue of the nature of their work.
Effect of non-compliance to procedural due process
DAP Corporation, Felix Pineda, President, and Densil Pineda,
General Manager, vs. CA and Maureen Marcial, G.R. No.
165811,December 14, 2005

FACTS:
DAP claims that it notified its employees of the termination of their
employments by reason of redundancy. On July 28, 2001, DAP paid their
wages and asked them to sign the payslips. It likewise informed them that
they would be paid their separation pay in installments because of liquidity
problems. The checks representing the separation pay were issued to the
employees.

ISSUE:
Whether there was lack of due process.

RULING:
Yes. Thus, we have held that the employer must comply with the following
requisites to ensure the validity of the redundancy program: 1) a written notice
served on both the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; 2)
payment of separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay or at least
one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher; 3) good faith in
abolishing the redundant positions; and 4) fair and reasonable criteria in
ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant and accordingly
abolished. The employees actual knowledge of the termination of DAPs
distributorship agreement with IDP is not sufficient to replace the formal and
written notice required by the law. In the written notice, the employees are
informed of the specific date of the termination, at least a month prior to the
date of effectivity, to give them sufficient time to make necessary
arrangements. In this case, notwithstanding the employees knowledge of the
cancellation of the distributorship agreement, they remained uncertain about
the status of their employment when DAP failed to formally inform them about
the redundancy.
Retirement
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and AIDA M. QUIJANO v.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. G.R. No. 123294, October 20, 2010

FACTS:
An investigating committee formally charged Quijano as Manager-ASAD in
connection with the processing and payment of commission claims to Goldair
wherein PAL overpaid commissions to the latter amounting to several million
Australian dollars during the period 1984-1987. Specifically, Quijano was
charged as Manager-ASAD for failure on the job and gross negligence
resulting in loss of trust and confidence. The LA dismissed the complaint. But
the NLRC reversed the LA and ordered PAL to pay retirement pay.

ISSUE:
Whether the NLRC erred in granting retirement pay.

RULING:
Yes. We do not agree with the NLRC that private respondents
separation pay should be awarded in accordance with PALs Special
Retirement & Separation Program dated February 15, 1988 plus ten percent
(10%) of the total amount by way of attorneys fees. rivate respondent was not
separated from petitioners employ due to mandatory or optional retirement
but, rather, by termination of employment for a just cause. Thus, any
retirement pay provided by PALs Special Retirement & Separation Program
dated February 15, 1988 or, in the absence or legal inadequacy thereof, by
Article 287 of the Labor Code does not operate nor can be made to operate
for the benefit of private respondent. Even private respondents assertion that,
at the time of her lawful dismissal, she was already qualified for retirement
does not aid her case because the fact remains that private respondent was
already terminated for cause thereby rendering nugatory any entitlement to
mandatory or optional retirement pay that she might have previously
possessed.
Rule on Technicality
Jaime H. Ballao vs Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 162342,October 11, 2006

FACTS:
After investigation, Chinabank found petitioner Ballao guilty of (1) serious
misconduct; (2) fraud or willful breach of trust reposed in him by Chinabank;
(3) stealing or attempting to steal from the bank or from others within the
premises; and (4) falsifying bank records or documents and tampering bank
equipment or facilities for the purpose of defrauding the bank or committing a
dishonest act. Chinabank terminated Ballao’s services. Seasonably, petitioner
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The LA found the termination illegal, but
was reversed by the NLRC on appeal. Ballao filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but was denied for failure to file within the reglementary
period.

ISSUE:
Whether the Motion was properly denied.

RULING:
No. Time and again, we have said the lack of verification is merely a formal
defect that is neither jurisdictional nor fatal. In a proper case, the court may
order the correction of the pleading or act on the unverified pleading, if the
attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rule may be
dispensed with in order to serve the ends of justice. It should be stressed that
rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in
the dispensation of justice. Courts cannot be enslaved by technical rules,
shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as
they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat vis-à-vis substantive rights, and not the other
way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather
than promote justice, it is always within the Court’s power to suspend the
rules or except a particular case from its operation. This is more so in labor
cases where social justice should be emphasized. In light of the
circumstances of this case, we find that the lack of verification may be
excused, so that the case could be decided on its merits.
Temporary off–detail
EAGLE STAR SECURITY SERVICES, INC. v. BONIFACIO L. MIRANDO
G.R. No. 179512, July 30, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner reiterates that it did not dismiss respondent who, so it claims,
voluntarily separated himself from the service by refusing to report for work.
Petitioner argues that respondent was on temporary off-detail, the period of
time a security guard is made to wait until he is transferred or assigned to a
new post or client. And since petitioners business is primarily dependent on
contracts entered into with third parties, the temporary off-detail of respondent
does not amount to dismissal as long as the period does not exceed 6
months.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent was illegally dismissed.

