G.R. No. 104732. June 22, 1993. Flores v. Drilon Constitution itself, e.g.
onstitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic and
Facts:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise
known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992,"
under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo
City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged with
prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order. Said provision provides the President the power
to appoint an administrator of the SBMA provided that in the first
year of its operation, the Olongapo mayor shall be appointed as
chairman and chief of executive of the Subic Authority.
Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional
provision of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution,
which states that "no elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer
or position during his tenure."
Issue:
Whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which
states, "Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations
from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo
shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of
the Subic Authority," violates the constitutional proscription
against appointment or designation of elective officials to other
government posts.
Held:
Yes. The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public
officer to hold multiple functions since they are accorded with a
public office that is a full time job to let them function without the
distraction of other governmental duties.
In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to
appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to
other government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the
constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching
of the imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec.
7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, the fact that the
expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the
higher interest of the body politic is of no moment. It is argued
that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC) permits the
appointment of a local elective official to another post if so
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office. But, the
contention is fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC is not
determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A.
7227, for no legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law
of the land.
In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to
another post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
office, ignores the clear-cut difference in the wording of the two
(2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the
second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an
appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more
stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against
appointment or designation of an elective official to other
government posts, except as are particularly recognized in the
planning agency; the Vice President, who may be appointed
Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be
designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
The distinction between the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 7,
Art. IX-B, was not accidental when drawn, and not without
reason. The distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to
appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be extended to
elective officials who are governed by the first paragraph.
As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible
for appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive Officer of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto
pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the Constitution
cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo
City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and
void; he may be considered a de facto officer, “one whose acts,
though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of
policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the
interest of the public and third persons, where the duties of the
office were exercised.
Laurel vs Hon. Desierto 381 SCRA 48 April 12, 2002
FACTS:
The present case involves the petition for certiorari assailing the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over the Chairman of National
Centennial Commission (NCC) on the ground that he is not a
public officer and the commission is not a public office.
NCC was constituted by Admin. Order No. 223 by Pres. Aquino
and later renamed by Pres. Ramos to take charge with the
administration of the nationwide preparations for the National
Celebration of the Philippine Centennial of the Declaration of
Philippine Independence and the Inauguration of the Malolos
Congress. Petitioner Salvador Laurel, as Chairman of NCC was
subsequently elected as Chief Executive Officer of the Philippine
Centennial Expo ’98 Corp (Expocorp). Senator Coseteng
denounced anomalies in the an operation of the project of
Expocorp and such issue was referred for investigation to the Blue
Ribbon Committee. Thereafter Laurel was prosecuted for
violating the rules on public bidding, relative to the award of
contracts to AK Corp; exhibiting manifest bias to the latter for the
construction of Freedom Ring in the absence of a valid contract,
precluding audit by COA of the funds by the government, thus in
violation of the anti-graft law (RA 3019).
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction
of said office but which was denied. His Motion for
Reconsideration was also denied thereafter. Thus this petition
contending that he cannot be prosecuted with the alleged act due
to the fact that NCC is not a public office and he is not a public
officer with the grounds that in his position, there was 1) no
delegation of sovereign functions; 2) no salary as he purportedly
did not receive compensation; and 3) no security of tenure or
continuance as NCC being temporary.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner, in his capacity as NCC Chairman, a
public officer, and therefore may be prosecuted under the
Ombudsman.
HELD:
Yes. The characteristics of a public office include the delegation
of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an
oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the
designation of the position as an office. ( Mechem) The
delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of
government is the most important characteristic in determining
whether a position is a public office or not.
Clearly, NCC performs sovereign functions as it was constituted
to ensure the synchronized celebration of the Philippine
Centennial and wider participation from the government and non-
government or private organizations and to rationalize the
relevance of historical links with other countries and to carry them
into effect. It is held that NCC performs executive functions,
generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws
and the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance. The executive function, therefore,
concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law.
Hence, NCC is a public office and the petitioner is a public
officer.
As to petitioner’s contention of not receiving compensation, the
same is of little consequence as his office may be of an honorary
office wherein no fees are attached, nonetheless a public office.
The narrow definition of public office regarding the need of salary
has expressed limitation to the application of RA No. 3019 and
does not apply in the determination of Ombudsman’s jurisdiction.
NCC, being an ‘ad hoc’ body which is coterminous upon the
happening of the celebration does not make the Commission less
of a public office.
Petitioner thus falls into the category of public officers that may
be prosecuted by the Ombudsman. Petition is DISMISSED.
To be noted:
 The Constitution provides in Article XIV (Education,
Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports)
thereof: Sec. 15. Arts and letters shall enjoy the
patronage of the State. The State shall conserve,
promote, and popularize the nation’s historical and
cultural heritage and resources, as well as artistic
creations.
 Mechem: “A public office is the right, authority and
duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of
the creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government , to
be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The
individual so invested is a public officer.”
 Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees) provides: "Public Officials" include elective
and appointive officials and employees, permanent or
temporary, whether in the career or non-career service
including military and police personnel, whether or not
they receive compensation, regardless of amount.
Samson v Restrivera G.R. No. 178454 : March 28, 2011
Petitioner Filipina Samson appeals the Decision dated October 31,
2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 83422 and
its Resolution dated June 8, 2007, denying her motion for
reconsideration. The CA affirmed the Ombudsman in finding
petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
Facts: Petitioner is a government employee, being a department
head of the Population Commission with office at the Provincial
Capitol, Trece Martirez City, Cavite. Sometime in March 2001,
petitioner agreed to help her friend, respondent Julia A.
Restrivera, to have the latter's land located in Carmona, Cavite,
registered under the Torrens System. Petitioner said that the
expenses would reachP150,000 and accepted P50,000 from
respondent to cover the initial expenses for the titling of
respondents land.
