(c)2002 American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics or Published with Permission of Author(s) and/or Author(s)' Sponsoring Organization.

AM*
AQ2-14248

AIAA-2002-1142
NACA/NASA and the National Unitary Wind
Tunnel Plan, 1945-1965

R.D. Launius
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Headquarters
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, D.C.

T.B. Irvine Glenn Research Center at Lewis Field

National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Cleveland, Ohio

E.A. Arrington
QSS Group, Inc.
Brook Park, Ohio

40th AIAA Aerospace Sciences

Meeting & Exhibit
January 14-17, 2002 Reno, NV
For permission to copy or republish, contact the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
1801 Alexander Bell Drive, Suite 500, Virginia 20191-4344
 (c)2002 American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics or Published with Permission of Author(s) and/or Author(s)' Sponsoring Organization.
AIAA 2002-1142

NACA/NASA and the National Unitary Wind Tunnel Plan, 1945-1965

R.D. Launius*
Headquarters
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, DC

T.B. Irvine**
Glenn Research Center at Lewis Field
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Cleveland, OH

E.A. Arrington***
QSS Group, Inc.
Brook Park, OH
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Abstract Center operated hy the U.S. Air Force. Recently, the

Just at the conclusion of World War n the
National Advisory Committee for Aox>nautics (NACA)
began efforts to advance the aerospace sciences through
a high-speed/high altitude research program aimed at
revolutionizing flight To do so, the NACA recognized
that it would need a host of new tools, especially wind
tunnels, enabling than to collect data on the transonic,
supersonic, and hypersonic flight regimes. At the same
time flie United States Army Air Forces (USAAF)
recognized a similar need and set out to establish its
own research facilities for high-speed flight. What
resulted from these separate and competing efforts was a
decision to assess the current state of aerospace research
tools in the United States and to fashion a unified effort
to meet the varying research needs of all constituencies
by building several new facilities. The National Unitary
Wind Tunnel Act of 1949 addressed these needs,
providing for NACA funds to build three new
supersonic wind tunnels at its laboratories, to upgrade
other NACA facilities, and to support selected facilities
at educational institutions. It also provided funding for
what became the Arnold Engineering Development
This paper is declared a work of the U.S.
Government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States.
* Member; Chief Historian, NASA.
** Senior Member, AIAA; Supv. AST,
Experimental Fac. Techniques, NASA Glenn.
*** Associate Fellow, AIAA; Task Manager, QSS
Wind Tunnel Test Engineering
Copyright©2002 by the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics, Inc. No copyright is asserted in the United States under
Title 17, U.S. Code. The U.S. Government has a royalty-free license
to exercise all rights under the copyright claimed herein for
Governmental Purposes. Al other rights are reserved by the
copyright owner."
state of the aeronautics industry and the availability/
utilization of the existing suite of ground test facilities
have both been the subject of intense scrutiny. Several
noteworthy facility assessments are reviewed and put
into the historic context of the Unitary Plan. A
recommendation is made that legislation, similar to the
National Unitary Wind Tunnel Act, offers the best
chance to revitalize the nation's investment in
aoxmautics research and technology and the required
ground testing.
The NACA and the Quest for a Supersonic
Wind Tunnel
The <<unitary wind tunnel" program1 originated
as two independent—in fact competing—efforts
begun almost simultaneously by the United States
Army Air Forces and the NACA just at the end of
World War n. Indeed, some have suggested
that the efforts were complementary, seeking to gain
congressional attention for the same actions from
two separate federal agencies. Such does not seem to
have been the case, however, as various
governmental bodies pursued their goals in this
arena to the exclusion of the requirements of other
interested organizations. Ultimately, compromise
resulted and three new supersonic wind tunnels were
built at NACA facilities, and a new capability was
added at Tullahoma, Toinessee.
The NACA effort began in April 1945 with a
letter to the committee's director of research, George
W. Lewis, from an engineer at the Aircraft Engine
Research Laboratory (AERL) in Cleveland. Bruce
Ayer wrote because he believed that that laboratory
had not given "sufficient consideration" to the needs
of supersonic flight. Ayer recommended not only

