Koh vs.

IAC of material facts or admissions from the adverse party through

written interrogatories; to obtain admissions from the adverse
1. Koh’s father sent her $500 through the Metropolitan Bank &
party regarding the genuineness of relevant documents or
trust Company which is the remitting bank of respondent First
relevant matters of fact through requests for admission; to
Interstate Bank of California. But due to a computer mistake,
inspect relevant documents or objects and lands or other
respondent Bank’s Los Angeles office erroneously overstated the
property in the possession or control of the adverse party; and
amount of $8500 instead of $500.
to determine the physical or mental condition of a party when
2. It was deposited to her account and she subsequently withdrew
such is controversy.
it.
3. Trial judges should therefore, encourage the proper utilization of
3. Koh admitted that what happened was true and that she’s
rules in discovery. However, recourse to discovery of procedures
offering the bank to pay it in installments of $100 but the offer
is not mandatory. If the parties do not choose to resort to such
was rejected.
4. The Officer in Charge of RTC Makati sent the following “NOTICE procedures, the pre-trial conference should be set.
OF CASE STATUS” to the parties through their respective lawyers.
Stated on it, “If a party believes that those modes of discovery
are not applicable, necessary or feasible with respect to him, he
shall file a manifestation to that effect.” REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON
5. No manifestation was filed by the parties’ lawyers. And for the GOOD GOVERNMENT), petitioner, vs.
non-compliance with Order the case was dismissed. SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. and
6. The respondent Bank refilled its case but Koh invoked res DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO, respondents.
adjudicate and filed for a motion to dimiss. It was denied by the G.R. No. 90478 November 21, 1991
judge.
7. Elevated to the IAC, it was also denied. FACTS: The case was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in behalf
ISSUE: Whether or not the earlier decision of dismissing the case was
of the Republic of the Philippines. The complaint which initiated
null and void.
the action was denominated one "for reconveyance, reversion,
HELD: The decision of the appellate court is affirmed. accounting, restitution and damages," and was avowedly filed
pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 of President Corazon C.
1. The omissions of the counsel are not fatal to its cause in view of Aquino. After having been served with summons, Tantoco, Jr.
the defective procedure which resulted in its dismissal. and Santiago, instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a
2. The rules on discovery are intended to enable a party to obtain
"Motion to Strike Out Some Portions of the Complaint and For
knowledge of material facts within the knowledge of the adverse
Bill of Particulars of Other Portions." The PCGG filed an
party or third parties through depositions; to obtain knowledge
opposition thereto, and the movants, a reply to the opposition.
Tantoco and Santiago then presented a "motion for leave to file
interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court" of which the
PCGG responded by filing a motion. On March 18, 1988, in
compliance with the Order of January 29, 1988, the PCGG filed
an Expanded Complaint of which the Sandiganbayan denied with
a Resolution. Tantoco and Santiago then filed an Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim. On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and
Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated
"Interrogatories to Plaintiff," and on August 2, 1989, an
"Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff"' as well as a Motion for
Production and Inspection of Documents. The Sandiganbayan
admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the motion
for production and inspection of documents respectively. PCGG
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of August
25, 1989, it also filed an opposition to the Amended
Interrogatories. Tantoco and Santiago filed a reply and
opposition. After hearing, the Sandiganbayan promulgated two
(2) Resolutions. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON PETITIONER CAN OBJECT TO THE INTERROGATORIES
SERVED ON IT IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 25 OF THE RULES OF
COURT.
2. WON SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN ORDERING FOR THE
PRODUCTION AND INSPECTION OF SPECIFIED DOCUMENTS AND
THINGS ALLEGEDLY IN THE POSSESSION OF PCGG.
HELD:
1. No. The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense
that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its consent. But it is
axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign
character and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the
level of an ordinary litigant. The PCGG cannot claim a superior or
preferred status to the State, even while assuming to represent
or act for the State.
2. No. The Court gives short shrift to the argument that some
documents sought to be produced and inspected had already
been presented in Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG's
exhibits, the movants having in fact viewed, scrutinized and even
offered objections thereto and made comments thereon.
Obviously, there is nothing secret or confidential about these
documents. No serious objection can therefore be presented to
the desire of the private respondents to have copies of those
documents in order to study them some more or otherwise use
them during the trial for any purpose allowed by law.
GERONIMO CAGUIAT, RUFINA CAGUIAT, FELICIDAD CAGUIAT,
FABIAN CAGUIAT, and APOLONIA CAGUIAT, petitioners-
appellants,
vs.
THE HONORABLE GUILLERMO E. TORRES and FRANCISCO
CAGUIAT, respondents-appellees.
De Santos and Delfino for petitioners-appellants.
L. D. Fuggan and Associates for respondents-appellees.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. No. 35429-R, Geronimo Caguiat, et al., Petitioners, vs.
Hon. Guillermo E. Torres and Francisco Caguiat, Respondents,
which "denied and dismissed" the petition for certiorari filed by
herein petitioners-appellants for the purpose of annulling and
setting aside the order of above-mentioned judge of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal in Civil Case No. 8050 of said court
between said appellants and private appellee — respondent
herein, Francisco Caguiat granting the latter's motion to enjoin
the taking of said appellee's deposition, by way of discovery,
after issues had already been joined by the filing of said
appellee's answer as defendant in said civil case.
The controlling facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as
follows:
Petitioners are plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 8050 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch VIII, presided over by respondent
Judge, while respondent Francisco Caguiat is the defendant
therein.
On August 18, 1964, after defendant had filed his answer with
counterclaim, and the plaintiffs, their reply to defendant's
answer (See Annexes A, B, C, D), the herein petitioners served on
respondent Caguiat a notice to take his deposition (Annex E). On
August 26, 1964 respondent Caguiat filed with the lower court
an urgent motion to prevent the taking of the deposition or to
restrict its scope (Annex F), which urgent motion the petitioners
opposed (Annex G). On the 29th of the same month the
respondent Judge issued an order (Annex F), to hold in abeyance
the resolution of his co-respondent's urgent motion until after
the pre-trial set for September 3, 1963 which was, however,
reset for October 2, 1964 to give the parties time to consider an
amicable settlement. The parties however failed to arrive at an
amicable settlement.
On October 3, 1964 herein petitioners again served on
respondent Caguiat a second notice for the taking of his
deposition upon oral examination (Annexes K and L), to prevent
which, the latter filed an urgent motion on the 14th of the same
month (Annex M). Petitioners opposed respondent Caguiat's
urgent motion (Annex N). Resolving the urgent motion and the
opposition thereto, the respondent Judge, on the 17th, granted
his co-respondent's urgent motion and ordered the petitioners
to refrain from taking the contemplated deposition (Annex O).
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration (Annex P) was denied
after its hearing on December 12, 1964 (Annex S).
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioners' avowed purpose in securing the deposition of
respondent Caguiat is to get the latter to lay his cards on the
table and/or to simplify or abbreviate the proceedings.
Respondent Caguiat, on the other hand, affirms that he has
already revealed practically his entire defense, even to the extent
of naming his witnesses, during the pre-trial, so that the
necessity of a deposition has been obviated. In fact, according to
respondent Caguiat, he had expressed willingness to enter into a
stipulation of facts, but apparently the petitioners did not want
to. We note that the petitioners have not denied respondent
Caguiat's assertion that he had already disclosed all his evidence
during the pre-trial, neither have they belied that personal
animosities between them and the same respondent which went
unfettered during the pre-trial, might endanger the peaceful and
objective conduct of the deposition upon oral examination.
It is significant that the respondent Judge deferred the resolution
of his co-respondent's first motion to prevent the taking of his
deposition or to restrict its scope, until after the pre-trial (See
Annex H). Likewise, the second urgent motion of the same tenor
(Annex M) and the petitioners' opposition thereto (Annex N)
were resolved only after the completion of the pre-trial and in
fact after the parties' joint petition for hearing on the merits had
been granted (Annex J). The fact that the controverted orders
were issued only after the pre-trial supports respondent
Caguiat's affirmation that he had revealed his defense during the
trial, and that the respondent Judge had satisfied himself that
after such revelation there was no more need to take the
former's deposition upon oral examination. Indubitably this view
must have been shared by the petitioners, otherwise they would
not have filed a joint motion for hearing on the merits even
before the orders in question were issued. (Decision of Court of
Appeals, pp. 1-2 & 4-5)
Appellants assign the following alleged errors of the Court of
Appeals:
I proposed appears well substantiated in the records before Us. As
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MAKING ITS DECISION
DEPEND ON THE UNSUPPORTED CONCLUSION THAT 'SINCE THE
RESPONDENT FRANCISCO CAGUIAT HAD PRACTICALLY
DISCLOSED ALL HIS EVIDENCE DURING THE PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE' THE NECESSITY OF A DEPOSITION THROUGH ORAL
EXAMINATION BY THE PETITIONERS WAS OBVIATED.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THERE WAS A DISCLOSURE OF
EVIDENCE BY THE RESPONDENT CAGUIAT DURING THE PRE-
TRIAL CONFERENCE AND THAT THE PERSONAL ANIMOSITIES
BETWEEN THE PARTIES MIGHT BE HEIGHTENED, THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN MAKING SAID 'FINDINGS' AS GROUNDS TO
COMPLETELY PREVENT AND BAR DISCOVERY THROUGH
DEPOSITION ON EXAMINATION.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN LIMITING PETITIONERS' MODE
OF DISCOVERY TO OTHER MEANS THAN ORAL EXAMINATION
IGNORING THEREBY THE SPIRIT BEHIND THE RULES OF
DISCOVERY. (Appellants' brief)
Anent the first alleged error, it is readily to be noted that the
conclusions of fact of the Court of Appeals being assailed are
binding upon the parties and this Court. Indeed, the finding of
that appellate court to the effect that appellee has already
disclosed all his evidence during the pre-trial and that personal
animosities between the parties "might endanger the peaceful
and objective conduct of the deposition upon oral examination"
aptly stated in the appealed decision:
It is significant that the respondent Judge deferred the resolution
of his co-respondent's first motion to prevent the taking of his
deposition or to restrict its scope, until after the pre-trial (see
Annex H). Likewise, the second urgent motion of the same tenor
(Annex M) and the petitioners' opposition thereto (Annex N)
were resolved only after the completion of the pre-trial and in
fact after the parties' joint petition for hearing on the merits had
been granted (Annex J). The fact that the controverted orders
were issued only after the pre-trial supports respondent
Caguiat's affirmation that he had revealed his defense during the
trial, and that the respondent Judge had satisfied himself that
after such revelation there was no more need to take the
former's deposition upon oral examination. Indubitably this view
must have been shared by the petitioners, otherwise they would
not have filed a joint motion for hearing on the merits even
before the orders in question were issued. (p. 5, CA's decision)

In their second assignment of error, appellants contend that the
disclosure by appellee of practically all his evidence at the pre-
trial and the danger of heightening the animosities between the
parties during the proposed taking of the deposition of appellee
are not enough to warrant the trial court's order preventing
completely the taking of said deposition. Such contention is
untenable.
There can be no question that the trial court has jurisdiction to
direct, in its discretion, that a deposition shall not be taken, if
there are valid reasons for so ruling. (Cojuangco v. Caluag, L-
7952, July 30, 1955, unreported) That the right of a party to take
depositions as means of discovery is not exactly absolute is
implicit in the provisions of the Rules of Court cited by appellants
themselves, sections 16 and 18 of Rule 24, which are precisely
designed to protect parties and their witnesses, whenever in the
opinion of the trial court, the move to take their depositions
under the guise of discovery is actually intended to only annoy,
embarrass or oppress them. In such instances, these provisions
expressly authorize the court to either prevent the taking of a
deposition or stop one that is already being taken.
In the case at bar, aside from having practically disclosed all his
evidence at the pre-trial, appellee expressed willingness to enter
into a stipulation of facts, which offer, appellants rejected.
Moreover, according to Court of Appeals, the parties herein filed
a joint motion for hearing on the merits even before the orders
in question were issued. Under these circumstances, it is
inevitable to conclude that there was indeed no further need for
the deposition desired by appellants. It could have served no
useful purpose, for there was nothing anymore to discover.
Appellants have not shown any real concrete reason for such
deposition.
Appellants' inference in their third assignment of error that the
Court of Appeals has limited their modes of discovery only to
other means than a deposition is entirely baseless. All that has
been done here is to hold, and rightly, that appellants have failed
to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in
holding that, under the circumstances proven in the records,
there existed good reasons to prevent them from taking the
deposition of appellee.
It is Our conclusion that this appeal is absolutely without merit.
Instead of availing themselves of the modes of discovery
provided in the Rules in the manner that would accomplish one
of the basic purposes for which they have been designed,
namely, to cut down trivial discussion about issues of fact which
are better agreed upon rather than formally tried, appellants
have chosen to unduly delay this case by taking the simple
incident herein involved to the Court of Appeals and later to this
Court.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Treble costs
against appellants in this instance
SANTIAGO LAND DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and KOMATSU INDUSTRIES (PHILS.), INC.,
respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari filed by
petitioner Santiago Land Development Corporation is the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 26, 1991, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing premises, this
petition is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.[1]
The following are the antecedent facts:
For failure of respondent Komatsu Industries (Phil.) to pay its
indebtedness amounting to P27,000,000, the Philippine National
Bank (PNB, for brevity) initiated the foreclosure proceedings of
the 18,000 square meter mortgaged property located at 2275
Pasong Tamo Extension, Makati and covered by TCT No. 469737
(S-5697) duly registered in the name of the mortgagor, herein
respondent Komatsu Industries.
On December 16, 1983, respondent Komatsu Industries filed an
action with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Makati, docketed
as Civil Case No. 5937, seeking to prevent the foreclosure of the
subject property. The trial court issued a temporary restraining
order but the property was, extrajudicially foreclosed by the
PNB. Thereafter, respondent Komatsu Industries filed an
amended petition for the declaration of nullity of the
extrajudicial foreclosure sale.
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 5937, petitioner Santiago
Land Development Corporation (SLDC, for brevity) purchased the
subject property for P90,000,000 and a deed of absolute sale
was executed by the PNB on November 21, 1989. Consequently,
petitioner SLDC filed a motion for intervention alleging that any
ruling or decision adverse to PNB would necessarily bind SLDC as
transferee pendente lite. Petitioner SLDC was then allowed to
intervene in the case at bar.
On November 20, 1990, petitioner SLDC served written
interrogatories on respondent Komatsu Industries counsel.[2]
The interrogatories were not, however, answered by the
respondent by reason of which petitioner SLDC filed a motion to
dismiss the action with prejudice based on Sec. 5, Rule 29 of the
Rules of Court.
An opposition to the motion to dismiss was filed by respondent
Komatsu Industries alleging inter alia that there was no valid
service of the written interrogatories inasmuch as the service
was made on the respondents counsel and not directly upon any
of the respondents officers who were competent to testify in its
behalf, pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 25 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In an order dated March 14, 1991, the trial court denied the
motion to dismiss.[3] Petitioner SLDC filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied.[4]
Petitioner SLDC filed a petition for review before this Court but it
was referred to the Court of Appeals by resolution dated July 17,
1991.
In the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated December
26, 1991, it was held:
In the case at bar, the private respondent itself admitted that the
interrogatories were served upon its counsel of record Emerito
Salva and Associates. There is, therefore, a valid service of the
interrogatories upon private respondent.[5]
However, while the Court of Appeals ruled that there was a valid
service and the failure of the respondent to answer the
interrogatories would warrant the dismissal of the case,
nevertheless, it explained, thus:
"However, while respondent court may have committed an error
of judgment in denying the motion to dismiss filed by the
petitioner in this case based on his interpretation of the rules,
the said court may hardly be accused of grave abuse of
discretion as would be tantamount to lack of or excess in
jurisdiction. Certiorari, therefore, does not lie in the case at bar.
As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals, 169 SCRA 244, a petition for
certiorari is intended to correct defects of jurisdiction solely and
not to correct errors of procedure or matters in the court a quos
findings or conclusions. (citing Ilacad vs. Court of Appeals, 78
SCRA 310).[6]
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, hence, this petition
for review before us.
Petitioner SLDC now argues that the civil action should have
been ordered dismissed with prejudice because of private
respondents deliberate, knowing, and continued refusal to
answer the written interrogatories. The respondent court,
therefore, committed grave abuse of discretion and/or
disregarded the usual course of judicial proceedings when it
refused to order the dismissal of the civil case. Petitioner invokes
Section 5, Rule 29 of the Rules of Court, which provides, to wit:
If a party or an officer or managing agent of a party wilfully fails
to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after
being served with a proper notice, or fails to serve answers to
interrogatories submitted under Rule 25, after proper service of
such interrogatories, the court on motion and notice, may strike
out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the
action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by
default against that party, and its discretion, order him to pay
reasonable expenses incurred by the other, including attorneys
fees.
The dismissal of the civil action would allegedly be the proper
sanction to respondents refusal to answer the interrogatories.
Moreover, justice would allegedly be promoted considering that
the civil action was purportedly without basis and was purely for
harassment.
In its comment, private respondent Komatsu Industries avers
that the court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
declaring that the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner
was not the proper remedy. The dismissal of the petition was
proper since the interrogatories were served after private
respondent had rested its case and after the presentation of
evidence, hence, improperly served.
Section 5, Rule 29 of the Rules of Court warrants the dismissal of
the complaint when the plaintiff fails or refuses to answer the
written interrogatories. If plaintiff fails or refuses to answer the
interrogatories, it may be a good basis for the dismissal of his
complaint for non-suit unless he can justify such failure or
refusal.[7] It should be noted that it is discretionary on the court
to order the dismissal of the action.
In Arellano vs. CFI,[8] it was held that -
The dismissal of an action for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute
the same rests upon the sound discretion of the trial court and
will not be reversed on appeal in the absence of abuse. The
burden of showing abuse of judicial discretion is upon appellant
since every presumption is in favor of correctness of the courts
action. (1 Moran, pp.528-529, 1970 ed.).
We agree with the respondent court that although there was an
error of judgment in denying the motion to dismiss,
nevertheless, such cannot be considered as grave abuse of
discretion and therefore, correctable by certiorari. Certiorari is
not available to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the
judges findings and conclusions and that certiorari will not be
issued to cure errors in proceedings or to correct erroneous
conclusions of law and fact.[9] Furthermore, the denial of a
motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory, cannot be
questioned by certiorari, it cannot be subject of appeal, until
final judgment or order is rendered.[10]
Considering the foregoing premises, a petition for a review by
certiorari in the case at bar does not lie. In Philippine Virginia
Tobacco Administration vs. Lucero,[11] it was lucidly stated that -
For certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary, and
whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial
prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and
common law traditions (Panaligan vs. Adolfo, 67 SCRA 176). The
abuse of discretion must be grave and patent and it must be
shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or
despotically (Palma and Ignacio vs. Q&S, Inc., et al., 17 SCRA 97).
Absent any arbitrary or despotic exercise of judicial power as to
amount to abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent
court, the instant petition cannot prosper.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit
with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Vda. De Manguerra vs Risos
G.R. No. 152643 August 28, 2008
CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA and THE HON.
RAMON C. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge of theRegional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 19,Petitioners,
- versus -
RAUL RISOS, SUSANA YONGCO, LEAH ABARQUEZ and ATTY.
GAMALIEL D.B. BONJE,
Respondents.
Respondents were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of
Public Document before the RTC as Criminal Case that arose
from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly
committed by respondents where they made it appear that
Concepcion, the owner of the mortgaged property known as the
Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the document.
Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu City, while on vacation
in Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical
Center due to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding; and was advised
to stay in Manila for further treatment.
The counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latters
deposition. He explained the need to perpetuate Concepcions
testimony due to her weak physical condition and old age, which
limited her freedom of mobility.
The motion was granted by the RTC. Aggrieved, respondent filed
a special civil action for certiorari before the CA.
At the outset, the CA observed that there was a defect in the
respondent’s petition by not impleading the People of the
Philippines, an indispensable party. This notwithstanding, the
appellate court resolved the matter on its merit, declaring that
the examination of prosecution witnesses, as in the present case,
is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. The
latter provision, said the appellate court, only applies to civil
cases. Pursuant to the specific provision of Section 15, Rule 119,
Concepcions deposition should have been taken before the
judge or the court where the case is pending and not before the
Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus, in issuing the assailed
order, the RTC clearly committed grave abuse of discretion.
The CA added that the rationale of the Rules in requiring the
taking of deposition before the same court is the constitutional
right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face. The
appellate court likewise concluded that Rule 23 could not be
applied suppletorily because the situation was adequately
addressed by a specific provision of the rules of criminal
procedure.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Rule 23 of Civil Procedure applies to the
deposition of the petitioner?
2. Whether or not failure to implead the People of the
Philippines in a petition for certiorari arising from a criminal case
a quo constitutes a waivable defect in the petition for certiorari?
Held:
1. It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the
trial of the case in the presence of the judge. This is especially
true in criminal cases in order that the accused may be afforded
the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his
constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face. It also
gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such
questions as they deem material and necessary to support their
position or to test the credibility of said witnesses. Lastly, this
rule enables the judge to observe the witnesses demeanor.
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28
of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of
discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action. These
rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of
witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings,
Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the
conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution
witnesses.
In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution
witness, who, according to the petitioners, was too sick to travel
and appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule 119 thus
comes into play, and it provides:
Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it
satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too
sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or
has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he
may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where
the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the
accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to attend the
examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the
same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of
the accused to attend the examination
The procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It
is thus required that the conditional examination be made
before the court where the case is pending. It is also necessary
that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the
examination, subject to his right to waive the same after
reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules
mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as an
examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.
To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution
witness for the purpose of taking his deposition should be made
before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is
pending. Such is the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the
Rules. We find no necessity to depart from, or to relax, this rule.
As correctly held by the CA, if the deposition is made elsewhere,
the accused may not be able to attend, as when he is under
detention. More importantly, this requirement ensures that the
judge would be able to observe the witness deportment to
enable him to properly assess his credibility. This is especially
true when the witness testimony is crucial to the prosecutions
case.
2. It is undisputed that in their petition for certiorari before the
CA, respondents failed to implead the People of the Philippines
as a party thereto. Because of this, the petition was obviously
defective. As provided in Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, all criminal actions are prosecuted under
the direction and control of the public prosecutor. Therefore, it
behooved the petitioners (respondents herein) to implead the
People of the Philippines as respondent in the CA case to enable
the Solicitor General to comment on the petition.
However, this Court has repeatedly declared that the failure to
implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal
of an action. In such a case, the remedy is to implead the non-
party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by
order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own initiative
at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the
petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party
despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the
complaint/petition for the petitioners/plaintiffs failure to comply.
Instructive is the Courts pronouncement in Commissioner
Domingo v. Scheer in this wise:
There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their
forms or contents. Their sole purpose is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties.
They were created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate and
promote, the administration of justice. They do not constitute
the thing itself, which courts are always striving to secure to
litigants. They are designed as the means best adapted to obtain
that thing. In other words, they are a means to an end. When
they lose the character of the one and become the other, the
administration of justice is at fault and courts are
correspondingly remiss in the performance of their obvious duty.

