Dhvanyaloka and It Critics Krishnamoorthy K. - Text

DHVANYALOKA
AND
ITS CRITICS
Dhvanyaloka and its Critics
— Dr. K. Krishna Moor thy
We have here for the first time
a fairly thorough, critical and
systematic exposition of a diffi¬
cult and highly important text
in almost all its aspects and
bearings, and as such the at¬
tempt certainly deserves encour¬
agement. The author shows a
good knowledge of Sanskrit
Poetics in addition to specialised
knowledge of the text he studies,
a sound grasp of the funda¬
mental problems, and no little
skill in the presentation and
controlling ol evidence.
—Report of the Bombay
University Referees
The theory of dhvani which

came into limelight in the 9th
century A.p. through its great
exponent Anandavardhana do¬
minated Indian Poetics from 9th
to 12th century, it receded in¬
to the background in the dec¬
adent . days of Indian culture.
There was a revival of interest
in it early in the 20th century
partly due to the influence of
Western writers like JL A.
Richards, but cniefiy due to a
new awakening in the cultural
heritage of India. Mahamaho-
padhyaya K. S. Kuppuswamy
Sastn of Madras, Prof. M.
Hiriyanna of Mysore, Dr. S. K.
De and K. C. Pandey of Cal¬
cutta and Dr. P. V. Kane of
Poona have created a new
interest in dhvani theory thro¬
ugh their works. The present
work by Dr. Krishna Moorthy
is the latest and the most com¬
prehensive on the subject of
dhvani.
—From the Foreword
by Prof. G. Hanumantba Rao
Price Ra. 30/- 42 sh. $7.50

THE DHVANYALOKA
AND
ITS CRITICS
Dr. K. KRISHNAMOORTHY. m.a., b.t., ph.d.

Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Karnatak University
Dharwar
MYSORE
KAVYALAYA :: PUBLISHERS
First Published in 1968
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No portion of it may be reproduced by any person
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Published by
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PRINTED IN INDIA BT G. H. RAMA RAO AT

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PREFACE
This is substantially the text of a thesis submitted by me in
1946 to the University of Bombay for the Degree of Ph.D. in
Sanskrit. It is a result of my independent study and I was
awarded the degree in 1947. I was also permitted by the
University to publish the work.
During the period 1947-1952, I published most of the
chapters in several research journals as per the suggestions of
the late Prof. M. Hiriyanna. As expected, there were some
reactions from scholars, the most remarkable one being from
Mahamahopadhyaya Dr. P. V. Kane in his second edition of
the History of Alankarasastra.
I have thoroughly revised and abridged my original thesis
nowin the light of the suggestions made by the learned referees
appointed by the Bombay University and other scholars. I have
added fresh material in the chapter on Authorship of karika
and vrtti and to meet the points newly raised by Dr. Kane.
The aim of the thesis is to set forth the theory of dhvatti in
all its bearings. Anandavardhana’s Dhvanyaloka, the locus
classicus of Sanskrit Poetics, has been studied here both in
retrospect and prospect. An attempt has been made to give a
complete sketch of the theory of dhvatti as outlined in the
Dhvanyaloka with some reference to the sources from which it
is derived and in relation to the rhetorical tenets then prevalent.
A survey of the controversy started by the new theory in the
history of Sanskrit Poetics is included and some parallels in
modern thought on the subject are indicated at the end.
This work has remained in the press too long; but this has
assisted me in recording up-to-date references in the footnotes.
My thanks are due to the unfailing courtesy of Sri Kudali
Chidambaram who has undertaken this publication as a labour
of love and to the printers for their excellent work. I am
grateful to Prof. G. Hanumantha Rao for enhancing the value
of this work by his illuminating Foreword.
Dharwar
K. Krishnamoorthy
3rd October 1967
FOREWORD
I
The theory of dhvani which came into limelight in the 9th
century A.D. through its great exponent Anandavardhana
dominated Indian poetics from the 9th to 12th century. It
receded into the background in the decadent days of Indian
culture. There was a revival of interest in it early in the 20th
century partly due to the influence of Western writers like I.A.
Richards, but chiefly due to a new awakening in the cultural
heritage of India. Mahamahopadhyaya K. S. Kuppuswamy
Sastri of Madras, Prof. M. Hiriyanna of Mysore, Dr. S.K. De
and K.C. Pandey of Calcutta and Dr. P. V. Kane of Poona
have created a new interest in dhvani theory through their
works. The present work by Dr. Krishnamoorthy is the latest
and the most comprehensive on the subject of dhvani.
It falls into three parts. The first parts deals with /the date
and authorship of the Dhvanyaloka and its doctrine. The
second part deals with the critics of Anandavardhana and the
development of the theory of dhvani in the light of the criti¬
cisms of it by writers subsequent to Anandavardhana. The
third part touches upon parallels to dhvani in contemporary
Western poetic theory.
II
Though a great admirer of Anandavardhana, Dr. Krishna¬
moorthy is not a blind adherent to Anandavardhana’s theory.
A close reading of his work brings out the important fact that
Indian poetics could not remain the same as before after
Anandavardhana wrote his Dhvanyaloka. Aestheticians of
poetry were compelled to wake up from their dogmatic slumber
and revise their notions about the older concepts of alankara,
guna and rlti in the light of the theory of dhvani. They were
compelled to recognise the fact that there could be live factors
in poetry only in so far as they shed the feature of conventional¬
ity and shared in the feature of dhvanana which is integral to
poetic imagination. As Bhatta Tauta pointed out it alone can
catch the infinite nuances of feeling and express it in ever new
forms. Though earlier aestheticians of poetry like Vamana
recognised that imagination is the main spring of poetry, they
thought that alankaras were the only expressive forms of imagi¬
nation. An aesthetician like Bhamaha clearly recognised that
some alankaras were vyangya and as Dr. Krishnamoorthy
following Jagannatha Pandita points out, though Bhamaha did
not use the word dhvani, he was clearly aware of Gunlbhuta
vyangya. But what Vamana and Bhamaha did not clearly see
was that the oblique turns of expression which all good poetry
has is not limited to the thirtysix alankaras. Every part of speech
and such small factors like even case-endings and particles can
at the touch of imagination, become pregnant with poetic mean¬
ing. This is a great discovery of Ananda and Western poetics
had to wait to make that discovery until the present century,
Aestheticians of poetry subsequent to Ananda could no longer
afford to be blind to this important discovery.
Another important fact brought home by Ananda is that
feeling cannot be objectively brought to consciousness by literal
expression (Vacya) and that it can be made an object of direct
experience only through indirect expression (Vyangya). While
literal expression is most adequate to fulfil the purposes of
discursive thinking such as is involved in Iâstra (Science) it is
insufficient for purposes of poetry. While the strength of what is
called abhidha or essential meaning lies in being direct and
exact the strength of poetic meaning (Vyangya) lies in being
indirect, wavelike and dynamic. While in a scientific proposi¬
tion the meaning of a word remains the same in whatever context
it is used, in poetic expression the meaning of the word changes
with the context and is not rigid even within the same context,
but sways and spreads like a wave. This activity of the poetic
1 4
Vll
word is called tarangayamanatva. This is characteristic not

merely of the poetic word but of all artistic symbols. An
Indian aesthetician of painting compares the meaning of a
picture to the liquid light that plays on a pearl. While the
light of scientific expression is like the steady light of a lamp,
the light of poetic expression is like that of a star. The beauty
of a star lies not so much in what we catch at the first glance,
but the twinkle that follows. It is in the after-movement that
its beauty lies. Likewise the beauty of the poetic word dose not
lie in the meaning we light upon in the first instance, but in the
Hash that follows. It is in this sense that pratlyamanartha
should be understood. Pratlyamanartha is not what follows as
the conclusion follows from premisses. It is what comes after
what is first perceived; it is like the beauty of the sunlight which
hursts into seven colours. In brief, the essence of poetic expres¬
sion lies in its spreading and spraying. It is in this spreading,
spraying, or to vary the metaphor, resonating (dhvanana) that
pootic expression lives, moves and has its being. Overlooking
for the moment the ambiguities that lurk in the use of words
like pratlti, gamyartha, to indicate dhvani, the theory of dhvani
understood as stated above is quite sound and is a permanent
contribution to the aesthetics of poetry.
Ill
This is only half the story of dhvani. The story is not com¬
plete without the mention of the reactions against it and the
further modifications it underwent. Just as previous theories
could not remain the same after Anandavardhana wrote about
dhvani, the theory of dhvani itself could not remain the same
after critics of Ananda like Bhatta Nayaka, Kuntaka, Dhanika
and Mahimabhatta pointed out some of its short-comings.
These critics of Ananda are generally spoken of as enemies,
of Ananda and as totally opposed to dhvani. That way of
upeaking is inexact and unfair to the critics of Ananda. All
these have gone some way with Ananda and have incorporated
Vlll
Some of the teaching of Ananda and are influenced by him.

No critic worthy of the name can fail to notice the elements of
truth contained in the theory he is criticising.
IV
Let us see what these critics have done. We shall start
with the first notable critic of Ananda, Bhatta Nayaka. Un¬
fortunately, his work Hrdayadarpana is not traced yet and we
have not before us all that he said. All that we have of the
work are such fragments as have been quoted by subsequent
writers of repute. The most outstanding of his statements about
dhvani calls our attention to a certain ambiguity underlying
Ananda’s thesis that dhvani is the soul of poetry. From begin¬
ning to end the whole of Dhvanyaloka is devoted to defend
this thesis. Bhatta Nayaka’s statement is a refutation of this.
(1) Let us grant,'he says, that dhvani is Vyanjanatmaka. It is
proved to be only a feature or aspect of the body (Kavyanga-
tvena) and not as its soul. If the distinction of body and soul
can be applied at all to poetry, what is entitled to rank as soul
is rasa and not dhvani. This argument of Bhatta Nayaka is
irrefutable. In fact, Abhinavagupta who is considered to be
the greatest defender of Ananda accepts this criticism against
Ananda. He says that dhvani is only an aspect of the body of
poetry and that rasa alone is really the soul.* He comes to the
rescue of Ananda by saying that though dhvani is a limb of
poetry it is called the soul of poetry since it is the most important
limb.
It is usually construed that Bhatta Nayaka does not
recognise Vyaiigya. This again is a mistake. In a verse of
Bhatta Nayaka which Abhinavagupta quotes, Bhatta Nayaka
says that rasa is Vyangyaparasamvitgocara. Abhinavagupta
remarks that the verse shows that dhvani is not unacceptable
♦Rasa eva vastuta atma : vastvalankaradhvani tu sarvatha rasam prati

paryavasyete iti V5cyadutkf$tau |au ityabhipnyena dhvanijj ksvyasyatms
ti ssmanyenoktam (Dhvair aloka—Locana, p. 27).
IX
In l!hftt|a Nayaka. What is important to note in Bhatta

Nilyuku's statement is that the very poetic consciousness is
Intrinsically Vyahgya. While Ananda attributes Vyangya to
the word, Bhatta Nayaka attributes it to the poetic conscious¬
ness itself. The word derives whatever power it has because of
the very nature of the consciousness from which the word is
shot out. In this connection it is highly relevant to take note
nl another of Bhatta Nayaka’s statements in which he points
out that the intonation of the word (sabda) is of paramount
Importance in the case of Veda and the directives that are given
by puranas are of utmost importance in the case of puranas. But
In poetry neither of these aspects as such is important. What
Is important in poetry is neither sabda nor artha but vyapara
l.o. capacity to evoke rasa. He calls this capacity bhavakatva-
vytlpara. This bhavakatva-vyapara has been equated with
Anandavardhana’s dhvani. It may appear that the two are
identical and that the difference is only terminological. But
the difference is deeper. Ananda does not go deep into the
question : what is the condition under which this vyapara
comes into existence and operates ? Bhatta Nayaka tackles
this problem. The great discovery he made in answering this
question is his concept of Sadharanlkarana.
Sadharanlkarana is the primary principle underlying
the attitude in envisaging persons and their feelings. In
this attitude a person and his feelings are not viewed as is
done in practical life with partiality because he is our friend
or relative or with prejudice because he is our enemy, or
with indifference because he is neither a friend nor a foe.
In this attitude everything is viewed as of equal interest or of
equal concern. Whatever the object may be, whether it is
attractive or repulsive, noble or mean, terrible or inviting,
Imponderable or deformed (from the worldly point of view),
when viewed in this attitude of equal interest it necessarily
gives rise to rasanubhava. It is only when a poet is in this
attitude that poetic expression springs.
X
As Dr. Krishnamoorthy points out in his long note on

rasasOtra of Kavyaprakasa,1 Abhinavagupta is clearly in¬
debted to Bhatta Nayaka since he makes use of this concep¬
tion more than a dozen times in his commentary on Bharata’s
rasasutra. Most of the seven impediments to rasanubhava as
stated by him may be traced to want of sadharanlkarana.
Abhinavagupta declares most emphatically that sadharam-
karana is indispensable and that there can be no Vibhavatva
apart from it and that rasatva cannot even be dreamt of
without it.2 One who reads Abhinavagupta’s commentary
on rasasutra cannot but wonder why Abhinavagupta who
declares that sadharanlkarana is indispensable for rasanu¬
bhava did not relate it to dhvani which he considers as
indispensable to rasa. Prof. Panchapagesa Sastry and others
think that sadharanlkarana is only dhvani in other words
and since dhvani is a long-established concept there is no
need for this new and later concept. To consider sadharanl-
karana as a mere duplicate of dhvani is to miss the significance
of sadharanlkarana altogether. Nowhere in Anandavardhana
can one find even a hint of the attitude involved in sadharanT-
karana. Without that attitude poetic consciousness cannot
function It is coterminous with the working of the aesthetic
consciousness and its vision (darsana or prakhya) and its
expression (varnana or upakhya). Whereas dhvani covers only
upakhya i. e. sabdavyapara, sadharanalkarana covers both
prakhya and upakhya and is thus more comprehensive than
dhvani. Whereas there can be darsana without varnana, there
can be no varnana without darsana (nanrsih kurute kavyam).
One may have vision and not write poetry but one cannot write
poetry without vision. Merely because there can be no varnana
without darsana one should not conclude that the one who
has the ability of darsana is greater than the one who has the
1 Kannada KsvyaprakaSa (1956). p. 79.

2 Sadhiranya graham vina na kadacidapi vibhavatvath svapnepi na
rasatvamiti ca na vismartavyam.
xi
capacity of varnana. The two are rdistinct and varnana is an
additional ability. As Bhatta Tauta and Hemacandra have
pointed out, Valmlki had darsana but he became a poet only
when he found appropriate expression for his darsana. His
Kavya is (in the estimation of Ananda) a great dhvanikavya
and his poem served as a stimulus for his concept of dhvani.
There is dhvani in Valmlki’s expression because he had darsana.
further, while Ananda is chiefly looking at Kavya from the
point of view of the reader, Bhatta Nayaka is viewing Kavya
from the point of view of the poet as well as the reader. While
Ananda is laying bare the heart of the reader, and has called
his work sahrdayaloka, Bhatta Nayaka is holding the mirror
to the heart of the poet as well as the reader and has therefore
given it the more general name Hrdayadarpana, (mirror of the
heart). He distinguishes between Kavigata-sadharanlbhava
from the sadharanlbhava of the reader. The two are allied but
are not identical. The latter is dependent on the former which
is deeper and more sustained. The poet has to stay in that
inood more intensely and for a longer duration, since his
mission is not only to see for himself but also to show to others
by means of his composition what he has seen. He has to
objectify it and make it realisable universally. This calls forth
fur greater imaginative power than having the experience all by
himself; he has to make his expression powerful enough to
Induce the same experience in others and make it easy for
others to recreate that experience in their own self. Compared
to the effort made by the reader in deriving the experience from
the poem, the effort involved in the creation of the poem by
the poet is immense. Bhatta Nayaka compares the poem
created with such deep concern and effort by the poet to the
cow of plenty. Out of the love for the calf the cow pours
nectar into the mouth of the calf which has only to apply its
mouth to its teats. Even so the poet out of his deep concern
for the reader makes his poem shower the nectar of rasa on the
reader who has only to open his heart to (he poem. The
Xll
reader’s activity (Vyapara) which is chiefly enjoyment with the

least effort is aptly termed by Bhatta Nayaka as bhoktrtva in
order to distinguish it from the poet’s activity which is more
one of immense imaginative effort (bhavaktava) than of enjoy¬
ment (bhoktrtva). If we thus understand Bhatta Nayaka’s
bhoktrtva (bhoktrtvam sahrdaya visayam) as what relates to the
reader and the reader is more a bhoktr than a kartr, the necessity
for the distinction which Bhatta Nayaka made between bhava-
katva and bhoktrtva becomes clear and Abhinavagupta’s
criticism of Bhatta Nayaka misses entirely the need for this
distinction.
V
Two followers of Bhatta Nayaka, Dhananjaya and Dhanika,
single out the linguistic theory of Abhihitanvayavada underlying
the theory of dhvani. According to Anandavardhana there
are three or four independent functions in explaining the
meaning of poetry. The first is called abhidha vrtti which
consists in understanding first the meaning of the individual
words of a poem. When we have understood the meaning
of individual words of a poem this vrtti comes to an end.
It is incapable of showing the relation between the individual
words. In order to understand the relation between the
individual words another linguistic function is necessary. It
comes into operation after the abhidhavrtti has stopped func¬
tioning. This second vrtti is called tatparya vrtti and is diffe¬
rent from abhidhavrtti. These two are sufficient to understand
the literal meaning of the poem. But the meaning of a poem is
not exhausted by these two. There is a third linguistic fuction
different from both which is commonly met with in poetry and
even in ordinary life when we come across sentences like “That
boy is a lion; this one is an ass”. Such sentences do not make
sense when literally understood. In order to bring out the sense
of those sentences a vrtti other than abhidha and tatparya is
necessary. This vrtti enables us to understand that the first
XU1
hoy in brave like a lion and the second stupid like an ass. It is
t ailed laksana vrtti. Laksana vrtti only makes the meaning of
(lie sentence plain by removing the apparent absurdity of the
spiilcnce, “That boy is a lion”, but fails to bring out the real
value of employing that indirect expression. The real aim of
I ho unc of indirect expression is to bring out the courage and
valour of the boy. This value is brought out by a vrtti other
Ilian laksana vrtti, tatparya vrtti and abhidha vrtti. It is called
Vyahjuna Vrtti which is the soul of kavya according to Ananda-
vardhana. In order to gpt at this meaning one has to go beyond
Hie first three. This meaning is called by Ananda pratTyama-
nfUtha since it is an after-meaning.
Dhanika points out the absurdity underlying this linguistic
Atomism. His contention is that the poem is one unit and the
meaning of it isône spontaneous indivisible continuum (Dlrgha-
illrghabhidhana). We do not understand the meaning of a poem
!>v going through these four Vrttis one after another. This way
of butchering a poem is the best way of missing the soul of a
poem. It is unnatural and artificial in the extreme and as
pointed out by Prof. T.N. Sreekantaiya (in his Bharatiya Kayva-
ntlmamse) is opposed to the best of modern linguistic theories.
Dhanika points out that ordinary speech as well as poetic
utterance is governed by the intention of the speaker or the poet
and this intention pervades the speech or poetic utterance from
the first word to the last word and the meaning of the speech or
poem is one whole and that neither the poet’s mind whose
utterance the poem *is nor the reader’s mind which is set on
understanding it stops functioning until the whole meaning of
the poem is grasped. He compares the movement of the mind
in getting at the meaning of a poem to the arrow shot by a good
marksman which races on and on and stops not until the target
is hit. This way of construing poetic meaning is quite in con¬
sonance with poetry which is noted for its unity. What governs
this unity is the unity of rasa that pervades the poem. Rasa is
called tatparya by Dhanika since everything in the poem stands
XIV
for and functions to further it (Tatparadeva tatparyani).* This

does not admit of three or four functions working independent¬
ly of one another but is one sole function which permeates
every part of the poem and at all stages of it. It may be
noted here that this view is consistent with the modern gestalt
theory of meaning. Dhanika speaks of the relation of a poem
to its meaning bhavya bhavaka sarhbhandha which is a pervas¬
ive relation and not vyangya-vyanjaka which is less compre¬
hensive since it relates only to one function arrived at by
artificial analysis. Call the relation by whatever name,
bhavya-bhavaka or vyangya-vyanjaka, the most important
thing to be noted is that it is spontaneous, continuous and
one and pervasive. This is a modification which dhvani
theory must accept if it is to be a living theory of poetic
meaning and the four artifical vrttis into which Ananda
cuts up poetic meaning must be discarded. That poetic mean¬
ing is not vacya is acceptable to Dhanika and that there
is agreement between him and Ananda on this point is what
really matters.
VI
Another aesthetician on whom Bhatta Nayaka exercised
great influence and who has also been wrongly looked upon as
a dhavni-virodhi is Kuntaka. Bhatta Nayaka spoke of poetic
meaning as Vicitra - abhidha in order to distinguish it from
the meaning of science (sastra) and logic (nyaya). Kuntaka
developed it into what is called Vakrokti. His conception
of Vakrokti is not a mere revival of the Vakrokti of Bhama-
ha, but bears unmistakably the stamp of Anandavardhana’s
dhvani theory since, as noticed by Mahimabhatta, throughout
the development of his theory of Vakrokti, the same examples
* Note that tatparya in the sense in which Ananda uses it stands for a
particular function, distinct from the three others, while Dhanika’s t&tparya
is the unity underlying every aspect of it,
XV
mill the same mode of reasoning are employed by Kuntaka

m» by Ananda. Kuntaka is as much an admirer of Bhatta
Nflynku as of Ananda and his Vakroktijivita is a new synthesis
nl both worked out with marked individuality. What distingui¬
shes him from Anandavardhana and Bhatta Nayaka is not
merely his ability to theorise about poetry but also his ability in
interpreting poetry concretely. We can find theorists of great
ability like Bhatta Nayaka and Ananda but it is rare to find
a critic like Kuntaka, who shows remarkable critical imagin¬
ation in writing about a given piece of poetry. Even when
he Is writing about an individual stanza or a part of a poem,
he has the context of the whole poem in view and what
It aims at and evaluates individual words and phrases and
utterances in so far as they promote or retard the central
meaning of the poem. Even when he finds fault with some
repression which has slipped in owing to the carelessness
or lethargy of the poet, his criticism is not negative, but
positive and constructive. He amends the expression so
nptly that the expression which first irked the reader blazes
with significance when read with his amendment.
Even as a critic of poetic theory we find in him the same
constructive temper. We are here concerned with him chiefly
ns a critic of Ananda’s theory of dhvani. Kuntaka is struck
by the great discovery that Ananda made. His discovery lies in
pointing out that poetic imagination does not consist in the li¬
mited number of alankaras commonly recognised by laksanikas
and that mere conventional expressions which are not live imagi¬
native expressions are really vacya and the poetry written in
set and worn out figures of speech is literal like works on sastra.
If poetry is written in conformity to the laksana-granthas such
as works on prosody and rhetoric they are bound to be like
rtOstric works literal and intellectual. Poetry is an expression of
Imagination and even if the same words occur in poetry as
do in practical life and scientific discourse, they do not have
the same meaning as they have elsewhere. They have a meaning
XVI
other than vacya and this other meaning only emerges

suddenly into view when one has turned his attention away
from the conventional meaning (vacyartha-vimuktamanam).
That is really the meaning of a poem and therein lies its charm.
The older aestheticians, Kuntaka said, were wrong in thinking
that the charm of poetic expression is limited to the common
alankaras and their plentiful use. Even certain letters, case-
endings and particles which are not recognised as having any
charm become charming at the touch of imagination. This
meaning cannot be hit upon by those who know only rules of
grammar and logic. Only those with imagination can recognise
this meaning which evades the grasp of grammarians and
logicians. Kuntaka accepted this new discovery of Ananda
wholeheartedly. But he disagreed with him since he looked
upon alankaras as such as Vacya. Alankaras as such are not
Vacya. There is a right use as well as a misuse of alankaras ;
there is a conventional use of them as well as a creative use
of them. Only as expressions of imagination they are
creatively used. What distinguishes poetic expression is its
wonder-provoking character. This is the criterion by which
poetic meaning has to be judged. Vakrokti is coeval with
imaginative expression and the forms of imaginative expression
are indeed infinite and not confined to thirty six of them as laid
down by alankarikas of old. There is no word or phoneme
which will not lend charm to expression when lit up by
imagination. By merely being able to name an expression as a
particular type of alankara the vaicitrya of it is not grasped.
If the meaning whose charm lies in being other than literal is
grasped, it does not matter in the least whether you are able to
name it or not. It is recognition of the poetic flavour that
matters.
Kuntaka found fault with Ananda for dubbing alankara
as Vacya and looking upon it as a mere embellishment
incapable of evoking rasa. He defined alankara as something
internal to poetry and extended its scope infinitely so as to
XVII
mtikc it inclusive of rasa-dhvani. He refused to recognise any

rtlitnknru as an alankara unless it evoked rasa. He emphatically
iI«h hired that all true alarikaras are rasavat and not mere so-
i tilled rusavadalankaras. Rasa is the soul of poetry. Alankara,
gimit, rlti, dhvani are different phases of imaginative
•mpicssion (Vakrokti) whose sole function is to evoke rasanu-
hhnvii. He thus goes beyond the older aestheticians in giving
• llivnni an important place in Vakrokti and Dr. Krishnamoorthy
in light in refuting Dr. De’s statement that Kuntaka is dhvani-
viiodhi and a bhaktavadi (pp. 260-263). He only criticises
Aniindavardhana for taking a restricted view of imaginative
fnpression and not recognising alankara as an important
mpression of imagination. Kuritaka’s chief aim is to widen
(hr sphere of imaginative expression. He therefore attempts a
new synthesis of all phases of poetic expression under the
hi under term Vakrokti which is coeval with imaginative
impression. By so doing he laid stress on the unity and
i ontinuity of poetic meaning which is one and indivisible and
right the defect in Ananda’s theory of poetry which split
poetry into vacya and vyarigya. Forms of imaginative
impression are infinite and among the infinite turns of poetic
impression alankaras have a prominent place and are as
Indispensable as the vyanjakas which Ananda discovered.
Neither of them can be a substitute for the other and there is
no poetry worth the name which is exclusively made up of
either the one or the other. Each is a complement to the
other and both stand together in the service of rasa. Where
they fail to serve rasa both of them are no better than Vacya.
The principle of relevancy (aucitya) to rasa applies equally to
lK>th and is the paramount regulative as well as constitutive
principle of poetry. Ananda recognises this as the supreme
principle but fails to apply it to every element in poetry.
Xviii
VII
Ksemendra accepted this principle of relevancy to rasa and
by applying it to every element of poetry raised it to the status
of a law universal. It is commonly construed that Ananda has
said the last word on aucitya and that Ksemendra is merely
repeating it. So construing is misconstruing Ksemendra’s con¬
tribution to poetic theory. He is improving on Ananda by the
wider application of the principle of relevancy of rasa to every
element of poetry without exception * Thereby dhvani gains
in consistency and comprehensiveness ; alahkara, guna, rlti
and every element of poetry comes within its orbit. Thus
construed dhvani theory will not stand as a prasthana
alongside of other prasthanas opposed to them ; it becomes an
all-inclusive view which brings them into its fold and is at
peace with them.
There is yet another possibility of widening dhvani and
suggestions are not wanting in Dhvanyaloka itself for doing
so. It is usually thought that dhvani is a concept confined
solely to poetry and is a vyapara of linguistic expression.
As noticed by Prof. Hiriyanna, though the dhvani theory
was “in the first instance intended to explain the method and
aim of poetry it is equally applicable to all forms of fine art.
This is indicated by Anandavardhana’s own references to other
arts like music for purposes of illustration. It is clear from
the nature of dhvani itself; for the means of suggestion need
not be confined to linguistic forms, but may extend beyond to
the media employed in arts other than poetry.’'f But it has
scarcely been noticed by scholars that these references by
Ananda to other arts like music imply that aestheticians of
other arts must have already thought of dhvani in relation to
* Aucitya-vic&ra-carce translated by Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy into

Kannada, Sarada Mandir, Mysore (1960) pp. 34.
t Art Experience by M. Hiriyanna, Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore
(1954) p. 71.
XiX
mimic, dance and acting. If aestheticians of poetry had made
mii attempt to find out who such aestheticians of other arts
miiy be, they would have, at least, found that Matanga, the
itinit aesthetician of music, considered dhvani to be an impor-
(Mill feature of musical meaning and had included it in the
• lollnition of raga for the first time* and that by so adding he
wim stating something new which was not stated by Bharata.
I lie nature of dhvani in music as set forth by Matanga and
ridiugudeva and Kallinatha has been explained by me in an
mi tide entitled “Dhvani in Music” contributed by me to
Uprtyana (Mysore, 1967). There I have pointed out that

mimical meaning is dhvani par excellence and is capable of
(mulshing a valid theory of meaning for the whole Parnassus
Mini exhibit clearly the unity of arts. (Upayana, p. 3). The
wider application of the theory of art which has close affinities
ii* dhvani has been worked out more elaborately by S. Langer
m lu r Feeling and Form than by any other Western aestheti-
i mn.
The definition of poetic meaning is an uphill task and the
ascent is steep and slippery. The view-point of each of the
Indian aestheticians of poetry is but a stepping stone hewn
with great care to negotiate the steep ascent. Anandavardhana
11mm tirelessly hewn an important step. But the ascent is by
no means complete with it. The step taken by Ananda
wm* rather aslant and did not connect well with the previous
steps carved out by aestheticians that preceded him and left a

wide gap. Those coming after him have hewn connecting steps
l lint bridge the gulf between those of the older alankarikas and
Ananda and thus established the unity, continuity and greater
universality of poetic meaning. Thereby they are only refining
Anunda’s theory and are not calumnating it. This way of
loimlruing the efforts of Indian aestheticians finds classic
impression in the following verses of Abhinavagupta :
♦ llfluuldetfi
XX
Urdhvordhvamaruhya yadarthatattvam
dhlh pasyati 6rantimavedayantl,
phalarh tadadyaih parikalpitanarn
vivekasopanaparamparanam II
tasmat satamatra na dusitam

matani taneyeva tu sodhitani
purvapratisthapitayojanasu
mulapratistha phalamamanantl II
—AbhinavabharatT, I, 278.
G. Hanumantba Rao
CONTENTS
Preface iii
Foreword V
I Introduction 1
II Genesis of the Theory of Dhvani 23
III Authorship of the Dhvanyaloka and
the Date of Anandavardhana .. 46
IV Detailed Descriptive Account of the
Dhvanyaloka 96
99 Section I: Dhvani Defined and
Illustrated 101
99 Section II: Classification of Poetry
from the Standpoint of Dhvani 117
99 Section III: Dhvani in Relation to
other concepts 126
99 Section IV : Varieties of Dhvani 182
99 Section V: Dhvani and Other Systems
of Thought .. 189
99 Section VI: Dhvani and Poetic
Imagination 198
99 Section VII : A Critical estimate 204
V Abhinavagupta’s Contribution to the
Theory of Dhvani 217
VI Critics of the Theory of Dhvani 230
VII Mahimabhatta’s Vyaktiviveka 268
VIIIEffect of Criticisms on the Subse¬
quent Development of the Theory of
Dhvani 297
IX Conclusion 310
Appendix : Poets Who Show open Recognition
of the Theory of Dhvani 341
Index • • • • • • 346
Errata .. • m » m 351
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The attempt at throwing some light on the critical activities
of the Dhvani theorists must inevitably begin with some
account of the literary traditions handed down from the
centuries immediately preceding. Whether we assume that the
Dhvani theory was foreshadowed in earlier works, or, it was
propounded for the first time in the Dhvanyaloka, in either
case it is to the works of earlier writers that we must turn for
some idea of the traditions that were current in the field of
poetics. The inadequacy and lopsidedness of the earlier
theories, when understood, will be sufficient to explain the
birth of a new theory which sought to remedy the defects.
Vedic literature in India goes back to a hoary antiquity,
and scholars1 have endeavoured to find in it traces of a system
of rhetoric not far unlike that of a later period. Though it is
imcontested that there are some beautiful specimens of
genuine poetry in the Vedas, there is no positive ground to
warrant the conclusion Jhat there was a full-fledged tradition
of poetics during that age. Besides, they were invariably
looked upon as gruti or divine revelation and hence they were
credited with the authority of a religious scripture. They
were zealously studied and committed to memory solely on
account of their religious importance, and not because of their
I Her ary excellence. It would be ingenious to discover in them
(lie germs of later theories and rather chauvinistic to affirm2
that they anticipate the views not only of later critics in
India but also of those in the West.
1 Vide Prof. P. S. Shastri’s article, Rgvedic Theory and Treatment of

Hiimi ami Dhvani, Poona Orientalist, Vol. IX. No. 3; C. Kunhan Raja,
Survey of Sanskrit Literature, Bombay 1962.
' Vide G. N. Chakravarthy, Poetry & Romanticism in the Rgveda, Poona
oilcntullst, Vo). VII No. 1-2.
2 THE DHVANYALOKA AND ITS CRITICS
We are on less slippery ground when we come to the epics.
Epic literature, which is as vast as the Vedic literature, is
avowedly of secular origin. We know Valmiki as the author
of the Ramayana, and Vyasa is credited with the authorship of
not only one encyclopaedic work like the Mahabharata but
eighteen such Puranas. Of all these epics, only the Ramayana
has been recognised as a poem (Kavya) par excellence and its
author is significantly styled as Adi-kavi or the first poet.
And all the other works are denied the title of Kavya : they
are generally classified under the category of Itihasa or Puraâ
according as their subject-matter relates to historical or semi-
historical or mythical incident.3 Thus we see that Valmiki
was the harbinger of the poetic tradition in India and his work
was looked upon as a model by all his successors—including
the greatest of them viz., Kalidasa.4 Leaving aside the fact
that the Ramayana is itself a masterpiece of literature, one
finds hardly any remarks by Valmiki about literature or the
principles of criticism. In the fourth canto of the Bala-katjda>
we have the stanza:-
But this kan<ja is believed to be a later appendage to the kernel

of Valmiki’s original. [Cf. H. Jacobi: ‘Das Ramayana.’] Nor
can one discover therein any allusion to a current school or
discipline of literary criticism. As a striking contrast to
Valmiki’s epic, we find in some Puranas,'* passing for Vyasa’s
works, brief discussions of literary topics. Mention may be
made in this connection of the Agnipurana and the Vi§nu-
dharmottara-Purana. The subject of the Puranas being as wide
as the universe, in its make-up, and its characteristics, these
Puranas sometimes attempt to summarise all items of knowledge
and thus find opportunities for the consideration of such unusual
s Sometimes Vyssa also is spoken of as a great poet :
sqi§ n —Anon.
4 Cf. Raghuvamga, I. 4; also Dhvanyaloka p. 532 (Beo.Edo.)
INTRODUCTION 3
topics as poetry and sculpture. Now it has been almost
conclusively established5 that these portions of the Puranas do
not after all date back to the early epic age and that they are
only accretions of a very much later date.
Coming to the purely classical Sanskrit period, about the
sixth century A. D., we come across works on poetics which
point to a long and running tradition of criticism. Both the
Knvyalankara of Bhamaha and the Kavyadarga of Dandin allude
to several forerunners in the field. The conclusion becomes
Irresistible that the earliest writings mentioned by these authors
iiro now lost to the world. Even so, the material available in
the works extant is rich enough to indicate the trend of the
limes.
All these early writers try to define the province of literature,
to classify the various literary forms in vogue, to discover the
elements of beauty, to point out the pitfalls to be avoided and
i<* give an exhaustive account of the ways and means to be
adopted for achieving mastery over the poetic art. Though in
theory drama is brought under the purview of literature (Kavya),
It receives little attention at the hands of these early rhetori¬
cians." The reason stated by them for this important omission is
that Bharata’s treatment of the topic is most exhaustive. It is
clear therefore that dramatic theory had been already perfected
independently by Bharata and his followers, and had come
to stay long before Bhamaha, Dandin and others wrote their
works. It is not at all strange in the circumstances to finaihese
writers tacitly presuming a knowledge of dramatic technique on
the part of their readers and referring them to the original text-
• Vide. Dr. R. C. Hazra, Our present Agnipurdna—Indian Historical

Ouurtcrly, vol. XII. p. 683ff; and Dr. S. K. De, Date of the AlaAkdra
tprtlon of the Agnipurdna'—The Poona Orientalist, vol. II, p. 15 ff.
* rf- STTSfc ^ 1
It —Kavyalankara I. 24.
fosilftl ital!RH|3r fifcK: I — K&vyadarta 1. 31.
I —Vamana's Ksvyslankarasutravrtti on I. iii 32.,

book of Bharata for fuller information on that subject.
Bharata’s contribution to literary theory deserves to be
noted since the Dhvani theory came to be reared on the
foundations supplied by the Natya&astra.1
Bharata, the celebrated author of the Natya$astra, has
been ranked as a hoary sage by posterity and his authority is
undisputed in later discussions about drama, poetry and fine
art. Though his encyclopaediac work is singularly free from
metaphysical subtleties, later commentators belonging to
different philosophical traditions have vied with one another in
interpreting the cryptic aphorism of Bharata on Rasa to yield a
full-fledged system of aesthetic thought. Without going into
these subtleties of interpretation here, we might content our¬
selves with a bare sketch of what poets like Kalidasa thought
to be the cream of Bharata’s observations on Rasa.8
Kalidasa is only echoing Bharata when he says :
snsar i
(Life in its variety, the outcome of the triple traits in
human personality, is seen in the drama, coloured by many
‘ rasa’s ; even to men of myriad tastes, drama doth provide
singular entertainment.)
In the only chapter Bharata devotes to the qualities of the ideal
spectators (preksakas), he refrains from using the words Bhava
♦ -
7 According to E. J. Rapson, Bharata’s Natyagastra belongs to the

beginning of the Christian era (Vide article on ‘Drama Indian*—the
Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics).
8 “Rasa has two phases, one the sentiments called heroism, love,
laughter, wonder, etc., forming part of the theme of the play, and another
that final transcendent blissful experience of the aesthetically responsive
spectator’s heart which results from witnessing these emotions in the play,
contemplating on them and allowing them to touch the corresponding
chords in one’s own being and thereby getting one’s being absorbed in the
blissful state that has been awakened.’’
—V. Raghavan, Sanskrit Drama and Performance (The Madras Univer¬
sity Journal (section A) vol. XXIX, No. I. p. 18)
Broadly it might be said that Bharata and the earlier writers are
concerned with Rasas of the theme, while later commentators like Bhatfa
Nsyaka and Abhinavagupta go into the nature of the spectator’s experince.
INTRODUCTION 5
mill liana prominently. On the other hand, he speaks of the
M»nI npcctutor as one who is happy at the sight of happiness,
ftiillri'lng ut the sight of grief and full of pity at the sight of the
piteous. This is what later writers call bfdaya-samvada or
vi»n,iamyu-vi$aya-tanmayibhavana-yogyata or empathy. Bharata
iih nullifies how it varies from individual to individual. He says
IIml drama must please all tastes, the illiterate and the learned,
Ilia wealth-seeker and.the world-weary,the heroic and the old.
No II In that drama gives scope to all sorts of characters, high
well as low, young as well as old, male as well as female.
11 into remarks of Bharata do not lead us to the conclusion
llial the nature of the joy provided by drama is one and the
same lor every one.
What then is Rasa according to Bharata as understood by
knlldasu ? It looks as if Rasa is the emotinal element in the
l heme or plot of a play which reveals a regular pattern. In
hie loo we have the interplay of several emotions; but they do
uni lull into any artistic pattern ; they are disorganised. The
i Imollc interplay of emotions in the world never brings exclu¬
sive |oy because the emotions in life are guided by the wayward
tdements of sattva, rajas and tamas which are always at logger¬
head*. Into the space of a single moment are packed various
hi livitics, very often arising out of clashing desires and conflict¬
ing emotions. It is impossible to name one ruling passion as
lhe source of all our activities in life. The imagination of the
playwright brings law and order into this lawless assemblage
nl mental states. It keeps out the incoherent elements and
pit kd out only the emotions, primary and derivative (sthayi- and
vyahhlchari-bhavas), their causes—human and material (vi-
hhnviiN) -and their effects (anubhavas) for representation. The
umitilnns thus sorted out by the poet become elemental or
ihiIvcinuI and shed their individualistic peculiarities. It is in
IIiIn dense that Bharata and Kalidasa speak of drama as an
Ideal representation of the world’s bhavas. The primary
emotions (bhavas) are called sthayi and are distinguished from
•mini ions which are fleeting or vyabhicari. Since the former
alone arc conducive to unity and development, they get the
name of Rasa when such unity has been achieved in a play
6 THE DH V ANY A LOK A AND ITS CRITICS
through the organic arrangement or successful fusion of their
causes and effects into anartistic unity. This has to be achieved
through all the media at the disposal of the dramatist. So the
characters in a drama fall into certain definite types in relation
to Rasa. The plot will have joints (sandhis) and links (sandhy-
angas) wherein each part will form an organic element of the
whole. Metre and music, dance and gesture, voice and tone,
dress and make-up, are all so utilized by the actors as to reveal
rasa. Rasa as a principle of unity does not mean the exclusion
of other rasas ; it only emphasises the need of one remaining
at the fore all the time, the others playing a subsidiary role.
Against this background, we may attempt a meaning of the
famous Rasa-sutra of Bharata. In Bharata’s psychological
classification, all possible emotions of man are brought under
49 heads; of which the first 8 (‘rati’,etc.) are permanent, the
next 33 (‘nirveda,’etc.) are fleeting and the last 8 . (‘stambha’ etc.)
are involuntary and psycho-physical. All these are bhsvas
or states of mind (cittavfttivigesa). Of these, the first 8
alone have the possibility of being treated or represented at
length as ruling passions of diverse situations, antecedent and
consequent. When so treated the sthayibhavas themselves are
described as Rasa because then their appeal to the audience is
certain. Though it is an undisputed fact that sahfdayas also
possess these sthayibhavas in instinctive (vasana) form and that
is why they can have hfdayasamvada and consequent asvada or
enjoyment, Bharata is not explaining that point in the sutra*
What he wishes to explain is that without an artistic and syste¬
matic representation of vibhavas etc., which he also called ‘artha’
(matter), no ‘rasa’ is possible ; and without ‘rasa’, the artistic
attempt is a failure (nahi rasadrte kascidarthah pravartate).
If Rasa is kept steadily in view, then all his other rules relating
to it become indispensable. The sutra says that by vibhava-
nubhava-vyabhicari-samyoga, rasa is called forth; or as explained
by Bharata himself later, sthayibhavas come to be called ‘rasa’.
But how the samyoga is to be effected is not explained in the
SQtra. It is the subject of the whole treatise.*
8 Cf. “The Greek theory of Terror, Pity and Katharsis is scrappy by the
INTRODUCTION 1
Besides the honour of having propounded the Rasa theory
for the first time, Bharata also gets the credit for being the
earliest rhetorician who tried to discover the elements of poetic
charm'and tabulated them under convenient heads. According
to Bharata there are four kinds of Abhinaya (1) the Angika
(relating to artistic poses of the body), (2) Vacika (relating to
beautiful speech), (3) Aharya (relating to dress and make-up)
und (4) Sattvika (relating to the acting of the Sattvika Bhavas)10.
Of these, thq second viz., Vacikabhinaya is mainly concerned
with the province of poetry and accordingly Bharata attempts
to give an account of the various elements that constitute
poetry in the XVI Chapter of the Natya-âstra.
To start with, we are introduced to the concept of Lak§a$as
in poetry, a concept which was not devefoped by succeeding
writers. Lak$ana may be rendered into English as “hall-mark”.
Though Bharata has no definite principles of poetic criticism to
offer, he raises the fundamental-question, “What are the hall¬
marks of poetry ?”, and gives a list of thirtysix characteristics
beginning with Bhuââ.11 The other concepts touched upon
by Bharata are, Guna, Alaiikara and Do?a. Though all these
three concepts of Lak§ana, Guna and Alankara look alike at
first sight, the distinction subsisting between them becomes
clear in Bharata’s treatment. The first is concerned with the
intrinsic theme of a poem and the poet’s manner of giving
side of the full Rasa-theory of Bharata, whose treatise is more complete

than Aristotle’s Poetics and Rhetoric put together”—V. Raghavan, Sanskrit
Drama and Performance, The Madras University Journal, vol. XXIX, No.l
p, 16). For a fuller account, see the present writer’s ‘Bharata’s Theory of
Rasa’, (Poona Orientalist, XII. No.l)
10 «rrfHt sn^Fr: i
WT 1 Ibid. VII10-11
3 swift iitanft % ^jpâforaift 11

^rantajft Rwpwqtenft g h—ibid, xvi 14.
$ THE DHVANYALOKA AND ITS CRITICS
expression to it. The second has in view the arrangement
words and syllables, their harmony and sound values, and tê
adequacy of the ideas in relation to a particular emotion that
is intended to be evoked. The last relates to the ways and
means by which words and meanings may be made to lo°k
picturesque and brilliant. Lak§anas are the broad outlines
grace, the presence of which makes one immediately recognlse
what poetry is. An analysis of it will lead to an admiration °f
the poet’s imagination and will give an inkling into the seCfet»
mysterious and wonderful workings of his mind an'd makes us
feel how he can create a live interest in the story and the chafa“
cters he is depicting. A consideration of the gunas will take
one far along the road of the realisation of Rasa which 1S
poetry’s chosen goal, by an artistic arrangement of words nfld
meanings in keeping with the emotion to be evoked. And a
knowledge of the Alankaras will readily help a man to discovrer
for himself how words and ideas may be rendered striking
brilliant by a few turns given to them here and there. Most
what has been stated above is only implicit in Bharata’s work-
A list of ten Gunas is proposed by Bharata and definiti^ns
are offered for four Alankaras. The Gunas are : Sle§a, Pras§da>
Samata, Samadhi, Madhurya, Ojas, Padasaukumarya, Artha_
vyakti, Udarata and Kanti. And of the four Alankaras, viz-*
Upama, Dipaka, Rupaka and Yamaka, five varieties of Upa**1*
and ten kinds of Yamaka, are distinguished which, suggests tfrat
in Bharata’s time rhyme was very much in vogue. This schef*1®
of Alankaras appears very simple when compared with tfre
scheme of Bharata’s followers. Finally, there is also a tre^*'
ment of ten technical flaws in composition (Do§as) to
avoided by the poet. This, in brief, is the summary of Bharat^s
rhetoric.
It is significant to note in this connection that Bhar£ta
treats of all these concepts particularly in relation to Ras£-,?
In the beginning of the 21st Chapter of the Natya-Sastra,
" Vide qstfl I

Ibid. XVI t*3
INTRODUCTION $
muvm : "Itivfttarh tu kavyasya Sariram pari-kirtitam ‘The
(Ik 11 if may be described as the body of poetry’; and it is most
Ilkrly (hat he meant Rasa to be its Atman or soul though he
Imu not mentioned it in so many words. Thus controversies
tuning around the ‘body’and soul of poetry in the Alankara-
m neem to have taken their start with Bharata. Though
Itlim iidfs treatment of rhetoric is rather sketchy, his definition,
tilvlnlotis and classifications of the drama are thoroughgoing
mill nro implicitly adopted in the writings of later theorists.13
We step into poetics proper in the Kavyalankara of
llhimiiiha (Circa 700 A. D.). By Bhamaha’s time, criticism had
umm to be looked upon as a science (fcastra) and poetry as a
him nit. Rhetoricians began to pay greater attention to poetry.
11 wrni felt that the conventions of procedure in the other
Mminm like Nyaya and Vedanta should be incorporated into the
II'Id ill'Alankara also. Hence we find a clarification of the
IM iiyojnna’ or purpose of the study at the beginning of works on
Ahn'iknraâstra.14 The main purpose of these treatises is to syste-
mnil/e the principles of poetic composition so that the aspiring
pm'i muy have a knowledge of the fundamentals of poetry and
iIk-ciltic an ability to recognise and appreciate it. Since the
MiipiirUince of the subject-matter is a measure of the importance
nl (lie ncience that deals with it,15 Alankara works grow eloquent
iivim the manifold merits of studying or composing poetry.
Itlinmuha indulges in a glorious praise of poetry at the very
• mihot of his Kavyalankara. He says that as a result of com¬
puting poetry all the fourfold values in life, viz., Dharma
(Hglilcousness), Artha (possession), Kama (passion) and Mok§a
jliluTiition) are attained, proficiency in all the arts is acquired,
(In' poet comes to be universally liked and his reputation
tpin«d».,B In Bhamaha’s opinion, poetry is the crowning result
"| |)r. Manmohan Ghosh’s authoritative translation of the Niqyadastra

lit* cilice been published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal,
11 Cf. the conventional idea of anubandha-catujtaya
" nf'Ni4«*n& arcing I
II Kivyila Akira, I, 2
of a life devoted to the study of the various branches of learn¬
ing. And all the learning acquired by man is of no avail, if
it does not culminate in making him a poet.17 That poetry is a
unique gift, more valuable than pedantic learning, is emphasized.
Persons of average intelligence too can become learned if they
receive good instruction, but they can never become poets.
Poets are distinguished by the spark of genius which is their
unique gift.18 Bhamaha eulogises the permanent value of
poetry and exhorts men to take to it.19 These remarks of
Bhamaha are repeated by almost every succeeding writer on
poetics.
Bhamaha’s ostensibly simple definition of poetry—
‘ feabdarthau sahitau kavyam ’ (word and meaning constitute
poetry)—means more than what it literally conveys. It is
guarded by his instructions as to the ‘ defects ’ to be avoided,
the 4 excellences ’ to be adopted and figures ’ to be utilized.*0
Bhamaha accepts the importance of Rasa as the funda¬
mental principle informing the whole work of art as such.*1 It
sustains the whole. While working out the details he accepts
the great use and function of imagery to sustain the Rasa. His
17 l
strain* u
fitaT *>i sft: «et fcren fosn I
Op. cit. I. 3-4
f^PTJ II Ibid. 1.8.

10 Cf.“ If form and substance mean anything in the poem, then each is
involved in the other, and the question in which of them the value lies has
no sense ' A.C. Bradley, ‘ Oxford Lectures on Poetry ’, p. 16; cf. also Dr.
Otto Jesperson’s remark : 4 As human beings are organised, sound and
sense cannot be separated without detriment to both
—Linguistica, p. 83
21
esteSTOlfcl TOST S*lf 1 Ibid, i, 21
iNTkODUCfiON il
•!**'» Iflc mention of Rasavad as an alankara22 indicates the
i tmiprihcnsive nature of his concept of alankara or beauty.
M»* w»»* not oblivious of the influence of Rasa in a work of art,
Mini oilers some illuminating remarks on the ‘logic’ of poetry.
The* Alaftkara school’ of Bhamaha had, in later times,
•miiiy followers such as Udbhaja and Rudra|a. These later
'Mllris Dagîn included among them (?)—either add new
Hume* lo the list of existing ones or classify them according to
•onip other principle. In essence, they do not differ from
llliniiinhu in holding that Alankara is an important aspect in
inipity.
Ilhnmaha’s chief contribution to literary theory is the
iloi dine of Alankaras. and it is important to consider more
hilly the principle of Vakrokti which according to him under¬
lie (hem. This conception of Vakrokti which had its orign in
litmiiila had a very interesting development at the hands of
loin writers, particularly of Kuntaka. Vakrokti stands for a
•i• lingo, out-of-the-way or unusual expression as contrasted
with llmt which is common-place or ordinary. It is a kind of
hum alive usage; and it is said to lie at the root of all the
HMembluge of Alankaras. The same is stated about AtiSayokti
alm». There is some exaggeration at the basis of all Alankaras.
Hip distinction between Vakrokti and Atigayokti is not very
• lem in the book. The slant of Bhamaha’s mind is towards
ii'Uinding alankara as arising from strangeness and beauty of
»>*|HCNsion :
■ The several Alankaras are nothing but the various ways
in which speech is rendered striking. This strikingness has an
•■U’lnenl of unusualness, which may be called Vakrokti. At the
Inn I* of this unusualness can be traced an element of exaggera¬
tion (or AtiiSayokti) in a small or great measure. Poetry is
•Itnnge, and therefore beautiful. It is strange because there is
dpvlnlion from what is commonplace, or, in other words, a
•light exaggeration. Ultimately, then, Vakrokti is Atiâyokti.
And without Vakrokti there can be no Alankara worth its
"• ... —Kivyilafiksra, II, 6.

il THE DHVANYALOKA AND ITS CRITICS
name.’28 It is for this reason that Bhamaha rejects Hetu,

Suk§ma and Le£a in his scheme of Alankaras.31 He categorically
states that speech does not become poetry by the mere usage
of sonorous syllables, and that Vakrokti is the sine qua non of
poetry.35 After enumerating the different forms of literature,
Bhamaha adds that in all of them the presence of Vakrokti is
very desirable.36 A poet, according to him, is invariably a vakra-
vak37. But in his great enthusiasm for achieving Vakrokti a
poet is not allowed to throw aside grammatical correctness and
logical coherence. The poet would land himself in defects by
disregarding these. And of all the flaws, offence to grammar
and idiom is the most offensive. Therefore Bhamaha attempts
to clarify the correct grammatical forms of words in cases of
doubt.
Such scattered details do not, however, represent the main
substance of Bhamaha’s teaching on the fundamentals of
poetry. For that we must turn to his analytical method of
treating language after the manner of the grammarians.
Bhamaha devotes a whole chapter (the VI) to a consideration
of subtle grammatical points and alludes to the theories of rival
schools of philosophy. This amply proves that during
Bhamaha’s age the science of poetics had not yet attained an
independent status as that of the other 6astras, and it was
trying to rise to their level by incorporating within itself the
major problems of language touched upon in the sciences of
flcbfrvri ZWITOTH II
qMIS^TT SBf§t*T SE!*T: »

—Kavyalankara, II. 85.
34 If: *0irtS*T I
Ibid. II. 86
35 * i
Ibid. I. 36
48 i Ibid. I. 30
37 ....ro?T3i jtfftari I sRifaT sril are*: i Ibid. VI. 23
INTRODUCTION 13
grammar and logic. It also proves that the study of grammar
was held in high esteem and considered to be an essential
prelude to the study of poetry or poetics 28 As a result, the
methods of the other sciences came to be implicitly accepted
tiN the methods to be followed in Poetics. Here we get an
explanation of the strange phenomenon in ancient Indian
poetics of everything being organised in a formal, analytical
und normative manner.
Despite his boundless respect for Panini and his followers.2*
Ilhamaha does not always accept the conclusions reached by
lhe grammarians. While reviewing the problem of the import
of words and propositions, Bhamaha emphatically asserts that
the Sphota-vada of the grammarians is thoroughly wrong and
ihould not be accepted even if they swear to its correctness.80
We will have occation to revert to this topic in another context.
Bhamaha’s work is permeated by a spirit of controversy. He
In proud of the fact that he has arrived at cogent conclusions
mi the basis of original examples composed by himself for the
purpose. Bhamaha does not admit any hard and fast distinc¬
tion of styles into Vaidarbhi and Gaudi. He points out that a
passage may be very sweet-sounding and yet stupid. Easy-
llowing-nonsensical verses cannot be called poetry. He reduces
ilie number of Gunas to three. He spares not even poets when
they indulge in fanciful flippancy.81 Though Svabhavokti is
defined and illustrated, Bhamaha seems to have a fling at those
who would give it a place as important as that of Vakrokti.
These things are considered by some scholars to be attacks
directed against Dandin’s Kavyadarâ. But since similar
i iilicisms are found in Dandin’s work also (each appearing to
Cf- spi<m^ Tifofor * i

,M cf- tetiRT ^mrqisRTtsq^TgT ^ i
3T*TR JR ft qrfotfftt VRR ^ ||
Ibid VI. 63
erer if i
Ibid. VI. 12
" Cf. Ibid. I. 42-44 ; IV. 39-46 and II. 20.
t4 THE DHVANYALOKA AND ITS CRITICS
criticise the other), the arguments cut both ways and fail to
carry conviction. Most probably, both Dan din and Bhamaha
refer to earlier—now non-extant—works of theorists who held
similar views, and the question of borrowing does not arise.
The next critic who deserves consideration here is Dandin.
His definition of kavya reads: “ganram tavadisfartha-
vyavacchinna padavali”82 (with respect to the body of poetry,
we opine that it consists of a series of words qualified by the
sense which the poet wishes to express).’ One might be tempted
at first sight to correlate it with Jagannatha’s famous definition
of poetry in his Rasagangadhara, viz., “Raman iyarthapratipa-
dakafc fcabdafc kavyath” and say that Dandin too gives more
emphasis to the word or ithe form than to its substance, which
is given the subordinate place of a vUesana (adjective) in the
latter definition.’8 But istartha does not mean ramaniyartha.
It means vivaksitartha, as the old commentator Taruna Vacas-
pati has pointed out, and should be translated as ‘sought to be
expressed’. Darnjin gives a very wide significance to the term
Alankara, more explicitly than Bhamaha. He says, “Kavya-
itobhakarsn dharman alahkaran pracaksate” (All attributes
adding beauty to poetry go by the name Alaftkara). Thus the
categories of Guna and Riti or Marga are included under it.
In order to differentiate him from the Alankara school of
Bhamaha (who assigns the first place to figures of speech),
Dandin has often been looked upon as the founder of the Riti
School, though the word Riti itself never occurs in his Kavya-
dar$a. He accepts the Vaidarbhi and Gaudiya styles (whose
essence consists of Gunas) which were later on well defined by
Vamana. Thus though Dandin is in the main a follower of
Bhamaha, he differs from him in more than one detail.
In Dandin’s definition of poetry quoted above, the word
‘dharma’ is significant. They are mere ‘characteristics’ which
are not so intrinsic to poetry as Guâs are. In another place
Dandin speaks of the Gunas as ‘Pranas’.34 Alankaras are
81 KavysdarSa, II. 1 ; (same as Agni-purs?a, 341-27).

88 This is how Kane and Sovani would take it.
54 cf- srnm ^T?Jon I -K*vyidar*a I. 42
INTRODUCTION 15
nothing more than ‘dharma’s. In the terminology of later
writers the same idea may be amplified by saying that the
relation of Kavya to Alankaras is merely Samyoga (conjunction),
whereas that of Kavya to Guftas is Samavaya (inherence)85
Though Dandin generally agrees with Bhamaha so far as
the status of Rasa is concerned, there is one important
illllcrence. Like Bhamaha, Dandin also treats of Rasa under
nit ulaftkara viz., Rasavat. As a matter of fact, he devotes a
much larger space for a consideration of the eight Rasas under
Kusuvat.88 But what is of greater significance is that he speaks
»•( Rusa under Guna also which, as we saw above forms, the
i m nerstone of Danîn’s conception of poetry. While defining
M#ilhurya-guna, Dandin states :
TOS^lfo TO%fS: I
tl Kavyadarâ I. 51
[‘The presence of Rasa in utterance as well as in the theme
will serve as an instance of the technical excellence
’ vwcetness”. Like the bees overwhelmed by delight through
In nicy, wise men also derive immeasurable delight through this
11111,111’]. The remark of Dandin is apt to be misconstrued if
i-ikrn in itself. It should be interpreted in the light of his
iiilicr remarks found in the different parts of the text. One of
iln iii is
wm OTfcwrafnaft to*$ fofajgfa i
i» —(1.62)
(All the alaftksras no doubt shower Rasa to some extent on
• lie Idea conveyed; yet it is agramyata or the absence of
vulgarity alone that is mostly responsible for Rasa). Another
iMuui k that deserves to be noted is :
*l<Ht¥tl5tl«ldW)ftjTT^f TO: I
It WeTOW-dl TO5Trn TO3T fitTO* II (II. 292.)
■’ Hre Hermann Jacobi, Ueber Begriff und fVesen der poetischen

h#*»i*'/i In der Indischen Poetik’. (Nachrichten der K. Gesselschaft der
A Uiicitvt Imflcn zu Gottingen. Philologisch- historische Klasse. 1908.
" ft NtlTOTU^T TOS^T TOST fitTO* I Ibid. II. 292
[‘Rasa which was previously shown in connection with
Madhurya must be underestood to refer only to (the negative
virtue of) the absence of vulgarity in expression. Here, in
Rasavad alankara, we have the positive presence of Rasas which
are eight in number’].
The three verses quoted above, when read together, will
unmistakably prove that Dandin had both a positive and
negative conception of Rasa. The famous Rasas of Bharata
were brought under the Rasavad alankara. He even went a
step further in regarding that every alankara might serve to call
forth Rasa. But this is not so fundamental at all when
compared to what is achieved by the Madhuryaguna. This
GuAa clears all the obstacles on the way towards the realisation
of Rasa, the greatest obstacle being gramyata. Unless this is
first accomplished, though this may be only a negative virtue,
no positive Rasa can be manifested by the other Alankaras
including the most important of them viz., the Rasavad.
There is no doubt that Dandin considered Gunas to be the
essential elements of poetry. One of these Gunas, viz.,
Samadhi, has been extolled by him. He calls it the quintess¬
ence of all poetry and opines that the whole galaxy of poets,
without any exception, resorts to it.37
On the other hand, Dandin’s attitude towards Ati£ayokti
and Vakrokti is the same as that of Bhamaha. Dandin writes
even more emphatically about the efficacy of these two figures.
He says : ‘ AtiSayokti has been devoutly worshipped even by the
great god of Speech, Brhaspati, and has fittingly been spoken
of as lying at the back of all figures of speech.’3’ And about
Vakrokti also, he has similarly remarked : “ Slesa (or paronoma¬
sia) enriches generally all varieties of poetic compositions, and
especially Vakroktis. And the whole range of literature is
37 WnfoRR *Tt *J°I: I

II —Ibid I. 100
ll —Ibid. II. 220

INTRODUCTION 17
divisible into two classes—Svabhavokti and Vakrokti ”.s9
As we have already seen, although the word ‘ iarira ’ has
been used both by Bharata and Daridin in their accounts of
poetry and though this implies that they must have had
something else in mind as the soul residing in that body, they
have not expressly mentioned it anywhere in'their works; and
the credit for having first tackled the problem of atman or soul
of kavya undoubtedly goes to Vamana (Circa 800 A.D.). When
he declares in one of his sutras40 that style or diction is the
noul of poetry (Ritiratma kavyasya), it is nothing but Danîn’s
position pushed to its logical conclusion. In minor matters of
detail, as, for example, the Ritis being essentially constituted by
I he presence of Gunas, he generally follows his predecessors.
Vamana is famous in the history of Sanskrit poetics as the
founder of the Riti school. Though the doctrine of Riti as
outlined by Vamana is not very much different from what was
already laid down by Dunlin, it must be said to Vamana’s
credit that he gave for the first time a clear conception of the
relative importance of Gunas and Alankaras. He defines
nluftkaras as those elements which serve to enhance beauty in
poetry, beauty which is directly produced by the agency of
(Jui?as Danilin had vaguely stated that Alankaras are beauti¬
fying elements in poetry, had treated Gunas as essential condi-
lions, and had also spoken of Rasa. Vamana improves on the
hints and suggestions thrown out by Dandin. He demarcates the
province and functions of these two factors in poetry, and adds
one more Riti, viz., Pafichali to the two existing ones. Regarding
the concept of Riti, Vamana has some penetrating remarks to
oiler. Riti, or style of composition, is nothing but a peculiar
arrangement of words. Gunas are responsible for bringing
about this peculiarity.42 And the traditional number of Gunas
as S^rifcl RFft fireq. l

fire fifW II -ibid. II. 363
40 K&vyslanksrasutra I. ii. 6
41 ^retVTRT: sssrct goii: I I
—Ibid. III. 1-2
42
fir^n-sr^5f qWtar qrarcft i -ibid, i ii. 6-9

2
is practically doubled by him in so far as he treats ten gunas
once in relation to Sabda or sound, and then again separately
in relation to artha or sense.
Regarding Rasa also, Vamana’s attitude is slightly different
from that of Dandin. In this connection, his omission of
Rasavad-alankara is very significant. But it must be noted that
he does not altogether deny a place to Rasas. Vamana has
included them under a Guna, viz., Kanti/3 By denying a place
to Rasas under the minor category of Alankaras and including
them within the major category of Gunas, Vamana certainly
shows his cognisance of their importance in poetry. It is hinted
by him that Rasa is the underlying principle of plots in the
various literary forms, when he speaks of drama as the best of
them.4*
One other instance of Vamana’s originality of outlook is
furnished in his scheme of classifying the Alankaras. He
recognises the prominence of simile and discovers a shade of it
in most of the figures of speech proposed by earlier writers. He
divides the whole range of Alankara into two broad types :
Upama (simile) and Upama-prapafica (figures based upon
simile).45 He declares that simile is the mainstay of poets.4®
Further, Vamana’s idea of Vakrokti differs considerably
from that of his predecessors. Vakrokti, in his treatment, is no
longer a generic term for all alankaras, but is merely one of the
Alankaras. In the place of Vakrokti as the underlying principle
of all alankaras, Vamana has substituted upama, and vakrokti
itself is relegated to the subordinate place of an alankara. His
definition of Vakroti is :
fllgyilgrernf or ‘‘Indication based upon resemblance”.
43
I —Ibid. III. ii. 14,
44
l - | —ibid. I. iii. 30, 32
45
—Kavyalankarasutravrtti on IV. ii. 1.

and
—IV. iii. 1
46
TOTT I sfoBiar I —Ibid, IV. ii. 17.
47 Ibid. IV. iii. 8.
INTRODUCTION 19
In this Vamana has broken new ground in recognising
indicated sense also as adding charm to poetry. And this was
tl»*' Marling point for the subsequent theorists, as will be clear
I• • **1111 lie sequel.
I Mbluqa, the next writer of note on Sanskrit poetics was a
»initemporary of Vamana. But unlike Vamana, he is an avowed
• • till iwer of the tradition started by Bhamaha. He is supposed
linvc written a commentary on the latter’s Kavyalankara
idled Bhamaha-vivararia, which, unfortunately, is lost.48 The
>'mIv work of Udbhata that is now extant is Kavyslankarasan-
iiiidm. It deals specifically with alankaras only, and the other
•n lions on poetics viz., Guna, dosa, and so on, are entirely left
'•idol' consideration. Udbhaja’s merit lies in the fact that he
upheld Bhamaha’s theory of Alankaras, especially at a time
u Inn it was being challenged, and brought the whole weight of
•ii i imlhority to bear upon the soundness of the theory. He
ildrd ‘‘junta as the ninth to the list of eight Rasas and proposed
•I Mldcr application for the figure felesa. Some quotations by
I'iiri writers like Pratiharenduraja, Abhinavagupta and Mam-
hm|n Indicate that Udbhata was a thinker who made original
... llnitions to the subjects of Rasa and Guna also.
I I10 lust great writer among the predecessors of the
I Mi vunikAra is Rudraja. His work is also called Kavyalankara.
I It introduces a new classification of figures under four different
In.nil or (I) Vastava (2) Aupamya (3) AtiSaya and (4) Sle§a.
Hi- omits to mention the Rasalankaras, viz., Preyas, Rasavad,
• 11 l.mvln and Samahita. But he devotes four whole chapters to
H i onsldcrution of Rasa and enters into all the details. He
nn nllonH Virasa as a do§a and illustrates it:
*t; snaw iRJtrfo: I
g =3 STTO: 5HF^T; II 19
(When a Rasa thoroughly inappropriate in the context is
'* Mump fragments have been recovered recently in Pakistan and

i-iililulmil by Dr. Gnoli in book form (Rome, 1962). The material, however,
n mi. meagre to warrant definite conclusions.
'* hivyilurtkara, XI. 12.
allowed to outshine the appropriate one, the flaw of virasa will
result).
A second variety of theisame dosa is described as follows :
ST: girodsft TOT i
1II 50
(Even a Rasa which is appropriate in the context will become a
flaw if it is overemphasized).
The words Prabandhebhyah and Prabandhesu in the above
stanzas are very significant. Unlike alankaras that subsist mostly
in individual portions of a work of art, Rasas permeate the
entire work.6’ For appreciating a work as a whole, the canon of
Rasa is more important than that of Alankaras. That this was
the view held by Rudrata becomes clearer when we see the space
he devotes to a consideration of the Rasas, as also some of his
explicit statements like :
5T3 ^F^T ^TOFTmSTOR^gtfT I
TO^tT^ I
ii 5i
shift i
qwTrBiqfiT^ri^g^fiigngT^^ n 53
era ^ i
g? TOT: qRFq^tRlft H
^ srenfi ft&n taraaift i
argnm^^TOT ^ ^ g^^^JrRT: II54
The trend of the above stanzas is unmistakable. Rudrata
is clear in indicating that the main purpose of Kavya or poetry
is delightful instruetion. This can be accomplished only through
the aid of Rasas, and herein lies the superiority of poetry
over scientific works. Readers are averse to technical treatises
*° Ibid. XI. 14
51 Moreover Rasa now becomes the sole criterion of both Drama and
Poetry.
» lb. XII. 2-3 “ lb. XVI. 1. 51 lb. XVI. 56
INTRODUCTION 2l
because they are devoid of Rasa. It is all the more necessary
then that a poet should incorporate Rasas into his work ; other¬
wise the work will suffer the same neglect as fcastras. Nor is this
all. As Rudraja’s verses quoted above show, in defining and
classifying the various types of literary composition also, the
principle of Rasa is prominently involved. The distinction of
Kavya into Mahan (great) andlaghu (light) is also based on this
principle. If in a literary composition all the rasas find due
expression, then it deserves to be called a Mahakavya or Great
Poem. Otherwise, if only some Rasas are treated to the
exclusion of the rest, that work will only be a light poem or
laghu-kavya. If there is no touch of Rasa, it is no poem at all.
In other words, Rasas are the vital elements in every literary
composition. Such is the view of Rudrata, which deserves
more than a passing notice.55
In the literature from Bharata to Rudrata we find the
scientific method of analysis, logical definition, division and
classification of the various elements of beauty fully perfected
in the treatment of rhetorical concepts. Bharata, in particular,
displays a grasp of the rudiments of aesthetic] experience, and
he makes it the starting point for all his remarks on poetry,
drama and fine art.
Most of these early theorists are fond of formalism and
attention to minute details. In their treatment of individual
excellences we miss a philosophical approach. They are
content with enunciating rules of rhetoric and illustrating
them with examples taken at random. Except for stray hints
and summary accounts, they hardly explain in a systematic way
important concepts like Intuition, Creative imagination, the
critic’s function and the principles of literary judgment. They
do not attempt evaluation of literary works as wholes and
comparative estimates of poets are rare. Their tone smacks of
dogmatism while their discussion is scholastic, aesthetic analysis
■** On inscriptional evidence, R. Narasimhachar suggests the possibility

of Rudrafa’s being identical with Rudrabhaua and being a native of
Karnataka. See : R. Narasimhachar—Introdn. to Nsgavarma's Kdvyava-
lokanarh (Kannada). The point is yet to be proved.
remaining but perfunctory. The vital issue of semantics does not
attract them and they have inadequately stated the complex
relation between the categories of Rasa, Guna and Alankara.
Nor did they endeavour to work out clearly the implications
of the Rasa theory with reference to plot, character, style and
metre, in non-drama tic literary forms. Though we cannot say
that they lacked in literary insight, we feel the lack of depth in
their formal categories. The value of these theories is in the
good promise they held out for a future writer, the author of
the Dhvanyaloka, to rise on their shoulders and perfect a
theory free from their drawbacks. Their performance served
as an excellent purvabhumi for the entry of Anandavardhana
(9th century A.D.).
The Dhvani theory in Sanskrit criticism was the upshot of
the revaluation on the part of the cultured critics of Kashmir
and it was authoritatively formulated in the well-known work
‘Dhvanyaloka.’ Though ultimately it came to be looked upon
as the final authority in all matters relating to literary criticism,
still in the initial stages, it had to face a storm of opposition
on all sides. In what follows, an attempt is made to trace all
the noticeable stages in the history of the Dhvani theory.
CHAPTER II
GENESIS OF THE THEORY OF DHVANI
The theory of Dhvani was expounded as the most

significant principle in literary criticism by the new school of
critics headed by Ananda\|ardhana. No less a writer than the
great Abhinavagupia-Acarya wrote an elaborate and authori¬
tative commentary on the Dhvanyaloka, wherein he has
explained all the implications involved in the theory with the
aid of copious illustrations culled out from the whole range of
Sanskrit literature and criticism. The masterly treatment of
the subject by Anandavardhana, combined with the authoritative
interpretation of it by Abhinavagupta was able to overcome
all opposition to the theory by rival schools and to elicit
universal admiration and accepfcince of it by later theorists.
But at the very outest we are faced with the question
whether the Dhvani theory was entirely original and was
propounded for the first time in the Dhvanyaloka, The Indian
mind is instinctively averse to new-fangled notions and a most
marked tendency in Indian philosophical writings is, even when
the writer holds an opinion different from that of the recognised
authority, to reinterpret the current theory in a new light rather
than to enunciate an original theory. Far from the craze for
originality, we find in Indian thinkers an anxiety to keep their
personality in the background as far as possible. Their
reverence for authority was almost religious and their idea was
not to be original but to be faithful to older texts. This should
not be understood to mean that the atmosphere was such as to
preclude all efforts at bold and independent thinking. Even in
religious matters, there was freedom for holding an indepen¬
dent outlook; but originality merely for the sake of being
original was never encouraged. Even great writers like
SankaraCarya and VacaspatimiSra chose to be commentators
rather than original authors.
Such being the case, one need not be surprised by the
statement 5EmiflT?r£t: in the very first

Karika of the Dhvanyaloka. Instead of claiming for himself
any credit for having laid down an original theory, the author
categorically asserts that the idea of Dhvani as constituting
the soul of poetry is an ancient one, and that it was so desig¬
nated by learned men. Whether there is any historical truth
in this assertion deserves to be examined at some length.
From the total absence of any reference to Dhvani in all
the works on Poetics from Bharata down to Rudrata, one
will be led to think at first sight that the remark of Anandavar-
dhana is to be explained as being occasioned by his enormous
zeal to disclaim all individual responsibility for the new view
proposed and that it is purposefully left vague, no writer in
particular being mentioned as the originator of the new doctrine.
Though to some extent this may be true, closer examination
will reveal that there may be a grain of truth also in the state¬
ment of the Karika.
What exectly is the meaning of Samamnatapurvalj ? If we
take it to mean “elaborately treated in books”, the statement
would of course be inaccurate since no such book of an earlier
author is known to exist. There is no reason to think that such
books might have been lost, for there is not a single reference to
them in the whole range of Sanskrit criticism. The same difficulty
had to be faced by Abhinavagupta also, and it is interesting to
note how he gets over it. This is done by taking ‘Samamnata-
purvahi’ to mean “orally handed down in learned circles with
an unbroken tradition, though unrecorded in books”.1
The plural number in the word budhaih is also taken to be
significant. The theory does not claim acceptance simply
because a stray critic affirmed it; on the other hand a number of
learned critics were in agreement regarding its importance in
literature, and it is this concensus of opinion prevailing amongst
a famous circle of cultured critics which is taken as sufficient to
prove its validity. The charge of incompleteness or incorrect¬
ness can perhaps be levelled against an individual critic’s views
—Locana. p. 32. (K.S.R.I. Edn.)

GENESIS OF THE THEORY OF DHVANI 25
but not against the views of a whole class of cultured critics®.
Moreover, the special significance of the upasarga * sam *
in ‘ samamnatapurvah ’ is also to be taken into account. ‘ Saih *
may be paraphrased as “ samyak ” meaning * well ‘ with great
interest ’. Surely, scholars of repute would not take so much
interest in teaching a doctrine if it were incredible.'
From the foregoing it would appear that the theory of
Dhvani was very much in vogue in a famous circle of cultured
critics, and, though it was never committed to writing, it was
being traditionally handed down as a valuable treasure from
generation to generation. In other words, the theory of
Dhvani was being looked upon as a precious inheritance from
the past rather than as a glorious achievement of the present.
Who, then, were these learned critics of the past ? We can
gather that they were well versed in the principles of literary
appreciation by the epithet “ Kavya-tattva-vidbhil? ” bestowed
on them by Anandavardhana himself in the Vrtti.4 We read
again that the Dhvani doctrine was absolutely unrecognised by
the ancient writers on poetics.5 At first sight it will appear to
be in flat contradiction with the earlier remark viz., “ Kavya-
syatma dhvanirit.i budhaih yah samamnatapurvah ”. But the
contradiction disappears when we note that the expression
“ kavya-laksana-vidhayibhih’ is not the same as ‘Kavya-tattva-
vidbhifc ’. The latter, or men of literary taste were* aware of
the theory, but the former or writers on rhetoric seem to have
ignored it. In their blind worship of conventional categories,
the rhetoricians seem to have neglected the views of these critics
though they deserved recognition/’ To supply this want in
3 gq&rei craifiroR , * 3 1
sprftfa 1 —Ibid. p. 31
3 31 ^ f’ST I —Ibid. p. 32*

4 —Vjtti on Dhvanyaloka, I. 1.
—op. cit. p. 76
6 i -Ibid. p. 186
the standard works on rhetoric was one of the objects with
which the Dhvanyaloka was written. By doing due justice to
the theory of Dhvani which was so far only in a floating
stage, the author of the Dhvanyaloka was sure of enlisting
the sympathy and support of all sahfdayas or critics of
sound literary taste. By establishing the soundness of the
theory on a solid basis in a well-planned book, by removing
all possible objections that might be raised against the theory,
and by reinterpreting the accepted categories of rhetoric in the
light of the new theory, Anandavardhana thought that he was
rendering a salutary service.7
It is clear from the above considerations that the Dhvani
theory was not thrown into the field of Sanskrit literary criticism
all of a sudden. It was not in the nature of a Copernican
revolution. The Dhvanyaloka itself unmistakably points to
the existence of the theory among critics of note for a pretty
long period before the work was actually written down. And
these critics, whoever they might have been, seem to have relied
on their own response to literature in arriving at the theory
instead of being noseled by the canons of criticism that were
codified in works on rhetoric. They appear to have approached
the masterpieces and classics of Sanskrit literature with an
unbiased and open mind, and their experience, which could
not be gainsaid, was the basis on which they built up the rudi¬
ments of a new theory, since the earlier categories of criticism
were found insufficient to accout for their enjoyment of
literature.8
According to these critics, then, the only criterion for
judging on literary matters was the gift of a sound literary
taste, or a responsive heart. And they took pride in styling
—The concluding verse of the Dhvanyaloka.

