SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and NESTOR G.R. No.

168387
DELA CRUZ, Accordingly, judgment is rendered:
Petitioners,
1. Finding [respondents] to be the owner by re-purchase from
Present:
RBBI [of] the Murong property covered by TCT No. [T-]62096
- versus - (formerly TCT No. 43258);
CORONA, C. J., Chairperson, 2. Ordering the cancellation of TCT with CLOA Nos. 395 and
ELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA ESPEJO, VELASCO, JR., 396 in the name[s] of Salun-at Marquez and Nestor de la Cruz
EMERITA ESPEJO, OPHIRRO LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, respectively, as they are disqualified to become tenants of the
ESPEJO, OTHNIEL ESPEJO, DEL CASTILLO, and Lantap property;
ORLANDO ESPEJO, OSMUNDO PEREZ, J.
ESPEJO, ODELEJO ESPEJO and 3. Directing RBBI to sell through VOS the Lantap property to
NEMI FERNANDEZ, Promulgated: its rightful beneficiary, herein tenant-farmer Nemi Fernandez
Respondents. August 25, 2010 under reasonable terms and conditions;

x--------------------------------------------------------x 4. Ordering RBBI to return the amount paid to it by Nestor

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.
When the parties admit the contents of written documents but put in issue whether these
documents adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties, the deciding
body is authorized to look beyond these instruments and into the contemporaneous and
subsequent actions of the parties in order to determine such intent.
Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that
prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract, not its wording which is prone to mistakes,
inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to
mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assails the October 7, 2003 Decision,[2] as well as
the May 11, 2005 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 69981. The
dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding reversible error committed by the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, the instant petition for review is
GRANTED. The assailed Decision, dated 17 January 2001, rendered
by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board is hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board of Bayombong[,] Nueva Vizcaya,
dated 17 March 1998, is REINSTATED. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The reinstated Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, in turn, contained the following dispositive
portion:
and Salun-at; and ordering the latter to pay 20 cavans of palay
per hectare at 46 kilos per cavan unto [respondents] plus such
accrued and unpaid rentals for the past years as may be duly
accounted for with the assistance of the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer of Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya who is also hereby
instructed to assist the parties execute their leasehold contracts
and;
5. The order to supervise harvest dated March 11, 1998 shall
be observed until otherwise modified or dissolved by the
appellate body.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Factual Antecedents
Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land,
with an area of two hectares each. One is located at Barangay Lantap, Bagabag, Nueva
Vizcaya (the Lantap property) while the other is located in Barangay Murong, Bagabag,
Nueva Vizcaya (the Murong property). There is no dispute among the parties that the
Lantap property is tenanted by respondent Nemi Fernandez (Nemi)[6] (who is the
husband[7] of respondent Elenita Espejo (Elenita), while the Murong property is tenanted by
petitioners Salun-at Marquez (Marquez) and Nestor Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz).[8]
The respondents mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI)
to secure certain loans. Upon their failure to pay the loans, the mortgaged properties were
foreclosed and sold to RBBI. RBBI eventually consolidated title to the properties and
transfer certificates of title (TCTs) were issued in the name of RBBI. TCT No. T-62096 dated
January 14, 1985 was issued for the Murong property. It contained the following description:
 Beginning at a point marked I on plan H-176292, S. 44034 W. 1656.31
m. more or less from B.L.L.M. No 1, Bagabag Townsite, K-27,
thence N. 28 deg. 20 E., 200.00 m. to point 2;
thence S. 61 deg. 40 E., 100.00 m. to point 3;
thence S. 28 deg. 20 W., 200.00 m. to point 4;
thence N. 61 deg. 40 W., 100.00 m. to point 1; point of beginning;
Containing an area of 2.000 hectares. Bounded on the northeast, by
Road; on the southeast, and southwest by public land; and on the
northwest by Public Land, properties claimed by Hilario Gaudia and
Santos Navarrete. Bearings true. Declination 0131 E. Points referred to
are marked on plan H-176292. Surveyed under authority of sections
12-22 Act No. 2874 and in accordance with existing regulations of the
Bureau of Lands by H.O. Bauman Public Land Surveyor, [in]
December 1912-March 1913. Note: All corners are Conc. Mons.
15x15x60 cm. This is Lot No. 79-A=Lot No. 159 of Bagabag Townsite,
K-27.[9]
Subsequently, TCT No. T-62836 dated June 4, 1985 was issued for the Lantap property
and contained the following description:
Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan H-105520, N. 80 deg. 32 W.,
1150.21 m. from BLLM No. 122, Irrigation project,
thence N. 61 deg. 40E., 200.00 m. to point 2;
thence N. 28 deg. 20E, 100.00 m. to point 3;
thence S. 61 deg. 40E, 200.00 m. to point 4;
thence S. 28 deg. 20W, 100.00 m. to point 1; point of beginning;
containing an area of 2.0000 hectares. Bounded on the northeast,
southeast, and southwest by Public land; and on the northwest by
Road and public land. Bearings true. Declination 0 deg. 31E., points
referred to are marked on plan H-105520. Surveyed under authority of
Section 12-22, Act No. 2874 and in accordance with existing
regulations of the Bureau of Lands, by H.O. Bauman Public Land
Surveyor, [in] Dec. 1912-Mar. 1913 and approved on January 6,
1932. Note: This is Lot No. 119-A Lot No. 225 of Bagabag Townsite K-
27. All corners are B.I. Conc. Mons. 15x60 cm.[10]
Both TCTs describe their respective subjects as located in Bagabag Townsite, K-27, without
any reference to either Barangay Lantap or Barangay Murong.
On February 26, 1985, respondents Espejos bought back one of their lots from RBBI. The
Deed of Sale[11] described the property sold as follows:
x x x do hereby SELL, TRANSFER, and CONVEY, absolutely and
unconditionally x x x that certain parcel of land, situated in the
Municipality of Bagabag, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and more
particularly bounded and described as follows, to wit:
Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan x x x x
Containing an area of 2.000 hectares. Bounded on
the NE., by Road; on the SE., and SW by Public
Land; and on the NW., by Public Land, properties
claimed by Hilario Gaudia and Santos
Navarrete. Bearing true. Declination 013 B. Points
referred to are marked on plan H-176292.
of which the Rural Bank of Bayombong (NV) Inc., is the registered
owner in fee simple in accordance with the Land Registration Act, its
title thereto being evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
62096issued by the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya.
As may be seen from the foregoing, the Deed of Sale did not mention the barangay where
the property was located but mentioned the title of the property (TCT No. T-62096), which
title corresponds to the Murong property. There is no evidence, however, that respondents
took possession of the Murong property, or demanded lease rentals from the petitioners
(who continued to be the tenants of the Murong property), or otherwise exercised acts of
ownership over the Murong property. On the other hand, respondent Nemi (husband of
respondent Elenita and brother-in-law of the other respondents), continued working on the
other property -- the Lantap property -- without any evidence that he ever paid rentals to
RBBI or to any landowner. The Deed of Sale was annotated on TCT No. T-62096 almost
a decade later, on July 1, 1994.[12]
Meanwhile, on June 20, 1990, RBBI, pursuant to Sections 20[13] and 21[14] of Republic Act
(RA) No. 6657,[15] executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of
petitioners Marquez and Dela Cruz, the tenants of the Murong property. Both VLTs
described the subject thereof as an agricultural land located
in Barangay Murong and covered by TCT No. T-62836 (which, however, is the title
corresponding to the Lantap property).[16]
After the petitioners completed the payment of the purchase price of P90,000.00 to RBBI,
the DAR issued the corresponding Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to
petitioners Marquez[17] and Dela Cruz[18] on September 5, 1991. Both CLOAs stated that
their subjects were parcels of agricultural land situated in Barangay Murong.[19] The CLOAs
were registered in the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya on September 5, 1991.
On February 10, 1997 (more than 10 years after the Deed of Sale in favor of the
respondents and almost seven years after the execution of VLTs in favor of the petitioners),
respondents filed a Complaint[20] before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(RARAD) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for the cancellation of petitioners CLOAs, the
deposit of leasehold rentals by petitioners in favor of respondents, and the execution of a
deed of voluntary land transfer by RBBI in favor of respondent Nemi. The complaint was
based on respondents theory that the Murong property, occupied by the petitioners, was
owned by the respondents by virtue of the 1985 buy-back, as documented in the Deed of
Sale. They based their claim on the fact that their Deed of Sale refers to TCT No. 62096,
which pertains to the Murong property.
Petitioners filed their Answer[21] and insisted that they bought the Murong property as
farmer-beneficiaries thereof. They maintained that they have always displayed good faith,
paid lease rentals to RBBI when it became the owner of the Murong property, bought the
same from RBBI upon the honest belief that they were buying the Murong property, and
occupied and exercised acts of ownership over the Murong property. Petitioners also
argued that what respondents Espejos repurchased from RBBI in 1985 was actually the
Lantap property, as evidenced by their continued occupation and possession of the Lantap
property through respondent Nemi.
RBBI answered[22] that it was the Lantap property which was the subject of the buy-back
transaction with respondents Espejos. It denied committing a grave mistake in the
transaction and maintained its good faith in the disposition of its acquired assets in
conformity with the rural banking rules and regulations.
OIC-RARAD Decision[23]
The OIC-RARAD gave precedence to the TCT numbers appearing on the Deed of Sale
and the VLTs. Since TCT No. T-62096 appeared on respondents Deed of Sale and the
said title refers to the Murong property, the OIC-RARAD concluded that the subject of sale
was indeed the Murong property. On the other hand, since the petitioners VLTs referred to
TCT No. T-62836, which corresponds to the Lantap property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that
petitioners CLOAs necessarily refer to the Lantap property. As for the particular description
contained in the VLTs that the subject thereof is the Murong property, the OIC-RARAD ruled
that it was a mere typographical error.
Further, since the VLTs covered the Lantap property and petitioners are not the actual tillers
thereof, the OIC-RARAD declared that they were disqualified to become tenants of the
Lantap property and ordered the cancellation of their CLOAs. It then ordered RBBI to
execute a leasehold contract with the real tenant of the Lantap property, Nemi.
The OIC-RARAD recognized that petitioners only right as the actual tillers of the Murong
property is to remain as the tenants thereof after the execution of leasehold contracts with
and payment of rentals in arrears to respondents.
DARAB Decision[24]
Upon appeal filed by petitioners, the DARAB reversed the OIC-RARAD Decision. It ruled
that in assailing the validity of the CLOAs issued to petitioners as bona fide tenant-farmers,
the burden of proof rests on the respondents. There being no evidence that the DAR field
personnel were remiss in the performance of their official duties when they issued the
corresponding CLOAs in favor of petitioners, the presumption of regular performance of
duty prevails. This conclusion is made more imperative by the respondents admission that
petitioners are the actual tillers of the Murong property, hence qualified beneficiaries thereof.
As for respondents allegation that they bought back the Murong property from RBBI, the
DARAB ruled that they failed to support their allegation with substantial evidence. It gave
more credence to RBBIs claim that respondents repurchased the Lantap property, not the
Murong property. Respondents, as owners of the Lantap property, were ordered to enter
into an agricultural leasehold contract with their brother-in-law Nemi, who is the actual tenant
of the Lantap property.
The DARAB ended its January 17, 2001 Decision in this wise:
We find no basis or justification to question the authenticity and validity
of the CLOAs issued to appellants as they are by operation of law
qualified beneficiaries over the landholdings; there is nothing to quiet as
these titles were awarded in conformity with the CARP program
implementation; and finally, the Board declares that all controverted
claims to or against the subject landholding must be completely and
finally laid to rest.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding reversible errors[,]
the assailed decision is ANNULLED and a new judgment is hereby
rendered, declaring:
1. Appellants Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Dela
Cruz as the bona fide tenant-tillers over the Murong property and
therefore they are the qualified beneficiaries thereof;
2. Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos.
395 and 396 issued in the name of [farmer-beneficiaries] Salun-at
Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz respectively, covered formerly by TCT
No. 62096 (TCT No. 43258) of the Murong property as valid and legal;
3. Ordering the co-[respondents] to firm-up an
agricultural leasehold contract with bona fide tenant-tiller Nemi
Fernandez over the Lantap property, [the latter] being the subject
matter of the buy back arrangement entered into between
[respondents] and Rural Bank of Bayombong, Incorporated, and other
incidental matters are deemed resolved.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In appealing to the CA, the respondents insisted that the DARAB erred in ruling that they
repurchased the Lantap property, while the petitioners were awarded the Murong
property. They were adamant that the title numbers indicated in their respective deeds of
conveyance should control in determining the subjects thereof. Since respondents Deed of
Sale expressed that its subject is the property with TCT No. T-62096, then what was sold
to them was the Murong property. On the other hand, petitioners VLTs and CLOAs say that
they cover the property with TCT No. T-62836; thus it should be understood that they were
awarded the Lantap property. Respondents added that since petitioners are not the actual
tillers of the Lantap property, their CLOAs should be cancelled due to their lack of
qualification.
The CA agreed with the respondents. Using the Best Evidence Rule embodied in Rule 130,
Section 3, the CA held that the Deed of Sale is the best evidence as to its contents,
particularly the description of the land which was the object of the sale. Since the Deed of
Sale expressed that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 the Murong
property then that is the property that the respondents repurchased.
The CA further ruled that as for petitioners VLTs, the same refer to the property with TCT
No. T-62836; thus, the subject of their CLOAs is the Lantap property. The additional
description in the VLTs that the subject thereof is located in Barangay Murong was
considered to be a mere typographical error. The CA ruled that the technical description
contained in the TCT is more accurate in identifying the subject property since the same
particularly describes the properties metes and bounds.
Both the RBBI[26] and petitioners[27] filed their respective motions for reconsideration, which
were separately denied.[28]
On June 22, 2004, RBBI filed a separate Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R.
No. 163320, with this Court.[29] RBBI raised the issue that the CA failed to appreciate that
respondents did not come to court with clean hands because they misled RBBI to believe
at the time of the sale that the two lots were not tenanted. RBBI also asked that they be
declared free from any liability to the parties as it did not enrich itself at anyones
expense. RBBIs petition was dismissed on July 26, 2004 for lack of merit. The said
Resolution reads:
Considering the allegations, issues[,] and arguments adduced in the
petition for review on certiorari, the Court Resolves to DENY the petition
for lack of sufficient showing that the Court of Appeals had committed
any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise
by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case.[30]
Their Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality.[31] Entry of judgment was
made in that case on December 15, 2004.[32]
On July 27, 2005,[33] petitioners filed the instant petition.
Issues
Rephrased and consolidated, the parties present the following issues for the Courts
determination:
I
What is the effect of the final judgment dismissing RBBIs Petition for Review on Certiorari,
which assailed the same CA Decision
II
Whether the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine the subject of the
contracts
III
What are the subject properties of the parties respective contracts with RBBI
Our Ruling
Propriety of the Petition
Respondents maintain that the instant petition for review raises factual issues which are
beyond the province of Rule 45.[34]
The issues involved herein are not entirely factual. Petitioners assail the appellate courts
rejection of their evidence (as to the contractual intent) as inadmissible under the Best
Evidence Rule. The question involving the admissibility of evidence is a legal question that
is within the Courts authority to review.[35]
Besides, even if it were a factual question, the Court is not precluded to review the
same. The rule that a petition for review should raise only questions of law admits of
exceptions, among which are (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on
a misappreciation of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when, in making
its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7)
when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by
the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[36]
In the instant case, we find sufficient basis to apply the exceptions to the general rule
because the appellate court misappreciated the facts of the case through its erroneous
application of the Best Evidence Rule, as will be discussed below. Moreover, the disparate
rulings of the three reviewing bodies below are sufficient for the Court to exercise its
jurisdiction under Rule 45.
First Issue
Dismissal of RBBIs appeal
Respondents maintain that the Courts earlier dismissal of RBBIs petition
for review of the same CA Decision is eloquent proof that there is no reversible error in the
appellate courts decision in favor of the respondents.[37]
We are not persuaded. This Court dismissed RBBIs earlier petition in G.R. No. 163320
because it failed to convincingly demonstrate the alleged errors in the CA Decision. The
bank did not point out the inadequacies and errors in the appellate courts decision but simply
placed the responsibility for the confusion on the respondents for allegedly misleading the
bank as to the identity of the properties and for misrepresenting that the two lots were not
tenanted. Thus, RBBI argued that respondents did not come to court with clean hands.
These arguments were ineffectual in convincing the Court to review the appellate courts
Decision. It is the appellants responsibility to point out the perceived errors in the appealed
decision.When a party merely raises equitable considerations such as the clean hands
doctrine without a clear-cut legal basis and cogent arguments to support his claim, there
should be no surprise if the Court is not swayed to exercise its appellate jurisdiction and the
appeal is dismissed outright. The dismissal of an appeal does not always and necessarily
mean that the appealed decision is correct, for it could simply be the result of the appellants
inadequate discussion, ineffectual arguments, or even procedural lapses.
RBBIs failure to convince the Court of the merits of its appeal should not prejudice petitioners
who were not parties to RBBIs appeal, especially because petitioners duly filed a separate
appeal and were able to articulately and effectively present their arguments. A party cannot
be deprived of his right to appeal an adverse decision just because another party had
already appealed ahead of him,[38] or just because the other partys separate appeal had
already been dismissed.[39]
There is another reason not to bind the petitioners to the final judgment against RBBI. RBBI
executed the transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners prior to the commencement of the
action.Thus, when the action for cancellation of CLOA was filed, RBBI had already divested
itself of its title to the two properties involved. Under the rule on res judicata, a judgment (in
personam) is conclusive only between the parties and their successors-in-interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action.[40] Thus, when the vendor (in this case
RBBI) has already transferred his title to third persons (petitioners), the said transferees are
not bound by any judgment which may be rendered against the vendor.[41]
Second Issue
Is it correct to apply the Best Evidence Rule?
Citing the Best Evidence Rule in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that the Deed of Sale
between respondents and RBBI is the best evidence as to the property that was sold by
RBBI to the respondents. Since the Deed of Sale stated that its subject is the land covered
by TCT No. T-62096 the title for the Murong property then the property repurchased by the
respondents was the Murong property. Likewise, the CA held that since the VLTs between
petitioners and RBBI refer to TCT No. T-62836 the title for the Lantap property then the
property transferred to petitioners was the Lantap property.
Petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in using the best evidence rule to determine
the subject of the Deed of Sale and the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer. They maintain
that the issue in the case is not the contents of the contracts but the intention of the parties
that was not adequately expressed in their contracts. Petitioners then argue that it is the
Parol Evidence Rule that should be applied in order to adequately resolve the dispute.
Indeed, the appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The Best
Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, the
best evidence is the original document itself and no other evidence (such as a reproduction,
photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a general rule. The original is preferred
because it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the document.[42]
In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule because
there is no dispute regarding the contents of the documents. It is admitted by the parties that
the respondents Deed of Sale referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while the
petitioners Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer referred to TCT No. T-62836 as its subject,
which is further described as located in Barangay Murong.
The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents adequately and
correctly express the true intention of the parties. As to the Deed of Sale, petitioners (and
RBBI) maintain that while it refers to TCT No. T-62096, the parties actually intended the sale
of the Lantap property (covered by TCT No. T-62836).
As to the VLTs, respondents contend that the reference to TCT No. T-62836
(corresponding to the Lantap property) reflects the true intention of RBBI and the petitioners,
and the reference to Barangay Murong was a typographical error. On the other hand,
petitioners claim that the reference to Barangay Murong reflects their true intention, while
the reference to TCT No. T-62836 was a mere error. This dispute reflects an intrinsic
ambiguity in the contracts, arising from an apparent failure of the instruments to adequately
express the true intention of the parties. To resolve the ambiguity, resort must be had to
evidence outside of the instruments.
The CA, however, refused to look beyond the literal wording of the documents and rejected
any other evidence that could shed light on the actual intention of the contracting
parties. Though the CA cited the Best Evidence Rule, it appears that what it actually applied
was the Parol Evidence Rule instead, which provides:
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of
such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.[43]
The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party seeks to
contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid agreement or instrument. Thus,
it appears that what the CA actually applied in its assailed Decision when it refused to look
beyond the words of the contracts was the Parol Evidence Rule, not the Best Evidence
Rule. The appellate court gave primacy to the literal terms of the two contracts and refused
to admit any other evidence that would contradict such terms.
However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at bar. In
the first place, respondents are not parties to the VLTs executed between RBBI and
petitioners; they are strangers to the written contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically
provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as between the parties and their
successors-in-interest. The parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at least one of
the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written document in question,
and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the
instrument.[44]
Moreover, the instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, as
provided in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9:
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(1) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or
imperfection in the written agreement;
 (2) The failure of the written agreement to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties
thereto;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the petitioners VLTs suffer from intrinsic ambiguity. The VLTs described the subject
property as covered by TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property), but they also describe the
subject property as being located in Barangay Murong. Even the respondents Deed of Sale
falls under the exception to the Parol Evidence Rule. It refers to TCT No. T-62096 (Murong
property), but RBBI contended that the true intent was to sell the Lantap property. In short,
it was squarely put in issue that the written agreement failed to express the true intent of the
parties.
Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an examination of
the parties respective parol evidence, in order to determine the true intent of the
parties. Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting
parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract,[45] not its wording which is
prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity,
and precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.
In this regard, guidance is provided by the following articles of the Civil Code involving the
interpretation of contracts:
Article 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt
upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations shall control.
If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties,
the latter shall prevail over the former.
Article 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties,
their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally
considered.
Rule 130, Section 13 which provides for the rules on the interpretation of documents is
likewise enlightening:
Section 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. For the proper
construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was
made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to
it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of
those whose language he is to interpret.
Applying the foregoing guiding rules, it is clear that the Deed of Sale was intended to transfer
the Lantap property to the respondents, while the VLTs were intended to convey the
Murong property to the petitioners. This may be seen from the contemporaneous and
subsequent acts of the parties.
Third issue
Determining the intention of the parties
regarding the subjects of their contracts
We are convinced that the subject of the Deed of Sale between RBBI and the respondents
was the Lantap property, and not the Murong property. After the execution in 1985 of the
Deed of Sale, the respondents did not exercise acts of ownership that could show that they
indeed knew and believed that they repurchased the Murong property. They did not take
possession of the Murong property. As admitted by the parties, the Murong property was in
the possession of the petitioners, who occupied and tilled the same without any objection
from the respondents.Moreover, petitioners paid leasehold rentals for using the Murong
property to RBBI, not to the respondents.
Aside from respondents neglect of their alleged ownership rights over the Murong property,
there is one other circumstance that convinces us that what respondents really repurchased
was the Lantap property. Respondent Nemi (husband of respondent Elenita) is the farmer
actually tilling the Lantap property, without turning over the supposed landowners share to
RBBI. This strongly indicates that the respondents considered themselves (and not RBBI)
as the owners of the Lantap property. For if respondents (particularly spouses Elenita and
Nemi) truly believed that RBBI retained ownership of the Lantap property, how come they
never complied with their obligations as supposed tenants of RBBIs land? The factual
circumstances of the case simply do not support the theory propounded by the
respondents.
We are likewise convinced that the subject of the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs)
in favor of petitioners was the Murong property, and not the Lantap property. When the
VLTs were executed in 1990, petitioners were already the tenant-farmers of the Murong
property, and had been paying rentals to RBBI accordingly. It is therefore natural that the
Murong property and no other was the one that they had intended to acquire from RBBI
with the execution of the VLTs. Moreover, after the execution of the VLTs, petitioners
remained in possession of the Murong property, enjoying and tilling it without any opposition
from anybody. Subsequently, after the petitioners completed their payment of the total
purchase price of P90,000.00 to RBBI, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) officials
conducted their investigation of the Murong property which, with the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty, did not reveal any anomaly. Petitioners were
found to be in actual possession of the Murong property and were the qualified beneficiaries
thereof. Thus, the DAR officials issued CLOAs in petitioners favor; and these CLOAs
explicitly refer to the land in Barangay Murong. All this time, petitioners were in possession
of the Murong property, undisturbed by anyone for several long years, until respondents
started the controversy in 1997.
All of these contemporaneous and subsequent actions of RBBI and petitioners support their
position that the subject of their contract (VLTs) is the Murong property, not the Lantap
property.Conversely, there has been no contrary evidence of the parties actuations to
indicate that they intended the sale of the Lantap property. Thus, it appears that the
reference in their VLT to TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property) was due to their honest but
mistaken belief that the said title covers the Murong property. Such a mistake is not
farfetched considering that TCT No. T-62836 only refers to the Municipality of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya, and does not indicate the particular barangay where the property is
located. Moreover, both properties are bounded by a road and public land. Hence, were it
not for the detailed technical description, the titles for the two properties are very similar.
The respondents attempt to discredit petitioners argument that their VLTs were intrinsically
ambiguous and failed to express their true intention by asking why petitioners never filed an
action for the reformation of their contract.[46] A cause of action for the reformation of a
contract only arises when one of the contracting parties manifests an intention, by overt
acts, not to abide by the true agreement of the parties.[47] It seems fairly obvious that
petitioners had no cause to reform their VLTs because the parties thereto (RBBI and
petitioners) never had any dispute as to the interpretation and application thereof. They both
understood the VLTs to cover the Murong property (and not the Lantap property). It was
only much later, when strangers to the contracts argued for a different interpretation, that
the issue became relevant for the first time.