G. R. N0. 102390. February 1, 2002
REY LAÑADA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS.
ROGELIO and ELIZA HEMEDEZ, respondents.
G. R. No. 102404. February 1, 2002
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC. and FRANCIS SANTOS, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. ROGELIO and ELIZA HEMEDEZ,
respondents.
FACTS:
Spouses Hemedez filed an action for damages against several
persons for the death of Dr. ViedVemir Garcia Hemedez which
happened in a dispersal operation during a strike staged by the
Union of Filipino Employees on account of alleged unfair labor
practices committed by Nestle Philippines, Inc.
The Hemedez spouses served the defendants a request for
admission of truth of the facts set forth in their complaint and
the genuiness of each of the documents appended therto.
Through their respective counsel, defendants filed a verified
answer to the request for admission.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an answer to a request for admission
signed and sworn to by the counsel of the party so requested is
sufficient compliance with the provisions of Rule 26 of the Rules
of Court.
HELD:
The provision of Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the matrix
upon which the resolution of these petitions rests, state:
SEC. 2. Implied admission. – Each of the matters of which an
admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless, within
a period designated in the request, which shall not be less than
ten (10) days after service thereof, or within such further time as
the court may allow on motion and notice, the party to whom
the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the
admission a sworn statement either denying specifically or
setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either
admit or deny those matters.
The issue for resolution thus calls for an interpretation of the
phrase “the party to whom the request is directed.” This is not
the first time that the Court is faced with the issue of whether a
party requested to make admissions may reply or answer
through his counsel. In PSCFC Financial Corporation v. Court of
Appeals.
(R.138) SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. – An
attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any
cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is
required to authorize him to appear in court for his client..”
Also in Section 23 of Rule 138 provides that “(a)ttorneys have
authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in
relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all
matters of ordinary judicial procedure..”
Neither is there a showing that petitioners Nestle and Santos did
not authorize their respective counsel to file in their behalf the
respective answers requested of them by private respondents in
the latter’s written request for admission. As this Court has said,
there is no reason to strictly construe the phrase “the party to
whom the request is directed” to refer solely or personally to the
petitioners themselves.
Moreover, as correctly observed by the lower court, the subject
matters of the request for admission are the same as the
ultimate facts alleged in the complaint for which private
respondents have filed their respective answers. Private
respondents thus desired the petitioners to admit once again the
very matters they had dealt with in their respective answers. The
Court reiterated that ruling in Briboneria v. Court of Appeals and
in Concrete Aggregates Corporation v. Court of Appeals.
In the latter case, the Court emphasized that the rule on
admission as a mode of discovery is intended “to expedite trial
and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not
be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by
reasonable inquiry.” Thus, if the request for admission only
serves to delay the proceedings by abetting redundancy in the
pleadings, the intended purpose for the rule will certainly be
defeated
SECURITY BANK CORP. vs. DEL ALCAZAR, et al.
THIRD DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this
Court dated MAR 11 2002.
G.R. No. 151310(Security Bank Corporation vs. Erlinda Dungo del
Alcazar, represented by her Attorney-In-Fact, Rufino S. Javier.)
Petitioner assails the resolution of the Court of Appeals
upholding the regional trial court's order allowing the taking of
the testimony of respondent and her witnesses by oral
depositions before the legal officer of the Philippine Embassy in
Los Angeles, California.
The present controversy stemmed from a complaint for damages
filed by private respondent against petitioner after the latter had
pre-terminated the contract of lease in violation thereof.
Apparently, on December 19, 1995, petitioner, represented by 2
of its vice presidents, entered into and executed a contract of
lease over respondent's property to put up a branch of
petitioner.The term of lease was for 10 years beginning June 1,
1995 until May 31, 2005.However, on October 26, 1998,
respondent received a letter from petitioner informing her of
petitioner's intention to pre-terminate said lease contract by
December 31, 1998.In response, respondent reminded
petitioner that under their lease contract, petitioner had no right
to pre-terminate.In spite of this, petitioner went ahead and
vacated the leased premises.On April 22, 1999, private
respondent wrote a letter to petitioner demanding payment of
arrearages amounting to P486,680.00 and rentals for the
ensuing months.Petitioner refused to pay.Thus, a case for
damages was filed with the regional trial court and in due
course, respondent filed a Notice to Take Deposition by Oral
Examination of respondent and 3 other witnesses all residing in
Los Angeles, California, USA.
The trial court allowed the deposition taking over petitioner's
opposition, prompting the latter to elevate the matter via a
petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals but the same
proved to be unavailing.
Without seeking reconsideration, petitioner filed the instant
petition.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner's lone argument that since respondent filed her suit in
the Philippines, she and her witnesses should appear before the
trial court for direct and cross examination, deserves scant
consideration.
 embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
Section 4 of Rule 24 of the Rules of Court is explicit: consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before
such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or
SEC. 4.Use of depositions. - At the trial or upon the hearing of a
under letters rogatory (Sec. 11, Rule 24) (Dasmariñas Garments,
motion of an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a
Inc. vs. Judge, et al, 225 SCRA 622.)
deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence, may
be used against any party who was present or represented at the It is to be noted too that the order to take deposition is
taking of the deposition or who had due notice thereof, in interlocutory in character and may not be questioned by
accordance with any of the following provisions: certiorari.Indeed, petitioner is not deprived of its right to cross-
examine the deponents nor of presenting countervailing
xxx xxx xxx
testimony.
(c)The deposition of a witness, whether or not aparty, may be
WHEREFORE, petition is denied due course.
used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: 1) that the
witness is dead; or 2) that the witness if out of the province and Rosete v. Lim
at a greater distance than fifty (50) kilometers from the place of June 8, 2006 | Chico-Nazario, J. | Petition for Certiorari | Rights
trial or hearing, or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that of a witness
his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition;
or 3) that the witness is unable to attend to testify because of PETITIONER: Alfredo Rosete, Oscar Mapalo, and Chito Rosete
RESPONDENT: Juliano Lim and Lilia Lim
age, sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or 4) that the party
offering the deposition has been unable to procure the
SUMMARY: The petitioners are being sued for annulment and
attendance of the witness by subpoena; or 5) upon application
specific performance because of the sale of real property made
and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make
by AFP-RSBS to Espreme Realty of parcels of land which allegedly
it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the
belong to the respondents Lims. The respondents want to take
importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in
the deposition of the petitioners, but the petitioners refuse to do
open court, to allow the deposition to be used.
so by filing a motion and objection to take deposition upon oral
examination. Petitioners claim that this goes against their right
It is apparent then that the deposition of any person may be
against self-incrimination since they have pending criminal cases
taken wherever he may be, in the Philippines or abroad.If the
involving the same facts, and that they can completely refuse to
party or witness is in the Philippines, his deposition shall be
testify. The trial court and the CA denied their motion. The SC
taken before any judge, municipal, or notary public (Sec. 10, Rule
upheld the lower courts’ ruling, saying that the present case is a
24, Rules of Court).If he is in a foreign state or country, the
deposition shall be taken: (a) on notice before a secretary or
civil case, not a criminal one. The pending criminal cases do not
give them the right to refuse to testify in the civil cases.
DOCTRINE: Only an accused in a criminal case can refuse to take
the witness stand. Or in cases which partake of the nature of a
criminal proceeding or analogous thereto. Or in civil actions
which are criminal in nature. It is the nature of the proceedings
that controls, not the character of the suit involved.
FACTS:
1. Juliano Lim and Lilia Lim filed complaint for annulment,
specific performance w damages against the AFP Retirement and
Separation Benfits Syste, Espreme Realty and Dev’t Co., Alfredo
Rosete, Maj. Oscar Mapalo, Chito Rosete, BPI, and Register of
Deeds of Mindoro Occidental.
• Asks for annulment of deed of sale, executed by AFP-RSBS to
Espreme Realty of parcels of land, and for the cancellation of the
titles in Espreme Realty’s name. They also ask for execution of
docs to restore ownership and title of the lands to the Lims.
2. Lots of procedural stuff happened (Answer ex abudanti
cautelam was filed). Relevant to us is that the respondents filed a
Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination, giving notice
that on June 18 and 20 1997, they will depose petitioners
Mapalo and Chito Rosete.
Petitioners filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion and Objection to
Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination.
• There are two pending criminal cases in Mandaluyong and
Pasig (BP 22 and Estafa) involving the same set of facts; allowing
their deposition would violate their right against self-
incrimination because the deposition would establish allegation
of fact in the complaint-affidavits in the crim cases.
3. Lower court denied the petitioners’ ex parte motion and
scheduled the taking of the deposition.
4. Petitioners filed an MR, followed by an Urgent Ex parte
Motion to Cancel/Suspend the Taking of the Deposition  Lower
court again denied.
5. Appeal to CA denied. Appealed to SC.
Petitioners arguments: CA wrong when it failed to recognize
their right against self-incrim when the taking of their
depositions was allowed.
• While an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the
witness stand, and claim privilege against self-incrim as each
question requiring incriminating answer is asked, accused may
altogether refuse to answer any and all questions because right
against self-incrim = right to refuse to testify.
• They would be incriminating themselves in the crim cases
because the testimony that would be elicited may be used in the
criminal cases.
ISSUE/S:
1. W/N the trial court erred in declaring that the right
against self-incrim would not be violated by the taking of their
deposition in the civil case – NO, lower courts are correct
RULING: CA decision AFFIRMED
RATIO: Petitioners are wrong
1. Right against self-incrim is accorded to every person who gives
evidence, whether voluntary or through subpoena
2. The right can only be claimed when a specific question is
actually put to the witness, and not at any other time. Witness
cannot decline to be appear before the court or refuse to testify.
Subpoena must be obeyed.
3. An accused in a CRIMNAL CASE may refuse to take the witness
stand as a witness, as held in People v. Ayson where the court
held an accused to occupy a different tier of protection
• Under the ROC, in all criminal prosecutions the defendant is
entitled among others (1) to be exempt from being a witness
against himself, and (2) to testify as a witness in his own behalf…
his refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or
be used against him. The Facts
• Clearly, only an ACCUSED in a CRIMINAL CASE can refuse to
take the witness stand. Or in cases which partake of the nature
of a criminal proceeding or analogous thereto. Or in civil actions
In May and June 1997, Gateway Electronics Corporation
which are criminal in nature. It is the nature of the proceedings
(Gateway) obtained from Solidbank Corporation (Solidbank) four
that controls, not the character of the suit involved.
(4) foreign currency denominated loans to be used as working
4. In this case, what is involved is a civil case for Annulment,
capital for its manufacturing operations.[2] The loans were
Specific Performance with Damages. It cannot be considered in
covered by promissory notes[3] (PNs) which provided an interest
the nature of a criminal proceeding. The pending criminal cases
of eight and 75/100 percent (8.75%), but was allegedly increased
do not give a right to refuse to testify in the civil case. They may
to ten percent (10%) per annum, and a penalty of two percent
invoke their right against self-incrim only when the incriminating
(2%) per month based on the total amount due computed from
questions are thrown their way.
the date of default until full payment of the total amount due.[4]
DECISION The particulars of the loans are:

NACHURA, J.: Promissory

Note No.

Date of Loan

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing

the Decision dated June 2, 2004 and the Resolution dated July
29, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73684.
Amount of Loan
Date Due

b) PN 97-408

29 May 1997

a) PN 97-375 US$ 570,000.00

20 May 1997 11 Nov. 1998

US$ 190,000.00

11 Nov. 1998
 15 June 1997

c) PN 97-435 US$ 130,000.00

09 June 1997 15 June 1998

US$1,150,000.00 To secure the loans covered by PN 97-375[5] and PN 97-408,[6]

Gateway assigned to Solidbank the proceeds of its Back-end
Services Agreement[7] dated June 25, 2000 with Alliance
Semiconductor Corporation (Alliance). The following stipulations
04 June 1998
are common in both PNs:

3. This Note or Loan shall be paid from the foreign exchange

proceeds of Our/My Letter(s) of Credit, Purchase Order or Sales
Contract described as follows: *** Back-end Services Agreement
dated 06-25-96 by and between Gateway Electronics
Corporation and Alliance Semiconductor Corporation.