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics

 (c)2002 American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics or Published with Permission of Author(s) and/or Author(s)' Sponsoring Organization.
building new instruments for researching in this
flight regime at existing NACA facilities, but also
establishing an entirely new "Altitude and
Supersonic Research Laboratory" at a site near the
recently completed Bonneville Dam on the Columbia
River, where there would be ample water for cooling
and power generation.2
Ayer suggested that the advent of jet propulsion
ensured that research problems for the foreseeable
future would emphasize high-speed flight. Wind
tunnels capable of operating in this flight regime
would require enormous amounts of power, far
beyond the capacity of existing facilities. These
facilities would also need to be located in areas
where they would not disturb businesses and
residences. All of these requirements pointed toward
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the need to create an entirely new research center.
Ayer received a polite and non-committal
response from Lewis, but not until the following
summer when NACA representatives returned from
Germany did the need for new wind tunnels win
support at NACA headquarters. When first viewed
in 1945, the 100,000-horsepower water-driven
supersonic wind tunnel built by the Germans just
outside Munich greatly impressed the NACA
representatives, as did a planned 500,000-
horsepower tunnel designed to produce airspeeds
between Machs 7 and 10. In a November 7, 1945,
memorandum to NACA headquarters, AERL
director Edward Sharp concluded, "the utilization of
water power for wind tunnel drive appears to be the
only feasible method for large supersonic wind
tunnels." He recommended that the NACA contact
the Federal Power Commission and the Reclamation
Service "with a view to determining the best
locations for future laboratory sites at which would
be located all of the future large supersonic tunnels
to be built by this country." He commented that "the
Committee should at once take steps to preempt this
field of high-speed research and an aggressive and
vigorous policy should be adopted in the interest of
keeping America first in scientific development
along these lines."3
Sharp received a positive response from NACA
headquarters and a charter to open negotiations with
the Reclamation Service. He learned that Boulder
Dam near Las Vegas offered an excellent site for a
new facility.4 Sharp presented his proposal to the
NACA High Speed Panel in December 1945, and
after further preparation again in January 1946, and
received that group's endorsement. When Sharp
reported on progress in February 1946, the new
facility had been given a name, the Supersonic
Research Center.5
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
AIAA 2002-1142
With the acceptance of this proposal at the
NACA, the die for the agency's future had been cast.
In essence, in a period of only nine months the new
supersonic laboratory had started as an interesting
but essentially unfeasible idea offered by a
journeyman research engineer. It had gained support
along the review process, and with its adoption
through the NACA committee structure a new
supersonic wind tunnel research facility had become
the cornerstone of the agency's plans for future
aeronautical research.
USAAF and the Need for High Speed Aircraft
At the same time, the Army Air Forces had
also been working quietly on a proposal remarkably
similar to that of the NACA. Sensing that the NACA
was already on to something important for the
future, and seeing firsthand the German research
facilities under construction at the end of the war, in
June 1945 the USAAF began developing their own
proposal to support research for a new generation of
jet fighters that would revolutionize aerial combat.
The Army Air Forces investigated the need for new
supersonic research facilities informally at Wright
Field until October 1945, and then established a
formal committee to prepare plans for an "air
engineering development center." On December 10,
1945, the USAAF published a formal plan and sent
it through Army Air Forces and War Department
channels in search of support.6
At the beginning of 1946, then, the NACA and
the U.S. Army Air Forces each had concrete plans
for new research centers, both necessitated by the jet-
propulsion revolution and both stimulated by the
discovery of advanced facilities in Germany. In both
instances, these responded to perceptions that
aeronautical research capabilities in the United
States were behind those of Europe. The NACA and
the USAAF, therefore, were scrambling to catch up.
The NACA, not wanting to lose this
opportunity to advance supersonic flight
technology—in the same way that it had with the jet
propulsion revolution of the early 1940s—pursued
the effort with diligence. The Army Air Forces,
concerned that the NACA might be unable to make
the rapid advances the military desired and at a
fundamental level wanting a "piece of the action" for
itself, was equally tireless.7 Both started as rivals in
the unitary wind tunnel plan, only to be forced into
cooperation through an intense political process.
Rivalry
 (c)2002 American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics or Published with Permission of Author(s) and/or Author(s)' Sponsoring Organization.
Exactly when each the NACA and US AAF
proponents learned of the plans of the other is not
clear, but many people believe that working level
engineers from both organizations were talking to
each other and coordinating their efforts. At the
October 1945 meeting of the NACA, General of the
Army Hap Arnold mentioned that several agencies
wanted supersonic research facilities. The subject
was also discussed at the December 17, 1945,
meeting of the NACA's Executive Committee, where
both NACA and USAAF reported on their interest in
developing supersonic research facilities.
These discussions prompted Edward Sharp in
Cleveland to ask a friend at Wright Field, Ohio,
about the details of the USAAF plan. He learned that
the Army Air Forces' proposed center would
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probably be located in the Rocky Mountains, would
include five tunnels—one of which could achieve
speeds in excess of mach 8—and would cost about
$100 million. Armed with this information, NACA
committee member Jerome C. Hunsaker suggested
that the two organizations seek to work together on
their plans. Hunsaker wrote that these facilities
"obviously cannot be duplicated for all the services,
and that the same tools must be used by all."8
Hunsaker tried to achieve unity on the matter at
an NACA Executive Committee meeting held March
21, 1946. He urged development of a single
"National Supersonic Research Center...adequate to
meet the needs of industry and of the military
services." The army and navy representatives agreed
that such a project should be large enough to meet
future needs of the services, and joined in
recommending that the staff prepare a supplemental
estimate to be considered at the next meeting.9
On the next day, however, General Curtis E.
LeMay, recently appointed to the new office of
Deputy Chief of Air Staf£ Research, and
Development, entered the offices of the Aircraft
Industries Association (AIA) and presented what
amounted to a "sales pitch," complete with slick
brochures, for what would become the Air
Engineering Development Center. His estimated
price tag was $500 million. That estimate surprised
industry and AIA personnel, who recognized that
LeMay's scheme was so expansive "that it could be
done only once" and feared that the NACA, their
first choice to run such a facility, was in danger of
being cut out of the effort.10
The AIA suggested that the NACA quickly call
a meeting with key government and industry
representatives and present its own plan for
providing supersonic facilities for the whole country.
Presumably the industry was prepared to endorse an
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AIAA 2002-1142
NACA plan. The NACA could save the situation,
but speed was of the essence, for "the high-powered
and high-pressure presentation of the Army's
proposal [was] such as to lead laymen and
congressmen to jump at it."11
The NACA leadership acted quickly. Within
days they decided to send to key industry and
government personnel their own proposal for a
supersonic research center. They asked for comments
by the time of the next meeting of the NACA
Executive Committee on April 25. A separate memo
went to Edwin Hartman in the Western Coordination
Office, asking him to get what response he could
from industry. Hartman replied on April 29 that "the
companies had agreed among themselves, to give out
no information regarding their individual feelings
toward the NACA proposal until a joint statement
had been prepared and submitted to the NACA
through the AIA."12
Unfortunately, the industry could not agree to
support publicly the NACA proposal. They failed to
agree among themselves on how research should be
divided between industry, the NACA, the military
services, and various educational institutions. They
also failed to agree on how to choose between the
USAAF and NACA proposals, on where new
laboratories might be located, and on how to ensure
that industry had adequate facilities for its own
developmental work. What they did agree to was an
independent review panel that would help merge the
two proposals into a cohesive supersonic wind tunnel
plan.13
The Raymond Panel
Convergence of the two proposals became
essential for the effort to have much chance in
Congress. At the April 25, 1946, meeting of the
NACA, the Committee appointed Arthur E.
Raymond of Douglas Aircraft Corporation chair of a
special panel chartered to merge the two proposals
into a single package acceptable to all concerned. In
June 1946 Raymond's panel recommended a unitary
wind tunnel plan incorporating the main features of
the rival proposals, a national supersonic research
facility for the NACA, and an air engineering
development center for the Army Air Forces. The
principal addition recommended by the Raymond
panel was a provision for wind tunnels at
universities, both to allow independent testing and
research and to serve as training tools for the
engineers of the future.14
The estimated $2 billion effort Raymond's
panel had recommended, which most believed was
 (c)2002 American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics or Published with Permission of Author(s) and/or Author(s)' Sponsoring Organization.
still not enough to do everything, appeared to many
advocates as a "poison pill" for the whole effort.15
Always a voice of reason, Hugh L. Dryden of the
National Bureau of Standards recommended an
approach to supersonic facilities less aggressive than
those advocated by the NACA and the Army Air
Forces. Commenting on the report of the Raymond
panel in 1946, Dryden wrote:
I believe that this plan answers any
foreseeable demands of the next twenty years,
but there are some doubts in my mind as to
whether the 8 ft and 15 ft supersonic and the
large hypersonic facilities should be built on
the time schedules proposed. If our diplomatic
and military leaders feel that a new war is so
imminent that active technical preparations
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should be expedited, the whole program should
be prosecuted vigorously. If this is not the case,
ordinary engineering prudence would dictate
that some operating experience be accumulated
in the five large supersonic tunnels now under
construction before building facilities of a
different order of magnitude. The fact that no
other nation has facilities or so far as known is
even contemplating facilities remotely
approaching those already undo: construction
in this country and that the Germans designed
the V-2 and other supersonic missiles on the
basis of tests in a 1.3 ft intermittent supersonic
wind tunnel appear to me to justify some
degree of conservatism.16
Dryden's reservations about the Raymond plan
did not necessarily convince the NACA and the
USAAF of the need to restructure grandiose plans,
but a similar skepticism from Congress eventually
led to legislation more in keeping with his concerns.
When Dryden became director of the NACA in 1947
he also served as a conduit for iurther convergence
on the details of the plan, and a reduction in size of
the effort.
Key Interest Groups in the Debate over the
Unitary Wind Tunnel Act
Even with a convergence of proposals through
the Raymond study in 1946, the steps leading to
passage of the Unitary Wind Tunnel Plan Act of
