THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 122880 April 12, 2006

FELIX AZUELA, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO substituted by ERNESTO G.
CASTILLO, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The core of this petition is a highly defective notarial will, purportedly executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo
(decedent), who died on 16 December 1982 at the age of 80. In refusing to give legal recognition to
the due execution of this document, the Court is provided the opportunity to assert a few important
doctrinal rules in the execution of notarial wills, all self-evident in view of Articles 805 and 806 of the
Civil Code.

A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is
written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental
witnesses is fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an
acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient
to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects is just aching for judicial rejection.

There is a distinct and consequential reason the Civil Code provides a comprehensive catalog of
imperatives for the proper execution of a notarial will. Full and faithful compliance with all the
detailed requisites under Article 805 of the Code leave little room for doubt as to the validity in the
due execution of the notarial will. Article 806 likewise imposes another safeguard to the validity of
notarial wills — that they be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.
A notarial will executed with indifference to these two codal provisions opens itself to nagging
questions as to its legitimacy.

The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila. The petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of
Eugenia E. Igsolo, which was notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the
decedent.

The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the vernacular Pilipino, read in full:

HULING HABILIN NI EUGENIA E. IGSOLO

SA NGALAN NG MAYKAPAL, AMEN:

AKO, si EUGENIA E. IGSOLO, nakatira sa 500 San Diego St., Sampaloc, Manila, pitongput siyam
(79) na gulang, nasa hustong pagi-isip, pag-unawa at memoria ay nag-hahayag na ito na ang aking
huling habilin at testamento, at binabali wala ko lahat ang naunang ginawang habilin o testamento:

Una-Hinihiling ko na ako ay mailibing sa Sementerio del Norte, La Loma sang-ayong sa kaugalian at

patakaran ng simbahang katoliko at ang taga-pag-ingat (Executor) ng habiling ito ay magtatayo ng
bantayog upang silbing ala-ala sa akin ng aking pamilya at kaibigan;

Pangalawa-Aking ipinagkakaloob at isinasalin ang lahat ng karapatan sa aking pamangkin na si

Felix Azuela, na siyang nag-alaga sa akin sa mahabang panahon, yaong mga bahay na nakatirik sa
lote numero 28, Block 24 at nakapangalan sa Pechaten Korporasyon, ganoon din ibinibigay ko ang
lahat ng karapatan sa bahay na nakatirik sa inoopahan kong lote, numero 43, Block 24 na pag-aari
ng Pechaten Corporation. Ipinagkakaloob kong buong buo ang lahat ng karapatan sa bahay at lupa
na nasa 500 San Diego St., Lot 42, Block 24, Sampaloc, Manila kay Felix Azuela at ang
pagkakaloob kong ito ay walang pasubali’t at kondiciones;

Pangatlo- Na ninunumbrahan ko si VART PAGUE na siyang nagpapatupad ng huling habiling ito at

kagustuhan ko rin na hindi na kailanman siyang mag-lagak ng piyansiya.

Aking nilagdaan ang Huling Habilin na ito dito sa Maynila ika 10 ng Hunyo, 1981.

(Sgd.)
EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
(Tagapagmana)

PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI

Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng ____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni
Eugenia E. Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayon ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay
nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng
lahat at bawa’t dahon, sa harap ng lahat at bawa’t sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda
sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawa’t isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng
nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa’t dahon ng kasulatan ito.

EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
address: 500 San Diego St.
Sampaloc, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-7717-37
Issued at Manila on March 10, 1981.

QUIRINO AGRAVA
address: 1228-Int. 3, Kahilum
Pandacan, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-458365
Issued at Manila on Jan. 21, 1981

LAMBERTO C. LEAÑO
address: Avenue 2, Blcok 7,
Lot 61, San Gabriel, G.MA., Cavite Res.
Cert. No. A-768277 issued at Carmona, Cavite on Feb. 7, 1981
JUANITO ESTRERA
address: City Court Compound,
City of Manila Res. Cert. No. A574829
Issued at Manila on March 2, 1981.

Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10, 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila.

(Sgd.)
PETRONIO Y. BAUTISTA

Doc. No. 1232 ; NOTARIO PUBLIKO

Page No. 86 ; Until Dec. 31, 1981
Book No. 43 ; PTR-152041-1/2/81-Manila
Series of 1981 TAN # 1437-977-81

The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages
of the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause.

The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent, namely:
petitioner himself, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided abroad. Petitioner
prayed that the will be allowed, and that letters testamentary be issued to the designated executor,
Vart Prague.

The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who represented herself as
the attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent.2 Geralda Castillo claimed that the will
is a forgery, and that the true purpose of its emergence was so it could be utilized as a defense in
several court cases filed by oppositor against petitioner, particularly for forcible entry and usurpation
of real property, all centering on petitioner’s right to occupy the properties of the decedent. 3 It also
asserted that contrary to the representations of petitioner, the decedent was actually survived by 12
legitimate heirs, namely her grandchildren, who were then residing abroad. Per records, it was
subsequently alleged that decedent was the widow of Bonifacio Igsolo, who died in 1965, 4 and the
mother of a legitimate child, Asuncion E. Igsolo, who predeceased her mother by three (3) months. 5

Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance
with law. She pointed out that decedent’s signature did not appear on the second page of the will,
and the will was not properly acknowledged. These twin arguments are among the central matters to
this petition.

After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate, in an Order dated 10 August 1992. 6 The RTC
favorably took into account the testimony of the three (3) witnesses to the will, Quirino Agrava,
Lamberto Leano, and Juanito Estrada. The RTC also called to fore "the modern tendency in respect
to the formalities in the execution of a will x x x with the end in view of giving the testator more
freedom in expressing his last wishes;"7 and from this perspective, rebutted oppositor’s arguments
that the will was not properly executed and attested to in accordance with law.

After a careful examination of the will and consideration of the testimonies of the subscribing and
attesting witnesses, and having in mind the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the
execution of a will, i.e., the liberalization of the interpretation of the law on the formal requirements of
a will with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, this
Court is persuaded to rule that the will in question is authentic and had been executed by the
testatrix in accordance with law.
On the issue of lack of acknowledgement, this Court has noted that at the end of the will after the
signature of the testatrix, the following statement is made under the sub-title, "Patunay Ng Mga
Saksi":

"Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng _____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin
ni Eugenia N. Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayong ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981,
ay nilagdaan ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng
lahat at bawa’t dahon, sa harap ng lahat at bawa’t sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda
sa harap ng nasabing tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawa’t isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng
nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa’t dahon ng kasulatan ito."

The aforequoted declaration comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgement and is
considered by this Court as a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.

On the oppositor’s contention that the attestation clause was not signed by the subscribing
witnesses at the bottom thereof, this Court is of the view that the signing by the subscribing
witnesses on the left margin of the second page of the will containing the attestation clause and
acknowledgment, instead of at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfies the purpose of identification
and attestation of the will.

With regard to the oppositor’s argument that the will was not numbered correlatively in letters placed
on upper part of each page and that the attestation did not state the number of pages thereof, it is
worthy to note that the will is composed of only two pages. The first page contains the entire text of
the testamentary dispositions, and the second page contains the last portion of the attestation clause
and acknowledgement. Such being so, the defects are not of a serious nature as to invalidate the
will. For the same reason, the failure of the testatrix to affix her signature on the left margin of the
second page, which contains only the last portion of the attestation clause and acknowledgment is
not a fatal defect.

As regards the oppositor’s assertion that the signature of the testatrix on the will is a forgery, the
testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses to the will are convincing enough to establish the
genuineness of the signature of the testatrix and the due execution of the will. 8

The Order was appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto Castillo, who had substituted his since
deceased mother-in-law, Geralda Castillo. In a Decision dated 17 August 1995, the Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate. 9 The Court of Appeals
noted that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering
the will void and undeserving of probate.10

Hence, the present petition.

Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that "the number of pages
used in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause" is merely directory, rather than mandatory,
and thus susceptible to what he termed as "the substantial compliance rule." 11

The solution to this case calls for the application of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, which we
replicate in full.

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the
will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin,
and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that
the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name,
under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses.
The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the
Clerk of Court.

The appellate court, in its Decision, considered only one defect, the failure of the attestation clause
to state the number of pages of the will. But an examination of the will itself reveals several more
deficiencies.

As admitted by petitioner himself, the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages of the
will.12 There was an incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having been allotted for
the insertion of the number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in;
hence, the requisite was left uncomplied with.

The Court of Appeals pounced on this defect in reversing the trial court, citing in the process Uy
Coque v. Navas L. Sioca13 and In re: Will of Andrada.14 In Uy Coque, the Court noted that among the
defects of the will in question was the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages
contained in the will.15 In ruling that the will could not be admitted to probate, the Court made the
following consideration which remains highly relevant to this day: "The purpose of requiring the
number of sheets to be stated in the attestation clause is obvious; the document might easily be
so prepared that the removal of a sheet would completely change the testamentary
dispositions of the will and in the absence of a statement of the total number of sheets such
removal might be effected by taking out the sheet and changing the numbers at the top of the
following sheets or pages. If, on the other hand, the total number of sheets is stated in the
attestation clause the falsification of the document will involve the inserting of new pages and the
forging of the signatures of the testator and witnesses in the margin, a matter attended with much
greater difficulty."16

The case of In re Will of Andrada concerned a will the attestation clause of which failed to state the
number of sheets or pages used. This consideration alone was sufficient for the Court to declare
"unanim[ity] upon the point that the defect pointed out in the attesting clause is fatal." 17 It was further
observed that "it cannot be denied that the x x x requirement affords additional security against the
danger that the will may be tampered with; and as the Legislature has seen fit to prescribe this
requirement, it must be considered material."18

Against these cited cases, petitioner cites Singson v. Florentino19 and Taboada v. Hon.
Rosal,20 wherein the Court allowed probate to the wills concerned therein despite the fact that the
attestation clause did not state the number of pages of the will. Yet the appellate court itself
considered the import of these two cases, and made the following distinction which petitioner is
unable to rebut, and which we adopt with approval:

Even a cursory examination of the Will (Exhibit "D"), will readily show that the attestation does not
state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. Hence, the Will is void and
undeserving of probate.

We are not impervious of the Decisions of the Supreme Court in "Manuel Singson versus Emilia
Florentino, et al., 92 Phil. 161 and Apolonio [Taboada] versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al., 118 SCRA
195," to the effect that a will may still be valid even if the attestation does not contain the number of
pages used upon which the Will is written. However, the Decisions of the Supreme Court are not
applicable in the aforementioned appeal at bench. This is so because, in the case of "Manuel
Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., supra," although the attestation in the subject Will did not
state the number of pages used in the will, however, the same was found in the last part of the body
of the Will:

"x x x

The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, which
requires that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which the will is
written, which requirement has been held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard against the
possibility of interpolation or omission of some of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to
whom the property is intended to be bequeathed (In re Will of Andrada, 42 Phil. 180; Uy Coque vs.
Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; Gumban vs. Gorcho, 50 Phil. 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil. 481;
Echevarria vs. Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of these cases seems to be that the
attestation clause must contain a statement of the number of sheets or pages composing the will
and that if this is missing or is omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the will if the deficiency
cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or examination of the will itself.
But here the situation is different. While the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or
pages upon which the will is written, however, the last part of the body of the will contains a
statement that it is composed of eight pages, which circumstance in our opinion takes this case out
of the rigid rule of construction and places it within the realm of similar cases where a broad and
more liberal view has been adopted to prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely
technical considerations." (page 165-165, supra) (Underscoring supplied)

In "Apolonio Tabaoda versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al." supra, the notarial acknowledgement in the
Will states the number of pages used in the:

"x x x

We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the
number of pages used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact
that, in this case, it is discernible from the entire will that it is really and actually composed of only
two pages duly signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first
page which contains the entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end
or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page which is
marked as "Pagina dos" comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The
acknowledgment itself states that "this Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including this
page" (pages 200-201, supra) (Underscoring supplied).
However, in the appeal at bench, the number of pages used in the will is not stated in any part of the
Will. The will does not even contain any notarial acknowledgment wherein the number of pages of
the will should be stated.21

Both Uy Coque and Andrada were decided prior to the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, at a
time when the statutory provision governing the formal requirement of wills was Section

618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.22 Reliance on these cases remains apropos, considering that the
requirement that the attestation state the number of pages of the will is extant from Section
618.23 However, the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950 did put in force a rule of interpretation of the
requirements of wills, at least insofar as the attestation clause is concerned, that may vary from the
philosophy that governed these two cases. Article 809 of the Civil Code states: "In the absence of
bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections
in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved
that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of
article 805."

In the same vein, petitioner cites the report of the Civil Code Commission, which stated that "the
underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the [law] on [wills] in this project
consists in the [liberalization] of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the
testator more [freedom] in [expressing] his last wishes. This objective is in accord with the [modern
tendency] in respect to the formalities in the execution of wills."24 However, petitioner conveniently
omits the qualification offered by the Code Commission in the very same paragraph he cites from
their report, that such liberalization be "but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the
commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the
testator."25

Caneda v. Court of Appeals26 features an extensive discussion made by Justice Regalado, speaking for the
Court on the conflicting views on the manner of interpretation of the legal formalities required in the execution
of the attestation clause in wills.27 Uy Coque and Andrada are cited therein, along with several other cases, as
examples of the application of the rule of strict construction.28 However, the Code Commission opted to
recommend a more liberal construction through the "substantial compliance rule" under Article 809. A
cautionary note was struck though by Justice J.B.L. Reyes as to how Article 809 should be applied:

x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination
of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in
each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All
these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the
attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all
persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in
the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate
proceedings.29 (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court of Appeals did cite these comments by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in its assailed decision,
considering that the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause is one of
the defects which cannot be simply disregarded. In Caneda itself, the Court refused to allow the
probate of a will whose attestation clause failed to state that the witnesses subscribed their
respective signatures to the will in the presence of the testator and of each other, 30 the other
omission cited by Justice J.B.L. Reyes which to his estimation cannot be lightly disregarded.

Caneda suggested: "[I]t may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omission which
can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic
evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the
will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by
evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will
itself."31 Thus, a failure by the attestation clause to state that the testator signed every page can be
liberally construed, since that fact can be checked by a visual examination; while a failure by the
attestation clause to state that the witnesses signed in one another’s presence should be considered
a fatal flaw since the attestation is the only textual guarantee of compliance. 32

The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written
remains a fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the
number of pages on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or
omission of one or some of its pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. 33 The
failure to state the number of pages equates with the absence of an averment on the part of the
instrumental witnesses as to how many pages consisted the will, the execution of which they had
ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed to. Following Caneda, there is substantial compliance with
this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many pages it is comprised of, as was the
situation in Singson and Taboada. However, in this case, there could have been no substantial
compliance with the requirements under Article 805 since there is no statement in the attestation
clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will.

At the same time, Article 809 should not deviate from the need to comply with the formal
requirements as enumerated under Article 805. Whatever the inclinations of the members of the
Code Commission in incorporating Article 805, the fact remains that they saw fit to prescribe
substantially the same formal requisites as enumerated in Section 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, convinced that these remained effective safeguards against the forgery or intercalation of
notarial wills.34 Compliance with these requirements, however picayune in impression, affords the
public a high degree of comfort that the testator himself or herself had decided to convey
property post mortem in the manner established in the will.35 The transcendent legislative intent,
even as expressed in the cited comments of the Code Commission, is for the fruition of the
testator’s incontestable desires, and not for the indulgent admission of wills to probate.

The Court could thus end here and affirm the Court of Appeals. However, an examination of the will
itself reveals a couple of even more critical defects that should necessarily lead to its rejection.

For one, the attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental witnesses. While the
signatures of the instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not
appear at the bottom of the attestation clause which after all consists of their averments before the
notary public.

Cagro v. Cagro36 is material on this point. As in this case, "the signatures of the three witnesses to
the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same
is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin."37 While three (3) Justices38 considered the
signature requirement had been substantially complied with, a majority of six (6), speaking through
Chief Justice Paras, ruled that the attestation clause had not been duly signed, rendering the will
fatally defective.

There is no question that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the
bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses
on the left-hand margin.

We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The attestation clause is "a
memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will" required by law to be made by the
attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause
cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom
thereof negatives their participation.

The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin
conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause.
This is untenable, because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be
signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three
witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a
will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses. 39

The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro. Article 805 particularly segregates the
requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite that the will
be "attested and subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses]." The respective intents behind these
two classes of signature are distinct from each other. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every
page signify, among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part
of the will. On the other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses
are referring to the statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the attestation
clause is separate and apart from the disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation clause results in
an unattested will. Even if the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page
containing the unsigned attestation clause, such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses’
undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that do appear on the page were directed towards a
wholly different avowal.

The Court may be more charitably disposed had the witnesses in this case signed the attestation
clause itself, but not the left-hand margin of the page containing such clause. Without diminishing
the value of the instrumental witnesses’ signatures on each and every page, the fact must be noted
that it is the attestation clause which contains the utterances reduced into writing of the testamentary
witnesses themselves. It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under Article 805 to
state the number of pages used upon which the will is written; the fact that the testator had signed
the will and every page thereof; and that they witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof
in the presence of the testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have
stated these elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.

Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the instrumental
witnesses, as they failed to sign the attestation clause.

Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial of this petition should also hinge. The
requirement under Article 806 that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses" has also not been complied with. The importance of this requirement is
highlighted by the fact that it had been segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and
entrusted into a separate provision, Article 806. The non-observance of Article 806 in this case is
equally as critical as the other cited flaws in compliance with Article 805, and should be treated as of
equivalent import.

In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote "Nilagdaan ko at

ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila."40 By no manner of
contemplation can those words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act
of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to
be his act or deed.41 It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to the
notary that the executor of a document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free
act and deed.
It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the usual
language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the
document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor. 42 Ordinarily, the language of the jurat should
avow that the document was subscribed and sworn before the notary public, while in this case, the
notary public averred that he himself "signed and notarized" the document. Possibly though, the
word "ninotario" or "notarized" encompasses the signing of and swearing in of the executors of the
document, which in this case would involve the decedent and the instrumental witnesses.

Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would nonetheless
remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be "acknowledged", and not
merely subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any textual proof, much less one under
oath, that the decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free
act or deed. The acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-important legal safeguard
against spurious wills or those made beyond the free consent of the testator. An acknowledgement is
not an empty meaningless act.43 The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental
witnesses to declare before an officer of the law that they had executed and subscribed to the will as
their own free act or deed. Such declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus allowing for
the criminal prosecution of persons who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those
executed without the free consent of the testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that
the testator is of certain mindset in making the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she
had designated in the will.

It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self-evident as it is under Article 806. A
notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses
is fatally defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.

There are two other requirements under Article 805 which were not fully satisfied by the will in
question. We need not discuss them at length, as they are no longer material to the

disposition of this case. The provision requires that the testator and the instrumental witnesses sign
each and every page of the will on the left margin, except the last; and that all the pages shall be
numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. In this case, the decedent,
unlike the witnesses, failed to sign both pages of the will on the left margin, her only signature
appearing at the so-called "logical end"44 of the will on its first page. Also, the will itself is not
numbered correlatively in letters on each page, but instead numbered with Arabic numerals. There is
a line of thought that has disabused the notion that these two requirements be construed as
mandatory.45Taken in isolation, these omissions, by themselves, may not be sufficient to deny
probate to a will. Yet even as these omissions are not decisive to the adjudication of this case, they
need not be dwelt on, though indicative as they may be of a general lack of due regard for the
requirements under Article 805 by whoever executed the will.

All told, the string of mortal defects which the will in question suffers from makes the probate denial
inexorable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-6285 February 15, 1912

PEDRO BARUT, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
FAUSTINO CABACUNGAN, ET AL., opponents-appellees.

A. M. Jimenez for appellant.

Ramon Querubin for appellees.

MORELAND, J.:

This case is closely connected with the case of Faustino Cabacungan vs. Pedro Barut and another,
No. 6284,1 just decided by this court, wherein there was an application for the probate of an alleged
last will and testament of the same person the probate of whose will is involved in this suit.

This appeal arises out of an application on the part of Pedro Barut to probate the last will and
testament of Maria Salomon, deceased. It is alleged in the petition of the probate that Maria
Salomon died on the 7th day of November, 1908, in the pueblo of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, leaving a last
will and testament bearing date March 2, 1907. Severo Agayan, Timotea Inoselda, Catalino Ragasa,
and A. M. Jimenez are alleged to have been witnesses to the execution thereof. By the terms of said
will Pedro Barut received the larger part of decedent's property.

The original will appears on page 3 of the record and is in the Ilocano dialect. Its translation into
Spanish appears at page 11. After disposing of her property the testatrix revoked all former wills by
her made. She also stated in said will that being unable to read or write, the same had been read to
her by Ciriaco Concepcion and Timotea Inoselda and that she had instructed Severo Agayan to sign
her name to it as testatrix.

The probate of the will was contested and opposed by a number of the relatives of the deceased on
various grounds, among them that a later will had been executed by the deceased. The will referred
to as being a later will is the one involved in case No. 6284 already referred to. Proceeding for the
probate of this later will were pending at the time. The evidence of the proponents and of the
opponents was taken by the court in both cases for the purpose of considering them together.