However, petitioner failed to accomplish the task as it was
found out that the land is government property. When petitioner
failed to return the P50,000, respondent sued her forestafa.
Respondent also filed an administrative complaint for grave
misconduct or conduct unbecoming a public officer against
petitioner before the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman found petitioner guilty of violating Section 4(b)
of R.A. No. 6713 and suspended her from office for three months
without pay. The CA on appeal affirmed the Ombudsman’s
Order. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be held administratively
liable for grave misconduct
Held: No. Decision Set Aside and a New judgment is Entered.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by a public officer.
The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to
disregard established rules, which must be proved by substantial
evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple. Conversely,
one cannot be found guilty of misconduct in the absence of
substantial evidence. In one case, we affirmed a finding of grave
misconduct because there was substantial evidence of voluntary
disregard of established rules in the procurement of supplies as
well as of manifest intent to disregard said rules.
In this case, respondent failed to prove (1) petitioner's violation of
an established and definite rule of action or unlawful behavior or
gross negligence, and (2) any of the aggravating elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate a law or to disregard
established rules on the part of petitioner. In fact, respondent
could merely point to petitioner's alleged failure to observe the
mandate that public office is a public trust when petitioner
allegedly meddled in an affair that belongs to another agency and
received an amount for undelivered work.
True, public officers and employees must be guided by the
principle enshrined in the Constitution that public office is a
public trust. However, respondents allegation that petitioner
meddled in an affair that belongs to another agency is a serious
but unproven accusation. It does not show that petitioner made an
illegal deal or any deal with any government agency. Even the
Ombudsman has recognized this fact. The survey shows only that
petitioner contracted a surveyor.
However, the foregoing does not mean that petitioner is absolved
of any administrative liability. For reneging on her promise to
return aforesaid amount, petitioner is guilty of conduct
unbecoming a public officer.
Recently, in Assistant Special Prosecutor III Rohermia J. Jamsani-
Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, et al., we said that
unbecoming conduct means improper performance and applies to
a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social
behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed
method.
Petitioner should have complied with her promise to return the
amount to respondent after failing to accomplish the task she had
willingly accepted. However, she waited until respondent sued her
for estafa, thus reinforcing the latter's suspicion that petitioner
misappropriated her money. Although the element of deceit was
not proven in the criminal case respondent filed against the
petitioner, it is clear that by her actuations, petitioner violated
basic social and ethical norms in her private dealings. Even if
unrelated to her duties as a public officer, petitioners transgression
could erode the public's trust in government employees, more so
because she holds a high position in the service.
Petitioner guilty.
Pat-Og v CSC G.R. No. 198755 June 5, 2013
FACTS:
This case was stemmed when a 14-year old student, Robert Bang-
on (Bang-on), of the Antadao National High School in Sagada,
Mountain Province, filed a complaint against Alberto Pat-Og, Sr.
(Petitioner), a teacher of the same school, before the Civil Service
Commission-Cordillera Administrative Region (CSC-CAR). A
blow was inflicted by the petitioner to Bang-on during the class,
for the latter’s failure to follow the former’s repeated instructions
which angered him.
The CSC-CAR believed that the act committed by petitioner was
sufficient to find him guilty of Grave Misconduct, but he was only
adjudged for Simple Misconduct and due to seriousness of the
resulting injury to the victim, it hereby imposed the maximum
penalty attached to the offense which is six months suspension
without pay.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner, but the
same was denied for lack of merit. On appeal with the CSC, the
latter dismissed petitioner’s appeal and affirmed with
modification the decision of the CSC-CAR, he was adjudged
guilty of grave misconduct and the penalty of dismissal from the
service with all its accessory penalties of cancellation of
eligibilities, perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the
government service, and forfeiture of retirement benefits.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, questioning for the
first time the jurisdiction of CSC over the case, on ground that
administrative charges against a public school teacher should have
been initially heard by a committee to be constituted pursuant to
the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. However, the CSC
denied the motion for reconsideration stating that petitioner was
estopped from challenging its jurisdiction considering that he
actively participated in the administrative proceedings against
him.
When the case reached the CA, it only affirmed the resolutions of
the CSC. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by
the petitioner. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
WON a simple misconduct and the concomitant penalty
of suspension should be upheld rather than the supreme penalty,
considering that petitioner is at the edge of retirement, and the
long years of his government service.
RULING:
Under Section 52(A)(2) of Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, the penalty for grave
misconduct is dismissal from the service, which carries with it the
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and
perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the government
service. This penalty must, however, be tempered with
compassion as there was sufficient provocation on the part of
Bang-on. Considering further the mitigating circumstances that
the petitioner has been in the government service for 33 years,
that this is his first offense and that he is at the cusp of retirement,
the Court finds the penalty of suspension for six months as
appropriate under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition
and MODIFIES the April 6, 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101700. Accordingly, Alberto Pat-
og, Sr. is found GUlLTY of Grave Misconduct, but the penalty is
reduced from dismissal from the service to SUSPENSION for
SIX MONTHS.
National Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Paredes, 439 SCRA 130
Facts: DILG, appointed as interim caretaker to administer and
manage the affairs of the Liga ng mga Barangay in giving remedy
to alleged violations made by the incumbent officer of the Liga in
the conduct of their elections, issued 2 memorandum circulars
which alter, modify, nullify or set aside the actions of the Liga.
Petitioner contends that DILG’s appointment constitutes undue
interference in the internal affairs of the Liga, since the latter is
not subject to DILG control and supervision. Respondent judge
contends that DILG exercises general supervisory jurisdiction
over LGUs including the different leagues based on sec. 1 of
Admin. Order No. 267 providing for a broad premise of the
supervisory power of the DILG.
