An Overview of Emergency Relief

System Design Practice

Harold G . Fisher
Union Carbide Chemicals and Plastics Company Inc.,
South Charleston, WV 25303

~ - _
_ _ _ _ ~ ~ ~ _ -~

Cost effective loss prevention requires an optimizing strategy to prevent, moderate

(relieve) and contain runaway reactions. Ensuring that an emergency relief system design
will either avoid or accommodate two-phase vapor-liquid flow is of particular importance.
Use of adiabatic runaway reaction test information in combination with digital computer
sirnulation is a powerful method to design an~-emergency relief system.
Introduction Safe operation.
Management surveillance.
A strategy is presented to achieve cost effective loss pre- Proper design practices must be employed from the conceptual
vention in situations where a potential exists for a runaway or through the detailed engineering phases. During conceptual
decomposition reaction. An iterative three-step assessment ap- design, items such as site selection, plant layout and the con-
proach to emergency relief system design is outlined which cepts of substitution [ I ] (use less hazardous materials), inten-
minimizes the potential for unacceptable risk of a major ac- sification [ I ] (use less of a hazardous material) and attenuation
cidental release of hazardous materials to the environment. [ I ] (use of a hazardous material at a lower temperature or
Graphical, analytical and direct scaling methods for sizing pressure) are considered. Detailed engineering focuses on pre-
emergency relief devices may be appropriate for some situa- venting potentially hazardous excursions and minimizing the
tions. However, use of adiabatic runaway reaction test infor- consequences from conceivable releases.
mation in combination with digital simulation is a powerful Construction to standard involves utilizing engineering and
method that should be invoked when consideration of alter- construction codes and standards and the practices of quality
natives is required to minimize the frequency and severity of assurance to ensure a well-built facility.
releases. Ensuring that an emergency relief system design will Safe operation considers the initial and on-going aspects of
either avoid or accommodate two-phase vapor-liquid flow is day-to-day facility operation. Pre-startup reviews emphasize:
of particular importance. Recent developments for design of Physical inspections.
emergency relief systems for runaway reactions are described Operating and maintenance procedures.
in this paper. Staff levels and training.
Emergency procedures and equipment.
Reviews of operating practices and maintenance procedures
A Strategy for Major Accidental Release Prevention examine the adequacy o f
Daily instructions.
A major accidental release may be described as a fire, toxic Standard procedures and practices.
emission or explosion which leads to serious effects on man Safety rules.
or the environment, inside or outside the confines of the work- Training and retraining.
place, and which results from uncontrolled developments in Quality assurance.
the course of an industrial activity. The CPI/HPI seeks to Finally, the management surveillance system should include
prevent a major accidental release from its facilities by: provisions for:
Proper design practice. Plant modification approval and implementation.
Construction to standard. Periodic safety audits.

Plantloperations Progress (Vol. 10, No. 1) January, 1991 1

 Reporting and responding to hazardous practices, inci-
dents and near misses.
A Strategy for Emergency Relief System Design
Identification of hazards and potential initiating events, as-
sessment of risk and mitigation of consequences are all required
to prevent a major accidental release during an emergency relief
situation. The processes of identification, assessment and
mitigation are iterative as applied to design of an emergency
relief system (Figure 1).
Hazard identification involves determination of the flam-
mability, toxicity (local and acute, general and chronic), ex-
plosibility and physical properties of materials which are im-
portant from an accidental release perspective. PotentiaI
initiating events such as an uncontrolled exothermic reaction,
design flaws and human error must be identified.
Assessment includes consideration of the risk associated with
design alternatives, determination of acceptable risk and steps
taken to minimize the potential for unacceptable risk. Differ-
entiation between a worst case and a worst credihle scenario
is the critical goal. The desirable result is a worst credible
scenario with a remote probability and a minor consequence.
Discussion of the mitigation of a major accidental release
is beyond the scope of this paper. The consequences of a minor
release can usually be mitigated by preparedness as well as
safety equipment and emergency procedures.
An Approach To Emergency Relief System Design As-
sessment
The process design should attempt to arrive at an inherently
safe facility; i.e., one from which a worse case event cannot
cause injury to personnel, damage to equipmen! or harm to
the environment. This can be achieved through an iterative
assessment approach which results in safety features lhat are
intrinsic (built-in), rather than extrinsic (added-on), to the basic
design. However, if the technology is not available or cost

( DESIGNCASE \
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ACCEPTABLE
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FIGURE 1. A strategy for emergency relief system FIGURE 2. An approach to emergency relief system
design. design assessment.
2 January, 1991 PlantlOperations Progress (Vol. 10, No. 1)
prohibitive, a three-step iterative approach can be used to arrive
at an acceptable risk at minimum cost through optimization
of the measures taken t o prevent, moderate (relieve) and con-
tain a runaway reaction or decomposition (Figure 2 ) .
Many factors must be considered in arriving at the best
approach to deal with hazards that may accompany runaway
reactions. Thermochemistry, reaction kinetics, thermal sta-
bility, process conditions/controls, abnormal operation, con-
taminants, equipment design, equipment and instrument
failures, operating procedures and human error are all ex-
amined when evaluating hazard potentials. A n approach to
the safe design of chemical processes which have the potential
for a runaway reaction is to identify and analyze worst credible
incident scenarios by proceeding as follows:
Make an exhaustive search for hazardous conditions by
involving safety specialists, reaction system designers,
process engineers and operating personnel.
Identify the sequences of events which could produce the
highest pressure within a vessel and maximum flow from
the emergency relief device@).
0 Scrutinize various failure modes t o arrive at the combi-
nation which produces the worst credible incident scen-
ario.
0 Then, utilize reaction, control, process and safety engi-
neering design technologies to prevent, moderate (relieve)
and contain runahray reactions.
Design and operating strategies which will help to prevent
runaway reactions include:
Acquire data to identify potential problems.
Measure and control critical parameters (temperature,
pressure, feed rate, coolant flow, catalyst level).
Operate at conditions (temperature, pressure, concentra-
tion) which provide a safe margin from runaway condi-
tions.
Jnstall redundant instrumentation t o increase reliability
of measurement and control of critical parameters.
Use alarms to warn operators that a critical parameter has
changed from its normal condition.
Train operators to safely react to upset conditions.
Identify never exceed limits.
Activate an emergency shutdown when a critical param-
eter has deviated from normal by a predetermined amount
or reaches a never exceed limit.
Prevent contamination by proper design and operating
procedures.
These and many other steps ensure that a runaway reaction
will not occur as the result of a single failure.