8 Cf. am ^ Pronto w
swisri srfhBifow i ioc. cit.
themselves as sahrdayas. In this sense this word also must
have been brought into currency only by about this time, as it
is conspicuous by its absence in all ancient works on poetics
earlier than Vamana. The word sahfdaya is very significant as
laying emphasis on the most important condition of a literary
critic, namely, the gift of a responsive heart, a heart which is
essentially akin to that of the poet and which can share in full
all that the poet has to communicate. This clearly shows the
new angle of vision which these critics brought to bear upon
their theorisings on poetry.
In some Mss. the Dhvanyaloka is found designated by the
alternate title Sahrdayaloka. Perhaps the explanation is to be
found in the fact that Anandavardhana was trying to syste¬
matise the ideas of the sahrdayas before him, who had already
evolved and preached the outlines of the Dhvani theory. But
this is only a conjecture.
The conjecture gains support from some allusions to
sahrdayas that propounded the Dhvani theory from writers like
Mukula Bhatta and his pupil Pratihara Induraja who belong to
a period anterior to Abhinavagupta. The plural in all these
references deserves to be carefully noted. Some of the references,
first noted by Dr- Kane, are given below
3 fora t[fa
(Mukula Bhatfa’s Abhidhavrtti-matrka, N.S. Edn. p. 21)
wt % forf$raF*rqrar i (ibid. p. 19)
(Pratiharendurgja’s Laghuvrtti on Udbhata’s Kavyalankara-

sangraha, B.S.S. Edn.p. 85)
These references of course, are quite insufficient to prove
our hypothesis that a circle of ;Sahrdayas first gave currency to
ffie theory of Dhvani. For, the expression *sahrdayaih can
28 THE DHVNYALOKA AND ITS CRITICS
be taken as standing for the author of the Dhvanyaloka also9. The
plural number may be explained as indicative of respect. But
why writers, belonging -as they do to a rival school of thought,
should accord such high respect to the author of the Dhvanyaloka
is mystifying. It looks very strange especially when we find that
these very writers invariably use the singular with reference to
the highest authorities even when they are quoting from them.
Another alternative would be to construe the plural as meant
in derision, which also is not very plausible. On the other hand,
there would be little difficulty if we consider that the expression
sahfdayaih in the plural is indicative of contemporaneity and is
wide enough to include Anandavardhana, the author of the
Dhvanyaloka. It need not appear strange, therefore, if some¬
times Anandavardana’s work is quoted as that of the
sahrdayas10 * * since he was the foremost as representative of the
school of sahrdayas'1. Thus though incidentally Anandavar¬
dhana may also be meant by the expression, it is not exclusively
applicable to him. It primarily refers to a whole class of
cultured critics that preceded Anandavardhana. V. V. Sovani’s
contention1- that Sahrdaya is the proper name of the Dhvani..
karika-kara loses mnch force in the light of the above
considerations.
In this connection the history of the usage of the word
Sahrdaya itself will be very serviceable. All my efforts to trace in
earlier writers even a single usage of the expression ‘sahrdaya* in
the sense made out by the Dhvani theorists13 ended in vain. In
9 Vide P. V. Kane, History of Alankara Literature, p. LX ff.

10 cf-') cPII %
I —Laghuvrtti, p. 85
h) I lbid- P- 89
iH) ^ etc. lbid- p-90

“ Cf- I Locana, p. 82
»s Vide V.V. Sovani, ‘Who is the author of the Dhvani-Karikas V
G.R.A.S., 1910. pp. 164-5
*s Abhinavagupta’s famous explanation of the word Sahrdaya is repeated
verbatim by all later writers and it reads: ^
the whole range of Sanskrit literature and criticism as also in
the numerous lexicons belonging to an age earlier than that of
the Dhvanyaloka, the word sahfdaya in this sense is unique
and conspicuous by its absence.14 This phenomenon is certainly
unique and in view of the importance that came to be attached
to the expression by Anandavardhana and his successors, one
may hazard the conjecture that most probably the idea arose in
the circle of talented critics who were also responsible for the
propagation of the Dhvani theory. This piece of negative
evidence also will acquire some value when considered along
with the other facts.
On this point, there is a further piece of evidence coming
from an ancient Kannada work on Rhetoric viz.. The Kaviraja-
Marga, ascribed to Nrpatunga, a Ra§trakuta King also known
by the name of Amoghavar$a (815-877 A.D.). This date makes
him a senior contemporary of Anandavardhana. Nrpatunga is
an out and out follower of the ancient Alankara school and
his Kavirajamarga is more often than not a Kannada rendering
of Bhamaha’s Kavyalankara and Dandin’s Kavyadarâ. There
is no reason to suspect that he had read the Dhvanyaloka which
arose in Kashmir about that time. On the other hand, it looks
more plausible that he had not read it in view of the fact that
at least a period of one or two generations must be held to
have elapsed before the Dhvanyaloka could become popular in
(Locana, p. 77). In support of this explanation Abhinavagupta jcites a verse

from Bharata's Natya-$astra as authority. But even in this verse the express¬
ion Sahrdaya does not occur.
cf- ctst vn^r safari: i
gMi iP15SnteTf«RI II <vn- 7>
14 Since writing the above, I have come across one exception. The word
Sahrdaya occurs in one of the verses quoted by Vsmana is his Kavyglan-
ksrasutravritti (I. ii. 21). But since Vsmana was a Kashmirian and could
well have been a contemporary of the new critics (Sahrdayas), his usage
does not affect the main argument. To argue that the verse might well be
far older than Vsmana is easy ; but it is just a guess as against the equally
plausible guess that it might not be very old.
30 THF. DHVANYA LOKA AND ITS CRITICS
such remote provinces as Karnataka. Now, this Nrpatunga
alludes to Dhvani, in its technical sense, and unlike Bhamaha
and Dandin (who never allude to it), he thinks it proper that a
place should be given to it in the scheme of Alankaras. Hence he
recognises Dhvani as an additional alankara and illustrates it.18
This statment of Nrpatunga will prove beyond doubt that
the term Dhvani had already been invested with its technical
sense in the realm of poetics even before the Dhvanyaloka was
written, and that it had become popular not only in Kashmir, but
even in a remote province like Karnataka, since a Kannada
writer on poetics considers it necessary to refer to it and recog¬
nise it as an independent alankara18 in his scheme of poetics.
The classification of Dhvani recognised by Nrpatunga'7 is also
primitive and undeveloped.
Similarly, Pratiharenduraja also refers to a classification of
Dhvani much simpler than that of Anandavardhana. He quotes
a scheme of ten divisions of Dhvani which, though similar to
that of Anandavardhana’s in essentials, is less exhaustive. But
these ten divisions mark an advance over the two divisions
mentioned by Nrpatunga, thus indicating that the Dhvani theory
was growing until it came to be finally systematised by Ananda¬
vardhana.18
Granting, then, that the outlines of the Dhvani theory had
already been forestalled by the school of sahfdayas long before
the Dhvanyaloka came into prominence, can we glean anything
about the way they came to coin the strange expression Dhvani
15 Cf. Dhvaniyembudalankiram
dhvaniyisugum gabdadindamarthade du?yam 1
nenevudidanintu kamalado—
lanimigayugamoppi torpudintidu codyam II
—Kavirajamsrga, III. 209
The precise meaning of the IdST three lines is not very clear.
16 Dhvaniyembudalankaram may also be taken to mean ‘Dhvanimama
alankirah’, i.e. ‘ Dhvani is no more than an alankara.*
17 i.e. isabda-dhvani and arthadhvani.
18 For a fuller account of the scheme of Dhvani-classification quoted by
Pratiharenduraja and a comparison of it with Anandavardhana's scheme,
see infra. Ch. VI.
for signifying this most original theory of literary appreciation?
The Dhvanyaloka and the Locana throw a flood of light on this
point as well.
The definition of Dhvani given in the Dhvanyaloka is:
?rei«r: 315^1 5TI i
Spf&I: II19
The pharse ipfot:” is not without significance. The
author purposely points out that Suris are found to style a
particular class of poetry as Dhvani. The allusion is clearly to
the sahrdayas who spoke of dhvani for the first time. The vrtti
makes it abundantly clear that the word dhvani in the sense
used has the sanction of eminent persons and hence should not
be dismissed as a random or crazy coinage.20 Here also
Is paraphrased as *.91 so that it might stand
for sahrdayas as contrasted from traditional writers on rhetoric
who, as we saw above, are referred to by the" expression
Though in this context the word suribhih
should properly signify only the sahrdayas, the vrtti alludes
to another possible sense in which the word might be taken .
Grammarians are said to deserve most the title ‘suri’, since all
branches of study are built upon the groundwork of grammar.
The expression ‘Dhvani’ was used by the Grammarians to
denote certain aspects of speech and meaning. And the sahrda¬
yas who held the views of the grammarians in high regard
appear to have borrowed this expression from the field of
grammar.22 In other words, the sahrdayas derived light and
19 Dhvanyaloka, I. 13
” 5i 3 srfrt-
qTOil | Ibid, p, 239
21 Ibid. p. 244
"Cf raft % fegrraTtqffiFm:, ^ =5^
qmi*r*iîfvr:
I —Ibid. pp. 240-6
guidance from the grammarians when they were faced with the
problem of clearly defining the essentials of poetry. The theory
was evolved by them independently, and they found a proper
designation for it in the works on grammar.
To what extent were the literary critics influenced by the
grammarians is the next question which may be taken up for
consideration. There can be no doubt that in their appraisal of
beauty in literature, these critics were faced with the pheno¬
menon of suggestion. More often than not, they must have
been struck by the strange phenomenon of the element of
poetic charm eluding their analytical intellect. There was no
mistaking their aesthetic response, but to no formal aspect of
poetry could they attribute this element of aesthetic appeal. It
would appear to be instanced now in style, now in sense, now in
the emotion evoked, but further analysis led them nowhere in
particular. By constant perusals of specimens of great litera¬
ture, they must have come to the conclusion that the underlying
principle of poetry is something which cannot be explained in
terms of its external features such as Alankara or Guna. It was
something more fundamental and more intrinsic. Though it was
cognised only through the medium of outward symbols viz.,
words and their meanings in poetry, still it was something out-
toping them, endowing them with anew lease of life as it were.
The critics, instead of dismissing this subtle principle of
suggestion involved in all great poetry as inscrutable, persisted
in their critical reflection till they came to some definite
conclusions.
In the course of their examination of the problem of mean-
injphe literary critics naturally looked up to logic and grammar
for light and guidance. They wanted to see if a similar experi¬
ence had been scientifically explained by the earlier writers.
How can a word give rise to a meaning altogether different
from the conventional one ; and how to explain this inner
meaning as the source of all aesthetic delight ? These were the
two questions confronting the literary critics and awaiting
satisfactory solution at their hands. The first question formed
an important subject of enquiry in Grammar as well as Logic.
And when the literary critics discovered that in Grammar the
same problem had been tackled successfully, they readily
borrowed not only their conclusions but even their nomencla¬
ture. The designation ‘dhvani’ which had been made use of by
the grammarians in explaining their principle of sphota was
transferred to the field of literary criticism.**
Dhvani in ordinary parlance means ‘tone’ or ‘sound’. But
in treatises on Grammar, it was given a more technical signi¬
ficance. Its usage in a three-fold sense is discernible in the Vdkya-
padiya of Bhartfhari. To get a clear idea of these various senses
in which the word ‘dhvani’ is used, an examination of the theory
of sphota itself, of which it forms an intrinsic part, is
indispensable.
The theory of sphota was propounded by the grammarians
as an explanation of the problem —‘ how do words signify
meaning ’ ? Words are nothing but a combination of letters,
and one might popularly hold that the letters are the ultimate
causes of meaning. Such a view is not acceptable to the
grammarians. A mere grouping of letters cannot lead to sense
according to them for the following reasons :--
(1) Meaning is conveyed by a word as a whole and not by
the letters individually. Letters cannot signify anything severally
because they are nothing more than mere sounds. Thus, when
the word gauh is uttered, meaning does not follow from any of
the three letters ‘ga’, ‘au’ and ‘visarga’ that go to form the
word. In case one letter were sufficient to signify the meaning,
the other two would be superfluous.2i
(2) If it is held that a combination of these letters is
23 We have reasons to think that the Sabdabrahmavada or the ‘doctrine

of the Eternal Verbum’ is far older than the Vakyapadiya of Bhartrhari.
Bharavi (c. 6lh century A.D.), for instance, refers to it in the course of his
description of the cosmic form of Siva as Vayu (Air) and employs the root
dhvani in this connection—
Cf error gsrcrft form q( qfiterat i
qftqt q: 3^ faq rwr qqqr^ u
—Kiratarjuniya, XVIII, 37 (N.S. Edn.).
14 Cf* qmpri I
—Locana-vyakhyt Kaumudr p. 241
3
responsible for giving rise to the meaning, such a combination
itself would be found impossible, inasmuch as letters are not
simultaneously uttered and, moreover, they are liable to
disappear as soon as they are uttered.25
(3) If all the letters, as recollected in a single act of
remembrance, are held to signify meaning, even then there
would be difficulty. Words such as ‘ sara ’ and ‘rasa’, consisting
of identical letters but in a different order, would have to
signify one and the same meaning; and this is not borne out by
experience.20
Thus the individual letters are found inadequate to explain
the phenomenon of word-import. If the parts of a word (viz.,
letters) are meaningless, the whole word too may be called
meaningless in a way.21 But the universal experience of meaning
cannot be gainsaid. How, then, are we to explain it ? The reply
of the grammarians is that we have to postulate the existence
of another entity called sphota which is suggested by the sounds
or letters, and which in its turn reveals the meaning. The sphota,
again, is not indiscriminately suggested by the several letters,
but by the last only as conditioned by a sequential mental
impression of the earlier ones.23
By admitting the concept of sphota, the grammarians solved
the difficulties seen above, which arise if letters are deemed
momentary, successive and devoid of meaning by themselves.
Whereas sphota is said to be eternal, indivisible and suggestive
of meaning, letters differ from word to word, and time to time.
Sphota is one, constant and unchanging. In the realm of
language, sounds are responsible for the seeming difference and
dichotomies, while spho|a is the one abiding and enduring
principle which stands for unity. Even as the Atman in the
25 ^ i
—Loc. cit.
26 TO I ~Loc- cit
27 cf. i
—Durga on Nirukta, I. 3
38 fgrwrasfar: qpFqfircqir?
srcarejnrowq* I —Kaumudj, p. 241
Vedanta, Sphota represents the Reality while the sounds are
only appearance. And like the Atman, again, Sphota is also
equated with the universal Brahman, and the whole world is
spoken of as its vivarta or manifestation in diverse forms.*9
It is in connection with the sphota theory that Gramma¬
rians made use of the expression Dhvani. The various sounds
that are spoken of as suggestive of sphota are referred to by
the same name ‘ dhvani ’30 Thus in the stock example of * gaufc*
there are three sounds or letters or dhvanis, viz., ‘ ga ’, * au \
and visarga. Each of these dhvani’s suggests the sphota of the
word as a whole. To put it in other words, each of the three
dhvani’s is a ‘ vyafijaka ’ of ‘ Gopadasphota ’ and ‘ Gopada-
sphota ’ is vyangya. This sphota which is of a unified character
gives rise to the meaning or * artha ’ viz., the idea of an animal
possessing dewlap, hump, hoofs and horns. Though the
sphota is suggested even by the utterance of the first letter, it
is not clear enough to be significant. The same is the case
with the sphota suggested by the subsequent letters, except the
last one. Sphota is rendered capable of signification only
when it is suggested finally by the utterance of the last letter.31
The real nature of all the letters is grasped only at this stage,
when one has the awareness of the sphota as suggested by the
last letter. Hence the dhvani’s are also described as antya-
buddhi-nirgrahya. And nada is only a synonym for dhvani
when understood in this sense,3* The idea is clearly brought
out by Bhartfhari when he says:—
WjpTFf: 3TT i
* 3 h awT: srmTffrt u
39 ercifefavrc i
srfasqT 3mm mi: II —Vakyapadiya, I. 1.
30 sqfisisfof .... Wr qsr :
i — Kaumudi, p. 241.
I % —Kaumudi, p. 241
39 <r*n sternum ^
b MPrat»fo?lÊT: I —Locana. pp.241-2
sri^n^NbiFTOi^^ «rfon Hf i
gnffaqftqrepri f^V si^tssrwi^ i33
The instance is taken of a student who is engaged in the task
of learning a hymn or stanza by rote. He is found to repeat
the same thing over and over again till he has definitely
committed it to m<£mory. The knowledge that he has success¬
fully learnt it by rote comes to the student only after he
repeats the text correctly for the last time. Though it is the
last recitation only that secures him success, the earlier recita¬
tions are not without their value. As a matter of fact, without
the earlier recitations, he could never have learnt the piece by
rote successfully- Thus, though the whole piece is repeated
every time, its full mastery is not gained till the successful
recitation in the end. In the same manner, the sphofa, though
suggested by every letter successively, is not completely grasped
till it is finally suggested by the.last. The outlines of sphota at
the earlier stages will be blurred and hazy. It becomes clear and
significant simultaneously with the utterance of the last letter.
Just as the grammarians referred to the letters that are
suggestive (vyanjaka) of sphota by the term dhvani, the literary
critics also employed the same expression to stand for words
and senses that are suggestive of other senses in the field of
literature."4 The literary critics were particularly fascinated by
this expression, since it had several other usages besides the
one explained above in the field of grammar, and they too were
in search of a similar significant expression that could equally
apply to all the important points. The other usages also are
indicated briefly in what follows.
The view of sphota detailed above is according to that
33 Vskyapadiya, I 83-85 Cf. also, pgqn^raSITT
SSiRrr I’ — Mahabhisya.
34 ifa 5*3^ — Locana, p. 241.
School of grammarians who hold that sphota or s'abda is
eternal and hence uncreated, since a beginning implies also an
end. They declare that gabda is always suggested and never
caused. Opposed to this school of Abhivyakti-vadins, there is
also another school upholding utpatti-paksa. They think that
sphota too is caused or created, and their view is also
summarised by Bhartfhari and following him, by Abhinava-
gupta. Bhartfhari says:—
“The first origination of sound due to conjunction and
disjunction of the various organs of speech-production is called
sphota; the other sounds born of this sphota are called Dhvanis
by others”.55
35 Vakyapadiya, I. 102. Strangely enough, Dr. A. Sankaran writes on

p. 67 of his book “Some Aspects of Literary criticism in Sanskrit” :—
“when a drum is beaten with a stick there is produced a sound in the space
nearest the drum. It is not this that is heard, but it generates a succession
of sound-waves just like the ever-widening concentric circles of light
ripples that are caused by throwing a stone in the still water of a pond, or
like the successive ringing sounds caused by the striking of a bell. And
the last of this succession of waves strikes the ear and it is this that is
heard. These last sounds that strike the ear are called Dhvani :—
^mf^TFTP^ri vtdronroft i
(sfcrtTT and fifrTpt refer to the contact of the stick with the drum and its
separation from it when beaten.)”
The whole explanation would be correct if it came from a representative
of the Vaije$ika School, who does not subscribe to the theory of sphota
and who admits a class of dhV'anyitmaka-iabdas or meaningless sounds
produced from drums and so on. But the verse has no reference at all to
the standpoint of the Nyayavaidesika thinkers. It embodies the view-point
of a rival school of grammarians who recognise sphota and yet believe in its
being caused. The verse is intended to give an alternative explanation of
sphoja and not an exposition of Dhvanis as understood by the Vais'egika
thinkers. Sphoja-vada has nothing to do with dhvanyatmaka-iabdas or
meaningless sounds produced from drums and so on. For the Nysya
Vaigesika view of Dhvani, vide—
Bha$apariccheda, Karika 64; and for their condemnation of sphota, vide
—qcriwr and also
‘WMSyT&g r Sridhara’s Nyaya-Kandali. (Viziana-
garam Sanskrit seriesj pp. 269-270)
38 the dhvanyaloka and its critics
All the commentators on this verse agree that it can be
interpreted in two ways, one from the standpoint of those who
hold that sphota is anitya or non-eternal and another from the
standpoint of those who consider sphota to be eternal.36. In
either of these interpretations, it is presumed that the view is
held by a school of grammarians'7. However closely the theory
might resemble the view of the Vai$e§ikas, it cannot be main¬
tained that Bhartfhari is here alluding to their view in so far as
the verse expresses his own Siddhanta and not a Purvapak§a.
An alternative explanation of sphota is offered in the verse
sre^-etc. ‘Samyoga’. and ‘vibhaga’ here refer to the
contact and separation of the internal air with the ‘karanas’ or
the various organs of speech-production.s,ft The first effect of
such a contact or separation is, according to this view, sphota.
Sphota is thus said to be produced by a cause, and is hence
non-eternal. And further, this sphota which initially comes
into existence is said to be responsible for the production of
a whole series of sounds, the last sound alone being clearly
perceptible. The initial sphota may be likened to the first
ringing sound of a bell, and the other series of sounds produced
later on, to the prolonged resonance of the first ring._ And such
numberless sounds resulting from sphoja are also termed
Dhvani.s8b Dhvani in this sense is not a Vyanjaka of sphoja but
on the contrary a vyangya. In other words, the sounds sugge¬
sted by sphota also can be termed Dhvani. On this analogy,
89 We have followed the anitya-pak9a in interpreting the stanza

since the nitya-pakâ is not suited to t-he context.
87 Cf. ‘fpn^r^ srfsiw MHjfHRoft'TEr I ’.Kaumudi
p. 289. This view agrees substantially with the interpretation of the karika
by Prof. K. A. Subramanya Iyer on the basis of Bhaj-thfari's own Vftti.
Vide his paper—“Who are the Anitya-sphoja-vadinah ?”—Proceedings of
the VIII Oriental Conference.
"a Cf. TraUlft+I lUI^^^T^’qfTT^VTFTT^T—-
—Pandit Suryanarayana Shukla’s commentary on Vakyapadiya, I. 102
Chowkhamba Edn.)
38b itaf TOflWSTO I I =3 1
—Locana, p. 241.
Suggested sense also was given the designation of Dhvani by
literary critics.39
The word Dhvani can thus stand for two entirely different
things according as it is interpreted in the one or the other
sense explained above. When taken in the first sense, Dhvani is
that which suggests sphota; according to the second, Dhvani is
that which is suggested by sphota. This difference in the
connotation of the word dhvani is due to the difference in out¬
look regarding the true nature of sphota by rival schools of
grammarians.
Thirdly, the process of suggestion too is often referred to by
the same expression Dhvani. Dhvani is■ distinguishable into two
classes, Prakrta, and Vaikrta. The former has reference to the
internal phenomena of sound production, the fund of internal
energy which is inherent or natural and hence invariable
in every individual. The latter or Vaikrta-dhvani is in
singular contact with the former, being unnatural or
momentary. Prakrta-dhvani is said to be the natural cause in
the manifestation of sphota, since, like sphota, it is also one
and indivisible and indentical in all instances. But the diversi¬
ties are brought about in sounds at a later stage by Vaikj-ta-
dhvani40. The differences which are seen in tone, pitch and
speed among sounds do not warrant the conclusion that there
are similar differences in their sphota as also Prakrta-dhvani. As
a matter of fact, all the differences are to be understood as the
outcomes of Vaikfta-dhvani41 only. Now the process
involved in bringing about the differences like druta and
vilambita (fast and slow) amongst sounds is not the same
as that of pronunciation, it is something over and above it.
39
1 Op.cit.
5T: nfriqtT?! Il —Vakyapadiya, I, 77.
-Ibid., I, 78,
To take an instance, let us suppose that a word is being
pronounced in a low voice. The person who is addressed will
either hear it completely or will not hear it at all. There is no
part-recognition and part-ignorance.42 The effect of the process
of pronunciation is thus a consistent whole which deos not
admit of being broken up. But the differences are seen, and
they are duSô the operation of another process involving
Vaikpta-dhvanis. And metaphorically the process itself, which
embodies these dhvanis, is also styled Dhvani.4"
In like manner, the literary critics held that the term Dhvani
could be applied to the process of signification, a process
having an independent existence apart from the generally
accepted processes viz., Abhidha, Laksana, and Tatparya.14
Abhidha is the process by which all primary meanings are
understood; Lak§ana is the name given to a process of
secondary signification. Tatparya or drift is said to be a third
process (by the Mimamsakas), as a result of which knowledge
of the drift of a passage is obtained.
Thus the term Dhvani which was found to be used by
Grammarians in a threefold sense was borrowed verbatim into
the field of poetics also in all the senses. It was looked upon
as a very happy expression, since it could serve several purposes
at one and the same time. It could be simultaneously applied to
all factors of suggestiveness in poetry, viz., the suggesters
(whether word or sense), the suggested meaning and the pro¬
cess of suggestion. The whole work of literature too which
comprised such suggestive factors came to be termed Dhvani.45
49 Cf- arafhmifa jttcI: i

en em stt u
—fsloka-varttika as quoted in Locana, p. 243.
ecrtfatttagift# I —Kaumudi, p. 244.
faftrRt «nqift 1 —Locana, p. 244
45 cf- i ~Ibid-
One is almost tempted to say that the whole discussion is
highly technical and pedantic betraying nothing more than the
love of the commentators for ingenuity and undue hairsplitting.
But this is not the whole truth. Even in the Karikas of the
Dhvanyaloka, the expression Dhvani has been used to stand
now for Kavya, now for suggested sense and so on. We cannot
dismiss the phenomenon simply as a lapse on the part of the
author. For instance, in the very first Karika the soul of
Kavya is referred to as Dhvani.46 Later on in the thirteenth
Karika, we are told that Kavya-visesa where the element of
suggestion predominates is called Dhvani.47 Ordinarily under¬
stood, the earlier statement will conflict with the succeeding
one. But it is not unlikely that the author deliberately used
these words since he was aware of the various senses in which
the term Dhvani could be employed.48 The Locana also notes
this feature and justifies it unmistakably along the lines
irtdicated above.49 As the Kaumudi (commentary on the
Locana) makes it clear, the four factors involved in suggestion,
viz., the suggestive words, the suggestive senses, the process of
suggestion and the suggested senses, are all samudayins or
members that unite in the making up of the samudaya or the
whole which is here nothing but poetry. The whole, in a way,
may be said to be identical with the parts and in a way distinct
from the parts. So there is no fallacy when the author some¬
times refers to them as being identical and as distinct at other
times.50
46 »R«reiWn STOISIRI'# I —Dhvanyaloka, I, 1.
47 WPT: srsft an I
II Ibid> U 13.
4R The contention of Dr. Goda Varma that the Karika-kara used the
word Dhvani only in one sense to mean Kavya, loses force in the light of
the above facts. For his view, vide New Indian Antiquary, Vol. V. No. 12.
49 &T I —Locana, p. 244.
I —loc. cit-
42 THE DHVAHYALOKA AND ITS CRITICS
Abhinavagupta also tries to offer some justification for the

use of the expression dhvani in all the above senses on the
basis of etymology. The word dhvani can be derived in
different ways :—
1- ‘ That which suggests’ (Both word and
meaning can be dhvani in;this sense).
2. ‘ That which is suggested’ (sense only
comes under this category)
3. ‘The process of suggestion’.
4 ‘The whole, viz., wprk of
literature, formed out of these elements of dhvani.’
Anandavardhana’s crisp remark “
sfasr: siskin i”5' is
shown to imply all these considerations.
So far the extent of the influence of grammatical speciâ-
tions on literary theory has been sketched. The nature of
similarity subsisting between the Vaiyakaraija conception of
Dhvani and the concept of Dhvani as elaborated in literary
criticism has also been indicated. We are now in a position to
examine whether the similarity is fundamental or not. Even a
cursory examination of the facts presented above is enough to
reveal the truth that the similarity is only extrinsic and not
intrinsic. Of course, in the technique of nomenclature, the two
schools agree almost to a letter. But there is not a shadow of
resemblance in what the terms stand for. This is clear enough
proof that the literary critics were indebted to the grammarians
only to a small extent, as regards terminology, and for the
most part they had to evolve the principles of their theory
anew.
It is significant to note in this context, how Bhamaha, the
ancient rhetorician, openly ridicules the theory of sphota/2
51 Dhvanyaloka, p. 244.
59 ^ i
—Kavyaladkara, VI, 12.
though he is second to none in his regard for the grammarians/1

When, however, these Sahfdayas came into prominence as
literary critics, the earlier attitude of hostility was replaced by
one of positive reverence. The changed outlook may be taken
as an index of the new spirit of enquiry that was prevalent
in the age immediately preceding that of Anandavardhana, and
following that of Bhamaha.
Though the term Dhvani having the sanction of the
Grammarians was appropriated into the field of literary criti¬
cism, all the difficulties with which the critics were faced could
not be satisfactorily solved. No doubt, the grammarians betray
a knowledge of some instances of suggestion. But suggestion
in poetry is not the same as the Dhvani of the Grammarians. On
the other hand it is singularly distinct. What is more, even the
grammarians had not found it necessary to look upon Dhvani
or Vyanjanavyapara as a separate process on a par with the
other two accepted processes viz., Abhidha and Lak§ana54. There
was a consensus of opinion amongst all the recognised darânas
or systems of philosophy that Abhidha and Laksana were suffi¬
cient to explain the problem of the import of words. Suggestion
in poetry and, in particular, suggestion of an emotion, could
not be brought under any of these recognised functions of
words. So the literary critics had to take into account all the
possibilities of Abhidha and Laksana as illustrated by the several
philosophical schools before formulating any new doctrine. Just
as the linguistic analysis of the Grammarians helped the critics
by supplying them a significant title (dhvani) for their theory,
in the same way, the logical analysis of words and their ways
by philosophers, served as a basis on which these critics
securely built the structures of their theory.
From Anandavardhana’s own statements it is clear that
the theory was current only in broad outline and the details
were yet to be worked out. That is why it was made fun of by
” Cf. Ibid., III. 63.

“ It was only the late writer Nageâ-bhajja that urged for the
acceptance of Vyafljans as a separate vj-tti even by the grammarians;
Cf. i ItnCTnaiaâgHftgiT —Manjuja, p. 160.
contemporary critics like Manoratha.66 It was to the task of
removing the charge of vagueness that Anandavardhana
addresed himself.56
Before closing this chapter, it must be mentioned to the
credit of the predecessors of Anandavardhana that they had
realised the importance of genius in the critic as in the poet.
The concomitance of poetic genius and critical taste which
they postulated in literary criticism may be considered as
their final achievement. It is a remarkable fact that they
considered the creative and the critical instincts as one and the
same in their most significant moments. Their very pride in
styling themselves as sahfdayas bears ample testimony to this
fact, though critics were not lacking who laughed at them on
this score.67 The concomitance of genius and taste does not in
itself sum up the whole life of the complex and difficult art of
criticism, but without it, criticism would really be impossible.
“ Genius is to aesthetics what the ego is to philosophy, the
only supreme and absolute reality,” said Schelling; and without
55 ct*n fd qqre —
sg?qlr =q qqr qqqsbFrftdSjfq ^ qq; i

q»isq sqftqi Hflfcwfafa sften srefagatl
sft foatsfaqqifa fife TS: II
—Dhvanyaloka, p. 58.
—Locana on the above.
56 q
qfqspi^Td chtiGlkwitiT
gqq qq k&x: 1 q q «Pifg$sW 1
—Dhvanyaloka, p 246
57 Cf- 1
—Dhvanyaloka, p. 57
also ^ ^ dmwirefiqifcq: qatfaân «qqV
VTvqcqqt^T: Udlddlsft s«wfa$Wtdlillf|dWq<!5*q^ I —Ibid, p. 53
subduing the mind to his transcedental system, it remains
true that ‘ what must always be inexplicable to mere reflections
is just what gives power to poetry.58 The predecessors of
Anandavardhana preached this doctrine for the first time
broadly and it was left to Anandavardhana to work out every
detail and place the theory on a firm footing by elaborating it
as the most perfect literary theory in his magnum opus— the
Dhvanyaloka.
58 J. E. Spingarn, Creative Criticism

CHAPTER III
AUTHORSHIP OF THE DHVANYALOKA AND

THE DATE OF ANANDAVARDHANA
Like the majority of Sanskrit scientific classics, the
Dhvanyaloka also is written in a mixture of prose and verse.
The verse-form became popular in scientific treatises for more
reasons than one. In the first place, verses could be easily
commited to memory and easily remembered. Secondly the
verse-form came handy as a device for saving space. To avoid
all prolixity and to confine attention to the bare essentials of the
subject, the verse-from was the most suited. But in this zeal
for conciseness and compactness, clarity had to be more often
than not sacrificed. And, in order to remave the obscurity of
the verses inevitable by their very nature as also incidentally
arising out of metrical exigencies, it was the practice of authors
to subjoin a prose explanation or Vrtti to their metrical compo¬
sitions or Karikas-1 In some very ancient texts, however, only
the Karikas have been preserved (e.g. the Sankhyakarika) while
the Vrtti or Bhasya is of a late origin. Even Bhartrhari, the
celebrated author of the Vakyapadiya, has now been proved to
have written a Vrtti on the metrical text himself2 and
the question that emerges is whether we are justified in regard¬
ing the Karika as well as the Vrtti portion in the Dhvanyaloka
to be the work of one and the same author.
G. Biihler was the first Orientalist to give an account of
the Dhvanyaloka and its date. He was led to believe that “the
Dhvanyaloka, Kavyaloka or Sahrdayaloka is a commentary in
four chapters on certain verses treating of Dhvani, implied
meaning, which is considered the soul of poetry.’’3 And the
1 Cf. the Vakroktijivita, KavyaprakaSa, Sahityadarpana, etc.

2 Fragments of it have been published in Lahore by Pandit Charu-
deva Shastri.
3 Detailed Report of a tour in search of Sanskrit Mss. by G. Buhler
1387. p. 65.
AUTHORSHIP AND DATE 47
reason adduced by him in support of this remark of his is—
“From Abhinavagupta’s Tika4 it appears that these verses are
the composition of some older writer whose name is not given.
But it is remarkable that they contain no mangalacarana”. In
other words, according to Buhler, the Karikakara must be
supposed to be other than the Vrttikara since Abhinavagupta
makes such a distinction. A number of eminent scholars—
Hermann Jacobi, S K. De, P. V. Kane, S. P. Bhattacharya being
the foremost among them—accepted this conclusion and one
might almost say that it became an established tradition. There
was however a section of scholars headed by the late M. S.
Kuppuswami Sastri (A. Sankaran, V. Raghavan, and T. R.
Chintamani being his followers) who challenged the above tradi¬
tion and endeavoured to establish the identity of authorship of
both Karika and Vrtti in the Dhvanyaloka. The mainstay of their
arguments also was, curiously enough.furnished by the remarks
of Abhinavagupta himself in his Locana. Of late, a scholar5 has
tried to prove that though Abhinavagupta favours the idea of
identity of authorship there are internal evidences in the
Dhvanyaloka which militate against such a view. The whole
problem has been again examined in a thorough-going manner
by Dr. Satkari Mookerjee® and the conclusion he has arrived at is
that an identical author is responsible for the composition
of both Kiirika and Vrtti and that it is Anandavardhana.
Such in brief are the various views held by scholars
regarding this seemingly simple question and they are enough
to show how the question is a much mooted one and how
scholars are far from being in agreement regarding it. An
attempt will be made here to record faithfully the various
evidences cited favouring the one or the other view and to
examine them again dispassionately.
4 cr- ifrPER: I - Locana, p. 1,

6 K. Goda Varma, ‘Different authorship of the Karikagrantha and
the Vfttigrantha of Dhvanyaloka’. New Indian Antiquary, Vol, V. No. 12
(March 1943),
* ‘ A Dissertation on the identity of the author of the Dhvanyaloka ’
B. C. Law Volume, Part I (1945) pp. 179-194.
48 THE DHVNYALOKA AND ITS CRITICS
To begin with, some of the striking statements of Abhina-
vagupta wherein the Karikakara and the Vrttikara seem to
have been carefully distinguished may be examined:—
i sra 3* i ff%-
$?3 sr^q-^rc^rrîoipr ^°3*T cR7?JJTJ|5I ^S'hÎT^TT I
—(pp. 162-163, Locana, Ben. Edn. 1940)
2. <n? srsroterft «si^s f?rn
C
i
^nfforeHtserpajfovTm foit^srii ^
n^PU^^JIT11! 3 ITTtT^N^ |
—(p. 163. Ibid )
3. 5nFlf5I?r., H3I ffrl *TRI: I «T
erft 3 spifcErainftpnî?^ i —(P- 165- Ibid.)
4. wh fl$3«r i
—(p. 166.)
5. fTcmi^Rr^^ * $?rn 3 3i%tni ^
drt^Rt I — (p. 290-D
6. îffonpfrn ^ wrfNfo T?E: i •|f^n7,*T oqfcfcs
3$3gqi*: I —(p- 304.)
These statements are important implying as they do not

only that Abhinavagupta regarded the: Karikakara as distinct
from the Vrttikara but also that he attempted to reconcile the
seemingly divergent positions of the two. There are also
numerous allusions to the Vrttikara" in the Locana though
no such opposition between the Vrttikara and the Karikakara
is meant to be explained. P. V. Kane" is of opinion that
whenever the expression ‘Granthakrt’ occurs in the Locana, the
allusion is to ‘ Anandavardhana8 9 10 and that the Karikakara is
8 Vide p. 136, p. 251, p. 259. p. 273, Dhvanyaloka (Ben Edn.)

9 Introduction to the Sahityadarpana, L1X.
10 Cf. p. 26 and p. 41. (Locana. Ben. Edn,).
always referred to by the term ‘ mula-grantha-krt.’11
These points serve as the sheet-anchor of the theory that
Abhinavagupta regards the anonymous Dhvanikara to be
different from Anandavardhana, the Vrttikara. And Abhinava-
gupta’s testimony is considered to be of greater weight than
those of his successors,12 in settling this vexed question.
As against these evidences may be pitted now other
statements of Abhinavagupta himself which appear to favour
the theory of identity of authorship :—
I (P- 302)
2. cr^ $1
*n^-5Wi^n%T I (P- 494)
“ Here and are words ending in the suffix
In the Sanskrit language the suffix or sqi* is used in
this manner (See Panini III, iv. 21 ; and
VII. i. 37, When two actions performed
by a single agent are desired to be conveyed, the suffix
or is added to that root which refers to the prior action
as, e. g, ETirirT; Similarly in the alcove
extracts the agent of or ft^r*should be the same as
the agent of *15. Now the agent of or expounds ;
i.e., he is the Vrttikara that explains everything, The agent of
*15 says or states. What does he state ? etc. and srqpr
. .etc., which are two Karikas, Dhv. Ill 2 and III 42. i.e., he
is the Karikakara. Panini’s rule quoted above requires these
agents, Vrttikara and Karikakara to be identical.” 13
(3) I (Locana p. 551.)
being the explanation of the significance of the word
occurring in - one of the two
11 Cf. Locana (p. 312) on the Vrtti—c£iwhich

reads ’
12 Cf. P. V. Kane, loc. cit.
15 A Sankaran, op. cit. p. 53.
4
50 THR DHVANYALOKA AND ITS CRITICS
concluding verses of the Vrtti text. It should be noted that
5% in the verse is to be connected with This
clearly makes us conclude that the Locanakara entertains the
view that the same author Anandavardhana has expounded
Dhvani through the Karikas as well as the Vrtti..15
(4) Abhinavagupta quotes some Karikas from the
Dhvanyaloka as Anandavardhana’s in his Abhinavabharati, u
commentary on Bharata’s Natyaâstra
i”—(G.O.S. Edn. of Natya£§stra, vol. II

p. 367.)
foWT stiffen I
=5t sisuTwrpfy snfaftWlfasn ii
\ grai^nfir: crfs^reol
l” (Op. cit. p. 385.)’°
In the first of these passages, Anandavardhana is said to
be the author of the Karika gfggcRq etc. (Dhvanyaloka III-16)
and in the second, the allusion is clearly to the two Karikas
'a&qiwqjk fefalftcp i <>
(II. 17) and feqgh etc. (11^18). What is more, Abhi¬

navagupta expressly states that'the illustrations too come from
the same pen as that of the author of these Karikas, who is
none other than Anandavardhana himself.
iii. AwiWSft WjpSIT H
14 Cf. Balapriya commentary on the Locana :—
diwri qfst^TOT \ I
—Ben. Edn. p. 551.
15 Goda Varma, op. cit. p. 271.
i# A. Sankaran, op. cit. p. 51.
^rcrcn* |” (-op. cit. p. 519)

Here also the quotation is of a Karika (Dhvanyaloka III. 12)
and it is ascribed to the author of the Sahfdayaloka, which
proves that aloka is a name standing for the entire text
in prose and verse and not exclusively for the Vrtti portion as
maintained by some scholars.17
These points favouring unity of authorship do not deserve
to be brushed aside as they are done sometimes. Prof. Siva
Prasad Bhattacharya, for instance, dismisses these facts un¬
hesitatingly with the strange remark, “ ... it is quite conceivable
that he (Abhinavagupta) was relying on his memory,—and
what man is infallible? We have such cases of erroneous
ascription by illustrious masters in other departments of
Sanskrit learning.”18 This position hardly does any justice to
the ability and competence of Abhinavagupta.
If these statements of Abhinavagupta, then, cannot be
explained away so easily, a similar difficulty will arise with
17 Cf. “The penultimate verse at the end of the 4th Uddyota

—etc*)» lea<*s one to infer that Kavya formed part of the
name of the original work (or was itself its name) on which Anandavardhana
commented (probably it was called Kavya-dhvani or simply Kavya or
Dhvani). Dhvanikarika III. 53. speaks of the Karika’s as Kavyalakjapa.
It is therefore proper that the Vrtti is called Kavyaloka or Dhvanyaloka”
Kane. Op. Cit. P. LX.
The present writer would greatly hesitate to maintain that a work of
literary criticism was itself designated as kavya, or Dhvani because such a
title would be queer in Alafikaraiastra. On the analogy of the title Kavya-
lankara, however, the expression Kavya-dhvani may be justified in a way.
Bnt this conclusion also will be found to be extremely improbale in the light
of the fact that there is not as much as a single reference to the work by
that name in the whole range of Sanskrit poetics. In all probability, the
word aloka might as well have been the essential element in the title of the
original work, the unstable element in the title being the word Dhvani which
could be substituted by the word Kavya or Sahj-daya according to one’s
choice,
18‘Dhvanyaloka and the Text of the Dhvanikarikas.' Proceedings of
the Sixth Oriental Conference, p. 617.
regard to the explanation of the earlier statements seen above,
which favour the idea of dual authorship. It would be nothing
short of impertinence to level the charge of confused think¬
ing against the Locanakara. If he spoke often* of the Kari-
kakara as distinct from the Vrttikara, there must have been
a purpose behind it, and he must have meant only a functional
difference between the two and not numerical difference. The
traditional practice of commentators in other departments of
Sanskrit learning also confirms the conclusion that this proce¬
dure of treating the authors of Karika and Vrtti as hypotheti¬
cally distinct (for purposes of clarity in exposition) is neither
exceptional nor arbitrary. Kullukabhatta records in his
commentary on Manusmrti that such a convention was current
even amongst sutrakaras:—
“snôi sicft ^ qftqforfte syfafer i
Accordingly we find that writers like Mammata and Vi^vanatha

refer to their own Karikas in the third person in the course of
their prose Vftti.19 The Karikas were considered to be self-
contained and independent units capable of being understood
without any external aid. The object of the Vrtti or the
commentary was merely to make explicit what was already
implicit in the Karika text. The Vrttikara had to be faithful to
the original in every detail and no insertion of any extraneous
or irrelevent material was allowed. Judging from the Dhvanya-
loka itself, it looks almost certain that first of all, the bare text
of the Karikas was written out at a stretch and the implications
were explained later on by the same author in the Vrtti.
In this connection it is interesting to note what the editor
* Cf. Prof. A.B. Gajendragadkar’s Notes on Kavyaprakaâ, I. 1.

19 Cf- i
—Kavya-prakaâ, I, 1
also,
—Sahityadarpana, I, J.
■o
of the Siddhi-trayi 3l,by Rajanaka Utpaladeva21 has got to say
about this traditional custom in Kashmir:—
“To append a Vrtti to a work seems to have been the
fashion of the day (cf. Spandavrtti; Sivasutravrtti etc.) The
attitude adopted by the author in writing his gloss on the two
Siddhis is markedly distinctive. He annotates in such a way that
the reader is often misled into thinking that the author of the
text is different from that of the gloss. The glossator always
appears in the third person throwing the reader off the scent as
regards the identity of the author and the annotator.” "
Dr. K. C. Pandey has adduced other instances as well to
prove that, even in the time of Anandavardhana, this fashion of
an identical person writing both the Karika and the vrtti, was
very much in vogue in Kashmir. He writes22:—“We know on
the accepted authority of Kalhana on this particular point that
Anandavardhana was king Avantivarman’s contemporary
(856-883 A.D.) and that Kallata also lived at the same time.
We also know that Vasugupta, the author of the s'ivasUtra was
a teacher of Kallata and that the latter wrote a commentary on
the Spandakarika which in itself is a sort of running commentary
on the giva sutra. Yet, whether the authorship of the Spanda
Karika be attributed to Vasugupta or to Kalla|a, our position
is not affected. What we intend to show here is that in or about
the 9th Century A.D. in Kashmir there are instances of the
same person, writing both the text and the commentary. So
that if we take Vasugupta to be the author of the Spanda Karika,
then, it is his own commentary on his own Siva sutra; but if
Kallata be accepted to be the author, then, he has also written
a commentary on it, called Spandasarvasva as pointed out above.
This is not a solitary instance; about the same time Somananda
also is said to have written a commentary upon his own Siva-
4r§fi and in the next generation Utpalacarya wrote the vjtti
and vivrti on his own / ^vara-pratyabhijHa-karika to which
10 Pandit Madhusudan Kaul Shastri, M.A., M.O.L., in his preface to

the Siddhitrayi (Kashmir series of Taxts and Studies, XXXIV p. 10.)
41 Whose date is the first half of the 10th Century A.D.
2a Abhinavagvpta, an historical and philosophical study, pp. 133-4
Abhinava makes a reference in one of the introductory verses
in his PratyabhijMvimariini.”
And as regards the contention that Abhinavagupta uses two
words, Karikakara and Vrttikara, and means to imply distinc¬
tion, the same writer points out that this also does not necessa¬
rily mean difference in point of the authorship of the works so
referred to. He observes :-3 “Our study of Abhinava’s works
tells us that it is his practice to refer to the same person as the
writer of one work or another, if he has written more than one
work, according as he refers to him in one capacity or another.
Leaving aside other instances, if we take up that of Utpalacarya
himself, we find that he is referred to both as Vrttikara and
Tlkakdra in one passage. On reading it, a person not knowing
the truth, is likely to fall into the error of thinking that there
are two different writers referred to by these two words. The
passage in question occurs in Abhinava’s commentary, called
Vimar&ini, on the first verse of Utpalacarya’s Idvara-pratya-
bhijUd-kdrika or sutra. It runs as fallows :—
“Iyati vyakhyane vrttikjrta bharo na kftalj tatparya-
vyakhyanat, yaduktam :
‘Samvf tasautrani rdes aviv r tima travyaparaya m ’ iti;
Jikakarenapi vj-ttimatram vyakhyatum udyatena nedam
spf§tam” (I. 22-23)
The above quotations serve to bring out the idea how the
apparent distinction made by Abhinavagupta should not be
taken too literally and given too much weight as a mainstay for
the argument of duality of authorship. Dr. Satkari Mookerjee
has examined at length24 the several passages in the Locana that
are supposed to favour the duality of authorship and arrives at
the conclusion that the duality is only apparent and not real.
His arguments deserve to be summarised here :
‘The mere distinction of the author of an original work,
say sutra or karika, from the author of the vj-tti is not neces¬
sarily a personal but a formal distinction, which is seen to be
observed even when the same person -is known to have
98Op. cit. p. 134.

m Vide—op. cit.
composed both.* *• The original and the gloss are two different
species of work and their role and status are also different. The
role of the commentary is to explain what is implicitly
contained in the original and it is an offence against the rules
of exegesis to introduce matters foreign to the original. The
offence is technically called utsutravyakhyana.26 Fidelity to the
original and observance of the limit imposed by it are absolutely
de rigueur. It is therefore a necessity of form that the author of
the gloss, even when he is the author of the original, should
refer to the latter as a different person and should always
comply with the subordinate role that the function of a
commentator imposes upon him.
‘Such being the case, the differentiation made by Abhinva-
gupta in accordance with the rules of exegesis cannot prove sepa¬
rate identity of the authors. Nor can we look for any internal
evidence, embodied either in the original text or in the gloss
purporting or alluding to personal identity, since such a
procedure would definitely go against the rule of the game.
Hence the only reliable evidence which can prove the numerical
difference or identity of the authors will be extra-textual
testimony.
‘As Kane himself has shown conclusively, there is perfect
unanimity among writers on Sanskrit poetics beginning with
Mahimabhatja down to the latest writers that the author of
the Karikas and the vj-tti in the Dhvanyaloka are a self-identical
person. Mahimabha^ta, Ksemendra, and Kuntaka (all hailing
from Kashmir), Rajasekhara, Hemachandra and others—all
regard Anandavardhana as the author of the entire w ork since
they quote freely from the Karika-portion as well as the vj-tti-
*Cf. Vamana’s Kavyalankarasutras and Vrtti ; Karika's and Vj-tti in

the Kavyaprakasa, Sahityadarpana, Bha$aparicchcda, Rasagafigadhara,
Hemacandra’s Pramana-mimamsa etc
85 Cf. ‘ yo hyutsutram kathayennado gj-hyeta—Mahabh&§ya. p, 24
(Benares Edn.)
Cf. also 4 taccedam na sGtrarthatam api pratipadayati’ Pancapadi*
kavivarapa on Sankara’s Adhyasabha$ya. (Brahmasutras I. i.l.)
*• Vide—History of Alankara Literature, p. LXI ff.
portion of the Dhvanyaloka under the common name of
Dhvanikara or Anandavardhana. Thus there is an unbroken
continuity of the tradition regarding numerical identity of the
authors of the Karikas and the Vrtti.
‘Now to examine closely some of the passages where Abhi-
navagupta distinguishes between the Vfttikara and the Karika-
kara: In the first chapter the classification of Dhvani into
avivak$itavacya and vivaksiianyaparavacya has been given in
the vrtti and not in the Karika. In the first Karika of the second
chapter the first type is subdivided into two kinds. Apart from
the observations of Abhinavagupta, it would appear that
this Karika presupposes the classification of Dhvani given
in the vrtti in the first chapter and the natural deduction
from this cross-reference would be that the author of the
Karika is identical with that of the vrtti. Though this is
the natural procedure for an identical person to make such a
cross-reference, it cannot be regarded as legitimate, offending
as it does the rigid rule of exegesis described above.
Accordingly Abhinavagupta, as the commentator, steps
forward to justify this breach of the etiquette of exegesis by
an ingenious device. In connection with the classification
given in the vrtti in the first chapter Abhinavagupta observes
that the author of the vrtti propounds this classification in
pursuance of the implicit reference which will be made to it
in the second chapter. In commenting on the vrtti at the
outset of the second chapter “Dhvani has been shown to be of
two kinds etc.”, Abhinavagupta supplies the necessary corre¬
ctive—“by me, in the capacity of Vrttikara, that.is the import.”
This has however not been stated in disregard of the original
text (sutra) but in pursuance of the intention of the Karikakara47.
Here the particle sata is very significant. It would be redundant
unless the functional difference in spite of the personal identity
were alluded to by Abhinavagupta.
,7 Maya vrttikarega sate’ti bhavah. Na caitanmayotsutramuktam, api

tu karika-karabhiprayaijetyaha...(Dhvanyaloka Locana p. 165). Tatra
prathambddyote Vfttikareija prakasitah tasya (avivak§itavacyasya) yal?
prabhedah tatpratipadanayedam ucyate...bhavati mulato dvibhedatvam
karikakarasyapi sammatameveti bhavah....Op. cit. p. 166
‘Again, the absence of refutation in 'the Karika of the

position that Dhvani is indefinable and the express refutation
of the same in the vrtti would seem to be an introduction of a
topic unintended by the Karikakara. Abhinavagupta again
justifies the vrttikara on the ground that he only makes explicit
what is implied by the Karikakara.2s A prima facie reading of
the text would rather give out the impression that the same
person being the author of the Karika and the vrtti, he does not
bother to state in the original verse what he will state in the
gloss. This would be a breach of etiquette which Abhinava¬
gupta tries to explain away.’
As Dr. Mookherjee says—“The real crux of the problem
however is found in the beginning of Chapter III. The obser¬
vation of Abhinavagupta hereunder seems to make him plainly
assert his faith in the numerical difference of the author of the
Karika from that of the vrtti.”*9 The vrttikara introduces the
chapter with the words : “Evam vyangyamukhenaiva dhvaneh
pradarsite saprabhede svarupe punarvyanjakamukhenaitat
praka^yate”. Regarding Abhinavagupta’s explanations of the
above, Dr. Mookerjee observes : “Abhinavagupta explains the
text of Anandavardhana in a far-fetched way and makes severe
animadversions upon the previous commentator, whose inter¬
pretation, however, is more satisfactory and logically more
consistent than what is offered by the former.”30 With all
my admiration for the brilliant dissertation of the learned
Doctor on this mooted problem and with all my conviction
about the fundamental validity of his ultimate conclusions, I
cannot see eye to eye with him on this point. I am afraid he
has overstated his case here and has allowed his enthusiasm
to cloud his judgment. Before I give my explanation, I
shall quote the Doctor’s exposition in extenso : “The Candrika,
which was the previous commentary, and which is criticised
here, explains the meaning of the expression Vyangya-
mukhena as referring to the division of dhvani in respect
Op. cit. pp. 162-3.

*9 Loc. cit. p. 185.
80 Loc. cit. p. 185.
of vastu, alankara, and rasa. Abhinavagupta is impatient with
this interpretation. He remarks : “This threefold division has
been set forth by the vj-ttikara and not by the Karikakara.
Nor is the vj-ttikara setting forth this division here and now.
So what relevancy would be there in the statement ‘this has been
done and this is being done, in case the authors are different ?
Nor does this interpretation square with the entire previous text
since such modes as avivaksitavacya also have been demonstrated
therein.31 Abhinavagupta accordingly explains the remarks
of Anandavardhana as having reference to the division of
Dhvani as avivak§itavacya etc.” This is no doubt an
excellent statement of Abhinavagupta’s position. The rendering
of ‘ kartj-bhede ka sangatih however is not entirely
satisfactory since it is capable of another meaning which
would better fit in here. The other meaning is—* How can
the two statements in the same breath that this has been
done and this is being done be compatible when the grammati¬
cal subjects are different, i.e., unless the two are identical ’ T2
Instead of identity of authorship, difference in authorship will
be brought into prominence if we interpret after the manner of
the Candrikakara that vyahgyamukhena refers to the Dhvani
of vastu etc., since this division is mentioned expressly by the
vrttikara and not the karikakara, and here the procedure of the
Vfttikara is not being explained, but only of the Karikakara.
So this interpretation of the Candrikakara is not acceptable,
since it does not explain the sangati properly.
Then Dr. Mookerjee proceeds to give his reasons : “ We
must confess that Abhinavagupta’s criticism of the Candriks
seems to be inspired more by petulance than regard to fact or
logical consistency. In the first place, it is not a fact that the
51 Etat tavat tribhedatvam na Karikakarena kftam vrttikarena tu

darsita*; na cedanim v^ttikaro bhedaprakatanaih karoti; tata$cedam krtarfi
idam kriyate iti kartfbhede ka saftgatih ?—et. seq., op., cit.
31 Cf. Vyangyamukhena pradarjite punarvyanjakamukhena etat
prakaSyate itayanena pradarânaprakaianayorekakartjkatvam svarasatah
pratiyate, tadasangatam bhavediti yavat...Balapriya, commentary on the
above.
threefold classification of dhvani has not been shown in the
karika itself. In II. 2., Dhvani based on the expressed sense is
shown to be two-fold according as the sequence between the
expressed and suggested sense is imperceptible. In III. 3,
Rasadhvani as representative of the first type is dealt with. In
II. 22, Alankaradhvani based on formal suggestiveness
(sabdasaktyudbhava) is discussed. In II 23-25, the vastudhvani
is elaborated at length. In II 26-31, alankaradhvani based upon
material significance (artha-Saktyudbhava) is treated of rather
in detail. The consideration of these facts would show that
Abhinavagupta is neither correct nor precise in his categorical
assertion that the three-fold division of Dhvani has not been
shown by the Karikakara.”33 It would seem that the Doctor
himself is neither correct nor precise in his categorical conclu¬
sion to the above effect. The question is whether:the Karikakara
has categorically stated anywhere earlier a three-fold classifica¬
tion of Dhvani into vastu, alankara and Rasa, not whether
such a classification is unacceptable to him. Even on the
evidences furnished by the Doctor himself, it will emerge that
the Karikakara has never given such a threefold classification
expressly. The classifications which the Karikakara does
propose are—
1. Asaihlaksyakrama and samlak§yakrama,
2. Sabdasaktyudbhava and arthaSaktyudbhava,
3. Prautfhoktinispannagarira and svataljsambhavi.
Rasa, alankara and vastu are no doubt brought under the one
or the other of the above classes. It only means that the
Karikakara recognises them as some -varieties J or sub-varieties
of dhvani; It does not prove that he proposes a three-fold
classification of Dhvani to include them. It is only the vrttikara
that proposes such a classification.8* Abhinavagupta is fully
justified in his statement to that effect.
Dr. Mookerjee continues his argument: “ In the second
place, Abhinavagupta’s animadversion would still be unjusti-
33 Loc. cit. p. 186

31 Cf. sa hyartho vacyasamarthyakjiptam vastumatramalankara
rasadayascetyanekaprabheda-prabhinno dars'ayi jyate—Dhvany&loka, p. 50
fiable even if it were true that the three-fold classification of
Dhvani were not dealt with in the Karika, but in the vrtti only.
He forgets in the heat of the controversy that the vrttikara
could not introduce a matter which was not intended or
endorsed by the Karikakara, since this would involve the
fallacy of utsutravyakhyana. Curiously enough, Abhinavagupta
himself justifies the cross reference in the beginning of the II
Chapter by this device. It is incomprehensible why the same
principle should not hold good in the case under consideration,
were the contention of Abhinavagupta correct.”15’' Here again,
one is tempted to say that it is the Doctor who is forgetting
the implications of his own remarks. It is precisely because
Abhinavagupta wants to redeem the vrttikara from the fallacy
of utsutravyakhyana that he criticises the Candrikakara who
would land him in the said fallacy. It is quite comprehensible
why Abhinavagupta does not resort to the same deyice as he
employed in the II chapter in interpreting the Vf ttikara. The two
instances are not on the same footing. In the beginning of the
II chapter,the Karika would be unintelligible without a reference
to the classification proposed in the vrtti. The karika
presupposes the classification made in the vrtti since no classifi¬
cation of any kind whatever has been made earlier in the
karika. But here the case is entirely different. The karika can
be perfectly understood without any cross-reference to the
vrtti. Some classifications have been already made in the
Karika and the text of the karika can be correctly interpreted
in view of these classifications. Hence there is no need to bring
in the classification proposed in the vrtti also. Hence Abhinava-
gupta’s dispute with the Candrikakara. He chooses the simpler
course instead of the needless one.
Dr. Mookerjee further writes: “ Another point remains to
be disposed of. Let us examine the complaint of Abhinavagupta
about irrelevancy in the case of the difference of the authors.
Is the difference meant to be personal also or functional only ?
The implication seems to be plain as follows : “ Of course the
attribution of what has been stated and what is going to be
M Loc. cit. p 186

stated to the same author may hold good in the present case by
way of a historical accident when the two authors viz., of the
Karika and the vrtti happen to be the self-identical person.
But this would break down if the authors were numerically two
different persons.” Here the learned Doctor misses the target
at which Abhinavagupta directs his attack. Abhinavagupta is
not worried over the personal or functional identity of the
authors of the two portions. On the other hand he is convinced
that they are identical. He joins issue with the Candrikakara on
the score that he is not justified in needlessly proposing an
interpretation which would violate a grammatical rule that of
two actions, one earlier and one later, both must relate to a
common subject. By interpreting the expression ‘ kartrbhede
ka saiigatih,’ in the manner suggested earler,"" the difficulty of
Dr. Mookherjee will disappear.
This of course does not invalidate Dr. Mookerjee’s con¬
clusion that * the cross-reference made out by the author of
the Candrika, would be possible only if the latter were
persuaded of the numerical identity of the two authors.’
Regarding another passage in the Locana (p. 135 Nirnaya
Sagar Press Edn.) Dr. Mookerjee shows correctly how the
expression ‘ asmanmulagranthakrtetyarthah ’ need not trouble
us since the differentiation is but formal, in accordance with
the etiquette of exegesis already noted.
Again, on p. 138, (N.S.Edn.) Anandavardhana observes
* darSitamevagre’ and the Locana on this reads: Darîtameveti
Karikakareneti bhutapratyayah ; vaksyate hi —‘anaucityad rte
nanyat rasabhangasya karanarft,’ ityadi. Kane explains the
Locana as follows:—“ If the Karika and the vrtti were the
work of the same author, he would have used the future tense
in place of the past in the word darSitam, when referring to
what was to be discussed later on ; but as the Karikas were the
work of a predecessor and were actually before the vrttikara
86 See supra. That Abhinavagupta’s expression kartrbheda has an

exclusive grammatical reference is practically proved by Raniero Gnoli in
his recent study,‘Udbhatas Commentry on the Kavyalafksra of Bhamaha
(Rome, 1962) on the basis of earlier usages of the same expression by
Mahimabhatta and Bhoja. See—op. cit. p. XIXf.
when he wrote this passage he employs the words—darritameva-
gre karikakarena.’137 As Dr. Mookerjee ably points out, the
Karikas can certainly be supposed to be logically though not
necessarily chronologically, prior to the vrtti, and this fact
would justify the use of the past tense; whereas the use of the
future tense would violate the conventions of exegesis even if
the two authors happened to be one and the same. Further,
the argument based on the use of tense is very inconclusive in
view of the fact that Anandavardhana uses future tense also in
several places in reference to what is stated later on in the
Karikas e.g. on p. 15, p. 23, p. 26, and p. 34. It cannot be
contended that the reference is only to the vrtti and not to the
Karika because Abhinavagupta often quotes some Karikas as
the objects of reference.ss
The above summary of Dr. Satkari Mookerjee’s argu¬
ments will be sufficient to weaken the hypothesis of duality of
authorship accepted as valid by writers like Jacobi, De, Kane
and S.P. Bhattacharya. The sheet-anchor of their hypothesis is
the supposed differentiation of authorship carefully made out
by Abhinavagupta. While the differentiation is a fact, it has
been shown above how it might have been occasioned by the
demands of the conventions of exegesis.
Dr. Mookerjee has also drawn attention to certain
passages in the Locana and the Dhvanyaloka which favour the
view of identity of authorship:
1. Abhinavagupta at least twice39 speaks of Anadavardhana
as a iastrakara. A mere vrttikara cannot deserve such high
praise. Even according to Abhinavagupta, the vrtti only makes
explicit what is already contained in the Karikas. The title
‘ Sastra ’ will significantly apply to the Karikas primarily and
9‘ History of Alankara Literature p. LIX

““ ‘Tatonyaccitramevetyagre darâyisyamah’, p.34. Abhinavagupta here
quote;; the Karika 111 42 as the place referred to. The use of the first person
deserves notice. Again, the pledge of the vrttikara vacyavacakacarutvahetavo
hi tasyangabhuta na tu tadekarupa eveti pratipadayisyamanatvat - is
endorsed in the Karika II. 4
59 Vide, p. 67 (N.S. Edn.); p. 533 (Ben. Edn.) cf. also p. 41 (N.S. Edn.)
hence Anandavardhana himself should have been the author of
the Karikas as well if he is to merit the title of a Hastrakara.
2. Abhinavagupta explains the penultimate verse
‘ityaklista’ etc. by the words ‘ karikatadvrttiprakarena ’
implying both to be the work of an identical person.
3- The last verse proves this beyond a shadow of doubt.
It states—“Anandavardhana, whose name is widely known, has
explicitly brought out for the edification of men of taste the
real essence of true poetry, which lay dormant for all the ages
in the minds of even men of mature intellect.” This statement
that the nature of Dhvani was not discriminatingly grasped by
previous writers,40 and that it was for the first time developed
and. systematised by Anandavardhana would become unmean¬
ing and untrue, were the doctrine developed in such a syste¬
matic form by a predecessor, viz., the Karikakara, who is made
out to be a different person by the theory of dual authorship.
It is further remarkable that the Karikakara also makes a
similar claim: in III. 56 when he says that the true nature of
poetry was but dimly apprehended by previous writers and their
failure to disentangle the same was responsible for the
promulgation of the theory of Ritis. This identical claim for
originality by both the Karikakara and the Vfttikara is
intelligible only if the two are regarded as identical.
4. The following considerations are clinching: On page
72,41 Abhinavagupta comments. (He) states the meaning of the
Karika by means of the Vrtti; on page 85, Abhinavagupta
observes ‘ Now (he) explains the expression sarupa by means of
the vrtti.’ On page 102, the commentator says—“ with this
intention (he) explicates in the vrtti.” On page 104, in the
commentary it is observed “ Accordingly (he) will explain in
the vrtti in the two-fold way ” and on page 105 again “(he)
now explains the minor subdivisions of praudhokti by means
of vrtti.” “ These remarks have escaped Kane, and his
predecessors and successors alike but they deserve more than a
passing notice. The analysis of their import reveals momentous
40 Cf. also...‘anjyasibhirapi buddhibhiranunirnlitapurvam’—Vrtti on 1.1.

41 The page references are to the Nirnaya Sagar Press Edn.
fact$. Certainly Abhinavagupta could not make these remarks
if he were absoultely convinced of the truth that Ananda-
var<ihana, qua the author of the vrtti was numerically different
fr°ih the author of the Karika.”
Such are the evidences, internal and external, adduced by
^r- Mookherjee to prove that Anandavardhana is the author
°f the whole of the Dhvanyaloka including the Karikas and the
vrtti.
In addition to the above, we may notice in support of the
sahie conclusion other points made out by Dr. A. Sankaran.4®
1. While commenting on the Karika II. 5, Pradhane’nyatra
etc>, Anandavardhana explains the portion of the Karika
* Alankaro rasadiriti me matih ’—with these words * rasa-
^f^lankarasya visaya iti mamakinah paksah’—thus identifying
himself with the author of the Karikas. Similarly in explaining
Karika II. 22, he says * ityasmakam vivaksitah.’
2. The habit of splitting their own Karikas (Khandikptya
pathanam) and commenting on them in parts has been in vogue
among writers like Mammata and Udayanacarya. It would
suPport identity instead of duality of authorship as the writers
tênaselves treat the portions of the Karikas as headlines of
paragraphs or sections in the vrtti/3
From the above, it will emerge that Abhinavagupta’s
teshmony does not undisputedly favour the theory of duality of
authorship. It now remains to be considered how far the other
ar§liments advanced in support of that theory are cogent. The
ne*t argument of the upholders of the theory may be stated as
follows:—“ The system, as given in its bare outline by the
K^tikakara in his concise verses has been considerably
exPanded, revised, and modified by the vrttikara, and many
prQblems not discussed or even hinted at by the former are
^borately treated of by*the latter... .Indeed, it seems that
Anandavardhana in his classical vrtti attempted to build up a
41 Vide—Some aspects of Literary Criticism p. 51 ff.

49 Vide, Contra—S. K. De. Journal of the Dapartment of Letters
I^lcutta University) Vol. IX. p. 17; S. P. Bhattacharya. Proceedings
lhe Sixth Oriental Conference p. 615.
more or less complete system of Poetics upon the loosely joined
ideas and materials supplied by the brief karikas; and his
success was probably so marvellous that in course of time the
Karikakara receded to the background, completely over¬
shadowed by the more important figure of his formidable
expounder-A bare margin of two generations between the -
karikakara and the vrttikara does not seem to be enough to
make room for a period of scholastic exposition of the former,
of which undoubted traces are preserved to us in the few
memorial verses—parikara-^lokas (pp. 34, 130, 137, 147, 163)
sangraha-^lokas (pp. 87, 223) and sanksepa-glokas (pp. 44, 74,
243)—incorporated by Anandavardhana in his vj-tti.**
Of course it cannot be contested that there is considerable
expansion, revision and modification of the karikss in the vrtti.
But in no way can this fact warrant the conclusion that the two
portions should have been the work of different authors. In
ancient India conciseness was the beau ideal of sutrakaras and
karikakaras. A Vftti or a gloss was always looked upon as a
necessary complement to the Sutras or karikas and the fact that
the vrtti of the Dhvanyaloka is more thoroughgoing than the
karikas only shows that it conforms to the general norms, and
nothing more. The several sangraha-^lokas and parikara-Slokas
may be explained as being occasioned by the exigencies of
summing up the trends of discussion in memorial verses. It is
quite plausible that Anandavardhana deliberately made the
Karikas very crisp and concise reserving all detailed discussions
to be dealt with in the vrtti. It is also conceivable that he wrote
the Karikas first and taught it to students so that he might
gain first-hand knowledge of the precise points that needed
fuller explanation, before he wrote out the vrtti. Thus it is
quite likely that there might have been some short intervening
period between the composition of the Karikas and the vrtti.
And in view of the controversial atmosphere prevailing in that
age, this short period will be quite sufficient to account for
some of the improvements effected in the vrtti. Ananda-
44 vide S.K. De : History of Sanskrit Poetics, p. 108 ff; also, H. Jacobi:

Z.D.M.G. Vol. 56 p. 406 and S. P. Bbattacharya, Op. Cit. p. 614
5
vardhana might have expanded the origional ideas in the light
of the immediate criticisms that were directed against them.46
Another and a more formidable argument that has been
advanced in support of the theory of dual authorship is that
the statements in the Karikas and the vj-tti often conflict with
one another, which would be impossible if both were the works
of one and the same person. Dr. Goda Varma holds this
extreme view.48 In what follows an attempt is made to review
the supposed conflicting passages cited by the Doctor and
show how they can be explained as involving no contradiction :
1. The first instance selected by Dr. Varma is Karika I 6.
According to him the Karika is intended to point out the
laksyabhuyastva of pratiyamanartha whereas the vj-tti
emphasises more the rarity of great poets. The two ideas are
said to be very dissimilar. Dr. Varma is not justified in thinking
that the Karika emphasises the laksyabhuyastva of pratlyama¬
nartha. It is no doubt true that ‘the Karika appears to be
designed to point to the lak§ya of pratiyamanartha and its
superiority over vacyartha’. But it does not follow that it also
has in view the laksyabhuyastva. The word ‘ alokasamanyam ’
is enough to silence all doubts on this point. The laksyas for
pratiyamanartha are not the works of all sorts of poets, but
only the masterpieces of Mahakavis who are endowed with an
extraordinary imaginative genius. In pointing out the rarity
of such mahakavis when compared to the numberless poets of
a lower order, the vj-tti is but elucidating what is already con¬
tained in the Karika. It does not * go a great way from the
purpose of the Karika’ as alleged.
2. Regarding Anandavardhana’s introduction to Karika
I 7, viz., idam caparam pratiyamanasyarthasya sadbhavasadha-
nam pramanam. Dr. Varma says that it is obviously inappro-
45 One such opinion of a contemporary quoted by Anandavardhana is :

Carutvamanakhyeyamavabhasate kavye tatra dhvanivyavahsrah iti yalla-
kganam dhvanerucyate kenacit tadayuktam...Dhvanyaloka p. 518 (Ben.
Edn.). Cf. also the well-known verse of Manoratha, pp. 26-7.
46 Vide—‘ Different Authorship of the Karikagrantha and the vrtti-
grantha of Dhvanyaloka ’—New Indian Antiquary, Vol. V. No. 12.
priate. He writes—“When once the existence of pratiyama¬

nartha is established, the question that naturally arises is how it
is perceived. The existence of pratiyamanartha as different from
vacyartha was pointed out in the Karika I 4; subsequently its
pre-eminence in poetry was discussed in the Karika I 5. The
same point together with the mention of laksyabhuyastva
formed the subject-matter of the next karika. To say that
another proof in support of a topic which was already
considered and left out is brought again at this junction is
indeed tampering with the logical continuity of the Karika-
grantha.” Here again. Dr. Varma does not appreciate the inten¬
tion of the Karikas. No one would venture to say that in the
course of the first six karikas, ‘ the existence of pratiyamanartha
is established. Anandavardhana himself thinks that it is establish¬
ed at the close of the third Uddyota, not earlier. Karika I 4 is
nothing but a poetic eulogy in praise of pratiyamanartha; I 5
illustrates it from Valmiki, the foremost of poets; I 6 points
out how this feature is not restricted to a single poet but a
feature found commonly in all great poets, though their
number might be small. These illustrations may be regarded as
some positive proofs that point to the existence of Dhvani.
Karika, I 7, also gives a similar proof by showing how a true
appreciation of such great poetry is restricted to a few
responsive critics. The proof furnished here is subjective a$
distinguished from the objective proofs furnished before. Thus
it will be seen that there is absolutely no ‘ tampering with the
logical continuity of the Karikagrantha’ as urged by Dr. Varma.
3. The propriety of the introduction given to the Karika
I 8 is also challenged by Dr. Varma. As before, he has missed
the point even here. He says, “ according to the Vrtti what is
discussed in the Karika is the pre-eminence of vyangyartha (cf.
pp. 96-7). But the purpose of the Karika seems to indicate the
fact that unlike the vacakaSabdas and vacysrthas, an additional
effort in the form of kavyatattvarthabhavana is essential for
detecting the vyanjakaâbdas and vyanjakarthas. The comments
made in the vrtti lead us to believe that the idea of the Karika
has been greatly misunderstood.” While it is true that the
previous Karika emphasises the need for Kavyatattvartha-
bhavana in detecting the pratiyamanartha, it is not the intention
of this karika to repeat the same idea or merely to extend the
idea to cover vyanjaka-âbdas also. What it does intend to
emphasise, however, is that both vynjakaâbdas and vyaftgyS-
rthas deserve to be carefully noted and appreciated by the poet
and critic alike, and as such their superiority and pre-eminence
over vacyartha and vacakagabda will be readily realised.47 The
vrtti will thus be seen to represent the view of the Karika
correctly. Having failed to appreciate the correct exposition in
the vftti of the purpose of the Karika, Dr. Varma conjectures
that its purpose is to show the additional effort needed in
detecting only the vyanjakas—both Sabdas and arthas—since
this feature of the vyangyartha has been already shown in the
previous Karika. Accordingly he strains the text to suit his
ingenious conjecture. The word so’rthah (which refers beyond
a shadow of doubt to vyangyartha) is construed with tadvya-
ktisamarthyayogi to yield the meaning vyafijakartha. Then he
takes the Vfttikara to task for not having explained the text in
this far-fetched manner. The purpose of the Karikas I 7 and
I 8 is not to distinguish between the special effort needed to
detect the vyangyartha on the one hand and the vyafijaka-
Sabda and vyafijakartha on the other, as Dr. Varma mistakes it
to be. The purpose of the Karika 18 is to contrast by implica¬
tion the preeminence of words that are suggestive and
meanings that are suggested over the ordinary words and their
meanings.
It will be seen that in the passages examined above there is
no difference in outlook between the Karika and the Vftti as
made out by Dr. Varma. He also cites some instances of
‘ indecisive interpretations ’ given in the vrtti which may now
be considered:—
1. In Karika I 4, there occurs the expression : ‘prasiddha-
vayavatiriktam’. The vrtti on it is ‘prasiddhebhyo’ lankftebhyah
pratitebhyo vavayavebhyah. Regarding this explanation in the
Vftti Dr. Varma remarks: ‘If the author of the Karikas himself
had written the Vftti he would have surely been definite in his
47 For a fuller explanation of this K&rika, see Infra.

explanation.’ The two explanations offered in the vj-tti are

mistaken by the learned Doctor to be alternate ones. The
particle va here means ‘and’; not ‘or’. According to the vrtti
the word prasiddha means both pratita and alankfta.49 This is
a poetic description of suggestion and the word has been delibe¬
rately used to carry both the meanings. There is no confusion
in the mind of the Vfttikara. He faithfully brings out the
implications of the Karikakara.
2. Dr. Varma opines that the expression “ ‘Kecidvacama-
vi§yam tattvamQcustadiyam’ in the initial Karika is twisted in
the vrtti and interpreted in favour of the Dhvani School as
‘yadi punah’... etc” (pp. 163-4). It should be noted here that the
Vj-tti first gives a positive reply to this objection before interpre¬
ting it in this funny way. Hence the Vfttikara cannot be accused
of having been in ignorance about the true meaning of the
expression. He deliberately argues in this manner to push the
position of the rivals to its logical absurdity. This mode of
reasoning is called chala in Indian logic.
3. Similarly the expression ‘sarvasadharanakriyah’ in the
Karika II. 10 is interpreted in the vrtti to:mean ‘sarvarasasadha-
rapa and sarvaracanasadharana’. Here again we do not see any
indecision on the part of the vfttikara. He is certain that it
means both. We know that the idea is not opposed to that of
the Karikakara since he recognises sanghatana or racana as
having its substratum in gunas.49
4. Other points made out by the Doctor are equally
baseless. He thinks that the vrtti is not sure of what 'vfttya-
naucityam’ means in Karika III. 19. There is no reason to doubt
the possibility of the Karikakara himself using the word vrtti in
both its recognised senses of dramatic Vfttis and anuprasa-Vfttis.
Dr. Goda Varma writes that “In the third Uddyota the
Vfttigrantha sets aside the padarthavakyartha-nyaya cited in the
Karika I. 10”. This is an exaggeration. In the I uddyota, we
come across mostly general observations about Dhvani, shorn
of all technical discussions. In the III Uddyota the purpose of
48 w-1
19 Cf. Dhvanyaloka III. 6.
70 THE DHVANYALOKA ^ND ITS CRITICS
the vrtti is to give a thread-bare scholastic analysis of the
process of suggestion. What coulc serve the general purpose of
the I Uddyota could not necessari.y bear the searching scrutiny
in the III. Hence an improvemenl over, the earlier analogy is
suggested. But it remains that the first analogy is more helpful
in explaining the nature of suggestion than the second which is
technically more accurate. There :s no question of setting aside
the earlier view. Only the intention of the author while writing
earlier, is clearly brought out. In like manner the contention of
Dr. Varma that ‘the vrttikara betrays his ignorance of the
author of the Bhaktavida’ will lost all weight in view of the fact
that Bhaktavada was only implicit in the treatment of earlier
theorists, but never explicit.
Another evidence adduced in support of the theory of dual
authorship is ‘the employment of terms in the vrtti in senses
other than the one intended in theKarika’. Dr. Varma illustrates
this point as follows : “The term Dhvani will always be found
to be used in the Karikagrantha only in the sense of Kavya-
prakdra. The vrtti considers it as a factor in poetry”. We have
already seen in chapter II50 how the Karikakara also considers
Dhvani as a factor in poetry. To prove the inaccuracy of the
Doctor’s statement, even the initial words of the first Karika
would be more than sufficient, since we read ‘Kavyasyatma
dhvanilj etc.’ How can a Kavya-prakara be the atman of
kavya ?
Such then are the slender grounds on which the conclusion
of Dr. Godavarma, that the authors of the Karikas and the
vrtti are different, rests.
Before we conclude this section, the additional arguments
(based on the internal evidence) advanced by another upholder
of the dual-authorship theory viz., Prof. S.P. Bhattacharya, may
be briefly noticed. One point which he makes out is that “ the
view-points regarding speculations about the relative impor¬
tance of entities in the Alahkaraâstra were different with these
two different writers ... Some striking features in the scheme
followed by the earlier writer seem to be concerned with the
50 See ante
AUTHORSHIP AND DATfc 71
nityanityadosavyavastha, the easiest of gabdalankaras in general,
the enumeration of alankaras as rupakadi, the subdivisions of
Kavyas, including the relation and inter-relation of plot with
rasa, and the consequent question of Vfttis in works of the
Katha type and drama, as also topics like the three gunas—
topics which differ considerably from the traditions preserved
in Kashmir. Amongst the topics introduced by Ananda are
s'abdavfttis, sanghatana and riti theories and Rasavadadi
alankaras.”31
The arguments are ingenious. That the Dhvanikara hailed
from a province other than Kashmir cannot be supported on
the basis of these facts. Prof. Bhattacharya wrongly thinks that
the Karikakara was following a tradition different from that of
the Vfttikara. The fact is that he was following no older
tradition, but starting a new tradition. All the topics referred
to as representing the Karikakara’s tradition are found in no
non-Kashmirian writer. Many of them are found in Kashmirian
writers. The attempt of the Professor to prove Bana’s acquain¬
tance of the concept of Dhvani, is not convincing.52 The
Vfttikara, too, is concerned more with elucidating the nature of
Dhvani than with fitting the theories of vrtti, riti etc. into the
framework of Dhvani.
On metrical and stylistic grounds Prof. Bhattacharya
thinks that Anandavafdhana had a hand in supplementing the
original Karikas by his own verses. He contrasts the style and
metre of the original Karikas with those of the suppossd
apocryphal ones. “ The brevity and terseness of the typical
karikas and their rough-hewn aphoristic trend, seems strikingly
at variance with the elaborate, refined, discussion and often
poetical finish of expression, as in the entire 4th Uddyota. It
appears to us that the entire fourth Uddyota is more likely
than not an apocryphal work....A favouritism for certain
“ Vide POC. VI, p. 620.

