Personal Autonomy and Society

Marina A. L. Oshana

Recent work in philosophy has addressed the issue of personal au-

tonomy as a phenomenon distinct from free will and moral responsibility. I
want to add to the discussion. Specifically, I wish to defend the claim that
personal autonomy, understood as self-government, is a socio-relational
phenomenon. By this I mean that autonomy is a condition of persons con-
stituted, in large part, by the external, social relations people find them-
selves in (or the absence of certain social relations).'
I will contrast the social or external account with what I will call
"internalist" or "psychological" theories of self-determination. Briefly,
internalist theories take the perspective of the individual whose self-gov-
ernment is at issue to determine her autonomy. Such accounts are Cartesian
in that they make the autonomy of persons derivative of specific psycho-
logical conditions. What goes on in the head of the individual, rather than
what goes on in the world around her, decides her standing as self-govem-
ing or not.
I will begin by offering a set of quite general intuitions about what we
mean when we say that an individual is self-governing. I think these intui-
tions will be accepted by those, such as the internalist, who propose quite
different accounts of autonomy from my own, and I will employ them
throughout this paper.
Next, I will review in greater detail intemalist theories of autonomy.
Although internalist accounts enjoy current favor, I think they are inad-
equate. For provided that certain psychological conditions are met, an
intemalist would count as autonomous one who is enslaved, or bound and
gagged. The externalist, by contrast, will deny autonomy to this person
and will claim that to characterize him as such is counterintuitive.
In section three,I will offer several case studies intended to document
the inadequacies of intemalist accounts. I will then propose a set of condi-
tions for an external or social account of autonomy suggested by these case
studies. In the fifth and final section, I shall explore the consequences and
the advantages of a socia1 focus. My aim is to show that a socio-relational
conception of autonomy is of greater philosophical value and intuitive ap-
peal than are various intemalist accounts.

1 Intuitions about Autonomy

Generally speaking, an autonomous person is one who is self-directed.

JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 29 No. 1, Spring 1998, 81-102

0 1998 Journal of Social Philosophy
82 Marina A. L. Oshana

The autonomous person formulates certain goals ,as relevant to the direc-
tion of her life, and is able to pursue these goals and make them effectivein
action. Moreover, she formulates these goals according to values, desires,
and convictions that have developed in an uncoerced and conscious fash-
ion. Such values can be described as the agent’s own even while they reflect
the influence of factors external to her. Additionally, an autonomous per-
son is able to meet her goals without depending upon the judgments of
others as to their validity and importance. Though the autonomous indi-
vidual may require the assistance of others in meeting these goals, she de-
cides which of them are most important.
Together, the intuitions suggest that an autonomous person is in con-
trol of her choices, her actions, and her will? There are many ways to un-
derstand the phenomenon of being in control.The idea could be interpreted
weakly. Some philosophers contend, for example, that a person can remain
in control of his choices, actions, and will even when the person acts under
conditions that could undermine self-government. For example, the per-
son who, for reasons of drug addiction, coercion, subordinaterank, or weak-
ness of will, could not do otherwise than perform a particular act (ingest a
drug, relinquish money to a mugger, execute a military order, or blow a
diet) might nevertheless be deemed in control of his actions if he would
have done the act anyway independently and of his own free will. Thus
control is possible even in the absence of alternate possibilities, and in the
face of factors that are suffiaent to determine one’s actions? It is this sort of
control that the internalists tend to highlight.
I believe that personal autonomy calls for a more stringent interpreta-
tion of “being in control.” As the case studies that follow illustrate, a person
might independently arrive at preferences that mirror those she holds un-
der conditions where control is absent. It may even be fortunate that this
coincidence occurs.’ But the fact that there is this coincidence will not de-
cide in favor of autonomy. When we say that a person is self-governing
because she is in control of her actions and choices, we are saying more
than that the person’s actions coincide with preferences or values that are
her own. We are saying that the person has the power to determine how
she shall live. Being autonomous is not simply a matter of having values
that are authentic, but of directing one’s life according to such values. And
this calls for control over one’s external circumstances.
One familiar way to understand these intui,tions is through the idea
that autonomy is the good which paternalism fails to respect. The autono-
mous individual may heed the advice, even the directives, of others, and
her choices and actions may be inspired by a source other than herself. But
no one must decide or act for the individual, and the opinions of others
must not be the wellspring from which the individual judges her choices
and actions to be valid and legitimate.
The self-governing person must face minimal interference in her ac-
tions and choices. Interferencescan be of a psychological or a physical na-
ture, and they can originate from within the individual as easily as they can
 Personal Autonomy and Society 83

from without. They include the familiar offenders of autonomy, such as

coercion, manipulation, and subjection to the dominant will of another, as
well as internal phenomena native to the individual such as captivity to
desires or physical impulses, psychological neuroses, or weakness of the
will. For persons who suffer in these respects lack the physical ability, emo-
tional conviction, or volitional fortitude to be in control of their choices,
actions, and will, no matter how fervently they might wish otherwise.

2 Internalist Accounts of Autonomy

What sort of theory of autonomyis consonant with these intuitions? In

recent years, attention has focused on what I have called intemalist inter-
pretations of self-determination.Internalist models understand ascriptions
of personal autonomy to depend only on the structural and/or historical
character of a person's psychological states and dispositions, and on an
agent's judgments about them. The most influential of these theories is
Gerald Dworkin's "hierarchical" account of self-determination-a theory,
he informs us, about "internal, psychological freed~m."~ According to
Dworkin, the condition of personal autonomy is best explained by appeal-
ing to a bileveled psychology in which are found the agent's "preferences
about desires to do X."6
Dworkin maintains that agents are autonomous when they "identify"
with the lower-order desires that move them to act following critical evalu-
ation and confirmationby desires of a higher order. This is the "authentic-
ity" requirement. In addition, he requires that a person identify with her
desires under conditions of "procedural independence." This means that
any factors that influence a person's reflective and critical faculties must
promote and improve these faculties rather than subvert them. Together,
authenticity and procedural independence provide "the full formula for
aut~nomy."~
Most recently, Dworkin has replaced the identification condition with
the requirement that the self-governing individual have the second-order
capacity to evaluate, and if necessary, amend, her first-ordermotivations. It
is this "capacity to raise the question whether I will identify with or reject
the reasons for which I now act"8 that is crucial for autonomy, for when this
capacity is exercised, "persons define their na ture...and take responsibility
for the kind of person they are."9
Jntemalistvariations of the hierarchicalmodel havebeen proposed. Gary
Watson advances a "Platonic" theory of free-agency, a condition that can be
understood as akin to personal autonomy.10Watson interpretsfree-agency
as a condition of persons who are rational and who are motivated by what
they value as much, if not more, as by what they desire. Specifically, au-
tonomy calls for a harmonious integration of the valuational and motiva-
tional systems of the agent.
More recently, John Christman has argued that autonomy is a function
of the development of a person's psychological states, and of the person's
84 Marina A. L. Oshana

