Вы находитесь на странице: 1из 21

CHE61403 / CHE3723 – Safety in Process Plant Design

Safety Training Record & Summary

Safety in Process Plant Design – Training Record Sheet

Name: Ho Jo Yee
Student ID: 0321225

Students are required to attend at least FOUR OSH related talk / workshop, and submit this record & summary, together with
the prove of attendance (Certificate of attendance, attendance confirmation email, etc.).

No. Date / Time Training / Workshop / Talk Speaker / Trainer Venue


1 23/5/17 Talk Mr. Edward Chong TLU
2 10/6/17 Talk Dr. Edwin Lim TLU
3 11/7/17 Seminar Elena Prats Webminar
(Aiche)
4 11/7/17 Seminar Neil Prophet Webminar
(Aiche)
5 14/7/17 Seminar John Crosman Webminar
(Aiche)
6 12/7/17 Journal H. Afefy nil

1
CHE61403 / CHE3723 – Safety in Process Plant Design
Safety Training Record & Summary

Summary of Training / Workshop / Talk #1 (300-500 words):


The objective of the given talk by Dr. Edward Chong is to project an outline of the safety practices
implemented in Taylor’s University (TLU). The goal of the Environmental, Health and Safety department
in TLU is to achieve a World Class EHS Performance by leading various communities to achieve a
common “Horizon Zero” goal. However, to attain this achievement, safety protocols must be implemented
in TLU to reduce risk of injuries. Based on the compilation of statistics, the injury rate in TLU is usually
high during peak periods when there is submission of assignments especially those in engineering or
architecture courses. Nevertheless, throughout the entire year, students from culinary arts and hospitality
program tops off with having the highest injury rate such as cuts or burns due to the regular contact with
sharp objects and fire. Relating back to the “Horizon Zero” project, as the manager of EHS in TU, Dr.
Edward Chong has a goal to achieve “Each person leaves each day in the same condition in which he or she
arrived” through this project. Hence, it is crucial to initiate a paradigm shift on the stereotype where the
little things do not cause a huge hazard to achieve a zero-accident environment. Dr. Edward also explained
the word SAFER can be evaluated as a “Strong visible leadership, Asses the risks, Follow the rules, Engage
in safety conversations and nonetheless”. The lessons learnt from this talk would be constantly improving
ourselves and prevent previous hazards to reoccur. Safety of an environment can only be sustained when all
individuals holds their responsibility in working together to reduce the risk occurrence.

2
CHE61403 / CHE3723 – Safety in Process Plant Design
Safety Training Record & Summary

Summary of Training / Workshop / Talk #2 (300-500 words):

Generally, the outline of this talk covers various risk identification methods such as HAZOP,
HAZID and QRA. Before moving on further, what does the word ‘risk’ signifies? Risk can be represented
with two keywords, consequences and probability. Consequences are the after effect of a hazard incident
while probability is how frequent will that hazard incident occur. Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)
evaluates the probability of an incident to occur along with the consequence. There are 6 steps to perform
QRA as shown below:
QRA method:
1. Part counts – Calculating the number of parts in a P&ID diagram as the failure rate at each part
varies.
2. Determining section volume and pressure – Parts with high pressure will have higher consequences
if any hazard occur.
3. Analyzing these consequences – Each source of ignition would be evaluated and the consequences
would be listed out.
4. Calculating the frequency (manning level) – The frequency of man hours spent on the part of the
plant would be considered.
5. Provide recommendations – Base on the information gathered, counter measurements to reduce the
risk will be imparted.
6. Determining individual risk – To evaluate the risk for each operator.

Hazard and operability study (HAZOP) analysis is a risk identification method which does not comprise
of anything beyond the process flow. HAZOP considers the ultimate consequences which means it does not
only look at one failure but also the down line failure which was caused by the first failure. Customarily,
there will be three parties involve during a HAZOP analysis; the owner of the plant, the designer of the
process and an independent third party hired as the HAZOP chairman.
The last method that was discussed during the talk would be Hazard Identification (HAZID) analysis.
HAZID analysis is a similar risk assessment method to HAZOP, with the only difference is HAZID
analyses hazards beyond the process. For instance, drop objects, lighting, pigging or even noise
disturbance.