Finally, the analysis of the likelihood and consequences of
multiple failures leads to the identification of the worst credible
runaway reaction scenario. An emergency relief system can
then be designed to handle this scenario to include safe disposal
of the discharged fluid. In addition t o moderation of a runaway
reaction by proper sizing of emergency relief, consideration
should also be given to installation of a liquid dump system,
provision for emergency blowdown of pressure or use of a
“kill” agent.
Containment can be approached in two ways. First, vessels
can be designed to withstarid the maximum pressure that can
develop from an upset. Although this approach may be viable
for some emergencies such as a vapor phase deflagration, it
may not be a feasible alternative for a runaway reaction or
vessel fire exposure because of the extremely high pressure that
can be produced.
Second, the term containment may also be used to describe
the disposaVdecontamination of the discharge from a relief
system. Vent stacks, vapor-liquid separators, quench tanks,
scrubbers, flares, incinerators or combinations thereof can be
used to disperse, quench, :scrub, detoxify or burn the dis-
charged fluid.
Plantloperations Progress (Vol. 10, No. 1)
DIERS/DIERS Users Group
The Design Institute for Emergency Relief System (DIERS),
a consortium of 29 companies under the auspices of AIChE,
was formed in 1976 to develop methods for the design of
emergency relief systems to handle runaway reactions. Of par-
ticular interest were the prediction of when two-phase flow
venting would occur and the applicability of various two-phase
vapor-liquid flashing flow methods for sizing relief systems
[ 2 ] . DIERS spent approximately $1.6MM to investigate the
two-phase vapor-liquid onset/disengagement dynamics and
hydrodynamics of emergency relief systems. The DIERS pro-
gram has come t o a successful conclusion with publication of
the research results [3-91 and preparation of a project manual
[lo].
Over 60 companies have formed a DIERS Users Group to
cooperatively assimilate, implement, maintain and upgrade the
DIERS methodology. The purpose of the new group is to:
Reduce the frequency, severity and consequences of pres-
sure producing accidents.
Promote the development of new techniques which should
improve the design of emergency relief systems.
Membership is open to industrial or engineering organizations
interested in the design, use or manufacture of emergency relief
systems or devices [ I l l .
Two-Phase Vapor-Liquid Flow Onset and Disengage-
ment
Emergency relief system design is a multifaceted problem.
Of particular significance is whether the relief system must be
designed for single phase (vapor or liquid) or two-phase vapor-
liquid flow. DIERS developed and tested a method to calculate
the onset (start) and disengagement (stop) of two-phase vapor-
liquid flow from a vessel due to emergency relief or depres-
surization [I21 (See Appendix A).
Two-Phase Vapor-Liquid Flow Through Relief Devices
DIERS examined various two-phase vapor-liquid flow
models from the open literature [4] and tested them using an
overall system model against large-scale experimental data [ 5 ] .
Fauske 1131 provided practical guidelines for use and Huff [a
included many personal insights in his discussion of the various
two-phase flow models. Two-phase vapor-liquid homogeneous
equilibrium flashing flow proved to be the most conservative
model for estimates of flow capacity from both safety valves
and rupture disks. However, this model is not necessarily con-
servative for safety valve back pressure calculations or effluent
containment considerations because under certain circum-
stances the appropriate application of other models will predict
higher flow rates.
Following completion of the DIERS program, Leung, et al.,
developed a generalized correlation for two-phase, homoge-
neous flow. These methods describe flashing, non-flashing
(frozen) and mixed flashing/non-flashing (hybrid) choked and
subcritical turbulent and laminar flow of single component
and multi-component mixtures through ideal nozzles (safety
valves) and horizontal and vertical pipes (rupture disks) [I#-
221. The various modifications to the basic methodology are
required t o design reliable emergency relief and containment
systems.
Experimental Data for Emergency Relief Systems Design
A careful experimental program which uses representative
samples is required to obtain data needed as a basis for emer-
gency relief system design. The present state of experimental
January, 1991 3

TABLE 1 VALID KINETIC FORMS FROM ADIABATIC
~~~~~
DATA
An - P arbitrary (zero, first, second,
nth) order
C librium flashing flow [3].
A - P nth order catalytic
A+B P - pseudo first order with a large
molar excess (more than 10
times) of one reactant or equi-
molar second order
P
A - P nth order autocatalytic
A -
B-P successive reactions
development should be considered when selecting an apparatus
to acquire these data. Some methods for obtaining and using
experimental data for emergency relief system design are sum-
marized below.
Accelerating Rate Calorimeter
The Accelerating Rate Calorimeter (ARC)* has found wide-
spread application for thermal stability (exotherm onset) and
runaway reaction studies. Methods to fit kinetics from the data
have been reported 123, 241.
The standard ARC bomb cannot be sampled during a run-
away reaction. Fractional adiabatic temperature rise is used to
represent the consumption of reactant (i.e., reactant concen-
tration). The sample t o be tested must therefore contain only
one rate-determining reactant as shown in Table 1 if kinetics
fit from ARC data are to be valid.
NOTE: Kinetics are best fit for successive reactions by ad-
justing the thermal inertia of the ARC bomb to achieve
maximum separation of the successive heat rate tem-
perature peaks. An arbitrary assumption of successive
first order reactions often yields an excellent fit to the
overlapping heat rate data obtained in the ARC. The
resultant model, however, is often unrealistic and can-
not be validated when compared t o data obtained in
an adiabatic vessel with a low thermal inertia.
Other means must be used to develop kinetics for more complex
reactions.
The usual techniques for fitting kinetics from adiabatic ARC
data assume a constant sample:
Mass (no decomposition and minimum sample vapori-
zation).
Volume (sample density).
Thermal inertia (sample mass and heat capacity).
Changes in any of these variables can have a significant effect
on the calculated kinetics [24].
DIERS Bench-Scale Apparatus
DIERS sponsored development of a Bench-Scale Apparatus
(VSP)** and a low thermal inertia test cell which can be used
to provide thermal stability and runaway reaction kinetic data
[3, 25, 26j. The low thermal inertia essentially overcomes a
limitation of other commercial devices, namely understating
the magnitude of the self-heat rate and the adiabatic temper-
ature rise. For the first time runaway reactions in the laboratory
can approximate the severity of those in industrial vessels. This
behavior is extremely useful for the validation of a comput-
erized runaway reaction model which typically includes ki-
netics, stoichiometry, heats of reaction, physical properties and
vapor-liquid equilibrium constants assembled from various
sources. This apparatus can also be used to:
‘Trademark of Columbia Scientific Industries Corporation.
**Marketed as the “Vent Sizing Package” by Fauske and Associates,
Inc.
4 January, 1991
Differentiate between materials which exhibit homoge-
neous versus non-foamy behavior during emerg,ency relief
by measurement of the final void fraction in a test cell
131.