59 fcWRd* ^ra^Tclt |
q^ q^ srfot ^ u
Introduction to the Kidatnbari
words (e.g. vi§aya, gunavrtti, skhaladgati, pratibha) evinces
itself in the portion which we would ascribe to Ananda.”
The conclusion is indeed extremely original but unsuppor¬
ted by weighty data. Beauty of style cannot in itself serve as a
criterion in judging that a Karika is the work of this or that
author. Is there no poetic finish in Karikas such as ‘pratiya-
manam punaranyadeva.’ I 4 and ‘Sarasvati svadu .16, whose
genuineness is recognised even by the Professor himself? Then
again, the assertion that Anandavardhana’s additions are all in
anu§|ubh verses and that these contain some special words with
restricted meanings, is far from being conclusive. To take only
the instance of such words cited by the Professor himself, the
word Pratibha is nothing uncommon to writers on Sanskrit
Poetics. It is used in the same sense by Bhamaha, Da^în and
Vamana. We know from Abhinavagupta’s testimony that
Udbhafa used the word Gunavrtti in his Bhamaha-vivarana and
Kumarila Bhatta makes use of it in his Jjlokavarttika. The words
vi$aya and skhaladgati are used in senses accepted by Indian
systems of thought. For instance, the last word is used by the
Buddhist logician Dharmakirti in exactly this sense,” in his
Pramana-varttika.
The data furnished by Prof. S.P. Bhattacharya will thus be
found to be inadequate to prove his conclusion.
Now we are in a position to conclude that the problem
discussed above may be taken as solved with a fair degree of
certainty. There is not a single piece of evidence to support
firmly the theory of dual authorship. And all evidences—exter¬
nal and internal—point to the conclusion that Anandavardhana
himself composed the entire work Dhvanyaloka, consisting of
Karikas and the vrtti.54
53 ^ 5TS^T I
sfroitswt* It Op- cit. Ill 37
54 Dr. C. Kunhan Raja also believes in the identity of Authorship ; Cf.
Introduction to the Slokavarttikavyakhya (Madras University Sanskrit
Series No. 13) p. XI.
ADDENDUM
The above (which originally appeared in the form of an
article in the Indian Historical Quarterly, vol. XXIV) has been
since noticed at length by Dr. P. V. Kane in the third edition of
his book History of Sanskrit Poetics (1951). While thanking
him for his reference to my work, I take this opportunity to
answer some of the worthwhile objections raised by him against
the conclusion here arrived at.
An impartial study of Mm. Kane’s work will reveal that his
making a distinction between the Karikakara and the vrttikara
has landed him in choosing the less plausible course in
preferance to a more plausible one in the following cases :—
1. The possibility of Sahrdaya being the name of the
karikakara as against the possibility of sahrdaya being a common
noun.
2. The possibility of the karikakara being the first
propounder of the idea of dhvani in the face of his own express
statements to the contrary.
3. The possibility that the controversial discussions in the
vftti may not have been intended or endorsed by the karika, or
to put it in other words, that one can show the vfttikaroLS own
ideas read into the karika in more than one place. The points
detailed above by me are enough, I think, to prove at least the
possibility that the karikakara himself wrote like a controver¬
sialist and it was one of his avowed objects to silence the
named and unnamed objections levelled against the idea.
What would be more natural than one and the same author
trying to state only the bare definitions, divisions and
classifications of Dhvani in memorial karikas reserving all
lengthy discussion and illustrations to the vrtti ? than regarding
the karikakara as concerned with working out the well-known
idea of Dhvani in a systematic form to remove the charge that
it was only a dogma of self-styled sahrdayas ? Working out the
details was the task of the vrtti. It was Dr. Goda Varma that
first raised this point at length and gave some concrete cases of
oppositionbetween the views of the karikakara 'and the vrtti¬
kara. In my critique above I believe I have shown how there is
no opposition. Dr. Kane might have proved my explanations
74 THE DHV\nYALOKA AND ITS CRITICS
unsatisfactory beforehe quoted with approval the instances put
forward by Goda Vatna. He has spared himself the trouble by
stating, “I do not thiik that it is necessary for me to go into
these matters at lengti” (p. 180, HSP).
4. The possibilty of the karikas having been called
“kdvya” or “dhvani' as against the possibility of both the
karika and the vrtti leing known as the Dhvanyaloka or the
Kdvyaloka or the Salrdayaloka. Raja$ekhara’s reference is to
the concept of Dhvaii and not to the treatise, Dhvanyaloka,
as Dr. Kane thinks.
5. The possibility that the commentator (Ruyyaka) on the
Vyaktiviveka is lendiig his support to the duality of authorship
of the Dhyanydloka when at the beginning of the 2nd Vimarga,
he remarks : ‘uktamii sahfdayaih; antarangamiti sdk§adrasa-
vipayatvat\ adyairiti ihvanikdraprabhrtibhih', taduktam: “anau-
cityadfte.. . ” ityadha on the text : iha khalu dvividhamanau-
cityamuktam arthavi§tyarh Sabdavisayam ceti- Tatra vibhavanu-
bhavavyabhicariridmajathdyatharh rasesu yo viniyogastanmatra-
laksanamekamantaratgamadyairevoktamiti neha pratanyate”
(Vide p. 188 HSP). I feel that the first reference in uktam is
not to the Dhvanydoka at all since we do not find there a
distinction* of anaujitya into artha-visaya and £abda-vi§aya.
Karika III 10 quoted by Kane in this connection does not
speak of this distinction. It refers to ‘Sahrdayaifc’ a school of
sahrdayas (who were well known at least in Kashmir) if
we are to believe E.uyyaka. The second reference in adyaih
is of course unmistakably to the Dhvanyaloka and Ruyyaka
would have us understand its author as the ‘Dhvanikara’.
Ruyyaka quotes in ths connection a parikara-Sloka from the
vftti and therefore Kane jumps to the conclusion that Sahf daya
is the karikakara aiid Dhvanikara is the Vrttikara. Even.
Hermann Jacobi and Dr. S. K. De, two able supporters of the
theory of duality ol authorship of the Dhvanyaloka, had
postulated that the unknown karikakara was 'meant by the
expression ‘dhvanikara’ and if they were to come across this
* At the most such a distinction might be argued to be implied in

Karika, III. 33. But even there the reference is to an older view.
fresh piece of evidence adduced by Kane, they would either
discredit Ruyyaka or give up their theory of duality. It is not
a little surprising therefore that Kane urges it in support of his
proposition. If he does not discredit Ruyyaka, he will have to
accept the position that Dhvanikara is not only the vrttikara
but also the karikakdra because the actual details of anaucitya
due to indiscreet use of vibhavas etc. stated in so many words
by Mahimabhatta are found in the karikds themselves. III 10-14.
There is no need at all to go up to the parikarailoka in the vjtti
quoted by Ruyyaka. If Ruyyaka did so it was because he had
no doubts about the identity of authorship of the kdrikd and
the vjtti and he could quote whatever came handy to illustrate
his point.
6. The possibilty that Mukula, the teacher of Pratiharend¬
uraja, regarded the karikakdra and vrttikara as distinct since
he says “ Dhvaneh sahrdayairnutanatayopavarpitasya” (p. 185.
HSP.). In my opinion the greater possibility is that Pratiharen¬
duraja who directly studied under Mukula was just recording
his teacher’s viewpoint only when he regards the karikakdra and
the vrttikara as identical, a fact admitted even by Kane (p. 183,
last line, HSP). Any one can see that Mukula has said nothing
expressly regarding the duality of the authors of the Dhvanya-
loka. Kane perhaps sees no inconsistency between his conclu¬
sion stated above and the remark, “Pratiharenduraja being a
pupil of Mukula, followed his master in employing the plural
sahrdayaih. The word kavyajivitabhutah employed by him
pointedly refers to the first karika 'kdvyasyatmd..’ ” But I
should be permitted to ask why the pupil so much devoted to
his guru go against his teacher in a matter of accredited testi¬
mony, viz. the identity of the authorship of the kdrikd and the
vrtti ? It is clear that Mukula cannot support the theory of
duality of authorship. I must add in this connection that
Pratiharenduraja is not referring to Kdrikd I. 1 as the learned
Doctor thinks, but only to Kdrikd I. 5 where the author states
his own theory, unlike Kdrikd I. 1 where the view of earlier
‘budhas’ is quoted.
7. The possibility that Manoratha, the author of the
iloka, ‘ yasminnasti na vastu kidcana manahprahladi..was
76 THE DHVaNYALOKA AND ITS CRITICS
not a contemporary of Anandavardhana in spite of the words
of Abhinavagupta tha: he was. (p. 159. HSP). Dr. Kane would
have us discredit Abfiinavagupta’s testimony on the ground
that it goes against the testimony of Kalhana. I had pointed
out citing the evidence of Jacobi and Raghavan (Journal of
Oriental Research, Madras, vol. HI) ‘ that the early years of
Anandavardhana and the old age of Manoratha synchronised.’
All that I meant to imply was that there was nothing logically
impossible in Abhiravagupta’s testimony since Manoratha
might have lived up to an age of four score and ten. It was
certainly not implied by me that Manoratha was ridiculing
Anandavardhana after he had written the Dhvanyaloka. If
anything, I have always held that such ridicules had become
the fashion before the Dhvanyaloka was written and that
Anandavardhana enceavoured to repudiate them by writing
the Dhvanyaloka. When Dr. Kane dismisses my supposition as
having no foundation (p. 156, HSP) and gives the reason:
“ the Dhvanyaloka was a work of a man of mature years and
so Anandavardhana as a critic (not as a poet) should be held
to have become well-kiown probably about or after 875 A.D.
If Manoratha was to be a contemporary of Ananda-and an
adverse critic of Ananda-’s theory he must have lived right into
the last quarter of the 9th century while he began his life as a
poet under Jayapiâ (779-813 A.D.) in the last quarter of the
8th century ’’ (p. 157, HSP). I am really at a loss to follow why
Kane assumes that Manoratha should have criticised the
doctrine of dhvani as embodied in the Dhvanyaloka. The truth
is that he criticised the germs of that theory as known in the
literary circles of Kashmir before the Dhvanyaloka was
written; and so understood the difficulty supposed by Kane
will disappear.
8. The possibility that the words of Jayantabhaita in the
Nyayamanjari, viz. “ yamanyah panQitammunyah prapede
kaficana dhvanim ” oust mean “ a wise-acre resorted to or
adopted a certain dbvani ” (p. 179, HSP) as against the
meaning suggested bj Dr. Mookerjee, viz., “ the doctrine is
refuted which has been propounded by a fellow who considered
himself a real scholar.’ The reason given by Kane on p. 180
(op. cit.) is the assertion, “ The word prapede cannot mean
‘propounded’. It can only mean ‘ resorted to, took refuge,
or adopted ’ ”. Even Apte notes as many as ten meanings
of pra+pad. The context here leaves no doubt that Jayanta
is not indulging in any quibbling on the word prapede as Kane
would, and in whatever sense we take the word, the main
argument remains unaffected. Jayantabhatta, then, does not
support the position of duality of authorship of the Dhvanya-
loka.
9. The possibility that Dr, Sankaran, I and others are
not “ putting a correct interpretation on the words mSmakinah
paksah in the vrtti on IT5” (p. 178, HSP) as against the
possibility that were the karikakara and the vrttikara different,
the vrttikara would have preferred using the third instead of
the first person, while explaining the idea embodied in a karika.
The explanation that karika becomes part of the vrtti that
explains it is unconvincing.
10. The possibility that “ if the author of both was the
same, the author would not have relegated the sangraha-ilokas
and parikaraSlokas to a subordinate position in the vrtti, but
would have given them a place in the karikas.” (p. 174, HSP).
Kane refers to my explanation (I. H. Q. vol. 24, p. 301) that
“ it is possible that Ananda-wrote the karikas first, taught them
to his students and that after some intervening time composed
the vrtti” and calls it a most lame explanation because the
author could as well have reedited the karikas to include the
parikaratlokas also. He could, no doubt; and he would have
done it also had he felt as Dr. Kane feels that the karika was
more important than the vrtti. The need for a karika would
arise only for a writer who was giving the full tenets of a
technical system in memorable form. The only writers of
Sutras or Karikas in Aiafikaraiastra were, those who were
either putting forward new theories like Vamana, Ananda-
vardhana and Kuntaka or those who were writing authoritative
text-books like Mammata, ViSvanatha and Ruyyaka. Those who
gave greater attention to criticism of rival views than propound¬
ing of a system like Mahimabhatta made greater use of prose
vrtti and parikara- and sangraha-ilokas. The purpose of the
78 THE DHVANYXLOKA AND ITS CRITICS
sangraha-ilokas and parikara-ilokas was to give a finishing
touch to the prose discussions of a polemical nature either by
way of summarising or by way of a brilliant turn of expression.
Mahimabhatta has given hundreds of such sangraha - and
parikara-ilokas in his Vyakti-viveka. They are freely employed
by Jayantabhatta tod in his Nyayamanjari which is also a
polemical treatise. They are ocasionally found in Kuntaka,
since Kuntaka is more eclectic than polemical. They are not at
all found in Mammata or ViSvanatha since they are only text¬
book writers claiming no novelty for their ideas. It is a matter
of individual opinion only whether these “ are striking and
pregnant with meaning and far better than several Karikas ”
(p. 173 HSP). Even if it be true, they cannot lay claims to
figure in the karika since the purpose of the karika is different
as shown above. Lest the learned Doctor should demur to
accept these ideas as satisfactory, I add that they are conclusions
drawn on the basis of the Alankaratastra-works which we have
to-day and we need not judge the Dhvanyaloka by standards
prevalent in any other iastra. I leave it to other scholars to
judge whether this explanation is lame or sound.
I might advert here to another charge levelled against me
by the Mahamahopadhyaya before closing this section. It is
“If the karikas and the vrtti were from the same hand the
breaking up of karikas and interspersing portions of vrtti
should have been uniform. But even so early as the Locana it
was noted that there is no such uniformity in this respect, some
Mss. of the vrtti reading the karikas in pieces and others
reading them as wholes. Dr. Krishnamurthy (I.H.Q. Vol. 24,
p. 300), while trying to explain away the splitting up of karikas
by the example of Mammata, has not said a word about the
discrepancy in the Mss. noted so early by the Locana as the 10th
century A.D.” (p. 176, HSP). For one thing, I was summing up
the arguments of Dr. A. Sankaran in the place referred to. For
another, I did not consider it as important to the problem at
issue as Dr. Kane would have us believe. But I proceed now
to give my explanation for what it is worth:—The discrepancy
in Mss. is very acute only in the IV Uddyota and not in the
earlier ones. A study of the first three Uddyotas will reveal the
fact that the purpose of the kariktikara, viz. giving a systematic
and compact exposition of the theory of Dhvani was complete
even by the end of the third chapter. There was nothing left to
be achieved in a separate JJddyota. I am constrained to think
that the first draft of the Dhvanyaloka consisted of only the
first three Uddyotas; and the fourth was an after-thought and a
later addition by the author himself. It just illustrates how
aspiring poets may turn the doctrine, already preached, to their
own advantage and ends in an exhortation to them to ply their
trade freely without fear of plagiarism so long as they can
invest even old thoughts with a new shade of suggestion. There
was nothing very polemical or of theoretical importance in this
chapter, and the author deliberately wrote in a mixture, some¬
times uneven mixture, of prose and verse. That explains the
discrepancy noted by Abhinavagupta in Mss. In case duality of
authorship alone were responsible for this state things, the
discrepancy should have been uniform in all the first three
Uddyotas also. But it is not so. I think I have explained why
the breaking up of karikas and interspersing portions of vrtti
has not been uniform.
So far I have examined the different questionable possi¬
bilities which the Mahamahopadhyaya has been pleased to wel¬
come in his eagerness to avoid the position that Anandavar-
dhana might have himself written both the karikas and the
vftti. I have shown how each of the ten possibilities maintained
by him are lighter than the possibilities maintained by those
who believe in identity of authorship. I have reserved the
major objection raised by him regarding Abhinavagupta’s testi¬
mony and the expression utsutra-vyakhyana used by Dr.
Satkari Mookerjee while arguing in favour of identity of
authorship (B. C. Law Volume I) for a detailed treatment in
the last section. Now to sum up the present section :—
1. Kane has admitted that “here and there some passages
of the Locana and of the Abhinavabharati DO IMPLY that
Anandavardhana is the author of both Karikas and the Vrtti”
(p. 155, HSP)
2. Kane says that the author of the Candrika was a believer
in the duality of authorship (Cf. “The passage of the Locana
(on p. 123) however quoted above if rightly interpreted, seems
to show that the Candrika also regarded the karikakara and
the vrttikara as distinct (p. 185, HSP). (For a refutation of
this view see the last section.)
3. Kane admits “the fact that almost all writers who came
long after the Dhvanyaloka (as shown by myself) identify the
karikakara and vrttikara”. (p 171, HSP).
4. Kane admits that Pratiharenduraja, who was anterior
to Abhinavagupta and nearer to Anandavardhana upheld
identity of the vrttikara and the karikakara. (Cf. “The words
of Pratiharenduraja lead to the conclusion that he attributed
both karika and vj-tti to Sahrdaya.”)
5. Kane has tried to derive support from Jayantabhatta
and Mukulabhajta for duality of authorship; but as shown
above, he has failed.
6. The most plausible hypothesis suggested by me and
dictated by incontestable evidence in the karikas themselves are
rejected by Kane and he does not even pause to account in
some other way the facts found in the text. His hypothesis of
duality of authorship cannot explain why the karikakara takes
pains to refer to his predecessors as having taught the idea of
dhvanl long before his time.
On the basis of these considerations, would it be wrong if
I conclude that there is not much external evidence to prove
duality of authorship of the karikas and the vrtti of the
Dhvanyaloka or to disprove the identity ?
Hence the only evidence that the Mahamahopadhyaya can
logically adduce in support of his position is internal evidence.
Once he admits that Abhinavagupta did believe in the identity
of the two, there is no point in citing his evidence hundred
times to prove that he regarded the two as different. It is futile
to go on asserting that Abhinavagupta is right when he seems
to hold the karikakara and the vrttikara as two different men
and that he is echoing his misinformed teacher and so on
when he identifies them. At that rate one can go on arguing
endlessly. It passes my understanding, how the Doctor can state
“ some passages of Locana are right and that Kuntaka,
Mahimabhatta, Ksemendra and a host of other writers had
not the correct tradition before them.” This ardhajaratiya
won’t do. Hence I do not like to review the different statements
of Abhinhvagupta quoted by Kane. I shall restrict myself
to a consideration of the internal evidence only which
Kane is underlining. All that Kane has done in a score
and more closely printed pages is to reiterate the evidence
of Abhinavagupta with redoubled emphasis. I repeat
that the whole procedure appears to be misdirected.
The learned Mahamahopadhyaya triumphantly throws out the
challenge: “I request Dr. Pandey, Dr. Mookerjee and
Dr. Krishnamoorthy to produce eight (or even a lesser number
of instances) of clear apparent opposition of the views of the
\fttikara and karikakara (where the author of both is the
same and where he belongs to the 9th or 10th century) and the
commentator is a different person altogether and brings out the
opposition”, (p. 165, HSP). I can only say that the suggestions
embodied in the challenge are peremptory to deserve serious
attention; it is not for us to dictate that such and such things
should appear at such a time; it is for us to examine facts as
history has presented them to us. There is only one Abhinava¬
gupta and only one Anandavardhana in the whole range of
Sanskrit critical literature, and however much we might wish
that scores of such brilliant commentators and original thinkers
existed, we cannot have them at our bidding. If, as Dr. Kane
thinks, this is a solitary instance of the phenomenon mentioned
by him, he should not forget that the Dhvanyaloka too is a
solitary masterpeice of its kind and that Abhinavagupta is a
commentator of singular abilty in the whole range of Sanskrit
Poetics. I for one cannot conceive how a similar combination of
karikakara, vrttikara and commentator could repeat itself in
Kashmir of the 9th or 10th century. An ordinary commentator
would not bother himself over questions that Abhinavagupta
considered important. Hence instead of attempting the
impossible, I shall content myself by referring Dr. Kane to the
evidence already adduced by me. I have quoted there the
conclusion reached by Pandit Madhusudan Sastri Kaul,
Editor of the Siddhitrayi by Rajanaka Utpaladeva (1st half
of the 10th century) of Kashmir: “To append a vrtti
6 ‘
to a work seems to have been the fashion of the day
(cf. Spandavrtti, givasutravrtti, etc.). The attitude adopted
by the author in writing his gloss on the two Siddhis is
markedly distinctive. He annotates it in such a way that the
reader is often misled into thinking that the author of the text
is different from that of the gloss. The glossator always appears
in the third person throwing the reader off the scent as regards
the identity of the author and the annotator.’' And as regards
my reference to Dr. Pandey to prove that “ this fashion of an
identical person writing both the karika and the vrtti, was very
much in vogue in Kashmir, Dr. Kane is pleased to brush it
aside with the remark : “ Dr. Krishnamoorthy blindly picks up
the example cited by Dr. Pandey.. (p. 166, HSP). I had no
craze for novelty and I humbly collected evidence from every
quarter available. The question is whether the evidence is right
or wrong. Dr. Kane rejects the evidence on the ground that
‘while Abhinava-expressly states that on the Pratyabhijfia-sutras
(the karikas) the author himself, Utpaladeva, wrote a vj-tti in
which he explained only the purport and a tika in which he dis¬
cussed the doctrines of the karikas the Locana does not say
so with reference to the Dhvanyaloka. (Loc. cit.). The learned
Doctor should know that mere negative evidence cannot prove
anything positive. In the face of the Doctor’s admission that
in some places Abhinavagupta does believe in the identity of
authorship of both the karikas and the vriti, I can only wonder
why he harps so much on Abhinava-’s negative evidence. When
on the top of it all I read the confession: “Dr. Krishnamoorthy
further relies on what Dr. K. C. Pandey says in his work on
Abhinavagupta pp. 134 ff., who puts forward the practice in
Kashmir that the same person wrote sutras or karikas and a
commentary. Hardly any one would dispute this (at least I do
not). But all this is irrelevant ” (p. 163, HSP), I am at my wit’s
end. The Learned Doctor however sees no inconsistency and
proceeds—“ The question is not whether the same writer could
have written a vrtti on his own karikas, but whether in this
particular case he actually did so and whether passages of the
Locana accept the identity or whether they lead to the
inference of non-identity.” (Loc. cit.) As already admitted by
Kane the author of the Locana accepts the identity in some
places ; now where is the point in labouring upon his ‘leading
to the inference of non-identity’ ? The doctor has come within
an ace of admitting that the same author could have written
both the vrtti and the karika and changes his ground by falling
back upon Abhinavagupta, of all persons.
So, then, we come to the crux of the problem. It is a fact
that Abhinavagupta makes an apparent distinction between the
vrttikara and the karikakara in more than eight places. Dr. Kane
impatiently asks why the distinction should be apparent and
not real. The simple answer is that Abhinava makes this distinc¬
tion only in the Locana where it serves an exegetical purpose (a
purpose explained by him explicitly, Vide-/«/ra) and not
elsewhere as in the Abhinavabharati where the said purpose is
absent. Dr. Kane is constrained to concede that Abhinava does
believe in identity also. Why then should he be loth to accept
this simple explanation? He would rather have us believe that
it served no exegetical purpose even here. Does he offer any
alternative explanation which is more convincing than the
testimony of Abhinavagupta himself? He only affirms that the
distinction made by him is real and the identity expressed by
him is a lapse. Is it a crime then if one were to place greater
weight on the veracity of Abhinavagupta himself than on that
of the Mahamahopadhyaya in such a predicament, particularly
when a simple explanation also is possible ? It is for dis¬
passionate scholars to decide.
The last point that remains to be considered is the denial
by Dr. Kane of any exegetical etiquette which Anandavardhana
was called upon to follow. Kane clubs me in this connection
invariably with Dr. Satkari Mookerjee and suggets throughout
that I have blindly copied the argument. Whatever Kane might
imply, I consider it a no small compliment to be mentioned in
good company. Regarding the charge of copying, I can only ask
my readers to see whether the considerations that weigh with
me now (as explained above) and that weighed with me earlier
(as explained in my I.H.Q. article), considerations which were
independently arrived at, are not enough to lead me logically
to the conclusion that Anandavardhana must have deliberately
kept the fact of his identical authorship of the karikas and the
vjtti in the background in deference to an etiquette of writers
of original treatises; and that Abhinavagupta who was aware of
it wanted to draw his readers’ attention to this fact by making
a formal distinction between the karikakara and the vrttikara.
If this formal distinction were not kept in mind, the very
purpose of a commentator would be stultified. The purpose of
a commentator (vyakhya-kdra) as Abhinavagupta understood
was to bring out the ‘ sangati ’ or complete agreement between
the ideas contained in the two parts of the text he commented
upon, viz, karika and vrtti (for a detailed explanation, vide,
Infra). His censure of the Candrikakara at the beginning of
the third chapter leaves no doubt as to what he thought of his
task as a commentator and the nature of the two parts of the
text he was commenting upon. Though explained already,
I shall now try to sum up all its implications <once again as
I feel that this will disprove the hypothesis of duality of the
karikakara and the vrttikara once and for all Any reader can
see that in interpreting this clinching evidence I am not one
with Dr. Satkari Mookerjee at all. Even Dr. Kane’s own
interpretation is nearer mine though we differ in details,
(p. 172-3, HSP). I repeat that here is a piece of positive evidence
which will settle the issue one way or the other and there is no
Ms. discrepancy and so forth tainting it. We must make an
honest attempt to understand all the implications made by
Abhinavagupta here
The passage in question is the Locana on the vrtti of III. 1.
(p. 150-51, N.S. Edn. 1935)
The vrtti of the Dhvanyaloka reads:
(evam vyangyamukhenaiva dhvaneh pradariite saprabhede
svarupe punarvyahjakamukhena tctprakd&yate—’
This is the Locana thereon :
iuddyotantarasangatim kartumaha vrttikarah—evamityddi.
tatra vacyamukhena tavadavivcksita-vacyadayo bhedah-
Vacyam ca yadyapi vvanjakameva; yathoktam . “yatrdrthah
dabdo va—”///. (tataica .. .mukhenapi bheda uktah.Tathdpi
sa vacye’rthe vyangyamukhenaiva bhidyate) tatha hyaviva-
ksitavacye vyahgye nyagbhavitah vivaksitanyaparavdcya iti
vyangyarthapravana evocyate. Ityevam mulabhedayoreva
yathdsvamavdntarabhedasahitayorvyaiijakarupd'rthah sa vy-
angyamukhe preksita&aranatayaiva bhedamasddayati. Ata
evdha—vyafigyamukheneti. kifica yadyapyartho vyaHjakas-
tathdpi vyahgyatdyogyoi' sau bhavatiti. dabdastu na
kadacidvyangyah ; api tu vyahjaka eveti. Tadaha—‘vyahjaka-
mukhenetV. Na ca vacyasyavivaksitadirupena yo bhedastatra
sarvathaiva vyahjakamukhatvam nastiti punah&abdenaha.
Vyafljakamukhendpi bhedah sarvathaiva na prakaiito'dhuna
punah 6uddha-vyahjakmukhena. Tathahi vyangyamukha-
preksitaya vina pad am, vakyarh, varnah padabhagah sahgha-
tana mahavakyamiti svarupata eva vyahjakdndm bhedah.
Na caisamarthavatkadacidapi vyahgyata sambhavatiii vyaiija-
kaikaniyatam svarupam yattanmukhena bhedah prakddate iti
tatparyam.
Yastu vydcaste—t(vyahgydnam vastvalahkararasdnam
mukhena” iti sa evam prastavyah -etattavattribhedatvam
na karikakarena krtam vrttikarena tu dariitam. Na
cedanim vrttikaro bhedaprakatanam karoti. Tatascedam
krtamidam kriyate iti kartrbhede ka sangatih. Nacaitdvatd
sakalapraktanagranthasahgatih krtd bhavati. Avivaksita-
vacyadinamapiprakaranam darkitatvadityalam nijapiirvaja-
sagotraih sdkam vivadena.
I do not presume there is anything in the above passage which
needs to be explained to scholars by me. I only say that the
second paragraph of the Locana above should not be interpreted
independently of the first paragraph.
If one reads the whole dispassionately, the following postu¬
lates made by Abhinavagupta cannot be missed :—
1. The karikas form one independent unit of the Text.
2. The vrtti forms another independent unit of the Text.
3. The Vrtti must show the ‘sangati’ or continuty of ideas
in the Karikas and should not mix up the additional ideas
provided in the vrtti while explaining the purpose of a new
karika. In other words a new karika must be explained by the
vfttikara only in the light of the karikas that have preceded
and not in the light of the vrtti also that has preceded that
new karika.
4. Which means that a vfttikara must behave as if he is a
stranger while explaining the Karikas though he might happen
to be factually the Kdrikakara also. In other words, the factua
identity of authorship of the karikas and the vrtti should be
pushed to the background and formal duality of authorship of
the two embraced, for purposes of explaining the karikas
properly.
5. It is the business of a vyakhyd-kara or commentator on
the two texts to show clearly how the vrttikara has discharged
his duty cf explaining the karikas efficiently. That means that
a commentary like the Locana does not directly comment on the
karikas at all. It considers that the vrtti has discharged that
function already. It proceeds to indicate only how it is so and
directly comments on the vrtti.
6. It follows therefore that a commentary (like the
Locana) will have failed of its purpose if, in the course of its
explanation, it gives the impression that the vrttikara is making
use of earlier material in the vrtti in explaining a new Kdrika
though tie idea has never occurred in the earlier Karikas
expressly.
7. The above procedure would be tantamount to suggest¬
ing that the kdrikakara and the Vfttikara are functionally
identical *nd the suggestion can only mean that the com¬
mentator is showing disrespect to the prestige of the Vfttikara
himself. It would be a grave fault on the part of any commen¬
tator to slow any such disrespect.
8. Apart from the insult it means to the author of the
vfttiy it also means that the commentator is unnecessarily
misinterpreting the vrttikara's intention when he takes the aid
of ideas found only in the vrtti to explain the purpose of a
vfttikara in explaining a new Karika.
9. The purpose of the commentator as explained in 5
above will have been defeated since no ‘sangati’ or continuity of
argument is possible in every case between the divisions etc.
proposed in the vrtti alone and not expressly corroborated in
the Kariki also.
10. The Candrikakara faild on all these counts since he
made a cross reference to the vjtti in explaining the vrttikara's
introduction to a new Karika at the beginning of a new
Uddyota:
(a) The real 'sangati' which he ought to have established, he
did not.
(b) The sort of ‘sangati' he has tried to establish was not the
one required of him as a faithful commentator.
(c) While giving his explanation he has forgotten the fact that
there is grammatical ‘kartfbheda* implied in his explana¬
tion. Only one grammatical subject is required for the
verbs ‘pradar&ite’ and *prakdiyate’. When the Candrika
kara gives two subjects in effect, viz., the vrttikara for the
first verb and karikakara for the second verb, the very-
idea of ‘sangati’ which he is out to illustrate falls to the
ground and the functional difference of the two authors
which he should have zealously preserved as a faithful
commentaor, he has neglected.
11. Abhinavagupta proposes such an explanation in his
Locana as is free from all these defects. He does not give a
cross reference to the vftti in explaining the intention of the
vjttikdra while the latter is introducing a new karika. He does
not lose sight of the functional difference between the
Karikakara and the vfttikara. He brings out the ‘sangati’’ in the
text properly.
Now I shall sum up briefly what repercussions these
incontrovertible premises of Abhinavagupta have on the
problem mooted by Kane :
1. The premises 1, 2, 3 and 4 above establish conclusively
that though one and the same author wrote both the karika
and the the vrtti he had to conform to some conventional
etiquette of exegesis while writing the vftti.
2. A commentator would be accused of the gravest lapse
if he lost sight of this conventional etiquette observed scrupu¬
lously by the author of the kdrikas as well as the vrtti in the
text (when the commentator explained the text).
* I am now convinced that this is the only correct, explanation of the

word.Cf. Gnoli quoted supra. This expression has been used in this
sense by other writers like Bhoja, Mabimabhatja and Ruyyaka.
3. Though the commentator was aware of the virtual
identity of the karikakara and the vrttikara, it was not up to
him to reveal this in the course of his commentary by forgetting
functional difference between the two. Abhinavagupta lis proud
that he has never done it. His censure of the Candrikakara can
permit only one explanation and that is : Candrikakara went
wrong in revealing this personal identity of the vrttikara and
the Karikakara against the acknowledged rule of the game.
That is to say that both Candrikakara and Abhinavagupta were
certain that one and the same person was responsible for the
karikas and the vrtti of the Dhvanyaloka. The convention of
commentators prevented them from stating it in the course of
their commentary. Abhinavagupta takes the Candrikakara to
task for violating this convention and making the reader feel
that ‘ sang at i ’ between the karlka and vrtti could be established
only by believing in the identity of the authors of the two. It
should be remembered that if we take duality of authorship as
meant by the Candrikakara (as Kane does on p. 172, HSP),
the very point of Abhinavagupta’s attack against him is lost.
Kane’s explanation of the second paragraph of the Locana
(loc. cit.), “ when (as you hold) the authors of the karika and of
vrtti are different, what is the use of showing ‘ sahgati' by
saying this has been done (by the vrttikara) and this is being
done (by the karikakara in 3rd Uddyota ?)” is highly ingenious
but far fetched. Even a tyro can see that the words in brackets
“ as you hold ” are read into the Locana by Kane to serve his
own purpose and he should not have done it.
Now I am in a position to conclude the position as it is :
1. There is no external evidence to show that the kari¬
kakara and the vrttikara were different.
2. There is no internal evidence to prove it; nor is there
the likelihood of its being there since it would go against the
etiquette observed by all writers of technical treatises in
Kashmir of the 9th century. Even if the two were different the
vrttikara would never give the impression that he was giving a
meaning opposed to that of the karikakara if we are to believe
Abhinavagupta.
3. Abhinavagupta makes a functional distinction between
the two because he thought it part of his duty as commentator
to do so according to his own testimony given above.
4. Abhinavagupta is aware of the identity of the two in
other places where no such duty binds him.
5. The Candrikakara is also aware of identity, which he
misuses according to Abhinavagupta.
These considerations are clinching enough and I feel that
Anandavardhana’s authorship of both the vrtti and Kdrikds of
the Dhvanyaloka is well nigh proved. I am aware that Dr. Kane
has challenged me and others who believe in identity to cite
parallel instances (as he cites the instance of Sankaracarya in
support of his position) before considering the matter as proven.
I protest that this is going out of the way since we have
given the positive evidence of Abhinavagupta regarding exegetic-
al etiquette and the fallacy of utsutra-vyakhya which the vrtti¬
kara had to steer clear of. This positive evidence is more
than sufficient for any scholar to accept the fact that this was
a tradition prevalent in Kashmir and that Anandavardhana res¬
pected it as much as Abinavagupta himself. Any other instance
is irrelevant whether for or against. Let me assure Dr. Kane
that this is the only place in the Locana where Abhinavagupta
has put his ideas about the function of the vrttikara, the
kdrikakdra and the vyakhydkara in an unmistakable way and
he should not underrate its importance. I do not hesitate to
state that Abhinavagupta is an author whose testimony we can
accept in the absence of anything positive to the contrary.
Arguments from analogy have no place when we are dealing
with a unique work in Alankdrasastra, the Dhvanyaloka, to
wit. On the evidence of Abhinavagupta himself, I believe I have
answered all the points raised by Kane. If Dr. Kane should
still be very particular of having evidence other than that of
Abhinavagupta, I would refer him to one of the older commen¬
taries on the Kdvyaprakata, viz, that of Vidyacakravartin
(published in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series) who adopts the
dictum mentioned by Abhinavagupta and makes a functional
distinction between the Vrttikara and the Karikakara of the
Kdvyaprakada in almost every opening sentence of his
commentary on the different Ulldsas. He employs the word
* sangati ’ too quite often in explaining the opening words of
the text in question, (cf. pp. 3,30,59,81,94,209-pt. I; 7,166,
199,249-pt. II). These must be sufficient to show that the
convention was there among writers on Alankaraiastra; and
no one would jump to the conclusion that Mammata was the
author of only the vrtti since Vidyacakravartin makes a clear
distinction between the Karikakara and the vrttikara. This
analogy agrees on all fours with the point at issue, if ever an
analogy could prove anything.
Finally, it is for scholars to judge whether there is any
likelihood of a work propounding a novel theory of poetry like
the Dhvanikarika’s being deemed self-complete without even
illustrations from poetry. Though perhaps philosophical texts
like the Sankhya-karikas may be regarded as self-contained, it is
because they are not in need of practical examples as in poetics.
A survey of Sanskrit Poetics from Bhamaha down to Jagannatha
will reveal how there is not a single text which does not
provide suitable illustrations. And where are the positive
proofs to indicate that Karikas in the Dhvanyaloka furnish a
a singular exception ?
DATE OF ANANDAVARDHANA
If we rely on the soundness of the testimony furnished in
Kalhana’s Rajataraiigini, there will be no difficulty in fixing the
date of Anandavardhana precisely. According to Kalhana,1
Anandavardhana flourished under Avantivarman, king of
Kashmir from 856 to 883 A.D. Jacobi thinks2 that there are
two things which go against this positive evidence. First comes
the verse ‘Yasminnasti na vastu kimcana etc.’ in the Dhvanya¬
loka (p..26) which is ascribed by Abhinavagupta to Manoratha,
a contemporary of the author (granthakft). Manoratha is to be
dated, according to the Rajatarangini3 during the reign of Jaya-
SPIT
Rajatarangini V. 34
II
» ZDMG Vol. 56 p. 404.
• Loc. cit. IV 497 and 671.
pida(C. 780-811 A. D.) and his successor Lalitapida. The
difficulty then arises that ‘Manoratha who is thus made a
contemporary of Anandavardhana lives in the middle or the
latter part of the 9th century, i.e. somewhat later than the date
assigned to him by Kalbaâ.4 Jacobi would get over the diffi¬
culty by understanding Abhinavagupta’s expression ‘granthakyt’
to mean the anonymous Dhvanikara. Dr. De notes that this
interpretation does not agree with the usual practice of
Abhinavagupta who invariably means Anandavardhana by the
term ‘granthakft’. Pischel5 thinks that Kalhana is wrong in
assigning Manoratha to the reign of Jayapi^la and Lalitapida.
Dr. De feels that there are only two other possible ways of
removing the difficulty—(i) by supposing that the two Manora-
thas were different persons or (ii) that Abhinavagupta himself
has confused the Karikakara with the Vjttikara in a manner not
usual with him. And he is at a loss to decide either way. But
there is a third possibility noted by Jacobi himself® and which
De ignores. It is to suppose that the early years of Ananda¬
vardhana and the old age of Manoratha synchronised. By
accepting this possibility, the difficulty will disappear.
The second point which contradicts the declaration of the
Rajatarangiî is Anandavardhana’s quotation of a versewhich is
found in the pataka of Bhallaâ who, according to the Rajataran-
gini (V. 204), lived under Saiikaravarman (883-902).7 Another
stanza which Anandavardhana claims to have composed
himself8 is also found ih Bhallaja’s Pataka. But this fact also
can be explained by saying that just as in Bhartphari’s Patakas9,
in BhaMata’s gataka also some verses composed by others are
included. Hence Kalhaâ’s testimony may be regarded as
correct so far as the date of Anandavardhana is concerned.
• S. K. De, History of Sanskrit Poetics, Vol. I, p. 112

6 Introduction to Rudraja's Sjngaratilaka.
8 ZDMG Vol. 56 p. 404, also WZKM Vol. IV, p. 239 ; Cf. also
V. Raghavan's article on Manoratha—JORM, Vol. III.
» See Colonel Jacob, JRAS 1897 p. 290
• p. 218, N. S. Press Edn.
• Cf, Keith, History of Sanskrit literature p. 177.
92 THE DHVANYA LOKA AND ITS CRITICS
ANANDAVARDHANA’S WORKS
In addition to the Dhvanyaloka, Anandavardhana appears
to have written several other works—both literary and philoso¬
phical. Excepting his Devisataka,10 no other work has come
down to us. The following are some of the side-references we
get to his other works.
1. Tattvaloka : Aohinavagupta twice refers to this
philosophical treatise of Anandavardhana in his commentary.
The first reference is : ‘.. Sarvam paramedvaradvayam brahmet-
yasmacchastrakarepa na na viditam tattvalokagrantham viraca-
yatetyastam.’" From this statement in the Locana we can gather
that the work was primarily meant as an exposition of the
philosophy of the Absolute. The second reference of Abhinava-
gupta is: ‘etacca granthakarena tattvaloke vitatyoktamiha
tvasya na mukhyo’vasara iti nasmabhistaddarsitaih’.'2 From
this it might be concluded that the Tattvaloka contained a
disquisition about the Kavya-naya and the gastra-naya. One
other reference to Ananadavardhana’s Tattvaloka is found in
MaheSvarananda’s commentary called Parimala on his own
Prakft treatise Mahirtha-manjari.13 He quotes Anandavardha-
na’s Karika 1-4 with these prefatory words : ‘Yaduktam Tattva-
lokakjta kavyaloke.”4
2. Pramana - vini&cayatika - vivrti called Dharmottari (?)
Anandavardhana himself refers to this work of his on Buddhist
Logic t while reviewing the position of the Buddhists about
anirvacamyata. The detailed name of the work is furnished by
Abhinavagupta who says: Granthantara iti viniScayatikayam
Dharmottaryaift ya vivrtiramuna granthakfta kfta (htraiva
tadvyakhyatum”‘\ This leads us to conclude that Anandavar¬
dhana had composed a commentary called Dharmottari on the
Pramana-viniscayatika of Dharmottara on the original pramana-
10 Published in the Kavyamala series, Vol. ix.

11 p. 67 (Ben. Edn.)
« p. 533 (Ben.)
18 Published in the Trivandrum Sanskrit series No. Ixvi.
14 Ibid. pp. 140-50.
i* Vide p. 519 (Ben. Edn.).
vinifJcaya16 (if we adopt the reading Dharmottama, this would

be Anandavardhana’s independent gloss on Dharmakirti’s text)
of Dharmakirti, who falls in the seventh century A. D.
3. Visamabana-lila : This is a Prakrt poem from which
Anandavardhana himself quotes. One of these verses has
the prefatory remark : ‘Yatha va mamaiva visamabanalilayam
asuraparakramane kamadevasya Abhinavagupta comments :
‘ Trailokyavijayo hi tatrasya varnyate.’17 It is clear then that the
theme of this work was the triumphant conquest of Manmatha
over all the three worlds. Writers like Kuntaka, Mammata,
Bhoja and Hemacandra quote from this poem.
4 Arjunacarita: According to Anandavardhana’s own
statement in the Dhvanyaloka, this was his Mahakavya. He says
‘ Yatha ca madiya evarjunacarite mahakavye.’18
5. Madhumathanavijaya (?) In the third Uddyota Ananda¬
vardhana refers to this work with these words—‘ tadyatha
madhumathanavijaye paficajanyoktisu \19 He does not however
explicitly state that it is his own work. From a quotation from
this work given by Abhinavagupta, it is clear that it is also a
Prakft poem. Peter Peterson regards this also as a work of
Anandavardhana.20
6. Deviiataka : It is a century of devotional lyrics written
in praise of Devi, full of various verbal figures of speech.
PERSONAL DETAILS KNOWN ABOUT ANANDAVARDHANA :
Not much is known about the personal life of Ananda-
,a About Pramanavinis'caya—See Scherbatsky, Buddhist Logic and

Poussin JRAS 1910. p. 132.
17 Vide p, 265 (Ben. Edn ). Cf. also p. 346.
»8 Vide p. 336 (Ben. Edn.)
18 Vide 345.
80 Introduction to Vallabhadeva’s Subhasitavali p. 10.
In the recently published Commentary of Sndhara on the Kavya
prakgga ^(Ed. S. P. Bhattacharya, Sanskrit College, Calcutta, 1959), two
corrupt verses from this Prakrit poem are found which indicate that the
utory related to Krishna’s marriage with Rukmini ; some verses are quoted
by Hemacandra also.
vardhana. That his father’s name was Nona is gathered from
Anandavardhana’s own statement in the Deviâtaka to that
effect. He says:—
Devya svapnodgamadi § tadevi &atakasamj fi aya
de$it3nupamamadhadato nonasuto nutim (101)
If one were to form an estimate of Anandavardhana as a poet
solely on the basis of this Deviâtaka, it would be positively
unfair to Anandavardhana. For as a poet he is seen to revel
here in just those tricks and poetic acrostics which he
condemned unreservedly as a critic. In sheer jugglery of
words and rhymes, in the twists and turns given to expressions,
in the artificial arrangement of sounds to suit set models of
drawings (citra-bandhas), in short, in all the artificial devices
perfected by poetasters, the work is almost un-paralleled.
Recondite puns and bombast characterise th^ Sataka from the
first verse to the last. One is almost tempted to remark that
Anandavardhana’s practice is poles apart from his precept.
But perhaps these none too flattering features in the Devjgataka
are to be explained as due to the fact that they were modelled
upon similar Patakas by Ban a and Mayura.
Several beautiful verses of Anandavardhana are available
as quotations in Anthologies like Vallabhadeva’s Subha§itavalf,21
Sridharadasa’s saduktikarnamrta,22 Jalhana’s Suktimuktavali23
and the Sarngadharapaddhati.24 These verses invariably reflect
Anandavardhana’s good taste and will serve as a corrective to
the impression left on our minds by reading his Deviâtaka
alone. To form a just estimate of Anandavardhana as a poet,
these verses must also be taken in conjunction with the
DeviSataka. But a full estimate of his greatness as a poet is
rendered impossible by the non-availability of all his works.
»> Verses 28, 1776, 578,60, 623, 3519, 3513, 2484,49, 615,157, 3226,
904, 525, 165, 343 and 559. Peterson and Durgaprasad's Edn.
24 IV 4.1 The Punjab Oriental Series No. 15.
43 x-62 ii-58, xxii-5, ii-99 Gaekwad’s Oriental Series Vol lxxxii,
w 4. 898, 906 etc., Peterson's edn.
But so far as the attitude of later writers towards Ananda-
vardhana is concerned, there can be no doubt that it was one of
boundless admiration. The following verse of Kayyata will
serve as a sample :
3TT
CHAPTER V
DETAILED DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT OF

THE DHVANYALOKA
From the foregoing chapters it is clear that the concepts of

Alanksra, Guna and Riti touched only the outer fringes of
poetry without going deeper into the essential forces that are
always at work both in the act of poetic creation and that of
appreciation. It was also seen that though in the domain of
drama, the importance of subjective factors such as sentiment
was fully realised, writers on poetry were not so sure and their
attitude towards rasa was one of under-estimation, if not
positive hostility. Their analyses of the elements of literature
and their attempts to classify the literary forms in a more or
less dogmatic way had some worth no doubt in so far as they
served to dispel many of the difficulties besetting the path of
an initial investigator. But for the most part, their doctrines
were rudimentary and were concerned with laws and forms
imposed from without. They seem to think that the poet first
gets certain ideas by virtue of his genius (Pratibha) and then he
sets about giving them the character of poetry by a skilful
superimposition of certain graces and turns of expression.
Even the idea and feeling to be expressed was predetermined
in a way, only particular subjects and Rasas being laid down
as appropriate in particular forms of literature ; for instance
the definition of Nataka or drama includes the statement that
only one of the two Rasas-grngara (Love) and Vira (Heroism)
must be made the dominant motif. In the field of Mahakavya,
eighteen items such as town, ocean, mountain and season,
were catalogued as fit subjects meriting elaborate description,
adopting as far as possible the Kavi-samayas or poetical
conventions. No wonder then, that in extreme cases, this
sense of form began to degenerate into formalism. The letter
kills the spirit and art was slowly and yet steadily being
degraded into a conventional artificiality. The wings of
DETAILED DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT 9?
originality were being almost clipped by this undue adherence
to conventional forms.
Such an atmosphere of formality and convention was
sought to be broken as we saw by a new school of critics
hailing from Kashmir whose foremost and famous represen¬
tative is Anandavardhana. In writing the Dhvanyaloka he had
two main purposes in view. In the first place, he wanted to
demonstrate the inadequacy of the ancient principles of
criticism in a proper estimate of literature. Secondly he aimed
at refuting all the charges brought against the new concept of
Dhvani and establishing its truth on a sound and solid basis.
To serve as a corrective to the older onesided emphasis on
figures and styles, he urged the need for a fuller recognition of
the subjective and aesthetic elements that enter into the
process of composition as well as appreciation. He pointed
out that the richness of poetry was not so much due to
the aspect of description, as that of suggestion. The direct
import of words was not all that mattered in poetry. More
often than not, in the greatest works of literature, the
meanings could not be found to lie actually on the surface.
Words and senses seemed to have within them a deeper
significance than that expressed, and they would not yield
their secret to discursive intellect without the aid of
imagination and feeling. It was Anandavardhana’s chosen aim
to bring out the cogency of this consideration, to prove that
words and senses in the greatest literature are charged with a
powerful hidden meaning and with infinite suggestion. The
greatest objection raised against such a view was, naturally,
that the concept of suggestion was too inscrutable and elusive
as not to merit rejection as an important principle in criticism.
Hence Anandavardhana was led to examine in minute detail
the various ways of the workings of suggestion in the course of
answering the objection. And the task of reinterpreting the
earlier concepts from the stand-point of Dhvani and valuing
them at their true worth also fell on his shoulders. As contrasted
with the outward, factual, or actual narration in poetry, he
showed with unerring judgment the existence and, more than
that, the importance of the inner meanings and their relation
7
to feelings and emotions and creative imagination. To catch
these subtle suggestions intended most by the poet, the critic
or the reader was to cultivate his taste and sensibility by a
constant study of literature with an open, unbiased and
responsive mind. In other words, Anandavardhana attempted to
educate the students of literature in the matter of taste also,
and this he did by means of hundreds of striking examples
culled out from the greatest works of literature, Sanskrit as
well as Prakrit. He also endeavoured to show that Pratibha
(Poetic Imagination) was indispensable for the making of a great
poem, and its ways of working could only be felt and
understood, but never analysed and described. He says that
even as with the enchanting grace of a beautiful woman, there,
is about the charm in poetry something which defies analysis,
inexplicable and mysterious. Furthermore, he tried to
recognise the truth that though the first and original inspira¬
tion could be only in the poet, yet all who could sympathise
with and rightly interpret him, must also be partakers of the
same inspiration. This in short, is what Anandavardhana
sought to achieve in his Dhvanyaloka and to what extent he
was successful will be clear by an examination of its contents
in greater detail.
The Dhvanyaloka or ‘ Light of suggestion ’ consists of four
chapters called Uddyotas or ‘ Flashes ’. The first chapter takes
into account all the objections, assumed as well as real—that
may possibly be brought against the validity of the theory of
Dhvani. These charges, coming as they do from adherents of
different schools of Philosophy, Grammar and Ancient Poetics,
are all shown to be baseless. Then follows the enunciation of
a definition of Dhvani and a clear explanation of the various
terms involved in the definition. A brief indication of the major
varieties of Dhvani, their relative importance and their relation
to the other concepts is also given.
The II chapter proceeds to enumerate the sub-divisions of
Dhvani, and to bring out the peculiarity of each of them with
the aid of striking examples. Then the province of each of the
several concepts-Guna, Riti, and Alankara-is precisely defined,
and Dhvani is shown to rule unrivalled in a realm of its own.
DETAILED DESCRIPTIVE ACCOUNT 99
How far the concepts are inter-dependent and how far
mutually exclusive is clearly brought out.
Adopting a new basis of division, the III chapter sets out
other subdivisions of Dhvani and then takes up for considera¬
tion the various fundamental factors which underlie the process
of composition. Illuminating Investigations relating to theme,
style, characters and propriety are all found in this chapter.
The questions of judgment in literature and the various degrees
of excellence in poetry are also discussed here.
In the IV chapter Anandavardhana explains with the help
of a number of examples how the province of poetry is never
completely exhausted or totally emptied even when the subject
of a poem happens to be one and the same thing for a number
of poets. A hundred poets might have written about a common
subject like sunrise. But for that reason alone it does not
become trite. There is bound to be difference from poet to
poet and every one of the poems may be equally good. This
endless variety is said to result from Pratibha or Poetic Imagi¬
nation which varies from man to man. And Pratibha itself is
said to run in channels ever new only when due deference is
shown to the claims of Dhvani in one way or another.
It will be seen that this division of the Dhvanyaloka into
four chapters is more arbitrary than logical. Instead of any
exclusive consideration of the different aspects of Dhvani in
the different chapters, we find all the topics running into each
other in every chapter. Hence, it is proposed in the following
pages tobring together all the relevant material in the book
under broad and convenient heads, care being taken not to
omit any significant detail. The various heads to be considered
serially are detailed below :—
I Dhvani, defined and illustrated.
II Classifications of Poetry from the standpoint of
Dhvani.
Ill Dhvani in relation to other concepts
1 Dhvani and Bhakti
2 Dhvani and Alankara
3 Dhvani and Rasa
4 Dhvani and Guna
5 Dhvani and Do$a
6 Dhvani and Sanghajana
7 Dhvani and Riti
8 Dhvani and Vjtti
IV Varieties of Dhvani
V Dhvani and the other systems of Thought
VI Dhvani and Poetic Imagination.
CHAPTER VI
DHVANI, DEFINED AND ILLUSTRATED
In the second chapter, the several senses in which the term

Dhvani is used (1^ tjie Dhvanyaloka) have been indicated.
The question tha*comes Up for consideration in this section is
Ananadavardhana g definition and illustration of Dhvani and
his analysis of t e imp0rt of words which serves as the basis for
an enunciation of he theory>
In almost all schools of Indian Philosophy, attempts
were made to am\e at a satisfactory explanation of the problem
of meaning. Thou, in point of minor detail, they differed
from one anot e was comrnonly held by all that words
denote primari y t conventional meaning and secondarily an
implied one. Theformer type 0f sense) the one that is direct,
primary and c°nv!ntional, they called Abhidheya as opposed
to the latter of s<:on(jary signification (Lak§ya). It was also
held that the V^s had two separate functions (Vj-ttis)
Abhidha and L«£§aj?aj corresponding to the two senses
mentioned above. jjecause Gf its secondary character, Lak$ahi
also was given 1[e names Guna-vj-tti and Bhakti. Ananda-
vardhana endeavors tQ prove that the suggested sense in poetry
cannot be props’1 under any of these recognised senses and
hence a third fun. wor(js should be postulated for its
explanation. His 3ntention is that in the province of poetry it
is suggested sens\fone tjiat matters most.
He says, for inâce, in the third Uddyota1—
& smfr * sRfhnrRpJ-
1 PP. 474- , e jnces are tQ tj,e pages Qf the Dhvanyaloka Edited hy

Pandit Patta hirarr gastrj an(j pUb]jshed by Jaya Krishnadas Haridas
Gupta as No. 1 ^ Sanskrit Series. The abbreviation Dhv. is
used for the Dhvan^
(There is not a single specimen of good poetry appealing
to men of taste, which does not owe all its beauty to the play
of suggestion. And this should be considered as the supreme
secret of poetry.)
At the very outset of the Dhvanyaloka, after alluding to
various criticisms that might be levelled against the theory of
Dhvani, Anandavardhana hastens to analyse the nature of
poetry and give a summary of his conclusions without entering
into needless controversy. ‘ The most important element in
poetry which elicits unstinted admiration from all men of taste
is its sense. And this sense in poetry will be found to have two
aspects on a closer analysis ; the one fundamental aspect is of
course the explicit, and the suggested happens to be the other
aspect.2 There is no mistaking the first one. Every critic, great
or small, is bound to recognise its importance and as a matter
of fact, all the earlier writers in the field have elaborately
explained it through their scheme of figures of speech like
simile and metaphor.3 Hence it is needless to dilate upon the
nature of the explicit sense. We shall freely draw upon the
writings of the ancients whenever there is an occasion for
alluding to the Alankaras. But the case of suggested sense is
altogether different. It does not readily catch the eye of the
critic like the Vacyartha. But a reference to any great poet is
enough to prove that it exists and that it strikes us in a
singularly delightful manner. The beauty of the suggested sense
is not identical with the beauty of its components, but some¬
thing over and above it. This unique phenomenon can be
likened to the bewitching beauty in lovely women pervading
their whole physical frame and yet exceeding the symmetry or
—Dhv. I. 2.
3|>*T sftsjsir: II —Dhv. I. 3.

DHVANI, DEFINED AND ILLUSTRATED 103
harmony of their various limbs.4 We shall have occasion to
show later that this suggested sense is distinguishable into
different types such as (i) idea (Vastu) (ii) figures of speech
and (iii) Rasas. But whatever type be taken, it will be found that
it has a separate existence of its own, by its own right, over and
above the explicit sense.’ Let us take some instances.5 First of
all we shall see how the suggested ‘ idea ’ differs from the
explicit idea (Vastu);—
vnwas *r grotsvr i
mral* it
(Ramble, o hermit, confidently ;
That dog is today killed
By the fierce lion that^dwells
In the wild thickets yonder
On the banks of the river Goda !)
If we take only the primary sense into consideration the
verse will be seen to contain an idea that encourages the
traveller to ramble without any hesitation, since the cause of
his anxiety so long, viz., the dog, has been conveniently killed.
But there is no mistaking the suggested idea which is just the
opposite of what is directly expressed. Will a man who is afraid
of a dog, hazard in grounds frequented by a lion ? In other
words a sly threat is issued to the traveller that his life will be
in greater peril than before, if he ventures any more into these
grounds. The suggested idea, stated plainly, would be ‘Do not
frequent this place hereafter.’ The relation between the explicit
idea and the idea suggested is in this instance one of direct
opposition.
flwfrT II Dhv. L 4
5 Dhv. pp. 50 ff. Only the Sanskrit Versions of the Prakrit verses are
given in the text.
The following is an instance where the position is reversed
While the explicit idea is that of prohibition, the suggested idea
is a positive invitation :—
forsrra anfif i
*n ?r«n?TTJTR?Tt?n^lr: u
(Here lies my mother-in-law, a heavy sleeper;
And here I, stretch: Mark well
While yet it is day.
O Traveller, night-blind,
Don’t you tumble into one of our beds !
When it is found that the verse is addressed by a woman of
loose morals to a stranger seeking accommodation for the night,
there will be no difficulty in getting at the suggested sense. It
is nothing but a veiled invitation to the stranger to get into bed
with her at night since the old mother-in-law will be sleeping like
a log to notice anything.
While the explicit sense is commendatory in force, the
suggested may be neither commendatory, nor prohibitive as in
the following instance
enr I
HI aWTft cTOT f^TT sifstaci II
(Get away hence;
Let sighs and sobs be mine alone,
And not thine too
By missing one you really love
Though making love to me for show!)
A devoted wife addresses her unfaithful husband in this verse.
That he should hasten to his mistress is the idea directly stated.
But the suggested idea is not so definite. She would not
like her husband’s going away, nor his stay for mere courtesy’s
sake.
One more instance where the explicit sense is negative and
yet the suggested is neither negative nor positive:—
«rftrenf^T°n for sarcl 11

(Prithee, be pleased to go back, love!
For darkness thick is dispelled by the light
Shed by your moon-face, causing
hindrance to others on the road, to wit,
Trysting damsels in the dark.)
The outward sense is ‘Don’t proceed further’. But the inner
meaning is different as will become clear from the context.
A lover has appointed a place of assignation to meet his
beloved at night, and the lady is proceeding accordingly.
But the impatient lover meets her even half-way and recognises
her in spite of her disguise and to avoid disclosing his identity
to the other wayfarers, he addresses the lady cleverly by this
verse. It is suggested that she should accompany him either to
his or her place. The suggested sense is thus indefinite.
It is also possible that while the explicit idea refers to one
object, the suggested has reference to an altogether different
object as in the following example:—
«TT «T TTTf fflPTFTT: |
(Who is there that won’t be angry

To see his love’s lip injured ?
Perversely you smelt the lotus
Which hid a bee within ;
Suffer now the consequence !)
The verse on the face of it is addressed to the lady and
means : ‘Now suffer for your obstinacy ; be prepared to receive
the rebukes of your husband.’ But the suggested sense has
reference more to the husband than the lady. The context is
this : In the absence of her husband a lady indulges in secret
dalliance with her lover asking her maid to warn her at the
arrival of the husband. Accordingly the maid warns her in this
verse and at the same time cleverly suggests to the husband that
he should not entertain undue suspicions about his wife at the
sight of her bleeding lips since they were caused by the acci¬
dental stinging of a bee.
So far, examples of Vastudhvani have been examined ; as an
illustration of alankara-dhvani, the following verse of Ananda-
vardhana himself may be considered6:—
« Dhv. p. 261.
a* 3^ «TOwaii|r i
8?ftT «T *HHlfa ^*T
^SJTrE^r STSTlf^ TOlfa: II
(Lit up are the quarters with your lustrous beauty.
And your face looks charming with a smile upon it;
And still, O darling, if the ocean does not swell.
Obviously it is a mass of inertness.)
Though the idea of the moon-face is not directly stated, it
is clearly suggested. It is only when the Metaphor that the
lady’s lovely face is identical with the moon is understood, the
passage will become fully meaningful. Much of the beauty in
the passage is due to this Rupakalankaradhvani. And the
figure is not at all to be discovered in the explicit sense.
And as regards Rasa-dhvani,7 or suggestion of an emotion
or mood, it is obvious that it always outreaches what is merely
matter-of-fact. It is in this variety only that the supreme
importance of suggestion can be readily realised. As a matter
of fact no emotion can be delineated, without the agency of
suggestion, in so many commonplace words. Granting for
argument’s sake that words do denote emotions, there will
be only two possibities for such a phenomenon—Rasas
will have to be denoted either by the words standing for
them, or (2) by a treatment of the Vibhavas etc., of the Rasas
concerned. The acceptance of the first alternative would mean
that there will be no Rasa in the absence of words signifying
them. But it is a matter of common experience that emotions
are never represented through the mention of their names. Even
in instances where the names are found, it is not because of
these names that Rasa is communicated8 but because of a poetic
description of the Vibhavas etc., leading up to the Rasa. The
name only serves to identify the Rasa (which is otherwise
T Dhv. pp. 78 ff
s The expression ‘ideally revived’ would represent the Indian theory
more correctly: ‘communicated’ is used here only loosely. I am indebted
to Prof. M. Hiriyanna for pointing this out to me.
occasioned ; and not to manifest it. And in several other
instances, we do not have the names of the Rasas at all and yet
we experience Rasa. There will arise no Rasa by a mere men¬
tion of words like tfrngara and Vira, in a composition totally
devoid of the delineation of Vibhavas etc. Thus in the light of
these facts, both positive and negative, we are led to the conclu¬
sion that emotions are represented not by their proper names,but
only by the delineation of Vibhavas etc- Now, these Vibhavas
and other accessories too do not generate Rasa like so many
physical causes. They only suggest Rasa. Thus it is clear
that Rasa is only suggested and never expressed.
This element of suggestion or Dhvani which has so far
been shown to possess a separate existence of its own outshin¬
ing what is merely explicit, occupies the most prominent place
in poetry. It may be said to be the very soul of poetry. So it
is that we find even Valmiki, the first of polets, declaring that
his pity at the sight of a pair of linnets which were forcibly
separated from each other for ever, transformed itself into a
verse.9 The sentiment of compassion (Kanina) has pity for
: Stfa: dwpia: II —Dhv. I. 5.

The text is apt to be misunderstood when taken literally. It is neces¬
sary that we should take assistance from Abhinavagupta to understand it
rightly. If Valmiki be regarded as the alambana-vibhava of Karuga-rasa, it
will mean that he is afflicted with sorrow and the fact of bis writing a poem
to give vent to his personal sorrow would be ridiculous according to
Abhinavagupta. (Of course this goes against the Western idea of a lyric as
an expression of the poet's personal emotion.) Personal sorrow in life is
supposed to find such worldly outlets as tears and not poems. Abhinavagupta
gets over the difficulty by saying that Valmiki is only a sympathetic
spectator who enjoys the Karuna-rasa, while the real sorrow is in the
surviving bird ; (i.e. the bird should be regarded as the alambana vibhava.)
Valmiki’s sympathetic heart is touched, he enters into ideal identity with
the sorrow of the bird, and has an emotional, imaginative and blissful
experience. The sorrow of the bird gets transfigured in the vision of the
imaginative poet and the result is aloka or song. The Indian explanation of
pleasure we derive in witnessing tragedies, is also based on this principle.
1 am indebted to Prof. M. Hiriyanna for drawing my attention to the
facts contained in this note.
its immediate primary impulse, and the essence ofValmiki’s
verse has of course to be sought in the Karujia-rasa that is
suggested therein. Of the three varieties of Dhvani mentioned
above, Rasa-Dhvani alone happens to be the most important;
the other two varieties are also classed under Dhvani in so far
as they too tend to reveal Rasas and Bhavas.
And the Muse of Great poets embodying that sweet
meaning (i.e. suggested) serves as a clear testimony to their
unique gift of genius in abundance.10 That is just the reason why
really great poetry is but rare in the world. Amidst all the
innumerable persons passing for poets, we can hardly come
across a handful of them who really deserve the designation of
Mahakavis or great poets.
For the same reason too, a true appreciation of suggestion
in poetry is not given to all. Mere knowledge of grammar and
lexicons is not enough to ensure a right understanding of
poetry. If poetry also were predominatly addressed to the
intellect (which would be the case if it consisted only of direct
meanings to the exclusion of suggested ones), knowledge of
grammar and dictionary should have proved quite sufficient for
a right understanding of it. But poetry abounds in emotive
suggestions and hence it is that a sound literary taste is
necessitated in the critic. Just as in the field of music, mere
knowledge of the mechanical principles will be of no avail
unless one has an ear for music, so in the field of poetry also,
no amount of learning will matter without a proper aesthetic
sensibility.11
Since suggestion forms such an important feature in all
the works of master-poets, the difficult task of getting at the
suggested sense and sometimes at the words too that are its
stfovnf^t^ ii —Dhv. 1.6.
5t i
h 3 *Pi«sn«hretff^r ii —Dhv. 1*7.
vehicles, devolves on the conscientious critic.12
It is of course true that poets do direct their attention
first of all towards the explicit sense. But this fact in itself does
not prove that Dhvani is unimportant or less important. A
man anxious to see things (during night) is seen to seek a torch
first of all as a means for attaining his object. The torch is not
an end in itself. It is only a means to accomplish another end.
In the same way, poets take interest in the explicit sense as a
means to communicate their other ideas suggestively. The
suggested ideas are the ends which guide the poets in their
selection of other things.13 And just as the knowledge of a
sentence depends on a knowledge of the component words, in
like manner the suggested sense also~f& grounded upon the
explicit sense.14 The import of the individual words is certainly
an essential factor leading up to the import of the sentence as
a whole. But once the total meaning of the sentence is grasped,
the individual meanings of the component words slide into the
margin. We simply ignore them.15 The phenomenon is just the
same in the appreciation of poetry. When the several suggested
senses flash forth before the steady and penetrating minds of
men of taste, they will in no way be concerned with the
explicit sense. When they are alive to the sparks of suggestion
coming with a sudden spontaneity, they will be totally unaware
of the explicit ideas.16
re!: II —Dhv. 1* 8
13 atrateisS? i
—1. 9.
14 *!**!$ *• 1
sn%q^ sr^t: ii — 1.10
15 srfaqrvrct i
—I. 11
-1.12.
Bearing in mind the foregoing considerations, a definition
of Dhvani may be laid down as follows :—
‘ Dhvani is a type of poetry wherein words and senses lose
their primary signification in order to suggest other things.
(These suggested ideas at their best, e.g. Rasas etc., do not
admit of being directly expressed at all; and even at their
worst (e.g., Vastu) they look much better when suggested than
when they are directly stated. The surface-meaning of the
poem as a whole may subordinate itself to the suggested sense;
the primary meanings of only particular words in the poem may
allow themselves to be eclipsed by suggested significations. In
either case, the predominance of suggestion is unquestioned and
hence such poetry as provides ample scope for the play of
suggestion, comes to be termed Dhvani.17
But it must be remembered that unless the suggested sense
arises naturally from a poem, it will not be entitled to the
status of Dhvani-Kavya. The suggested sense must be such as
caD be grasped readily, and not strained.10 secondly, it should
be of primary importance, not being subordinated to explicit
sense (in which case it would become Gunibhutavyangya). And
finally, words prominently used in odd fashion by a beginner in
the composition of poetry either because of his lack of educa¬
tion or sufficient imagination, should also be regarded as falling
outside the province of Dhvani-Kavya19 Clarity and importance
are thus the two fundamental conditions of Dhvani in
whatever form it is found (20)’
—Dhv. I. 13.
18 W gdfrwwtsfl: sf I
srift STI^fr *Tt=3?t II —Dhv. II. 31.
19
«Ts I
5I5êt g ^ wA: II —Dhv. II. 32.
—Dhv. II. 33.

Anandavardhana contents himself with these preliminary
observations about Dhvani in the I Uddyota, without going
into too many details. In the III Uddyota, however, the
implications of these statements are clearly and fully brought
out. Anticipating plausible objections to the doctrine of
Dhvani from adherents of Mimamsa and other systems, the
author endeavours to silence them all by advancing arguments,
strictly logical and cogent.
The theory of Dhvani proceeds with three fundamental
postulates. In the first place, it assumes that Dhvani exists
apart from primary sense. Secondly, it presupposes that
Dhvani is most intrinsic tp poetry. And thirdly, it believes that
Dhvani cannot be explained in terms of either Denotation
(abhidha) or Indication (laksapa) and hence a new function of
words viz., suggestion (Vyanjana) should be admitted. Of these
postulates, all the philosophic systems are prepared to concede
the truth of the first two; but they demur as regards the accep¬
tance of the third as valid. The Mimamsakas, for instance,rmight
argue thus—‘ words are always intended by the speaker to
convey a particular sense. Even the so-called suggested sense is
meantto be conveyed only by the words used. Now, our conten¬
tion is that so long as a particular alone is comprehended from
the words used, there is nothing to prevent us from regarding
that sense as being denoted by those words. The province of
Abhidha or Denotation is certainly wide enough to include
under it Dhvani too, and hence there is no necessity of admitt¬
ing Vyanjana or suggestiveness as a separate process. The
ultimate meaning meant to be conveyed by a passage is itself
to be considered as the primary meaning. And if any other
meaning intervenes, it should be taken only as a helpful medium
having temporary existence, existing only so long as
the ultimate meaning is not grasped. The purpose of these
intervening meanings is to lead one to a full understanding of
the Tatparya and once this purpose is attained, they exist no
longer. As an analogy, the relation between padartha and
Vakyartha might be cited. The import of individual words in a
sentence is but a stepping-stone and a helpful means in the
comprehension of the meaning of a sentence as a whole. The
same relation subsists between Mukhyartha and tatparya.21
The objection, it will be seen, is concerned more about the
philosophical necessity or otherwise of admitting a third
function of words besides the accepted ones, than about the
soundness of Dhvani as an element of literature. So, Ananda-
vardhana proceeds to point out the hollowness of the objection
adopting the polemic style of philosophy.
Anandavardhana begins his refutation* (of the objection)
by saying that a word does very often convey a further meaning
besides its conventional sense and that this fact is uncontested.
In such an instance, the question that naturally arises is whether
the two meanings are conveyed by one and the same function
or by two different functions of the word working separately.
The first alternative wherein no difference can be discerned
between the two functions cannot be accepted since it contra¬
dicts experience. The two functions are directed to different
objects and there is difference in their nature also (rupabheda).
To explain: One function, viz., Vacakatva or Denotation is
directed towards its conventional meaning; the other function
viz., Gamakatva or suggestion is concerned with a meaning
other than the conventional one. In other words, we might say
that while Denotation expresses its own (i.e. well-known)
meaning, suggestion conveys a meaning beyond that of denota¬
tion. Whereas the relation between Denotation and its sense is
!1 *3 . . . f*T%: f3?TT I
i to ^ to en^rotlr-
Vft WTT7TT: I ft TOT

ÎTO: I *TT TOlf^ «n^l’-d4Wdllrl:> ?TT
An article recently appearing on this subject is—S. P. Bhattacharya,

‘ Two Nyayas in realation to the Dhvani creed ' Journal of the Oriental
Institute, Baroda; Vol. IV pt, 4, pp. 393-404
* See Dhv. pp 416 ff.
direct, it is one degree removed in the case of suggestion and its
sense. For suggestion includes and yet exceeds denotation.
It is through the medium of the primary sense alone that the
suggested sense is conveyed. Suggestion cannot proceed with¬
out taking in its stride the conventional meaning also. Yet if
suggestion too were directly connected with that sense, there
would be no further sense at all than the conventional one. And
therefore, that there is Vi$ayabheda between the two functions
is proved beyond a shadow of doubt.
In addition to Visayabheda, there is also Rupabheda bet*
ween them as remarked above. The two functions (Abhidhana-
Sakti and Avagamanagakti) are not identical. For, it is seen
that even sounds entirely lacking in denotation convey sense.
Songs, for example, convey emotive meanings or Rasas. Why,
even gestures where sound also is not present, signify certain
shades of meaning. For these reasons, the two functions of
a word, viz., Denotation and Suggestion, must be regarded as
separate, and the one should not be pressed to do duty- for the
other.
Moreover, the analogy of padartha and vakyartha, cited in
the objection, is not quite applicable to Vacya and Vyangya. It
is the opinion of some thinkers22 that the very idea of padartha
is unreal. But the others23 who hold that it is real will have to
explain the relation between padartha and vakyartha on the
analogy of gha$a and its upadanakarai?a. Clay is the material
cause of a pot. Clay cannot be distinguished as such once it is
transformed into the shape of a pot. The natural state of clay
is changed out of all recognition. So also, when one has the
idea of a sentence as a whole, the idea of the several component
words will become unserviceable. But this ghaja—tadupadana-
karana-nyaya cannot explain satisfactorily the relation between
vacya and vyangya. When the suggested sense is comprehend¬
ed, the primary meaning is not unserviceable. On the contrary,
the suggested sense is always grasped together with the
** The Vaiyakarapas who believe in the reality of only sphoja.

** Bbajja Mfmamsakas, and Naiysyikas.
8
expressed and yet distinctly. A satisfactory explanation of this
phenomenon can be found in the ghata-pradipa-ny§ya< An
object like ajar is perceived at night only with the aid of light.
If the light is removed, the perception of the object too ceases
instantaneously. Just as the perception of a jar is influenced by
the continued presence of a light, so the suggested meaning
also is influenced by the continued presence of the primary
sense. In the light of these considerations, the remark in the I
Uddyota that the relation of Vacya and Vyangya is similar to
that of padartha and vakyartha must be understood with some
reservation, as referring broadly to their similarity in general,
sharing as they do the characteristic of being a means in
common.
Furthermore, it is only in instances where the suggested
sense happens to be primarily intended that the Mimamsakas
can try to explain it away as the result of Denotation according
to their dictum ‘Yatparah gabdah sa fcabdarthah’. But in
other instances where suggested sense is not primary, but
subordinate to the expressed sense (as in Gunibhuta-vyangya)
they too have to admit that suggestion is not the same as
Denotation and that it exists separately. Once they admit this
fact with reference to some instances, where is the point in their
denying it with reference to others? If suggestion can haev
independent existence when it is subordinate to denotation,
nothing can prevent it from enjoying the same privilege even
when it is principally intended.
Two arguments (viz., Visayabheda and Rupabheda) have
already been advanced to prove that Vacakatva and Vyanjaka.
tva are distinct. There is also a third reason which leads us to
that conclusion. While words and words alone can denote,
words as well as meanings can suggest. Thus it will be seen that
in addition to Visayabheda and Rupabheda there is also
Karanabheda or distinctness in their means.
Vyanjakatva is thus a characteristic belonging to both
$abda and artha. And it proceeds with the assistance of the
primary function or Vacakatva. If we examine the two processes
carefully we shall see how they differ in respect of their proce¬
dure also. Vacakatva is based on the well-known conventional
significance of words, a significance which will always have
remained constant since the time of learning the language dur¬
ing childhood. But Vyafijakatva does not remain constant like
that as it is adventitious (aupadhika). It goes on varying as time,
circumstance and the speaker differ. One might ask, why
consider it at all if it is so indefinite ? The answer is that though
it is indefinite with regard to the suggestors, it is quite definite
and constant with regard to what is suggested.24
The Mimamsaka might again urge that at this rate there
would be Vyafijakatva in every commonplace utterance as
‘Bring the cow’ (Gamanaya), since the intention of the speaker
to milk it is suggested therein and not expressed. This is true no
doubt. But a distinction is to be made between the practical
intention of a common man and the aesthetic intention of an
imaginative poet. In commonplace utterance, the Vyafijakatva
in every sentence is to be taken as identical with its denotation
since the two are invariably concomitant. But to poetry where
there is special charm due to Vyafijakatva we give the exclusive
title ofDhvani and it should not be confused with what is
merely commonplace. Take any instance of poetry which
appeals to a critic of taste and you are sure to find therein the
unfailing and charming touch of suggested sense. And this is
the supreme secret of poetry.25
And this most important truth must be clearly borne in
mind whether one is engaged in the task of creation or appre¬
ciation of good poetry.26
But at the same time Dhvani should not become a fad with
poets or critics.27 They should not go out of their way to in¬
corporate suggestion at the expense of propriety and clarity.
Very often poetry is rendered charming by subordinating
suggestion to Denotation instead of making it exclusively
24 See Dhv. pp. 436-7.