All told, we rule that the Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985 between respondents and
RBBI covers the Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836, while the Deeds of Voluntary
Land Transfer and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and CLOA-396 of the petitioners cover the Murong
property under TCT No. T-62096. In consequence, the CAs ruling against RBBI should not
be executed as such execution would be inconsistent with our ruling herein. Although the
CAs decision had already become final and executory as against RBBI with the dismissal
of RBBIs petition in G.R. No. 163320, our ruling herein in favor of petitioners is a
supervening cause which renders the execution of the CA decision against RBBI unjust and
inequitable.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed October
7, 2003 Decision, as well as the May 11, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 69981 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The January 17, 2001 Decision of
the DARAB Central Office is REINSTATED. The Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985
between respondents and Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. covers the Lantap property
under TCT No. T-62836, while the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer and TCT Nos. CLOA-
395 and CLOA-396 of the petitioners cover the Murong property under TCT No. T-
62096. The Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya is directed to make the necessary
corrections to the titles of the said properties in accordance with this Decision. Costs against
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
 a. dismissing the complaints in two cases;

b. declaring defendants except Salvador Anona and Jose

Lozada as owners and lawful possessors of the land in
G.R. No. L-39972 & L-40300 August 6, 1986 question together with all the improvements thereon;

VICTORIA LECHUGAS, petitioner, c. dismissing the claim for damages of all defendants except
vs. that of Jose Lozada;
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MARINA LOZA, SALVADOR LOZA, ISIDRO
LOZA, CARMELITA LOZA, DAVID LOZA, AMPARO LOZA, ERLINDA LOZA
and ALEJANDRA LOZA, respondents. d. ordering plaintiff to pay defendant Jose Lozada the sum of
P500.00 as attorney's fees and the amount of P300.00 as
litigation expenses; and
A.R. Montemayor for petitioner.
e. ordering plaintiff to pay the costs of both proceedings.
Arturo L. Limoso for private respondents.
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter sustained the
dismissal of the cases. Hence, this petition with the petitioner making the
following assignments of errors:
GUTIERREZ, JR., J:
I
This petition for review invokes the parol evidence rule as it imputes grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the appellate court for admitting and giving credence THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
to the testimony of the vendor regarding the sale of the disputed lot. The CONSIDERING PAROL EVIDENCE OVER THE OBJECTION
testimony is contrary to the contents of the deed of sale executed by the vendor OF THE PETITIONER IN ORDER TO VARY THE SUBJECT
in favor of the petitioner. MATTER OF THE DEED OF DEFINITE SALE (EXHIBIT A)
ALTHOUGH THE LAND THEREIN IS DESCRIBED AND
The petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages against the private DELIMITED BY METES AND BOUNDS AND IdENTIFIED AS
respondents, alleging that the latter by means of force, intimidation, strategy and LOT NO. 5456 OF LAMBUNAO CADASTRE.
stealth, unlawfully entered lots A and B, corresponding to the middle and
northern portion of the property owned by the petitioner known as Lot No. 5456. II
She alleged that they appropriated the produce thereof for themselves, and
refused to surrender the possession of the same despite demands made by the
petitioner. The complaint was dismissed. Petitioner appealed to the then Court of THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. CONSIDERING THE THEORY OF THE DEFENDANTS-
5055. APPELLEES FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL THAT THE
LAND DESCRIBED IN THE DEED OF SALE (EXHIBIT A) IS
LOT NO. 5522 INSTEAD OF LOT NO. 5456 OF THE
While the above appeal was pending, the petitioner instituted another action LAMBUNAO CADASTRE, THEIR ORIGINAL THEORY BEING
before the CFI of Iloilo for recovery and possession of the same property against THAT THE DEED OF SALE (EXHIBIT A) IS NULL AND VOID
the private respondents. AB INITIO BECAUSE LEONCIA LASANGUE CAN NOT SELL
THE LAND IN QUESTION IN 1950 SINCE IT WAS
This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5303. The two cases were tried jointly. ALLEGEDLY SOLD IN 1941 BY HER FATHER EMETERIO
After trial, the court rendered judgment. The dispositive portion of the decision LASANGUE.
states:
III
Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is rendered, to wit:
 THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT CANNOT REFORM THE
DEED OF DEFINITE SALE BY CHANGING ITS SUBJECT
MATTER IN THE ABSENCE OF STRONG, CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE AND ON THE STRENGTH OF
LONG TESTIMONY OF THE VENDOR AND ALTHOUGH NO
DIRECT ACTION FOR REFORMATION WAS FILED IN THE
COURT OF ORIGIN.
A summary of the facts which brought about the controversy is contained in the
findings of the appellate court:
Plaintiff (petitioner) Victoria Lechugas testified that she bought
the land now subject of this litigation from Leoncia Lasangue
as evidenced by a public "Deed of Absolute Sale" which
plaintiff had caused to be registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds; preparatory to the execution of the deed
Exhibit "A", plaintiff had the land segregated from the bigger
portion of 12 hectares owned by Leoncia Lasangue by
contracting a private land surveyor, the Sirilan Surveying
Office, to survey the land on December 3, 1950 and establish
its boundaries, shape, form and area in accordance with the
said plan which was attached to exhibit A as Annex A thereof.
She also states that she caused the declaration of the said
portion of six hectares subject of Exhibit A in her name
beginning the year 1951 under tax declaration No. 7912, paid
taxes on the same land, and has taken possession of the land
through her tenants Jesus Leoncio, Roberta Losarita and
Simeon Guinta, who shared one-half of the produce of the
riceland with her, while she shouldered some of the expenses
in cultivation and seeds, and one-third share in other crops,
like coffee beans, bamboos, coconuts, corn and the like.
xxx xxx xxx
Plaintiff's declaration is corroborated by her tenant Simeon
Guinta who testifies that the land subject of the complaint was
worked on by him 1954 when its former tenant, Roberto
Lazarita, now deceased, left the land. As tenant thereof, he
planted rice, corn peanuts, coffee, and other minor products,
sharing the same with the owner, plaintiff Victoria Lechugas;
that on June 14, 1958, while witness was plowing Lot A
preparatory to rice planting, defendants entered the land and
forced him to stop his work. Salvador Anona and Carmelita
Losa, particularly, told witness that if he (witness) would sign
an affidavit recognizing them as his landlords, they would allow
him to continue plowing the land. On that occasion, Salvador
Anona, David Loza and Jose Loza were carrying unsheathed
bolos, which made this witness very afraid, so much so that he
left the land and reported the matter to Victoria Lechugas who
reportedly went to the Chief of Police of Lambunao to ask the
latter to intervene. The advise however of the chief of police,
who responded to the call of plaintiff, was not heeded by the
defendants who stayed adamantly on Lot A and refused to
surrender the possession thereof to plaintiff appropriating the
harvest to themselves. This witness further declares that on
June 24, 1958, defendants entered Lot B of the land in
question, situated on the northern portion, and cut the bamboo
poles growing thereof counted by plaintiff's brother and
overseer in the land, Bienvenido Laranja, to be 620 bamboo
poles all in all. Despite the warning of the overseer Laranja,
defendants did not stop cutting the bamboos, and they
remained on the land, refusing to leave the same. To top it all,
in June of 1959, defendants, not contended with just occupying
the middle and northern portions of the land (Lots A and B),
grabbed the whole parcel containing six hectares to the
damage and prejudice of herein plaintiff, so that plaintiff was
left with no other recourse but to file Civil Case No. 5303 for
ownership, recovery of possession and damages.
Defendants, on the other hand, maintain that the land which
plaintiff bought from Leoncia Lasangue in 1950 as evidenced
by the deed exhibit A, is different from the land now subject of
this action, and described in paragraph 2 of plaintiff's
complaint. To prove this point, defendants called as their first
witness plaintiff herself (pp. 6167, t.s.n., Tuble), to elicit from
her the reason why it was that although her vendor Leoncia
Lasangue was also residing at the municipality of Lambunao,
Iloilo, plaintiff did not care to call her to the witness stand to
testify regarding the Identity of the land which she (plaintiff)
bought from said vendor Leoncia Lasangue; to which query
witness Lechugas countered that she had tried to call her
vendor, but the latter refused, saying that she (Lasangue) had
already testified in plaintiff's favor in the forcible entry case in
the Justice of the Peace Court. In connection with her
testimony regarding the true Identity of the land plaintiff, as
witness of defendants, stated that before the execution of
Exhibit "A" on December 8, 1950 the lot in question was
surveyed (on December 3, 1950) by the Sirilan Surveyor
Company after due notice to the boundary owners including
Leoncia Lasangue.
Defendant's evidence in chief, as testified to by Carmelita
Lozada (pp. 100-130, t.s.n., Trespeces; pp. 131-192, t.s.n.,
Tuble) shows that on April 6, 1931 Hugo Loza father of
Carmelita Loza and predecessor-in-interest of the rest of the
heirs of herein defendants, (with the exception of Jose Loza
and Salvador Anona) purchased a parcel of land from one
Victorina Limor as evidenced by the deed "Venta Definitiva"
(exhibit 3, pp. 49-50, folder of exhibits). This land, containing
53,327 square meters is bounded on the north by Ramon
Lasangue, on the south by Emeterio Lasangue and covered by
tax declaration No. 7346 (exhibit 3-9, p. 67, Id.) in vendor's
name; that immediately after the sale, Hugo Loza took
possession of the said parcel of land and declared the same in
his name (exhibit 3-10, p. 67, folder of exhibits) starting the
year 1935. On March 17, 1941, Hugo Loza bought from
Emeterio Lasangue a parcel of land with an area of four
hectares more or less, adjoining the land he (Loza) had earlier
bought from Victoria Limor, and which sale was duly evidenced
by a public instrument (exhibit 2, pp. 35-36, folder of exhibits).
This property had the following boundaries, to wit: on the north
by Eladio Luno, on the south, by Simeon Lasangue, on the
west, by Gregorio Militar and Emeterio Lasangue and on the
east, by Maximo Lasangue and Hipolito Lastica (exhibit 2,
exhibit 2-B, p. 37, Id). After the execution of the deed of sale,
Exhibit 2, Hugo Loza cause the transfer of the declaration in
his own name (tax declaration No. 8832, exh. 2-C, p. 38, Id.)
beginning 1945, and started paying the taxes on the land
(exhibits 2-d to 2-i, pp. 39-44, Id.). These two parcels of land
(that purchased by Hugo Loza in 1941 from Emeterio
Lasangue, and a portion of that bought by him from Victoria
Limor sometime in 1931) were consolidated and designated,
during the cadastral survey of Lambunao, Iloilo in 1959 as Lot
No. 5456; while the remaining portion of the lot bought from
Victorina Limor, adjoining Lot 5456 on the east, was
designated as Lot No. 5515 in the name of the Heirs of Hugo
Loza. Defendants claim that the lot bought by plaintiff from
Leoncia Lasangue as evidenced by exhibit A, is situated south
of the land now subject of this action and designated during
cadastral survey of Lambunao as Lot No. 5522, in the name of
Victoria Lechugas.
xxx xxx xxx
Leoncia Lasangue, plaintiff's vendor in exhibit A, testifying for
defendants (pp. 182-115, t.s.n., Tambagan; pp. 69-88, t.s.n.,
Tuble) declared that during his lifetime her father, Emeterio
Lasangue, owned a parcel of land in Lambunao, Iloilo,
containing an area of 36 hectares; that said Emeterio
Lasangue sold a slice of 4 hectares of this property to Hugo
Loza evidenced by a deed of sale (Exh. 2) dated March 17,
1941; that other sales were made to other persons, leaving
only some twelve hectares out of the original 36; that these 12
hectares were transferred by her parents in her (witness)
name, being the only child and heir; that on December 8, 1950,
she (Leoncia Lasangue) sold six hectares of her inherited
property to Victoria Lechugas under a public instrument
(exhibit A) which was prepared at the instance of Victoria
Lechugas and thumbmarked by herself (the vendor).
Refuting plaintiff's contention that the land sold to her is the
very land under question, vendor Leoncia Lasangue testifies
that:
Q. But Victoria Lechugas declared here that,
by means of this document, exhibit 'A', you
sold to her this very land in litigation; while
you declared here now that this land in
litigation was not included in the sale you
made of another parcel of land in her favor.
What do you say about that?
A. I only sold six (6) hectares to her.
Q. And that was included in this land in
litigation?
A. No.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Did you tell her where that land you were
selling to her was situated?
xxx xxx xxx
A. On the South.
Q. South side of what land, of the land in
litigation?
A. The land I sold to her is south of the land
in litigation.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What portion of these thirty-six (36)
hectares of land did you sell actually,
according to your agreement with Victoria
Lechugas, and was it inside the thirty-six
(36) hectares of land or a portion on one of
the sides of thirty-six (36) hectares?
 A. It is on the edge of the whole land.
Q. Where is that edge? on the north, east,
west or south?
A . This edge. (witness indicating the lower
edge of the piece of paper shown into her)
Q. Do you know what is east, that is, the
direction where the sun rises?
A. I know what is east.
Q. Do you know where the sun sets ?
A. The sun sets on the west.
Q. If you are standing in the middle of your
land containing thirty-six (36) hectares and
facing the east, that is, the direction where
the sun rises, where is that portion of land
sold to Victoria Lechugas, on your left, on
your right, front of you or behind you?
A. On my right side. (Witness indicating
south). (Testimony of Leoncia Lasangue, pp.
209-211, rollo) (emphasis supplied).
On the basis of the above findings and the testimony of vendor Leoncia
Lasangue herself, who although illiterate was able to specifically point out the
land which she sold to the petitioner, the appellate court upheld the trial court's
decision except that the deed of sale (Exhibit A) was declared as not null and
void ab initio insofar as Leoncia Lasangue was concerned because it could pass
ownership of the lot in the south known as Lot No. 5522 of the Lambunao
Cadastre which Leoncia Lasangue intended to sell and actually sold to her
vendee, petitioner Victoria Lechugas.
In her first assignment of error, the petitioner contends that the respondent Court
had no legal justification when it subjected the true intent and agreement to parol
evidence over the objection of petitioner and that to impugn a written agreement,
the evidence must be conclusive. Petitioner maintains, moreover, that the
respondent Court relied so much on the testimony of the vendor who did not
even file a case for the reformation of Exhibit A.
The contentions are without merit.
The appellate court acted correctly in upholding the trial court's action in
admitting the testimony of Leoncia Lasangue. The petitioner claims that Leoncia
Lasangue was the vendor of the disputed land. The petitioner denies that
Leoncia Lasangue sold Lot No. 5522 to her. She alleges that this lot was sold to
her by one Leonora Lasangue, who, however, was never presented as witness in
any of the proceedings below by herein petitioner.
As explained by a leading commentator on our Rules of Court, the parol
evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to
the litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not
party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base
a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the
relation established thereby. (Francisco on Evidence, Vol. VII, part I of the Rules
of Court, p. 155 citing 32 C.J.S. 79.)
In Horn v. Hansen (57 N.W. 315), the court ruled:
...and the rule therefore applies, that as between parties to a
written agreement, or their privies, parol evidence cannot be
received to contradict or vary its terms. Strangers to a contract
are, of course, not bound by it, and the rule excluding extrinsic
evidence in the construction of writings is inapplicable in such
cases; and it is relaxed where either one of the parties
between whom the question arises is a stranger to the written
agreement, and does not claim under or through one who is
party to it. In such case the rule is binding upon neither. ...
In the case of Camacho v. Municipality of Baliuag, 28 Phil. 466, this Court held
that parol evidence which was introduced by the municipality was competent to
defeat the terms of the plaintiff's deed which the latter executed with the Insular
Government. In his concurring opinion, Justice Moreland stated:
It should be noted in the first place, that there is no written
instrument between the plaintiff and the municipality, that is,
between the parties to the action; and there is, therefore, no
possibility of the question arising as to the admissibility of parol
evidence to vary or contradict the terms of an instrument. The
written instrument that is, the conveyance on which plaintiff
bases his action was between the Insular Government and the
plaintiff, and not between the municipality and the plaintiff; and
therefore, there can arise, as between the plaintiff and
defendant no question relative to the varying or contradicting
the terms of a written instrument between them ...
The petitioner's reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. The rule is not
applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to the document
and third persons. The deed of sale was executed by Leoncia Lasangue in favor
of Victoria Lechugas. The dispute over what was actually sold is between
petitioner and the private respondents. In the case at bar, through the testimony
of Leoncia Lasangue, it was shown that what she really intended to sell and to be
the subject of Exhibit A was Lot No. 5522 but not being able to read and write
and fully relying on the good faith of her first cousin, the petitioner, she just
placed her thumbmark on a piece of paper which petitioner told her was the
document evidencing the sale of land. The deed of sale described the disputed
lot instead.
This fact was clearly shown in Lasangue's testimony:
Q. And how did you know that that was the
description of the land that you wanted to
sell to Victoria Lechugas?
R. I know that because that land came from
me.
S. But how were you able to read the
description or do you know the description?
A. Because, since I do not know how to read
and write and after the document was
prepared, she made me sign it. So I just
signed because I do not know how to read.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What explanation did she make to you?
A. She said to me, 'Manang, let us have a
document prepared for you to sign on the
land you sold to me.' So, after the document
was prepared, I signed.
Q. Did you tell her where that land you were
selling to her was situated?
xxx xxx xxx
A. On the South.
Q. South side of what land, of the land in
litigation?
A. The land I sold to her is south of the land
in litigation.
Q. Did you tell her that before preparing the
document you signed?
A. Yes, I told her so because I had
confidence in her because she is my first
cousin. (pp. 198-207, rollo)
From the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion but that Lasangue did not
intend to sell as she could not have sold, a piece of land already sold by her
father to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents.
The fact that vendor Lasangue did not bring an action for the reformation of
Exhibit "A" is of no moment. The undisputed fact is that the respondents have
timely questioned the validity of the instrument and have proven that, indeed
Exhibit "A" does not reflect the true intention of the vendor.
There is likewise no merit in the contention of the petitioner that the respondents
changed their theory on appeal.
Respondents, from the very start, had questioned and denied Leoncia
Lasangue's capacity to sell the disputed lot to petitioner. It was their contention
that the lot was sold by Leoncia's father Emeterio Lasangue to their father, Hugo
Loza wayback in 1941 while the alleged sale by Leoncia to the petitioner took
place only in 1950. In essence, therefore, the respondents were already
attacking the validity of Exhibit "A". Moreover, although the prior sale of the lot to
their father may have been emphasized in their defenses in the civil cases filed
against them by the petitioner in the lower court, nevertheless in their affirmative
defense, the respondents already raised doubt on the true intention of Leoncia
Lasangue in signing Exhibit "A" when they alleged that..." Leoncia Lasangue,
publicly, and in writing repudiated said allegation and pretension of the plaintiff, to
the effect that the parcel of land now in litigation in the present case "WAS NOT
INCLUDED in the sale she executed in favor of the plaintiff ... .
Consequently, petitioner cannot impute grave abuse on the part of the appellate
court and state that it allowed a change of theory by the respondents for the first
time on appeal for in reality, there was no such change.
The third issue raised by the petitioner has no merit. There is strong, clear, and
convincing evidence as to which lot was actually sold to her. We see no reason
to reverse the factual findings of both the Court of First Instance and the Court of
Appeals on this point. The "reformation" which the petitioner questions was, in
fact, intended to favor her. Instead of declaring the deed of sale null and void for
all purposes, the Court upheld its having passed ownership of Lot No. 5522 to
the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit with costs against the petitioner.
G.R. No. L-10100 August 15, 1916
GALO ABRENICA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANUEL GONDA and MARCELO DE GARCIA, defendants-appellees.
Marcelo Caringal for appellants.
Ramon Diokno for appellee.
ARAULLO, J.:
These proceedings were brought by the plaintiff to compel the defendant to
return to him the two parcels of land described in the complaint which he alleges
were sold by him under right of repurchase to the defendant on February 21,
1916, for the sum of P75 and for the period of seven years. The plaintiff alleged
that the defendant refused to deliver said property to him when, upon the
expiration of the period mentioned, he endeavored to redeem the same and
tendered payment to the defendant of the sum aforesaid.
The first of the defendants, Manuel Gonda (who had already sold said parcels to
the other defendant Marcelino de Gracia, for which reason the latter was also
made a party defendant) alleged that about 19 years ago he was the sole
possessor and owner of said parcels, and in the course of the trial endeavored to
prove that they had been sold to him by the plaintiff and his mother.
The issue presented by the pleadings, therefore, is whether said two parcels of
land were sold under right of repurchase by the plaintiff to the defendant for the
period of seven years, for the sum of P75, or whether they were conveyed to the
defendant in absolute sale by the plaintiff's parents.
The justice of the peace of the provincial capital, who tried the case by
assignment of the judge of the Court of First Instance of the same province,
heard the evidence introduced by the parties and after making a sufficiently clear
summary of and duly considering the same, reached the conclusion that the
proofs introduced by the plaintiff were entitled to the greater credit and, on the
grounds that the plaintiff had not yet lost his right to recover the lands from the
defendant Gonda and that the sale made by this defendant to the other
defendant De Gracia, supposing it to be genuine, could have no legal effect as
Gonda was not the true owner of the land, entered judgment in behalf of the
plaintiff and against the two defendants whereby he ordered each and both of
them to return and deliver to the plaintiff the parcels of land claimed by him, after
payment to Gonda of the sum of P75 that had been deposited with the clerk of
the court, and assessed the costs against the defendants in equal shares. The
court made no finding in regard to the damages demanded by the plaintiff as
there was no evidence to show that any had been caused. The defendants
moved for a new trial. Their motion having been overruled, they excepted to the
ruling and, by proper bill of exceptions, appealed to the Supreme Court. In this
instance the appellants allege in the first place that the trial judge erred in holding
that he had jurisdiction to try the case, and in trying the same in spite of the fact
that the Act which authorizes justices of the peace to try by assignment cases
filed with the Court of First Instance is unconstitutional.
Before the hearing in first instance, counsel for the defendant did in fact
challenge the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace of the provincial capital to try
the case at bar, on the ground that Act No. 2041 of the Philippine Legislature is
unconstitutional. In deciding this question, said justice of the peace held that he
did have jurisdiction and immediately proceeded to enter judgment in the manner
aforestated.
This Supreme Court has held on various occasions, among them in the decision
rendered on December 24, 1914, in the case of Calampiano vs. Tolentino (29
Phil. Rep., 116) that said Act No. 2041 is valid and does not conflict with the
provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902; that a justice of the peace,
acting under the designation under the law just referred to, acts not as a justice
of the peace or holds a justice's court, but acts as a judge of the zone of first
instance and holds, in effect, a Court of First Instance; and finally, that for this
reason the objection that this case falls within that of Barrameda vs. Moir, 25
Phil. Rep., 44 (which is the one cited by the appellants in their brief to show that
the error aforementioned was incurred), is not well taken. This assignment of
error cannot, therefore, be sustained.
The second error assigned by the appellants to the judgment of the trial court
consists, as they maintain, in that the court founded its judgment on inadmissible
and illegal evidence which was rejected by the same court during the course of
the trial.
In effect, the plaintiff ought to have proven that on February 21, 1906, he sold,
under right of repurchase for the period of seven years, the two parcels of land
mentioned in the complaint, or, what amounts to the same thing, that a contract
of sale with right of repurchase (or one of pledge or mortgage, as it was
improperly called in the complaint and so termed by the plaintiff) was entered into
between this latter and the defendant, on the date aforementioned, in respect to
said parcels of land.
The plaintiff, testifying at the trial in regard to the existence of the contract, stated
that it was a verbal one between himself and said defendant. Assuredly such a
contract could not be proven a trial, except by means of some written instrument
in accordance with the provisions of subsections 1 and 5, section 335, of the
Code of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff, however, having been placed on the stand
as a witness by his on attorney, testified at length and answered all the questions
asked him with respect to the said contract, the details of the same, the persons
who witnessed it, the place where it was made, and various other circumstances
connected with its execution. These questions and answers cover six pages of A. Yes, sir.
the record, and yet the defendants' counsel raised no objection to the
examination, aside from challenging one of the questions as leading and another Q. Who paid the land tax before the lands were pledged? —
of them as irrelevant. It seems that only when the examination was terminated
did counsel for defendants move to strike out all of the testimony given and
statements made by plaintiff in regard to the contract, on the ground that the A. I could not declare them before they were pledged. I have not yet
period for the fulfillment of the contract exceeded one year and that it could not paid the land tax, because I have not been able to declare those lands.
be proven except by means of a written instrument. The court sustained this
motion, to which an exception was entered by the plaintiff. xxx xxx xxx

