472. P. vs.

Aspili, November 21, 1990

FACTS:

Two criminal cases were filed against the accused namely: Rodolfo Aspili, Ernesto Magbanua, Eduardo
Mendoza, Jr., Rodolfo Sales, Roberto Aguirre and Pacifico Rebutido. The two cases were consolidated and, after
hearing, the lower court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty of the crime of rape with homicide.
The Court finds all the herein accused, guilty of the crimes of Rape with Homicide, with the aggravating
circumstances of Robbery in Band, taking advantage of nighttime, recidivism, abuse of superior strength and craft, in
the above-entitled Criminal Case No. 3, beyond reasonable doubt, and sentences all of them to Reclusion Perpetua,
and all, likewise, guilty of the same but separate crime with all the same aforementioned aggravating circumstances,
in the above-entitled Criminal Case No. 4, beyond reasonable doubt and imposes upon all of them, another separate
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, both penalties to be served successively, with all its accessory penalties too in both
cases, further, all same six (6) herein accused are sentenced and ordered to pay actual damages jointly and solidarily.
The appellants seek a reversal of the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) contending that their guilt
was not established beyond reasonable doubt by prosecution and the their confessions were inadmissible because
they were not informed of their right to counsel.

ISSUE: Whether accused contentions have merit

HELD:

The interlocking extrajudicial confessions executed by the appellants are admissible even if they were not
informed of their right to counsel. These confessions were all taken in January 1970, long before the 1973 Constitution
took effect. Article III Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, for the first time, concretized the present right of persons
under custodial investigation to counsel, how to be informed of such right and the effect of non-compliance. The
requirements and restrictions surrounding this constitutional guarantee, however, have no retroactive effect and do
not apply to confessions taken before January 17, 1973, the date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. (See Magtoto
v. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4 [1975])

At any rate, even without considering these extrajudicial confessions, the Court is convinced that the guilt of
appellants has been incontrovertibly established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution.

473. People vs. Judge Ayson, 175 SCRA 216

Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at
its Baguio City station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the
sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be
conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of
Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with
the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A
letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000.
The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused
proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts.
He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime
of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the
prosecution contained Ramos’ written admission and statement, to which
defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being

1
represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that
accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have
counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence
this appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as

evidence the admission and statement of accused.

Held: No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-
incrimination (only to witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating
to a different crime charged- not present in case at bar).

This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The
right is not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself.” It prescribes an
"option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of
inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in
character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It
does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear
before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a
right that a witness knows or should know. He must claim it and could be waived.

Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of

the accused include:

1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right.
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
free will shall be used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in
evidence.

The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to
answer or make a statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are
demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him.
474. P. vs. Pinlac, 165 SCRA 675

FACTS:

At around five o'clock in the afternoon of April 7th Sato went out of his house. At around 6:45
following, Jandayan also left the house in order to go home to Novaliches, Quezon City. But
before leaving the house Jandayan saw to it that the windows and doors were securely closed
and locked. It was only in the morning of the following Monday that Jandayan returned to her
employer's residence. Returning home at around 11:30 in the evening of the same day, Sato
noticed that the front door was already unlocked. Upon returning to his room upstairs he

2
discovered that his Walkman transistor which was placed beside his bed was already missing.
He searched for it upstairs, downstairs and around the house. It was only after entering
Jandayan's room that he found his transistor together with his two wrist watches (he was then
wearing one), cigarette lighter and eyeglass case. Another watch, an Alba Seiko, which he
bought in Japan for 7,000 yen (the approximate equivalent of P300.00), a gold necklace which
had sentimental value because given to him as a gift, an cash money amounting to P180.00,
were all missing. They were never recovered. Sato thereafter went to the Makati Police Station
to report the robbery. He requested some policemen to repair to his residence to investigate. It
was when the police investigators had already reached his residence that he learned about the
death of Osamu. In assailing his conviction, the accused (now petitioner) contends that the trial
court erred in admitting in evidence his extra-judicial confession, which was allegedly obtained
thru force, torture, violence and intimidation, without having been apprised of his constitutional
rights and without the assistance of counsel.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused’s constitutional rights were violated

HELD:

In the case of People vs. Galit, G.R. No. L-51770, promulgated on March 20, 1985, which cited
the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 538, this Court reiterated the correct
procedure for peace officers to follow when making arrest and in conducting a custodial
investigation. Therein, We said —

7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the
reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, .... He shall be informed of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and that any statement he might make could
be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible — or by
letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court
upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone in his behalf. The right to counsel may
be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory in whole or in part shall be inadmissible in evidence. When the Constitution requires
a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must
be presumed to contemplate the transmission of a meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, therefore,
it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the
provisions of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the
latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms. In other words, the right of
a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the
police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in
understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be
said that the person has been "informed" of his rights.

3
 475. People vs. Loveria, 187 SCRA 47

FACTS: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines and was allegedly involved in
irregularities in the sales of plane tickets. The PAL management notified him of an investigation to be
conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the
Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to
which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The
findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating
that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two
months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the
prosecution contained Ramos’ written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the
confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit
those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A
motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission and
statement of accused.

HELD: No. The judge should admit the evidence in court as the accused was not under custodial investigation
when his statements were taken. One cannot invoke violation of the right to counsel in administrative
proceeding. The right to self-incrimination and custodial investigation are accorded only when the accused is
subjected to custodial inquest which involves the questioning initiated by police authorities after a person is
taken in custody or deprived of his freedom in any way. Because the statements were obtained beyond the
purview of custodial investigation the evidence should be admitted in court.

476. Gamboa vs. Judge Cruz, 162 SCRA 675

Facts:

On July 19, 1979, at about 7:00 o’clock in the morning, petitioner

Christopher Gamboa was arrested for vagrancy, without warrant of arrest, by Patrolman ArturoPalencia.
On July 20, 1979, during the line-up of five (5) detainees including petitioner Gamboa who was identified
by complainant Erlinda B. Bernal as one of the companions in the commission of the crime of robbery.
On July 23, 1979, an information for robbery was filed against him. On August 22, 1979, he was
arraigned. On August 13, 1980, petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit predicated on the ground that the
conduct of the line- up, without notice to, and in the absence of, his counsel violated his constitutional
rights to counsel and to due process. On October 23, 1980, the lower court denied the Motion to Acquit,
hence, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s constitutional rights to counsel and to due process were violated during the
conduct of police line- up.

Held:
Police line- up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet
entitled at such stage to counsel. When the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to
the accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail of
the services of his lawyer. Since petitioner in the course of his identification in the police line- up had not
yet been held to answer for a criminal offense, he was, therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted
by counsel because the accusatory process had not yet set in. The police could not have violated

4
petitioner’s right to counsel and due process as the confrontation between the State and he had not
begun. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation.
At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the
pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the
person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense. On the right to due process, the
Court finds that petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of the substantive and constitutional right, as
he was duly represented by a member of the Bar. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and
to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a
Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack
of opportunity to be heard. The petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order issued is lifted.

477. People vs. Agustin, 240 SCRA 541

Facts: Dr. Bayquen, a dentist, together with his son, Anthony; Anthony's girlfriend,
Anna Theresa; his daughter, Dominic; and Danny, a family friend, were on their way
aboard their Brasilia to the doctor's residence at Malvar Street, Baguio City. While
they were cruising along Malvar Street and nearing the Baptist church, a man came
out from the right side of a car parked about two meters to the church. The man
approached the Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle through its window, and fired at the
passengers. The Brasilia swerved and hit a fence. The gunman immediately returned
to the parked car which then sped away. All those in the car were hit and Dr.
Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot. Dominic was bale to get out of the
Brasilia to run to the Alabanza store where she telephoned her mother. Later, she
and her mother brought her father and Anthony to the hospital. Danny went home
and was then brought to the Hospital for treatment.