Determine the effect of viscosity on homogeneous equi-
Measure parameters required for graphical or analytical
methods for emergency relief device design [3].
Size emergency relief devices directly by using top or bot-
tom vented experiments [27, 281.
Reactive Systems Screening Tool (RSST)
Following completion of the DIERS program, Fauske and
Associates, Inc. developed the Reactive Systems Screening Tool
(RSST). This adiabatic calorimeter can be used for character-
ization of and vent sizing for tempered, hybrid and gassy
reactive systems [29-311. This apparatus should find accept-
ance as part of an overall safety and design activity.
Two-Phase Flow Onset/Disengagement Behavior Test-
ing
Experimental final void fractions (a‘)due to a combination
of two-phase vapor-liquid venting of various fluids from sev-
eral large vessels are shown in Table 2. Values for the same
fluids measured using the DIERS Bench-Scale Apparatus and
a 120 cc test cell are compared with those from thc 1arg.evessels.
The averages compare quite well considering the limited data.
They demonstrate a first approximation ability to differentiate
between materials which exhibit homogeneous versus non-
foamy behavior.
NOTE: The styrene runaway reaction data appear t o fall into
three groups. The lowest final void fractions occur
when polymer conversions are Low as a result of rapid
external heating of the experimental vessels. Higher
conversions to polymer appear to decrease (disengage-
ment [12].Additional data and analysis arc required.
The data d o indicate the difficulty and care which must
be taken to characterize the disengagement of reactive
systems.
Two-Phase Flow Viscosity Characterization
DIERS conducted a limited program to measure the two-
phase vapor-liquid flashing mass flux for certain high viscosity
fluids through nozzles, long constant diameter vent lines and
long vent lines with internal restrictions 118, 32, 34--351. Mass
flux reductions of an order of magnitude were measured for
laminar (viscous) compared to turbulent (non-viscous) flow in
a constant diameter vent line. Internal restrictions in long vent
lines resulted in a vapor, rather than a liquid, continuous flow
regime. Mass flux reductions for laminar compared to tur-
bulent flow were not as great for this situation 13.1, 351. Vis-
cosity characterization was found to be an important ERS
design consideration.
The DIERS Bench-Scale Apparatus has the capability to
determine mass loss (i.e., mass flux) as a function of blowdown
duration and vent area [3].The experimentally determined
mass flux can be compared t o a calculated value to discriminate
between turbulent and laminar flow during an emergency relief
situation.
Characterization of Runaway Reaction Behuvior
Direct experimental sizing of emergency relief devices is de-
pendent upon physical limitations of certain apparatuses as
discussed below. Available graphical, analytical and direct
scaling methods are also limited to certain types of reactions,
which are defined as follows:
Volatile/TemperedReaction: The reactants, products and;
or solvents must be volatile. Heat of vaporization cooling
PlantlOperations Progress (Vol. 10, No. 1)
 TABLE 2 FINAL VOID FRACTION COMPARISON
Bench-Scale
Large-Scale Vessel Apparatus Fluid
Fluid Volume (liters) afaf[32] QI [331 Characterization
Water 2190 0.56 0.64
2190 0.62 0.53
2190 0.55
2190 0.63
35 0.63
35 0.58
_35_ 0.67
__-
AVG 0.61 0.585 Non-foamy
Water w/100 ppm 2190 0.96
Detergent 2190 0.98
__
32 0.97
AVG 0.97 0.98 Homogeneous
Polyvinyl Alcohol- 35 0.73 0.89 Intermediate
Water (Limited data)
Ethylbenzene 32 0.59
32
- 0.60
-
AVG 0.60 0.65 Non-foamy
Polybutadiene- 200 0.76 0.73 Intermediate
Hexane
Styrene (Runaway 32 0.92
Reaction) 32 0.96
32 0.94
(Slow Heating, 32 0.93
High Conversion) 32 0.88
32
__
0.92
- -
AVG 0.93 0.95 Homogeneous
Styrene (Runaway 2190 0.84
Reaction) 2190 0.80
AVG 0.82 Intermediate
Styrene (Runaway 2190 0.65
Reaction) 2190 0.67
2190 0.59
(Rapid Heating, 32 0.62
Low Conversion) 32 0.64
32 0.58
32 0.69
32 0.65
-
AVG 0.65 Non-foamy

during vapor or two-phase flow venting is sufficient to
control dT/dt at the set pressure of the ERS device during
the entire course of the reaction (i.e,, dT/dt = 0 or in-
creases due only to a change of volatility).
HybricUTernpered Reaction: Non-condensible gases are
produced as a result of a decomposition reaction. The
reactants, products and/or solvent must be volatile. Heat
of vaporization cooling during vapor or two-phase flow
venting is sufficient to control dT/dt at the set pressure
of the ERS device during the entire course of the reaction.
NOTE: The ERS device is able to control T(dT/dt = 0) and
P(dP/dt = 0) at the set pressure.
Hybrid/Non- Tempered Reaction: Non-condensible gases
are produced as a result of a decomposition reaction. The
reactants, products and/or solvent, if volatile, are present
in insufficient quantity or have insufficient heat of va-
porization during vapor or two-phase flow venting to tem-
per the reaction throughout its entire course.
NOTE: The ERS device is not able to control T(dT/dt >> 0)
and P(dP/dt >> 0) at the set pressure.
Gussy/Non-Tempered: Non-condensible gases are pro-
duced as a result of a decomposition reaction. The reac-
tants, products and/or solvent are not volatile or have an
extremely low volatility. The heat of vaporization during
vapor or two-phase flow venting is insufficient to temper
the reaction at any point.
Emergency Relief System Design Techniques
Techniques for sizing an emergency relief system for run-
away reaction include:
Graphical or analytical design methods.
Direct scaling of experimental data obtained in vessels
with a very low thermal inertia.
Computer simulation of incidents and flow through relief
systems.

Plantloperations Progress (Vol. 10, No. 1) January, 1991 5

L
P
3 TABLE 3 EMERGENCY RELIEF DEVICE SIZING METHODS USING EXPERIMENTAL DATA
C
P
3 Analytical Methods Experimental (Bench-Scale Apparatus) Methods
-.
