www.thejournalofcounterterrorism.

org

Al Qaeda’s
Exploitation
Of The Internet
For Terrorist Command, Control, And Communications 

By Mike Perelman, Aaron Richman, Saleh Kafora

A l Q a e d a ’s
deputy leader
Ayman al-Zawahri
speaks in an image taken
from video footage released on
April 29, 2006. Zawahri said hundreds
of suicide bombers had “broken America’s
back” in three years of war in Iraq, according to
a video posted on the Internet. The release of the video
came just days after the broadcast of an audio tape from Al
Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and a rare video from Abu Musab
12 al-Zarqawi, the group’s leader in Iraq. REUTERS

Vol.16, No.1
Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International
Communication is critical. A message must
be relayed to the intended audience in an
effective and clear manner….
Every Western organization that hopes
to succeed faces the issue of effective
employee development. Seminars are
conducted; trainers are contracted and
hold day-long training sessions; and the
intranet is used for cost effective employee
skills development. All of this time and
expense is aimed at improving employee
– and thus organizational – morale,
motivation, and performance.  countermeasures in place.
movement that needs to motivate lone wolves
and small homegrown cells, the terror network
must be able to communicate in a bi-directional
fashion, while protecting its own infrastructure
from security forces.
Many people have seen downloaded tapes on
the techniques of making a suicide bombing
vest – from the mixing of the chemicals for the
production of an explosive to the placement of
BBs to maximize the affects of shrapnel. While
these training videos will never “go out of style,”
the terrorists are always reaching for new ways
to perfect their deadly craft.   the compound into the ventilation system of an
International terrorists adapt to the failures and
successes of themselves as well as other terror
elements. Hezbollah tactics are improved by the
Taliban, and Hamas suicide bombers are studied
by the Al Qaeda movement all with a goal of
constantly sharing lessons learned and tactics
and techniques to outdo the security forces and
by the Aum Shinrikyo sect. To be successful,
it concluded, the terrorist had to be more af-
fective in atomizing the nerve agent.
 
Finally, the SME advised the jihadist who had
asked the question how to improve his safety in
the production and transportation phases of us-
ing sarin. The answer dealt with the production
of two compounds that can be more easily and
safely transported. The binary compound would
be safer to transport, but would turn into sarin
when mixed. Now, all the aspiring jihadist would
have to do is buy or steal a bug sprayer and pump
office building.
Other training examples include:
• Preparation of toxic materials.
• Preparing explosives including tutorials
and detailed instructions.
• Preparation of missiles.
• Organizing cells and recruiting members.
• Terrorism / hackers.
• Methods and tactics.