3
CHE61403 / CHE3723 – Safety in Process Plant Design
Safety Training Record & Summary

Summary of Training / Workshop / Talk #3 (300-500 words):

Title: Optimizing LOPA


There are four main hazards present in the process industries; Fire and explosion, reactive
substance, toxic materials and machinery defaults. In any case of event, the goal in constructing a plant is to
avoid any personal injury, reduce environmental impact, decrease any business interruption and minimize
property damage. A common risk assessment commences with hazard identification, following by
frequency and consequences analysis. Based on these analysis, risk evaluation would be made by setting a
tolerable risk and planning risk mitigations. Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) was done before any hazard
analysis to identify hazards, comply with regulatory requirements and to identify potential interactions that
could result an accident. PHA can be conducted via four steps; selecting the study node, identifying
hazards, causes & consequences, identifying safeguards, assessing risk and lastly, developing and
implementation of recommendations.
Layers of Protection Layer (LOPA) is a quantum method to establish layers of protection to reduce
probability of hazard and risk. The predominant aim of this method is to evaluate the sustainability of the
layers of protection in resisting the consequences of any case of accident. The layout of an LOPA diagram
is similar to the ‘Onion model’ as shown in Figure 3.0. The sequence from the core of the model to the
outer most layer of a LOPA model is: Design process, Basic Process Control System (BCPS), Detective
measure (alarms etc.), Physical Protections, Emergency response and finally community emergency
response. Each layer of protection would be evaluated base on certain criteria. For instance, more complex
processes require more layers of protection and stronger protection layer. LOPA is usually applied after an
hazard evaluation (PHA, HAZOP, QRA etc.) to reduce the complexity of the process.

Figure 3.0: Illustration of a typical LOPA diagram

4
CHE61403 / CHE3723 – Safety in Process Plant Design
Safety Training Record & Summary

LOPA can be summarized into 6 basic steps as shown below:


1. Determining the aftereffect to buffer possible accident scenarios.
2. Picking an accident scenario base on the previous screenings.
Step 1 and 2 can be summarized referring to a risk matrix. The level of consequence and likelihood
of an undesirable event would determine whether LOPA is needed in the event. As shown in Figure
3.1, areas in A, B and C may need a LOPA analysis depending on the strictness of the particular
company. This is to verify if the existence protection layers present in the plant is sufficient or
additional IPLs are needed.

Figure 3.1: Risk Matrix table


3. Pinpointing an initiating event which leads to the respective accident scenario along with the
probability of occurrence.
The initiating event are categorized into 3 categories; external failures, equipment failures or human
failures. Each accident initiating event would have their respective frequency of the occurrence on a
yearly basis. Several databases can be accessed to identify the frequency of occurrence.

4. Establish the independent protection layers (IPLs) and approximate the probability of failure
on demand (PFD).
The protection layers can be established from safety protocols which consist of 3 criteria; effective,
independent of the initiating event or failures and auditable to ensure it is properly maintained.

5. Approximate the risk of the scenario.

6. Evaluate the risk to reach decisions.

5
CHE61403 / CHE3723 – Safety in Process Plant Design
Safety Training Record & Summary

Summary of Training / Workshop / Talk #4 (300-500 words):


Title: The Mechanics of a Quantitative Risk Analysis - Better Understand Your Risks

This seminar explains about the Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) method used to evaluate risks in
an operation. Similar to other speakers, risk is defined as product of probability and consequences. QRA
can be classified into two forms, individual risk and societal risk. Assumptions were made for individual
risk where it assumes that the recipient is outside for 24 hours per day and no protective action is taken.
QRA also does not include the actual population present. Individual risk increases as the distance between
the individual and the source of hazard are closer. Contradictory, another form of the QRA which is societal
risk, take into account of the actual population present. This form of QRA also depicts the frequency of
accident involving number of fatalities. Usually, it can be represented as a single number; Average Rate of
Death (ROD) or Potential Loss of Life (PLL). The steps involved in conducting a QRA are as following:
1. Gathering related data and information
In prior to a QRA study, process and plant related data such as P&ID diagrams, Heat & Material
balances, Equipment listings, Plant layouts, ignition source details, onsite and offsite population and
PHA studies must be gathered.
2. Identifying hazard scenario
In a hazard identification process, these containment scenarios that occurred can be categorized as
generic and non-generic scenarios. Generic scenarios are typical failure of equipment and piping,
while, non-generic scenarios are more to unusual scenarios where it cannot be identified from
looking the P&ID. For generic scenarios, a specific section of the P&ID diagram would be chosen
and would be evaluated.
3. Frequency estimation
For generic scenarios, there are various documents that can be referred to identify the standard
approximated frequency of each of the event. However, for non-generic scenarios, a more detailed
analysis such as Fault tree analysis or LOPA can be used to estimate the frequency of event.
4. Modelling the consequence
The consequences involved in an event can be modelled base on the operating parameters at that
moment of time or even environmental conditions.
5. Calculating the risk of the consequences
6. Provide recommendations for risk reduction
6
CHE61403 / CHE3723 – Safety in Process Plant Design
Safety Training Record & Summary

Summary of Training / Workshop / Talk #5 (300-500 words):