In the case before us the learned probate court found that the will was not entitled to probate upon
the sole ground that the handwriting of the person who it is alleged signed the name of the testatrix
to the will for and on her behalf looked more like the handwriting of one of the other witnesses to the
will than that of the person whose handwriting it was alleged to be. We do not believe that the mere
dissimilarity in writing thus mentioned by the court is sufficient to overcome the uncontradicted
testimony of all the witnesses to the will that the signature of the testatrix was written by Severo
Agayan at her request and in her presence and in the presence of all the witnesses to the will. It is
immaterial who writes the name of the testatrix provided it is written at her request and in her
presence and in the presence of all the witnesses to the execution of the will.
The court seems , by inference at least, to have had in mind that under the law relating to the
execution of a will it is necessary that the person who signs the name of the testatrix must
afterwards sign his own name; and that, in view of the fact that, in the case at bar, the name signed
below that of the testatrix as the person who signed her name, being, from its appearance, not the
same handwriting as that constituting the name of the testatrix, the will is accordingly invalid, such
fact indicating that the person who signed the name of the testatrix failed to sign his own. We do not
believe that this contention can be sustained. Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as
follows:

No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or
personal, nor charge or effect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or
by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his expenses
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of each. . . .

This is the important part of the section under the terms of which the court holds that the person who
signs the name of the testator for him must also sign his own name The remainder of the section
reads:

The attestation shall state the fact that the testator signed the will, or caused it to be signed
by some other person, at his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and that
they attested and subscribed it in his presence and in the presence of each other. But the
absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the will
was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.

From these provisions it is entirely clear that, with respect to the validity of the will, it is unimportant
whether the person who writes the name of the testatrix signs his own or not. The important thing is
that it clearly appears that the name of the testatrix was signed at her express direction in the
presence of three witnesses and that they attested and subscribed it in her presence and in the
presence of each other. That is all the statute requires. It may be wise as a practical matter that the
one who signs the testator's name signs also his own; but that it is not essential to the validity of the
will. Whether one parson or another signed the name of the testatrix in this case is absolutely
unimportant so far as the validity of her will is concerned. The plain wording of the statute shows that
the requirement laid down by the trial court, if it did lay down, is absolutely unnecessary under the
law; and the reasons underlying the provisions of the statute relating to the execution of wills do not
in any sense require such a provision. From the standpoint of language it is an impossibility to draw
from the words of the law the inference that the persons who signs the name of the testator must
sign his own name also. The law requires only three witnesses to a will, not four.

Nor is such requirement found in any other branch of the law. The name of a person who is unable
to write may be signed by another by express direction to any instrument known to the law. There is
no necessity whatever, so far as the validity of the instrument is concerned, for the person who
writes the name of the principal in the document to sign his own name also. As a matter of policy it
may be wise that he do so inasmuch as it would give such intimation as would enable a person
proving the document to demonstrate more readily the execution by the principal. But as a matter of
essential validity of the document, it is unnecessary. The main thing to be established in the
execution of the will is the signature of the testator. If that signature is proved, whether it be written
by himself or by another at his request, it is none the less valid, and the fact of such signature can be
proved as perfectly and as completely when the person signing for the principal omits to sign his
own name as it can when he actually signs. To hold a will invalid for the lack of the signature of the
person signing the name of the principal is, in the particular case, a complete abrogation of the law
of wills, as it rejects and destroys a will which the statute expressly declares is valid.
There have been cited three cases which it is alleged are in opposition to the doctrine which we
have herein laid down. They are Ex parte Santiago (4 Phil. Rep., 692), Ex parte Arcenas (4 Phil.
Rep., 700), and Guison vs.Concepcion (5 Phil. Rep., 551). Not one of these cases is in point. The
headnote in the case last above stated gives an indication of what all of cases are and the question
involved in each one of them. It says:

The testatrix was not able to sign it for her. Instead of writing her name he wrote his own
upon the will. Held, That the will was not duly executed.

All of the above cases are precisely of this character. Every one of them was a case in which the
person who signed the will for the testator wrote his own name to the will instead of writing that of
the testator, so that the testator's name nowhere appeared attached to the will as the one who
executed it. The case of Ex parte Arcenas contains the following paragraph:

Where a testator does not know, or is unable for any reason, to sign the will himself, it shall
be signed in the following manner: "John Doe, by the testator, Richard Roe;" or in this form:
"By the testator. John Doe, Richard Roe." All this must be written by the witness signing at
the request of the testator.

The only question for decision in that case, as we have before stated, was presented by the fact that
the person who was authorized to sign the name of the testator to the will actually failed to sign such
name but instead signed his own thereto. The decision in that case related only to that question.

Aside from the presentation of an alleged subsequent will the contestants in this case have set forth
no reason whatever why the will involved in the present litigation should not be probated. The due
and legal execution of the will by the testatrix is clearly established by the proofs in this case. Upon
the facts, therefore, the will must be probated. As to the defense of a subsequent will, that is
resolved in case No. 6284 of which we have already spoken. We there held that said later will not
the will of the deceased.

The judgment of the probate court must be and is hereby reversed and that court is directed to enter
an order in the usual form probating the will involved in this litigation and to proceed with such
probate in accordance with law.

Arellano, C.J., Mapa and Carson, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

TORRES, J., concurring:

The undersigned agrees and admits that section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not
expressly require that, when the testator or testatrix is unable or does not know how to sign, the
person who, in the presence and under the express direction of either of them, writes in the name of
the said testator or testatrix must also sign his own name thereto, it being sufficient for the validity of
the will that the said person so requested to sign the testator or testatrix write the name of either in
his own handwriting.
Since this court began to decide cases with regard to the form, conditions and validity of wills
executed in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, never has the specific
point just above mentioned been brought into question. Now for the first time is affirmed in the
majority opinion, written by the learned and distinguished Hon. Justice Moreland, that, not being
required by the said code, the signature of the name of the person who, at the request of the testator
or testatrix, writes the name of either of the latter to the will executed, is not necessary.

Various and considerable in number have been the decisions rendered by this court in which, as will
be seen further on, upon applying the said section 618 of Code of Civil Procedure and requiring its
observance in cases where the testator or testatrix is unable or does not know how to sign his or her
name, expressly prescribed the practical method of complying with the provisions of the law on the
subject. Among these decisions several were written by various justices of this court, some of whom
are no longer on this bench, as they have ceased to hold such position.

Paragraph 2 of the syllabus of case No. 2002, Ex parte Delfin Santiago,1 concerning the probate of a
will, reads as follows:

Wills, authentication of . — Where a will is not signed by a testator but by some other person
in his presence and by his direction, such other person should affix the name of the testator
thereto, and it is not sufficient that he sign his own name for and instead of the name of the
testator.

Paragraph 1 of the syllabus of case No. 1708, Ex parte Arcenas,2 in the matter of the probate of a
will, states:

1. Wills, requisites of; Civil Code, article repealed. — Article 695 of the Civil Procedure;
consequently where a testator is unable to sign his name, the person signing at his request
must write at the bottom of the will the full name of the testator in the latter's presence, and
by his express direction, and then sign his own name in full.

In the syllabus of decision No. 2586, Tomas Guison vs. Maria Concepcion,3 the following statements
appear:

Wills; inability to sign; signature by another. — The testatrix was not able to sign her name to
the will, and she requested another person to sign it for her. Held, That the will was not duly
executed. (Following Ex parte Arcenas et al., No. 1708, August 24, 1905; Ex parte Arcenas
et al., No. 1708, August 24, 1905; Ex parte Santiago, No. 2002, August 18, 1905.)

The following syllabus precedes decision No. 3907:4

Execution of wills. — Where it appears in a will that the testator has stated that by reason of
his inability to sign his name he requested one of the three witnesses present to do so, and
that as a matter of fact, the said witness wrote the name and surname of the testator who,
stating that the instrument executed by him contained his last will, put the sign of the cross
between his said name and surname, all of which details are set forth in a note which the
witnesses forthwith subscribed in the presence of the testator and of each other, said will
may be probated.

When the essential requisites of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the execution
and validity of a will have been complied with, the fact that the witness who was requested to
sign the name of the testator, omitted to state the words 'by request of .......... the testator,'
 when writing with his own hand the name and surname of the said testator, and the fact that
said witness subscribed his name together with the other witnesses and not below the name
of the testator, does not constitute a defect nor invalidate the said will.

The following statement appears in the syllabus of case No. 4132, in the matter of the will of Maria
Siason:5

The recital of the name of the testator as written below the will at his request serves as a
signature by a third person.

Moreover among the grounds given as a basis for this same decision, the following appears:

In sustaining this form of signature, this court does not intend to qualify the decisions in Ex
parte Santiago (4 Phil. Rep., 692), Ex parte Arcenas, above quoted, or in Abaya vs.
Zalamero. In the Arcenas case the court pointed out the correct formula for a signature which
ought to be followed, but did not mean to exclude any other for substantially equivalent.

In the syllabus of decision No. 4454,6 Ex parte Ondevilla et al., the following appears:

The testatrix was unable to sign her will with her own hand and requested another person to
sign for her in her presence. This the latter did, first writing the name of the testatrix and
signing his own name below: Held, That the signature of the testatrix so affixed is sufficient
and a will thus executed is admissible to probate. (Ex parte Arcenas, 4 Phil. Rep., 700.)

The syllabus of decision No. 51497 sets forth that:

The legality of a will is not affected by the insertion, supposed to have been made subsequently, of
another name before that of the testator when such name may be treated as nonexistent without
affecting its validity.

Among the conclusions contained in this last decision the following is found:

Although the said words "For Simplicia de los Santos" be considered as inserted
subsequently, which we neither affirm nor deny, because a specific determination either way
is unnecessary, in our opinion the signature for the testatrix placed outside of the body of the
will contains the name of the testatrix as if she signed the will, and also the signature of the
witness who, at her request, wrote the name of the testatrix and signed for her, affirming the
truth of this fact, attested by the other witnesses then present. And this fully complies with the
provisions of section 618 of the Act.

It is true that in none of the decisions above quoted was the rule established that the person who, at
the request of the testator or testatrix, signed the latter's or the former's name and surname to the
will must affix his own signature; but it no less true that, in prescribing the method in which the
provisions of the said section 618 to be complied with, it was stated that, in order that a will so
executed might be admitted to probate, it was an indispensable requisite that the person requested
to sign in place of the testator or testatrix, should write the latter's or the former's name and surname
at the foot of the will in the presence and under the direction of either, as the case might be, and
should afterwards sign the instrument with his own name and surname.

The statement that the person who writes the name and surname of the testator or testatrix at the
foot of the will should likewise affix his own signature thereto, name and surname, though it be
considered to be neither a rule nor a requisite necessary to follow for the admission of the will to
probate, yet it is unquestionable that, in inserting this last above-mentioned detail in the aforesaid
decisions, it was deemed to be a complement and integral part of the required conditions for the
fulfillment of the provisions of the law.

It is undisputable that the latter does not require the said subscription and signature of the person
requested to affix to the will the name of the testator or testatrix who is not able to sign; but by stating
in the decisions hereinabove quoted that the name and surname of the said person should be
affixed by him, no act prohibited by law was recommended or suggested, nor may such a detail be
understood to be contrary or opposed to the plain provisions thereof.

In the preceding decision itself, it is recognized to be convenient and even prudent to require that the
person requested to write the name of the testator or testatrix in the will also sign the instrument with
his own name and surname. This statement induces us to believe that, in behalf of the inhabitants of
this country and for sake of an upright administration of justice, it should be maintained that such a
signature must appear in the will, since no harm could accrue to anyone thereby and, on the
contrary, it would serve as a guarantee of the certainty of the act performed and also might eliminate
some possible cause of controversy between the interested parties.

The undersigned feels it his duty to admit that, though convinced of the complete repeal of article
695 of the Civil Code and, while he conceded that, in the examination and qualification of a will for
the purpose of its probate, one has but to abide by the provisions of said section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, the sole law applicable in the matter, yet, perhaps imbued with the strongly impelled
by a traditional conception of the laws which he has known since youth, relative to the form of
execution of testaments, he believed it to be a vary natural and common sense requisite that the
signature, with his own name and surname, of the person requested to write in the will the name and
surname of the testator or testatrix should form a part of the provisions of the aforementioned
section 618.

He undoubtedly thought, perhaps mistakenly, that such a requisite of the signature of the person
before referred to — a requisite deemed to be convenient and prudent in the majority opinion —
formed a part of the provisions of the law, since the latter contains nothing that prohibits it. The
aforementioned different decisions were drawn up in the form in which they appear, and signed
without dissent by all the justices of the court on various dates. None of them hesitated to sign the
decisions, notwithstanding that it was expressly held therein that the person above mentioned
should, besides writing in the will the name and surname of the testator or testatrix, also sign the
said instrument with his own name and surname.

Without being understood to criticize the provision contained in the said section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure it will not be superfluous to mention that the system adopted in this section is the
same as was in vogue under the former laws that governed in these Islands, with respect to
witnesses who were not able or did not know how to sign their testimony given in criminal or civil
cases, in which event any person at all might write the name and surname of the witness who was
unable or did not know how to sign, at the foot of his deposition, where a cross was then drawn, and,
this done, it was considered that the instrument had been signed by the witness, though it is true that
all these formalities were performed before the judge and the clerk or secretary of the court, which
thereupon certified that such procedure was had in accordance with the law.

The difference is that in the will, pursuant to section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the person
who writes the name and surname of the testator or testatrix does so by the order and express
direction of the one or of the other, and this fact must be recorded in the will; but in the matter of the
signature of a deposition, the witness, who could not or did not know how to sign, did not need to
designate anyone to write the deponent's name and surname, and in practice the witness merely
made a cross beside his name and surname, written by whomever it be.

With regard to the execution of wills in accordance with the provisions of previous statutes, among
them those of the Civil Code, the person or witness requested by the testator or testatrix who was
not able or did not know how to sign, authenticated the will by signing it with his own name and
surname, preceded by the words "at the request of the testator or testatrix." Paragraph 2 of article
695 of the Civil Code contains the following provisions bearing on the subject:

Should the testator declare that he does not know how, or is not able to sign, one of the
attesting witnesses or another person shall do so for him at his request, the notary certifying
thereto. This shall be done if any one of the witnesses can not sign.

So that, prior to the enforcement in this country in 1901 of the Code of Civil procedure prescribed by
the old laws with respect to the signing of a will by a testator or testatrix who did not know how or
who could not sign, consisted in that the person appointed and requested by the testator or testatrix
to sign in his or her stead, such fact being recorded in the will, merely affixed at the bottom of the will
and after the words "at the request of the testator," his own name, surname and paragraph.

It is not at all strange that the attorneys of this country, imbued with and inspired by these legal
provisions, which it may said, are traditional to them in the ideas they have formed of the existing
laws in the matter of procedure in compliance therewith as regards the execution and signing of a
will, should have believed that, after the name and surname of the testator or testatrix had been
written at the foot of the will, the person who signed the instrument in the manner mentioned should
likewise sign the same with his own name and surname.

If in various decisions it has been indicated that the person who, under the express direction of the
testator or testatrix, wrote the latter's or the former's name and surname, should also sign the will
with his own name and surname, and since this suggestion is not opposed or contrary to the law, the
undersigned is of opinion that it ought not to be modified or amended, but that, on the contrary, it
should be maintained as a requisite established by the jurisprudence of this court, inasmuch as such
a requisite is not contrary to law, to public order, or to good custom, is in consonance with a tradition
of this country, does not prejudice the testator nor those interested in an inheritance, and, on the
contrary, constitutes another guarantee of the truth and authenticity of the letters with which the
name and surname of the testator of testatrix are written, in accordance with his or her desire as
expressed in the will.

Even though the requisites referred to were not recognized in jurisprudence and were unsupported
by any legal doctrine whatever, yet, since it is in harmony with the juridical usages and customs
observed in this country, it ought, in the humble opinion of the writer, to be maintained for the benefit
of the inhabitants of the Islands and for the sake of a good administration of justice, because it is not
a question of a dangerous innovation or of one prejudicial to the public good, but a matter of the
observance of a convenient, if not a necessary detail, introduced by the jurisprudence of the courts
and which in the present case has filed a vacancy left by the positive written law.

The foregoing considerations, which perhaps have not the support of better premises, but in the
opinion of the undersigned, are conducive to the realization of the purposes of justice, have impelled
him to believe that the proposition should be enforced that the witness requested or invited by the
testator or testatrix to write his or her name to the will, should also subscribed the instrument by
signing thereto his own name and surname; and therefore, with the proper finding in this sense, and
reversal of the judgment appealed from, that the court below should be ordered to proceed with the
probate of the will of the decedent, Maria Salomon, in accordance with the law.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 157451 December 16, 2005

LETICIA VALMONTE ORTEGA, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, Respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The law favors the probate of a will. Upon those who oppose it rests the burden of showing why it
should not be allowed. In the present case, petitioner has failed to discharge this burden
satisfactorily. For this reason, the Court cannot attribute any reversible error on the part of the
appellate tribunal that allowed the probate of the will.

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and
1

set aside the December 12, 2002 Decision and the March 7, 2003 Resolution of the Court of
2 3

Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 44296. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, and the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. In its place judgment is rendered approving and allowing probate to the said last will and
testament of Placido Valmonte and ordering the issuance of letters testamentary to the petitioner
Josefina Valmonte. Let this case be remanded to the court a quo for further and concomitant
proceedings." 4

The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The facts were summarized in the assailed Decision of the CA, as follows:

"x x x: Like so many others before him, Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States
until he finally reached retirement. In 1980, Placido finally came home to stay in the Philippines, and
he lived in the house and lot located at #9200 Catmon St., San Antonio Village, Makati, which he
owned in common with his sister Ciriaca Valmonte and titled in their names in TCT 123468. Two
years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28
years old, in a ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on February 5, 1982. But in a
little more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984 of a cause written down
as COR PULMONALE.
"Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2)
pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains
the entire testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and was signed at the end
or bottom of that page by the testator and on the left hand margin by the three instrumental
witnesses. The second page contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment, and was signed by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again on
the left hand margin. It provides in the body that:

‘LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF PLACIDO VALMONTE IN THE NAME OF THE LORD AMEN:

‘I, PLACIDO VALMONTE, of legal age, married to Josefina Cabansag Valmonte, and a resident of
9200 Catmon Street, Makati, Metro Manila, 83 years of age and being of sound and disposing mind
and memory, do hereby declare this to be my last will and testament:

1. It is my will that I be buried in the Catholic Cemetery, under the auspices of the Catholic Church in
accordance with the rites and said Church and that a suitable monument to be erected and provided
my by executrix (wife) to perpetuate my memory in the minds of my family and friends;

2. I give, devise and bequeath unto my loving wife, JOSEFINA C. VALMONTE, one half (1/2) portion
of the follow-described properties, which belongs to me as [co-owner]:

a. Lot 4-A, Block 13 described on plan Psd-28575, LRC, (GLRO), situated in Makati, Metro Manila,
described and covered by TCT No. 123468 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro-Manila
registered jointly as co-owners with my deceased sister (Ciriaca Valmonte), having share and share
alike;

b. 2-storey building standing on the above-described property, made of strong and mixed materials
used as my residence and my wife and located at No. 9200 Catmon Street, Makati, Metro Manila
also covered by Tax Declaration No. A-025-00482, Makati, Metro-Manila, jointly in the name of my
deceased sister, Ciriaca Valmonte and myself as co-owners, share and share alike or equal co-
owners thereof;

3. All the rest, residue and remainder of my real and personal properties, including my savings
account bank book in USA which is in the possession of my nephew, and all others whatsoever and
wherever found, I give, devise and bequeath to my said wife, Josefina C. Valmonte;

4. I hereby appoint my wife, Josefina C. Valmonte as sole executrix of my last will and testament,
and it is my will that said executrix be exempt from filing a bond;

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 15th day of June 1983 in Quezon City,
Philippines.’

"The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the grounds that:

1. Petitioner failed to allege all assets of the testator, especially those found in the USA;

2. Petitioner failed to state the names, ages, and residences of the heirs of the testator; or to give
them proper notice pursuant to law;

3. Will was not executed and attested as required by law and legal solemnities and formalities were
not complied with;
4. Testator was mentally incapable to make a will at the time of the alleged execution he being in an
advance sate of senility;

5. Will was executed under duress, or the influence of fear or threats;

6. Will was procured by undue and improper influence and pressure on the part of the petitioner
and/or her agents and/or assistants; and/or

7. Signature of testator was procured by fraud, or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument
should be his will at the time of affixing his signature thereto;’

and she also opposed the appointment as Executrix of Josefina alleging her want of understanding
and integrity.

"At the hearing, the petitioner Josefina testified and called as witnesses the notary public Atty. Floro
Sarmiento who prepared and notarized the will, and the instrumental witnesses spouses Eugenio
Gomez, Jr. and Feliza Gomez and Josie Collado. For the opposition, the oppositor Leticia and her
daughter Mary Jane Ortega testified.

"According to Josefina after her marriage with the testator they lived in her parents house at
Salingcob, Bacnotan, La Union but they came to Manila every month to get his $366.00 monthly
pension and stayed at the said Makati residence. There were times though when to shave off on
expenses, the testator would travel alone. And it was in one of his travels by his lonesome self when
the notarial will was made. The will was witnessed by the spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez, who
were their wedding sponsors, and by Josie Collado. Josefina said she had no knowledge of the
existence of the last will and testament of her husband, but just serendipitously found it in his attache
case after his death. It was only then that she learned that the testator bequeathed to her his
properties and she was named the executrix in the said will. To her estimate, the value of property
both real and personal left by the testator is worth more or less P100,000.00. Josefina declared too
that the testator never suffered mental infirmity because despite his old age he went alone to the
market which is two to three kilometers from their home cooked and cleaned the kitchen and
sometimes if she could not accompany him, even traveled to Manila alone to claim his monthly
pension. Josefina also asserts that her husband was in good health and that he was hospitalized
only because of a cold but which eventually resulted in his death.

"Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the testator’s will, testified that it was
in the first week of June 1983 when the testator together with the three witnesses of the will went to
his house cum law office and requested him to prepare his last will and testament. After the testator
instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to
come back on June 15, 1983 to give him time to prepare it. After he had prepared the will the notary
public kept it safely hidden and locked in his drawer. The testator and his witnesses returned on the
appointed date but the notary public was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to come
back on August 9, 1983, and which they did. Before the testator and his witnesses signed the
prepared will, the notary public explained to them each and every term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect
which the testator spoke and understood. He likewise explained that though it appears that the will
was signed by the testator and his witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been
executed had he not gone out of town, the formal execution was actually on August 9, 1983. He
reasoned that he no longer changed the typewritten date of June 15, 1983 because he did not like
the document to appear dirty. The notary public also testified that to his observation the testator was
physically and mentally capable at the time he affixed his signature on the will.
"The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated the testimony of the notary public, and testified that
the testator went alone to the house of spouses Eugenio and Feliza Gomez at GSIS Village, Quezon
City and requested them to accompany him to the house of Atty. Floro Sarmiento purposely for his
intended will; that after giving his instructions to Atty. Floro Sarmiento, they were told to return on
June 15, 1983; that they returned on June 15, 1983 for the execution of the will but were asked to
come back instead on August 9, 1983 because of the absence of the notary public; that the testator
executed the will in question in their presence while he was of sound and disposing mind and that he
was strong and in good health; that the contents of the will was explained by the notary public in the
Ilocano and Tagalog dialect and that all of them as witnesses attested and signed the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other. And that during the execution, the testator’s wife,
Josefina was not with them.

"The oppositor Leticia declared that Josefina should not inherit alone because aside from her there
are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him. She
attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution of the notarial
will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind. She knew whereof she
spoke because in 1983 Placido lived in the Makati residence and asked Leticia’s family to live with
him and they took care of him. During that time, the testator’s physical and mental condition showed
deterioration, aberrations and senility. This was corroborated by her daughter Mary Jane Ortega for
whom Placido took a fancy and wanted to marry.

"Sifting through the evidence, the court a quo held that [t]he evidence adduced, reduces the
opposition to two grounds, namely:

1. Non-compliance with the legal solemnities and formalities in the execution and attestation of the
will; and

2. Mental incapacity of the testator at the time of the execution of the will as he was then in an
advanced state of senility

"It then found these grounds extant and proven, and accordingly disallowed probate." 5

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the trial court, the appellate court admitted the will of Placido Valmonte to probate. The CA
upheld the credibility of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses who had acknowledged the
due execution of the will. Moreover, it held that the testator had testamentary capacity at the time of
the execution of the will. It added that his "sexual exhibitionism and unhygienic, crude and impolite
ways" did not make him a person of unsound mind.
6

Hence, this Petition. 7

Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

"I.

Whether or not the findings of the probate court are entitled to great respect.

"II.
Whether or not the signature of Placido Valmonte in the subject will was procured by fraud or
trickery, and that Placido Valmonte never intended that the instrument should be his last will and
testament.

"III.

Whether or not Placido Valmonte has testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the
subject will."
8

In short, petitioner assails the CA’s allowance of the probate of the will of Placido Valmonte.

This Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:

Probate of a Will

At the outset, we stress that only questions of law may be raised in a Petition for Review under
Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. As an exception, however, the evidence presented during
the trial may be examined and the factual matters resolved by this Court when, as in the instant
case, the findings of fact of the appellate court differ from those of the trial court.
9

The fact that public policy favors the probate of a will does not necessarily mean that every will
presented for probate should be allowed. The law lays down the procedures and requisites that must
be satisfied for the probate of a will. Verily, Article 839 of the Civil Code states the instances when a
10

will may be disallowed, as follows:

"Article 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:

(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;

(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will, at the time of its
execution;

(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence of fear, or threats;

(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence, on the part of the beneficiary or
of some other person;

(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud;

(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will
at the time of affixing his signature thereto."

In the present case, petitioner assails the validity of Placido Valmonte’s will by imputing fraud in its
execution and challenging the testator’s state of mind at the time.

Existence of Fraud in the

Execution of a Will

Petitioner does not dispute the due observance of the formalities in the execution of the will, but
maintains that the circumstances surrounding it are indicative of the existence of fraud. Particularly,
she alleges that respondent, who is the testator’s wife and sole beneficiary, conspired with the notary
public and the three attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly
reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the will.

Petitioner contends that it was "highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young life [to] almost
immediately plunge into marriage with a man who [was] thrice her age x x x and who happened to
be [a] Fil-American pensionado," thus casting doubt on the intention of respondent in seeking the
11

probate of the will. Moreover, it supposedly "defies human reason, logic and common
experience" for an old man with a severe psychological condition to have willingly signed a last will
12

and testament.

We are not convinced. Fraud "is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the
subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the
nature or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in
consequence of the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for
the fraud, he would not have made." 13

We stress that the party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the
time of its execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a
14

showing of credible evidence of fraud. Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving
15

allegations of petitioner, no evidence of fraud was ever presented.

It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a
will. That the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact that he
16

had instituted his wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and
disregarded petitioner and her family, who were the ones who had taken "the cudgels of taking care
of [the testator] in his twilight years."
17

Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing on the
will does not invalidate the document, "because the law does not even require that a [notarial] will x x
x be executed and acknowledged on the same occasion." More important, the will must be
18

subscribed by the testator, as well as by three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it
in the presence of the testator and of one another. Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must
19

acknowledge the will before a notary public. In any event, we agree with the CA that "the variance in
20

the dates of the will as to its supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively
explained by the notary public and the instrumental witnesses." 21

The pertinent transcript of stenographic notes taken on June 11, 1985, November 25, 1985, October
13, 1986, and October 21, 1987 -- as quoted by the CA -- are reproduced respectively as follows:

"Atty. Floro Sarmiento:

Q You typed this document exhibit C, specifying the date June 15 when the testator and his
witnesses were supposed to be in your office?

A Yes sir.
Q On June 15, 1983, did the testator and his witnesses come to your house?

A They did as of agreement but unfortunately, I was out of town.

xxxxxxxxx

Q The document has been acknowledged on August 9, 1983 as per acknowledgement appearing
therein. Was this the actual date when the document was acknowledged?

A Yes sir.

Q What about the date when the testator and the three witnesses affixed their respective signature
on the first and second pages of exhibit C?

A On that particular date when it was acknowledged, August 9, 1983.

Q Why did you not make the necessary correction on the date appearing on the body of the
document as well as the attestation clause?

A Because I do not like anymore to make some alterations so I put it in my own handwriting August
9, 1983 on the acknowledgement. (tsn, June 11, 1985, pp. 8-10)

Eugenio Gomez:

Q It appears on the first page Mr. Witness that it is dated June 15, 1983, whereas in the
acknowledgement it is dated August 9, 1983, will you look at this document and tell us this
discrepancy in the date?

A We went to Atty. Sarmiento together with Placido Valmonte and the two witnesses; that was first
week of June and Atty. Sarmiento told us to return on the 15th of June but when we returned, Atty.
Sarmiento was not there.

Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento on June 15, 1983, did you again go back?

A We returned on the 9th of August and there we signed.

Q This August 9, 1983 where you said it is there where you signed, who were your companions?

A The two witnesses, me and Placido Valmonte. (tsn, November 25, 1985, pp. 7-8)

Felisa Gomez on cross-examination:

Q Why did you have to go to the office of Atty. Floro Sarmiento, three times?

xxxxxxxxx

A The reason why we went there three times is that, the first week of June was out first time. We
went there to talk to Atty. Sarmiento and Placido Valmonte about the last will and testament. After
that what they have talked what will be placed in the testament, what Atty. Sarmiento said was that
he will go back on the 15th of June. When we returned on June 15, Atty. Sarmiento was not there so
we were not able to sign it, the will. That is why, for the third time we went there on August 9 and that
was the time we affixed our signature. (tsn, October 13, 1986, pp. 4-6)

Josie Collado:

Q When you did not find Atty. Sarmiento in his house on June 15, 1983, what transpired?

A The wife of Atty. Sarmiento told us that we will be back on August 9, 1983.

Q And on August 9, 1983 did you go back to the house of Atty. Sarmiento?

A Yes, Sir.

Q For what purpose?

A Our purpose is just to sign the will.

Q Were you able to sign the will you mentioned?

A Yes sir. (tsn, October 21, 1987, pp. 4-5)" 22

Notably, petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of a "grand conspiracy" in the commission of a
fraud. There was no showing that the witnesses of the proponent stood to receive any benefit from
the allowance of the will. The testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses and the notary are
credible evidence of its due execution. Their testimony favoring it and the finding that it was
23

executed in accordance with the formalities required by law should be affirmed, absent any showing
of ill motives.
24

Capacity to Make a Will

In determining the capacity of the testator to make a will, the Civil Code gives the following
guidelines:

"Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its
execution.

"Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his
reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or shattered by disease, injury
or other cause.

"It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the
estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.

"Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the
contrary.

"The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is
on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before
making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will
must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval."
According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be
considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the
proper objects of the testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this
test to the present case, we find that the appellate court was correct in holding that Placido had
testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.

It must be noted that despite his advanced age, he was still able to identify accurately the kinds of
property he owned, the extent of his shares in them and even their locations. As regards the proper
objects of his bounty, it was sufficient that he identified his wife as sole beneficiary. As we have
stated earlier, the omission of some relatives from the will did not affect its formal validity. There
being no showing of fraud in its execution, intent in its disposition becomes irrelevant.

Worth reiterating in determining soundness of mind is Alsua-Betts v. CA, which held thus:
25

"Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which unquestionably carries with it
full testamentary capacity, and that degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or
idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or incapacity and while on one hand it has
been held that mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from age, will
not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or feebleminded person may make a valid
will, provided he has understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about to
do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it
is not necessary that the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise. It
has been held that testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall actually
be insane or of unsound mind." 26

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 211972 July 22, 2015

WILSON GO and PETER GO, Petitioners,

vs.
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE FELISA TAMIO DE BUENA VENTURA, represented by
RESURRECCION A. BIHIS, RHEA A. BIHIS, and REGINA A. BIHIS; and RESURRECCION A.
BIHIS, RHEA A. BIHIS and REGINA A. BIHIS, in their personal capacities, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 212045

ELLA A. GUERRERO, DELFIN A. GUERRERO, JR. and LESTER ALVIN A.
GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE FELISA TAMIO DE BUENA VENTURA, herein represented by
RESURRECION A. BIHIS, RHEA A. BIHIS and REGINA A. BIHIS, and RESURRECION A. BIHIS,
RHEA A. BIHIS and REGINA A. BIHIS, in their personal capacities, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari are the Decision dated December
1 2 3

19, 2013 and the Resolution dated April 1, 2014 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
4

CV No. 96697, which modified the Decision dated June 8, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of
5

Quezon City, Branch 224 (RTC) in Civil Case No. Q-97-32515, and thereby ordered: (a) the
nullification of the Deed of Sale dated January 23, 1997 in favor of Wilson Go (Wilson) and Peter Go
(Peter), petitioners in G.R. No. 211972; (b) the reconveyance of the disputed property to the Estate
of Felisa Tamio; and (c) the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-1704 75, as well
as the issuance of a new title in the name of the Estate of Felisa Tamio by the Register of Deeds.

The Facts

On March 17, 1959, the late Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura (Felisa) purchased from Carmen
Zaragosa, Inc. a parcel of land with an area of 533 square meters, more or less, situated at Retiro
corner Kanlaon Streets, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City (subject property) and, thus, TCT No.
45951/T-233 was issued in her name. Thereafter, she constructed a three-storey building thereon,
called D'Lourds Building, where she resided until her death on February 19, 1994. On February 10,
6

1960, Felisa supposedly sold the subject property to one of her daughters, Bella Guerrero (Bella),
the latter's husband, Delfin Guerrero, Sr. (Delfin, Sr.), and Felimon Buenaventura, Sr. (Felimon, Sr.),
Felisa's common-law husband. Bella, co-petitioner in G.R. No. 212045, and Delfin, Sr. paid
7

₱15,000.00 as consideration therefor. Thus, TCT No. 45951/T-233 in the name of Felisa was
8

cancelled and TCT No. 49869 was issued in the names of Felimon, Sr. and Bella, married to Delfin,
9

Sr..

Sometime in 1968, Resurrecion A. Bihis (Resurrecion), the other daughter of Felisa, sister of Bella,
10

and respondent in both G.R. Nos. 211972 a nd 212045, began to occupy the second floor of the
D'Lourds Building and stayed therein until her death in 2007. 11

As it appears that TCT No. 49869 in the names of Felimon, Sr. and Bella, married to Delfin, Sr., was
irretrievably destroyed in the interim, Bella caused its reconstitution and was issued TCT No. RT-
74910 (49869), again registered in their names.
12

When Felisa died on February 19, 1994, she allegedly bequeathed, in a disputed last will and
testament, half of the subject property to Resurrecion and her daughters, Rhea A. Bihis (Rhea) and
Regina A. Bihis (Regina), corespondents in both G.R. Nos. 211972 and 212045 (collectively, the
Bihis Family). Thus, on April 19, 1994, the Bihis Family caused the annotation of an adverse claim
on TCT No. RT-74910 (49869). Felisa's purported will likewise declared Bella as the administrator of
the subject property.13

On the strength of such appointment, Bella filed, on May 24, 1994, a petition for the probate of
Felisa's will. She was eventually appointed as the administratrix of the Estate of Felisa and, in an
inventory of Felisa's properties, Bella included the subject property as part of said estate.
14
On January 22, 1997, the adverse claim of the Bihis Family was cancelled. The following day,
January 23, 1997, Felimon Buenaventura, Jr. (Felimon, Jr.) and Teresita Robles, a.k.a. Rosalina
Buenaventura Mariano (Teresita), apparently the heirs of Felimon, Sr. (Heirs of Felimon, Sr.),
15

executed a purported Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Felimon Buenaventura, Sr., and
caused its annotation on TCT No. RT-74910 (49869). By virtue thereof, TCT No. RT-74910 (49869)
was cancelled and TCT No. N-170416 was issued in the names of the Heirs of Felimon, Sr., Bella,
and her co-petitioners in G.R. No. 212045, Delfin A. Guerrero, Jr. (Delfin, Jr.) and Lester Alvin A.
Guerrero (Lester) (collectively, Bella, et al.).
16

On the very same day, January 23, 1997, through a Deed of Sale of even date, the subject property
was sold to Wilson and Peter by Bella, et al. for the amount of ₱4,500,000.00, a transaction
completely unknown to Felisa's other heirs, the Bihis Family. Thus, TCT No. N-170416 was
cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 170475 was issued in the names of Wilson and Peter.
Thereafter, Wilson and Peter filed ejectment cases against the occupants and/or lessees of the
subject property.17

In July 1997, the probate court revoked the appointment of Bella as administratrix of the Estate of
Felisa and eventually, granted letters of administration to Resurrecion. Hence, on October 17, 1997,
18

herein respondents, the Estate of Felisa, as represented by the Bihis Family, and the Bihis Family, in
their personal capacities (collectively, respondents), filed a complaint for reconveyance and
damages before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-32515, against Bella, et al., Wilson,
Peter, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, alleging that Felisa, during her lifetime, merely
entrusted the subject property to Felimon, Sr., Bella, and Delfin, Sr. for the purpose of assisting Bella
and Delfin, Sr. to obtain a loan and mortgage from the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS). To facilitate the transaction, Felisa agreed to have the title over the subject property
transferred to Bella and Felimon, Sr. However, Felisa never divested herself of her ownership over
the subject property, as evidenced by her continuous residence thereon, as well as her act of leasing
several units to various tenants. In fact, in a letter dated September 21, 1970 (September 21, 1970
19

letter) addressed to Delfin, Sr., Felisa reminded Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. that the subject
property was merely entrusted to them for Bella and Delfin, Sr. to procure a loan from the GSIS. At 20

the bottom of the letter, Bella's and Delfin, Sr.' s signatures appear beside their names. 21

Likewise, respondents alleged that Wilson and Peter were buyers in bad faith, as they were aware of
the facts and circumstances that would have warranted further inquiry into the validity of the title of
the sellers, Bella, et al. They averred that Wilson and Peter knew that the building was occupied by
individuals other than the sellers, as in fact, the Bihis Family was residing therein.
22

In their defense, Bella and Felimon, Jr. claimed that the subject property was owned by Bella and
(the late) Felimon, Sr., as evidenced by TCT No. RT-74910 (49869), which title was issued to them
as early as February 10, 1960. Such title has therefore subsisted for almost thirty seven (37) years
without having been voided or nullified by a court decree. Moreover, they have exercised acts of
ownership over the subject property, such as m01igaging the same and leasing the building to third
parties. Finally, they asserted that Bella's act of including the subject property in the inventory of
properties of the Estate of Felisa was merely because of inadvertence. 23

For his part, Wilson claimed that when he and his brother, Peter, purchased the subject property
from Bella, et al. on January 23, 1997, he was not aware of the judicial settlement of the Estate of
Felisa. He testified that before they acquired the subject property, he verified the validity of the title
covering the same with the Registry of Deeds, and that a period of two (2) months had lapsed before
the sale was consummated because his lawyer advised him to request Bella to cancel the
encumbrance annotated on the title over the subject property. However, he asserted that .his lawyer
merely advised him to ask for the cancellation of the annotation but he was not aware of the details
surrounding the same. Eventually, the annotation was cancelled and that he only knew that the
subject property was included in the Estate of Felisa when herein respondents' complaint before the
RTC was filed. As such, he maintained that he and Peter were purchasers in good faith. 24

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision dated June 8, 2009, the RTC found that there was an implied trust between Felisa, on
25

the one hand, and Bella and Felimon, Sr., on the other, created by operation of law. The RTC
concluded that it was the intention of the late Felisa to merely entrust to Bella and Felimon, Sr. the
subject property for the sole purpose of using the same as collateral to secure a loan with the GSIS.
As such, while it is true that a title was issued in the names of Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. by
virtue of the sale of the subject property to them, it was clear that Felisa never intended to relinquish
her ownership over the subject property. In concluding so, the RTC gave probative weight to the
September 21, 1970 letter executed and signed by Felisa which not only reminded Bella, Delfin, Sr.,
and Felimon, Sr. that the subject property was merely entrusted to them for purposes of securing a
loan from the GSIS, but also expressed Felisa's desire to have the subject property divided equally
among her heirs. 26

However, the R TC held that reconveyance can no longer be effected since the subject property had
already been transferred to Wilson and Peter, whom it found to be purchasers in good faith. The
RTC found that through Wilson's testimony, they were able to disprove respondents' allegation that
they were aware of an infirmity in the title of the sellers when they acquired the subject property.27

Consequently, as Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. were unjustly enriched at the expense of the
respondents who, as compulsory heirs, were also entitled to their share in the subject property, the
RTC directed Bella, et al. to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the amounts of: (a) ₱2,000,000.00 as
compensatory damages, representing half of the purchase price of the subject property considering
that reconveyance can no longer be granted; (b) ₱200,000.00 as moral damages; (c) ₱100,000.00
as exemplary damages; and (d) ₱200,000.00 as attorney's fees. 28

Dissatisfied, the following parties filed their separate appeals before the CA: the Estate of Felisa; the
Bihis Family; the Estate of Rosalinda B. Mariano; and Bella, Delfin, Jr., and Lester. The CA
29 30

simplified the issues raised in the separate appeals, as follows: (a) whether or not there was a trust
established by Felisa in favor of Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr.; (b) whether or not the action for
reconveyance had already prescribed; and (c) whether or not Wilson and Peter are purchasers in
good faith.31

The CA Ruling

In a Decision dated December 19, 2013, the CA modified the RTC Decision, and thereby ordered:
32

(a) the nullification of the Deed of Sale dated January 23, 1997 in favor of Wilson and Peter; ( b) the
reconveyance of the disputed property to the Estate of Felisa; and (c) the cancellation of TCT No. N-
170475 in the name of Wilson and Peter, as well as the issuance of a new title in the name of the
Estate of Felisa by the Register of Deeds. 33

In its ruling, the CA upheld the RTC's finding that an implied trust was constituted between Felisa,
during her lifetime, and Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. when the former sold the subject property
to the latter. Like the RTC, it gave substantial weight and credence to the September 21, 1970 letter
executed by Felisa which expressed her intention to convey the subject property to Bella, Delfin, Sr.,
and Felimon, Sr. only for the purpose of obtaining a loan from the GSIS. The CA similarly found that
Felisa had not intended to relinquish her ownership over the subject property in their favor, as
evidenced not only by the said letter but also by her contemporaneous and subsequent acts of
ownership, i.e., leasing the building to tenants, instituting ejectment suits, having business permits
issued in her name, and including the subject property in her last will and testament. 34

Moreover, the CA ruled that the issuance of TCT No. 49869 in the names of Bella, Delfin, Sr., and
Felimon, Sr. did not operate to vest ownership of the subject property upon them, as a certificate of
title is not equivalent to title. Hence, the presentation of TCT No. 49869 does not conclusively prove
their claim of ownership over the subject property. 35

With respect to the issue of whether or not the action for reconveyance based on an implied trust
had already prescribed, the CA found that prescription has not set in. Citing jurisprudence, it held
that an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in ten ( 10) years, to be
counted from the date of issuance of the Torrens title over the property. However, the rule applies
only when the claimant or the person enforcing the trust is not in possession of the property. When
the claimant is in actual possession of the property, the action for reconveyance, which is effectively
an action for quieting of title, is imprescriptible. In this case, it has been indubitably established that
the Bihis Family have been in actual possession of the subject property; hence, their action for
reconveyance is imprescriptible. 36

Finally, with regard to the question of whether or not Wilson and Peter are purchasers in good faith,
the CA ruled in the negative. It took into consideration the admission made by Wilson that he has
knowledge of the adverse claim of the Bihis Family annotated on the title of the subject property but
denied knowledge of its contents. Likewise, he admitted that he directed his lawyer to have the said
annotation cancelled before purchasing the subject property. Records also show that he knew that
the Bihis Family have been occupying the second floor of the D'Lourds Building. However, despite
knowledge of the foregoing facts, he and his brother failed to make the necessary inquiries as to the
validity of the title of the sellers, Bella, et al. Consequently, he and Peter cannot be considered as
buyers in good faith.37

Wilson and Peter, Bella, Delfin, Jr., and Lester, Felimon, Jr., and the Estate of Rosalinda
Buenaventura Mariano filed separate motions for reconsideration, which were all denied in the
38

Resolution dated April 1, 2014; hence, these petitions.

