BERSAMIN CASES

Following is a compilation of chosen digests of decisions of Justice Lucas P. Bersamin in Civil

Procedure and Criminal Procedure taken from the compilation made by students of UST.

CIVIL PROCEDURE:

Douglas Cagas vs. Commission on Elections and Claude Bautista

G.R. No. 194139, January 24, 2012
BERSAMIN, J.:

A party aggrieved by an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the Commission on Elections

(COMELEC) in an election protest may not directly assail the order in this Court through a special civil
action for certiorari. The remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order during the appeal of the
decision of the Division in due course.

FACTS:

This case is a petition for certiorari filed by protestee Cagas from an order of the 1 st Division of
COMELEC denying his affirmative defense that that protestant Bautista did not make the requisite cash
deposit on time; and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the acts or omissions
complained of, as well as the order denying Cagas’ motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether the Court can take cognizance of the petition for certiorari.

RULING: No

The governing provision is Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution. This provision, although
it confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, limits such
power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory
order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review on
certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC.

There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special affirmative defenses
of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Division to first
decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special
affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en banc along with the other errors committed by the Division upon
the merits.

It is true that there may be an exception to the general rule, as the Court conceded in Kho v.
Commission on Elections. In that case, the protestant assailed the order of the COMELEC First Division
admitting an answer with counter-protest belatedly filed in an election protest by filing a petition for
certiorari directly in this Court on the ground that the order constituted grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the COMELEC First Division. Under the exception, therefore, the Court may take cognizance of a
petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to review an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC
on the ground of the issuance being made without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it does not appear to be specifically
provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the matter is one that the COMELEC en banc may
sit and consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or the members of the Division unanimously vote
to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort to the Court because
the COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory
order can be reviewed.

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. vs. Antonino Tobias III

G.R. No. 177780, January 25, 2012
BERSAMIN, J.:
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Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over
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which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute
their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch, represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The
settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the
purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion.

Priscilla Alma Jose vs. Ramon Javellana et al

G.R. No. 158239, January 25, 2012
BERSAMIN, J.:

The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the defending party’s motion to dismiss
is not an interlocutory but a final order because it puts an end to the particular matter involved, or settles
definitely the matter therein disposed of, as to leave nothing for the trial court to do other than to execute the
order. Accordingly, the claiming party has a fresh period of 15 days from notice of the denial within which to
appeal the denial under the ruling in Neypes vs. CA

Nerwin Industries Corp. vs. PNOC-Energy Development Corp.

G.R. No. 167057, April 11, 2012
BERSAMIN, J.:

Republic Act No. 8975 expressly prohibits any court, except the Supreme Court, from issuing any temporary
restraining order (TRO), preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction to restrain, prohibit or
compel the Government, or any of its subdivisions or officials, or any person or entity, whether public or
private, acting under the Governments direction, from: (a) acquiring, clearing, and developing the right-of
way, site or location of any National Government project; (b) bidding or awarding of a contract or project of
the National Government; (c) commencing, prosecuting, executing, implementing, or operating any such
contract or project; (d) terminating or rescinding any such contract or project; and (e) undertaking or
authorizing any other lawful activity necessary for such contract or project.

Accordingly, a Regional Trial Court (RTC) that ignores the statutory prohibition and issues a TRO or
a writ of preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction against a government contract or project
acts contrary to law.

Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corp. and PhilcomSat vs. Victor Africa

G.R. No. 184622, July 3, 2013
BERSAMIN:

In intra-corporate dispute involving a corporation under sequestration of the Presidential Commission on

Good Government (PCGG) falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), not the
Sandiganbayan.

Section 5 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A vested the original and exclusive jurisdiction over
cases in the SEC. Upon the enactment of Republic Act No. 8799 (The Securities Regulation Code), effective on
August 8, 2000, the jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate controversies and the other cases enumerated in
Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A was transferred to the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 5.2 of the law.
Conformably with Republic Act No. 8799, and with the ensuing resolutions of the Court on the implementation
of the transfer of jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Court, the RTC (Branch 138) in Makati had the authority to
hear and decide the election contest between the parties herein. There should be no disagreement that jurisdiction
over the subject matter of an action, being conferred by law, could neither be altered nor conveniently set aside
by the courts and the parties. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has been held not to extend even
to a case involving a sequestered company notwithstanding that the majority of the members of the board of
directors were PCGG nominees.