Issue: WON DILG Secretary as alter-ego of the President has
power of control over the Liga ng mga Barangay.
Held: No. Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution provides that the
President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
over local government, which exclude the power of control. As
the entity exercising supervision over the Liga, the DILG’s
authority is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it
cannot lay down such rules itself nor does it have the discretion to
modify or replace the same.
Estrada v Desierto
FACTS
Joseph “Erap” Estrada alleges that he is the President on
leave while Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President.
From the beginning of Erap’s term, he was plagued by problems
that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent
from power started on October 4, 2000. Singson, a longtime
friend of Estrada, went on air and accused the Estrada, his family
and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The
exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 19,
Estrada fell from power. At 1:20 p.m. of said day, the
Erap informed then Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that
General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, had defected. January 20 turned to be the day of
Erap’s surrender. On January 22, the Monday after taking her
oath, Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the
Presidency. After his fall from the pedestal of power, Erap’s legal
problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed
against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arroyo is a legitimate (de jure) president.
HELD: The SC holds that the resignation of Estrada cannot be
doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the
press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged
the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic
albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he
was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He
did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability
and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the
disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people
for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was
referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as
President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future
challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our
country. Estrada’s reference is to a future challenge after
occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and
(5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a
constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the
presidency. The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his
final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.
Even if Erap can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground
that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has
been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent
Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary
FACTS
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the Cabinet,
their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary
positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties
Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is
unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being
challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds
exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which
provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession,
participate in any business, or be financially interested in any
contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest
in the conduct of their office.”
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions against holding
any other office or employment in Government are those provided
in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be
appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2),
Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member
of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987
Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding
during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the
government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution
itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without
additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of their office, the
citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples
during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down
for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal
opinions which cannot override the constitution’s manifest intent
and the people’s understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in
relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO
284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of
positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not
more than 2 positions in the government and government
corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple
offices or employment in direct contravention of the express
mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting
them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
SARMIENTO vs. MISON
GR No. 79974 December 17, 1987
Facts:
 Petitioners seek to enjoin respondent Mison from
performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs and respondent Carague as Secretary of the
Dept of Budget from disbursing payments for Mison’s
salaries and emoluments on the ground that Mison’s appointment
as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by
reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments (CA). On the other hand, respondents maintain the
constitutionality of Mison’s appointment without the confirmation
of the(CA). It is apparent in Sec 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution that
there are four groups of officer swhom the president shall appoint.
Issue:
Whether or not the appointment of Mison is unconstitutional.
Held:
No. The 1935 Constitution requires confirmation by the CA of all
presidential appointments. This has resulted in horse-trading and
similar malpractices.*Under the 1973 Constitution, the president
has the absolute power of appointment with hardly any check on
the legislature. Given these two extremes, the 1987 Constitution
struck a “middle ground” by requiring the consent of the CA for
the 1st group of appointments and leaving to the President without
such confirmation the appointments of the other officers:
1st group: the heads of the exec departments, ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers
whose appointments are vested in him in the Constitution,
Specifically:*Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council
[Art. VIII, Sec. 8(2)]*Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil
Service Commission [Art. IX-C, Sec. 1 (2)];*Chairman and
Commissioners of the COA [Art. IX-D, Sec. 1 (2)];*Members of
the regional consultative commission (Art. X, Sec. 18.)The rest of
the appointments mentioned in sec. 16 are not subject to
confirmation:
2nd group: all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for bylaw,
3rd group: those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint and
4th
group:officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress ma
y by law vest in the President alone.
Reason: 1. Position of bureau director is quite low
2. Confirmation of head of bureau would lead to political
influence. The clear and expressed intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution is to exclude presidential appointments from
confirmation on the CA except appointments to offices expressly
mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII. Therefore, the
confirmation on the appointment of Commissioners of the Bureau
of Customs by the CA is not required. The appointment of Mison
without submitting his nomination the CA is within the
constitutional authority of the President.
Bautsita vs Salonga
FACTS
In August 1987, then President Corazon Aquino
designated Mary Concepcion-Bautista as the Acting Chairwoman
of Commission on Human Rights. In December 1987, Cory made
the designation of Bautista permanent. Bautista then took her
oath of office.
Later however, Bautista received a letter from the
Commission on Appointments (COA) requiring her to submit
certain documents for her qualification and for confirmation by
the COA. Bautista then wrote a letter to the COA Chairman,
Senate President Jovito Salonga, and she explained that her
position as chairwoman of the CHR does not require confirmation
by the COA as laid down in the case of Sarmiento vs Mison.
Meanwhile, pending the issue of Bautista’s appointment
with the COA, Cory designated Hesiquio Mallilin as the acting
chairman of the CHR.
In 1989, the COA finally disapproved the appointment of
Bautista. COA considered Bautista’s appointment as “ad interim”.
Bautista went to the Supreme Court and questioned
COA’s actions. She impleaded Mallillin. Mallillin on his part
invoked Executive Order No. 163-A which provided that the
appointment of the CHR chair is at the pleasure of the president.
Hence, since Cory left the issue with the COA and the latter
decided not to confirm Bautista, Mallillin should be allowed to
take his seat as chairman of the CHR.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista’s appointment is subject to
COA’s confirmation.
HELD: No. The appointment of the Chairman and Members of
the CHR is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself,
unlike the Chairmen and Members of the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission
on Audit, whose appointments are expressly vested by the
Constitution in the President with the consent of the COA. The
President appoints the Chairman and Members of the CHR
pursuant to the second sentence in Sec 16, Art. 7, that is, without
the confirmation of the COA because they are among the officers
of government “whom he (the President) may be authorized by
law to appoint.”
The law which authorizes the president to make
appointments to the CHR is Executive Order No. 163.