39

The Issues Before the Court

The issues advanced for the Court's consideration are: (a) whether or not the CA erred in ruling that
there was an implied trust created between Felisa, on one hand, and Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon,
Sr., on the other; (b) whether or not the action for reconveyance had not yet prescribed; and (c)
whether or not Wilson and Peter are purchasers in good faith.

The Court's Ruling

The petitions are bereft of merit.

The following facts are undisputed: in 1960, Felisa, as owner of the subject property, transferred the
same to her daughter Bella, married to Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. to assist them in procuring a loan
from the GSIS. In view thereof, her title over the property, TCT No. 45951/T-233, was cancelled and
a new one, TCT No. 49869, was issued in the names of Bella, married to Delfin, Sr., and Felimon,
Sr. After it was lost, TCT No. 49869 was reconstituted and TCT No. RT-74910 (49869) was issued in
their names.
Upon Felisa's death in 1994, the Bihis Family, Felisa's other heirs who have long been occupying the
subject property, caused the annotation of their adverse claim over the same on TCT No. RT-74910
(49869). Subsequently, however, or on January 22, 1997, the said annotation was cancelled, and
the next day, the Heirs of Felimon, Sr. executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of his estate and caused
its annotation on said title. TCT No. RT-74910 (49869) was then cancelled and TCT No. N-170416
was issued in the names of Bella, et al. Finally, by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated January 23, 1997,
the subject property was sold to Wilson and Peter, in whose names TCT No. 170475 currently exists.
Months later, or on October 17, 1997, the complaint for reconveyance and damages, docketed as
40

Civil Case No. Q-97-32515, was instituted.

From the foregoing factual milieu, the Court holds that: one, a trust was established between Felisa,
on the one hand, and Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr., on the other, albeit not an implied trust as
concluded by the RTC and the CA but an express one; two, the present action for reconveyance has
not yet prescribed; and, three, Wilson and Peter are not purchasers in good faith.

I.

Trust is the right to the beneficial enjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in another. It
is a fiduciary relationship that obliges the trustee to deal with the property for the benefit of the
beneficiary. Trust relations between parties may either be express or implied. An express trust is
1âwphi1

created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, while an implied trust comes into being by
operation of law. 41

Express trusts are created by direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed, or will,
or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create a trust. Under Article 1444 of
the Civil Code, "[n]o particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being
sufficient that a trust is clearly intended." It is possible to create a trust without using the word "trust"
or "trustee." Conversely, the mere fact that these words are used does not necessarily indicate an
intention to create a trust. The question in each case is whether the trustor manifested an intention
to create the kind of relationship which to lawyers is known as trust. It is immaterial whether or not
he knows that the relationship which he intends to create is called a trust, and whether or not he
knows the precise characteristics of the relationship which is called a trust. 42

Further, in the case of Tamayo v. Callejo, the Court recognized that a trust may have a constructive
43

or implied nature in the beginning, but the registered owner's subsequent express acknowledgement
in a public document of a previous sale of the property to another party effectively converted the
same into an express trust. 44

In the present case, both the R TC and the CA found that an implied trust was established, heavily
giving credence, among others, to the September 21, 1970 letter executed by Felisa during her
lifetime, which partly reads:

Dear Delfin,

Ipinaaabot ko sa iyo ang sulat kong ito upang malaman mo ang aking nagiging damdamin. Hinihiling
ko sa iyo at ipinakikiusap sa iyo tungkol doon sa late at building ng D 'lourds.

Hindi naman kaila sa ivo kung papaano ko ito naisalin sa inyong pangalan nina Filemon C.
Buenaventura Sr., Bella Alvarez Guerrero at Delfin Guerrero Sr. Ang dahilan nito ay dahil sa pag-
utang sa GSIS.
Kaya gusto kong malaman mo na ito ay nagpapatotoo na ito ay sarili kong pag-aari at walang
sinumang nagbigay o tumulong sa akin sa lupang ito. At maski si Ka Fe ling mo ay walang naibigay
na pera dito.

Kaya hinihiling ko ang gusto kong mangyari sa ngayon ay maging kaparehong-kapareho ang
paghahati ng bawat isa sa anumang aking kabuhayan.

Kaya hinihiling ko sa iyo Delfin na kung maaari lamang ay ang lahat ng nakatala dito ay pirmahan
ninyo.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

45

Beneath the letter appear the signatures of Bella and Delfin, and the signature of Felisa signing as
"MOMMY" as well. 46

Taking the contents of the foregoing letter into consideration – the validity and due execution of
which were never put in issue, hence, indubitably established - the Court therefore differs from the
finding of the courts a quo that an implied trust was established; instead, the Court rules that an
express trust was duly proved in this case.

The words of Felisa in the above-quoted letter unequivocally and absolutely declared her intention of
transferring the title over the subject property to Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. in order to merely
accommodate them in securing a loan from the GSIS. She likewise stated clearly that she was
retaining her ownership over the subject property and articulated her wish to have her heirs share
equally therein. Hence, while in the beginning, an implied trust was merely created between Felisa,
as trustor, and Bella, Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr., as both trustees and beneficiaries, the execution
of the September 21, 1970 letter settled, once and for all, the nature of the trust established between
them as an express one, their true intention irrefutably extant thereon.

Bella's attempt to thwart the express trust established in this case by claiming that she affixed her
signature on the September 21, 1970 letter only "to appease" her mother, Felisa, and that she could
afford to sign the letter since the title covering the subject property was in their name as owners
anyway, does not hold water. As correctly ruled by the CA, citing Lee Tek Sheng v. CA, the "[m]ere
47 48

issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the
real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the ce1iificate or that the
registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the
issuance of the certificate of title," as in this case. Registration does not vest title; it is merely the
49 50

evidence of such title. Moreover, the Court notes that even during the proceedings before the RTC,
51

Bella never denied the purpose for which the sale to them of the subject property was effected.
Instead, they relied heavily and anchored their defense on the existence of their certificate of title
covering the subject property, which, to reiterate, was insufficient to prove their ownership over the
same independent of the express trust.

In light of the foregoing, while the Court agrees with the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that Bella,
Delfin, Sr., and Felimon, Sr. only hold the subject property in trust for Felisa, the Court however finds
that an express trust, not an implied one, was established in this case.

II.
Anent the issue of prescription, the Court finds that the action for reconveyance instituted by
respondents has not yet prescribed, following the jurisprudential rule that express trusts prescribe in
ten (10) years from the time the trust is repudiated.
52

In this case, there was a repudiation of the express trust when Bella, as the remaining trustee, sold
the subject property to Wilson and Peter on January 23, 1997. As the complaint for reconveyance
53

and damages was filed by respondents on October 17, 1997, or only a few months after the sale of
54

the subject property to Wilson and Peter, it cannot be said that the same has prescribed.

III.

Finally, with regard to the question of whether or not Wilson and Peter are purchasers of the subject
property in good faith, the Court concurs with the CA' s finding that they are not.

A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to, or an interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at
the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of some other person's claim or interest in the
property. Corollary thereto, when a piece of land is in the actual possession of persons other than
55

the seller, the buyer must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in possession. Without
making such inquiry, one cannot claim that he is a buyer in good faith. When a man proposes to buy
or deal with realty, his duty is to read the public manuscript, that is, to look and see who is there
upon it and what his rights are. A want of caution and diligence, which an honest man of ordinary
prudence is accustomed to exercise in making purchases, is in contemplation of law, a want of good
faith. The buyer who has failed to know or discover that the land sold to him is in adverse possession
of another is a buyer in bad faith.
56

In his testimony before the R TC, Wilson claimed to have verified the validity of the title covering the
57

subject property before the Registry of Deeds. However, he also admitted that two (2) months had
lapsed before the sale could be consummated because his lawyer advised him to request Bella, one
of the sellers, to cancel the encumbrance annotated on the title of the subject property. He also
claimed that he had no knowledge about the details of such annotation, and that he was aware that
individuals other than the sellers were in possession of the subject property.

As aptly concluded by the CA, such knowledge of the existence of an annotation on the title covering
the subject property and of the occupation thereof by individuals other than the sellers negates any
presumption of good faith on the part of Wilson and Peter when they purchased the subject property.
A person who deliberately ignores a significant fact which would create suspicion in an otherwise
reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for value, as in this case.
58

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated December 19, 2013 and the
Resolution dated April 1, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96697 are hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 189984 November 12, 2012

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT
OF ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ RICHARD B. LOPEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DIANA JEANNE LOPEZ, MARYBETH DE LEON and VICTORIA L. TUAZON, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the March 30, 2009 Decision and October 22, 2009
1

Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 87064 which affirmed the August 26,
2

2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42 (RTC), in SP. Proc. No. 99-95225
3

disallowing the probate of the Last Will and Testament of Enrique S. Lopez.

The Factual Antecedents

On June 21, 1999, Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy B. Lopez, and their four
legitimate children, namely, petitioner Richard B. Lopez (Richard) and the respondents Diana
Jeanne Lopez (Diana), Marybeth de Leon (Marybeth) and Victoria L. Tuazon (Victoria) as
compulsory heirs. Before Enrique’s death, he executed a Last Will and Testament on August 10,
4

1996 and constituted Richard as his executor and administrator.

On September 27, 1999, Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will and
Testament before the RTC of Manila with prayer for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor.
Marybeth opposed the petition contending that the purported last will and testament was not
executed and attested as required by law, and that it was procured by undue and improper pressure
and influence on the part of Richard. The said opposition was also adopted by Victoria.

After submitting proofs of compliance with jurisdictional requirements, Richard presented the
attesting witnesses, namely: Reynaldo Maneja; Romulo Monteiro; Ana Maria Lourdes Manalo
(Manalo); and the notary public who notarized the will, Atty. Perfecto Nolasco (Atty. Nolasco). The
instrumental witnesses testified that after the late Enrique read and signed the will on each and
every page, they also read and signed the same in the latter's presence and of one another.
Photographs of the incident were taken and presented during trial. Manalo further testified that she
was the one who prepared the drafts and revisions from Enrique before the final copy of the will was
made.

Likewise, Atty. Nolasco claimed that Enrique had been his client for more than 20 years. Prior to
August 10, 1996, the latter consulted him in the preparation of the subject will and furnished him the
list of his properties for distribution among his children. He prepared the will in accordance with
Enrique's instruction and that before the latter and the attesting witnesses signed it in the presence
of one another, he translated the will which was written in English to Filipino and added that Enrique
was in good health and of sound mind at that time.
On the other hand, the oppositors presented its lone witness, Gregorio B. Paraon (Paraon), Officer-
in-Charge of the Notarial Section, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Manila. His testimony centered
mainly on their findings that Atty. Nolasco was not a notary public for the City of Manila in 1996,
which on cross examination was clarified after Paraon discovered that Atty. Nolasco was
commissioned as such for the years 1994 to 1997.

Ruling of the RTC

In the Decision dated August 26, 2005, the RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to
5

comply with Article 805 of the Civil Code which requires a statement in the attestation clause of the
number of pages used upon which the will is written. It held that while Article 809 of the same Code
requires mere substantial compliance of the form laid down in Article 805 thereof, the rule only
applies if the number of pages is reflected somewhere else in the will with no evidence aliunde or
extrinsic evidence required. While the acknowledgment portion stated that the will consists of 7
pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written, the RTC
observed that it has 8 pages including the acknowledgment portion. As such, it disallowed the will for
not having been executed and attested in accordance with law.

Aggrieved, Richard filed a Notice of Appeal which the RTC granted in the Order dated October 26,
2005.6

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On March 30, 2009, the CA issued the assailed decision dismissing the appeal. It held that the RTC
7

erroneously granted Richard's appeal as the Rules of Court is explicit that appeals in special
proceedings, as in this case, must be made through a record on appeal. Nevertheless, even on the
merits, the CA found no valid reason to deviate from the findings of the RTC that the failure to state
the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause was fatal. It noted that while Article 809 of
the Civil Code sanctions mere substantial compliance with the formal requirements set forth in Article
805 thereof, there was a total omission of such fact in the attestation clause. Moreover, while the
acknowledgment of the will made mention of "7 pages including the page on which the ratification
and acknowledgment are written," the will had actually 8 pages including the acknowledgment
portion thus, necessitating the presentation of evidence aliunde to explain the discrepancy. Richard's
motion for reconsideration from the decision was likewise denied in the second assailed
Resolution dated October 22, 2009.
8

Hence, the instant petition assailing the propriety of the CA's decision.

Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.

The provisions of the Civil Code on Forms of Wills, particularly, Articles 805 and 809 of the Civil
Code provide:

ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the
will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin,
and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that
the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name,
under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter
witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one
another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to
them. (underscoring supplied)
1âwphi1

ART. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and
influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall
not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial
compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.

The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or
some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. 9

While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause,
Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject
last will and testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and
acknowledgment are written" cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists
10

of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere

examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence aliund. On this score is the
11

comment of Justice J.B.L. Reyes regarding the application of Article 809, to wit:

x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination
of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in
each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All
these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the
attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons
required to sign did so in the presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation
clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
12

Hence, the CA properly sustained the disallowance of the will. Moreover, it correctly ruled that
Richard pursued the wrong mode of appeal as Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court explicitly
provides that in special proceedings, as in this case, the appeal shall be made by record on appeal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-38338 January 28, 1985

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF ANDRES G. DE JESUS AND BIBIANA

ROXAS DE JESUS, SIMEON R. ROXAS & PEDRO ROXAS DE JESUS, petitioners,
vs.
ANDRES R. DE JESUS, JR., respondent.

Raul S. Sison Law Office for petitioners.

Rafael Dinglasan, Jr. for heir M. Roxas.

Ledesma, Guytingco Velasco and Associates for Ledesa and A. R. de Jesus.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the order of respondent Hon. Jose C. Colayco, Presiding
Judge Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI disallowing the probate of the holographic Will of
the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.

The antecedent facts which led to the filing of this petition are undisputed.

After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, Special Proceeding
No. 81503 entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de
Jesus" was filed by petitioner Simeon R. Roxas, the brother of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de
Jesus.

On March 26, 1973, petitioner Simeon R. Roxas was appointed administrator. After Letters of
Administration had been granted to the petitioner, he delivered to the lower court a document
purporting to be the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus. On May 26, 1973,
respondent Judge Jose Colayco set the hearing of the probate of the holographic Win on July 21,
1973.

Petitioner Simeon R. Roxas testified that after his appointment as administrator, he found a
notebook belonging to the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus and that on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24
thereof, a letter-win addressed to her children and entirely written and signed in the handwriting of
the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was found. The will is dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my
win which I want to be respected although it is not written by a lawyer. ...

The testimony of Simeon R. Roxas was corroborated by the testimonies of Pedro Roxas de Jesus
and Manuel Roxas de Jesus who likewise testified that the letter dated "FEB./61 " is the holographic
Will of their deceased mother, Bibiana R. de Jesus. Both recognized the handwriting of their mother
and positively Identified her signature. They further testified that their deceased mother understood
English, the language in which the holographic Will is written, and that the date "FEB./61 " was the
date when said Will was executed by their mother.

Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir filed an "opposition to probate" assailing the
purported holographic Will of Bibiana R. de Jesus because a it was not executed in accordance with
law, (b) it was executed through force, intimidation and/or under duress, undue influence and
improper pressure, and (c) the alleged testatrix acted by mistake and/or did not intend, nor could
have intended the said Will to be her last Will and testament at the time of its execution.

On August 24, 1973, respondent Judge Jose C. Colayco issued an order allowing the probate of the
holographic Will which he found to have been duly executed in accordance with law.

Respondent Luz Roxas de Jesus filed a motion for reconsideration alleging inter alia that the alleged
holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus was not dated as required by Article 810 of the
Civil Code. She contends that the law requires that the Will should contain the day, month and year
of its execution and that this should be strictly complied with.

On December 10, 1973, respondent Judge Colayco reconsidered his earlier order and disallowed
the probate of the holographic Will on the ground that the word "dated" has generally been held to
include the month, day, and year. The dispositive portion of the order reads:

WHEREFORE, the document purporting to be the holographic Will of Bibiana Roxas

de Jesus, is hereby disallowed for not having been executed as required by the law.
The order of August 24, 1973 is hereby set aside.

The only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will of the
deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code which
reads:

ART. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written,
dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form,
and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.

The petitioners contend that while Article 685 of the Spanish Civil Code and Article 688 of the Old
Civil Code require the testator to state in his holographic Win the "year, month, and day of its
execution," the present Civil Code omitted the phrase Año mes y dia and simply requires that the
holographic Will should be dated. The petitioners submit that the liberal construction of the
holographic Will should prevail.

Respondent Luz Henson on the other hand submits that the purported holographic Will is void for
non-compliance with Article 810 of the New Civil Code in that the date must contain the year, month,
and day of its execution. The respondent contends that Article 810 of the Civil Code was patterned
after Section 1277 of the California Code and Section 1588 of the Louisiana Code whose Supreme
Courts had consistently ruled that the required date includes the year, month, and day, and that if
any of these is wanting, the holographic Will is invalid. The respondent further contends that the
petitioner cannot plead liberal construction of Article 810 of the Civil Code because statutes
prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of holographic Wills are strictly construed.

We agree with the petitioner.

This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory
requirements regarding the due execution of Wills. We should not overlook the liberal trend of the
Civil Code in the manner of execution of Wills, the purpose of which, in case of doubt is to prevent
intestacy —
 The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the provisions of the law on
wigs in this Project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with
the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, but
with sufficien safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the
exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator.

This objective is in accord with the modem tendency with respect to the formalities in
the execution of wills. (Report of the Code Commission, p. 103)

In Justice Capistrano's concurring opinion in Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos (27 SCRA 327) he
emphasized that:

xxx xxx xxx

... The law has a tender regard for the will of the testator expressed in his last will
and testament on the ground that any disposition made by the testator is better than
that which the law can make. For this reason, intestate succession is nothing more
than a disposition based upon the presumed will of the decedent.

Thus, the prevailing policy is to require satisfaction of the legal requirements in order to guard
against fraud and bad faith but without undue or unnecessary curtailment of testamentary
privilege Icasiano v. Icasiano, 11 SCRA 422). If a Will has been executed in substantial compliance
with the formalities of the law, and the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise thereof is
obviated, said Win should be admitted to probate (Rey v. Cartagena 56 Phil. 282). Thus,

xxx xxx xxx

... More than anything else, the facts and circumstances of record are to be
considered in the application of any given rule. If the surrounding circumstances
point to a regular execution of the wilt and the instrument appears to have been
executed substantially in accordance with the requirements of the law, the inclination
should, in the absence of any suggestion of bad faith, forgery or fraud, lean towards
its admission to probate, although the document may suffer from some imperfection
of language, or other non-essential defect. ... (Leynez v. Leynez 68 Phil. 745).

If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites, although compliance is
not literal, it is sufficient if the objective or purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite is
actually attained by the form followed by the testator.

The purpose of the solemnities surrounding the execution of Wills has been expounded by this Court
in Abangan v. Abanga 40 Phil. 476, where we ruled that:

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to
guaranty their truth and authenticity. ...

In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that of two
competing Wills executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the day on which a
Will was executed (Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no such contingency in this case.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad faith and fraud in
its execution nor was there any substitution of Wins and Testaments. There is no question that the
holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely written, dated, and signed by
the testatrix herself and in a language known to her. There is also no question as to its genuineness
and due execution. All the children of the testatrix agree on the genuineness of the holographic Will
of their mother and that she had the testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of said Will.
The objection interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that the holographic Will is
fatally defective because the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will is not sufficient
compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical to be entertained.

As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its
execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue
influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or
not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the
Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial
compliance.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The order appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the order allowing the probate of the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de
Jesus is reinstated.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 83843-44 April 5, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF MELECIO LABRADOR.

SAGRADO LABRADOR (Deceased), substituted by ROSITA LABRADOR, ENRICA
LABRADOR, and CRISTOBAL LABRADOR, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GAUDENCIO LABRADOR, and JESUS LABRADOR, respondents-
1

appellees.

Benjamin C. Santos Law Offices for petitioners.

Rodrigo V. Fontelera for private respondents.