participation in that process. Christman identifies autonomy as “the actual

psychological condition of self-governmentdefined as the ability to be self-
governing.“11He contends that this condition is forthcoming when an
individual’s psychology remains, throughout its history, free from factors
that “illegitimately”influence the individual. Illegitimateinfluencesare those
that compromise an individual‘s ability to evaluate the manner in which
the desires that motivate her are formed.
A fourfoldtest precludes illegitimacy and thereby determines autonomy:
factors external to the individual cannotbe the solecauses of the individual’s
preferences; the process by which a person comes to have desires, and the
factors that influence the development of desires, must be “transparent”to
the person; if, at any moment, the person wishes to revise her desires once
the manner in which they transpire is evident to her, she must be able to do
so; and the person must be rational, i.e., her desires must emerge from a
consistent set of beliefs.12
htemalist theories deserve praise. Characteristics of a person’s psy-
chology, including dispositional qualities and traits of temperament, are
certainly relevant to that person’s preparedness for self-go~enunent.~~ In
addition, the internalist approach offers a way of dealing with the worry
that self-determination calls for self-creation or complete control over one’s
life. Whether or not causal determinism is true, this seems a difficult condi-
tion to meet. We are, after all, interdependent in many ways, and are subject
to a variety of external influences, and it is not obvious that all of these
undermine autonomy.
The hierarchical analysisof Dworkin circumventsthis putative require-
ment by noting that autonomy is guaranteed as long as nothing occurs to
compromisethe “structural”integrity of the agent’s psychology. Autonomy
does not require that a person’s desires or values have developed under
conditions over which she has complete control. In fad, that a person has
been subject to coercion, manipulation, deception, or run-of-the-mill social-
ization is unimportant; what is important is the effect such factors can have
upon her capacity to identify with her operative desires and in a procedur-
ally independent manner,
Similarly, Christman argues that autonomy cannot be a matter of being
unaffected by any of the multitude of external influences that make self-
creation impossible. Rather, what distinguishes the autonomous from the
nonautonomous agent is that whatever factors do affect the psychology of
the former neither constrain her reflective capacities nor compromise her
ability to approve or disapprove of the manner in which her motivations
were formed.
But the intemalist’s approach to personal autonomy is not without its
problems. Two consequences are especially noteworthy.
First, intemalist theories in effect assimilate autonomy with respect to
one‘s preferences or values with the autonomy of persons, as if what can be
predicated of the former can be predicated of persons as well. This assimi-
lation signals the need for an alternate account of self-government.The prob-
 Personal Autonomy and Society 85

lem is not merely that internalists lack an adequate account of the condition
of personal autonomy in terms of things other than preferences. Rather,
they contend that the autonomy of persons is a matter of the condition of a
person’s psychology, and they seek no other account. Nor is it true that the
intemalist is attempting to explain something other than the autonomy of
persons, such as psychological freedom simpliciter.What is distinctiveabout
the internalist is his attempt to explain the autonomy of persons in terms of
one’s autonomy with respect to one’s psychological states.
But, as the case studies will show, there is no natural transition from a
conception of autonomy that focuses on psychological states, or capacities,
to an account of the autonomy of persons. Although a person’s status as
self-governing is in part dependent on her psychology, personal au-
tonomy and autonomy vis a vis one’s psychological states differ in kind;
since the subjects vary, the conditions for each may vary as well. In any
event, what I am interested in is not autonomy with respect to one’s
preferences or history and the conditions that make that possible but
rather the autonomy of persons, persons who have certain preferences,
and who pursue certain options.
Second, according to internalist theories, people with the same psychol-
ogy are, ips0 facto, equally autonomous (or nonautonomous). A more
”externalist” theory such as I will offer denies that personal autonomy is a
condition that supervenes on psychological or dispositional states alone.
On the external analysis, it is possible for two individuals to satisfy all the
psychological and historical conditions we have been discussing, but to
differ with respect to their status as autonomous beings-and this differ-
ence is to be explained in terms of some variance in their social circum-
stances. (Thestudy of Harriet, in the following section, illustratesthis point.)
In addition to whatever subjective psychological characteristicsare required
for autonomy there are objective social criteria according to which we judge
someone as autonomous, and these externalcriteria are independent of the
individual’s internal state.
I have called the externalist account I favor “socio-relational”by way of
contrasting it with an internalist account. By this I do not mean to imply
that intemalist accounts lack a relational component, and that they are flawed
for this reason. My complaint about intemalist accounts of autonomy is not
that they fail to include among the components of a person’s psychology
certain relational or ”interactive”qualities or abilities. Rather, my complaint
is that such accounts are exclusively subjective. The agent’s psychological
condition-specifically, the structural and historical character of her judg-
ments and preferences-is alone important for her autonomy.
The psychological emphasis of internalist theories reflects the convic-
tion that preserving the autonomy of persons consists in preserving what
is metaphorically described as the “inner citadel.‘’ The metaphor asks
us to assume the existence of some essential (presumably psychological)
element of the individual, independent of the world and inviolable, in
virtue of which autonomy is safeguarded. This element is often referred
86 Marina A. L. Oshana

to as the “true self” or “real self.”14

I do not think the imagery of an inner citadel advances our understand-
ing of personal autonomy. In the first place, the existence of such an ele-
ment is questionable and requires considerable defense; at the very least,
we need some explanation of what this ”true self” is. (Perhaps it is some-
thing akin to Kant‘s Wille?) In the second place, our intuitions make it
unlikely that it will be a condition that attaches to a person as to an entity
separated from the world, as the metaphor implies. Moreover, if I am cor-
rect that autonomy is determined by how a person interacts with others,
the metaphor of the inner citadel will not accurately capture the condition
of the self-determined agent.

2 Case Studies

The following four case studies establish that persons who are
nonautonomous in certain situations fail to be autonomous because they
lack characteristics that only a social theory of self-determination can ac-
commodate. Each is intended to highlight the extemalist’s intuition that
autonomy is incompatible with constraint-even where constraint is self-
chosen and reflects a free, rational choice. The first three cases depict per-
sonswho satisfy the various intemalist criteria for autonomy but who nev-
ertheless fail to meet the general intuitions for self-government. To sim-
plify, I consider a hybrid intemalist theory according to which the criteria
are second-order identification with the operative desire, integration of
motivational and valuational systems, and historically proper preference
formation. The fourth case depicts persons who lack autonomy but who
nevertheless have authority over this lack.