25 Dhv. P. 441.
36 SPTMcT: I
sn m n —Dhv. III. 45.
2T ntoqqt i —Dhv. p. 481.

important. An example might make this clear :—
SpsSTT I
m xrotV rtt 3TSTH II

Here Kalidasa is describing how Parvati reacted to the
mischievous humour of her attendant. Having painted Parvati’s
feet well, the Sakhi suggests laughingly to her lady that she
might put it to action against the digit of the moon on the
head of her husband, Siva. And Parvati here is said to have
beat the Sakhi with her garland ‘without a word’.
Here this negative statement ‘without a word’ conveys only
its primary sense. Kalidasa could easily have substituted it by
a positive expression suggestive of all that Parvati felt. But as
it is, the remark that she did not utter a word does more credit
to Parvati’s modesty than a suggestive portrayal of her mixed
feelings in a more positive manner.
CHAPTER IV
(Section II)
CLASSIFICATION OF POETRY FROM
THE STANDPOINT OF DHVANI
In the preceding section it was pointed out that suggestion

plays a very important role in the sphere of poetry and that
even outside poetry, it deserves to be admitted as an independ¬
ent function of words. It was carefully distinguished from the
function of ordinary denotation and its influence on poetry was
indicated in general terms. In this section, an attempt is made
to explain how an acceptance of the principle of Dhvani will
help us practically in our study of poetry, how it will provide
us with a sound criterion in discriminating between grades
of beauty in poetry and estimating them at their true worth.
Poetic excellence, as we saw, is mostly achieved through
the agency of suggestion. The element of suggestion may be
either predominant in a given instance of poetry or it may be
subordinate to the explicit sense. The third alternative is that
it may not be present at all. Starting with this simple
analysis we can arrive at a reasonably valid classification of
poetry. First of all, we have that class of poetry wherein the
suggested significance alone matters, all the other consider¬
ations serving only as means to a full grasp of the suggestion,
and not as ends in themselves. It will represent the highest and
the best kind of Poetry and may be termed as Dhvani-Kavya.1
The second class of poetry is that in which the suggested
significance is lost in the primary charm of the expressed sense.
Suggestion is present but only has a secondary importance. If,
in the highest class of poetry, the beauty of the expressed sense
tends to be eclipsed by the greater charm of the suggested, in
the second variety, the position of the expressed and suggested
1 See ante, Section I

senses is reversed. The second class of poetry may therefore be
called significantly Gun ibhuta-Vyangya-kavya2 (lit. Poetry of
subordinated suggestion). To take an instance,
* Who is this maiden here, a new Ocean of Beauty!

Where lilies blue blossom with the moon ?
And two temples of a wild elephant bathe
Beside plantain stems and lotus-stalks ? ’
The words ‘ blue lily ‘ moon ’ ‘ temples of an elephant ’
* plantain stem ’ and ‘ lotus-stalks ’ suggest respectively the
eyes, the face, the breasts, the thighs and the arms of the lady
that is being described. The words by themselves are strictly
inapplicable to a lady, and hence the suggested meaning must be
resorted to for making sense out of the poem. But these
suggested ideas only serve to reinforce the initial remark that
she is a new (eighth) ocean of Beauty. That the context is a
description of the woman’s beauty is clearly indicated by the
words: mqlfo % ? This is the subject-matter of the poem
and hence occupies the first place. The suggested beauty of the
various parts of her body is subordinate to the figuratively
expressed idea that she is a veritable ocean of Beauty. The
stanza therefore is an example of Gunibhuta-vyadgya.
It is not necessary that the individual words should shed
their expressed sense altogether in favour of suggested ones as
was the case in the above instance. They may retain their
expressed meanings also and the suggested idea may be
subordinate to the expressed as in the following example4:—
arft %^rm; 5T II
The (Lady of the) Twilight is flushed (with love),
And (her love,) the Day is moving just in (her) front;
9 srerctsssrt gtihgeraqpi: i
31^1^ qnswfaqt II —Dhv III. 34.
5 See Dhv. pp. 459-60. 4 Dhv. p. 461.
CLASSIFICATION OF POETRY 119
Alas, how strange the course of Fate :
Yet there is no union for them.
Though there is a world of suggestion in the verse, the
beauty of the figure of speech itself is more appealing5, and
hence this is to be classed as Gunibhuta-vyangya-Kavya.
Though the suggested idea is prominent, if the same idea
gets explicitly stated besides being suggested, then also we have
an instance of Gunibhuta-vyangya, e.g.
&Z 5pc3TT i
The artful lady understood

The lover’s mind for the time of tryst;
And with eyes that smiled meaningfully,
She closed the lotus-petals in her hand.
The suggested idea in the last quarter of the verse6 is
corroborated by the expressed idea in the three lines immedi¬
ately preceding.
When the suggestion of an emotion or feeling is subordi¬
nated to the expressed sense, we have examples of Rasavad-
alankara. The status of Rasa and Bhava in such circumstances
may be likened to that of a king while he attends the .marriage
of one of his servants.7
Or a suggested figure of speech may become subordinated
to an expressed one as, for instance, upama in examples of
Dipaka.8
5 The context is the direct description of the evening. Hence the primary
meaning comes to be looked upon as prominent. The figure of speech-
skgepa or Samasokti here—which is only a turn given to direct meaning—
becomes more appealing than the shades of suggested meaning which may
not have a direct bearing on the context.
6 Viz. Sunset is the time of assignation.
7 as =* jpfwtst
i Dhv- p-462
8 i —Loc. Cit.
120 THE DHVANYALOKA AND ITS CftlTICS
It will be seen from the above that a detailed considera¬
tion of Gunibhuta-vyangya involves an estimate of the different
kinds of figures of speech. A full treatment of this aspect will
appear later in section III. 2.
Though Gunibhuta-vyangya has been given the second
place in the classification of poetry, it should not be mistaken
to be always second-rate in importance or appeal. Many
passages in poetry which are seen to delight the readers by their
grace and grandeur come under the class of Gunibhuta-vyangya,
and the poet should spare no effort in resorting to subordinated
suggestion while composing similar verses.9
The following verse will serve as an example :—
strain i
•ppPEffitfi’ * $3** »10
Lak§hmi is his daughter and Hari himself the son-in-law.

Ganga is his wife ; Moon and Nectar, sons.
Oh ! what a family the mighty Ocean has !
The suggested meaning is—‘ Lak§mi or wealth is rela¬
ted to Hari and Ganga on the one hand and Moon
and Nectar on the other. That is to say, wealth can be obtained
through devotion to Hari and bathing in the Gaiiga; and once
it is got, one will think of the Moon and Nectar; in other
words, the wealth is best spent on wine in the company of
women on moonlit nights.’ Though beautiful in itself, this
suggested meaning is suppressed by the contextual primary
meaning viz., ‘The family of the mighty ocean is extra-ordinary’.
Under this class of Gunibhuta-vyangya can be included
instances where there is suggestion through ironic tone(Kaku) in
case the suggested sense is subordinate to the expressed, E. g.
‘ vrafat i ’
‘Oh! The sons of Dbftara§tra will live in peace (or Heaven)
as long as I breathe.*
0 Sis****!*. §31*51-. 1
^ * ^3 *W*lS*fl* *ter: II Dhv. HI. 35
10 Dhv. p. 463.
Bhima’s ironic suggestion here that the Kauravas
can never enjoy peace is subordinated to the explicit idea,
which is paranomastic. It should be noted that the ironic
meaning is suggested by the words directly through the assis¬
tance of Kaku, and Kaku by itself is incapable of signifying
anything unless it has influence on the primary function of
words viz., Abhidha or Denotation. In other words, Kaku is
immediately concerned with Denotation, not suggestion. But in
as much as the Denoted sense is conveyed only along with the
suggested sense (though subordinate), it comes to be called
Gunibhuta-vyangya. In every instance of Gunibhuta-vyangya,
then, the presence of either denoted sense only or suggested
sense only is not enough : both of them must be simultaneously
present and the suggested should be subordinate to the
Denoted.12
So Far we have tried to give an account of the Gunibhuta-
vyangya from the standpoint of contextual meaning. But if we
look at the same Gunibhuta-vyangya from the standpoint of
Rasa, the designation will be deceptive, since Rasa is always
Vyaiigya and generally not subordinated to Vyangya. From
this point of view, the very instances given under Guijibhuta-
will have to be looked upon as instances of Dhvani-Kavya.13
There is hardly any composition entirely devoid of Rasa. For
everything in the world acts as Vibhava (stimulus) to one or the
other Rasa.14 And if these Rasas are primarily intended by the
poet to be conveyed in a given instance, one must regard it an
example of Dhvani. Thus in Kalidasa’s verse
11 spTparcnfa: seren *n w i
*n srerciim*nf«ren u -Dhv. m. 38.
12 Dhv. pp. 477-9.
i<M4qqrefr5R3T 3*: n —Dhv. m. 40
14 ^ sep* srfaqui
fowfo I —Dhv. p. 495.
etc., quoted as an instance of Guîbhutavyangya outshining
Dhvani,15 if one were to consider it as indicating the rise of the
sentiment of Love, it would be proper to regard it as Dhvani
itself.
It is necessary, then, to make sure of the point of view be¬
fore bringing poetry under one or the other of the classes pro¬
posed. Wherever Rasa is primarily intended, not only
Gunibhutavyangya, but the other varieties of Dhvani too,
assume the role of Vyafijakas towards Rasa.16 It is only when
Rasa is not primarily intended that the other classifications
will hold good. And in such places great care must be taken
while determining the relative importance of the suggest¬
ed the and expressed senses17. This is the only practicable way
in which confusion between Dhvani, Gunibhuta-vyangya and
Alankaras can be avoided.13
The third class of poetry is given the name of Citra (or
Pictorial poetry) in so far as the element of suggestion plays no
part in it, whether principal or subsidiary. In other words.
Rasa receives hardly any attention in this variety of poetry.19 It
abounds in striking imagery, and revels in peculiar turns given
to sound and sense. Such beauty as it achieves will be entirely
due to the various figures of speech. And accordingly Citra-
Kavya may be sub-divided into Sabda-Citra and Artha-Citra.20
15 See ante.
16 Dhv. III. 40.
17 twiiarimmiwh i—Dhv-p- *94.
18 qr* sprat fNiroi:,
19 qvrRjjumiî^TT i
n —Dhv. in. 4i
p. 495.
TO qimfiwww: ll —Dhv, III. 42.

The name ‘Citra’ is given to this class of poetry as it
resembles a painted picture in more than one respect.21 Let us
suppose that a picture of a living king is painted on a canvas.
The picture will be an imitation or a representation of the
living king. It may look quite beautiful as a result of the pain¬
ter’s skill in drawing. But it will be wanting in the most impor¬
tant element :of Life. The king lives but the picture is only
a lifeless object. And this is a very important difference. While
the picture may be of use in the absence of the king to revive
his memory vividly, in his immediate presence, it cannot serve
as a substitute for the king. The same is the position about
citra-kavya. By the aid of several striking figures and tropes,
an author may make his composition appear picturesque; but
there will be no life-essence about it. Rasa-dhvani is the vital
essence of poetry and this will be completely lacking in citra-
kavya. Still it comes to be classed under poetry because it
imitates the other two classes of poetry (viz., Dhvani and
Guijibhuta-vyangya). Strictly speaking, however, it should not
be counted as poetry at all.22
Sabda-citra is instanced in the employment of arduous
figures of sound such as Rhyme and Alliteration.23 An Artha-
citra will be the result when figures such as poetical fancy
(Utprek§a) are employed for their own sake without any
regard for Dhvani.24
One might object to the above description of Citra-kavya
as follows: “If Citra is defined as a kind of composition entirely
devoid of suggestiveness, the definition may perhaps exclude
suggestion of vastu and suggestion of Alankara, but how can it
21 «T I IRjV I —Dhv. p. 4 95.
—Dhv. pp. 499-500.

23 — —Dhv. p. 495.
wwu&wt fera i _Dbv <p. 495.

exclude suggestion of Rasa ? For there can be no such instant
of poetry which is totally devoid of Rasa. Poetry must l
related to some external object and there is no external obje
in the world which does not act as a promoter of some Rasa <
the other in the mind of men. Unless these objects excited i
emotion in the poet, he would not start composing the poet
Rasas always affect the mind and how can poetry be entire
devoid of it ? So at least from the point of view of the po
who must be supposed to have written under the influence <
an emotive frame of mind, the definition of Citra will l
proved to be untenable.”25
The objection is no doubt true. Strictly speaking, Ra!
cannot be totally absent from any specimen of poetry. Bu
while studying a given > passage, we will have to determii
whether the poet intended the delineation of any Rasa. If tl
poet is seen to indulge in verbal and conceptual figures <
speech without any intention of delineating Rasa, we concluc
that the passage is devoid of Rasa. It is the intention of the po
(Vivak§a) alone that serves as a criterion in deciding th
question in the province of poetry. Though in particular ii
stances there may be suggestion of some Rasa in spite of tl
poet’s Vivak§a, it will be practically negligible and hence v
may treat them by and large as citra. But if Rasas are real
meant to be conveyed by the poet, the poem must of cours
be regarded as Dhvani-kavya itself.26
I Dhv. p. 49
srastwSbnft insra®! gftew 1

—Dhv. pp. 496
CLASSFICATION OF POETRY 125
In this connection, Anandavardhana deplores the practice
of poets who delight in the use of Alankaras with a total
disregard to the considerations of Rasa. He makes the pointed
remark that according to the new school of poetic criticism,
Dhvani and Dhvani alone deserves the designation of poetry
and citra has no place at all.27
*T For a fuller consideration of this subject see Section III. 3 on

Dhvani and Rasa.
CHAPTER IV
(Section III)
DHVANI IN RELATION TO OTHER CONCEPTS
1. Dhvani and Bhakti:

One of the objections against the theory of Dhvani which
Anandavardhana refutes at great length is that Dhvani is
identical with Bhakti. Bhakti is a name given to the secondary
significance of words. Its synonyms are Gupa-vytti and Lak§ana.
Bhakti is resorted to when Abhidha (or primary significance) is
inapplicable in a context, on the strength of current usage. If in
practice a particular word is seen very often to be used in a
sense other than the primary one, this usage can be borrowed
into writing also at a particular stage. And one understands
this secondary meaning in lieu of the primary one in such
passages owing to the sanction of metaphorical usage or
upacara. Thus, it will be seen, upacara or established usage in a
secondary sense lies at the root of Bhakti. And the principle
underlying Dhvani is suggestion where new meanings are
conveyed both by words and surface meanings. Such being the
case, if one tries to correlate Dhvani with Bhakti, it would be
fallacious. Since the provinces of the two differ, such a corre¬
lation would involve both the fallacies of * Too wide *
(Ativyapti) and ‘Too narrow’1 (Avyapti). To illustrate:
Firstly, since instances can be cited of Bhakti where there is no
dhvani at all, we have the fallacy of ‘ Too wide ’. We shall take
an example where there is no charm due to Dhvani, but where
Bhakti is present in so far as the author has employed words
in a secondary sense on the strength of established usage.2
1 *RFn I
ii _Dhv, i. h.
2 See Dhv. p. 143
DHVANI IN RELATION TO OTHER CONCEPTS 127
ft ^*jst3Rt§<r3%:
ftfUsHI: W=m^ 11
(This bed of lotus leaves indeed bespeaks
The torment of the maid that slept thereon;
With its two ends faded due to pressure
From buxom breasts and well-shaped hips ;
And space about the waist fresh green
for want of contact;
And with the bed all disturbed
By the languid movements of creeper.like arms.
Here the expression or * bespeaks ’ is used to mean
‘ clearly indicates ’. It is a symbolic or secondary usage of the
word (Bhakti). But no special charm is secured in the poem as
a result of this secondary usage of the word. Even if the words
* deary indicates ’ were used, there would have been no gain or
loss to the sense. Such secondary usages should never be
confused with Dhvani. When a word conveys through the
process of suggestion some special charm which cannot be
coveyed by any other word, it is then alone that'.it deserves to
be designated ‘ Dhvani.’ In the above verse there is no such
special charm and hence there is no Dhvani.
The word is used by the author with a purpose,
viz., to mean that it very clearly indicates. In employing the
word, he is guided by the common and customary usage of
such expressions in daily parlance. The author knows that
(* Vadati ’ primarily means ‘ speaks ’ and not ‘ indicates ’; Yet
he selects it since it serves his purpose. But there are other
words such as ‘ Lavanya the original meaning of which has
entirely been abandoned .as a result of long and established
usage. They were originally metaphors but as a result of
constant usage, they are no longer regarded as metaphors.
Lavariya, etymologically means * Saltishness ’. But when a poet
uses the word in the sense of ‘ lovely grace ’, he does not do
so with any purpose. He uses it merely as if it were not a
metaphor, following usage. Such ‘ dead metaphors ’3 too cannot
be classed as Dhvani.4 Of course such words too can find
a place in Dhvani-kavya; but the Dhvani there will be a
resultant of other factors and not of those words.5
Further, it should be noted that the secondary function of
words is resorted to mostly with a definite purpose in view.
E.g., when one says ‘ ’ (‘The student is a lion’) the
word ‘lion’ should be taken to mean ‘courageous boy.’ This we
do because the primary meaning is incompatible in the context.
The student cannot be a real lion. To put it differently, the
* lion ’ is ‘ skhalad-gati ’ (inapt) if used in its primray sense. If
we imagine that words proceed unchallenged in conveying their
word meanings, the word ‘lion’ here cannot proceed unchecked.
It stumbles even at the outset because of incompatibility. Now,
why is it one thinks of saying * the student is a lion ’ while he
could as well have said ‘ the student is courageous ’ ? Some
purpose must be admitted to be in the mind of the speaker to
explain his out of the way usage. The purpose is to convey more
strikingly the extraordinary courage of the boy. This hidden
purpose also has got to be conveyed by these very words.
One might say that it is conveyed once again by the secondary
function of the words. But it is impossible. For the word ‘lion*
by Lak§ana means ‘ courageous boy ’ because ‘ lion ’ is skhalad-
gati in its primary sense. Now, if ‘ courageous boy ’ should
also by Lak§ana convey the sense of * extraordinarily
courageous, nimble, dignified, undaunted etc.*—all this is
3 An expression first coined by Max Muller.
4 foi^sre^ srs^r- i
srereren: * refer u -Dhv. 1.16
Anandavardhana’s derivation of from may not be accep¬
table to modern philology ; it appears to be a Prakrit derivative of
reborrowed into Sanskrit.
6 ^ fore 5ESKl»d>l retd |

«T I Dhv. pp. 146-7
the intended purpose in using the word lion secondarily) then

the expression courageous should also be skhalad-gati in its
primary sense, because that is the most important condition for
resorting to Laksana. We know that the word ‘courageous boy’
is not incompatible with its primary sense, is not skhaladgati.
If we suppose for the sake of argument that it is ‘skhaladgati’
then the use of Laksana itself would be a Dosa (defect). For, in
order to avoid the flaw of skhaladgatitva, we understand a word
in its secondary sense. But if the secondary sense also is going
to be skhaladgati, why resort to Laksana at all even at the first
instance ? We would thus be committing a fault. It is there¬
fore impossible that the idea of ‘purpose’ for the sake of which
one resorts to Laksana, can also be explained in terms of
Laksana.® It can be explained only in terms of Dhvani.
Gunavrtti or Bhakti always has for its basis Abhidha or
Vacakatva. There is an essential connection between the two.
Bhakti follows only in the wake of Abhidha, and the secondary
meaning is connected in some way or the other with the primary
meaning. It is never independent of Abhidha. But it is not so
with Dhvani. Dhvani has vyanjakatva for its basis and not
vacakatva. And there is no such essential relation between the
meaning suggested and the meaning denoted. For this reason
also, Dhvani should be regarded as different from Bhakti.7
As was stated earlier, if we hold that the two functions of
words are identical, we will be faced with the fallacy of ‘too
narrow* (avyapti) in addition to that of ‘too wide’ which has
already been illustrated. Bhakti co-exists with Dhvani only in
one of its sub-varieties viz., avivaksitavacya. But all the other
varieties of Dhvani like vivaksitanyapara, will be left out since
there is no Bhakti at all in them.8
6 gast fi% qffcsss i
as It — Dhv. I. 17.
aiT^JT II —Dhv. I. 18
8 safown a i srssrfSarsat i a%
EH a aâ: stont aaai ;
—Dhv. pp. 151-2
9
In view of all these considerations, Dhvani should b<
looked upon as different from Bhakti ; and Bhakti can henc<
never serve as a definition of Dhvani as urged by som<
objectors.9
But there is nothing to prevent Bhakti co-existing witl
suggestion in some instances and serving as a pointer to it1
This does not mean that by knowing the nature o
Bhakti, the nature of Dhvani also is as good as known. At tha
rate, one might say that by knowing the nature of Abhidha the
nature of all Alankaras is as good as known, which would implj
that all the treatises on Alaftkara are a superfluous waste deserv
ing to be consigned to oblivion. The argument is absurd on th<
face of it.11
In the III Uddyota, Anandavardhana takes up this questior
again for a more thorough-going analysis. While differentiatinj
Vyanjakatva from Vacakatva, one of the reasons given was
that the latter is always based on ‘words’, in contrast to th<
former which may be based either on \words or meanings12
But Bhakti or Gunav'ftti also shares this characteristic ii
common with Vyanjakatva. ‘Gunavrtti’ is of two kinds (1
Based on Upacara (2) Based on Lakâna. The first kind is
illustrated in the usage of two words seemingly incom
patible with each other, to refer to one and the sam<
object on the basis of their excessive similarity as e.g.
where means (ftgqgsi and becomes an adjective tc
9 ammflMggFTCt I —Dhv. p. 152
10
HI 3 I
ârpjT
*r- u —Dhv. 1. 19
spfi: Him wfoireiWW

—Dhv. p. 162
11 See ante
the word. But in an example like jxfpri gW: (‘herd-station
on the Ganges’) we have Laksana and not Upacara. As in the
previous instance, the word Gangayam here does not become an
adjective to the word Ghosah. While the secondary sense is
understood, the sense here is directed to a new idea altogether,
the idea of gaiigatira or the bank of the Ganges, which is not
expressed by; any word. In other words, if; the secondary mean¬
ing is as good as implied in the words used (e. g. ^;) we
have upacara ; when it is not so very clear and we have to
think of the context and other circumstances before getting at
the secondary meaning, we have Laksana. In the former, i.e.,
upacara, there is samanadhikaranya between the two seemingly
incongruous words; that is to say both the words relate
to one and the same idea. But in the latter, (i.e., Laksarta)
there is no Samanadhikaranya between the words. While the
Vatu himself is metaphorically a lion, the Ghosa itself is not
Gangatata, even metaphorically13.
Both the above varieties of Gunavrtti 'are Sabdagrayaas
well as arthaSraya just like Vyanjakatva. Not only do the words
but their meanings also play a part in instances where we under¬
stand a secondary meaning. But, from this, one should not jump
to the conclusion that Gunavrtti and. Vyanjakatva are identical14.
We have already pointed out there is Svarupabheda and Visaya-
bheda between Denotation and suggestion. The same differen¬
ces can be detected even between Indication (Gunavrtti) and
suggestion (Dhvani).
Rupabheda or difference in their individual natures maybe
explained as follows :— Gunavrtti is resorted to only in instan¬
ces where the process of primary denotation cannot function
directly. To avoid the incompatibility between the word and its
primary sense we turn to Gunavrtti for assistance. It is thus
clear that Gunavrtti is only a secondary function of words
•s See Dhv. P. 138 ff.

14 | fife 3 tPTfsft
Rnw i
16 See ante.
(amukhyataya Vyaparal?); But Vyan jakatva is a process, not at
all secondary, but primary as Vacakatva itself (mukhyataya
vyaparah).16 Moreover,Indication may be considered as nothing
but secondary denotation itself. The difference is only that of
degree and not of kind. But,as has been shown earlier, suggestion
differs from Denotation in kind also. Besides, when a word
denotes some other meaning secondarily, the primary meaning
loses itself completely in the secondary sense. In Gangayam
ghosah, for instance, primary meaning, viz., ‘current’ is aban¬
doned in favour of the secondary meaning ‘ bank ’. But in an
instance of suggestion, the primary sense continues to be felt
alongside of the suggested sense. And if one were to assert that
the process of Laksana applies also to instances where the pri¬
mary meaning is not abandoned while other meanings are
conveyed, it would be tantamount to saying that Laksana or
Indication itself is the primary sense of words ; which is absurd.
Every sentence does convey a purport (Tatparya) over and above
the merely expressed meanings of the component words and
this will have to be regarded as due to Gunavf tti. The conclu¬
sion is absurd to a degree.17
We shall now pass on to Visayabhedaor distinction in regard
to the objects they are connected with. There are three things
that can be suggested (1) All the Rasas (2) Some of the Alan-
karas and (3) beautiful ideas. Of these three, who will ever say
that Rasas can be conveyed by Gunavftti ?18 The same is the
position regarding the suggestions of figures of speech too. So
far as ideas are concerned, a distinction has to be made; while
any sort of idea, beautiful or otherwise, can be conveyed by
Gunavftti on the basis of established usage, only beautiful
ideas form the subject of suggestion.19
16 gwfoffgwym stf*F33 I
5 wyq «nqR: i *
aFTT WflW* JRFTft 55^ I —Dhv. pp. 423-4
17 Dhv. p. 424.
18 crer ?! %5*fagRra *r * errp. i
^-p. 42.
18 See ante.
Though distinct from Vacakatva on the one hand, and
Gunavftti on the other, Vyanjakatva still derives assistance
from both of them in conveying the suggested sense. It is to
indicate this relation clearly that Dhvani is divided
into two kinds-Vivaksitanyaparavacya and avivak§itavacya.
In the former kind, Dhvani is based on Denotation and
in the latter, on Indication. Dhvani is thus seen to derive assis¬
tance from both. And for that very reason, it becomes impossi¬
ble that it should be identical with the one or the other. If it
were completely identical with Denotation, it could not be
based on Indication; if it were entirely the same as Indication,
then it could not be assisted by Denotation.20
Another argument also can be advanced. Words entirely
devoid of both Denotation and Indication are found to possess
the property of Vyanjakatva. For instance, the melodious notes
of music suggest Rasas. No one can say that those notes possess
Denotation or Indication. The Rasas evoked by them must be
said to be communicated by a third function other than the
above two. This third function can be noted some¬
times in natya etc., which are not even sounds. Vyanja¬
katva, then, must be admitted to be a unique function.21 If still
one were to assert that it can be admitted only as one of the
two recognised functions of words, at least in instances where
words are employed if not in such instances as music and gesture
we have only to push it to its logical absurdity by showing how
80 8*3*555* ft mu
i qjfef i ^wnsrmsnrrerqT-
snrom ft i
ere* si i 1
* =* b****rt?* i *
1 —Dhv. p. 427
21 mn ft *f\ci«cisrwwft s*^c**% ^
SSSTJIT *1 ss*tfg§Si*I5l I 5T5^M|5nfq
I —Dhv. p. 427.
134 THE DHVANYALOKA AtyD ITS CRITICS
even this trouble of equating Vyanjakatva with Vacakatva or
Guâvftti can be avoided by equating Vyanjakatva with sabda
or word itself straight away.22 It must therefore be taken as
proved that all words have three functions in the communica¬
tion of sense viz., (1) Vacakatva (Denotation) (2) Gupavftti
(Indication) and (3) Vyanjakatva (Suggestion). And in Vyanja¬
katva, if the suggested sense predominates over the others we
have Dhvani.23
2. DHVANI AND ALANKARA

The doctrine of Alahkaras had come to exercise such a
hold on the poets and critics of the period that Ananda-
vardhana could not dismiss it with casual remarks. He
devotes much space for a full consideration of the doctrine in
all its bearings. He endeavours to prove that provinces of
Alahkara and Dhvani are distinct, and tries to indicate precisely
their mutual relationship in poetry. And by pointing out the
limitations of the Alahkaras, he shows how several specimens
of good poetry will be left out of account unless the theory of
Dhvani is accepted ; and how such an acceptance would make
the notion of Alahkaras also more precise and meaningful.
At the outset Anandavardhana anticipates the objections
that might be levelled against the new theory from the
adherents of the Alahkara school and states them as follows:—
“ It is no doubt true that all the alahkaras do not contain
suggestion. But in alahkaras such as Samasokti (Compressed
83 qfjj 3T''H><3'3$hi<£hi
wk swTTFarn i
—Dhv. p. 428.
83 TORT:—I
cRf I —Dhv. p. 429.
Recently, a comprehensive study of Lakjana in Sanskrit literature

has appeared, viz.,
Louis Renou, ‘ The Enigma in the Ancient Literature of India ',
(Diogenes, Spring 1960, No. 29, pp. 32-42).
Metaphor), Ak§epa (Paraleipsis ), Anukta-nimitta-viêsokti
(Oxymoron), Paryayokta (Periphrasis), Apahnuti (Negative
Poetic Fancy), Dipaka (a verbal conceit ), Sankara (Conglome
ration of Figures) etc., the element of suggestion is unmista¬
kable and what you call Dhvani may be conveniently brought
under these figures.”24
The reply of Anandavardhana is that though in the said
alankaras, the element of suggestion is present, it is not exclu¬
sively important as in Dhvani where the primary words and
meanings subordinate themselves to the suggested sense. In the
alankaras, on the contrary, the suggested sense itself becomes
subordinate to the primary sense, and this point is illustrated
by Anandavardhana with the aid of numerous examples, one of
them may be cited here25:—
tot srfsrm i
tot mm crt sdsfo wiftfea si 35f§ira5* n
The twilight (the heroine’s face) with twinkling stars
(shining pupils) was illumined (kissed) by the moon (the hero)
glowing red (overcome by emotion) so suddenly (with such love)
that the entire mass of darkness (black garment) disappearing in
the east (slipping even in front) due to illumination (love) was
not at all noticed.
This is an instance ofSamasokti. The subject under descrip¬
tion is moon-rise and the primary meaning is given in the
translation. But, at the same time, the words are deliberately
used to convey a suggested sense also as indicated in brackets.
The primary sense relates to the disappearance of darkness at
the advent of the moon suddenly on the eastern horizon. But
the suggested sense refers to the dalliance of two lovers. The
verse owes its beauty to the primary sense with its accompany-
24 ^3 TO H TOT TTT ^ ^RTO:I

TO 3 TOT—
—Dhv. p. 108.
” Dhv. p. 109.
ing suggestion, not to the suggested sense exclusively. It is
therefore not Dhvani, but only Gunibhutavyangya.
The relative position of Dhvani and Alankaras may there¬
fore be summed up as followsCompositions where the
suggested sense is unimportant in so far as it merely follows
the expressed one are to be regarded as clear instances of
Dhvani, every other element such as sound and sense will be
directed towards this end of contributing to the superior
excellence of suggestion. The relation of Dhvani to Alankaras,
Gunas etc., is the same as that of the Angin (soul) towards its
various Angas or limbs. The individual limbs and the soul in
the body are always distinct and not identical.26
Similarly, a distinction is to be drawn between the
Rasavad-alankara of the ancient writers and Rasa-dhvani.
Rasa-dhvani is instanced in poems where all the other elements
of poetic excellence (such as alankaras and G unas) serve only
one purpose of evoking the Rasas.27 But as against this if the
Rasas are given a secondary position by being made subordi¬
nate to the expressed meaning, we have Rasavad-alankara.28
From this point of view, even the Alankara called Preyas by
some writers29 will be found to merit the title of Rasavad-
26 53^3 33T3I3T::3 3T^3m3Tg3lf33: l
«#'• *7 ^3 T333T TF353: II

... 3 3T333 ^3 T-t^TS^tRT Stf^: | —Dhv. pp. 130—1
33 77 S3Î333t 33: II
28 33#S?33 313313 33# fj 7777^3: I
dft47SMfl<l 7771^7% ^ 7?%: II —Dhv. II. 5
18 Bbamaha, for instance.

DHVANI IN RELATION TO OTHER CONCEPTS HI
alankara. For, the main significance of Preyas consists in Catu
or sweet and pleasing flattery to convey which the Rasas
assume the subordinate role of ancillaries (Angas).30
Thus in the new scheme of Rasavad-alankara that is
proposed here, two varieties can be distinguished, viz., pure
(feuddha) and Mixed (Sankirna).31 The first is illustrated in
the verse given below:—
* ft
HctiWifodl fdfrci; I
I ||
(‘Enough of jest; you can’t leave me again.

Ah ! how long you made me watch and wait!
Heartless indeed of you to be so fond of being away; ’
May I know the cause for this our separation so long,
So speak the wives of your enemy in dreams
clasping fast the neck of their husband ;
But alas only to awake and lament loud
at the sight of their empty arm-rings outstretched.)
The stanza is intended to be in praise of a king of
extra-ordinary valour. So ca$u or sweet flattery is the
main subject matter. And there is also the sentiment of
Karuna in the poets’ vivid description of the pathetic lot
to which the widows of the enemy have been reduced. It
is obvious the Karuna-rasa delineated here is not meant to
be important in itself, but meant as secondary, only in so
far as it redounds to the heroism of the king. Since Karuna-
rasa is delineated here exclusively without an admixture of
any other Rasa, we might say that guddha-rasa is an
alankara of this stanza.
The Sankirna (Mixed) variety of Rasa-alankara is instanced
in the following*:—
30 cRWi ^153 apftsssfTre* 1

—Dhv. pp. 191—3
11 Dhv. p. 193.
* Dhv. p. 195.
aj^%$<^crrc3ai<oiftifladl ^f$ra: spstfri i

sn%^?rrs^^T%r3?3^%fti: ^n^^îfvr:
*i*IWn<w ?r ^3 siFwr sRifrr: n
(Let the fire of diva’s shaft burn down our sins; a shaft which
conducted itself just in the manner of a lover who has given
offence to his lady love; Though shaken off by the Tripura-
yuvatis shedding tears, it would cling fast to their hands ;
though forcibly pushed out, it would hold on to the ends of
their skirts; though violently thrust aside by the hair,
it would fall at their feet unnoticed in their agitation.)
To sing the great glory of Siva who triumphed over the
Tripuras is the main object of the stanza. The state of women
in love excited by jealousy is also vividly brought out by means
of $le§a or double entendre. But it is only subordinate to the
idea of praise which forms the main subject of description. The
Karuna-rasa is also portrayed in the picture of the women as
shedding copious tears. In the circumstances, it would be
regarded a flaw on the part of the poet to describe contradictory
sentiments such as Love and Pathos simultaneously. But since
both of them here are only seconday to the primary subject of
praise of Siva and not of principal interest, the flaw is avoided.
Whenever Rasa happens to be the chief content of a poem, it
can never be an alankara. For, alankara means a ‘ beautifier ’•
And;how can Rasa become a beautifierôf itself? It can be called
an alankara only when it serves as a beautifier of something
else as in the above example. When Rasa itself happens to be
predominant, , it is Dhvani-kavya, and the other figures of speech
like upama will serve to beautify it*. If the above considerations
are borne in mind, the distinct spheres of Dhvani, alahkaras like
* ^ f| *3*3 =*iw-
$3: srftf’3;:5 5i srarewH mwarreite i .. •
g 0§T: . . . STClT-j 1 *** 3 smrp^n-
| —-Dhv. pp. 197-8

Upama and Rasavad-alankara will be clearly detected32. But if
it is said that all passages describing emotional behaviour in man
come under Rasavad alankara, the other figures like upama will
be left either with no scope at all or with very little scope.
Because even in the treatment of an insensible object, the con¬
duct of sensible beings is inextricably involved in some way or
another. Contrariwise, even while the description of a sensible
behaviour is present, one will have to deny its right to be
considered as Rasavad-alankara in case the insensible objects
happen to be the main subjects of description. And by doing
so we will be branding as nirasa (devoid of Rasa) a vast bulk of
literature in spite of its abounding in Rasa.33 The following
instances from Kalidasa will make the point clear :—
for Tg?rfiTT i
2TTTrT
STT TftvTct! II34.
“ Frowning with its waves as with brows, girdled with the

line of fluttering birds, and throwing off its foam as a garment
loosened in anger, and hurrying in devious ways with a repea¬
tedly stumbling step, surely, here is my jealous beloved, changed
into the form of the stream.”35
Dhv. p. 198.
i ... am sgrwft <pstt

<3Rt*n«ri «tihV JTijd:
wsrei i pp- 198-200
94 Vikramorvaiiyam, IV, 52—Karmarkar’s Ed.
9‘ Translation is E.B. Cowell's.
qi^qfaa siraigrn^ hi ii36

There standest thou, creeper,
All slender, thy poor sad leaves are moist with rain.
Thou silent, with no voice of honey-bees
Upon thy drooping boughs ; as from thy lord
The season separated, leaving off
Thy habit of bloom ; why, I might think I saw
My passionate darling sitting penitent
WITH tear-stained face and body unadorned
Thinking in silence how she spurned pay love.”37
In these instances though the subjects of description
happen to be insensible objects, the attribution of sentient
behaviour to them is obvious. But we would be forced to deny
the right of such instances to be regarded as meriting the
description of Rasavad-alankara. Besides, whenever there is a
description of emotional behaviour in men, we would be
constrained to consider it as Rasavad-alankara. Under these
circumstances there is almost no scope or hardly any scope left
for the application of all the other figures of speech such as the
simile. For, every object in this world, even an insensible one,
ultimately comes to be looked upon as an associate of Rasa at
least in the capacity of a Vibhava or exciting circumstance. The
view point of the critic is thus unsound, and hence the new
scheme of Rasavad-alankara deserves to be accepted un¬
hesitatingly.38
We saw above the intrinsic nature of Rasa in relation to
poetry and how this fact necessitates a revision of our concep¬
tion of Rasavad-alankara. Nor is this all. Our ideas about the
nature of all figures of speech will have to be changed and
'* Ibid.
” Translation is Sri Aurobindo’s.
—Dhv. pp. 203-4

recast. As Rasa happens to be the soul of Dhvanikavya, the use
of alankaras will be justified only in so far as the latter assist
in the communication of Rasa. The end of poetry is communi¬
cation of Rasa and alankara also serves as one of the means
towards achieving that end. It follows that if in a poem the
alankaras attract attention for their own sake, have nothing to
do with Rasa, we may at best admire the extraordinary effort
and skill of the poet, but not the poem in itself. When the
figures of speech divert the attention of the reader from the
essential enjoyment of Rasa in poetry, they will be far from
fulfilling their function. As a matter of fact, such a tourde force
will have to be looked upon as a veritable flaw in composi¬
tions.* If on the other hand, the figures appear naturally and
effortlessly and in harmony with the Rasa to be communicated,
they will justify their title of being alankaras or ornaments.t
Thus understood, the difference between the status of Alankara
in Citra-kavya and in Dhvanikavya will stand out clear.
In this connection, some might raise the objection that
though in the case of verbal figures such as yamaka (allite¬
rative repetition) the poet’s special effort towards their achieve¬
ment is quite patent, while with regard to figures of sense it is
not so patent, the fact remains that the poet should pay special
attention in devising them (Arthalankaras) also. They are thus
on a par and any attempt to classify some of them as hindering
Rasa and others as helping Rasa is to say the least, un¬
warranted.39
The Criticism is not valid because, when we take the
process of poetic creation into consideration, we find a legion
of these arthalankaras swarming at the poet’s choice in his
inspired moments, when his whole mind is lost in the rapture
of Rasa. In the composition itself they may look as though
— «
" Dhv. II. 15
H Dhv-IL16
they are the products of great effort on the poet’s part, but
nonetheless they occur spontaneously at the time of poetic
creation. Bana’s description of the sight of Kadambari by the
hero,40 and Pravarasena’s41 portrayal of Slta’s anxiety at the
sight of the severed head of Mayarama, may be cited as
instances in support of our remark. There is nothing unnatural
either in this state of affairs. Rasas are best communicated by
striking expressions and what are the figures of speech except
ornaments to expression ? Expressions become striking because
of the alankaras or ornaments. Hence there is nothing surpri¬
sing in the fact that alankaras become intrinsic factors in the
communication of Rasas. But a tour de force like Yamaka will
be entirely extrinsic. Wherever they are met, there can be no
doubt that they are being primarily aimed at by the poet, and
even if there be some shade of Rasa in such instances, it would
be'secondary and not primary. In instances of Rassbhasa (mis¬
placed Rasa) however, Yamakas also may be used: But in
Rasa-dhvani they can never find a place.*
Even amidst Rasas, Sringara or Love is most important,
and in poetry attempting to> describe Srngara, the alaAkaras
should be employed with great discrimination and judgment.42
They should always be ancillary to Rasa, helping the readers to
enjoy the Rasa in full. They should never occupy the foremost
place themselves. According to the context they should be
40 Cf. Kadambari.
41 Pravarasena, author of the Prakrit poem—“ Setubandha.”
*T fcsnl II
THmiHimiPres i
ii —Dhv. p. 222
I, 20
—Dhv. II17
employed, and the skill of the poet is evidenced even in his

rejection of the figures sometimes in lieu of Rasa. Ordinarily,
they should not be pressed too far, and if sometimes they are
pressed, they should serve only as promoters of Rasa.43 The
following example will make the point clear:—
1 WWfltf STS STflffc *Tf3TT
m ssrear ^ n44
“ Her moving-corner’d eye,
Trembling as in pain, thou touchest oft and oft;
Like secret whisperer.
Tenderly thou hummest, flitting by her ear;
She waving both her hands.
Thou dost drink her lip, be-all of pleasure soft;
We, searching for the truth,
Are undone, O drone! thou, yea, art lucky here !”45
The realistic description of the bee’s behaviour in the above
verse (or in;other words the Bhramarasvabhavokti) is in keeping
with the sentiment.
2 §rm-
5# Î: ||46
“To-day I shall certainly make the Queen’s face purple with
anger gazing upon this garden-creeper, as upon another woman
in love, that in a moment has displayed a profusion of buds
(a powerful longing), has a pale complexion, has its buds
43 ^t^ri ^ ^ ingaiwwlV n
mu srerlsnm*1 n
44 Abhijnana-Sakuntala. II, 3
46 Roby Datta’s Translation
48 Ratnsvali
opening up (has commenced to yawn), and has been manifest¬
ing the disturbance (anguish) felt by it (her) by the ceaseless
puffs of wind (by means of the constant heavings of sighs)”47
In this instance the double entendre (Slesa) is explained
more clearly by means of the simile (upama) narimivanyam.
3 vmi wgflwft fcropn ?$-
wwKufeti jrraf't I
*Ffi f>?t: n48

The double entendre in this verse is given up towards the
last line in favour of Vyatireka or contrast, and helps in
revealing the Rasa better.
jften hto sNtai g*: i
The Metaphor (Rupaka) of imprisoning the husband in this

verse is not pressed further into every detail in view of the Rasa
to be communicated,
ivi&zsm *rrcg i
T^nfjT stcigg 5$sftf%g
“ In the Priyangu do I trace thy limbs,

In eyes of startled antelope thy glance;
The moon recalls thy radiant countenance.
The peacocks’ tails thy shining tresses;
While tiny ripples in the streamlets view
To imitate the archings of thy brows.
41 M. R. Kale’s Translation
4« Dhv. p. 227
49 Amarugataka, 9
10 Meghaduta II
Yet alas, O jealous one, in none of these
Is there the whole likeness of thee!”*
Though the figure utpreksa (poetic fancy) is worked out in great
detail, it subordinates itself to the Rasa expressed in the last
line.
Unless the above considerations are kept in mind, the poet
cannot achieve his object of communicating Rasa. By disregard¬
ing these, he lands himself in patent flaws. Anandavardhana
says—‘Such flaws are sometimes found to taint even the works
of master-poets. But we have refrained from illustrating the
flaws lest it should reflect upon our own taste.’52
The next point which deserves our consideration is the
nature of Alafikara-dhvani. But before taking it up, the scope of
the figure glesa and its distinctness from one of the varieties of
Dhvani (viz., âbda-âktimula-anuranana-rupa) might be indi¬
cated in passing, since there is likelihood of confusing the one
with the other.
In the figure Slesa two ideas are simultaneously communi¬
cated by virtue of the equivocal words used ; and both the
ideas will be equally plausible, since there is nothing to decide
in favour of the one or the other. E.g., ‘ Sarvadomadhavah
payat’ may mean-(l) ‘May giva, the husband of Parvati protect
us always’ or (2) ‘May Madhava protect us who is a granter
of all desires.’ But in the variety of dhvani mentioned
above, a new figure of speech is suggested besides a second
idea on the basis of the equivocal words. It is this feature (the
suggestion of a new figure of speech) which marks it off from
glesa.51
Udbhata’s opinion is that Slesa embraces all instances
where other figures are understood through its medium.52 Even
according to his view, the other figures are expressed by the
words used in the poem, not suggested. But in gabda-$akti
* Translation Rooke's
61 Vide Dhv. p. 235
/ Dhv. p. 236.
Vide also Udbhata’s Kavyalafikira-sangraha,
JO
mula-dhvani, the other alahkaras are not expressed by the

words used but only suggested.53 For instance in the following
verse:
?rcn fonfa former siftofr i
^TÎTTHg-. f^FRT ^ II
one of the Vyabhicari-bhavas of Srngara, viz., Vismaya and
the figure of speech, viz., Virodha are both expressed besides
Sle§a. Such instances do not come under Sabda-âkti-mula-
dhvani. The latter is instanced when the alankara is suggested
and not expressed as in the above verse. As an example, the
following sentence from Bana54 may be taken :—
There are first of all two different ideas expressed in the

sentence. The one is a description of summer and the other a
description of Kala-Rudra. Both are based on the equivocal
nature of the words used. Since the context is decisive in favour
of the former sense alone, the latter would become asam-
baddhartha or incoherent. To avoid this difficulty, to make the
other idea also coherent in the context, we understand that the
two ideas are related as upamana and upameya. That is to say,
we take the other idea as a simile. The Simile is only suggested
and not at all explicitly expressed. It is suggested by virtue of
the words used. Hence it significantly called Sabda-âkti-mula-
dhvani.55
Whatever the suggested idea in a poem, if it is rendered
explicit too by some of the expressions used, it at once ceases
53 W 3 HlWlfsra gnxqgqfaftTfe
sr«T5T^ H I Dhv- p- 236■
84 Har?acarita, Ch. II
65 R7I315*^3 srnsn-
... —Dhv. p. 244.

to be Dhvani and must be regarded only as an alankara.56
We shall now pass on to Alankara-dhvani. The concept of
Alankara-dhvani is nothing very new. Even ancient writers
on poetics like Udbhata have clearly pointed out how one
Alankara’may suggest another alankara.57 For instance, Upama,
Rupaka and AtiSayokti have been shown to lie at the root of
many alankaras such as Sasandeha. Alankara-Dhvani is thus a
recognised fact and there is no need of discussing it in great
detail. But one point needs emphasis. It is that all instances
where some alankara is suggested by some other alankara
do not merit the designation of Alankara-dhvani. Only such
instances as owe all their beauty exclusively to the suggested
alankara, and not to the expressed, deserve to be considered
as Alaiikara-dhvani. It follows that alankaras like Dipaka
wherein upama is invariably suggested, do not come to be
classed as Dhvani, since their charm lies in the expressed figure
and not in the suggested.53 But in instances as
etc-50
the whole charm of the verse is ascribable to the suggested
figure alone, and hence they are called Alahkara-Dhvani.
Anandavardhana illustrates this in detail drawing instances
from a number of Alankaras which look charming by reason
of their being suggested60.
Dhv. II. 23.
57 flrer 1
H ftFST5F5n R^RT5t; 11
—Dhv- 11 26‘ p* 258*
* ^rrrarsi snnV jrpif n Dhv. 11. 27.

cptt =* i
Dhv. p. 259
89 See ante.
00 See Dhv, pp. 262 ff.
So long as the alankaras remain beautifiers of expressed
sense alone, they will be nothing more than external embellish¬
ments added on to the body of poetry.61 They cannot even be
considered as part and parcel of the body of poetry. But the
moment they partake .in the element of suggestion, they shed
their extrinsic nature and become intrinsic. They assume the
position of not only the body, but the soul of poetry.62 As seen
above, they can enter into relation with suggestion in two
ways, either in the role of suggestors or in the role of being
objects of suggestion. In the latter capacity they will be either
Gunibhuta-vyangya or Dhvani. We have dhvani when they
are suggested and the suggestion is exclusively important.63
This Alankara-dhvani also may arise in two ways. The
alankaras may be suggested either by an expressed idea or by
another alankara. When they are suggested by an idea, they
will certainly deserve to be regarded as Dhvanikavya, since
the very process of poetry is grounded on this feature.64
Otherwise, if the idea did not suggest any striking alankara,
it would be nothing more than a common place utterance
never rising to the rank of poetry. Even in the other
alternative, when alankaras are suggested by some other
alankaras, they will be raised to the status of dhvani provided
they are exclusively important and charming, as already pointed
out.65
81 CfDhv. p. 130
62 qiftlteyn ^ arcfcicrat i
q?i n —Dhv. i
Dhv. p. 278.
64 ercgiTRrn i
Dhv. II 29.
63 grgfiTrercsqiRreTil «r?qiRn i
Dhv. II. 35.
Dhv. p. 280.
DHVANI IN RELATION TO OTHER CONCEPTS 14$
No doubt writers on poetics have given a one-sided
emphasis in their consideration of alankaras by emphasizing
exclusively the beauty of the expressed figures ; still it should be
noted that all the alankaras play a part in suggestion either of
i an idea or another alankara.66 Just as every Dipaka suggests an
- Upama and every Samasokti a new idea, in the same way, all the
alankaras suggest either new ideas or new figures. For instance,
we have Atiâyokti playing a part in all figures of speech. It is
through Atiâyokti (Hyperbole) that great poets achieve beauty
in their poems. Within the bounds of propriety, whenever Ati-
gayokti is employed, it cannot fail to contribute to the beauty
of a piece.67 Even Bhamaha has noted this feature in his defini¬
tion of the figure.68 Striking imaginative description is the true
index of a poet’s genius and like an undercurrent it runs through
all the various figures he may employ. It is the presence of this
touch of Atiâyokti which promotes beauty in every figure; in
its absence, the figures would be like so many dead-weights with¬
out any beauty. Since it is the sole factor guaranteeing beauty
in all figures or speech, Atiiayokti has been so highly spoken of
by Bhamaha. And AtiSayokti can influence the other alankaras
in a two-fold manner. It may be directly expressed in addition
to some other figure in a given instance ; or it may be suggesti¬
vely understood by the help of the expressed figures. When it is
suggestively understood, it may be either exclusively important
or only secondary. Accordingly, we have AtiSayokti in every
instance of alankara in one of these three forms:—(1) Direct
AtUayokti (2) Atiâyokti-dhvani and (3) Gunibhuta-Vyangya-
atiSayokti.69
This characteristic of influencing other alankaras is not
peculiar to Atigayokti alone. Several figures of speech share
this feature in common with Atiâyokti. But while atiâyokti
66 miPifengjiA Hfa i
Dhv. III. 35.
87 Dhv. pp. 464-5.
88 See ch. I
89 Dhv. pp. 468-70
has a role in respect of every alaiikara, the other figures of
speech are not so universally applicable. Their scope is restrict¬
ed to particular figures. Thus, for instance, in figures like
Rupaka, Upama, Tulyayogita, and Nidarâna which are all
based on similiarty, the beauty is generally due to the suggest¬
ed idea of similarity as influencing the direct meaning.
Hence they must all be regarded as instances of Gunibhuta-
vyangya. Figures like Samasokti, Aksepa, and Paryayokta are
invariably related to a suggested idea and there cannot be any
difference of opinion about their being considered as Gunibhuta-
vyangya. But with regard to some figures it will be observed that
their scope of Gunibhuta-vyangya is restricted to single figures.
Vyajastuti, for instance, involves only one alaiikara, Preyas. In
other figures,the scope is limited to the suggestion of a nalaiikara
only as against Vastu. For instance, in Sandeha and such
other figures, only Upama (and figures based on upama) can be
suggested. Some other figures are found to be mutually involved
in the capacity of Gunibhuta-vyangya ; Dipaka and Upama for
example. It is well known that Dipaka involves Upama. k/pama
also sometimes—as in Malopama—involves a shade of Dipaka.
In this way all the figures of speech are found to involve an
element of subordinate suggestion. It is only this feature which
is commonly shared by all the alankaras; and it is only on
account of this feature that alankaras become beautiful. Take
away from the alankaras this element of Gunibhuta-vyangya;
and they will at once lose all their poetic charm though all
their other characteristics are present. For instance we may cite a
sentence like qsjl It is far from being poetic in spite
of its containing the characteristics of Upama. The reason is to
be sought in the total absence of suggestion.71
70 anj =3 sreiftssNi^^fi?i®n*rfer, Nr 3 *t 1
—Dhv. p. 470.
m 1 * Nt asirsrrataRi *mi£-
I -Dhv. p. 472.
It follows from the above that a general definition of
alankara must be based on the principle of Gunibhutavyangya.
And such a definition only can be free from the fallacy of too
narrow (avyapti). The procedure of the rhetoricians who refrain
from attempting a general definition of alankara and treat only
of the individual figures is open to several drawbacks. In the
first place, it is never possible to appreciate the definitions of
particular figures in the absence of a general notion of
alankaras. Secondly, it is not at all possible to exhaust all the
individual figures in any scheme of rhetoric, since they are
innumerable. Just as the modes of human speech are infinite,
the figures of speech in poetry too are infinite,72 based as they
are on human speech. On the other hand, when we define all
the alankaras as Gunibhuta-vyangya, there is no room left for
any fallacy. In the first place, the definition will have universal
application to all ihe alankaras, whether recorded or not in
manuals of rhetoric. Secondly, it will leave no alankara out of
consideration since Gunibhuta-vyangya is very wide, being
three-fold in nature (vastu, Rasa and Alankara) and all the
alankaras come under it one way or the other. Thus a clear
grasp of the concept of alankaras implies an acceptance of the
doctrine of dhvani.73
Further, an acceptance of the principle of Gunibhuta-
vyangya will assist one in deciding about the precise figure in
a given instance. It is found that in the absence of such
acceptance, doubts will crop up even in regard to well-known
figures.74 The following stanza, for instance, has been regarded
by some as an example of Vyaja-stuti75
72 SFFÎ % ^ I Dhv. p. 473.
Dhv. pp. 474-5.

74 sTTspri g i —Dhv- p-
» Dhv. p. 487.
&01«q «T 3T^T^
5R33 ^Hcl: ftMerit I
qsnft dgwwwrotwfl ^ri

?FTOII
What did the Creator have in his mind
When he lavished all his materials of beauty
And took inordinate trouble
To create this girl who inflames
Fires of longing in the innocent men
That were happy and free only a moment before;
The girl herself being far from happy
In the absence of a lover befitting ?
If we consider it as a Vyajastuti, it will imply that this is
veiled praise of the woman by a person in love with her. But
lover cannot be normally expected to make such a remark a
‘ In the absence of a lover befitting her ’, for he would conside
at least himself as deserving her love. We cannot go to th
other extreme and say that the verse records the impressions c
an ascetic who has abandoned the passions and who tries t
moralise in this way, for an ascetic will not bother about sue
questions. Unfortunately, the source of this quotation i
unknown. Otherwise, we could perhaps have decided the tru
meaning of the verse easily in the light of its context. Unde
these circumstances, it is desirable to regard it as an instance c
AprastutapraSamSa rather than that of Vyajastuti. By conside]
ing it as an instance of Aprastutapraârhsa, we shall be doin
full justice to the suggested (and subordinate) idea that this :
a poetic outburst of a person who rates himself very highl;
who is proud of his own uncommon virtues and endowment
who excites his less fortunate brothren into jealousy and wh
cannot find a single man that can appreciate his true wortl
The distress of such a man is suggestively portrayed here, an
the tradition that the verse is Dharmakirti’s gets added suppoi
from such an interpretation.76 It is indeed very likely thi
76 cwi to srffcf?: i * aro i

DHAVNI IN RELATION TO OTHER CONCEPTS 153
Dharmakirti wrote this verse, especially in view of the fact
that he has written other verses in the same strain (cf.
etc. p. 489).
Such then is the practical use to which the concept of

Guîbhuta-vyangya can be put in cases of doubt.
(3) DHVANI AND RASA
Anandavardhana is not at all tired of emphasising time and
again77 that Rasa is the most important element in poetry and
all the other elements deserve consideration only in so far as they
tend to make the way smooth for Rasa. Rasa is said to be the soul
of Dhvani, being amenable to no other process of communica¬
tion save suggestion. And Anandavardana’s treatment of all
the various topics in the Dhvanyaloka may be said to be condi¬
tioned by his attitude towards Rasa. If, amidst all the mass of
Anandavardhana’s scattered speculations, we are still able to
recognise a running thread, it is entirely due to his steady and
systematic appraisal of Rasa as the highest goal in poetry. It was
Anandavardhana’s opinion that every poet should strive towards
achieving it by making judicious use of all the material at his
disposal, and that the critic should have all his faculties awake
and open to receive and appreciate the charm of the Rasas
thus conveyed by the poet through the medium of his poetry. As
we had occasion to see in previous sections, Anandavardhana’s
remarks about Alankara, Bhakti, or any other concept con¬
tain an implicit reference to his general view of Rasa,;and once
this view is clearly grasped, all his other ideas will be easily
understood. Rasa may be regarded as the key-stone of the
arch of Dhvani according to Anandavardhana. The soundness
of his theory of Dhvani depends entirely upon the soundness
of the theory of Rasa, and Anandavardhana must have felt that
the cogency of his conclusions could not be questioned so
long as the supreme importance of Rasa in poetry was fully
recognised. And his procedure of explaining every element of
poetry in relation to Rasa, justifiable as it is, baffles any attempt
at an exclusive consideration of the various topics dealt with in
17 See Dbv. pp. 329, 363-4, 396-7, 400-01, 466-7, 498-9. 526-9, etc.
the Dhvanyaloka. In the preceding sections, an idea has bei
given of the place of Rasa in relation to Alankara. In tl
following sections the relation of Rasa to Gunas, Dosas, Vrt
and Sanghatam will be indicated separately. To avoid nee
less repetition, the present section will be devoted to a consid
ration of only such remarks of Anandavardhana about Rasa
do not come under the other sections.
Rasa is said to belong to a class of Dhvani called asar
laksyakrama. This is to emphasize the fact that Rasa is suggest
almost simultaneously with the primary sense( Vacyartha
Logically, of course, it must be admitted that there is son
sequence in their occurrence, but it is too slight to be notice
In this respect Rasa differs from the other classes of Dhvani.
According to Anandavardhana, the theme of a poei
(Itivrtta) and its style (vj-tti) are to be regarded as the boc
(Sarira) whose soul is Rasa78. This metaphorical account of Rai
is criticized by some objectors in the following manner—‘Whi
appreciating a poem, the primary meaning itself, in inseparab
associaion with Rasa impresses one, and the two are not expei
enced separately. Hence one should regard the position of tl
two as analogous to that of a substance and its quality, rath
than to that of a body and its soul. The reply of Anandava
dhana to this charge is that the other analogy proposed dot
not correctly represent the relation of Vacyartha to Rasa.
Vacyartha were inseparably associated with Rasa as a sub
tance is with its quality (e.g. a body and its white complexion
then Rasa would have to be invariably enjoyed by all reader
whether endowed with taste or not, even as whiteness is alwa;
perceived in the body. And as has been already shown79, this
not so 80
Vjtti on Dhv. III. :

19 See ante.
srfft gfirawwft srfrmiHd srist a«n m

^ i ?! i —Dhv- p* *
The critic might further argue thus-‘Just as the quality of
preciousness (Jatyatva) in gems can be recognised only by a
select few, so the quality of poetry, viz., Rasa, can be discerned
only by men of taste (sahrdayas)81’. The argument can be refuted
by pointing to the fact that while the quality of preciousness in
gems is discerned as identical with its nature as a gem (i.e.,
‘preciousness’ is the same as being a gem). Rasa is not identical
with the nature of vibhavas, anubhavas :etc., that are expressed
in a poem. They are different, being related to each other as
cause and effect, and as such some time-sequence must be
admitted to exist between the cause (the expressed vibhavas
etc.) and the effect (Rasa). But since it is too subtle to be
scrutinized, Rasa comes to be called asamlaksya-krama.82
Supposing the critic continues his objection, he might per¬
haps say—“Words themselves may be taken to convey
both the expressed and the suggested meanings simultaneously ;
why the needless bother about temporal sequence ? As every¬
one knows, a knowledge of the expressed sense is not at all an
invariable antecedent of the understanding of the suggested
sense. For instance, in the language of music, Rasa is suggested
and there is no cognition of the expressed sense preceding it.83
The argument may be met thus—‘That words by themselves can
sometimes convey Rasa.is an accepted fact. But at other times
they convey Rasa only through the medium of their primary
function (Vaeakasakti). Since this Vaeakasakti is an invariable
medium for suggestion of Rasa in poetry, the temporal sequence
cannot but be admitted.’84
81 **n*w?n^ i TOif^-
i i Dhv- P- 403.
82 *r % fo*RT3«rcsqfvraif*<n q* tot i era q*
^ fe*TT3li^SKftcqi%5TWIRfcft TOT^RT tf'Srdtefr 3RT4T5R<n*TEfa
^rassRierors^îcft i 3 snsrara stctorI q* Rrat
I —Dhv. pp. 403-4.
83 *155 qq m&te seftfagqsra-

Mrfllfl ft dif !•••■ —Dhv. p, 405.
84 Dhv. p, 405.
Since it is too rapid a process, the sequence is not clearh
felt. But this in itself does not mean that Rasa is communi
cated simultaneously with the expressed sense. In case Rass
were to be conveyed exclusively by the words assisted by thei
context, without any sort of interference by the primary sense
then it would mean that even persons who are ignorant of th<
meanings of words, but to whom the context has been mad<
known, might be quite able to enjoy the experience of Rasa ty
merely hearing the sounds of poetry. We know that such is no
the case. Further, if the two experiences (of the Vacya and th<
Vyangya) are really simultaneous, then Vacya-pratiti would b<
rendered useless; if there should be use for it, there can be nt
simultaneity (saha-bhava). Even in the case of words in music
there is some temporal sequence (of however short duration
between the hearing of the sound and the appreciation of th<
suggested sentiment. In such instances as this where we d<
not have any primary sense and also in other instances when
the suggested Rasa is not contrary to but in perfect harmon:
with the expressed, the temporal sequence cannot be clearh
discerned because the action of the various devices employee
(Ghatana) exclusively for the sake of Rasa, is very rapid.85
This variety of dhvani (alak§ya-krama-vyangya) emanate:
from not only wprds and sentences (like the other types o
dhvani) but from letters, modes of arrangement (Sanghajani
and entire compositions (prabandha). Harsh letters like q, £
q, and ^ are generally detrimental to the sentiment o
Srngara; but the same letters will serve to intensify the senti
ment of Bibhatsa. This is enough to prove how letters alsc
participate in the suggestion of sentiments.86
86 i
3^3 i
^1 ÎT ll —Dhv. III. 3-4
How a word may be imbued with a world of suggestive

emotion is instanced in the following verse87 where the word
‘those’ is emotively used :
f Hishf ^1
(As you trembled, letting the hem of thy garment slip

In a state of wild fear, and turning
Those eyes for help in all directions,
You were burnt to death at once
By the cruel Fire, severe;
Blinded he was perchance by smoke
And unable to catch sight of you.)
The following is an example of an emotive sentence
(Vakya) where the whole idea suggests the sentiment of love-
in-separation exquisitely :
sRuft *T3T sft?*?i atnarar i
h m fara-: ii88
(While my mother’s entreaties failed with thee,
Thy feigned anger, tears and appealing looks prevailed
(with me)
And thou didst come, O beloved,
Even to the forest for the love of me;
But I, ôur lover, with a heart of stone,
Still breathe, without you, unmoved
Even by the sight of the skies
Overcast by the new dark clouds.)
Nominal and verbal case-terminations, (sup-tift-vacana),
their grammatical number and relation, the force of karaka or
87 Dhv. p. 304 —Dhv. pp. 407-8

88 Dhv. p. 307-8
1S8 THE DHVANYALOKA AND ITS CRITICS
case-endings, primary and secondary affixes (kj-t and taddhita)
and samssa (compounds)—all these can be pressed into service
as vehicles of emotive suggestion.1 In the verse given below
almost all the above items are found to be illustrated :—
smfRictwr 1% m
*ar|SUH II3
(That there are enemies of mine, is insult enough to me.
What is more, this enemy is but an anchorite;
He too wipes out the Raksasa-race right under my nose;
Oh, that Ravana should live still!
Fie, fie upon the conqueror of Indra;
What is the use of awakening even Kumbhakarna ?
What avail these arms of mine.
Bloated by plundering a hamlet, viz., Paradise ?)
In if q-^r:, the possessive case, and the plural number
are suggestive; in ctiTO:? the taddhita affix and
nipata are suggestive ; in sfcrerff
the ksrakas and the verb are significant. In the second half of
the verse, the krt and taddhita affixes, the:samasa and upasarga
are all emotive. A verse embodying such subtle emotive force
in almost every one of its words acquires charm of style.3
The most important question, however, is how Rasa can
be made to permeate an entire work (Prabandha). The beauty
of a work as a whole is usually brought about by paying
attention to the demands of Rasa. It is not enough if the indi¬
vidual parts are made striking. The lasting impression of a
1 1
* Dhv. p. 348.
ft>JJ3 *T5T STf^T I Phv- P- 349■

work taken as a whole is something beyond the temporary
strikingness of the parts. As a result, there:are certain princi¬
ples underlying the unity and appeal of an entire work which
the poet should always bear in mind In the matter of selecting
a theme, in handling it, in introducing innovations into it; and
in the use of the various devices at his disposal, the poet should
always pay heed to Aucitya or propriety in relation to the
Rasa sought to be conveyed.
First of all, the poet should select only such themes for his
work as are rich in situations wherein the accessories of Rasa
viz., vibhava, bhava, anubhava, and saficari-bhava can be freely
and properly developed. The theme may be adapted from
well-known sources or originally invented; but always this
fact must be kept in mind.4 Bhava is used here in the sense of
Sthayi-bhava and its propriety consists in strictly adhering to
the nature and culture of the characters, while depicting their
actions. Characters may belong to different stations in life such
as the high, the middle and the low, and they may be either
divine or human. Propriety demands that the behaviour of a
particular character be in strict conformity with his status. If
human characters are credited with superhuman or divine
achievements, they would spoil the even flow of Rasa, being
incredible in themselves. Propriety of Vibhavas etc. in poetry
is the same as in drama and Bharata’s remarks regarding them
are of great value in poetry also.89
If in a theme, adapted from a well-known source, the poet
is faced with the difficulty of conflicting Rasas, he should not
hesitate to recast the story so as to suit the dominant senti¬
ment. Even great poets like Kalidasa have taken recourse to
this procedure. The purpose of the poet is not fulfilled by
being blindly faithful to the original story irrespective of
considerations of Rasa. Even historical chronicles record the
4 I
fofa: STT II Dhv. III. 10.

88 Phv. pp. 329 ff.
events faithfully. And they cannot be considered to be literature
on that score.89
In the field of drama, Bharata has already laid down the
various elements of a plot to be carefully employed by the
dramatist. They are the sandhis (lit. joints) and sandhyaftgas.
In devising a plot it will not do, if merely for the sake of obey¬
ing these rules, a dramatist invents scenes and situations. He
must invent them with the express intention of evoking the
sentiments appropriately.90
Another factor to be kept in mind in this connection is
that a single Rasa cannot be delineated incessantly, and
there should be rise and fall of the emotion as far as
possible. But the fall of the emotion, though thus necessary
sometimes, should not be subordinated to other sentiments.
The unity of the dominant emotion must be maintained always—
even while showing it at its lowest ebb. In the Ratnavali, for
instance, the constant changes in the development of the
emotion of love in the hero are very well portrayed, and in the
Tapasavatsaraja, the dominant emotion of love in the hero
towards Vasavadatta is very cleverly maintained amidst all
the other situations indicating different emotions.91
Finally, the poet should use alankaras sparingly, even when
he is capable of using them in plenty. Otherwise, he is likely to
be led astray by his over-fascination towards alankaras.92
89 I
90
R3 3T|^n^^T!5^g3T II —III. 12.

For a recent study of the studies, See
1 V. M. Kulkarni, Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda,
Vol. 4, pp. 369-405.
* T. G. Mainkar—Sandhi, and Sandhyafigas, Poona
91 idQtWWWfr I
also. Dhv. p. 341-2.

92 WStfM 4l*H^ I
II —Dhv. III. 14.
Such are the obligations to aucitya or propriety imposed
upon the poet by the exigencies of Rasa. Breach of these rules
will make his compositions devoid of Rasa and land them in
the region of Dosas or flaws.92 Hence the most important
function of the poet consists in his paying due deference to the
demands of Rasa.93 Even Bharata shows an awareness of this
fact in his classification of Vfttis into two types, one based on
sense (KaiSiki etc.) and the other on sound (Upanagarika etc.),
since both of them are to be employed only in harmony with
the Rasa to be suggested 94
As has been already observed,95 there can be no class of
poetry totally devoid of Rasa. The poetic activity, even of the
greatest poets, will lose all its charm in case Rasa is not given
full scope. And once the importance of Rasa is realised, the
poet will find it possible that even the driest and most insipid
subjects can be infused with poetic beauty. Even inanimate
objects can be made to play a remarkable part as exciters of
Rasa and they may even be attributed with the behaviour of
animate beings.96 Thus, in the boundless realm of poetry, the
poet himself is to be regarded as the sole creator. According to
his tastes, the whole world will revolve.97 If the poet is sensitive
to emotions himself, the whole world will be depicted by him as
°* See Infra.
ll —Dhv. p. 401.
u —Dhv. nr. 33.
95 See ante
96 sarm ^ a rsrri^-
aicTa a£*3 jfbnrisf a srgufi+wfd 1 sriftRi
—Dhv. p. 497.
97 srerrqfo 1
JEITTfl II —Dhv. 498.
11
suffused with emotion; on the other hand, if he should lack in
feeling, the world of his creation also will be dry and emotion¬
less.98 He is free to lend life to inanimate objects and make
even animate things look inanimate in their behaviour.99 It is
a rare privilege of the poet that he can thus transmute anything
in the world to solid gold of poetry. But in this he succeeds
just in the same proportion as he does justice to the claims of
Rasa.100 The same idea has been often strikingly expressed by
poets themselves. As one of them says :101
«it ffawfa i
(All praise to the poetry of masters which can make our

minds believe that things are truly so even when they are not!)
Even trite and common-place subjects shine out ever new
and charming when they are endowed with Rasa, like the trees
putting on a new glory of colour and beauty at the advent of
spring.102 The worldly objects which always labour under the
weight of conventional limitations are freed from these
shackles, and endless variety and captivating novelty are
introduced in them as a result of Rasa.103
Of all the several ways of suggestion illustrated in this
treatise, that of Rasa outshines all else and the poet should
98 STsFTft $15^ 5TR TgiRT I

H 5t^ II —Dhv. 498.
99 %ct5R$cTCR%eWg I
sqqrgrcqfo Rd^-MI II °P- Clt*
100 ct^g <f«wWdl TtfdTWTd; ctgfwR-
cwfcti 5i i î si JJOTTiflf 1 —Dhv- P- 498.
101 See Dhv. p. 527.
102 f’ET'SjlT wfo irat: ^1^ I

m 5RT ^T^lf^t ^ 7JTT‘- II —Dhv. IV-4.
103 WTRISnst^T glWTWWWIHWI gsifrrTT%f^ I

—Dhv. p. 527.
bestow all his attention towards its achievement.104 If we
examine great works like the Ramayana and the Mahabharata,
we will find that though there are hundreds of scenes depict¬
ing battles, the authors never repeat themselves. This is so
because even the same thing is made to look entirely new by
the force of Rasa. And care must be taken by the poet in
maintaining the unity of any particular sentiment in the entire
work. Other sentiments may receive all elaboration at his
hands; but they should not impair the unity and importance of
the principal sentiment (angi-rasa). These epics themselves
will serve as illustrations of this fact since, amid all variety of
the incidents narrated, the continuity of one dominant senti¬
ment is remarkably preserved 105
In the R^mayapa, we have the exquisite example of
Valmiki’s elaboration of the Karuna-rasa (sentiment of compa¬
ssion) as the chief sentiment to which others became subor¬
dinate. We have Valmiki’s own testimony at the very outset of
the book that he was unburdening himself of the sentiment of
karuna by means of the Ramayana106, and he has preserved its
unity not only in the middle of the work but right up to the
conclusion, the work ending, as we see, in the eternal loss of
Sita by Rama.107
In the Mahabharata too,which seemingly appears to contain
more heterogeneous elements, being both a $astra (science) and
a Kavya in one,.we can discover the unity of a principal senti¬
ment. Here also the conclusion of the work is a clear indicator
of it. The Mahabharata ends in a note of despair, all the
victors too ending as victims of fate inexorable, the great Vj-sni
104 i
II —Dhv. IV. 5.
gamfa i w ^rr wstorI i —Dhv- p- 529.

106 See. ante.
Dhv. p. 529
and Panâva chiefs too]meeting their death in ignoble circum¬
stances. There is no mistaking the intention of Vyasa in this,
which is to emphasize the need for cultivating a sense of
disgust and detachment towards worldly pleasures. However
promising they may look in the beginning, they are certain to
land one in an abyss of despair in the long-run. The greatest
heroes could not escape the inevitable doom. How much more
true this must be in the case of ordinary men ! To get over
this inevitable doom, there is one succour, and that is in follow¬
ing the path of Mok§a or supreme Beatitude. Such is the
impression one gets finally by reading the concluding episodes
of the Mahabharata. And the Mahabharata is not a Kavya or
poem par excellence like the Ramayaâ. It combines in itself
the characteristics of a Sastra (scientific treatise) also. When we
look upon it as a gastra, we say that its final teaching is Moksa
as a parama-puru§artha or the highest end to be attained by
man. And this is what some commentators have already shown.
But when we consider Mahabharata as a Kavya, the same thing
will have to be regarded in a different light. We should rather
say that the final sentiment communicated in the epic is Santa
or Tranquillity. Vyasa deserves everyone’s esteem as the
foremost sage who attempted to rescue his fellow men wallow¬
ing in dense ignorance, by the light of his sound and steady
knowledge; and he has expressed himself very clearly in more
than one place. To quote only one such passage : —
ri*ji 5wt formtssr 11

(Just in the same proportion as worldly pursuits turn out to be
unavailing, one’s sense of aversion to them is engendered ;
there is no doubt about it.)
It might be urged by some that since Vyasa expressly
claims in the anukraman 1 or the introductory chapter of the
epic that his work throws light on all the Purusarthas (ends of
life) and contains all the Rasas, the above assertion is not
tenable. But it must be noted that even in the anukramani,
Vyasa suggestively refers to the pre-eminence of the work as
indicating the true approach to Vasudeva, the supreme Reality
(e.g. $rrt?T: I )• By implication all the
other descriptions, the rise and fall in the fortunes of heroes
etc., are intended only to emphasize the desirability of renounc¬
ing materialistic ends in favour of a life of devotion to the
Lord.
The addition of the Harivaift$a at the end of the Maha-
bharata also points to the same conclusion. By shewing in
detail the merits of devotion to the Lord, Vyasa contrasts the
solemnity and serenity of such a life with the struggle and
stress of mundane life beset with foibles, failures and frustra¬
tions. Thus it is clear that Vyasa intends to awaken the idea of
Vairagya by his description of the heroes in various situations;
Vairagya in its turn points to Moksa as the final goal and
Moksa is nothing but the attainment of the highest state of
Brahman. That is why the Gita which expounds the nature of
Vasudeva or Brahman (Absolute Reality) may be regarded as
the cream of the Mahabharata.108
The above illustrations from the two greatest epics in
Sanskrit are enough to prove that one Rasa must be made
principal and the others must be subordinated to it in every
work of literature.109
4. DHVANI AND GUljJA
Once the supreme importance of Rasa in poetry was duly
established, the task of Anandavardhana in indicating the
precise position of concepts such as Guna, Dosa, Vj-tti and
Sanghajana was comparatively easy. He interprets all these
concepts in relation to Rasa. As against his predecessors who
recognised some ten Guâs or literary excellences, Ananda¬
vardhana accepts only three-Madhurya, Ojas and Prasada.
Gunas are defined as attributes of Rasa, the principal
element in poetry.110 Just as qualities like * heroism ’ in a man
,os See Dhv. pp. 530 ff.
srvract 1 —Dhv p* 534

110 ^sf?rT ^ ^n: « —Phv. ij. 6,
serve to indicate the greatness of his soul, so qualities like
Madhurya assist one in recognising the presence of Rasa in
poetry. Madhurya (lit. sweetness) is a quality of the sentiment
of Love (Srngara-rasa) and hence is invariably found in love-
poems. As Srngara happens to be the most appealing of all
sentiments, the quality of Madhurya also will be generally most
pleasing.111 It is a characteristic of sounds and senses convey¬
ing the sentiment of love, and it has nothing to do with mere
euphony of sounds and lack of compounds as Bhamaha
thinks.113 This latter characteristic is not exclusive to Madhurya
asOjasalso is found to share it often.113
This quality of Madhurya succeeds in melting the minds of
the readers and, as such, it shines out most prominently in
compositions where the sentiments of Love-in-separation
(Vipralambha-^fngara) and compassion (Karuija) are delinea¬
ted.114
The sentiments of Raudra (Furious), Vira (Heroic) and
Adbhuta (wonder) delineated in poetry are found to inflame
and excite the mind of the readers.115 This is due to the quality
of Ojas (lit. brilliance) subsisting both in the words and the
senses of the poem. When Ojas is found only in words, they
generally become involved in lengthy compounds.115 When Ojas
is found in meaning (artha), the long compounds may even be
absent and the style may be very lucid.117
Prasada or Perspicuity is a quality in poetry which associa-
111
^ TO: I aiSPT JTT^r*
HfaRmRi ii Dhv. II. 7.
112 Bhamaha's Kavyfilankara, I. ii. 3.
113 See below.
111 ^ i
115 TOT 355^ I

—Dhv. II. 9.
ns e.g. Cancadbhuja etc., —Dhv. p. 210.
H7 e.g. Yo yafc gastram etc.,-Dhv. p, 211.
tes itself in the suggestion of all the Rasas, unlike Madhurya
and Ojas which assist in the suggestions of only particular
Rasas.118 Lucidity both in the words and meanings contri¬
butes to the easy grasp of every Rasa. It is a common quality
not only of all the Rasas, but of all the styles. The quality has
primary relationship only with the suggested emotions though
it is said to be found in words, meanings, styles etc.119
5. DHVANI AND DOSA

Anandavardhana’s view of Dosa is quite a novel one in the
history of Sanskrit Poetics. The earlier writers120 had carefully
tabulated the various faults that might occur in the usage of
words, sentences, and the senses conveyed in poetry. They
had given a list of logical, grammatical, syntactical and metrical
flaws which might be inadvertently committed in compositions.
The metaphysical question whether Dosas were positive entities
marring the beauty of poetry or merely negative ones resulting
in the absence of Gunas was also hotly discussed..But Ananda-
vardhana no longer considers them as absolute entities or
attributes like the gunas. He speaks of Dosas too only in
relation to Rasa. As we have already seen, Aucitya or propriety
is to be regarded as the most fundamental principle governing
the incorporation of Rasa in literature.121 The gravest defect
in poetry is thus none other than Rasabhanga, (hindrance
to the even progress of Rasa,) which, in its turn, is a direct
result of anaucitya or impropriety.122.
Strict conformance to the canons of propriety (aucitya)
118 sparer ^
S3
i
« STHTTf II —Dhv. II. 10.
1,9 jt^s^.-i—Dhv p- 213-

120 For a fuller treatmet of this subject.vide my article:‘The Doctrine
of Do?as in Sanskrit Poetics’, I. H. Q. vol. XX.
121 See. ante.
122 I
—Dhv. p. 330,
may be observed in the works of truly great writers. The most
essential function of every Mahakavi is to conform to the
principles of propriety in selecting his theme and giving ade¬
quate expression to it, always keeping Rasa in view as the
primary goal to be achieved.123 In other words, the poet should
always be on his guard to steer clear of the deterrents of Rasa,
no matter whether he is engaged in the composition of a long
poem or a short self-contained stanza (Muktaka)—provided
he wants to infuse Rasa into his work.124
The deterrents (virodhins) of Rasa invariably land a poet
in anaucitya, which, as mentioned above, is the greatest flaw
(Dosa) that a poet might commit. They can be brought under
the following heads :
1. Adoption of Vibhavas etc. associated with an incompa¬
tible Rasa :125 For instance, if after portraying a person as
spiritual-minded (as a Vibhava of Santa-rasa), the poet makes
the same person appear abruptly in the role of a romantic lover,
we have anaucitya. Similarly, when a woman is feigning anger
(Kopa, which is a Bhava) after a love-quarrel (Pranaya-kalaha),
if the hero is described as wooing her by growing eloquent over
the emptiness of worldly pleasures, anaucitya is the result.
And again, supposing the lady does not yield to his importuni¬
ties, if the hero is described as getting wild with rage and the
anubhavas of Raudra-rasa are brought out, we have an¬
aucitya. .
2. Distension or indulging in disproportionately lengthy
descriptions of things though they might be very remotely con¬
nected with the Rasa.126 For instance, while seeking to describe
the hero, if a poet goes off at a tangent to describe mountains
123 ^ sftsR** i
—Dhv. Ill, 32.
124 i
*TR: 5*tirRI fert$RP£ II —Dhv. III. 17.
—Dhv. HI. 18a.
—Dhv.III. 18b.
etc., at an inordinate length, he will be committing the flaw of
anaucitya.
3. Abrupt break in the delineation of Rasa as also abrupt
intrusion of some other Rasa :127 For example, after portraying
the rise of migual love in the hero and the heroine, if, instead
of describing their endeavours at union, the poet proceeds to
dwell upon their other activities, anaucitya will result. In the
same way, if a heio like Rama is shown to suffer the pangs of
separation from his lady-love when a terrible battle is raging at
its height, there is anaucitya.128 The poet cannot escape this
flaw by the excuse that the character is shown to act as a puppet
in the hands of destiny, for, as has been already pointed out,129
the theme is not an end in itself for the poet; it is only a means
which can be changed at will to be in harmony with the end,
viz., throwing Rasa into bold relief.130
4. Frequent over-elaboration of a Rasa even when it has
been adequately manifested Too much of a good thing also
becomes bad and by over-elaboration the delicate flower of
Rasa gets faded.
5. Lastly, impropriety in the portrayal of Vj-tti:—131 By
Vrtti is meant the behaviour of the characters, the Vfttis
(KaiSiki etc.,) of Bharata, and the Vfttis (Upanagarika) etc- of
the rhetoricians.132
6. The beauty and harmony of Rasa are thus marred by
anaucitya or impropriety, and it is the gravest flaw in the poet.
Emptied of Rasa, a composition is worse than useless. Nirasa-
tva may be regarded as the most unpardonable error in the
poet. It will take away from him even the justification of styling
147 sram? ^ ^ STOreHU I —Dhv. III. 19a.