Accused Quiaño, an alleged former military agent who had been picked up by the
police authorities, confessed during the investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal
Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman. He implicated Abenoja, Jr.,
who engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Cartel, who provided the armalite, and
a certain "Jimmy." During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiaño was assisted by Atty.
Reynaldo Cajucom. Stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation
as transcribed with the sworn statement of Quiaño was signed, with the assistance of
Atty. Cajucom, and swore to before City Fiscal Balajadia. The following day, Agustin
was apprehended, and was investigated and was afforded the privileges like that of
Quijano. Agustin’s defense interpose that he was forced to admit involvement at
gunpoint in the Kennon Road. He further declared that although he was given a
lawyer, Cajucom (a law partner of the private prosecutor), he nevertheless, asked for
his uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from only two
minutes in English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he understands. The
promise that he would be discharged as a witness did not push through since Quijano
escaped. However the RTC convicted him, since conspiracy was established. Hence
the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not accused-appellant’s extrajudicial statements admissible as

evidence. Held: No. Extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial confession. In a
confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused, while an admission is
a statement direct or implied of facts pertinent to the issue. The rule on
inadmissibility, however expressly includes admissions, not just confessions.The
extrajudicial admission of the appellant, contained in twenty-two pages appear to be

5
 signed by him and Atty. Cajucom but for reasons not explained in the records, the
transcript of the notes which consists of twelve pages was not signed by the
appellant. Since the court cannot even read or decipher the stenographic notes it
cannot be expected that appellant, who is a farmer and who reached only the fourth
grade, to read or decipher its contents

The appellant, therefore was deprived of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of
the Constitution. Firstly, he was not fully and properly informed of his rights. The
appellant was not explicitly told of his right to have a competent and independent
counsel of his choice, specifically asked if he had in mind any such counsel and, if so,
whether he could afford to hire his services, and, if he could not, whether he would
agree to be assisted by one to be provided for him. He was not categorically informed
that he could waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel and that this waiver
must be in writing and in the presence of his counsel

He had, in fact, waived his right to remain silent by agreeing to be investigated. Yet,
no written waiver of such right appears in the transcript and no other independent
evidence was offered to prove its existence. In short, after the appellant said that he
wanted to be assisted by counsel, the City fiscal, through suggestive language,
immediately informed him that Atty. Cajucom was ready to assist him. Moreso said
counsel is not independent since he is an associate of the private prosecutor.

478. P. vs. Galit, 135 SCRA 465

FACTS:
The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He had been
detained and interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistently maintained his
innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously, something drastic had to be done.
A confession was absolutely necessary. So the investigating officers began to maul him and to torture
him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on his innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must
be obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his
face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner could not take any more. His body could no
longer endure the pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will had been broken. He
admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confession they prepared.
Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a
reenactment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and
that any statement he might make could be used against him.

RULING:
Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the
law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be
several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language
known to the person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he
understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with
his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been
brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had executed the
Salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver
of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed

6
reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of
his rights.

479. P vs. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109

Facts: This is an automatic review of a decision of the court of First Instance of Rizal,
Seventh Judicial District, Branch VII, Pasay City finding all the accused, namely, Ramiro
Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan, Melecio Cudillan y Arcillas and Jesus
Medalla y Cudillan, guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo y Maravilla, Spinster, 57 years old,
whose body was found in her bathroom inside her house at the Maravilla compound,
Ignacio Street, Pasay City, in the early morning of July 26, 1966.She died of asphyxia
by manual strangulation. Her bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it
was ransacked. The drawers and several cabinets were open, and some personal
garments, hadbags and papers were scattered on the floor. No witness saw the
commission of the crime.

When arraigned on August 10, 1966, Mario Comayas, Melecio Cudillan, Jesus Medalla
and Ramiro Alegre entered a plea of not guilty. The prosecution presented nine
witnesses. None of them, however, testified on the actual commission of the crime. The
recital of facts contained in the decision under review was based principally and mainly
on the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan. The only evidence, therefore,
presented by the prosecution to prove the guilt of appellants are the testimonies of Sgt.
Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo. The testimony of Sgt. Mariano Isla of the Pasay City
police is to the effect that when he was investigating Melecio Cudillan, the latter pointed
to Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas and Jesus Medalla as his companions in the
commission of the crime. According to him, said appellants "just stared at him (Melecio
Cudilla) and said nothing. Hernando Carillo, a detention prisoner in the Pasay City jail,
declared that the three appellants admitted to him that they took part in the robbery and
homicide committed in the residence of the deceased. Appellants now contend that the
lower court erred in utilizing the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan (now
deceased) as evidence against herein appellants; in concluding from the alleged
"Silence" of appellants when allegedly pointed to by Melecio Cudillan as "his
companions" in the commission of the crime, an admission of guilt; and in giving undue
weight and credence to the testimony of an inmate of the Pasay City Jail that appellants
admitted to him their participation in the crime.

Issue: Whether the lower court erred in utilizing the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio
Cudillan (now deceased) as evidence against herein appellants; in concluding from the
alleged "Silence" of appellants when allegedly pointed to by Melecio Cudillan as "his
companions" in the commission of the crime, an admission of guilt.

Ruling: The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan, on the basis of which the trial
court was able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question,
cannot be used as evidence and are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro

7
Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non
debet" there being no independent evidence of conspiracy. 2As a general rule, the
extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible
and does not have probative value against his co- accused. It is merely hearsay
evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. While there are recognized
exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not
bring it within the purview of such exceptions. The only evidence, therefore, linking the
appellants to the crime would be their purported tacit admissions and/or failure to deny
their implications of the crime made by Melecio Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal
confessions to Hernando Carillo, an inmate of the Pasay City jail.

480. Draculan vs. Donato, 85 SCRA 266

Facts: On June 25, 1973, the Chief of Police of San Isidro, Isabela filed with the Municipal Court of the
said place, a complaint for Less Serious Physical Injuries against Florencio Miguel. Tried after pleading
not guilty upon arraignment, accused Miguel was convicted as charged and thereafter accordingly
sentenced in a decision promulgated on November 14, 1973.
From the aforesaid decision, Miguel appealed to the then Court of First Instance of Isabela, and assigned
to Branch V of the said court presided by the Honorable respondent Judge. 'The record of the said case
was then transmitted and referred by the Clerk of Court to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela.
Upon a review of the evidence made by the provincial fiscal's office, petitioners found that accused-
appellant Miguel should have been charged with "Direct Assault Upon a Person in Authority" it
appearing that Benjamin Antonio, the offended party, is a person in authority then engaged in the
performance of his official duties when assaulted. In view thereof, petitioners' office, then conducted a
new preliminary investigation and upon a prima facie showing that direct assault was actually the, crime
committed by accused- appellant Miguel, petitioners filed with the respondent court t a Motion to
Dismiss the appealed Less Serious Physical Injury case. Simultaneously, a new information for Direct
Assault was filed against Miguel. Upon receipt of the records of this assault case, respondent Judge, in
an order dated December 17, 1975, directed that it be returned to the Fiscal's Office on the ground that
it was prematurely filed considering that at that time, the prosecution's motion to dismiss the appeal
was still pending resolution.
The instant petition wherein it is prayed that the aforementioned orders of respondent Judge dated
April 13, 1976 and May 28, 1976 be declared null and void; that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss
the appealed less serious physical injury case; and that a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining
respondent from proceeding with the trial of the appealed less serious physical injury case be issued
which should be made permanent after hearing on the merits. The petition is devoid of merit.
Consequently, its dismissal is in order.
Issue: Whether or not the prosecution may amend the information and/or file a new information
charging an offense different from that with which accused-appellant was tried and convicted in the
court below?
Held: Section 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court contains two parts: one authorizes the amendment of
an information or complaint, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the
defendant pleads, and thereafter, only as to matters of form. The other provides that, if it appears at
any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court may
dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper
offense, provided the defendant would not be placed in double jeopardy.
The amendment 6 or the filing of a new case where there had been a mistake in charging the proper

8
offense after the dismissal of an existing one, 7 spoken of and therein provided for apply, only to an
original case where no judgment has as yet been rendered. Much less does the said section apply to an
appealed case such as the instant proceeding.
The reason is obvious and that is because the right to amend or to file a new complaint or information
charging the proper offense after the dismissal of the original complaint or information, is subject to the
rule on double jeopardy, which petitioners in the instant case miserably missed.

481. P. vs. Borromeo, June 29,1983

(Note: Iba yung issue nung case ni Borromeo, though same sila ng title and date nung case na nasa outline. Wala
naman pong right to remain silent sa case na ‘to).
FACTS:
Petitioners seek to set aside the order of respondent Judge dated June 30, 1982 denying the verbal motion of the
City Fiscal of Mandaue City to amend the information for grave coercion against private respondent Joaquin
Borromeo by changing the date of the commission of the crime from "on or about the 24th day of June, 1981" to
"on or about August 28, 1981," after the accused had been arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty and during
the testimony of the complainant, as well as the order of July 28, 1982 denying the motion for reconsideration of
the aforesaid order.

The original information dated February 18, 1982 as well as the first amended information dated March 19, 1982,
for grave coercion alleges that "the crime was committed on or about the 24th day of June, 1981." The first
amended information was admitted in an order dated March 24, 1982.

After the accused pleaded not guilty, at the trial on or about June 30, 1982 and during the testimony of the
complainant who testified that the crime of grave coercion was committed on or about August 28, 1981, the
prosecution orally moved to further amend the amended information by changing the date of the commission of
the offense from June 24, 1981 to August 28, 1981.