Case #1: Voltinta y slavery

Consider the situation of the contented slave. Let us suppose, first, that
the decision to become a slave was autonomous, in that it met the condi-
tions for psychological autonomy proffered by the internalists. This indi-
vidual has willingly relinquished his rights, and has chosen to be a slave
under conditions free of whatever factors might impair the autonomy of
his decision. Second, assume that a life of slavery is consistent with this
person’s values and that it satisfies his notion of well-being. What role, if
any do these facts play in determining the autonomy of the slave? Is his
autonomy guaranteed by the fact that he possesses an integrated and co-
herent psychology, and that he has arrived at this preference in a procedur-
ally independent manner? Does the fact that he expresses happiness or
approval over his situation transform what seems to be a state that violates
autonomy into one of nonviolation?
It is certainly possible for a person’s conception of well-being to fail to
include an interest in a~tonorny.’~ For example, deeply religious persons
may believe that their interests are best served by following, without ques-
tion, the edicts of their leaders. Such persons will not value or seek self-
 Personal Autonomy and Society 87

determination. Furthermore, persons who do value and wish for self-de-

termination, but who have given up hope of achieving that state, may for-
mulate conceptions of welfare and pursue ventures that perpetuate their
condition. For example, such individuals might believe it in their best inter-
ests to remain in dysfunctional domesticsituations rather than risk the frus-
trations and challenges that accompany life on one’s own.16 Not everyone,
then, will include the autonomous life among those goals integral to their
well-being, nor is autonomyguaranteed by an individual’s successin achiev-
ing what he believes to be in his best interest.
The question of immediateinterest is whether the individual who seeks
a situation of enslavement-who knowingly, willingly, and freely chooses
a life of bondage-where this choice fulfills his version of well-being, is
autonomous as a result. I claim that this person is not. The slave does con-
sent to the state of affairs in which he finds himself, but what he consents to
is a loss of freedom.” And although the slave may be unhampered in his
pursuit of his conception of the “good” life, what he has in mind for that
life, and what he in fact obtains, is a life that satisfies few, if any, of the
intuitions described above, and so is a life of nonautonomy.’*
For whether or not the slave has freely chosen bondage, and whether or
not, once he is a slave, he expresses pleasure or displeasure with his status,
having become a slave he has no authority over those aspects of his social
situation that influence his will and the direction of his life.Ig Being a slave
means that how he shall live is,no longer up to him. The slave is denied the
possibility of seeing himself as an independent participant in “the willing,
planning, and controlling aspect” of the projects he works on. Instead, he is
“harnessed to somebody else’s...enterprise as though he were merely a natu-
ral force, like a beast of burden or like water-power.”20
The slave may never actually experience treatment of the sort that pro-
vides plain evidence of a failure of self-determination.But why should such
evidence be required? The slave might always comply with his master’s
orders, and as a reward for his obedience he might never suffer punish-
ment (assuming,of course, that his master is reasonable).Nevertheless, ser-
vility, degradation, the expectation of punishment, and dependence on the
good will of his master are very real, actual properties of his condition,
whether or not punitive treatment is ever realized. k i n g a slave means that
he could be punished or mistreated at his master’s whim. Thus the fact that
he is not autonomous is a fact about the actual situation, the truth of which
rests upon the truth of certain counterfactual claims.
That the slave feels content does not indicate that he is self-governing.
The slave might feel satisfied because the tasks he performs are less menial
than are those performed by his counterparts, and for this he is grateful. He
may be content because his master allows him the opportunity to learn to
read and write, an envied and valuable skill. But the fact that he is better off
than are most other slaves, and that his attitude is one of appreciation, does
not mean that he is free.His lack of autonomy is in part signaled by the fact
that he looks upon literacy as a gift to be thankful for. By contrast, a free
88 Marina A. L. Oshana

man, even if he were grateful to be literate, would likely view literacy as a

skill to which he has a right.
What have intemalists to say about the autonomy of the contented
slave?21Dworkin remarks that

If we conceive of autonomy as the capacity of individuals to critically

reflect on and take responsibility for the kind of persons they want to be,
then...there is nothing in the idea of autonomy which precludes a person
from saying: “I want to be the kind of person who acts at the commands
of others. I define myself as a slave and endorse those attitudes and pref-
erences. My autonomy consists in being a slave.”

If this is coherent, and I think it is, one cannot argue against such slavery
on the grounds of autonomy.”

But is this coherent? Dworkin claims that one cannot argue that volun-
tary slavery offends autonomy, because its voluntary nature renders it con-
sistent with autonomy But Dworkin‘s argument is unsatisfactory for the
following reasons. First, it relies too heavily on choice as a sufficient condi-
tion for autonomy. But choice does not guarantee autonomy,for the person
who chooses might be compelled to do so, and to do so from within the
confines of a situation that grants her no autonomy; consider Sophie’s
choice.23And since a person can freely select a life that denies him self-
determination, the exercise of choice is no guarantee that the result of that
choice will be a situation in which the chooser is autonomous.
The person who chooses slavery is of course (at least partially) respon-
sible for his resulting lack of autonomy But autonomy is absent as long as
he remains a slave, for he is subject to coercion and his standing remains
one of compliance, submissiveness, and dependency.
This suggests a further point. It is certainly possible that a person could
autonomously choose nonautonomy; the example of the religious devo-
tee offers a plausible case in point. Some, however, would question
whether the person who conceives of servitude as a state that will con-
tribute to his welfare, and who pursues that state in light of this belief-
who opts for the choice that denies him autonomy-really is autono-
mous to begin with. For example, Thomas Hill recalls Rousseau’s thought
that the very idea of consenting to slavery (or, analogously, to torture or
imprisonment) is incoherent, since it means that the agent ”displays a
conditioned slavish mentality that renders [such] consent worthless.”
Hill argues that “a person’s consent releases others from obligation only
if it is autonomously given, and consent resulting from underestimation
of one’s moral status [as a human being entitled to a certain body of
rights] is not autonomously
Although I do not share Hill’s belief, it merits consideration. For if Hi11
is correct, then it is unlikely that truly autonomous desires-desires that
meet the hybrid conditions of the internalist-will be for states of
 Personal Autonomy and Society 89

nonautonomy. A person who is autonomous, or who at least meets the

internalist’s criteria for psychological autonomy, will desire situations of
autonomy. Equally, a person’s desire for nonautonomy will be sufficient to
signal her lack of autonomy or of an autonomous psychology. In short,
being autonomous (or having an autonomous psychology) will turn on
having desires of a certain sort. I want to put this concern on hold for the
moment, and return to it in considering the next case-study. The point to be
made at this juncture is that, if Hill’s objection holds, it raises difficulties for
Dworkin’s claim that the slave’s desire is consistent with autonomy.
Finally, Dworkin’s analysis suggests that the ability to critically reflect
in a procedurally independent fashion is sufficient for the condition of be-
ing autonomous. But being able to engage in critical reflection, to take stock
of oneself and to shape oneself on the basis of this evaluation, does not
guarantee that whatever state of affairs ensues from this activity will be one
of personal autonomy. Since actually being autonomous depends on cir-
cumstancesbeyond those descriptiveof a person’s psychology, it may still
be possible to “argue against slavery on the grounds of autonomy.”