The act of Cory submitting Bautista’s appointment to the
COA for confirmation is merely political in nature and it has no
basis in law or in the constitution. Appointment to the CHR
should be made without the participation of the COA. Thus,
Cory’s act of submitting the appointment of Bautista to the CHR
is done without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Even assuming arguendo that the President can submit
such appointment to the COA for the latter’s approval or
rejection, such submission is not valid because at the time of
submission, the office of the chairman (chairwoman) of the CHR
is not vacant – as at that time, Bautista already took her oath and
was the incumbent CHR chairperson.
 There is also no basis for the COA to consider Bautista’s
appointment as “ad interim”. Since the position of chairman and
members of the CHR are not subject to COA confirmation, all
appointments to the CHR are always permanent and cannot be ad
interim.
Anent the argument of Mallillin that EO 163-A provides
that the chairman and members of the CHR may be removed at
the pleasure of the president, the same is not valid. Thus, EO 163-
A is unconstitutional. Note that the earlier EO 163 provides that
the chairman and the members of the CHR shall have a term of 7
years. The Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR cannot
be removed at the pleasure of the president for it is guaranteed
that they must have a term of office. They can only be removed
upon cause and with the observance of due process.
Blaquera vs. Alcala G.R. No. 109406, September 11, 1998
Facts: On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which
granted each official and employee of the government the
productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount equivalent
to 30% of the employee’s one month basic salary but which
amount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the
productivity incentive benefits shall be granted only for the year
1991.
Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including
government boards of government-owned or controlled
corporations and financial institutions, are strictly prohibited from
granting productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 and
future years pending the result of a comprehensive study being
undertaken by the Office of the president.
The petitioners, who are officials and employees of
several government departments and agencies, were paid
incentive benefits for the year 1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then
Pres. Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity
incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of
P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO 268,
enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior
approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all
departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment of
productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992 in excess of P1,
000.00 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. In
compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of
the government concerned caused the deduction from petitioners’
salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged
overpayments.
Issue: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the
validexercise of presidential control over the executive
departments
Held: The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental
power and authority are exercised and implemented through him.
His power includes the control of executive departments as
provided under Sec. 17,Art. VII of the Constitution.
Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of
the latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control, review,
modify, alter or nullify any actionor decision of his subordinate in
the executive departments, bureau or offices under him.
When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive
benefits,enjoining heads of government agencies from granting
incentive benefits without approval from him and directing the
refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was
just exercising his power of control over executive departments.
The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity
incentive benefits and to prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and
demoralization among government personnel by committing
limited resources of government for the equal payment of
incentives and awards. The Pres. was only exercising his power of
control by modifying the acts of the heads of the government
agencies who granted incentive benefits to their employees
without appropriate clearance from the Office of the Pres.,
thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government
resources.
The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin.
So, too, is his control of executive departments.
FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION, v PLDT
FACTS:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Minister of Labor
and Employment.
There was a labor dispute between the Free Telephone Workers
Union (the Union) and the Philippine Long Distance Company.
Eventually, the Minister of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the
issue pursuant to Article 264 of the Labor Code as amended by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 130.
It is the submission of Petitioner labor union that "Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130 in so far as it amends article 264 of the Labor
Code delegating to the Honorable Minister of Labor and
Employment the power and discretion to assume jurisdiction
and/or certify strikes for compulsory arbitration to the National
Labor Relations Commission, and in effect make or unmake the
law on free collective bargaining, is an undue delegation of
legislative powers.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether the acts of Minister of Labor and Employment, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are
presumptively acts of the Chief Executive?
2.) Whether or not the provision in question is an undue
delegation of power.
HELD:
1.) Yes. It is presumptively acts of the President.
As held in the case of Villena v. Secretary of Interior it
was made clear that under the presidential system, "all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the
law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that
he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through
the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of
business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”
Here, the Minister is an official of the executive branch
of the government.
It is therefore logical that he, the President, should be answerable
for the acts of said Minister.
2.) No, Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 insofar as it empowers the
Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes is not
on its face unconstitutional for being violative of the doctrine of
non-delegation of legislative power.
It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the
making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds
exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may
constitutionally delegate authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its
policies, for the reason that the legislature often finds it
impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the
multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying
the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation
should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the
regulation be not in contradiction with it; but conform to the
standards that the law prescribes.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 cannot be any clearer, the
coverage being limited to "strikes or lockouts adversely affecting
the national interest.”
Hence, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
CRISANTO M. AALA v. REY T. UY GR No. 202781 January
10, 2017
Facts:
On July 12, 2011, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Tagum City's Committee on Finance conducted a public hearing
for the approval of a proposed ordinance. The proposed ordinance
sought to adopt a new schedule of market values and assessment
levels of real properties in Tagum City. It then passed City
Ordinance No. 516, s-2011, entitled An Ordinance Approving the
New Schedule of Market Values, its Classification, and
Assessment Level of Real Properties in the City of Tagum. The
ordinance was approved by Mayor Rey T. Uy (Mayor Uy) on
November 11, 2011 and was immediately forwarded to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte for review.
On February 7, 2012, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Davao del Norte's Committee on Ways and Means/Games and
Amusement issued a report dated February 1, 2012 declaring City
Ordinance No. 516, s-2011 valid. It also directed the respondents
to revise the ordinance based on the recommendations of the
Provincial Assessor's Office. Consequently, petitioners returned it
to the respondents for modification. As a result of the
amendments introduced to City Ordinance No. 516, s-2011, on
March 19, 2012, the respondents passed City Ordinance No. 558,
s-2012 and was approved by Mayor Uy on April 10, 2012. It was
then transmitted for review to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Davao del Norte. The petitioners received the proposed ordinance
on April 12, 2012.