In an order dated June 30, 1982, the respondent Judge denied the verbal motion to amend on the ground that the
proposed amendment would impair the substantial rights of the accused as guaranteed by the Constitution,
invoking the case of People v. Hon. Reyes (G.R. No. L-32557, Oct. 23, 1981, 108 SCRA 23). The motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied in an order dated July 28, 1982.
ISSUE:
Whether the change of date of the commission of the crime of grave coercion from June 24,1981 to August 28,
1981 is more formal than substantial and would not prejudice the rights of the accused.
HELD: No.
The petition is meritorious.
As opined by the Solicitor General in his comment dated May 9, 1982, the change of the date of the commission of
the crime from June 24, 1981 to August 28, 1981 is more formal than substantial and would not prejudice the
rights of the accused, as the said proposed amendment would not alter the nature of the offense of grave
coercion.Nor will the amendment or correction cause any surprise on the accused, who has been furnished the
affidavits of prosecution witnesses, all of which uniformly state that the date of the commission was August 28,
1981.
The Supreme Court allowed the said amendment holding that it did not prejudice in any sense the right of the
accused as "it did not affect the essence of the crime charged, but merely an accidental detail of the same" and "it
did not deprive the accused of an opportunity to produce evidence for their defense, if they had desired, in
relation to the said amendment; . . ." Consequently, the accused is not thereby denied any opportunity to present
evidence in his defense.
Wherefore, the petition is hereby granted, the orders of respondent judge dated June 30, 1982 and July 28, 1982
are hereby set aside, and the respondent judge is hereby directed to admit the additional amendment to the
amended information from "June 24, 1981 to August 28, 1981."

9
 482. P vs. Camalog, GR No. 77116, January 31, 1989 (Including the
duty of Police Officers in connection with said right)

FACTS: In the morning of June 12, 1985, the Integrated National Police (INP) stationed at
Tanza, Cavite received a report that a killing was perpetrated inside a house at Barrio Amaya,
Tanza, Cavite. Two INP police officers, Patrolmen Ruben Bolante and Augusta de la Cruz
responded to the report and conducted an investigation at the scene of the crime. They came
upon the lifeless body of Jose M. Malabanan. The deceased was found lying on the floor of the
room. They noted that the furniture was in disarray and that the cabinet in the room was forcibly
opened with its contents scattered around the victim. The investigators took note of the
presence of several bloodstains in many parts of the room. They then found a pick hammer
lying near the victim's body. They also came upon a triple bladed knife, popularly called as tres
cantos. Upon going outside the house, they discovered human blood spilled near an artesian
well. A third police officer, Sgt. Esmeraldo Romero, interrogated some of the residents of the
Barrio. He eventually came upon a barrio resident, Bayani Bocalan, who told them that he saw
Armando de los Reyes, a resident of Tanza, strolling near the house of the victim in the early
morning of June 12, 1985 and was in the company of two other men, all of them acting
suspiciously in the vicinity of the house of the victim.

Acting on the information given by Bayani Bocalan, the police authorities invited Armando de los
Reyes to their office for questioning. Sgt. Romero informed de los Reyes about his constitutional
rights and then began interrogating him. De los Reyes admitted his participation in the
commission of the crime and identified his two companions as a certain Mario from Ilocos and
one Ben from Manila, both of whom, according to him, could be found in the Luneta Park of
Manila. The extra-judicial confession was reduced in writing and was signed by him before
Judge Aurelio Icasiano, Municipal Trial Court Judge of Tanza, Cavite.

A team of Tanza policemen accompanied De los Reyes to the Luneta on the evening of June
13, 1985 to look for the said Mario and Ben. At the Luneta, De los Reyes pointed out to the
policemen the accused Ferdinand Camalog and Novelito Sotto whom he identified as his fellow
conspirators.

Ferdinand Camalog and Novelito Sotto were interrogated and made to sign extra-judicial
confessions wherein they admitted their alleged participation in the commission of the crime
charged. These statements were subscribed and sworn to also before Judge Icasiano.

On the basis of these extra-judicial confessions, the three were charged with the crime of
Robbery with Homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extra-judicial confessions are admissible?

HELD: No. The records show that their confessions were not regularly obtained. There were
enough indications that the statements were not given voluntarily. The trial court relied on the
testimony of the police investigators that the appellants have been informed of their fundamental
rights but failed to take note of the conspicuous absence of any lawyer to assist the accused
during the custodial investigation. Even assuming that the accused waived their constitutional
right to counsel, there is no indication that they did so with the assistance of counsel. Very
relevant to this case is the pronouncement of this Court in Morales vs.

10
Ponce Enrile, 10 reiterated in People vs. Galit 11 and People vs. Lumayok, 12 where this Court
categorically stated that the waiver by the accused of his right to counsel must be made in the
presence and with the assistance of counsel.

We stressed the inadmissibility of extra-judicial confessions obtained in violation of this

principle:

At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to
inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any, He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and
to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him.
The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if
possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibilityof the arresting
officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person
arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself of by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel
may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance
of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid,
whether exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence. (Emphasis supplied.) 13

P vs. Cui, Jr., 162 SCRA 220

On 3 November 1975, at around 2:00 p.m., the complainant and the accused met in the house of
Anita Quiao Tacang, (Nita, or Anita for short), the complainant's dressmaker. They stayed in Nita's
house and engaged in conversation, which lasted until around 7:15 in the evening, when they left the
house together and rode a jeepney bound for Magsaysay Boulevard, where they both alighted. Then
the complainant walked with the accused to the boat and went inside the latter's cabin. 5 It was inside
the cabin that the accused had carnal knowledge of the complainant, which the latter alleges was
committed by means of force and intimidation, and without her consent, but, which the accused
claims, in his defense, was consummated with mutual consent

The following day, at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the accused was at Magsaysay Park sitting in
one of the benches and, eating banana cue when Merlita (the complainant) came, with her friend
Sylvia. She (complainant) asked him about the incident of the previous night. He told her not to
worry because she will not get pregnant since his semen splashed on her thighs. 26

Thereafter, according to the accused, Merlita's two (2) brothers, her sister, her cousin and a friend
came to the boat and brought him to the house of complainant to ask him if he was willing to marry
her. And when they thought he had acceded, they brought him to the police station so that his
promise to marry her would be blottered. But in the police station, he told the investigating policeman
that he cannot marry Merlita Jasa because he is already married. The complainant's brother, Atty.
Jasa, wanted to file a case against him for seduction, but he did not push through with it because
Merle was no longer below eighteen (18) years of age. Instead, a case of abduction was planned to
be filed against him, but the requisite elements were not also present, hence, it did not push through.

11
But because Atty. Jasa really wanted the license of the accused as a ship officer revoked, the case
for rape was filed.

Issue: WON his statement during police investigation without a counsel is valid

Held: The testimony of the complainant is said to be corroborated by Patrolman Manampan, the
Desk Officer who investigated the case. He told the court that the accused admitted to him that he
used force in having sexual intercourse with the complainant. But the prosecution cannot avail of
such entry in the police record. The alleged statement of the accused given during police
investigation does not help the prosecution any in view of the rule that a statement taken from the
accused without first informing him of his rights under the Constitution, and without the assistance of
counsel, is inadmissible. According to Patrolman Manampan himself,the only persons present when
the accused was investigated were Patrolman Manampan, the complainant, Patrolman de Guzman
and Atty. Jasa, the brother of the complainant. So the accused was without any assistance from
counsel at the time he made in writing the alleged extrajudicial confession; neither was there any
evidence adduced to prove that the accused waived his right to be assisted by counsel.

As repeatedly enunciated by the Court, the weakness of the defense will not be allowed to
strengthen the evidence for the prosecution, and that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its
own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the defense.

The accused is presumed innocent until proved otherwise, and it is only by proof beyond reasonable
doubt, which requires moral certainty, that this presumption of innocence can be overcome.
Therefore, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. In the case at bar, the prosecution fell short of this duty. Hence, the constitutional
presumption of innocence calls for a reversal of the judgment of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused is
ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt,

3-a. Ho0w about if the accused gives an spontaneous statement before he could
be advised of his right to remain silent/ Factors indicating voluntariness?

Read:
483. PEOPLE VS. VILLARINO, March 15, 2010

FACTS:
In this special complex crime of rape with homicide, the unsolicited and spontaneous confession of guilt
by the appellant to the police officer is admissible in evidence. The circumstantial evidence is also
sufficient to sustain the conviction of the appellant even if no spermatozoa was found in the victim’s body
during an autopsy.
On August 3, 1995, an Information1 was filed charging appellant Victor Villarino y Mabute with the special
complex crime of rape with homicide.
On May 2, 1995, the police brought appellant to Calbayog City for medical examination since he had
scratches and abrasions on his body. While waiting for a boat ride at 4:00 o’clock in the morning, the
police team took a coffee break. SPO4 Genoguin was momentarily left alone to guard the appellant.