4. We/I assign, transfer and convey to Solidbank all title and

interest to the proceeds of the foregoing Letter(s) of Credit to
the extent necessary to satisfy all amounts and obligations due
d) PN 97-458
or which may arise under this Note or Loan, and to any
extension, renewal, or amendments of this Note or Loan. We/I
agree that in case the proceeds of the foregoing Letter(s) of
Credit prove insufficient to pay Our/My outstanding liabilities
under this Note or Loan, We/I shall continue to be liable for the
deficiency. Earlier, on October 11, 2000, Solidbank filed a Motion for
Production and Inspection of Documents[12] on the basis of an
information received from Mr. David Eichler, Chief Financial
Officer of Alliance, that Gateway has already received from
5. We/I irrevocably undertake to course the foreign exchange Alliance the proceeds/payment of the Back-end Services
proceeds of the Letter(s) of Credit directly with Solidbank. Agreement. The pertinent portions of the motion read:
Our/My failure to comply with the above would render Us or Me
in default of the loan or credit facility without need of demand.
[8]
8. Therefore, plaintiffs request that this Honorable Court issue an
Order requiring defendant GEC, through its Treasurer/Chief
Financial Officer, Chief Accountant, Comptroller or any such
officer, to bring before this Honorable Court for inspection and
copying the following documents:
Gateway failed to comply with its loan obligations. By January
31, 2000, Gateways outstanding debt amounted to
US$1,975,835.58. Solidbanks numerous demands to pay were
not heeded by Gateway. Thus, on February 21, 2000, Solidbank
filed a Complaint[9] for collection of sum of money against
Gateway.

a) The originals, duplicate originals and copies of all documents

pertaining to, arising from, in connection with or involving the
On June 16, 2002, Solidbank filed an Amended Complaint[10] to Back-end Services Agreement of defendant GEC and Alliance
implead the officers/stockholders of Gateway, namely, Nand K. Semiconductors;
Prasad, Andrew S. Delos Reyes, Israel F. Maducdoc, Jaime M.
Hidalgo and Alejandro S. Calderon who signed in their personal
capacity a Continuing Guaranty[11] to become sureties for any
b) The originals, duplicate originals and copies of all books of
and all existing indebtedness of Gateway to Solidbank. On June
account, financial statements, receipts, checks, vouchers,
20, 2002, the trial court admitted the amended complaint and
invoices, ledgers and other financial/accounting records and
impleaded the additional defendants.
documents pertaining to or evidencing financial and money
transactions arising from, in connection with or involving the
Back-end Services Agreement of defendant GEC and Alliance 9. Furthermore, plaintiffs request that said Order to the
Semiconductors; and Treasurer/Chief Financial Officer, Chief Accountant, Comptroller
of defendant GEC include the following instructions:

c) The originals, duplicate originals and copies of all documents

from whatever source pertaining to the proceeds/payments a. If the response is that the documents are not in defendant
received by GEC from Alliance Semiconductors. GECs or the officers possession or custody, said officer should
describe in detail the efforts made to locate said records or
documents;

d) Documents, as used in this section, means all writings of any

kind, including the originals and all non-identical copies, whether
different from the originals by reason of any notation made on b. If the documents are not in defendant GECs or the officers
such copies or otherwise, including without limitation, possession and control, said officer should identify who has
correspondence, memoranda, notes diaries, statistics, letters, control and the location of said documents or records;
telegrams, minutes, contracts, reports, studies, checks,
statements, receipts, returns, summaries, pamphlets, books,
inter-office and intra-office communications, notations of any c. If the request for production seeks a specific document or
sort of conversations, telephone calls, meetings or other itemized category that is not in defendant GECs or the officers
communications, bulletins, printed matter, computer records, possession, control or custody, the officer should provide any
diskettes or print-outs, teletypes, telefax, e-mail, invoices, documents he has that contain all or part of the information
worksheets, all drafts, alterations, modifications, changes and contained in the requested document or category;
amendments of any of the foregoing, graphic or oral records or
representations of any kind (including, without limitation,
photographs, charts, graphs, microfiche, microfilm, videotapes,
recordings, motion pictures, CD-ROMs), and any electronic, d. If the officer cannot furnish the originals of the documents
mechanical or electric records or representations (including, requested, he should explain in detail the reasons therefore; and
without limitation, tapes, cassettes, discs, recordings and
computer or computer-related memories).
e. The officer should identify the source within or outside GEC of
each of the documents he produces.[13]
On January 30, 2001, the trial court issued an Order[14] granting
the motion for production and inspection of documents, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the defendant GEC is hereby ordered to bring all
the records and documents, not privileged, arising from, in
connection with and/or involving the Back-end Services
Agreement between defendant GEC and Alliance Semiconductor
Corporation, particularly to those pertaining to all payments
made by Alliance Semiconductor Corporation to GEC pursuant to
said Agreement, incorporating the instructions enumerated in
par. 9 of the instant motion, for inspection and copying by the
plaintiff, the same to be made before the Officer-In-Charge,
Office of the Branch Clerk of Court on February 27, 2001 at 9:00
a.m.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Gateway filed a motion to reset the production and inspection of
documents to March 29, 2001 in order to give them enough time
to gather and collate the documents in their possession. The trial
court granted the motion.[16]
On April 30, 2001, Solidbank filed a motion for issuance of a
show cause order for Gateways failure to comply with the
January 30, 2001 Order of the trial court.[17] In response,
Gateway filed a manifestation that they appeared before the trial
court on March 29, 2001 to present the documents in their
possession, however, Solidbanks counsel failed to appear on the
said date.[18] In the manifestation, Gateway also expressed their
willingness to make available for inspection at Gateways offices
any requested document.[19]
On May 31, 2001, the trial court issued an Order setting the
production and inspection of documents on June 7, 2001 in the
premises of Gateway.[20] It was subsequently moved to July 24,
2001. On the said date, Gateway presented the invoices
representing the billings sent by Gateway to Alliance in relation
to the Back-end Services Agreement.[21]
Solidbank was not satisfied with the documents produced by
Gateway. Thus, on December 13, 2001, Solidbank filed a motion
to cite Gateway and its responsible officers in contempt for their
refusal to produce the documents subject of the January 30,
2001 Order. In opposition thereto, Gateway claimed that they
had complied with the January 30, 2001 Order and that the
billings sent to Alliance are the only documents that they have
pertaining to the Back-end Services Agreement.[22]
On April 15, 2002, the trial court issued an Order[23] denying the
motion to cite Gateway for contempt. However, the trial court
chastised Gateway for exerting no diligent efforts to produce the
documents evidencing the payments received by Gateway from
Alliance in relation to the Back-end Services Agreement, viz.:
Before this Court is a Motion to Cite Defendant GEC In Contempt
For Refusing To Produce Documents Pursuant to the Order Dated
30 January 2001 filed by plaintiff dated December 12, 2001,
together with defendant GECs Opposition thereto dated January
14, 2002, as well as plaintiffs Reply dated February 6, 2002 and
GECs Rejoinder dated February 27, 2002.
As Courts are cautioned to utilize the power to punish for
contempt on the preservative and not on the vindictive,
contempt being drastic and extraordinary in nature (Wicker vs.
Arcangel, 252 SCRA 444; Paredes-Garcia vs. CA, 261 SCRA 693),
this Court is inclined to DENY the present motion.
However, as no diligent effort was shown to have been exerted
by defendant GEC to produce the documents enumerated in the
Order dated January 30, 2001, this Court hereby orders, in
accordance with Sec. 3(a), Rule 29 of the Rules of Court, that the
matters regarding the contents of the documents sought to be
produced but which were not otherwise produced by GEC, shall
be taken to be established in accordance with plaintiffs claim,
but only for the purpose of this action.
SO ORDERED.[24]
Gateway filed a partial motion for reconsideration of the April
15, 2002 Order. However, the same was denied in an Order[25]
dated August 27, 2002.
On November 5, 2002, Gateway filed a petition for certiorari[26]
before the Court of Appeals (CA) seeking to nullify the Orders of
the trial court dated April 15, 2002 and August 27, 2002.
On June 2, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision[27] nullifying the
Orders of the trial court dated April 15, 2002 and August 27,
2002. The CA ruled that both the Motion for Production of
Documents and the January 30, 2001 Order of the trial court
failed to comply with the provisions of Section 1, Rule 27 of the
Rules of Court. It further held that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the matters regarding the
contents of the documents sought to be produced but which
were not produced by Gateway shall be deemed established in
accordance with Solidbanks claim. The fallo of the Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the assailed portion of the Order dated April 15,
2002 and Order dated August 27, 2002, both issued by public
respondent, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE without
prejudice to the filing by private respondent of a new Motion for
Production and Inspection of Documents in accordance with the
requirements of the Rules.
SO ORDERED.[28]
Solidbank filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of
the CA. On July 29, 2004, the CA rendered a Resolution[29]
denying the same. Thus, this petition.
The Issues
I. Whether Solidbanks motion for production and inspection of
documents and the Order of the trial court dated January 30,
2001 failed to comply with Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of
Court; and
II. Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that the matters subject of the documents sought to be
produced but which were not produced by Gateway shall be
deemed established in accordance with Solidbanks claim.
The Ruling of the Court
We resolve to deny the petition.
Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection; order. Upon
motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in
which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce
and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or
on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain
evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which
are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party
or permit entry upon designated land or other property in his
possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring,
surveying, or photographing the property or any designated
relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall specify the
time, place and manner of making the inspection and taking
copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and
conditions as are just.
The aforecited rule provides the mechanics for the production of
documents and the inspection of things during the pendency of
a case. It also deals with the inspection of sources of evidence
other than documents, such as land or other property in the
possession or control of the other party.[30] This remedial
measure is intended to assist in the administration of justice by
facilitating and expediting the preparation of cases for trial and
guarding against undesirable surprise and delay; and it is
designed to simplify procedure and obtain admissions of facts
and evidence, thereby shortening costly and time-consuming
trials. It is based on ancient principles of equity. More
specifically, the purpose of the statute is to enable a party-
litigant to discover material information which, by reason of an
opponent's control, would otherwise be unavailable for judicial
scrutiny, and to provide a convenient and summary method of
obtaining material and competent documentary evidence in the
custody or under the control of an adversary. It is a further
extension of the concept of pretrial.[31]
The modes of discovery are accorded a broad and liberal
treatment.[32] Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of Court permits
fishing for evidence, the only limitation being that the
documents, papers, etc., sought to be produced are not
privileged, that they are in the possession of the party ordered
to produce them and that they are material to any matter
involved in the action.[33] The lament against a fishing
expedition no longer precludes a party from prying into the facts
underlying his opponents case. Mutual knowledge of all relevant
facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To
that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge
whatever facts he has in his possession.[34] However, fishing for
evidence that is allowed under the rules is not without
limitations. In Security Bank Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the
Court enumerated the requisites in order that a party may
compel the other party to produce or allow the inspection of
documents or things, viz.:
(a) The party must file a motion for the production or inspection
of documents or things, showing good cause therefor;
(b) Notice of the motion must be served to all other parties of
the case;
(c) The motion must designate the documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things which
the party wishes to be produced and inspected;