1949 were intricate.17 The interested parties each
had their own perspectives, priorities, and political
interests. Eight principal entities were dominant in
the act's passage.
1. Joint Chiefs of Staff: Attempted to decide where
air power and guided missiles would fit into
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
AIAA 2002-1142
American defense policy in the face of an
escalating cold war.
2. National Research and Development Board:
Sought to reconcile the enormous expense of
this unitary wind tunnel proposal with other
worthy priorities.
3. United States Air Force: Sought to ensure
continued supremacy of American air power, a
superiority that rested on technical advances
produced by intensive research and
development. They could afford to be second to
none, but could they entrust that responsibility
to any other organization.
4. United States Navy: Also sought to ensure
continued supremacy of American air power, but
also was increasingly concerned about its power
within a defense establishment where an army-
air force alliance seemed a real threat.
5. Bureau of the Budget: Wanted to coordinate the
proposals so as to prevent interagency rivalry.
6. Congress: Spoke with multiple voices, as it had
in the past and would in the future, seeking to
ensure an appropriate defense posture while
failing to define what was appropriate, and as
always searching for duplication and waste.
7. NACA: Wanted to regain its role in fundamental
research and dominate the new field of
supersonic research.
8. Industry: While speaking with multiple voices,
it wanted to protect its development prerogatives
against encroachment by government agencies
and at the same time gain access to facilities
built at government expense,18
These major groups were neither monolithic
nor mutually exclusive, and members of one were
often also members of another of the remaining
seven. Sometimes dedicated scientists, such as
Theodore von Karman, were also business leaders,
as he was for a time in the Aerojet General Corp.
Some advocates from the military, such as Air Force
Scientific Advisory Board chair Vannevar Bush, also
served on the NACA and the National Research and
Development Board. All of these actors, regardless
of their membership in other interest groups, were
often adamant cold warriors. The interplay of the
individuals making up these various groups created a
climate in which passage of the National Unitary
Wind Tunnel Act was difficult but certainly possible.
That was true largely because everyone wanted
something done. The public policy debate, therefore,
was over the substance and the amount appropriated
for supersonic wind tunnels rather than on whether
or not to build them. What had to take place,
however, was to find a way to negotiate the
 (c)2002 American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics or Published with Permission of Author(s) and/or Author(s)' Sponsoring Organization.
differences between the needs of the NACA, the
military, and the aerospace industry. Each had its
own perspective.
The NACA believed that it had the necessary
expertise as well as the responsibility for conducting
all fundamental supersonic research for the nation.
The military services believed that they had to ensure
their readiness for any military threat the United
States might face, and that could well involve
responsibility for whatever research might be
necessary to meet that threat. They nominally agreed
that their proper field was testing and evaluation, but
the line between development and evaluation was no
more distinct than the NACA's line between
research and development. Squeezed between them
was an industry that feared encroachment by two
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arms of government on the area it insisted on
holding exclusively—product development. Unable
or unwilling to build expensive supersonic tunnels,
industry wanted the government to pay for the
tunnels and then make them available to industry—
either at government laboratories or at universities—
where tunnels might serve dual purposes of training
and testing.
Convergence of these differing priorities,
which everyone knew would be required for anyone
to obtain any new research tools, involved several
compromises. First, they agreed that NACA should
receive supersonic research tunnels that it would
operate. Second, tunnels for industry would be
situated at universities or at government laboratories
where they would be clearly earmarked for
developmental work. Third, the Air Force should
gain tunnels for the military. Finally, some existing
NACA laboratories would get still more tunnels
earmarked for industry's developmental work.
Everyone understood that some NACA research
would spill over into development, as would some
military evaluation, but there would be plenty of
latitude to work out boundaries and
responsibilities.19
In some respects these relationships reflect the
dynamics that Brian Balogh cumbersomely labeled
the "proministrative state," a union of government,
university, political, and business elites that
developed policy aimed at furthering their respective
agendas. "Armed with unprecedented organizational
resources," Balogh concluded,
the Federal government emerged from World
War n as a formidable political actor in its own
right. It not only responded to well-organized
interest groups, it now had the capacity to
create them. It not only had access to vast
networks of expertise, it helped to create them
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
AIAA 2002-1142
and to define the research agenda of a host of
professional disciplines.20
Each of these groups was initially empowered by the
government and in turn sought to effect its direction.
Their loose alliance created a critical mass in favor
of passing the National Unitary Wind Tunnel Act of
1949.
The key interest groups jockeyed for position as
the policy debate took place in Washington. Refusing
at first to work for compromise, they emphasized the
need to give each competitor everything requested.
Leaders on the House Armed Services Committee
recognized these rivalries for what they were,
concluding that many of the same "conditions which
previously led to our taking second place in the race
for more advanced aeronautical weapons [in World
War II] may still be present today and that the
existence of such conditions can lead to a repetition
of our earlier experience-possibly with more
disastrous consequences."21 Only through concerted
effort by Congress, especially its staffers, did the
various groups agree to the act as finally hammered
out in 1949.
The Legislation
The National Unitary Wind Tunnel Plan Act of
1949 consisted of two titles. Title I authorized $136
million for the NACA to build three new supersonic
wind tunnels, one at each of its existing laboratories,
and $10 million to build tunnels at educational
institutions. The tunnels to be built at the NACA
laboratories were to be shared with industry 'Tor
testing aircraft and guided missiles under
development by industry." The committee report
emphasized, "It is absolutely essential that tests be
scheduled and conducted in accordance with
industry's requirements and the laboratory time be
allocated with proper emphasis upon the
requirements of the various contractors engaged in
the development of new types of military aircraft for
the services." Title II provided for an Air
Engineering Development Center, allocating $100
million to this construction effort. The committee
allotted this sum with the understanding that future
construction would be necessary to expand the
center.22
Several important points should be made
concerning the final legislation. First, the effort to
obtain legislation for supersonic research facilities
was successful. While the process was neither
straightforward nor without pain, the end result was
a political decision to expend significant resources
for new supersonic wind tunnels. Second, at virtually
 (c)2002 American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics or Published with Permission of Author(s) and/or Author(s)' Sponsoring Organization.
every step of the review and authorization process,
the National Unitary Wind Tunnel Plan had to be cut
back. While unfortunate for the organizations
seeking these new facilities, the discipline involved
in multiple reviews, in-depth negotiations between
communities with different ideas on the subject, and
interagency ''murder boards" that looked for
weaknesses in the plan and arguments for its
necessity served the public decisionmaking process
well. Third, not surprisingly and indeed most of the
time in the history of flight, the industry enjoyed a
significant level of influence in shaping this
legislation.23
In the end, the legislation gave everyone some
but not all of what it wanted. The House Armed
Services Committee suggested in its report on the
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legislation's hearings that it would be inappropriate
to "place the bulk of our aeronautical research eggs
in one basket—the NACA basket. Even the most
competent and best qualified scientists and research
workers can always profit from the stimulating
effects of healthy outside competition."24 Concerning
the Air Force's role in this legislation, congressional
leaders added, "A serious question may very well be
raised as to whether the military may not be stepping
outside of its proper sphere when it enters into the
arena of research as distinguished from development
and evaluation."
The committee then presented an informed
commentary on the "Differentiation between
Research, Development, and Evaluation." It assigned
the first responsibility to the NACA and private
institutions, the second to industry, and the third to
the military. It concluded that "the services, by their
very nature and organization and the training of
their personnel, are not well qualified to, undertake
activities in the fields of research and development
as distinguished from evaluation."25
So What?
This debate over the National Unitary Wind
Tunnel Act of 1949, and by extension the nature of
supersonic research and development in the United
States, led to complex political interaction and
eventually a decision to proceed with a program far
different from what any of the advocates had
originally envisioned. In this political process the
extreme positions were identified and compromised
to a middle ground so that a majority of decision-
makers could live with the outcome. Competing
people, positions, institutions, and interest groups
haggled over a myriad of specific issues. While there
was not a clear-cut winner, the negotiation moved
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
AIAA 2002-1142
the debate toward a centrist position. Such a process
is basically government by a large committee, and in
it all give up what they passionately believe, so that
they can dispassionately agree about something none
of them believe.
This debate was the first instance in which the
NACA had ever been forced to participate in this
type of political decision-making process for an
expensive and far-ranging initiative. Other federal
agencies were seasoned veterans in the political give
and take of Washington, and accomplished their
duties within a framework that required cagey
partisan activity. The challenges and competition
between them and their leaders ensured that in most
instances middle-courses were agreed upon. Because
of this environment, the ability to navigate the
labyrinth of the Washington political community
was a hard-won and highly-prized skill within the
federal government.26 As a result the NACA was not
forced to operate in this political arena in anything
approaching the intensity of most other federal
agencies.
The National Unitary Wind Tunnel Act was
based on what was then known about the political,
economic, social, and technological issues raised at
the time. It was informed by the realities felt by those
involved in the process. It was an example of
heterogeneous engineering, which recognizes that
technological issues are simultaneously
organizational, economic, cultural, and political.
These interests often clash in the decision-making
process as difficult calculations have to be made.
What perhaps should be suggested is that a complex
web or system of ties between various people,
institutions, and interests brought forward the
National Unitary Wind Tunnel Act of 1949.27 These
came together to make it possible to build a set of
supersonic wind tunnels that satisfied the majority of
the priorities brought into the political process by the
various parties concerned with the issue at the time