12
During this short period, the appellant voluntarily admitted to SPO4 Genoguin that he committed the
crime charged. He also told SPO4 Genoguin that he could keep the pendant and bracelet if he would
retrieve the t-shirt and throw it into the sea. SPO4 Genoguin rejected the appellant’s offer and reminded
him of his right to a counsel and that everything the appellant said could be used against him in court.
Unperturbed, the appellant reiterated his offer.24
When they boarded the motorboat, the appellant repeatedly offered to give SPO4 Genoguin ₱20,000.00
if he would throw the sando into the sea. However, the police officer ignored the offer and instead
reported the matter to the Chief of Police of Almagro, SPO4 Basilio M. Yabao.25 Later, the appellant’s
mother, Felicidad Mabute y Legaspi, asked him not to testify against her son.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant’s confession is admissible despite the absence of his counsel.

HELD:
In the instant case, appellant voluntarily confessed to raping and killing "AAA" to SPO4 Genoguin. He even
offered to give the pieces of jewelry to the latter if his sando is thrown into the sea. The appellant did not
deny this accusation nor assail its truthfulness.
When appellant confessed to the crime, he was alone with SPO4 Genoguin, and no force or intimidation
was employed against him. The confession was spontaneously made and not elicited through questioning.
The trial court did not, therefore, err in holding that compliance with the constitutional procedure on
custodial interrogation is not applicable in the instant case.
At any rate, even without his confession, appellant could still be convicted of the complex crime of rape
with homicide. The prosecution established his complicity in the crime through circumstantial evidence
which were credible and sufficient, and led to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant committed
the complex crime of rape with homicide. When considered together, the circumstances point to the
appellant as the culprit.
First. Prior to the incident, three witnesses saw the appellant wearing the white sleeveless t-shirt, a
necklace with pendant and a bracelet. Rodrigo saw the appellant wearing the same sando and pieces of
jewelry when the latter was working in his fishing venture. He again saw the appellant wearing the same
apparel and jewelry on the day the victim was raped and murdered. SPO4 Genoguin recalled that he saw
appellant wearing the necklace with pendant and the bracelet on the eve of the commission of the crime.
On that fateful day, he noticed that the appellant was wearing the white sleeveless t-shirt and the same
pieces of jewelry in a drinking spree a kilometer away from the crime scene. "BBB" also testified that on
the day of her daughter’s death, she saw the appellant wearing a white sleeveless t-shirt, a necklace with
pendant, and a bracelet.
Second. The pendant and bracelet were later recovered a few meters away from the lifeless body of
"AAA". The white sando was also found clasped in the right hand of the victim.
Third. The appellant could no longer produce the sando and pieces of jewelry after his arrest.
Fourth. The physical examination on the appellant revealed 10 healed abrasions and two linear abrasions
or scratches on his breast, knees and ears which could have been caused by the fingernails of the victim.
Appellant offered no plausible explanation on how he sustained said injuries.
Fifth. The victim had blood oozing from her vaginal orifice, while the appellant had human blood-stains
on his briefs.
Sixth. The appellant attempted to bribe SPO4 Genoguin and the policemen who were escorting him to
Calbayog City, by offering them ₱20,000.00 in exchange for the disposal of his white sleeveless t-shirt
found in the crime scene.
Seventh. The appellant’s mother requested SPO4 Genoguin not to testify against her son.

13
 484. PEOPLE VS. PIA, 229 Phil. 577 (1986)

FACTS:

Juanito Chua and his wife were kidnapped and seriously illegally detained in the following manner:
Immediately after complainant Juanito Chua parked his car near their residence and while he was opening
its door, two (2) persons accosted him, one of them poked a gun at his head and the other poked a knife at
his neck, warning Juanito Chua to keep quiet. They tied Juanito Chua's hands and those of his wife Elma
Diato Chua and brought them in a car to a hut. The kidnappers demanded a ransom of P100,000.00, warning
that a refusal would compel them to kill Juanito Chua and his wife. Juanito Chua told them that he did not
have that amount. He bargained to reduce it. The kidnappers finally agreed to accept the amount of
P18,000.00. Juanito Chua's wife was then released so that she could secure the money which was to be
delivered to the kidnappers at Zapote, Las Piñas, Metro Manila in the afternoon of December 29, 1977. In
the meantime, Juanito Chua continued to be detained in the hut by his kidnappers. He was rescued by the
Philippine Constabulary on January 3, 1978.

Under an information filed by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite on March 28, 1978, herein
appellant Gaudencio Lamangan, together with his co-accused Victorio Pia, Venancio Pia, Diosdado
Anciado, Mario Garcia and Eduardo Vinas, were charged with the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention. The court suspended the trial of the case against Venancio Pia, Victorio Pia and Eduardo Vina,
and the two other participants, Emiliano del Rosario and Federico Camia, who were at large, until they shall
have been apprehended. The trial of the case proceeded with respect to accused Gaudencio Lamangan,
Diosdado Anciado and Mario Garcia.

ISSUE:
WON the extrajudicial confession of the appellants is not admissible
HELD:
Records show that accused Venancio Pia, Mario Garcia, Victorio Pia and appellant executed their
confessions before investigators in the presence of counsel de oficio. Appellant's repudiation of his sworn
statement during the trial because the Philippine Constabulary (PC) allegedly extracted his admissions
through the use of force, threats and intimidation consisting of physical violence is baseless. For if they had
indeed been maltreated, particularly appellant, they should have complained to the counsel de oficio or to
Municipal Judge to whom the case was referred by the PC for preliminary investigation. It has been held
that where the defendants did not present evidence of compulsion or duress or violence on their persons;
where they failed to complain to the officers who administered the oaths; where they did not institute any
criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared
to be no marks of violence on their bodies and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable
physician to buttress their claim, all these should be considered as factors indicating voluntariness of
confessions.
The rule is that an extrajudicial confession replete with details could not have been extracted by force.
(People vs. Nillos, 127 SCRA 207) In the case at bar, the confession of appellant contains details which the
investigators could not have known beforehand.
The foregoing declarations were corroborated in their essential details by prosecution witnesses Elma Chua
and PC Sergeant Rodolfo Habana. Clearly then, even if the confession were to be disregarded, the testimony
of the witnesses proved the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

14
 485. ABALLE VS. PEOPLE, 183 SCRA 196

FACTS:
At around seven o'clock in the evening of November 7, 1980 in Saypon, Toril, Davao City, Quirino
Banguis, a 42-year old driver, attended a birthday party at the residence of his neighbor Aguilles Mora. He
brought along his wife and other children, leaving his 12-year-old daughter Jennie alone in their house.
Upon their return at around 8:30 that same night, Quirino found Jennie in the sala, lying prostrate, bathed
in her own blood with multiple wounds on different parts of her body. There were no eyewitnesses to the
bizarre killing.
The postmortem report disclosed that Jennie sustained a total of thirty-two (32) stab wounds. Cause
of death was attributed to hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds. At daybreak of the following
day, November 8, 1980, acting on information furnished by the victim's father, a police team headed by
Sergeant Herminigildo Marante sought the accused Peter Paul Aballe for questioning. They found him just
as he was coming out of the communal bathroom in Saypon and wearing what appeared to be a bloodstained
T-shirt. Upon seeing Sgt. Marante, the accused without anyone asking him, orally admitted that he killed
Jennie Banguis. Sgt. Marante subsequently brought him to the Toril police station for interrogation.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not a confession can be used against him if the statement was given spontaneously.

HELD:
"The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offenses charged may be
given in evidence against him."The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard
the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all
of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its substance.
Compliance with the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation is not applicable to a spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner, whereby the accused orally
admitted having slain the victim

486. PEOPLE VS. DANO, 339 SCRA 515

FACTS:
Wilfredo Tapian was resting in the house of a Neneng Miras, when Teresita Dano arrived and asked for his
help. Teresita told Wilfredo that her husband, Emeterio, attacked his brother Alberto, herein appellant, in
the latter’s house. Wilfredo immediately rushed to Alberto’s house, which was some one hundred meters
away.
On arriving at Alberto’s house, Wilfredo saw the victim pacing back and forth in appellants front
yard. The victim, armed with a scythe was shouting at appellant, who was looking out of the window, to
come down so they could fight to the death. (Kanaog diri kay magkamatay ta.) Wilfredo tried to pacify the
victim who kept repeating his challenge while striking his scythe on the ground, but to no avail. Appellant
also advised his younger brother to go home, but the latter refused to listen. Suddenly, Emeterio leaped at
appellant who was standing with his head out of the window and slashed appellant with his scythe but
missed. Seeing that his efforts to stop the fraternal quarrel were of no use and fearful of being hit in the
affray, Wilfredo left for home.