(d) Such documents, etc., are not privileged;
(e) Such documents, etc., constitute or contain evidence material
to any matter involved in the action, and
(f) Such documents, etc., are in the possession, custody or
control of the other party.[35]
In the case at bench, Gateway assigned to Solidbank the
proceeds of its Back-end Services Agreement with Alliance in PN
Nos. 97-375 and 97-408. By virtue of the assignment, Gateway
was obligated to remit to Solidbank all payments received from
Alliance under the agreement. In this regard, Solidbank claims
that they have received information from the Chief Financial
Officer of Alliance that Gateway had already received payments
under the agreement. In order to ascertain the veracity of the
information, Solidbank availed of the discovery procedure under
Rule 27. The purpose of Solidbanks motion is to compel Gateway
to produce the documents evidencing payments received from
Alliance in connection with the Back-end Services Agreement.
Solidbank was able to show good cause for the production of the
documents. It had also shown that the said documents are
material or contain evidence relevant to an issue involved in the
action. However, Solidbanks motion was fatally defective and
must be struck down because of its failure to specify with
particularity the documents it required Gateway to produce.
Solidbanks motion for production and inspection of documents
called for a blanket inspection. Solidbanks request for inspection
of all documents pertaining to, arising from, in connection with
or involving the Back-end Services Agreement[36] was simply too
broad and too generalized in scope.
A motion for production and inspection of documents should not
demand a roving inspection of a promiscuous mass of
documents. The inspection should be limited to those
documents designated with sufficient particularity in the motion,
such that the adverse party can easily identify the
documents he is required to produce.[37]
Furthermore, Solidbank, being the one who asserts that the
proceeds of the Back-end Services Agreement were already
received by Gateway, has the burden of proof in the instant case.
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the
facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the
amount of evidence required by law.[38] Throughout the trial,
the burden of proof remains with the party upon whom it is
imposed,[39] until he shall have discharged the same.
II
The trial court held that as a consequence of Gateways failure to
exert diligent effort in producing the documents subject of the
Order dated January 30, 2001, in accordance with Section 3(a),
Rule 29[40] of the Rules of Court, the matters regarding the
contents of the documents sought to be produced but which
were not produced by Gateway, shall be considered as having
been established in accordance with Solidbanks claim.
We hold that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the aforesaid Order. It is not fair to penalize Gateway
for not complying with the request of Solidbank for the
production and inspection of documents, considering that the
documents sought were not particularly described. Gateway and
its officers can only be held liable for unjust refusal to comply
with the modes of discovery if it is shown that the documents
sought to be produced were specifically described, material to
the action and in the possession, custody or control of Gateway.
Neither can it be said that Gateway did not exert effort in
complying with the order for production and inspection of
documents since it presented the invoices representing the
billings sent by Gateway to Alliance in relation to the Back-end
Services Agreement. Good faith effort to produce the required
documents must be accorded to Gateway, absent a finding that it
acted willfully, in bad faith or was at fault in failing to produce
the documents sought to be produced.[41]
One final note. The CA decision nullifying the orders of the trial
court was without prejudice to the filing by herein petitioner of a
new motion for Production and Inspection of Documents in
accordance with the Rules. It would have been in the best
interest of the parties, and it would have saved valuable time
and effort, if the petitioner simply heeded the advice of the CA.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is
DENIED for lack of merit.
EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N. NAVAL
and CRISPIN I. OBEN, Petitioners,
vs.
CAMERON GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
For resolution is respondent Cameron Granville 3 Asset
Management, Inc. 's motion for reconsideration1 of our April 10,
2013 decision,2 which reversed and set aside the Court of
Appeals' resolutions3 and ordered respondent to produce the
Loan Sale and Purchase Agreement (LSPA) dated April 7, 2006,
including its annexes and/or attachments, if any, in order that
petitioners may inspect or photocopy the same.
Petitioners Eagleridge Development Corporation, Marcelo N.
Naval, and Crispin I. Oben filed on June 7, 2013 their motion to
ad.mit attached opposition.4 Subsequently, respondent filed its
reply5 and petitioners their motion to admit attached rejoinder.6
The motion for reconsideration raises the following points:
(1) The motion for production was filed out of time;7
(2) The production of the LSPA would violate the parol evidence
rule; and8
(3) The LSPA is a privileged and confidential document.9
Respondent asserts that there was no "insistent refusal" on its
part to present the LSPA, but that petitioners filed their motion
for production way out of time, even beyond the protracted pre-
trial period from September 2005 to 2011.10 Hence, petitioners
had no oneto blame but themselves when the trial court denied
their motion as it was filed only during the trial proper.11
Respondent further submits that "Article 1634 [of the] Civil Code
had been inappropriately cited by [p]etitioners"12 inasmuch as it
is Republic Act No. 9182 (Special Purpose Vehicle Act) that is
applicable.13 Nonetheless, even assuming that Article 1634 is
applicable, respondent argued that petitioners are: 1) still liable
to pay the whole of petitioner Eagleridge Development
Corporation’s (EDC) loanobligation, i.e., ₱10,232,998.00 exclusive
of interests and/or damages;14 and 2) seven (7) years late in
extinguishing petitioner EDC’s loan obligation because pursuant
to Article 1634, they should have exercised their right of
extinguishment within 30 days from the substitution of Export
and Industry Bank or EIB (the original creditor) by respondent in
December 2006.15 According to respondent, the trial court
order "granting the substitution constituted sufficient judicial
demand as contemplated under Article 1634."16 Also,
maintaining that the LSPA is immaterial or irrelevant to the case,
respondent contends that the "[o]rder of substitution settled the
issue of [respondent’s] standing before the [c]ourt and its right
to fill in the shoes of [EIB]."17 It argues that the production of
the LSPA will neither prevent respondent from pursuing its claim
of 10,232,998.00, exclusive of interests and penalties, from
petitioner EDC, nor write off petitioner EDC’s liability to
respondent.18 The primordial issue of whether petitioners owe
respondent a sum of money via the deed of assignment can
allegedly "be readily resolved by application of Civil Code
provisions and/or applicable jurisprudence and not by the
production/inspection of the LSPA[.]"19 Respondent also argues
that "a consideration is not always a requisite [in assignment of
credits, and] an assignee may maintain an action based on his
title and it is immaterial whether ornot he paid any
consideration [therefor][.]"20
Respondent also contends that: (1) the production of the LSPA
will violate the parol evidence rule21 under Rule 130, Section 9
of the Rules of Court; (2) the LSPA is a privileged/confidential
bank document;22 and (3) under the Special Purpose Vehicle
Act, "the only obligation of both the assignor (bank) and the
assignee (the SPV; respondent Cameron) is to give notice to the
debtor (Eagleridge, Naval,and Oben) that its account has been
assigned/transferred to a special purpose vehicle (Sec. 12, R.A.
9182) [and] [i]t does not require of the special purpose vehicle
or the bank to disclose all financial documents included in the
assignment/sale/transfer[.]"23
Finally, respondent points out that the deed of assignment is a
contested document. "Fair play would be violated if the LSPA is
produced without [p]etitioners acknowledging that respondent
Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc. is the real party-in-
interest because petitioners . . . would [thereafter] use . . . the
contents of a document (LSPA) to its benefit while at the same
time"24 refuting the integrity of the deed and the legal
personality of respondent to sue petitioners.25
For their part, petitioners counter that their motion for
production was not filed out of time, and "[t]here is no
proscription, under Rule 27 or any provision of the Rules of
Court, from filing motions for production, beyond the pre-
trial."26
Further, assuming that there was a valid transfer of the loan
obligation of petitioner EDC, Article 1634 is applicable and,
therefore, petitioners must be informed of the actual transfer
price, which information may only be supplied by the LSPA.27
Petitioners argue that the substitution of respondent in the case
a quowas "not sufficient ‘demand’as contemplated under Article
1634 of the Civil Code inasmuch asrespondent Cameron
failed . . . to inform petitioner EDC of the price it paid for the
[transfer of the] loan obligation,"28 which made it "impossible
for petitioners to reimburse what was paid for the acquisition of
the . . . loan obligation [of EDC]."29 Additionally, petitioners
contend that respondent was not a party to the deed of
assignment, but Cameron Granville Asset Management (SPV-
AMC), Inc., hence, "as [to] the actual parties to the Deed of
Assignment are concerned, no such demand has yet been
made."30
Petitioners add that the amount of their liability to respondent is
one of the factual issues to be resolved as stated in the
November 21, 2011 pretrial order of the Regional Trial Court,
which makes the LSPA clearly relevant and material to the
disposition of the case.31
Petitioners next argue that the parol evidence rule is not
applicable to them because they were not parties tothe deed of
assignment, and "they cannot be prevented from seeking
evidence to determine the complete terms of the Deed of
Assignment."32 Besides, the deedof assignment made express
reference to the LSPA, hence,the latter cannot be considered as
extrinsic to it.33
As to respondent’s invocation that the LSPA is
privileged/confidential, petitioners counter that "it has not been
shown that the parties fall under . . . or, at the very least . . .
analogous to [any of the relationships enumerated in Rule 130,
Section 124] that would exempt [respondent] from disclosing
information as to their transaction."34
In reply, respondent argues that "[petitioners] cannot accept and
reject the same instrument at the same time."35 According to
respondent, by allegedly "uphold[ing] the truth of the contents
as well as the validity of [the] Deed of Assignment [in] seeking
the production of the [LSPA],"36 petitioners could no longer be
allowed to impugn the validity of the same deed.37
In their rejoinder, petitioners clarified that their consistent
position was always to assail the validity of the deed of
assignment; that alternatively, they invoked the application of
Article 1634 should the court uphold the validity of the transfer
of their alleged loan obligation; and that Rule 8, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court "permits parties to set forth alternative causes of
action or defenses."38
We deny the motion for reconsideration. prejudiced.41 This court further held that "[t]he use of discovery
Discovery mode of is encouraged, for it operates with desirable flexibility under the
production/inspection of discretionary control of the trial court."42
document may be availed of
even beyond pre-trial upon a In Dasmariñas Garments, Inc. v. Reyes,43 this court declared that
showing of good cause
depositions, as a mode ofdiscovery, "may be taken at any time
after the institution of any action [as there is] no prohibition
The availment of a motion for production, as one of the modes
against the taking of depositions after pre-trial."44 Thus:
of discovery, is not limited to the pre-trial stage. Rule 27 does
not provide for any time frame within which the discovery mode
Dasmariñas also contends that the "taking of deposition is a
of production or inspection of documents can be utilized. The
mode of pretrial discovery to be availed of before the action
rule only requires leave of court "upon due application and a
comes to trial." Not so. Depositions may be taken at any time
showing of due cause."39 Rule 27, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of
after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or
Court, states:
convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to
the period of pre-trial or before it; no prohibition against the
SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection order — Upon
taking of depositions after pre-trial. Indeed, the law authorizes
motion of any party showing good cause therefor the court in
the taking of depositions of witnesses before or after an appeal
which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce
is taken from the judgment of a Regional Trial Court "to
and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or
perpetuate their testimony for use in the event of further
on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents,
proceedings in the said court" (Rule 134, Rules of Court), and
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
even during the process of execution of a final and executory
tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain
judgment (East Asiatic Co. v. C.I.R., 40 SCRA 521, 544).45
evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which
are in his possession, custody or control[.] (Emphasis supplied)
"The modes of discovery are accorded a broad and liberal
treatment."46 The evident purpose of discovery procedures is
In Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,40 this
"to enable the parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to
court held that since the rules are silent asto the period within
obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts
which modes of discovery (in that case, written interrogatories)
before civil trials"47 and, thus, facilitating an amicable
may still be requested, it is necessary to determine: (1) the
settlement or expediting the trial of the case.48
purposeof discovery; (2) whether, based on the stage of the
proceedings and evidence presented thus far, allowing it is
Technicalities in pleading should be avoided in order to obtain
proper and would facilitate the disposition of the case; and (3)
substantial justice. In Mutuc v. Judge Agloro,49 this court
whether substantial rights of parties would be unduly
directed the bank to give Mutuc a complete statement asto how
his debt was computed, and should he be dissatisfied with that
statement, pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, to allow
him to inspect and copy bank records supporting the items in
that statement.50 This was held to be "in consonance with the
rules on discovery and the avowed policy of the Rules of Court . .
. to require the parties to lay their cards on the table to facilitate
a settlement of the case before the trial."51
We have determined that the LSPA isrelevant and material to the
issue on the validity of the deed of assignment raised by
petitioners in the court a quo, and allowing its production and
inspection by petitioners would be more in keeping with the
objectives of the discovery rules. We find no great practical
difficulty, and respondent continuously fails to allege any, in
presenting the document for inspection and copying of
petitioners. On the other hand, to deny petitioners the
opportunity to inquire into the LSPA would bar their access to
relevant evidence and impair their fundamental right to due
process.52
Article 1634 of the New Civil Code is applicable
The LSPA is not privileged
and confidential in nature
Respondent’s contention that the LSPAis privileged and
confidential is likewise untenable.
Indeed, Rule 27 contains the proviso that the documents sought
to be produced and inspected must not be privileged against
disclosure. Rule 130, Section 24 describes the types of privileged
communication. These are communication between or involving
the following: (a) between husband and wife; (b) between
attorney and client; (c) between physician and patient; (d)
between priest and penitent; and (e) public officers and public
interest.
Privileged communications under the rules of evidence is
premised on an accepted need to protect a trust relationship. It
has not been shown that the parties to the deed of assignment
fall under any of the foregoing categories.
This court has previously cited other privileged matters such as
the following: "(a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the
source of published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to
disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information
contained in tax census returns; . . . (d) bank deposits"62
(pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act); (e) national
security matters and intelligence information;63 and (f) criminal
matters.64 Nonetheless, the LSPA does not fall within any of
these classes of information. Moreover, the privilegeis not
absolute, and the court may compel disclosure where it is
indispensable for doing justice.
At any rate, respondent failed to discharge the burden of
showing that the LSPA is a privileged document.1âwphi1
Respondent did not present any law or regulation that considers
bank documents such as the LSPA as classified information. Its
contention that the Special Purpose Vehicle Act65 only requires
the creditor-bank to give notice to the debtor of the transfer of
his or her account to a special purpose vehicle, and that the
assignee-special purpose vehicle has no obligation to disclose
other financial documents related to the sale, is untenable. The
Special Purpose Vehicle Act does not explicitly declare these
financial documents as privileged matters. Further, as discussed,
petitioners are not precluded from inquiring as to the true
consideration of the assignment, precisely because the same law
in relation to Article 1634 allows the debtor to extinguish its debt
by reimbursing the assignee-special purpose vehicle of the actual
price the latter paid for the assignment.
An assignment of a credit "produce[s] no effect as against third
persons, unless it appears ina public instrument[.]"66 It strains
reason why the LSPA, which by law must be a publicinstrument
to be binding against third persons such as petitioners-debtors, is
privileged and confidential.
LOURDES CAMUS DE LOPEZ, on her behalf and as guardian ad
litem of the minors,
SALVADOR C. LOPEZ, JR., and LUIS CARLOS LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CIRILO G. MACEREN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Davao,
MARIA N. VDA. DE LOPEZ, ENRIQUE LOPEZ, SALVADOR LOPEZ,
JR., LEOPOLDO LOPEZ, RODOLFO LOPEZ and the guardian ad
litem for the minor FLORDELIZ LOPEZ, respondents.
Soriano, Inton and Peña for petitioners.
Abella, Cavestany, Syyap and Estrellado for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Petitioner Lourdes Camus de Lopez, on her behalf and as
guardian ad litem of her minor children, Salvador C. Lopez, Jr.,
and Luis Carlos Lopez, is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 1035 of the
Court of First Instance of Davao. Respondents Maria N. Vda. de
Lopez, Enrique Lopez, Salvador Lopez, Jr., Leopoldo Lopez,
Rodolfo Lopez and Flordeliz Lopez are the defendants in said
case No. 1035, the purpose of which is to secure delivery of
some property of the deceased Salvador Lopez, Sr., as alleged
share of the petitioner, who claims to be his widow. She
contends that, although his previous marriage with respondent
Maria N. de Lopez, which was unknown to petitioner, had not
been dissolved and was still subsisting, and acting in bad faith,
and without advising petitioner of such first marriage, Salvador
Lopez, Sr., wedded the latter in 1938, and, thereafter, lived as
husband and wife with her; and that, as a consequence of said
union, Salvador C. Lopez, Jr., and Luis Carlos Lopez were born in
Manila on December 6, 1939, and November 25, 1940,
respectively, and then christened as legitimate children of
Salvador Lopez, Sr. and the petitioner, as set forth in their
respective birth and baptismal certificates. After the filing of the
answer of said respondents, as defendants in said Civil Case No.
1035, or on December 8, 1953, petitioner herein through her
counsel filed a "notice for the taking" of her deposition and that
of one Pilar Cristobal, at Room 202 of the Vasquez Building, 1865
Azcarraga Street, Manila, on January 16, 1954, at 2:00 p.m.
Acting, however, upon an urgent motion of the defendants in
said Civil Case No. 1035, respondent Hon. Cirilo C. Maceren, as
Judge of First Instance of Davao, issued an order, dated January
11, 1954, prohibiting the taking of said deposition. Accordingly,
petitioner instituted the present case for the purpose of
annulling said order of January 11, 1954, and of having no
restraint to the taking of the aforementioned deposition.
Petitioner maintains that respondent Judge committed a grave
abuse of discretion in forbidding the taking of said deposition,
she being entitled thereto as a matter of right, without leave of
court, after the filing of the answer of the defendants in said Civil
Case No. 1035, for section 1 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Deposition pending action, when may be taken. — By leave of
court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or
over property which is the subject of the action, or without such
leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any
person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of
any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written
interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled
by the use of subpoena as provided in Rule 29. Deposition shall
be taken only in accordance with these rules. The deposition of a
person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on
such terms as the court prescribes.
Under the other hand, respondents invoke, in their favor, section
16 of the same rule, reading:
Orders for the protection of parties and deponents. — After
notice is served for taking a deposition by oral examination,
upon motion seasonably made by any party or by the person to
be examined and upon notice and for good cause shown, the
court in which the action is pending may make an order that the
deposition shall not be taken, or that it may be taken at some
designated place other than that stated in the notice, or that it
may be taken only on written interrogatories, or that certain
matters shall not be inquired into, or that the scope of the
examination shall be limited to certain matters, or that the
examination shall be held with no one present except the parties
to the action and their officers or counsel, or that after being
sealed the deposition shall be opened only by order of the court,
or that secret processes, developments or research need not be
disclosed, or that the parties shall simultaneously file specified
documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be
opened as directed by the court; or the court may make any
other order which justice requires to protect the party or witness
from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression.
This provision explicitly vests in the court the power to "order
that the deposition shall not be taken" and, this grant connotes
the authority to exercise discretion in connection therewith
(National Bondholders Corp. vs. McClintic, 1 Fed. Rules Service,
388, 99 F. [2d] 595). It is well-settled, however, that the
discretion conferred by law is not unlimited; that it must be
exercised, not arbitrarily, capriciously or oppressively, but in a
reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law,
to the end that its purpose may be attained. Referring to the
objective of section 16 of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, former
Chief Justice Moran has the following to say:
The advisory committee of the United States Supreme Court said
that this provision is intended to be one of the safeguards for the
protection of the parties and deponents on account of the
unrestricted right to discovery given by section 1 and 2 of this
Rule. A party may taken the deposition of a witness who knows
nothing about the case, with the only purpose of annoying him
or wasting the time of the other parties. In such case, the court
may, on motion, order that the deposition shall not be taken. Or,
a party may designate a distinct place for the taking of a
deposition, and the adverse party may not have sufficient means
to reach that place, because of poverty or otherwise, in which
case the court, on motion, may order that the deposition be
taken at another place, or that it be taken by written
interrogatories. The party serving the notice may wish to inquire
into matters the disclosure of which may oppressive or
embarrassing to the deponent, especially if the disclosure is to
be made in the presence of third persons, or, the party serving
the notice may attempt to inquire into matters which are
absolutely private of the deponent, the disclosure of which may
affect his interests and is not absolutely essential to the
determination of the issues involved in the case. Under such
circumstances, the court, on motion, may order "that certain
matter shall not be inquired into or that the scope of the
examination shall be limited to certain matters, or that the
examination shall be held with no one present except the parties
to the action and their officers or counsel, or that after being
sealed the deposition shall be opened only by order of the court,
or that secret processes, developments, or research need not be
disclosed, or that the parties shall simultaneously filed specific
documents or informations enclosed in sealed envelopes to be
opened as directed by the court." In other words, this provision
affords the adverse party, as well as the deponent, sufficient
protection against abuses that may be committed by a party in
the exercise of his unlimited right to discovery. As a writer said:
"Any discovery involves a prying into another person's affairs —
a prying that is quite justified if it is to be a legitimate aid to
litigation, but not justified if it is not to be such an aid." For this
reason, courts are given ample powers to forbid discovery which
is intended not as an aid to litigation, but merely to annoy,
embarrass or oppress either the deponent or the adverse party,
or both. (Comments on the Rules of Court by Moran, Vol. I, pp.
435-6, 1952 ed.)
It is not claimed that the order complained of sought to avert
any of the evils which said section 16 was meant to prevent or
arrest. Moreover, petitioner was permitted to institute and
maintain Civil Case No. 1035 as a pauper. As such, she can ill
afford to meet the expenses to make, with her witnesses, the
trip or trips from Manila to Davao, and to stay in said province
for the time necessary for the hearing of the case, which might
not take place on the first date set therefor. Hence, the order in
question tended, in effect, to deprive her, not only of her right,
under section 1 of Rule 18, to take the deposition in question,
but also, of the opportunity to prove her claim and,
consequently, of the due process guaranteed by the
Constitution. Upon the other hand, the records indicate that the
defendants in Civil case No. 1035 — who are the widow of
Salvador Lopez, Sr. and their legitimate children — must be well-
off financially, for the estate of the deceased Salvador Lopez, Sr.,
which has already been partitioned among them, appears to be
worth approximately half a million pesos. The main reason given
in support of the contested order is that, if the deposition were
taken, the court could not observe the behaviour of the
deponents. The insufficiency of this circumstance to justify the
interdiction of the taking of a deposition becomes apparent
when we consider that, otherwise, no deposition could ever be
taken, said objection or handicap being common to all
depositions alike. In other words, the order of respondent Judge
cannot be sustained without nullifying the right to take
depositions, and, therefore, without, in effect repealing section 1
of Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which, clearly, was not intended
by the framers of section 16 of the same rule.
It is, consequently, clear that a grave abuse of discretion was
committed by respondent Judge in issuing the aforesaid order of
January 11, 1954, for which reason the same should be, as it is
hereby annulled and set aside, with cost against the
respondents, except the Hon. Cirilo C. Maceren.
FORTUNE CORPORATION VS. CA AND INTER-MERCHANTS
CORPORATION
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari of the decision of the respondent
CA affirming the decision of the RTC of San Pablo City disallowing
the taking of the oral deposition of Juanito A. Teope who was the
chairman of the Board Directors of private respondent. An
action for breach of contract was filed by the petitioner against
the private respondent and after the latter filed its answer
petitioner served them with written interrogatories pursuant to
Rule 25 of the ROC. The pre-trial was scheduled for January 9,
February 12 and April 22, 1992.
On March 26, 1992, petitioner served the private respondent a
Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination notifying the
latter that petitioner would take the deposition of the chairman
in accordance with Section 15, Rule 24. Private Respondent filed
an Urgent Motion Not to Take Deposition/Vehement Opposition
to Plaintiff’s Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination
alleging that: a) petitioner has previously availed of one mode of
discovery, b) there is absolutely no sound reason or justification
advanced for the taking of the oral deposition, c) such taking
would cause annoyance, embarrassment and oppression upon
the prospective deponent, d) deponent has no intention of
leaving the country, e)the intended deponent is available to
testify in open court if required during the trial on the merits.
Trial court ruled that the deposition should not be taken on the
grounds that the deposition of Juanito A. Teope appears
unwarranted since the proposed deponent had already
responded to the written interrogatories of the plaintiff and has
signified his availability to testify in court. The petitioner filed an
original action for certiorari before the SC and was referred to
the CA for further adjudication on the merits. CA ruled
dismissing the petition holding that the RTC has jurisdiction to
direct, in its discretion, that a deposition shall not be taken, if
there are valid reasons for the ruling. This is provided for in
Sections 16 and 18, Rule 24 of the ROC which imply that the
right of the party to take depositions as means of discovery is
not absolute. They reasoned that: a)proposed deponent had
earlier responded to the written interrogatories; b)deponent had
signified his availability to testify in court; c)to allow the
deposition would deprive the trial court of the opportunity to
ask clarificatory question.
With the denial of the petitioner’s MFR the instant petition was
filed with the SC.
ISSUE:
1.WON that the decision of respondent court dismissing its
petition on the ground that appeal and not certiorari is the
proper remedy in this case, is erroneous for the reason that such
ruling is based on facts which are not obtaining in the case at
bar, viz.: (a) that petitioner had already obtained a deposition,
which it had not; (b) that said deposition was offered as
evidence, which was not done because there was nothing yet to
offer, and (c) that said offer was rejected, which did not happen
because there was nothing to reject as nothing was offered.
2. WONthe trial court gravely abused its discretion in ordering
that the deposition be not taken in the absence of good cause
therefor. It asserts that the reasons advanced by the trial court
cannot
be considered "good cause" within the contemplation of the law,
which reasons, to repeat, are: (a) that the proposed deponent
had earlier responded to written interrogatories; (b) that the
proposed deponent had signified his availability to testify in
court; and (c) that to allow the deposition would deprive the trial
court of the opportunity to ask clarificatory questions to the vital
witness.
RULING:
The SC discussed that the finer attributed of the rules of
discovery would contribute immensely to the attainment of the
judiciary’s primordial goal of expediting the disposition of cases.
The deposition-discovery procedure was designed to remedy the
conceded inadequacy and cumbersomeness of the pre-trial
functions of notice-giving, issue formulation and face revelation
theretofore performes primarily by the pleadings. The various
modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve 1) as a
device, along with the pre trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow
and clarify the basic issues between the parties and 2) as a
device for ascertaining the facts relative to those issues. The
evident purpose is to enable the parties consistent with
recognized privileges to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of
the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said
trials are carried on in the dark. To this end , the field of inquiry
that may be covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad
as when the interrogated party is called as witness to testify
orally at trial.
I. Section 16 of Rule 24 provides that after notice is served for
taking a deposition by oral examination, upon motion seasonably
made by any party or by the person to be examined and upon
notice and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is
pending may, among others, make an order that the deposition
shall not be taken.
This provision explicitly vests in the court the power to order
that the deposition shall not be taken and this grant connotes
the authority to exercise discretion in connection therewith. It is
well settled, however, that the discretion conferred by law is not
unlimited: that it must be exercised, not arbitrarily, capriciously,
or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in consonance
with the spirit of the law, to the end that its purpose may be
attained.
Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that certiorari will not lie
to review or correct discovery orders made prior to trial. 11 This
is because, like other discovery orders, orders made under
Section 16, Rule 24 are interlocutory and not appealable, 12
considering that they do not finally dispose of the proceeding or
of any independent offshoot of it. However, such rules are
subject to the exception that discretionary acts will be reviewed
where the lower court or tribunal has acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction, where an interlocutory order does not
conform to essential requirements of law and may reasonably
cause material injury throughout subsequent proceedings for
which the remedy of appeal will be inadequate, or where there
is a clear or serious abuse of discretion. It is our considered
opinion that on the bases of circumstances obtaining in the case
at bar, and which will hereinafter be discussed, certiorari may be
availed of to review the questioned order of the trial court. SC
ruled that certiorari may be availed of to review the questioned
order of the trial court.
II. It is true that to ensure that availment of the modes of
discovery would be untrammeled and efficacious, Rule 29
imposes serious sanctions on the party who refuses to comply
with or respond to the modes of discovery, such as dismissing his
action or proceeding or part thereof, or rendering judgment by
default against the disobedient party; contempt of court, or
arrest of the party or agent of the party; payment of the amount
of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining a court order to
compel discovery; taking the matters inquired into as
established in accordance with the claim of the party seeking
discovery; refusal to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose designated claims or defenses; striking out his pleadings
or parts thereof; or staying further proceedings. Section 16 of
Rule 24 clearly states that it is only upon notice and for good
cause shown that the court may order that the deposition shall
not be taken. The matter of good cause is to be determined by
the court in the exercise of judicial discretion. The requirement,
however, that good cause be shown for a protective order puts
the burden on the party seeking relief to show some plainly
adequate reasons for the order. A particular and specific
demonstration of facts, as distinguished from conclusory
statements, is required to establish good cause for the issuance
of a protective order. 16 What constitutes good cause
furthermore depends upon the kind of protective order that is
sought.
The allegation that the deponent knows nothing about the
matters involved does not justify prohibiting the taking of the
deposition, nor that whatever the witness knows is protected by
the "work product doctrine," nor that privileged information or
trade secrets will be sought in the course of the examination, nor
that all the transactions were either conducted or confirmed in
writing. 18 In the present case, private respondent failed to
sufficiently establish that there is good cause to support the
order of the trial court that the deposition shall not be taken.
1. On the question of whether an oral deposition might be taken
after service of interrogatories, the courts took a relatively liberal
view. In Howard v. States Marine Corp., the first case in which
this question was raised, Judge Hilbert said that:
"Where it develops that examination by interrogatories has been
inadequate, the court unquestionably has, and in a proper case
should exercise, discretion to permit an oral examination. But it
should be made to clearly appear that the relevant subject
matter will not involve the interrogation of the witness with
respect to those particulars upon which he was examined by
interrogatories." It is quite clear, therefore, and we so hold that
under the present Rules the fact that a party has resorted to a
particular method of discovery will not bar subsequent use of
other discovery devices, as long as the party is not attempting to
circumvent a ruling of the court, or to harass or oppress the
other party. As a matter of practice, it will often be desirable to
resort to both interrogatories and depositions in one or the
other sequence.
2. The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court
does not constitute "good cause" to justify the court's order that
his deposition shall not be taken. That the witness is unable to
attend or testify is one of the grounds when the deposition of a
witness may be used in court during the trial. 25 But the same
reason cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit the taking of
his deposition.
The right to take statements and the right to use them in court
have been kept entirely distinct. The utmost freedom is allowed
in taking depositions; restrictions are imposed upon their use.
Regardless of the development of devices for pre-trial fact
investigation, our legal system is now thoroughly committed to
the notion that on the trial itself the adducing of facts by viva
voce testimony of witnesses — whose demeanor and manner
are subject to the observation of the judge — is superior to the
use of written statements of the same witnesses. Preference for
oral testimony has dictated most of the limitations on the use of
depositions as evidence. And since their use as evidence was
originally conceived as the sole function of depositions proper,
the limitations on their taking dovetailed with the limitations on
their use. But under the concept adopted by the new Rules, the
deposition serves the double function of a method of discovery
— with use on trial not necessarily contemplated — and a
method of presenting testimony. Accordingly, no limitations
other than relevancy and privilege have been placed on the
taking of depositions, while the use at the trial is subject to
circumscriptions looking toward the use of oral testimony
wherever practicable.
3. The main reason given in support of the contested order is
that, if the deposition were taken, the court could not observe
the behavior of the deponents. The insufficiency of this
circumstance to justify the interdiction of the taking of a
deposition becomes apparent when we consider that, otherwise,
no deposition could ever be taken, said objection or handicap
being common to all depositions alike. Finally, in the absence of
proof, the allegation that petitioner merely intended to annoy,
harass or oppress the proposed deponent cannot ably support
the setting aside of a notice to take deposition.
Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance,
embarrassment or oppression may be issued if the following
requirements are complied with: (a) that there is a motion made
by any party or by the person to be examined; (b) that the
motion has been seasonably filed; (c) that there is good cause
shown; and (d) that notice of such motion has been served to
the other party.
4. Finally, in the absence of proof, the allegation that petitioner
merely intended to annoy, harass or oppress the proposed
deponent cannot ably support the setting aside of a notice to
take deposition.
Orders to protect the party or witness from annoyance,
embarrassment or oppression may be issued if the following
requirements are complied with: (a) that there is a motion made
by any party or by the person to be examined; (b) that the
motion has been seasonably filed; (c) that there is good cause
shown; and (d) that notice of such motion has been served to
the other party. Inconvenience to the party whose deposition is
to be taken is not a valid objection to the taking of his
deposition. 32 No doubt, private respondent and its
representative who is to be examined will be inconvenienced —
as are all parties when required to submit to examination — but
this is no ground for denial of the deposition-discovery process.
On the bases of the foregoing disquisitions, we find and so hold
that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
issuing an order that the deposition shall not be taken in this
case, and that respondent court erred in affirming the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned decision
of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and judgment is hereby rendered ORDERING the court a
quo to allow herein petitioner to take the deposition upon oral
examination of Juanito S. Teope in and for purposes of Civil Case
No. SP-3469 pending before it. SO ORDERED.
CONCORDIA LALUAN, et al., petitioners,
vs.
APOLINARIO MALPAYA, MELECIO TAMBOT, BERNARDINO
JASMIN, et al., respondents.
Primicias, Regino and Macaraeg for petitioners.
Saturnino D. Bautista for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
In 1950 the Laluans,1 the Laguits2 and the Sorianos3
(hereinafter referred to as the petitioners) filed with the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan a complaint against Apolinario
Malpaya, Melecio Tambot and Bernardino Jasmin (hereinafter
referred to as the respondents) for recovery of ownership and
possession of two parcels of land. The petitioners seek a
declaration that they are the owners pro indiviso of
A PARCEL OF RICELAND, situated in the barrio of Inoman,
Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, Philippines ... containing an area of 1
hectare nine hundred seventy one (10,971) square meters, more
or less; bounded on the N. by Nicolas Estares; on the E. by Zanja;
on the S. by Estero Inoman and on W. by Aniceta Marquez; ...,
and the owners pro indiviso of one-half of
A PARCEL OF RICELAND AND CORNLAND, situated in the barrio
of Inoman, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, ... containing an area of
(31,548) square meters, more or less, bounded on N. by Rosendo
Serran; E. by Esteban Malpaya; S. by Creek and W. by Creek that
surround it; ....
They base their claim on their alleged right to inherit, by legal
succession, from Marciana Laluan (the respondent Malpaya's
wife) who died intestate on July 17, 1948 and without any
children.
The first parcel of land they allege as paraphernal property of the
late Marciana Laluan. They claim that the respondent Malpaya,
taking advantage of the senility of his wife, sold the land to the
respondent Tambot, as evidenced by the "Deed of Absolute Sale
of Real Property" dated June 26, 1948. The second parcel of land
they allege as conjugal property of the spouses Malpaya and
Laluan, and charge that the respondent Malpaya, with right to
sell only one-half thereof, sold the whole property, four days
after the death of his wife, to the respondents Tambot and
Jasmin, as evidenced by the "Absolute Deed of Sale" dated July
21, 1948.
The respondents filed their answer,4 denying the allegations of
the complaint and claiming that the parcels of land belonged to
the respondent Malpaya as his exclusive property. The
respondents Tambot and Jasmin further aver that the
respondent Malpaya had the "perfect legal right" to dispose of
the said parcels of land and that they bought the properties in
good faith, unaware of any flaw in the title of their vendor.
To expedite the proceedings, the parties entered into a partial
stipulation of facts at the hearings of August 31 and October 25,
1950. The petitioners then proceeded to adduce their evidence.
Several postponements of the scheduled hearings followed.
Then, at the hearing scheduled on August 1, 1957 neither the
respondents nor their counsel appeared, notwithstanding due
and proper notice served on them. Nor did they file any motion
for postponement. The petitioners thus moved for leave to
continue with the presentation of their evidence. This the court
a quo granted, allowing the petitioners to adduce their evidence
before the clerk of court.
On September 23, 1957 the court a quo rendered judgment
declaring null and void the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property" dated June 26, 1948 as well the "Absolute Deed of
Sale" dated July 21, 1948, except as regards the one-half portion
of the land described in the latter document which belonged to
the respondent Malpaya. With respect to the parcel of land
covered by the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property," the
court a quo declared the petitioners owners pro indiviso of the
entirety thereof and ordered the respondent Tambot not only to
deliver the possession of the land to them but also to pay them,
by way of damages, the amount of P750 — the value of the
crops which the petitioners failed to realize for the last nine
years from the land — plus P500 annually from date until
possession thereof shall have been delivered to them. With
respect to the parcel of land subject of the "Absolute Deed of
Sale," the court a quo likewise declared the petitioners owners
pro indiviso of one-half thereof and ordered the respondents
Tambot and Jasmin to deliver the possession of the half-portion
to the petitioners, as well as to pay them, in damages, the sum
of P1,343.75 — the value of the produce which the petitioners
failed to realize for the last nine years from the half-portion of
the land - plus P687.50 annually from date until possession
thereof shall have been delivered to them.
On October 7, 1957 the respondents Tambot and Jasmin filed
their Mocion de Reconsideracion. On October 18, 1957 the court
a quo, finding the grounds invoked by the respondents in their
motion without merit, denied the same.
The respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals
(hereinafter referred to as the respondent Court). On January 31,
1963 the respondent Court rendered judgment setting aside the
appealed decision and entered another remanding the case to
the court a quo for further proceedings. The respondent Court
voided the procedure whereby, at the continuation of the
hearing of the case on August 1, 1957, the court a quo, in the
absence of the respondents and their counsel, allowed the
petitioners to present their evidence before the clerk of court.
In due time, the petitioners, through a motion for
reconsideration, asked the respondent Court to re-examine its
decision. This motion, however, the respondent Court denied.
In the instant petition for certiorari, the petitioners pray for the
reversal of the decision of the respondent Court as well its
resolution denying their motion for reconsideration, and ask that
judgment be rendered affirming in toto the decision of the court
a quo dated September 23, 1957.
The petitioners and the respondents point to what they believe
is the sole question for resolution; whether or not the reception
by the clerk of court of the petitioners' evidence, in the absence
of the respondents and their counsel, constitutes a prejudicial
error that vitiated the proceedings.
The petitioners argue that a trial court has authority to designate
its clerk of court to receive the evidence of the party present
when the other party fails to appear. In receiving evidence, the
petitioners continue, the clerk of court merely performs a
ministerial task. The ministerial nature of such a task allows the
clerk of court to dispense with the procedural steps5 prescribed
by Rule 33 of the Rules of Court.
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the court a
quo arrogated unto itself the power, otherwise denied it, to
designate its clerk of court to receive the petitioners' evidence.
No provision of the Rules of Court, according to them, empowers
a trial court to authorize its clerk of court to receive the evidence
of a party litigant; only when the clerk of court becomes a
commissioner, by appointment pursuant to Rule 33, has he the
authority to so receive the evidence of a party litigant, and even
in such a situation Rule 33 requires the clerk of court to observe
the procedural steps therein prescribed.
The provisions of Rule 33 of the Rules of Court invoked by both
parties properly relate to the reference by a court of any or all of
the issues in a case to a person so commissioned to act or report
thereon. These provisions explicitly spell out the rules governing
the conduct of the court, the commissioner, and the parties
before, during, and after the reference proceedings. Compliance
with these rules of conduct becomes imperative only when the
court formally orders a reference of the case to a commissioner.
Strictly speaking then, the provisions of Rule 33 find no
application to the case at bar where the court a quo merely
directed the clerk of court to take down the testimony of the
witnesses6 presented and to mark the documentary evidence7
proffered on a date previously set for hearing.
No provision of law or principle of public policy prohibits a court
from authorizing its clerk of court to receive the evidence of a
party litigant. After all, the reception of evidence by the clerk of
court constitutes but a ministerial task — the taking down of the
testimony of the witnesses and the marking of the pieces of
documentary evidence, if any, adduced by the party present.
This task of receiving evidence precludes, on the part of the clerk
of court, the exercise of judicial discretion usually called for
when the other party who is present objects to questions
propounded and to the admission of the documentary evidence
proffered.8 More importantly, the duty to render judgment on
the merits of the case still rests with the judge who is obliged to
personally and directly prepare the decision based upon the
evidence reported. 9
But where the proceedings before the clerk of court and the
concomitant result thereof, i.e., the judgment rendered by the
court based on the evidence presented in such limited
proceedings, prejudice the substantial rights of the aggrieved
party, then there exists sufficient justification to grant the latter
complete opportunity to thresh out his case in court.
1. Anent the parcel of land subject of the "Deed of Absolute
Sale of Real Property," the court a quo, in its decision dated
September 23, 1957, declared it as the paraphernal property of
the deceased Marciana Laluan. In so doing, the court a quo
relied mainly on the documents — the deed of donation propter
nuptias and the translation thereof in English — presented by
the petitioners before the clerk of court at the hearing on August
1, 1957. However, the respondents contend — and this the
respondent court took significant note of in its resolution dated
March 30, 1963 — that the land described in the "Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Property" is not any of those set forth in
the deed of donation.
The "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" describes the land
subject thereof as follows:

A parcel of riceland, together with all the improvements existing
thereon situated in the Barrio of Inoman, Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan, Philippines, ... containing an area of 1 hectare nine
hundred seventy one (10,971) square meters, more or less;
bounded on the N. by Nicolas Estaris; on the E. by Zanja; on the
east by Estero Inoman and on the W. by Aniceta Marquez; the
boundaries consists of visible dikes that surround it; declared
under Tax No. 20006 in the name of the Vendor and assessed at
P330.00 of the current year of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan; said land
is not registered under Act No. 496 nor under the Spanish
Mortgage Law. 10
On the other hand, the deed of donation propter nuptias treats
of three parcels of land in this manner.
First: A parcel of riceland situated in Paldit, municipality of
Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, the measurement and boundaries on all
sides could be seen from the sketch at the back hereof, this
parcel of land is given in lieu of jewelry, whose value is TEN
(P10.00) PESOS.
Second: Another parcel of riceland situated in the same place
mentioned above, also its measurements and boundaries on all
sides could be seen from the sketch at the back hereof, and
valued at THIRTY (P30.00) PESOS.
... a parcel of riceland ... situated in Inmatotong, this
municipality, its measurements in brazes and boundaries on all
sides could be seen on the sketch herein below, and this said
parcel of land is valued at TEN (P10.00) PESOS.
The sketch appearing on the deed of donation covers three
parcels of land: the first parcel, 63 X 52 brazas, 11 bounded on
the north by Jacinto Malpaya, on the west by a payas, and on the
south and east by Pedro Malpaya; the second parcel, 30 X 63
brazas, bounded on the north by Tomas Tollao, on the west by
Jacinto Laluan, on the south by a colos, and on the east by Pedro
Malpaya; and the third parcel, 52 X 23 brazas, bounded on the
north and west by Pedro Malpaya, on the south by Roman
Gramata, and on the east by Eustaquio Marquez. All of these
three parcels have stated metes and bounds quite different from
those of the land covered by the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real
Property," the location too of the latter land differs from those of
the parcels described in the deed of donation. While the land
subject of the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" lies in
Inoman, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, the parcels included in the
deed of donation lie either in Paldit or in Inmatotong, both also
in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan. At first sight also appears the marked
variance between the respective areas of those parcels
described in the deed of donation and the parcel subject of the
"Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property."
Indeed, there arises the possibility that in the interim of fifty six
years from February 15, 1892 (the date of the deed of donation
propter nuptias) to June 26, 1948 (the date of the "Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Property"), the parcels of land contiguous
to those described in the deed of donation passed in ownership
from one hand to another, or changes in the man-made or
natural boundaries used to indicate the confines of the parcels
set forth in the said document occurred. This could very well
explain the discrepancies between the names of the boundary
owners of the piece of land described in the "Deed of Absolute
Sale of Real Property" and the names of the adjacent owners of
the parcels subject of the deed of donation as well as the
absence of any mention of the payas and colos in the later "Deed
of Absolute Sale of Real Property." In addition, the variance
between the location of the land described in the "Deed of
Absolute Sale of Real Property" and those of the parcels set forth
in the deed of donation could reasonably be due to the creation
of new barrios in the municipality of Pozorrubio Pangasinan, or
the alteration of the boundaries of the barrios therein.
However, the apparent difference between the area of the land
described in the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" and
the areas of the parcels included in the deed of donation propter
nuptias should be fully and properly explained. The record shows
that the petitioners neither offered nor attempted to offer any
evidence indicating that the land sold by the respondent
Malpaya to his co-respondent Tambot corresponds with any of
the three parcels described in the deed of donation. The
petitioners failed to specify precisely which of the three parcels
— its location, area, and contiguous owners — subject of the
deed of donation constitutes the very land delimited in the
"Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property."
All these give rise to a grave doubt as to the specific identity of
one of the parcels of land in dispute which the court a quo
neither noticed nor considered notwithstanding the obvious fact
that the location, area and boundaries of the land covered by
the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property" do not coincide
with those of any of the parcels described in the deed of
donation propter nuptias.
The invariable applicable rule 12 is to the effect that in order to
maintain an action to recover ownership, the person who claims
that he has a better right to the property must prove not only his
ownership of the property claimed but also the identity thereof.
The party who desires to recover must fix the identity of the land
he claims. 13 And where doubt and uncertainty exist as to the
identity of the land claimed, a court should resolve the question
by recourse to the pleadings and the record as well as to
extrinsic evidence, oral or written.
Absent, therefore, any indicium in the record to show and
identify with absolute certainty any of the three parcels of land
included in the deed of donation propter nuptias as the land
described in the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property," the
prudent course open obviously consists in an investigation by the
court a quo, either in the form of a hearing or an ocular
inspection, or both, to enable it to know positively the land in
litigation. If, indeed, the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property"
treats of a piece of land entirely different and distinct from the
parcels described in the deed of donation propter nuptias, and
considering that the court a quo, in its decision dated September
23, 1957, relied mainly on the said deed of donation in declaring
the land subject of the "Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property"
as the paraphernal property of the late Marciana Laluan and in
nullifying the latter document, then there exists sufficient
ground to remand the case to the court a quo for a new trial on
the matter.
2. Anent the parcel of land subject of the "Absolute Deed of
Sale," the court a quo, in its decision dated September 23, 1957,
found and declared it as the conjugal property of the spouses
Laluan and Malpaya. In so doing, the court a quo relied heavily
on the presumption established by article 1407 14 of the Civil
Code of 1889 that "[a] 11 the property of the spouses shall be
deemed partnership property in the absence of proof that it
belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife."
It needs no emphasis to point out that the court a quo
committed no error in declaring that the parcel of land subject of
the "Absolute Deed of Sale" belongs to the conjugal partnership
of the spouses Laluan and Malpaya. Indeed, the spouses Laluan
and Malpaya acquired the said parcel of land from Eustaquio
Marquez "sometime in 1912" or, specifically, during the
marriage. Following the rule then that proof of acquisition of the
property in dispute during the marriage suffices to render the
statutory presumption operative, 15 it seems clear enough that
the parcel covered by the "Absolute Deed of Sale" pertains to
the conjugal partnership of the spouses Laluan and Malpaya.
Likewise, the court a quo committed no error in declaring the
"Absolute Deed of Sale" null and void as to the one-half portion
of the land described therein which belonged to Laluan, spouse
of the respondent Malpaya; in declaring the petitioners the
owners pro indiviso of one-half of the land subject of the said
"Absolute Deed of Sale;" and in ordering the respondents
Tambot and Jasmin to deliver the possession of the said half-
portion to the petitioners. The court a quo also correctly cited
and applied the provisions of articles 953 16 and 837 17 of the
Civil Code of 1889 which, pursuant to article 2263 18 of the new
Civil Code, govern the rights of the petitioners and the
respondent Malpaya to the property left by Marciana Laluan
who died on July 17, 1948 or before the effectivity of the new
code. Consequently, the court a quo correctly ordered the
respondents Tambot and Jasmin to pay to the petitioners, by
way of damages, the amount of P1,343.75 which is the value of
the produce which the said petitioners failed to realize for nine
years from the half-portion of the land subject of the "Absolute
Deed of Sale" — plus the sum of P687.50 annually from
September 23, 1957 until possession of the said half-portion of
land shall have been delivered to them.
ACCORDINGLY, (1) the judgment of the Court of Appeals dated
January 31, 1963 and its resolution dated March 30, 1963 are set
aside; (2) the judgment of the court a quo dated September 23,
1957, insofar as it pertains to the "Absolute Deed of Sale," is
hereby affirmed; and (3) the judgment of the court a quo of the
same date, insofar as it relates to the "Deed of Absolute Sale of
Real Property," is set aside, and the case (civil case 11219) is
hereby remanded to the court a quo for a new trial, to the end
that the identities of the parcels of land in dispute may be
specifically established. At the new trial, it will not be necessary
to retake evidence already taken, but the parties shall be
afforded opportunity to present such evidence as they may
deem relevant to the particular question raised herein. No costs.
VICENTE YU, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
EMILIO MAPAYO, defendant-appellee.
Lozano Law Office & Associates for plaintiff-appellant.
Gregorio A. Palabrica for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:p
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Davao City,
Branch II (Judge Alfredo I. Gonzalez presiding), rendered in its
Civil Case No. 4018, dismissing plaintiff's action for lack of
prosecution.
The case originally started in the City Court of Davao, Branch II,
where appellant therein had filed suit to recover from defendant
Emilio Mapayo the sum of P2,800, representing the unpaid
balance of the purchase price of a Gray Marine Engine sold by
the plaintiff to the defendant, plus attorney's fees. The answer
admitted the transaction and the balance due but contended
that by reason of hidden defects of the article sold, the
defendant had been forced to spend P2,800 for repairs and
labor, wherefore plaintiff had agreed to waive the balance due
on the price of the engine, and counterclaimed for damages and
attorneys' fees. The City Court, after trial, disallowed the
defenses and ordered the defendant to pay plaintiff P2,500.00
and costs (Record on Appeal, pages 9-16).
Defendant Mapayo appealed to the Court of First Instance, filing
an answer therein that was a virtual reproduction of his original
defenses in the City Court. When, after several continuances, the
case was called for hearing on 13 March 1968, the defendant, as
well as his counsel, failed to appear and the court scheduled the
case for hearing ex parte on the same day. The Court ordered
plaintiff to present his evidence, and from the unchallenged
stenographic notes quoted in appellant's brief, pages 11-14
(Transcript, pages 4-7), the following transpired:
ATTY. LOZANO:
If your Honor please, before I present my witness I should like to
present the issue because all the allegations of the complaint are
admitted and I am going to specify by the answer, your Honor.
(Emphasis supplied)
COURT:
The issue is void on the hidden defect.
ATTY. LOZANO:
That is why, if your Honor please, the point if your Honor please,
is I do not have to prove that there is a gasoline engine that was
taken by the defendant from the plaintiff for an agreed amount
of P6,800.00 because the allegation in paragraph 1, No. 2 and
No. 3, is admitted in the answer.
In other words, if your Honor please, the promissory note in the
amount of P2,800.00 ... (interrupted by court).
COURT:
Wait a minute, are you going to present evidence or not?
ATTY. LOZANO:
Will you please give me a chance, if your Honor please, because
my purpose is, it will turn out that it will be the defendant to
present evidence to prove that there is hidden defect. He
admitted the allegation, he admitted that there is a balance of
P2,800.00; it is not paid by him but at the same time he said that
there is a hidden defect.
In other words, if your Honor please, it should be the defendant
to present the evidence ... (interrupted by court).
COURT:
Are you going to present evidence, substantial, oral, or not?
Answer the question of the Court.
ATTY. LOZANO:
If your Honor please, on the complaint, on the allegation of the
complaint, all are admitted by the defendant ... (interrupted by
court).
COURT:
The attorney does not answer the question of the Court.
Answer the question, are you going to present evidence OR NOT
AND SUBMIT THE CASE ON THE PLEADINGS. (Capitals supplied)
ATTY. LOZANO:
Would you please allow me, your Honor, because in the answer
of the defendant ... (interrupted by court)
COURT:
I do not need discussion; I want you to answer the question of
the Court.
ATTY. LOZANO:
I am not going to present my evidence yet because this moment
I am submitting my evidence on the pleading until after the
defendant will present evidence and I reserve my right to
present rebuttal evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
COURT:
Make it of record that the attorney refuses to present evidence
either oral or documentary when required by the Court.
ATTY. LOZANO:
Motion for reconsideration, if your Honor please, that is not
what I said, if your Honor please, I manifested that it should be
the defendant to prove first, to present evidence and we reserve
our right to present rebuttal evidence, if your Honor please.
(Emphasis supplied).
COURT:
All right, denied.
Submit the case for the consideration of the Court.
The court then issued an order on the same day in the following
terms (Record on Appeal, page 24):
ORDER
Make it of record that the attorney for the plaintiff refuses to
present evidence, either oral or documentary, when required by
the Court.
Submit the case for the consideration of the Court.
SO ORDERED.
A motion for reconsideration having been filed by counsel for
plaintiff, it was denied by the court by an order of 21 March, and
the case was dismissed for lack of prosecution (Record on
Appeal, pages 34-35), the trial judge reasoning that —
When the case is called for trial on 19 March 1968, defendants
counsel asked again for another postponement of the trial on
the ground that defendant and his witnesses were not able to
come for lack of transportation, notwithstanding a stern warning
by the Court, per its order of 9 March 1968 that it would not
entertain further motion for continuation of trial. Counsel for the
plaintiff vehemently objected to such motion and insisted in
presenting his evidence which the Court grants inspite of
another civil case and one miscellaneous case which were ready
for hearing at the same time.
Court ordered the plaintiff to present his evidence. Plaintiff's
counsel refused to comply with said order. Instead of calling his
witnesses, he moved the Court to present them after the
defendant had presented their evidence. The court asked said
counsel twice whether he would present his evidence for the
plaintiff, but said counsel refused to do so and sticked to his
demand that he would introduce his witnesses only in rebuttal.
This is dictation to the Court to disregard its lawful command
and a violation of the order of trial provided in the Rules of
Court.
This is an appealed case from the Municipal Court elevated to
this Court on 18 May 1963 and from that time several
postponement were granted at the instance of the parties which
cause delay and is detrimental to the interest of justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, let this case be dismissed for failure to
prosecute on the part of counsel for the plaintiff without
pronouncement as to costs.
Finding defendant's counterclaim not meritorious, same is also
dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Further motions to reconsider having proved futile, the plaintiff
appealed.
We find for plaintiff-appellant. Since the answer admitted
defendant's obligation as stated in the complaint, albeit special
defenses were pleaded, plaintiff had every right to insist that it
was for defendant to come forward with evidence in support of
his special defenses. Section 2 of Revised Rule of Court 129
plainly supports appellant:
Sec. 2. Judicial admissions.— Admissions made by the parties in
the pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings
do not require proof and can not be contradicted unless
previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake.
While this appeal is not a complaint against the presiding judge,
We can not refrain from observing that the trial judge's despotic
and outrageous insistence that plaintiff should present proof in
support of allegations that were not denied but admitted by the
adverse party was totally unwarranted, and was made worse by
the trial judge's continual interrupting of the explanations of
counsel, in violation of the rules of Judicial Ethics.
Defendant not having supported his special defenses, the
dismissal of the case was manifestly untenable and contrary to
law.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is hereby revoked
and set aside, and the court below is directed to enter judgment
in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of
P2,800.00, plus attorney's fees which this Court considers just
and reasonable (Civil Code, Article 2208, paragraph 11). Costs
against defendant-appellee.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Honorable, the
Secretary of Justice, for his information and action.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
LEE V RAMILLO
DECISION
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
The accused-appellant Vicente Temblor alias "Ronald" was
charged with the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 1890 of
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Agusan
del Norte and Butuan City for shooting to death Julius
Cagampang. The information alledge:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the evening of December 30, 1980 at Talo-ao,
Buenavista, Agusan del Norte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused conspiring,
and confederating with one another with Anecito Ellevera who is
at large, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with treachery and with intend to kill, attack, assault and shoot
with firearms one Julius Cagampang, hitting the latter on the
vistal parts of the body thereby inflicting mortal wounds, causing
the direct and instantaneous death of the said Julius Cagampang.
"CONTRARY TO LAW: Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code."cralaw virtua1aw library
Upon arraignment on June 8, 1982, he entered a plea of not
guilty. After trial, he was convicted and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties
thereof under Articles 41 and 42 of the Revised Penal Code, and
to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P12,000
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He
appealed.
The evidence of the prosecution showed that at about 7:30 in
the evening of December 30, 1980, while Cagampang, his wife
and their two children, were conversing in the store adjacent to
their house in Barangay Talo-ao, Buenavista, Province of Agusan
del Norte, the accused Vicente Temblor alias Ronald, arrived and
asked to buy a half pack of Hope cigarettes. While Cagampang
was opening a pack of cigarettes, there was a sudden burst of
gunfire and Cagampang instantly fell on the floor, wounded and
bleeding on the head. His wife Victorina, upon seeing that her
husband had been shot, shouted her husband’s name "Jul." Two
persons, one of whom she later identified as the accused, barged
into the interior of the interior of the store through the main
door and demanded that she brings out her husband’s firearm.
Igawas mo ang iyang armas!" ("You let out his firearm!") they
shouted. The accused fired two or more shots at the fallen
victim. Terrified, Victorina hurried to get the male-ta" (suitcase)
where her husband’s firearm was hidden. She gave the suitcase
to the accused who, after inspecting its contents, took her
husband’s .38 caliber revolver, and fled.
In 1981, some months after the incident, Victorina was
summoned to the Buenavista police station by the Station
Commander Milan, where she saw the identified the accused as
the man who killed her husband.
The accused’s defense was alibi. He alledge that from 4:00
o’clock in the afternoon of December 30, 1980, he and his father
had been in the house of Silverio Perol in Barangay in Camagong,
Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, where they spent the night drinking
over a slaughtered dog as "pulutan," until 8:00 o’clock in the
morning of the following day, December 31, 1980.
The accused and his companion, admittedly members of the
dreaded NPA (New People’s Army) were not apprehended earlier
because they hid in the mountains of Malapong with other
members-followers of the New People’s Army. Temblor
surrendered to Mayor Dick Carmona of Nasipit during the mass
surrendered of dissidents in August, 1981. He was arrested by
the Buenavista Police at the Buenavista public market on
November 26, 1981 and detained at the Buenavista municipal
jail.
The accused capitalized the fact that the victim’s widow,
Victorina, did not know him by name. That circumstance
allegedly renders the identification of the accused, as the
perpetrator of her husband’s killing, insufficient. However, during
the trial, the accused was positively identified by the widow who
recognized him because she was less than a meter away from
him inside the store which was well lighted inside by a 40-watt
flourescent lamp and by an incandescent lamp outside. Her
testimony was corroborated by another prosecution witness — a
tricycle driver, Claudio Sabanal — who was a long-time
acquaintance of the accused and who knew him as "Ronald." He
saw the accused in the store of Cagampang at about 7:30 o’clock
in the evening of December 30, 1980. He heard the gunshots
coming from inside the store, and saw the people scampering
away.chanrobles law library
Dr. Alfredo Salanga who issued the post-mortem examination
report certified that the victim sustained three (3) gunshot
wounds.
Rebutting the accused’s alibi, the prosecution presented a
Certification of the Nasipit Lumber Company’s Personnel Officer,
Jose F. Tinga (Exh. D), and the NALCO Daily Time Record of
Silverio Perol (Exh. D), showing that Perol was not at home
drinking with the accused and his father, but was at work on
December 31, 1980. The accused did not bother to overcome
this piece of rebuttal evidence.
In this appeal, the appellant alleges that the court a quo
erred:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. in the finding that he was positively identified by the
prosecution witness as the killer of the deceased Julius
Cagampang; and
2. in rejecting his defense of alibi.
The appeal deserves no merit. Was the accused positively
identified as the killer of Cagampang? The settled rule is that the
trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses while
testifying is generally binding on the appellate court because of
its superior advantage in observing their conduct and demeanor
and its findings, when supported by convincingly credible
evidence as in the case at bar, shall not be disturbed on appeal
(People v. Dava, 149 SCRA, 582).
The minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the eyewitness
Victoria Vda. de Cagampang did not diminish her credibility,
especially because she had positively identified the accused as
her husband’s assailant, and her testimony is corroborated by
the other witnesses. Her testimony is credible, probable and
entirely in accord with human experience.
Appellant’s self serving and uncorroborated alibi cannot prevail
over the positive identification made by the prosecution
witnesses who had no base motives to falsely accuse him of the
crime. Furthermore, the rule is that in order for an alibi to be
acceptable as a defense, it is not enough that the appellant was
somewhere else when the crime was committed; it must be
demonstrated beyond doubt that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the scene of the crime. Here it was admitted that
Perol’s house in barrio Camagong, Nasipit is accessible to barrio
Talo-ao in Buenavista by jeep or tricycle via a well-paved
witnesses who had positively identified him could not be
overcome by the defendant’s alibi. (People v. Mercado, 97 SCRA
232; People v. Venancio Ramilo, 146 SCRA 258.)cralawnad
Appellant’s alleged lack of motive for killing Cagampang was
rejected by the trial court which opined that the defendant’s
knowledge that Cagampang possessed a firearm was motive
enough to kill him as killings perpetrated by members of the
New People’s Army for the sole purpose of acquiring more arms
and ammunition for their group are prevalent not only in Agusan
del Norte but elsewhere in the country. It is known as the NPA’s
"agaw armas" campaign. Moreover, proof of motive is not
essential when the culprit has been positively identified (People
v. Tan, Jr., 145 SCRA 615).
WHEREFORE, the judge merit appealed from is affirmed in all
respects, except as to the civil indemnity payable to the heirs of
the deceased Julius Cagampang which is increased to
P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
CONTINENTAL BANK, petitioner-appellant
vs.
HON. JOEL P. TIANGCO, Presiding Judge of Branch XXVIII, Court of
First Instance of Manila, INCOME AND ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION, STAR LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION and
PRIMITIVO E. DOMINGO, respondents appellees.
Vicente P. Fernando for appellant.
Pacifico B. Tacub for appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision dated
September 26, 1967, ordering Income and Acceptance
Corporation, Star Life Insurance Corporation and Primitive E.
Domingo to pay solidarily Lo the Continental Bank the sum of
forty-six thousand three hundred pesos and eighty-one centavos
(P46,300.81), with twelve percent interest per annum from June
1, 1967 until the principal has been fully paid, plus attorney's
fees of three thousand pesos and the costs (Civil Case No.
69703).
That judgment was rendered on the basis of the evidence which
was presented before the deputy clerk of court who was
commissioned Lo receive the same after the defendants were
declared in default for nonappearance at the pre-trial. As no
appeal was interposed from the said judgment, it became final