1,8 Cf. Venisamhara, II Act.
149 See ante.
110 ....*SPFW CTEf STOF^T SPjftfoFSR I
agTF? ^ —Dhv. III. 363.
181 i
—Dhv. III. 19,
1,4 Cf. Udbhaja's Kavyalnkarasarigraha I. 1. ff.

himself a poet. According to Anandavardhana, nothing but
oblivion is in store for such a poet133 It is true that ancient
poets were able to achieve poetic fame though unbound by any
ties of rules. But the moderns should not belittle the truth of
the above considerations following their ex^nple.134 As a
matter of fact, the above dicta are in complete conformity
with the practice of master poets like Valmiki and Vyasa.135
In this connection, Anandavardhana points out how the
flaw of anaucitya can be avoided in different ways. There can
be no dogmatic rule about aucitya and anaucitya which will
have universal application. Each individual instance of poetry
will have to be judged on its own merits. Some Rasas are
mutually opposed; e.g., Sj-ngara and Bibhatsa, Vira and
Bhayanaka, Santa and Raudra, Vira and Karuna and Santa and
Sriigara.136 But they can be delineated simultaneously by the
poet if the primary Rasa has been already well brought out and
established on a secure footing. The principal Rasa should be
capable enough to outshine the opposite Rasa, that is all; or
the opposite Rasa may be made an ancillary of the principal
one. In either case, no anaucitya is committed.137
Hence it follows that in every work of literature.there must
be only one dominant Rasa, though the other Rasas also can
enter into relation with it as ancillaries.138 The occurrence of
the other Rasas can in no way detract from the importance of
133 snrot q: I
s u -Dhv. P. 364.
134 I
^ ii —Dhv. P. 365.
135 gwiar sr*%nai: safaJTT: i

ii —Dhv. P. 365.
136 Dhv. P. 381.
137 55*3%$ 3 I
«lps«IRI*W^W sn5IHig%^3?5T H —Dhv. III. 20
138 I
—Dhv. III. 21
II
DHVAN1 IN RELATION TO OTHER CONCEPTS 171
the principal one, since the latter is seen steadily and constantly
running through the entire work, and is never totally lost sight
of.139 The unity of Rasa is analogous to the unity of action in
a drama, where, in spite of the variety and complexity of the
■; incidents, the organic wholeness of the theme is preserved.
| The diversity of Rasas only serves to enhance the beauty of the
principal one.140
I As a corollary, it follows that no other Rasa (opposed or
I unopposed), should receive greater treatment in a work than
i the principal one. Attention should be primarily devoted to¬
wards the principal Rasa, and the others should come in only
incidentally. By so doing, the opposition between Rasas will
soon disappear.141
Further, an opposite Rasa may be pressed into service of
the principal one by presenting it in a character other than the
hero. For instance, if 'Vira is being described in the hero, its
opposite viz., Bhayanaka may be delineated with reference to
■“the antehero, and by so doing, the effect of the principal
Rasa is reinforced by striking contrast. Even elaboration of
it at great length will cease to be a flaw then.142
It is also possible that sometimes two Rasas, mutually
opposed, may be shown in one and the same character. In such
instances, the two Rasas should not be portrayed simultaneous¬
ly ; otherwise there would be anaucjtya-dosa. Some other Rasa
should be made to intervene the two Rasas, and the fault is
139 WPcNSOTlIST: 51*33*1 3: I

—Dhv. III. 22
140 mi 5rfw i
ct?tt m n —Dhv. III. 23
141 31 i
—Dhv. III. 24
142 3*3 *3lf33t 3^3 I

3 frftrensPT: II —Dhv. III. 25
thus avoided.143 Nor is there anything surprising about this.
For even in small self-contained stanzas (which are so very
small in compass when compared with long poems) consisting
of not more than a single sentence, this phenomenon is obser¬
ved. The mutual enmity of two Rasas is seen to disappear
when a third Rasa intervenes between them.144
Opposition and agreement between Rasas must be clearly
noted as indicated above particularly, when dealing with
Sj-ngara Rasa, as it is the most delicate of all Rasas. The
slightest inappropriateness will spoil it completely. And what
it more, the flaw of the poet becomes most patent there. The
poet should therefore take especial care while portraying
J>rngara.145
Since Sfngara thus occupies the greatest place amongst the
Rasas, more often than not, the poet will have to incorporate
it into his work. He may have to infuse a tinge of Sfngara
even into themes not strictly amenable to such treatment. But
it will not be a fault, provided the poet deliberately resorts to
such ‘S>rngaric elaboration’ with a definite purpose in view. The
purpose may be either to win over the audience before giving
them moral instruction, or to invest his composition with grea¬
ter beauty.146
—Dhv. III. 26
Cf. the intrusion of Adbhuta between fsrngara and Santa in the
Nag&nanda.
144
forfeftfon ii —Dhv. III. 27
145 ^
f^TTcn-3 gfITKdtl fWt II
Jurist % 11 —Dhv. Ill, 28-.
14(5 ssTswftrrofcr err i

Phv, III. 30,
11
Such is the nature of ‘avirodha’ and ‘virodha’ amongst
Rasas. And by grasping the above distinctions carefully, the
poet will be in a position to steer clear of all blemishes. He
will never stray away into the mire of dosas.147
^ The ancient writer Bhamaha148 and following him
^ Dandin,149 had advanced the view that a blemish is not always
JI a blemish. Bhamaha went to the extent of maintaining that a

blemish may sometimes be converted into an excellence.
Anandavardhana’s contention is that this fact of impermanence
I of Dosas, recognised even by the earlier writers, would fit into
; his scheme of poetry better than into the earlier one. By follow¬
ing the earlier view, we would be left without a positive
criterion to help us in judging whether a blemish hinders or
helps the poetic effect in a given instance. But if the principle
of Rasa-Dhvani is accepted, there would be no longer any
such difficulty. “Dhvani is the soul of poetrv, Rasa is the soul
of Dhvani, and grngara is the most important of all the Rasas.”
On the basis of this truth, we can arrive at a positive criterion
for judging blemishes or dosas. Dosas like S>rutidu§ta (lit.
offending the ear)150 may be looked upon as blemishes only
when they creep into compositions treating of gj-ngararasa as
the most primarily suggested emotion. In other places they
cease to be faults.151
fitePT ^ >'
— Dhv. III. 31.
148 i
Kavyalankara, I. 54-5
149 cf. ^ ftrar si i
gmrifwrre *r*t%*TV * vtoraiq; n —Kavyadarsa, II. 51
150 Cf. Bhamaha's Ksvyalankara, 1. 47
151 ^ ^ I
—Dhv. II. 11
Finally, Anandavardhana attempts to offer a useful classi¬
fication of Dosa. He avoids going into minor details and
broadly classifies all dosas under two heads avyutpattikfta
and agaktikfta. Vyutpatti is the training and education which a
a poet has received; and Sakti the gift of poetic genius which
he inherits. A blemish may be committed either for want of
proper education (avyutpatti) or for want of poetic imagination
(asakti). Of these, the former class of do§as will not look gla¬
ring, in case there is sufficient poetic imagination to cover them.
But the latter class will strike one even at the first glance.152
By this Anandavardhana indirectly shows unmistakably the
intrinsic relation between Rasa and Sakti or Pratibha, a subject
for a consideration of which, he devotes a whole chapter later
on.153
It is indeed a great compliment to the taste of Anandavar¬
dhana that he refrains from illustrating the blemishes at great
length like his predecessors in the field. He feels that captious
discovery of blemishes in great poets on the part of the critic
will be nothing but a sad commentary on his own lack of
culture. He says-“Even in the works of masters, blemishes
are bound to creep in; but they,need not be catalogued, over¬
shadowed as they are by a thousand and one excellences.154
6. DHVANI AND SANGHATANA

The variety of Dhvani known as alaksya-krama-vyangya
has been declared earlier155 to be instanced in Sanghatana. What
then, is this Sanghatana ? According to some writers, Sangha¬
tana means the arrangement of words with or without com¬
pounds (Samasa) and it is of three kinds—(i) Without
compounds (asamasa) (ii) with medium-sized compounds
(madhyamasamasa) and (iii) with lengthy compounds (dirgha-
152 fm.' STtFTI I

G II —Dhv. p. 316
153 The fourth Uddyota.
154 vide ante.
155 See ante.
samasa).156 Anandavardhana agrees with them and adds that,
grounded in the substratum of Gunas such as Madhurya,
Sanghatana succeeds in suggesting Rasas; and Aucitya is the
factor which determines their selection—aucitya of the speaker
as also of ideas.157
In this connection Anandavardhana discusses the question
how Sanghatana and Guna are not on the same footing as
|; suggesters of Rasa. About the mutual relation of Guna and
? Sanghatana, three alternative views are possible.
| 1. Guna and Sanghatana are identical.
2. They are different and Sanghtana is found in the
substratum of Guna;
and 3. Guna is found in the substratum of Sanghatana.
Anandavardhana tries to prove that whatever.is the view held,
the relation of Guna to Rasa and that of Sanghtana to Rasa
must be held distinct. Incidentally the untenability of the first
and the last views is also pointed out.
The relation of Guna to Rasa is constant and unchanging,
whereas that of Sanghatana to Rasa is variable. There is no
exception to the rule (niyama) that only particular Gunas
should be utilized to suggest particular Rasas. For instance,
Madhurya and Prasada may suggest only Karuna and Vipra-
lamt>ha-$rngara; Ojas should suggest only Raudra, Adbhuta and
the like, not Karuna and the like. But there is no such rule
governing Sanghatana. Any and every-Sanghatana may be made
to suggest any and every Rasa. Even in Srngara, lengthy com¬
pounds may be used as in
156 arsumn i
—%fagr<i^ * — Dhv. hi. 5

157 «FTRifsr?«r gj i
—Dhv. III. 6
and Raudra may be suggested without the use of compounds
as in
3: f^?faq5q»TT 7DT5T^T mt 3\ I
3t ?*l ?iar STcftq;
It follows then that Gunas cannot be identical with San¬

ghatana or grounded in Sanghatana as their substratum. The
procedure of the two should be held distincit. Gunas are
grounded in Rasas as already pointed out.159
They cannot be based exclusively on words since even
letters can suggest Rasas and consequently contain Gunas. For
the sake of convenience one might say they are the properties
of a man’s physical frame.
Just as there is an invariable relation between Gunas and
Rasas, there is no such relation between Guâs and Sanghatana.
Madhurya-guna may be found in all the three varieties of San¬
ghatana; even Ojas may be so found, though traditionally it
has come to be believed that Ojas is inseparably connected with
lengthy compounds only. For, according to the new exposition
given here, Ojas has inseparable connection only with Rasas
like Raudra, and not with lengthy compounds. Hence^the
provinces of Guna and Sanghatana are diverse.
It also follows that neither Gunas nor Rasas directly deter¬
mine the employment of Saiighatanas. What so determines
them is Aucitya or propriety of speaker, the idea, the context,
and the nature of the composition.160
Anandavardhana says that Rasas do not directly determine
158 Venlsamhara.
159 See ante
160 cri i
m3 n^F^sfci tftqiflwiwiSfa 11 —Dhv. III. 7-8

the employment ofSanghatanas because sanghatanas may be
found even when they suggest no Rasa- And when they suggest
Rasas it is through the medium of other factors like the proprie¬
ty of the speaker and the like that they do so and not directly.
When the poet is under the influence of Rasas, (i.e., in lyrics),
or when the characters.he depicts are supposed to be under the
influence of Rasa (i. e., in drama, fiction and epic), he has to
select only particular types of Sanghatana. This comes about
almost incidentally without any special effort on the part of the
poet when he keeps in mind the various deterrents of Rasa
already enumerated. Lengthy compounds are the deterrents
of Rasa and thus they come to be eschewed when delineating
Rasa, Usually, we will have only two types of Sanghatana
(a-samasa and madhyama-samasa) in such compositions, espe¬
cially in thostf abounding in Karuna and Vipralambha-srrigara.
It is but on rare occasions that dirgha-samasa-sarighatana is
utilized as while portraying Raudra in the anti-hero. And
unless Prasadaguna enters into relation with every sanghatana,
there is no suggestion of Rasas. A-samasa sanghatana, by
itself cannot suggest Karuna-rasa. It must needs be enlivened
by Prasada; similarly with other varieties also. Thus it will be
seen that Sanghatana becomes a suggestor of Rasa supported
by the Gunas; its relation to Rasa is remote and indirect as
contrasted with the direct and invariable relation of Guna
.towards Rasa,
In the light.of the above, the remark of Anima Bose16'1
that “there appears to be some confusion of thought on this
issue” should be dismissed as a sweeping generalisation. The
reason given by Bose that “Sanghatana,” is more or less, .a
superfluous concept, .the samasa-vrtti being a constituent of the
Gunas in their variety,”162 is far from convincing. Anandava,r-
101 Cf. ‘Aqpnclav^rdteQa’s TJr^tm^ntef Safighatapa’, blew Indian

Antiquary, Yql. VII, p. 77.
.162 qp.ett.
dhana has proved it to the hilt that Samasa-vrtti or Sanghatan
is not a constituent of the Gunas in their variety. The writ<
further imagines-“His concern is perhaps not to set forth
theory of Sanghatana, but to show that the views of earlit
writers on the older concept of Sanghatana is not justify
ble”163. To say the least, the conclusion is unwarrante<
Anandavardhana’s main purpose in dealing with Sanghatana
to show how it can be a suggester of Rasa (a variety of alaksy<
krama-vyahgya- dhvani) like Varna, etc., and how this relatio
of Sanghatana to Rasa should be differentiated from the reh
tion of Guna to Rasa. He is not at all very particular aboi
criticising the earlier views as is clear from his winding up <
the discussion with the remark “whatever the view heh
Sanghatanas will be found to be suggesters of Rasa,164 dete
mined by the above considerations of aucitya”.
Another feature of Sanghatana is that it is governed b
aucitya of the literary form used. Muktakas are influence
only by Rasa-bandha-aucitya; But Sandanitakas (Two stanzt
forming one unit) etc., should contain only Madhyama-samas
and dlrghasamasa varieties. In paryayabandhas (several stanzj
devoted to a description of some single topic) only asamas
and madhyama-samasa should be used. In Parikathas (didact
stories) there is no restriction; any variety of Sanghatana im
be employed. In drama and poetry (Mahakavya) Rasa-aucitj
is pre-eminent; in prose compositions also, these consideratioi
apply- Akhyayikas should abound in madhyama-samasa ar
dlrghasamasa types of Sanghatana. But in Kathas, Ras;
aucitya is of more importance165
It will thus be seen that aucitya of. Rasa plays a maj<
r&le in all compositions whether verse or prose. But it is n<
163. Op. cit.

104 SfT mfgWII
l —Dhv. P. 32
166. Cf. Dhv. pp. 324-7
entirely exclusive of other aucityas, particularly of visaya-auci-
tya. Rasa-aucitya will have to be supplemented by conside¬
rations of Visaya-aucitya in some instances; and so supplement¬
ed, it will acquire a new type of charm166. The magnitude of
Visaya-aucitya is both less and more than that of Rasa-aucitya.
Thus in akhyayikas, where snigara predominates, visaya-
aucitya demands that there should be madhyama and dlrgha
samasas; Rasa-aucitya demands that there should be no com¬
pounds (asamasa). But the claims of Visaya-aucitya are conced¬
ed. In such instances it is more potent than Rasa-aucitya. But
in other instances like the drama, it is positively less important;
for even in cases of Raudra etc., very lengthy compounds are
not employed. Such in short, is the relation between Sangha-
tana and alaksya-krama-vyaiigya-dhvani.
7. DHVANI AND RITI

Anandavardhana notices the doctrine of RIti and dismisses
it with the remark that there is nothing to consider seriously
about it at any considerable length. He pays a compliment to
the RIti theorists that they .were the first to have some glimmer¬
ings, however faint and dim, about the truth of poetry. Though
they could not actually realise the importance of Dhvani, they
had advanced far enough in that direction.167 They discovered
that alankaras were only external vestures of poetry and the
life-informing principle was something different.168 Their view
of Gunas as constituting an intrinsic element of poetry was
sound to some extent. But when it came to grasping the essence
186 xhi Hfsren i

cFT 11 —Dhv. III. 9.
167 i
ftsnr* ^nsraracti: w —Dhv. m. 46.
168 cf- vprotarar* wn i
—Vamana’s Kavyalankara-sutra-Vjtti III. 1.1-2.
of Gunas they failed. They thought that Rttis169 were the
resultants of Gunas and hence the soul of poetry. If only they
had realised that Rasas happen to be the essence of Gunas and
Rasas can only be suggested, their theory would be perfect.
But as it happened, they could not realise this important truth
and consequently their theory is inadequate *
8. DHVANI AND VRTTI

It is Anandavardhana’s opinion that the concept of Vrtti
also gets re-oriented by an acceptance of the Dhvanf-theory.170
He alludes to the vrittis like KaisikT made famous by Bharata
ib the field of Dramaturgy as also to the Vrttis like upanagari-
ka mentioned by writers on rhetoric.171 Vrtti thus is said to be
two-fold. While Bharata’s Vrttis relate to artha or subject of a
dramatic performance, the latter Vrttis are concerned with
alliterative sounds to be utilized in poetry. Is there, then, any
feature shared in common by these two types of Vrtti ? Ananda¬
vardhana’s reply is that vyavahara or mode of usage is the
common characteristic. Both the types of Vrtti are modes of
usage, one of dramatic performance and the other of allitera¬
tive sounds in poetry. The principle governing such modes of
usage is none other than aucitya of Rasa.172 And disregard of
such Rasaucitya on the part of the poet while employing Vrttis
i«9Vaidarbhr, Gau^jys and PanCali, cf. Vsmana. op. cit. I. ii. 9

* For an article on this subject, see B. Bhattacharya, The Riti School
And Anandavardhana’s Dhvani Theory-JASB. Vol. XVII. No. 1.
170 ^dTTi^ri: I
frnftsfa H —Dhv. III. 4?.
i7i Udbhaja, for instance.
—Dhv. III. 33
Also 3 I —Dhv. P. 325.
DHVANI IN RELATION TO OTHFR CONCEPTS 181
will result in Rasabhanga.173 Thus a fuller appreciation of the

value of Vrttis is possible only by following the theory of
Dhvani. It is the claim of Anandavardhana that the all-com¬
prehensive Dhvani-theory explains not only new facts about
poetry undiscovered by the ancient writers, but also explains
better and more fully even concepts already discovered and
formulated.
175
tPTT I
—Dhv. P. 364.
. CHAPTER IV
(Section IV)
VARIETIES OF DHVANI
In the course of our consideration of Anandavardhana’s
theory of Dhvani in relation to other concepts, several varieties
of Dhvani have been incidentally touched upon. But here an
attempt is made to explain the principle adopted by Ananda-
vardhana in the classification of Dhvani and to give illustrations
for such varieties as have not been dealt with before.
As we have already seen,1 though suggestiveness is an
independent function of words on a par with Denotation
(Abhidha) and Indication (Laksana), it is also entirely depen¬
dent upon them. Dhvani can never function without the
assistance of either Abhidha or Laksana. It derives initial
support from either of them and yet outshines them ultimately.
Based on this fact, we have the most fundamental division of
dhvani into 1. Avivaksita-vacya or laksanamula, and 2.
Vivaksitanyaparavacya or abhidhamula.2
In the first of these varieties, Dhvani is based upon
Laksana, the primary sense (vacya) being insignificant. In the
second, there is no part played by Laksana. Dhvani proceeds
directly on the basis of the primary sense.
In avivaksita-vacya-dhvani, again, the primary sense may
either become amalgamated with the new sense or get itself
destroyed completely.
Accordingly, we have two subdivisions of it:—
1. Arthantara-sankramita-vacya, and
i See ante Ch. V. Sec. I.

« I H fNf§RIT^q?*T^raHrI fefor *1
—Dhv. p. 136.
2. atyanta-tiraskrta-vacya.3
The following verse is an instance of the former :
SRI
^RT: q»55T: 1
5W sfs ^rors%? *r
/ % SR 5^1 5T ^ vft?T *R II4
I The word Rama in the verse is .used with a great sugges-
I tive force. It means here much more than an individual known
I by that proper name. It suggests poignantly how Rama’s
gentle heart has been converted into a stone as it were by the
repeated onslaughts of mounting misfortune; and how he can
put up with any calamity now without the slightest sensitivity
even if it wefire to be news of his darling SIta’s death.5
The latter is illustrated in :—
* 5R>raT5* 11
The primary sense of‘andha’ in ân^T: (Like a
mirror blinded by breath’), will have to be relinquished since
the mirror cannot become literally blind. It secondarily means
'rendered dim and cloudy’ which again suggests the ideas
of absence of beauty and the like.6
In vivaksitanyaparavacya-dhvani also two sub-divisions
might be noted. The suggested sense may be grasped simulta¬
neously, as it were, with the primary sense, or there may be
some interval of time between the comprehension of the two
3 8RTRT HfifrfjRfRRd Wf I
fe(«Uii>e<4 fli'JT II —Dhv. II. 1.

4 Dhv. pp. 167-8
5 «rsr I
51 I Dhv. p. 169.
• Dhv. p. 172.
senses. In the first alternative we have asamlaksyakrama-
vyangya since no temporal sequence in the understanding of
the two senses can be perceived; in the second alternative we
have sarhlaksyakramavyaiigya.7 All primary suggestion of
Rasas, Bhavas, Rasabhasas. Bhavabhasas,. Rasa-santi and
Bhavasanti should be regarded as coming under the first of the
above categories, viz., asamlaksyakrama.8 But samlaksyakrama
follows in the wake of the primary sense like the resonance of
an echo and it may arise through words (Sabda) or meaning
(artha). Hence we have two varieties of it :—
1* Sabda-sakti-mula-anuranana-rupa-vyangya and
2. Artha-sakti-mula-anuranana-rupa vyahgya.9
The following verse of Kalidasa is an instance of the second
variety:—
qr^ 11
(Kumara-Sambhava, VI, 4)
Parvatf s modesty and secret happiness are suggested by
her action of counting lotus petals. The suggestion is due not
to the extra-ordinary power of the words, but to the meaning.10
Though modesty is a Vyabhicari-bhava, its suggestion in the
verse is not alaksya-krama. For the latter’s province is restric-
ted.to the suggestion of Rasas directly through explicit descrip-
7 awggffissitegfcf: q*: l
11 Dhv. n. 2.
vriOTRt sqqfera: 11 Dhv, 11.3.

» For a distinction between, this and §le§a-alankira vide ante p. 145 f.
11 Dhv. II 20.
10
q*<q?qT sqq^g% 11 Dhv. 11.22

tion of Vibhavas, anubhavas etc.11 In other words, if the
suggestion of Bhavas invariably and necessarily leads to the
grasping of Rasas we have alaksyakrama.
But in this instance, counting of lotus petals is not invari¬
ably associated with either modesty or the sentiment of love.
It may be done in sport also. So it is not alaksyakrama-
vyaiigya, but arthasaktimula-dhvani.
This variety of dhvani may be further subdivided on the
basis oflhe principle whether the suggested idea happens to be
only an imaginative one fancied by the poet (Praudhoktimatra-
nispannasarlra) or can also be found in the world of Nature
(Svatahsambhavin). In other words, the suggested idea may
belong entirely to the imaginative world of the poet, (or
a character in poetry invented by the poet) or it may have
correspondence with the world of reality also.12 The example
‘evam vadini’ etc. belongs to the second category since such a
thing as counting lotus-petals is not impossible in this world.
As an instance of the first, we may take the following
verse :—
(The spring prepares and yet not hurls down the darts of
Cupid at the targets, viz., youthful ladies; darts whose tips
are fresh sahakara flowers and feathers (at the back) are new
sprouts and leaves.)
The suggested idea is that first seeds of love-torment are
being sown in the hearts of ladies which will assume greater
proportions with lapse of time at the advent of the spring
SRffrcT*, 1 Dhv. II. p. 248

12 swrt to* i
Dhv. H. 24.
186 THE DHVANYALOKA AND ITS CRITICS '
season bringing in its wake a rich harvest of flowers and

sprouts.13
That the suggested idea is grasped at all is due to the
highly imaginative style of the poet. If he had simply said—
“Flowers and sprouts were in abundance during spring,’’ there
would be nothing suggested.
In the two categories of arthasakti-mula-dhvani mentioned
above, what is suggested is an idea or Vastu. But alaiikaras
may also be suggested and this is a third category to be
noted.14
(The above varieties of Dhvani are schematically represen¬
ted on p. Id7)
The above classification is made from the standpoint of
Vyahgya or ‘what is suggested’. These various classes of
dhvani may be looked at from the standpoint of Vyanjaka or
‘the suggested also. It will be noticed that in all the varieties
of Dhvani pada (word) and vakya((sentence) serve as suggesters.
In addition to these two, Prabandha (the work as a whole) can
act as a suggester in the three varieties of arthasakti-mula-
anurananarupa-dhvani.15 But in Rasa-dhvani which is asamla-
ksyakrama), besides these three mentioned above, varna (letter),
Sanghatana (arrangement), sup (case-endings of nouns), tin
(case endings of verbs), vacana (number), sambandha (agree¬
ment), Karaka-sakti (special meanings of cases), Krt (Primary
affixes), Taddhita (Secondary affixes), and samasa (compound)
all serve as suggesters.16 Thus Vyanjakas are broadly of two
«T wtsfe I Dhv. Locana, P. 255.
14 srsfarc* I
^ ; ll Dhv. II. 25.
stsft II —Dhv. III. 15

16 See ante P. 156
187
Dhvani
DHVANI IN RELATION TO OTHER CONCEPTS
Vastu from Vastu.
Alankira from Vastu
Vastu from Alankara
Alankara from Alanksra
kinds—(1) based on Vacyartha (2) independent of vacyartha;
and it is the latter consideration which makes dhvani a more
comprehensive concept than that of alankaras.
Anandavardhana winds up this subject by pointing out
how these several classes of dhvani enter into further permuta¬
tions and combinations not only with one another, but also
with the classes of gunlbhuta vyangya and with the numberless
alankaras;17 so much so that their number is countless, and can
never be exhausted by simple enumeration. Only the broadest
distinctions have been indicated above.18 In every instance of
poetry a touch of suggestion is involved in some form or
another and the poet as well as the critic should note the ways
of suggestion carefully.19
19 A* n
—Dhv. m. 43.
18 C[% I
—Dhv. III. 44-
19 gaffigggqft *tt srasra: : I

—Dhv. III. 45.
snss 5TT
CHAPTER IV
(Section V)
DHVANI AND THE OTHER SYSTEMS OF THOUGHT
As stated by Ananda-vardhana in the very first verse of
the Dhvanyaloka, there seems to have been a wide-spread
opposition to the theory of Dhvani from various quarters.
Rhetoricians, philosophers, and laymen - all appear to have
united in attacking the newly-proposed theory of Dhvani in
poetics. The reasons that actuated such criticism were not. how¬
ever, the same always. They differed from critic to critic. The
rhetoricians held that the field of poetry had been exhaustively
explained by the well-known categories of Alankara etc., and
that there was no scope left for propounding any original
theory lfike Dhvani afresh; the philosophers denied the validity
of the theory of dhvani on logical grounds, and laymen simply
asserted that Dhvani was a thing beyond their comprehen¬
sion.1 In such a hostile atmosphere Anandavardhana address¬
ed himself to the task of defending the theory by offering full
justification for its soundness. The greatest part of his task
consisted in carrying conviction to the redoubtable rhetoricians
about the truth of the new theory since they were strongly
entrenched in their prejudice in favour of the older concepts.
The whole of the Dhvanyaloka, containing as it does the defini¬
tion, classification and illustration of dhvani, as also the clear
1 5^1! tWItf (d'ijt ■;
fcf TO: II Dhv. 1.1.

For a notable article appearing on this subject see : V. A. Ramaswaroi
Sastri ‘Studies in Dhvanyaloka —The Adivakya in Dhvanyaloka’—Bulletin
«if the Deccan College Research Institute Vol. X. I pp. 223.30
190 THE DHVANYALGKA AND ITS CRITICS
line of demarcation between dhvani and other concepts, should
be regarded as one long and thorough-going reply to the charge
of rhetoricians and others that dhvani was a superfluous and
meaningless concept. Since this has been already considered at
some length in the foregoing section, the present section will
be devoted to an elucidation of Anandavardhana’s arguments
to show how the theory of Dhvani does .not conflict with the
premises of the three major systems of thought - viz., pada
(Vyakarana), Vakya (Mlmamsa) and Pramana (Tarka). Corres¬
pondences and differences between the theory of Dhvani and
these other systems in minor matters of detail have been inci¬
dentally indicated earlier.2 We shall be concerned here with
only showing how the theory is compatible with the doctrines
of other systems also.
To take up the system of POrva-mTmarhsa first : Jaimini,
the author of Purva-mlmamsa-sutras holds that the relationship
between the word and its meaning is natural and eternal, not
conventional.3 Sabdas may be uttered by men (Pauruseya) or
revealed in the Vedas (apauruseya). The Vedas are regarded as
eternal having no authorship And as such the Vedic injunc¬
tions are supposed to be necessarily valid as instruments of
knowledge (Pramana). But the validity of human utterances
depends upon the trustworthiness (aptatva) of the persons
concerned. Sentences uttered by men (Pauruseya-vakyas) may
be sometimes valid and at other times invalid. The draw¬
backs in the speaker contribute towards the invalidity pf his
utterances. Now the question arises: How do the draw-backs in
the speaker bring about falsity into his statements ? For, as we
2 See ante. Ch. II.
s The word Utpatti in the Sutra

(I.i.5.) is to be interpreted as Nitya ; cf. Sahara •svatnins Bha$ya on the
above.'*
For a fuller treatment of this topic see: G.V. Devasthali, Mimamss, the
Vakyalistra of Ancient India [Oriental Thought, Vol. IV. Nos. 1 and 2. pp
36, ff.]
saw above, the relation between a word and its meaning is nat¬
ural and eternal and hence true also; and whatever the words
he chooses to use, they must invariably carry valid meaning.
The drawback of the speaker cannot therefore affect the eter¬
nal relationship of word and its primary meaning. The«explana-
tion of the Mlmamsakas is that the drawback vitiates the
judgement or intention (abhipraya) of the speaker,4 Accord¬
ing to Anandavardhana. the above explanation implicity presu¬
mes that in addition to their primary meanings, words convey
the intention of the speaker also. And since the relation bet¬
ween the intended sense and the word is not eternal (like that
between the primary sense and the word), the difficulty seen
above will be got over; for, the intention is conveyed by an
adventitious function of the word (here suggestion or Vyan-
jana), leaving thus untouched the eternal relation between a
word and its primary meaning). Similar phenomena are met
with in tf^ world of physical nature also. The moon for instance
is famous for its cool and delightful effect on the onlookers.
The relationship between coolness and moon may be said to be
constant. But to lovers arfiicted by the burning pangs of sepa¬
ration, the same moon is said to cause a scorching sensation.
This is due to an adventitious circumstance which in itself is
powerless to take away the constant connection between the
moon and coolness. It will be clear from the above how a '
recognition of an adventitious function of words like Vyanjana
is rendered necessary in the system of MImamsa if the distinc¬
tion between pauruseya-and apauruseya sentences is to be
properly explained. Far from being opposed to the doctrines
of that system, the principle of suggestion will be found to be
extremely serviceable.6
4 Cf. 5RW- * I
—Sahara- bha?ya
sRgcnggoi q^r i —Dhv. p. 443.
For the wole discussion, see Dhv. pp. 438-443

So far as the system of Grammar is concerned, the ques¬
tion whether the theory of Dhvani is compatible with that sys¬
tem or not does not arise at all: for the very expression
Dhvani has been borrowed into the field of poetics from the
grammarians who maintain that Sabda in its eternal form of
sphota is identical with Brahman or Absolute Reality6 and
that sphota is only suggested and never expressed.7
Turning to the rationalistic system of Tarkikas or Logici¬
ans*8 it will be seen that the theory of Dhvani cannot clash
with their view either, since they hold that the relationship bet¬
ween a word and its meaning is conventional, or artificial
(Krtrima). Being notionalists, the Tarkikas have to admit that
whatever is true to experience is real. They can enter into con¬
troversy only over such questions which do not come under
our direct experience. Whether the relationship between Sabda
and artha is a natural one or a conventional one is such a ques¬
tion and allows dispute. But there can be no dispute about
universally preceived facts such as black colour and sweet
taste. With reference to an object of which there is an uncontra¬
dicted experience of ‘black"’, the logician cannot direct his
objections and say: ‘This is yellow, not black.’ He has to accept
it as valid. In the same way, suggestion as a phenomenon is
experienced not only with reference to meaningful words, but
also with reference to meaningless sounds of music and
expressive gestures in dance. This universal and uncontradicted
experience of suggestion cannot be denied by the logician at
all.
6 Cf. (ij) anp i

jrfsRPT snrat M v$kyapa.djya, t, 1.
(ii) *uu%frr i
Sarvadarganasafigraha P. 140
7 Cf. Dhv. pp. 443-4
For a detailed account of this view see ante Ch. II
s As also Buddhists who hold the view that the relationship between a
'word and its meaning is non-eternal.
But the logician might attempt to equate Vyanjana with
anumiti or Inference on the ground that £abda (word) itself
forms the Linga (probans) justifying the inference of the so-
called Vyarigya which deserves to be looked upon as Lirigin
(probandum). In other words, sugestion of the speaker’s intent
from words would be nothing but an instance of inference, the
words acting as probans and the speaker’s intent being the
probandum. The logician might further say that the speaker’s
intent is never suggested but only inferred and therefore Vyari-
gya-vyanjaka-bhava is nothing other than Linga-lingi-bhava.
Anandavardhana meets this objection of the Tarkikas in a
two-fold manner. First of all, he points out that even granting
for argument’s sake that the above proposition is true, the
position of the Dhvani theorists that Vyanjakatva is a function
of words over and above vacakatva and gunavrtti is not disprov¬
ed. The phenomenon would be recognised as a fact though the
designation given to it by them might vary. Instead of the term
Vyanjakatva they might use the term Lihgatva. But beyond
the difference in nomenclature, nothing further would be
achieved.
Next, Anandavardhana subjects the view of the Tarkikas
to a searching scrutiny and proves how Vyanjakatva and
Lihgatva are not, as a matter of fact, identical. The argument
of the logician is that a speaker’s intent is inferred and not
suggested as Anandavardhana maintains. But Anandavardhana
simplifies his statement more analytically. He points out that
when he refers to a speaker’s intent as being suggested, he
does not preclude other varieties of suggestion on the one hand
and does not mean that it should be looked upon as a justifi¬
cation for the theory of Dhvani, on the other. The criticism
will thus be seen to be grounded on a misinterpretation of his
earlier statement. By carefully analysing the facts about the
real nature of word, meaning and inference this is what one
would find : sabda or word has a two-fold scope (Visaya):- 1.
Anumeya or Inferable and 2. Pratipadya or Signifiable. Of
13
these, anumeya is always of the nature of Vivaksa or desire to
speak. This Vivaksa may be towards uttering sounds for their
own sake ignoring the semantic side or towards uttering them
with the aim of conveying some meaning. Vivaksa of the for¬
mer type does not play any part in verbal deportment. It only
serves to distinguish an animal from a non-animal. But the
latter type of Vivaksa plays the part of a proximate cause
(Karana) in verbal deportment though it is rather remotely
connected (vyavahita) with the comprehension of the words
used. And both the above types of Vivaksa are inferable from
words. At the same time, these exhaust the inferable scope of
words. That is to say, one can infer on the basis of words,
only the desire in the speaker to employ words or meaningful
words but what that meaning:itself is cannot be so inferred. It
must be understood from the words themselves.
This brings us to the second scope of words viz., the signi-
fiable (Pratipadya), which is also two-fold:-l- Vacya and 2.
Vyahgya. The speaker may use words with a view to conveying
his meaning directly by means of those words and then we have
vacyartha. But he may also use words which do not directly
convey his meaning with a view to other considerations, and
then we have vyahgyartha. Both these aspects of the signifi-
catory scope of words are far from being ’understood as Lirigin
f
or probandum of any anumana or inference based on Sabda.

The relationship between sabda and its significatory scope is
something quite different which may be natural or otherwise.
It is the desire to utter meaningful words in the speaker that
can be taken as the probandum inferred from the probans of
sabda, not the meaning itself. In case the significatory func¬
tions too really come under inference, there should be no scope
for doubt at all whether a meaning is right or wrong. For
instance, when fire is inferred from smoke, fire is a certainty.
But with reference to meanings of words there is no such cer¬
tainty.
Further, simply because there is no such direct relation-
dhvani in relation TO OTHER CONCEPTS 195
ship between sabda and Vyaiigyartha as between sabda and
Vacyartha, one cannot deny that the two are related. Direct¬
ness or remoteness does not happen to be the differentiating
condition of a relationship. That Vyanjakatva is related to
Vacakatva has been already shown. The conclusion is thus
indisputable that while vivaksa of the speaker is inferred, the
meanings are signified.
Let us take instances of meanings which are suggestively
signified by a word. They may be of the nature of intent (abhi-
praya) or not. Can we say that such meanings are conveyed by
Vacakatva alone of the words? If not, some other function of
words must be admitted and that is exactly what we call Vyan¬
jakatva. And Vyanjakatva is not co-extensive with Lingatva
since the former exists in objects like light where the latter is
absent. Just as the primarily signified meaning of a word is not
identical with the probandum of an inference based upon the
word as probans so also the suggestively signified meaning of
a word is not the same as such an inference. Contrariwise,
such an inferred probandum (e.g. vivaksa) is never signified,
but only understood as an attribute. And as already stated
above, the fact of doubts arising with regard to the meanings of
words is explicable only by considering them to be not amen¬
able to inference.
It is no doubt true that sometimes one does resort to
inference and other pramanas while deciding about the truth
or falsity of even an expressed meaning. But this does not in
the least destroy the importance of Abhidha as a function of
word The same is true of Vyanjana also. As a matter of
fact, this question of logical truth and falsity does not arise in
literature at all whose soul is suggestion. There is also no
question of seeking the aid of other pramanas in settling the
truth or falsity of passages in literature. Such a procedure
would look ridiculous because poetic truth and material truth
are not on a par.
Moreover, the suggested aspect which admits of being
A A AU AA T I k A 1 AAA A-A V 1 At ■ I 1 A A fc_^ ■N_x
inferred from words (viz., Vivaksa) is not at all an intrinsic

factor determining the nomenclature of Dhvani. It is quite an
unessential feature and it is put forward as an argument only
to elicit the support of even the Mlmamsakas- Vyanjakatva,
as a matter of fact, sometimes co-exists with Lingatva, at
other times is enlivened by Pratyaksa, Abhidha, Laksana etc.,
and is found in meaningful as well meaningless sounds. As
such it is something existing over and above them all and
deserves to be accepted universally.9
In this connection, Anandavardhana refutes also the charge
of critics who hold that Dhvani is an inscrutable feature of
poetry, and dismisses as untenable a similar view held by
Buddhists that all things are indefinable (anirdesya). The critics
draw an analogy between the uniqueness of preciousness in
particular diamonds, which can only be felt by those who deal
in them, but not described, and the uniqueness of charm in parti¬
cular types of poetry which can also be felt by some gifted
connoisseurs, but at the same time is indefinable. Anandavar¬
dhana points out that the analogy is not valid since the
uniqueness of poetic charm can be detected and described
unlike the uniqueness of diamonds. The uniqueness of words as
such in poetry consists in the avoidance of inconsistency and
repetition. The uniqueness of words as conveyers of sense
consists intheir clarity and suggestiveness. The uniqueness of the
senses consists in their lucidity, in their capacity to become in¬
struments of suggestion and in their ability to derive the assist¬
ance of suggestion. All these'unique characteristics in poetry
have been fully explained in the Dhvanyaloka and there
would thus be no point in the criticism that dhvani is an inde¬
finable and unique feature of poetry. If the critics still persist
in their view in spite of the Dhvanyaloka, it would only show
that they have deliberately refused to exercise their sense of
judgement. Logically, this anakhyeyatva or indefinability is an
9 What is meant is that Dhvani is a concept which does not go against

the postulates of other Indian thinkers.
impossible concept if it is to mean ‘being beyond the pale of all
expression' for, ultimately, it has to be referred to at least by the
expression ‘anakhyeya’ itself. The critic might say that by
‘anakhyeyatva’ he means an indeterminate experience of some
thing which eludes determinate usage of words. This view also
is admissible only in the case of the unique charm of diamonds
and nofwith the charm of poetry, since the latter has been
explained by several writers on poetics quite determinately,
unlike the former whose values are fixed only by imaginary
standards. The similarity between diamonds and poetry is thus
not intrinsic but only extrinsic. There is of course similarity
in the fact that only a few skilful persons can discover theii
unique preciousness. Just as Vaikatikas (jewellers) alone can
judge the value of diamonds, it is only the true connoisseurs
(Sahrdayas) that can pass remarks on poetry.
As regards the theory of the Buddhists that everything in
the world is indefinable which ipso facto goes against the
definability of Dhvani, Anandavardhana feels that a thorough¬
going refutation is out of place in the Dhvanyaloka. The
curious readers who want to pursue the point further are,
however, referred to his other work Dharmottama (V. L,
Dharmottara ; in that case it would mean that Anandavardhana
wrote his gloss on Dharmottara’s commentary on the text ol
Dharmaklrti) a commentary on DharmakTrti’s work on Bud¬
dhist logic entitled “Pramana-Viniscaya-Tika.” Ananda-
vadhana contents himself with the remark that just as the
Buddhists themselves are seen to indulge in definitions of per¬
ception etc., in spite of their theory of universal indefinability
the definition of poetry attempted in the Dhvanyaloka mighi
be justified.
10 It is a matter of regret that this work of Anandavardhana on Buddhisi

Logic has not come down to us.
Two recent articles which have appeared in this connection are notec
below :—
(i) S. P. Bhattacharya. ‘New-Buddhist Nucleus in Alankara$astra*
JASB,Vol. XXII.
(ii) Anantalal Thakur, ‘Influence of Buddhist Logic on Alankarajastn
—Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda, VII. No. 4. p, 257-262.
CHAPTER IV
Section VI
DHVANI AND POETIC IMAGINATION
After discussing the theory of Dhvani in all its bearings,

Anandavardhana proceeds to demonstrate how poetry is enrich¬
ed remarkably as a result ofconforming to this principle Endless
variety of pratibha (Imagination) in poets is said to be brought
about by the agency of Dhvani.11 In other words, Dhvani might
be characterised as the touch-stone of poetic genius. If there is
sufficient genius in a poet, he will succeed in infusing variety and
fresh charm into his poem even while handling such subjects
as have become hackneyed and trite. What has been said already
by an ancient poet may yet be made to look new and interest¬
ing provided there is the gift of pratibha in the poet. And in
such cases pratibha invariably takes the form of Dhvani in some
shape or the other.12 Rasa, especially, contributes a great deal
to the ever-fresh charm in literature. It endows a new lease of
charm even to dullest themes. And the poet should direct his
special attention towards achieving beauty of Rasa though
there are other varieties of Dhvani.13 So long as poetic imagi¬
nation functions with the support of the various types
of dhvani and Gunlbhuta-vyarigya, there is no fear of the
province of poetry being exhausted.14 In the absence of prati¬
bha, of course, nothing can serve as a theme for a poem. Some
11 waists: t
Dhv. IV. 1.
12 srrt fFqafonft smnrn i
Dhv. IV. 2.
13 Cf. Dhv. IV 3-5.
14 sqrtfasj gofinjj-isqjjsrcq xT 1
Dhv. IV. 6.
DHVANI AND POETIC IMAGINATION 199
might say that more than pratibha in relation to artha, it is
bandhacchaya or dexterity in employing a sweet and pleasant
style that makes for a poem. This cannot be true as no pleasant
style can emanate in the absence of pratibha. Style is related
not only to words but also to meanings. And to say that
style depends exclusively on the beauty of words and not on
the beauty of meanings is unwarranted. At that rate, even
sweet-sounding nonsense would deserve the designation of
poetry. But, as a matter of fact, true poetry arises out of the
fusion of beauty in words as well as ideas. Compositions having
beauty of style alone arealso loosely called poems just as compos¬
itions which bodily reproduce ideas of others are regarded as
poems. But they do not merit that designation.15
Before bringing the book to a close, Anandavardhana offers
some hints to the aspiring poet. In his anxiety to achieve novelty
and variety, such an aspirant should not entirely sacrifice truth
in nature. Fidelity to natural truth does not mean absence of
poetry- Nature herself,says Anandavardhana,admits of endless
variety and striking novelty; time, place and circumstances
contribute to this natural variety and thus the scope of primary
meaning also is unlimited.16
In this connection,Anandavardhana notes a plausible objec¬
tion about the variety that Pratibha is capable of contributing to
poetry. The objection is that as a matter of fact no such variety
is possible due to Pratibha. Poets universalise on the basis of
their limited experience only and they cannot be expected
to have visions into the past, present and the future like
the Yogins. Such universalised experience of laymen is but
restricted in scope and the first poets like Valmlki have certainly
exhausted the field. What variety, then, can be left for later
poets ? At the most, the variety may be supposed to exist in the
16 Cf. Dhv. pp. 537-8.

18 snwsn^TOissii^foft i
vfHiwta $3^ (ft n Dhv. IV. 7,
manner of presenting the old ideas, not in the matter pre¬
sented.17
Anandavardhana meets the objection by pointing to the
undisputable variety of poetic charm instanced in different
master-poets. If the objection were true, there would be no
possibility at all for a second poet to be rightly so regarded
after Valmlki, the first poet, since there would be no matter
for poetry except the universalised phenomena, alreadj
exhausted by Valmlki. But it is not so. The critic himself says
that the seeming novelty in poets is due to ukti-vaicitrya or
variety in the manner of presentation. And since matter is
always intextricably connected with manner, novelty in manner
necessarily implies novelty in matter too. The idea of noveltj
in manner does not go against tne theory of dhvani either. Or
the other hand, it reinforces the possibility of limitless variety ir
poetry due to pratibha18.
Primary meaning, rendered manifold owing to difference
in time, place, circumstance etc., is pressed into the service o:
poetry quite often as is seen in a number of instances. But its
beauty is made all the more striking by the mingling of Rasas 1!
The infinite possibilities of poetry are thus due to the clever use
of the various shades of primary and suggested senses with £
touch of Rasa. Like the resources of mother nature, the infi
nite possibilites of poetic themes can never be drained of
even by a thousand Vacaspatis working with all their migh
simultaneously, provided the poet is careful in incorporate
Rasa, Bhava etc., in harmony with Aucitya into his themei
17 Cf. Dhv. pp 541-2.
5lfh*TT% || Dhv. P 54:
Dhv. IV. 8
and rendered manifold by the agency of time, place, context
etc.20 Instead of exhausting the poetic field, such attempts will
contribute new shades of charm which will increase the province
of poetry infinitely.
In spite of all this, there are bound to be some coincidences
amongst poets, since all great men think alike- But they should
not be always regarded as deliberate plagiarisms.21 There are
three kinds of coincidence:
The first is like that of a reflected image; the second is like
that of a painted picture; and the third is like that of persons
bearing resemblance in bodily features. The first kind of
coincidence should be avoided by aspiring poets as it contains no
life or body of its own. The second kind also deserves to be
eschewed, lacking as it does in the essential life of poetry. The
third can be utilised freely because when there is a different
body as well as a soul, there is no fear of mistaking the one
for the other.22 That is to say, if the poet can clothe the idea in
a different garb and can infuse new life into it by introducing
Rasas, he need not be afraid of handling even themes worked
upon by other poets. Provided there is the presence of
Dhvani, the soul of poetry, even themes modelled upon earlier
20 TSDTT5ni^sr«r§;T i
it
hi m srf n Dhv. IV. 9-10

21 i
Dhv. IV. 11.
22 i
gate 3 stîot u Dhv. IV. 12-13.

ones will acquire new beauty just as the delightful face of a
woman will appear charming in its own way in spite of, and
perhaps because of, its close resemblance with the moon.23 In
other words, no theme will become trite or outworn when
handled with due regard to suggestion.
So much about sentences which echo earlier utterances.
But so far as letters and words are concerned, it is practically
impossible that there should be any originality. The same letters
and words in the language have to be employed perforce by
every poet. Once there is the touch of suggestion, these do not
act as blemishes at all in poetry.24 Well-known paranoma-
stic words can thus be utilised by poets without any hesitation.
In short, everything, including even those that smack of earlier
influence, can be turned Wo good account as a subject for a
new poet’s composition; only, true connoisseurs must be able to
feel a flash of aesthetic pleasure about it.25 If they cannot feel
it, then the composition falls short of the water-mark of
poetry.
Anandavardhana concludes with an exhortation addressed
to poets to ply their profession without any mis-giving, to com¬
pose more and more poems abounding in manifold ideas and
nectar-like Rasas, and the poets are reassured that the god-
23 |
II Dhv. IV. 14
24 STC3HRT SHcPft I
^<5 hi * 11
Dhv. IV. 15
Dhv. IV. 16
dess Sarasvatl herself will fulfil their desire for being original
and that they need not be worried by the prospect of appro¬
priating the wares of others.26
26
srr? : i
47^ft || Dhv Iv 17
For an account of Plagiarism see :
i) C.R. Devadhar, ‘Plagiarism—its varieties and limits’—ABORI,
p 210
ii) V. M. Kulkarni, ‘Sanskrit writers on Plagiarism’, Journal of the
Oriental Institute, Baroda, III pt. IV., p. 403 f.
CHAPTER IV
Section VII
A CRITICAL ESTIMATE
In attempting an estimate of the literary theory expounded

thoroughly for the first time by Ananda vardhana, the historical
setting of the Dhvanyaloka will have to be clearly borne in
mind. In the first place, there were rules of rhetoric claiming
to explain the nature of poetry ; in the second place, there was
a science of art and dramaturgy systematised ably by Bharata
whose authority had come to stay in the field of art. In the
third place, there were the independent investigations of
grammarians, logicians and other thinkers upon the problem
of language and meaning. On the top of it all came the vast
body of classical Sanskrit literature, whose finest specimens
appealed irresistibly to the minds of talented readers; who seem
to have felt that the rules of rhetoric were not quite adequate to
explain the charm of poetry since, most often, suggestion played
an intrinsic part in the best passages of poetry. This view of
some self-styled sahrdayas appears to have been assailed on
all sides and ridiculed as nonsense by the conventional thinkers.
Against such a storm of protest, the new hazy theory could not
hold its own and it was all but crumbling when Anandavardhana
came forward championing its cause, though pooh-poohed by
his contemporaries as the advocate of a lost cause. To carry
conviction to the minds of the conventionalists who were
entrenched in their strong-hold of prejudice was no easy task,
and Anandavardhana had to make use of every resource at his
disposal. By bringing to bear upon his work his high attain¬
ments of wide reading, subtle acumen, and penetrating
analysis, by going to the very root of the problems and subjec¬
ting them to a minute, threadbare examination, never
jumping to conclusions, but by arriving at them slowly and
A CRITICAL ESTIMATE 205
considerately, disarming at every step plausible criticisms,
and above all, by inviting attention to the best specimens of
literature and appealing to the responsive taste of the
readers in every case, Anandavardhana was able to achieve
success in a large measure. The pointed and controversial
style adopted in the Dhvanyaloka, an attempt on the author’s
part to maintain a certain majesty and stateliness of closely
reasoned argument throughout, avoiding every prolixity, and
at the same time trying to be crisp and tense even to a fault—
these are also ascribable to the same reason.
The bare essence of the theory is condensed into the
smallest compass of about 120 cryptic verses or Karikas.
Anandavardhana scrupulously avoids all details, digressions
and debates in the karika-portion reserving them all for his
prose Vrtti or gloss. The Karika-portion is nothing more
than the shortest possible summary of the main tenets of the
dhvani theory. Illustrations of these tenets too do not find a
place in the Karika. The Vrtti is thus a necessary supplement
to the Karika. It supplies illustrations, and offers explanations;
it adds new material and answers objections, both actual and
anticipated. Important additions to the theory are noted in the
Vrtti and remarkable observations made therein are generally
summed up in the form of memorable verses or Parikara-slokas.
To state the theory first in a nut-shall, then to examine it in
all its implications, and finally to sum up the main results of the
discussion in a memorable verse-such is the procedure followed
in the Dhvanyaloka.
The purpose of poetry as envisaged by Anandavardhana is
to yield delight. In this however, he breaks no new ground.
Earlier writers on rhetoric too had made it abundantly clear.
But he is certainly taking a step further than his predecessors
when he notes that the delight of poetry cannot be experienced
by all and sundry alike. The truth, that even a good grinding in
grammar and the lexicons may not ensure the capacity in a
person to appreciate poems, was strikingly brought home for
the first time by Anandavardhana. He clearly stated that
literature is addressed to the heart of the reader, not so much
to his head; to emotions and feelings, and not exclusively to the
intellect. His predecessors had not realised this fundamental
truth and that is why their attempts at explanation of poetry in
terms of intellectual standards were foredoomed to failure.
They were under the mistaken impression that poetry was
mainly the product of vast erudition and assiduous practice.
Though they were aware of pratibha as a third factor, though
they sometimes recognised its more intrinsic nature in the
making of poetry, still they did not make any attempt at
explaining it fully. But Anandavardhana saw the necessity for
a fuller and more intimate understanding of the workings of
Pratibha in passing judgment on works of literature.
Anandavardhana thus saw clearly that any observation on
poetry had to lean for its support on the universal testimony of
responsive critics or sahrdayas. In the process of arriving at
conclusions about poetic values, logic and learning were
absolutely of no avail. The experience of the reader alone and
nothing else would count in this. But once the conclusion had
been drawn, though independently of logic, Anandavardhana
saw the importance of subjecting it to a strict logical scrutiny
so that the conclusion might acquire the status of a theory.
Without such a logical treatment, the conclusion, though
grounded on aesthetic psychology, would be nothing more than
a dogmatic assertion of an individual. To give it a wider scope
and an intrinsic validity, the methods of philosophy were
indispensable. Clearly distinguishing thus, in the matter of
formulating a theory of literature, the provinces of subjective
estimate on the one hand and an objective scientific consideration
on the other, Anandavardhana avoided the error of going to
either extreme. While the fundamentals of the theory are thus
grounded in the experience of responsive readers, its elaboration
is effected with the aid of the principles of correct reasoning.
Instead of looking upon reason as the sole criterion (like his
predecessors in the field), he takes its assistance only as a
supplement to the reader’s experience, only in so far as it serves
to render the conclusions more precise and accurate. And this
is what justifies Anandavardhana’s claim for originality. Instead
of trudging along the beaten track of rhetoric, he followed
altogether a new line of approach to literature, a line at once
psychological and philosophical.
Just as Anandavardhana shows an originality of outlook
in his approach to the study of literature, the conclusions he
arrives at are also very original. He starts from undisputable
facts and draws conclusions strictly in accordance with the
principles of reasoning. The facts are:— the poet at one end, the
sahfdaya at the other end and the poem that connects the two.
A theory of poetry is concerned with the poem primarily, but it
must needs take cognisance of the poet as well as the critic. The
poet is endowed with the gift of pratibha which makes him
keenly sensible of the subtlest beauty in life. It is this pratibha
again which translates his own sensibility into the form of a
poem Now pratibha, though always present in the poet, takes
the form of a poem only on rare occasions. It functions only
when spurred to action. It is but rarely spurred to action since
most of the time it remains only dormant. What then, are
those rare occassions when a poet’s imagination is stirred
so strongly as to make him compose a poem? They are the
occasions which impress him emotionally, which call forth the
outburst of one emotion or the other in the poet. It may be just
a trifle from the ordinary layman’s point of view. Still it may
succeed in calling forth a very strong emotional reaction from the
poet. The occasion of a bird’s being shot down in cold blood by
a hunter was enough to stimulate Valmlki’s pratibha and he
composed the Ramayana under the pressure of that emotion.
In other words the emotion of compassion once kindled in
Valmlki was so strong and sustained as to remain in action till
the completion of the whole of the Ramayana. Other emotions
do intervene, but never as ends in themselves, only as means to
reinforce the effect of the one dominant emotion by contrast.
From the poet’s stand-point, then, Anandavardhana concludes,
it is emotion that is sought to be conveyed through the medium
of language consisting of words and meanings. Language thus
is seen to acquire a new meaning in literature. The subtle
overtones of emotional meaning are not at all part of the
conventional meanings of words in ordinary parlance.
Anandavardhana then approaches the subject of poetry
from the sahrdaya’s standpoint. He takes delight in poetry,
he enjoys it. But what exactly is that which he enjoys in poetry?
Does he enjoy the words and the matter-of-fact meanings for
their own sake ? Surely, this cannot be. For these are not
exclusive in any way to poetry. In a book on logic too they can
be found. Shall we say then that he enjoys the clever use
of words with alliterative effect etc. and full of ornamental
imagery ? Even this is not quite sound because certain passages
in poetry having none of these merits are found to exercise an
enchanting appeal to the sahrdaya. The cause for their delight
must be something more intrinsic to poetry. On reflection it will
be found to be the emotional element. The emotional element
in poetry draws forth a sympathetic response from the heart of
the sahrdaya. The phenomenon of poetic appreciation is noth¬
ing but the sahrdaya’s yielding for the nonce to the pressure of
an emotional upsurge in himself. That is why a sahrdaya is also
a Rasika. Unless a critic can re-live the emotional experience
of the poet, he is no sahrdaya. His heart must be made of the
same stuff as the poet’s, his sensibility must be as keen and his
emotional susceptibility as full. This also explains why a
laborious learning or pedantic scholarship does not always
warrant a capacity to appreciate literature. Thus from the
critic’sstandpoint also Anandavardhana arrives at the conclusion
that it is the emotional, imaginative element which is important
and intinsic in poetry. It is this which the poet seeks to convey
at one end and which the critic receives with satisfaction at the
other end through the medium of poetry.
Here again, there is nothing absolutely original that
Anandavardhana discovered for the first time. Bharata’s
famous theory of Rasa, formulated centuries earlier, had already
taken note of these factors. But its application was so far being
confined to the fields of histrionics and dramaturgy. Though its
importance in poetry was slowly coming to be recognised (as
by Rudrata for instance), no full-fledged theory of literature had
been evolved on the basis of that principle. And this is what
Anandavardhana achieved, and achieved with such ability.
Borrowing as he did Bharata’s theory of Rasa, even in its
minutest detail, Anandavardhana, at the same time, went be¬
yond it in setting forth his theory of poetry. Though the Dhvani
theory implicitly postulates an acceptance of the Rasa theory, it
is not coextensive with the latter. While it comprehends the
theory of Rasa, it also extends beyond it. The reason why
Bharata’s theory of Rasa could not apply in toto to poetry is
obvious. The medium of drama or dance or music is not quite
the same as the medium of poetry. Even between drama and
poetry, there is some difference in the media. Whereas the
medium of poetry consists of language exclusively, the medium
of drama is language plus gesture and song. Bharata’s concern
was to formulate a theory which would explain the essential
element of charm in all these arts, and not in any one of them
in particular. His general theory could thus serve to explain the
peculiar functions of language in poetry only in part and not
in full. For a complete theory of poetry, therefore, further
Supplementing was necessary in view of the unique and exclusive
nature of the medium, viz., language. The task, in its very
nature, was a very complicated and difficult one because
language enters into relationship not only with literature but
with all kinds of human intercourse. Hence the problem before
Anandavardhana was to point out how the same words having
restricted significance in daily parlance or scientific discourse
could acquire new significance when used in poetry. The
precise nature of the relation between the two significations was
14
another problem to be tackled; and the precise conditions
under which such new significance resulted was yet another
problem demanding solution. And all these problems had to be
solved in such a way that there would be no opposition to the
theory of Rasa on the one hand and to the scientific conclusions
of the grammarians and logicians on the other. Such was the
arduous nature of the task which Anandavardhana had to
shoulder, relying upon his own resources.
Certainly it is no small achievement to the credit of
Anandavardhana that he gave a satisfactory solution to all the
problems indicated above by enunciating the theory of Dhvani.*
Starting with the undisputable fact that emotive significations
in poetry are only suggested and not directly expressed by the
words used, Anandavardhana proceeds to show how this
function of suggestion lies at the root of all poetic appreciation.
Words and their well-known meanings assist in the pheno¬
menon of suggestion and it is only when they so assist that they
become essential ingredients of poetry as contrasted with
science.
The emotional element is no doubt the most important
element in poetry which permeates the poem as a whole and
which also plays a significant part in the individual units that
go to form a poem. But in the various individual parts of a
poem, though the emotional element may predominate, it is
often found to coexist with other elements as well. Thus, for
instance in a Muktaka or a self-contained stanza, the other
* Cf. “The theory of Dhvani has for us among all the theses of poetics
the particular interest of being the one of which incidences of language are
most remarkable. When we reflect upon the remarks on the order of the
words, on the use of the pronouns, of the “Pre-verbs”, of particles, on the
choice of terms as contained in so many commentaries on poetics, we clearly
see that there lie the elements of a stylistic system on a linguistic basis,
very conscious of itself, and in some way rather near in intention to which
the moderns are striving to establish in the West.”
L. Renou, ‘The Dhvani in Sanskrit Criticism’ (Brahma Vidys, New
Series, I. i. 1954, p. 25).
elements may strike the imagination of the reader more than

the emotional element. These other elements such as smooth,
elegant diction, and picturesqueness of imagery, do impress the
reader as being the causes for the beauty in the Muktaka.
Careful examination will reveal that in such instances the
beauty of these other elements is not self-contained but
conditioned by the inner emotional element. The emotional
element usually takes the form of beautiful diction and imagery
because that is the best way in which it can express itself. A
poet whose pratibha is stirred into activity under the pressure
of an emotion naturally abounds in alankaras and gunas. But
on this account the latter alone should not be regarded as
exclusively important. They are important only in so far as they
can successfully portray the emotion sought to be conveyed by
the poet. In the absance of such emotion to be conveyed, the
alankaras cease to be integral constituents of poetry, they will
be like so many dead weights. Relatively^speaking, then, the
beauty due to style and figures of speech in poetry is secondary.
But they can certainly serve as Rasahgas or promoters of Rasa.
This revaluation of the earlier categories of rhetoric is one of
the most important contributions of Anandavardhana to Indian
Poetics. It singularly points out how the poetic process does
not admit of any ‘dissociation of sensibility’.
Having thus cleared the ground of the accumulated
prejudices about poetry, Anandavardhana embarks upon a
searching study of words and their ways in poetry.* Outside
poetry, words are found to possess two kinds of meaning. One
is the well known traditional or conventional meaning. The
other is a metaphorical meaning occasioned by speciality of the
context. These meanings play a part in poetry too But they
are not the only meanings in poetry. Emotive significance
cannot come under any of these two varieties of word-import.
* For a detailed study of this subject. Vide G. Marulasiddiah,’ Nature

and Scope of Vj-ttis’ (Bangalore Press, 1950).
It is a third kind or import over and above them and rnay be
called dhvani. Suggestion as a function of words is not
exclusively found in poetry either. It is instanced often in
common parlance, and recognised even in the system of
grammar. Even in common talk, some ideas are never directly
expressed but only suggested. Though suggestion has thus an
independent existence, it cannot function without the aid of the
other two varieties of meaning. Thus it is both dependent and
independent. But suggestion in poetry is not the same as
suggestion in common talk. When a person says : ‘give me a
cup of water’, the idea that he is thirsty is suggested no doubt,
though not expressed in so many words. But it is not poetry,
for there is no strikingness about the suggestion. It is only
striking suggestion that plays an important part in poetry. And
strikingness of suggestion consists in the fact that the suggested
idea is such as can never be expressed directly by the words as
effectively. It is only when ordinary words with their worn-out
meaning are found insufficient by the poet to convey his
meaning, that he resorts to suggestion. The same words he has
to use of course ; but he uses them with a wealth of suggested
meaning. Rasas and Bhavas provide the best examples of such
suggestion ; but they are not all. An idea which would look dry
or obscene when stated plainly might be made to look charming
and beautiful when suggested, and that is Vastu-dhvani. A
figure of speech may also be pressed into similar service. It may
in its turn be made to suggest another figure of speech or a new
idea; and that is alaiikara-dhvani. But in all these instances it
should be clearly borne in mind that a suggested idea or a
suggested figure of speech is not the same as a plainly stated
idea or a plainly stated figure of speech. In the process of
suggestion they become poetic and are transformed into things
of beauty; they emerge completely anew with special charm
and special grace out of the crucible of suggestion which has
got that transmuting power. The most commonplace things are
transformed into poems by this medium of suggestion that
words are made to acquire in poetry by poets gifted with
genius So it is that alongside of Rasa-dhvani, we have also
Vastu-dhvani and Alankaradhvani in the best specimens of
literature. This may be regarded as Anandavardhana’s greatest
original contribution to Indian literary criticism.
If Anandavardhana had stopped with this, the theory of
Dhvani would be considerably imperfect in so far as a vast bulk
of recognised poetry would be left out of consideration. So he
introduces into his classification of poetry the elements of
Gunxbhuta-vyangya and citra. The former would apply to all
instances where suggestion is present and yet not primarily
important, and the latter would comprise all such instances as
owed their beauty to the presence of ornaments (alankaras) in
spite of the absence of rich suggestion, Anandavardhana notes
that, strictly speaking, this citra variety does not deserve to be
regarded as poetry at all if there is not the slightest touch of
suggestion, at least of emotive suggestions. Thus we see that
Anandavardhana made provision in his scheme of literary
criticism, for degrees of excellence in poetry and he showed the
criterion by means of which a critic could judge whether a given
composition was good or bad, better or worse, and best or
worst. This idea too was recognised for the first time by
Anandavardhana in the history of Sanskrit literary criticism.
More than all, what compels us into a sincere admiration
of Anandavardhana is his singularly refined taste for literature.
Being himself a poet of no mean order in both Sanskrit and
Prakrit, he had first-hand knowledge of the poetic process.
What is more, he had a genuine appreciation of the rich and
matchless muse of Valmlki, Vyasa and Kalidasa. His taste had
been formed by enjoying the works of these masters and it was
sound and strong enough not to allow itself to be vitiated by
the perverse monstrosities of the kind perpetrated in literature
by second-rate poets who came after them. He had a keen
sense for discriminating between genuine and false in poetry.
In the whole of the Dhvanyaloka, hardly a single passage
selected by Anandavardhana as illustrating poetry of the finest
order, can be shown to ring false. In addition to these attain¬
ments, Anandavardhana combined in himself scholarship of a
versatile nature. He was perfectly at home in all the systems of
thought then current in India up to the minutest detail. He was
on expert in Vedanta and Buddhist philosophy, having written
original treatises on them, and was well versed in the tenets of
Tarka, Mlmarhsa and Vyakarana. About the qualities that
must go to the making of a great literary critic, an English
writer observes:—“He must have the mind of a poet, a cool head
the faculty of self-surrender and a certain modicum of bookish¬
ness.”1 There can be no doubt that Anandavardhana possessed
all these qualities in an abundant measure. And it is this
which singularly marks him off from his predecessors in the field
of Sanskrit poetics.
We, who study the Dhvanyaloka at this distant date,
separated by more than a thousand years from its author, are
apt to take objection to one feature in which the work abounds,
viz., the preponderance of minute classification, subtle hair¬
splitting and at times even logic-chopping; It may rightly
appear to us so much waste of energy on matters insignificant
in respect of literary criticism. But while making such an
estimate we should not blind ourselves to the fact that Anan¬
davardhana is an ancient writer living in an age when the
whole atmosphere was permeated with a love for philosophical
argument and logical subtlety; and if Anandavardhana errs,
sometimes on the side of too much brevity and at other
times on the side of over-subtlety, it is because he was a
typical product of that age and he was merely following the
zeit geist. At the same time, we should also remember that it
was precisely for this reason—a reason for which we find fault
with Anandavardhana now—that writers on Sanskrit poetics
have for canturies been regarding the Dhvanyaloka with the
i E.M.W. Tillyafd—Lamb's Criticism, Introduction P. IX.

highest esteem. If traditionally the Dhvanyaloka has come to
be looked upon as the locus classicus of literary criticism in
Sanskrit, it is so more because of its philosophical 'and contro¬
versial argument than because of its clear and original pre¬
sentation of a sound literary theory. The attempt of Ananda-
vardhana to raise literary theorisings to the level of philosophi¬
cal discussion and to procure them a status on an equal footing
with the other systems of thought had a greater appeal to the
minds of the ancients. We might agree with them or fee)
differently about it; it is all a matter of subjective opinion.
For having thus dared to venture into other regions not
strictly literary, Anandavardhana had to pay a heavy penalty too
by being made the target of attack by the adherents of all the
other systems. Once the truth of their conclusions was assailed,
their love of controversy was given a strong fillip and the
Dhvanyaloka had to pass through an ordeal of criticism
unequalled in the history of Sanskrit literary criticism. Even
those who could agree with the essentials of Anandavardhana’s
theory joined in the tirade against his philosophical dialectics.
A study of this blast of criticism directed against the Dhvanya¬
loka and the counterblast it occasioned will be taken up in the
sequel.
Now to sum up the present estimate of Anandavardhana
and his work : Unlike the ancient writers on Sanskrit rhetoric
who aimed at nothing more than the provision of elaborate
systems of devices, with ample divisions and subdivisions,
capable of mechanical application, Anandavardhana enunciated
the broad general principles of poetry based on an insight into
the psychology of human nature. Instead of viewing literature
as mere verbal artistry, mere meretricious glitter or glamour of
expression and imagery, Anandavardhana strikingly demons¬
trated that emotive and suggestive significance is the very soul
of poetry. By thoroughly explaining the linguistic and logical
implications of the theory of Dhvani, he tried to secure for it
a high place of honour in the eyes of appreciators and thinkers
alike. By properly defining the scope of Dhvani in relation to
earlier concepts he was able to settle the precise importance
of each in literature. And he brought to bear upon his work
all the qualifications essential for a great literary critic. No
wonder, then, that his Dhvanyaloka came to be looked upon as
the final authority in all literary matters by the subsequent
writers on Sanskrit poetics. A strikingly original work, it
combines the merit of fullness with that of conciseness: it sums
up and explains all the previous speculations on the subject
and becomes in its turn the starting point of a number of
brilliant text-books on poetics. It is a great land-mak in the
history of Sanskrit poetics dividing the whole range of criticism
into two schools—the old and the new. It marks the termina¬
tion of the old school of criticism and heralds the birth of a
modern school, modern in style, in theory, and in approach.
There can be no better and more fitting encomiumof praise
bestowed on Anandavardhana than this beatiful verse of
Rajasekhara:
* The following is a general article on the subject:—

N. Balasubrahmanya, ‘The Alamkarikas and the Semantics of Sugges
tion’ (Half-yearly Journal of the Mysore University, Vol. XVI , No. 1.).
CHAPTER V.
ABHINAVAGUPTA’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY

OF DHVANI
Before taking up for consideration the various polemical
criticisms directed against the Dhvani theory, it is necessary
that Abhinavagupta’s contribution to the theory be indicated,
for more reasons than one. In the first place, though Abhinava-
gupta has written only a commentary on the Dhvanyaloka, he
is much more than a mere commentator explaining the difficul¬
ties of text; he is an original thinker, representing the whole
theory in fuller and more comprehensive form. He is one of
those few great men that India has produced, who remoulded
and refashioned the older ideals in thought and life and whose
influence on the minds of the masses continued to have its
effect, centuries after their death. A philosopher and a poet, a
savant and a saint, a mystic and a critic of art and literature,
he deserves to be ranked beside Sankara and Bhartrhari.
Endowed with many-sided genius as he is, Abhinavagupta’s
approch to the theory of Dhvani is refreshing and brilliant.
While his commentary elucidates the remarks of Anandvar-
dhana, it also amplifies and illustrates them ; it adds here and
supplements there; it explains and it also substantiates the
Dhvanyaloka. The name of the commentary itself is very
significant. It is the ‘Locana’—the veritable eye itself ; it is not
merely an eye-opener; it furnishes the eye itself through which
alone the Dhvanyaloka can be seen in its proper perspective.
Secondly, Abhinavagupta also hails from Kashmir, the
home of Anandavardhana’s literary activity; and in point of time
too, there is hardly an intervening period of a century and a
half between them. More interesting is the fact that in the family
of Abhinavagupta the study of the Dhvanyaloka formed a con¬
tinuous tradition and one of his own ancestors had written a
commentary called Candrika on the Dhvanyaioka, earlier.
More often than not, Abhinavagupta is found to disagree with
the views of the Candrika-kara,1 which shows that he was not a
blind follower of his family tradition and that he tried to incor¬
porate the merits of other traditions too, which he learnt at the
feet of Bhatta-Induraja.2 This is enogh to prove that the
Dhvanyaioka had already come to be looked upon as a celebra¬
ted classic and there were already divergent schools of
tradition in the matter of interpreting it, even in the land of its
birth. Abhinavagupta’s commentary, then, embodying all these
traditional views, is of inestimable value to us in the study of
the Dhvanyaioka.
Thirdly, Abhinavagupta’s Locana takes into account the
repercussions that followed in the wake of the Dhvanyaioka
from the adherents of rival schools of thought. All our
knowledge of the immediate controversy occasioned by the
Dhvanyaioka in the history of Indian thought is derived mainly
from the Locana. In the light of the counter-arguments
advanced, Abhinavagupta had to re-interpiret the Dhvanyaioka
by touching up the details here and there; what is more,
Abhinavagupta makes an attempt to disprove most of the
accusations brought against the teachings of the Dhvanyaioka.
Finally, Abhinavagupta also helps us considerably in
deciding about the correct readings of the text It would appear
as if the true reading of the Dhvanyaioka were very uncertain
even at the time of Abhinavagupta himself. The fourth
Uddyota, in particular, would be almost unintelligible without
the Locana.
Thus for a proper understanding of the Dhvanyaioka, for a
knowledge of the discussion that ensued immediately afterwards,
and for the sake of the new material adduced in support of the
theory, a study of Abhinavagupta’s Locana is indispensable. In
1 Cf. Dhv. Locana, p. 290. 305-6, 319, 383, 394,410, 484.