but that left others untamed, most of which arose
later. What resulted from these separate and competing
efforts was a decision to assess the current state of
aerospace research tools in the United States and to
fashion a unified effort to meet the varying research
needs of all constituencies by building several new
facilities.
The Wind Tunnels
The Unitary Plan as implemented by the
NACA and by the Army Air Force included five
wind tunnel complexes, one each at the three NACA
Laboratories and two wind tunnels plus an engine
 (c)2002 American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics or Published with Permission of Author(s) and/or Author(s)' Sponsoring Organization.
test facility at what would eventually become known
as the Arnold Engineering Development Center
(AEDC). These ground test facilities were built and
operated to meet the needs of industry, the military
services and other government agencies. Primarily,
these organizations needed large, or as near to flight
as possible, Reynolds Number (Rn) testing of
supersonic aircraft and missiles and high speed/high
altitude testing of engines.
During World War H, the United States had
developed weapons, including the atomic bomb, but
lacked advanced weapon delivery systems. The
necessary systems required that the government and
industry perform extensive research and
development of airplane propulsion systems and
swept wing aircraft, as well as long-range rocket and
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guided missile technologies. In these areas, the
United States lagged behind Europe, and especially
Germany. Entirely new wind tunnel capability was
required to take these systems from concept to design
to fabrication and assembly. At the time, however,
the significant technical obstacle to high speed
research in wind tunnels was the choking affect as
test section airspeeds approached Mach 1.0.
Breakthroughs at the NACA laboratories, including
the creative use of expanding nozzles and of slotted
wall test sections, made possible the large scale
supersonic wind tunnel technology envisioned by
authors of the Unitary Plan Act.
Precursor Facilities
Prior to the availability of supersonic wind
tunnel capability, high speed research was done
primarily by one of two methods. The first, known
as the 'Tailing-body technique," required dropping
models from high altitude bomber aircraft Data was
transmitted to the ground via radio-telemetry. The
second method was to use solid propellant rockets to
achieve supersonic speeds. This method, for the
most part, limited researchers to the study of
aerodynamic shapes.28
In order to address the need for supersonic
ground test capability and prior to the Unitary Plan
Act becoming law, the NACA had committed to the
construction of five supersonic wind tunnels located
at it's various research laboratories. At the Langley
Aeronautical Laboratory, a 9 in. supersonic tunnel
was operating, in which much of the pioneering
research on swept wing drag reduction was
performed. Langley also committed to designing
and building a 4 X 4 ft. supersonic research wind
tunnel. This tunnel would become operational in
1948 following installation of 45,000 horsepower
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
AIAA 2002-1142
drive system. At the Ames Aeronautical Laboratory,
two supersonic research wind tunnels were
constructed. These included the 1 X 3 ft. SWT that
operated to a maximum test section airspeed of Mach
2.2. A larger 6 X 6 ft. supersonic research tunnel
was also constructed at Ames. This tunnel is notable
as it was the first large supersonic tunnel that made
use of the asymmetric supersonic nozzle (see figure
la) that would be successfully used in several of the
yet to be designed Unitary Plan Wind Tunnels. It
also contained for purposes of flow visualization a 50
in. Schlieren window system. Tests performed in the
Ames tunnels included research on wing shapes,
dynamic stability, aircraft control, panel flutter and
air inlet design. At the Lewis Flight Propulsion
Laboratory a large 8 X 6 ft. transonic wind tunnel
with the capability to operate at test section .airspeeds
from Mach 0.4 to 2.0, was built for testing aircraft
power plants and was operational by 1949. This
wind tunnel was an open circuit tunnel whore the air
was vented to atmosphere in order to dispose of the
engine combustion products.29
Through the design of these supersonic wind
tunnels, NACA engineers perfected their
understanding of the differences between supersonic
and subsonic wind tunnels. Some of these
differences included the wind tunnel nozzle design
upstream of the test section, the energy losses in the
wind tunnel circuit and the required cleanliness and
dryness required to successfully operate wind tunnels
at supersonic speeds. Lessens learned by NACA
engineers in the operation of these five supersonic
research wind tunnels at the three NACA sites laid
the groundwork for that organization's future
successes in designing and building the Unitary Plan
Wind Tunnels.
New Tunnels
As mentioned previously the plans being
forwarded by the various interested parties in the
nation's supersonic ground testing capability were
wide ranging in scope and magnitude. One plan
envisioned a complex of up to 33 large transonic,
supersonic and hypersonic wind tunnels to be built at
NACA sites, an Air Force Center, industry and
academia. What was finally built was less expansive
in scope and reflected the political and budgetary
realities discussed previously. Under the Unitary
Plan Act, a large supersonic wind tunnel was
constructed at each of the three NACA sites and the
Air Force was authorized to go forward with
construction of the Air Engineering Development
Center.
 (c)2002 American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics or Published with Permission of Author(s) and/or Author(s)' Sponsoring Organization.
Air Engineering Development Center
Initially, the plans for AEDC included two 16
ft. supersonic wind tunnels, a jet engine altitude
chamber, an aeronautics laboratory and the
necessary support facilities. AEDC was dedicated by
President Truman on June 25, 1951. The first
facilities at AEDC included an engine test facility,
the Gas Dynamics Facility, later renamed in honor of
Theodore von Karman, and the Propulsion Wind
Tunnel Complex.30
The Engine Test Facility made extensive use of
captured German and Japanese WWII vintage
equipment. It was designed for turbojet and ramjet
testing. It operated at pressures equivalent to 80,000
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ft. altitude and at temperatures down to -125 °F. It
included three separate test chambers. The Gas
Dynamics Facility was designed for test and
evaluation of aircraft and guided missiles through
the supersonic and hypersonic range. Initially, there
were two test sections both with adjustable nozzles.
The transonic leg of the Propulsion Wind Tunnel
was constructed with money from the original
Unitary Plan appropriation. The construction of the
supersonic leg required additional appropriated
funds at a later date. The purpose of the PWT was
for testing of full-scale, operating ramjet and turbojet
powerplants. The size of the PWT test sections, both
16 X 16 ft., also allowed for testing of full-scale
components of aircraft and missiles.
The performance parameters of the PWT,
including test section size, total temperature, speed
range, pressure altitude and dynamic pressure and
Reynolds Number (Rn) are shown in Table 1 along
with data for the NACA wind tunnels31'32. A
schematic of the PWT is shown in figure 2.
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
The NACA constructed three supersonic wind
tunnels as part of the initial Unitary Plan
appropriation. These included the Ames
Aeronautical Laboratories Unitary Plan Wind
Tunnel with three test sections including the 11X11
ft. transonic test section, a 9 X 7 ft. supersonic test
section and an 8 X 7 ft. supersonic test section. At
the Langley Aeronautical Laboratory, a Unitary Plan
Wind Tunnel was constructed with two 4 X 4 ft.
supersonic test sections. At the Lewis Flight
Propulsion Laboratory, a 10 X 10 ft. Supersonic
Wind Tunnel was erected.
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The business management of the NACA wind
tunnels was retained at NACA Headquarters, while
the technical management was delegated to the
laboratories. Business management responsibilities
included facility/test schedules, responding to
requests for testing and cost estimating and billing.
Technical management included facility operations
and maintenance, test support equipment/facility-to-
test model template management, and dissemination
of facility technical performance information. All
tests performed in the wind tunnels were conducted
under NACA supervision provided by the
laboratories.
The NACA distinguished between the types of
tests being conducted in the Unitary Plan Wind
Tunnels as being either "Company Projects" or
"Government Projects." The priority assigned to a
given test activity, a company's access to the wind
tunnels, and the fees associated with the tests were
dependent on the type of tests being performed. The
master schedule of the Unitary Plan Wind Tunnels
was maintained by NACA Headquarters and was
released on the 20th day of each month for the
succeeding six month period.
Company tests were defined as work for
industry on projects not undo* contract to the
government or not supported by a letter of intent
from a Government Agency. This category also
included tests related to a government project that
was beyond the scope of test requested by the
government. Sixty working days per NACA facility
were set aside for company tests, in four, 15 day
blocks. No more than 15 days in a given facility was
allocated to any single company. Priority was
established via order of test request receipt.
Previously scheduled time for a given company was
also considered. The company defined the test
objective and program. The only non-negotiable
constraints on the test program were personnel and
facility related safety requirements.
The fees associated with a company test were
comprised of an occupancy charge (ranging from
$25,000 to $35,000, depending on the fecility of
choice), electric power, data reduction and report
preparation, and special charges associated with
propulsion testing (fuel usage, open loop operations
expenses). A company had access to the test facility
24 hours a day but only one, 8 hour shift was
dedicated to actual testing. The myriad conditions
associated with performing company tests in NACA
wind tunnels, such as delays, cancellations, billing,
and damages, were defined in "Regulations for
Development Work for Industry in NACA Wind
 (c)2002 American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics or Published with Permission of Author(s) and/or Author(s)' Sponsoring Organization.
Tunnels and Engine Test Facilities," Federal
Register, Vol. 19, No. 178, Sept. 14, 1954.
Government projects were defined as industry
work being done under contract with, or letter of
intent from, the government. There were no fees
passed on to industry for this type of test. Two
management groups decided priority and test time
allocation for government projects. These groups
were the "Aircraft and Missiles Projects Allocation
Group" and the "Propulsion Projects Allocation
Group," One representative from each of the Air
Force, the Navy, the Army and the NACA sat on
these groups. Scheduling of tests and due
consideration of priorities also fell under the purview
of these groups.33
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The Langley Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel (UPWT)
The purpose of the Langley UPWT was for the
aerodynamic development of high-speed missiles.
As such, the test section size could be limited to 4 ft.
by 4 ft. Missiles were tested for high speed
performance, stability and control, maneuverability,
jet-exhaust effects and other miscellaneous
performance factors. The construction of the
Langley UPWT was completed in 1955. Basic
experimental fluid-mechanics research that gave rise
to methods for predicting supersonic aerodyanamic
performance were a staple of the Langley UPWT.34
Development test of nearly every supersonic
airplane, missile and spacecraft, including such
aircraft as the F-4 Phantom, the X-15 and the F-l 11
were performed here.29
The Langley UPWT is comprised of two test
sections, both 4 ft. (h) X 4 ft. (w) X 7 ft. (1). Test
section 1 operates in the airspeed range from Mach
L5 to 2.9 at maximum stagnation pressure of 60
psia. Test section 2 operates in the airspeed range
from 2.3 to 5.0 at maximum stagnation pressure of