PARAS, J.:

The sole issue in this case is whether or not the alleged holographic will of one Melecio Labrador
is dated, as provided for in Article 810 of the New Civil Code.
2
The antecedent and relevant facts are as follows: On June 10, 1972, Melecio Labrador died in the
Municipality of Iba, province of Zambales, where he was residing, leaving behind a parcel of land
designated as Lot No. 1916 under Original Certificate of Title No. P-1652, and the following heirs,
namely: Sagrado, Enrica, Cristobal, Jesus, Gaudencio, Josefina, Juliana, Hilaria and Jovita, all
surnamed Labrador, and a holographic will.

On July 28, 1975, Sagrado Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs), Enrica Labrador
and Cristobal Labrador, filed in the court a quo a petition for the probate docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 922-I of the alleged holographic will of the late Melecio Labrador.

Subsequently, on September 30, 1975, Jesus Labrador (now deceased but substituted by his heirs),
and Gaudencio Labrador filed an opposition to the petition on the ground that the will has been
extinguished or revoked by implication of law, alleging therein that on September 30, 1971, that is,
before Melecio's death, for the consideration of Six Thousand (P6,000) Pesos, testator Melecio
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale, selling, transferring and conveying in favor of oppositors Jesus
and Gaudencio Lot No. 1916 and that as a matter of fact, O.C.T. No. P-1652 had been cancelled by
T.C.T. No. T-21178. Earlier however, in 1973, Jesus Labrador sold said parcel of land to Navat for
only Five Thousand (P5,000) Pesos. (Rollo, p. 37)

Sagrado thereupon filed, on November 28, 1975, against his brothers, Gaudencio and Jesus, for the
annulment of said purported Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of land which Sagrado allegedly
had already acquired by devise from their father Melecio Labrador under a holographic will executed
on March 17, 1968, the complaint for annulment docketed as Civil Case No. 934-I, being premised
on the fact that the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale is fictitious.

After both parties had rested and submitted their respective evidence, the trial court rendered a joint
decision dated February 28, 1985, allowing the probate of the holographic will and declaring null and
void the Deed of Absolute sale. The court a quo had also directed the respondents (the defendants
in Civil Case No. 934-I) to reimburse to the petitioners the sum of P5,000.00 representing the
redemption price for the property paid by the plaintiff-petitioner Sagrado with legal interest thereon
from December 20, 1976, when it was paid to vendee a retro.

Respondents appealed the joint decision to the Court of Appeals, which on March 10, 1988 modified
said joint decision of the court a quo by denying the allowance of the probate of the will for being
undated and reversing the order of reimbursement. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the
aforesaid decision was denied by the Court of Appeals, in the resolution of June 13, 1988. Hence,
this petition.

Petitioners now assign the following errors committed by respondent court, to wit:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING AND APPROVING THE PROBATE
OF THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE TESTATOR MELECIO LABRADOR; and

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ORDER OF THE LOWER
COURT DIRECTING THE REIMBURSEMENT OF THE FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
REPRESENTING THE REDEMPTION PRICE WAS ERRONEOUS.
The alleged undated holographic will written in Ilocano translated into English, is quoted as follows:

ENGLISH INTERPRETATION OF THE WILL OF THE

LATE MELECIO LABRADOR WRITTEN IN ILOCANO
BY ATTY. FIDENCIO L. FERNANDEZ

I — First Page

This is also where it appears in writing of the place which is assigned and shared or the
partition in favor of SAGRADO LABRADOR which is the fishpond located and known place
as Tagale.

And this place that is given as the share to him, there is a measurement of more or less one
hectare, and the boundary at the South is the property and assignment share of ENRICA
LABRADOR, also their sister, and the boundary in the West is the sea, known as the SEA as
it is, and the boundary on the NORTH is assignment belonging to CRISTOBAL LABRADOR,
who likewise is also their brother. That because it is now the time for me being now ninety
three (93) years, then I feel it is the right time for me to partition the fishponds which were
and had been bought or acquired by us, meaning with their two mothers, hence there shall
be no differences among themselves, those among brothers and sisters, for it is I myself
their father who am making the apportionment and delivering to each and everyone of them
the said portion and assignment so that there shall not be any cause of troubles or
differences among the brothers and sisters.

II — Second Page

And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the
respective assignment of the said fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day,
in the year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed.
And the one who made this writing is no other than MELECIO LABRADOR, their father.

Now, this is the final disposition that I am making in writing and it is this that should be
followed and complied with in order that any differences or troubles may be forestalled and
nothing will happen along these troubles among my children, and that they will be in good
relations among themselves, brothers and sisters;

And those improvements and fruits of the land; mangoes, bamboos and all coconut trees
and all others like the other kind of bamboo by name of Bayog, it is their right to get if they so
need, in order that there shall be nothing that anyone of them shall complain against the
other, and against anyone of the brothers and sisters.

III — THIRD PAGE

And that referring to the other places of property, where the said property is located, the
same being the fruits of our earnings of the two mothers of my children, there shall be equal
portion of each share among themselves, and or to be benefitted with all those property,
which property we have been able to acquire.

That in order that there shall be basis of the truth of this writing (WILL) which I am here
hereof manifesting of the truth and of the fruits of our labor which their two mothers, I am
signing my signature below hereof, and that this is what should be complied with, by all the
 brothers and sisters, the children of their two mothers — JULIANA QUINTERO PILARISA
and CASIANA AQUINO VILLANUEVA Your father who made this writing (WILL), and he is,
MELECIO LABRADOR y RALUTIN (p. 46, Rollo)

The petition, which principally alleges that the holographic will is really dated, although the date is
not in its usual place, is impressed with merit.

The will has been dated in the hand of the testator himself in perfect compliance with Article 810. It1âwphi1

is worthy of note to quote the first paragraph of the second page of the holographic will, viz:

And this is the day in which we agreed that we are making the partitioning and assigning the
respective assignment of the said fishpond, and this being in the month of March, 17th day,
in the year 1968, and this decision and or instruction of mine is the matter to be followed.
And the one who made this writing is no other than MELECIO LABRADOR, their father.
(emphasis supplied) (p. 46, Rollo)

The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only
requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. These
requirements are present in the subject will.

Respondents claim that the date 17 March 1968 in the will was when the testator and his
beneficiaries entered into an agreement among themselves about "the partitioning and assigning the
respective assignments of the said fishpond," and was not the date of execution of the holographic
will; hence, the will is more of an "agreement" between the testator and the beneficiaries thereof to
the prejudice of other compulsory heirs like the respondents. This was thus a failure to comply with
Article 783 which defines a will as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the formalities
prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take effect after his
death."

Respondents are in error. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of the execution of the
will is plain from the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the
will was not an agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that what he
was executing was a will. The act of partitioning and the declaration that such partitioning as the
testator's instruction or decision to be followed reveal that Melecio Labrador was fully aware of the
nature of the estate property to be disposed of and of the character of the testamentary act as a
means to control the disposition of his estate.

Anent the second issue of finding the reimbursement of the P5,000 representing the redemption
price as erroneous, respondent court's conclusion is incorrect. When private respondents sold the
property (fishpond) with right to repurchase to Navat for P5,000, they were actually selling property
belonging to another and which they had no authority to sell, rendering such sale null and void.
Petitioners, thus "redeemed" the property from Navat for P5,000, to immediately regain possession
of the property for its disposition in accordance with the will. Petitioners therefore deserve to be
reimbursed the P5,000.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 10, 1988 is hereby
REVERSED. The holographic will of Melecio Labrador is APPROVED and ALLOWED probate. The
private respondents are directed to REIMBURSE the petitioners the sum of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00).

SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14003 August 5, 1960

FEDERICO AZAOLA, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
CESARIO SINGSON, oppositor-appellee.

F. Lavides and L.B. Alcuaz for appellant.

Vicente J. Cuna and P.S. Singson for appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This appeal, taken on points of law from a decision rendered on 15 January 1958 by the Court of
First Instance of Quezon City in its Special Proceedings No. Q-2640, involves the determination of
the quantity of evidence required for the probate of a holographic will.

The established facts are thus summarized in the decision appealed from (Rec. App. pp. 22-24):

"Briefly speaking, the following facts were established by the petitioner; that on September 9,
1957, Fortunata S. Vda. de Yance died at 13 Luskot, Quezon City, known to be the last
residence of said testatrix; that Francisco Azaola, petitioner herein for probate of the
holographic will, submitted the said holographic will (Exh. C) whereby Maria Milagros Azaola
was made the sole heir as against the nephew of deceased Cesario Singson; that witness
Francisco Azaola testified that he saw the holographic will (Exh. C) one month, more or less,
before the death of the testatrix, as the same was handed to him and his wife; that the
witness testified also that he recognized all the signatures appearing in the holographic will
(Exh. C) as the handwriting of the testatrix and to reinforce said statement, witness
presented the mortgage (Exh. E), the special power of the attorney (Exh. F), and the general
power of attorney (Exh. F-1), besides the deeds of sale (Exhs. G and G-1) including an
affidavit (Exh. G-2), and that there were further exhibited in court two residence certificates
(Exhs. H and H-1) to show the signatures of the testatrix, for comparison purposes; that said
witness, Azaola, testified that the penmanship appearing in the aforesaid documentary
evidence is in the handwriting of the testatrix as well as the signatures appearing in the
aforesaid documentary evidence is in the handwriting of the testatrix as well as the
signatures appearing therein are the signatures of the testatrix; that said witness, in answer
to a question of his counsel admitted that the holographic will was handed to him by the
testatrix. "apparently it must have been written by her" (t.s.n., p. 11). However, on page 16 on
the same transcript of the stenographic notes, when the same witness was asked by counsel
if he was familiar with the penmanship and handwriting of the deceased Fortunata Vda. de
Yance, he answered positively in the affirmative and when he was asked again whether the
penmanship referred to in the previous answer as appearing in the holographic will (Exh. C)
was hers (testatrix'), he answered, "I would definitely say it is hers"; that it was also
 established in the proceedings that the assessed value of the property of the deceased in
Luskot, Quezon City, is in the amount of P7,000.00.

The opposition to the probate was on the ground that (1) the execution of the will was procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner and his wife, and (2) that the
testatrix did not seriously intend the instrument to be her last will, and that the same was actually
written either on the 5th or 6th day of August 1957 and not on November 20, 1956 as appears on the
will.

The probate was denied on the ground that under Article 811 of the Civil Code, the proponent must
present three witnesses who could declare that the will and the signature are in the writing of the
testatrix, the probate being contested; and because the lone witness presented by the proponent
"did not prove sufficiently that the body of the will was written in the handwriting of the testatrix."

The proponent appealed, urging: first, that he was not bound to produce more than one witness
because the will's authenticity was not questioned; and second, that Article 811 does not mandatorily
require the production of three witnesses to identify the handwriting and signature of a holographic
will, even if its authenticity should be denied by the adverse party.

Article 811 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to the following effect:

ART. 811. In the probate of a holographic will, it shall be necessary that at least one witness
who knows the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and
the signature are in the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three of
such witnesses shall be required.

In the absence of any competent witnesses referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the
court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. (691a).

We agree with the appellant that since the authenticity of the will was not contested, he was not
required to produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were
contested, we are of the opinion that Article 811 of our present Civil Code can not be interpreted as
to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator,
under penalty of having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at the
execution of a holographic will, none being required by law (Art. 810, new Civil Code), it becomes
obvious that the existence of witness possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the
control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing any three
witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of the testator" and
who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not so express) "that the will and the
signature are in the handwriting of the testator". There may be no available witness of the testator's
hand; or even if so familiarized, the witnesses may be unwilling to give a positive opinion.
Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of Article 811 may thus become an impossibility. That is
evidently the reason why the second paragraph of Article 811 prescribes that —

in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the
court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.

As can be seen, the law foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be found (or what
amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of
the will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.
It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be presented if the will is
contested and only one if no contest is had) was derived from the rule established for ordinary
testaments (cf. Cabang vs. Delfinado, 45 Phil., 291; Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57 Phil., 742). But it can
not be ignored that the requirement can be considered mandatory only in the case of ordinary
testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses at the execution of ordinary
wills is made by law essential to their validity (Art. 805). Where the will is holographic, no witness
need be present (Art. 10), and the rule requiring production of three witnesses must be deemed
merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.

Again, under Article 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words "if the Court deem
it necessary", which reveal that what the law deems essential is that the Court should be convinced
of the will's authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is produced and the court is
convinced by their testimony that the ill is genuine, it may consider it unnecessary to call for expert
evidence. On the other hand, if no competent witness is available, or none of those produced is
convincing, the Court may still, and in fact it should, resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the
Court, in fine, is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the
proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect.

Commenting on analogous provisions of Article 691 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, the noted
Commentator, Mucuis Scaevola (Vol. 12, 2nd Ed., p.421), sagely remarks:

La manera como esta concebida la redaccion del ultimo apartado de dicho precepto induce
la conclusion de que siempre o por lo menos, en la mayor parte de los casos, el Juez debe
acudir al criterio pericial para que le ilustre acerca de la autenticidad del testamento
olografo, aunque ya esten insertas en los autos del expediente las declaraciones testificales.
La prudencia con que el Juez debe de proceder en resoluciones de transcendencia asi lo
exige, y la indole delicada y peligrosa del testamento olografo lo hace necesario para mayor
garantia de todos los interes comprometidos en aquel.

En efecto, el cotejo pericial de letras puede ser una confirmacion facultativa del dicho
profano de los testigos y un modo de desvanecer las ultimas dudas que pudieran ocurrir al
Juez acerca de la autenticidad que trata de averigaur y declarar. Para eso se ha escrito la
frase del citado ultimo apartado, (siempre que el Juez lo estime conveniente), haya habido o
no testigos y dudaran o no estos respecto de los extremos por que son preguntados.

El arbitrio judicial en este caso debe formarse con independencia de los sucesos y de su
significacion, para responder debidamente de las resoluciones que haya de dictar.

And because the law leaves it to the trial court if experts are still needed, no unfavourable inference
can be drawn from a party's failure to offer expert evidence, until and unless the court expresses
dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay witnesses.

Our conclusion is that the rule of the first paragraph of Article 811 of the Civil Code is merely
directory and is not mandatory.

Considering, however, that this is the first occasion in which this Court has been called upon to
construe the import of said article, the interest of justice would be better served, in our opinion, by
giving the parties ample opportunity to adduce additional evidence, including expert witnesses,
should the Court deem them necessary.
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is set aside, and the records ordered remanded
to the Court of origin, with instructions to hold a new trial in conformity with this opinion. But evidence
already on record shall not be retaken. No costs.

Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 123486 August 12, 1999

EUGENIA RAMONAL CODOY, and MANUEL RAMONAL, petitioners,

vs.
EVANGELINE R. CALUGAY, JOSEPHINE SALCEDO, and UEFEMIA PATIGAS, respondents.

PARDO, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals1 and its
resolution denying reconsideration, ruling:

Upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness Matilde
Ramonal Binanay, the authenticity of testators holographic will has been established and the
handwriting and signature therein (exhibit S) are hers, enough to probate said will. Reversal
of the judgment appealed from and the probate of the holographic will in question be called
for. The rule is that after plaintiff has completed presentation of his evidence and the
defendant files a motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence on the ground that upon the
facts and the law plaintiff has shown no right to relief, if the motion is granted and the order
to dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right to present evidence in his
behalf (Sec, 1 Rule 35 Revised Rules of Court). Judgment may, therefore, be rendered for
appellant in the instant case.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is REVERSED and judgment rendered allowing the
probate of the holographic will of the testator Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal. 2

The facts are as follows:

On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and
legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, a petition3 for probate of the holographic will of
the deceased, who died on January 16, 1990.

In the petition, respondents claimed that the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, was of
sound and disposing mind when she executed the will on August 30, 1978, that there was no fraud,
undue influence, and duress employed in the person of the testator, and will was written voluntarily.
The assessed value of the decedent's property, including all real and personal property was about
P400,000.00, at the time of her death.4

On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition 5 to the petition
for probate, alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. This
gives an impression that a "third hand" of an interested party other than the "true hand" of Matilde
Seño Vda. de Ramonal executed the holographic will.

Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or appearing on will after every disposition is
out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the one who executed the will, and was not forced, the dates
and the signature should appear at the bottom after the dispositions, as regularly done and not after
every disposition. And assuming that the holographic will is in the handwriting of the deceased, it
was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries, or
through fraud and trickery.
1âwphi1.nêt

Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence. Petitioners instead of
presenting their evidence, filed a demurrer6 to evidence, claiming that respondents failed to establish
sufficient factual and legal basis for the probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño
Vda. de Ramonal.

On November 26, 1990, the lower Court issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Demurrer to Evidence having

being well taken, same is granted, and the petition for probate of the document (Exhibit "S")
on the purported Holographic Will of the late Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, is denied for
insufficiency of evidence and lack of merits.7

On December 12, 1990, respondents filed a notice of appeal, 8 and in support of their appeal, the
respondents once again reiterated the testimony of the following witnesses, namely: (1) Augusto
Neri; (2) Generosa Senon; (3) Matilde Ramonal Binanay; (4) Teresita Vedad; (5) Fiscal Rodolfo
Waga; and (6) Evangeline Calugay.

To have a clear understanding of the testimonies of the witnesses, we recite an account of their
testimonies.

Augusto Neri, Clerk of Court, Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, where the special
proceedings for the probate of the holographic will of the deceased was filed. He produced and
identified the records of the case. The documents presented bear the signature of the deceased,
Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, for the purpose of laying the basis for comparison of the handwriting
of the testatrix, with the writing treated or admitted as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered.

Generosa Senon, election registrar of Cagayan de Oro, was presented to produced and identify the
voter's affidavit of the decedent. However, the voters' affidavit was not produced for the same was
already destroyed and no longer available.

Matilde Ramonal Binanay, testified that the deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal was her aunt,
and that after the death of Matilde's husband, the latter lived with her in her parent's house for
eleven (11) years from 1958 to 1969. During those eleven (11) years of close association the
deceased, she acquired familiarity with her signature and handwriting as she used to accompany her
(deceased Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal) in collecting rentals from her various tenants of
commercial buildings, and deceased always issued receipts. In addition to this, she (witness Matilde
Binanay) assisted the deceased in posting the records of the accounts, and carried personal letters
of the deceased to her creditors.

Matilde Ramonal Binanay further testified that at the time of the death of Matilde Vda. de Ramonal,
she left a holographic will dated August 30, 1978, which was personally and entirely written, dated
and signed, by the deceased and that all the dispositions therein, the dates, and the signatures in
said will, were that of the deceased.

Fiscal Rodolfo Waga testified that before he was appointed City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro, he was a
practicing lawyer, and handled all the pleadings and documents signed by the deceased in
connection with the proceedings of her late husband, as a result of which he is familiar with the
handwriting of the latter. He testified that the signature appearing in the holographic will was similar
to that of the deceased, Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal, but he can not be sure.

The fifth witness presented was Mrs. Teresita Vedad, an employee of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Region 10. She testified that she processed the application of
the deceased for pasture permit and was familiar with the signature of the deceased, since the
signed documents in her presence, when the latter was applying for pasture permit.

Finally, Evangeline Calugay, one of the respondents, testified that she had lived with the deceased
since birth, and was in fact adopted by the latter. That after a long period of time she became familiar
with the signature of the deceased. She testified that the signature appearing in the holographic will
is the true and genuine signature of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.

The holographic will which was written in Visayan, is translated in English as follows:

Instruction

August 30, 1978

1. My share at Cogon, Raminal Street, for Evangeline Calugay.

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

August 30, 1978

2. Josefina Salcedo must be given 1,500 square meters at Pinikan Street.

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

August 30, 1978

3. My jewelry's shall be divided among:

1. Eufemia Patigas

2. Josefina Salcedo

3. Evangeline Calugay
 (Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

August 30, 1978

4. I bequeath my one (1) hectare land at Mandumol, Indahag to Evangeline R. Calugay

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

August 30, 1978

5. Give the 2,500 Square Meters at Sta. Cruz Ramonal Village in favor of Evangeline R.
Calugay, Helen must continue with the Sta. Cruz, once I am no longer around.

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

August 30, 1978

6. Bury me where my husband Justo is ever buried.

(Sgd) Matilde Vda de Ramonal

August 30, 1978

Gene and Manuel:

Follow my instruction in order that I will rest peacefully.

Mama

Matilde Vda de Ramonal

On October 9, 1995, the Court of Appeals, rendered decision 9 ruling that the appeal was meritorious.
Citing the decision in the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102, penned by Mr. Justice J. B. L.
Reyes, a recognized authority in civil law, the Court of Appeals held:

. . . even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, we are of the opinion that
Article 811 of our present civil code can not be interpreted as to require the compulsory
presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of
having the probate denied. Since no witness may have been present at the execution of the
holographic will, none being required by law (art. 810, new civil code), it becomes obvious
that the existence of witnesses possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the
control of the proponent. For it is not merely a question of finding and producing any three
witnesses; they must be witnesses "who know the handwriting and signature of the testator"
and who can declare (truthfully, of course, even if the law does not express) "that the will and
the signature are in the handwriting of the testator." There may be no available witness
acquainted with the testator's hand; or even if so familiarized, the witness maybe unwilling to
give a positive opinion. Compliance with the rule of paragraph 1 of article 811 may thus
become an impossibility. That is evidently the reason why the second paragraph of article
811 prescribes that —
 in the absence of any competent witness referred to in the preceding paragraph, and if the
court deems it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to.

As can be see, the law foresees, the possibility that no qualified witness ma be found (or
what amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to the
authenticity of the will), and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency.