15
 Between the hours of six and seven oclock that same evening, Demosthenes Peralta, the barangay
captain, was informed by Wilfredo and a certain Fernando Teves that the Dano brothers were
quarreling. Demosthenes went to appellants home to investigate. On his way, he met appellant. The latter
told Peralta he had killed Emeterio and voluntarily surrendered to him. Demosthenes left appellant in
Wilfredos house and preceded to appellant’s residence where he saw the bloody corpse of the victim
sprawled in the yard, near the stairs. He noticed that the body bore several hacking and slashing wounds.
Demosthenes fetched appellant from Wilfredo’s house and took him to the police station.
Early in the morning of the next day, Demosthenes fetched a doctor to examine the victim’s body, still
lying in appellant’s yard. At the request of the police station commander, Demosthenes took photos of the
corpse, which he later turned over to the police. He conducted a further examination of the crime scene and
found a bloodstained scythe beneath appellant’s house. The scythes wooden handle had the name Alberto
Dano carved on it. He turned over the scythe to the police.
When interrogated by the police, appellant, without assistance of counsel, admitted he killed his
brother. The pertinent portion of his statement, contained in the police blotter, and read into the records
without objection by the defense, reads:

Subject admitted of killing his younger brother as the latter was drunk and provoked him for a scythe duel
right downstairs of his house that prompted him to get his scythe and come down from his house and
allegedly boxed first his brother and subsequently hacked several times as he was already commanded by
his evil thought.

Appellant claimed that he acted in self-defense and in defense of his family. He narrated that he and
his family were preparing to go to bed at around 6:30 p.m., when he heard somebody shout Boy, come
down and we will fight to death. (Boy kanang diha kay magpatay ta) At first, he tried to ignore the
challenge, but when it was repeated several times, he looked out the window and saw his brother Emeterio
outside, armed with a scythe. He told his brother to go home but the latter, who appeared disturbed, did not
heed his words. Instead, he kept on hitting the ground with the scythe. Without any provocation on his part,
Emeterio suddenly leaped at him and attacked him with the scythe, which he evaded. Emeterio then
ascended the stairs to push open the bamboo door on the porch leading to their living room. The door
partially opened after Emeterio slammed it several times. Appellant’s wife and children screamed and cried
in fear. Appellant held and twisted his brother’s wrist to disarm him of the scythe. They grappled for the
scythe while in the porch, then tumbled down the stairs. When they hit the ground, the victim was
dead.Appellant did not know how many times he hit his brother or how many wounds he inflicted. He said
he was not in a normal state of mind. Seeing that he had killed his brother, appellant threw the scythe under
his house and went to the barangay captain to surrender. His spouse largely corroborated appellants version
of the first round of the fratricidal affray. She claimed, however, that she did not see how the victim was
killed as they were inside the house and she, as well as her children, had their eyes closed in shock and fear.
Appellant denied owning the scythe found by the barangay captain beneath his house. He did not know
why his name was engraved on the wooden handle of said scythe. He was sure, however, that it was the
same scythe that his brother was carrying during the incident.
Appellant explained that he had a previous misunderstanding with the victim over the purchase of a
horse from his cousin Doroteo Oliver on installment basis. Emeterio wanted to buy the horse, but appellant
bought it ahead of him, which caused the former to resent him.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial courts err in admitting the extrajudicial confession of the accused?
HELD:

16
 A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is guaranteed the following rights by
the Constitution: (1) the right to remain silent; (2) the right to have competent and independent counsel of
his own choice, and to be provided one if he cannot afford the services of counsel; and (3) the right to be
informed of these rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. A
confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) the confession must be voluntary;
(2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the
confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in writing. In convicting the accused of the
offense charged, the trial court held:

Accused testimony on the witness stand however, contradicts his version appearing on the police blotter
of the police station of Margosatubig dated March 16, 1994, where he admitted the killing of his younger
brother Emeterio Dano as the latter was drunk and provoked him for (sic) a scythe duel right downstairs
of his house that prompted him to get his scythe and come down from his house and allegedly boxed first
his brother and subsequently hacked several times as he was already commanded by evil thoughts.

During the formal offer of evidence by the prosecution, defense counsel admitted the authenticity of the
extract of above entry in the police blotter (Exhibit B, prosecution) containing the foregoing recital as
testified to by SPO4 Jesus Reales. Such entry in the police blotter when not objected to, is presumed to
have been accomplished in the regular performance of official duties by the police officer who made the
entry, hence is entitled to full faith and credit. It having been entered at the time when the accused had
just surrendered to the authorities in a remorseful attitude and in a spontaneous manner free of any
extraneous influence and coaching of a lawyer, the same entry carries great weight and high probative
value, in the absence of any proof of tampering or alteration thereof. This Court therefore considers the
recital in said entry more credible and easy to believe, than the self-serving version of the accused given
on the witness stand which is more a product of an after-thought and concocted story than an honest and
truthful version of what actually happened.

We have carefully scrutinized the records including the List of Exhibits for the Prosecution and the
prosecutions offer of evidence and nowhere find mention of Exhibit E. What we find offered by the
prosecution as evidence is the testimony of SPO3 Jesus Reales on the authenticity of the entries on the
police blotter. The blotter recorded the incident immediately after the crime and another entry in the
morning, recorded what was observed on the scene of the crime including a description of the prostrate
body of the accused. We also noted in the records that the defense objected to the admission of the testimony
of SPO3 Reales because said witness is incompetent to testify as to the entry having admitted that he was
not one who entered that (sic) events in the police blotter and that he has no knowledge when the entries in
the police blotter were made. Moreover, we noted that SPO3 Reales admitted that as an assistant
investigator, he was familiar with investigation procedures. Under cross-examination, he also admitted
appellant was interrogated by the police regarding the incident, but there was no showing whatsoever
appellant was assisted by counsel during custodial investigation.
Considering the foregoing circumstances, we find merit in appellants claim that his constitutional
rights were violated. First, the trial court erred when it relied on the supposed extrajudicial confession of
appellant in the police blotter. Extrajudicial confessions must conform to the requirements of the
Constitution. A suspects confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, when taken without the assistance of
counsel without a valid waiver of such assistance regardless of the absence of coercion or the fact that it
had been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if appellants confession were gospel truth.

17
 487. PEOPLE VS. MAYORGA, 3 6 SCRA 458

FACTS: On June 20, 1980, at approximately 7:00 P.M., several detectives assigned to the Long
Island Drug Enforcement Task Force were at the intersection of the Long Island Expressway
and Little Neck Parkway, near the Nassau-Queens border, in connection with a prearranged
plan to purchase cocaine. Shortly after 7:00 P.M., another car approached in which a
confidential informant, the defendant and another were seated. After the transaction was
consummated, detective ordered a surveillance unit to arrest everybody in the vehicle.

The defendant was removed at gunpoint, patted down, and, prior to the administration
of Miranda warnings, was asked by one of the officers, "Do you know what's going on here?" He
responded, "I'm doing a favor for a friend", indicating, as well, that he was to have made $500
on the deal. The defendant was thereupon transported to the office of the Nassau County
Narcotics Squad.

During the trip, Miranda warnings were administered and the defendant stated that "[a] friend of
mine asked me if I knew anybody who had cocaine for sale, and I told him I did. I met with
[another person arrested at the same time] and we came out here and I was arrested". He again
admitted that he was to have made $500 on the transaction. For the remainder of the trip, the
defendant was silent.

The defendant and the officers arrived at the office of the Narcotics Squad at about 7:45 P.M.
Pedigree and related information was obtained from the defendant, immediately after which the
defendant was asked "if he was interested in helping himself" and he answered: "Yes, I'll do
anything". The detectives indicated that he could help himself if he would tell them and show
them who was engaged in selling cocaine. The defendant said that "[i]f you can get me out" he
would do so as he knew people "in Florida and * * * in New York".

The defendant was again advised of his Miranda rights and he initialed a waiver form. He
thereupon made a detailed oral confession which was reduced to writing and signed. ¶ After a
hearing, the County Court suppressed the defendant's first statement, made on the scene prior
to the administration of Miranda warnings (the People assume, without conceding, that
suppression of this statement is mandated by People v Quarles, 58 N.Y.2d 664, cert granted
___ US ___, 103 S.Ct. 2118), but refused to suppress the subsequent oral statement made in
the police vehicle and the oral and written confessions made at the police precinct.

HELD: “Judgment reversed, on the law and the facts, plea vacated, motion granted, insofar as it
is to suppress all of the defendant's oral and written statements made to the police, and case
remitted to the County Court, Nassau County, for further proceedings.”