A
l Qaeda and Al Qaeda-linked organi-
zations face exactly the same issues.
How do you provide training for a
decentralized organization? How do
you teach a person who has never been inside a
modern classroom to use the appropriate house-
hold chemicals to create explosive compounds?
How do you teach the person wearing the suicide
vest where to stand on a crowded bus to maxi-
mize civilian casualties?  blogs are titled “Preparation and Planning Divi-
What’s more, Al Qaeda must constantly be
concerned with its own security and Western
intelligence interdiction of their activities. All of
this while at the same time maintaining a high
level of quality assurance, communications,
control, and delegation of global responsibilities
to assure mission success.
These terror organizations use the internet for
conveying information, instructions, and com-
mands to relevant members of the organization,
other organizations, potential new members as
well as to its adversary itself, the West. For ter-
rorist organizations, the internet has become the
most effective tool for transferring and receiving
information at a global and local level.
Al Qaeda-linked organizations have mastered
the management of training and education at
both a global and local level. This has enabled
customized and site specific communications
with better information and data transfer.
Al Qaeda’s On-Line University
The response to human resource development is-
sues by Al Qaeda-linked organizations is exactly
the same as the response by major international
corporations – training and teaching through the
internet.  As a decentralized organization and a
Various portals for information delivery are • All books and movies are accompanied
used by the adversary to effectively assure clear by very detailed explanations.
instructions and guidance to specific parties in
particular regions – intended to efficiently guide On-Line Courses
their mission objective without getting caught or
being identified. Although the student of Al Qaeda’s On-Line
University will never attend a graduation cer-
Enter The SMEs emony for his education, the subject matter
experts ensure that the sincere student can gain
In most terror-related training sites today, jihad a full appreciation of what to use and how to
use it to destroy the property and lives of the
sion.” Within these training and education
wings, there is the capability for members
to ask any question and get any questions
answered directly from the web-
site or email.
A recent posting to a jihadist
website was identified by the
A recent posting to a jihadist website was
Institute of Terrorism Re- identified by the Institute of Terrorism
search and Response’s Arabic
language researchers. It was Research and Response’s Arabic
written by an individual who
wanted to kill Westerners, but
language researchers. It was written
wasn’t motivated enough to by an individual who wanted to kill
die in the process. He posed
the “How do I do it?” question Westerners, but wasn’t motivated
to the website. Within hours a
Subject Matter Expert (SME)
enough to die in the process. He posed
had posted a multi-page re- the “How do I do it?” question to the
sponse to his question. Poison
gas was the answer.  website. Within hours a Subject Matter
What followed was a dis-
Expert (SME) had posted a multi-page
course on the chemicals response to his question. Poison gas
needed to make sarin gas
– the proportions and the was the answer. 
dangers to the person pro-
ducing the nerve agent. The
posting also included “lessons
learned” from the 1995 Tokyo sarin
gas subway terror attack carried out
www.thejournalofcounterterrorism.org
kefir. Examples of recent material from the
SMEs included the use of phosphorous as a
chemical to be used in incendiary attacks and the
appropriate targeting of Americans through the
use of small arms:  Examples of this communications can be taken
“…if you have access to a weapon the best thing
to do is to go to crowded places that have little
security like the Halloween  parties (this is an
opportunity that our brothers can exploit next
year) which provide good cover for movement and
presence of many heretics from all ages but not
children. You should choose the time and place
that Muslims or children are not there (before you
attack). And remember what happened in the club
in Russia that 100 people were killed in it…”  selection in the area of the Arabian Peninsula.
The “how to” question of creating a bomb
that can be carried onto an airliner was
answered and available (and identified by
Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden is seen
speaking in this video grab provided to Reuters
on September 11, 2007. Bin Laden eulogizes a
September 11 hijacker as a rare and magnificent
man in a tape released to mark the sixth
anniversary of the attacks on the United States.
REUTERS/Internet
analysts of the Targeted Actionable Monitoring
Center) to jihadists months ago. The West finally
saw the weapon used in the Christmas Day at-
tempted bombing of Flight 253.  up alongside your brothers in Gaza, that surrounded
Transmitting Orders
The dispatch of operational orders to lone-
wolves and local cells through calls for action
via various sources for communications or the
recruitment of personnel at local levels for the
execution of various missions is done through
various means: from password protected and
encrypted websites to easier tools including
blogs and chats. There have been instances
where lone-wolves sought out assistance in
joining up with larger, better organized groups.
The inductions into these groups for the poten-
14
Vol.16, No.1
Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International
tial recruit included points of contact, meeting
locations, exploitable border crossings, and
periodic situational reports.
from TAM-C Alerts issued in 2009 by the Institute
of Terrorism Research and Response:
Recent activity intercepted by Arabic language
researchers of the Targeted Actionable Monitor-
ing Center (TAM-C) identified communications
indicating the desire to place pressure on Israel
and Egypt to force them to reduce the pressure on
Hamas controlled Gaza.  Another example of the use of the web for terror
The “how to” question of creating a bomb
that can be carried onto an airliner was
answered and available (and identified
by analysts of the Targeted Actionable
Monitoring Center) to jihadists months
ago. The West finally saw the weapon
used in the Christmas Day attempted
bombing of Flight 253.  guard locations that AQAP want targeted.
Although the recent anti-tunneling fence has been
built on Egyptian soil, the communication identifies
Egypt as an enemy and demands of jihadists “to stand
them with fences and especially the steel wall that has
been erected by the enemies of Islam.”  find ourselves reacting to jihadists moving at cy-
Such a statement is a call for action as a result of
specific actions on the part of the adversary (Egypt)
and then directives are given for elements that align
themselves with the terror group to target specific
assets. The communication further states, “Kidnap
Zionist soldiers, or American soldiers in Iraq, and
release them only on condition that the closure be
removed from Gaza.”  Director, Institute of Terrorism Research
The potential for terror activity in Egypt, es-
pecially in the Sinai, remains high. The danger
is particularly significant because many West-
erners spend the December holiday season at
resorts in the Sinai.  Previously intercepted
communications clearly indicate the intent to
destabilize the Egyptian government by going
after the Mubarak regime. 
Even though the terror organization or the indi-
vidual perpetrated such propaganda may be in
another location on the globe, the web enabled
global planning, training, and attack execution
at a local level.
activity that showed the 2009 broadening of target
On 28 December 2009 Arabic language
researchers of the Targeted Actionable
Monitoring Center (TAM-C) identified
communications that caused the TAM-C
Mid-East Desk to raise the threat level of
terror activity to SEVERE. 
On 29 December 2009 TAM-C Arabic
language researchers identified commu-
nications from Al Qaeda of the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) indicating the intent
to spread terror operations through the
recruitment of Muslims who are not cur-
rently aligned with terror elements. 
TAM-C analysts note that a portion of the
communication was especially aimed at the
recruitment of Muslim security personnel who
 
TAM-C analysts note that the AQAP commu-
nications includes the intent to target Iranian
assets in addition to Western assets. 
TAM-C analysts note that the AQAP
has previously used “creative” methods
of carrying out terror operations including
the insertion of a bomb in the body cavity of a
suicide bomber. 
TAM-C analysts believe that future AQAP terror
activity may threaten Western maritime assets.   
Obviously the terrorists’ command, control,
and communications is not without risks, as is
indicated by the TAM-C’s intercepts. However,
it is sufficiently effective that the risk of terror
activity is ever present.
Those involved in the world of counter terror
ber speed. The West has much to learn about the
successful exploitation of the Internet for a terror
movement. Hopefully, we will learn it in time. 
About the Author
Mike Perelman, Co-Director, Institute of Terrorism
Research and Response. Aaron Richman, Co-
and Response. Saleh Kafora, Director,
International Research and Analysis, Institute
of Terrorism Research and Response