Case #2: The subservient woman

Consider the woman whose role as spouse and as homemaker affords
her less recognition and independence than she deservesand than she might
otherwise have. Let us imagine that this woman, whom I shall call Harriet,
prefers to be subservient. I will assume that Harriet is sober and mature,
and that we have no reason to suspect any failure on her part to give her
preferencefor this life-style whatever measure of deliberationit merits. Nor
have we reason to believe that she has not evaluated her motivations to
whatever extent seems appropriate. Harriet‘s reasons for her actions are
consistent, value-reflective, and historically sound. She possesses adequate
informationabout, and has taken a critical and reflective stance with regard
to, the events that have shaped her character and her desires, and she has
no wish to alter these events. I will even assume that Harriet finds her life
gratifymg and has no wish to alter it. There is nothing she values or wants
more than she wants subservience. Thus she has no preferences of a higher
order that are somehow ineffective against her will.
Let us return now to Hill’s concern about persons who choose
nonautonomy.Against Hill, I want to deny that Harriet’s lack of autonomy
rests on the substance of her preferences and desires. A person’s prefer-
ences-for religious devotion, for slavery, for subservience, for power-
can certainly serve as an indicator of that person’s ability to be self-govern-
ing, and some desires more than others are hospitable to autonomy. But
having a desire for nonautonomy does not entail that the individual who
has the desire is nonautonomous; I might desire to experience the
nonautonomous conditionof hypnosis, while being autonomousin my wish.
Nor must such a desire emerge from conditionshostile to autonomy.Of
course, if Harriet’s desire for subservience was produced by a socially rein-
forced belief in her inferior status, then we might be persuaded that her
90 Marina A. L. Oshana

choice was not autonomous. Her lack of autonomy could be traced to an

unsupportive history? But we have assumed that such a history is not true
of Harriet. In spite of the fact that Harriet's desires may be regrettable, she
meets the intemalist's qualifications for autonomy?
Harriet's lack of autonomy is not due to her lamentable desires. But
neither is her self-determinationguaranteed by the fact that she satisfiesthe
intemalistcriteria. Harriet has the "right" psychology. Nonethelessshe fails
to be autonomous-not because she wants to be subservient, but because
she is subservient. Her lack of autonomy is due to her personal relations
with others and to the social institutions of her society.
Let us assume the social relations Harriet is party to, given her role as
homemaker, afford her less financial flexibility, less confidence and emo-
tional security and fewer opportunities for intellectual and creative devel-
opment than she could have were these relations otherwise.u Absent, too,
from Harriet's life are economic and political institutions that might em-
power homemakers.
Harriet's life is similar to that standardly ascribed to an average woman
in a fundamentalistIslamic society. She has few options for action and little
authority over her social situation.Although Harriet is "master of her will,"
although she lives in a manner consonant with her preferences, the "choices"
she makes are guided almost entirely by the judgments and recommenda-
tions of others. Taken together, these facts imply that Harriet is not autono-
mous. But an internalist theory would characterize her as autonomous,
despite her subservient situation.
We might strengthen this case by assuming that Harriet's regard for
others not only exceeds any regard she pays herself, but supersedes or sup-
plants that regard. We could assume Harriet does not think of herself as
anything other than an other-regarding caregiver, and that she fails to per-
ceive herself as someone whose activities, needs, preferences, and interests
have value independently of the value they have for others. We could de-
scribe Harriet as someone who systematically disregards her own counsel,
and fails to act in a self-managed way.
We need not do this, however, since Harriet's lack of autonomy is not
owing to a deficient measure of self-regard, nor to the failure of others to
accord her consideration.Self-respect and respectful treatment from others
may make it more likely that a person will be autonomous, but neither are
constitutive of self-governmerkB Certainly how a person regards herself
colors the choices she makes, the activitiesshe pursues, and the desires she
has. And when a person's feelings of inadequacy cause her chronically to
make "choices which call for submission to humiliation or maltreab~ent,"~~
choices which will be attended by an acceptance of maltreatment from oth-
ers, autonomy is impossible.
Similarly, self-respect is needed to inspire others to reciprocate with a
similar attitude of respect toward oneself. The person who, for example,
constantly reneges on, or is inconsistent about, the personal values he es-
tablishes for himself exhibits no commitment to these and so cannot expect
 Personal Autonomy and Society 92

that others will take his expression of these values seriously. As a result,
others might regard this individual as less than capable of self-government
just because he appears incapable of upholding a system of values. None-
theless, that a person respects himself or fails to do so will not decide his
status as self-governing.
The inadequacy of intemalistaccounts can be illustrated by contrasting
the case of Harriet with that of a homemaker who is self-governing. Both
Harriet and her counterpart, whom I shall call Wilma, share the properties
touted by the internalist. Both possess structurally coherent psychologies,
and each offers reasons for her actions that are consistent, value-reflec-
tive, and historically sound. But suppose that the personal relations in
which Wilma finds herself, and the social institutions that affect her life,
afford her control over her choices. She directs her life from within a
range of possibilities that promise economic independence and the op-
portunity for personal growth. Moreover, although Wilma may view
herself as an other-regarding caregiver, she is treated by others as one
whose needs and wants deserve to be respected, and this desert is rein-
forced by her social situation. While both women desire to be of service
to others, only Harriet finds herself subservient. Wilma can be described
as autonomous while Harriet cannot.

Case #3: The conscientious objector

Consider the conscientious objector (CO) who chooses prison rather
than denounce his pacifistic principles. Let us suppose that the CO identi-
fies with his choice, and it is the choice most consistent with his values. He
might even be said to have brought imprisonment upon himself. But since
incarceration denies the CO control over his daily life, and renders him
dependent on the judgment and will of others for the satisfaction of his
objectives and for the direction of his life, the CO must be judged
"nonautonomous." The intemalist, however, will claim that the CO not
merely decides in an autonomousfashion, but that he remains autonomous
insofar as the psychological and historical criteria are met. The CO may
marshal the "respect" of others; he might be admired, perhaps even by his
captors, for his emotional fortitude or for his fidelity to his principles. (The
slave might be similarly admired.) But respect of this sort will not make the
incarcerated individual autonomous.
The followinganalogymay help illurninate the extemalist's assessment
of the slave, the housewife, and the CO. Consider a state occupied and
controlled by a foreign power. The state might not object to this occupation.
Indeed, its Congress might vote after the occupation to welcome the for-
eign power, and might develop a rational plan of action for the occupation.
And the citizens might never experience hardship or adversity in this situ-
ation. An intemalist account would call this state autonomous because it is
master of its will; the state has fashioned goals for itself of which it ap-
proves, the political situation external to its goveming body notwithstand-
ing. But an extemalist will claim that it makes more sense to deny that this
92 Marina A. L. Oshana

state is self-governingbecause it is subject to the dictates of a foreign power.

Not being subject to the dictates of others is part of what it means to be self-
governing. This is as true of a state as it is of a slave.

Case #4: The monk

It is possible to relinquish one’s autonomous condition without losing
authority over that condition. A monk, for example, who opts to live under
the dictates of a religious order, thereby foregoing his autonomy may none-
theless preserve the power to reinstate his autonomy. Suppose that every
year it is up to the monk to decide whether to remain in the order and to
continue conducting his life in a manner that denies him a fuller range of
freedom. Then, even if the religious order has power over him sufficient to
compel him to behave in a certain way, the monk can annul this power
annually,in much the same way that individuals have the legal authority to
dissolve the terms of certain contracts.30Unlike the slave, the monk has
consented to a condition that guarantees him ultimate authority over him-
self on a yearly basis, and he is sovereign in thisregard.
Nonetheless, his monastic superiors preserve authority in the interim,
for his life is ruled by them on a daily basis. Thus the fact that the monk can
annul his status as nonautonomousdoes not mean he is self-governing.But
in light of the social relations he is party to, the monk can become self-
governing merely by revoking his decision to be subservient. The slave is in
a different social position, a position which, unlike that of the monk, makes
it impossible for him to annul his status.3l
I should caution that what decides a person’s autonomy is not the inter-
val of time for which a person behaves (or fails to behave) in a self-man-
aged way. As I noted earlier, the presence or absence of local or occurrent
control does not grant or rob a person of a life of self-government.J2 Just as
one who occasionally tells a lie can be an honest person, and one who is
occasionally despondent can be a happy person, so, too, can a person be
autonomous even though her life might include moments of nonautonomy.
(For example, the person might be suffering from a severe bout of flu.)
Equally, the monk (or the slave) fails to be self-governing though on occa-
sion he might be in control of some aspect of his life. What I am interested in
is a global sense of autonomy-the idea of living a self-governed life, the
idea of autonomy as a global condition of persons rather than a transient
characteristic.=
Let me summarize some of the ideas posed by the case studies. Au-
tonomy requires more than upholding a person’s values and conception of
well-being. It requires more than the ability to formulate and execute a plan
for life. It requires more than the ability to judge favorably of one’s history.
A n individual does not enjoy autonomy because he is admired by others
any more than he lacks autonomy merely because he depends on others.
Rather, autonomy is determined by what dependency and admiration en-
tail for persons in their daily lives. A self-governingperson must be able to
evaluate his reasons for action, and in a socially and psychologically unfet-
 Personal Autonomy and Society 93