2 Cf. Dhv. Locana. p. 115 ; also, op. cit. p. 8; also P. 2.
ABHINAVAGUPTA’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY 219
this chapter, an attempt is made to give in brief outline the
new points made out by Abhinavagupta.
Abhinavagupta’s greatest contribution to the theory of
poetry is his explanation of the process of aesthetic pleasure or
Rasa. Anandavardhana had broadly stated that Rasa was only
vyahgya or suggested, since it could not be denoted or indi¬
cated primarily. The assertion was supposed to be based on the
authority of Bharata himself. But there was a keen contro¬
versy raging amongst the commentators of Bharata about the
precise meaning.intended by Bharata. Mlmarhsakas likeLollata
understood the word ‘nispatti’ in Bharata’s sutra to mean
‘utpatti’ or production like that of an effect; Naiyayikas
like Sankuka thought it to mean ‘anumiti’ or inference. Bhatta
Nayaka, a subscriber to the view of MTmamsa took it to
mean ‘delectable excitation’ by the combined process of Bhava-
katva and Bhojakatva. It will be seen that none of these
interpretations of Bharata could explain satisfactorily the
position taken up by Anandavardhana. Hence a re-interpreta¬
tion of Bharata’s text was rendered necessary from the stand”
point of Dhvani. And to this task Abhinavagupta addressed
himself both in his commentary on the Natya-sastra (the
Abhinavabharati) and in the Locana. His exposition was so
thorough-going and masterly that it came to be implicitly
accepted by all the succeeding writers on poetics headed by
Mamma+a.
Abhinavagupta points out that the Mfmamsaka view is
wrong because the distinction between cause and affect implied
therin is inapplicable in the case of Rasa. The expression
Rasa-partipatti does not imply, as the. Mimamsaka supposes,
that Rasa is something existing without and becomes an object
of cognition to the reader or the spectator. As a matter of
fact, there is no such thing as Rasa outside the mind of the
spectator himself. Rasa is an aesthetic experience arising
within the mind of the spectator. It is unique (alaukika) in
every way and therefore the worldly criteria of cause, effect,
remembrance, inference etc., cannot enter into relation with it
at all. Its very essence is enjoyment of the vibhavas etc.,
presented in poetry. Such criteria as cause and effect do play a
part in the cognisance of worldly emotions and a spectator is
expected to be aware of these criteria and their precise relation¬
ship with worldly experience. But experience of emotion in
life is one thing and aesthetic experience in literature is a
totally different thing. In life a man can take up the attitude of
a dispaassionate onlooker, himself remaining unaffected by the
emotions witnessed ; he can discriminate between the cause,
the effect and the excitants of an emotion in the persons that he
is observing. But the process of aesthetic experience in poetry is
entirely different. Here, to experience Rasa means to enjoy, to
surrender himself to the delectable experience; and in that
stage of enjoyment there is no place for any discrimination
between man and man or cause and effect. It is to indicate this
uniqueness of enjoyment in poetry that the very objects which
serve as cause etc, in ordinary experience are given unique
names such as vibhavas. This aesthetic experience cannot be
of the nature of remembrance (smrti) since there is no possibi¬
lity of its ever having been gained in the past by means of other
pramanas, and in the present also no other pramana can lead to
it because of its unique (alaukika) nature. Hence Abhinava-
gupta concludes that Rasa or aesthetic enjoyment is neither
produced by causes as MImarhsakas might urge nor cognised by
means of pramanas like Perception and Inference as Naiyayikas
might assert. Being neither a product, nor an inferred piece of
knowledge. Rasa must needs be regarded as suggested. Bhara-
ta’s non inclusion of Sthayi-bhavas expressly in his Rasa-sutra,
his statements like ‘Vibhavo vijnanarthah loke karanamevabhi-
dhlyate na vibhavah’; and ‘Yadayarh anubhavayati vagariga-
sattvakrto’bhinayah tasmad anubhavah’ are adduced by Abhi-
navagupta in favour of the above interpretation.1
j See Locana. pp. 155-60.

ABHtNAVAG U PTA’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY 221
Bhatta-nayaka seems to have differed from Ananda-
vardhana’s view that Rasa is only suggested. His position is
quoted in full by Abhinavagupta and refuted at length. This
will be dealt with in the succeeding chapter.
Anandavardhana had spoken of a threefold classification
of Dhvani, viz., Vastu, Alankara and Rasa; at the same time he
had also pointed out that Rasa-dhvani is more important than
the other two varieties.1 But he did not go any further than
that. Abhinavagupta, however, pushes this position to its
logical conclusion ; He says that when we speak of Dhvani as
the soul of poetry, it is Rasa-dhvani alone which is meant.
Though the term Dhvani is wide enough to include Vastu-
dhvani, and Alankara-dhvani, its application should be restric¬
ted to Rasa-dhvani in defining the essence of poetry, But
Abhinavagupta is cautious enough to make it clear that the
definition as it reads should not be regarded as open to the
fallacy of‘too wide’, since Vastu-dhvani and Alankara-dhvani
too culminate in Rasa-dhvani itself.3 In poetry they cannot
exist at all entirely unmixed with a tinge of Rasa. It is only
when they are devoid of Rasa that they cease to be essential
elements of poetry. In more than one place Abhinavagupta
1 cf- sTcfonTH**!
jrrapEjiPi; \ —Dhv. p. 90-1 ;
also rt*nfa
gnwrra* I —Dhv. P. 197.
2 s?snsi^ tjata <pr
v* ^<1 3 H&TT TO St%

^TrT ‘ : qnssppri^ ’ %
! Dhv. Locana. pp. 84-5
emphasizes this view.1 And it was this view which Visvanatha
later on borrowed and incorporated into his celebrated defini¬
tion of poetry—‘Vakyam rasatmakam kavyarii.’2
Regarding the classification and sub-classification of
Dhvani-varieties, Anandavardhana had contented himself with
indicating the broad types. He had concluded with the remark
that innumerable varieties of Dhvani were possible. Abhinava-
gupta attempts to give the precise mathematical number of such
varieties though he too ultimately finds that the task is impossi¬
ble since the number of figures of speech is unlimited. He
counts thirty five varieties of Dhvani, an equal number of
varieties of Gunibhuta-vyarigya and one alarikara (35 + 354-1 =
71). This figure 71 is then multiplied by 4 (the subclasses of
Sankara and Sarhsrsti) and then again multiplied by 35 to cover
all possible instances of mixed types. Thus the final figure
arrived at is : 284 x 35 = 9940. Mammata in his Kavya-prakasa
imitates Abhinavagupta in this feature. Mammata’s figure,
however, is a still higher one, 10455.3
Abhinavagupta often strikingly illustrates points which are
left vague or only implicit by Anandavardhana. After reading
the bare text of the Dhvanyaloka one may be left with the
impression that since suggestion is the soul of poetry, the
presence of suggestion in some form or another is enough to
constitute poetry. But obviously such an impression would be
wrong. In a statement like ‘Sirhho vatuh’, there is no doubt
suggestion ; and yet it is not poetry Abhinavagupta gives an
apt analogy in explaining this. Atman or soul is said to be
1 cf. i
Dhv. Locana P. 39 ;
• (W:) ^ H 1
c „ Op- Cit. p. 51-2,
STTOT^lf^TH I 1 Op. cit. p. 90
i * ft a* |snr
Op. cit, p. 175
2 Sahityadarpapa-I. 3.
s Cf. Dhv. Locana, P. 281 and PP. 501-2.
‘vibhu’ or all-pervasive and hence it is present even in a jar.
But does the jar on that account deserve to be considered as a
living object ? Just as Atman comes to be associated with life
only when found in a special kind of body, so also Dhvani
acquires the status of poetry only when it is encased in the
body of beautiful sounds and meanings adorned with Gunas
and alankaras. The concept of soul is relative to that of the
body and poetry includes not only Dhvani but also beautiful
expressions conveying picturesque ideas.
Similarly, in interpreting Karika I. 8., Abhinavagupta
shows his penetrative insight. That Anandavardhana himself
deliberately employed the word ‘Pratyabhijneyau’ in an equivo¬
cal way is clear from his vrtti. On the one hand, the readers are
to be on the alert for suggestive words and the ideas suggested
by them ; on the other, the poet also should be on the look out
for them at the time of composing his poems. The word 'Pra-
tyabhijneyau' literaily means ‘should be recognised.’ But as
Abhinavagupta suggests: the word perhaps js used here not in
its literal sense but in the specialized sense given to it in the
Pratyabhijna school of thought. One of the cardinal doctrines
of that philosophy is that God is omnipresent and that the
individual soul is one with Him. Ignorance of this truth is the
cause of bondage. All that is needed for release is pratyabhijna
or recognition of the reality. The verse of Utpala, quoted by
Abhinavagupta in this connection, illustrates this by a telling
analogy. After repeated requests and many attempts on the
part of a love-sick woman, her lover may ultimately present
himself before her; but so long as she cannot recognise that
this is the very person for whom she has been pining all along,
there is no possibility of her desires being fulfilled.1 In the
rnrcrqfhn^T * w i
ssrR^faira-noi: fsrwjft
fvrsftrnTPT it
—Dhv. Locana, P. 98.
same way, though the individual self is none other than t
omnipotent God, so long as there is no recognition of th
there is no bliss. The poet’s function also is said to be of t
same category. By virtue of his pratibha, a hundred and o
ideas will come swarming at the call of the poet. But he w
have to use his sense of discretion in selecting the ones be
suited to his purpose. He will have to recognise or identi
that single expression which he was seeking so long to convi
his meaning precisely. Without such selection, if he uses tl
expressions promiscuously as and when they occur to him, tl
poem will not rise to the highest rank.1
In this connection, mention also should be made of tl
interesting side-lights thrown by the Locana on creative worl
of literature and criticism which have unfortunately bee
destroyed by ravages of time. Thus, for instance, we learn froi
the Locana that Abhinavagupta’s own teacher Batta Tau’
wrote an independent treatise called Kavya-Kautuka to illi
strate the special. charm of poetry from the stand-point <
Pratibha; and that Abhinavagupta himself commented upon i
Some of the quotations from this book which we find in th
Locana are indeed very illuminating. Tauta appears to hav
held the view that a hero in literature, a poet who writes aboi
him, and a reader who appreciates the poem, all are said t
have a similar kind of experience.2 Another view attributed t
Tauta and shared by Abhinavagupta is that, of all Rasas, 3ant
is the most important since it has for its basis Moksa, th
•fa SfcR
f^TH, 3 5 « °p- cit- pp- 97*
2 wtg:
—Dhv. Locana, p. 9:
ABHINAVAGUPTA’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE THE ORY 225
summum bonum.1 Similarly a reference is made to Udbhaja’s
Bhamaha-vivarana, wherein Gunavrtti as a function of words is
clearly noted.2 Creative works of literature like Yasovarman’s
Ramabhyudaya,3 Jayantaka’s ‘Kadambarl kathasara,4 and
Vatsarajacarita5 are also alluded to. Illustrations are cited from
almost all important Sanskrit poets as also from his teacher-
poets, like Induraja. Besides these, the rich store-house of
Prakrit lyrics is freely drawn upon and a large number of his
own verses too are given as illustrations.
Further, the apparent contradictions in the text are al.
resolved in the Locana. Thus, while interpreting the Karika I.
2 and the Vrtti thereon, Abhinavagupta gets over the contradic¬
tion involved by understanding the word ‘Bhedau’ in the sense
of ‘amsau.’ It would be a contradiction to say that the soul of
poetry viz., suggested sense is two-fold : vacya and pratlyamana,
for Vacya is neither suggested nor the soul of poetry. But as
Abhinavagupta takes it, the karika only means that ‘Meaning,
universally appreciated by the sahrdayas as the soul of poetry
consists of two aspects—the expressed and the suggestedl
There is no contradiction now because Meaning, in its un¬
divided state may be called the soul of poetry though when the
*§?TT I
—Dhv. Loeana p, 394
For a few more verses of Tauta. see the present writer’s article—Bhajja
Tauta’s Defence of Poetry—The Aryan Path, October 1960.
2 i 1 ‘ sfirarren.-
wnsma
5^T JJoiffW I 0p. cit. p. 32.
a Op. Cit., p. 335
« Op. Cit., p. 326
5 Op. Cit., p. 363
15
analysis goes further, only pratlyamanartha deserves to be so
regarded.1
While distinguishing ‘arthasaktyudbhava anusvanopama
vyahgya’ from ‘alaksyakrama-vyarigya’ Anandavardhana states
under II. 22 that the latter is instanced only in cases where the
vibhavas, anubhavas and vyabhicaribhavas are conveyed
through words while the former is suggestion without the assis¬
tance of direct expressions. Here indeed is a glaring contradic¬
tion on the face of it. Though one might understand that
vibhavas and anubhavas are vacya or sabda-nivedita, one fails
to see how vyabhicari-bhava can be equally ‘saksacchabdani-
vedita’, since that would shake the very sheet-anchor of the
thesis of the Dhvanyaloka that emotions are not directly com¬
municable by words. Abhinavagupta sees the self-contradiction
involved and offers the explanation that though vyabhicari¬
bhavas are really asamlaksyakrama-vyangya where they are
readily grasped without any time lag only by way of their
vibhavas described in so many words, metaphorically or loosely,
the vyabhicaribhavas themselves may be said in a sense to be
directly started.2
About the function of literature, Abhinavagupta has some
original remarks to offer. He first refers to the statement of
Bhamaha3 that literature makes for proficiency in four-fold
1 ara q* 5% fagtqqigm fcg.
I
2 Cf. Dhv. Locana-
g fcfor: I p. 248
But it is interesting to note that Sndhara in his commentary on Kavya-
prakada points out this self<contradiction of Anandavardhana as the greatest
slip conceivable in an original theorist. KavyaprakaSa (Calcuta, 1959) p. i28.
Op. cit. p. 40
purusarthas as well as the arts and that it brings fame and
delight (prlti). Then he points out that of all these, delight alone
constitutes the distinguishing mark of poetry. He says that the
Vedas issue commands like masters, and the Itihasas give us
good counsel after the manner of friends. But poetry differs
from them and is unique in its capacity to instruct one delight¬
fully like one’s sweetheart. Thus pleasure alone is the highest
and most important function of literature.1
Though one of the purposes of poetry is the same as that
of the Vedas and the Itihasas, viz., instruction, its methods and
ways are different. Pleasure-seeking princes and such others
may not care to undergo the laborious and painful course of
instruction in the Vedas and Itihasas. But in the interests of
the welfare of the state, they must needs be educated and
literature comes handy as a means for educating them. They
will be attracted by the aesthetic charm in literature and will
take delight in reading poems. Incidentaly, they will also get
an insight into the nature of dharma, artha, kama and
mok§a. Thus poetry combines instruction with delight and
delight in poetry is nothing but enjoyment of Rasa. Rasas, in
their turn, can be successfully delineated in poetry only by
following the considerations of Aucitya relating to Vibhavas
etc . Hence it is that Abhinavagupta’s teacher went to the
extent of equating Priti with Rasa, Rasa with Na^ya and
Najya with Veda;2 Mammaâ, Vi^vanatha and a host of
1 cPTTft jftrefa iraRH, I WWPTT srgHfwrfoft
*^1 frivol miT®Tiy f*to W fijluTl I
Op. Cit. pp. 40-1

subsequent writers borrowed this idea from Abhinavagupta,
though it was already foreshadowed by Bhatta Nayaka and
Kuntaka.
About the precise relationship of Aucitya with Rasa,
Abhinavagupta offers some striking remarks. He alludes to a
view held by some that Aucitya, as governing the usage of
$abdas and arthas, is enough to explain the beauty of poetry,
and that no soul like Dhvani need be postulated. He ridicules
this view by showing how the concept of Aucitya is intrinsi¬
cally related to Rasa-dhvani alone and to nothing else.1
And above all, what strikes us most in Abhinavagupta is
his amazing clarity even in the most intricate subtleties of
philosophical dialectics. Never does ihe mince matters. The
minutest detail is outset in all its bearings with a profound
grasp of the subject. It is this which makes the Locana
rise above the ordinary run of commentaries. In addition to
offering aid in the matter of clearly construing the text, Abhi¬
navagupta subjects every point to a thoroughgoing scrutiny,
gathering together all relevant material within the reach of the
reader, though left unsaid by the author of the .text. From
start to finish, the Locana contains this virture. One may take
out any page at random and that would serve as an instance as
good as any other, since Abhinavagupta always rides on the
crest of his argument with ease and grace. The Locana may
gsqggtqTiq:, *g?<n«n: snrpfavjiî-
îgsfow i * * * *r«r it i qrasgtqfTRreitta* -
JpftsraifafrT srqtffogi i sft^nwn m
4P44IRI: : I Op. Cit. 4$?.

ABHINAVAGUPTA’S contribution TO THE THEORY 229
be likened to a great palace containing magnificent halls and
beautiful rooms, anterooms, chambers and boudoirs, each
unlike the other and yet attractive in its own way. Whether
it is a topic of poetry or fine art, grammar or etymology, logic
or mysticism, there is no fear of losing one’s way while going
through the Locana. The topic is handled in such a
masterly manner that it unfailingly soaks into the mind of the
reader. Even the most serious discussions are conducted in a
sparkling style and the tension is relieved by homely and witty
remarks.1 Perhaps Abhinavagupta is the only writer on
Alankara’-Sastra who possesses the ;rare combination of wit
and wisdom, of profound scholarship and a sparkling sense of
humour. And his Locana is thus, among other things, a most
readable work, and there is no exaggeration at all when he
claims at the end :—
1 Cf. srefbntR&f thi^t

footer i
Op. Cit. p. 484

also, % ^ ?frf
§|?rrr i win 3**;’ i
Op. Cit. p. 69.
CHAPTER VI
CRITICS OF THE THEORY OF DHVANI
At about the beginning of the ninth century A.D., several
schools of literary criticism prevailed in Kashmir and in
Anandavardhana’s Dhvanyaloka, we see an attempt made for
the first time to set forth a theory of poetry assimilating all the
essentials found in the various schools, and at the same time
presenting a new explanation of all the problems. Already, as
we have seen, by the time of Anandavardhana, a theory of
suggestion regarding literature had been current for some time
in literary circles in however vague a form, and it was being
ridiculed by orthodox critics. It was as a spokesman and fore¬
most representative of this new school of thought that Ananda¬
vardhana wrote his Dhvanyaloka. Being a typical product of
that age of polemics, the Dhvanyaloka was written in a highly
contentious and argumentative style. Though in one sense, the
Dhvanyaloka is an eclectic work, it does not go the whole hog
with any of the earlier theories. It presupposes the modus
operandi of Rasa taught by Bharata and adopts his very termi¬
nology but at the same time it considers Rasa only in relation
to Guna. Alankara, Do§a and other rhetorical concepts. It
implicitly borrows the scheme of alankaras as taught by Bhamaha
and Udbhata, recognises that they are beautifying elements in
poetry, but introduces one condition - that they should be in
harmony with Rasa. Similarly the concept of Gunas, Riti, Vftti
and Sanghajana are referred to and accepted subject to the
condition of assisting Rasa-dhvani. The linguistic analysis of
grammarians and logicians is adopted, only to be modified so
as to suit the uniqueness of poetry. Other schools of thought
too come in only for review. Thus, in its very nature, the
Dhvanyaloka could not satisfy completely the sentiments of
any single school of thought or discipline of rhetoric, excepting
CRITICS OF THE THEORY OF DHVAVI 231
a section of literary connoisseurs (Sahrdayas).1 And instead of

stopping the controversy about literary theories once and for
all time, it gave a fresh impetus for further discussions with a
greater zest. Commentators on Bharata’s Natya-iastra like
Bhatta Nayaka wrote elaborate books2 to disprove Ananda-
vardhana’s theory that Rasa is always suggested. Followers of
orthodox disciplines of rhetoric like Pratiharenduraja tried
their best to defend their systems by bringing Dhvani under
one or another figure of speech. Logicians like Jayanta Bhatja
and Mahima bhaâ too joined in the attack against the Dhvani
theory and the latter wrote a long polemical treatise with the
only object of demolishing the doctrine of Dhvani. Independent
writers like Kuntaka sought to exhibit an originality greater
than that of Anandavardhana by offering new explanations of
Dhvani. There arose text-book writers like Vi^vanatha and
Jagannatha who took objection to points of detail in the
Dhvanyaloka. That even such an implicit follower of Ananda¬
vardhana as Mammaâ thought it better to avoid the very
mention of Dhvani in his so-called definition or description of
poetry is clear enough to show how this controversy had done
considerable damage to the theory of dhvani as formulated by
Anandavardhana and elaborated by Abhinavagupta. In fact, as
many as twelve views pitted against Dhvani have been recorded
by Jayaratha in his vimariini on the Alaiikarasarvasva*. Most
1 Cf. a*. I Dhv. I. 1. and
. . swat srfasifafa I
Vftti thereon.
2 Cf. The Hydaya Darpana.
* f£«n i
Tsrer WT: »
%I5TT fesrfrTOrnF ll —Loc. cit. N.S. Edn. p. 9
For a fuller account of these, see V. Raghavan, SjAgsraprakaSa, p. 149.
of these, however, have been noticed and answered by the
teachers of the Dhvani theory, viz., Anandavardhana and
Abhinavagupta. In this chapter, an attempt is made to give an
account of the various criticisms levelled against the Dhvanya-
loka ; a consideration of the Vyaktiviveka, however, is omitted
here since the next chapter is devoted to its exclusive and
exhaustive treatment.
All that has come down to us of the controversies about
Dhvani, prior to the composition of the Dhvanyaloka is a single
stray verse quoted in the Dhvanyaloka itself. And to the fact
that it comes from the pen of a poet called Manoratha, con¬
temporaneous with Anandavardhana himself, we have Abhinava-
gupta’s clear testimony in the Locana.3 The verse abounds in
biting sarcasm. It states :
‘A poem which contains nothing delightful, which does not
have figures of speech, which is not composed of polished
expressions, and which is totally devoid of vakroktis—who
else but an ignoramus can praise such a poem as possessing
Dhvani? And one is at a loss to imagine what reply he would
give when a sharp-witted man puts him a straight ques-tion
about the nature of Dhvani itself.’4
According to Manoratha, then, the idea of Dhvani is
nothing but nonsense born in the perverted minds of some
ignoramuses. He is of opinion that whatever beauty there can
be in a poem comes under one or another kind of the well-
known figures of speech and that it is idle to claim any new
kind of poetic charm for pieces lacking in alaiikaras. The verse
3 For a discussion about Manoratha see ante Ch. III.

4
qfinafid ST STCrJ fiN* 3fR'SI^T^[ giSSffa
c
A r\ » ^ A fs •
si®* ar qjtfedfafa sften srefcrervt

fife §*T%STT : II
Dhv. pp 26-27,
Cftlttcs OF THE THEORY OF DHVANi 233
gives striking expression to all the contempt and scorn charac
teristic of a contemporary traditionalist towards a new-fangled
notion.
If Manoratha's verse indicates the boundless contempt of a
senior contemporary of Anandavardhana towards the Dhvani
theory, Jayantabhatta’s summary criticism of it in his Nyaya-
mafijan manifests the same attitude shared by a younger con¬
temporary. Jayantabhaffa was a reputed logician of Kashmir
who composed an elaborate treatise on the tenets of the Nyaya
system and who endeavoured to repudiate the views of other
systems which did not agree with the tenets of Nyaya. He
thinks that the newly preached theory of Dhvani does not
deserve any serious notice at all. He laughs at the very idea
that poets, of all persons, should propose solutions to problems
concerning words and their import, problems that have eluded
satisfactory solution even at the hands of the most learned of
logicians.5 He ridicules Anandavardhana as a ‘panditammanya’
a man who makes a pretence for scholarship which he does not
possess. He notes the first two instances of Vastu dhvani cited
by Anandavardhana,6 and contents himself with the remark
that the fact can be explained more satisfactorily by regarding
the so-called suggested meaning as being conveyed by the
primary function of words with the assistance of other
6 cf. «r«rar ^ srbrd i
for
5ht ii
—Nysyamanjan p. 45 (Kashi Sanskrit series)
vtfww wtaaft *25 (item

Nysyamasjari, P. 45 (Kashi Sanskrit Series)
pramanas, particularly anumana or inference.7 Jayanta Bhajja’s
criticism has been hedged in between his refutation of the views
of Mimamsakas that Arthapatti (Implication) and Abhava
(Non-apprehension) should be regarded as independent
pramanas or instruments of valid knowledge. In Jayanta
Bhatta’s view, Dhvani occupies almost the same place as of
Arthapatti and therefore the criticisms levelled against the
latter, will, in his opinion, apply mutatis mutandis in regard to
Dhvani too. Just as arthapatti is shown to be nothing more
than a kind of inference, Dhvani also will be another kind of
inference only. He kills two birds with one stone by positing
that words with their well-known functions are enough to
explain all meanings, got at through some pramana or another.
Variety in meaning is due, in other words, to the variety of the
pramanas that assist in the grasp of the meaning, not to
the variety of functions (vyapara) of a word. It will be seen that
Jayanta criticizes the thory of Dhvani only incidentally, in the
course of his attack on the Bhatta school of Mlmamsa.1 What
interests us, however, is the low opinion he has about the capa¬
city of poets like Anandavardhana to speak with authority on
such abstruse subjects as the import of words.
A more formidable critic of the Dhvani theory was Bhatta-
Nayaka. He wrote a full-length treatise called Hrdaya Darpana
to repudiate the Dhvanyaloka. The work, however, is not
extant now though we come across references to it in Mahima-
bhatta’s Vyaktiviveka, Mankhuka’s (Ruyyaka’s?) commentary
thereon, Hemachandra’s Kavyanusasana, Jayaratha’s commen¬
tary on Alankarasarvasva etc., besides a number of quotations
a* asr am s*n 'i

—Loc. cit.
Loc. Cit.
CRITICS OF THE THEORY OF DHVANI 235
to be found in Abhinavagupta’s Locana.9 According to the
Rajataranginl,’0 he lived in the period of ânkaravarman (883-
902 A.D.), which would imply that he was nearer to the time of
Anandavardhana than to that of Abhinavagupta. He is the one
critic whom Abhinavagupta mentions by name again and again,
whose statements he quotes in full and refutes. From Abhinava¬
gupta’s frequent references to Bhatta Nayaka in the former’s
commentary on Bharata’s Natyasastra, it is clear that the
Hrdaya-darpana contained a constructive exposition of Bharata’s
theory of Rasa and other important topics besides destructive
criticism of the Dhvanyaloka.11 That Bhatta Nayaka was a
reputed writer is proved beyond doubt by the fact that even
Abhinavagupta quotes many of his statements with approval,11
and even when he differs from him, gives the view of Bhatta
Nayaka in extenso before refuting it.
Bhatta Nayaka’s greatest contribution to Indian poetics is
his masterly exposition of Rasapratlti. He begins by pointing
out the inadequacy of earlier views on Rasa. He points out
that Rasa is not apprehended either as existing in another or as
arising in oneself. The first alternative implies that Rasa already
exists in some other person and in the process of inferring it as
such, one derives aesthetic delight. The second alternative
presupposes that Rasa is produced for the first time in the mind
of the spectator (or the reader). Before taking up for criticism
Anandavardhana’s theory of Rasa-dhvani, Bhatta Nayaka
exposes the drawbacks in these two earlier views. Regarding
the first view he points out that if the locus of Rasa happens to
9 Cf. P. V. Kane, History of Alankara literature pp. Ixxvii ff.

10 V. 59.
n The suggestion of Dr. K. C. Pandey, that Sahj-daya-darpana was a
second work of Nsyaka does not appear plausible. See “Abhinavagupta”.
pp. 129-30
12 Cf. <£=t % I
N HJT: ft : It
—Locana, pp. 91-92 ; also 97.
236 THE dHVANYALOKa aSID its CRITICS
be someone other than the spectator, then, the relationship of
the spectator with Rasa would be one of strict neutrality
(tatasthya). In other words, the pleasurable experience of the
spectator will be left unexplained if that experience should be
supposed to be pre-existing in another - either the hero or the
actor. The second view that Rasa is realised as being produced
in oneself, is shown to be equally untenable. For, by reading
poetry containing the story of Rama and Slta how can one ever
get the impression that Rasa is born in his mind for the first
time? What is the purpose of the poet in describing the
various vibhavas, anubhavas etc? Is it to kindle the sthayibhavas
in the hero or kindle the sthayibhava in the reader ? Surely, the
former alone must be regarded as the intention of the poet.
Slta, the heroine of the poem is a vibhava for Rama, the hero,
not the reader. Supposing one were to say that instead of the
individual Sita, a universalised idea of Kantatva (wife-hood)
can serve as a vibhava in rousing the reader's instincts also, we
have only to point out that even this would be impossible in
poems where love between gods happens to be the theme. As a
matter of fact, while enjoying a love-poem, no one necessarily
thinks of his beloved. Further, the above statement that though
Slta in particular cannot be a vibhava for the reader, the idea
of a beloved wife as universalised can act as vibhava, implies
that this universalised aspect has close affinity to the experience
of the reader. But how can superhuman deeds such as Rama’s
bridging the ocean etc., have any affinity with human efforts?
Since such exploits do not accord with the reader’s actual
experience he cannot say that Rama’s utsaha or energy rouses
his sthayibhava and produces Rasa in his mind. Nor can he say
that remembrance of Rama’s utsaha produces Rasa, though
not utsaha itself, since there can be no remembrance of what
has never before been cognised. Even if it be held that Rama’s
utsaha might be cognised by sabda or verbal testimony, it does
not in any way prove that Rasa results in the reader as a result
of such cognition. Just as by directly seeing the amours of a
CRITICS OF THE THEORY OF DHVANI i) 1
loving couple (i. e. by pratyaksajnana of a Nayakamithuna)
there arises no rasa, but just its opposite, viz., embarrassment,
so also smrti or anubhava of Rama’s exploits does not produce
Rasa in the reader. Moreover, if one holds that Rasas are
produced in the reader, it would mean that actually misery is
produced in his mind by reading pathetic descriptions; and if
that were true, who would ever court misery by reading or
witnessing tragedies and tales of woe? Hence it follows that
Rasa is cognised neither as having existence elsewhere nor as
being literally produced in one’s own mind.
Having thus set aside the earlier views about Rasa-realisa¬
tion, Bhatta Nayaka turns to a refutation of Anandavardhana’s
positionHe finds fault with the latter’s statement that
vyahgya and vacya are related to each other precisely like a pot
and a torch which illumines it (Ghata-pradlpa-nyaya). An
illumined object like the jar can exist apart from the light that
illumines it. The jar is there even before the torch is brought.
In the same way, one cannot say that Rasa already exists before
it is suggested by the vibhavas etc. One might say that though
Rasa does not pre-exist in its final form it can be taken as pre¬
existing in a latent form, (£aktirupa). And it would mean that
various degrees are possible in the experience of Rasa, that
Rasa differs from work to work in degree though not in kind.
Just as the degree of brightness in a torch affects the perception
of ajar, so also the degree of vibhavas etc., will have to affect
the experience of Rasa and just as the brightest light will ensure
the clearest perception of the jar, so the most elaborate
treatment of the vibhavas etc., alone will have to condition
the fullest experience of Rasa. But this is not true since it
contradicts the universal experience of Rasa as one and
indivisible. Moreover there would be the same difficulties as in
the views already examined, in so far as Rasa is supposed to
exist - though in latent form - either in some one else or
in oneself. Bhatta Nayaka, therefore, concludes his criticism of
all these views about Rasa with the pointed remark that Rasa
is neither apprehended, produced nor suggested, by Kavya.
Having thus cleared the field of all misconceptions, Bhatta
Nayaka sets forth his own solution to the problem of Rasa-
realisation in poetry. According to him, words in poetry come
to be invested with a peculiar three-fold significance: - The first
is Abhidhayakatva or conventional denotation; the second is
Bhavakatva or the power to universalise and it is associated
with Rasa ; and the third is known as Bhojakatva (or Bhoga-
krttva or Bhoglkarana) or the power to yield delight and it
relates to the Sahrdaya. If the power of denotation alone
sufficed to explain the peculiar charm of poetry, then how is the
difference between sastraic maxims that convey more than one
meaning and figures of speech like slesa (Paronomasia) to be
accounted for ? Mere difference in vrtti or mode of verbal and
syllabic arrangement is not enough to account for it. Even if it
were enough, the reason why cacaphonous syllables (sruti-dusta)
should be eschewed in particular instances, will be left unex¬
plained. Hence it is necessary that we should accept Bhavakatva
as a second vyapara or import of literary words, over and
above Abhidha or primary denotation. This Bhavakatva is
related to Rasa, and it serves to impcrsonalise or universalise
the personal vibhavas etc., in the poem. It is as a result of
Bhavakatva that all individualistic associations separating the
spectator from the actor and the hero are unconsciously
submerged. Rasa is thus bhavita or released, not as existing
somewhere outside or inside, but only in a general way, since
all such discrimination is countered by the generalising power
of bhavakatva; it is this idealised Rasa which is aesthetically
enjoyed by the spectator through the third process of Bhoja¬
katva or Delectability. Bhojakatva, again, is a unique process
differing from anubhava (cognition), smrti (remembrance), and
pratipatti (apprehension). It has an essential three-fold influence
-- druti (melting), vistara (spreading) and vikasa (illumining)
or. the mind of the Sahrdaya. The mind is constituted of three
guâs viz., Rajas, Tamas, and Sattva. The first leads a man
CRITICS OF THE THEORY OF DHVANl 139
into ceaseless activity, the second encourages indolence and it is

the third which can procure him spiritual Bliss; Brahmananda
or spiritual Bliss can be had only when the influence of the
other two qualities is completely suppressed, and sattva alone is
allowed to shine out unhindered. The power of Bhojakatva in
poetry takes the reader very near the goal of spiritual Bliss. The
active Rajas is melted and rendered powerless, Tamas is allowed
to spread but by nature it cannot actively hinder the pure and
unalloyed bliss of Sattva. It is because of the presence of Tamas
that Kavyananda or aesthetic experience falls short of
Brahmananda or spiritual Bliss. Thus Bhojakatva is the most
important function pre-conditioned (siddha) in literature. The
Aesthetic delight of the Sahydaya is what matters most, not
instruction (vyutpatti).1
Such is Bhatta Nay aka’s theory of Rasa quoted in full by
Abhinavagupta. It will\be seen that this theory, unlike others, is
quite sound practically, based as it is on the essential psycho¬
logical response of the sahrdaya. Abhinavagupta himself
realises this fact and before attempting a repudiation of
Bhatta-Nayaka’s theory, he clears the ground by proceeding
cautiously. He is in complete agreement with Bhatta Nayaka
excepting for three of his statements. Firstly, Abhinavagupta
believes, as against Bhatta Nayaka, that Rasa is apprehended
that there is pratlti of Rasa. Secondly, he thinks that both the
functions of Bhavakatva and Bhojakatva can be brought under
the more comprehensive function of Dhvanana. Here he takes
i See Dhv. Locana pp. 180-183.

Uttungodaya in his commentary on the Locana summarises the
position of Bhatja Niyaka in the following verse :
snfet sstErW «r- i
—Dhvanyaloka, KSRI Edn. p. 79

14o dhvanyAloka and its CRITICS
objection to Bhatta Nayaka’s terminology rather than his

theory. Thirdly, Abhinavagupta considers Bhatta Nayaka’s
explanation of Rasa in terms of druti, vistara and vikasa of
Rajas etc., as inadequate. Reserving his criticism on these
points to the end, Abhinavagupta proceeds to state the various
views held about Rasa, in relation to Natya.
‘Writers are seen to differ even about the nature of Rasa
itself Some (i. e Lollata and his followers) maintain that Rasa
is found only in the hero (anukarya) whose actions are repre¬
sented on the stage; The sthayi-bhava in the hero will itself
come to be termed as Rasa at a later stage when it is heightened
by vibhavas etc. And we call it Natya-rasa for the simple reason
that it is employed in Natya.
Others demur to this view and state that Rasa is found
only in Natya and not at all in the anukarya. Their reasons are
as follows:—Sthayibhavas and Vyabhicaribhavas are all
propensities of the mind. Just as in a running current of water,
new water takes the place of the old every moment, these pro¬
pensities also go on changing every moment. If there is a flood
there is flood in the whole stream, not in portions of the current.
In the same way, either all the propensities are heightened
simultaneously or remain as they were before. One propensity
(say, a vyabhicaribhava) cannot heighten another propensity
(say, a Sthayibhava). By gradual degrees the intensity of sthayi¬
bhavas like vismaya (wonder), soka (grief), and krodha (anger)
slows down rather than increases. Such being the case, how can
the sthayibhava in the hero, so increase in intensity by the
interplay of other bhavas as to be transformed into Rasa? Nor
is it possible that Rasa can exist in the anukartr or actor ; for
if it exists in him already, why should he need the assistance of
music and dance? It is not even possible that Rasa can exist in
the spectator (samajika). Supposing it does arise in him, even
then what guarantee is there that camatkara or beauty alone is
felt? On the contrary, in the case of Karunarasa (sentiment of
pathos), the spectator will have to suffer grief. Hence this
alternative too will not do. Then again, the very idea of
representation of the original sthayibhavas in the hero is
impossible since their range is unlimited. Representation is
possible of the sthayibhavas only in one of their innumerable
manifestations; and there can never be the certainty that the
particular manifestation represented is the one which is always
constant (niyata). And by such a representation of one
particular, perhaps unessential, aspect of sthayibhava, what is
the purpose gained? Nothing at all, since not even instruction
can be had by the spectator who remains neutral while witnes¬
sing the representation. For all the above reasons, it follows that
Rasa is a kind of delectable apprehension (asvadarupa prati-
pattih) found only in Natya but based upon the actor’s
performance wherein sthayibhava, in its variable aspect (not in
its constant or unchanging aspect) blends with vibhavas, anu¬
bhavas and vyabhicari-bhavas. This apprehension is different
from remembrance of the hero's happiness in the past; it is
delectable in itself. The basis for the apprehension of Rasa is
none other than the actor who is identified with the hero by the
spectator, and it is the spectator that enjoys Rasa. Hence
Rasa is apprehended in Natya alone, not in the hero.
Some others say that just as in the case of a painted horse
the very imitation of the real horse becomes a source of plea¬
sure, so also the very imitation by the actor (with the aid of
histrionics) of the original sthayibhava in the hero, becomes a
source of pleasurable experience. Hence the name Rasa, which
literally means ‘what is enjoyed.’ And Rasa is enjoyed through
Natya.
Still others hold that Vibhavas and anubhavas themselves
get the name of Rasa when they are successfully staged in so
far as they get into relation with the sthayibhava in the specta¬
tors as conditioned by the vibhavas and anubhavas that are
enacted. And when they thus affect the particular propensities
in the spectator, he experiences unique joy. Hence acting
itself (Natya) should be looked upon as Rasa.
16
There are also other writers who regard that Rasa is
identical with one or another of the following-(I) Vibhavas,
(2) anubhavas, (3) sthayibhava, (4) vyabhicaribhava (5) the
blending of the above (6) the hero, (7) a conglomeration of
all the above.
Su ch is the divergence of opinion amongst commentators
about the real nature of Rasa even in the field of Natya. Bhatta
Nayaka’s theory is set forth with reference to kavya or poetry
in general. Abhinavagupta proceeds to point out that, as a
matter of fact, there is no difference at all in the manifestation
of Rasa between Natya and Kavya. Just as Natya has got
two essential aspects, viz., Lokadharmi and Natyadharml, Kavya
also has two corresponding aspects. Lokadharmi is the
naturalistic aspect in acting where one tries to incorporate one’s
natural gestures in real life and which also allows for a variety
according to the station of the men and women in question ;
Natyadharml is the conventional element which does not have
anything corresponding to real life. It is the conventional
utilisation of music, harmony and rhythm by the actors 16 In
lieu of Lokadharmi we have Svabhavokti in poetry; and in
place of Natyadharml we have Vakrokti; The three Gunas viz.,
clarity, sweetness and floridity add grace to the vibhavas etc.,
treated in poetry. Such being the case there is no reason why
Rasa in poetry should be regarded as being different from Rasa
in Natya. Though Abhinavagupta is prepared to concede for
argument’s sake that experience of Rasa in poetry may be
different from that in Natya inasmuch as the media are different,
he cannot see any difference so far as the procedure (sarani) of
Rasa-realisation is concerned.
16 cf. i
stt*t ^nsrstm »’
Kgvyaprakagasanketa, p. 75 (Mysore Edn.). Cf. also. Dr. V. Ragha-
van’s article on Loka Dharmi and Na{ya Dharnii (Conventions and
Idealism)of Bharata’s stage, Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, Vol. VII.
The several theories about Rasa-pratTli enumerated above
therefore apply to poetry also though they have been formulated
with particular reference to Natya. And of them, Abhinava-
gupta points out that only the first (viz., Lollaâ’s) is open to
the criticism of Bhatta Nayaka that Rasa-pratlti is neither sva-
gata nor paragata. At the same time, he also shows how the fact
of Rasa being a pratlti is common to all the views and Bhatta
Nayaka’s denial of it is untenable. Abhinavagupta cites a
counter-instance to prove the hollowness of the position taken
up by Bhatta Nayaka. Supposing there is something which has
never been apprehended at all, a ghost for instance, then it
cannot be made the subject of any discourse. But Rasa is not
on a par with a ghost. It is not an apparition but a real experi¬
ence. Just as the genus of apprehension (pratlti) can include
under it several species like perception, inference, verbal testi¬
mony, intuition and spiritual perception, each differing from
the other because of difference in the means (upaya-vailaksanya)
leading up to each, so also Rasa can be regarded as another
species of pratlti, called by various names, such as carvana
(relishing), asvadana (tasting) and bhoga (enjoyment), since
the means leading up to Rasa are quite unique. The means that
go to manifest Rasa are vibhavas etc., which can touch a
sympathetic chord in the heart of the reader.
At this point, Abhinavagupta anticipates and answers a
possible objection. If Rasa itself is a pratlti, to speak of the
pratlti of Rasa would be absurd. Abhinavagupta admits that
this is true and yet justifies such usages as ‘Rasah pratlyante’
on the analogy of usages like ‘odanam pacati’. Cooked rice is
called odana and yet loosely, people speak of cooking odana.
In the same way the usage which makes it appear as though
Rasa is an object of apprehension, rather than apprehension
itself, should be regarded as a loose and rambling usage which
passes muster though, strictly speaking, it is incorrect. Rasa is
itself an apprehension. In Natya it is unique because it is
distinct from ordinary inference though inference becomes a
means in the apprehension of Rasa; similarly, in Kavya it is
unique because it is distinct from other kinds of verbal
knowledge though verbal knowledge does play a part in the
apprehension of Rasa.
Abhinavagupta next takes up for criticism Bhatta Nayaka’s
statement that superhuman exploits cannot touch any sympathe¬
tic chord in the heart of the spectators. He considers that the
statement of Bhatta Nayaka is a very daring one (mahat-
sahasarii) since it goes against the conclusions of Patanjali, the
author of Yoga-sutras, who says clearly that since desires are
eternal, human propensities also which are inherited from birth
to birth are eternal and limitless.16
Abhinavagupta then turns to a refutation of Bhatta
Nayaka’s idea of vyaparas. He says that in poetry there is only
one vyapara which supervenes abhidha and that is suggestion
(dhvanana). He is not prepared to accept the two additional
vyaparas postulated by Bhatta Nayaka. Abhinavagupta says
that Bhojakatva is nothing but another name of Dhvanana
itself. And so far as Bhavakatva is concerned, if it means
promotion of Rasa, that function too can be brought under the
category of appropriate usage of Gunas and alankaras,
Abhinavagupta states that there is nothing new in this idea to
justify its being regarded as an independent function. But if it
should mean an efficient cause of Rasa, Bhatta Nayaka’s own
theory will be vitiated by the very defects he tried to avoid, viz.,
the position that Rasa is produced.
Further, Bhavakatva is said to be a vyapara of Kavya by
Bhatta Nayaka. Kavya consists of sabda and artha. Bhatta
Nayaka cannot say that Bhavakatva is a function either of the
sabdas alone or of the arthas alone since in the ignorance of
either, Rasa is not enjoyed. If he says that it is a function
of both, then it would be identical with suggestion in fact
ie Cf. Yogasutras, IV. 9-10.

and the difference will be only in name. Abhinavagupta then
proceeds to examine the implications of the word Bhavakatva
in the light of the MTmamsa system and proves that ultima¬
tely the vyapara will be dhvanana alone and nothing else.
According to the Mlmamsakas, all Vedic injunctions refer
to acts of duty and the verb (in the imperative mood) denotes
Bhavana. Bhavana is the force of predication which contains
three aspects—Sadhya (the end), sadhana (the instrument)
and the itikartavyata (procedure). Applying this principle
to Kavya, one might say that Kavya is the Bhavaka, sadhya
is Rasa and Itikartavyata is the incorporation of appropriate
Gunas and alankaras. What then is the karana (or Sadhana)?
It is nothing' but vyanjakatva itself. So even according
to the Mimamska conception of Bhavana involving a
triple aspect, suggestion deserves to be recognised as the
instrument; hence there is no necessity for regarding Bhavana
as one of the vyaparas of Kavya. When suggestion is recognised
as a significant vyapara in Kavya, Bhojakatva also will be
explained and hence is superfluous.lt is riot the term kavya that
brings enjoyment. Enjoyment is a unique aesthetic experience
brought about by a rending of the thick blinding veil of massive
ignorance which covers the essentially blissful sattva. And this
extraordinary experience can be explained only in terms of
suggestion which includes Bhojakatva within itself. Further
the manifestations of sattva and other Gunas being endless, any
attempt at a rigid explanation of them in terms of druti, vistara
etc., is bound to be inadequate.
Finally, Abhinavagupta says that Bhatta Nayaka is under¬
estimating the moral value of Kavya. It is no doubt true that
there is no direct instruction which takes the form ‘one must
behave like Rama’ etc., as in the case of sastras and itihasa.
But enjoyment of Rasa itself is the highest training which can
ever be given to one’s imagination.
Such is Abhinavagupta’s counter-criticism of the points
raised by Bhatta Nayaka in connection with the process of
Rasa-realisation17. It will be seen that there is no difference of
opinion regarding the fact that Rasa is the most important
element in poetry.18 It is only round the term to be given to its
mode of realisation that the scholastic controversy centres.
Besides this elaborate criticism of Bhatta Nayaka directed
against the theory of Rasa-Dhvani in general, stray sentences
of Bhatta Nayaka criticising particular statements in the
Dhvanyaloka are found scattered throughout the Locana. Thus
in orte passage quoted on page 39 18, Bhatta Nayaka points out
that Dhvani as vyanjana-vyapara, though admitted for
argument’s sake as an independent function, can constitute at
best an element of poetry but not the soul of poetry. The soul
of poetry is Rasa and a function of words cannot dislodge its
status of being the soul. Abhinavagupta meets the objection by
taking dhvani in the sense of ‘what is suggested’ (dhvanyate iti.)
so as to apply to Rasa ; and he also points out that the other
two categories of vastu and alankara-dhvani become significant
only in relation to Rasa.
In another passage,20 Bhatta Nayaka tries to show that the
first instance of vastu-dhvani given by Anandvardhana is not
an instance of the play of suggestion, but only of the Bhayanaka-
\
rasa. Abhinavagupta answers the objection by the witty

observation that Bhatta-Nayaka is unconsciously supporting
Rasa-dhvani in his zeal for denying vastu-dhvani.21 He also
17 Cf. Dhv. Locana pp. 184-90.

18 Cf
sreatsmfesiqtsfef i °p- Cit- p- 39-
19
^ II Dhv. Locana, p. 39
Cf. also, op. cit. p. 52.
^ . . . Op. Cit. p. 68.

cf. .
—Dhv. Locana p. 69.
points out that the Rasa suggested is not Bhavanaka but
srhgara.
Anandavardhana’s second instance of Vastudhvani is also
dismissed by Bhatta Nayaka with the comment that the so-
called suggested idea is only sabda or something primarily de¬
noted because of the gestures of the speaker and the context.28
Abhinavagupta points out that here again, Bhatta Nayaka is
lending unconscious support to Dhvani as a separate vyapara
when he refers to the aid of the context etc.23
Bhatta Nayaka also seems to have urged that every sentence
would be an instance of poetry if Dhvani were looked upon as
the soul24 Abhinavagupta disproves it by stating thatonly those
instances which are rendered beautiful by the proper adoption
of Gunas and alarikaras are regarded as poetry according to the
Dhvani theory.
In Karika I. 13. the dual number of the word ‘vyanktah’
appears to have been criticised by Bhatta Nayaka as insigni¬
ficant.25 Abhinavagupta meets the criticism by showing the
special significance of the dual number.
In the instance of arthantara-sankramita-vacya-dhvani
given in the Dhvanyaloka,26 Bhatta Nayaka says that the beauty
is due to the interjections which bring out the excitement of the
speaker, and no dhvani is instanced.27 Abhinavagupta's reply is
-Dhv.Locanap.72
“:! xt rnwfrt sspRifa 1

—Loc. Cit
24 — srN ctt| $1**1**1951*: i
—Op. cit. p. 88.
25 955*19%* f^r=5R I
—Op. cit. p. 104.
s« See ante.
5^959*1 **>*; --‘551 |f* *ftwn9fs9 ’truspir: i
—Dhv. Locana p. 171,
that at least Rasa-dhvani is instanced since excitement is a
vyabhicari-bhava of vipralambha-srhgara.
Some quotations cited by Abhinavaguptafrom the Hrdaya-
darpana show how Bhatta-Nayaka fully realised the intrinsic
relation between Rasa and poetry and how his theory of poetry
took into account the peculiar processes whereby Rasa is
manifested. He regards poets as the favourite children of the
goddess of speech. She is said to shower her choicest gifts
lovingly upon them even as the cow which yields the best part
of her milk to the calf. In this respect Rasa in Kavya is said to
surpass even spiritual ecstatic bliss. The yogins have to struggle
hard before they can share the spiritual Bliss; but Rasa in
poetry is achieved by the poets without any struggle. It would
appear as though Vak herself runs to them with her choicest
blessing as the cow towards its calf.28 Bhatta Nayaka says that
unless the poet himself is fully permeated with aesthetic delight
at the beginning, he will not succeed in communicating it
through his poem.29 He further demarcates the province of
poetry clearly from that of scripture and mythology in the
following way : “It is the word which is exclusively important
in scripture (sastra) ; the meaning is more important than the
word in mythology (akhyana); but in poetry both word and
meaning become less important; it is the vyapara (procedure)
itself which is exclusively important.30
From these stray quotations alone, we cannot form an
adequate estimate of Bhatta-Nayaka. More often than not, in
his zeal to make the statements of Bhatta-Nayaka look
ridiculous, Abhinavagupta quotes them torn from their context,
NS
srtfrrftrrt «r: ii —Dhv. Locana. p. 91.

28 marsnr mwign i —°p-cit- p- 87
nrr'TTTOT'OTar n —Op. cit. p. 87.

CRITICS OF THE THEORY OF DHVAN1 249
not even in full, but only in fragments. But even these
insufficient data are enough to show that Bhatta Nayaka was
more than a mere carping critic like Mahimabhatta ; he was a
constructive writer who formulated a new theory of poetry free
from the defects he found in the Dhvanyaloka. His remarks on
Rasa clearly bear testimony to his sound judgement and as the
very title of his work shows, he claimed not perhaps undeserve¬
dly, that he was holding up the mirror to the hearts of responsive
readers. But as against the theory of Anandavardhana, Bhatta
Nayaka’s theory could not long hold its own and in course of
time came to be consigned to the limbo of oblivion.
The next critic of the Dhvanyaloka who deserves to be
noticed here is PratThara-Induraja, the writer of a commentary
(called Laghu-vrtti) on Udbhata’s Kavyalahkara-sarasahgraha.
Though but a commentator, and though Udbhata’s work
contains absolutely no reference to Dhvani, PratThara-Induraja
goes off at a tangent to prove at considerable length how the
newly-preached theory of Dhvani can be explained in terms of
the alankaras themselves. Whether this PratThara-Induraja is
identical with Bhatta-Induraja, the preceptor of Abhinavagupta,
is still a mooted point amongst scholars.31 There is no doubt
that they should have lived about the same time, but in view of
the fact that Abhinavagupta’s Guru was an adherent of the
Dhvani theory whereas PratTharenduraja was its opponent, it
would appear that the two were distinct persons. PratTharendu¬
raja, though he professes to explain Udbhata’s text, is seen very
often to hold independent views. Thus, while Udbhata regards
Rasa as only an alankara, Induraja emphatically quotes with
approval a stanza which states that Rasa is the soul of poetry.32
si Cf. Dr. S. K. De., MM. P. V. Kane and N. D. Banhatti. editor of

Udbhata’s work in the Bombay Sanskrit series.
32 ‘wrofaffcar m :i
cGTSrnftiri VIWTO II ’
Laghu-vrtti on the KavyalaAkara-Sangraha (Bombay Sanskrit Series),
p. 83.
And in opposition to Udbhata’s view that Gunas andalankaras

are almost on a par,33 Induraja believes with Vamana that
Gunas are more intrinsic to poetry than alahkaras.34 So there is
nothing surprising in Induraja’s attempt to bring all the
important varieties of Dhvani under figures of speech.
Induraja alludes to a scheme of classification of Dhvani,
which is slightly different from Anandavardhana’s but which
includes all the varieties mentioned by the latter. Induraja’s
scheme consisting of twenty varieties is as shown on page 251.
These ten varieties are further said to be two-fold, i.e. in
pada and vakya, and hence the total number is twenty. The
four broad varieties of vivaksita-vacya, [marked (a), (b), (c)
and (d) in the table] are said to come under the figure of
speech Paryayokta. The two main varieties of avivaksita-vacya
[marked (i) and (ii) in the table] are brought under the figure
aprastuta-prasamsa.35 Thus taking the very instances of Dhvani
cited by Anandavardhana,36 Induraja remarks that they are
subsumed under one of these two alankaras, or some other
alankara like Rasavad, Preyas, Urjasvin,Udatta, Nidarsanaand
slesa. What strikes us most while reading Induraja is the fact
that he accepts the principle of Dhvani and even its divisions
while trying to point out that the beauty of the instances of
Dhvani is due to the presence of one alankara or another. It is
indeed a very strange position that Induraja has taken up.
Often he indulges in what look like self-contradictions. He
believes that Rasa is the soul of poetry, its body being sabda
and artha. He also knows that Rasa being the soul is alaiikarya
33 W: i
—(Ruyyaka’s Alaftkarasarvasa, P. 7 (K. M. Edn.)
3« Laghu Vftti P. 82
36 Cf. Dhv. p. 225, pp. 167-9, p. 261, p. 137, p. 246, p. 175 with Laghu-
Vj-tti, pp. 85-92.
Dhvani
(what is ornamented) and not an alankara'(an ornament).37 Yet

he has no hesitation in regarding Rasavad as an alankara. His
attitude towards Dhvani also is analogous to his uncertain atti¬
tude towards Rasa. Induraja is concerned more with showing
that Udbhata’s work is not open to the charge of omission, than
with disproving the theory of Dhvani as explained by Ananda-
vardhana. Thus only a historical importance attaches to
Pratlhara Induraja’s remarks, not any intrinsic merit. No
wonder he found no followers in subsequent writers.
In the recently published Commentary of RatnasrTjnana on
Dandin’s ‘Kavyalaksana’ or Kavyadarsa (MTthila Institute,
Darbhanga, 1957), we have a similar attempt at explaining
away Dhvani under one of the Alankaras, viz. Samasokti.
This Ceylonese commentator (of the tenth century, according
to the editors) writing perhaps in Nalanda, observes that the
very principle of ‘Samasokti’ is given the name of ‘Dhvani’ by
others and quotes the Dhvanyaloka Kanka “Yatrathah_”
(I. 13). According to him, Dandin’s samasokti alankara
embodies the principle of subordinating the primary meaning
to the implied significance and is thus not different from what
the Dhvanyaloka calls Dhvani.38
37 Cf. Laghuvftti. p. 83.
Recently an attempt has been made to argue that the verses
3^ gynfori n Loc-c,t- p- ^ and
are from the pen of Udbhafa himself and are quoted by Induraja from
a lost work of Udbhafa.
Vide—‘Udbhata and the Rasavada’ by Lala Ramayadupala Simha
(Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. Vol.
XXXIX, pt. MI. pp. 118-26.
38 Cf. cRJTTf^f SPIPcR I
fuifa | *n?rg
5fT 1
To the same period also belongs the DasarGpaka, a work

on Dramaturgy by Dhanafijaya Dhanika, who was not much
separated from Dhanafijaya in point of time has written a lear¬
ned commentary called Avaloka on the Dasarupaka. He also
seems to have written an independent treatise on poetry called
Kavya-nirnaya, from which he frequently quotes. Though
expressly a work on dramaturgy, the Dasarupaka touches upon
the problem of Rasa which is common to both drama and
poetry. Danafijaya, in his exposition of Rasa follows Bharata
in the main and his position that Rasa is aesthetic pleasure
enjoyed only by the spectator and that it cannot be said to
exist in the hero or the actor closely resembles the view
of Bhatta Nayaka.39 He also follows Bhatta Nayaka in holding
that the vibhavas etc., shed their individual associations and
get universalised in literature.40 Only Bhatta Nayaka’s expres¬
sion Bhoga, is replaced by the word svada in Dhanafijaya’s
explanation of the nature of Rasa.41 Dhanafijaya thus may be
said to be a follower of Bhatta Nayaka in his interpretation of
Bharata. But unlike Bhatta Nayaka, Dhanafijaya does not
disprove Anandavardhana’s theory. Dhanika, however, tries to
supply this omission on the part of Dhanafijaya. At considera¬
ble length he sums up the position of Anandavardhana and
then refutes it. Dhanika states clearly that the relation of
poetry to Rasa is one of Bhavya-Bhavaka-Bhava and not
vyangya-vyafijaka-bhava.42 He works out the implications
of Bhatta Nayaka’s remarks Vyafijana is said to be a supernu-
3# of. The Dasarupaka (published by the Gujerati Printing Press

Bombay) IV. 37-39 42.
40 *n =5 qftwiTKfeito TOtcnT: I--.. Ibid Iv- 41.
41 Cf. Ibid. IV. 43-45
42 si snsSbr i ft aft ?
i snsq- % *n»n ^ ft saat
—The Daiarupaksvaloka, p. 158

merary vyapara since the sthayibhavas in a poem are not

suggested but only signified. Dhanika is of opinion that
Tatparya or purport which plays a part in ordinary statements,
also plays a similar part in statements of poetry. Following
Bhatta Nayaka, Dhanika tries to show how the MImamsa
concept of Bhavana can be made to apply to literature also.
In every sentence, the predicate is the most important element
as conveying the main intention of the speaker; the verb may
be expressed in a sentence (as in gam abhyaja) or it may be
left to be understood by the speaker (as in dvararn dvararn).
Even in such instances as the latter where the verb is unexpres¬
sed, the meaning is understood because of the tatparya-sakti
or purport. In the same way, the main thing (Karya) to be
communicated in a poetic statement is aesthetic pleasure
(svananda). And pleasure, we know, can be communicated only
through the medium of Ratyadis. These Ratyadis may be
expressed in so many words (as in prltyai navodha priya) or
they may be left unexpressed. Even when they are left unex¬
pressed, the expressed words will be sufficient to convey
them through Tatparyasakti. Just as the final drift (vakyartha)
of every sentence (Vedic or non-Vedic) is kriya or predica¬
tion, whether expressed explicitly or not, so also the final
drift (vakyartha) of every poetic utterance is Ratyadis as
heightened by vibhavas etc. (i.e. Rasa.). And in view of
the purpose of poetry, the vibhavas etc., may be looked upon
as corresponding to padarthas (or meanings of individual
words). In other words, Dhanika thinks that corresponding to
Tatparya-sakti in all sentences (which is different from sabda-
vyaparas like Abhidha and Laksana), there is Bhavakatva in
poetic utterances ; but there is no independent sabda-vyapara
such as vyanjana. He feels that this explanation will also show
why only sahrdyas can enjoy poetry and why Abhidha and
Laksana also enter into relationship wtth poetry. Since Bhava¬
katva is an essential element in poetry, only sahrdayas who
can recognise it can enjoy Rasa And since Rasa (which is
Bhavya) corresponds to vakyartha or Tatparya, it can be

understood only through the medium of padarthas (which are
either primary or secondary). Dhanika's explanation, then
can be summed up as follows :—
(Ordinary) Abhidha or Laksana (padartha) Tatparya

(sentences) (Vakyrtha)
i i \ i
(Poetic)
(utterancs) Abhidha or Laksana (Ratyadi) Bhavakatva (Rasa)
Whereas Anandavardhana thinks that in a sentence the

scope of each vyapara—Abhidha, Laksana and Tatparya ceases
as soon as their meanings are signified, Dhanika holds that
their scope does not cease. In other words, through Tatparya,
Abhidha or Laksana itself functions till the vakyartha is
understood. Dhanika says that there is nothing which restricts
the unlimited scope of Tatparya. Thus in the instance “Bhrama
Dharmika etc., Anandavardhana thinks that Abhidha ceases
as soon as the meaning of Vidhi (i. e. ‘freely do wander’) is
denoted, and it is powerless to denote the meaning of Nisedha
(i.e. *do not venture to come’). But Dhanika says that since
the intention (vivaksa or tatparya) of the speaker is nisedha,
abhidha itself is powerful enough to denote rhat meaning too.43
Thus it will be seen that Dhanika was an implicit follower
of Bhatta Nayaka who tried to demonstrate the needlessness of
accepting vyahjana as a third vyapara. He too asserts catego¬
rically the all-important nature of Rasa in poetry, and
takes objection only to its explanation in terms of Dhvani.
Ingenious as his explanation of Tatparya was, still it could not
enlist the support of any notable writer in the history of
Sanskrit poetics. We find echoes of this view, however,, in the
voluminous work Srngara-prakasa of Bhoja,44 in Saradatanaya’s
i:> See Dasarupakavaloka pp. 149-159,

M Cf. Dr. V. Raghavan, ‘Syngara Praka$a’ Vol. I-Pt. 1., p. 170.
Bhava-prakasa45 and in Kumarasvamin’s Ratnapana, a com¬

mentary on the Prataparudra-Yasobhusana.46
Next we may pass on to Kuntaka, the author of the
Vakrokti-jTvita. Kuntaka’s place is unique in the history of
Sanskrit Poetics. Perhaps a younger contemporary of Abhina-
vagupta, Kuntaka knew the theory of Dhvani and was not
entirely dissatisfied with it. Endowed as he was with a refined
taste for poetry and a sound sense of values, he found that
Anandavardhana’s analysis of Dhvani, and elaboration of Rasa-
aucitya were perfectly justified. But he was not prepared to go
the whole length with Anandavardhana when it came to a
summary rejection of all alahkaras, so ably expounded by the
ancients, as of little or no importance. He could not bring
himself to say, as Anandavardhana had said, that all the
ancient writers on Alankara had entirely missed the truth about
poetry. Kuntaka knew, at the same time, that the restricted
application of particular figures, or Gunas or RTtis could never
do justice to all the manifold instances of poetry. He therefore
wanted to demonstrate a new universal principle of poetry
capable of the widest application. According to Kuntaka,
Dhvani in itself could not be an adequate explanation of poetry
since it invariably had to take the assistance of the other
elements. Taking his cue from Bhamaha and Dandin, who had
referred to the wide principle of Vakrokti or Atisayokti as under¬
lying all figures of speech, Kuntaka tried to give it even a wider
significance by bringing under its fold even the principles of
Dhvani ahd Rasa-aucitya. He is not a slavish follower of either
the ancient alankara-school or the new Dhvani-school; at the
same time, he is also not an unsparing critic of either school.
Kuntaka, therefore, may be regarded as an eclectic writer who
45 amt i
p. 150 (Gaekwar Oriental Series)

m cf the Ratnipapa pp. 32-33 (Balamanorama Sanskrit Series.
incorporates into his work the merits of both the schools. But
whereas his criticism of the ancients is more pointed and
frequent,45 it may be said that he hardly criticizes the Dhvani
theory and he is second to none in his admiration for Ananda-
vardhana since he always quotes from the latter with approval.46
Kuntaka brought to bear on his study a taste for poetry and a
gift for sharing his delight, unrivalled in the range of Sanskrit
writers. His insight into literature is surprisingly keen and he
has the very rare capacity of analysing things and, after a
searching examination of every element, laying his finger
precisely on the points which give rise to pleasure. Kuntaka’s
eclecticism is instanced in his description of the b$st road to
poetry (the Sukumara-marga). But at the same time it reads
more like a commentary on the Dhvani theory rather than a
criticism of it:—
“The high road of poetry along which have trodden the
greatest of poets is one where words and meanings
acquire ever new shades as a result of #the fresh genius
of the poet; which is embellished but little by figures, and
.where excellences are not strained; where the skill and
effort of the poet are made invisible by the abundance
of feelings and natural descriptions which bring
aesthetic delight to the minds of men of taste; where
the identity of parts is lost in the enjoyment of the
whole; which is comparable only to the ingenious creation
of Brahman in point of variety and beauty; and where,
whatever the poetic effect, everything is the result of the
poet’s genius.”47
Here Kuntaka is almost summarising Anandavardhana’s
position. Kuntaka’s Vakrokti-jivita represents not so much a
new theory of kavya as an attempt at bringing all the specific
46 Cf. pp. 159, 172, 173, 170, 171 etc. (Vakroktijvijta, II Edn.)
46 Cf. pp. 56-57, 58, 62-64, 134, 187, 89, 163, 140, 208, 171,95, 239 etc.
Ibid.
47 Vakroktijivita I. 25-29.
17
conceptions of Alankara, Guna, RIti, Rasa and Dhvani under a
more general principle. Vakrokti is this general principle and
according to Kuntaka, it is the essence of poetry. By Vakrokti
he understands the peculiarity capable of producing extraordi¬
nary charm. Vakrokti is that special activity of the poet (Kavi-
vyapara) which deviates from the ordinary mode of linguistic
usage and as a result of which both sounds and senses are
invested with unique beauty so as to give aesthetic delight to
the sahrdayas. Thus in poetry, from the standpoint of the
poet, it is vakra-vyapara which matters most; from the stand¬
point of the reader it is vakrata or vaicitrya (or vicchitti or
camatkara or parispanda) that is significant. Beauty in poetry
is due to the poet’s extraordinary function. Having thus
stated his position in general terms, Kuntaka proceeds to
analyse the various types of vakrokti or ukti-vaicitraya. He
distinguishes six varieties of vakrata in kavi-vyapara- (1)
Varna-vinyasa (2) padapurvardha (3) Pratyaya (4) Vakya
(5) Prakarana (6^ Prabandha.48 All alankaras are brought
under the first or the 4th variety, viz., vakya-vakrata.
Madhurya, Ojas etc., are said to be Gunas of vakrata or
vaicitrya contributing to particular Margas or styles. It will
be seen that the other four varieties of vakrata as also some
varieties of vakya-vakrata do not relate either to alankaras or
Gunas or RItis. They all include only the various aspects
of Dhvani. Dhvani in general is identified with vakrokti-
vaicitrya itself.49 The major classification of Dhvani into three
varieties viz., Vastu, Alankara and Rasa is implicitly accepted by
48 Vakroktijivita I. 19.
Vakroktijivita I. 38-40,
Kuntaka.50 Even sabdasakti-mula-dhvani, a variety based on a

different classification, is explicity brought under paryaya-
vakrata, a sub-class of pada-purvardha-vakrata ;51 and the very
instances cited by Anandavardhana are quoted.52 Similarly
arthantara-sahkramita-vacya-dhvani is brought under Rudhi-
vakrata, another sub-class of pada-purvardha-vakrata.63 Rasa
is said to be at the root of all Vakrokti and its particular
manifestation in relation to pada, vakya, prakarana and pra-
bandha etc., is considered under either the sub-classes of pada-
purvardha-vakrata such as visesana-vakrata, samvrti-vakrata,
vrtti-vakrata and bhava-vakrata, or under independent .major
varieties of vakrati such as prakarana-vakrata, vakyavakrata,
pada-vakrata and prabandha-vakrata.54 And in the third chapter
Kuntaka illustrates alahkaradhvani under vakya-vakrata.
Finally, Anandavardhana’s atyanta-tiraskrta-vacya-dhvani (or
laksana-mula-dhvani) is brought under upacara-vakrata, a sub¬
class of pada-purvardha-vakrata.
Kuntaka is also of opinion that rasa can never be deemed
as any of the alahkaras in their restricted sense since in his view
it is alahkarya. Hence he criticizes the definitions of Rasavadal-
ankara, given by Bhamaha, Dandin and Udbhata.55 But Kuntaka
also uses the word alankara with a very wide connotation, as
60 Cf. S.K. De : ‘...he (Kuntaka) gives his opinion that this so-called
figure (viz, Parivj-tti) is charming when it involves suggestion, and
speaks, categorically in this connection of the three forms of suggestion
of Vastu alankara and rasa...’Introduction to the Vakroktijivita (IIEdn.)
p. XLV.
51
Op. cit. p. 25
62 Cf. op. cit, p. 95
6:i Op. cit. p. 18-9.
64 Cf. op. cit. Ch. II p. 105: 107, 129 etc
65 Cf. op. cit. III. p. 156 ff.
synonymous with Vakrokti itself.56 And in this wide sense Rasa

is said to be an alankara.57
All these facts prove that Kuntaka was fully alive to the
importance of Rasa and the doctrine of Dhvani as preached by
Anandavardhana and that he was more opposed to the narrow
view of alankaras held by the ancient writers. It is only the
expression Vakrokti which he borrows from the ancients in its
general sense; and even then, he invests it with a richer conno¬
tation than the ancients had done. Kuntaka’s idea of alankara
is poles apart from the narrow idea of the ancients. Such being
the case, the following statement of Dr. De will have to be
regarded as inaccurate: “Thus in the figure Rasavat, which was
recognised by Old Poetics (Bhamaha iii 6; Dandin ii 280 f.) and
which helped to smuggle in, as it were, the idea of rasa into
their systems, the moods and feelings are roused not for their
own sake but only to adorn the expressed thought, Kuntaka
substantially follows this tradition although in the meantime the
Dhvanikara and Anandavardhana had already worked out the
importance of Rasa and indicated its position as an essential
element of poetry** (Italics ours). Kuntaka does not follow the
ancient traditions; he follows Anandavardhana’s tradition.
But we are concerned here more with Kuntaka’s attitude
towards Dhvani. Here again, Kuntaka’s position has been
frequently misrepresented. Dr. Harichand Sastri states 9 that
the system of vakrokti, as propounded by Kuntaka, is also
II I. 10.
Cf. also III p. 174 ff.
57 Vide Contra, De Kuntaka as a follower of Bhamaha, Udbhafa
and the alankara school started a vigorous but shortlived reactionary move¬
ment which wanted to go back to the old position ...’ (Introdn. to Vakrokti-
jivita, II Edn. p. xlvi)
58 Introduction to the Vakroktijivita, pp. xxvi-xxvii (I edn).
59 Kalidasa et 1’ Art poetique de 1* Inde. pp. 96-7.

known as the system of Bhakti. Dr. S. K. De who thinks this
statement to be inaccurate, himself writes: “The Vakrokti-jlvita-
kara, therefore, may be classed (together with Bhamaha,
Udbhata, and Vamana) among those who hold (according to
the classification of the Dhvanikara and Anandavardhana) that
Dhvani or suggestion is Bhakta; or in other words, among
those who maintain that the suggested sense may be reached
by the process of Indication or Transference (Laksana)...
Thus we see that the doctrine of Vakrokti (with relation to the
theory of Dhvani), as set forth by Kuntaka, is not synonymous
with but is only a variety of Bhakti-vada, which is alluded to
by the Dhvanikara in the first verse of his work, but which
takes several forms, as Abhinavagupta points out, according
as the tadatmya or tadrupya, laksana or upalaksana ... Indeed,
Kuntaka belongs to that group of authors, who, having
flourished after Anandavardhana’s times do not deny the
concept of Dhvani, but try to explain it in terms of already
recognised ideas.”60
This long quotation from De contains many mis-statements.
Firstly, as it has been already pointed out, it is wrong to hold
that Kuntaka is on a par with Bhamaha, Dandin and others
regarding his attitude towards Dhvani. Secondly, it is equally
wrong to hold that Kuntaka subscribes to the Bhakta-vada in
whatever form. Not only is vakrokti not synonymous with
Bhakti (as Dr. Harichand thinks), it is also not even a variety
of Bhakti. In upacara-vakrata, no doubt we have the idea of
Bhakti but it is only one of the innumerable sub-varieties of
vakrata, not the whole of it. Even so, if Kuntaka had brought
all the varieties of Dhvani under upacara-vakrata, the statement
that Kuntaka is a bhakta-vadin would have been valid. But as
so De’s Introduction to the Vakrokti-jivita pp. xxix - xxx (I Edn.)

(pp. xlii-xliii, II Edn.). Though in the II Edn, of the Vakroktijivita, Dr. De
openly recognises the fact of Kuntaka’s unstinted acceptance of Dhvani
(cf. pp. xliii-xlvi), he does not alter the above statements made in the first
edition.
we have seen, it is only one variety which Anandavardhana
himself is prepared to concede as Laksana-mula, that Kuntaka
brings under upacara vakrata. Supposing Kuntaka had refused
to accept any other variety of Dhvani except this laksana-mula
variety, even then the statement that Kuntaka is a bhakta-
vadin would have been valid. But as we have shown, Kuntaka
admits all the varieties of Dhvani. Dr. De refers to the several
forms which bhakta-vada may assume according to Abhinava-
gupta. It is evident that Kuntaka’s concept of vakrokti can
come under none of those forms. It has already been shown
that Kuntaka's Bhakti is not identical with Anandavardhana’s
Dhvani (so no tadatmya); It is not even the differentiating
property of all varieties of Dhvani (hence no laksana); upa-
laksana or occasional mark it can be in some instances, and
this is a point conceded by Anandavardhana himself. But since
in all instances it cannot be an upalaksana, this form of bhakta-
vada also will not apply to Kuntaka’s view of vakrokti and
dhvani. In support of his statement Dr. De writes: “The word
bhakti or bhakta, as explained by Abhinavagupta (p. 9), is
almost synonymous with laksana or laksanika, and is therefore
a very comprehensive term to indicate generally the system of
all writers who regard Dhvani as a secondary element (bhakta
or gauna) in poetry. Kuntaka, therefore, in maintaining the
primary importance of Vakrokti and regarding dhvani as a
secondary element included therein, certainly belongs to this
school; but the same remark applies also to Bhamaha, Udbhata,
Dandin and Vamana of older Poetics who apparently include
all ideas of Dhvani in particular poetic figures like Paryayokta
etc.” Dr. De has completely misunderstood Abhinavagupta.
It is true that ‘Bhakti or Laksana is a very comprehensive term,
to indicate the systems of all writers who regard Dhvani as a
secondary element; but the question is about the precise
meaning of ‘secondary’. According to Abhinavagupta, Bhakta-
vada is that which thinks that Dhvani is‘secondary’ or laksanika,
not primary or Abhidheya, nor vyangya or suggested. Abhinava-
gupta considers Vamana to be a bhakta-vadin because be
refers to Laksana as a function of words in his sutra ‘sadrsya-
Uaksana Vakroktih’; Similarly Udbhata also is said to be a
Bhakta-vadin because he recognised Guna-vrtti as an
independent function of words in his Bhamaha-vivarana.
Abhinavagupta does not call either Bhamaha or Dandin a
Bhakta-vadin since they do not explicitly refer to Laksana or
Bhakti. Dr. De’s assertion that all the four rhetoricians are
Bhakta-vadins cannot, thus, get any support from Abhinava¬
gupta.
The fact that Dhvani is included by some like Udbhata
(according to the opinion of the commentators) under particular
poetic figures like paryayokta goes to prove only that Udbhata
and such others were abhava-vadins and not bhakta-vadins
‘according to the classification of Anandavardhana’. For
alankarantarbhava-vada is only a kind of abhavavada, not
bhakta-vada.61 If Dr. De is using the word ‘secondary’ not as a
technical English equivalent of laksana or Bhakti, but as a
general term to mean ‘secondary in importance,’62 even then at
the most, all the four writers Bhamaha, Dandin, Udbhata and
Vamana may be called bhaktavadins since they do not give
primary importance to Dhvani in all its aspects and consider
alankaras as more important. But with Kuntaka, the position
is different. He recognises explicitly the supreme importance of
Dhvani in general (since he equates Dhvani with vakrata or
vaicitrya) as well as the varieties of Dhvani in particular (since
he equates them with particular varieties of vakrata). Thus it
will be seen that whichever way one might consider the problem,
Kuntaka’s theory of Vakrokti cannot be described as Bhakti.
Hence P. V. Kane’s statement similar to that of De, “It (the
Vakrokti-jTvita) therefoie holds the same view as those who
ai Cf. Anandavardhana’s vrtti on the 1st Karika.

62But then, this would not be ‘according to the classification of
Anandavardhana’ as De would like to think.
264 . THE DHVANYALOKA AND ITS CRITICS
regarded Dhvani to be Bhakta”,63 will also be found to be wide
of the mark. De’s oilier statement that Kuntaka did not deny
the concept of Dhvani, but tried to explain it in terms of
already recognised ideas is also far from being accurate. Kuntaka
did not explain Dhvani in terms of already recognised ideas.
He explained it in terms of Vakrokti, a term which was no
doubt already recognised, but which was by him made to
signify ideas never before signified.
But it must be noted in this connection that staunch
followers of Anandavardhana like Vidyadhara64 and Jayaratha65
had branded Kuntaka as a bhakta-vadin, and that is the reason
which has misled modern scholars. Such mis-statements of
Vidyadhara etc., can be explained only by the fact that they
never based their remarks on a complete study of Kuntaka’s
work. Even Visvanatha in his Sahityadarpana66 makes Kuntaka
say that Vakrokti is only an alankara in its narrow sense. Even
a cursory reading of the Vakrokti-jlvita is enough to disprove
Visvanatha.
The upshot of the above discussion is that Kuntaka does
not repudiate the Dhvani-theory. That he deserves a place
here at all amidst the critics is because he is neither a devoted
follower of the Dhvani theory exclusively. Since his view of
Vakrokti is more comprehensive than Dhvani, it is clear that
he was not completely satisfied with Anandavardhana’s exclu¬
sive consideration of Dhvani. There is a shift in the emphasis
on the importance of Dhvani. Anandavardhana held that Kavi-
pratibha works only through the medium of Dhvani, and hence
Dhvani is the soul of poetry. Kuntaka would put it differently.
Dhvani very frequently indicates Kavi-pratibha. But the
os History of Alankara Literature p. lxxxv.