Title: Making Your HAZOP Study Work for You
The overview of this webminar provides an outline on utilising the data from HAZOP study to
enforce much effective safeguards. In prior to explanation of HAZOP, Mr. Crosman had gave a brief
introduction on risk assessment. Risk assessment can be represented by a few keywords; causes,
consequences, safeguards, risk rank and recommendations. Causes and consequences data are usually
obtained together through consequences analysis such as QRA. Safeguards refers to existing critical safety
equipment which was present in the scene. Risk rank determines the priority of the risks in an event where
several risks needed to be solved. Lastly, recommendations provide actions that can be done to tracked or
resolve the risk. Consequently, any additional safeguards that were added into the system would affect the
risk rank. The issue that most risk assessment may arise would be the data generated from these
assessments may not be fully shared within all departments in a company, resulting miscommunication in
delivering the decisions made to resolve a certain risk. This is when the risk that was identified at the earlier
stage may creep to an unacceptable level and a risk validation may be too late.
Next, the webminar also provides a few scenarios for the application of HAZOP and LOPA. The
main outcome from these applications would be the recommendation to reduce the risk at every study node.
These recommendations that were proposed should first be validated from the scenario to verify the need
for the magnitude of risk reduction. If it is needed, the recommendation should be further validated through
simulations or analysis to determine the most effective and sustainable solution that can be applied. The
implementation of the recommendation should be planned to ensure it is not over implemented or
“overkill”. Last but not least, the implied recommendations should be discussed in the Management of
Change (MOC) to ensure every department in the company is notified of the changes.

7
CHE61403 / CHE3723 – Safety in Process Plant Design
Safety Training Record & Summary

Summary of Journal #6 (300-500 words):


Title: Analysis and Risk Assessments for Industrial Processes Using FMEA and Bow-Tie Methodologies
Risk assessment is a crucial study in any chemical process plant as no industry dealing with toxics
and hazardous materials can bear the consequences of it. Henceforth, a risk assessment report is a
compulsory study of a chemical plant during commissioning stage. Several risk assessment methods being
utilized nowadays are the Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), Fault Tree Analysis, Event Tree
Analysis, Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) and many more. However, a lot of this assessment also
have their limitations on only laying out the cause and effect without making a proper linkage between the
two. Henceforth, the author of this paper suggest a better method to bowtie method. This paper focuses on
the noble method known as the Bowtie Analysis. The bow-tie model was applied to large scale industries,
for the probabilistic assessment of risks of major industrial accidents.
The failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) is the most common method where risks are being
assessed. Most of the time, FMEA is usually being utilized to the area of product manufacturing and design
in large industrial process. However, there are several downside of the FMEA. For example, each FMEA
team has their own thoughts and field of expertise. This produces different series of data due to
discrepancies in their cross function and multidisciplinary nature. This causes the difficulties of integrating
the information into FMEA by the widely used model and fuzzy logic approach. Moreover, the proving
mechanism of the FMEA method utilizes the risk priority number (RPNs) which is done by the
multiplication of occurrence (O), severity (S) and detection (D) of each failure mode, however this is not a
good approach to analyze a risk at hand.
Henceforth, this paper proposes the bowtie method as a way to link the cause and effect in an
effective way. Essentially, a bowtie method is a combination of both fault tree and event tree. The method
of analyzing a risk with bowtie method is simple, which starts by identifying the bowtie hazard. Following
that, make an assessment of threats on the left, and the assessments of consequences to the right. Then,
assign the control action towards the threats, and the recovery actions towards the consequences. The
threats of the controls action are then being analyzed again for their threats, and the control action towards
the threats of the control actions are constructed. This provides a clear image between the threats and
consequences with their necessary control actions.

8
CHE61403 / CHE3723 – Safety in Process Plant Design
Safety Training Record & Summary

Appendix

Talk 3: Web seminar online receipt:

9
CHE61403 / CHE3723 – Safety in Process Plant Design
Safety Training Record & Summary

Talk 4: Web seminar online receipt:

10
CHE61403 / CHE3723 – Safety in Process Plant Design
Safety Training Record & Summary

Talk 5: Web seminar online receipt:

11
CHE61403 / CHE3723 – Safety in Process Plant Design
Safety Training Record & Summary

Journal 6: Screenshot of Journal

12
CHE61403 / CHE3723 – Safety in Process Plant Design
Safety Training Record & Summary

13
CHE61403 / CHE3723 – Safety in Process Plant Design
Safety Training Record & Summary

14
CHE61403 / CHE3723 – Safety in Process Plant Design
Safety Training Record & Summary

15
CHE61403 / CHE3723 – Safety in Process Plant Design
Safety Training Record & Summary

16
CHE61403 / CHE3723 – Safety in Process Plant Design
Safety Training Record & Summary

17
CHE61403 / CHE3723 – Safety in Process Plant Design
Safety Training Record & Summary

18
CHE61403 / CHE3723 – Safety in Process Plant Design
Safety Training Record & Summary

19
CHE61403 / CHE3723 – Safety in Process Plant Design
Safety Training Record & Summary

20
CHE61403 / CHE3723 – Safety in Process Plant Design
Safety Training Record & Summary

21

Вам также может понравиться