W
W Runaway Vapor-Liquid Huff FA1 Leung A/C Scaling Scaling Equation A/C Scaling
_____
Reaction Disengagement Design Nomograph/ Analytical Top Vent Test Bottom Vent Test Bottom Vent Test
Behavior Regime Method Analytical
___ Methods Top ERS Device Top ERS Device Bottom ERS Device
Volatile/ Vapor X I361 NA X 1451 NA NA
Tempered
CT/B X I361 X 138,391 X 143, 441 NA [27, 281 x 1271
H X I361 X [29-311 X [3, 40-421 * [28, 461 x 1281
Hybrid/ CT/B NA NA N.4 NA NA
Tempered
I*
H NA X [29-311 x ~411 NA NA
Hybrid/Non- CT/B NA NA NA NA NA NA
Tempered
H NA X [29-311 x 1411 * * [37] NA NA
Gassy/Non- CT/B NA NA NA * * [37] NA NA
Tempered
H NA X [29-311 x 1411 * * 1371 NA NA

A/C -Relief area: Vessel Charge (Weight)

Volatile/Tempered -Volatile With dT/dt = 0 And dP/dl = 0 With Adequate Vent @ ERS Device Set Pressure
Hybrid/Tempered -Volatile And Gassy With dT/dt = 0 And dP/dt = 0 With Adequate Vent @ ERS Device Set Pressure
Hybrid/Non-tempered -Volatile And Gassy With dTidt >> 0 And dPidt >> 0
Gassy/Non- tempered -Gassy With dT/dt >> 0 And dP/dt >> 0
CT/B/H -Churn-turbulent/Bubbly/Homogeneous
X -Valid Method
NA -Not Applicable (Method Not Valid)
* -Restrictions apply (Ensure That The Plant Vessel Will Not Vent Two-Phase Flow Using the Method in the
Amendix)

z
?
The technique selected depends upon the:
Type and number of chemicals involved.
Availability of required process and experimental data.
Constraints imposed upon the designer.
Emergency Relief Sy,ytem Design-Analytical Methods
Huff [36] has presented details of a pseudo-steady-state
method, which makes use of closed system ARC data, for
design of emergency relief devices for volatile/tempered re-
actions. Fauske has published a vent sizing nomograph [37-
391 and analytical design methods [38, 391 for volatile/tem-
pered reactions. Leung, el al., have discussed analytical design
methods and closed form approximations for runaway reac-
tions with homogeneous [3,40-421 and churn-turbulent/bub-
bly vessel behavior [43, 441. These methods include design
approaches for volatile/cempered [40-421, hybrid/tempered,
hybrid/non-tempered and gassy/non-tempered [41] reactions.
Recently, FA1 published alternative analytical design methods
for each type reaction [29-311. The DIERS Bench-Scale Ap-
paratus can be used to provide required data for all of the
emergency relief system design methods shown in Table 3 .
Emergency Relief System Design-Area: Charge Scaling
The DIERS Bench-Scale Apparatus can be used for direct
sizing of emergency relief devices by conducting top or bottom
vented tests (See Table 3). Relief area to vessel charge scaling
using top vented tests is valid for sizing top mounted emergency
relief devices for:
Volatile/tempered reactions which exhibit vapor or ho-
mogeneous disengagement behavior [27, 28, 461.
NOTE: Area: Charge Scaling is not valid for fluids which
exhibit partial disengagement (churn-turbulent or
bubbly) regimes.
Hybrid/non-tempered and gassylnon-tempered reactions
which have a very high superficial vapor velocity and
therefore vent material more effectively and at a lower
temperature from a large vessel [ 3 7 .
NOTE: Area: Charge Scaling is only valid if the test cell emp-
ties.
For volatile/tempered reactions which exhibit churn-turbulent,
bubbly or homogeneous disengagement:
Top mounted emergency relief devices can be sized using
bottom vented tests and a scaling equation [28].
Bottom mounted emergency relief devices can be sized by
relief area to vessel charge scaling using bottom vented
tests [ 4 4 .
NOTE: Sizing for hybrid or gassy reactions using bottom vent-
ing is not valid because gas is lost through a pressure
equalization hole in the test cell.
Limitations on Area: Charge Scaling for Emergency
Relief System Design
Direct use of data to size an emergency relief device for a full-
size vessel by scaling on the basis of relief area to vessel charge
from a small, improperly designed vessel can lead t o a non-
conservative design. Several factors can limit the usefulness of
some test vessels:
The thermal inertia (ratio of the product of mass times
heat capacity of the vessel plus sample to that of the sample
alone) is high for most test vessels. Therefore, the ratio
of the temperature rise of the sample plus heavy-walled
container is low compared to the temperature rise of the
sample alone. The experimental peak heating rate can
easily be reduced by a factor of one to two orders of
magnitude for a reaction with a high activation energy.
Plantloperations Progress (Vol. 10, No. 1)
NOTE: Thermal inertia increases substantially as a test vessel
empties during relief area to vessel charge scaling ex-
periments. Thermal inertia changes can have a signif-
icant effect on the heat rate in the small vessel and the
scaled relief area for a large vessel.
A four-inch (100 mm) relaxation length is required to
attain homogeneous equilibrium flashing flow. Use of a
short nozzle or orifice in a small test vessel to simulate
flow from a large emergency relief device is not conserv-
ative since a given homogeneous non-equilibrium flow is
handled by a smaller area than an equivalent homogeneous
equilibrium flashing flow [28].
The onset of two-phase vapor-liquid flow during a relief
incident is dependent upon vessel height, except for a fluid
which exhibits a homogeneous vapor-liquid onset/dis-
engagement regime. Materials which exhibit homogeneous
(foamy/highly viscous) behavior will be essentially com-
pletely emptied from either a small or full-size vessel. High
vapor slip for a material with a partial (non-foamy/non-
viscous) onset/disengagement behavior may result in all
vapor or limited two-phase vapor-liquid flow from a small
test vessel while a much more extensive two-phase vapor-
liquid mixture can flow from a full-size vessel with the
same heat release per unit charge. Early disengagement
and potential runaway reaction rate turnaround in the
small vessel will yield a non-conservative emergency relief
device area for a full-size vessel [27.
Runaway Reaction Emergency Relief System Design
Computer Programs
Computer programs may be preferred or even required in
some situations to correctly size safety valves, rupture disks
or breather vents for process equipment. Since the underlying
science continues to be refined and advanced, these computer
programs should contain the latest technology. This is the
continuing mission of the AIChE Design Institute for Emer-
gency Relief Systems (DIERS).
The non-linear heat and mass balance differential equations
describing the transients of a worst credible runaway reaction
incident and the fluid dynamic equations describing the flow
capacity of an emergency relief system are normally solved by
numerical integration in a digital simulation computer pro-
gram. The kinetics, stoichiometry, heats of reaction, physical
properties and vapor-liquid equilibrium constants for the ma-
terials present can be read into the computer program from a
data file. All physical properties should be calculated as a
function of temperature in accordance with recognized ther-
modynamic models.
