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tax
ii. governing law
iii. validity of acts
iv. personality to sue
v.
1. Control Test
It was the English courts which first in the Daimler case applied this new concept
of "piercing the corporate veil', which was adopted by the Peace Treaties of 1919
and the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals established after the First World War 2.
In Filipinas Compañia de Seguros v. Christern, the Court held that in times of war,
the control test should be used in order to determine the nationality of
corporations. The Court considered the juridical entity an enemy based on the
fact that the "majority of the stockholders of the respondent corporation were
German subjects."
1 Filipinas Compañia De Seguros v. Christern, Hunefeld & Co., Inc., G.R. No. L-2294, [May 25, 1951], 89 PHIL 54-60
2
"Enemy Corporations" by Martin Domke, a paper presented to the Second International Conference of the Legal Profession held at The
Hague (Netherlands) in August, 1948
legal existence beyond the bounds of the state or sovereignty by which it is
created. It exist only in contemplation of law and by the force of law, and where
that law ceases to operate, the corporation can have no existence. This principle
however, does not prevent a corporation from acting in another state or country
with the latter's express or implied consent3.
In sum, the general rule adhered to by the Corporation Code is the Place of
Incorporation Test. However, during exceptional circumstances, ie. 1) In times of
war, as regards public enemy; 2) For investment purposes, as defined under the
Foreign Investment Act, the control test is used.
CASE:
Hyopsung Maritime Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, sought to qualify the Facilities
Management rule. In that case which involved the suit filed in local courts against
a foreign corporation, the Court mandated the principle that service of summons
under Section 14, Rule 14 of the old Rules of Court "requires that the foreign
corporation be one which is doing business in the Philippines. This is sine qua non
requirement. This fact must first be established in order that summons can be
made and jurisdiction acquired."
The Court then provided that when the contract sued upon has entirely been
executed outside of Philippine jurisdiction, the rule in Facilities Management is
inapplicable, thus:
The present case must be distinguished from Facilities Management Corp. vs. de
la Osa which involved the non- payment by Facilities Management Corp (FMC in
short), a non-resident foreign corporation, of overtime compensation, as well as
swing shift and graveyard shift premiums to Leonardo de la Osa, a Filipino,
successively employed as painter, houseboy, and cashier. Notably, de la Osa was
hired in Manila by the Filipino agent of FMC and the contract of employment
between him and FMC was originally executed and subsequently renewed in
Manila. . . On the other hand, the present suit is for the recovery of damages
based on a breach of contract which appears to have been entirely entered
into, executed, and consummated in Korea. . . Simply put, the petitioner is beyond
the reach of our courts.
In 1990 in Marubeni Nederland B.V. v. Tensuan the Supreme Court took a different
approach. In that case, a suit was filed by a local against a Japanese
corporation, on the basis of the limited and special appearance filed by counsel
of the foreign corporation seeking dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
the court a quo had no jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner "since it is a
foreign corporation neither doing nor licensed to do business in the Philippines."
The Court then clearly laid the "pivotal" issue to be "whether or not petitioner
Marubeni Nederland B.V. can be considered as `doing business' in the Philippines
and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of our courts," implying the minimum nexus
to be "doing business" to allow our courts to have jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant foreign corporation. In any event, the Court, relying on the
provisions of rules and regulations implementing Rep. Act 5455 which considered
as "doing business" soliciting of orders, purchases (sales) or service contracts in the
Philippines, held Marubeni Nederland B.V. to be doing business in the Philippines,
and with or without a license, was subject to the jurisdiction of local courts:
Even assuming for the sake of argument that Marubeni Nederlands B.V. is a
different and separate business entity from Marubeni Japan and its Manila
branch, in this particular transaction, at least, Marubeni Nederland B.V. through
the foregoing acts, had effectively solicited “orders, purchases (sales) or service
contracts” as well as constituted Marubeni Corporation, Tokyo, Japan and its
Manila Branch as its representative in the Philippines to transact business for its
account as principal. These circumstances, taken singly or in combination,
constitute “doing business in the Philippines” within the contemplation of the law.
It is ironical that in 1990 in Marubeni Nederland B.V. the Supreme Court was still
struggling with the issue of whether the defendant foreign corporation was "doing
business in the Philippines" to warrant jurisdiction of the trial court over the "person"
of the defendant, when there existed already the Facilities Management doctrine
which allows court jurisdiction over foreign corporation even not engaged in
business in the Philippines on an isolated transaction done in the Philippines.