tered way. Moreover, the choices he makes and the goals he sets as relevant
to the direction of his life must emanate from a variety of acceptable alter-
natives, and the individual must be able to pursue these choices without
undue social or psychological cost.

4 The Conditions for Personal Autonomy

The preceding scenarios indicate the need for the following conditions
for autonomy In conjunction with one another they are sufficient to consti-
tute autonomy. I recognize that persons can be more or less autonomous,
and that not everyone need be autonomous to the same degree in order to
count as autonomous. But these conditions must be satisfied, each to some
significant degree, if a person is to be autonomous. Thus,there is a thresh-
old for autonomy. The scope of this paper does not allow a satisfactory
discussion of the threshold. However, it should be apparent that I view the
satisfaction of the intemalist’s conditions required for autonomy vis a vis
preferences to fall short of the threshold required for the autonomy of agents.

Condition #I: Critical reflection

First, autonomy requires that persons be able to engage in the psycho-
logical activity of critical reflection assumed by the intemalist. On my view,
a person engages in critical reflection when she assumes the stance of a
third party in appraising her motivations and actions, and the environment
in which these develop. The individual assesses these as she would the
motives, actions, and environment of another comparably developed hu-
man being. If, on the basis of this evaluation, the individual accepts her
motivations as her own-if she identifies with them-then they are au-
thentic. If she does not identify with them, then they may require correction
or revision.34

Condition #2 :Pr oced tiral independence

In order to be autonomous, an agent must not in fact be influenced or
restricted by others in autonomy-constrainingways. That an individual
happens to reach, via critical reflection, certain conclusions about the influ-
ences which affecther is not sufficient to determine whether she is autono-
mow. For a person can decide, mistakenly, that she has not been affected in
ways that jeopardize autonomy,even where she has in fact been so affected.
Hence the need for a condition of procedural independence (PI). For
Dworkin, PI is satisfied when a person’s critical faculties have not been
influenced in ways that undermine the authenticity of the motivations that
are appraised by those faculties. Dworkin takes PI to guarantee the integ-
rity of a person’s critical faculties, but he wants to remain neutral with re-
spect to the kinds of situations and influences (external or internal) that are
conducive to such integrity.
However, I don’t believe an account of PI can be neutral in this fashion.
For if a person is to appraiseher desires under conditionsof PI, the environ-
94 Marina A. L. Oshana

ment must be free of whatever variety of factors destroy the psychological

integrity of the person, and disable the person in her relations with others.
For example, the environment must be noncoerave and nonmanipulative.
In general, PI incorporatescertain (ratheropen-ended)standardsof histori-
cal and social-relational legitimacy into the criteria for personal autonomy.
I take these standards to characterize substantively the manner in which
the autonomous individual relates to others in the world.

Condition #3: Access to a range of relevant options

The self-governing individual must have access to an adequate assort-
ment of options." It is not enough that a person acknowledges the state of
affairs in which she finds herself as one she would consent to even if she
were lacking any other options, for the fact that a person finds her choice
acceptable does not mean that an acceptable range of choices was hers. An
assortmentis not adequateif a person can only choose nonautonomy.Thus
the option to choose nonsubservience must be available to the agent. Nor is
an assortment adequate if the agent's choices are all dictated by duress (eco-
nomic, emotional, etc.) or by bodily needs. The social climate must be sen-
sitive to the fact that humans are not brute creatures; they are individuals
whose physical and emotional well-being depends on the ability to engage
the body and the mind variously and creatively. Moreover, these options
must be "real"-they must be options that a person can, in fact, hope to
achieve, and they must be relevant to the development of her life.%

Condition #4: Social-relational properties

In order to be autonomous, a person who is in a society must find her-
self within a set of relations with others that enable her to pursue her goals
in a context of social and psychological security. By this I mean that a person's
socialbackground, where this includes social institutions,must be such that
the following are true:
a. The individual can defend herself against (or be granted defense
against) psychological or physical assault when it is necessary to do so.
b. The individual can defend herself against (or be granted defense
against) attempts to deprive her of her civil and economic rights, where
and when such attempts arise.
c. The individual need not take responsibility for another's needs, ex-
pectations, and failings unless doing so is agreed upon or is reasonably
expected of the individual in light of a particular f ~ n ~ t i ~ n ? ~
d. The individual can have, and can pursue, values, interests, needs,
and goals different from those who have influence and authority over her,
without interferenceor risk of reprisal sufficient to deter her in this pursuit.
Although only the fourth condition of personal autonomy is explicitly
labeled "social-relational," conditions 1- 3 can also be characterized as ap-
pealing to external circumstances and relations beyond the psychology of
the agent as essential to self-government.All contribute to a conception of
Self-governmentthat is distinct from an account of psychological freedom.%
 Personal Autonomy and Society 95

The claim of the extemalist is that a sensiblecharacterization of autonomy

requires a certain environment external to the agent whose self-govern-
ment is at issue. Together, the four conditions should be sufficient to guar-
antee that an individual is autonomous-that she is an independent par-
ticipant in situations that pertain to the diredion of her life and to the projects
she selects as important to her life, that she is not captive to social impedi-
ments, or to psychological and physical disabilities, of the sort that prevent
her from forrriulating and realizing her goals, and that she is able to sustain
herself without relying on the judgment and will of others.
Notice that satisfaction of these conditions does not guarantee that a
person will be autonomous at some point of time or with respect to some
particular function. I might meet these conditions and so be an autono-
mous agent, but at the moment be too distraughtby some crisis to function
in a self-directed way. The role of these conditions-in particular the latter
two-is not to account for the means to securing control over one’s imme-
diate situation but to illustratewhat is absent in the lives of individuals like
the slave, the subservient housewife, the prisoner, and the monk. As I have
noted, personal autonomy is a stable property of an autonomous person
rather than a transient characteristic.