and executory. It was not satisfied.
The sheriff in his return dated August 30, 1968 stated that he
served the writ of execution upon the judgment debtor, P.E.
Domingo, who manifested that he would settle the case with the
bank. After the expiration of the sixty-day period, without the
judgment having been satisfied, the sheriff returned the writ to
the court.
On March 17, 1977, the bank, "through the Statutory Receiver",
filed a complaint also in the Court of First Instance of Manila for
the revival of the said judgment (Civil Case No. 107556). lt was
alleged therein that the judgment debtors (now the private
respondents) had made partial payments and that the amount
due as of March 15, 1977 was thirty-four thousand six hundred
twenty-two pesos and nineteen centavos (P34,622.19) with
twelve percent interest a year from March 16, 1977. The bank
prayed that the judgment be revived.
The defendants answered the complaint. Then, they filed a
motion to dismiss on the grounds that the action for revival of
judgment had prescribed and that the plaintiff bank had no
cause of action because the judgment sought to be revived is
void since it was based on the evidence received by the deputy
clerk of court as commissioner.
The motion to dismiss was opposed by the bank. The trial court
granted the motion in a minute order which reads: "Considering
the allegations contained, the arguments advanced and the
doctrine cited in defendants' motion to dismiss as well as those
of the opposition filed thereto by the plaintiff, the Court resolves
to grant the motion." The plaintiff appealed under Republic Act
5440.
We have admonished the trial courts not to issue a minute order
lie the one under appeal. A trial court should specify in its order
the reasons for the dismissal of the complaint so that when the
order is appealed, this Court can readily determine from a casual
perusal thereof whether there is a prima facie justification for
the dismissal.
The contention that the action for revival of the judgment had
prescribed is manifestly devoid of merit. "A judgment may be
executed on motion within five (5 years from the date of its
entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the
lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action." (Sec. 6, Rule
39, Rules of Court.) The prescriptive period for enforcing a
judgment is ten years (Art. 1144[3], Civil Code).
In this case, the ten-year period for enforcing the judgment had
not yet expired when the action for its revival was filed on March
17, 1977 because, as already stated, the judgment was rendered
on September 26, 1967. Respondents' contention that between
September 26, 1967 and March 17, 1977 a period of ten years,
five months and twenty-one days had elapsed is a palpable error.
There can be no doubt that the action herein was filed within ten
years from the rendition of the judgment, not to mention the
date of the entry thereof, which, although not shown in the
record, can be assumed to be much later.
Also erroneous and unmeritorious is respondents' contention
that the judgment in question is void and unenforceable because METROBANK VS SANDOVAL (G.R. NO. 169677 FEBRUARY 18,
it was based on evidence which was heard by the deputy clerk of 2013)
court as commissioner. That judgment is valid and enforceable Metrobank vs Sandoval
G.R. No. 169677 February 18, 2013
because it was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and
it was not impaired by extrinsic fraud nor by lack of due process.
Facts: On July 17, 1987, the Republic brought a complaint for
The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages in
judgment debtors. They acquiesced in the validity of the
the Sandiganbayan against Andres V. Genito, Jr., Ferdinand E.
judgment when they made partial payments to satisfy it.
Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos and other defendants. The action was
obviously to recover allegedly ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses,
The defendants or private respondents did not question in the
their nominees, dummies and agents. Among the properties
lower court its delegation to the deputy clerk of court of the
subject of the action were two parcels of commercial land
duty to receive plaintiff's evidence. 'There is no showing that
located in Tandang Sora (Old Balara), Quezon City, covered by
they were prejudiced by such a procedure, that the
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 266423 and TCT No. 266588
commissioner committed any mistake or abuse of discretion, or
of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City registered in the names
that the proceedings were vitiated by collusion and collateral
of Spouses Andres V. Genito, Jr. and Ludivina L. Genito. On
fraud. It is too late at this hour for them to question the
February 5, 2001, the Republic moved for the amendment of the
reception of plantiff's evidence by the deputy clerk of court
complaint in order to implead Asian Bank as an additional
acting as commissioner. (See CCC Insurance Corporation vs.
defendant. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion. It appears
Court of Appeals, L-25920, January 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 264; 2
that Asian Bank claimed ownership of the two parcels of land as
Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970, Ed., pp. 159-160
the registered owner by virtue of TCT No. N-201383 and TCT No.
citing Apurillo vs. Garciano L-23683, July 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 1054:
N-201384 issued in its name by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
Province of Pangasinan and Soriano vs. Palisoc, 116 Phil. 609,
City. Asian Bank was also in possession of the properties by
614. Cf. Lim Tanhu vs. Ramolete, L-40098, August 29, 1975, 66
virtue of the writ of possession issued by the Regional Trial Court
SCRA 425, 453-4.)
(RTC) in Quezon City. When the Republic was about to terminate
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal is reversed and its presentation of evidence against the original defendants in
set aside. Costs against the private respondents. Civil Case No. 0004, it moved to hold a separate trial against
Asian Bank.
SO ORDERED.
Issue: Whether or not a motion for separate trial is proper.
Held: No. The rule on separate trials in civil actions is found in
Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Section 2. Separate trials. – The court, in furtherance of
convenience or to avoid prejudice, may order a separate trial of
any claim, crossclaim, counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or
of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims,
counterclaims, third-party complaints or issues.
The text of the rule grants to the trial court the discretion to
determine if a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim,
counterclaim, or third-party complaint, or of any separate issue
or of any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-
party complaints or issues should be held, provided that the
exercise of such discretion is in furtherance of convenience or to
avoid prejudice to any party.
Further, Corpus Juris Secundum makes clear that neither party
had an absolute right to have a separate trial of an issue; hence,
the motion to that effect should be allowed only to avoid
prejudice, further convenience, promote justice, and give a fair
trial to all parties.
Exceptions to the general rule are permitted only when there are
extraordinary grounds for conducting separate trials on different
issues raised in the same case, or when separate trials of the
issues will avoid prejudice, or when separate trials of the issues
will further convenience, or when separate trials of the issues
will promote justice, or when separate trials of the issues will
give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise, the general rule must
apply.
Beatriz Wassmer vs Francisco Velez
July 23, 2011
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ADVERTISEMENTS
12 SCRA 648 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Article 21 of the
Civil Code – Moral Damages – Exemplary Damages – Breach of
Promise to Marry
In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their
marriage. They decided to schedule it on September 4, 1954.
And so Wassmer made preparations such as: making and
sending wedding invitations, bought her wedding dress and
other apparels, and other wedding necessities. But 2 days before
the scheduled day of wedding, Velez sent a letter to Wassmer
advising her that he will not be able to attend the wedding
because his mom was opposed to said wedding. And one day
before the wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer
advising her that nothing has changed and that he will be
returning soon. However, he never returned.
This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez
never filed an answer and eventually judgment was made in
favor of Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary and moral
damages in favor of Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled
wedding was because of fortuitous events. He further argued
that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to
marry Wassmer because there is no law upon which such an
action may be grounded. He also contested the award of
exemplary and moral damages against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not
tenable and also unsubstantiated. It is true that a breach of
promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, in
this case, it was not a simple breach of promise to marry.
because of such promise, Wassmer made preparations for the
wedding. Velez’s unreasonable withdrawal from the wedding is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Wassmer’s
cause of action is supported under Article 21 of the Civil Code
which provides in part “any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.”
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured
party to receive an award for moral damages as properly
awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of
exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the circumstances of
this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to Wassmer,
acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner – this
warrants the imposition of exemplary damages against him
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was
declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before the clerk
of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was
rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual
damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;
P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the costs.
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits
was in fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage, because the
judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having
been based on evidence adduced before the clerk of court. In
Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962,
this Court pointed out that the procedure of designating the
clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned
by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to
defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to
be obtained for he was declared in default and thus had no
standing in cour
Radiowealth Finance Company v. Del Rosario
G.R. No. 138739 July 6, 2000
Lessons Applicable: Demurrer to Evidence, Promissory Note,
When Demandable, Penalty, Interest (Credit Transactions)
Laws Applicable: Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules of Court (Civil
Procedure)
FACTS:
• March 2, 1991: Spouses Vicente and Maria Sumilang del
Rosario jointly and severally executed, signed and delivered in
favor of Radiowealth Finance Company a Promissory Note for
P138,948 without need of notice or demand, in instalments of
P11,579.00 payable for 12 consecutive months leaving the Ordered to PAY P138,948, plus 2.5 percent penalty charge per
period for the instalments blank. Upon default, the late month beginning April 2, 1991 until fully paid, and 10 percent of
payment, 2.5% penalty charge per month shall be added to each the amount due as attorney’s fees.
unpaid installment from due date thereof until fully paid.
• June 7, 1993: Radiowealth filed a complaint for the 1. NO.
collection of a sum of money before the RegionalTrial Court of • Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules
Manila. During the trial, Jasmer Famatico, the credit and o SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.—After the plaintiff has
collection officer of Radiowealth, presented in evidence the completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may
Spouses’ check payments, the demand letter dated July 12, move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the
1991, Spouses’ customer’s ledger card, another demand letter law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is
and Metropolitan Bank dishonor slips. Famatico admitted that denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the
he did not have personal knowledge of the transaction or the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is
execution of any of these pieces of documentary evidence, reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present
which had merely been endorsed to him. evidence.
• July 29, 1994: Spouses filed a Demurrer to Evidence for • Defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiff’s
alleged lack of cause of action evidence retain the right to present their own evidence, if
• RTC: Dismissed for Radiowealth’s failure to substantiate the the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with
claims, the evidence it had presented being merely hearsay them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of
• CA: reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the
o During the pretrial, through judicial admissions or the right to present their own evidence
spouses admitted the genuineness of the Promissory Note and • The appellate court shall resolve the case and render
demand letter dated July 12, 1991. Their only defense was the judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to
absence of an agreement on when the installment payments discourage prolonged litigations
were to begin
ISSUES: 2. Yes.
1. W/N the spouses can still present evidence after the • The act of leaving blank the due date of the first installment
appellate court’s reversal of the dismissal on demurer of did NOT necessarily mean that the debtors were allowed to pay
evidence (Civil Procedure) as and when they could. While the specific date on which each
2. W/N the obligation is due and demandable (Credit installment would be due was left blank, the Note clearly
Transaction) provided that each installment should be payable each month. It
also provided for an acceleration clause and a late payment
HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Appealed Decision is MODIFIED. penalty, both of which showed the intention of the parties that
the installments should be paid at a definite date. Per the
acceleration clause, the whole debt became due one month
(April 2, 1991) after the date of the Note because the check
representing their first installment bounced.
• Respondents started paying installments on the Promissory
Note, even if the checks were dishonored by their drawee bank.
• The Note already stipulated a late payment penalty of 2.5
percent monthly to be added to each unpaid installment until
fully paid. Payment of interest was not expressly stipulated in
the Note. Thus, it should be deemed included in such penalty.
Liquidated damages, however, should no longer be imposed for
being unconscionable. Such damages should also be deemed
included in the 2.5 percent monthly penalty. Furthermore, we
hold that petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees, but only in a
sum equal to 10 percent of the amount due which we deem
reasonable under the proven facts
Cesar Nepomuceno, Leon Arcillas, and Ruben Avenido v. The
Hon. Commission on Elections and Oscar Laserna
GR No. L-60601
Date: December 29, 1983
By: Jelica
Topic: Demurrer to Evidence
Facts
• Petitioners Cesar Nepomuceno, Leon Arcillas, and Ruben
Avenido were the official candidates of the Nacionalista Party in
the 1980 local elections for the positions of mayor, vice mayor,
and member of the Sangguniang Bayan, respectively, of Sta.
Rosa, Laguna.
• Oscar Laserna filed a petition before the Comelec to
disqualify petitioners on the ground of turncoatism.
• The Comelec granted the petition, denying due course to
petitioners’ certificates of candidacy.
• Alleging denial of due process, petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining
order, which the Court granted.
• The petitioners were allowed to be voted for in the elections.
In the said elections, petitioners won and were proclaimed
winners in their respective positions.
• The Court remanded the case to Comelec for hearing and to
decide the case as expeditiously as possible after giving the
parties full opportunity to present all evidence relevant to the
issue of alleged turncoatism.
• The Comelec accordingly set the case for hearing on the
merits.
• However, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the said
case. The petitioners alleged that, it being a pre-election case,
the same should be dismissed, without prejudice to the filing of
appropriate quo warranto proceedings pursuant to the 1978
Election Code. The motion was denied.
• Petitioners filed another petition, this time with the Supreme
Court, assailing the Comelec’s resolution which denied their
motion to dismiss. The Court dismissed the second petition.
• The Comelec proceeded with the case.
• After Oscar Laserna had terminated the presentation of his
evidence, petitioners filed their respective Motions to
Dismiss/Demurrer to Evidence, which were opposed by Laserna.
• The Comelec issued the following order denying the
demurrer to evidence. The Comelec held that the Commission
Second Division would rather have the complete facts and
evidence of the parties upon which to reach a decision than
prematurely go into it now upon the facts and evidence of the
petitioner only.
• Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied.
 • Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss with the Comelec, which
was denied.
Issue/s
WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing
to resolve the petitioner’s demurrer to evidence by way of a
judgment wherein it should state the facts and the law on which
its resolution is based. – NO.
Ruling
Rule 35 of the Rules of Court allows the defendant to move for
dismissal of the case after the plaintiff has presented his
evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, and
provides for the effects of the dismissal or non-dismissal, as the
case may be, on the right of the defendant to present his cause.
It authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the
defendant having to submit evidence on his part as he would
ordinarily have to do, if it is shown by plaintiff’s evidence that
the latter is not entitled to the relief sought. The demurrer,
therefore, is an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination
of an action, similar to a motion to dismiss, which the court or
tribunal may either grant or deny.
The requirement of Section 1 of Rule 36 would only apply if the
demurrer is granted, for in this event, there would in fact be an
adjudication on the merits of the case. A denial of the demurrer
is not a final judgment, but merely interlocutory in character as it
does not finally dispose of the case, the defendant having yet the
right to present his evidence.
The challenged order being merely an interlocutory order and
not a final judgment or decision, no abuse of discretion was
committed by Comelec in its failure to state the facts and the law
on which its order denying petitioners’ demurrer to evidence is
based.
Doctrine
Notes
CASENT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP., Petitioner, versus
PHILBANKING CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 150731 | 2007-09-14
(Failure of plaintiff to deny genuineness and due execution of a
document constitutes judicial admission)
Facts:
Casent Realty Developmet Corp. executed two
promissory notes in favor of Rare Realty. These promissory notes
were used by Rare Realty as a security for a loan that Rare Realty
obtained from Philbanking wherein a Deed of Assignment was
executed. When Rare Realty failed to pay its debt, the bank went
after the security of the loan. The bank demanded payment
based on the promissory notes issued by Casent Realty Corp to
Rare Realty by virtue of the deed of assignment.
On a separate loan with Philbanking, Casent Realty
satisfied its obligation by executing a Dacion en pago.
Philbanking filed for a complaint for the collection of
payment against Casent based on the promissory notes. Casent
Realty, in its answer, raised that a Dacion en pago was already
executed which extinguished its obligation. Philbanking failed to
file a reply.
Casent Realty points out that the defense of Dacion and
Confirmation Statement, which were submitted in the Answer,
should have been specifically denied under oath by respondent
in accordance with Rule 8, Section 8 of the Rules of Court. It’s
failure constituted an admission on the part of the bank.
Philbanking claimed that even though it failed to file a
Reply, all the new matters alleged in the Answer are deemed
controverted anyway, pursuant to Rule 6, Section 10:
Section 10. Reply.--A reply is a pleading, the office or function of due execution of the Dacion and Confirmation Statement under
which is to deny, or allege facts in denial or avoidance of new oath, then these are deemed admitted and must be considered
matters alleged by way of defense in the answer and thereby by the court in resolving the demurrer to evidence. We held in
join or make issue as to such new matters. If a party does not file Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Sweet Lines,
such reply, all the new matters alleged in the answer are deemed Inc. that "[w]hen the due execution and genuineness of an
controverted. instrument are deemed admitted because of the adverse party's
failure to make a specific verified denial thereof, the instrument
Issue: need not be presented formally in evidence for it may be
Whether or not failure to file a Reply and deny the Dacion and considered an admitted fact."
Confirmation Statement under oath constitute a judicial Admission of the genuineness and due execution of the Dacion
admission of the genuineness and due execution of these and Confirmation Statement does not prevent the introduction
documents of evidence showing that the Dacion excludes the promissory
notes. Petitioner, by way of defense, should have presented
Held:
evidence to show that the Dacion includes the promissory notes.
Yes. Since respondent failed to file a Reply, in effect,
respondent admitted the genuineness and due execution of said WHEREFORE, the March 29, 2001 Decision and
documents. This judicial admission should have been considered November 7, 2001 Resolution of the CA are AFFIRMED. Costs
by the appellate court in resolving the demurrer to evidence. against petitioner.
Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Judicial admissions.--An admission, verbal or written,
made by a party in the course of the proceeding in the same UY v chua
case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted
only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or DECISION
that no such admission was made.
We agree with petitioner. Rule 8, Section 8 specifically
applies to actions or defenses founded upon a written
instrument and provides the manner of denying it. It is more
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which merely provides the
effect of failure to file a Reply. Thus, where the defense in the
Answer is based on an actionable document, a Reply specifically
denying it under oath must be made; otherwise, the
genuineness and due execution of the document will be deemed
admitted. Since respondent failed to deny the genuineness and
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Resolution dated 25 June 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 24, which granted the demurrer
to evidence of respondent Jose Ngo Chua, resulting in the
dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB.
Petitioner Joanie Surposa Uy filed on 27 October 2003 before the
RTC a Petition[1] for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate
filiation against respondent. The Complaint was docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB, assigned to RTC-Branch 24.
Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that respondent, who was
then married, had an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa
(Irene). Respondent and Irene had two children, namely,
petitioner and her brother, Allan. Respondent attended to Irene
when the latter was giving birth to petitioner on 27 April 1959,
and instructed that petitioners birth certificate be filled out with
the following names: ALFREDO F. SURPOSA as father and IRENE
DUCAY as mother. Actually, Alfredo F. Surposa was the name of
Irenes father, and Ducay was the maiden surname of Irenes
mother. Respondent financially supported petitioner and Allan.
Respondent had consistently and regularly given petitioner
allowances before she got married. He also provided her with
employment. When petitioner was still in high school,
respondent required her to work at the Cebu Liberty Lumber, a
firm owned by his family. She was later on able to work at the
Gaisano- Borromeo Branch through respondents efforts.
Petitioner and Allan were introduced to each other and became
known in the Chinese community as respondents illegitimate
children. During petitioners wedding, respondent sent his
brother Catalino Chua (Catalino) as his representative, and it was
the latter who acted as father of the bride. Respondents relatives
even attended the baptism of petitioners daughter.[2]
In his Answer[3] to the Complaint, filed on 9 December 2003,
respondent denied that he had an illicit relationship with Irene,
and that petitioner was his daughter.[4] Hearings then ensued
during which petitioner testified that respondent was the only
father she knew; that he took care of all her needs until she
finished her college education; and that he came to visit her on
special family occasions. She also presented documentary
evidence to prove her claim of illegitimate filiation.
Subsequently, on 27 March 2008, respondent filed a Demurrer to
Evidence[5] on the ground that the Decision dated 21 February
2000 of RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB had
already been barred by res judicata in Special Proceeding No.
12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24.
It turned out that prior to instituting Special Proceeding No.
12562-CEB on 27 October 2003, petitioner had already filed a
similar Petition for the issuance of a decree of illegitimate
affiliation against respondent. It was docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, assigned to RTC-Branch 9. Petitioner
and respondent eventually entered into a Compromise
Agreement in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, which was
approved by RTC-Branch 9 in a Decision[6] dated 21 February
2000. The full contents of said Decision reads:

