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Vietnan: Ten Years After Victory
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VIETNAM: TEN YEARS AFTER VICTORY 59
despite its explicitly racialist appeal, was rejected by the Axis.3 While
the war was in progress the French and the Japanese actively collaborated
to rule Indochina and suppress the nationalist movement. On 2
September 1945 Ho Chi Minh issued a declaration of independence based,
ironically enough, on the American declaration of 4 July 1776. This bold
action of Vietnam forced the United States to come to a decision on the
Indochina question. On 23 September 1945, the French staged a come-
back supported by the British to rule Indochina again. The French and
the British troops attacked Viet Minh (guerrilla wing of the Communist
Party of Vietnam) strongholds on the pretence that they were Japanese
agents On many occasions the French and the British employed Japanese
troops who had surrendered in mopping-up operations against the Viet
Minh.4 But the nationalists were not to be subdued so easily.
With the division of the country, like many other colonies, Ho Chi
Minh signed an agreement with the French in March 1946 which declared
North Vietnam, Republic of Vietnam, "a free state". But the French
ignored the promises made to the Viet Minh, brought in thousands of
troops and started the bombardment actively supported by the United
States under Marshall Plan which gave the call for defeating communism.
The US contention was that the nationalist movement was not genuine.
The Americans and the French chose Bao Dai as the true nationalist,
a person who was distinguished earlier for his collaboration with the
Japanese, but who, after the war, had formally abdicated in favour of the
Viet Minh and received an honorary post as political counsellor to Ho Chi
Minh. When the fighting was in progress between the Viet Minh and the
French, Bao Dai ran away to Hong Kong. He again renounced the Viet
Minh and accepted the offer of the Americans, after two years of
persuation to play the role of a "true nationalist". It was not until the
summer 1949 that the French colonial war was officially labelled as a
defence of the "legitimate" government of Bao Dai. Soon the Vietnamese
nationalist movement had international repercussions. The Black troops
from Africa and West Indies quickly realized that they were being used as
cannon fodder to suppress the nationalist movement in another colony.
The shifting of troops from other colonies weakened the French garrisons
in North Africa and the direct inspiration of the Viet Minh's struggle was
reflected in the growth of militant resistance movements in Tunisia (1952),
Morocco (1953) and Algeria (1954). By mid-1954 the French lost nearly
100,000 troops; another 114,000 were wounded. The cost of the war for
the French was over $ 7 billion and the US was paying 78 per cent of the
French cost in the Indochina war. The siege of Dien Bien Phu resulted
in the complete defeat of the French on 13 March 1954 and the
stage was set for US intervention. John Foster Dulles offered Bidault
the use of nuclear weapons at Dien Bien Phu; the Freneh did not accept
because the West would have completely lost its credibility and long-term
interests.
In April 1954, US Vice-President Richard Nixon proposed to send
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60 SOCIAL SCIENTIST
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VIETNAM: TEN YEARS AFTER VICTORY 61
living in rural areas came down from 85 per cent to less than 40 per cent
by 1970 in South Vietnam, and Saigon became the most congested city
in the world. The Americans left Vietnam with 58,000 dead, 300,000
wounded and a humliliating defeat. The price was heavier for the
Vietnamese. During the American intervention alone nearly two million
Vietnamese were killed, 4.5 million wounded and nine million became
refugees. A leading US weekly ruefully commented on the futility of the
"deployment of 3.3 million American troops and a concentrated application
of firepower that was, by every historical standard, almost inconceivable in
so small a place."6 The social, economic and ecological damage was
beyond anybody's imagination. It was reported that there were 30,000
cases of permanent deafness among children from the 1972 bombing
alone.
By late-1960s it became too much for the US to bear the cost of the
Vietnam war, with hopes of victory diminishing. Richard Nixon
announced on the island of Guam, the US military base in the Pacific, the
fomous "Nixon Doctrine" in 1969 which meant the withdrawal of troops
from Vietnam but to lend active support to the US ally, the Thieu regime
in South Vietnam. In other words it was "Vietnamization" of the
conflict where North and South Vietnam would fight each other. In 1973
the US withdrew its troops from Vietnam after the Paris Talks which was
only a face saving device and was nothing short of an acceptance of defeat
on the part of the US. But it was presented as a "stunning diplomatic
victory" in the US. Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho were awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize jointly after the successful conclusion of the talks.
Le Duc Tho rejected the award implying that the Vietnamese won the
peace defeating aggression. The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to
Kissinger represented supreme irony.
Instead of allowing the three political forces (the Provisonal Revolu-
tinory Government, the Thieu administration and a third force of
nationalists) to set up a council of National Reconciliation and Concord,
which was to organize elections in South Vietnam and set up a new
government--as was accepted under the Paris Agreement-the US started
supplying arms to Theiu as part of Vietnamization.7 But littie did anyone
imagine that the fall of Saigon would be so soon. On 21 April 1975,
South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu resigned and flew to Taipei,
reportedly shipping out a retirement fund of 3.5tons of gold. By the
end of April 1975, the whole of South Vietnam, including Saigon, fell to
the liberation forces. The sudden collapse of South Vietnam was not
because of any overwhelming numerical superiority of the guerilla forces,
but because of the degree of moral disintegration which the South
Vietnamese army had reached in 1975.
The People's Liberation Armed Forces occupied Saigon and imme-
diately restorted order in South Vietnam, which had been converted into
what Senator Fullbright called "a society of prostitutes and mercenaries."
They banned brothels, dance halls, opium dens, and "all decadent slave
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62 SOCIAL SCIENTIST
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VIETNAM : TEN YEARS AFTER VICTORY 63
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64 SOCIALSCIENTIST
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