150 psia. Both test section have upstream
asymmetric sliding block nozzles. The tunnel
stagnation pressure and temperature are controlled
independently. A schematic of the Langley UPWT
is shown in figure 3.
Model support systems were designed to
accommodate the extreme range of orientations that
missiles transition through during normal flight.
The models installed in the wind tunnel are
supported by a string/horizontal strut system. The
angle of attack (AoA) range using the standard
configuration is ±20°. Pressure measurements and
electrical leads were available through the strut. A
set of internal strain-gage balances were available
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
AIAA 2002-1142
from the NACA for use in the tunnels. Pressure
measurements were taken via a manometer. A
Schlieren system was installed in the test section
wall with a 49 in. diameter field of view and a 9 X 9
in. aerial camera was available for photographing
the shock waves. A force data readout system was
available to record strain-gage and other electrical
signal output.
The operating characteristics of the Langley
UPWT are found in Table 1. The average power
costs to run the Langley UPWT was $15/M-hr.33
The Ames Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel
The Ames Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel
represented a continuing commitment on the part of
the NACA to update it's inventory of wind tunnels
in order to provide the U.S. aerospace industry with
advanced testing facilities. The Ames UPWT was
used extensively by the west coast aerospace
industry, including Boeing and Douglas Aircraft, to
improve cruise efficiencies and enhance landing
performance. The Ames UPWT has contributed
equally to the development of aircraft and manned
spacecraft. Construction of this complex started in
1950 and was completed in 1955.35
The Ames Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel is
comprised of three test sections including the 11 X
11 ft. transonic leg that operates from Mach 0.7 to
1.4, the 9 X 7 ft. supersonic leg that operates from
Mach 1.4 to 2.6, and the 8 X 7 ft. supersonic leg that
operates from Mach 2.4 to 3.5. The air speed in all
three test sections is continuously variable over the
ranges given. Initially, plans called for building a
single wind tunnel with an 8 ft. test section.
However, over the desired airspeed range, this did
not prove to be practical. In the end, three test
sections were constructed in order to best simulate
the entire range of aircraft and missile flight. At
transonic airspeeds, the wall reflected shocks require
that the model be smaller in scale or that the tunnel
be larger. This requirement leads to the design
requirement that the compressors required to achieve
transonic and supersonic flow are much different.
Therefore, a decision was made to build three test
sections. The airflow in the supersonic test sections
is driven by a shared 11-stage axial-flow compressor.
The airflow in the transonic test section is driven by
a 3-stage axial flow compressor. Both compressors
are coupled to a common 4 electric motor, 100,000
hp drive system. Each test section has it's own
stand-alone control room. A schematic of the tunnel
is shown in figure 4.
 (c)2002 American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics or Published with Permission of Author(s) and/or Author(s)' Sponsoring Organization.
The test section of the transonic leg of the
complex is 11 ft. X 11 ft. X 22 ft. long. Slotted walls
were used in this test section to control the shock-
wave reflection. A flexible wall nozzle is located
upstream of the test section. Continuous variation of
the test section airspeed is accomplished via
compressor speed and flex wall positioning. The
nozzle of the 9X7 supersonic test section is the
asymmetric sliding block type whereas the nozzle of
the 8X7 test section is the flex-wall type.
Continuous Mach number variation is accomplished
via positional variation of the fixed contour block or
the flex wall. Provisions were made in both test
sections for flow field imaging via Schlieren
equipment with circular coverage of up to 4.22 ft.
(dia.).
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The model support systems in all three test
sections were sting-mounted models on traversing
struts. The string to model attachment used identical
mounting heads for transportability between test
sections. The sting/strut combinations are setup for
automatic angle-of-attack (alpha) variation and
sideslip, or beta, variation. Straight and bent stings
were available, the latter allowing for shifts (greater
range) in both alpha and beta. Internal strain-gage
balances for measuring the forces and moments
present on the models were available from the
NACA. Pressure leads were routed through the
sting-strut configuration and patched to sets of 64
tube manometer boards. A 17 channel data recorder
was available including the capability to visually
monitor the 10 channels of strain gage data. One
channel was used for run identification and the
remaining six were available for supplemental data
such as AoA, sideslip, Mach No., total pressure, or
static pressure via an analog signal from a
transducer.
The operating characteristics of the tunnels are
shown in Table 1. The estimated power costs to
operate the complex was $10/M-hr.33
The Lewis Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel
The Lewis Unitary Plan wind tunnel is a
supersonic propulsion wind tunnel with a 10 X 10
ft. cross-sectional area test section that operates in
the airspeed range from Mach 2.0 to 3.5. This wind
tunnel was unique within NACA in that it operated
in two distinct modes, the first being aerodynamic
cycle and the second being propulsion cycle. In the
former, the wind tunnel was operated as a closed
return-type tunnel whereas, in the latter, it operated
as an open non-return type tunnel. In propulsion
cycle, the exhaust gases were expelled from the
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AIAA 2002-1142
tunnel circuit prior to returning through the air
compressor. A schematic of the tunnel is shown in
figure 5.
Because the requirements for testing full scale
supersonic jet engines are restrictive, especially with
regards to air density, temperature and humidity, the
auxiliary equipment of the 10X10 posed a challenge
to it's designers. The main components of the 10 X
10 ft. supersonic wind tunnel included the air dryer
building in which air was dryed to a dewpoint of-
40°F, an exhauster to reduce the air density in the
tunnel for start-up, the flexible wall nozzle that was
made of two 10 ft. high by 76 ft. long by 1 3/8 in.
thick stainless plates actuated by hydraulically
operated screwjacks (fig. Ib), the test section, a
second nozzle-type throat that reduced the test
section Mach no. prior to the normal shock wave so
as to reduce power requirements, a primary 8 stage
axial flow compressor driven by 4 wound rotor
induction motors rated at 150,000 hp, a secondary 10
stage axial flow compressor driven by 3 wound rotor
induction motors rated at 100,000 hp, an exhaust
muffler to quiet discharge when operating in
propulsion cycle, and the control room.
Models were installed in the test section by
lowering the entire test section floor to a shop level
via a set of screwjacks. Models were mounted on
stings that were in turn supported by one of two
struts. The first strut penetrates the test section floor
and is retractable when not in use. The second is a
suspended model strut wherein the model is
suspended from the ceiling. When using the
suspended model strut, an auxiliary strut for
supporting a tail-rake pressure measurement system
could be used.
Three component bearing-type strain gage
balances were available over a wide range offerees.
On the suspended model strut, the balance was
integral to the strut itself. Other measurements that
could be taken as part of the standard data set
included attitude indication, pressure measurements,
and temperatures via self-compensating
thermocouples. In the control room, a closed circuit
television system was available. Still and high speed
motion picture capability existed to capture Schlieren
images. Two clear window openings, each 33 in.
dia. offset eccentrically in a larger 60 in. dia. disk
are available for viewing and for flow visualization
via a Schlieren system.
As the 10X10 was designed as a propulsion
wind tunnel, multiple engine fuel systems were
designed and installed. These included gaseous
systems with the capability to provided 1800 Ibs/hr
 (c)2002 American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics or Published with Permission of Author(s) and/or Author(s)' Sponsoring Organization.
at 200 psig and liquid fuel systems with independent
pilot and main high-pressure systems.
The operating characteristics of the 10X10 are
as shown in Table 1. The nominal cost of operating
the 10X10 was $9/M-hr on 3rd shift (midnight to 8
am) operation.
Upgrades and Improvements
Significant technological advances in the areas
of supersonic wind tunnels and data acquisition were
made as a result of the Unitary Plan. When
originally proposed in 1945, the government owned
supersonic wind tunnel capability was to be
collocated along side significant hydroelectric power
generation capability. The German experience,
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wherein the air compressors were run by water
driven turbines, influenced conceptual designs. The
availability of power in the near urban settings of the
NACA Laboratories or from the Tennessee Valley
Authority hydroelectric grid, in the case of AEDC,
meant that large electric motors could be utilized to
drive the air compressors. This opened the door to
the construction of supersonic ground testing
capability on a scale previously not attainable.
Secondly, the state of the art in data acquisition was
changing and the engineers of NACA and the Army
Air Corp took full advantage of automated data
acquisition and recording and display devices for
acquiring and recording analog data.
Since being built, the Unitary Plan Wind
Tunnels have had active maintenance programs to
keep the facilities operable and the Air Force and
NASA have funded improvement and modernization
programs to meet evolving aircraft program needs.
These improvement and modernization programs
have resulted in the ability to acquire larger
quantities of data, more accurate data, and lower
testing costs.
In the Propulsion Wind Tunnel Complex at
AEDC, this has included adding capability such as a
high angle-of-attack automated sting, a captive
trajectory system for trajectory tracing of separated
stores, diffuser improvements that have lowered
power consumption, flow quality devices such
screens and honeycomb in the upstream of the test
section to improve velocity uniformity and flow
angularity, and numerous improvements to the data
acquistion system. In addition to modifications to
the ground test facilities built under the Unitary Plan
Act, AEDC has added significant testing capability
to it's original set of ground testing capability.
Additions include electric arc facilities and
hypervelocity ranges to simulate the environment
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AIAA 2002-1142
experienced by flight vehicles re-entering the earth's
atmosphere from orbital or ballistic trajectories. The
Aeropropulsion Systems Test Facility (ASTF) was
commissioned in 1986 after nearly 20 years of
planning, design, construction and activation. The
ASTF's large 28 ft. diameter test cell allows for
testing of full scale engines at nearly all practicable
altitudes.29 More recent efforts at AEDC have
focused on reducing design/testing cycle time as
aircraft and munitions developers and manufacturers
seek dramatic reductions in cost and product
development cycle time.36
Modifications and improvements to the
NACA/NASA Unitary Plan Wind Tunnels have
been documented in various reports and papers.34'37'
38, 39,40,41 jft plan Tuiuiels
Qf the NASA Unitary
have been rehabilitated since being brought on-line.
This has included, for example, rewinding of the
drive motors and and the installation of new motor
controls that has allowed for improved speed
control.42
The decade of the 70s are noted as the period
when wind tunnel test calibrations were reported
upon extensively. Prior to this time, little was
documented on many of the wind tunnel airflow
performance parameters such as flow angularity,
turbulence and boundary layer characteristics.
Significant strides were being made in terms of wind
tunnel instrumentation and flow visualization.
Scanivalve systems, a pressure scanning system that