RULING:
Yes. Petitioners citation of Article 286 of the Labor Code is misplaced. We
stress that Article 286 applies only when there is a bonafide suspension of the
employers operation of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding
six (6) months. In such a case, there is no termination of employment but only
a temporary displacement of employees, albeit the displacement should not
exceed six (6) months. The paramount consideration should be the dire
exigency of the business of the employer that compels it to put some of its
employees temporarily out of work. In security services, the temporary off-
detail of guards takes place when the security agency’s clients decide not to
renew their contracts with the security agency, resulting in a situation where
the available posts under its existing contracts are less than the number of
guards in its roster. In the present case, there is no showing that there was
lack of available posts at petitioners clients or that there was a request from
the client-bank, where respondent was last posted and which continued to
hire petitioners services, to replace respondent with another. Petitioner
suddenly prevented him from reporting on his tour of duty at the bank
on December 15, 2001 and had not thereafter asked him to report for duty.
Security of Tenure of Probationary Employee
SHS PERFORATED MATERIALS, INC., WINFRIED HARTMANNSHENN,
and HINRICH JOHANN SCHUMACHER v. MANUEL F. DIAZ, G.R. No.
185814, October 13, 2010

FACTS:
On November 29, 2005, Hartmannshenn instructed Taguiang not to release
respondents salary. Later that afternoon, respondent called and inquired
about his salary. Taguiang informed him that it was being withheld and that he
had to immediately communicate with Hartmannshenn. Again, respondent
denied having received such directive. The next day, on November 30, 2005,
respondent served on SHS a demand letter and a resignation letter.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent was constructively dismissed.

RULING:
It is worthy to note that in his resignation letter, respondent cited
petitioners illegal and unfair labor practice as his cause for resignation. As
correctly noted by the CA, respondent lost no time in submitting his
resignation letter and eventually filing a complaint for illegal dismissal just a
few days after his salary was withheld. These circumstances are inconsistent
with voluntary resignation and bolster the finding of constructive dismissal.
Respondent was constructively dismissed and, therefore, illegally
dismissed. Although respondent was a probationary employee, he was still
entitled to security of tenure. Section 3 (2) Article 13 of the Constitution
guarantees the right of all workers to security of tenure. In using the
expression all workers, the Constitution puts no distinction between a
probationary and a permanent or regular employee. This means that
probationary employees cannot be dismissed except for cause or for failure to
qualify as regular employees.
 CENTRAL PANGASINAN ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., vs NLRC, G.R.
No. 163561, July 24, 2007

FACTS:
Upon investigation, it appeared that Cagampan knowingly entered into an
unauthorized contract for the installation of a transformer, and that he was not
authorized to accept payment. Hence, Cagampan was found guilty of violating
CENPELCOs Code of Ethics and Discipline, namely: (1) unauthorized
acceptance of payments for new connection; (2) dishonest or unauthorized
activity whether for personal gain or not; and (3) defrauding others by using
the name of the company. He was dismissed from service.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent is entitled to separation pay.

RULING:
No. When the employee is dismissed for any of the just causes he shall not
be entitled to termination pay without prejudice to applicable collective
bargaining agreement or voluntary employer policy or practice. Separation
pay shall be allowed only in those instances where the employee is validly
dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his
moral character. Separation pay in such case is granted to stand as a
measure of social justice. If the cause for the termination of employment
cannot be considered as one of mere inefficiency or incompetence but an act
that constitutes an utter disregard for the interest of the employer or a
palpable breach of trust in him, the grant by the Court of separation benefits is
hardly justifiable. In this case, private respondent was found by the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC to have been validly dismissed for violations of company
rules, and certain acts tantamount to serious misconduct. Such findings, if
supported by substantial evidence, are accorded respect and even finality by
this Court
Separation Pay
AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES CORPORATION, et. al., v.
JUEBER P. SIAZAR G.R. No. 177970, August 25, 2010.

FACTS:
The company insists that the Court should reinstate the original CA decision,
given the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that it had not dismissed
Siazar.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent was illegally terminated.