Program input and output describing the physical situation
should be checked for consistency and printed to provide a
written record of the calculations. The mass of each component
should also be continually checked to ensure a balance. A
variable step size in temperature and pressure may be used to
maintain numerical accuracy for stiff (rapid runaway reaction)
systems. Warning messages are usually provided if the emer-
gency relief devices cannot maintain the system pressure to
meet ASME pressure vessel code requirements.
Huff [47 appears to have been the first to publish acomputer
simulation method to size emergency relief devices. His model
introduced the ‘‘uniform froth” or “homogeneous” concept
to allow simulation of two-phase venting. A slip equilibrium
hydrodynamics model for relief system flow was also docu-
mented.
Huff [471 subsequently refined and extended his simulation
program t o cover the disengagement range from all vapor to
all liquid relief. Additional two-phase hydrodynamic details
were provided.
Huff has summarized the basic method and equations in his
versatile program and illustrated the use of the DIERS dis-
engagement (churn-turbulent) and hydrodynamic (homo-
January, 1991 7
geneous equilibrium) models [47l.Versions of this computer
program were kept current with DIERS findings and have
contributed greatly to a n understanding of the DIERS exper-
imental data over the years.
Two of the DIERS contractors also developed computer
programs. Fauske and Associates, Inc. [4, 481 developed an
extremely versatile program which describes the multi-phase
dynamics for emergency relief of a batch chemical reactor or
storage vessel. All of the DIERS analytical methods were in-
corporated into the code. The program that resulted (SAFIRE)
was used to analyze the two-phase vapor-liquid relief from the
DIERS sponsored large-scale runaway reaction and blowdown
experiments. The SAFIRE computer program was distributed
to DIERS members and has been made available for sale to
the CPI/HPI by the AIChE DIERS Users Group.
JAYCOR [9]independently developed a one-dimensional
computer program for relief of runaway reactions. This pro-
gram solves the Navier-Stokes equations in space and time for
the mass, momentum and energy balance equations of the
vapor-liquid mixture as well as an equation for the relative
motion between the vapor and liquid. This program and a
“two-fluid model” were also successfully used to analyze the
DIERS large-scale tests. The DIERS computer program is suit-
able for design/evaluation of emergency relief systems for
runaway reactions and is available for saleAicense to the CPI/
HPI.
Overall System Modeling
Emergency relief system design seeks to prevent a major
accidental release by:
Identification of hazards and potential initiating events.
Assessment of risk by consideration of alternative meth-
ods of
1. Prevention
2 . Moderation (relief) and
3. Containment.
Mitigation of consequences.
When consideration of alternatives is required, use of adi-
abatic runaway reaction test information in combination with
digital simulation is a powerful method t o design an emergency
relief system. The diversity of questions to be considered sug-
gests use of several experimental and calculational techniques.
Neither experimental procedures nor digital simulation alone
can be used to address all alternatives for emergency relief
system design.
Mathematical modeling using digital simulation allows
quantification of rates of heat release and pressure and tem-
perature changes for a variety of operating and upset condi-
tions. Design possibilities can be examined by exploring
alternatives for:
Prevention.
1. Concentration
2. Operating temperature
3. Catalyst concentration
4. Feed rate
5 . Alarm/shutdown set points
6. Cooling capacity under upset conditions
7. Contamination
8. Heat losses
9. Fire exposure heat flux (insulation, water spray)
10. Fire exposure duration
Moderation (relief).
1. Safety valve versus rupture disk
2. Relief device set pressure
3. Staggered relief pressures
4. Vessel fill ratio
5 . Top versus bottom mounted relief devices
6. Use of volatile solvents
Containment.
1 . Vessel MAWP
8 January, 1991
2. Vent stacks (dispersion)
3. Vapor-liquid separators
4. Quench tanks
5 . Scrubbers
6. Flares
7. Incinerators
Combinations of the above and other factors determine the
emergency relief system design basis.
Digital simulation helps to promote a focus on prevention
of a runaway reaction and determination of the worst credible
scenario. Once a validated model is in place, simulation allows
parametric studies which improve our assessment of risk. Sim-
ulation also allows a ready examination of the effects uf several
partial disengagement and two-phase flow models on emer-
gency relief and containment system designs.
Use of digital simulation does require a comprehensive com-
putational capability. The need for additional data and a more
extensive and costly design effort are also perceived as dis-
advantages of simulation. When the limitations of alternative
methods are understood and the cost and performance ad-
vantages of an optimal combination of prevention, moderation
(relief) and containment of a runaway reaction are appreciated,
computer simulation should prove to be the preferred course
of action.
Conclusions
Prevention of a major accidental release of hazardous ma-
terials from a CPI/HPI facility requires proper design, con-
struction t o standard, safe operation and management
surveillance. A n emergency relief system design strategy, which
seeks to prevent a major accidental release, should include
iterative considerations of hazard and initiating event identi-
fication, assessment of risk and mitigation of consequences.
Cost effective loss prevention requires an optimizing strategy
to prevent, moderate (relieve) and contain runaway reactions.
This iterative three-step assessment approach to emergency
relief system design will minimize the potential for unaccept-
able risk of a major accidental release of hazardous materials
to the environment.
Graphical or analytical design methods, direct scaling of
experimental data and computer simulation may be used to
size emergency relief systems. Use of adiabatic runaway re-
action test information in combination with digital simulation
is a powerful design method when consideration of alternatives
is required. Digital simulation allows parametric studies which
improve our understanding of a runaway reaction and assess-
ment of risk. When the advantages of simulation and the
limitations of alternative methods are appreciated, computer
simulation should prove t o be the preferred course of action.
Emergency relief system design is a multifaceted problem.
Of particular significance is whether the relief system must be
designed for single or two-phase vapor-liquid flow. Generally,
two-phase flow requires a larger relief area than all vapor or
subcooled (non-flashing) liquid flow. Containment and miti-
gation requirements also depend upon a definition of the flow
and vapor-liquid phase ratio of the discharged material. The
importance of sound two-phase flow and incident simulation
capabilities cannot be overstated. Design methodologies like
those that have been and continue to be provided by DIERS
should ensure the adequacy of the total emergency response
system against episodic events.
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to acknowledge contributions of the mem-
bers of the DIERS Technical Committee, the DIERS con-
tractors, members of the DIERS Users Group and his co-
workers. R. R. Bannister, H . w. Wegert and theauthor jointly
Plantloperations Progress (Vol. 10, No. 1)
developed the ideas in the section entitled “An Approach to
Emergency Relief System Design Assessment. ” Union Carbide
has provided support for the author’s participation in DIERS
activities for the past 14 years.
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1. Kletz, T. A., “Inherently Safer Plants,” Plant/Operations
Progress, 4(3), 164-167 (July 1985).