64 I -Ekavaii P, 51
68 *iu««c4hs«r (=«^:) ^rf*rg-

I — Alaakara-vimar$ini, p. 8
so Sahityadarpana (Kane's Edn), p. 3.
activity of pratibha is more comprehensive and it is not chained
to Dhvani only. It may derive help from Alankaras, Gunas,
RTtis, and Dhvani. Hence Kavi-pratibha is more important
and its activity is vakrokti noticeable in a thousand and one
ways though the major ways are of Dhvani. While Ananda-
vardhana thinks that alankaras, Gunas etc., are all related to
Dhvani, Kuntaka holds that they are realated to vakrokti. This
is all the difference in theory. Mahimabhatta, who was nearer in
point of time to Kuntaka than Vidyadhara and Jayaratha was
careful enough to note the close resemblance of Kuntaka’s Vak¬
rokti and Anandavardhana’s Dhvani. He thinks that Vakrokti
is nothing but Dhvani masquerading in disguise since the same
examples of Anandavardhana fill the pages of Kuntaka’s work.67
And he directs his attack against Vakrokti as much as against
Dhvani. Kuntaka’s theory was no doubt very ingenious and
beautifully explained; but in its very nature it could not affect the
stream of thought in any noticeable way.
Visvanatha is a writer who closely follows the theory of
Dhvani but who thinks that certain statements of Ananda¬
vardhana are too loose and do not stand the test of a scientific
scrutiny. According to him the only scientific definition of
poetry is ‘Vakyam rasatamakam Kavyam ’. And whatever falls
outside the sphere of Rasa should be automatically regarded
as falling outside the province of poetry. Thus in his zeal for
scientific accuracy and logical precision, Visvanatha heaps
ridicule not only upon the conservative definition proposed by
his worthy predecessor (upajlvya) Mammata, but also on almost
all the definitions of the ancients including Anandavardhana.
Visvanatha, first of all, refers to the statement of Ananda¬
vardhana ‘kavyasyatma dhvanih*, and the three-fold classifica-
67 Cf. aqpwRWi *rar%
—Vyaktiviveka p. 126.
tion of Dhvani (viz , Vastu, Alankara and Rasa) mentioned by
him. And then he points out that if Anandavardhana means
only the last class of Dhvani, i. e. Rasa, to be the soul of
poetry, he has nothing to complain of; but if on the other hand,
Anandavardhana should mean that all the three classes of
Dhvani are the soul of poetry, Visvanatha is not prepared to
agree with him. Visvanatha says that such a view is incorrect
in as much as it would apply with equal force to Prahelikas or
conundrums which also contain some suggested vastu. The
definition of Anandavardhana is thus shown to be tainted by
the fallacy of‘too wide’.68 Further, Rasa alone is said to be
the distinguishing mark of poetry ; prosaic statements such as
‘Devadatta goes to town’ also may contain suggested meanings
such as ‘His servant also accompanies him’; but they are not
poetry because of the absence of Rasa. In the same way, the
stanzas quoted as instances of vastu-dhvani by Anandavardhana
are regarded as poetry not because of Vastu-dhvani therein,
but because of the presence of Rasa or Rasabhasa.69 Like
Mahimabhatta, Visvanatha also points out the contradiction
involved in Anandavardhana’s Dhvanyaloka-Karikas 1.1 and
1.2. If Dhvani is the soul of Kavya, Pratlyamanartha alone
deserves to be looked upon as the soul, not vacyartha also, as
the second Karika would apparently imply.70
as
Vl+lbft 37 I 1 ih: I Sahityadarpana p. 4

89
‘arm qra**r *i*m«î*
st 1 *wi*rrea%lf<T aw: 1 snw^ti t^-ai
1 c °p- C5t-
70 —‘am: ^ tr-
miwpsr ‘ îsqmiwi ’ffs 1
Op. Cit. p. 5.
For Abhinavagupta’s resolution of the contradiction see a'nte.
CRITIC'S OF THE THEORY OF DH VANI 267
It will be seen that Visvanatha’s criticism of Ananda-
vardhana related only to minor matters of detail and not to the
fundamental doctrines as such. By comparing the criticisms of
Visvanatha with those of Mahimabhatta, we find that he has
borrowed, almost verbatim, the words of the latter. As we have
already seen, Anandavardhana himself explicitly admits that
Vastu-Dhvani and alaiikara-dhvani invariably enter into
relationship with Rasa and this is no discovery made by
Visvanatha for the first time. The three kinds of Dhvani are
treated separately in so far as they make a unique appeal to the
Sahrdayas. Vi^vanatha’s criticism of Anandavardhana’sclassifi¬
cation of Dhvani into three major types can be ascribed only
to his eagerness for evolving a theoretically perfect definition
of poetry. But from the practical point of view such definitions
are bound to be inadequate. As Jagannatha points out,71
descriptions like those of a flowing river or a waterfall where
the charm consists in the suggested ideas (vastu) or figures of
speech will have to be shut out from the purview of poetry
according to Visvanatha’s rigid definition. Great poets are very
often seen to indulge in such descriptions and it would be
presumptuous on the part of a literary theorist to place a ban
on such a vast bulk of recognised literature.
7i Vide—RasagaAgadhara (N. S. Edn) p. 9.

CHAPTER VII
MAHIMABHATTA'S VYAKTIVIVEKA
All the criticisms of the Dhvanyaloka considered in the

previous chapter pale into insignificance when compared with
the redoubtable Vyaktiviveka of Mahimabhatta, After Kuntaka,
Mahima-Bhatta may be said to be the only original writer in
the history of Sanskrit poetics till the time of Jagannatha. An
astute logician, a brilliant connoisseur and a master at polemics,
Mahimabhatta stands out foremost in the rank of Ananda-
vardhana’s critics. The oblivion into which his work Vyakti¬
viveka has unfortunately fallen is totally unmerited. Whatever
be the soundness of his arguments, it is more than certain that
in him we find a bold thinker coming forward with his original
investigations in the matter. Amid the hundred and one books
on Sanskrit Alaiikarasastra which drearily trudge along the
trodden track omitting an insignificant detail here or adding a
superficial one there, it is most refreshing to come across a
work like the Vyaktiviveka which is written because the author
feels that he has got to say something new about the subject.
To get an idea of the polemics raging about theories of poetry
in ancient India, there can be no better study than that of
the Vyaktiviveka. The intricate logic-chopping as also the
subtle analytical distinctions that are met with in the work
fill the reader with wonder at the sharpness of its author’s
intellect.
At the very outset of his work, Mahimabhatta avows his
object in writing it in these emphatic words—“In order to prove
that all the forms of Dhvani are really comprehended under
the wider domain of inference, this ‘critique of suggestion’ is
written after having offered due salutations to the supreme
MaHIMABHAtjA’S VYAKTIVIVEKA 269
Goddess of Speech.”1 Mahimabhatta himself is not very sure
about the kind of reception that may be accorded to his works.
He knows that it cannot make any effective impression on men
of average intelligence ; he hastens, therefore, to point out that
his work can be appreciated only by the highest critics, who are
akin to him in intellect and temperament. He cites the instance
of sunrise which stirs different objects to different reactions.
Though the stimulus is the same, the response may not neces¬
sarily be so. The kind of response will depend more on the
nature of the responding object itself. ‘Thus at the time of
sunrise while some flowers bloom, others close their petals ; and
some sparkling stones shoot up into flame’.2 Mahimabhatta
thus slyly ridicules those critics wko are likely to do him
injustice on account of their preconceived notions. But at the
same time he is confident that his remarks are sound enough to
stand the test of reason and,emerge successful.
It would appear as if Anandavardhana’s Dhvanyaloka had
already achieved great renown and come to be looked upon as
an unquestionable authority even by the time of Mahimabhatta,
since he explicitly states that criticism of a renowned author like
Anandavardhana is bound to bring him lasting credit. He makes
it clear too that whenever he quotes from Anandavardhana, it
is not invariably to show that the latter is in the wrong; he may
often quote from him with approval as well 3 Mahimabhatta
<TTT ii
Vyaktiviveka I. 1.
2 assurra i
||
Ibid. I, 2.
3 55 #srfojftrafsj*roi sp i
fora israar atom u Ibid I. 3.
270 DHVANYALOKA AND ITS CRITICS
also admits that in his haste to shoot himelf into sudden fame
by giving a knock-out blow to the Dhvani-theory, he had no
patience to acquaint himself with other works on the subject
such as the Candrika and the Hrdaya-darpana, and hence some
flaws might have crept into his own work.4 He is aware of the
arduousness of his self-imposed task and craves the indulgence
of the readers whose sympathy is proverbial/’ Ft is also clear
that Mahimabhatta must have been a pretty old man, a grand¬
father of at least three children, when he composed the Vyakti-
viveka and the book was written primarily for their enlighten¬
ment. Other personal details given by Mahimabhatta about
himself are that he was the son of Srl-Dhairya and a student of
. / _
Mahakavi-Syamala.6 The work closes with a note of uncertainty
about the fate lying in store for it. He says that, perhaps,
scholars will only neglect the work embodying as it does an
entirely novel approach and will think of it only in a jesting
mood.7 Time has only proved Mahimabhatta’s worst fears to
be very true.
Before taking up for consideration Mahimabhatta’s
criticisms and charges levelled against Anandavardhana, it
would not be out of place to say a word about the procedure
adopted by him in the Vyaktiviveka. A careful perusal of the
Ibid. 1. 4.
WTO?n; q^ q^
Ibid. I. 5.
0
*raig i irf&rcRsrHT
ii ibid in 35-36.
7
Ibid. III. 3.
MAHIMABHATTA’S VVAKTIVIVEKA 271
Vyaktiviveka reveals that the only running and continuous link
in the whole book is the emphasis laid on one or the other of the
defects pointed out by the author in the statements of Ananda-
vardhana. In trying to elucidate the nature of these defects,
Mahimabhatta, more often than not, strays away far too much
into the varied fields of grammar and philosophy. The Vyakti¬
viveka consists of three chapters, called vimarsas. In the first
chapter, it is Mahimabhatta’s intention to lay bare no less than
ten defects of omission and commission in the very definition
of Dhvani as stated by Anandavardhana. Mahimabhatta goes
off at a tangent every now and then to prove how the remarks of
Anandavardhana flatly militate against the accepted doctrines
of grammar and other systems of philosophy. In the second
chapter Mahimabhatta is at pains to point out the mistakes
committed by Anandavardhana in his very first Karika —
‘Kavyasyatma dhvaniriti’. To establish his conclusion,
Mahimabhatta devotes almost the whole chapter for a considera¬
tion of the nature of defects in composition. Citing a number cf
illustrations, which, in his opinion, are faulty and suggesting
emendations so as to get over the faults, Mahimabhatta no
doubt displays his highly critical acumen and proficiency in
felicitous expression, but the space allotted to such discursive
digressions, not at all strictly germane to the subject on hand,
is out of all proportion to the relevancy of the matter. But it is
in the third chapter, which is also the shortest, that Mahima¬
bhatta does not digress so much into by-ways and sub'Ways. He
tries to prove succinctly how all the illustrations of Dhvani
given by Anandavardhana can be really regarded as instances
of Kavyanumana or Poetic Inference.
From the foregoing, it will be clear that Mahimabhatta
has not paid much attention throughout his work to the factors
that contribute to unity and coherence in a book. He has
sacrificed order and sequence at the altar of pedantry and
scholarship. It is no wonder, then, that we find his account very
often diffuse and rambling. Mahimabhatta himself appears to
have been conscious of this defect in his work since he tries to
offer a sort of justification for it at the end.8 In the body of the
work also, he tries to remedy this defect by pulling the scattered
strings together again and again and connecting them to the
main topic by means of antara-slokas. The procedure that
Mahimabhatta adopts may be indicated thus : First, he quotes
a statement from Anandavardhana; second, he points out
the defect or defects therein ; third, he indulges freely in
pedantic discussions and intricate logic-chopping, making nice
distinctions, anticipating objections, refuting them and so
forth (at this statge one is apt to lose the trend of the main theme
itself); fourth, he wends his way back to his original position;
finally, retraces briefly the several steps in his argument that go
to establish his conclusion. This is done by the antara-slokas
or intermediary stanzas which are concise and at the same time
indicative of the main direction in which the discussion is pro¬
ceeding. They serve as half-way houses between one argument
and another, summing up the most important points worth
remembering. To a great extent these assist the reader in
clearly understanding the point at issue. But very often, in spite
of them, a less careful reader is sure to lose his way in the
labyrinth of dialectics and subtle reasonings.
From the nature of the book itself, it will be seen that only
brief outline of the essential defects pointed out by Mahima-
bhajta can be attempted here. First we may take up the ten
major faults which he points out in Anandavardhana’s defini¬
tion’s of Dhvani :—
“Yatrarthah sabdo va tamarthamupasarjanlkrtasvarthau I
Vyanktah kavya-visesah sa dhvaniriti suribhihkathitah” II
They are summed up in the two following verses by Mahi¬
mabhatta
MAHlMABHArrA’S VYAKTIVIVEKA 273
“artliasya visistatvam sabdah savisesanah tadah
pumstvam ll
dvivacanavasabdau ca vyaktirdhvaninama kavya-
vaisistyam
vacanam ca kathanakartuh kathita dhvanilaksmanlti
• • •
dasa dosah
Ye tvanye tadbhedaprabhedalaksanagata na te ganitah ll
(Vyaktiviveka, I, 23-2).
The first defect is ‘arthasya visistatvam’; The adjective
(viscsana) ‘upsarjanlkrtatmatva’ (self-subordination) as qualify¬
ing the noun ‘artha’ (primary meaning) in the above definition
of Anandavardhana is said to be pointless. Mahimabhatta
explains that the primary meaning is always nothing more
than a means towards getting at some other meaning which
happens to be the end. It is but natural that there should be
subordination of the means to the ultimate end; and not a
single instance to the contrary can be cited. Now an adjective,
in order to be meaningful, must be able to mark off the
noun it qualifies distinctly from other objects and should not
be (itself incompatible with the nouns). An adjective must
satisfy both these conditions if it is to escape the charge
of superfluity. In order to mark off anything distinctly, we must
have a number of instances similar in some respects and
different in other respects. If all the instances are absolutely
similar, no adjective can be employed to indicate the unique
nature of a particular object. Hence the need for at least one
instance to the contrary if the adjective is to be meaningful.
This condition is as essential as that of compatibility in regard
to significant attributes. Now, as was already stated, not
even a single instance can be cited wherein the primary meaning
suggests a different meaning without subordinating itself. As a
rule, in all such instances, the primary meaning does subordinate
itself to the suggested one. Since this is quite a normal, and not
any extra-ordinary, feature, non-mention of it would not have
18
left any scope for doubt in the minds of the readers. Mention
of it, therefore, is open to the charge of superfluity. For
instance, when the existence of fire has already been established,
there is nothing further gained by mentioning the presence of
smoke also. For the latter, which is a secondary attribute of the
former goes without saying. It is subordinate to the idea of
fire and continues to be so whether mentioned or not. Such is
always the nature of an attribute. It is never primary.9
No doubt it may be alleged that the attributes possess a
primary importance in such figures of speech as samasokti
(implied Metaphor), and hence the adjective is quite significant
in the definition as stated by Anandavardhana. Mahimabhatta
anticipates this point and answers it as follows In Samasokti,
importance is found to exist in the attributes only in their
relation to the context (prakarana) and not in relation to the
suggested sense. By taking the very example of samasokti cited
by Anandavardhana, viz., ‘upodha-ragena — etc.10 Mahima¬
bhatta shows how Anandavardhana himself regards the ultimate
meaning here to be ‘the moon and the night on whom the
behaviour of lovers has been figuratively super-imposed’; and
if that be so, the primary meaning should be regarded as a
means in getting at this ultimate meaning and it would not be
an instance to the contrary (vyabhicara) at all as alleged. Even
granting that this is an instance of vyabhicara, i.e. where
primary meaning is not subordinated to the suggested,
Mahimabhatta states that the use of the adjective in question
(upasarjanlkrtatma) would be wrong in Anandavardhana’s
definition in so far as the above verse would be denied the
name of Kavya. Only those instances where the primary
cRTi^rera?*rstri; 1 —Vyaktiviveka pp. 9-10.

10 See ante.
MAHIMABHATTA'S VYAKTIVIYEKA 275
meaning is subordinated to the suggested would be Dhvani, and
only Dhvani would be Kavya according to the definition. But
Ciunibhuta-vyangya also is Kavya though it contains no primary
meaning subordinated to something else.I 11 For all these
reasons Mahimabhatta concludes that the adjective ‘subordin¬
ating itself’ does not deserve to find a place in the definition
of Dhvani.12
The second dosa which Mahimabhatta finds in the defi¬
nition of Anandavardhana is the inclusion of the word ‘sabda.
According to Mahimabhatta all sabdas have only one function
and that is to denote their own meaning. Apart from this they
have no other function and hence the inclusion of the word
‘Sabda’ in the definition is said to be fallacious. Words convey
only one meaning primarily and if other meanings are suggested,
it is due to the function of inference based on primary meanings
alone and not to the function of words. After elaborate analysis
of the nature of words and sentences, their import, and classifi¬
cation, Mahimabhatta concludes that meaning is two-fold,
vacya (Expressed) and anumeya (Inferred). The meaning of
individual words is only vacya and never anumeya. The
meaning of a sentence, however, is both vacya and anumeya ;13
the Inferred idea being always assisted by some Pramana or
another such as Loka (the world), Veda (scripture) and
Adhyatma (Individual Experience).14 Since words can thus
serve no other purpose than to denote their meaning, mention
of the term sabda in Anandavardhana’s definition is declared
I —Ibid. p. 12
12
II —Ibid. p. 13.
13 arafsfq f^-Tr «£=t ;

I —Ibid. pp. 39-40.
14 swm fsrfoi I —Ibld- p- 42>
to be valueless. Such commonplaces should not find any place
in logical definitions according to Mahimabhatta.
As a corollary of the above dosa follows the third defect,
viz., ‘saviêsana’, i.e. giving an attribute to the term sabda. The
attribute which Mahimabhatta calls in question is ‘upsarjam-
krtarthatva’ (subordinating its meaning). As already pointed out,
a sabda cannot have any other function except denotation; what
is more, this particular attribute is said to be nothing unique at
all. It is only in direct speech where the exact words of the
speaker are reported that we might perhaps regard the meaning
as subordinate to the word.15 But even there the subordination
of meaning is not towards any other meaning such as the
suggested. In other instances, the word is the means towards
conveying the sense and hence is itself invariably subordinate
to the meaning conveyed. But to say that its meaning which is
the end is also subordinate would be a ridiculous statement.
When we want water we take the aid of a pot. The pot may be
regarded as subordinate in importance. But can it ever be
said that water also is subordinate in importance ?16 Thus
it is proved that the adjective governing sabda is equally
useless.
Against these three expressions in the definition of
Dhvani, Mahimabhatta also brings another charge. Supposing
for argument’s sake that these expressions are justifiable,
Mahimabhatta points out how the omission of Abhidha-vyapara
as upasarjanlkfta, is unjustified. i£abda and artha have been
mentioned with this attribute. Since Abhidha as the basis of all
alankaras plays a part in poetry, even as sabda and artha, it
also ought to have been mentioned in the definition. If one
were to say that Abhidha is as good as mentioned since £abda
15
srwfa I —Ibid- p- 14-
16
—Ibid. pp. 75-76.

MAHIMABHATTA’S VYAKTIVIVEKA 277
and artha have been mentioned, Mahimabhatta’s retort would
be that by mentioning artha alone, sabda also would be impli¬
citly understood. Thus Mahimabhatta argues that either all the
three should have been mentioned in the definition or only
artha. The mention of sabda is thus unjustified.
In this connection, Mahimabhatta finds fault with Ananda-
vardhana17 for thinking that instances of dlpaka etc., are not
instances of alankara-dhvani though simile etc., may be suggest¬
ed since they are not primarily intended to suggest the simile.
Mahimabhatta feels that the suggested simile is quite significant
in an instance of Dlpaka, since without it there would be no
dlpakalankara at all. And hence he says that such instances
also should be regarded as coming under alankara-dhvani.18
The fourth drawback pointed out in the definition of
Dhvani is *tadah purhstvam’. Anandavardhana has used the
masculine gender in ‘tarfa artharii’ where ‘taift’ stands for
pratlyamanavastu. A pronoun takes the gender of the noun
that precedes and not that of what follows. We use a pronoun
instead of repeating a noun that has already been mentioned;
and here the pronoun ‘tarh’ stands for the pratlyamanavastu
which has been previously stated in Karikas 1.4 and 1.6.
(‘Pratlyamanarh punaranyadeva vastvasti’ etc., and Sarasvatl
svadu tadarthavastu nisyandamana etc ) with the neuter gender.
Since the pronoun should agree with the noun in gender, we
expect ‘tat’ (the neuter form) and not ‘tarn’ (the masculine
form). Hence the masculine usage of the pronoun is said to be
a defect in the definition. To get over this defect Mahimabhatta
17 srwz I
sr n Dhv-n-22-
I —Vyaktiviveka, pp. 19 20,

suggests emendations in the readings of the earlier Karikas as
follows:—
‘PratTyamanah punaranya eva so’rtho’sti vanlsu mahakavl-
narh I
Yo’sau prasiddhavayavatiriktah cakasti lavanyamivanga-
nasu It and
‘sarasvatT svadutamam tamartham*.
He prefers thus to change the readings of the earlier Karikas
instead of changing the reading of the definition itself into
‘vastu tad’ (though this would be simpler) for the sake of
consistency. If the reading of the definition alone were changed,
the defect of inconsistency in gender would still persist in so far
as the masculine gender is employed in other Karikas.19
Employment of'dvivacana’ or the dual number is consider¬
ed to be the fifth blemish in Anandavardhana’s definition. Since
the two words in the subject, namely artha and sabda are joined
together by an alternative conjunction viz., ‘va’ (‘or’), the verb
should be put only in the singular number and not in the dual.
Bhatta Nayaka had made a similar criticism which Abhinava-
gupta tried to refute by defending the usage of the dual number
as specially significant inasmuch as there is always mutual
assistance between sabda and artha though for the sake of con¬
venience one of them may be regarded as the vyanjaka.
Mahimabhatta dismisses this defence of Abhinavagupta as
unimportant, and as arising out of delusion.21
The usage of the conjunction ‘va’ is the sixth defect tainting
i» Cf. I. 5, 7, 8 etc.
£0 foa afSlfa i^ftsgqw:
f^*n I'TH: I :> *T ?^TT
I qrfa ^ SPltf) I —Vyaktiviveka, pp. 91-92.
—Tbid. pp. 90-91.

the definition of Dhvani. Mahimabhatta shows that va should
normally signify option (vikalpa) and here by taking it in that
sense, it would mean that either sabda by itself or artha by
itself may ‘suggest’. In the first place, since words have been
proved to have no other function except Abhidha, they cannot
by themselves ‘suggest’, and the conjunction ‘va’ would conse¬
quently be defective. In the second place, if it is said that the
conjunction ‘va’ does not have the sense of option but of
cumulation (samuccaya), then instances where sabdas or arthas
by themselves are regarded by Anandavardhana as vyanjakas
will have to be denied the title of Dhvani. Thus both the
alternatives are shown to be unsatisfactory.22
The idea of suggestion (vyakti) embodied in Ananda-
vardhana’s definition by means of the expression ‘vyanktah’ is
the seventh defect in the opinion of Mahimabhatta. Mahima¬
bhatta gives a searching philosophical analysis of the concept of
vyakti or Abhivyakti and points out how vyakti is impossible
in poetry in every sense of the term. In general terms, Abhi¬
vyakti is described as having reference to such objects,—existent
or non-existent — as are cognised simultaneously with the
prakasakas or those objects which manifest them without the
condition that the relation between them should be remember¬
ed.23 The manifestation (abhivyakti) of a non-existent thing
[asat) is only of one kind. For example, the white light of the
sun manifests a rainbow (which is really non-existent apart from
the white light). But the manifestation of an existent thing (sat)
22 tar* 4131^1 tasqral *r rc

sgsntarml waft
?T STFi; I —Ibid. pp. 89-90.
23 jWVsgW WtWWF-WI StspRta

Frtr l -Ibid. pp. 76-77.
is of three kinds. The first is manifestation of something in a
noticeable form, which was so far present only in a potential
form. Curd for example is potentially present even in the state
of milk but is clearly noticed as such only at a later stage. This
is according to the satkaryavada of the Sankhyas. The Naiyayi-
kas would regard it as an instance of utpatti (production). The
second is manifestation of an object, already existing in reality
but not capable of being apprehended owing to obstacles,
through the aid of a manifestor which is subordinate in impor¬
tance. In such instances, both the manifester and the manifested
will be simultaneously appehended. The case of a jar illumined
by a torch will illustrate this kind of abhivyakti. The third kind
of satah abhivyakti is instanced where traces of a former experi¬
ence of a thing, lying latent in our minds, are kindled by reason
of some external thing which happens to be invariably concomi¬
tant with it or a word which denotes such a thing. For example,
smoke serves to manifest the idea of fire in the above way. By
seeing an image we are reminded of the actual person ; and by
hearing a word, say, cow, we understand the meaning it stands
for. Now of these three varieties of abhivyakti, Vacyartha can¬
not be said to possess the first kind since it is not cognisable by
the senses as in the case of curds; nor can it be said to possess
the second kind of abhivyakti since there is no simultaneity bet¬
ween the vacyartha and the vyangyartha. There may be occasion
for the third. But a closer scrutiny will reveal that the third kind
contains such characteristics as are more applicable to anumana
or inference than vyakti or suggestion.24 A meaning is under¬
stood either because of the power of the words (sakti) or
because of invariable concomitance (nantarlyakata). In the
former case, we have $abda-pramana and in the latter anumana-
Other varieties of knowledge like Arthapatti and upamana can
also be brought under Anumana itself. Consequently, vyakti
also easily comes under anumana itself. One cannot say that
24 Cf. Ibid. pp. 78-79,

there is no invariable concomitance between vacyartha and
vyarigyartha because, at that rate, there would be no limit to
suggestions possible from any expression. Everything will have
to suggest everything else in the world And since temporal
sequence between the two is found, and not even simultaneity,
Mahimabhatta concludes that the mention of theêxpression
vyakti in Anandavardhana’s definition is open to the fallacy of
asambhava or irrelevancy.25 If one were to say that in Rasa-
vyakti there is simultaneity and hence the use of the word
vyakti is justified, then Vastu-dhvani and Alankara-dhvani where
there is no simultaneity would be left out of account and
avyapti or ‘too narrow’ would be the fallacy in the definition.26
Mahimabhatta further demonstrates how even in Rasa-
pratlti, there is causal relation between Ratyadis and Rasa, and
how the cause and effect are never cognised simultaneously.
The concept of ‘prakasaka’ (that which manifests some¬
thing else) is then analysed into two kinds and it is shown by
Mahimabhatta how vacyartha cannot be a prakasaka in any of
the two ways. The first kind is said to be of the nature of
upadhi or that which is simultaneously involved in the appre¬
hension of something else. Jnana (knowledge), sabda (words),
pradlpa (torch) etc. are regarded as upadhi-rGpa-prakasakas
since the process of knowing is related inextricably with
the object known and words are inseparably related to their
meanings, and light is simultaneously cognised along with the
object. The second kind of prakasakas is svatantra (independ¬
ent) and is instanced in the probans of an inference such as
‘smoke’ while inferring fire. If Anandavardhana employs the
25 *
***KT«Wt I Ibid. p. 79.
26 m mt: sprier JRnsrtsfwra

i gwyngigfwwqsrcwc srenrtRwI Ibid p- 79>
term ‘vyanktah’ in the sense of upadhirupa, then either the
perceptual knowledge (pratyaksa) or the primary meaning
itself will have to be considered as Kavya or poetry, which
would be absurd. If he adopts the second sense, it would imply
that the process is anumana and not vyakti.
Mahimabhatta continues his examination of the impli¬
cations of vyakti and points out how it is inadequate as an
explanation of poetry. If vacyartha alone is vyanjaka in poetry,
then instances where vyangyartha is vyanjaka would be denied
the status of poetry. For example, in Kalidasa’s verse ‘evam
vadini devarsau —’ etc., the bhava of Lajja or bashfulness is
first suggested which in its turn suggests the sentiment of love.
The definition would be inapplicable to £rhgara-rasa-dhvani in
the above verse. If, to get over this fallacy of ‘too-narrow’, the
word ‘arthah’ in the definition of Anandavardhana is taken to
apply both to vacyartha and vyangyartha in the light of the
Karika 1.2. (Yo’ rthah sahidaya-slaghyah etc.), this explanation
would flatly go against Anandavardhana’s own explanation of
‘artha’ as ‘artho=vacya-vi£esah\ Even supposing the explanation
to be correct, there would be the fallacy of‘too wide’ instead
of ‘too narrow’ because instances where the sense finally
suggested is very much removed from the one expressed, by two,
three or more degrees, also will have to be regarded as poetry,
though they contain no charm. Mahimabhatta illustrates his
point by means of the following verse:—
tftilfoWH iwrfrt fettfgT II

Here the removal of LaksmI’s bashfulness is what is finally
suggested. The reason for that is the fact that the right eye of
Visnu happens to be the Sun. The closing of that eye makes us
infer that the Sun is setting. This in its turn explains why the
navel-lotus should close its petals. It is this fact which obstructs
the sight of Brahman. So many reasonings are involved in this
stanza that it impedes the enjoyment of Rasa. The verse is as
good as a prahelika or conundrum and the definition of
Anandavardhana would apply to such instances as well. Hence
‘too-wide’ is the fallacy committed in the definition.27
The title ‘Vyaktiviveka’ given to the work of Mahimabhatta,
will appear quite significant in view of this elaborate examina¬
tion of the concept of vyakti. This is the most fundamental
criticism advanced against the definition of Anandavardhana.28
The eighth dosa levelled agaiost the definition by Mahima¬
bhatta is the use of the word ‘Dhvani’ (Dhvani-nama).
Mahimabhatta thinks that the expression Dhvani is nothing
more than an unnecessary coinage since it does not serve in any
way to make the meaning of poetry clearer.29 How it does not
help in making our notion of poetry more precise is explained
while illustrating his ninth charge, to be dealt with presently.
‘Kavya-vaisistyam’ is the ninth flaw in Anandavardhana’s
definition according to Mahimabhatta. In the definition we find
the expression ‘Kavya-visesah’ used by Anandavardhana.
Mahimabhatta raises an objection to this usage.30 He says that
Kavya is meant to be defined and Rasa has been admitted to
be the soul of poetry even by Anandavardhana himself in
Karika 1.5 (Kavyasyatma sa evarthah etc.). Once this fact is
admitted, Mahimabhatta asks how there can be any visesa or
distinction in Kavya which is Rasatma. He gives copious
quotations from Bharata about the nature of Rasa to show how
Rasa is a unified experience admitting of no distinctions.
Mahimabhatta also shows elaborately how the poet’s primary
function is to delineate Rasas by a proper treatment of the
Vibhavas etc., and how it is this alone which marks off poetry
27 Cf. Vyaktiviveka, pp. 80-86.

28 cf sw+jtfi I
sgfoangMMfiW: II ~Ibid- P- 455-
29 ^ ^ fofagdla’mil&Udt&lgmfaMifiUtdifafH *
\ —Ibid. p. 101.
30 Prtfrgwijyimm ~Ibid p- 92-

from Sastra. Distinction in Rasas, it is said, cannot bring about
distinction in poetry, for, at that rate, the delineation of only
particular Rasas would make for poetry. Even vastu and
alankara, it is stated by Mahimabhatta, cannot bring about
distinction in poetry whose soul is Rasa, just as colours like
dapple-grey cannot make a cow distinct. Even granting that this
is possible, the term Dhvani can apply only to instances where
vastu and alankara are suggested and not where Rasa alone is
suggested. The term Dhvani would also apply to instances like
Prahelika, totally devoid of Rasa. Hence Mahimabhatta observes
that Rasa should be equated with Kavya and cannot put in the
same class as vastu and alankara. In the definition also, mere
mention of the word Kavya is enough to include Rasa according
to Mahimabhatta. Since Rasa is thus inseparably connected
with Kavya, he says that kavya should be called Dhvani and
not Kavya-visesa. By regarding Dhvani as kavya-visesa,
Mahimabhatta feels that full justice can not be done to the
exclusive importance of Rasa in poetry. He makes it clear that
individual compositions like the MeghadGta are regarded as
Kavya-visesa not because they delineate distinct Rasas, but
because they deal with distinct themes. Mahimabhatta concludes
by stating that even if visesa in kavya be possible, the word
need not find a place in the definition, since it would be impli¬
citly understood by virtue of the definition itself, just as a man
mounted on a State-horse is implicitly understood to be a
king. Thus avacyavacana (mention of that which does not
deserve mention) is said to be the fallacy committed in the
definition.
The last major defect, the tenth, is with reference to the
expression ‘suribhih kathitah’ in Anandavardhana’s definition
of Dhvani. The express mention of the subject viz., suribhih
with referenc to the verb in the passive voice viz., kathitah, is
regarded as a defect by Mahimabhatta (vacananca kathanakar-
tuh). Mahimabhatta argues that the subject of the action of
saying is either some particular persons or persons in general.
If it is the latter, then, since all actions invariably presuppose
some agent in general, the agent need not be mentioned at all.
If it is the former, even then the merits of the speakers can be
understood quite well from the exposition of Dhvani itself.
That they are learned need not be emphasised even at the
outset. Thus, in either case, Mahimabhatta thinks that the use
of the word suribhih is unwarranted.31
Such a searching scrutiny as Mahimabatta’s, is perhaps
unparalleled in the history of Indian polemics. Under the
ruthless vivisection of Mahimabhatta, every word in Ananda-
vardhana’s definition becomes defective for one reason or
another. To get over the various defects described above, the
definition will have to be thoroughly recast and Mahimabhatta
himself shows how it should be recast:
“Vacyastadanumito va yatrartho’rthantararh prakasyati I
Sambandhatah kutascit sa Kavyanumitirityukta II
It is obvious that the changed definition does not at all take
cognisance of vyakti which is substituted by anumiti.
Nor does Mahimabhatta stop with his attack on the defini¬
tion of Dhvani. He proceeds to criticise Anandavardhana’s
conception of Bhakti as a function of words (sabda-vyapara)
like Abhidha. Mahimabhatta says that sabdas or words have
only one function and that is Abhidha. If meanings other than
the primarily denoted ones are understood from words, it
is because of the peculiar ability of the denoted meanings and
not because of the words. Mahimbhatja holds that this ability
of arthas or meanings is anumana just as the function of words
is Abhidha.32 Since the two varieties of Bhakti — one based
on upacara as in *simho vatuh’, and the other based on
laksana as in ‘gangayam ghosah’. - are just new meanings
31 Î
—Ibid. p. 103.
32
arrived at on the basis of the primary meanings, they deserve
to be included under annumana rather than be given an
independent status. In the first kind of Bhakti, sadrsya or
similarity serves as the probans of the inference; in the second,
sambandha or ‘relationship’ acts as the probans.33 According
to Mahimabhatta, Bhakti cannot be regarded as a function of
words because words cannot in their nature possess more than
one function. Fire, for example, possesses two functions, viz.,
of burning and illumining which become active simultaneously
quite independent of each other Similarly, words cannot have
two or three functions independent of one another since
all meanings, whether due to Laksana or vyanjana, are
dependent on primary meaning. Having thus concluded that
Bhakti is a variety of inference and not a function of words,
Mahima Bhatta shows that Anandavardhana’s view of Bhakti
is untenable. Since Bhakti comes under Inference, Mahima¬
bhatta says that there is no reason why they should not be
regarded as identical. The fallacies of avyapti and ativyapti
pointed out by Anandavardhana34 do not apply to this changed
conception of Bhakti which can be of two kinds—(i) based upon
padartha and (2) based upon vakyartha (but never based upon
sabda). Hence Mahimabhatta states his own view of Bhakti
adopting the very Karikas of Anandavardhana by introducing
slight changes here and there :
vrph i
^ rPTT II
«T ’snsq#: STH^rl I
|| -Ibid. p. 116 (I. 47)
also’ ft?! ftspspH* I fejpTqHMlfa-

5|fiT || - Ibid. p. 118 (I. 55)
si Vide. Dhv. 1. 14 to 18.
MAHIMABHATTA’S VYAKtlVtVfiKA 281
SPPTC: 5TFT^ II
sRwinfn: ircrtfsrel ?! *n*for ^ i

Vyaktiviveka, pp. 119-121
gÊTT 1# qf^ «®r
qff^FT W WSf 5T®^T %% ^55*%: II
in<o<^ g«J|^frit«fjtil I
'zft: gtlffrwl * %** II
4m+<cuw-!ii<ftgi goit^îwn u
H%-s,l goifrRT: 1
q^rffeqffMgl II
d^lcj. ^GrtllWi Pl^Wt ?T: I
*rtsfa faifcfl SgqRfeq^lS^dq; ||
Vyaktiviveka pp. 119-121
Mahimabhatta finds fault with Anandavardhana for by¬
passing the explanation of suggestion When suggestion is said
to be the soul of poetry, one would expect a treatment of the
various ways in which vacyartha gives rise to vyangyartha. But
Mahimabhatta complains that Anandavardhana has avoided
this procedure by shifting the emphasis to a consideration of
what is pradhana (important) and apradhana (unimportant)
in the various instances of poetry.35 Mahimabhatta examines
all the instances cited by Anandavardhana of Vastu-dhvani,
Alankara-dhvani, Rasa-dhvani, and Gnnlbhuta-vyangya, and
arrives at the conclusion that far from any pradhanya or other¬
wise, there is a common characteristic of charm due to
36 5R?I *ar^q ufrUtdl fmn^HT-
I l<Add d<Ti: snqT^RT0TI^5q^*T

I -Vyaktiviveka p. 136.
anumana in all those instances.36 Hence he reiterates his
criticisms against the Dhvani theory in the following forcible
words :
ii
PR fH |rM«D^ 3S*IoT «£T II
a ggar rr%ht: Rtf^*TRrnmR n

H TO | K^tW^PTT1
+1^+14R TOTIfHTTORifll^ 3RI: II
^ ^ HTOflWMgl&IWWiIsfd: I
grrî^ra^F srfjpji h^rt pr: u
—Vyaktiviveka, p. 142 (I. 96-100)
Next Mahimabhatta pours ridicule on the classifications
of Dhvani proposed by Anandavardhana. First he selects for
criticism the major classification of Dhvani into avivaksita-
vacya and vivaksitanyapara-vacya. Regarding the former
class, Mahimabhatta would like to know what exactly is meant
by avivaksita. It may mean either anupadeya (unacceptable) or
anyapara (expressing something else). If the former meaning
be adopted, then the question would arise whether it is wholly
unacceptable or only in part. If vacya should be wholly
unacceptable, then the suggested sense based upon that also
would become unacceptable and the very usage would be
fallacious. Supposing we take it to mean ‘unacceptable in part’;
then the question arises—‘in what part?’ Anandavardhana has
SE!S?TOt 1 —Ibid. p. 140.

also, ^
MfrWVllfa 1 ~Ibid* p> 141 •

MAHIMABHATTA’S vvaktiviveka 289
not made it clear. By examining it ourselves we will find that ulti¬
mately avivaksita can only mean apradhana (not important) or
in other words anyapara or upasarjanlkrta. Now this fact forms
a part of the general definition of Dhvani itself and it cannot
serve to describe a particular species of Dhvani. The purpose
of classification is to show how there is some speciality in the
particular species which cannot be included in the general defini¬
tion itself. In the general definition of a cow, no mention js
made of its colour. So various species are possible such as the
dapple-grey (sabaleya). ‘Cow’ itself in general cannot be both
the genus and the species. In this variety of avivaksita-vacya-
dhvani there is no specific peculiarity besides the generic differ¬
entia. Hence it cannot be regarded as a species of Dhvani.
Having thus criticised the first variety of Dhvani proposed
byAnandavardhana, Mahimabhatta takes up the second variety,
viz., vivaksitanyaparavacya, for examination. At the outset
Mahimabhatta remarks that he is at a loss to understand what
it could signify. If vivaksita is to mean pradhana, how could it
also be adyapara (apradhana) at the same time ? Anyapara
means secondary and vivaksita means primary. The juxtaposi¬
tion of both re nothing but a contradiction in terms. Further, the
criticism against avivaksita-vacya that the characteristic is only
generic and nothing specific will apply against this variety also.
And Mahimabhatta adds that at least for the sake of uniformity,
‘anyapara’ should be used either with reference to both or none
of the varieties, since it is a common characteristic of both.
Referring next to another variety of Dhvani, viz., arthantara-
satikramita-vacya, Mahimabhatta remarks that its illustrations
prove that it is other than Bhakti based upon upacara. Upacara
is defined as transference of one thing to another, though
they are completely different with their own separate character¬
istics, in order to indicate their similarity.37 Since Bhakti
37
: SqviH: I
(iContinued on next page) —Ibid. p. 146.
19
290 THE DHVANYALOKA AND US CRITICS
comes under anumana, this variety of Dhvani too, is
automatically explained by Anumana. Mahimabhatta explains
that there are two forms of anumana.—dharma-rupa (i.e.
inference relating to characteristics) and dharmirupa (i.e.
inference relating to objects). In Arthantara-sankramitavacya-
dhvani we have inference of the characteristics. In instances
like ‘Ramo’smi sarvam sahe’ the word Rama by virtue of the
context (prakarana) signifies all the excellences he posseses
and all the sufferings he has braved. The reason for the
communication of these meanings hapens to be the context, not
the word.
The same remark applies to the variety of Dhvani designat¬
ed by Anandavardhana as ‘atyanta-tiraskrta-vacya, perhaps
with greater force, since there also we find upacara. Conse¬
quently, in Mahimabhatta’s scheme, it also deserves to be
included under anumana.
Finally, Mahimabhatta dismisses ‘Sabdasakti-mulanurana-
narupa-vyangya’ as an impossibility since words are said to
possess no further power besides denotation.
All these criticisms against Anandavardhana’s classification
Dr. Hara Dutt Sharma has missed the point in explaining Mahima-
bhajta’s view of upacara. He writes—“The prayojana of upacara according
to him is strikingness. Upacara may be lakgita or'anumita. He considers
that even Rasa is an outcome of upacara” (‘The meaning of the word
upacara’ Poona Orientalist, Vol. No. 1. p. 30) Upacara is never lakjita
according to Mahimabhatta. It is always anumita. He never regards Rasa
as an outcome of upacara ; on the other hand, he flatly rejects this view (cf.
nahi kecit etc., Ibid. p. 394). Strikingness (camatkara) is not the prayojana
in all upacara. It is the prayojana only in such instances as have been called
vyaftjana by Anandavardhana. The term vyanjana is itself an upacara in
relation to what is really anumeya. This is the correct explanation of
WT 5 cT^CT I
MqWuhTl I (P- 108)
quoted by Dr. Sharma in support of his statement.
of Dhvani are well summarised by Mahimabhatta himself in the
following verses:—
STaPRrTT 1
*% 11
wti i
5F* tPT fvi^T I

ST^TTT V: 11
foBgld«KWl): I
*T: JT^T cffS^t 11
3RrBt*tW* WrT: 1
(Vyaktiviveka, I. 101-105)
Mahimabhatta devotes the whole of the second chapter to

a discussion of the nature of defects as a prelude to stating
that almost all these defects are instanced in a single verse of
Anandavardhana, the first verse to wit—‘Kavyasyatma Dhvani-
riti—etc. It is very surprising indeed to find Mahimabhatta, a
carping critic himself, saying at the outest that good manners
forbid a lengthy discussion of others’ faults and the office of the
true critic is to understand the merits, if any, in others rather
than to pick holes in them. This procedure of being alive only to
the defects in others, will, according to him, fall to the lot of
only unfortunate persons. But he justifies his exposition of faults
by remarking that he had to transgress the path of the righteous
in order to satisfy the request of his pupils who sought for
enlightenment as also to remove misapprehension in the minds
of men who might level against him the unmerited charge of
muddle-headedness or want of politeness in not replying to
* For a fuller account of this. Vide—Trilokanatha Jha, ‘A Critique

of the Initial verse of the Dhvanyaloka’,—The Calcutta Review, Sept. 1958,
pp. 253-262.
292 I HE DHVANYALOKA AND ITS CRITICS
questions put, or reticence due to jealousy.38 Mahimabhatta
does not himself claim to be perfect and free from every fault.
He says that nothing prevents a doctor who is himself addicted
to unwholesome diet from prohibiting others’ indulgence in it.39
Mahimabhatta says that all defects can be brought under
the general name anaucitya. It may be intrinsic (antarahga) or
extrinsic (bahirariga). The antarahga anaucitya consists in the
improper employments of vibhavas, anubhavas and vyabhicari-
bhavas in the manifestation of Rasa. The bahiranga anaucitya
is broadly divisible into arthavisaya and sabdavisaya. These
again are further subdivisible into five different classes—vidhe-
yavimarsa, prakramabheda, kramabheda, paunaruktya and
vacyavacana. It will be seen that these defects are as much
logical as literary.
In the very first Karika of the Dhvanyaloka, most of these
defects are said to be illustrated. In ‘Kavyasyatma dhvaniriti’
we are told that prakramabheda or irregularity of expression is
instanced. ‘Iti’ should refer to ‘Kavyasyatma’ and not to
‘dhvanih’. In Mahimabhatta’s opinion the correct form would
be ‘kavyasyatmeti dhvanih samamnatah’.
The fallacy of Paunaruktya is said to be instanced in
‘samamnata-purvah’. The past participle samamnata in the
passive voice will implicitly signify some speaker as well as the
past time. Only the object of the verb needs to be separately
stated. But, since Anandavardhana states the subject (viz.,
‘budhaih’) as well as the past time (cf. ‘purvah') in addition to
38 ft foarowr qs g
—Ibid. II.1.
3*
Op. cit.
the object (viz , Kavyasyatma), Mahimabhatta regards it as an
instance of the fallacy of redundance.
In ‘bhaktamahustamanye’ and wacamavisayarh tattva-
mucustadlyarii’, Mahimabhatta points out the fallacy of vacya-
vacana or omission of what ought to be mentioned. While
stating the first view the author has used the word ‘iti’ which
clearly shows that it is a direct quotation of the view of some.
Similarly since these views (the view'that Dhvani is Bhakti and
the view that Dhvani is indefinable) also are direct quotations
they deserve to be clearly marked off by the use of the word
‘iti’. Anandavardhana has failed to do it; thus he is guilty of
the said fallacy according to Mahimabhatta.
Agreement in tense is said to be discarded by Ananda¬
vardhana since both the past and the present (cf. jagaduh,
ucuh, brumah etc.) have been simultaneously employed in the
verse.
The derivative form of Bhakti (viz., Bhakta) is shown to be
valueless by Mahimabhatta since it does not add anything new
to the basic form of the word in the Karika.
In ‘sahrdayamanah-prltaye’, the word manah is held to be
redundant because prlti always refers to ‘manas’ only. Having
shown these defects even in the very first stanza of Ananda¬
vardhana, Mahimabhatta suggests the following emendation of
it : —
FfcT ait:
To make his theory of anumana thoroughly applicable to

poetry, Mahimabhatta examines almost all the instances cited
by Anandavardhana in the Dhvanyaloka, and points out how
the essential element of syllogistic inference is invariably
present throughout. That he does not blindly call all Ananda-
vardhana’s instances of Dhvani by the term anumana is a
tribute to Mahimabhatta’s sense of judgement. He rejects
verses like ‘atta ettha nimajja-i’ as not coming under the scope
of anumana since no definite meaning can be made out of
them. Here we may refer only to one instance of Dhvani
explained in terms of Inference by Mahimabhatta:
We have already seen Anandavardhana’s explanation of the
vastudhvani in the verse ‘Bhama dhammi-a vlsattho’ etc-
Mahimabhatta says that there are two inferences involved here.
The destruction of the dog serves as the probans for the syllo¬
gistic conclusion that the pious man may enjoy unrestricted
movement. But here we do not stop since there is incompatibi¬
lity (badha). How can he enjoy unrestricted movement in the
face of a deadlier animal, the lion ? This fact, assisted as it is
by the peculiarity of the speaker (being a woman of low
morals), becomes the probans for the second conclusion that
he should not think of venturing on those dangerous grounds.
Only intelligent readers will enjoy the second inference. In this
instance also, Mahimabhatta does not concur with Ananda-
vardhana that it is a very good example of poetry. He says
that the poet could as well have mentioned a wolf or a bear as
having killed the dog and there is no special charm in making a
lion, well-known as the enemy of the biggest of animals like
the elephant, kill an insignificant dog. Mahimabhatta regards it
as a breach of propriety. Mahimabhatta further shows how one
alankara can serve as a probans for the inference of another
alankara and how vibhavas etc., serve as probans in the
inference of Rasa.
At first sight it might appear that Mahimabhatta indulges
in nothing more than a ruthless destructive criticism of Ananda-
vardhana. Closer examination will show that this is not the
whole truth. He is no doubt a most captious and unsparing
critic of the Dhvanyaloka; but at the same time he is
also a constructive critic. His doctrine of inference is not
the same as dhvani; it is more comprehensive. It includes
instances of Gunlbhutavyangya in addition to those of Dhvani,
MAHIMABHATT’AS VYAKTIVIVEKA 295
So far as the all-important nature of Rasa in poetry is concerned,
Mahimabhatta agrees completely with Anandavardhana.40 But
he quarrels with him only when it comes to a question of giving
it a technical nomenclature. That the nature of Dhvani is
better described in terms of Inference is the view of Mahima¬
bhatta. According to him. Rasa is the soul of poetry, not the
process leading up to it, whether Dhvani or Inference. It is
Rasa which endows special charm to inference in poetry and by
this chastening influence of Rasa, inference is made to shed its
purely intellectual and prosaic associations.41 Mahimabhatta is
even more emphatic than Anandavardhana himself in denying a
place in poetry for compositions devoid of Rasa. Thus Citra-
Kavya is no Kavya at all from the standpoint of Mahima¬
bhatta. Even Gunlbhata-vyangya, Mahimabhatta is not
prepared to accept as such. Anandavardhana believes that
Rasadhvani may be present and yet secondary (gunibhuta) in
some instances. Mahimabhatta would say that wherever Rasa
is present, it is always primary in importance and never
secondary. Thus what Anandavardhana calls Gunlbhiita-
vyangya would also be the highest kind of poetry according to
Mahimabhatta.42 Anandavardhana thinks that Dhvani may also
be looked upon as a function of words. Mahimabhatta is
totally opposed to such a view. Words, logically, cannot have
more than one function according to him. All meanings other
than the primary are due to the function of inference based
upon primary meanings. Thus Mahimabhatta includes under
the comprehensive fold of Inference, not only Anandavardhana's
Ssmi HI Ngfawft $3: » —ibid. I. 26.
5t =3 JtffcraR: H ^ *WT II °P* cit- p- 74-

42 cr. ^ I
afi ii Ibid. 1.96
Dhvani, but Dhanika's Tatparya,43 Kuntaka’s Vakrokti,44
Lollata’s comprehensive conception of Abhidha45 and the
general notion of Bhakti. In depth of perception, clearness of
exposition and vastness of erudition, Mahimabhatta very nearly
approaches Anandavardhana himself. The Vyaktiviveka excels
in the art of subtle dialectics and hyper-critical polemics and
has hardly had a parallel in the whole range of Sanskrit criti¬
cism Mahimabhatta was himself very doubtful whether
posterity would recognise the worth of his work. His concluding
stanza is indeed very touching
o. Cf. op. cit. pp. 121-2.

44. Cf. op. cit. pp. 124-27.
46. This view compares the comprehensive scope of Abhidha to the
successive function of an arrow which moves, hits the target, penetrates the
armour, pierces the vitals and kills the enemy ultimately, cf. op. cit. p. 123,
CHAPTER VIII
EFFECT OF CRITICISMS ON THE SUBSEQUENT
DEVELOPMENT OF THE THEORY OF DHVANI
In the foregoing chapters we have surveyed the several
stages in the storm of controversy that followed in the wake
of Anandavardhana’s Dhvanyaloka. The revolutionary attempt
on the part of Anandavardhana to bring about a radical re¬
orientation of thought in the matter of literary criticism could
not elicit unstinted admiration at the hands of writers who
immediately came after him, inspite of the able defence put
forth by Abhinavagupta. Instead, it served as a great stimulus
for other thinkers to set forth rival theories. Brilliant and
and original writers like Kuntaka and Mahimabhatta put
forward fresh explanations of poetry; and in the period that
immediately followed these critics, there must have been a great
deal of uncertainty about the fundamental principles of literary
criticism. In such an atmosphere seething with controversy, great
scholars holding divergent views, the common student of litera¬
ture could hardly choose who was the best guide. Though
there was hot discussion about technical matters, the several
views were not entirely devoid of common ideas about the
essentials of poetry. After a long period of intense original
thinking, what was needed was a clear and comprehensive text¬
book embodying the results of all previous investigations This
need of the hour was fulfilled ably by Mammata in his Kavya-
prakasa. His work is in the form of a brilliant textbook,
clear, concise and comprehensive. It presents within the covers
of one book all the concepts of alankarasastra *n a precise,
authoritative, style. The Kavya-prakasa is not a mere compen¬
dium of earlier theories, it is a carefully amalgamated account
of all earlier views, their relative importance being indicated
precisely and finally. Being intended for the use of beginners,
it does not presuppose anything on the part of the readers. It
defines, describes and illustrates every point. Curtailing all
controversy to a minimum—the controversial points are of
course precisely indicated— and aiming at a full and consoli¬
dated exposition of all important categories of poetics, the
Kavya-prakasa ‘marks the fourth important stage in the history
of Sanskrit poetics’. The first attempts on the part of writers
like Bhamaha, Dandin and Vamana at reducing the essential
elements of poetry to convenient categories of rhetoric may be
characterised as the first stage; Anandavardhana's original
explanation of the essence of poetry may be regarded as the
second stage; the third stage is represented by the criticisms
against the theory of dhvani. The fourth and also the final
stage in a way, of Sanskrit poetics is represented by Mammata’s
Kavya-prakasa. During this stage, original and creative criti¬
cism is at an end; the earliar ideas are re-interpreted in a con¬
solidated form. If Anandavardhana is the first great writer
with originality of thought, Mahimabha^ta may be said to be the
last. How can this unique phenomenon in Sanskrit poetics be
explained ? Perhaps the only answer is, not that there was any
dearth of intelligent writers in the centuries that followed (—for
we have such notable personages in Ksemendra, Ruyyaka,
Appayya DIksita and Jagannatha)—but that the example of even
such a great author as Anandavardhana being subjected to an
ordeal of unsympathetic criticism made men very chary of fall¬
ing into the temptation of originality. The indirect effect of the
several criticisms against the Dhvanyaloka was thus to discour¬
age all attempts at being original in the writers that followed.
The subsequent history of Sanskrit poetics clearly bears out this
statement. Mammatacame to be regarded as a greater author¬
ity than Anandavardhana; writers like Bhaâ Nayaka, Kuntaka
and Mahima Bhatta were soon forgotten. The Kavya-prakasa
was invested with such importance and esteem that scholars
considered it an honour to write commentaries on it; authors
considered it a duty to model their works upon it. Original
EFFECT OF CRTICISMS ON THE SUBSEQUENT 299
investigations of the past were forgotten and original investiga¬
tions in the present were discouraged. Such a state of affairs,
none too heartening at all, can be explained only as a result of
the intense critical activity indulged in by the polemical writers
that immediately came after Anandavardhana.
But more than this indirect and negative effect of the
criticisms, we are concerned here with their positive effects on
the subsequent development of the Dhvani theory. Mammata
whole-heartedly recognises the soundness of the Dhvani theory
and gives a detailed account of it in his Kavya-prakasa. It is
this fact which accounts for the universal acceptance of the
theory by all subsequent writers. But at the same time a careful
study of the Kavya-prakasa will show how Mammata often tries
to be more cautious and conservative than Anandavardhana,
and his treatment is influenced by the criticisms levelled
against the Dhvani theory.
Mammata opens his work with what appears like a defini¬
tion of poetry though it is perhaps nothing more than an indica¬
tion of his chapter headings, in the words: ‘tadadosau sabdar-
thauisagunavanalankrtT punah kvapi.’ Poetry is spoken of here
as consisting in sabda and artha, free from demerits, full of
excellences, and rarely unadorned by figures of speech. While
Mammata thinks it necessary to make a reference to the Gunas,
alankaras and Dosas in his definition of poetry, it is significant
to note how he avoids all reference to Dhvani. After Ananda-
vardhana’s categorical statement that Dhvani is the soul of
poetry, no follower of the Dhvani theory can well be expected
to omit mention of Dhvani in a definition of Kavya. But this is
what Mammata actually does. Though a close follower of
Anandavardhana, he seems to fight shy of including it in his
general definition of Kavya, because it had become a very
controversial point by his time. He cleverly evades the issue and
tries to flatter traditional sentiment by including only those
categories that were universally recognised. But in his treatment
of these categories, he is a complete follower of Ananda-
vardhana, no doubt. And he introduces the idea of Dhvani
openly in the course of his classification of poetry.1
Not only in the framing of the general definition of poetry,
but also in the manner of exposition that Mammata adopts
throughout his Kavyaprakasa we observe how Mammata
avoids a downright denunciation of the earlier concepts in
poetics, though he is careful to adopt the new meanings given
to the concepts by Anandavardhana. Though a follower of
Anandavardhana, Mammata devotes more space to a considera¬
tion of topics like alankara, guna and dosa than Dhvani.
Mammata’s account of the alankaras and the dosas happens to
be more elaborate and detailed than even the account of the
earlier rhetoricians like fihamaha and Udbhata. The practical
procedure of Mammata is thus eclectic and he believes that
poetry will mostly take the form of alankara, at least asphuta-
lankara, if not sphutalankara.2 At the same time, he unhesitat¬
ingly accepted the supreme importance of the Dhvani theory
and gave a systematic summary of the principles of suggestion
in poetry, after the manner of Anandavardhana.
Mammata notices briefly the criticism of Mahimabhatfa
and shows how the theory of logical inference cannot be applied
to poetry. He refers to Mahimabhatta’s explanation of the
Ksvyaprakija, I. 4
2 grivatsa Lgiichana, a follower of Mammata, brings out this implica
tion forcefully in his Kavya Pank$a (Mithila Institute, Dasbhanga, 1956) and
explains that even in verses like quoted by Mammata as examples
of analankara, the generic figure of Vakrokti is present though specific figures
are absent; and that the verse is entitled to be regarded as Kavya only
because of the presence of Vakrokti.
Cf.
1 *TOT ‘*T: &HR3T-’
I pp-12
EFFECT OF CRITICISMS ON THE SUBSEQUENT 301
verse ‘bhama dhammi-a’ etc.,3 in terms of anumana, and points
out that the alleged inference cannot be valid since it is vitiated
by all the three Hetvabhasas or Fallacies in Reasoning. The
probans is shown to be open to the defect of anaikantika
(instanced where the concomitance between the probans and
the probandum is not invariable) since the man may be forced
by duty to continue his wanderings. The defect viruddha
(instanced where the probans is invariably concomitant with
the non-existence of the probundum) is also stated to vitiate the
inference in so far as the religious man may be afraid of being
polluted by a dog, but at the same time, being a hero, he may
not be afraid of a lion. The defect asiddha (non-established
probans) is also shown to taint the inference because the
probans in the verse happens to be the statement of an un¬
chaste woman and is not entitled to be taken for truth.4
This summary criticism of Mahimabhatta is repeated by all
subsequent writers like Visvanatha, Hemacandra and Vidya-
dhara.
We may say that Mammata almost fixed for all time to
come the course along which the Dhvani theory had to flow by
his most systematic and perfect treatment of the various topics
of alahkara-sastra in his Kavya-prakasa. Following Abhinava-
gupta, he refuted all the criticisms levelled against the Dhvani
theory and demonstrated that it was intrinsically sound. But at
the same time, he did not lose himself in any exaggerated
admiration of the Dhvani theory exclusively. Anandavardhana
had already tackled the problem squarely and boldly and given
Dhvani a status and a name in the realm of poetry. The
battle of words that immediately followed in the wake of the
Dhvanyaloka was fast subsiding in tempo. And Mammata
gave the final death-blow to the criticisms of Dhvani; the
Kavyaprakasa put an end to all the controversies that were
3 See ante Ch. VII.

4 Cf. Kavyaprakasa, V, concluding paragraph.
raging earlier about the validity of the Dhvani theory. In
Mammae’s work, there is not much originality of thought. He
only paraphrases either Anandavardhana or Abhinavagupta
while giving an exposition of the Dhvani-theory. But his book
was so timed that it acquired great publicity and veneration.
Mammata, who was considered to be a very great authority on
all branches of learning, set the seal of his authority on the
Dhvani theory and was eventually able to disarm all fastidious
criticisms. Mammata, at the same time, was careful enough
not to start any fresh controversies ; this he could manage by
giving an equal consideration to all the traditional concepts of
rhetoric. In a word, Mammata produced a master-piece of a
textbook of which the people were badly in need, and it came to
receive so much appreciation that it became the fashion to
write similar textbooks in the period that followed. The
natural course for the development of the Dhvani theory was
thus hampered in a way. Individual and exclusive treatises on
the Dhvani theory like the Dhanyaloka went out of vogue. In
the whole range of Sanskrit poetics there is not a second work
which exclusively treats of the Dhvani theory. Mammata
followed the method of a textbook writer, not of an original
thinker. But Mammata’s admirers imitated his method slavishly
in later years and entirely abandoned the noble path set by
writers like Anandavardhana and Kuntaka. The Dhvani-theory
is invariably considered in relation to the categories of gunas
and alankaras in the later works on Sanskrit poetics. Even the
amount of space that Mammata gives to a consideratiomof the
Dhvani theory goes on gradually decreasing until the last stage
is reached when alankaras alone, with all their divisions and
subdivisions fill the pages of works on Sanskrit poetics.
Ruyyaka’s Alankara-sarvasva, Appayya DTk§ita’s Citra-
mlmamsa and Kuvalayananda, Jagannatha’s Rasa-gangadhara
and Kuvalyananda, Jagannatha’s Rasa-gangadhara and Kesava-
misra’s Alankara-Kaustubha illustrate this growing tendency
to minimise the treatment of Dhvani and revel in the
EFFECT OF CRITICISMS ON THE SUBSEQUENT 30*
niceties of distinguishing alankaras and adding to their
number. But it is significant to note that all these later writers
swear to the all-important nature of Dhvani in theory though
in practice they indulge only in the classification, distinction,
and illustration of the alaAkaras. Thus the mighty stream of
Dhvani which started with Anandavardhana was made to run
in a narrow channel prescribed by Mammata, and the channel
went on becoming narrower and narrower until at last the
waters almost dried up in the sands of endless alankaras,
Mammata’s Kavya-prakasa silenced the objections against
the theory of Dhvani, but indirectly it also silenced the grow¬
ing interest in the theory itself.
Visvanatha, the author of the Sahityadarpana, is a very
close follower and admirer of Mammata. He adds a chapter
on dramaturgy too, thus making his work more complete than
the Kavya-Prakasa. But for this fact, in every other way,
Visvanatha is indebted to Mammata and he is himself not loth
to admit it, since he explicitly refers to .Mammata as an upa-
jlvya and a raanya.5 Even such an admirer as Visvanatha is
constrained to differ strongly from Mammata about the defini¬
tion of Kavya. He is completely dissatisfied with Mammata’s
definition, which, as we saw above, is a half-hearted attempt to
appease everybody as it were. Visvanatha is for a more open
recognition of the truth that Rasa occupies the most important
place in poetry. This fact is implicity admitted both by Ananda¬
vardhana and Mammata. But Visvanatha pleads for an explicit
avowal of the same by including it in the general definition of
poetry. Mammata, as we saw above, ridicules Mahimabhatta
and registers his unqualified adherence to Anandavardhana’s
theory of Dhvani. Visvanatha on the other hand, as we have
already seen6, borrows the very arguments of Mahimabhatta to
e See ante.
criticise Anandavardhana’s definition of poetry. Viswanatha is
strongly influenced by Mahimabhatta so far as his view of Rasa
as the soul of poetry is concerned. On this point, the views of
Visvanatha are completely identical with those of Mahima-
bhatja. Mahimabhatta may thus be said to have enlisted the
support of at least one follower, viz., Visvanatha. But he is a
most uncertain follower, since he follows no one in every detail.
In trying a fool-proof definition of poetry, Visvanatha borrows
the arguments of Mahimabhatfa; but there ; the borrowing
ceases; for in justifying the independent existence of Dhvani,
Visvanatha does not hesitate to follow Mammata and to
ridicule Mahimabhajta’s theory of Inference. Hence Mahima-
bhatta’s influence over Visvanatha is only partial.
In the long and illustrious line of writers on Sanskrit
Poetics, Jagannatha’s name comes last. After him, we may say,
the generation of bold and independent writers comes to a close.
By the time of Jagannatha, Sanskrit Poetics had assumed a
definite and finished shape; and there was not much room left
for any original contribution of a highly significant nature.
About the nature of Dhvani, Alankara, Gunas etc., in poetry,
there was no scope for any serious difference of opinion. Origina¬
lity, if any, could show itself only'in the practical applications
of the general notions to suit individual examples Jagannatha,
a versatile genius, was not the kind of writer who could derive
pleasure in slavishly repeating well-known things. Even when
he summarises earlier views, there is an unmistakable touch of
the author’s individuality. Jagannatha has great veneration for
Anandavardhana whom he calls the supreme legislator in the
realm of literary criticism (alankara-sarani-vyavasthapaka)7.
All his ability as a master of polemics is directed only against
Appayya DIksita, Ruyyaka and such other writers, when he
suggests improvements on their classifications and illustrations
of particular figures of speech. So far as the theory of Dhvani
7 Cf. Rasagangadhara, p. 425.

is concerned, he is in the main, a follower of Anandavardhana.
But even here, Jagannatha does not stop with the definition
and classification of Dhvani as proposed by Anandavardhana
and adopted by Mammaâ. He shows his originality by going
a step further than them and making some new suggestions.
Thus while tracing the history of the Dhvani theory, Jaganna¬
tha deserves especial notice.
Jagannatha, at the outset of his work Rasagarigadhara,
enunciates a novel definition of poetry: ‘Ramanlyartha-prati-
pidakah sabdah Kavyam’. According to him kavya is word
which conveys a charming sense. The essence of poetry con¬
sists in charmingness or Ramanlyata. Charmingness is technic¬
ally defined as that quality which is involved in the
apprehension of something as being the cause of extraordinary
delight. And the extra-ordinariness or Lokottaratva is said to
be a species amenable only to experience and camatkaratva or
strikingness is spoken of as its synonym. The condition
necessary for experiencing it is said to be culture and ripe
judgement on the part of the reader.8 It looks as if Jagannatha
is deliberately making the definition of poetry very wide so as
to emphasise the fact that all the four classes of poetry
(Dhvani etc.) possess beauty (or ramanlyata) in common. His
concept of camatkara is wide enough to cover dhvani and not
restricted to alankaras.
What is significant in this definition of poetry is the omission
of a word like alaiikara, guna. or rasa, or dhvani to repre¬
sent precisely the camatkara or charm of poetry. It is
Jagannatha’s opinion that no single concept can fully explain
Camatkara. Anandavardhana had himself shown how alankaras
and gunas by themselves cannot adequately account for beauty
8
*
Ibid. p. 4.
20
in poetry. It is this fact which Mammata failed to appreciate
in enunciating his definition of poetry, and for this he was seve¬
rely criticised by Visvanatha. Kuntaka had tried to widen the
application of the idea of Vakrokti so as to include all types of
camatkara in poetry. And his classification of the several varie¬
ties of Vakrokti was no doubt ingenious but hardly serviceable.
Mahimabhatta had stated that Rasa alone could explain
Camatkara and this opinion was shared by Visvanaatha.
Jagannatha dissents from all the above views. According to
him, the scope of Camatkara in poetry is so wide that no single
concept, not even Rasa or Dhvani, can explain it comprehensiv¬
ely. They may explain it in part, but never in full. Jagannatha
makes it clear that a definition of poetry should be wide enough
to include all specimens universally accepted as poetry, and
should not be too narrow excluding some specimens. He
points out that beautiful verses have been writen by poets even
on such funny themes as the frisk of a monkey’s tail, not to
mention themes of nature such as a flooded current, a water¬
fall, a fountain and a whirl-pool. Jagannatha points out that
such descriptions will have to be denied a place in poetry if
one rigidly holds that only Rasa can constitute a poem. This is
an objection against the view of Visvanatha. Jagannatha also
shows that a fastidious attempt to discover some tinge of Rasa
even in such descriptions is of no avail since such a tinge can
be discovered in whatever passage one is given, even in prosaic
statements like ‘the cow goes’ and ‘the deer runs’.9
In his view of Gunas and Sanghafana, Jagannatha clearly
differs from Anandavardhana. Atman or soul according to the
Vedanta, is nirguna or devoid of attributes. ‘If Rasa is atman
of poetry, how can it have attributes like sweetness?’ This is the
question pointedly posed by Jagannatha. So he logically holds
that ‘sweetness’ etc. can be qualities of sabdas and arthas only
as the ancients declared; and adds that Sarighajana which is
» Cf. Rasaganggdhara, pp. 5-7

no more than the ‘ordered arrangement’ (anupurvi) of words,
letters, etc. can be the only logical indicator (vyanjaka) of
the gunas.10
Another significant omission in Jagannatha’s definition is—
failure to give its due importance to ‘artha'. From Bhimaha
onwards, every writer on Sanskrit Poetics (except Visvanatha
who uses the term vakya) has brought in the idea of both
sabda and artha simultaneously in his consideration of poetry.
Only Mahimabhatta holds the extreme view that Rasa which
is the soul of poetry is got at only through the medium of artha,
never through that of sabda.
Jagannatha goes to the other extreme and says that only
sabdas are referred to as kavya. Jagannatha, of course, does
not mean that meaningless sounds constitute poetry. What he
does mean, however, is that when we refer to something as
kavya, we directly refer to the sabdas that constitute it and the
enjoyment of the poem through the medium of its meanings is
only at a later stage. Jagannatha, in this connection refers to
common usages such as‘kavya is read aloud’; ‘The meaning
from kavya is grasped’; ‘kavya is heard, but the meaning is not
understood’. In all these usages sabdas alone are referred to as
kavya since artha is distinguished from Sabda. Hence Jagan¬
natha thinks that a definition of poetry must be exclusively in
terms of sabda which possesses the capacity to convey charming
ideas.11
Similarly, in the matter of classifying poetry, Jagannatha
gives evidence of his original approach. As against the three¬
fold classification of poetry into Dhvani, Gunlbhutavyangya
and citra proposed by Anandavardhana, Jagannatha proposes
a four-fold classification viz., uttamottama, uttama, Madhyama
and adhama. Mahimabhatta, as we saw, does not agree
with Anandavardhana that gunlbhuta-vyangya is only
10 Cf. Rasagangsdhara, p. 69 and p. 80.

a Rasagngadhara, p. 5
308 THE DHVANYALOKA AMD ITS CRITICS
second-best poetry, the best always being Dhvani. Mahima-
bhatta’s position is that wherever Rasa is present, it is also
invariably predominant and hence it can never be Gunibhuta.
Jagannatha does not go to this extent like Mahimabhatta.
He only wants to show that Gunlbhuta-vyarigya is also -good’
poetry though not rising to the level of the highest kind viz.,
Dhvani. Instead of calling it madhyama (as Mammata does),
Jagannatha would prefer to call it uttama, reserving the title
uttamottama for Dhvani-kavya, where suggestion is exclusiuely
predominant. In Anandavardahna’s scheme of classification,
instances where suggestion predominates and instances where
suggestion is subordinate are taken note of; but the logical
possibility of instances where suggestion is neither primary nor
secondary, but just on a par with the directly expressed sense,
is left out of consideration. This omission is rectified by
Jagannatha since he includes them under madhyama. It is
here in the alankarapradhana kavya, that a general amount of
uniformity in judgement is possible amongtcritics; while in
respect of dhvanikavya it is restricted to a small circle of
sahrdayas. His partiality for the beauty of alankaras is
instanced in his holding that even when suggested meaning is
principal in a poem, it can coexist with an alankara as in
instances of Paryayokta. He holds, contrary to Ananadvardhana
that the suggested meaning (vyangyarlha) is not subordinate
(gunibhuta) in examples of parysyokta, as in examples say, of
DIpaka. Contrariwise, Jagannatha also holds that a primary
alankara too can have another alankara as secondary to itself
With a rare logical precision, Jagannatha observes that
‘alankara’ by its very name can only be an enhancer of the
beauty of the ‘soul’; and most of the instances of poetry will
naturally have some rasadi-dhvani embellished by the one or the
other alankara ; yet in particular examples, the means might
appear as the end ; and such alankaras which strike as ends in
themselves deserve to be regarded as “pure” (suddha), since the
beauty of the piece wholly depends on these. They are beauti-
ful in themselves (sva-vaicitrya-matra-paryavasita) though they
are not aids to set off the beauty of anything else.12 This is a
concept which is wider than that of Anandavardhana and is
in line with the view of the early theorists.
With unerring insight, Jagannatha points out how one and
the same thing, say, (smrti) may be an alankara when it is based
on similitude (sad: syamula), but when without any such basis*
might appear as bhava-dhvani, and when neither, -might form
the bare theme or ‘vastu'.13 The improvements of Jagannatha
in details are many ; but we have hardly the space to go into
them in this general survey of ours.
We have noticed some of the broad improvements effected
in the Dhvani theory by Jagannatha, in the light of the
criticisms that had been raised. But in the main, he is an
implicit adherent of the Dhvani Theory. It will thus be seen
that the Dhvanyaloka received a temporary set-back due to the
various criticisms only to be re-installed on a firmer footing by
Mammata. But at the same time the natural development of the
Dhvani-theory was stifled and it remained in much the same
form as when it was first promulgated by Anandavardhana; the
slight modifications of the theory were due to Jagannatha and
after him the growth of the theory ceased entirely.
Vide Rasagangsdhara, p. 269.

13. Vide RasagaAgidhara, 288.
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION
We have now come to the end of our study. Starting from

the early state of speculations on poetics, we have surveyed the
vague and nebulous origins of the Dhvani theory, sketched its
authoritative exposition in the Dhvanyaloka, indicated the
nature of several criticisms hurled against the theory and traced
the effect of these criticisms on the subsequent development of
the doctrine in the history of Sanskrit poetics. Specific estimates
of individual writers and the importance of their remarks have
also been indicated in the course of the -foregoing chapters. It
remains now to review the material in general terms with some
reference to modern views about literature. Western thought
to-day about the fundamental values of literature is far from
being uniform or concordant. The problem has been studied
from various standpoints such as Aesthetics, Psychology,
Psycho-analysis, History of criticism, and commonsense. Even
when investigators adopt one and the same line of enquiry,
more often than not, they arrive at different conclusions. Out
of such a tangled mass of divergent opinions, it is hardily possi¬
ble for a student to lay his finger precisely on those points
which are commonly accepted in the West. An attempt is made
in this chapter to select only such remarks of Western writers
of note as bear strong resemblance to the conclusions of Sanskrit
writers and indicate the parallelisms clearly.
Before taking up for consideration the Western parallels, a
word must be said about the attitude of later writers on Sans¬
krit poetics regarding the Dhvani theory as stated by Ananda-
vardhna. We have already seen how writers like Ruyyaka,
Appaya DIkshita and Jagannatha devote more space to a treat¬
ment of figures of speech than to that of Dhvani. This phenom-
CONCLUSION 311
enon may partly be explained as due to the cogency of some of
the attacks directed against Anandavardhana’s exposition of the
Dhvani-theory. But it is not the whole explanation. They seem
to hare held that while Dhvani is the soul of poetry, it mani¬
fests itself mostly by way of alankaras. Though in theory they
adm.t the possibility of Dhvani manifesting itself without
alaiikaras, they appear to think that, in practice, Dhvani shines
out naturally through the medium of Alaiikaras alone. Thus
the final stage of Sanskrit Poetics represents a happy and har¬
monious blend of the triple principles of Rasa, Dhvani and
Aluikara. Rasa may be characterised as a theory of aesthetic
pleasure which attempts to explain both the mainsprings of
literature and the culminating experience of the reader. It
derives support from the concept of Pratibha (a term wide
enoigh to include the intuition, inspiration and creative
imagnation of the poet as well as the sympathetic and res¬
ponsive imagination of the reader) and is grounded on the
Indian analysis of aesthetic psychology. The principle of
Dhvani embodies the conclusions of Indian writers on the
unique unction of language in poetry viz., suggestion. And the
concept )f alankaras illustrates not only the principles of rhythm
and verlal music in literature but also the various ways in
which conmon imagery are rendered poetic. The scheme of
Sanskrit aankaras is more comprehensive than that of English
figures of s>eech. While the scheme of English figures of speech
attempts ti explain only some of the oblique turns given to
expression ii poetry, the Indian scheme of alankaras endeavours
to give an e;haustive account of all the possibilities of the
principle of loetic imagery. The doctrine of Gunas and Riti
does full justee to the qualities of excellence in literature and
the various stjes of diction that are generally met with. The
nature of defers in composition is fully brought out under the
head of Dosas.Thus it will be seen that Sanskrit Poetics in its
final form take full cognisance of considerations relating
to aesthetic pvchology,. semantics, rhetoric, and literary
criticism. And the universal practice of Sanskrit poets in
beginning their works with a salutation to God, and writing
innumerable devotional lyrics addressed to different deities,
will furnish glowing testimony to the fact that Indians always
considered literature as a means to the attainment of spiritual
or religious advancement. Their characteristic faith in spiritual¬
ity and religion is reflected in their literature as well. There
was never a divorce effected between material pursuits and
spiritual enlightenment. Literature also was enlisted in the
service of spiritual progress and the last word in Indian
Poetics is the equation between aesthetic pleasure and spiriual
bliss of Brahman :—
(l
mi u
Hence some of the attributes of the Divine Mother are ‘Kala-
nidhih Kavyakala Rasajna Rasasevadhih’.2
The explanation of Rasa in terms of Sthayibhavas, vbhavas,
anubhavas and vyabhicari-bhavas3 bears close resemHance to
some Western views. McDougall’s classification of instincts
agrees almost verbatim with the Indian analysis <f Sthayi¬
bhavas, which are categorically stated to be vasanitmaka or
innate dispositions. If Indian writers speak of eijht or nine
sthayibhavas viz., Rati, Hasa, 3oka, Krodha, Utsiha, Bhaya,
Jugupsa, Vismaya and lâma, McDougall speaks of nine
primary emotions, viz., fear, anger, positive self-feeing, negative
self-feeling, laughter, disgust, tender emotion, woider and lust.
The only serious omission here is that of J>air*, which is a
category typically Indian. The vyabhicari-bhavas nay be said to
x Sahityadarpana III. 2-3.