5 Why Social Autonomy?

Part 1. The consequences ofan external analysis

The externalist account that I advocate has the following consequences.
First, the emphasis moves from the autonomy of preferences or values to
the autonomy of persons. Though a person‘s psychological status affects
that person’s ability to be self-governing, actually being autonomous is at
least partly a function of social relationships, and states of affairs, that ob-
tain independently of these psychological properties.
Second, personal autonomy cannot be determined solely by reference
to a person’s history, or to the history of his psychological states, even given
a historical account that is sensitive to the person‘s socio-relational back-
ground. In general, intemalists who offer a historical account fail to discuss
the conditions under which a suitable psychology must develop in terms
that are clearly sensitive to the agent’s socio-relational environment. For
example, the “reflection-constraining factors“ and “illegitimateinfluences”
which Christman employs to test the autonomy of persons offer no more
than veiled references to the social relations that affect the agent’s psycho-
logical capacities,J9
It is likely, however, that the internalist has in mind certain social fac-
tors and influences when he speaks of appropriateand inappropriate influ-
ences. But even if he does, the only facts the internalist addresses are facts
about a person’s psychological history-facts pertaining to the develop-
ment of the agent’s capacity to reflect upon, revise, and identify with her
psychological states. I claim, however, that to the extent an agent’s history
is important for her autonomy, much more than her psychological history
96 Marina A. L. Oshana

is at stake. For example, what ishistoricallyrelevant to the monk’s autonomy

is that his monastic order permits him to leave when he sees fit. What is
historically relevant to Harriet’s lack of autonomy is a pattern of social prac-
tices that have made her subject, rather than sovereign, of her life.
But a deeper difficulty confronts any historical account of autonomy.
This is that history is important for autonomy only to the extent that it re-
sults in a certain state of affairs in the present. The fact that a person’s his-
tory offers an optimal breeding ground for autonomy, andso is a history
happily free of autonomy-constraining factors, is relevant for personal au-
tonomy only if that history yields the kind of social relations and psycho-
logical stability that are suitable for self-government. A person’s history
may contribute to an ability to live a self-determined life, but does not con-
stitute autonomy.
A third consequence of a social account is that the autonomous indi-
vidual is regarded in a less atomistic light than might be expected from an
intemalist theory of self-determination. Kant’s account of autonomy, for
example, is atomistic in that the locus of autonomyis the will of the rational
individual. What occurs external to this person in the larger social and phe-
nomenal environment is of no consequence.40By contrast, my view of au-
tonomy is, in a manner of speaking, heteronomous, since I make au-
tonomy a characteristic that attaches to persons in light of their socio-rela-
tional standing.
The fact that autonomy is a phenomenon that is best understood
relationally does not mean that a person can only be autonomous in an
interpersonal context. People can, of course, oversee their choices and di-
rect their lives when distant from others; a Robinson Crusoe, for example,
who has never interacted with others could be described as autonomous.
But Crusoe’s autonomy would still be a matter of his not being enslaved,
and the like. We call people autonomous (or refuse to do so) in part by
examining their external circumstances.

Part 2. Theftinction ofa socialfocus

The social relations in which a person finds himself contribute both
causally and materially to the condition of autonomy.The intemalist would,
I believe, concede that appropriate social relations contribute causally to
autonomy.For, assuming that an individualdoes not suffer from whatever
psychological infirmities might make autonomy difficult even in the most
hospitable of social situations, a person in appropriatesocial circumstances
is more likely to experience psychotogical autonomy. The principal psy-
chological characteristics of self-determination-an ability to engage in ra-
tional, reflexive self-evaluation,and identificationwith one’s motives-flour-
ish when a person interacts with others in unimpeded ways.
But since the intemalist views psychological freedom as sufficient for
self-government,he is likely to see no other role than a causal one for social
relations to play. Appropriate social conditions provide the background
against which persons can implement whatever psychological abilities pre-
 Personal Autonomy and Society 97

pare them for autonomy but the intemalist will contend that a person need
not be in these social situations in order to meet the requisite psychological
conditions and, thereby be autonomous.
Our case studies, however, illustrate that satisfylng the psychological
conditions simply will not be sufficient for self-government. We can speak
of a person’s desires as autonomous, or of a person as autonomous over her
desires, even where the person is not autonomous (just as we can speak of
a person’s desires as satisfied even where the person is not). We refuse to
count the slave et al. as self-governing because his external environment
renders him incapable of functioning in a self-governing way.
Not being subject to the dictates of others, or not being severely con-
strained,or not having an adequate range of options might only be causally
necessary for meeting the internalist’sconditions-for being what one might
call a “rational planner.” But they are constitutively necessary for being
autonomous. Thus in addition to whatever role social conditions play in
bringing about a climate more conducive to self-government, an
unconstraining social situation is partly constitutive of, or contributes ”ma-
terially” to, self-government.

Part 3. The advantages of a social fociisfor airtonomy

The intemalist might raise the following objection. He might object that
two separate notions of autonomy are at issue, and accuse me of having
equivocated between them. For while the intemalist defines autonomy in
terms of psychological conditions (by way of the criteria supplied in sec-
tion two), he might say I am developing a different notion of autonomy.
Perhaps he would concede that an extemalist analysis plays a useful role in
certain contexts, but he will contend that the intemalist’s conception of au-
tonomy is legitimate in its own right. It is not incoherent or improper to
analyze autonomy in a Cartesian fashion.
In support of his complaint, the intemalist may deny he shares my in-
tuitions about self-government.Believing that personal autonomy consists
in the integrity of the ”inner citadel,” the internalist might contend that the
person who is subjugated and controlled, either because of natural or artifi-
cial factors, may nevertheless be autonomous vis a vis a properly struc-
tured or welldeveloped set of preferences, or vis a vis the possession of
some intrinsic dispositionfor autonomy.As a result, the intemalist will find
his own criteria for autonomy quite adequate: autonomy is a condition that
supervenes on psychological states, and the presence or absence of socio-
relational conditions, if relevant at all, is useful only as a way of explaining
what is required for the exercise of autonomy, understood as the realization
of these psychological states.
Perhaps there are differentnotions of self-government at play here. But
I doubt it. I think the intemalist would accept the intuitions about self-gov-
ernment offered earlier, and that his objective, like that of the externalist, is
to provide an account of autonomy that will capture these intuitions.I think
these intuitions are sound, and that they show that what needs to be ana-
98 Marina A. L. Oshana