RULING:
Yes. From an examination of the record, the Court has ascertained that the
evidence supports the CA’s finding that the company dismissed Siazar from
work. The company did not adduce any evidence to prove that Siazar’s
dismissal had been for a just or authorized cause as in fact it had been its
consistent stand that it did not terminate him and that he quit on his own. But
given that the company dismissed Siazar and that such dismissal had
remained unexplained, there can be no other conclusion but that his dismissal
was illegal. The Court has held that, under Article 279 of the Labor Code,
separation pay may be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee in lieu of
reinstatement when continued employment is no longer possible where, as in
this case, the continued relationship between the employer and the employee
is no longer viable due to strained relations between them and reinstatement
appears no longer practical due to the length of time that had since passed.
Social Justice
MANILA JOCKEY CLUB EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION-PTGWO, vs MANILA
JOCKEY CLUB, INC.,G.R. No. 167760,March 7, 2007

FACTS:
In the CBA, the parties agreed to a 7-hour work schedule from 9:00
a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on a work week of
Monday to Saturday. The CBA likewise reserved in respondent certain
management prerogatives, including the determination of the work schedule.
The NCMBs panel of voluntary arbitrators, in a decision dated October 18,
2001, upheld respondent's prerogative to change the work schedule of
regular monthly-paid employees under Section 2, Article XI, of the
CBA. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the panel denied the motion.
Dissatisfied, petitioner then appealed the panels decision to the CA in CA-
G.R. SP No. 69240. In the herein assailed decision of December 17, 2004,
the CA upheld that of the panel and denied petitioners subsequent motion for
reconsideration via its equally challenged resolution of April 4, 2005.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent violated the principle of non-diminution of pay.

RULING:
No. Respondent, as employer, cites the change in the program of horse
races as reason for the adjustment of the employees work schedule. It
rationalizes that when the CBA was signed, the horse races started at 10:00
a.m. While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the
protection of the working class, it should not be presumed that every labor
dispute will be automatically decided in favor of labor. The partiality for labor
has not in any way diminished our belief that justice in every case is for the
deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established facts and the
applicable law and doctrine. When the races were moved to 2:00 p.m., there
was no other choice for management but to change the employees' work
schedule as there was no work to be done in the morning. Evidently, the
adjustment in the work schedule of the employees is justified.
Distinction between union members & union officers
SANTA ROSA COCA-COLA PLANT EMPLOYEES UNION vs COCA-COLA
BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., G.R. Nos. 164302-03, January 24, 2007

FACTS:
Upon the expiration of the CBA, the Union informed the Company of its desire
to renegotiate its terms. The CBA meetings commenced on July 26, 1999,
where the Union and the Company discussed the ground rules of the
negotiations. The Union insisted that representatives from the Alyansa ng
mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola be allowed to sit down as observers in the
CBA meetings. The Union officers and members also insisted that their wages
be based on their work shift rates. For its part, the Company was of the view
that the members of the Alyansa were not members of the bargaining unit.
The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of employees of the Company in its
various plants; and is not a registered labor organization. Thus, an impasse
ensued. The Union served a Notice of Strike.

ISSUE:
Whether the strike is illegal.

RULING:
Yes. For a strike to be valid, the following procedural requisites provided by
Art 263 of the Labor Code must be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with
the DOLE 30 days before the intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of
unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in
a meeting called for that purpose, (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results
of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike. These
requirements are mandatory and the failure of a union to comply therewith
renders the strike illegal. It is clear in this case that petitioners totally ignored
the statutory requirements and embarked on their illegal strike.
Lustria Decision
LOLITA A. LOPEZ, ET. al., vs. QUEZON CITY SPORTS CLUB, INC.
G.R. No. 164032, January 19, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioners insist that the requirement for perfecting an appeal before the
NLRC had not been met because under the Lustria decision, QCSC was
ordered to pay the sum of P25,004,442.22 but it merely posted P4,000,000.00
and filed a motion for reduction of the bond.

ISSUE:
Whether the simultaneous filing of the motion to reduce the appeal bond and
posting of the reduced amount of bond within the reglementary period for
appeal constitute substantial compliance with Article 223 of the Labor Code.