was based on solenoid activated pressure passages,
were introduced to be able to acquire more pressure
data in less time. Expanded digital data acquisition
systems were installed as this technology matured.
The decade of the 80s brought measurement of
vortex patterns via vapor-screen imaging at the
Langley facilities. Later, laser Doppler velocimetry
for flow field analysis and determination of
aeroelastic properties was successfully used in the
Lewis wind tunnels. Coherent Raman spectrometry
was used at Langley to measure velocity, pressure
and temperature. Remote, computer controlled
model support systems with multiple degrees of
freedom were installed to allow expanded model
orientations.
In the 90s, measurement techniques continued
to be updated and refined to include electronically
scanned pressure systems, non-intrusive flow
measurement techniques such as pressure sensitive
paint, infrared thermography, and Moire
interfromemtry. Data quality was improved as
statistical methods for quantifying uncertainties were
introduced and overall test time was reduced via
introduction of automatic test sequencing.43
 (c)2002 American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics or Published with Permission of Author(s) and/or Author(s)' Sponsoring Organization.
Recent Developments
The National Unitary Wind Tunnel Plan—
despite the twists and turns that it took in the
political process—represented one of the more
rational approaches to aerospace research planning
undertaken in the twentieth century. At a basic level,
would that more planning efforts evolved so
rationally. Instead of convergence in all too many
cases, various organizations have pursued their
priorities to the exclusion of all others, following a
winner take all strategy that ultimately may prove
detrimental to the cause of aerospace technology and
the leadership of the United States in it.
In the 1990s the DoD and NASA, and other
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organizations, conducted several studies relative to
the current state of wind tunnels:
® Future Aerospace Ground Test Facility
Requirements - AEDC (NCR - 1992)
« Aero/Thermodynamic T&E Facilities Reliance -
DoD (1994)
• DoD Aeronautical Test Facilities Assessment
(1997)
• Wind Tunnels Preferred by Boeing (1998)
• National Wind Tunnel Study - DoD and NASA
(9/2000)
Each of these peered forward twenty years with a
view to recognizing that budgets are tight and will
remain so. They identified existing facilities that can
contribute significantly to development work so they
can be properly maintained, operated, and utilized.
They also went about cautiously and selectively
identifying new facilities that might be needed to
pursue the technologies envisioned. Always they
recognized the need to understand requirements and
roles before committing to any specific facility. Each
of these five studies deserve some discussion.
Future Aerospace Ground Test Facility
This study, completed in 1992, explored the
research facilities that would be required for
subsonic and supersonic airplane development.
Tunnels at NASA LaRC and AEDC were considered
to be essential, including:
• AEDC 16 foot transonic tunnel
• AEDC 16 foot supersonic
• LaRC National Transonic Facility
The study team found that few, if any, facilities were
adequate for transonic wing development and
validation, and that required upgrades would
necessitate the expenditure of more than $100
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million. The study recommended working with
NASA and industry to develop strategies on
providing cost-effective transonic ground test
capability with near-flight realism.
This study drew a distinction between
"research" facilities and "development" facilities.
The research facilities are generally highly
instrumented and generate high-resolution data for
well defined and controlled test conditions. They are
used to provide phenomenological insights and to
develop and validate computational codes. They are
also usually smaller in size and shorter in test time
then development facilities. In short, they provide
the detailed data for understanding the physics and
validating and refining computer codes. The
development facilities help to validate overall design
and system durability and performance. Acquiring
new development facilities would be a a challenge
not without difficulties. They are generally larger in
size, emphasize measurements of macroquantities
and near-flight conditions, have relatively long test
times, cost more to build and operate, and require a
very long lead-time for acquisition.
Aero/Thermodynamic T&E Facilities Reliance
This 1994 study recommended that NASA
provide service to DoD for large subsonic T&E
facilities. And it asked that DoD and NASA
Reliance type coordination be pursued and MOAs
developed. The study also recommended that NASA
and DoD jointly pursue a National Wind Tunnel
Complex (NWTC) that would advance the cause of
both organizations. The study team found that there
could be significant added value to DoD systems
development, provided DoD requirements are
included in the NWTC specifications.
The study also found that the DoD and NASA
had been too oriented toward their own priorities and
should pursue policies that enhanced cooperation
rather than made it more difficult. As an example, it
recommended adopting a uniform pricing policy for
all T&E facilities, preferably with institutional
funding provided to cover indirect costs.
DoD Aeronautical Test Facilities Assessment
In 1997 the DoD undertook an aeronautical,
test facilities assessment that considered near-, mid-
and long-term needs for core transonic wind tunnels
facilities for military needs for the AEDC 16 foot
transonic facility and the NASA Ames Research
Center 11-foot tunnel. It made several important
recommendations.
 (c)2002 American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics or Published with Permission of Author(s) and/or Author(s)' Sponsoring Organization.
• DoD should invest $100 million over 5 years in
16T/16S for upgrades and productivity
improvements.
• DoD/NASA/industry should consort to build a
new high Re transonic wind tunnel (the NWTC
Project, a industry /government partnership had
been canceled at the end of fiscal year 1996.
The NWTC Final Report documents project
information available at the time of it's
cancellation).44
® Government should enhance wind tunnel and
CFD capabilities:
® Government should develop national technology
program addressing both wind tunnel and CFD
needs.
« DoD and NASA should increase funding to
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$30M/yr for these technologies.
The study also suggested founding a new office to
manage the investment and technology funds for the
nation's core government wind tunnels.
Wind Tunnels Preferred by Boeing
The next year, 1998, an assessment of wind
tunnel capabilities required for Boeing work found
that the nation was in rather dire straits for the
future. This study found that none of the tunnels for
transonic development of a new subsonic transport
was scored as high as "satisfactory" (3 out of a 5
point scale). Only one tunnel, the Ames Research
Center's 11-foot tunnel, scored as high as
"Satisfactory" for the transonic development of a
derivative subsonic transport. Only the National
Transonic Facility was scored as high as
"satisfactory" for transonic development of a new
subsonic transport (ETW was the backup and just
below "satisfactory"). Finally, the BSWT and BTWT
were the primary and back-up tunnels for transonic
development of a supersonic aircraft (rated above
"satisfactory").
National Wind Tunnel Study
The National Wind Tunnel Study of 2000 by
the DoD and NASA reviewed all of these previous
studies, as well as some additional ones, and found
several common issues from previous studies
• Need for NASA/DoD Alliance.
• Shortcomings in wind tunnel and technology
investments.
• Need for integrated T&E (wind tunnel, CFD and
flight test).
• Uniform pricing policy.
• Identification of core capabilities.
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The study's authors agreed with recommendations
from 1997 and 1998 studies and seconded the need
to develop a National Wind Tunnel Business Plan
under NASA. They also called for implementing the
provisions of the NWTA without further delay. They
called for a strengthening of the NATA charter and
for NASA to complete an internal assessment of core
wind tunnel requirements.
The bottom line this study found: Numerous
studies have been made, all making, and often
echoing, recommendations on the future direction of
ground testing in the US; however, none of the major
recommendations have been implemented. 'What we
need now is not another study but the
implementation of the recommendations from the
previous studies," the author's commented.
Conclusion
What has not happened during the experience
of the 1990s that did take place during the 1940s is
that the studies of that earlier era eventually
converged on positive legislation that all could agree
to and resulted in tunnels being built and put into
operation. The situation at present seems to be about
where the United States was in the National Unitary
Wind Tunnel Plan about 1947 or 1948 before
legislation emerged that yielded results. In that era a
driving force was national defense, as the Cold War
was just beginning. Absent some driving future
imperative, convergence of proposals might not take
place anytime soon. At present there is not consensus
on:
• Military imperative.
• Impact to national security.
• Impact to economic security.
• Critical need in aerospace research and
development programs.
The current state of aeronautics and aeronautics
research in the United States is the subject of
numerous recent articles and papers. Excellent
examples from the perspective of the airframe and
propulsion segments of the industry cover the gamut
from workforce issues to government investment.45'46
We might suggest that the United States is
currently threatened just as thoroughly at present as
it was by the Soviet Union in the latter 1940s. The
threat today, however, is economic competition
rather than military competition. In the last decade
the United States has been losing market share in all
major aerospace sectors. In passenger aircraft, for
example, Airbus Industrie's analysis suggests that to
satisfy an expected average annual growth rate in
 (c)2002 American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics or Published with Permission of Author(s) and/or Author(s)' Sponsoring Organization.
passengers and cargo of 5.2 per cent during the next
ten years, the number of passenger aircraft in service
will increase from some 10,350 in 1999 to 14,820 in
2009 and 19,170 in 2019. Satisfying that
requirement is Airbus' objective for the indefinite
future. And they are showing remarkable staying
power there. At the Paris airshow in 2001 they
nailed down 110 orders for new aircraft to Boeing's
less than 40.47
Commercial aviation is quickly evolving, both
technologically and in the context of the global
business climate. Pacing world economic growth, air
travel is evolving through profound changes to
provide better service at lower cost. The world fleet
is currently three times as large as it was twenty
years ago, and todays fuel-efficient jetliners offer
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airlines greater choice in terms of range, passenger
capacity, and operating economics. More than half of
all flights are made on routes bounded by few, if any,
regulatory constraints. Flag carriers are privatizing,
"open skies" agreements are replacing bilateral air
service agreements, and global alliances are on the
rise. As a result, airlines now have unprecedented
flexibility to pursue strategies that meet the needs of
the next century's global community. They will not
purchase American aircraft because we want them to
do so. Indeed, with the growth of overseas carriers,
there is an ideological reason to refrain from buying
American if for no other reason than to thumb their
noses at the last remaining superpower. Accordingly,
U.S. technology must be clearly superior.
The only way to meet this threat is to ensure
the technical superiority of American aerospace
technology. There is a direct correlation between
R&D investment and excellence in technology. Since
the 1960s the percentage of investment by the United
States in aerospace technology has stabilized at about
one percent of the Federal budget. The aerospace
corporations and some universities invest in R&D as
well, but that is a decidedly small amount and at