2 Lalita-sahasranama-stotra.
a Cf. ante, ch. I,

CONCLUSION 313
correspond to what McDougall calls derived emotion. The
vibhavasmay be regarded as the specific stimuli which call
forth anubhavas or psychophysical responses in a person who
possesses certain innate instincts (vasanas); sattvikabhavas may
be characterised as those physical reflexes which are beyond our
control as tears, blushes, tenseness, palpitation etc. It is thus
obvious that the Indian theory of Rasa is based on a psycho¬
logy comparable to that of Mc.Dougall4.
In this connection it might be indicated that the Indian
distinction between Bhava and Rasa is very akin to the distinc¬
tion between personal emotions and art-emotion, made by
T.S Eliot.5 The poetic personality, he points out, is different
from any other in that it is not a personality properly speaking,
but a highly sensitised medium. He offers us the analogy of the
catalyst. “When a bit of finely .filiated platinum is introduced
into a chamber containing oxygen and sulphur dioxide ...
they form sulphuric acid leaving the platinum itself apparently
unaffected.” He opines that “the poet’s mind is in fact a
receptacle for seizing and storing up numberless feelings,
phrases, images, which remain there until all the particles which
can unite to form a new compound are present together.” Of
course the poet’s own experience in the form of some deep
emotion may be there. But then, it is firstly a mere ingredient,
one of the several particles which is transformed in the process
of poetic organisation. Secondly, the poetic emotion which
brings about the combination of experiences into form is
essentially different from personal emotion. As Eliot himself
puts it, “It is not the greatness, the intensity of the emotions,
the components, but the intensity of the artistic process, the
pressure, so to speak, under which the fusion takes place that
counts”. Art-emotion (Rasa) qua art-emotion is therefore
«. Cf. Outlines of Psychology: cf. also the analysis of emotions and

their bearing on art in Sully’s Outlines of Psychology.
#. In ‘The use of Poetry and the use of Criticism’.
impersonal. To call it the expression of personality is to miss
the basic distinction between significant emotion and raw
emotion. The popular stories woven around great poets like
Kalidasa and Bhurtrhari — that one was a voluptuary and the
other a man of uncertain temperament constantly wavering
between the wordly life of pleasure and the religious life of the
monastery — indicate only a failure to appreciate this distin¬
ction between personal bhava and impersonal Rasa.
Definitions of poetry enunciated in terms of aesthetic
emotion are not rare in the history of western criticism Thus
J. S. Mill says ‘What is poetry but the thought and words in
which emotion spontaneously embodies itself?’6 Wordsworth
remarks that “Poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful
feelings: it takes its origin from emotion recollected in tranquil¬
lity”7. Theodore Watts Dunton says — “No literary expression,
can, properly speaking, be called poetry that is not in a certain
deep sense emotional”8. Similarly Lamborn states “That it
should be an attempt to communicate a genuine emotion is the
first condition of poetry”.9 And C. P. Green defines art as a
‘conscious and purposeful human action directed to an end,
that end being emotion for the sake of emotion.’10
It is obvious, however, that emotion as such is only the stuff
or material of poetry. For all expression of feeling is not poetry,
else every pang of grief would be tragedy and every outburst of
laughter would be comedy. The ‘magic’ of poetry is necessary
e ‘What is poetry ?’
7 ‘Preface to Lyrical Ballads’.
8 Article on Poetry in the ‘Encyclopaedia Britannica’.
9 Rudiments of Criticism, p. 11.
10 The Problem of Art, p. 169. Cf. “Poetry is the art of representing
human experience .... usually with chief reference to the emotions and by
means of the imagination”—Reymond M. Alden (An Introduction to Poetry,
P. 1). Cf. also “By the phrase, emotional element in literature, then, we will,
understand the power of literature to awaken emotion in us who read ;
emotional element in literature means the emotion of the Reader”—Win¬
chester (P.L.C) P. 62-3.
CONCLUSION 315
before emotion (bhava) can be transformed to aesthetic expe¬
rience (Rasa). In regard to the Indian explanation of this
‘magic’ too, we may find strong similarities in Western
Aesthetics.
In modern European Philosophy, the German tradition of
Aesthetics has long held the field. Kant, Hegel and Schopen¬
hauer— these are outstanding names in the history of Aesthe¬
tics as in Metaphysics. It is commonly agreed that their
aesthetic doctrines were coloured and conditioned to a large
extent by their metaphysical predilections It has been said that
what they have given us is ‘metaphysical aesthetic” and not 'a
metaphysics of aesthetic”. In the words of Israel Knox, “It
(Metaphysics) led Kant to build an aesthetic upon a basis of
paradoxes, that is to say, to posit an aesthetic judgment that is
universally valid and yet subjective, that manifests a purposive¬
ness without purpose, that exhibits a necessity which is
exemplary but not apodictic. It compelled him to speak of a
pleasure which is abstract, of a beauty which is “Free” and
devoid of content, and of a sublime which is a violation of form
in nature. It involved Hegel in a bifurcation between content
and form and in the mazes of the stages and types of art. It
induced him to delimit art as a historical propaedeutic to
philosophy and to announce its imminent death. It constrained
Schopenhauer to proclaim art as a flight from life with its
coercions to the Lethe-land of asceticism with its negations.”11
But apart from these metaphysical implications, if we examine
the views of these German writers on Aesthetics side by side
with the Indian explanations of aesthetic experience, we will be
struck by the close resemblance of the two in essentials.
Kant formulated four principles for distinguishing
aesthetic from other kinds of judgment.1* He surveys the
aesthetic judgment from the viewpoints of quality, quantity.
u The Aesthetic theories of Kant, Hegel and Schopenhaur. p 7.

is In the ‘Critique of Judgment’.
relation and modality and arrives at four ‘moments’ which can
serve to differentiate the beautiful from the scientific as well as
from the moral and the practical. The four moments are :—
1. The moment of disinterestedness ;
2. the moment of universality ;
3. the moment of finality and
4. the moment of necessity.
It is remarkable that most of these ideas should be includ¬
ed in Abhinavagupta’s philosophy of rasa. Abhinavagupta
clearly states that a Rasa is an alaukika-camatkara, a unique
experience not at all on a par with sensuous pleasure. He also
contrasts it with worldly pleasure and pain by pointing out how
Rasa is different from pleasure brought about by happy news
such as “putraste jatah” (‘A son is born to you’) in ordinary life.
Abhinavagupta designates Rasa as ‘vTta-vighna-pratiti’ precisely
for this reason, and shows how Rasa is neither effect (karya)
nor cause (jnapya) in the worldly sense, neither bare sensation
(nirvikalpaka-pratyaksa) nor determinate perception (savikal-
paka-pratyaksa). The world of beauty is regarded as sui generis.
Rasa is said to be an experience transcending the distinctions of
friend, foe and neutral, and presenting objects for contempla¬
tion without their usual effects of attraction and aversion, in a
word, free from all personal reference.
Kant’s universality may be spoken of as the exact coun¬
terpart of Sadharanikarana, a process which explains the
mysterious work of the poet. All worldly and personal associ¬
ations are shed in the realm of art because of this generalising
power of poetry (called Bhavakatva by Bhatta Nayaka).
The ‘moment’ of finality also receives adequate considera¬
tion at the hands of Abhinavagupta and Mammaâ. The latter
uses the expression ‘Sakala-prayojana-mauli-bhutam’. It is not
a means to anything else. Its essence is said to be enjoyment,
transporting the reader to ecstasy filling his whole frame and
banishing all other thoughts.
The ‘moment’ of necessity expounded by Kant has its
CONCLUSION J17
parallel in the expression sakala-hrdava-samvada-bhak as
applied to Rasa which has in view the power of art to enter all
responsive hearts.
Schiller took his central aesthetic doctrines from Kant.
His view of beauty and art is inseparable from his view of the
nature of man. Man according to him is at once sensuous and
spiritual. The material instinct (stofftrieb) fetters man to time
and space, expresses the impulses of his lower nature. The
formal instinct (Formtrieb) lifts man to the spiritual level,
transforms him into a self-active, determining being. Now since
man is neither wholly matter nor wholly spirit, art and beauty
are the product of the interpenetration of both impulses, of the
sensuous and the rational; of the Stofftrieb and the Formtrieb
in the unification of the Spieltrieb, the play-impulse. Schiller
says : “Supreme art is that in which play reaches the highest
point, when we play, so to speak, from the depths of our being.
Such is poetry and especially dramatic art.”13
The Indian view of human nature is that it is essentially
constituted out of the triple strands of the Gunas of Tamas,
Rajas and Sattva, that pain and misery are due to the warring
nature of the three gunas and that spiritual pleasure will result
when Sattva is freed from the impact of the other two and a
happy and harmonious poise or balance of the three Gunas is
achieved. Such a view approximates very much to Schiller’s
idea. We have seen above how the theory of Rasa speaks of
man, as being emancipated from all physical and moral con¬
straint and as enjoying the privilege of unperturbed and
unfettered contemplation. This is also the view of Schiller:
Only he attributes it to the joyous realm of play and semblance.
Even this idea, is not new to Indian Writers. In the earliest
Indian Textbook on Rasa, viz., Bharata’s Natya-£astra, we
read that gods headed by Indra approached Lord Brahman
with the request that he might be so good as to give them
13. Essays : Aesthetical and Philosophical

something for recreating themselves. They wanted a ‘Krlda-
myaka’ (Lit. A play-thing) that might appeal to their ear and
eye.14 Brahman it is said, satisfied their wish by granting them
Natya. Thus even such an ancient writer as Bharata seems to
be quite familiar with the idea that dance and drama belong
to the realm of play.
Hegel's idea of the Absolute coloured his treatment of
Aesthetics considerably According to him, even spirit is
inherently rational and ‘the scene of reason is the universe
and its season eternity’. In this rational Hegelian universe per¬
vaded by spirit, beauty is ‘the sensuous presentatation of the
Idea (das sinnliche scheinen der idee). About his meaning of
the word Idea Hegel writes: “...We cannot more succinctly
define the absolute Idea, in the above use of the expression,
than by saying it is mind (spirit); and we may add that the
mind thus referred to is not mind regarded as finite, that is,
subject to the conditions and limitations of sense-perception,
but the universal and absolute intelligence, which out of its own
activity determines Truth in the profoundest signification of
the term.15 Jagannatha’s identification16 of the Upanisadic
Monism of Rasa and Brahman (Metaphysical Absolute)17 with
Kavya-rasa as well, affords some similarity.
But Schopenhauer’s account of aesthetic experience is
more in line with the Indian view since his metaphysics also
resembles Indian metaphysics a good deal. Knox sums up
Schopenhauer’s view beautifully thus : “In the Sabbath of
aesthetic contemplation the wheel of Ixion stands still, the
sieve of the Danaids is put aside, the stone of Sisyphus is at
rest, the agony of Tantalus is in abeyance. In such a moment, a
11. Cf. Natyagastra I. 11.

i5 Quoted by Knox. Op. Cit.
is Vide Rasagangadhara I.
17 ‘Raso vai sah ; Rasam hyeviyam labdhvanandi bhavati’. —Taittn
yopanijad.
CONCLUSION 319
man has ceased tracing the reconciliation of causal relationships
—a tracing and a weaving having as its source and end a relation
to his own will. He has become oblivious of his own self-hood.
He is now the undimmed mirror of the object of perception.
The distinctions between the subject, the object, and the process
of perception are obliterated ; they have become one.”18 The
whole thing reads like a commentary on the Indian theory of
Rasa. Similarly, the following sentences of Schopenhauer
himself will show their strong affinities with the Indian view:
“If, raised by the power of the mind, a man relinquishes
the common way of looking at things... if he thus ceases to
consider the where, the when, the why, and the whither
of things, and looks simply and solely at the what; if
further, he does not allow abstract thought the concepts of the
reason to take possession of his consciousness, but, instead of
all this gives the whole power of his mind to perception, sinks
himself entirely in this, and lets his whole consciousness be
filled with the quiet contemplation of the natural object
actually present, whether a landscape, a tree, or whatever it
may be., .if thus the object has to such an extent passed out of
all relation to something outsideît, and the subject out of all
relation to the will, then that which is so known;is no longer the
particular thing as such ; but it is the Idea, the eternal form,
the immediate objectivity of the will at this grade; and there¬
fore, he who is sunk in this perception is no longer individual,
for in such perception the individual has lost himself; but he is
pure, will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge.19 Just
as it is easy to find in Indian thought parallelisms to Schopen¬
hauer’s metaphysics of pessimism that ‘Life is an endless
longing, a bitter complaining, a mirage-like groping through
sickness, despair, old age, to the peace that is annihilation, to
is Op. cit. p. 132

ut. Die Welt als Wille and Vorstellung, Translated by Haldane
p. 231.
the haven that is death’, it is also easy to find close resemblance
between the two views in regarding aesthetic experience as an
avenue leading to salvation. According to Schopenhauer there
are two open roads to salvation or self-integration. The
enfranchisement of artistic contemplation, the self-transcen¬
dence of will-less knowing in aesthetic apprehension, is said to
be one of the roads. But it does not lead to the summit. It is
not a permanent departure from the world of desire, of delu¬
sion; it is more like a chain of single exalted experiences, or
like a number of beautiful landscapes occasionally intersecting a
long and tedious journey. The second path leads to the height
from which the entire world may be viewed with the non¬
chalance, with the unfaltering freedom from the thraldom of
desire which is the bliss of the saint. This perfect freedom is
Nirvana, a state of absolute self-oblivion, a spiritual state of
sainthood. This idea of Schopenhauer is quite a familiar
note in Indian thought, especially in the Buddhist system
A similar view is adumbrated by J. Mark Baldwin in his
Genetic Theory of Reality, though in a slightly different form
His view may be summarised as follows :—‘In the search for
reality the mystical mode of the prelogica! stage gives place to
the speculative mode of logical stage. Neither of these exhausts
the real and each by itself involves but a partial appreciation
of it. The mystical concerns itself with the self-experience; the
speculative with the ‘other’ of the objective world. “The
question is this: Is there any experience in which the self
realises itself, not as in opposition to the ‘other’, but as in the
‘other’?20 This synthetic reconciliation Baldwin finds in the
aesthetic experience. “In the aesthetic contemplation of an
object experience achieves the synthetic and full appreciation of
“Reality”; aesthetic contemplation being a state which maybe
described as one of feeling.”21 The Indian attempt at comparing
20.Op. Cit. p. 200

2i Op. Cit. p. 231.
CONCLUSION 321
aesthetic experience with self-awareness is certainly similar to
the above view.
The Indian explanation of the Spectator’s state of mind22
during aesthetic experience has its echoes in the following
extract from Charles Morgan, a modern writer on the subject:
“Drama is a unity. We are certain that every play-goer has
been made aware now and then of the existence in the theatre
of a supreme unity, a mysterious power, a transcendent and
urgent illusion, which so to speak, floats above the stage action
and above the spectator, not merely delighting and instructing
him as Dryden says, or purging his Aristotelian emotions, but
endowing him with a vision, a sense of translation and ecstasy,*
alien to his common knowledge of himself. The hope of this
illusion is the excitement and the experience of it the highest
reward, of playgoing. Strangely enough we become conscious
of its approach as though there were a sound of wings in the
air — before the play begins. The order of his experience is
always the same — a shock and after the shock an inward still¬
ness, and from that stillness an influence emerging, which
transmutes him — not his opinions. This great impact is
neither a persuasion of the intellect, nor a beguiling of the
senses. It does not spring from the talent of the dramatist
alone, or of the actor alone, or of the musician alone, or
from an aggregate of their talents. It is not the work of any
one artist-in-chief whose name is written on an earthly
programme. It is the enveloping movement of the whole drama
upon the soul of man. We surrender and are changed. “The
outward sense is gone, the inward essense feels” until, betrayed
by some flaw in the work of art or failure in ourselves we begin
to perceive again, not the drama, but its parts.
“When the ear begins to hear, and the eye begins to see,
When the pulse begins to throb—the brain to think again,
22. Cf. Abhinavagupta’s explanation in the Abhinava-bharati. cf. also

Sahityadarpana.
21
The soul to feel the flesh, and the flesh to feel the chain,”
— then the illusion is broken, we return to our little prisons
and through the bars are the critical spectators of a play”.23
The above account of ‘illusion’ is nothing more than the
alaukika camatkara of Indian writers, its essence consisting in
bhavakatva or sadharanikarana.
The much mooted question whether beauty is subjective or
objective is not made much of in Indian poetics. As a result of
the advocacy of Kant, the tenet that beauty is subjective rather
than objective has become prominent in modern considera¬
tions of Aesthetics as against the view of the great Greek
philosophers, Plato and Aristotle who look upon beauty as
something quite objective. Indian writers take for granted the
existence of beauty in a work of art but they always explain it
only as related to Rasa which is a subjective experience of the
connoisseur. The Indian view may be explained by adapting the
words of C. P. Green, who first of all poses the problem —
‘where then can we look for an explanation of Beauty ?” and
gives the following answer:—“The answer is not really as
difficult as it seems. We have been looking for it in the observers
— in men and women, that is to say — and we have been
looking for it in the objects observed, in works of art. And in
so doing we have fallen into one of the commonest faults of
philosophers. We have separated two terms in a relation, and
examined them separately, where all the significance of the
matter, for us, lies in their being taken together. Here is an
example. We speak of lead as fusible. But lead is not fusible
apart from heat. We speak of fire as having the power to fuse.
But fire does not fuse paper which it consumes, nor fire-clay
which it hardens. Fusibility is a relation which exists between
heat and certain substances, and it has no meaning apart
from either term of the relation. So beauty is a relationship
23. The Nature of Dramatic Illusion’ by Charles Morgan. — Essays by
diverse Hands, Vol. XII.

94. The Problem of Art, p. 107.
CONCLUSION 323
between certain objects and sentient creatures. Apart from
either term of the relation the word has no meaning.”25 Indian
theorists fully realised the truth of these considerations and
refrained from all one-sided discussions.26
Indian writers also were fully aware of the facts that
Beauty is that which arouses in us aesthetic emotion : that an
aesthetic emotion is one that is an end in itself, desired for its
own sake; not one that is either a means to some other end or
a necessary accompaniment to something else that we desire ;
and that art seeks to place man in his right emotional attitude
to the universe; its end being that all men may feel the same.
Art was looked upon seriously in so far as it was held to be
capable of enlarging the sphere of human experience, enabling
men to feel the emotions of other men and so to live as it were
more lives than one.27 On the strength of these considerations
Green remarks that “while a poem must necessarilly be about
something, its poetic value, as a work of art, depends wholly
on the emotion felt by the poet, expressed in the poem and
transmitted to the reader.28 This sounds almost like an echo of
Visvanatha’s view of poetry.
As we have seen above, Sanskrit theorists draw a line of
distinction between the personal emotion of the poet (which is
only bhava) and the aesthetic experience of the reader (which
is Rasa). But at the same time they are not oblivious of the
fact that such aesthetic experience is vouchsafed only to a select
few whose tastes are cultivated and cannot be shared in equal
25. Loc. Cit.

2«. cf. “A work of art does not exist until it is experienced by an
individual mind. It will always be an individual experience; but at the same
time it is an experience given to this individual mind by another individual
mind and wholly governed by the conditions under which it is given.”—
Lascelles Abercrombie (A Plea for the Liberty of Interpreting, p. 28).
27. cf. Abhinavagupta’s expressions — vijadibhute manomukure
vamaniya-vi?aya-tanmayibhavanayogyata etc., as qualifications of Sahfdayas.
28. The Problem of Art. p. 146.
324 THE DHVANYALOK A AND ITS CRITICS
measure by all and sundry. They take pains to point out that
poetry can be appreciated only by true sahrdayas, i.e. those who
possess a similar emotional sensibility as that of the poet himself.
The essential unity of genius and taste was fully realised. In
the words of Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, “the glorious synthesis
between the the Kavi and the Sahrdaya, which was dimly per¬
ceived in this land was first definitely achieved by ValmTki and
later worked up by succeeding generations of poets and critics
and allowed to culminate in the master-critic Abhinavagupta.”
“Art can find its alter-ego only in art-criticism.”29 This
idea too is not strange to western thought. Thus Spingarn
writes : The identity of genius and taste is the final achievement
of modern thought on the subject of art, and it means that
fundamentally in their most significant moments, the creative
and the critical instincts are one and the same... .This identity
does not sum up the whole life of the complex and difficult art of
criticism, but without it criticism would really be impossible.”
“Genius is to aesthetics what the ego is to philosophy, the only
supreme and absolute reality” said Schelling; ‘and without
subduing the mind to this transcendental system, it remains
true that what must always be inexplicable to mere reflection
is just what gives power to poetry; that intellectual curiosity
may arouse itself by asking its little questions of the silent sons
of light, but they vouchsafe no answer to art’s pale shadow,
thought; the gods are kind if they give up their secret in
another work of art, the art of criticism, that serves as some
sort of mirror to the art of literature, only because in their
flashes of insight taste and genius are one’.30
In modern criticism two schools can be prominently
discerned—the analytic and the impressionistic. The analyst’s
purpose has been to lay down rules and establish universal
standards of judgment; the impressionist’s to set up no god but
29. Cf. Highways and Byways of Literary criticism in Sanskrit.

10 Creative Criticism p. 42 If.
CONCLUSION 325
his own state, and to write a history of the voyage of his soul
among masterpieces. The value of his criticism has thus
depended upon the value of his soul - always an uncertain
factor. Of course, there is the well-known saying: ‘De
gustibus non est disputandum’. And though writing of this
school, when practiced by men of quality, has yeilded great
treasures, the liberty, the artist’s privilege, necessary to impress¬
ionistic criticism has often been turned into license, and made
an excuse for arrogant and disorderly variations of the pronoun
T. There is thus in modern criticism, a real danger of anarchy
if its erratic movements cannot by some means be related and
stabilised. But Indian Poetics has never been faced with this
danger. Right from the beginning, it tried to hit the golden
mean between stringent rules and lawless license. While the idea
of Sahrdaya provided some scope for originality and freedom,
the analytical theories of Rasa, Guna and Alankara ensured
smooth and orderly application of it in the evaluation of indi¬
vidual literary works. Ample scope was provided for critics to
exercise their genius in criticism if they could. Literary critics
like Anandavardhana, Mahimabhatta, Kuntaka and Jagannatha
rose to towering heights of originality; commentators like
Abihnavagupta also could rise to their full stature of originality.
But the ordinary run of critics could content themselves with
the mechanical application of set formulas to individual
instances.31
The concept of Pratibha or poetic imagination forms an
inseparable ingredient of Indian theorisings about poetry.
Echoes of almost all important speculations on this subject in
3i Cf. “Faults are none the less faults for being committed by genius.
But the headstrong energy of genius which ignores rules and commits faults
is more likely to do valuable things in the whole result, than the cautious
spirit which always remembers the rules and will not run the risk of
offending good taste. Yet no poet who wishes to make the most of his
endowment, should be indifferent to rules.” Longinus on the Sublime
(Summarised by Abercrombie in bis Principles of Literary Criticism.)
the West to-day can be had in the treatment of this concept by
Indian writers. It goes to the credit of Anandavardhana that
he was the first literary critic to dwell on this aspect at con¬
siderable length. It is a suggestive remark of Walter Pater32
that “The difference between ‘good’ art and ‘bad’ art may
depend upon form, but not the difference between ‘great’ and
‘small’ art.” Anandavardhana brought out strikingly for the
first time the implications of this important fact. He put an
end to all the earlier futile discussions about subjects fit for
poetry by pointing out that there was nothing on earth which
could not serve as grist to the mill of a poet gifted with genius
and everything could be transmuted into a thing of beauty.33
He went to the extent of saying that even faults like vulgarity
would cease to be faults provided they are overwhelmingly
concealed by the genius of the poet. John Drinkwater, a
contemporary writer of note, makes use of even the very simile
employed by Anandavardhana when he writes about the
limitless possibilities of genius “And so poetry is beauti¬
fully like life itself in seeming not to change yet always
being new. Each year you see the trees covering themselves
with green, the flowers in bloom . .. And in a way these seem
to be the same trees and flowers and seasons that have been
passing before men’s eyes far back through the ages, and yet
each year they are all marvellously new as truly exciting
discoveries for us when we see them as though there had never
been such life before. And so with the poet and his poetry.”34
“So that you see the poet does not have to discover and
express new emotions and his thoughts, but rather to
express any emotion and his thought about it in such a
way that we are certain that the experience in his mind is newly
32 Essay on Style.
33 “Nothing of him doth fade, but doth suffer a sea-change into some¬
thing rich and strange”—Shakespeare (The Tempest, Ariel’s Song, Act I.
Sc. II.)
a* The Way of Poetry, p. 27.
CONCLUSION 327
discovered by him and not merely handed on to him ready-made
by some one else.”35
J. C. Shairp notes the following as some of the most promi¬
nent points of the way in which Imagination works:36
‘To a man’s ordinary conceptions of things Imagination
adds force, clearness, distinctness of outline, vividness of
colouring.
Imagination is a power intermediate between intellect and
emotion, working towards both, and partaking of the nature of
both. In its highest form, it would seem to be based on moral
‘intensity’. The emotional and the intellectual in it act and
react on each other, deep emotion kindling imagination, and
expressing itself in imaginative form, while imaginative
insight kindles and deepens emotion.
Closely connected with this is what some have called penet¬
rative, others the interpretative, power of Imagination. It is
that subtle and mysterious gift, that intense intuition which,
piercing beneath all surface appearance, goes straight to the
core of an object, enters where reasoning and peddling analysis
are at fault, lays hold of the inner heart, the essential life, of a
scene, a character, or a situation and expresses it in a few
immortal words. What is the secret of this penetrative glance,
who shall say? It defies analysis. Neither the poet himself who
puts it forth, nor the critic who examines the results can explain
how it works, can lay his finger on the final source of it. A line,
a word, has flashed the scene upon us, has made the character
live before us; how we know not, only the thing is done.
A further note of Imagination is that combining and
harmonising power, in virtue of which the poetic mind, guided
by the eternal forms of beauty which inhabit it, out of a mass of
incongruous materials, drops those which are accidental and
irrelevant, and selects those which suit its purpose, those which
atThe New Criticism p. 108 ff.

h Aspects of Poetry p. 7 ff.
bring out a given scene or character, and combines them into a
harmonious whole.
There is also in Imagination a power which spiritualises
what is visible and corporeal and fills it with a higher meaning
than mere understanding dreams of.
Imagination is not, as has sometimes been conceived, a
faculty of falsehood or deception, calling up merely fictitious and
fantastic views. It is pre-eminently a truthful, truth-seeing
faculty, perceiving subtle aspects of truth, hidden relations,
far- reaching analogies, which find no entrance to us by any
other inlet. It is the power which vitalises all knowledge’
which makes the dead abstract and the dead concrete meet, and
by their meeting live, which suffers not truth to dwell by itself
in one compartment of the mind, but carries it home through
-out whole being-understanding, affections, will.
This vivid insight, this quick imaginative intuition, is
accompanied by a delight in the object or truth beheld-a glow
of heart, ‘a white heat of emotion’, which is the proper condi¬
tion of creation. The joy of imagination in its own vision, the
thrill of delight, is one of the most exquisite moods man ever
experiences.
Emotion, then, from first to last inseparably attends the
exercise of Imagination, pre-eminently in him who creates, in
a lesser degree in those who enjoy his creations.’
I have taken the above long extract from Shairp since it
reads like a modern version of the Indian doctrine of pratibha
in relation to creation and criticism. In this connection it
should also be noted that while the alarikarikas gave the greatest
importance to prati-bha as the direct cause of poetry, they did
not lose sight of other factors which go to assist in the process
of poetic creation. As Shairp himself would put it: “While
Imagination, working in these and other ways, is the poet’s
peculiar endowment, it is clear that for its beneficent operation
there must be present an ample range, a large store of material,
on which to work. Thi9 it cannot create for itself. From
CONCLUSION 329
other regions it must be gathered from a wealth of mind in the
poet himself, from large experience of life and intimate know¬
ledge of nature, from the exercise of his heart, his judgment,
his reflection, indeed of his whole being, on all he has seen and
felt. In fact, a great poet must be a man made wise by large
experience, much feeling and deep reflection ; above all, he
must have a hold of the great central truth of things. When
many conditions are present, then and then only can his imagin-
nation work widely; benignly, and for all time ; then only can
the poet become a
‘Serene creator of immortal things.’37
The parallel view in Indian criticism is the well-known
dictum that only a seer can compose a poem - ‘Nanrsih kurute
kavyam’ with the qualification that he must have a wide vyut-
patti besides sakti.
The controversy about the relative importance of form and
substance in poetry is conspicuous by its absence in Indian
Poetics. This does not mean that Indian writers omitted this
question out of their consideration. For they expressly give
equal importance to form and substance both. This fact will
be borne out by the commonly accepted idea of sahitya or co-
existance of sabda and artha in all poetry. And such is the
view held by modern thinkers too.
Before we pass on to other points it might be noted that
the famous theory of Benedetto Croce also agrees in general
with the Indian view of Rasa and Pratibha sketched above,
though not in details. Croce’s work ‘Aesthetic as science of
Expression and General Linguistic’ has become a classic on the
subject in the present century. His view is very ingenious
and it has elicited as much admiration as bitter criticism.
He gives to the word ‘Aesthetics’ a meaning quite peculiar to
himself. All activity of mind which is not classed as ‘logical’,
all ‘intuition’ as opposed to ‘conceptual thinking’, is classed as
aesthetic.
87 ibid. p. 9,
For Croce beauty is nothing but the expression of intuition,
and intuition is the individualising activity which participates
in the mobility of life. Expression and intuition cannot be
separated, for the sign of intuition is expression The word
‘intuition* itself is rather ambiguous. The identification of
‘expression’ and ‘intuition’ with each other and of both with
art has given readers a good deal of trouble. It can be under¬
stood, however, on the basis of his philosophical background,
and it affords an excellent instance of what happens when the
theorist superimposes philosophic preconceptions upqn an
arrested aesthetic experience For Croce is a philosopher who
believes that the only real existence is mind, that “the object
does not exist unless it is known, that it is not separable from
the knowing spirit”. In ordinary perception, objects are taken
as if they were external to mind. Therefore, awareness of
objects of art and of natural beauty is not a case of perception,
but of an intuition that knows objects as, themselves, states of
mind. “What we admire in a work of art is the perfect imagi¬
native form in which a state of mind has clothed itself.” “Intui¬
tions are truly such because they represent feeling.” Hence the
state of mind that constitutes a work of art is expression as a
manifestation of a state of mind, and is intuition as knowledge
of a state of mind. In the words of Croce himself, ‘senti¬
ments or impressions pass by means of words from the
obscure region of the soul into the clarity of the contempla¬
tive spirit. In this cognitive process it is impossible to
distinguish intuition from expression. The one is produced
with the other at the same instance, because they are not two
but one.’38 In Dewey’s words, “This is the extreme to which
philosophy may go in superimposing a preconceived theory
upon aesthetic experience, resulting in arbitrary distortion.”39
As Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri has strikingly pointed out, we
sa Aesthetic, p. 14.
89 Art as Experience, p. 295.
CONCLUSION 331
have only to reverse the terms in Croce’s statement to get at
the Indian view. Instead of ‘all art is expression’ we may as
well say ‘all expression is art.’40 In fact this substitution is taken
to be the corner-stone of the new criticism. As Spingarn puts
it: “We should dethrone the concept that all art is expression;
we should come to the conclusion that all expression is art.”41
Regarding the fundamental position of Anandavardhana
that suggestion is the soul of poetry, there is no dearth of
Western parallels. Anandavardhana’s answer to the question
‘why should suggestion be the soul of poerty ?' may be indicated
in some such way as this ; Poetry is not an expression of life;
but of that which is significant in life. To lay bare just what is
significant, the ordinary means that are available in life won’t
do. There is need for a vocabulary charged with special
meaning. Poetry achieves its effect not as much as it conforms
to life in every detail but more because it deviates from life in
a highly expressive way. There is generally poetical distortion.
Poets exaggerate or underrate what is in life to make their
effect quite lasting and clear. If they stick to the conventional
usage of words alone, a logical statement is possible. But that
is not at all the intended result of poetry. Hence it is that
Dhvani or suggestion becomes an absolutely essential element
in poetry.
W. M. Urban in his authoritative work on Language and
Reality fully admits this position. He writes : “Language has
two uses, the evocative and the indicative; it evokes feeling or
emotion and indicates objects. Poetic language, it is held, is
a development of the former, scientific development of the
latter. Now the primary function of poetic language is evocative.
The vis poetica lies first of all in the power of language to evoke
feeling. But it evokes much more than feeling, namely, the
intuitive meanings as distinguished from emotive. The basal
40Highways and byways of literary criticism in Sanskrit, p. 19.

41 The New Criticism, p, 19.
332 THE DHVANYaLOKA AND ITS CRITICS
elements of language, the noun, the verb, the adjective, have
intuitive as well as denotative and emotive meanings. It is these
intuitive meanings which poetic language, in the first instance
exploits. Merely psychologically expressed, it is a function of
imagination. The vis poetica of language, out of which conscious
poetry develops, consists in the power to evoke images, but the
images are the means of the intuition, not the intuition itself;
the intuition is bound up with imagination and imagery but,
not identical with it.”42
“The phenomenon of poetic distortion is so general in all
forms of art as to be given this special name. It consists in so
moulding the immediately given intuition or phenomenon—so
distorting it, so to speak—as to express an intuition, a meaning
not otherwise expressible.”43
“Poetry, like any form of aesthetic experience, may be enjoyed
intrinsically and not primarily for its cognitive and existential
implications. But poetry is also to be interpreted, and precisely
that interpretation is in a sense part of the enjoyment.”44
“This leads us to a further necessary distinction, namely,
between what poetry says explicitly and what it says implicitly.
Poetry means what it says, but it does not always say all that
it means. There is always a great deal of unexpressed reference.
What poetry says explicitly is always in its first intention fiction
—at the best silly, at the worst, as in the minds of naturalistic
literalists, dangerous lies.”45
We may note some more remarks of modern writers of
note about the value of suggestion in poetry. The true inward¬
ness of the phenomenon of aesthetic distortion in poetry has
been well brought out by Ezra Pound. The poetic use of
language “takes words ordinarily having conventional objective
meanings, and by forcing them into a new and independent
42 Language and Reality, p. 464.

43 Ibid. 472.
44 Ibid. p. 487.
46 Ibid. p. 489.
CONCLUSION 333
structure objectifies fresh meanings... The function of the
artist is precisely the formulation of what has not found its way
into language i.e. any language, verbal, plastic or musical.”46
I. A. Richards writes: There are two totally distinct uses
of language ... A statement may be used for the sake of the
reference, true or false, which it causes. This is the scientific
use of language. But it may also be used for the sake of the
effects in emotion and attitude produced by the reference
it occasions. This is the emotive use of language.”47
Again, “we may either use words for the sake of the
references they promote, or we may use them for the sake
of the attitudes and emotions which ensue.”48 When words
are used for the sake of reference or interpretation, we get
statements, and “a statement... .is justified by its truth i.e.
its correspondence in a highly technical sense, with the fact
to which it points.” On the other hand, “A pseudostatement is
a form of words which is justified entirely by its effects in releas¬
ing or organising our impulses and attitudes.” In Science, there¬
fore, language is symbolic, while poetry is “The supreme form
of emotive language . As Science frees itself from the emotional
outlook, and modern physics is becoming something in connec¬
tion with which attitudes seem rather de trop, so poetry seems-
about to return to the conditions of its greatness by abandon¬
ing the obsession of knowledge.”49 John Sparrow remarks :
“ It has always been recognised that words do more than
merely express meaning: They sound, and they suggest; litera¬
ture gives an especial importance to their functions, and those
other functions have always played a more important part in
verse than they have in prose.”50
it Article in the Criterion, April 1930.

47 Principles of Literary Criticism, p. 267.
is Ibid.
49 Ibid.
go Sense and Poetry, p. 4.

Another writer observes: “Many of the apparent statements
in poetry are not intended to make a logically significant
reference at all, but an emotive ‘symbolic’ reference....
Language has two main functions, the control of ideas and the
control of emotions.”51 Similarly Livingston Lowes says, “The
business of prose is primarily to state, of poetry not only to
state, but also (and sometimes primarily) to suggest.”
In the famous work ‘Meaning of Meaning’, the above idea
is reiterated. ‘What is certain is that there is a common and
important use of words which is different from the scientific or
as we shall call it, the strict symbolic use of words.”52
Another writer brings out the difference between the two
functions in the following words : “The difference between the
man who uses language scientifically and the man who uses it
emotively is not that the one produces sentences which arc
incapable of arousing emotion, and the other sentences which
have no sense, but that the one is primarily concerned with the
expression of true propositions, the other with the creation of
a work of art.”53 Daphne Binny observes: “The poet most often
goes quite beyond the limits of expression and wins that much
more territory for us.”64 He adds—‘Experience, and the truth
we learn from experience is of two kinds. There is the truth of
material fact, of information, of accumulated knowledge, of
the world of science. For such truth, prose is probably the
right medium. But there is a truth also of intuition, of inter¬
pretation, of wisdom, of the world of philosophy and religion,
and here, more often than not, poetry is the more accurate
channel of communication.. . Whether it be the first blush of
love, the dull ache of the exile, the pangs of Weltschmerz, or the
uprush of sudden joy, for the finest and most universal expres-
ei Critique of Poetry, p. 33.

ea C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, ‘Meaning of Meaning’, pp. 148-9.
53 A. J. Ayer “Language, Truth and Logic” p. 37.
54 “On the art of Poetry”, Poetry Review Vol. XXVII.
CONCLUSION 333
sion of all such feelings, it is to our poets we must go.55 George
Santayana also subscribes to this view. He remarks “it is
the evident characteristic of modern genius to study and enjoy
expression—the suggestion of the not-given—rather than the
form, the harmony of the given.”56
Prescott differentiates between poetic suggestion and logi¬
cal inference in these words : “While the voluntary thought
only deals with likeness of practical value in reasoning, the
poetic thought is free to recognise likeness of any kind what¬
ever. For it likeness need not be extended, a likeness in any
single point to afford a link for the mind is sufficient. Voluntary
thought must see the resemblances and point out in what it
consists i.e. explain it, but poetic thought is satisfied with a
mere recognition of resemblance and may not be able at all to
define it. This cannot be seen but felt.57
E. D. Selincourt recognises the supreme importance of
suggestion in poetry. According to him, “That words have an
intellectual significance from which the poet cannot escape is
no disadvantage to poetry. It is simply the condition over
which it triumphs, and the effect of the poet’s music cannot be
dissociated from its meaning.58 ‘Words are intellectual symbols,
and they are indeed nothing else, so long as they are imprisoned
in the dictionary; but as soon as they escape into a living
sentence, they gain individuality from the speaker’s voice and
the expression upon his face and catch subtle shades of mean¬
ing which no dictionary can define, a meaning not purely
intellectual, and capable of infinite variation according to the
genius of him that uses them. We say that such language
suggests more than it expresses ... If, then, the poet’s words
convey to us a transcendental feeling, over and above their
logical significance, it is because the poet had that feeling and
86 Op. Cit.
64 Sense of Beauty, p. 174.
67 The Poetic Mind, p. 217.
68 Oxford Lectures on Poetry, p. 5.
consciously expressed it.59 Dr. K. R. Srinvasa Iyengar, in
writing about Sri Aurobindo’s conception of poetry makes the
following suggestive remarks : “In logical phraseology we
might say that a word has both a definitive denotation and an
unknown, almost limitless connotation: we might say that a
word has both a semantic import and phonetic significance;
but we cannot ever hope altogether to dispossess words of their
potency, their mystery and their ineluctable magic. Words
that are apparentaly rugged and prosaic when looked at within
the covers of a dictionary or in the columns of a newspaper
are suddenly kindled, at the poet’s magic touch, into a flame of
beauty, that radiates “thoughts that wander through eternity.”60
Aurobindo himself writes, “Art is subtle and delicate, and it
makes the mind also in its movements subtle and delicate. It
is suggestive, and the intellect habituated to the appreciation
of art is quick to catch suggestions, mastering not only, as the
scientific mind does, that which is positive and on the surface
but that which leads to ever fresh widening and subtilising of
knowledge and opens a door into the deeper secrets of inner
nature where the positive instruments of science cannot take
the depth or measure.61 And E. M. W. Tillyard has thought it
lit to write a whole volume in order that the ‘oblique’ charac¬
ter of great poetry might be well brought out.62
The best exposition of the subject in modern times may
be said to be Lascelles Abercrombie’s. He presents the modern
attitude towards poetry very strikingly in the following words
which may also be taken as an excellent modern commentary
on Ananadavardhana’s theory of Dhvani:—
“Language in literature must be made to mean very much
more than the logical or grammatical meaning which is given
by its syntax—the orderly arrangement of its parts. In fact,
59 Ibid, p. 10.
eo Sri Aurobindo,
«i The National value of Art, p. 43
ea Poetry, direct and Oblique
CONCLUSION 337
literary language differs from ordinary language precisely by

the conscious and deliberate use in it of powers additional to the
force of grammatical meaning; powers which are only casually
employed in common speech. Thought is not expressed in
literature for its own sake, but for the sake of the organisation
it gives to experience. Not only thought, but equally emotions,
sensuous impressions, psychological intuitions, and the mass
of infinitely variable associations that accompany the move¬
ment of thought, must also <be communicated to the reader’s
mind; that is to say, experience itself by being imaginatively
provoked there. Thus, as we have already noticed, something
infinitely variable (experience) must be committed to a notation
(language), the capacity of which is, by its very nature, limited.
Literary art, therefore, will always be in some degree suggestion;
And the height of literary art is to make the power of sugges¬
tion in language as commanding, as far-reaching, as vivid, as
subtle as posible. This power of suggestion supplements
whatever language gives merely by being plainly understood;
and what it gives in this way is by no means confined to its
syntax. But for conveying the finest and, perhaps, the most
individual qualities of his imagination, the author must rely on
his reader’s ability to respond to what his language can only
suggest.”63
“It is the sense of language that distinguishes the literary
artist from his fellows and the supreme test of this is knowledge
of what language can be relied on to suggest. Just so it is the
sense of language, proved by ability to respond to the sugges¬
tions of language, that makes the enjoyer of literary art. This
is that special nature which, active in the creator, and passive
in the enjoyer, we must assume as the prime specific condition
of literary art.”64
“Language consists of the meaning of words and of the
sound of words. These are the two aspects of one essentially
03 Principles of Literary Criticism pp. 38-39.

e« Ibid. pp. 39-40.
22
indivisible combination; but each aspect can be separately
attended to. And each of these can again be subdivided into
two. Of the meaning of words, there is first the grammatical
meaning of the sentences given by the syntax. This is structure
of language and represents thought as the structure of experi¬
ence. But every individually significant word may have,
independent of its grammatical force, a peculiar value for
imagination, derived from its context. For what a word means
is by no means a simple affair. The meaning which the
dictionaries give is not much more than the nucleus round
which clusters a whole system of secondary meanings. The
nucleus of meanings stands for a certain thing or action ; the
secondary meanings indicate the various ways the thing or action
can occur. A very large part of literary skill consists in vividly
liberating for its effect on imagination just that particular
secondary meaning in words which is not only appropriate to
the immediate occasion, but which will make the occasion
come to life in the reader’s mind.”65
“The power to enjoy poetry, like the power to compose it
proceeds from a certain nature. Very probably, indeed, both
powers proceed from the same nature ; only in the one case it
exists passively, in the other actively.”66
If, then, Anandavardhana’s theory is fundamentally sound,
the question would arise whether Mahimabhatta’s work is not
a sheer waste of labour. Though at first sight it may seem
that he had completely missed the mark, closer scrutiny will
show that Mahimabhatta also is justified to an extent in his
attempt at explaining Dhvani in terms of Anumana. Very often
it is quite possible that under the guise of Dhvani, the poet may
stray away from the subject too far, farther than is warranted.
He may even fail to connect the literal with the intended mean¬
ing. In other words, the distortion which is essential in all
great poetry should not be carried to excesses where the
6& Ibid, pp. 4—41.

m Ibid, pp. 8-9.
CONCLUSION 339
normal meanings cannot suggest them. Hence the need for
some criterion to define the limits of poetic suggestion. Mahi-
mabhatta did a great service by calling it Inference. According
to him, there must be some relation between the ordinary
meanings and suggested ones in poetry; at least a remote
relation if not a close one. It must be within the bounds of
logical inference To explain the sameness of meaning in a
poem to people of different tastes, Mahimabatta thinks it
necessary to believe that the poetic meaning is inferential rather
than suggested, from the stand-point of the readers. Theodore
Watts Dunton states : “As to what is called ratiocinative poetry
it might perhaps be shown that it does not exist at all. Not by
syllogism, but per saltum must the poet reach in every case his
conclusions. We listen to the poet-we allow him to address us
in rhythm or in rhyme,—we allow him to sing to us while other
men are only allowed to talk, not because he argues more
logically than they, but because he feels more deeply and
perhaps more truly. It is for his listeners to be knowing and
ratiocinative; it is for him to be gnomic and divinely wise”.67 At
first sight one is apt to mistake Mahimabhatta’s standpoint and
take him to mean that the highest poetry is essentially ratio¬
cinative. It is from this mistake that he is often accused of a
want of literary taste. In truth, however, he clearly explains
the emotive value of words used by the poet and he introduces
the idea of syllogism only at a later stage, at the stage when the
reader is trying to get at the poet’s idea. And here there is
nothing wrong as the above extract makes it abundantly clear.
We have seen at length how the doctrine of Rasa-Dhvani
represents the cream of Indian literary criticism and how it
has striking parallels with some of the well-recognised trends
of modern thought on the subject. We have noted how the
Indian writers on Rasa-Dhvani have gone thoroughly into the
delineation and analysis of aesthetic experience and have con-
67 Poetry, p. 11.
structed a coherent theory without the subjective metaphysical
implications of Kant and Croce, and singularly free from the
anti-philosophical prejudice of psychologist-critics like I. A.
Richards and C.K. Ogden. In the light of the facts adduced
here it will not be difficult to realise the unfairness of the
following remarks of Dr. S.K. De about Sanskrit Aesthetic :
“Sanskrit Poetics, seeking to solve the riddle did hardly
attempt to solve it, but delighted itself with the pleasure of
abstract thought and formal calculations. Its method in gene¬
ral is suitable for the study of Botany or Zoology but affords
hardly any assistance for the understanding of aesthetic facts
or principles. While it had an intuitive realisation of the true
nature of poetry, it allowed its intellectual prepossession to
confine itself to the formulation of pedagogic expedients or
normative abstractions. It is like studying the index of a book
than the book itself.”68 At least Anandavardhana will have to
be excluded from this summary criticism. The following plea
of Amaranatha Jha comes nearer the truth ; “Why should we
accept Aristotle or Horace or Johnson as our law-givers, when
we have had law-givers in our own country, Visvanatba,
Dandin, Mammata, Jagannatha, Ksemendra ? These latter have
written elaborate treatises on poetics, on the laws of Drama¬
turgy, on the science of emotions, on almost every phase of the
literary art. It should be our endeavour to establish an Indian
School of criticism, which while assimilating the best features
of Western criticism, should derive inspiration from these
works which are best suited to the genius and outlook of the
men of this land, which speak a language which we can under¬
stand, and which uphold ideals familar to us.”69
68 ‘Sanskrit Poetics as a study of Aesthetic’ The Dacca University Studies

Vol. I. No. II. p. 124.
69 ‘The use of English in India” The Allahabad University Magazine,
Vol. XIX, No. 3.
APPENDIX
POETS WHO SHOW OPEN RECOGNITION OF THE

THEORY OF DHVANI
We have seen how Anandvardhana's Dhvani-theory

obtained universal acceptance at the hands of later writers on
Sanskrit poetics, though in the beginning there was fierce
opposition. It would be of some interest to note how far
poets were influenced by the theory. Since we have to rely
only upon the express mention of their attitude towards Dhvani
on the part of the poets, the number of such poets will have
necessarily to be small and restricted. A large number of poets
who might possibly have held the theory in high esteem but
do not openly acknowledge it in so many words, will have to
be excluded from consideration. As a rule, we can expect no
poet to go off at a tangent and indicate his preferences for this
or that literary theory. It is not normal. Exceptionally, we find
some authors who do so and in this section an attempt is made
to bring together the names of such poets bestowing high
praise on the greatness of Dhvani in Poetry :
1. Bilhana (11th century) finds an occasion to bestow
praise on the greatness of poetry in the first canto of his
Vikramankadevacarita. In this connection he eulogises Dhvani
as follows :
Rasadhvaneradhvani ye caranti
sahkrantavakroktirahasyamudrah I
te* smatprabandhanavadharayantu
kurvantu sesah sukavakyapatham II1
2. Mankha (ka) (12th century), the author of‘Srlkantha-
carita, devotes the whole of the second canto for a poetic
i Op. Cit. I. 22 (The Princess of Wales Sarasvati Bhavana Texts Series

No. 62).
consideration of the meritorious function of poets and a
censure of captious critics. The nature of good poetry also
comes in for consideration. The following verses will serve to
show Mahkha’s sincere admiration for the theory of Rasa-
dhvani :
artho’sti cenna padasuddhirathasti sapi
no rltirasti yadi sa ghatana kutastya I
sapyasti cenna navavakragatistadetad
vyartharn vina Rasamaho gahanam kavitvam 01
taistairalankrtisatairavatamsito’pi
rudho mahatyapi pade dhrtasausthavo’pi |
nunarh vina ghanarasaprasarabhisekarh
kavyadhirajapadamarhati na prabandhah n2
3. Vedanta Desika who was a great exponent of the
Visistadvaita system in the sixteenth century was also a poet of
no mean order. He is the author of Yadavabhyudaya, a
Mahakavya in twenty four cantos, of Harhsa-sandesa, a lyric,
of Sankalpa-suryodaya, a drama in ten Acts, and of Subhasita-
nltl, a collection of his own memorable verses. In the last
named work we come across the following tribute paid to
Dhvani in poetry :
apankiladhiyah suddhah
sadhumanasavrttayah I
vamanti srutijlvaturh
Dhvanirii navarasaspadam II3
In the Yadavabhyudaya also we read :
sa kavih, kathyate srasta
ramate yatra bharat! I
Rasabhavagunlbhutai-
ralankarairgunodayaih a4
1 Srikanthacarita, II 30 (Kavyaraala Edn.)

2 Ibid, II. 32.
a Sukavipaddhati, first verse.
4 Op. Cit. I 5.
APPENDIX 343
4. Nilakantha Dlksita is a great poet of the seventeenth
century who has written several poems auch as îvalllarnava
(a Mahakavya in 22 contos), Gangavatarana, Nalacarita-
nataka, Kalividambana, Sabharanjana-4ataka, Anyapadesa-
sataka, ânti-vilasa and Vairagya sataka. In the first canto of
the Sivalilarnava1 we come across an unqualified praise of
dhvani in more stanzas than one. Some of them are noted
below :
sahityavidyajayaghantayaiva
sarhvedayante kavayo yasamsi |
yatha yathasyam dhvanirujjihlte
tatha tatha sarhati mulyabhedan H (I. 8)
yavatkavermardavamuktibandhe
yavaddhiyah srotari komalatvam |
tavaddhvanau tadvyatibhedamule
taratvamalahkrtika vadanti II (I. 9)
asminmahatyastamitanyavedye
visrtvare vTcitarangarTtya |
kavyadhvanau jagrati dehabhajarh
karnarfi viseyuh kathamanyasabdah II (I. 10)
vakroktayo yatra vibhusanani
vakyarthabadhah, paramah prakarsah |
arthesu bodhyesvabhidhaiva dosah
sa kacidanya saranih kavlnam \\ (I. 19)
kvarthah kva sabdah kva rasah kva bhavah
kva vyangyabhedah kva ca vakyarltih |
kiyatsu dystih kavina na deya
kimasti rajnamiyatlha cinta I (I. 30)
anyonyasamsargaviêsaramya-
pyalaiikrtih pratyuta socanlya |
nirvyaiigyasare kavisuktibandhe
niskrantajlve vapuslva datta II (I. 36)
i Sri Vani Vilas Press Edn,

vidvatpriyarn vyangyapatham vyatltya

sabdarthacitresu kalervilasat J
prapto’nurago nigamanupeksya
bhasaprabandhesviva pamaranaih I! (I. 37)
krte yuge vyanjanayavatlrnam
tretayuge saiva gunlbabhuva |
aslttrilye tu yuge’rthacitrarh
yuge turlye yamakaprapancah || (I. 38)
vacam vipanclmiva vadayanti
karnamrtena dhvanina kavindrah || (I. 57)
anandathurbrahmavidarh yadeka-
ste vyarigyalabhesu satam kavlnam || (I. 63)
labheya nindamapi satkavTnam
savyangyasaurabhyarasairvacobhih |
na tu prasarhsamapi duskavlnam
durgandhibhirvltarasairamlbhih || (I. 44)
apyantikasthairavibhavamyah
suksmah prakrtya mrdusuktijanma |
kutarkavidyavyasanopajataih
kolahalairna dhvaniresa vedyah || (I. 72)
5. In anthologies like the Subhasitavall, we get some
stray verses of poets who regard Dhvani with high esteem.
Some of them are noted below :
kaverabhiprayamasabdagocararii
sphurantamardresu padesu kevalam |
vadadbhirarigaih krtaromavikriyair-
janasya tusnlmbhavato’yamanjalih I!
— Vijjika (Subhasitavall, 158)
anudhghustah sabdairatha ghacanatasca sphutatarah
padanamarthatma sukhayati na tuttanitarasah |
yatha kincitkincitpavanacalaclnamsukataya
kucabhogah strinarh sukhayati na tudghatitamurah ||
—Dharmasoka (SuktimuktavallIV. 36)
APPENDIX 345
yadetadvagarthavyatikarmayam kincidamrtam
tadanandasyandaih sahrdayamanamsi snapayati |
idam kavyam tattvam sphurati tu yadatranuparamam
tadantarbuddhlnaih sphutamatha ca vacamavisayah H
—HrsTkesa {Sadukti-karnamUam, V. 32. 1)
DhvaninatigabhTrena kavyatattvanivesina |
Anandavardhanah kasya nasTdanandavardhanah ||
—Rajasekhara (Suktimuktavall, IV. 28)
INDEX
A Dhanika and Dhananjaya on 253-5;
Abercrombie,Lascelles 336 and modern parallels 289, 336 f, 325
Abhavavada 263 See Dhvanyaloka.
abhidhs 112 ; Mahimabhatta on 276, Appayyadikgita 298, 310f
279. Arabhati. see Vjtti
Abhinavagupta 23, 47, 49. 50-1, 53-64, Arjunacarita 93
72,76,79, 217-8,220, 316, 323n, 324 ; artha, Jagannatha’s idea of 307
criticising Bhaâ Nayaka 244, 248- arthacitra 122
9; on rasapratiti 240-44; as an in¬ aucitya 159 f, 167 f, 176, 178, 180
terpreter of Dhvanyaloka 223-5 ; on Aurobindo, Sri 140n, 336
aucitya andrasa 228 ; on function of Avantivarman 53.
literature 225-7 ; on arthaâktyud-
bhava-anurananarupa-vyaftgya and B
alak^yakramavyafigya 226; on vscya Balapriys, commentary on Locana 50
and vyaflgya 225. Balasubrahmanya, N. 2I6n
abhinaya, division of 7 Baldwin, J.M. 320
abhivyakti 279-82 Baria 146
Agnipurana 2 Banahatti, N. D. 249
akhyayika 178 Bhaktavada 261; and Kuntaka 262 ; in
Alden, R. M. 314 n the treatment of Mahimabhatta
alankaras, defined by Vamana 17 ; 285-6,289,293
relation with Dhvani 134; by bhakti 126
Anandavardhana 151 ; involving Bhamaha 3; date of 9; style of 13 ; and
each other expressly or suggestively sphotavada 13; 72, 149, 166, 173,
l42f, 149 f; tflega 145 f; atigayokti 225. 230, 256, 298. 307
and others 149 f; and Jagannatha Bhamaha-vivarana 225
308f; and rasa-dhvani 311, 325. Bharata 3,5, 6,8,21, 50, 159-60, 161,
alaftkara-dhvani 105, 145 f: and 4le«a 180, 219-20, 253, 317 f
145 f: Udbhaja’s idea of Slesa, 147 ; Bhartfhari 37, 46, 314
its nature 147 f; its division 148 ; Bhattacharya. S. P. 51, 62,65.71, 112,
application in ati£ayokti, etc. 149 f. 197n
Alankarasarvasva 231, 234 Bha{{enduraja 218, 225, 249
Amoghavarga 29. Bhana Nayaka 221, 228, 234, 235-40
Anandavardhana, 28 ; date of 90-91 ; 242-49; 253-55, 298. 316
Kalhana’s testimony regarding date Bhatja Tauta 224-5
91; purpose of 97 f; his distinction bhava 6, 8
between vyanjakatva and liftgatva Bhavaprakaâ 256
193; his answer to objections of Bhoja 61n, 87n, 255
Tarkikas 193; regarding truth in Bilhana 341
logic and poetry L95 : refuting the Binny’, Daphne 334
charge of inexplicability 196; pur¬ Bose, Anima 177f
pose of poetry as envisaged by 205- Bradley, A. C. lOn
6 ; on nature of poetry 207 ; on his Buddhists 196-7
approach to poetry 206-7; on the
ideal sahfdaya 208 ; on degrees of C
excellence in poetry 213; an estimate Candrika 57,80,218 ; —kara 60-1
213-4 ; Bhafta Nayaka’s objections caju 137
against 237; Mahimabhatta’s objec¬ Chintamani, T. R. 47
tions against Ch. VII; Dhanaa- Citra-kavya 122, 124
jaya s objections against 253 : Coincidences among poets 201
INDEX 347
critic, importance of 44 G
Croce 329f, 340 Gajendragadkar, A. B. 52 n
D Gnoli. R. 19n, 61, 87n
Dandin 3, 13, 14-17,173, 252,256, 298, Goda Varma 41n, 66, 67, 68,69, 70,
340 73, 74
Dagarupaka 253 grammarians, on dhvani 32-3
De, S. K. 62, 65n, 74, 340 Green, C. P. 314.322, 323
Devdhar, C. R. 23 gupas, kinds of 8, number of 165,
Devasthali, G. V. 190n nature and varieties of 165 f ; where
Devigataka 93 found 166 f; compared with rasa
Dewey 330 and sanghajana 175f; according to
Dhanafijaya 253 Kuntaka 258 ; and Jagannatha 306 f
Dhanika 253-55, 296 325
Dharmakirti 72 gunavjtti, nature and scope of 129-31
Dharmottama 197 gunibhutavyafigya, 118 f, 120 f,
Dharmottari 92 Gupta, K.H., I02n
Dhvani, proofs for the existence of 6f.
204-5 ; time when first propounded H
23 ; references to 24 ; ancient view Haldane 319n
of 25; as used by grammarians 31, Haradatta Sharma 290n
40; in relation to sphoja 38 f; Hazra, R. C. 3n
distinguishing marks of 39 ; process Hegel 315, 318
of 40; derivation of 42; threefold Hemacandra 55,93n, 234, 248, 301
classification of 59 60 ; distinct from Hetvabhasas 301
lak?ana 101, 126, 131 ; knowledge of Hiriyanna, M. 106n, 107n
109 ; definition of 110 ; definition of Hfdayadarpana 234 f
dhvaniksvya 117; distinct from
alafikara 134; in relation to alankara J
136 ; varieties of 182 f, 187, 222; and Jacobi, Hermann 15n, 62
tarka 190 192; function of 198-9 ; Jagannatha 14, 231, 298, 304, 305 f, 325
novelty in theory of 200 ; its histori¬ 340
cal setting 204; Abinavagupta’s Jaimini 190
contribution to theory of 217 f; Jayanta Bhatta 76,77, 80, 226, 231,
importance of rasa-dhvani 221 ; 233-4
treatment of 230-1; Manoratha’s
criticism of 232; Jayanta Bhaâ’s K
criticism of 233-4 ; Bhatja Nayaka’s Kadambarikathasara 225
criticism of 234-5 ; Abhinavagupta‘s Kaigikj, See Vj-tti
answers to Bhajja Nayaka 239-247 ; Kalhana 53, 76
Pratiharenduraja’s varieties of Kalidasa 2, 159, 184, 314
250-1 ; and alankaras 252; and Kallafa 53
kuntaka 256-264; Mahimabhajja’s Kant 315 f, 340
criticism of 272-86 ; critical estimate Kane, P. V. 27,48,51,55,61, 62, 63.
of 214-6 73-90, 235, 249
dipaka and alafikara-dhvani, Mabima- Karika 46
bhafta’s view 277 Karmarkar, R. D. I39n
do§a, nature of 167; old view 167; Carunarasa 107
rasabhanga and anaucitya 167; Caunriudi, com. on Locana, 41
how to avoid 168, 170f; especially Cavirajamarga 30n,
in grfigara 172 f; division of 168 f; <avya, Kuntaka’s theory of 257 f;
174 Mahimabhatfa on 271
Drinkwater, John, 326 KavyadarSa 173n, 252 see Dandin
Dunton, T. W. 314 Kavyakautuka 224
Durga 34 n Kavyalankara 173n, 179n, see Bhamaha
E kTsvvsiaAk5ras5rasaneraha 249 see
Eliot, T. S. 313 Udbhafa
348 dhvanyaloka and its critics
Kgvyalafikgrasutra 55n See Vimana
Mukulabhatta 27, 75, 80
Kgvyanirnaya 257
Muktaka 168, 178
Kgvygnugasana 234 See Hemacandra
KavyaprakaSa 52, 93n, 242, 297 See
Mammata N
Knox, J. 315, 318 Nageshabhatta, 43n
K§emendra 55, 298, 340 Naiygyikas 219, 220
Kullukabhatta 52 Narasimhachar, R. 21n
Kulkarni, V. M. 203 Nslanda 252
Kuppuswami Sastri, S. 324, 330 NgtyaSastra 4, 50, 169, 219, 235, 319f ;
Kumgrasvgmin 256 authorship of 4, d i scussion on 4f
Kuraarasambljava 184 Nilakanfha Dikgita 343
Kunban Raja 72n Nfpatunga date and works of 29
Kuntaka 11, 55, 77, 231, 256,260, 296, Nygyamanjarj 76, 233
306, 325 Nygya-vai$e?ika 37n
L O
Laghuvftti, 247 Ojas-See gufta
Lakâna,7,128, 182
Lamborn, 314 P
literary taste, 108 Pandey, K. C. 53
Locana, 41, 62, 78, 217, 224, 228-9 Parikathg 178
logicians, 193-194, See Tgrkikas Parygyabandha 178
Loilata, 219, 296 Poets — their stimulus and response
Lowes, Livingston 334 of emotion 207 f
Poetics—art of 3 ; age of 3
M Poetry—analogy between the theory of
Madhumatbanavijaya 93 Buddhists and 197 ; Abhinavagupta's
Mgdhurya 16 See Guna contribution to the theory of 219;
Mahabhgrata 163 f; both Kgvya and his discussion of bhgvakatva in-244f:
Sastrs 164 his explanation of dhvani acquir¬
Mahabhajya 36n ing a status in 222f; plagiarism
Mahgkgvya 21 in 201 ; Bhaffa Ngyaka’s solution
Mabimabhaua 55, 6ln, 78, 87n, Cb. to the problem of Rasa relating
VII, 231,234, 249, 289 f, 306 f, 325 as to 238 f; classification of 47; con¬
regards the identity of the author tribution of prtibhg to 199 f;
55, his criticism against Dhvani difference between Ananda and
variety 291, his theory of anumana Bharata in setting forth the theory of
293, his view of anaucitya 292, his 209 f; Bhgmaha’s definition of 10;
work 268 f, on the nature of Dhvani distinction of Rasas in 284; emotional
295. and modern parallels 338 elements in 210 f; enjoyment from
Madhusudana Kaul, Pandit 53 n 245 ; essential ingredients of 210 :
Mammata 52, 64, 78, 227, 231, 291, achieving novelty and variety in 199f;
305f, 316, his asphufalarnkgra 300, moral value of 245 ; ngtya and kgvya
bis definition of kgvya 299, his in 242 ; purpose of 227 ; Principle of
sphutalamkgra 300 ; 340 32; rasa and infinite possibilities of
Mankhaka 234, 341 200; Sahrdaya’s standpoint of 208;
Manomohana Ghosh 9n soul of 246; suggestion in 214; three
Manoratha 75 f, 90 f, 232, 233 kinds of coincidences in 201 f;
Marula Siddiah 211n uniqueness of words in 196; unique¬
Max Muller 128 ness in 196 f; values of 9, vyanjaka
Me, Dougall312f in 282; words and their ways in 21 If
Mill. J. S, 314 Prakaâka according to Mahimabhatta
MimamSa 190 f, 245, 254 281
Mimarhsaka 111, 115, 219, 220, 234 Prgkj-ta—dhvani explanation of 39.
Mookherjee 57-62, 64, 79, 84 Pramgna—vgrttika 72
Morgan, C, 321 Pramgna—vinWcayafiki 197
INDEX 349
Pratibhj 94, 174,311, 325 20 ; conception of do?a of 20; concep¬
Pratiharenduraja 30, 80. 231, 245-252 ; tion of rasa of 21 ; distinction of
his references to dhvani 30 kivya by 21
Pratiyamanavastu, according to Rupabheda 113,131
Mahimabhatta 277 Rupakalaiikara-dhvani 106
Pravarasena 142 n Ruyyaka 74f, 87n, 298, 250, 310f
Prescott 335
Primary meaning according to Mahima S
bhafta 273 S'abarabhajya 191n
Punarukti 292 £abda See^Words
Purina—subject of 2 ; age of 3 gabdacitra 122
$abda$aktimuta-dhvani 145, 146 184
R sahrdaya27f
sam'yoga 38
Raghavan, V. 4n, 9n, 47, 231n, 255n
samasokti 135, 274
Rajagekhara 55, 74
Rajatarangini 235 Sanghajana, its nature and division,
{74 f, compared with guna and rasa
Ramaniyata 305
Ramayana 163 wbat determines its selection
Ramabhyudaya 225 176 f; objections answered 178 f;
Rapson, E. J. 4n special features 178 f; Jagannatha on
3U6 t
Rasa—discussion of 5 f ; in drama and
poetry 20n ; attributes regarding 96; bankaran, A., 37n, 64, 77, 71, 122
Sankuka 219
suggestion of 106f; being the essence
Santayana, George 335
of poetry 141f; nature of 153; its
Saradatanaya 255
treatemem as basis of dhvani theory
153 f; as a class of dhvani 154; its Sarvadarganasangraha 193n
Satkari Mookerjee 47
relation to theme and style 154 f;
Schiller 317
sources of 156f; how it is made to
peimeate whole work 158 f; import¬ Sehopenhauer 315, 318 f
Selincourt, E. D. 335
ance of 161 f; as predominant and
Shairp, J. C. 327f
subordinate 163 f, 170 f; and Rama¬
yana 163, 170 ; and Mahabharata ■Ueja, nature of 145;and dhvani 145ff;
Udbha{a on 145 f
163 f, opposing 170 ; Angara 172 ;—
Somananda 53
asagainstthe view of mjmamsakas
219 f; the essence of 220;—in ordinary Sovani, V. V. 28n
Sparrow, John 333
life and in poetry 220f;— Bhat{a-
Nayaka differs from Anandavardhana Sphoja, explained 33, 34, 35, 36,37, 38f
Spingarn 324, 331
in respect of 221 ; Tauta’s view
regarding 224; Bhaâ Nayaka’s Syngaraprakasa 255 See Bhoja
position in the theory of 235-37 ; Sndhara 93n
Abinava’s discussion of 244; various Srinivasa Iyengar, K. R. 336
writers discussing the position of Snvatsalafichana 300n
Srutiduifa 173
249 f; view of Kuntaka as regards
style, 13, 199 See Riti
259 f
Rasadhvani and its importance 107 f, Subramanya Iyer, K. A. 38n
325 suggestion, Mahimabhatta’s view 279,
Rasavadalankira4,137, 140 287, See Dhvani
Rasagangadhara 14,16, 304, 305 f Sully 3l3n
Ratnipana 256 sari 31
Ratmvali 160 T
Ratnagrijnana 252 Tapasavatsaraja 160
Renou, Louis 134n. 210 Tatparya 132
Richards, I. A.,333, 340 Tattvaloka 92
Riti 17; 179 f Thakur, Anantalal 197n
Rudra;a—his conception of new figures Tillyard, E M. W 214, 336
19; his view on the purpose of kivya truth, poetic and material 195
350 DHVANYALOKA ANDITS CRITICS
u vijamabanaljla 93
Udayana 64 vi?vanatha 52, 222, 231, 265, 267, 301,
Udbhaja 11,19, 145, 180n, 225, 230, 303, 306,323
249, 252, 300 vivak§a, nature and types of 194
See Kavyalafikarasarasangraha Vivaksitanyaparavacya-dhvani 289
upacara 289 Vr6nis 183
Upamgarika 169, 180 See Vrtti Vytti 46, 161; Kaiîki; upanagarika
Urban, W. M. 33If etc. 169,180; old view 180; Ananda-
Utpalacarya 54, 223 vardhana’s view 18f
Uttufigodaya 239 Valmiki 324
Vyakarana, and dhvani 190, 192
V Vyasa 164, 170
vacaspatimigra 23 Vyakti, brought under anumana 280-1
vacya-,in relation to vyangya-artha 102 Vyaktiviveka 232, 234, See Mahima-
vcaya, vis-a-vis anumeya 275 bhafta
vaikfta-dhvani 39 Vyanjaktva, vis-a-vis vacakatva, 196
vakrokti 258, 306 Vyanjana, denial of 111 See Vyniija
Vakroktijivita 256 See Kuntaka katva
Vakyapadiya 192 See Bhartrhari
Valmiki 2, 170 W
Vamana, his date and work 17; his
doctrine of riti 17 ; on vakrokti 18 ; Western thought, compared with
on rasa 18, 55 n, 179, 180n Dhvani theory, 31 Off; with alankara
Vasavadatta 160 312; with rasa 312f; Western aes¬
Vastu-dhvani 105 thetics 315
Vasugu^ta 53 Words, scope of 19;3 leading to vyan-
Vatsarajacarita 225 gyartha 194-5 ; leading to vacyartha
Vedantadegika 342 194; meaning of 194
Vedic literature 1 Words and meanings 275
Venisamhara 169n Wordsworth 314
vibhava 168, 185
vibhaga 38
vikalpa, concept of 279 Y
virodha in rasas 170f Yadavabhyudaya 342
vi?ayabheda 113 Yagovarman 225
ERRATA
Page Line Incorrect Correct
5 29 vyabhichari vyabhicari
6 2 anartistic an artistic
8 8 lead to lead us to
15 11 above forms above, forms
22 8 is lies
28 21 mnch much
39 20 indentical identical
40 5 deos does
44 8 considered regarded
46 8 verse-from verse-form
51 footnote 12 improbale improbable
55 6 utsQtravyakhyana utsQtravyakhyana
77 last but two than propound than the propound-
78 13 claims claim
86 3 factua factual
86 3 faild failed
86 37 commentaor commentator
89 5 of identity of the identity
90 14-15 it is became it is so because
91 26 ih in
96 1 Chapter V Chapter IV
99 6 Llluminating Illuminating
101 1 Chapter VI Chapter IV (Section I)
111 22 particular alone particular sense alone
116 9 beat struck
123 7 element of life element that is life
129 26 we will be we shall be
139 9 considered as Rasa. considered Rasa
140 18 it as Rasavad it Rasavad ®
141 6 sake, have sake and have
142 19 is most is the most
146 12 sitanfirerer aihuiftrare
146 26 whatever the whatever be the
147 13 considered regarded
148 4 99 9t
149 2 emphasizing stressing

149 19 or of
150 14 a nalaAkara an ala Qksra
352 DHVANYALOKA AND ITS CRITICS
Page Line Incorrect Correct
151 16 ihe the
151 20 the other another
152 30 brothren brethern
160 footnote 5 the studies the sandhis
161 18 attributed endowed
171 J9 antehero anti-hero
172 11 it is
176 26 of speaker of the speaker
178 4 views view
184 5 Rasabhasas. Rasabhasas,
186 17 Dhvani pada Dhvani, pada
194 8 (karana) (karana)
197 2 expression’ for expression; for
214 6 on export an expert
216 17 beatiful beautiful
219 27 affect effect
219 29 Rasa-partipatti Rasa-pratipatti
222 footnote 1 m
223 2 considered as a considered a
225 10 al. all
228 14 outset set down
230 21 Guna. Guna,
247 12 sonhi SOUl24.
247 16 Karika Karika
250 9 is as shown is shown
253 footnote 1 of. Cf.
255 6 vakyrtha vakyartha
255 21 rhat that
255 footnote 1 Dadarupaka. Dagarupaka
259 1 arthantara arthantara
259 19 alankaras alankaras
263 23 as more more
265 17 realated related
265 • 22 rasatamakam rasatmakam
266 1 aloiikara alankara
272 7/8 second/third secondly/thirdly
272 12 fourth fourthly
273 last any extra-ordinary . an extra-ordinary feature
feature
276 1 valueless worthless
279 19 vyaktl vyakti
284 11 cannot put cannot be put
293 18 valueless worthless
300 footnote 5 Dasbhanga Darbhanga
303 9 alankaras. alaftkaras.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Krishna moorthy, Keralapura : Born at Keralapura, Mysore
State, in 1923. Educated, Mysore University, where he took
B.A. (Hons.) and M.A, Degrees with I Class. Won gold
medals and prizes in Sanskrit, English, Kannada and general
proficiency. Awarded Ph.D. degree by Bombay University in
1947 for his thesis published now. Taught Sanskrit at Mysore,
Bagalkot and Kumta. Head of the Department of Sanskrit,
Karnatak University, Dharwar, since 1959.
Translated into English for the,first,time in 1955, the Dhvanya-
loka, a classic of Sanskrit poetics. His other publications
include Essays in Sanskrit Criticism (Karnatak University, 1963)
Some Thoughts on Indian Aesthetics (Mysore University, 1968),
Edited critically for the first time with English translations
Sanskrit poems like Yasodhara Carita (Karnatak University,
i960), and Kavikaumudi (Karnatak University, 1965). Translat¬
ed a dozen classics into Kannada from Sanskrit. His Kannada
works include a history of Sanskrit poetry and a study of
Kalidasa’s plays. His latest work is on Kalidasa under
publication in Twayne’s World Authors’ Series, New York.
Has contributed over a hundred articles to learned journals in
English and Kannada.
The present work. The Dhvanyaloka and Its Critics supplies, in
the words of Dr. S. C. Nandimath, M.A., Ph.D. (London),
“a long felt need in studying the Dhvani School. It presents a
thorough and systematic exposition and covers all important
points about the School and its principal exponent Ananda-
vardhana.” In tne words of the same scholar it is the product
of a “ prolonged, deep and devoted study of the Alankara
lustra.”
With a Foreword by Prof. G. Hanumantha Rao
Demy 8vo xx-f-352 pp. Price Rs. 30/-; 42 sh; $ 7.50
KAVYALAYA PUBLISHERS :: JAYANAGAR, MYSORE-4

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DHVANYALOKA

The theory of dhvani which

Price Ra. 30/- 42 sh. $7.50

Dr. K. KRISHNAMOORTHY. m.a., b.t., ph.d.

PRINTED IN INDIA BT G. H. RAMA RAO AT

word is called tarangayamanatva. This is characteristic not

Some of the teaching of Ananda and are influenced by him.

♦Rasa eva vastuta atma : vastvalankaradhvani tu sarvatha rasam prati

In l!hftt|a Nayaka. What is important to note in Bhatta

As Dr. Krishnamoorthy points out in his long note on

1 Kannada KsvyaprakaSa (1956). p. 79.

reader’s activity (Vyapara) which is chiefly enjoyment with the

for and functions to further it (Tatparadeva tatparyani).* This

mill the same mode of reasoning are employed by Kuntaka

other than vacya and this other meaning only emerges

mtikc it inclusive of rasa-dhvani. He refused to recognise any

* Aucitya-vic&ra-carce translated by Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy into

Uprtyana (Mysore, 1967). There I have pointed out that

steps carved out by aestheticians that preceded him and left a

tasmat satamatra na dusitam

1 Vide Prof. P. S. Shastri’s article, Rgvedic Theory and Treatment of

But this kan<ja is believed to be a later appendage to the kernel

s Sometimes Vyssa also is spoken of as a great poet :

• Vide. Dr. R. C. Hazra, Our present Agnipurdna—Indian Historical

I —Vamana's Ksvyslankarasutravrtti on I. iii 32.,

7 According to E. J. Rapson, Bharata’s Natyagastra belongs to the

side of the full Rasa-theory of Bharata, whose treatise is more complete

3 swift iitanft % ^jp^aforaift 11

" Vide qstfl I

"| |)r. Manmohan Ghosh’s authoritative translation of the Niqyadastra

f^PTJ II Ibid. 1.8.

"• ... —Kivyilafiksra, II, 6.

name.’28 It is for this reason that Bhamaha rejects Hetu,

qMIS^TT SBf§t*T SE!*T: »

Cf- spi<m^ Tifofor * i

81 KavysdarSa, II. 1 ; (same as Agni-purs?a, 341-27).

■’ Hre Hermann Jacobi, Ueber Begriff und fVesen der poetischen

37 WnfoRR *Tt *J°I: I

ll —Ibid. II. 220

as S^rifcl RFft fireq. l

fir^n-sr^5f qWtar qrarcft i -ibid, i ii. 6-9

—Kavyalankarasutravrtti on IV. ii. 1.

'* Mump fragments have been recovered recently in Pakistan and

■** On inscriptional evidence, R. Narasimhachar suggests the possibility

The theory of Dhvani was expounded as the most

statement 5EmiflT?r£t: in the very first

—Locana. p. 32. (K.S.R.I. Edn.)

3 31 ^ f’ST I —Ibid. p. 32*

—The concluding verse of the Dhvanyaloka.

(Mukula Bhatfa’s Abhidhavrtti-matrka, N.S. Edn. p. 21)

wt % forf$raF*rqrar i (ibid. p. 19)

(Pratiharendurgja’s Laghuvrtti on Udbhata’s Kavyalankara-

9 Vide P. V. Kane, History of Alankara Literature, p. LX ff.

iH) ^ etc. lbid- p-90

(Locana, p. 77). In support of this explanation Abhinavagupta jcites a verse

23 We have reasons to think that the Sabdabrahmavada or the ‘doctrine

33 Vskyapadiya, I 83-85 Cf. also, pgqn^raSITT

35 Vakyapadiya, I. 102. Strangely enough, Dr. A. Sankaran writes on

89 We have followed the anitya-pak9a in interpreting the stanza

5T: nfriqtT?! Il —Vakyapadiya, I, 77.

49 Cf- arafhmifa jttcI: i

ecrtfatttagift# I —Kaumudi, p. 244.

faftrRt «nqift 1 —Locana, p. 244

qMIS^TT SBf§tT SE!T: »

37 WnfoRR Tt J°I: I