It may be true that the rule of this article (requiring that three witnesses be presented if the
will is contested and only one if no contest is had) was derived from the rule established for
ordinary testaments (CF Cabang vs. Delfianado, 45 PHIL 291; Tolentino v. Francisco, 57
PHIL 742). But it can not be ignored that the requirement can be considered mandatory only
in case of ordinary testaments, precisely because the presence of at least three witnesses at
the execution of ordinary wills is made by law essential to their validity (Art. 805). Where the
will is holographic, no witness need be present (art. 10), and the rule requiring production of
three witnesses must be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.

Again, under Art. 811, the resort to expert evidence is conditioned by the words "if the court
deem it necessary", which reveal that what the law deems essential is that the court should
be convinced of the will's authenticity. Where the prescribed number of witnesses is
produced and the court is convinced by their testimony that the will is genuine, it may
consider it unnecessary to call for expert evidence. On the other hand, if no competent
witness is available, or none of those produced is convincing, the court may still, and in fact it
should resort to handwriting experts. The duty of the court, in fine, is to exhaust all available
lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested as the proponent that the true intention of
the testator be carried into effect.

Paraphrasing Azaola vs. Singson, even if the genuineness of the holographic will were
contested, Article 811 of the civil code cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory
presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under penalty of
the having the probate denied. No witness need be present in the execution of the
holographic will. And the rule requiring the production of three witnesses is merely
permissive. What the law deems essential is that the court is convinced of the authenticity of
the will. Its duty is to exhaust all available lines of inquiry, for the state is as much interested
in the proponent that the true intention of the testator be carried into effect. And because the
law leaves it to the trial court to decide if experts are still needed, no unfavorable inference
can be drawn from a party's failure to offer expert evidence, until and unless the court
expresses dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay witnesses.10

According to the Court of Appeals, Evangeline Calugay, Matilde Ramonal Binanay and other
witnesses definitely and in no uncertain terms testified that the handwriting and signature in the
holographic will were those of the testator herself.

Thus, upon the unrebutted testimony of appellant Evangeline Calugay and witness Matilde Ramonal
Binanay, the Court of Appeals sustained the authenticity of the holographic will and the handwriting
and signature therein, and allowed the will to probate.

Hence, this petition.

The petitioners raise the following issues:

(1) Whether or not the ruling of the case of Azaola vs. Singson, 109 Phil. 102, relied upon by
the respondent Court of Appeals, was applicable to the case.
 (2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that private respondents had been
able to present credible evidence to that the date, text, and signature on the holographic will
written entirely in the hand of the testatrix.

(3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not analyzing the signatures in the
holographic will of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.

In this petition, the petitioners ask whether the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are
permissive or mandatory. The article provides, as a requirement for the probate of a contested
holographic will, that at least three witnesses explicitly declare that the signature in the will is the
genuine signature of the testator. 1âwphi1.nêt

We are convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is mandatory. The
word "shall" connotes a mandatory order. We have ruled that "shall" in a statute commonly denotes
an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the presumption is
that the word "shall," when used in a statute is mandatory.11

Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief that aims to
prevent. In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and
the evil to be prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will
employ means to defeat the wishes of the testator.

So, we believe that the paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the true intent
of the deceased. An exhaustive and objective consideration of the evidence is imperative to
establish the true intent of the testator.

It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified explicitly that they
were familiar with the handwriting of testator. In the case of Augusto Neri, clerk of court, Court of
First Instance, Misamis Oriental, he merely identified the record of Special Proceedings No. 427
before said court. He was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the
holographic was that of the deceased.

Generosa E. Senon, the election registrar of Cagayan de Oro City, was presented to identify the
signature of the deceased in the voter's affidavit, which was not even produced as it was no longer
available.

Matilde Ramonal Binanay, on the other hand, testified that:

Q. And you said for eleven (11) years Matilde Vda de Ramonal resided with your parents at
Pinikitan, Cagayan de Oro City. Would you tell the court what was your occupation or how
did Matilde Vda de Ramonal keep herself busy that time?

A. Collecting rentals.

Q. From where?

A. From the land rentals and commercial buildings at Pabayo-Gomez streets.12

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Who sometime accompany her?

A. I sometimes accompany her.

Q. In collecting rentals does she issue receipts?

A. Yes, sir.13

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Showing to you the receipt dated 23 October 1979, is this the one you are referring to as
one of the receipts which she issued to them?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Now there is that signature of Matilde vda. De Ramonal, whose signature is that Mrs.
Binanay?

A. Matilde vda. De Ramonal.

Q. Why do you say that is the signature of Matilde Vda. De Ramonal?

A. I am familiar with her signature.

Q. Now, you tell the court Mrs. Binanay, whether you know Matilde vda de Ramonal kept
records of the accounts of her tenants?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why do you say so?

A. Because we sometimes post a record of accounts in behalf of Matilde Vda. De Ramonal.

Q. How is this record of accounts made? How is this reflected?

A. In handwritten.14

xxx xxx xxx

Q. In addition to collection of rentals, posting records of accounts of tenants and deed of

sale which you said what else did you do to acquire familiarity of the signature of Matilde Vda
De Ramonal?

A. Posting records.

Q. Aside from that?

A. Carrying letters.

Q. Letters of whom?

A. Matilde.
 Q. To whom?

A. To her creditors.15

xxx xxx xxx

Q. You testified that at time of her death she left a will. I am showing to you a document with
its title "tugon" is this the document you are referring to?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Showing to you this exhibit "S", there is that handwritten "tugon", whose handwriting is
this?

A. My Aunt.

Q. Why do you say this is the handwriting of your aunt?

A. Because I am familiar with her signature.16

What Ms. Binanay saw were pre-prepared receipts and letters of the deceased, which she either
mailed or gave to her tenants. She did not declare that she saw the deceased sign a document or
write a note.

Further, during the cross-examination, the counsel for petitioners elicited the fact that the will was not
found in the personal belongings of the deceased but was in the possession of Ms. Binanay. She
testified that:

Q. Mrs. Binanay, when you were asked by counsel for the petitioners if the late Matilde
Seno vda de Ramonal left a will you said, yes?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Who was in possession of that will?

A. I.

Q. Since when did you have the possession of the will?

A. It was in my mother's possession.

Q. So, it was not in your possession?

A. Sorry, yes.

Q. And when did you come into possession since as you said this was originally in the
possession of your mother?

A. 1985.17
 xxx xxx xxx

Q. Now, Mrs. Binanay was there any particular reason why your mother left that will to you
and therefore you have that in your possession?

A. It was not given to me by my mother, I took that in the aparador when she died.

Q. After taking that document you kept it with you?

A. I presented it to the fiscal.

Q. For what purpose?

A. Just to seek advice.

Q. Advice of what?

A. About the will.18

In her testimony it was also evident that Ms. Binanay kept the fact about the will from petitioners, the
legally adopted children of the deceased. Such actions put in issue her motive of keeping the will a
secret to petitioners and revealing it only after the death of Matilde Seño Vda. de Ramonal.

In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, the following were established:

Q. Now, in 1978 Matilde Seno Vda de Ramonal was not yet a sickly person is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. She was up and about and was still uprightly and she could walk agilely and she could
go to her building to collect rentals, is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.19

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Now, let us go to the third signature of Matilde Ramonal. Do you know that there are
retracings in the word Vda.?

A. Yes, a little. The letter L is continuous.

Q. And also in Matilde the letter L is continued to letter D?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Again the third signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal the letter L in Matilde is continued
towards letter D.

A. Yes, sir.
 Q. And there is a retracing in the word Vda.?

A. Yes, sir.20

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Now, that was 1979, remember one year after the alleged holographic will. Now, you
identified a document marked as Exhibit R. This is dated January 8, 1978 which is only about
eight months from August 30, 1978. Do you notice that the signature Matilde Vda de
Ramonal is beautifully written and legible?

A. Yes, sir the handwriting shows that she was very exhausted.

Q. You just say that she was very exhausted while that in 1978 she was healthy was not
sickly and she was agile. Now, you said she was exhausted?

A. In writing.

Q. How did you know that she was exhausted when you were not present and you just tried
to explain yourself out because of the apparent inconsistencies?

A. That was I think. (sic).

Q. Now, you already observed this signature dated 1978, the same year as the alleged
holographic will. In exhibit I, you will notice that there is no retracing; there is no hesitancy
and the signature was written on a fluid movement. . . . And in fact, the name Eufemia R.
Patigas here refers to one of the petitioners?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You will also notice Mrs. Binanay that it is not only with the questioned signature
appearing in the alleged holographic will marked as Exhibit X but in the handwriting
themselves, here you will notice the hesitancy and tremors, do you notice that?

A. Yes, sir.21

Evangeline Calugay declared that the holographic will was written, dated and signed in the
handwriting of the testator. She testified that:

Q. You testified that you stayed with the house of the spouses Matilde and Justo Ramonal
for the period of 22 years. Could you tell the court the services if any which you rendered to
Matilde Ramonal?

A. During my stay I used to go with her to the church, to market and then to her
transactions.

Q. What else? What services that you rendered?

A. After my college days I assisted her in going to the bank, paying taxes and to her lawyer.
 Q. What was your purpose of going to her lawyer?

A. I used to be her personal driver.

Q. In the course of your stay for 22 years did you acquire familiarity of the handwriting of
Matilde Vda de Ramonal?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How come that you acquired familiarity?

A. Because I lived with her since birth.22

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Now, I am showing to you Exhibit S which is captioned "tugon" dated Agosto 30, 1978
there is a signature here below item No. 1, will you tell this court whose signature is this?

A. Yes, sir, that is her signature.

Q. Why do you say that is her signature?

A. I am familiar with her signature.23

So, the only reason that Evangeline can give as to why she was familiar with the handwriting of the
deceased was because she lived with her since birth. She never declared that she saw the
deceased write a note or sign a document.

The former lawyer of the deceased, Fiscal Waga, testified that:

Q. Do you know Matilde Vda de Ramonal?

A. Yes, sir I know her because she is my godmother the husband is my godfather. Actually I
am related to the husband by consanguinity.

Q. Can you tell the name of the husband?

A. The late husband is Justo Ramonal.24

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Can you tell this court whether the spouses Justo Ramonal and Matilde Ramonal have
legitimate children?

A. As far as I know they have no legitimate children.25

xxx xxx xxx

Q. You said after becoming a lawyer you practice your profession? Where?
A. Here in Cagayan de Oro City.

Q. Do you have services rendered with the deceased Matilde vda de Ramonal?

A. I assisted her in terminating the partition, of properties.

Q. When you said assisted, you acted as her counsel? Any sort of counsel as in what case
is that, Fiscal?

A. It is about the project partition to terminate the property, which was under the court
before.26

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Appearing in special proceeding no. 427 is the amended inventory which is marked as
exhibit N of the estate of Justo Ramonal and there appears a signature over the type written
word Matilde vda de Ramonal, whose signature is this?

A. That is the signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal.

Q. Also in exhibit n-3, whose signature is this?

A. This one here that is the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de Ramonal.27

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Aside from attending as counsel in that Special Proceeding Case No. 427 what were the
other assistance wherein you were rendering professional service to the deceased Matilde
Vda de Ramonal?

A. I can not remember if I have assisted her in other matters but if there are documents to
show that I have assisted then I can recall.28

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Now, I am showing to you exhibit S which is titled "tugon", kindly go over this document,
Fiscal Waga and tell the court whether you are familiar with the handwriting contained in that
document marked as exhibit "S"?

A. I am not familiar with the handwriting.

Q. This one, Matilde Vda de Ramonal, whose signature is this?

A. I think this signature here it seems to be the signature of Mrs. Matilde vda de Ramonal.

Q. Now, in item No. 2 there is that signature here of Matilde Vda de Ramonal, can you tell
the court whose signature is this?

A. Well, that is similar to that signature appearing in the project of partition.

 Q. Also in item no. 3 there is that signature Matilde Vda de Ramonal, can you tell the court
whose signature is that?

A. As I said, this signature also seems to be the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal.

Q. Why do you say that?

A. Because there is a similarity in the way it is being written.

Q. How about this signature in item no. 4, can you tell the court whose signature is this?

A. The same is true with the signature in item no. 4. It seems that they are similar. 29

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Mr. Prosecutor, I heard you when you said that the signature of Matilde Vda de Ramonal
Appearing in exhibit S seems to be the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal?

A. Yes, it is similar to the project of partition.

Q. So you are not definite that this is the signature of Matilde vda de Ramonal. You are
merely supposing that it seems to be her signature because it is similar to the signature of
the project of partition which you have made?

A. That is true.30

From the testimonies of these witnesses, the Court of Appeals allowed the will to probate and
disregard the requirement of three witnesses in case of contested holographic will, citing the
decision in Azaola vs. Singson,31ruling that the requirement is merely directory and not mandatory.

In the case of Ajero vs. Court of Appeals,32 we said that "the object of the solemnities surrounding the
execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and
testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But on the other hand, also one must
not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the
right to make a will.

However, we cannot eliminate the possibility of a false document being adjudged as the will of the
testator, which is why if the holographic will is contested, that law requires three witnesses to declare
that the will was in the handwriting of the deceased.

The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the respondents,
who kept it even before the death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, she revealed
that the will was in her possession as early as 1985, or five years before the death of the deceased.

There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the
deceased with other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance at
comparison was during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners asked
Ms. Binanay to compare the documents which contained the signature of the deceased with that of
the holographic will and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the former lawyer of the deceased
expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the signature in the holographic will.
A visual examination of the holographic will convince us that the strokes are different when
compared with other documents written by the testator. The signature of the testator in some of the
disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes, retracing and erasures on the will.

Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978, 33 and the signatures in
several documents such as the application letter for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980, 34 and
a letter dated June 16, 1978,35the strokes are different. In the letters, there are continuous flows of
the strokes, evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will. We,
therefore, cannot be certain that ruling holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The records are ordered remanded
to the court of origin with instructions to allow petitioners to adduce evidence in support of their
opposition to the probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seño vda. de Ramonal. 1âwphi1.nêt

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12190 August 30, 1958

TESTATE ESTATE OF FELICIDAD ESGUERRA ALTO-YAP deceased. FAUSTO E.

GAN, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ILDEFONSO YAP, oppositor-appellee.

Benedicto C. Belran, Crispin D. Baizas and Roberto H. Benitez for appellant.

Arturo M. Tolentino for appellee.

BENGZON, J.:

On November 20, 1951, Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure in the University of Santo
Tomas Hospital, leaving properties in Pulilan, Bulacan, and in the City of Manila.

On March 17, 1952, Fausto E. Gan initiated them proceedings in the Manila court of first instance
with a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the deceased, substantially
in these words:
 Nobyembre 5, 1951.

Ako, si Felicidad E. Alto-Yap, may asawa, at ganap na pag-iisip, ay nagsasalaysay na ang

aking kayamanan sa bayan ng Pulilan, Bulacan ay aking ipinamamana sa aking mga
kamag-anakang sumusunod:

Vicente Esguerra, 5 Bahagi

Sr. .............................................

Fausto E. 2 Bahagi
Gan .........................................................

Rosario E. 2 Bahagi
Gan .........................................................

Filomena 1 Bahagi
Alto ..........................................................

Beatriz 1 Bahagi
Alto ..............................................................

At ang aking lahat ng ibang kayamanan sa Maynila at iba panglugar ay aking ipinamamana
sa aking asawang si Idelfonso D. Yap sa kondisyong siya'y magpapagawa ng isang Health
Center na nagkakahalaga ng di kukulangin sa halagang P60,000.00 sa bayan ng Pulilan,
Bulacan, na nakaukit ang aking pangalang Felicidad Esguerra-Alto. At kung ito ay may
kakulangan man ay bahala na ang aking asawa ang magpuno upang matupad ang aking
kagustuhan.

(Lagda) Felicidad E. Alto-Yap.

Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not left
any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime.

After hearing the parties and considering their evidence, the Hon. Ramon R. San Jose,
Judge,1 refused to probate the alleged will. A seventy-page motion for reconsideration failed. Hence
this appeal.
The will itself was not presented. Petitioner tried to establish its contents and due execution by the
statements in open court of Felina Esguerra, Primitivo Reyes, Socorro Olarte and Rosario Gan
Jimenez, whose testimonies may be summarized as follows:

Sometime in 1950 after her last trip abroad, Felicidad Esguerra mentioned to her first cousin, Vicente
Esguerra, her desire to make a will. She confided however that it would be useless if her husband
discovered or knew about it. Vicente consulted with Fausto E. Gan, nephew of Felicidad, who was
then preparing for the bar examinations. The latter replied it could be done without any witness,
provided the document was entirely in her handwriting, signed and dated by her. Vicente Esguerra
lost no time in transmitting the information, and on the strength of it, in the morning of November 5,
1951, in her residence at Juan Luna Street, Manila, Felicidad wrote, signed and dated a holographic
will substantially of the tenor above transcribed, in the presence of her niece, Felina Esguerra
(daughter of Vicente), who was invited to read it. In the afternoon of that day, Felicidad was visited
by a distant relative, Primitivo Reyes, and she allowed him to read the will in the presence of Felina
Esguerra, who again read it.

Nine days later, he had other visitors: Socorro Olarte a cousin, and Rosario Gan Jimenez, a niece.
To these she showed the will, again in the presence of Felina Esguerra, who read it for the third time.

When on November 19, 1951, Felicidad was confined at the U.S.T. Hospital for her last illness, she
entrusted the said will, which was contained in a purse, to Felina Esguerra. But a few hours later,
Ildefonso Yap, her husband, asked Felina for the purse: and being afraid of him by reason of his
well-known violent temper, she delivered it to him. Thereafter, in the same day, Ildefonso Yap
returned the purse to Felina, only to demand it the next day shortly before the death of Felicidad.
Again, Felina handed it to him but not before she had taken the purse to the toilet, opened it and
read the will for the last time.2

From the oppositor's proof it appears that Felicidad Esguerra had been suffering from heart disease
for several years before her death; that she had been treated by prominent physicians, Dr. Agerico
Sison, Dr. Agustin Liboro and others; that in May 1950 husband and wife journeyed to the United
States wherein for several weeks she was treated for the disease; that thereafter she felt well and
after visiting interesting places, the couple returned to this country in August 1950. However, her
ailment recurred, she suffered several attacks, the most serious of which happened in the early
morning of the first Monday of November 1951 (Nov. 5). The whole household was surprised and
alarmed, even the teachers of the Harvardian Colleges occupying the lower floors and of by the Yap
spouses. Physician's help was hurriedly called, and Dr. Tanjuaquio arrived at about 8:00 a.m., found
the patient hardly breathing, lying in bed, her head held high by her husband. Injections and oxygen
were administered. Following the doctor's advice the patient stayed in bed, and did nothing the
whole day, her husband and her personal attendant, Mrs. Bantique, constantly at her side. These
two persons swore that Mrs. Felicidad Esguerra Yap made no will, and could have made no will on
that day.

The trial judge refused to credit the petitioner's evidence for several reasons, the most important of
which were these: (a) if according to his evidence, the decedent wanted to keep her will a secret, so
that her husband would not know it, it is strange she executed it in the presence of Felina Esguerra,
knowing as she did that witnesses were unnecessary; (b) in the absence of a showing that Felina
was a confidant of the decedent it is hard to believe that the latter would have allowed the former to
see and read the will several times; (c) it is improbable that the decedent would have permitted
Primitivo Reyes, Rosario Gan Jimenez and Socorro Olarte to read her will, when she precisely
wanted its contents to remain a secret during her lifetime; (d) it is also improbable that her purpose
being to conceal the will from her husband she would carry it around, even to the hospital, in her
purse which could for one reason or another be opened by her husband; (e) if it is true that the
husband demanded the purse from Felina in the U.S.T. Hospital and that the will was there, it is hard
to believe that he returned it without destroying the will, the theory of the petitioner being precisely
that the will was executed behind his back for fear he will destroy it.

In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the oppositor's evidence that
Felicidad did not and could not have executed such holographic will.

In this appeal, the major portion of appellant's brief discussed the testimony of the oppositor and of
his witnesses in a vigorous effort to discredit them. It appears that the same arguments, or most of
them, were presented in the motion to reconsider; but they failed to induce the court a quo to change
its mind. The oppositor's brief, on the other hand, aptly answers the criticisms. We deem it
unnecessary to go over the same matters, because in our opinion the case should be decided not on
the weakness of the opposition but on the strength of the evidence of the petitioner, who has the
burden of proof.

The Spanish Civil Code permitted the execution of holographic wills along with other forms. The
Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) approved August 7, 1901, adopted only one form, thereby
repealing the other forms, including holographic wills.

The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its arts. 810-814. "A person may
execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the
testator himself. It is subject to no other form and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need
not be witnessed."

This is indeed a radical departure from the form and solemnities provided for wills under Act 190,
which for fifty years (from 1901 to 1950) required wills to be subscribed by the testator and three
credible witnesses in each and every page; such witnesses to attest to the number of sheets used
and to the fact that the testator signed in their presence and that they signed in the presence of the
testator and of each other.

The object of such requirements it has been said, is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to
prevent substitution of wills, to guarantee their truth and authencity (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil.,
476) and to avoid those who have no right to succeed the testator would succeed him and be
benefited with the probate of same. (Mendoza vs. Pilapil, 40 Off. Gaz., 1855). However, formal
imperfections may be brushed aside when authenticity of the instrument is duly proved. (Rodriguez
vs Yap, 40 Off. Gaz. 1st Supp. No. 3 p. 194.)

Authenticity and due execution is the dominant requirements to be fulfilled when such will is
submitted to the courts for allowance. For that purpose the testimony of one of the subscribing
witnesses would be sufficient if there is no opposition (Sec. 5, Rule 77). If there is, the three must
testify, if available. (Cabang vs. Delfinado, 34 Phil., 291; Tolentino vs. Francisco, 57 Phil., 742). From
the testimony of such witnesses (and of other additional witnesses) the court may form its opinion as
to the genuineness and authenticity of the testament, and the circumstances its due execution.

Now, in the matter of holographic wills, no such guaranties of truth and veracity are demanded, since
as stated, they need no witnesses; provided however, that they are "entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself." The law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the
document itself as material proof of authenticity, and as its own safeguard, since it could at any time,
be demonstrated to be — or not to be — in the hands of the testator himself. "In the probate of a
holographic will" says the New Civil Code, "it shall be necessary that at least one witness who knows
the handwriting and signature of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the signature are in
the handwriting of the testator. If the will is contested, at least three such witnesses shall be required.
In the absence of any such witnesses, (familiar with decedent's handwriting) and if the court deem it
necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to."

The witnesses so presented do not need to have seen the execution of the holographic will. They
may be mistaken in their opinion of the handwriting, or they may deliberately lie in affirming it is in
the testator's hand. However, the oppositor may present other witnesses who also know the
testator's handwriting, or some expert witnesses, who after comparing the will with other writings or
letters of the deceased, have come to the conclusion that such will has not been written by the hand
of the deceased. (Sec. 50, Rule 123). And the court, in view of such contradictory testimony may use
its own visual sense, and decide in the face of the document, whether the will submitted to it has
indeed been written by the testator.

Obviously, when the will itself is not submitted, these means of opposition, and of assessing the
evidence are not available. And then the only guaranty of authenticity 3 — the testator's handwriting
— has disappeared.

Therefore, the question presents itself, may a holographic will be probated upon the testimony of
witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator?
How can the oppositor prove that such document was not in the testator's handwriting? His
witnesses who know testator's handwriting have not examined it. His experts can not testify,
because there is no way to compare the alleged testament with other documents admittedly, or
proven to be, in the testator's hand. The oppositor will, therefore, be caught between the upper
millstone of his lack of knowledge of the will or the form thereof, and the nether millstone of his
inability to prove its falsity. Again the proponent's witnesses may be honest and truthful; but they may
have been shown a faked document, and having no interest to check the authenticity thereof have
taken no pains to examine and compare. Or they may be perjurers boldly testifying, in the
knowledge that none could convict them of perjury, because no one could prove that they have not
"been shown" a document which they believed was in the handwriting of the deceased. Of course,
the competency of such perjured witnesses to testify as to the handwriting could be tested by
exhibiting to them other writings sufficiently similar to those written by the deceased; but what
witness or lawyer would not foresee such a move and prepare for it? His knowledge of the
handwriting established, the witness (or witnesses) could simply stick to his statement: he has seen
and read a document which he believed was in the deceased's handwriting. And the court and the
oppositor would practically be at the mercy of such witness (or witnesses) not only as to the
execution, but also as to the contents of the will. Does the law permit such a situation?

The Rules of Court, (Rule 77) approved in 1940 allow proof (and probate) of a lost or destroyed will
by secondary — evidence the testimony of witnesses, in lieu of the original document. Yet such
Rules could not have contemplated holographic wills which could not then be validly made here.
(See also Sec. 46, Rule 123; Art. 830-New Civil Code.)

Could Rule 77 be extended, by analogy, to holographic wills?

Spanish commentators agree that one of the greatest objections to the holographic will is that it may
be lost or stolen4 — an implied admission that such loss or theft renders it useless..

This must be so, because the Civil Code requires it to be protocoled and presented to the judge,
(Art. 689) who shall subscribe it and require its identity to be established by the three witnesses who
depose that they have no reasonable doubt that the will was written by the testator (Art. 691). And if
the judge considers that the identity of the will has been proven he shall order that it be filed (Art.
693). All these, imply presentation of the will itself. Art. 692 bears the same implication, to a greater
degree. It requires that the surviving spouse and the legitimate ascendants and descendants be
summoned so that they may make "any statement they may desire to submit with respect to the
authenticity of the will." As it is universally admitted that the holographic will is usually done by the
testator and by himself alone, to prevent others from knowing either its execution or its contents, the
above article 692 could not have the idea of simply permitting such relatives to state whether they
know of the will, but whether in the face of the document itself they think the testator wrote it.
Obviously, this they can't do unless the will itself is presented to the Court and to them.

Undoubtedly, the intention of the law is to give the near relatives the choice of either complying with
the will if they think it authentic, or to oppose it, if they think it spurious. 5 Such purpose is frustrated
when the document is not presented for their examination. If it be argued that such choice is not
essential, because anyway the relatives may oppose, the answer is that their opposition will be at a
distinct disadvantage, and they have the right and privilege to comply with the will, if genuine, a right
which they should not be denied by withholding inspection thereof from them.

We find confirmation of these ideas--about exhibition of the document itself--in the decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of June 5, 1925, which denied protocolization or probate to a document
containing testamentary dispositions in the handwriting of the deceased, but apparently
mutilated, the signature and some words having been torn from it. Even in the face of allegations
and testimonial evidence (which was controverted), ascribing the mutilation to the opponents of the
will. The aforesaid tribunal declared that, in accordance with the provision of the Civil Code
(Spanish) the will itself, whole and unmutilated, must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no
effect.

Considerando que sentado lo anterior, y estableciendose en el parrafo segundo del articulo

688 del Codigo civil, que para que sea valido el testamento olografo debera estar escrito
todo el y firmado por testador, con expression del año, mes y dia en que se otorque, resulta
evidente que para la validez y eficacia de esos testamentos, no basta la demostracion mas
o menos cumplida de que cuando se otorgaron se Ilenaron todos esos requisitos, sino que
de la expresada redaccion el precepto legal, y por el tiempo en que el verbo se emplea,
se desprende la necesidad de que el documento se encuentre en dichas condiciones en el
momento de ser presentado a la Autoridad competente, para au adveracion y
protocolizacion; y como consecuencia ineludible de ello, forzoso es affirmar que el de autos
carece de validez y aficacia, por no estarfirmado por el testador, cualquiera que sea la causa
de la falta de firma, y sin perjuicio de las acciones que puedan ejercitar los perjudicados,
bien para pedir indemnizacion por el perjuicio a la persona culpable, si la hubiere, o su
castigo en via criminal si procediere, por constituir dicha omision un defecto
insubsanable . . . .

This holding aligns with the ideas on holographic wills in the Fuero Juzgo, admittedly the basis of the
Spanish Civil Code provisions on the matter.6

PRECEDENTES LEGALES--Fuero Juzgo, libro segundo, titulo V, ley 15--E depues que los
herederos e sus fijos ovieren esta manda, fasta ... annos muestrenla al obispo de la tierra, o
al juez fasta VI meses y el obispo o el juez tomen otros tales tres escritos, que fuesen
fechos por su mano daquel que fizo la manda; e por aquellos escriptos, si semjara la letra
de la manda, sea confirmada la manda. E depues que todo esto fuere connoscido, el obispo
o el juez, o otras testimonios confirmen el escripto de la manda otra vez, y en esta manera
vala la manda. (Art. 689, Scaevola--Codigo Civil.)

(According to the Fuero above, the will itself must be compared with specimens of the testators
handwriting.)
All of which can only mean: the courts will not distribute the property of the deceased in accordance
with his holographic will, unless they are shown his handwriting and signature. 7

Parenthetically, it may be added that even the French Civil Law considers the loss of the holographic
will to be fatal. (Planiol y Ripert, Derecho Civil Frances, traduccion por Diaz Cruz, 1946, Tomo V,
page 555).

Taking all the above circumstances together, we reach the conclusion that the execution and the
contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of
witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. 8

Under the provisions of Art. 838 of the New Civil Code, we are empowered to adopt this opinion as a
Rule of Court for the allowance of such holographic wills. We hesitate, however, to make this Rule
decisive of this controversy, simultaneously with its promulgation. Anyway, decision of the appeal
may rest on the sufficiency, rather the insufficiency, of the evidence presented by petitioner Fausto E.
Gan.

At this point, before proceeding further, it might be convenient to explain why, unlike holographic
wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial evidence when lost or destroyed. The difference
lies in the nature of the wills. In the first, the only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself; in
the second, the testimony of the subscribing or instrumental witnesses (and of the notary, now). The
loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the
subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate.

In the case of ordinary wills, it is quite hard to convince three witnesses (four with the notary)
deliberately to lie. And then their lies could be checked and exposed, their whereabouts and acts on
the particular day, the likelihood that they would be called by the testator, their intimacy with the
testator, etc. And if they were intimates or trusted friends of the testator they are not likely to end
themselves to any fraudulent scheme to distort his wishes. Last but not least, they can not receive
anything on account of the will.

Whereas in the case of holographic wills, if oral testimony were admissible9 only one man could
engineer the fraud this way: after making a clever or passable imitation of the handwriting and
signature of the deceased, he may contrive to let three honest and credible witnesses see and read
the forgery; and the latter, having no interest, could easily fall for it, and in court they would in all
good faith affirm its genuineness and authenticity. The will having been lost — the forger may have
purposely destroyed it in an "accident" — the oppositors have no way to expose the trick and the
error, because the document itself is not at hand. And considering that the holographic will may
consist of two or three pages, and only one of them need be signed, the substitution of the unsigned
pages, which may be the most important ones, may go undetected.

If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more objectionable feature — feasibility
of forgery — would be added to the several objections to this kind of wills listed by Castan, Sanchez
Roman and Valverde and other well-known Spanish Commentators and teachers of Civil Law. 10

One more fundamental difference: in the case of a lost will, the three subscribing witnesses would be
testifying to a fact which they saw, namely the act of the testator of subscribing the will; whereas in
the case of a lost holographic will, the witnesses would testify as to their opinion of the handwriting
which they allegedly saw, an opinion which can not be tested in court, nor directly contradicted by
the oppositors, because the handwriting itself is not at hand.
Turning now to the evidence presented by the petitioner, we find ourselves sharing the trial judge's
disbelief. In addition to the dubious circumstances described in the appealed decision, we find it hard
to believe that the deceased should show her will precisely to relatives who had received nothing
from it: Socorro Olarte and Primitivo Reyes. These could pester her into amending her will to give
them a share, or threaten to reveal its execution to her husband Ildefonso Yap. And this leads to
another point: if she wanted so much to conceal the will from her husband, why did she not entrust it
to her beneficiaries? Opportunity to do so was not lacking: for instance, her husband's trip to Davao,
a few days after the alleged execution of the will.

In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost holographic will, we
think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so tainted with improbabilities and
inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that "clear and distinct" proof required by Rule 77, sec.
6.11

Wherefore, the rejection of the alleged will must be sustained.

Judgment affirmed, with costs against petitioner.

Paras, C. J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.,
Endencia and Felix, JJ.,concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B. BONILLA

deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor.

Luciano A. Joson for petitioner-appellant.

Cesar Paralejo for oppositor-appellee.

RELOVA, J.:

This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals for final determination pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.

As found by the Court of Appeals:

... On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of
letters testamentary in her favor. The petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 8432, was
opposed by the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita
Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on the following grounds:

(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will by failing to
produce the will within twenty days of the death of the testator as required by Rule
75, section 2 of the Rules of Court;

(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a disposition of
property after death and was not intended to take effect after death, and therefore it
was not a will

(3) The alleged hollographic will itself,and not an alleged copy thereof, must be
produced, otherwise it would produce no effect, as held in Gam v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509;
and

(4 ) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and
attested as required by law.

The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the case with another case Sp.
Proc. No, 8275). Their motion was granted by the court in an order dated April 4,
1977.

On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the cases, the appellees
moved again to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will. They argued that:

(1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an instruction as to the
management and improvement of the schools and colleges founded by decedent
Ricardo B. Bonilla; and

(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by secondary evidence

unlike ordinary wills.

Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was denied by the court in its
order of February 23, 1979.

The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the order
was contrary to law and settled pronouncements and rulings of the Supreme Court,
to which the appellant in turn filed an opposition. On July 23, 1979, the court set
aside its order of February 23, 1979 and dismissed the petition for the probate of the
will of Ricardo B. Bonilla. The court said:

... It is our considered opinion that once the original copy of the holographic will is
lost, a copy thereof cannot stand in lieu of the original.

In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court held that 'in the
matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to suppose, regards the document
itself as the material proof of authenticity of said wills.
 MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged holographic will was executed on
January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. In view of the lapse
of more than 14 years from the time of the execution of the will to the death of the
decedent, the fact that the original of the will could not be located shows to our mind
that the decedent had discarded before his death his allegedly missing Holographic
Will.

Appellant's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an appeal to the Court of Appeals in
which it is contended that the dismissal of appellant's petition is contrary to law and well-settled
jurisprudence.

On July 7, 1980, appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on the ground that the appeal
does not involve question of fact and alleged that the trial court committed the following assigned
errors:

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A LOST HOLOGRAPHIC WILL

MAY NOT BE PROVED BY A COPY THEREOF;

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DECEDENT HAS
DISCARDED BEFORE HIS DEATH THE MISSING HOLOGRAPHIC WILL;

III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S WILL.

The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be
proved by means of a photostatic copy. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of
holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been proved.
The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required
and, if no witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying
witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other
copy is available, the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting
of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between sample handwritten
statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the
holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the
testator. In the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the
contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of
witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall
produce no effect. The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in
Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic
copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the probate
court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be
admitted because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the
probate court.

WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979, denying appellant's motion for
reconsideration dated August 9, 1979, of the Order dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to
approve the will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Actg. C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984

ROSA K. KALAW, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa
City, and GREGORIO K. KALAW, respondents.

Leandro H. Fernandez for petitioner.

Antonio Quintos and Jose M. Yacat for respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming to be the sole heir of
his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, for the probate of her holographic Will executed on December 24,
1968.

The holographic Will reads in full as follows:

My Last will and Testament

In the name of God, Amen.

I Natividad K. Kalaw Filipino 63years of age, single, and a resident of Lipa City, being of sound and
disposing mind and memory, do hereby declare thus to be my last will and testament.

1. It is my will that I'll be burried in the cemetery of the catholic church of Lipa City. In accordance
with the rights of said Church, and that my executrix hereinafter named provide and erect at the
expose of my state a suitable monument to perpetuate my memory.

xxx xxx xxx

The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir.
Hence, on November 10, 1971, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw opposed probate alleging, in substance,
that the holographic Will contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without the proper
authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814 of the Civil Code
reading:
 Art. 814. In case of any insertion, cancellation, erasure or alteration in a holographic
will the testator must authenticate the same by his full signature.

ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first written, should be given effect and probated
so that she could be the sole heir thereunder.

After trial, respondent Judge denied probate in an Order, dated September 3, 197 3, reading in part:

The document Exhibit "C" was submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for
examination. The NBI reported that the handwriting, the signature, the insertions
and/or additions and the initial were made by one and the same person.
Consequently, Exhibit "C" was the handwriting of the decedent, Natividad K. Kalaw.
The only question is whether the win, Exhibit 'C', should be admitted to probate
although the alterations and/or insertions or additions above-mentioned were not
authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix pursuant to Art. 814 of the Civil
Code. The petitioner contends that the oppositors are estopped to assert the
provision of Art. 814 on the ground that they themselves agreed thru their counsel to
submit the Document to the NBI FOR EXAMINATIONS. This is untenable. The
parties did not agree, nor was it impliedly understood, that the oppositors would be in
estoppel.

The Court finds, therefore, that the provision of Article 814 of the Civil Code is
applicable to Exhibit "C". Finding the insertions, alterations and/or additions in Exhibit
"C" not to be authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix Natividad K. Kalaw,
the Court will deny the admission to probate of Exhibit "C".

WHEREFORE, the petition to probate Exhibit "C" as the holographic will of Natividad
K. Kalaw is hereby denied.

SO ORDERED.

From that Order, GREGORIO moved for reconsideration arguing that since the alterations and/or
insertions were the testatrix, the denial to probate of her holographic Will would be contrary to her
right of testamentary disposition. Reconsideration was denied in an Order, dated November 2, 1973,
on the ground that "Article 814 of the Civil Code being , clear and explicit, (it) requires no necessity
for interpretation."

From that Order, dated September 3, 1973, denying probate, and the Order dated November 2,
1973 denying reconsideration, ROSA filed this Petition for Review on certiorari on the sole legal
question of whether or not the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions
were voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should
be probated or not, with her as sole heir.

Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a
holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature, ... the Will is not thereby invalidated as a
whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined. 1 Manresa gave
an Identical commentary when he said "la omision de la salvedad no anula el testamento, segun la regla de jurisprudencia establecida en la
sentencia de 4 de Abril de 1895." 2

However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision,
which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the
requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire
Will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could
remain valid. To state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the
seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect
because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full signature,

The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such insertions, cancellations, erasures or
alterations in a holographic Will, which affect only the efficacy of the altered words themselves but
not the essence and validity of the Will itself. As it is, with the erasures, cancellations and alterations
made by the testatrix herein, her real intention cannot be determined with certitude. As Manresa had
stated in his commentary on Article 688 of the Spanish Civil Code, whence Article 814 of the new
Civil Code was derived:

... No infringe lo dispuesto en este articulo del Codigo (el 688) la sentencia que no
declara la nulidad de un testamento olografo que contenga palabras tachadas,
enmendadas o entre renglones no salvadas por el testador bajo su firnia segun
previene el parrafo tercero del mismo, porque, en realidad, tal omision solo puede
afectar a la validez o eficacia de tales palabras, y nunca al testamento mismo, ya por
estar esa disposicion en parrafo aparte de aquel que determine las condiciones
necesarias para la validez del testamento olografo, ya porque, de admitir lo
contrario, se Ilegaria al absurdo de que pequefias enmiendas no salvadas, que en
nada afectasen a la parte esencial y respectiva del testamento, vinieran a anular
este, y ya porque el precepto contenido en dicho parrafo ha de entenderse en
perfecta armonia y congruencia con el art. 26 de la ley del Notariado que declara
nulas las adiciones apostillas entrerrenglonados, raspaduras y tachados en las
escrituras matrices, siempre que no se salven en la forma prevenida, paro no el
documento que las contenga, y con mayor motivo cuando las palabras
enmendadas, tachadas, o entrerrenglonadas no tengan importancia ni susciten duda
alguna acerca del pensamiento del testador, o constituyan meros accidentes de
ortografia o de purez escrituraria, sin trascendencia alguna(l).

Mas para que sea aplicable la doctrina de excepcion contenida en este ultimo
fallo, es preciso que las tachaduras, enmiendas o entrerrenglonados sin salvar saan
de pala bras que no afecter4 alteren ni uarien de modo substancial la express
voluntad del testador manifiesta en el documento. Asi lo advierte la sentencia de 29
de Noviembre de 1916, que declara nulo un testamento olografo por no estar
salvada por el testador la enmienda del guarismo ultimo del año en que fue
extendido (Emphasis ours).
3

WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby dismissed and the Decision of respondent Judge, dated
September 3, 1973, is hereby affirmed in toto. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Plana, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

Relova, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur. Rosa, having appealed to this Court on a sole question of law, is bound by the trial court's
factual finding that the peculiar alterations in the holographic will crossing out Rosa's name and
instead inserting her brother Gregorio's name as sole heir and "sole executrix" were made by the
testatrix in her own handwriting. (I find it peculiar that the testatrix who was obviously an educated
person would unthinkingly make such crude alterations instead of consulting her lawyer and writing
an entirely new holographic wig in order to avoid any doubts as to her change of heir. It should be
noted that the first alteration crossing out "sister Rosa K. Kalaw" and inserting "brother Gregorio
Kalaw" as sole heir is not even initialed by the testatrix. Only the second alteration crossing out
"sister Rosa K. Kalaw" and inserting "brother Gregorio Kalaw" as "sole executrix" is initialed.)
Probate of the radically altered will replacing Gregorio for Rosa as sole heir is properly denied, since
the same was not duly authenticated by the full signature of the executrix as mandatorily required by
Article 814 of the Civil Code. The original unaltered will naming Rosa as sole heir cannot, however,
be given effect in view of the trial court's factual finding that the testatrix had by her own handwriting
substituted Gregorio for Rosa, so that there is no longer any will naming Rosa as sole heir. The net
result is that the testatrix left no valid will and both Rosa and Gregorio as her next of kill succeed to
her intestate estate.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 193484 January 18, 2012

HYPTE R. AUJERO, Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the November 12, 2009
Decision and July 28, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 107233
1 2

entitled "Hypte R. Aujero v. National Labor Relations Commission and Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation."

In its November 12, 2009 Decision, the CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court from the National Labor Relations Commission’s (NLRC) July 4, 2008
and September 29, 2008 Resolutions, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions dated July 4, 2008 and
September 29, 2008 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR Case
No. 00-07-08921-2004 [NLRC NCR CA No. 049644-06] are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 3

The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the above Decision but this was likewise
denied by the CA in its July 28, 2010 Resolution.