Defendants' counsel moved that the case be dismissed on the ground that, as Q. Tell us where Manuel Gonda was living on the date when, as you
the aforementioned testimony was stricken out, there was no proof of the said, the pledge was made. —
contract. This motion being denied by the court, counsel excepted to the ruling
and on cross-examination put several question to the plaintiff relative to the A. In the barrio of Moson.
plaintiff's ownership in said parcels of land and the manner in which he acquired
it. Among these questions some were asked which bore upon the answers given
by the plaintiff on direct examination regarding the existence of the contract by Q. Of Taal or Bauan? —
which, according to the plaintiff, the defendant Gonda came to hold said parcels.
These questions on cross-examination and their respective answers are as A. Bauan.
follows:
Q. What is the distance between the then domicile or residence of
CARINGAL: (To the plaintiff). Prior to the day on which the defendant Manuel Gonda and the house of Domingo Tamayo in which you were
Manuel Gonda went to see you or to visit you in the house of Domingo living? —
Tamayo, you had not spoken to him with regard to the pledge of some
land of yours, had you? —
A. I think it is the same as between Bauan and Taal.

A. No, sir.
Q. And notwithstanding that distance, Manuel Gonda went
purposely to take the money to you? —
Q. Did you then take advantage of that circumstance of his having
gone to visit you? —
A. He took the money to the house of Domingo Tamayo.

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was there no written contract of that mortgage? —

Q. You knew then that he was married, did you not? —

A. No, sir.

A. Yes, sir.
That is all.

Q. Did you not think of necessary to speak to Manuel Gonda's wife

Continuing to present evidence, the plaintiff put three witnesses on the stand and
about the mortgage? —
they were examined.