On April 30, 2012, Engineer Crisanto M. Aala (Aala) and Colonel
Jorge P. Ferido (Ferido), both residents of Tagum City, filed
before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte an
Opposition/Objection to City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012. It was
referred to the Committee on Ways and Means/Games and
Amusement. The Committee conducted a hearing to tackle the
matters raised in the Opposition.
In their Opposition/Objection, Aala and Ferido asserted
that City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 violated Sections 130(a),
198(a) and (b), 199(b), and 201 of the Local Government Code of
1991. They alleged that Sections III C 1, 2, and 3 as well as
Sections III G 1(b) and 4(g) of the proposed ordinance divided
Tagum City into different zones, classified real properties per
zone, and fixed its market values depending on where they were
situated without taking into account the "distinct and fundamental
differences ... and elements of value" of each property.
Aala and Ferido asserted that the proposed ordinance classified
and valued those properties located in a predominantly
commercial area as commercial, regardless of the purpose to
which they were devoted. According to them, this was erroneous
because real property should be classified, valued, and assessed
not according to its location but on the basis of actual use.
Moreover, they pointed out that the proposed ordinance imposed
exorbitant real estate taxes, which the residents of Tagum City
could not afford to pay.
After the hearing, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del
Norte's Committee on Ways and Means/Games and Amusement
issued Committee Report No.5 dated May 4, 2012, which
returned City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 to the respondents. The
petitioners also directed the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum
City to give attention and due course to the oppositors' concerns.
On May 22, 2012, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum City
issued Resolution No. 808, s-2012 dated May 14, 2012,
requesting the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte to
reconsider its position on City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte issued
Resolution No. 428 declaring as invalid Sections III C 1, 2, and 3,
Sections III D (1) and (2), and Sections G 1(b) and 4(g) of City
Ordinance No. 558, s-2012.
However, on July 9, 2012, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Tagum
City passed Resolution No. 874, s-2012 declaring City Ordinance
No. 558, s-2012 as valid. It argued that te Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Davao del Norte failed to take action on City
Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 within 30 days from its receipt on
April 12, 2012. Hence, under Section 56(d) of the Local
Government Code of 1991, City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012
enjoys the presumption of validity.
On July 13, 2012, City Ordinance No. 558, s-2012 was published
in the July 13-19, 2012 issue of Trends and Time, a newspaper of
general circulation in Tagum City.
Alarmed by the impending implementation of City Ordinance No.
558, s-2012, petitioners filed before this Court an original action
for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus on August 13,
2012. The Petition included a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction.
In their Petition, petitioners seek to nullify the ordinance on the
ground that respondents enacted it with grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners invoke this Court's original jurisdiction under Article
VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution in view of the need to
immediately resolve the issues they have raised.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners comply with the doctrine
on hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of administrative remedy?
Held:
No. The Supreme Court denies the Petition for serious
procedural errors. The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is a
practical judicial policy designed to restrain parties from directly
resorting to this Court when relief may be obtained before the
lower courts. The logic behind this policy is grounded on the need
to prevent "inordinate demands upon the Court's time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction," as well as to prevent the congestion of the
Court's dockets. Hence, for this Court to be able to "satisfactorily
perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter,"
it must remain as a "court of last resort." This can be achieved by
relieving the Court of the "task of dealing with causes in the first
instance."
As expressly provided in the Constitution, this Court has original
jurisdiction "over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, and habeas corpus."However, this Court has
emphasized that the power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus does not exclusively pertain to this Court. Rather,
it is shared with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Courts. Nevertheless, "this concurrence of jurisdiction" does not
give parties unfettered discretion as to the choice of forum. The
doctrine on hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate
venue where petitions for extraordinary writs should be filed.
Parties cannot randomly select the court or forum to which their
actions will be directed.
There is another reason why this Court enjoins strict adherence to
the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. The doctrine that requires
respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to
ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated
roles in an effective and efficient manner."
Consequently, this Court will not entertain direct resort to it when
relief can be obtained in the lower courts. This holds especially
true when questions of fact are raised. Unlike this Court, trial
courts and the Court of Appeals are better equipped to resolve
questions of fact. They are in the best position to deal with causes
in the first instance.
Given the serious procedural errors committed by petitioners, we
find no genuine reason to dwell on and resolve the other issues
presented in this case. The factual issues raised by petitioners
could have been properly addressed by the lower courts had they
adhered to the doctrines of hierarchy of courts and exhaustion of
administrative remedies. These rules were established for a
reason. While petitioners' enthusiasm in their advocacy may be
admirable, their overzealousness has further delayed their cause.
Ang Tibay v CIR
FACTS
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather
company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged
shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his
employees. However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU)
questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred that the said
employees laid off were members of NLU while no members of
the rival labor union (National Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid
off. NLU claims that NWB is a company dominated union and
Toribio was merely busting NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR)
where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the
Supreme Court invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with
NLU. The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion
for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled
to a new trial.
HELD: Yes. The records show that the newly discovered
evidence or documents obtained by NLU, which they attached to
their petition with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them
at the time of the trial that even with the exercise of due diligence
they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached
documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and
effect that their admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment rendered (said newly
obtained records include books of business/inventory accounts by
Ang Tibay which were not previously accessible but already
existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR,
although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also make
sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For
administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by
observing the following:
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present
his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights
which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation
to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding
or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at
the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected.
(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore,
must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to
the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty
is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
[ G.R. No. 198140, January 25, 2016 ]
IA1 ERWIN L. MAGCAMIT, PETITIONER, VS.