The Antecedent Facts

It was in 1967 that the petitioner started working for respondent Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (Philcomsat) as an accountant in the latter's Finance Department. On August 15, 2001
or after thirty-four (34) years of service, the petitioner applied for early retirement. His application for
retirement was approved, effective September 15, 2001, entitling him to receive retirement benefits
at a rate equivalent to one and a half of his monthly salary for every year of service. At that time, the
petitioner was Philcomsat's Senior Vice-President with a monthly salary of Two Hundred Seventy-
Four Thousand Eight Hundred Five Pesos (₱274,805.00). 4

On September 12, 2001, the petitioner executed a Deed of Release and Quitclaim in Philcomsat’s
5

favor, following his receipt from the latter of a check in the amount of Nine Million Four Hundred
Thirty-Nine Thousand Three Hundred Twenty-Seven and 91/100 Pesos (₱9,439,327.91). 6

Almost three (3) years thereafter, the petitioner filed a complaint for unpaid retirement benefits,
claiming that the actual amount of his retirement pay is Fourteen Million Fifteen Thousand and Fifty-
Five Pesos (₱14,015,055.00) and the ₱9,439,327.91 he received from Philcomsat as supposed
settlement for all his claims is unconscionable, which is more than enough reason to declare his
quitclaim as null and void. According to the petitioner, he had no choice but to accept a lesser
amount as he was in dire need thereof and was all set to return to his hometown and he signed the
quitclaim despite the considerable deficiency as no single centavo would be released to him if he did
not execute a release and waiver in Philcomsat's favor. 7

The petitioner claims that his right to receive the full amount of his retirement benefits, which is
equivalent to one and a half of his monthly salary for every year of service, is provided under the
Retirement Plan that Philcomsat created on January 1, 1977 for the benefit of its employees. On 8

November 3, 1997, Philcomsat and the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) executed a Trust
Agreement, where UCPB, as trustee, shall hold, administer and manage the respective contributions
of Philcomsat and its employees, as well as the income derived from the investment thereof, for and
on behalf of the beneficiaries of the Retirement Plan. 9

The petitioner claims that Philcomsat has no right to withhold any portion of his retirement benefits
as the trust fund created pursuant to the Retirement Plan is for the exclusive benefit of Philcomsat
employees and Philcomsat had expressly recognized that it has no right or claim over the trust fund
even on the portion pertaining to its contributions. As Section 4 of the Trust Agreement provides:
10

Section 4 – The Companies, in accordance with the provisions of the Plan, hereby waive all their
rights to their contributions in money or property which are and will be paid or transferred to the Trust
Fund, and no person shall have any right in, or with respect to, the Trust Fund or any part thereof
except as expressly provided herein or in the Plan. At no time, prior to the satisfaction of all liabilities
with respect to the participants and their beneficiaries under the Plan, shall any part of the corpus or
income of the Fund be used for or diverted to purposes other than for the exclusive benefit of Plan
participants and their beneficiaries.11
The petitioner calls attention to the August 15, 2001 letter of Philcomsat's Chairman and President,
Mr. Carmelo Africa, addressed to UCPB for the release of ₱9,439,327.91 to the petitioner and
₱4,575,727.09 to Philcomsat,which predated the execution of his quitclaim on September 12,
2001. According to the petitioner, this indicates Philcomsat’s pre-conceived plans to deprive him of a
12

significant portion of his retirement pay.

On May 31, 2006, Labor Arbiter Joel S. Lustria (LA Lustria) issued a Decision in the petitioner’s
13

favor, directing Philcomsat to pay him the amount of ₱4,575,727.09 and ₱274,805.00, representing
the balance of his retirement benefits and salary for the period from August 15 to September 15,
2001, respectively. LA Lustria found it hard to believe that the petitioner would voluntary waive a
significant portion of his retirement pay. He found the consideration supporting the subject quitclaim
unconscionable and ruled that the respondent failed to substantiate its claim that the amount
received by the petitioner was a product of negotiations between the parties. Thus:

It would appear from the tenor of the letter that, rather that the alleged agreement, between
complainant and respondent, respondent is claiming payment for an "outstanding due to Philcomsat"
out of the retirement benefits of complainant. This could hardly be considered as proof of an
agreement to reduce complainant’s retirement benefits. Absent any showing of any agreement or
authorization, the deductions from complainant’s retirement benefits should be considered as
improper and illegal.

If we were to give credence to the claim of respondent, it would appear that complainant has
voluntarily waived a total amount of [₱]4,575,727.09. Given the purpose of retirement benefits to
provide for a retiree a source of income for the remainder of his years, it defies understanding how
complainant could accept such an arrangement and lose more than [₱]4.5 million in the process.
One can readily see the unreasonableness of such a proposition. By the same token, the Quitclaim
and Waiver over benefits worth millions is apparently unconscionable and unacceptable under
normal circumstances. The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that waivers must be fair,
reasonable, and just and must not be unconscionable on its face. The explanation of the
complainant that he was presented with a lower amount on pain that the entire benefits will not be
released is more believable and consistent with evidence. We, therefore, rule against the effectivity
of the waiver and quitclaim, thus, complainant is entitled to the balance of his retirement benefits in
the amount of [₱]4,575,727.09. 14

In its July 4, 2008 Resolution, the NLRC granted Philcomsat’s appeal and reversed and set aside
15

LA Lustria’s May 31, 2006 Decision. The NLRC dismissed the petitioner’s complaint for unpaid
retirement benefits and salary in consideration of the Deed of Release and Quitclaim he executed in
September 12, 2001 following his receipt from Philcomsat of the amount of ₱9,439,327.91, which
constitutes the full settlement of all his claims against Philcomsat. According to the NLRC, the
petitioner failed to allege, much less, adduce evidence that Philcomsat employed means to vitiate
his consent to the quitclaim. The petitioner is well-educated, a licensed accountant and was
Philcomsat’s Senior Vice-President prior to his retirement; he cannot therefore claim that he signed
the quitclaim without understanding the consequences and implications thereof. The relevant
portions of the NLRC’s July 4, 2008 Resolution states:

After analyzing the antecedent, contemporaneous and subsequent facts surrounding the alleged
underpayment of retirement benefits, We rule that respondent-appellant have no more obligation to
the complainant-appellee.

The complainant-appellee willingly received the check for the said amount, without having filed any
objections nor reservations thereto, and even executed and signed a Release and Quitclaim in favor
of the respondent-appellant. Undoubtedly, the quitclaim the complainant-appellee signed is valid.
Complainant-appellee has not denied at any time its due execution and authenticity. He never
imputed claims of coercion, undue influence, or fraud against the respondent-appellant. His
statement in his reply to the respondent-appellant’s position paper that the quitclaim is void alleging
that it was obtained through duress is only an afterthought to make his claim appear to be
convincing. If it were true, complainant-appellee should have asserted such fact from the very
beginning. Also, there was no convincing proof shown by the complainant-appellee to prove
existence of duress exerted against him. His stature and educational attainment would both negate
that he can be forced into something against his will.

It should be stressed that complainant-appellee even waited for a period of almost three (3) years
before he filed the complaint. If he really felt aggrieved by the amount he received, prudence dictates
that he immediately would call the respondent-appellant’s attention and at the earliest opportune
shout his objections, rather than wait for years, before deciding to claim his supposed benefits,
[e]specially that his alleged entitlement is a large sum of money. Thus, it is evident that the filing of
the instant case is a clear case of afterthought, and that complainant-appellee simply had a change
of mind. This We cannot allow.

xxxx

In the instant case, having willingly signed the Deed of Release and Quitclaim dated September 12,
2001, it is hard to conclude that the complainant-appellee was merely forced by the necessity to
execute the quitclaim. Complainant-appellee is not a gullible or unsuspecting person who can easily
be tricked or inveigled and, thus, needs the extra protection of law. He is well-educated and a highly
experienced man. The release and quitclaim executed by the complainant-appellee is therefore
considered valid and binding on him and the respondent-appellant. He is already estopped from
questioning the same. 16

Philcomsat’s appeal to the NLRC from LA Lustria’s May 31, 2006 Decision was filed and its surety
bond posted beyond the prescribed period of ten (10) days. On June 20, 2006, a copy of LA Lustria’s
Decision was served on Maritess Querubin (Querubin), one of Philcomsat’s executive assistants, as
Philcomsat’s counsel and the executive assistant assigned to her were both out of the office. It was
only the following day that Querubin gave a copy of the said Decision to the executive assistant of
Philcomsat’s counsel, leading the latter to believe that it was only then that the said Decision had
been served. In turn, this led Philcomsat’s counsel to believe that it was on June 21, 2006 that the
ten (10) day-period started to run.

Having in mind that the delay was only one (1) day and the explanation offered by Philcomsat’s
counsel, the NLRC disregarded Philcomsat’s procedural lapse and proceeded to decide the appeal
on its merits. Thus:

It appears that on June 20[,] 2006[,] copy of the Decision was received by one (Maritess) who is not
the Secretary of respondents-appellants’ counsel and therefore not authorized to receive such
document. It was only the following day, June 21, 2006, that respondents-appellants[’] counsel
actually received the Decision which was stamped received on said date. Verily, counsel has until
July 3, 2006 within which to perfect the appeal, which he did. In PLDT vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No.
60250, March 26, 1984, the Honorable Supreme Court held that: "where notice of the Decision was
served on the receiving station at the ground floor of the defendant’s company building, and received
much later at the office of the legal counsel on the ninth floor of said building, which was his address
of record, service of said decision has taken effect from said later receipt at the aforesaid office of its
legal counsel."
Be that as it may, the provisions of Section 10, Rule VII of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, states,
that:

"SECTION 10. TECHNICAL RULES NOT BINDING. The rules of procedure and evidence prevailing
in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling and the Commission shall use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. x x x"

Additionally, the Supreme Court has allowed appeals from decisions of the Labor Arbiter to the
NLRC, even if filed beyond the reglementary period, in the interest of justice. Moreover, under Article
218 (c) of the Labor Code, the NLRC may, in the exercise of its appellate powers, correct, amend or
waive any error, defect or irregularity whether in substance or in form. Further, Article 221 of the
same provides that: In any proceedings before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and
intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiters shall use in each
case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the
interest of due process. 17

In his petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to the CA, the petitioner accused the
NLRC of grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the respondent’s belated appeal by
relaxing the application of one of the fundamental requirements of appeal. An appeal, being a mere
statutory right, should be exercised in a manner that strictly conforms to the prescribed procedure.
As of July 3, 2006, or when Philcomsat filed its appeal and posted its surety bond, LA Lustria’s
Decision had become final and executory and Philcomsat’s counsel’s failure to verify when the copy
of said Decision was actually received does not constitute excusable negligence.

The petitioner likewise anchored his allegation of grave abuse of discretion against the NLRC on the
latter's refusal to strike as invalid the quitclaim he executed in Philcomsat’s favor. According to the
petitioner, his retirement pay amounts to ₱14,015,055.00 and ₱9,439,327.91 he received from
Philcomsat as supposed settlement for all his claims against it is unconscionable and this is more
than enough reason to declare his quitclaim as null and void.

By way of the assailed Decision, the CA found no merit in the petitioner’s claims, holding that the
NLRC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the respondent’s appeal.

The Supreme Court has ruled that where a copy of the decision is served on a person who is neither
a clerk nor one in charge of the attorney’s office, such service is invalid. In the case at bar, it is
undisputed that Maritess Querubin, the person who received a copy of the Labor Arbiter’s decision,
was neither a clerk of Atty. Yanzon, private respondent’s counsel, nor a person in charge of Atty.
Yanzon’s office. Hence, her receipt of said decision on June 20, 2006 cannot be considered as
notice to Atty. Yanzon. Since a copy of the decision was actually delivered by Maritess to Atty.
Yanzon’s secretary only on June 21, 2006, it was only on this date that the ten-day period for the
filing of private respondent’s appeal commenced to run. Thus, private respondent’s July 3, 2006
appeal to the NLRC was seasonably filed.

Similarly, the provision of Article 223 of the Labor Code requiring the posting of a bond for the
perfection of an appeal of a monetary award must be given liberal interpretation in line with the
desired objective of resolving controversies on the merits. If only to achieve substantial justice, strict
observance of the reglementary periods may be relaxed if warranted. However, this liberal
interpretation must be justified by substantial compliance with the rule. As the Supreme Court ruled
in Buenaobra v. Lim King Guan:
xxxx

We note that in the instant case, private respondent substantially complied with the filing of its
appeal and the required appeal bond on July 3, 2006 – the next working day after July 1, 2006, the
intervening days between the said two dates being a Saturday and a Sunday. Substantial justice
dictates that the present case be decided on the merits, especially since there was a mere one-day
delay in the filing by private respondent of its appeal and appeal bond with the NLRC. x x x. (citation
18

omitted)

The CA further ruled that the NLRC was correct in upholding the validity of the petitioner’s quitclaim.
Thus:

In the same vein, this Court finds that the NLRC did not act with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring as valid the Deed of Release and Quitclaim dated
September 12, 2001 – absolving private respondent from liability arising from any and all suits,
claims, demands or other causes of action of whatever nature in consideration of the amount
petitioner received in connection with his retirement – signed by petitioner. x x x

xxxx

The assertion of petitioner that the Deed of Release and Quitclaim he signed should be struck down
for embodying unconscionable terms is simply untenable. Petitioner himself admits that he has
received the amount of [₱]9,327,000.00 – representing his retirement pay and other benefits – from
private respondent. By no stretch of the imagination could the said amount be considered
unconscionably low or shocking to the conscience, so as to warrant the invalidation of the Deed of
Release and Quitclaim. Granting that the source of the retirement pay of petitioner is the trust fund
maintained by private respondent at the UCPB for the payment of the retirement pay of private-
respondent’s employees, the said circumstance would still not justify the invalidation of the Deed of
Release and Quitclaim, for petitioner clearly understood the contents thereof at the time of its
execution but still choose to sign the deed. The terms thereof being reasonable and there being no
showing that private respondent employed coercion, fraud or undue influence upon petitioner to
compel him to sign the same, the subject Deed of Release and Quitclaim signed by petitioner shall
be upheld as valid. (citations omitted)
19

The petitioner ascribes several errors on the part of the CA. Specifically, the petitioner claims that the
CA erred in not dismissing the respondent’s appeal to the NLRC, which was filed beyond the
prescribed period. There is no dispute that Querubin was authorized to receive mails and
correspondences on behalf of Philcomsat’s counsel and her receipt of LA Lustria’s Decision on June
20, 2006 is binding on Philcomsat. Also, the failure of Philcomsat’s counsel to ascertain when exactly
the copy of LA Lustria’s Decision was received by Querubin is inexcusable negligence. Since the
perfection of an appeal within the ten (10)-day period is a mandatory and jurisdictional requirement,
Philcomsat’s failure to justify its delay should have been reason enough to dismiss its appeal.

The petitioner also claims that the CA erred in upholding the validity of the subject quitclaim. The
respondent has no right to retain a portion of his retirement pay and the consideration for the
execution of the quitclaim is simply unconscionable. The petitioner submits that the CA should have
taken into account that Philcomsat’s retirement plan was for the exclusive benefit of its employees
and to allow Philcomsat to appropriate a significant portion of his retirement pay is a clear case of
unjust enrichment.

On the other hand, Philcomsat alleges that the petitioner willfully and knowingly executed the subject
quitclaim in consideration of his receipt of his retirement pay. Albeit his retirement pay was in the
reduced amount of ₱9,439,327.91, Philcomsat alleges that this was arrived at following its
negotiations with the petitioner and the latter participated in the computation thereof, taking into
account his accountabilities to Philcomsat and the latter’s financial debacles.

Philcomsat likewise alleges that the NLRC is clothed with ample authority to set aside technical
rules; hence, the NLRC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining Philcomsat’s appeal
in consideration of the circumstances surrounding the late filing thereof and the amount subject of
the dispute.

Issues

In view of the conflicting positions adopted by the parties, this Court is confronted with two (2) issues
that are far from being novel, to wit:

a. Whether the delay in the filing of Philcomsat’s appeal and posting of surety bond is inexcusable;
and

b. Whether the quitclaim executed by the petitioner in Philcomsat’s favor is valid, thereby foreclosing
his right to institute any claim against Philcomsat.

Our Ruling

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is confined to the correction of errors of
jurisdiction and will not issue absent a showing of a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment,
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Not every error in a proceeding, or every erroneous conclusion of
law or of fact, is an act in excess of jurisdiction or an abuse of discretion. The prerogative of writ
20

of certiorari does not lie except to correct, not every misstep, but a grave abuse of discretion.21

Procedural rules may be relaxed to give way to the full determination of a case on its merits.

Confronted with the task of determining whether the CA erred in not finding grave abuse of discretion
in the NLRC's decision to give due course to Philcomsat's appeal despite its being belatedly filed,
this Court rules in Philcomsat's favor.

Procedural rules may be waived or dispensed with in absolutely meritorious cases. A review of the
cases cited by the petitioner, Rubia v. Government Service Insurance System and Videogram
22

Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals, where this Court adhered to the strict implementation of the
23

rules and considered them inviolable, shows that the patent lack of merit of the appeals render
liberal interpretation pointless and naught. The contrary obtains in this case as Philcomsat's case is
not entirely unmeritorious. Specifically, Philcomsat alleged that the petitioner's execution of the
subject quitclaim was voluntary and he made no claim that he did so. Philcomsat likewise argued
that the petitioner's educational attainment and the position he occupied in Philcomsat's hierarchy
militate against his claim that he was pressured or coerced into signing the quitclaim.

The emerging trend in our jurisprudence is to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for
the proper and just determination of his cause free from the constraints of technicalities. Far from
24

having gravely abused its discretion, the NLRC correctly prioritized substantial justice over the rigid
and stringent application of procedural rules. This, by all means, is not a case of grave abuse of
discretion calling for the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
Absent any evidence that any of the vices of consent is present and considering the
petitioner’s position and education, the quitclaim executed by the petitioner constitutes a
valid and binding agreement.

In Goodrich Manufacturing Corporation, v. Ativo, this Court reiterated the standards that must be
25

observed in determining whether a waiver and quitclaim has been validly executed:

Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily
entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be
disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the
waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are
unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But
where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of
what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the
transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. (emphasis supplied)
26

In Callanta v. National Labor Relations Commission,27 this Court ruled that:

It is highly unlikely and incredible for a man of petitioner’s position and educational attainment to so
easily succumb to private respondent company’s alleged pressures without even defending himself
nor demanding a final audit report before signing any resignation letter. Assuming that pressure was
indeed exerted against him, there was no urgency for petitioner to sign the resignation letter. He
knew the nature of the letter that he was signing, for as argued by respondent company, petitioner
being "a man of high educational attainment and qualification, x x x he is expected to know the
import of everything that he executes, whether written or oral." 28

While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and quitclaims by employees who are inveigled or
pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their legal responsibilities,
a legitimate waiver representing a voluntary settlement of a laborer's claims should be respected by
the courts as the law between the parties. Considering the petitioner's claim of fraud and bad faith
29

against Philcomsat to be unsubstantiated, this Court finds the quitclaim in dispute to be legitimate
waiver.

While the petitioner bewailed as having been coerced or pressured into signing the release and
waiver, his failure to present evidence renders his allegation self-serving and inutile to invalidate the
same. That no portion of his retirement pay will be released to him or his urgent need for funds does
not constitute the pressure or coercion contemplated by law.

That the petitioner was all set to return to his hometown and was in dire need of money would
likewise not qualify as undue pressure sufficient to invalidate the quitclaim. "Dire necessity" may be
an acceptable ground to annul quitclaims if the consideration is unconscionably low and the
employee was tricked into accepting it, but is not an acceptable ground for annulling the release
when it is not shown that the employee has been forced to execute it. While it is our duty to prevent
30

the exploitation of employees, it also behooves us to protect the sanctity of contracts that do not
contravene our laws. 31

The petitioner is not an ordinary laborer. He is mature, intelligent and educated with a college
1awphi1

degree, who cannot be easily duped or tricked into performing an act against his will. As no proof
was presented that the said quitclaim was entered into through fraud, deception, misrepresentation,
the same is valid and binding. The petitioner is estopped from questioning the said quitclaim and
cannot renege after accepting the benefits thereunder. This Court will never satisfy itself with
surmises, conjectures or speculations for the purpose of giving imprimatur to the petitioner's attempt
to abdicate from his obligations under a valid and binding release and waiver.

The petitioner's educational background and employment stature render it improbable that he was
pressured, intimidated or inveigled into signing the subject quitclaim. This Court cannot permit the
petitioner to relieve himself from the consequences of his act, when his knowledge and
understanding thereof is expected. Also, the period of time that the petitioner allowed to lapse before
filing a complaint to recover the supposed deficiency in his retirement pay clouds his motives,
leading to the reasonable conclusion that his claim of being aggrieved is a mere afterthought, if not a
mere pretention.

The CA and the NLRC were unanimous in holding that the petitioner voluntarily executed the subject
quitclaim. The Supreme Court (SC) is not a trier of facts, and this doctrine applies with greater force
in labor cases. Factual questions are for the labor tribunals to resolve and whether the petitioner
voluntarily executed the subject quitclaim is a question of fact. In this case, the factual issues have
already been determined by the NLRC and its findings were affirmed by the CA. Judicial review by
this Court does not extend to a reevaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper
labor tribunal has based its determination.32

Factual findings of labor officials who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their
respective jurisdictions are generally accorded not only respect, but even finality, and are binding on
the SC. Verily, their conclusions are accorded great weight upon appeal, especially when supported
by substantial evidence. Consequently, the SC is not duty-bound to delve into the accuracy of their
factual findings, in the absence of a clear showing that the same were arbitrary and bereft of any
rational basis.
33

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed November 12,
2009 Decision and July 28, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107233 are
hereby AFFIRMED.

No pronouncements as to cost.

SO ORDERED.