Under consideration is a Compromise Agreement filed by the
parties on February 18, 2000, praying that judgment be rendered
in accordance therewith, the terms and conditions of which
follows:
1. Petitioner JOANIE SURPOSA UY declares, admits and
acknowledges that there is no blood relationship or filiation
between petitioner and her brother Allan on one hand and
[herein respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA on the other. This
declaration, admission or acknowledgement is concurred with
petitioners brother Allan, who although not a party to the case,
hereby affixes his signature to this pleading and also abides by
the declaration herein.
2. As a gesture of goodwill and by way of settling petitioner and
her brothers (Allan) civil, monetary and similar claims but
without admitting any liability, [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA
hereby binds himself to pay the petitioner the sum of TWO
MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00) and another TWO MILLION
PESOS (P2,000,000.00) to her brother, ALLAN SURPOSA.
Petitioner and her brother hereby acknowledge to have received
in full the said compromise amount.
3. Petitioner and her brother (Allan) hereby declare that they
have absolutely no more claims, causes of action or demands
against [respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA, his heirs, successors and
assigns and/or against the estate of Catalino Chua, his heirs,
successors and assigns and/or against all corporations,
companies or business enterprises including Cebu Liberty
Lumber and Joe Lino Realty Investment and Development
Corporation where defendant JOSE NGO CHUA or CATALINO
NGO CHUA may have interest or participation.
4. [Respondent] JOSE NGO CHUA hereby waives all counterclaim
or counter-demand with respect to the subject matter of the
present petition.
5. Pursuant to the foregoing, petitioner hereby asks for a
judgment for the permanent dismissal with prejudice of the
captioned petition. [Respondent] also asks for a judgment
permanently dismissing with prejudice his counterclaim.
Finding the said compromise agreement to be in order, the Court
hereby approves the same. Judgment is rendered in accordance
with the provisions of the compromise agreement. The parties
are enjoined to comply with their respective undertakings
embodied in the agreement.[7]
With no appeal having been filed therefrom, the 21 February
2000 Decision of RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding 8830-CEB
was declared final and executory.
Petitioner filed on 15 April 2008 her Opposition[8] to
respondents Demurrer to Evidence in Special Proceeding No.
12562-CEB. Thereafter, RTC-Branch 24 issued its now assailed
Resolution dated 25 June 2008 in Special Proceeding No. 12562-
CEB, granting respondents Demurrer.
RTC-Branch 24 summarized the arguments of respondent and
petitioner in the Demurrer and Opposition, respectively, as
follows:
This is to resolve the issues put across in the Demurrer to the
Evidence submitted to this Court; the Opposition thereto; the
Comment on the Opposition and the Rejoinder to the Comment.
xxxx
1. The instant case is barred by the principle of res judicata
because there was a judgment entered based on the
Compromise Agreement approved by this multiple-sala Court,
branch 09, on the same issues and between the same parties.
2. That such decision of Branch 09, having attained finality, is
beyond review, reversal or alteration by another Regional Trial
Court and not even the Supreme Court, no matter how
erroneous.
3. Judicial Admissions or admission in petitioners pleadings to
the effect that there is no blood relationship between petitioner
and respondent, which is a declaration against interest, are
conclusive on her and she should not be permitted to falsify.
4. That the Certificate of Live Birth showing that petitioners
father is Alfredo Surposa is a public document which is the
evidence of the facts therein stated, unless corrected by judicial
order.
5. After receiving the benefits and concessions pursuant to their
compromise agreement, she is estopped from refuting on the
effects thereof to the prejudice of the [herein respondent].
The summary of the Opposition is in this wise:
1. That the illegitimate filiation of petitioner to respondent is
established by the open, and continuous possession of the status
of an illegitimate child.
 This court upholds the Policy of Judicial Stability since to do
otherwise would result in patent abuse of judicial discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The defense of lack of
2. The Demurrer to the evidence cannot set up the affirmative
jurisdiction cannot be waived. At any rate, such is brought forth
grounds for a Motion to Dismiss.
in the Affirmative Defenses of the Answer.