A. No, sir, because I considered him as an uncle of mine.

One of them, Juan Carandang, testified in regard to the plaintiff's ownership and
possession of the lands. The court sustained a motion by defendants' counsel to
xxx xxx xxx strike out one of the statements made by this witness in which he stated that he
knew by hearsay that said lands had been "pledged" (sic).
CARINGAL: So that you knew, did you, that it was Manuel Gonda who
paid the land tax? —
Another of these witnesses, Domingo Tamayo, testified that he was present at
the time the plaintiff asked the defendant for the P75 mentioned in the complaint,
and when the agreement was made with regard thereto between the two men in
connection with the so-called pledge of the lands in question. He also testified
that he received that sum from the defendant, at the plaintiff's suggestion.
And, finally, the third witness, Pedro Mendoza, also the plaintiff's, testified that he
was present when the money was tendered by the defendant to the plaintiff, and
heard the latter tell the witness Domingo Tamayo to receive it. He stated that
Tamayo did in fact take the money.
In the course of the examination of these witnesses, the defendants' counsel
moved that their testimony be stricken out. The court sustained one of these
motions, while as to the rest of them be said that counsel's motion would be
taken under consideration; later, when one of these witnesses, replying to a
question by the court, stated that the contract was not executed in writing, the
court said that the motion was sustained, but, notwithstanding this ruling, and
immediately after it had been made, the defendants' counsel put the following
question to this witness on cross-examination:
Q. Do you remember positively that it was on a Sunday the first
time, and on a Tuesday or a Wednesday the second time, that Manuel
Gonda went to your house and delivered the money? —
A. Yes, sir.
The court finally granted the motion of counsel for defendants for strike out the
testimony given by this witness. Counsel for plaintiff excepted to this ruling.
Now then, it has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or
objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper
time, and that if not so made it will be understood to have been waived. The
proper time to make a protest or objection is when, from the question addressed
to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation of the proof,
the inadmissiblity of the evidence is, or may be, inferred.
A motion to strike out parol or documentary evidence from the record is useless
and ineffective if made without timely protest, objection, or opposition on the part
of the party against whom it was presented.
Objection to the introduction of evidence should be made before the
question is answered. When no such objection is made, a motion to
strike out the answer ordinarily comes too late. (De Dios Chua Soco vs.
Veloso, 2 Phil. Rep., 658).
In the case of Conlu vs. Araneta and Guanko (15 Phil. Rep., 387) in which one of
the points discussed was the inadmissibility of parol evidence to prove contracts
involving real property, in accordance with the provisions of section 335 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, no objection having been made to such evidence, this
court said:
A failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform with the
statute, is a waiver of the provisions of the law.
An objection to a question put to a witness must be made at the time
question is asked. (Kreigh vs. Sherman, 105 Ill., 49; 46 Am. Dig.,
Century Ed., 932.)
Objections to evidence and the reason therefor must be stated in apt time."
(Kidder vs. McIlhenny, 81 N. C., 123; 46 Am. Dig., Century Ed., 933.)
It is held in general that by failing to object to the proof of an oral
contract a party waives the benefit of the statute and cannot afterward
claim it. (20 Cyc., 320, where several decisions on the subject are
cited.)
Many rulings have been made in regard to this matter by the courts of the United
States, and among them we cite a few found in volume 46 of the American
Digest, page 933:
Where plaintiff without objection proved by parol evidence that certain
land belonged to him, defendant cannot afterwards object that the deed
should have been produced. (Clay vs. Boyer, 10 Ill. [5 Gilman], 506.)
After a question has been repeatedly asked and answered without
objection, it is too late to object to its repetition on the ground that the
answer is in itself inadmissible. (McKee vs. Nelson, 4 Cow., 355; 15 Am.
Dec., 384.)
An objection to the admission of evidence on the ground of
incompetency, taken after the testimony has been given, is too late. (In
re Morgan, 104 N. Y., 74; 9 N. E., 861.)
Plaintiff having testified to conversation between defendant's son and
himself until the direct examination extended through about 12 folios,
defendant could not sit by and then objet to the "foregoing testimony."
(Boehme vs. Michael, 5 N. Y. St. Rep., 492.)
The first witness to testify at the trial was the plaintiff himself. From the first
question put to him, it clearly appeared, as may be seen in folios 5, 6, and 7 of
the stenographic notes, that the contract of pledge or mortgage of the lands, as
the plaintiff himself improperly calls it, or the sale of said lands with right of
repurchase, between him and the defendant Gonda, was a verbal one and for
the period of seven years, made in the course of a conversation between the
plaintiff and said defendant in the house of Domingo Tamayo. The defendants'
counsel, however, did not endeavor immediately to obtain from the witness a
statement as to whether that contract was set forth in any instrument; he did not
object to the witness' continuing to testify in regard to the contract, nor did he in
any way object to the questions they continued to ask the witness concerning the
matter, though he did object to one question as leading and to another one as
irrelevant, thus indicating that he had no other objection to make to those
questions. Only after witness, the plaintiff, had finished answering all the
questions put to him on the subject of the contract, did counsel for the
defendants move that all of his testimony and statements be stricken out. It is
obvious that the court should not have granted that motion; but we must also
bear in mind that the court did not grant other similar and subsequent motions
made during the examination of the other witnesses; he merely said that he
would take them under advisement. The fact that the defendants' counsel asked
various cross-questions, both of the plaintiff and of the other witness, in
connection with the answers given by them in their direct examination, with
respect to particulars concerning the contract, implies a waiver on his part to
have the evidence stricken out.
It is true that, before cross-examining the plaintiff and one of the witnesses, this
same counsel requested the permission of the court, and stipulated that his
clients' rights should not be prejudiced by the answers to those witnesses in view
of the motion presented to strike out their testimony; buy this stipulation of the
defendants' counsel has no value or importance whatever, because, if the
answers of those witnesses were stricken out, the cross-examination could have
no object whatsoever, and if the questions were put to the witnesses and
answered by them, they could only be taken into account by connecting them
with the answers given by those witnesses on direct examination.
As no timely objection or protest was made to the admission of the testimony of
the plaintiff with respect to the contract; and as the motion to strike out said
evidence came to late; and, furthermore, as the defendants themselves, by the
cross-questions put by their counsel for the witnesses in respect to said contract,
tacitly waived their right to have it stricken out, that evidence, therefore, cannot
be considered either inadmissible or illegal, and court, far from having erred in
taking it into consideration and basing his judgment thereon, notwithstanding the
fact that it was ordered to be stricken out during the trial, merely corrected the
error he committed in ordering it to be so stricken out and complied with the rules
of procedure hereinbefore cited.
The lower court was guided by the evidence in making that finding, for it was
proved that the plaintiff sold to the defendant Gonda for the period of seven
years, with right of repurchase, the two aforementioned parcels of land, on
February 21, 1906, for the sum of P75, Philippine currency. The testimony of the
plaintiff himself and of the witnesses Juan Carandang, Domingo Tamayo, and
Pedro Mendoza, of which mentioned is made in the judgment, proves those
facts. As against this testimony, the defendants presented that of one of
themselves, Manuel Gonda, who stated that said two parcels of land were sold to
him outright by the plaintiff Galo Abrenica and his mother, Mamerta Bonio, more
than 19 years ago, for the sum of P75; but this allegation was in no matter
proven, for, having stated that an instrument of sale was executed but that it had
been lost, he furnished absolutely no proof of the existence of the instrument, nor
of any such sale having been made between himself and the plaintiff. This
defendant did, indeed, exhibit a copy of the affidavit filed by him on May 26,
1906, in the municipality of Taal, for the purpose of the assessment of a piece of
land which he says included the two parcels in question; but the plaintiff has
explained why the tax declaration of said parcels was not made by him, but by
the defendant Gonda. It is easily understood that the latter might have made this
declaration on May 26, 1906, that is, three months after the land had been sold
to him by the plaintiff under right of repurchase, inasmuch as said defendant had
been the owner of said parcels since the month of February of the same year
and, by reason of said sale, was to be their owner for seven years, so long as the
plaintiff did not make use of his right to redeem them. On the other hand, the very
fact that the defendant Gonda did not declare these parcels of land before May
26, 1906, is proof that he did not purchase them outright from the plaintiff and the
latter's mother 19 years ago.
As the plaintiff made use of his right to recover the property within the period
stipulated by the contract and which did not exceed ten years, and as he
deposited with the clerk of the court the sum of P75, the price of the purchase, in
due time, the defendant is not entitled to oppose the recovery, and the said
parcels of land must be delivered to the plaintiff, even though they be in the
possession of the other defendant, Marcelino de Garcia, to whom they were sold
by his codefendant Gonda, for the latter could not sell them to De Gracia except
under the condition that they could be repurchased by the plaintiff within the said
period of seven years. Even still less right could the defendant De Gracia have to
retain possession of these lands, if the contract executed between the plaintiff
and Manuel Gonda had been one of mortgage (as it was styled all along by the
plaintiff and the defendants at the trial and by the lower court himself in the
judgment appealed from) for, as the defendant Gonda was not the owner of the
lands, he could not lawfully convey them to his codefendant.
There being no proof that any damages was caused to the plaintiff by the
defendants' refusal to return said parcels of land to him, no finding should be
made against the defendants with respect thereto.
We therefore affirm the judgment appealed from, with the costs of this instance
against the appellants. So ordered.

[G.R. No. 107372. January 23, 1997]
RAFAEL S. ORTAEZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, OSCAR
INOCENTES, AND ASUNCION LLANES INOCENTES, respondents.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
On September 30, 1982, private respondents sold to petitioner two (2)
parcels of registered land in Quezon City for a consideration of P35,000.00
and P20,000.00, respectively. The first deed of absolute sale covering Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 258628 provides in part:
"That for and in consideration of the sum of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND (P35,000.00)
PESOS, receipt of which in full is hereby acknowledged, we have sold, transferred and
conveyed, as we hereby sell, transfer and convey, that subdivided portion of the property
covered by TCT No. 258628 known as Lot No. 684-G-1-B-2 in favor of RAFAEL S.
ORTANEZ, of legal age, Filipino. whose marriage is under a regime of complete
separation of property, and a resident of 942 Aurora Blvd., Quezon City, his heirs or
assigns."[1]
while the second deed of absolute sale covering TCT No. 243273 provides:
"That for and in consideration of the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00)
PESOS receipt of which in full is hereby acknowledged, we have sold, transferred and
conveyed, as we hereby sell, transfer and convey, that consolidated-subdivided portion of
the property covered by TCT No. 243273 known as Lot No. 5 in favor of RAFAEL S.
ORTANEZ, of legal age, Filipino, whose marriage is under a regime of complete
separation of property, and a resident of 942 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City his heirs
or assigns.[2]
Private respondents received the payments for the above-mentioned lots, but
failed to deliver the titles to petitioner. On April 9, 1990 the latter demanded from
the former the delivery of said titles.[3] Private respondents, however, refused on
the ground that the title of the first lot is in the possession of another person, [4] and
petitioner's acquisition of the title of the other lot is subject to certain conditions.
Offshoot, petitioner sued private respondents for specific performance before
the RTC. In their answer with counterclaim private respondents merely alleged the
existence of the following oral conditions[5] which were never reflected in the deeds
of sale:[6]
"3.3.2 Title to the other property (TCT No. 243273) remains with the defendants (private
respondents) until plaintiff (petitioner) shows proof that all the following requirements
have been met:
(i) Plaintiff will cause the segregation of his right of way amounting to 398 sq. m.;
(ii) Plaintiff will submit to the defendants the approved plan for the segregation;
(iii) Plaintiff will put up a strong wall between his property and that of defendants' lot to
segregate his right of way;
(iv) Plaintiff will pay the capital gains tax and all other expenses that may be incurred by
reason of sale. x x x."
During trial, private respondent Oscar Inocentes, a former judge, orally
testified that the sale was subject to the above conditions, [7] although such
conditions were not incorporated in the deeds of sale. Despite petitioner's timely
objections on the ground that the introduction of said oral conditions was barred
by the parol evidence rule, the lower court nonetheless, admitted them and
eventually dismissed the complaint as well as the counterclaim. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the court a quo. Hence, this petition.
We are tasked to resolve the issue on the admissibility of parol evidence to
establish the alleged oral conditions-precedent to a contract of sale, when the
deeds of sale are silent on such conditions.
The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First, private
respondents' oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who
has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human
memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence.[8] Spoken words
could be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform
language.[9] Thus, under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 [10] of the Rules
of Court, when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case,
it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms
can be admitted other than the contents thereof.[11] Considering that the written
deeds of sale were the only repository of the truth, whatever is not found in said
instruments must have been waived and abandoned by the parties. [12] Examining
the deeds of sale, we cannot even make an inference that the sale was subject to
any condition. As a contract, it is the law between the parties.[13]
Secondly, to buttress their argument, private respondents rely on the case of
Land Settlement Development, Co. vs. Garcia Plantation[14] where the Court ruled
that a condition precedent to a contract may be established by parol evidence.
However, the material facts of that case are different from this case. In the former,
the contract sought to be enforced [15]expressly stated that it is subject to an
agreement containing the conditions-precedent which were proven through parol
evidence. Whereas, the deeds of sale in this case, made no reference to any pre-
conditions or other agreement. In fact, the sale is denominated as absolute in its
own terms.
Third, the parol evidence herein sought to be introduced would vary,
contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument, [16] hence, contrary to the
rule that:
The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to x x x the terms of a written instrument by
testimony purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the document, other or
different terms were orally agreed upon by the parties.[17]
have incorporated important stipulations that the transfer of title to said lots were
conditional.[26]
One last thing, assuming arguendo that the parol evidence is admissible, it
should nonetheless be disbelieved as no other evidence appears from the record
to sustain the existence of the alleged conditions. Not even the other seller,
Asuncion Inocentes, was presented to testify on such conditions.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is REVERSED and the records of
this case REMANDED to the trial court for proper disposition in accordance with
this ruling.
SO ORDERED.

Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, "it

cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing unless
there has been fraud or mistake." [18] No such fraud or mistake exists in this case.
Fourth, we disagree with private respondents' argument that their parol
evidence is admissible under the exceptions provided by the Rules, specifically,
the alleged failure of the agreement to express the true intent of the parties. Such
exception obtains only in the following instance:

"[W]here the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual
intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In
such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the
parties to each other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they
entered into the contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper
interpretation of the instrument." [19]

In this case, the deeds of sale are clear, without any ambiguity, mistake or
imperfection, much less obscurity or doubt in the terms thereof.
Fifth, we are not persuaded by private respondents contention that they "put
in issue by the pleadings" the failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent of the parties. Record shows[20] that private respondents did
not expressly plead that the deeds of sale were incomplete or that it did not reflect
the intention[21] of the buyer (petitioner) and the seller (private respondents). Such
issue must be "squarely presented."[22] Private respondents merely alleged that
the sale was subject to four (4) conditions which they tried to prove during trial by
parol evidence.[23] Obviously, this cannot be done, because they did not plead any
of the exceptions mentioned in the parol evidence rule. [24] Their case is covered by
the general rule that the contents of the writing are the only repository of the terms
of the agreement. Considering that private respondent Oscar Inocentes is a lawyer
(and former judge) he was "supposed to be steeped in legal knowledge and
practices" and was "expected to know the consequences" [25] of his signing a deed
of absolute sale. Had he given an iota's attention to scrutinize the deeds, he would