2. Fisher, H. G., “DIERS Research Program on Emergency
Relief Systems,” CEP, 81(8), 33-36 (August 1985).
3. Fauske, H. K. and Leung, J. C., “New Experimental
Technique for Characterizing Runaway Chemical Reac-
tions,” CEP, 81(8), 39-46 (August 1985).
4. Grolmes, M. A. and Leung, J. C., “Code Method for
Evaluating Integrated Relief Phenomena,” CEP, 81(8),
47-52 (August 1985).
5 . Grolmes, M. A., Leung, J. C. and Fauske, H. K., “Large-
Scale Experiments of Emergency Relief Systems,” CEP,
81(8), 57-62 (August 1985).
6. Huff, J. E., “Multi-phase Flashing Flow in Pressure Relief
Systems,” Plant/Operations Progress, 4(4), 191-199 (Oc-
tober 1985).
7. Grolmes, M. A., and Epstein, M., “Vapor-Liquid Dis-
engagement in Atmospheric Liquid Storage Vessels Sub-
jected to External Heat Source,” Plant/Operafions
Progress, 4(4), 200-206 (October 1985).
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Response of Safety Relief Valves to Saturated Water
Flow,” Plant/Operations Progress, 4(4), 207-216 (Octo-
ber 1985).
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dation of a Tool for Sizing Emergency Relief Systems for
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AIChE/DIERS (1991).
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Development/Dissemination of Emergency Relief System
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72, (April 1989).
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“Emergency Relief Systems for Runaway Chemical Re-
actions and Storage Vessels: A Summary of Multi-phase
Flow Methods,” AIChE/DIERS (1986).
13. Fauske, H. K., “Flashing Flows or: Some Practical Guide-
lines for Emergency Releases,” Plant/Operations Prog-
ress, 4(3), 132-134 (July 1985).
14. Leung, J. C., “A Generalized Correlation for One-Com-
ponent Homogeneous Equilibrium Flashing Choked
F l o , ~ , AIChE,
” J , 32(10), 1743-1746 (October 1986).
15. Leung, J. C . and Grolmes, M. A., “The Discharge of
Two-Phase Flashing Flow in a Horizontal Duct,” AZChE,
J , 33(3), 524-527 (March 1987).
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relation for Flashing Choked Flow of Initially Subcooled
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Pipes-A Unified Approach,” Journal Loss Prevention
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18. Fauske and Associates, Inc., “Flashing Viscous Flow of
Polystyrene Mixtures: Test Data and Scale-up Methods,”
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19. Leung, J. C. and Epstein, M., “The Discharge of Two-
Phase Flashing Flow From an Inclined Duct,” Trans.
ASME-Journal of Heat Transfer, 112(2), 224-228 (May
1990).
20. Leung, J. C., and Epstein, M., “A Generalized Corre-
lation for Two-Phase NonFlashing Homogeneous Choked
Flow,” Trans. ASME-Journal of Heat Transfer, 112(2),
528-530 (May 1990).
Plantloperations Progress (Vol. 10, No. 1)
21. Leung, J. C., “Similarity Between Flashing and Non-
Flashing Two-Phase Flow,” AIChE J , 36(5) 797-800
(May 1990).
22. Leung, J. C. and Epstein, M., “Flashing Two-Phase Flow
Including the Effects of Noncondensible Gases,” Journal
of Heat Transfer in press (February 1991).
23. Townsend, D. I. and Tou, J. C., “Thermal Hazard Eval-
uation by an Accelerating Rate Calorimeter,” Thermo-
chimica Acta, 37 1-30 (1980).
24. Ahmed, M., Fisher, H. G. and Janeshek, A. M . , “Re-
action Kinetics From Self-Heat Data-Correction for the
Depletion of Sample,” Proceedings of the International
Symposium on Runaway Reactions, CCPS, Cambridge,
MA (March 1989).
25. Leung, J. C., Fauske, H. K . andFisher, H. G., “Thermal
Runaway Reactions in a Low Thermal Inertia Apparatus,”
Thermochimica Acto, 104 13-29 (1986).
26. Leung, J. C., Creed, M. J. and Fisher, H. G., “Round-
Robin ‘Vent Sizing Package’ Results,” Proceedings of the
International Symposium on Runaway Reactions, CCPS,
Cambridge, MA (March 1989).
27. Fauske, H. K., Grolmes, M. A. and Henry, R. E., “Emer-
gency Relief Systems-Sizing and Scale-up,” Plant/Op-
erations Progress, 2(1), 27-30 (January 1983).
28. Fauske, H. K.,“Scale-up for Safety Relief of Runaway
Reactions,” Plant Operations Progress, 3(1), 7-1 1 (Jan-
uary 1984).
29. Grolmes, M. A., Leung, J. C. and Fauske, H. K., “Re-
active Systems Vent Sizing Evaluations,” Proceedings of
the International Symposium on Runaway Reactions,
CCPS, Cambridge, MA (March 1989).
30. Grolmes, M. A. and King, M. J., “Emergency Relief
Requirements for Certain Organic Peroxides Based on
DIERS Methodology,” Paper Presented at the 23rd An-
nual Loss Prevention Symposium, AIChE Spring National
Meeting, Houston, TX (April 1989).
31. Fauske, H. K. and Creed, M. J., “An Easy, lnexpensive
Approach to the DIERS Procedure,” CEP, 85(3), 45-49
(March 1990).
32. Fauske and Associates, Inc., SmallILarge Experimental
Data and Analysis, “Experimental Results for Series IV
Tests, Analysis and Program Summary,” AIChE/DIERS
(1986).
33. Fauske and Associates, Inc., Bench-Scale Apparatus De-
sign and Test Results, “Bench Scale ERS Sizing Tools:
Acquisition of Flow Regime Data-Prototype Test Re-
sults,’’ AIChE/DIERS (1986).
34. Fauske and Associates, Inc., Small/Large Scale Experi-
mental Data and Analysis, “Large Scale Rubber Cement
High Viscosity Two-Phase Flow Test Report ,” AIChE/
DIERS (1986).
35. Fauske and Associates, Inc., SmalVLarge Scale Experi-
mental Data and Analysis, “Large Scale Polystyrene-
Ethylbenzene High Viscosity Two-Phase Flow Test Re-
port,” AIChE/DIERS (1986).
36. Huff, J. E., “Emergency Venting Requirements,” Plant/
Operations Progress, 1(4), 21 1-229 (October 1982).
37. Fauske, H. K., “Emergency Relief System (ERS) Design,”
CEP 81(8), 53-56 (August 1985).
