79. Lidasan vs.

COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496 (1967), October 25, 1967

Facts:

Petitioner, a resident of Parang, Cotabato questioned the constitutionality of RA

4790 entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del
Sur” because it includes barrios located not only in the province of Lanao del Sur but also
in Cotabato province.

Issue:

Whether or not, the said Act is constitutional considering the petitioner’s

contention that the constitutional mandate provides that "No bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the
bill."

Ruling:

No, the said Act is unconstitutional.

Art. VI, Sec. 12(1), 1935 Constitution provides in part, [N]o bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the bill.

In this case, the said Act has two divided subjects combined in one statute. First,
it creates the municipality of Dianaton from twenty-one barrios coming from the two
towns in the province of Lanao del Sur; and second, it dismembers two municipalities in
Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.
80. Miller vs Mardo, 2 SCRA 398 (1961), July 31, 1961

Facts:

These appeals present a question of law, namely, the validity of Reorganization

Plan No. 20-A, prepared and submitted by the Government Survey and Reorganization
Commission (GSRC) under the authority of Republic Act No. 997, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1241, insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the
Department of Labor created in said Plan to decide claims of laborers for wages,
overtime and separation pay, etc.

The pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 997, as amended, invoked in favor of
this argument reads as follows:

“SEC. 6 (a) The provisions of the reorganization plan or plans submitted by the
President during the Second Session of the Third Congress shall be deemed
approved after the adjournment of the said session…”

Issue:

Whether or not the Reorganization Plan by the GSRC is valid under the
Constitution, considering the petitioner’s contention that exclusive and original
jurisdiction shall belong to the Court. Considering further the respondent’s contention
that it was created under the authority of the RA 997, as amended.

Ruling:

No, the Reorganization Plan is not valid under the Constitution.

Sec. 20(1), Art. VI of the Constitution provides in part, [E]very bill passed by the
Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves
the same, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it with his objections to the House where
it originated, which shall enter the objections at large on its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it.

In this case, A comparison between the procedure of enactment like the

questioned Reorganization plan, provided in section 6 (a) of the Reorganization Act and
that prescribed by the Constitution will show that the former is in distinct contrast to the
latter.
81. Arroyo vs De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997

Facts:

Petitioners are challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which amends
certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes"
(actually specific taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes. The law
originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral
committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo
made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the
Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. Majority
Leader moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report.
The Chair called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being
none, approved.”

Issue:

Whether or Not the said Republic Act is null and void because it was approved in
violation of the Rules of the House, considering the petitioner’s contention that he moved
for the adjournment for lack of quorum. Considering further the respondent’s contention
that the roll call was made and there be a quorum and the petitioner’s motion was
already defeated when put to a vote.

Ruling:

No, the said Republic Act is valid.

Sec. 27, Art VI of the Constitution, provides in part, [a]fter such reconsideration,
two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent,
together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered,
and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law.

In this case, the claim is not that there was no quorum (at least two-thirds of all the
Members of that House) but internal Rules of the House. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to
adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the
existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially
when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the
House.
82. Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 (1986), December 29, 1986

Facts:

This is a motion for reconsideration, after due process was invoked by the
petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they
claimed had not been published as required by law. In the decision of this case on April
24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees,
and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

Issue:

Whether or not publication of all laws in the official gazette can be dispensed with
considering the petitioners’ contention regarding the people's right to be informed on
matters of public concern. Considering further the respondents’ contention that that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided,"
as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval.

Ruling:

No, publication in the official gazette of all laws is indispensable.

In Pesigan vs. Angeles, the Court, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise
the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on
the persons affected thereby. "

In this case, such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the
public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly
provide that a law effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of
publication, it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result
not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its
existence.