INTERNAL AFFAIRS SERVICE -PHILIPPINE DRUG
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, AS REPRESENTED BY SI V
ROMEO M. ENRIQUEZ AND DIRECTOR GENERAL
DIONISIO R. SANTIAGO,
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court[1] filed by IA1 Erwin L. Magcamit (Magcamit)
from the March 17, 2011 decision[2] and the August 9, 2011
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
108281. The CA upheld the March 17, 2009 decision of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) denying Magcamit's appeal from the
May 20, 2008 memorandum of the Internal Affairs Service of the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (IAS-PDEA), which found
Magcamit guilty of grave misconduct and, consequently,
recommending his dismissal from the service.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
In a letter dated April 13, 2008, addressed to Director General
Dionisio R. Santiago, a person named Delfin gave information
about an alleged extortion done to his mother by Magcamit and
other PDEA agents. The PDEA agents denied the irregularities
imputed to them and maintained that the letter-complaint was
made only to destroy their reputation.
On May 5, 2008, Magcamit and his co-agents, namely, IO3 Carlo
Aldeon, IO2 Renato Infante, IO2 Ryan Alfaro, and IO2
Apolinario Mationg, Jr., were formally charged with Grave
Misconduct for demanding and/or obtaining P200,000.00 from
Luciana M. Jaen (Jaen) in exchange for her release after she was
apprehended in a buy-bust operation in Lipa City. After they had
submitted their Answer, their case was submitted for
recommendation and action.
In a memorandum dated May 20, 2008, Special Investigator V
Romeo M. Enriquez (SI V Enriquez) found Magcamit and his
co-agents liable for grave misconduct and recommended that they
be dismissed from the civil service. Accordingly, they were
dismissed on June 5, 2008.
SI V Enriquez gave credence to Jaen's narration of events that
when she sought help from the team leader of the buy-bust team,
she was referred to SPO1 Peter Sistemio (SPO1 Sistemio) as the
person who would facilitate her release; that SPO1 Sistemio
bluntly demanded money in exchange; that she had initially
offered P50,000.00 but SPO1 Sistemio rejected it outright; and
that, eventually, they agreed on P200,000.00.
After the agreed monetary consideration was produced, the PDEA
agents allegedly instructed Jaen's son, Delfin, to wait at the ATM
machine outside PDEA. Jaen still remained in detention after a
lapse of several hours.
The narration was reinforced by the sworn statements dated April
15, 2008 and April 17, 2008, of Compliance Investigator I
Dolorsindo M. Paner (CI Paner) who recalled that IO2 Renato
Infante (IO2 Infante) told him to meet him at the office for an
important matter about their operation; and that when IO2 Infante
arrived, he handed the money to CI Paner who then counted it on
the spot. This incident was allegedly captured by a surveillance
camera.
On July 10, 2008, Magcamit filed his motion for reconsideration
arguing that the IAS-PDEA committed errors of law and/or
irregularities prejudicial to his interest; its decision, too, was not
supported by the evidence on record.
Aside from the procedural lapses Magcamit claimed the IAS-
PDEA had committed, he raised the fact that his name never
came up in the sworn statements submitted to SI V Enriquez.
Moreover, he argued that the application of the "doctrine of
implied conspiracy" was misplaced because the evidence on
record did not show any act showing that he participated in the
alleged extortion.
On July 23, 2008, SI V Enriquez denied the motion for
reconsideration of Magcamit and his co-agents as they had been
duly afforded administrative due process and had been given a
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side. He added
that the absence of a preliminary investigation was not fatal to
their case. Lastly, he maintained that direct proof is not necessary
to establish conspiracy as long as it is shown that the parties
demonstrate they concur with the criminal design and its
objective.
Magcamit responded by filing a notice of appeal and elevating his
case to the CSC.
In its March 17, 2009 decision, the CSC denied Magcamit's
appeal and affirmed his dismissal from the civil service. It ruled
that administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers -
such as the IAS-PDEA - are unfettered by the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements especially when due process has been
fundamentally and essentially observed. It found that Magcamit
was positively identified by CI Paner in his sworn statement as
the person who identified the members of the group who received
their respective shares from the £200,000.00, thus, establishing
his participation in the extortion. The CSC noted that Magcamit
failed to controvert this allegation against him.
Reiterating the grounds he relied upon in his appeal to the CSC,
Magcamit filed a petition for review under Rule 43 with the CA,
imputing error on the part of the CSC in affirming his dismissal
from the service.
THE CA DECISION
In its March 17, 2011 decision, the CA denied the petition for
review and upheld the March 17, 2009 CSC decision.
The CA held that the CSC, in investigating complaints against
civil servants, is not bound by technical rules of procedure and
evidence applicable in judicial proceedings; that rules of
procedure are to be construed liberally to promote their objective
and to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses.
The CA found that the CSC correctly appreciated CI Paner's
sworn statement which described Magcamit's link to the extortion.
The CA said that apart from his bare and self-serving claim,
Magcamit failed to show that CI Paner was actuated by ill motive
or hate in imputing a serious offense to him.
On August 9, 2011, the CA denied Magcamit's motion for
reconsideration; hence, the present petition for review
on certiorari before this Court.
THE PETITION
Magcamit filed the present petition on the following grounds:
1. his right to due process was denied because gross irregularities
attended the administrative investigation conducted by the IAS-
PDEA; and
2. the evidence on record does not support his dismissal.
Magcamit contends that the anonymous letter-complaint of a
certain Delfin should not have been given due course as it was not
corroborated by any documentary or direct evidence and there
was no obvious truth to it. Worse, the letter-complaint had no
narration of relevant and material facts showing the acts or
omission allegedly committed by Magcamit and his co-agents.
Further, the letter-complaint only referred to him as "Erwin" and
did not specifically identify him.
Magcamit claims that he was deprived of his right to seek a
formal investigation because the IAS-PDEA deliberately failed to
inform him of this right.