38. Fauske, H. K., “Venting of Runaway Chemical Reactions
and Non-equilibrium Effects,” Paper Presented at the 4th
Miami International Symposium on Multi-phase Trans-
port and Particulate Phenomena (December 15-17, 1986).
39. Fauske, H. K., “Emergency Relief System Design for Run-
away Chemical Reaction: Extension of the DIERS Meth-
odology,” Chem. Eng. Res. Des., (67), 199-201 (March
1989).
40. Leung, J . C., “Simplified Vent Sizing Equations for Emer-
gency Relief Requirements in Reactors and Storage Ves-
sels,” AIChE, J , 32(10), 1622-1634 (October 1986).
41. Leung, J. C. and Fauske, H. K., “Runaway System Char-
acterization and Vent Sizing Based on DIERS Method-
January, 1991 9
 ology,” Plant/Operations Progress, 6(2), 77-83 (April
1987).
42. Leung, J. C. and Fisher, H. G., “Two-Phase Flow Venting
of Reactor Vessels,” Journal Loss Prevention Process In-
dustries, 2(2), 78-86 (April 1989). N
ITIAIL- 9S% ( 5 5 0 G A L )
43. Leung, J. C., “Overpressure During Emergency Relief 150°C 58 P S I G
Venting in Bubbly and Churn-Turbulent Flow,” AZChE,
J, 33(6), 952-958 (June 1987).
44. Leung, J . C., et al., “Emergency Relief Requirements for FINAL 68% ( 3 9 5 G A L )
Reactive Chemical Storage Tanks,” I. Chem. E. Sym- 107°C 6 PSIG
posium Series No. 110 (1988).
45. Fauske and Associates, Inc., Bench-Scale Apparatus De-
sign and Test Results, “Bench-Scale ERS Sizing Tools:
Acquisition of Thermal Data-Apparatus Design and
-
Sample Thermal Data for 5 Systems,” AIChE/DIERS
(1986).
46. Harmon, G. W. and Stuper, W. W., “Sizing Emergency
Relief Systems on Vessels Containing Monomers,” CEP,
80(3), 53-59 (March 1984).
47. Huff, J . E., “Computer Simulation of Runaway Reaction
Venting,” I. Chem. E. Symposium Series, No. 85, 109-
129 (1984).
48. Fauske and Associates, Inc., SAFIRE Computer Program
and Documentation, “System Analysis for Integrated Re- FIGURE 3. Water blowdown example.
lief Evaluation (SAFIRE) User’s Manual,” AIChE/DIERS
(1986).
49. Wallis, G. B., “One-dimensional Two-phase Flow,” (ix., are held up) in a vessel. Gas holdup can be high at low
McGraw-Hill, Inc., New York (1969). relief rates if the liquid is highly viscous or foam). Yon-viscous,
50. Fauske, H. K., et al., “Emergency Relief Sizing for Fire non-foamy liquids will also swell at high relief rates.
Emergencies Involving Liquid Filled Atmospheric Storage Boiling takes place throughout the volume of liquid, rather
Vessels,” PZant/Operations Progress, 5(4), 205-208 (Oc- than solely at the surface. Each bubble occupies volume and
tober 1986). displaces the liquid surface upward. Individual bubbles are
51. Epstein, M., Fauske, H . K. and Hauser, G . M., “The able to rise (slip) through the liquid with a velocity that is
Onset of Two-Phase Venting Via Entrainment in Liquid- dependent upon the buoyancy and surface tension and retarded
Filled Storage Vessels Exposed to Fire,” Journal Loss by viscosity and the foamy character of the fluid. I f a sufficient
Prevention Process Industries, 2( l), 45-49 (January 1989). volume of bubbles become trapped, the liquid surface reaches
the height of the relief device and two-phase flow occurs.

APPENDIX Two-Phase Blowdown Example

Best Estimate Procedure to Calculate Two-Phase Vapor- An example should serve to illustrate the phenomena. A4
Liquid Flow Unset/Disengagement two-inch diameter relief device (nozzle) was rapidly opened on
a tank which was 95 percent filled with 540 gallons of cit)
water at approximately 150°Cand under its own vapor pressure
(Ideal Prediction- Vertical Vessel) of about 58.5 psig. Approximately 28 percent of the tanh
contents vented by two-phase flow (Figure 3). The experiment
Overview

Emergency relief system design is a multifaceted problem.

Of particular significance is whether the relief system must be
designed for single phase (vapor or liquid) or two-phase vapor-
liquid flow. During a runaway reaction, the vessel pressure is
INITIAL-
150°C 58 PSIG
- 951% ( 5 5 0 G A L )
affected by the volumetric discharge rate of the emergency
relief system and the influence of temperature, composition
and mass loss o n the reaction rate. If two-phase flow occurs, CHICAGO
the volumetric discharge rate, the system mass loss and evap- CITY
orative cooling will be affected by the vapor-liquid phase ratio. WATER
Generally, two-phase flow requires a larger relief area than all W/1000 P P M
vapor or subcooled (non-flashing) liquid flow. DETERGENT
Containment and mitigation of consequences also depend
upon a definition of the vapor-liquid phase ratio of the dis-
charged material. Ensuring that emergency relief system de-
signs will accommodate two-phase vapor-liquid flow is of
particular importance. 107°C 6 PSIG
FINAL - 4% (25 G A L )

L
Liquid Swell

A boiling or gas-sparged liquid can rise to the level of a top

mounted emergency relief device if enough bubbles accumulate FIGURE 4. Foamy water blowdown example.
10 January, 1991 Plantloperations Progress (Vol. 10, No. 1)
was repeated, except that 1000 ppm of a liquid household Calculation Procedure (Ideal Calculation-Vertical
detergent were added. Approximately 96 percent of the tank Vessels) [I21
contents vented by two-phase flow [32](Figure 4). Clearly, the
foamy nature of the second fluid significantly influenced the 1. Determine the vapor capacity (lb/hr) of the relief device(s)
character of the two-phase blowdown tests. at the desired relief pressure.
2. Calculate the superficial vapor velocity.
Experimental Procedure to Differentiate Two-Phase F
Flow Onset/Disengagement Behavior Jgm = 3600 A,

The DlEKS Bench-Scale Apparatus can be used to differ- where jgm - Superficial vapor velocity (ft/sec)
entiate between materials which exhibit homogeneous (foamy) F - Vapor flow rate (lb/hr)
versus non-foamy two-phase, vapor-liquid flow onset (start)/ pg - Vapor density (Ib/ft3)
disengagement (stop) behavior during runaway reaction emer- A, - Vessel cross-sectional area (ft2)
gency relief by measurement of the final void fraction in a test 3. Calculate the bubble rise velocity.
cell. Once data indicate 1hat a mixture is non-foamy ,the method
described below can be used to calculate ideal two-phase flow K[32.174 (2.2046E-3) u ( ~ f - p ~ ) ] ” ~
onset and disengagement behavior depending upon the vis-
urn= Pi
1/2

cosity of the fluid.