The argument has reached full circle recently in Signetics Corporation v. Court of
Appeals. In that case, an American corporation, Signetic Corporation, through a
wholly-owned subsidiary, entered into a lease contract over a piece of land with
a local company. In a case subsequently filed by a the local company against
the American corporation for damages arising from the lease contract (there was
a piercing of the veil of corporate fiction treating the local subsidiary and the
parent American company as one), Signetics filed, by way of special
appearance, a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over its person. It invoked Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and
the rule laid down in Pacific Micronisian Line, Inc. v. Del Rosario to the effect that
the fact of doing business in the Philippines should first be established in order that
summons could be validly made and jurisdiction acquired by the court over a
foreign corporation.
In affirming the denial of the motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court held that the
doctrine in Pacific Micronisian Line should be interpreted to mean the fact of
doing business must be established by appropriate allegations in the complaint,
and thereafter extraterritorial service of summons may be done pursuant to the
provisions of Section 17, Rule 14, of the Rules of Court. In addition, the Court held
that even if Signetics were not doing business in the Philippines, under the Facilities
Management doctrine "a foreign corporation, although not engaged in business
in the Philippines, may still look up to our courts for relief; reciprocally, such
corporation may likewise be `sued in Philippine courts for acts done against a
person or person in the Philippines."
The Court went on to say that Signetics right to question the jurisdiction of the
court over its person is now to be deemed a foreclosed matter since - . . . If it is
true, as Signetics claims, that its only involvement in the Philippines was through a
passive investment in Sigfil, which it even later disposed of, and that TEAM Pacific
is not its agent, then it cannot really be said to be doing business in the Philippines.
It is a defense, however, that requires the contravention of the allegations of the
complaint, as well as full ventilation, in effect, of the main merits of the case, which
should not thus be within the province of a mere motion to dismiss. . .
96 Phil. 23 (1954).
This was a curious proposition on the part of the Court, since by adopting the
Facilities Management doctrine, whether or not a foreign corporation is engaged
in business in the Philippines has now become legally irrelevant, and the fact of
not doing business in the Philippines is not a proper defense for a suit brought in
Philippine courts against a foreign corporation. The point that matters with the full
adoption of the Facilities Management doctrine is whether the requirements of
due process and fair play could be complied with against a foreign corporation
not doing business in the Philippines, i.e., whether the proper process of obtaining
jurisdiction over its "person" have been complied with.
This point at least was recognized in Signetics Corporation when the Court went
to stress that -
. . . provided that, in the latter case, it would not be impossible for court processes
to reach the foreign corporation, a matter that can later be consequential in the
proper execution of judgment. Verily, a State may not exercise jurisdiction in the
absence of some good basis (and not offensive to traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice) for effectively exercising it, whether the proceedings are
in rem, quasi in rem or in personam.
Lately, in Avon Insurance PLC v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court seems to
have discounted the absolute suability rule of Facilities Management, thus:
In the alternative, private respondents submits that foreign corporation not doing
business in the Philippines are not exempt from suits leveled against them in courts,
citing the case of Facilities Management Corporation vs. Leonardo Dela Osa, et
al.,. . . We are not persuaded by the position taken by the private respondent. In
Facilities Management case, the principal issue presented was whether the
petitioner had been doing business in the Philippines, so that service of summons
upon its agent as under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court can be made in
order that the Court of First Instance could assume jurisdiction over it. The Court
ruled that the petitioner was doing business in the Philippines, and that by serving
summons upon its resident agent, the trial court had effectively acquired
jurisdiction. In that case, the court made no prescription as the absolute suability
of foreign corporations not doing business in the country, but merely discounts the
absolute exemption of such foreign corporations from liabilities particularly arising
from acts done against a person or persons in the Philippines.
venue to be within the proper courts in the Philippines, the Supreme Court has
recognized the same to be a consent to being sued in the Philippines even when
a stipulation
was provided for in the licensing agreement entered into between a foreign
corporation and a local company that read: "All legal settlements within the
compass of this AGREEMENT shall fall under the jurisdiction of Philippine
courts."
185
served upon its local counsel, the Supreme Court held that no evidence as to
whether the foreign corporation was doing business in the Philippines was
since whether or not the foreign corporation is doing business in the Philippines
"will not matter because the parties had expressly stipulated in the AGREEMENT
that all controversies based on the AGREEMENT `shall fall under the jurisdiction
of Philippine courts.' In other words, there was a covenant on venue to the effect
that [the foreign corporation] can be sued by [the local company] before
184
evidence to show that the foreign corporation was engaged in business for the
case to come under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court where doing
184
185
186
Ibid, at p. 524.
Ibid, at p. 527.
186
187
effected by extraterritorial service under Section 17, Rule 14, in relation to Rule 4
of the Rules of Court, "which recognizes the principle that venue can be agreed
188
Lingner & Fisher GMBH therefore laid down the rule that "if a local plaintiff
publication can be made on the foreign corporation under the principle of liberal
construction of the rules to promote just determination of actions."
189
Corporations
Partnerships