RULING:
This rule was given a liberal interpretation by this Court in Nicol v. Footjoy
Industrial Corporation. This Court ruled that the bond requirement on appeals
involving monetary awards had been and could be relaxed in meritorious
cases such as: (1) there was substantial compliance with the Rules; (2) the
surrounding facts and circumstances constitute meritorious grounds to reduce
the bond; (3) a liberal interpretation of the requirement of an appeal bond
would serve the desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits; or
(4) the appellants, at the very least, exhibited their willingness and/or good
faith by posting a partial bond during the reglementary period. Applying these
jurisprudential guidelines, we find and hold that the NLRC did not err in
reducing the amount of the appeal bond and considering the appeal as having
been filed within the reglementary period.

Retrenchment
Flight Attendants and Stewards Asso. of the Phils. vs, PAL, Inc., et. al.
G.R. No. 178083, July 22, 2008
FACTS:
Prior to the full implementation of the assailed retrenchment program, FASAP
and PAL conducted a series of consultations and meetings and explored all
possibilities of cushioning the impact of the impending reduction in cabin crew
personnel. However, the parties failed to agree on how the scheme would be
implemented. Thus PAL unilaterally resolved to utilize the criteria set forth in
Section 112 of the PAL-FASAP CBA in retrenching cabin crew personnel: that
is, that retrenchment shall be based on the individual employees efficiency
rating and seniority.

ISSUE:
Whether the retrenchment scheme was justified.

RULING:
No. While it is true that the exercise of this right is a prerogative of
management, there must be faithful compliance with substantive and
procedural requirements of the law and jurisprudence, for retrenchment
strikes at the very heart of the workers employment, the lifeblood upon which
he and his family owe their survival. Retrenchment is only a measure of last
resort, when other less drastic means have been tried and found to be
inadequate. The burden clearly falls upon the employer to prove economic or
business losses with sufficient supporting evidence. Its failure to prove these
reverses or losses necessarily means that the employees dismissal was not
justified. Any claim of actual or potential business losses must satisfy certain
established standards, all of which must concur, before any reduction of
personnel becomes legal.

Abandonment
Padilla Machine Shop, et al. vs. Rifuno A. Javilgas
G.R. No. 175960, February 19, 2008

FACTS:
Javilgas filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of 13 th month
pay, separation pay and non-remittance of SSS contributions against
petitioners Padilla Machine Shop, Rodolfo Padilla and Leonardo Padilla. He
alleged that he was hired by Padilla. He found that Petitioners made regular
deductions for his SSS contributions, but sometime in 2002, he found out that
his employer was not remitting the contributions to the SSS; as a result, he
was not able to avail of the benefits thereof when his wife gave birth. When he
complained about the failure of his employer to remit his SSS contributions,
the latter transferred him to the Novaliches branch office.

ISSUE:
Whether Javilgas was illegally dismissed.

RULING:
Yes. In illegal dismissal cases, the burden of proof is on the employer to show
that the employee was dismissed for a valid and just cause. Petitioners have
failed to discharge themselves of the burden. Petitioner Rodolfo, however, did
not elaborate or show proof of the claimed abandonment. Instead, he
concluded that Javilgas abandoned his corresponding duties and
responsibilities when he established and created his own machine shop outfit.
For abandonment to exist, it is essential (a) that the employee must have
failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable
reason; and, (b) that there must have been a clear intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt acts. The
establishment of his own shop is not enough proof that Javilgas intended to
sever his relationship with his employer.

Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction Co. Ltd., et. al. vs. FelicitoIbañez,
et. al. G.R. No. 170181. June 26, 2008

FACTS:
The Labor Arbiter found merit in the respondents complaint and declared that
they were regular employees who had been dismissed without just and valid
causes and without due process. It ruled that HANJINs allegation that
respondents were project employees was negated by its failure to present
proof thereof. It also noted that a termination report should be presented after
the completion of every project or a phase thereof and not just the completion
of one of these projects. The Labor Arbiter further construed the number of
years that respondents rendered their services for HANJIN as an indication
that respondents were regular, not project, employees. The NLRC reversed
the LA’s ruling.

ISSUE:
Whether respondents were illegally dismissed.

RULING:
Yes. In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of proving with
clear, accurate, consistent and convincing evidence that a dismissal was
valid. Records failed to show that HANJIN afforded respondents, as regular
employees, due process prior to their dismissal, through the twin
requirements of notice and hearing. Respondents were not served notices
informing them of the particular acts for which their dismissal was sought. Nor
were they required to give their side regarding the charges made against
them. Certainly, the respondents dismissal was not carried out in accordance
with law and was, therefore, illegal.