G.R. No. 180314 April 16, 2009
NORMALLAH A. PACASUM, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the
Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 27483 promulgated on 7 August
2007 which found petitioner Normallah A. Pacasum guilty of Falsification under Article
171, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, and its Resolution 2 dated 22 October
2007 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for New
Trial/Reception of Newly Discovered Evidence.
On 2 May 2002, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with Falsification
of Public Documents, defined and punished under paragraph 1 of Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about August 22-23, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto in
Cotabato City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused NORMALLAH A. PACASUM, a high ranking public official being the
Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City, while in the performance of her official functions,
committing the offense in relation thereto, taking advantage of her official position, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsified her Employee
Clearance3 submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, by imitating the signature of Laura Y. Pangilan, the
Supply officer I of the DOT-ARMM, for the purpose of claiming her salary for the
months of August and September 2000.4
On 29 May 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking that she be given
the opportunity to file her counter-affidavit during a preliminary investigation in order
that her right to due process would not be violated.5Petitioner further filed an Urgent
Motion for Preliminary Investigation and/or Reinvestigation with a Prayer to Recall or
Defer Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.6
On 4 May 2004, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for preliminary
investigation/reinvestigation decreeing that petitioner was not deprived of the
opportunity to be heard before the Office of the Ombudsman as she had waived her
right to be heard on preliminary investigation. 7
On 16 June 2004, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged.8 Thereafter, pre-trial conference was held and the Sandiganbayan
issued a Pre-Trial Order.9 The parties did not enter any admission or stipulation of
facts, and agreed that the issues to be resolved were as follows:
1. Whether or not accused Normallah Pacasum, being then the Regional
Secretary of the Department of Tourism in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City, falsified her Employee Clearance, which
she submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor of the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, by imitating the signature of Laura Y. Pangilan,
the Supply Officer I of the DOT-ARMM, for purposes of claiming her salary
for the months of August and September 2000;
2. Whether or not the accused took advantage of her official position in order
to commit the crime charged.10
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: Subaida K. Pangilan, 11 former
Human Resource Management Officer V of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM); Laura Y. Pangilan, former Supply Officer of the Department of
Tourism, ARMM;12 and Rebecca A. Agatep,13 Telegraph Operator, Telegraph Office,
Quezon City.
Subaida K. Pangilan (Pangilan) testified that she was a retired government employee
and formerly a Human Resource Management Officer V of the ARMM which position
she held from May 1993 to 28 May 2003. As such, one of her duties was to receive
applications for clearance of Regional Secretaries of the ARMM. She explained that
an Employees Clearance was a requirement to be submitted to the Office of the
Regional Director by retiring employees, employees leaving the country or those
applying for leave in excess of thirty days. The person applying for clearance shall get
a copy of the employees clearance and shall accomplish the same by having the
different division heads sign it.
Mrs. Pangilan disclosed that she knew the accused-petitioner – Norma Pacasum – to
be the former Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism (DOT), ARMM. She
narrated that in the year 2000, petitioner submitted the original of an Employees
Clearance to her office in compliance with the memorandum 14 dated 8 August 2000
issued by Governor Nur Misuari, directing all officers and employees to clear
themselves of property and money accountabilities before their salaries for August
and September 2000 would be paid. Upon inspection of the Employees Clearance,
she noticed that the signature of Laura Pangilan (Laura) contained in said document
was not hers. She said Laura Pangilan was her daughter-in-law, and that the latter’s
signature was very familiar to her. Mrs. Pangilan immediately photocopied15 the
original Employees Clearance with the intention of sending the same to her daughter-
in-law for the purpose of having the latter confirm if the signature on top of her name
in the Employees Clearance was hers. There being no messenger available, she
instead called up Laura to come to her office to verify the signature. Laura, whose
office was only a walking distance away, came and inspected the clearance, and
denied signing the same. After she denied that she signed the clearance, and while
they were conversing, the bearer of the Employees Clearance took said document
and left.
Mrs. Pangilan said she did not know the name of the person who took the original of
the Employee Clearance, but said that the latter was a niece and staff member of the
petitioner. She said that all the signatures 16 appearing in the Employees Clearance
were all genuine except for Laura’s signature.
The next witness for the prosecution was Laura Y. Pangilan, the person whose
signature was allegedly imitated. Laura testified that presently she was holding the
position of Human Resource Management Officer II of the Department of Tourism -
ARMM. Prior to said position, she was the Supply Officer of the DOT - ARMM from
1994 to January 2001. As such, she issued memorandum receipts (MR) to employees
who were issued government property, and received surrendered office properties
from officers and employees of the DOT - ARMM. She said she knew the accused, as
she was their Regional Secretary of the DOT - ARMM.
Laura recounted that on 9 August 2002, Marie Cris 17 Batuampar, an officemate and
niece of petitioner Pacasum, went to her house with the Employees Clearance of
petitioner. Batuampar requested her to sign in order to clear petitioner of all property
accountabilities. She refused to sign the clearance because at that time, petitioner
had not yet turned over all the office properties issued to her. A few days later, she
was called by her mother-in-law to go to the latter’s office and inspect the Employees
Clearance submitted by the representative of petitioner. She went to her mother-in-
law’s office and was shown the Employees Clearance of petitioner. Upon seeing the
same, she denied the signature18 appearing on top of her name. Thereupon, Marie
Cris Batuampar, the representative of petitioner, took the Employees Clearance and
left.
Laura revealed she executed a joint complaint-affidavit19 dated 28 August 2001
regarding the instant case. She issued a certification20 with a memorandum
receipt21 dated 23 November 1999, signed22 by petitioner. The certification attested
she did not sign petitioner’s Employees Clearance because all the office properties
issued to petitioner had not been turned over or returned to the Supply Officer of the
DOT - ARMM. Finally, she said that as of 2 January 2005, her last day as Supply
Officer, petitioner had not returned anything.
The last witness for the prosecution, Rebecca A. Agatep, Telegraph Operator,
Telegraph Office, Quezon City, testified that she had been a telegraph operator for
nineteen years. On 31 May 2005, she was at the Telegraph Office in Commission on
Audit, Quezon City. She received two telegrams 23 for transmissions both dated 31
May 2005. One was addressed to petitioner and the other to Marie Cris Batuampar.
Upon receiving said documents, she transmitted the documents through telegram.
The telegram addressed to petitioner was received by her relative, Manso Alonto, in
her residence on 1 June 2005, while that addressed to Ms. Batuampar was
transmitted to, and received in, Cotabato City on 1 June 2005. 24
On 4 July 2005, the prosecution formally offered25 its documentary evidence
consisting of Exhibits A, A-1, A-1-a, A-2, A-2-a, A-2-b, A-2-c, A-2-d, A-2-e, A-2-f, A-2-
g, A-3, A-3-1, A-4, A-4-a, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, and A-9, to which the accused filed her
objections.26 The trial court admitted all the exhibits on 10 August 2005. 27
For the defense, petitioner and Atty. Jose I. Lorena, former ARMM Regional Solicitor
General, took the stand.
For her defense, petitioner testified that she was appointed by ARMM Regional
Governor Nur Misuari (Gov. Misuari) as Regional Secretary of the DOT of the ARMM
in 1999. She said she was familiar with the Memorandum dated 8 August 2000 issued
by Gov. Misuari directing all ARMM officers and employees to liquidate all outstanding
cash advances on or before 31 August 2000 in view of the impending expiration of the
Governor’s extended term. At first, she said the memorandum applied to her, she
being a cabinet secretary, but later she said same did not apply to her because she
had no cash advances. Only those with cash advances were required to get an
Employees Clearance before they could receive their salaries. She then instructed her
staff to work on her salary.
Petitioner said she did not know where the original of her Employees Clearance was.
Neither did she know if the signature of Laura Pangilan therein had been imitated or
forged. She likewise said that although the Employee Clearance was in her name,
she did not cause Laura’s signature to be affixed thereto.
Petitioner disclosed that she was able to get her salary for the month of August 2000
sometime in said month, because ARMM Executive Secretary Randolph C. Parcasio
told her that she did not need a clearance before she could get her salary because
she was re-appointed.28
Petitioner explained that she has not seen the original of the subject Employees
Clearance.29 When she first saw the photocopy of the Employees Clearance, the
signature of Laura was not there. She was able to see the photocopy of the
Employees Clearance again after this case had been filed with the Sandiganbayan,
already with the alleged signature of Laura. Petitioner said it was not she who placed
or caused Laura’s purported signature to be affixed there.
Petitioner added that the memorandum of Gov. Misuari did not apply to her, because
she had no cash advances and she could receive her salary even without clearance.
At that time, she said the Cashier, Accountant and the Auditor checked her records
and found that she had no cash advances.30 Because she was elsewhere, she
instructed her secretary to get her salary. However, she was informed by her staff that
her salary could not be released because the Office of the Governor required a
clearance. Her staff worked on her clearance, the purpose of which was for the
release of her salary for the months of August and September 2000. She was able to
get all the needed signatures except for Laura’s signature. With the refusal of Laura to
sign, her staff went to Executive Secretary Parcasio and explained the situation.
Petitioner denied receiving a telegram from Asst. Special Prosecutor I Anna Isabel G.
Aurellano ordering her to submit to the Office of the Special Prosecutor the original of
the Employees Clearance of the DOT-ARMM issued in her name sometime on 22-23
August 2000.
On cross-examination, petitioner said that prior to her receipt of her salary, she
believed that an Employees Clearance was necessary, and for this reason she had
this document prepared by her staff. She said her Employees Clearance was always
in the possession of Marie Cris, her assistant secretary. It was Marie Cris who
showed her the document twice.31
Atty. Jose I. Lorena, former ARMM Solicitor General, testified that he was familiar with
the Memorandum dated 8 August 2000 issued by Gov. Misuari because the same
was the product of consultation among him, Gov. Misuari and ARMM Executive
Secretary Parcasio. He explained that this memorandum pertained only to
outstanding cash advances. He added that an Employees Clearance was not a
requirement and was not sufficient to comply with the directive contained in the
memorandum, because what was required for the purpose of release of salaries was
a credit notice from the Resident Auditors of the Commission on Audit.
On 16 February 2007, the defense formally offered its documentary
exhibits32 consisting of Exhibits 1 to 5, with sub-markings. The prosecution objected to
the purpose for which Exhibit 1 was offered. The trial court admitted all the defense
exhibits.33
On 7 August 2007, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed decision convicting
petitioner of the crime charged in the information. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Normallah A. Pacasum
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged in the Information and, with
the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and without any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, hereby sentencing her to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF prision correccional
as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum
with the accessories thereof and to pay a fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(₱2,000.00) with costs against the accused.34
The Sandiganbayan found the signature of DOT-ARMM Supply Officer Laura Y.
Pangilan appearing in the Employees Clearance of petitioner to have been
falsified/forged. It did not give much weight on petitioner’s defense denying she was
the one who actually falsified her Employees Clearance by imitating the signature of
Laura Pangilan and that she had no idea about the alleged falsification, because it
was her assistant secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, who worked for her clearance and
the one who submitted the said clearance to the Office of the Regional Governor of
the ARMM. The trial court found said denial unsubstantiated and ruled that while there
was no direct evidence to show that petitioner herself "actually" falsified/forged the
signature of Laura Pangilan, there were circumstances that indicated she was the one
who committed the falsification/forgery, or who asked somebody else to falsify/forge
the subject signature in her Employees Clearance. The Sandiganbayan added that
considering it was petitioner who took advantage of and profited from the use of the
falsified clearance, the presumption was that she was the material author of the
falsification. Despite full opportunity, she was not able to rebut said presumption,
failing to show that it was another person who falsified/forged the signature of Laura
Pangilan, or that another person had the reason or motive to commit the
falsification/forgery or could have benefited from the same.
The Sandiganbayan likewise did not sustain petitioner’s contention that she did not
stand to benefit from the falsification of her Employees Clearance and from the
submission thereof to the Office of the Regional Governor, because she allegedly had
no existing cash advances. She claimed that an Employees Clearance was not
needed to enable her to draw her salary for the months of August and September
2000 under the 8 August 2000 Memorandum of Gov. Misuari, and that the
presumption that he who benefits from the falsification is presumed to be the author
thereof does not apply to her. The lower court explained that the aforementioned
memorandum applied to petitioner, she being an official of the ARMM. It said that the
applicability of said memorandum to petitioner was even admitted by her when she, in
compliance therewith, instructed her staff/assistant secretary to work for her
Employees Clearance to enable her to collect her salary for the month of August
2000. It said that the fact that she (allegedly) had no existing cash advances did not
exempt her from the coverage of the memorandum, because she must show she had
no cash advances and the only way to do this was by obtaining a clearance.
Petitioner argued that the photocopy of her Employees Clearance had no probative
value in proving its contents and was inadmissible because the original thereof was
not presented by the prosecution. The Sandiganbayan did not agree. It said that the
presentation and admission of secondary evidence, like a photocopy of her
Employees Clearance, was justified to prove the contents thereof, because despite
reasonable notices (telegrams) made by the prosecution to petitioner and her
assistant secretary to produce the original of her Employees Clearance, they ignored
the notice and refused to present the original of said document.
On 21 August 2007, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Sandiganbayan35 to which the prosecution filed a Comment/Opposition. 36 Subsequent
thereto, petitioner filed a Supplement to Accused’s Motion for Reconsideration &
Motion for New Trial/Reception of Newly Discovered Evidence. 37 Petitioner prayed
that her motion for new trial be granted in order that the testimony of Marie Cris
Batuampar be introduced, the same being newly discovered evidence. The
prosecution filed its Opposition.38
On 22 October 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit; and the motion for new trial, because the
evidence sought to be presented did not qualify as newly discovered evidence. 39
On 16 November 2007, the instant petition was filed.
In our Resolution40 dated 27 November 2007, respondent People of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), was required to file its Comment
on the petition.41 After two motions for extension to file comment on the petition, which
were granted by this Court, the OSP filed its Comment dated 18 February
2008.42Petitioner was required43 to file a Reply to the Comment, which she did on 5
June 2008.44
On 5 August 2008, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition for review on
certiorari and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda within thirty
(30) days from notice. They filed their respective memoranda on 21 November 2008
and on 5 November 2008.45
Petitioner assails her conviction arguing that the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in:
I. Finding that petitioner benefited from the alleged falsification, hence must
be deemed the author thereof, when the evidence on record does not
support, but even contradicts, such a conclusion.
II. Presuming that petitioner had unliquidated cash advances hence was
required under the Misuari Memorandum to submit her Employee’s
Clearance to clear herself of these, when there is no evidence to that effect
and the prosecution even admitted so.
III. Not resolving doubt as to the authenticity of the photocopy of the
allegedly forged Employee’s Clearance, in favor of the innocence of the
Accused.
IV. In short-circuiting the right of the petitioner to present additional evidence
on her behalf, thus denying her due process. 46
Petitioner contends that under the Misuari memorandum dated 8 August 2000, she
was not required to file an Employees Clearance to draw her salary, since what was
required under said memorandum was a Credit Notice from the COA. She further
contends that since she was not required to file said Employees Clearance because
she had no cash advances, the signature in her Employees Clearance was "irrelevant
and a non-issue" because what was required was a Credit Notice.
As to the first contention, we agree with petitioner that under the aforesaid
memorandum, what was required before she could draw her salaries was a Credit
Notice from the COA and not an Employees Clearance. The full text of the
Memorandum47 form the Regional Governor reads:
MEMORANDUM FROM THE REGIONAL GOVERNOR
TO: ALL CONCERNED
SUBJECT: AS STATED
DATE: AUGUST 8, 2000
1. In view of the impending expiration of the extended term of the
undersigned, it is hereby directed that all outstanding cash advances be
liquidated on or before August 31, 2000.
2. Effective September 1, 2000, the salaries and other emoluments of all
ARMM officials/employees with unliquidated cash advance shall be withheld
until they have settled their accounts and a corresponding Credit Notice is
issued to them by the Commission on Audit.
3. Due to budgetary and financial constraints brought about by the drastic
cut of our budget, memorandum dated December 01, 1998 is hereby
reiterated. Therefore all releases for financial assistance is hereby
suspended effective immediately.
4. For strict compliance.
PROF. NUR MISUARI
It is clear from said memorandum that what was required from officers/employees
who had unliquidated cash advances was the corresponding Credit Notice issued by
the COA after they had settled their accounts. There was indeed no mention of any
Employees Clearance therein. Up to this point, we agree with petitioner. However, on
her contention that the signature of Laura Pangilan in her Employees Clearance was
"irrelevant and a non-issue," we disagree. Whether the signature of Laura Pangilan
was imitated or not is the main issue in this case for falsification.
From the memorandum of Gov. Misuari, the Credit Notice requirement was effective
only starting 1 September 2000 and not before. In the case at bar, the information
charges petitioner not with failure to secure a Credit Notice, but with allegedly
falsifying her Employees Clearance by imitating the signature of Laura Y. Pangilan,
Supply Officer I of the DOT-ARMM. The Credit Notice requirement was therefore
irrelevant and a non-issue as regards the release of salaries prior to 1 September
2000.
The questions to be answered are: (1) Was the signature of Laura Pangilan in
petitioner’s Employees Clearance imitated? If yes, (2) Who imitated or caused the
imitation of said signature?
On the first query, the same was answered by Laura Pangilan. She said that the
signature in petitioner’s Employees Clearance was not hers. The same was an
imitation. When a person whose signature was affixed to a document denies his/her
signature therein, a prima facie case for falsification is established which the
defendant must overcome.48
Petitioner argues there was no need for her to file an Employees Clearance to draw
her salary. She adds that Atty. Randolph C. Parcasio, Executive Secretary of the
ARMM, told her and her secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, that she did not need an
Employees Clearance because she was re-appointed.49
These arguments are untenable. There was a need for petitioner to file an Employees
Clearance not only for compliance with the Misuari memorandum but, more
importantly, because her term of office was about to end, since her position was
coterminous with the term of Gov. Misuari, the appointing authority. 50 She even
admitted that before she received her salary for August, 2000, 51 an Employees
Clearance was necessary.52 Moreover, her claim that Atty. Parcasio told her and her
secretary that she did not need an Employee Clearance to get her salary does not
persuade us. In fact, we find her alleged "re-appointment," when she was working for
her Employees Clearance at around August 2000, improbable. How could she have
been re-appointed by Gov. Alvarez,53 whom she claims re-appointed her sometime in
the year 2000, when Gov. Misuari was still the Regional Governor of the ARMM when
she had her Employees Clearance prepared sometime in August 2000? Clearly, her
statement that she did not need an Employees Clearance because she was re-
appointed does not inspire belief.
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for applying the presumption that if a person had
in his position a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking
advantage of it and profiting thereby, he is presumed to be the material author of the
falsification. He argues that the Sandiganbayan overlooked the fact that there was no
evidence to prove that petitioner made use of or uttered the Employees Clearance,
because there was no evidence that she submitted it -- if not, at least caused it to be
submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor. To support such claim, she said