Allen Macasaet et al vs. Francisco Co, Jr.

G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:

To warrant the substituted service of the summons and copy of the complaint, the serving officer must first
attempt to effect the same upon the defendant in person. Only after the attempt at personal service has become
futile or impossible within a reasonable time may the officer resort to substituted service.

NOTE: In other decided cases, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the prior attempts at personal
service must be recorded in a Sheriff’s Return before resort to substituted service can be allowed
otherwise the service of summons will be rendered void

Simplicia Abrigo and Demetrio Abrigo vs. Jimmy Flores et al

G.R. No. 160786, June 17, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:
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Once a judgment becomes immutable and unalterable by virtue of its finality, its execution should follow as a
matter of course. A supervening event, to be sufficient to stay or stop the execution, must alter or modify the
situation of the parties under the decision as to render the execution inequitable, impossible, or unfair. The
supervening event cannot rest on unproved or uncertain facts.

-In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the sale by one of the parties (an heir of Francisco Faylona) of his
1/4th share in the portion of the property decreed to pertain to the heirs of Francisco Faylona subject property
was not a supervening event that would be sufficient to stop the execution of the final and executory judgment
decreeing the partition of the property between the Heirs of Francisco Faylona and the heirs of Gaudencia
Faylona. It was not deemed sufficient to reopen the final and immutable judgment to further partition the portion
adjudicated to the heirs of Francisco Faylona. That sale should be the subject of another action for partition
between and among the heirs of Francisco Faylona.

Datu Ampatuan, Jr. vs. Sec. Leila de Lima

G.R. No. 197291, April 3, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:

ISSUED: Will mandamus lie to compel the Secretary of Justice to prosecute an confessed
participant in the Ampatuan Massacre after the said participant had already been given
coverage under the Witness Protection Program (RA 6891) by the DOJ as a state witness?

NO. In matters involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus cannot be used to direct
the manner or the particular way the judgment and discretion are to be exercised. Consequently, the Secretary
of Justice may be compelled by writ of mandamus to act on a letter-request or a motion to include a person in
the information, but may not be compelled by writ of mandamus to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny
such letter-request or motion.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Manila Electric Company

G.R. No. 201715, December 11, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:

The intervening rendition by the trial court of a decision on the merits of the case renders moot and academic
the resolution of any issue raised on certiorari against interlocutory orders setting the pre-trial and declaring
the petitioner to have waived its right to present its evidence. The resolution of the issue, having been
preempted by the decision in the main action, ceased to have any practical value.

Heirs of Marcelo Sotto vs. Matilde Palicte

G.R. No. 159691, February 17, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:

For the ground to be effective, the insufficiency of the complaint must appear on the face of the complaint, and
nowhere else. It will be unfair to the plaintiff, indeed, to determine the sufficiency of his cause of action from
facts outside of those pleaded in the complaint.

In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that it was unfair for the defendant’s counsel to cite the filing, by
the plaintiff, of a motion to dismiss in another case to argue that the plaintiff had thereby admitted the
an agreement between her and the defendant which supposedly negated the plaintiff’s cause of action in
this case.

The SC emphasized that the admission was a HYPOTHETICAL ADMISSION only for the purpose of
resolving the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss in the other case.

The alleged insufficiency of the complaint in this case must appear on the face of the complaint itself and
not on extraneous matters.

Herminia Acbang vs. Hon. Jimmy Luczon, Jr,

G.R. No. 164246, January 15, 2014

BERSAMIN, J.:

To stay the immediate execution of the judgment in an ejectment case, the defendant must perfect an appeal,
file a supersedeas bond, and periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the pendency of the appeal.
Otherwise, the writ of execution will issue upon motion of the plaintiff.
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Juanito Magsino vs. Elena De Ocampo and Ramon Guico
G.R. No. 166944, August 18, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:

The Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing the petition for review from a judgment in an ejectment case
under Section 2 of Rule 42 because the petitioner failed to attach the complaint, the answer, and the defendant’s
motion to dismiss which are certainly relevant pleadings and parts of the case record needed to support the
allegations in the petition.