U-Bix Corporation, et al. vs. Valerie Anne H. Hollero

G.R. No. 177647, October 31, 2008
FACTS:
Respondent who was made to understand that she was the contact person of
U-Bix and the head of the implementation team, was furnished a copy of her
job description. From December 18-19, 1996, respondent suffered from loose
bowel movement, preventing her from reporting for work. She, however, failed
to notify the company of her absence. Malfitano advised her that he was
recommending the termination of her services and asked her to, as she did,
turn over her files and office keys. And he advised her not to report for work
until further notice.

ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal is valid.

RULING:
In termination cases, the employer has the burden of proving that the
dismissal is for a valid and just cause. While an employer enjoys a wider
latitude of discretion in terminating the employment of managerial employees,
managerial employees are also entitled to security of tenure and cannot be
arbitrarily dismissed at any time and without cause as reasonably established
in an appropriate investigation. In the case at bar, petitioners failed to
substantiate their allegations of respondent's habitual absenteeism, habitual
tardiness, neglect of duties, and lack of interest. Daily time records,
attendance records, or other documentary evidence attesting to these
grounds could have readily been presented to support the allegations but
none was.

Serious Misconduct
EATS-CETERA FOOD SERVICES OUTLET and/or SERAFIN RAMIREZ v.
MYRNA B. LETRAN and MARY GRACE ESPADERO,
G.R. No. 179507, October 2, 2009

FACTS:
Espadero had been employed by Eats-cetera Food Services Outlet since
June 30, 2001 as cashier. On November 20, 2002, when she reported for
duty, Espadero discovered that her time card was already punched in. After
asking around, she found out that a certain Joselito Cahayagan was the one
who punched in her time card. Espadero, however, failed to report the incident
to her supervisor, Clarissa Reduca (Reduca). This prompted Reduca to report
the incident to the personnel manager, Greta dela Hostria. Espadero
contended that she was dismissed outright without being given ample
opportunity to explain her side. She claimed that on November 21, 2002,
petitioners called her and asked her to make a letter of admission as a
condition for her reemployment.

ISSUE:
Whether Espadero was validly dimissed.

RULING:
Yes. Espaderos position as a cashier is one that requires a high degree of
trust and confidence, and that her infraction reasonably taints such trust and
confidence reposed upon her by her employer. A position of trust and
confidence has been defined as one where a person is entrusted with
confidence on delicate matters, or with the custody, handling, or care and
protection of the employers property and/or funds. The rule, therefore, is that
if there is sufficient evidence to show that the employee occupying a position
of trust and confidence is guilty of a breach of trust, or that his employer has
ample reason to distrust him, the labor tribunal cannot justly deny the
employer the authority to dismiss such employee.

Authorized Causes
ALFREDO A. MENDROS, JR v. MITSUBISHI MOTORS PHILS.
CORPORATION (MMPC)
G.R. No. 169780, February 16, 2009

FACTS:
MMPC instituted the first stage of its retrenchment program affecting around
531 hourly manufacturing employees, a step which later proved not adequate
enough to stem business reverses. Hence, after holding special labor-
management meetings with the hourly union, MMPC launched a temporary
lay-off program to cover some 170 hourly employees. This batch included
Alfredo who, sometime in January 1999, received a letter dated December 19,
1998, informing him of the temporary suspension of his employment, inclusive
of benefits. As there indicated, the temporary lay-off scheme, initiated due to
continuing business contraction, was for six months from January 4 to July 2,
1999.

ISSUE:
Whether the retrenchment is valid.

RULING:
Yes. The right of management to retrench or to lay-off workers to meet clear
and continuing economic threats or during periods of economic recession to
prevent losses is recognized by Article 283 of the Labor Code. Decisional law
teaches that the requirements for a valid retrenchment are: (1) that the
retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses
which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but substantial, serious,
and real, or only if expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived
objectively and in good faith by the employer; (2) that the employer serves
written notice both to the employees concerned and the DOLE at least a
month before the intended date of retrenchment; (3) that the employer pays
the retrenched employee separation pay in an amount prescribed by the
Code; (4) that the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench in good faith;
and (5) that it uses fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be
retrenched or retained.

Loss of Trust and Confidence

LEANDRO M. ALCANTARA v. THE PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND
INTERNATIONAL BANK ,G.R. No. 151349, October 20, 2010

FACTS:
The Labor Arbiter dismissed petitioners complaint for illegal dismissal for lack
of merit in a Decision dated February 1, 2000 wherein it was held that there
was substantial evidence that petitioner manipulated the records of
respondent to facilitate the anomalous transactions of the members of the
alleged criminal syndicate.