where V, - Bubble rise velocity (ft/sec)
K - 1.53 (Churn-turbulent fluid)
DIERS Calculation Methodology for Two-Phase Flow 1.18 (Bubbly fluid)
u - Surface tension (dynedcm)
Onset and Disengagement
pf - Liquid density (lb/ft’)
ps - Vapor density (lb/ft3)
DIERS developed and tested a method to calculate the onset
(start) and disengagement (stop) of two-phase vapor-liquid 4. Calculate the dimensionless superficial vapor velocity due
flow from a vessel due to emergency relief or depressurization to flow.
[12].A first order lumped parameter “drift flux” formulation $F = jgd-Jm
[49] was utilized as a basis for a vapor holdup correlation. A n where $F - Dimensionless superficial vapor velocity
empirical parameter, C,, was used to adjust the correlating due to flow
relationships to availabk data [Id?]. Calculation of the onset jgrn - Superficial vapor velocity (ft/sec)
(start) and disengagement (stop) of two-phase vapor-liquid U, - Bubble rise velocity (ft/sec)
flow from a vertical vessel was facilitated by considering three 5. Calculate the dimensionless superficial vapor velocity a t
vapor-liquid regimes which are differentiated by the viscosity which two-phase vapor-liquid flow commences.
and foamy behavior of the fluid (121 as shown in Table 4.
Churn-turbulent fluid Bubbly fluid
2& &( 1 - &)2
$=-
Additional Variables Affecting Liquid Swell I-C,cr g = (1 - or3)(1 - ~ , o r )
where C, - Correlating parameter given by
Best Estimate Conservative Best Estimate Conservative
Vapor holdup in a vessel ir influenced by axial and radial
1.5 1 .o 1.2 1.01
effects created by a two-phase boundary layer due to an ex-
$ - Dimensionless superficial vapor velocity
ternal heat flux 17, 121, internal circulation [7, 121 and hydro- at which two phase flow commences
static head [50].These phenomena mitigate liquid swell. - Vessel average void fraction
&
For essentially liquid filled atmospheric storage vessels, where NOTE: = (V, - V,)/V,
little or no overpressure can be tolerated, a n emergency relief where V, - Vessel volume (ft3)
device can be sized for vapor flow for a non-reactive scenario - Volume of liquid in vessel (ft3)
(i.e., fire exposure). Howcver, the vapor velocity into the vent V,
NOTE: The conservative estimate for Bubbly flow (C, =
at the swelled llquid height must be less than a critical en- 1.01) can be used t o predict the onset/disengage-
trainment velocity and the vessel contain a non-viscous and ment of two-phase flow due to homogeneous be-
non-foamy fluid [51]. havior.
A trarsition to droplet dispersed flow of a homogeneous
nature can also occur at very high superficial vapor velocities 6. Decision criteria:
[48]. This phenomenon greatly increases liquid swell. If $p 5 $, Two-phase venting is predicted.
The type of vessel (vertical, horizontal, spherical) also in- If gF < $, All vapor venting is predicted.
fluences liquid swell [22].The following analysis is only ap- If $F < $ and two-phase flow is in progress, disengagement
plicable to vessels which are vertical, right circular cylinders. is predicted.

TABLE 4 DIERS CALCULATION METHODOLOGY FOR TWO-PHASE ONSET AND DISENGAGEMENT

-
Maximum Void
Foaming Fraction at
Disengagement
Disengagement
Regime Viscosity Tendency
Churn-turbulent < loocp no & = 0.67
Bubbly 2 100 cp no & = 0.83
Homogeneous __ Yes & = 1.0
NOTE: Many reactive mixtures (e.g., styrene-polystyrene) exhibit homogeneous disengagement behavior, but will not form
a stable foam when shaken or agitated.

PlantlOperations Progress (Vol. 10, No. 1) January, 1991 11

 1

0.9

0.8

LL

0.5
H
0
>
w
W
0.4
U
Ly

0.2

0.1

0
0.1 1 10 103

D I M E N S I O N L E S S S U P E R F I C I A L VAPOR V E L O C I T Y . 9

FIGURE 5. Two-phase vapor-liquid churn-turbulent/ bubbly flow onsetldisengagement.

NOTE: Figure 5 illustrates the disengagement relation- 5. Dimensionless Superficial Vupor Velociry at Mihich Two-
ships. phase Flow Commences (Churn-turbuleni)
2cy 2 (0.2)
$=-- - = 0.57
Sample Calculation 1 -COG 1 - 1.5 (0.2)

Vessel: Vertical 6. Decision Criteria ( Two-phase Flow Onspt)

Diameter: 10.0 feet Since $F (1.04) > $ (0.57),two-phase flow i s predicted.
Fill Ratio: 0.8 (0.2 - void fraction) NOTE: Figure 5 may also be used as follows..
Rupture Disk Diameter: 4 inches @ CU = 0.2, rl. = 0.57 from the CT (C, = 1.5) curve.
Burst Pressure: 100 psig Since $F = 1.04 (the dimensionless superficial vapor
Assume: Vapor venting using water prop- velocity due to flow) is greater than $ == 0.57 (the
erties, except for surface tension dimensionless superficial vapor velocity at which two-
1 . Relief Device Vapor Capacity phase flow occurs), two-phase flow is predicted.
F = 43200Ib/hr 7. Void Fraction at Disengagement
2. Superficial Vapor Velocity At disengagement $+- = $. Rearrange the Churn-tur-
- -
F 43200 bulent equation and calculate the void fraction at dis-
J p = - = 0.637 ft/sec engagement.
3600 p,A, 3600 (0.24) 78.54
1.04
3. Bubble Rise Velocity (Churn-turbulent) a=-- $ - = 0.29
2+C,$ 2 + 1.5 (1.04)
1.53 (32.174 (2.2046E-3) (r ( p - ~ ~ ) ) * ’ ~
u, = NOTE: Figure 5 may also be used as follows:
P,’/2

1.53 (32.174 (2.2046E - 3) (20) (56.03 -0.24)”4

-
-
= 0.610 ft/sec
(56.03)”2

4. Dimensionless Superficial Vapor Velocity Due to Flow @ & = rl. = 1.04, ol = 0.29 from the CT (C, =-
+bP = jgm/Um= 0.637/0.610 = 1.04 1.5) curve.

12 January, 1991 Plantloperations Progress (Vol. 10, No. 1 )