3. The question on the civil status, future support and future

This Court, saddled with many cases, suffers the brunt of
legitime can not be subject to compromise.
allowing herein case involving same parties to re-litigate on the
same issues already closed.[10]

4. The decision in the first case does not bar the filing of another
action asking for the same relief against the same defendant.[9]

In the end, RTC-Branch 24 decreed:

Taking into consideration the aforementioned positions of the

parties, RTC-Branch 24 held that:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Demurrer to the
Evidence is hereby given due course, as the herein case is hereby
ordered DISMISSED.[11]
Looking at the issues from the viewpoint of a judge, this Court
believes that its hands are tied. Unless the Court of Appeals
strikes down the Compromise Judgment rendered by Branch 09
of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, this Court will not
attempt to vacate, much more annul, that Judgment issued by a
co-equal court, which had long become final and executory, and RTC-Branch 24 denied petitioners Motion for
in fact executed. Reconsideration[12] in a Resolution[13] dated 29 July 2008.
Petitioner then filed the instant Petition raising the following
issues for resolution of this Court:
Whether or not the principle of res judicata is applicable to
judgments predicated upon a compromise agreement on cases
enumerated in Article 2035 of the Civil Code of the Philippines;
II
Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by the
parties herein before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 09 of Cebu
City effectively bars the filing of the present case.[14]
At the outset, the Court notes that from the RTC Resolution
granting respondents Demurrer to Evidence, petitioner went
directly to this Court for relief. This is only proper, given that
petitioner is raising pure questions of law in her instant Petition.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party
desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law,
may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on
certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which
must be distinctly set forth.
Clearly, a party may directly appeal to this Court from a decision
or final order or resolution of the trial court on pure questions of
law. A question of law lies, on one hand, when the doubt or
difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; a
question of fact exists, on the other hand, when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.
Here, the facts are not disputed; the controversy merely relates
to the correct application of the law or jurisprudence to the
undisputed facts.[15]

The central issue in this case is whether the Compromise
Agreement entered into between petitioner and respondent,
duly approved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February
2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, constitutes res
judicata in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB still pending before
RTC-Branch 24.
The doctrine of res judicata is a rule that pervades every well-
regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon two
grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law,
namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it in the
interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation,
interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, and (2) the hardship of the
individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause,
nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causa.[16]
For res judicata, to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent
action, the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be a
final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must
be a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there must be,
between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action.[17]
It is undeniable that Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, previously
before RTC-Branch 9, and Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB,
presently before RTC-Branch 24, were both actions for the
issuance of a decree of illegitimate filiation filed by petitioner
against respondent. Hence, there is apparent identity of parties,
subject matter, and causes of action between the two cases.
However, the question arises as to whether the other elements
of res judicata exist in this case.
The court rules in the negative.
A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making
reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one
already commenced.[18] In Estate of the late Jesus S. Yujuico v.
Republic,[19] the Court pronounced that a judicial compromise
has the effect of res judicata. A judgment based on a
compromise agreement is a judgment on the merits.
It must be emphasized, though, that like any other contract, a
compromise agreement must comply with the requisites in
Article 1318 of the Civil Code, to wit: (a) consent of the
contracting parties; (b) object certain that is the subject matter
of the contract; and (c) cause of the obligation that is
established. And, like any other contract, the terms and
conditions of a compromise agreement must not be contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order. Any
compromise agreement that is contrary to law or public policy is
null and void, and vests no rights in and holds no obligation for
any party. It produces no legal effect at all.[20]
In connection with the foregoing, the Court calls attention to
Article 2035 of the Civil Code, which states:
ART. 2035. No compromise upon the following questions shall be
valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation;
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime. (Emphases ours.)
The Compromise Agreement between petitioner and
respondent, executed on 18 February 2000 and approved by
RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in Special
Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, obviously intended to settle the
question of petitioners status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an
illegitimate child of respondent. In exchange for petitioner and
her brother Allan acknowledging that they are not the children
of respondent, respondent would pay petitioner and Allan
P2,000,000.00 each. Although unmentioned, it was a necessary
consequence of said Compromise Agreement that petitioner also
waived away her rights to future support and future legitime as
an illegitimate child of respondent. Evidently, the Compromise
Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and
respondent is covered by the prohibition under Article 2035 of
the Civil Code.
Advincula v. Advincula[21] has a factual background closely
similar to the one at bar. Manuela Advincula (Manuela) filed,
before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iloilo, Civil Case No.
3553 for acknowledgment and support, against Manuel
Advincula (Manuel). On motion of both parties, said case was
dismissed. Not very long after, Manuela again instituted, before
the same court, Civil Case No. 5659 for acknowledgment and
support, against Manuel. This Court declared that although Civil
Case No. 3553 ended in a compromise, it did not bar the
subsequent filing by Manuela of Civil Case No. 5659, asking for
the same relief from Manuel. Civil Case No. 3553 was an action
for acknowledgement, affecting a persons civil status, which
cannot be the subject of compromise.
It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, that the status and
filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Public policy
demands that there be no compromise on the status and filiation
of a child.[22] Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is a
relationship that must be judicially established, and it is for the
Court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the
will or agreement of the parties.[23]
Being contrary to law and public policy, the Compromise
Agreement dated 18 February 2000 between petitioner and
respondent is void ab initio and vests no rights and creates no
obligations. It produces no legal effect at all. The void agreement
cannot be rendered operative even by the parties' alleged
performance (partial or full) of their respective prestations.[24]
Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, by approving the
Compromise Agreement, in its Decision dated 21 February 2000
in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, already made said contract
valid and legal. Obviously, it would already be beyond the
jurisdiction of RTC-Branch 9 to legalize what is illegal. RTC-Branch
9 had no authority to approve and give effect to a Compromise
Agreement that was contrary to law and public policy, even if
said contract was executed and submitted for approval by both
parties. RTC-Branch 9 would not be competent, under any
circumstances, to grant the approval of the said Compromise
Agreement. No court can allow itself to be used as a tool to
circumvent the explicit prohibition under Article 2035 of the Civil
Code. The following quote in Francisco v. Zandueta[25] is
relevant herein:
It is a universal rule of law that parties cannot, by consent, give a
court, as such, jurisdiction in a matter which is excluded by the
laws of the land. In such a case the question is not whether a
competent court has obtained jurisdiction of a party triable
before it, but whether the court itself is competent under any
circumstances to adjudicate a claim against the defendant. And
where there is want of jurisdiction of the subject-matter, a
judgment is void as to all persons, and consent of parties can
never impart to it the vitality which a valid judgment derives
from the sovereign state, the court being constituted, by express
provision of law, as its agent to pronounce its decrees in
controversies between its people. (7 R. C. L., 1039.)
A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It
cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any
obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never
become final, and any writ of execution based on it is void. It
may be said to be a lawless thing that can be treated as an
outlaw and slain on sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it
exhibits its head.[26]

In sum, Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB before RTC-Branch 24
is not barred by res judicata, since RTC-Branch 9 had no
jurisdiction to approve, in its Decision dated 21 February 2000 in
Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, petitioner and respondents
Compromise Agreement, which was contrary to law and public
policy; and, consequently, the Decision dated 21 February 2000
in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB, being null and void for
having been rendered by RTC-Branch 9 without jurisdiction,
could not have attained finality or been considered a judgment
on the merits.
Nevertheless, the Court must clarify that even though the
Compromise Agreement between petitioner and respondent is
void for being contrary to law and public policy, the admission
petitioner made therein may still be appreciated against her in
Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB. RTC-Branch 24 is only
reminded that while petitioners admission may have evidentiary
value, it does not, by itself, conclusively establish the lack of
filiation.[27]
Proceeding from its foregoing findings, the Court is remanding
this case to the RTC-Branch 24 for the continuation of hearing on
Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB, more particularly, for
respondents presentation of evidence.
Although respondents pleading was captioned a Demurrer to
Evidence, it was more appropriately a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of res judicata.
Demurrer to Evidence is governed by Rule 33 of the Rules of
Court, Section 1 of which is reproduced in full below:
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the plaintiff has
completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may
move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the
law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is
denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion
is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he
shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of
the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his
part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff's evidence
shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought. Demurrer,
therefore, is an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination
of an action, similar to a motion to dismiss, which the court or
tribunal may either grant or deny.[28]
The Court has recently established some guidelines on when a
demurrer to evidence should be granted, thus:

A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and
the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Where the
plaintiff's evidence together with such inferences and
conclusions as may reasonably be drawn therefrom does not
warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence
should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise
sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the
plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and
reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make
out one or more of the material elements of his case, or when
there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his
claim. It should be sustained where the plaintiff's evidence is
prima facie insufficient for a recovery.[29]
The essential question to be resolved in a demurrer to evidence
is whether petitioner has been able to show that she is entitled
to her claim, and it is incumbent upon RTC-Branch 24 to make
such a determination. A perusal of the Resolution dated 25 June
2008 of RTC-Branch 24 in Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB
shows that it is barren of any discussion on this matter. It did not
take into consideration any of the evidence presented by
petitioner. RTC-Branch 24 dismissed Special Proceedings No.
12562-CEB on the sole basis of res judicata, given the Decision
dated 21 February 2000 of RTC-Branch 9 in Special Proceeding
No. 8830-CEB, approving the Compromise Agreement between
petitioner and respondent. Hence, the Resolution dated 25 June
2008 of RTC-Branch 24 should be deemed as having dismissed
Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB on the ground of res judicata
rather than an adjudication on the merits of respondents
demurrer to evidence. Necessarily, the last line of Section 1, Rule
33 of the Rules of Court should not apply herein and respondent
should still be allowed to present evidence before RTC-Branch 24
in Special Proceedings No. 12562-CEB.
It must be kept in mind that substantial justice must prevail.
When there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice
would result from the strict application of the Rules, this Court
will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial
justice. The Rules of Court were conceived and promulgated to
set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind
and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will
be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial
discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering real justice
have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously
guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take
backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way
around.[30]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution dated 25 June
2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24, in
Special Proceeding No. 12562-CEB is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
This case is ordered REMANDED to the said trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with the ruling of the Court herein.
No costs.