there were no "receipt marks" in the Employees Clearance to show that the Office of
the Regional Governor received said documents.
It is to be made clear that the "use" of a falsified document is separate and distinct
from the "falsification" of a public document. The act of "using" falsified documents is
not necessarily included in the "falsification" of a public document. Using falsified
documents is punished under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. In the case at
bar, the falsification of the Employees Clearance was consummated the moment the
signature of Laura Pangilan was imitated. In the falsification of a public document, it is
immaterial whether or not the contents set forth therein were false. What is important
is the fact that the signature of another was counterfeited.54 It is a settled rule that in
the falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be
present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person for the reason that in the
falsification of a public document, the principal thing punished is the violation of the
public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.55 Thus,
the purpose for which the falsification was made and whether the offender profited or
hoped to profit from such falsification are no longer material.
The records further show that petitioner "used" or uttered the Employees Clearance.
The fact that the same was circulated to the different division heads for their
signatures is already considered use of falsified documents as contemplated in Article
172. The lack of the stamp mark "Received" in the Employees Clearance does not
mean that said document was not received by the Office of the Regional Governor.
We find the certification signed by Atty. Randolph C. Parcasio, Executive Secretary of
Office of the Regional Governor - ARMM, as contained in the Employees Clearance,
to be sufficient proof that the same was submitted to the Office of the Regional
Governor. It must be stressed that the Executive Secretary is part of the Office of the
Regional Governor.
Petitioner denies having "actually" falsified her Employees Clearance by imitating the
signature of Laura Pangilan, claiming that she had no knowledge about the
falsification because it was her assistant secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, who
worked for her Employees Clearance.
Petitioner’s denial, unsubstantiated and uncorroborated, must certainly fail. Denial,
when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving
evidence, which deserves no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 56 Denial is intrinsically weak, being a
negative and self-serving assertion.57
In the case at bar, petitioner did not even present as her witness Marie Cris
Batuampar, the person whom she instructed to work for her Employees Clearance.
Her failure to present this person in order to shed light on the matter was fatal to her
cause. In fact, we find that the defense never intended to present Marie Cris
Batuampar as a witness. This is clear from the pre-trial order, because the defense
never listed her as a witness.58 Her attempt to present Ms. Batuampar to help her
cause after she has been convicted is already too late in the day, and Ms.
Batuampar’s testimony, which is supposed to be given, cannot be considered newly
discovered evidence as to merit the granting of her motion for new trial and/or
reception of newly discovered evidence.
The lack of direct evidence showing that petitioner "actually" imitated the signature of
Laura Pangilan in her Employees Clearance will not exonerate her. We have ruled
that it is not strange to realize that in cases of forgery, the prosecution would not
always have the means for obtaining such direct evidence to confute acts contrived
clandestinely. Courts have to rely on circumstantial evidence consisting of pieces of
facts, which if woven together would produce a single network establishing the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.59 We totally agree with the Sandiganbayan,
which said:
While there is no direct evidence to show that the accused herself "actually" forged
the signature of Laura Pangilan in the Employees Clearance in question, the Court
nevertheless finds the following circumstances, obtaining in the records, to
establish/indicate that she was the one who committed the forgery or who asked
somebody else to forge or caused the forgery of the signature of Laura Pangilan in
her Employees Clearance, to wit –
1. that the accused instructed her staff Maricris Batuampar to work for her
Employees Clearance in compliance with the Memorandum of ARMM
Regional Governor Nur Misuari and that the forged signature of Laura
Pangilan was affixed on her clearance are strong evidence that the accused
herself either falsified the said signature or caused the same to be
falsified/imitated, and that possession by Maricris of the falsified clearance
of the accused is possession by the accused herself because the former
was only acting upon the instructions and in behalf of the latter;
2. that it was the accused who is required to accomplish and to submit her
Employees Clearance to enable her to collect her salary for the months of
August and September 2000 is sufficient and strong motive or reason for her
 to commit the falsification by imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan or
order someone else to forge it; and
3. that the accused was the only one who profited or benefited from the
falsification as she admitted that she was able to collect her salary for the
month of August 2000 after her falsified Employees Clearance was
submitted and approved by the ORG-ARMM and therefore, she alone could
have the motive for making such falsification.
On the basis of the foregoing circumstances, no reasonable and fair-minded man
would say that the accused – a Regional Secretary of DOT-ARMM – had no
knowledge of the falsification. It is an established rule, well-buttressed upon reason,
that in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, when a person has in his possession
or control a falsified document and who makes use of the same, the presumption or
inference is justified that such person is the forger or the one who caused the forgery
and, therefore, guilty of falsification. Thus, in People v. Sendaydiego, the Supreme
Court held that –
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made
use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is
that he is the material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or
uttering of the forged documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery
that the user or possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the
forgery, or to have close connection with the forgers. (U.S. v. Castillo, 6 Phil. 453;
People v. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People v. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28; People v. Astudillo,
60 Phil. 338; People v. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).
In line with the above ruling, and considering that it was the accused who took
advantage and profited in the use of the falsified Employees Clearance in question,
the presumption is inevitable that she is the material author of the falsification. And
despite full opportunity, she was not able to rebut such presumption by failing to show
that it was another person who forged or falsified the signature of Laura Pangilan or
that at least another person and not she alone, had the reason or motive to commit
the forgery or falsification, or was or could have been benefited by such
falsification/forgery.60
The circumstances enumerated by the Sandiganbayan, as against the denials of
petitioner, convince us to apply the rule that in the absence of satisfactory
explanation, one who is found in possession of, and who has used, a forged
document, is the forger and, therefore, guilty of falsification. 61 The effect of a
presumption upon the burden of proof is to create the need of presenting evidence to
overcome the prima facie case created, which, if no contrary proof is offered, will
thereby prevail.62 A prima facie case of falsification having been established,
petitioner should have presented clear and convincing evidence to overcome such
burden. This, she failed to do.
Petitioner assails the weight given by the Sandiganbayan to the testimonies of the two
Pangilans when they failed to report the alleged falsification to the police or alert the
Office of the Regional Governor of said falsification, or tried to stop petitioner from
getting her salaries.
We do not agree with the petitioner. It is a settled rule that the findings of fact of the
trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the
probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are
accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. 63 The determination of the credibility of
witnesses is the domain of the trial court, as it is in the best position to observe the
witnesses’ demeanor.64 The Sandiganbayan has given full probative value to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. So have we. We find no reason to depart
from such a rule.
Aware that the prosecution failed to present the original from which the photocopy of
petitioner’s Employees Clearance was supposed to have been obtained, she
maintains that the Sandiganbayan should have doubted the authenticity and probative
value of the photocopy of the Employees Clearance.
The Sandiganbayan correctly admitted in evidence the photocopy of the Employees
Clearance. We agree when it ruled:
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself. The purpose of the rule requiring the production by the offeror of the
best evidence if the prevention of fraud, because if a party is in possession of such
evidence and withholds it and presents inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the
presumption is that the latter evidence is withheld from the court and the adverse
party for a fraudulent or devious purpose which its production would expose and
defeat. Hence, as long as the original evidence can be had, the Court should not
receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the
absence of any clear showing that the original has been lost or destroyed or cannot
be produced in court. Such photocopies must be disregarded, being inadmissible
evidence and barren of probative weight.
The foregoing rule, however, admits of several exceptions. Under Section 3(b) of Rule
130, secondary evidence of a writing may be admitted "when the original is in the
custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and
the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice." And to warrant the admissibility of
secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in the custody or control of the
adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides as follows:
Sec. 6. When original document is in adverse party’s custody or control. – If the
document is in the custody or control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable
notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he
fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case
of loss.
Thus, the mere fact that the original is in the custody or control of the adverse party
against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The
offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by
giving notice to the said party to produce the document which may be in the form of a
motion for the production of the original or made in open court in the presence of the
adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in custody of
the original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such party has the original
of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it, or refuses to produce it,
secondary evidence may be admitted.
Here, the accused admitted that her Employees Clearance was always in the
possession of her assistant secretary, [Marie Cris] Batuampar. So the prosecution in
its effort to produce the original copy of the said Employees Clearance of the
accused, thru Assistant Special Prosecutor Anna Isabel G. Aurellano of the Office of
the Prosecutor, sent on May 31, 2005 thru the COA Telegraph Office at Quezon City
two (2) telegram subpoenas addressed to accused Normallah Pacasum, and [Marie
Cris] Batuampar ordering them to submit to the Office of the Special Prosecutor on or
before June 8, 2005, the original of the Employees’ Clearance in the name of
Normallah Alonto Lucman-Pacasum for the release of her August and September
2000 salary as DOT Regional Secretary. Notwithstanding receipt of the said telegram
subpoena by her uncle Manso Alonto in her residence on June 1, 200[5], the accused
did not appear before or submit to Assistant Special Prosecutor Anna Isabel G.
Aurellano, the original of the said Employees Clearance, much less offered to produce
the same.
Under the circumstances, since there was proof of the existence of the Employees
Clearance as evidenced by the photocopy thereof, and despite the reasonable notices
made by the prosecution to the accused and her assistant secretary to produce the
original of said employees clearance they ignored the notice and refused to produce
the original document, the presentation and admission of the photocopy of the original
copy of the questioned Employees Clearance as secondary evidence to prove the
contents thereof was justified.65
This Court decrees that even though the original of an alleged falsified document is
not, or may no longer be produced in court, a criminal case for falsification may still
prosper if the person wishing to establish the contents of said
document via secondary evidence or substitutionary evidence can adequately show
that the best or primary evidence – the original of the document – is not available for
any of the causes mentioned in Section 3,66 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner claims she was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan severely
restricted her time to present evidence, allowing her only two hearing dates, thus
resulting in her failure to present another important witness in the of person of Atty.
Randolph Parcasio. Petitioner was not denied due process. She was given every
opportunity to adduce her evidence. The Sandiganbayan outlined the proceedings of
the case as follows:
After the prosecution rested its case, by agreement of the parties, the initial hearing
for the reception of defense evidence was scheduled on September 19 and 20, 2005
both at 8:30 in the morning. However, upon motion of the prosecution, the Court, in its
Order of September 16, 2005, cancelled the setting as the handling prosecutor, Pros.
Anna Isabel G. Aurellano, had to attend a 5-day workshop at PHINMA in Tagaytay
City on September 19-23, 2005 and scheduled anew the hearing on November 23
and 24, 2005, both at 8:30 in the morning. However, for failure of the defense
counsel, Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita, to appear at the November 23, 2005 hearing
despite due notice, the Court cancelled the November 23 and 24 hearings, and
moved the same to March 13 and 14, 2006 both at 8:30 in the morning, and at the
same time directed the said defense counsel to show cause in writing within five (5)
days from receipt of the Order why he should not be held in contempt for his failure to
appear despite due notice. In compliance with this Order,1awphi1 Atty. Rico B.
Bolongaita, filed his Explanation and Withdrawal of Appearance, respectively, which
were both Noted by the Court in its Resolution of January 19, 2006.
In view of the absence of the accused in the March 13, 2006 hearing and her
continued failure to get a substitute counsel considering that her counsel, Atty. Rico B.
Bolongaita, had already withdrawn from the case since January 16, 2006, the Court
cancelled the March 13 and 14, 2006 hearings and moved the same to July 3 and 4,
2006 both at 8:30 in the morning and designated Atty. Conrado Rosario of the PAO
as counsel de oficio of the accused and directed the accused upon receipt of the
order to immediately confer with said counsel for purposes of preparing for her
defense in the case.
On March 20, 2006, the Court issued the following Resolution, which reads:
Accused Normallah L. Pacasum’s letter of February 17, 2006 (received by mail on
March 16, 2006) requesting extension of time to engage the services of counsel is
merely NOTED WITHOUT ACTION as the next hearings are scheduled on July 3 and
4, 2006 and said accused would have more than ample time to engage the services
of counsel of her choice. For this reason, any excuse from the accused on said
settings that she failed to engage the services of counsel or that her counsel needs
more time to prepare will be unacceptable. At all events, this Court, in its Order of
March 13, 2006, had already appointed Atty. Conrado Rosario of the PAO as a
counsel de oficio to represent the accused, with specific orders to the latter to confer
with Atty. Rosario and assist him in preparing for her defense.
On July 3, 2006, upon the manifestation of Atty. Conrado Rosario, counsel for the
accused, that since he was appointed counsel de oficio, the accused has not
communicated with him and therefore he was not ready to present any evidence for
the accused, the Court cancelled the hearing in order to give the defense another
opportunity to present its evidence and reset it to July 4, 2006, the following day as
previously scheduled.
On July 4, 2006, the Court issued the following Order, which reads –
"When this case was called for hearing, accused asked for the resetting of the case
on the ground that she just hired a new counsel who thereafter arrived and entered
his appearance as Atty. Napoleon Uy Galit with address at Suite 202 Masonic
Building, #35 Matalino St., Diliman, Quezon City. With the appearance of her new
counsel, Atty. Conrado C. Rosario is hereby discharged as counsel de oficio of the
accused.
"As prayed for by the accused, she is given the last chance to present her evidence
on October 9 and 10, 2006, both at 8:30 o’clock in the morning. For repeated failure of
the accused to acknowledge receipt of the notices of the Court, her waiver of
appearance is hereby cancelled and she is ordered to personally appear in the
scheduled hearings of this case.
SO ORDERED.
On October 6, 2006, the accused thru counsel, Atty. Bantreas Lucman, filed an Entry
of Appearance, Motion For Postponement of October 9 and 10 Hearings stating
therein that since his service as new counsel was just engaged by the accused, and
that the accused herself cannot also attend the said hearing because she is
undergoing fasting until October 24, 2006 in observance of Ramadan, he asked to
postpone the settings on October 9 and 10, 2006. At the hearing on October 9, 2006,
the Court issued the following, which reads –
"Acting on the Entry of Appearance, Motion for Postponement of October 9 and 10,
2006 Hearing filed by accused Normallah L. Pacasum, thru counsel, Atty. Bantreas
Lucman, finding the same to be without merit, as this case has been set for hearing
several times and the accused has been given the last chance to present evidence,
the Court hereby denies the motion for postponement.
"In this regard, in view of the absence of accused Normallah L. Pacasum in today’s
hearing despite the Order of the Court dated July 4, 2006, canceling her waiver of
appearance, and ordering her to personally appear before this Court, as prayed for by
the prosecution, let a Bench Warrant of Arrest be issued against the said accused.
The cash bond posted for her provisional liberty is ordered confiscated in favor of the
government. The accused is given thirty (30) days from notice to explain in writing
why final judgment shall not be rendered against the said bond.
With the Manifestation of Atty. Bantreas Lucman that the defense is not ready to
present its evidence today and tomorrow, the last chance for it to present its evidence,
the Court is constraint to consider the accused’s right to present evidence as waived.
The parties are hereby given thirty (30) days to submit their respective memoranda.
Thereafter, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, the accused thru counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
above Order dated October 25, 2006, and Motion to Set Hearing For Motion for
Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of Arrest dated October 31, 2006.
At the hearing of accused’s motion for reconsideration on November 3, 2006, the
Court issued the following Order, which reads –
"When the ‘Motion To Set Hearing for Motion for Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant
of Arrest’ was called for hearing this morning, only Attorneys Bantuas M. Lucman and
Jose Ventura Aspiras appeared. Accused Normallah L. Pacasum was absent.
In view of the absence of the accused, the Court is not inclined to give favorable
action to the Motion for Reconsideration. It must be stressed that the primordial
reason for the issuance of the order sought to be reconsidered in the presence of the
accused in the previous hearing in violation of the Court’s Order for her to personally
appear in the hearings of this case and for her indifference to the directives of the
Court. With the absence anew of the accused, the Court has no alternative but to
deny the Motion.
Moreover, the Court notes the allegation in the Motion that the counsel sought the
assurance of the accused (and she promised) to appear before this Court if the
motion will be granted, as if the Court owes the accused the favor to appear before it.
The accused is reminded/advised that the issuance of the warrant of arrest, she has
to voluntarily surrender and appear before the Court or be arrested and brought to the
Court.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the Omnibus Motion to Hold in Abeyance Consideration of Prosecution’s
Memorandum (And for a Second Look on the Matter of Accused’s Right to Present
Defense Evidence) of the accused dated November 21, 2006, and the prosecution’s
Opposition thereto, the Court issued the following Order, which reads –
"This refers to the Accused "Omnibus Motion to Hold in Abeyance Consideration of
Prosecution’s November 7, 2006 Memorandum (And For a Second Look on the
Matter of Accused’s Right to Present Defense Evidence)" dated November 21, 2006
and the plaintiff’s Opposition thereto dated November 28, 2006.
"Inasmuch as the accused has already appeared before the Court and posted an
additional bond of P10,000.00 despite the aforesaid opposition of the prosecution, in
the interest of justice, the Court is inclined to reconsider and give favorable action to
the motion and grant the accused another and last opportunity to present here
evidence.
"WHEREFORE, the motion is granted and this case is set for hearing for the
accused’s last chance to present and/or complete the presentation of her evidence on
February 5 and 6, 2007 both at 8:30 in the morning in the Sandiganbayan Centennial
Building in Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, despite the initial indifference of the accused to present her defense, the Court
gave her ample opportunity to present her evidence. 67
The Sandiganbayan properly dealt with the situation. In fact, we find that the trial court
was lenient with the petitioner. The failure of the defense to present Atty. Parcasio
was its own doing. The defense failed to prepare its witnesses for the case. As proof
of this, we quote a portion of the hearing when petitioner was testifying:
ATTY. ASPIRAS
Q Would you know where (sic) the whereabouts of this Sec. Parcasio would be (sic)
at this time?
A He lives in Davao but after what happened to Gov. Misuari, we have not got
together with the other members of the cabinet of Gov. Misuari, but he lives in Davao,
sir.
Q Would it be possible, Madame Witness, to request or ask him to testify in this case?
ten (10) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty to be
imposed shall be taken from the medium period of prision mayor, while the minimum
shall be taken from within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is
prision correccional or from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Crim.
Case No. 27483 dated 7 August 2007 and its resolution dated 22 October 2007 are
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
A After this hearing, I will look for Sec. Parcasio just to clear my name, sir.