The recognized guideposts to determine whether or not the rules should be relaxed are:

First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition. Only those
which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it.

Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it is
shown that the contents thereof can also (sic) found in another document already attached to the
petition.

Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due course
or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required,
or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits.

Even based on all these the dismissal of the petition for review in this case was proper.

Yinlu Bicol Mining Corporation vs. Trans-Asia Oil and Energy Development Corporation
G.R. No. 207942, January 12, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:

Appeals from decisions of the Office of the President under Sections 1 and 4 of Rule 43, should be taken via
petition for review to the Court of Appeals within 15 days “"from notice of the award, judgment, final order or
resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the
denial of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration x x x."

Thus a petition for review filed 10 months after receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration was
certainly filed out of time.

Fortune Life Insurance Company Inc. vs. Commission on Audit

January 27, 2015 | G.R. No. 213525
BERSAMIN, J.:

The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the aggrieved party is
allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or from
receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. In the latter, the petition is filed within 30
days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. NOTE: The SC clarified
that the Neypes ruling or the fresh period rule does not apply to the reglamentary period under Rule 64 because
under Rule 64, the petition is filed within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
sought to be reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural
rules of the Commission concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved
party may file the petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any event,
reckoned from the notice of denial.

Bpi Family Savings Bank vs. Sps. Benedicto & Teresita Yujuico
G.R. No. 175796, July 22, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:

An action to recover the deficiency after extrajudicial foreclosure of a real property mortgage is a personal
action because it does not affect title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein. NOTE: This
means that the proper venue is NOT based on where the property is but on where any of the plaintiffs or
defendants reside in accordance with Rule 4.

Nilo Chiongian vs. Victoria Benitez-Lirio et al

G.R. No. 162692, August 26, 2015
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BERSAMIN, J.:
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Pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule 41, the proper mode of appealing a judgment or final order in special proceedings
is by notice of appeal and record on appeal. Under Section 3 of Rule 41, a party who wants to appeal a
judgment or final order in special proceedings has 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order within
which to perfect an appeal because he will be filing not only a notice of appeal but also a record on appeal
that will require the approval of the trial court with notice to the adverse party. The period of appeal shall be
interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration.

NOTE: Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings. In the context of the final judgment rule, Section
1 of Rule 109 does not limit the appealable orders and judgments in special proceedings to the final order or
judgment rendered in the main case, but extends the remedy of appeal to other orders or dispositions that
completely determine a particular matter in the case, such as when it allows or disallows, in whole or in part,
any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a
claim against it; and when it constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of
the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special administrator.

In this case The dismissal of the petitioner's intervention constituted "a final determination in the lower court
of the rights of the party appealing," that is, his right in the paraphernal properties of his deceased sister. As
such, it fell under Section 1 or Rule 109, because it had the effect of disallowing his claim against the estate.

Tung Hui Chung and Tong Hong Chung vs. Shih Chi Huang
G.R. No. 170679, March 9, 2016
BERSAMIN, J.:
A compromise agreement has the effect and authority of res judicata between the parties, and is immediately
final and executory, unless rescinded upon grounds that vitiate consent. Once stamped with judicial
imprimatur, it is more than a mere contract between the parties. Any effort to annul the judgment based on
compromise on the ground of extrinsic fraud must proceed in accordance with Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

Andrew Fyfe et al vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc

G.R . NO. 160071, June 6, 2016
BERSAMIN, J.

There was sufficient compliance with the rule on verification and certification against forum shopping. The
SPAs individually signed by the petitioners vested in their counsel the authority, among others, "to do and
perform on my behalf any act and deed relating to the case, which it could legally do and perform, including
any appeals or further legal proceedings."

In this case the issue was the validity of the verification and certification against forum shopping considering
that it was the counsel and not the parties who signed it. The SC ruled that the SPAs signed by the parties in
favor of their counsel was sufficiently broad to expressly and specially authorize their counselto sign the
verification/certification on their behalf.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Teodoro Reyes vs. Ettore Rossi

G.R. No. 159823, February 18, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:

The rescission of a contract of sale is not a prejudicial question that will warrant the suspension of the
criminal proceedings commenced to prosecute the buyer for violations of the Bouncing Checks Law (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22) arising from the dishonor of the checks the buyer issued in connection with the sale.