We reverse. Based upon a practical "assessment of external events" we are compelled to

conclude that the defendant was "subjected to such a continuous interrogation" that
the Miranda warnings subsequently administered "were insufficient to protect his rights" (People
v Chapple, 38 N.Y.2d 112, 115). We perceive no "definite, pronounced break in the
interrogation that the defendant may be said to have returned, in effect, to the status of one who
is not under the influence of questioning" (People v Chapple, supra, p 115; see, also, People v
Johnson, 64 A.D.2d 907, affd 48 N.Y.2d 674; People v Glover, 58 A.D.2d 814). ¶ The dissent
concedes that suppression of the oral statements made at the scene of the arrest and in the
police car is required and agrees that there is a temporal proximity between those oral

18
statements and the oral and written confessions made at the police precinct. Nonetheless, it
finds that what it characterizes as "the intervening bargaining acts of the defendant" constitute
the requisite break in the chain of events. We cannot agree.

As set forth above, the record indicates that the defendant's purported agreement to help the
officers was neither spontaneous nor the result of an independent, voluntary act by the
defendant. It was initiated by the arresting officers and rather than a break in the interrogation, it
was part and parcel of it.

Moreover, we also disagree with the dissenters' suggestion that a harmless error analysis may
be employed, if, as is their view, suppression of only the oral statements made before
defendant's arrival at the police precinct is required. "[W]hen a conviction is based upon a plea
of guilty an appellate court will rarely, if ever, be able to determine whether an erroneous denial
of a motion to suppress contributed to the defendant's decision, unless at the time of the plea he
states or reveals his reason for pleading guilty" (People v Grant, 45 N.Y.2d 366, 379-380;
emphasis added). There is no indication upon which to hinge such a determination here for "a
confession is a most serious matter in the trial of a criminal case" and "[i]t is enough * * * to note
that the confession was a likely factor which might have induced the plea and might have
affected substantially a verdict upon a trial" (People v Ramos, 40 N.Y.2d 610, 618-619; see,
also, People v Purdy, 53 N.Y.2d 806; People v Tyler, 99 A.D.2d 537; but cf. People v Coles, 89
A.D.2d 471).

488. PEOPLE VS. TAMPUS , MARCH 28, 1980

NATURE
Automatic review of CFI judgment convicting Tampus of murder, sentencing him to death; co-accused Avila was also
sentenced to death in another case but did not appeal in this case because his sentence was already under review

FACTS
-Tampus and Avila, members of the Oxo gang, avenged the stabbing of their co-gang member Rosales bystabbing Saminado,
a member of the Batang Mindanao gang which was a hostile group to the Oxo gang. The accused and the victims were all
prisoners in the national penitentiary and are in the emergency ward.-How it happened: at around 10 am, Saminado went to
the toilet. Tampus and Avila followed Saminado and, by means of their bladed weapons, assaulted him. Tampus inflicted 8
incised wounds while Avila stabbed Saminado 9 times. Afterwards, the two surrendered to a prison guard their knives,
saying"Surrender po kami, sir. Gumanti lang po kami." Saminado died 11am upon arrival in the prison hospital.-the officer of
the day investigated the incident right away. 2 days after the killing, another prison guard investigated the two and obtained
their extrad judicial confessions wherein they admitted that they assaulted Saminado.-at the arraignment, they pleaded
guilty even after they were told regarding the gravity of the charge and informed them that the death penalty might be
imposed upon them. When the prosecution presented evidence, the two accused took the witness stand, affirmed their
confessions and testified as to the manner in which they repeatedly wounded Saminado. The trial was held at the state
penitentiary.

ISSUES
WON Tampus was denied his right to a public trial because the arraignment and hearing were held atthe state penitentiary
WON the extrajudicial admissions of Tampus and Avila were admissible

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HELD
1. NO.
Ratio.
For the convenience of the witnesses a case is tried in Bilibid Prison without any objection on the part of the accused is not a
ground for reversal of the judgment of conviction. The accused may waive his right to have a public trial as shown in the rule
that the trial court may motu proprio exclude the public from the courtroom when the evidence to be offered is offensive to
decency or public morals. The court may also, upon request of the defendant, exclude from the trial every person except the
officers of the court and the attorneys for the prosecution and defense. (Sec. 14, Rule 119, Rules of Court. See 21 Am Jur2d
305, sec. 270).
Reasoning.
The New Bilibid Prison was the venue of the arraignment and hearing, and not the trial court's session hall at Makati, Rizal,
because this Court in its resolution of July 20, 1976 in L-38141, where Rodolf Avila was one of the accused-appellants,
refused, for security reasons, to allow him to be brought to Makati So, this Court directed that the arraignment and trial in
the instant case, where Avila was a co-accused of Tampus, be held at the national penitentiary in Muntinlupa. No showing
that the public was actually excluded from the place where the trial was held or that the accused was prejudiced by the
holding of the trial in the national penitentiary.2. YES
Reasoning.
(1) Confession was voluntarily made. The investigator in taking it endeavored, according to his understanding, to comply with
section 20 of the 1973 Constitution (refer to the case for the salaysay);(2) Res Gestae: even if there was an initial investigation
before the extrajudicial confession was obtained(where the right against self-incrimination may not have been told to the
accused), Tampus and Avila had already admitted it when, after coming out of the toilet, the scene of the crime, they
surrendered to Reynaldo S. Eustaquio, the first guard whom they encountered, and they revealed to him that they had
committed an act of revenge; (3) they already waived their right to remain silent and to have the right when they gave
freely on the spur of the moment without any urging or suggestion; Admission was confirmed by their extrajudicial
confession, plea of guilty and testimony in court. They did not appeal from the judgment of conviction

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3-b. When shall the constitutional rights of the accused as mentioned
above demandable? During police line-up?

Read:

489. P VS. USMAN HASSAN, 157 SCRA 261

Facts: usman hassan an illiterate push cart cargador was accused for killing Ramon Pichel jr while he was riding on
his motorcycle to buy mangoes at Fruit Paradise near the Barter Trade Zone in Zamboanga City. While Jose Samson
(company of Ramon) was selecting mango he saw in his peripheral vision that someone approached Ramon and
stabbed him only once and after the stabbing the assailant run towards the PNB Building.

Samson described the assailant as wearing a white, short-sleeved t-shirt and maong pants, but "he did not see if
the aggressor was wearing shoes," that the assailant stabbed Ramon with a knife but "he did not exactly see what
kind of knife it was, and he did not see how long the knife was He said he brought the wounded Ramon to the
Zamboanga City General Hospital in a tricycle.

Samson’s Testimony was taken only two days after the stabbing, and sworn to only also two days after it was
taken, or four days after the killing, was never presented or mentioned by the prosecution at all.

Issue: whether or not there is a constitutional right violated by the Police officers by presenting self-proclaim
witness?

Ruling:

The manner by which Jose Samson, Jr. was made to confront and Identify the accused alone at the funeral parlor,
without being placed in the police line-up, was "pointedly suggsestive, generated confidence where there was
none, activated visual imagination, and, all told, subserted his reliability as eyewitness. This unusual, coarse, and
highly singular method of Identification, which revolts against the accepted principles of scientific crime detection,
alienates the esteem of every just man, and commands neither our respect nor acceptance."

Moreover, the confrontation arranged by the police investigator between the self-proclaimed eyewitness and the
accused did violence to the right of the latter to counsel in all stages of the investigation into the commission of a
crime especially at its most crucial stage — the Identification of the accused.

As it turned out, the method of Identification became just a confrontation. At that critical and decisive moment,
the scales of justice tipped unevenly against the young, poor, and disadvantaged accused. The police procedure
adopted in this case in which only the accused was presented to witness Samson, in the funeral parlor, and in the
presence of the grieving relatives of the victim, is as tainted as an uncounselled confession and thus falls within the
same ambit of the constitutionally entrenched protection. For this infringement alone, the accused-appellant
should be acquitted.

490. GAMBOA VS . JUDGE CRUZ, 162 SCRA 642

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FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for TRO to annul and set aside the CFI
decision against Gamboa. He was arrested for vagrancy without warrant of arrest. He was brought to
precinct 2, Manila, booked for vagrancy and then detained. The next day, he was identified as a
companion to a robbery. He was arraigned. In the hearing, Gamboa filed a motion to acquit or demurrer
to evidence presenting that his constitutional right to counsel and due process was violated. Court
denied the motion. Hence this instant petition.
ISSUE: WON petitioner’s right to counsel and due process violated.
HELD: The instant petition is one for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, committed by the respondent judge in issuing the questioned order dated 23 October 1980.
It is basic, however, that for certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise
of power, the very antithesis of judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and
common law traditions.
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts
to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At
such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious
practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing
interrogation, for the commission of an offense.
As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at least, in this case) was not
part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. It was
held that when the process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory as when police
investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer.
On the right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this
substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a member of the Bar. He was
accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only
that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its
case.