lyzed is a condition that is more plausibly called "self-government" than is

any purely psychological state.
Moreover, to the extent the case studies show autonomy to be lacking
in the lives of certain agents, we can say that autonomy requires control
over one's external situation, a viable range of options for choice, and the
absence of severe constraint. While the internalist disregards (or at best,
sidesteps) these consequences, the externalist confronts them. Thus the
philosophical work a socio-relational theory of self-determination can do
gives it a theoretical advantage over a more psychologistic approach.
Three benefits, in particular, attend such an approach. One advantage
is that such an account recognizes our status as social creatures. Isaiah Ber-
lin, commenting on the desire persons have for social recognition and fra-
ternity, says that "my independent self is not something which I can detach
from my relationship with others, or from those attributes of myself which
consist in their attitude towards me.''41 And Joel Feinberg notes that "to be
a human being is to be part of a community,...to take one's place in an al-
ready functioning group. We come to awareness of ourselves as part of an
ongoing social process...defined by reciprocal bonds of obligation, c o m o n
traditions, and instituti~ns."~~
One might object that an account of autonomy such as I offer makes
autonomy possible only within a rather limited range of socialcircumstances.
As a result, my account might be deemed too restrictive to be of great use.
Whatever the case, I believe the conception of autonomy I describe is the
most plausible. Notice, too, that autonomy may be highly valued even in
cultures that allow only a privileged few to be autonomous.
The second benefit is that, while an intemalist account might be ad-
equate to answer certain questions pertinent to our status as responsible
agents, a social conception of autonomy is of greater service when address-
ing questions about our status as moral agents generally understood. This
is because morality, like autonomy, is a phenomenon of social application
and importance. "Morally" laden events, such as violations of personal
autonomy, protection against such violations, and punishments for viola-
tions,depend on a person's social standing relative to others. And it seem
correct that being morally autonomous, or autonomous with regard to re-
viewing and adopting a system of moral norms, requires that a person first
be self-goveming in the sense I have explained.
The third advantage is that a socio-relational account can easily explain
how persons might be self-goveming even while manifesting "external" or
"communal" social virtues that might appear to reduce autonomy. These
might include allegiance to others, obedience to bodies of authority, and a
commitmentto notions of correctnessand objectivity in the moral, epistemic,
and other standards that govern conduct and reasoning. Though an
intemalist account may explain how autonomy is possible in these circum-
stances, a social theory explains this in a natural way. Because being au-
tonomous means, in typical cases, that a person is in a certain kind of social
network, moral and other.socia1 virtues are a natural accompaniment of
 Personal Autonomy and Society 99

autonomy and can easily be components in the lives of autonomous per-

sons.
In conclusion, I believe that a more promising approach to personal
autunomy than intemalist theories supply emerges when autonomy is cast
in a socio-relationalor ”external”perspedive. An externalist account is con-
cerned with many of the problems and issues that preoccupy internalist
approaches. But I depart from intemalist theories in my conviction that the
primary constituents of self-government are social in nature.

Earlier versions ofthis paper have been presented at the University ofCalif0mia,
Davis, Temple University, and CaliforniaState University, Sun Bernardino. Thanks
are due to David Copp, John Martin Fischer, Ishtiyaque Haji, Tony Roy,Richard
Wollheim, and various refereesfor their comments.

Notes
Others who analyze autonomy in a similarly social light are Lawrence Haworth in Au-
tonomy: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology and Ethics, 1986 (New Haven: Yale
University Press), and Diana Meyers, in Self, Society, and Personal Choice, 1989 (New
York Columbia University Press).
The truth of this claim need not entail the denial of physical or psychological determin-
ism. An adult may have no more metaphysical control over the world than does a child,
but it makes sense to say that an adult is in control of her actions, and has certain rights
of sovereignty,where a child is not, and does not. While being in control of one’s choices
suggests that a person is able to alter her present way of life, if she so chooses, this
ability need not entail the denial of determinism a s long as one can be determined in
such a way as to make this ability possible.
Harry Frankfurt argues for the weak view in “Coercion and Moral Responsibility,”1973,
in Ted Honderich, ed., Essays on Freedom of Action, 63-86 (London:Routledge & Kegan
Paul), and in his “Three Concepts of Free Action, 2,” 1975, Proceedings of the Aristote-
lian Society, Supp. Vol. 40,113-25.
’
Along these lines, Irving Thalberg discusses prudent behavior under situations of coer-
cion in ”Hierarchical Analyses of Unfree Action,” 1978, Canadian Journal of Philoso-
phy, Vol. 8, No. 2.
Dworkin, “Acting Freely,” 1970, Nous, Vol. 9: 367-83.
Dworkin, “The Concept of Autonomy,” in Science and Ethics, ed.Rudolph Haller (Rodopi
Press, 1981). Reprinted in The Inner Citadel, ed. John Christman (New York Oxford
University Press, 1989).Al1references are to this text. Dworkin develops his view inThe
Theory and Practiceof Autonomy (New York CambridgeUniversity Press, 1988).Frank-
furt, too, employs the hierarchical theory, but does so in an effort to discover the kind of
freedom relevant for moral responsibility. Frankfurt’s view may be that these varieties
of freedom-viz., acting freely, choosing freely, and willing freely-are adequate for
autonomy. (See his ”Identification and Wholeheartedness,” in The Importance of What
We Care About [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 19881, pp.170-71.) And
Dworkin’s employment of the hierarchical apparatus to generate a theory of autonomy
also suggests that similar use of this tool could have been made by Frankfurt. But
Frankfurt’s claim is that the variety of freedom required for responsibility need not
include the ability to do otherwise, and in this respect his account differs fmm my ac-
count, and Dworkin‘s account, of personal autonomy.
Dworkin, 1989, p.61. Dworkin’s account of autonomy and his employment of the condi-
tion of procedural independence are ihtemalist, in the sense I have defined. Although
procedural independence requires that the environment external to the agent be free of
factors that impair the agent’s ability to critically appraise her lower-order reasons for
100 Marina A. L. Oshana

acting, Dworkin's concern is only with the effect such external phenomena have upon
the psychology of the agent. Nothing about the external environment or its relation to
the individual matters in itself. It does not matter, for example, whether the individual
has been coerced or manipulated. What matters is that the individual has not been
affected in a way that undermines her critical and reflective hdties.Thus, as Dworkin
understands it, procedural independence only requires that a person's psychological
abilities not be undermined. His account of autonomy remains intemalist, the condi-
tion of procedural independence notwithstanding.
Dworkin, 1988, p. 15.
Dworkin, 1988, pp. 20 and 108. Lawrence Haworth raises problems with the capacity
condition in "Dworkin on Autonomy," Ethics 102 (Oct., 1991), 129-39.
lo Watson, "Free Agency," Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 8,1975.
l1 Christman, 1989, pp. 5-6.Also see his "Autonomy: A Defense of the Split-Level Self,"
1987, Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 25, No. 3,281-93, and "Autonomy and Per-
sonal History," 1991, Canadian Joumal of Philosophy, Vol. 20, No. 1,l-24.
l2 As with Dworkin's condition of procedural independence, Christman's devetopmental
or "historical" criteria for individual self-government may seem external in character.
But I take Christman's theories to be internalist since he views the psychological stand-
ing of the individual as decisive for personal autonomy.
l 3 In addition to the structural and historical criteria that internalists provide, disposi-
tional considerations also figure importantly for autonomy. It matters, for example,
whether the individual is docile and easily swayed by others, or is strong-minded
and confident.
Both Charles Taylor and Gerald Dworkin employ the ideas of "true" and 'real' selves;
various challenges to these notions have been raised by Isaiah Berlin, Marilyn Fried-
man, and Susan Wolf.
l5 Joseph Raz discussessuch cases at pp. 3W91, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1986).
I h Both of these persons differ from the individual who believes that a life of service to
others is the most fulfilling. This individual may value other-regarding behavior more
highly than he does behavior founded on self-interest,but may still value his autonomy
and view it as compatible with service to others.
I 7 A s Isaiah Berlin notes, consenting to a loss of liberty does not negate or reverse that loss:
"If I consent to be oppressed, or acquiesce in my condition with detachment or irony,
am I the less oppressed? If I sell myself into slavery, am I the less a slave? If I commit
suicide, am I the less dead because I have taken my own life freely?" Berlin, "Two
Concepts of Liberty," in Four Essayson Liberty (Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress, 1969),
p.164.
InThe slave could be self-governingwith respect to any activitiesor relations in his life over
which he retained control-in his status as spouse, or sibling, or parent, for example.
But being autonomous in certain activities or with respect to certain roles-being ',lo-
cally" autonomousdoes not make the slave an autonomous person, or one who lives
a "globally" autonomous life. I also grant that autonomy can be had in degrees, to the
extent that the conditions for autonomy are met. section four, bdow, addresses this
point.
Along this line, Alfred Mele notes that one who autonomously chooses a particular state
might fail to be autonomous with respect to remaining in that state; an appropriately
autonomous history of choice might not be adequate for the continued or occurrent
condition of autonomy.See his "History and Personal Autonomy" CanadianJournal of
Philosophy 23 (June 1993), 271-80.
Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 302.
Though Waldron is speaking of what ought to characterize human involvement in
projects of self-assertionupon nature, he takes autonomy to involve self-assertion.
Christman (1987) denies autonomy to the slave on the grounds that the slave does suffer
from an unsuitable psychological history. I pursue my disagreement with Christman in
"Autonomy Naturalized," Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. XIX (1994), 7694.
Dworkin, "Paternalism: Some Second Thoughts," p.111, in Rolf Sartorius, ed., Paternal-
 Personal Autonomy and Society 101