Rafael Consing Jr. vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:

An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial
question to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant for estafa through
falsification. This is because the result of the independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or
innocence of the accused.
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Jose Sanico vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 198753, March 25, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:

The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the appeal ONLY in civil
cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases, because Section 9(c) Rule 122, imposes on the RTC the
duty to decide the appeal “on the basis of the entire record of the case and of such memoranda or briefs as
may have been filed” upon the submission of the appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration of the
period to file the same.

Marie Callo-Claridad vs. Philip Esteban and Teodora Esteban

G.R. No. 191567, March 20, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:
The determination of probable cause to file a criminal complaint or information in court is exclusively within
the competence of the Executive Department, through the Secretary of Justice. The courts cannot interfere in
such determination, except upon a clear showing that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

NOTABLE CASE ON PREJUDICIAL QUESTIONS

GEN RULE IS THAT THERE CAN BE A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION ONLY BETWEEN

CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASES BUT THIS IS ONE OF THE EXCEPTIONS

San Miguel Properties, Inc. vs. Sec. Hernando Perez

G.R. No. 166836, September 4, 2013
BERSAMIN, J:

The pendency of an administrative ease for specific performance brought by the buyer of residential
subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory .Board (IILURH) to compel the seller to deliver the
transfer certificate of title (TCTs) of the fully paid Jots is properly considered a ground to suspend a criminal
prosecution for violation of Sectio11 25 of Presidential Decree NL). 9571 on tile ground of a prejudicial
question. The administrative determination is a logical antecedent of the resolution of the criminal charges
based on non-delivery of the TCTs.

People of the Philippines vs. PO2 Eduardo Valdez and Edwin Valdez
G.R. No. 175602, February 13, 2013 (BERSAMIN, J.)

Facts: Edwin and Eduardo were convicted by the RTC for three (3) counts of murder which was affirmed by
the CA. They both appealed to the SC but pending the appeal, Edwin filed a motion to withdraw appeal which
was granted the SC deemed the appeal, as to him, closed and terminated.

Thereafter, the SC ruled on Eduardo’s appeal by downgrading the conviction to three (3) counts of homicide
instead of murder. Edwin sent a letter to the Court Administrator a letter pleading that the same judgment be
made applicable to him.

Issue: Whether or not the SC’s judgment should benefit Edwin in view of the withdrawal of his appeal

Ruling: Yes. Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court is applicable. “Section 11. Effect of appeal by any
of several accused. – (a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not
appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

Herminio Disini vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos. 169823-24, September 11, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:

The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action involving petitioner
notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering that his criminal prosecution is intimately related to
the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their immediate family, subordinates and close associates.

Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan was vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction over
all cases involving “Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1,
2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986”.

The qualification that an accused must be occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or included in the list
under Section 4 of RA8249 applies only to the cases listed in Section 4(a) and 4 (b) and NOT to those under
Sec. 4 (c) under the mandate of the PCGG to bring the civil and criminal cases pursuant to and in connection
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with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

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Bernardo Mesina vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 162489, June 17, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:
Under the law, the civil liability of the petitioner may involve restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and
indemnification for consequential damages.

In this case, the SC held that the RTC and the CA while correct in finding the accused guilty of malversation,
were nonetheless INCORRECT in failing to hold the accused liable for the restitution of the misappropriated
amount as it is an express mandate of Section 2, Rule 120 that judgments of conviction should include “the
civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the
offended party”

Horacio Salvador vs. Lisa Chua

G.R. No. 212865, July 15, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:
The accused who fails to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction loses the remedies
available under the Rules of Court against the judgment, specifically: (a) the filing of a motion for new trial or
for reconsideration (Rule 121), and (b) an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122).

Mayor Anwar Berua vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 177600, October 19, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:
The issuance by the trial court of the warrant of arrest upon filing of the information and supporting papers
implies the determination of probable cause for the offense charged. It is then superfluous for the accused to
seek the judicial determination of probable cause on the pretext that the trial court should still act and proceed
independently of the executive determination of probable cause to charge the proper offense.

NOTE: Under the Revised Guidelines on Continuous Trial in Criminal Cases, a motion for judicial determination
of probable cause is among the PROHIBITED MOTIONS that courts are mandated to deny outright even without
comment or opposition.

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