491. DE LA TORRE VS. CA, 294 SCRA 196

FACTS: Petitioner was convicted of qualified theft for stealing 6 electric meters being an employee of
MERALCO. During the police line-up, petitioner was duly recognized and pointed by the witness as the
perpetrator of the offense. Petitioner, however, assails the validity of the conduct of the police line-up as
he was alleging that there was no counsel to assist him.
ISSUE: W/N police line-up can be considered as part of the custodial investigation which requires the
assistance of counsel?
HELD: NO. Petitioner, together w/ the other crewmembers of MERALCO truck522, was merely included
in a line-up of 8 persons from w/c he was picked out as the leader of the group w/c has removed the
electric meters from the CAPASSCO premises. Until then, the police investigation did not focus on the
petitioner. Indeed, no questions were put to him. Rather, the questions were directed to witnesses of the
complaint. There is, therefore, no basis for petitioner’s allegations that his rights as a suspect in a custodial
investigation were violated. However, the petitioner is acquitted as there was no sufficient evidence
adduced to rebut the presumption of his innocence.

492. PEOPLE VS. HATTON

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Facts:
The town of Catarman, Northern Samar was celebrating its fiesta on that day of August 29,
1986. The victim, Faustino Algarme and three (3) of his friends. namely: Jesus Aboda, Romeo
Basierto and witness Edgardo Ongue were on their way to the house of Engr. Corbillo after
drinking two (2) bottles of beer each at Aileen's Restaurant. The group walked abreast Algarme,
who was on the extreme left at the edge of Bonifacio street, with Ongue, Basierto and Aboda, in
that order, to his right. It was about seven (7) o'clock in the evening. When they neared the CLAO
office, they noticed two (2) men coming towards their direction. One was short and stocky and the
other was tall. While the tall man was one step behind them, he tapped the shoulder of Faustino
Algarme with his left hand and stabbed him with his right hand. Algarme shouted for help and
called "Romy (Basierto), please help me I was struck." At that moment. Ongue gazed at the tall
man who tried to pull back the knife from the victim's back. Ongue did not know the man who
stabbed Algarme, but he took notice of his mestizo features. The tall man failed to get the knife.
Then he ran towards the corner of a house owned by Nonong Hatton.
COA: The accused-appellant denied having stabbed the victim. He categorically stated also that
he was left-handed.
Ruling:

Hatton was brought to the police station only to be identified. by a witness to the killing of
Algarme. Technically, he was not yet under custodial investigation.The right to counsel attaches
upon the start of an investigation. i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such point or stage.
the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of
extorting false or coerced admission or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing
interrogation, for the commission of an offense.While it is true that the defense of alibi is weak. it
holds true only if the prosecution's evidence is strong. The better rule is, the prosecution must rely
on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the defense (People v. Solis. et al.,
182 SCRA 182 (1990); People v. Buenaflor. 181 SCRA 225 (1990), People v. Rodriguez. G.R.
No. 95902, Feb. 4, 1992). With the exclusion of the pre-indictment identification of the accused-
appellant and the failure of the prosecution witnesses to positively identify him in court, the case
against him must fail.

ACCORDINGLY, The appealed decision is reversed. Accused-appellant is ACQUITTED on

reasonable doubt.

493. PEOPLE VS. MACAM, 238 SCRA 306

Prosecution’s version:

On Aug 18,1987, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan Jr., Danilo Roque and
Ernesto Roque went to the house of Benito Macam (uncle of Eduardo Macam) located at 43
Ferma Road QC. Upon the arrival of the accused, Benito invited the former to have lunch.

23
Benito asked his maid Salvacion Enrera to call the companions of Eduardo who were waiting
in a tricycle outside the house. A. Cedro, E. Cawilan and D. Roque entered the house while
E. Roque remained in the tricycle. After all the accused had taken their lunch, Eduardo
Macam grabbed the clutch bag of Benito Macam and pulled out his uncle’s gun then
declared a hold-up. They tied up the wife (Leticia Macam), children, maid (Salvacion) and
Nilo Alcantara and brought them to the room upstairs. After a while Leticia was brought to
the bathroom and after she screamed she was stabbed and killed by A. Cedro. Benito, Nilo
and Salvacion was also stabbed but survived. The total value of the items taken was P536,
700.00.

Defense’s version:

Danilo Roque stated that he being a tricycle driver drove the 4 accused to Benito’s house for
a fee of P50.00. Instead of paying him, he was given a calling card by Eduardo Macam so
that he can be paid the following day. Upon arriving, he went with the accused inside the
house to have lunch. Thereafter he washed the dishes and swept the floor. When Eugenio
Cawilan pulled a gun and announced the hold-up, he was asked to gather some things and
which he abided out of fear. While putting the said thins inside the car of Benito (victim) he
heard the accused saying “kailangan patayin ang mga taong yan dahil kilala ako ng mga
yan”. Upon hearing such phrase he escaped and went home using his tricycle. He also
testified that his brother Ernesto Roque has just arrived from the province and in no way
can be involved in the case at bar. On the following day, together with his brother, they
went to the factory of the Zesto Juice (owned by the father of Eduardo Macam) for him to
get his payment (50.00) . He and his brother was suddenly apprehended by the security
guards and brought to the police headquarters in Q.C. They were also forced to admit
certain things.

After which, he together with all the accused, in handcuffs and bore contusions on their
faces caused by blows inflicted in their faces during investigation, was brought to the QC
General Hospital before each surviving victims and made to line-up for identification.
Eugenio Cawilan was also charged with Anti-fencing Law but was acquitted in the said case.

Issue: Whether or Not their right to counsel has been violated. WON the arrest was valid.
WON the evidence from the line-up is admissible.

Held: It is appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even
before trial. A police line-up is considered a “critical” stage of the proceedings. Any
identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible.
HOWEVER, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding appellant’s identification at
the line-up. The witnesses identified the accused again in open court. Also, accused did not
object to the in-court identification as being tainted by illegal line-up.

24
 The arrest of the appellants was without a warrant. HOWEVER, they are estopped from
questioning the legality of such arrest because they have not moved to quash the said
information and therefore voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial
court by entering a plea of not guilty and participating in trial.

The court believed the version of the prosecution. Ernesto Roque, while remaining outside
the house served as a looked out.

Read: 1. The right to counsel, 57 SCRA 481 In places where there are no
lawyers:
494. PEOPLE VS. DECIERDO, 149 SCRA 496

FACTS:
Decierdo was apprehended in his residence by Patrolman and was brought to the municipal judge, wher
e he supposedly executed a written confession admitting responsibility for the shooting of Montillano. B
ut the same was made in the absence of a counsel. This was admitted by the judge himself.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of Decierdo should be admitted in evidence considering that
the same was made without counsel.
RULING:
No. There is no doubt that the accused’s alleged extrajudicial confession is in the nature of an uncounsel
led confession and hence, inadmissible in evidence. Decierdo was not assisted by a lawyer when he sign
ed his supposed confession. That makes that statement, in contemplation of law, “involuntary,” even if i
t were otherwise voluntary, technically. And since the confession is inadmissible, it follows that Decierdo
is entitled to an acquittal considering that there was no eyewitness.

495. PEOPLE VS. ESPIRITU, February 2, 1999

FACTS:
That on or about the 8th day of September, 1995, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and with
treachery and evident prem[e]ditation, after the accused GERALD ALICOY Y SIANO offered
the sum of P20,000.00 to the accused FRED MALICDAN Y MILLER and RIZAL ESPIRITU Y
KINAO for them to kill SATO SANAD[3] Y DOGA-ONG, the accused Fred Malicdan and Rizal
Espiritu, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab Sato
Sanad with a sharp pointed instrument several times on his back inflicting on said Sato Sanad
several stab wounds at his back as a result of which said Sato Sanad died.

The commission of the offense is qualified by evident premeditation in that the three (3) accused
planned the killing where the accused Gerald Alicoy offered to the accused Fred Malicdan and

25
Rizal Espiritu the sum of P20,000.00 for them to kill Sato Sanad and the accused Fred Malicdan
and Rizal Espiritu carried out the plan and killed Sato Sanad.

The commission of the offense is likewise qualified by treachery in that the accused Rizal
Espiritu suddenly held and locked the neck of Sato Sanad with his hands and thereafter the
accused Fred Malicdan stabbed Sato Sanad several times on his back and the accused adopted
that mode of attack to ensure that the deceased could not put up a defense.