ISSUE:
Whether Alcantara was illegally dismissed.

RULING:
No. Loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is
premised from the fact that an employee concerned holds a position of trust
and confidence. This situation holds where a person is entrusted with
confidence on delicate matters, such as the custody, handling, or care and
protection of the employers property. But, in order to constitute a just cause
for dismissal, the act complained of must be work-related such as would show
the employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for the employer.

Unfair Labor Practice

Arellano University Employees and Workers Union vs Court of Appeals,G.R.
No. 139940, September 19, 2006

FACTS:
On December 12, 1997, the Union, the exclusive bargaining representative of
about 380 rank-and-file employees of the University, filed with the NCMB a
Notice of Strike charging the University with Unfair Labor Practice. Petitioners
insist that the University violated the CBA by withholding union dues and
death benefits. The University counters that on the request of Union members
in light of their gripes against the Union and its officers, it did withhold said
dues and benefits which they deposited with the DOLE where the parties
could settle the issues among themselves.

ISSUE:
Whether the University committed ULP.

RULING:
No. To constitute ULP, however, violations of the CBA must be gross. Gross
violation of the CBA, under Article 261 of the Labor Code, means flagrant
and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions
thereof. Evidently, the University can not be faulted for ULP as it in good faith
merely heeded the above-said request of Union members.

PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION VS PILIPINO TELEPHONE

EMPLOYEESASSOCIATION (PILTEA), G.R. No. 160058
G.R. No. 160094, June 22, 2007
FACTS:
The Union and its officers maintain that their September 4, 1998 strike was
legal. They allege that the Company was guilty of union busting in promoting
a substantial number of Union members and officers to positions outside the
bargaining unit during the period of CBA negotiations. Allegedly, said Union
members and officers maintained the same jobs and duties despite their
promotion. They also capitalize on the CAs finding that the company was
guilty of unfair labor practice in refusing to turn over the deducted contingency
fees of the union members to the union. They contend that this finding of
unfair labor practice precludes the CA from ruling that the strike was illegal
and that the Union was in bad faith in conducting the strike.

ISSUE:
Whether the strike was legal.

RULING:
In the case at bar, the Union staged the strike on the same day that it filed its
second notice of strike. The Union violated the seven-day strike ban. This
requirement should be observed to give the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike
really carries the approval of the majority of the union members. Moreover, we
agree with the CA that there was no union busting which would warrant the
non-observance of the cooling-off period. To constitute union busting under
Article 263 of the Labor Code, there must be: 1) a dismissal from employment
of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-
laws; and 2) the existence of the union must be threatened by such
dismissal. In the case at bar, the second notice of strike filed by
the Union merely assailed the mass promotion of its officers and members
during the CBA negotiations. Surely, promotion is different from dismissal.

Verification
OSCAR G. SAPITAN et al vs JB LINE BICOL EXPRESS, INC.
G.R. No. 163775, October 19, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a case for illegal dismissal against respondent. Although
the LA found that some of JB Line's employees were validly dismissed from
their jobs, he nonetheless ruled that JB Line was liable for constructive
dismissal. Respondent JB Line appealed finding that the bond posted was not
equivalent to the monetary judgment, the NLRC ordered respondent JB Line
to post an additional bond, otherwise, its appeal would be dismissed for non-
perfection. The latter failed, hence, the NLRC denied its appeal. Respondent
JB Line elevated the case to the CA via Rule 65 however the CA dismissed
the petition for failure to attach a secretary's certificate or board resolution
authorizing Lao Huan Ling to sign the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping for and on behalf of respondent JB Line.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the Petition.

RULING:
No. Verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless formality. Its import
must never be sacrificed in the name of mere expedience or sheer caprice.
For what is at stake is the matter of verity attested by the sanctity of an oath
to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading have been made
in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative. The reason
for this is that the principal party has actual knowledge whether a petition has
previously been filed involving the same case or substantially the same
issues. If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the one
signing on his behalf must have been duly authorized. A certification without
the proper authorization is defective and constitutes a valid cause for the
dismissal of the petition. Although respondent JB Line claims that
it substantially complied with the requirement, albeit belatedly, said certificate,
however, was neither dated nor its signatory Lao Huan Ling authorized to sign

the verification and the certification of non-forum shopping to be filed in

the CA.