Magcamit questions how the IAS-PDEA never presented him
with pieces of evidence - specifically CI Paner's sworn statement -
that were considered against him. He emphasizes that the CSC
and the CA affirmed his dismissal based on an affidavit of
complaint executed by CI Paner on May 7, 2008, that was only
attached to the IAS-PDEA's comment before the CSC.
As to his alleged participation in the extortion, Magcamit alleges
that he never had any discussion with CI Paner about each agent's
share in the P200,000.00. He argues that he could not have
refuted the allegation against him since he was not even aware
of CI Paner's sworn statement until the case was brought up
before the CSC.
Magcamit claims support for his case after the dismissal of the
criminal complaint filed against him and his co-agents. In its June
18, 2010 resolution, the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office found
the evidence against them insufficient to prove that they requested
or received any money from Jaen.
Finally, Magcamit maintains that the purported surveillance video
is inadmissible as evidence because it was not authenticated nor
shown to him.
OUR RULING
We GRANT the present petition because Magcamit's dismissal
was unsupported by substantial evidence.
Although Magcamit assails that the letter-complaint should not
have been entertained to begin with as it was not in accord with
the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(RACCS),[4] we do not find any need to dwell on this point. The
administrative complaint was initiated when Jaen and Delfm
executed sworn statements and filed them with the IAS-PDEA.
As the CA correctly pointed out, the letter-complaint did not, by
itself, commence the administrative proceedings against
Magcamit; it merely triggered a fact-finding investigation by the
IAS-PDEA. Accordingly, these sworn statements - together with
the letter-complaint -were used as pieces of evidence to build
a prima facie case for extortion warranting a formal charge for
grave misconduct.
Administrative determinations of contested cases are by their
nature quasi-judicial; there is no requirement for strict adherence
to technical rules that are observed in truly judicial
proceedings.[5] As a rule, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are relaxed in administrative proceedings in order "to
assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of their respective claims and defenses." [6] By
relaxing technical rules, administrative agencies are, thus, given
leeway in coming up with a decision.
Nonetheless, in deciding disciplinary cases pursuant to their
quasi-judicial powers, administrative agencies must still comply
with the fundamental principle of due process. Administrative
tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are unfettered by the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements, subject to the
observance of fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in justiciable cases presented before them.[7]
Due process in administrative cases, in essence, is simply an
opportunity to explain one's side or to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling. For as long as the parties were given fair and
reasonable opportunity to be heard before judgment was rendered,
the demands of due process were sufficiently met.[8]
The cardinal primary rights and principles in administrative
proceedings that must be respected are those outlined in the
landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations,[9] quoted below:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which
includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his
case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which
he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. "Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at
the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges,
therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of
the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial
questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to
the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty
is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
The first of the enumerated rights pertains to the substantive rights
of a party at the hearing stage of the proceedings.[10]
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang
Tibay requirements are reinforcements of the right to a hearing
and are the inviolable rights applicable at the deliberative stage,
as the decision maker decides on the evidence presented during
the hearing.[11]These standards set forth the guiding considerations
in deliberating on the case and are the material and substantial
components of decision making.[12]
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and substance of
the decision of a quasi-judicial body, further complements the
hearing and decision-making due process rights and is similar in
substance to the constitutional requirement that a decision of a
court must state distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is
based.[13]
At the hearing stage, while Magcamit was never afforded a formal
investigation, we have consistently ruled that there is no violation
of procedural due process even if no formal or trial-type hearing
was conducted, where the party was given a chance to explain his
side of the controversy.
Before the IAS-PDEA, Magcamit had the opportunity to deny and
controvert the complaint against him when he filed his reply to
the letter-complaint and his answer to the formal charge.
Dissatisfied with the IAS-PDEA's decision, he elevated his case
to the CSC which likewise found him guilty of conspiring with
his co-agents, rendering him liable for gross misconduct. From
these developments, it can hardly be said that the IAS-PDEA and
the CSC denied Magcamit his opportunity to be heard.
In addition, Magcamit was duly represented by counsel who could
properly apprise him of what he is entitled to under law and
jurisprudence. Thus, he cannot claim that he was deprived of his
right to a formal hearing because the IAS-PDEA failed to inform
him of such right.
With the issue on due process at the hearing stage resolved, we
now move on to discuss the merits of the petition before us.
Claiming that he was not involved in the extortion, Magcamit
argues that the CSC and the CA misappreciated the facts when
they considered the affidavit of complaint CI Paner executed on
May 7, 2008, as substantial evidence supporting the conclusion
that he conspired with his co-agents. This issue involves a
question of fact as there is need for a calibration of the evidence,
considering mainly the credibility of witnesses and the existence
and the relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their
relation to one another and to the whole, and the probabilities of
the situation.[14]
In cases brought before us via a petition for review
on certiorari, we are limited to the review of errors of law.[15] We,
however, may review the findings of fact when they fail to
consider relevant facts that, if properly taken into account, would
justify a different conclusion or when there is serious ground to
believe that a possible miscarriage of justice would result.[16]
We recall that only the April 17, 2008 affidavit of Jaen and the
April 17, 2008 affidavit of Delfin were attached to the formal
charge for grave misconduct against Magcamit and four
(4)[17] other members of the PDEA-Special Enforcement Service
(SES). This formal charge required them to submit their
respective position papers on the administrative charge. Notably,
both affidavits never mentioned the name of Magcamit.
SI V Enriquez's memorandum/decision dated May 20, 2008 -
which found Magcamit and his four co-accused guilty of grave
misconduct, and recommended their dismissal from the service -
relied on the affidavits of CI Paner dated April 15, 2008 and April
17, 2008, respectively, which it considered to have "reinforced the
allegations" of Jaen and her son, Delfin. CI Paner's two
affidavits were never shown to Magcamit. At any rate, CI
Paner's two affidavits, like the affidavits of Jaen and Delfin,
did not mention Magcamit.