ISSUE: Whether there is a valid extra judicial confession

HELD: In assailing the admissibility of his extrajudicial confession, appellant invokes paragraphs
1 and 3 of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. He insists that his confession was
obtained in violation of his rights (1) to have an independent and competent counsel and (2) to be
informed of such right. Further, he argues that he was not advised by Atty. Mangallay of the
consequences of the execution of a confession.
We disagree. We are convinced that the confession of Appellant Espiritu is admissible in
evidence, as it was satisfactorily shown that it was (1) voluntary and (2) made with the assistance
of a competent and independent counsel.[18]
With respect to the first requisite, we find that Espiritu readily admitted killing Sanad when
he was confronted by the relatives of the deceased.[19] Thereafter, without being invited by the
investigating officers, he went to the police station and voluntarily gave his statement to SPO1
Wilfredo P. Cabanayan.[20] Later, appellant affirmed before Prosecutor Romeo Carbonell the fact
that he, with Atty. Mangallay, had gone to the police station to surrender and that the said counsel
had assisted him when the police started taking his statement.[21] In his confession, appellant
admitted that he and Malicdan killed Sanad, after being hired by Alicoy to do so for the sum
of P20,000. Aside from describing the details of how he and his cohort killed Sanad, Espiritu,
during an ocular inspection, even pointed out the place where the killing had been committed.
These acts of the appellant are clear manifestations that, contrary to his protestations, no
torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means was used against him to force him
to confess.

496. PEOPLE VS. AGUSTIN, 240 SCRA 541

Facts:
Dr. Bayquen, a dentist, together with his son, Anthony; Anthony's girlfriend, Anna Theresa; his
daughter, Dominic; and Danny, a family friend, were on their way aboard their Brasilia to the doctor's
residence at Malvar Street, Baguio City. While they were cruising along Malvar Street and nearing the
Baptist church, a man came out from the right side of a car parked about two meters to the church. The
man approached the Brasilia, aimed his armalite rifle through its window, and fired at the passengers. The
Brasilia swerved and hit a fence. The gunman immediately returned to the parked car which then sped
away. All those in the car were hit and Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot. Dominic was bale
to get out of the Brasilia to run to the Alabanza store where she telephoned her mother. Later, she and her

26
mother brought her father and Anthony to the hospital. Danny went home and was then brought to the
Hospital for treatment.
Accused Quiaño, an alleged former military agent who had been picked up by the police authorities,
confessed during the investigation conducted by Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he
was the triggerman. He implicated Abenoja, Jr., who engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Cartel, who
provided the armalite, and a certain "Jimmy." During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiaño was assisted by
Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. Stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation as transcribed
with the sworn statement of Quiaño was signed, with the assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to before
City Fiscal Balajadia. The following day, Agustin was apprehended, and was investigated and was afforded
the privileges like that of Quijano. Agustin’s defense interpose that he was forced to admit involvement at
gunpoint in the Kennon Road. He further declared that although he was given a lawyer, Cajucom (a law
partner of the private prosecutor), he nevertheless, asked for his uncle Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty.
Cajucom interviewed him from only two minutes in English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he
understands. The promise that he would be discharged as a witness did not push through since Quijano
escaped. However the RTC convicted him, since conspiracy was established. Hence the appeal.

Issue:
Whether or Not accused-appellant’s extrajudicial statements admissible as evidence.

Held:
No. Extrajudicial statement is not extrajudicial confession. In a confession, there is an
acknowledgment of guilt of the accused, while an admission is a statement direct or implied of facts
pertinent to the issue. The rule on inadmissibility, however expressly includes admissions, not just
confessions.The extrajudicial admission of the appellant, contained in twenty-two pages appear to be
signed by him and Atty. Cajucom but for reasons not explained in the records, the transcript of the notes
which consists of twelve pages was not signed by the appellant. Since the court cannot even read or
decipher the stenographic notes it cannot be expected that appellant, who is a farmer and who reached
only the fourth grade, to read or decipher its contents. The appellant, therefore was deprived of his rights
under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Firstly, he was not fully and properly informed of his
rights. The appellant was not explicitly told of his right to have a competent and independent counsel of his
choice, specifically asked if he had in mind any such counsel and, if so, whether he could afford to hire his
services, and, if he could not, whether he would agree to be assisted by one to be provided for him. He was
not categorically informed that he could waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel and that this waiver
must be in writing and in the presence of his counsel. He had, in fact, waived his right to remain silent by
agreeing to be investigated. Yet, no written waiver of such right appears in the transcript and no other
independent evidence was offered to prove its existence. In short, after the appellant said that he wanted
to be assisted by counsel, the City fiscal, through suggestive language, immediately informed him that Atty.
Cajucom was ready to assist him. Moreso said counsel is not independent since he is an associate of the
private prosecutor.

497. PEOPLE VS CAMPOS

Facts:
Felicidad Alfaro and Mercelina Alfaro Jacobe resided inside Maxim's Mini Mart at Cefel's Park
Subdivision, Tala, Novaliches, Caloocan City. Beside the mini mart was Cefel's General Merchandise, a
hardware store owned by Felipa Jacobe, the mother-in-law of Mercelina Alfaro Jacobe.
On August 16, 1989, at around 10:00 in the evening, Felicidad and Mercelina prepared to sleep. Their
bedroom and the kitchen were located inside the mini mart. Felicidad turned off all lights in the store
except the kitchen light. Mercelina laid on the bed with her two-year old son, Christopher, while
Felicidad laid on the floor beside them.

27
At around midnight, Felicidad roused from her sleep and stood up. Suddenly, someone stabbed her on
her left arm. She started to shout as her assailant continued to stab her. She was hit on her abdomen,
left arm, and left side. She fell to the floor in a sitting position and she looked at the person who stabbed
her. She recognized accused Alejandro Campos, who worked at the neighboring gravel and sand area
and frequented their store to buy gas. She also noticed accused Renato dela Cruz standing near the door
of the room. She knew accused dela Cruz because they used to work together in the Cefel's General
Merchandise Store, a hardware store adjacent to the mini-mart.
Suddenly, accused Campos moved towards Mercelina and started stabbing her. Mercelina, still lying on
the bed, woke up and shouted for help. Accused Campos kept stabbing her.
Thereafter, the two accused left hurriedly, exiting through the storeroom of the minimart.
At around midnight of August 17, 1989, Barangay Captain Federico Hallig was inside the Barangay Hall at
Malaria, Tala, Caloocan City together with Barangay Tanods Romulo Meglares, Jesus Sienda, Marcos
Manalo and Maximo Baylon. Suddenly, they saw a man running outside the barangay hall with blood on
his chest and on his short pants. The man was holding a kitchen knife about eleven inches long. After
questioning the man, who identified himself as Alejandro Campos, the barangay officials brought him to
the police station.
Meanwhile, Felicidad, though wounded, managed to call for help from her mother-in-law, Felipa Jacobe,
who resided beside the store. Felicidad was brought to Tala Hospital but was later transferred to
Quezon City General Hospital. Mercelina was taken to Tala Hospital. She was pronounced dead on
arrival.
Alejandro Campos was positively identified by Felicidad but he denied the allegations and claimed that
it was Renato dela Cruz was the one who perpetrated the act. After which dela Cruz entrusted a knife
into the hands of accused Campos and told him to keep it. Accused Campos walked away from the store,
holding the knife. He failed to notice that the knife was bloodied. Later, barangay officials intercepted
him and brought him to police headquarters for questioning.
Held:
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it.Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy; however, the evidence
to prove the same must be positive and convincing. Similar to the physical act constituting the crime
itself, the conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. It must be founded on facts, not on
mere surmises or conjectures.
In this case, there was no clear indication of the existence of conspiracy. First, eyewitness' identification
of accused-appellant at the scene of the crime was not clear. Although the witness was familiar with the
accused-appellant, the lack of lighting in the store at the time left doubt as to her proper identification
of accused-appellant, who was several meters away from her. Second, Felicidad merely stated that she
saw him standing by the door of the store. Mere presence at the scene of the crime is insufficient to
prove conspiracy. A conspirator must perform an overt act in furtherance of the plan to commit a
felony; mere presence at the scene of the incident, knowledge of the plan or acquiescence thereto are
not sufficient grounds to hold a person liable as a conspirator. Mere presence, knowledge, acquiescence
to or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any
active participation in the commission of the crime, with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose.
Undoubtedly, accused-appellant did not stab Felicidad and Mercelina. Considering the scant evidence
showing conspiracy and accused-appellant's involvement in the stabbing incident, accused-appellant
cannot be convicted of the crime charged. It is axiomatic that the accused is accorded in his favor the
disputable presumption of innocence. Unless the guilt of the accused is proven beyond reasonable
doubt, the constitutional presumption of innocence applies.

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