least in the case of the private sector limited to
almost entirely short term research
A Recommendation
The American nation should commit to
doubling the investment in aerospace R&D during
the first decade of the twenty-first century. This is
fully within the bounds of our capability, and it will
help assure American economic, military, and
cultural competitiveness in the new century. With
regards to ground testing capability specifically, the
present over-capacity/under-utilization of the
available testing capability has led the idustry to
14
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AIAA 2002-1142
ignore new wind tunnel requirements when doing
program planning for new flight systems. As
documented in several of the afore mentioned
national studies, the existing suite of wind tunnels is
deficient with regards to the design of new aircraft.
The likely result is conservative designs, or, worse
yet, undetected design problems. Converging the
various ground-test and wind tunnel studies of the
present into meaningful legislation is the best and
perhaps only workable means available to ensure
America's aeronautics capabilities into the twenty-
first century.
Notes
1
A general discussion of this legislation is contained
in Alec Roland, Model Research: The National
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 1915-1958
(Washington, DC: NASASP-4103, 1985), 1:211-21,
2
Bruce E. Ayer to Lewis, April 24, 1945, NASA
Historical Reference Collection, NASA History
Division, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC.
3
Lewis to Ayer and Lewis to Sharp, both May 15,
1945; Edward R. Sharp to director of research,
'Wind Tunnels," November 7, 1945, NASA
Historical Reference Collection.
4
Sharp to director of research, "Wind Tunnels,"
December 14, 1945. By this time the Ames
laboratory was also recommending new supersonic
facilities, but, in contrast with the AERL proposal,
Ames was promoting itself as the center to build and
control them. See Smith J. DeFrance to NACA,
"High-speed Research Facilities," December 7, 1945,
both in NASA Historical Reference Collection.
5
Sharp to NACA Director of Research, "Proposal
for a Supersonic Research Center," February 5,
1946, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
6
Arnold Engineering Development Center,
"Chronology," n.d., 11 pp., typescript; Thomas O.
Sturm, The USAF Scientific Advisory Board
(Washington, DC: OflSce of Air Force History, 1978
ed.), p. 6; and Frank L. Wattendorf to Gen. F. O.
Carroll, "Proposal for a New Air Forces
Development Center," June 19, 1945, in which a
member of the Army Air Forces team wrote that "the
scope of German plans make[s] it essential that our
own plans be certainly not less ambitious in the light
of our future security."
7
The NACA's overall story is related in George F.
Gray, Frontiers of Flight: The Story of NACA
Research (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948). On
the inability to foresee the jet revolution see, Roger
D. Launius, '"Never Was Life More Interesting':
 (c)2002 American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics or Published with Permission of Author(s) and/or Author(s)' Sponsoring Organization.
The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics,
1936-1945," Prologue: Quarterly of the National
Archives 24 (Winter 1992): 361-73; Edward W.
Constant II, The Origins of the Turbojet Revolution
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1980); Roland, Model Research, pp. 186-94.
8
Minutes of NACA annual meeting, October 25,
1945, p. 5; minutes of special meeting of Executive
Committee, December 17, 1945, pp. 2-4; Sharp to
director of research, "Proposal for a Supersonic
Research Center," February 5, 1946; Sharp to
director of research." Telephone Conversation with
Major Jay AuWerter December 20, 1945 Regarding
Location for Wind Tunnels," December 20, 1945,
with note by Charles H. Helms; D.B. Langmuir,
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"Extract of Remarks by Dr. Hunsaker Made at the
15th Meeting of the Joint Committee on New
Weapons and Equipment] Guided Missiles
Committee on 1 March 1946, "attached to RG.
Robinson to Hunsaker, March 20, 1946, all in NASA
Historical Reference Collection.
9
Minutes of Executive Committee meeting, March
20, 1946, p. 4, NASA Historical Reference
Collection.
10
RG. R[obinson]., "Army Air Force plan for Air
Engineering Development Center," memo for file,
March 25, 1946, handwritten, marked "Secret Very
Limited Internal Distribution," NASA Historical
Reference Collection.
11
LeMay actually revealed the plan to the press on
April 20, 1946, but apparently did not publish the
plan at that time. See New York Herald-Tribune,
April 21, 1946. The NACA received a copy of
"Proposed Air Engineering Development Center
Summary for Air Staff," undated, 12 pp., on April
16, 1946, but there seems to have been no indication
of the campaign that was about to begin to sell the
plan. Roscoe C. Wilson to George Lewis, April 16,
1946; Lewis to E.R Sharp, April 16, 1946, both in
NASA Historical Reference Collection.
12
"Notes on Conference with Dr. Lewis, Messrs.
Crowley, Victory, Chamberlin, Ulmer, Helms, and
Robinson," March 27, 1947; Lewis to Reid,
DeFrance, Sharp, "Proposed National Supersonic
Research Center," April 2, 1946, with enclosures;
NACA, "A Proposal for the Construction of a
National Supersonic Research Center," April 1946;
T.L.K. Smull to Hartman, April 4, 1946; Hartman to
chief of research coordination, "Industry Reaction to
NACA Proposal for a National Supersonic Research
Center," April 29, 1946, all in NASA Historical
Reference Collection.
15
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
AIAA 2002-1142
13
For examples of the studiously noncommittal
replies from industry, see G.S. Schairer (Boeing) to
Lewis, April 19, 1946; J.C. Miller (General Electric)
to Lewis, April 18, 1946; J. Carlton Ward
(Fairchild) to Lewis, April 17, 1946; and RE.
Hopper (Hughes) to Lewis, April 16, 1946, all in
NASA Historical Reference Collection.
14
The Raymond panel did not resolve all the
questions surrounding the need for new tunnels, so a
special committee on supersonic facilities succeeded
it, chaired by Jerome Hunsaker. That committee met
October 21, 22, and 24, 1946, to iron out differences.
The minutes reveal that one of the major problems
was Hunsaker's hostility toward the Army Air
Forces, which he claimed "have arrived at the point
of wanting to duplicate NACA equipment." The Air
Force representatives denied this, but they seem to
have done nothing to allay Hunsaker's concern. The
harsh tone of this exchange was edited out of the
final version of the minutes, but the source of
contention remained. See "Report of Special
Committee on Supersonic Facilities," October 24,
1946.
15
In fact, Raymond was sure it would cost more than
$2 billion and asked for an outside audit. The
engineering firm of Sverdrup and Parcel was
contracted to carry out this review and subitted a
report in the fall of 1946 that estimated the total cost
to be in excess of $3 billion.
16
Hugh L. Dryden to Arthur E. Raymond, May 29,
1946, NASA Historical Reference Collection.
17
Key events in this processcan be traced in "Short
History of Unitary-Wind-Tunnel Plan." 4 p.
typescript, November 7, 1949; "Addendum to Short
History of Unitary-Wind-Tunnel Plan." 6 p.
typescript, July 31, 1950; "Arnold Engineering
Development Center chronology," lip. typescript,
n.d.
18
These interest groups are essentially the same as
those found in other NACA initiatives.
19
These differing perceptions can be seen in the
summary of proceedings of the "NACA Industry
Conference on Unitary Plan," held in Los Angeles
on November 14, 1949, where NACA-industry
suspicion of Air Force intentions was especially
evident. The NACA's own plans appear most clearly
in a staff memorandum for Lewis, "Analysis of
Supersonic Facilities," October 18, 1949, NASA
Historical Reference Collection.
20
Brian Balogh, "Reorganizing the Organizational
Synthesis: Federal-Professional Relations in Modem
America," Studies in American Political
 (c)2002 American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics or Published with Permission of Author(s) and/or Author(s)' Sponsoring Organization.
Development 5 (Spring 1991): 119-172, quote from
pp. 121-122.
21
House Committee on Armed Services, Report to
Accompany S. 1267, 81st Cong., 1st sess., H. Kept.
1376, p. 4.
22
Ibid, p. 10-13.
23
Industry influence was evident throughout the
legislative hearings, as evidenced in the Report to
Accompany S. 1267: "While the committee is fully
aware of the ramifications of the NACA system of
committees and subcommittees and the fact that
provision is made for industry representation among
these various groups, it would appear
notwithstanding that there is considerable room for
the development of adequate procedures which will
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insure at all times that basic scientific information is
circulated freely and made available to all research
groups and technical workers having an interest in
the subject matter, except in those cases where there
is a very clear and unquestionable need for placing
the information in a classified category on grounds
of military security alone and for no other reason"
(p. 8).
24
Ibid., p. 5.
25
Ibid., pp. 10-11.
26
This has been appreciated in assessing the careers
of several senior appointed government leaders. See
Jameson W. Doig and Erwin C. Hargrove, eds.,
Leadership and Innovation: A Biographical
Perspective on Entrepreneurs in Government
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1987).
27
John Law, "Technology and Heterogeneous
Engineering: The Case of Portugese Expansion," pp.
111-34; and Donald MacKenzie, "Missile Accuracy:
A Case Study in the Social Processes of
Technological Change," pp. 195-222, both in Wiebe
E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor J. Pinch,
eds., The Social Construction of Technological
Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and
History of Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1987).
28
"This New Ocean - Chl-2: Conquest of the Air,"
available at
http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/ffistory/SP-
4201/chl-2.html.
29
Donald D. Baals and William R Corliss, "Wind
Tunnels of NASA." pp. 49-73, NASA SP-440, 1981.
30
"What were the first test facilities built at
AEDC?," available at
http://www.arnold.af.mil/aedc/highmach/stories/first
facilities.html.
16
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
AIAA 2002-1142
31
J. G. Mitchell, "Current wind tunnels and planned
improvements at the Arnold Engineering
Development Center (AEDC)", A86-24763.
32
"Aeronautical Facilities Catalogue, Volume 1:
Wind Tunnels," Editors: Frank E. Penaranda and M.
Shannon Freda, NASA RP-1132, 1985.
33
"Manual for the Users of the Unitary Plan Wind
Tunnel Facilities of the National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics," NASA TM-80998,
Washington, 1956.
34
Charlie M. Jacobson, William A. Corlett, and
William J. Munta, "Description and Calibration of
the Langley Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel," NASA TP
1905, 1981.
35
Man in Space: A National Historic Landmark
Theme Study, available at
HTTP://www.cr.nps.gov/history/omline_books/buto
wsky4/spacea.html.
36
William L. Peters, et. al., "Cycle Time Reduction
Strategies and Improvements in Transonic Testing
in the AEDC Wind Tunnel 16T," AIAA-99-0179,
1999.
37
Robert A. Aiello, "NASA Lewis 10- By 10- Foot
Supersonic Wind Tunnel," NASA TMX-71625,
1974.
38
David N. Bowditch, "Current Wind Tunnel
Capability and Planned Improvements at Lewis
Research Center," NASA TM 87190, 1986.
39
Robert E. Bower, "Current Wind Tunnel
Capability and Planned Improvements at the NASA
Langley Research Center," AIAA-86-0727-CP,
1986.
40
John R Micol, "Langley Research Center's
Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel: Testing Capabilities and
Recent Modernization Activities," AIAA-2001-0456,
2001.
41
Lado Muhlstein Jr., "Wind Tunnel Test
Productivity and Technology Accomplishments at
Ames in the ADTE Program," AIAA-98-0141,
1998.
42
Edward A. Becks, "Drive System Enhancements
in the NASA Lewis Research Center Supersonic
Wind Tunnels," AIAA-98-2886, 1998.
43
Jerome T. Kegelman, "Accelerating Ground-Test
Cycle Time; The Six-Minute Model Change and
Other Visions for the 21st Century," AIAA-98-0142,
1998.
44
NWTC Final Report, NAS3-27330 Phase 2A
Deliverable No.: NWT-03-A-9000-01, April 22,
1996.
 (c)2002 American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics or Published with Permission of Author(s) and/or Author(s)' Sponsoring Organization.