CHAIRMAN

Not after this hearing, you should have already done that. Because we already gave
you enough opportunity to present your side, right? You should not be telling the
Court that only after this hearing, you will start looking (for) people who will, definitely,
clear your name. You should be doing that months ago, correct?

WITNESS

Yes, your Honors.68

Petitioner was charged with falsifying her Employees Clearance under Article 171,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. For one to be convicted of falsification under
said paragraph, the followings elements must concur: (1) that the offender is a public
officer, an employee, or a notary public; (2) that he takes advantage of his official
position; and (3) that he falsifies a document by counterfeiting or imitating any
handwriting, signature or rubric.

All the foregoing elements have been sufficiently established. There is no dispute that
petitioner was a public officer, being then the Regional Secretary of the Department of
Tourism of the ARMM, when she caused the preparation of her Employees Clearance
(a public document) for the release of her salary for the months of August and
September 2000. Such being a requirement, and she being a public officer, she was
duty-bound to prepare, accomplish and submit said document. Were it not for her
position and employment in the ARMM, she could not have accomplished said
Employees Clearance. In a falsification of public document, the offender is considered
to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he had the duty to make or
prepare or otherwise intervene in the preparation of the document; or (2) he had
official custody of the document which he falsified. 69 It being her duty to prepare and
submit said document, she clearly took advantage of her position when she falsified
or caused the falsification of her Employees Clearance by imitating the signature of
Laura Pangilan.lawphil.net

Going now to the penalties imposed on petitioner, we find the same proper. The
penalty for falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is prision
mayor and a fine not exceeding ₱5,000.00. There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance in the commission of the felony, the imposable penalty is prision
mayor in its medium period, or within the range of eight (8) years and one (1) day to