ism, 1983(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), pp.105-11.

William Stymn, Sophieis Choice, 1979.
Thomas Hill, ”Servility and Self-Respect,”in Autonomy and Self-Respect, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.15.
25AsDiana Meyers notes, to give credence to such desires as those befitting an autonomous
person would be to succumb to the undesirable state of affairs from which they origi-
nate. See her Self, Society, and Personal Choice for related discussion.
2h Thus I disagree with those who argue that Harriet fails to be autonomous because she has
desires that she would not really want were she in full possession of her faculties, and
who take the absence of such desires as evidence of an absence of critically reflective
activity or of a healthy psychology. (Susan Wolf and Marilyn Friedman offer arguments
abng these lines. See Wolf, ”Sanityand the Metaphysics of Responsibility,” in Schwman,
1987. Friedman‘s view is found in her ”Autonomyand the Split-LevelSelf,” 1986,South-
ern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 24, No. 1.) In my view, rationality and the activity of
critically evaluating one’s motives may lead a person to a variety of preferences-some
odious, others admirable-with no promise other than that these preferencesare formed
in a clear-headed fashion.
27 For example, suppose that Harriet’s relationship with her spouse, though congenial, is
that of an unequal partner. She makes none of the important financial decisions, she
does not decide when or where they shall vacation, or where they shall live, and so on.
Nor, for that matter, do they guarantee that a person will become autonomous. The per-
son who respects himself may be better equipped than others to “rise above” adverse
conditions, but transcending adverse conditions is not sufficient for autonomy The con-
centration camp internee might find that his self-respect remains intact to the extent
that he spiritually triumphs over atrociously inhumane conditions. Yet it seems absurd
to claim that this individual is autonomous.
A Hill, 1991, p.6. Hill comments that ”the duty to avoid servility is a duty to take a certain
stance towards others, and hence would be inappropriate if isolated” (ibid., p. 17).This
suggests that self-respect, the converse of servility, is essentially a relational phenom-
enon, and so cannot merely be a matter of a person’s attitude toward herself.
3o Dissolving the contract may, of course, carry a penalty sufficiently burdensome to make
autonomy difficult, if not impossible. And of course, what the contract requires of the
individual will be important for assessments of autonomy.
Similarly,consider Ulysses‘ request that his crew physically restrain him when their jour-
ney brings them in proximity to the Sirens‘songs. While he is bound and restrained, his
autonomy is curtailed, for then he lacks control of his fate (and also, of course, com-
mand of the ship and crew). But Ulysses’ circumstancediffers from that of the consent-
ing slave (and more closely approaches that of the monk) in the following fashion. He is
not relinquishing his right to determine his course of life; none of his considered op-
tions for the future are closed to him since his relations with his crew members remain
such that he will resume control at the agreed upon moment.
32 At note 19.
Explaining the distinction between global and local is problematic, and I will not attempt
to resolve the problem here. Asimilar distinctionbetween theglobal and the local raises
problems for virtue theory; one must distinguish the local sense of honesty (telling the
truth at some time) from the disposition, qua trait of character, to tell the truth, i.e., to be
an honest person.
%Alongthese lines, Waldron (1989, p.305) remarks that autonomy involves “the ability to
stand back from one’s occurrent desires, to determine in some w a y - o n the basis of a
thought-out conception of the good-which desires and preferences one wants to be
motivated by....With this done, choice, decision, and action are a matter of responding
to values and to desires that have been given this reflective precedence....” Of course,
we cannot subject all of our motives to such evaluation in order to count as autono-
mous. Only those choicesand actions significant for the direction of a person’s life call
for critical reflection.
Raz (1986, pp.373-78) formulates this condition, but in stronger terms than I think are
necessary. He states that, in order to be autonomous and live autonomously, a person
102 Marina A. L. Oshana

must face a range of options that "enable him to sustain throughout his life activities
which, taken together, exercise all the capacities human beings have an innate drive to
exercise, as well as [have the option] to decline to develop any of them."
)6 A satisfactory analysis of this condition (in particular, of the notions of an option and of

being able to achieve options) is not possible in thispaper. I am relying on the intuition
that we can speak meaningfully about having options for action, even though we may
be undecided about the truth of determinismand of the Principleof Alternate Possibili-
ties. Clearly, a variety of alternativesof every sort is not necessary for autonomy. At the
very least, I am restricted in my choices by the fact that I suffer from certain physical,
intellectual,geographic, and financiallimitations, as well as by the fact that I share this
planet with others to whom I must accord certain courtesies. But none of this need limit
my autonomy.
37 A parent, for example, is responsible for fulfilling the needs of his children; an attorney is
expected to serve the needs of her client.
38 I wish to thank Richmond Campbell for his suggestion that I emphasize the external
nature of the first three conditions.
In fact, Christman shuns social criteria for autonomy where such criteria incorporate
external elements of the sort sufficient to compromise self-government.Christman ar-
gues that, in order "to capture the idea of self-government that is the motivating con-
cept behind autonomy," the rationality of an autonomous agent must be defined in
terms of a set of "subjective" criteria internal to the agent. His account is thus doubly
internalist;no externalcriteria are allowed for rationality, and agent autonomy turns on
the psychological character of the individual. See Christman (1991), notes 18 and 23,
pp.9 and 14,respectively.
* Berlin remarks that, while "Kant's free man needs no public recognition for his inner
freedom," the need humans have for recognition within their social sphere "is bound
up wholly with the relation that [they]have with others....I feel myself to be somebody
or nobody in terms of my position and function in the social whole; this is the most
'heteronomous' condition imaginable." See his 'Two Concepts of Liberty", p.156, note 1.
41 Berlin, 1969, p. 156, my emphasis.
42 Joel Feinberg, Harm To Self, Vol. 3 of The Moral Limits of Criminal Law (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 46-47. See also Raz, 1986, p. 394.