Probably realizing that the April 17, 2008 affidavit of Jaen, the
April 17, 2008 affidavit of Delfin, and the April 15, 2008 and
April 17, 2008 affidavits of CI Paner did not mention the
involvement of Magcamit in the extortion, the CSC's Resolution
No. 090431 dated March 17, 2009, used as basis another affidavit
of CI Paner (dated May 7, 2008) in affirming the May 20, 2008
decision of the IAS-PDEA. Curiously, the CSC termed this
affidavit as CI Paner's 'original affidavit' although it was the third
affidavit that CI Paner had executed.
The evidence on record shows that CI Paner executed three (3)
affidavits with different dates,[18] relating to the manner the
members of the PDEA-SES tried to give him a share of the
P200,000.00 they extorted from Jaen. It must be noted, however,
that it was only the Affidavit of Complaint dated May 7, 2008,
that linked Magcamit to the scheme. Curiously, this affidavit was
never mentioned, despite being a more complete narration of what
transpired, in SI V Enriquez' recommendation dated May 20,
2008. In fact, the investigating officer referred only to the
affidavits dated April 15, 2008 and April 17, 2008.[19]
Surprisingly, the CSC ruled that the statements of CI Paner in his
May 7, 2008 affidavit "was never controverted by Magcamit"
although the latter had not been furnished this document. It was
only when Magcamit requested for certified true copies of the
Comment and the other documents submitted by the IAS-PDEA
to the CSC that he discovered the existence of Paner's May 7,
2008 affidavit.
As the CSC did, the CA ruled that Magcamit participated in the
extortion on the basis of Paner's May 7, 2008 alone. Accordingly,
it affirmed the CSC's resolution.
Under these circumstances, the CA erred in affirming the CSC's
dismissal of the respondent on the basis of Paner's May 7, 2008
affidavit - a document that was not part of the proceedings before
the IAS-PDEA.
Given how the evidence against him came out, we find that
Magcamit could not have adequately and fully disputed the
allegations against him since during the administrative
investigation he was not properly apprised of all the evidence
against him. We point out that Magcamit could not have refuted
the May 7, 2008 affidavit of Paner, which was the sole basis of
the CSC's and the CA's finding of Magcamit's liability; notably,
the formal charge requiring him and his co-accused to file their
position papers was dated May 5, 2008. Corollarily, Magcamit
and his co-agents were not even furnished a copy of the affidavits
of CI Paner dated April 15, 2008 and April 17, 2008 before the
recommendation for dismissal came out. Magcamit was thus
blindsided and forced to deal with pieces of evidence he did not
even know existed.
Thus, the requirement that "[t]he decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record AND disclosed to the parties affected," was not
complied with. Magcamit was not properly apprised of the
evidence presented against him, which evidence were eventually
made the bases of the decision finding him guilty of grave
misconduct and recommending his dismissal.
Although, in the past, we have held that the right to due process of
a respondent in an administrative case is not violated if he filed a
motion for reconsideration to refute the evidence against him, the
present case should be carefully examined for purposes of the
application of this rule. Here, the evidence of Magcamit's
participation was made available to him only after he had elevated
the case to the CSC. Prior to that, or when the IAS-PDEA came
up with the decision finding him guilty of gross misconduct, there
was no substantial evidence proving Magcamit was even
involved.
We consider, too, that even if we take into account CI Paner's
May 7, 2008 affidavit, we find this document to be inadequate to
hold - even by standards of substantial evidence - that Magcamit
participated in the PDEA's extortion activities.
We note that the CSC and the CA linked Magcamit to the alleged
extortion in paragraph 13 of CI Paner's May 7, 2008 affidavit of
complaint, which reads:
13. That pretending nothing had happened and yet projecting to
the group that I am a bit apprehensive as to the evident inequality
in the sharing of the extorted money from subject Jaen, I was able
to talk with Agent Erwin Magcamit, one of the members of the
arresting team, and asked the latter as to how the group came up
with the Php21,500.00 sharing for each member out of the
Php200,000.00; from which Agent Magcamit simply said to me
that such was the sharing and everybody except me seemed to
have consented; in addition thereto, Agent Magcamit vividly
mentioned all other members who got their share of the
Php21,500.00, namely, [1] Carlo S. Aldeon, [2] PO3 Emerson
Adaviles, [3], PO2 Reywin Bariuad, [4] IO2 Renato Infante,
[5] IO2 Apolinario Mationg, [6] IO2 Ryan Alfaro, and [7] PO3
Peter Sistemio.[20]

We discern no showing from this allegation that Magcamit

extorted money from Jaen, or that he was among those who took
part in the division of the money allegedly extorted from Jaen. For
conspiracy to exist, it must be proven or at least inferred from the
acts of the alleged perpetrator before, during, and after the
commission of the crime. It cannot simply be surmised that
conspiracy existed because Magcamit was part of the team that
took part in the buy-bust operation which resulted in Jaen's arrest.
In other words, respondents failed to pinpoint Magcamit's
participation in the extortion that would make him
administratively liable.

After evaluating the totality of evidence on record, we find that

the records are bereft of substantial evidence to support the
conclusion that Magcamit should be held administratively liable
for grave misconduct; Magcamit was dismissed from the service
based on evidence that had not been disclosed to him. By
affirming this dismissal, the CA committed a grave reversible
error.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the present

petition. The March 17, 2011 decision and the August 9, 2011
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 108281 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency isORDERED to reinstate IA1 Erwin L.
Magcamit to his previous position without loss of seniority rights
and with full payment of his salaries, backwages, and benefits
from the time of his dismissal from the service up to his
reinstatement.

SO ORDER.