AIAA 2002-1142

45
John H. McMasters and Russel M. Cummings,
"Airplane Design - Past, Present and Future,"
AIAA-2001-0535,2001.
46
Carol Cash, "Crisis in Aeronautics", AIAA-2001-
0133, 2001.
47
Global Market Forecast, 2000-2019 (Blagnac,
France: Airbus Industrie, 2000), 4-5.
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17
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
 AIAA 2002-1142

O
8
CD

0)
c o> ^ O CD CD"
_o Z Q c o
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c '5 II 2 x .2 £ CD
CO w& o .^ IS 3 la, O
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cz C « <£ 3
0>

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-
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H W
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(/) ^
3T S
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Q 0. ;=•
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Wind Tunnel
Transonic
O
16T AEDC 1952 16x16x40 0-1.6 1.0-6.0 1.0-1000 3-26.3 540-620 3
Q)

11 ft (Unitary) ARC 1956 11x11x22 0.7-1,4 1.26-9.4 150-2000 7.35-31.9 530-585 o'
(/>
8 x 6 ft* GRC 1948 8x6x39 0.4-2.0 3.6-4.8 200-1240 15.3-2.5 560-700 O

Supersonic Tl

16S AEDC 1954 16x16x40 1.5-4.75 0.1-2.6 30-500 3.0-12.5 580-1080

9 x 7 ft (Unitary) ARC 1956 9x7x10 1.4-2.6 0.8-6.5 200-1450 4.41-28.8 520-610 CD
Q.

8 x 7 ft (Unitary ARC 1956 8x7x16 2.4-3.5 0.6-5.0 100-1000 4.41-29.4 520-610

4 ft Unitary #1 LaRC 1954 4x4x7 1.47-2.86 0.5-12.2 90-2670 56.94 max 560-760 Tl
CD
4 ft Unitary #2 LaRC 1954 4x4x7 2.29-4.63 0.5-9.5 90-1710 150 max 560-760
10x 10ft GRC 1955 10x10x40 2.0-3.5 0.12-3.4 (C) 20-720 (C) 1.4-34.7 500-750 C
2.1-2.7 (O) 500-600 (O) 520- 11 50 O

*The NACA considered the 8x6 as an alternative to the Unitary Plan Tunnel when propulsion testing at <Mach 2.0 was required 5
O

AEDC - Arnold Engineering Development Center (C) - Closed

ARC - NASA Ames Research Center (O) - Open O

GRC - NASA Glenn Research Center

LaRC - NASA Langley Research Center

CO
I
§
Table 1. Unitary Plan Wind Tunnel Operating Characteristics

18
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 (c)2002 American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics or Published with Permission of Author(s) and/or Author(s)' Sponsoring Organization.

AIAA 2002-1142
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Figure la. Aysymmetric Sliding Block Supersonic Nozzle

of

2.0 AT
3.S

Figure Ib. Flexible Wall Supa-sonic Nozzle

19
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
 (c)2002 American Institute of Aeronautics & Astronautics or Published with Permission of Author(s) and/or Author(s)' Sponsoring Organization.

AIAA 2002-1142

UNITARY PLAN WIND TUXNEL

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Figure 2: Schematic of the AEDC Propulsion Wind Figure 4: Schematic of the Ames Unitary Plan Wind
Tunnel Complex Tunnel

10x10 Supersonic Wind Tunnel

/-Dry air storage spheres
Cooing tower- / r' /~M8in drive control oararis
~ • ft monitoring stet

Data acquisition room

Low fetecfi number Ujst section

Figure 3: Schematic of the Langley Unitary Plan Figure 5. Schematic of the Lewis Unitary Plan Wind
Wind Tunnel Tunnel

20
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics