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Abella vs.

COMELEC o The effects of a DQ case under RA 6646 (votes not counted)


Gutierrez explains the necessity for continuing the investigation of Larrazabal
 This involves a controversy as to who is the rightful governor of Leyte notwithstanding the fact that the election was already ongoing!
Province. It was petitioner Adelina Larrazabal who obtained the highest  In line with the previous SC ruling, COMELEC conducted hearings in the DQ
number of votes and was proclaimed the duly-elected governor. But the case on the basis of Legal Residence in Leyte, and not being a registered
COMELEC subsequently declared that Larrazabal (PDP-Laban) didn’t meet voter in the province, required under the LGC and the Consti (X-12)
the residence and registration qualifications under the Constitution and the
Local Government Code (old) Or is it petitioner Abella (Liberal Party) who MOSTLY FACTUAL DISCUSSION MUNA
obtained the 2nd highest number of votes? Or is it Petilla, who was the duly-
elected Vice-Governor? COMELEC – the Comelec based its finding on the fact that Larrazabal registered at
o Abella (and co-petitioner De la Cruz) argued that Larrazabal was a Kananga, Leyte, to qualify her to run for the Governor position of the Province of
resident and voter of Ormoc City, an independent province under Leyte. Clearly, the COMELEC says, she considers herself already a resident of Ormoc
X-12 City. There was also no evidence of separate residence from that of her husband.
o Larrazabal maintained that she resided in Kananga, Leyte.
Larazabal is questioning the COMELEC’s use of the provisions of the SC - The SC had ruled on the principle of Animus Revertendi in Faypon vs. Quirino –
Family Code to rule that Larrazabal lacks residence mere absence from one’s residence or origin in order to pursue studies, business,
 Larrazabal is arguing that for purposes of the Election Law, avocation, etc, is insufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence –
the matter of residence is more on the principle of Residence largely depends upon intention inferred from acts and utterances. The
INTENTION (animus revertendi) rather than anything party claiming abandonment must show such abandonment and loss.
else
 Originally, it was Larrazabal’s husband who ran for governor. He was In this case, there’s no evidence to prove that Larrazabal left her residence in
disqualified by the COMELEC for lack of residence. The day before the Kananga, Leyte, to pursue any calling, profession, or business (as to show na didn’t
election, Adelina Larrazabal filed her own COC in substitution of her husband mean to abandon).
o Contested by Registered Voter Cruz – COMELEC’s members yet to
be appointed so it went to SC which remanded it to COMELEC What’s clear is that she established her residence in Ormoc City and considered
whose members had been appointed herself as a resident therein. Occassional visits does not signify an intent to return.
o Meanwhile, Abella contested Larrazabal’s election before the
COMELEC – Abella also intervened in Cruz’s falsification and SC – Larrazabal’s supposed cancellation of registration in Ormoc and the transfer of
misrepresentation of residence in COC cases registration in Kananga is not supported by the records. As the COMELEC stated,
o After the cases reached the SC, the SC ordered the dismissal of the unworthy of belief yung version of the facts ni Larrazabal (long time cancelled, long
proclamation case but ordered the DQ case to continue time registered)
 The proceedings before the COMELEC and the SC (back then) netted the  Application for cancellation of registration conveniently misplaced (by a
lifting of the TRO against Larrazabal’s proclamation and her assumption of clerk from Kalanga) and was discovered only in 1988.
office – but the DQ case continued as per the SC decision  It was eventually delivered only on the last hour of the “revision day” when
 COMELEC voted to DQ, in the same resolution, COMELEC held that Abella all the members of the Board of election inspectors had already signed the
can’t be proclaimed governor of Leyte minutes indicating na no revision of the voters list (di siya cancelled)
 Moreover, the List of Voters in Kalanga, as signed by the Chairman and Poll
Issue #1 – W/N COMELEC acted against the SC orders? NO Clerk, only showed an addition of 9 registered voters. This was signed by
 The SC reversed and set-aside the COMELEC ruling with regard to the issue the chairman, poll clerk, and a third person, while the one containing
of residence. The SC said that the matter was squarely raised before it and Larrazabal’s name was only signed by the chairman.
COMELEC shouldn’t have shunted it aside to its Law Department for a  Aratuc vs COMELEC – presume regularity of COMELEC action
“roundabout investigation through the filing of a criminal prosecution, tapos
tsaka pa lang madidis-qualify if found guilty sa criminal case”
o COMELEC should’ve opted for a more direct and speedy process.
MAIN Issue #2 – W/N even if she was a registered voter in Ormoc City, there was no is a Special Proceeding (difference was that QW, na-proclaim na as winner
impediment to her candidacy for the governorship in Leyte province? yung contested person)
 The Charter of Ormoc City states that the qualified voters of Ormoc City shall  SC disagrees – the fact remains that at the time the elections were held,
not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the provincial Larrazabal was considered a bona-fide candidate.
governor and the members of the provincial board. From this we can o The voters voted for her in the belie that she was qualified.
conclude that Ormoc City is an independent component city. o In effect, Abella was repudiated by the electorate, which is exactly
 So the question is not – W/N the prohibition from voting includes a why in Frivaldo and Labo, those who obtained the 2 nd highest
prohibition against registered voters from an ICC to become provincial number of votes were not allowed to assume the positions vacated
officials by Frivaldo and LAbo.
 The nature of the proceedings is not that compelling.
Larrazabal: X-4 of the consti states that Ps exercise general supervision over o As one who obtained the second highest number of votes, he was
component cities, and so the independence of an ICC only relates to administrative clearly not the choice of the people
supervision, and it doesn’t mean that said voters cannot hold provincial offices.
Concepts from Topacio vs Paredes
SC: untenable. Based on X-12, ICCs are treated like HUCs, outside the supervisory it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
power of the province. This includes a prohibition against voting and from being guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or
voted. plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots
Moreover, independent of the Consti is the charter of Ormoc City – Section 89 of that they do not choose him.
which states “shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the
provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the province of Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received
Leyte” – this connotes two prohibitions, one from running for office and the other the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental
from voting idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and
 Court disagreed with Larrazabal’s interpretation na both “qualified” and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of
“entitled” refer to the manner of voting and not to being elected. the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
 It’s basic legal hermeneutics that “AND” is not meant to separate words but
used to denote a joinder or a union. The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does
Issue #3 – W/N the COMELEC decision was valid despite the fact na ~expired~ na yung not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of
term dapat ni Commissioner Flores votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead,
 Larrazabal argues na president appointed Flores on February 2, 1988, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid the vote the winner into office
confirmed February 15, 1988, pero 3 year period ends on February 2 raw, or maintain him there. However, the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a
eh yung decision was February 14 contrary politics and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the
 SC says na won’t delve into this constitutional issue because at any rate, it sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be
won’t make Larrazabal any more qualified. treated as stray, void or meaningless.
 At any rate, the decision would be recognized under the De Facto Doctrine
– in the absence of a statute telling us when the COMELC post begins and
expires, continuance in office has a color of validity

Main Issue #4 – W/N Abella, obtaining the 2nd highest number of votes next to
Larrazabal, should be proclaimed to have won the election NO
 Abella states that the COMELEC wrongfully relied on the Labo and Frivaldo
cases because those cases were Quo Warranto cases while the instant case
Frivaldo vs. COMELEC the US District Court – California, duly authenticated by the Vice Consul of the PH in
Cruz San Francisco.
 Frivaldo was proclaimed the governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on
January 22, 1988. That Frivaldo became a US citizen isn’t denied by him. While the Court does not doubt
 The League of Municipalities, represented by its president Estuye, also suing that Frivaldo was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship, it cannot agree that
in his personal capacity, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the as a consequence of being an enemy, Frivaldo was coerced into embracing American
annulment of the election of Frivaldo as well as the proclamation, on the Citizenship.
ground that he was not a Filipino Citizen but was naturalized in the US in  Plenty of Filipinos at the time were similarly situated as Frivaldo, some of
1983. them subject to even greater risk than he. These people did not find it
 DEFENSES - Frivaldo admits to having been naturalized but raised the necessary to abandon their status as Filipinos, compared to Frivaldo who
defense that he had to be naturalized to protect himself from president took the oath that “I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all
Marcos allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, etc.
o That he returned to PH immediately after EDSA to help the
restoration of democracy Nottebohm case is irrelevant as that case delat with a conflict between the
o Should be dismissed since it was, in reality, a quo warranto nationality laws of two states, decided by a third state. In this case, the sole question
proceeding which must be filed within 10 days from proclamation is w/n under Philippine law, Frivaldo is a citizen.
o The league was an improper party since it wasn’t a voter.
 Against a motion filed by Frivaldo for preliminary hearing, COMELEC instead No repatriation – actively participating in the congressional elections did not
set a date for the hearing and trial on the merits. It was elevated to the SC repatriate him. That he automatically forfeited his US citizenship under US laws does
through a certiorari case. The SC issued a TRO and asked COMELEC to not change what the law of the Philippines on that matter. He became a stateless
comment as well as PR individual.
o The League of Municipalities reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo
was a naturalized American who did not have Philippine Citizenship Non-org of the Special Committee does not excuse him – otherwise it would allow
at the time of his election, he was therefore not qualified to run for all Filipinos who have renounced the Philippines to claim back their citizenship
and be elected. without formal adoption and reaffirmance of their allegiance.
Frivaldo’s arguments  If he really wanted to become a Filipino again, he needs to acquire such
 Frivaldo argues that he did not lose his Filipino citizenship because his status through an act of congress, naturalization, or repatriation. None of
application for naturalization in the US was not impressed with which he did.
voluntariness, citing the Nottebohm Case.
 He says he could not have repatriated himself because the Special Argument on COMELEC’s tardiness is not well-taken – qualifications for public office
Committee on Naturalization had yet to be organized prior to the election are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the election but
 His active participation in the 1987 Congressional Elections had divested him during the entire tenure.
of American Citizenship under US law.  If any qualification is lost during the term, his title may be seasonable
 Prescription of DQ case under the OEC challenged

SC: Why this question is relevant The fact that he received the highest number of votes also doesn’t really matter – the
 Constitution says that all public officials and employees owe the State and electorate cannot amend the qualifications prescribed by law
the Constitution “allegiance at all times (XI-9)
 LGC requires candidates to be registered voters and citizens of the PH Like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it’s not quick to welcome back
 OEC requires qualified voters to be citizens with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children

Frivaldo’s COC states that Frivaldo is a natural-born Filipino. However, evidence Gutierrez Concurring – exception dapat tong case sa 10-day rule for Quo Warranto.
shows that he was naturalized as a US citizen in 1983, proven by a certification from Pag age, residence, or any other grounds, dapat 10-days after proclamation STRICT
Labo vs. COMELEC (1989) of the Philippines. This was penned by COMELEC chair Chigas. It found Labo to be a
Cruz Filipino citizen because the evidence that he married an Australian woman, obtained
 Preliminary matters – Labo wishes that the court prevent COMELEC from an Ausstralian passport, and registered with the CID as an alien was mere conjecture
looking into his qualifications (as to citizenship) for mayor of baguio city on
the ground that the filing fees of 300 pesos for the QW case was not filed on The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman Miriam DS and 2
time. “Kingdom was lost for want of a horse” commissioners of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. This time, there
 Labo was proclaimed the mayor-elect of Baguio City on January 20, 1988. was documentary evidence in the form of an Official Statement of the Australian
The petition was filed on January 26, 1988, but the filing fees were paid only Governement (1984) through its PH consul that Labo was still an Australian Citizen
on February 10 (21 days later) by reason of his naturalization in 1976.
o OEC - Labo argues that since the petition is considered unfiled
without payment of the filing fee, it should be deemed to have The 1982 COMELEC decision (1st admin decision) took the fact that he doesn’t deny
been filed late. (OEC 253 – 10 days from proclamation of the result) obtaining a passport, registering as an alien, and applying for an Immigrant Certificate
o COMELEC Rules – Labo also argues that under the Procedural Rules of Residence as Mistakes. SC disagrees – Petitioner is “not an unlettered person”
of COMELEC, no petition for QW shall be given due course til an
amount of 300 pesos is paid. Labo: I didn’t automatically become Australian when I married an Australian
 Luis Lardizabal (PR) denies that the filing fees were paid out of time. In fact, SC: it doesn’t matter because the allegation was that he became an Australian by
he says, it was filed Ahead of the time. being naturalized through a formal and positive process. He even swore to be faithful
o Apparently, when Lardizabal filed his complaint on January 26, and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second.
COMELEC treated it as a pre-proclamation controversy and
docketed it as SPC Case. No docket fees were paid although they Labo: dual national at worst, still ilipino
were offered! SC: specious argument under CA 63 which enumerates how to lose Philippine
 Lardizabal argues na at that time, suspended yung running Citizenship including (1) Naturalization, (2) Express Renunciation of Citizenship, (3)
nung QW period under OEC-248 oath of allegiance to support the Consti or laws of a foreign country
 At anyrate, the COMELEC Rules of Proc became effective  All apply to Labo.
only on November 15, 1988, months after this issue (300  IV-5 Dual Allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall
pesos issue) be dealt with by law.
o It was only on Feb 8 when COMELEC decided to treat the petition
as one for Quo Warranto, redocketed it – Lardizabal only paid the Labo: marriage was annulled because it was bigamous
filing fee on that date. SC: That circumstance does not automatically restore his citizenship. The divestiture
Issue #1 – W/N late? NO – on time! of his Australian Citizenship does not concern us here. What matters is he lost his
 Assuming that Res. 1450 was published (old one requiring payment), and Philippine citizenship freely and voluntarily.
Res 1996 took effect only on March 3, 1988 (new one for 300), on time pa  Under CA 63, again, one re-gains one’s citizenship through direct act of
rin because the 10-day period to pay the fee was extended by the treatment congress, naturalization, or repatriation, none of which Labo did!
of the petition as a pre-proclamation proceeding w/c doesn’t require it.  No showing of compliance with PD 725 on repatriation – apply and if
 At any rate, the fee was paid. Any delay was not imputable to petitioner’s approved, take oath of allegiance to the RP
fault or neglect. As per Sun Insurance Office vs. Asuncion – court may allow
payment within a reasonable time. Hence Labo was not a citizen on the day of elections. He was not even a qualified
voter because he was an alien. Hence, he cannot be mayor of Baguio City. LGC – 42
SC decided to also answer the question on w/n Labo is a citizen based on the need requires citizenship
for an early resolution of this case, justified by – annex
On: the electorate
Issue #2 – W/N Citizen of PH? NO!  Labo: thunderous majority, mere technicality vs. will of the people
There are two administrative decisions from which this controversy stems from. The
first is a decision by the COMELEC (May 1982) wherein it found Labo to be a citizen
 SC: not that thunderous (2100 votes lang over next), besides, the people of
the locality could not have, even unanimously, changed the LGC
requirements and the Constitutional requirements na bawal alien
 A lot of the voters probably thought na he was qualified to hold the office
he now holds.
 The requirements are continuing ones – once any of them are lost during
the incumbency, title to the office is forfeited.

Issue #3 – W/N Lardizabal, as recipient of the 2nd highest number votes, is entitled to
the office? NO
 He obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election.
Hence, he’s not chosen one.
 Reversed the doctrine in Santos vs. COMELEC, go back to the rule in
Geronimo vs. Ramos (concepts in previous case) ‘

Annex – Why inanswer ang citizenship issue despite lack of contest by the parties
 Most important question clearly and urgently affecting public interest
 The facts and the legal propositions involved will not change, nor should the
ultimate judgment. Considerable time has already elapsed and, to serve the
ends of justice, it is time that the controversy is finally laid to rest
 ñèt Sound practice seeks to accommodate the theory which avoids waste of
time, effort and expense, both to the parties and the government, not to
speak of delay in the disposal of the case

Gutierrez Concurring
 Found SC’s discussion on citizenship troubling because there was yet to be
a COMELEC decision, order, or ruling to justify certiorari.
 Particularly distressing since Labo had done a good job in the beautification
of Baguio City
Labo vs. COMELEC & Ortega (1992) another order directing the election registrar to personally serve the
Bidin summons. Hence, the delay in the resolution of the case can only be
 (1992 this time, same Baguio City Mayor Office) Roberto Ortega filed his COC attributed to Labo and no one else.
for the same office (Mayor of the City of Baguio). Shortly after Labo filed his o When Labo finally filed his answer, he did not profer any evidence
own COC, Ortega filed disqualification proceedings before the COMELEC on to show existing facts and supervening events to justify moving
the ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated therein away from the earlier Labo decision.
that he (Labo) is Natural-Born Citizen of the PH  Up to this point, walang evidence. Instead, Labo relies on Vance vs. Terrazas.
o Summons  answer. Failed to answer. Motion to declare Labo in But this case was already deliberated upon in the earlier Labo case, so
Default… there’s no need to re-examine the same.
 On May 4, the disqualification case was set for reception of evidence. At the  Since no evidence, COMELEC can’t be held for GAOD in cancelling the COC
said hearing, Ortega presented the earlier SC decision declaring Labo to not and declaring that he isn’t a citizen.
be a PH citizen
 May 9 COMELEC issued the assailed resolution – Labo’s COC is DENIED due #2 – OEC 72 is not a “legislatively mandated special repatriation proceeding”
course and ordered cancelled.  First of all this was already repealed by Section 6 of RA 6646 talking about
 May 9 parin, Labo filed a motion to stay implementation until he raised the the effects of a disqualification case  If for any reason a candidate is not
matter before the SC declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
 May 10, COMELEC issued an order stating that the May 9 decision voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
disqualifying him shall become final and executory only after 5 days from Court or the Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
promulgation, as such, Labo may still be voted upon as a candidate on May action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
11, 1992, subject to the final outcome of the case if elevated to the SC intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
 May 13, COMELEC issued an order suspending the proclamation of labo in proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong
the event he wins the elections for mayor of Baguio City  So no doubt na COMELEC has that authority
 May 15
o Labo filed a Petition for Review with the SC #3 – The application for reacquisition of PH Citizenship filed with the OSG pursuant
o Ortega filed an Urgent Motion for the Implementation of the May to PD 725 and LOI 270 has no effect
9 resolution  Denied because of the appeal to the SC.  Because application palang. Despite favorable recommendation by the OSG,
o Ortega then filed a petition for mandamus praying for the the Special Committee on Naturalization had yet acted upon said
implementation of the May 9 resolution (June 1) application.
 Mere application.
Arguments
 Labo argues that he was denied a trial on the merits as well as the lack of MANDAMUS CASE BY ORTEGA
opportunity to be heard in the earlier Labo case. Also, he says he can prove Ortega argues two things
his citizenship.  Since the SC did not issue a TRO against the implementation of the COMELEC
o CID made no categorical finding as to his specific intent in resolution on May 9, it’s already final and executory
renouncing citizenship  Since Labo is disqualified, Ortega, obtaining the 2nd highest number of votes,
o COMELEC erred in not allowing him to present a full-dress should be proclaimed the winner.
presentation of his case (1-day hearing, 2-day notice, no hearing
actually conducted) #1 - SC agrees with the first argument – the resolution is already final and executory
after the lapse of 5 days pursuant to OEC – 78 w/c makes it so unless the SC stays it.
APPEAL OF COMELEC BY LABO Final na by May 14. The fact that Labo was elected by a majority of the electorate is
#1 – DUE PROCESS NOT DENIED no moment.
 Summons was issued as early as late march followed by a letter on April 1.
When Ortega filed a motion to hold Labo in default, the COMELEC issued
#2 – But again, the DQ of Labo does not necessarily entitle Ortega, receipient of the
2nd highest number of votes, proclamation as the Mayor of Baguio City
 The fact remains that the sovereign did not choose him. Labo was
overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief
that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City.
 Repudiated by the electorate. A minor or defeated candidate cannot be
deemed elected to the office.
 Some obiter na different scenario if the electorate knew about the
disqualification bec in that case, the electorate would have waived the
validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their
franchise or throwing away their votes. (??????) and by throwing / waiving
their votes, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of
votes may be deemed elected

VICEMAYOR
As a consequence of petitioners' ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested
office has occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor, in accordance with
Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code, to wit:

Vacancies and Succession


Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor
and Vice-Mayor. — (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or
mayor, the vice-governor or the vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor
or mayor (emphasis supplied)

Annex
Section 72 – Old effects of DQ cases - 2 Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases
and priority. — The Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of
disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall
be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the
disqualification is sought.

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any
reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his
proclamation and assumption to office.
Frivaldo vs. COMELEC & Lee (1996) COMELEC 1st Division  Frivaldo
Panganiban COMELEC en banc  Frivaldo
The ultimate question in this case is who is the rightful governor of the Province of SC issued a TRO (1st Case)
Sorsogon
 Frivaldo – obtained highest number of votes in 3 successive elections but As for the second case, the facts are the same. Frivaldo in this case is assailing the
who was twice declared by the SC to be disqualified as he was an alien, who following resolutions on the ground that they violate the OEC – 78
now claims to have reassumed his Philippine citizenship through  Reso (2nd Div) DQing Frivaldo on the ground of lack of citizenship
repatriation requirement
 Lee – second placer in the Canvass but who claims that the votes cast in  Resos of En Banc
favor of Frivaldo should be considered Void, that those who voted for  OEC 78  "Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate
Frivaldo this time should be considered as having thrown away their votes, of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
and thus it’s him who had secured the most number of valid votes certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground
 Deri – incumbent VG obviously not directed to the position of governor but that any material representation contained therein as required under
who, according to prevailing jurisprudence, should take over the said post Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later
pursuant to jurisprudence na VG if may permanent vacancy ehem previous than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
case. candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and hearing, not later than
Spoiler alert it’s Frivaldo fifteen days before the election."
 Frivaldo filed a COC for the position of Governor of Sorsogon in the 1995 o Basically, COMELEC has no JD because these were rendered later
elections. 3 Days later, Lee filed a petition @ COMELEC praying that Frivaldo than 15 days before the election. Frivaldo claims this is a
be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by jurisdictional defect rendering the resos void.
reason of not yet being a citizen of the PH.
o COMELEC granted the petition and declared Frivaldo disqualified. #1 – On Repatriation
o MORE unacted upon so his candidacy continued (cause I guess  The LGC requires that elective local officials be citizens of the PH. Under
filing a MORE stayed the decision) and his name could still be voted Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress,
for on the day of the elections. naturalization, or repatriation. In a previous case, Frivaldo told the SC that
o COMELEC en banc affirmed the division resolution disqualifying he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that the bill
Frivaldo from running for office. disallowing him to do so “failed to materialize, notwithstanding the
 Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election endorsement of several members of the HOR” due to “maneuvers of
returns. Frivaldo won with a 20k lead. political rivals”
 Lee filed the aforementioned petition o Apart from the direct act of Congress, his attempt at naturalization
 COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution ordering the Provincial Board was rejected by the court because of jurisdictional, substantial and
of Canvassers to reconvene to declare Raul Lee as the winning governatorial procedural defects.
candidate. Lee was proclaime the winner.  Three times already, Frivaldo obtained a landslide amount of votes over Lee
Frivaldo filed a new petition with the COMELEC after the proclamation of the winner (27,000 in 1988; 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995). Twice he was DQ-ed
 Petition for the Annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee duly- but not he comes to us boasting his repatriation under PD 725, with no less
elected governor than the Solicitor general himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in
 Frivaldo argues that on June 30, 1995, 2 in the afternoon, he took his oath the previous cases he lost. Na 2:00PM vs. 8:30 PM PB-COM meeting to
of allegiance as a citizen of the PH after his petition for repatriation under proclaim Lee.
PD 725 filed with the Special Committee on Naturalization had been
granted. First
 As such, when such order was released and received by Frivaldo, there was Lee: PD 725 had been effectively repealed when Pres. Aquino forbade the grant of
no more legal impediment to the proclamation of Frivaldo as governor! citizenship by PD or executive issuances
SC: not at all. Repeals are express or implied. Not express. Implied repeals not favored
unless clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist.
 Just bec. may legislative powers si Cory nun doesn’t make it a legislative Issue #2 – Is Lack of Citizenship a continuing DQ?
enactment. Not every pronouncement of the Chief Executive under the Lee: the May 1 resolution affirmed by the en banc became final and executory 5 days
Transitory provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded later on May 17. Hence there was already a final and executory judgment
as an exercise of her law-making powers under the Transitory Provisions. disqualifying Frivaldo. Lee also cited past SC cases of Frivaldo
 What Cory did was leave it in the hands of the legislature. If she intended to SC disagrees: Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship
repeal the same, she would’ve clearly said so! cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because a person may
subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the
Second modes recognized by law for the purpose.
Lee: Serious Congenital Irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings – approved
in just one day. Sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on Naturalization
intended solely for the interest of the respondent. Issue #3 – Was Lee’s proclamation valid? NO
SC: presumption of regulariry. Just because the proceedings were speedy doesn’t SC: Fact remains na Lee was not the choice of the sovereign will. A second placer is a
mean they were tainted. PD 725 not difficult to comply with nor are they tedious and second placer. Furthermore, the “waiver/throwing-exception” in Labo does not apply
cumbersome especially considering na Frivaldo was a former NBC. in this case because there’s no evidence that the electorate of Sorsogon was fully
 OSG also recommended the naturalization of 10 other ppl soooo. aware in fact and in law that Frivaldo was ineligible.

Third Davide’s Dissent, refutatio


Lee: The repatriation was valid only 2:00 PM of June 30 but the qualification must  COMELEC allowing him to register abetted a mockery of the two previous
exist on the date of his election, if not when the COC is filed. judgments declaring him a non-citizen. “We do not see such abetting or
SC: LGC-39 does not state with particularity the time and date on which the candidate mockery” because again, his repatriation is retroactive and cures the legal
must possess citizenship unlike for residency na 1 year before day of election and age defects of his registration as a voter.
na 23 years on election day.  The retroactivity dilutes the holding in the previous Frivaldo cases – the first
SC: an official only begins to discharge his functions upon proclamation and on the and second cases did not involve repatriation.
day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his  Frivaldo’s American citizenship was publicly known hence dapat si lee
citizenship the very day the term of office began, he was qualified to be proclaimed! panalo. SC disagees, no empirical evidence for such public knowledge. Even
 Liberal interpretation to give spirit, life, and meaning if there was, such knowledge can be post facto only for the last two elections
 Again, purpose of citizenship is to make sure that no person owing allegiance o Tayo nga di sure sa citizenship niya during the 3rd election eh
to another nation shall govern our people.  Possess qualifications at election day (not just commencement of the
term/proclamation) because “elective” and not “elected” – legislature
What about his registration as a voter, which came before his re-assumption of cit? would have said so if it applied to candidates and not just those elected
SC: we look at the purpose of the requirement – if the law intended the citizenship already
qualification to be possessed prior to election with the requirement of being a
registered voter, then the law wouldn’t have made citizenship a separate
requirement for public office.
 Also purpose ng voter requirement  make sure na he’s from that AREA or
TERRITORY, not to make sure he’s Pinoy!

To remove all doubts, we hold na the repatriation of Frivaldo RETRO ACTED to the
date he filed his application all the way back in 1994! While the General Rule is that
laws are not retroactive, in this case, PD 725 is curative and remedial in nature
 New right; new remedy – Filipinas who lost citizenship by marriage and who
cannot avail of existing repatriation laws til the husband dies.
Mercado vs. Manzano Issue #1 – Right to Bring Suit – meron
Mendoza In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention
 Mercado and Manzano were candidates for the Vice Mayorality of the City on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioners
of Makati in the 1998 elections. The other candidate was Daza. purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified from running for [an]
o Manzano won with 103k votes. Mercado at a close 2nd with 100k elective local position under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally
votes, and Daza with 54k votes. instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was
 The proclamation of Manzano was suspended in light of a pending Petition competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate
for DQ filed by Mamaril who alleged that Manzano was not a citizen of the for vice mayor of Makati City
Philippines but of the US.
 COMELEC – D granted the petition for DQ of Mamaril and ordered the Issue #2 – is Dual Citizenship a ground for DQ?
cancellation of the COC of the respondent on the ground that he is a dual  DQ is being sought under LGC-40 (d) “those with dual citizenship”
citizen and, under 40(d) of the LGC, persons with dual citizenship are  Dual Citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former is a result of
disqualified from running for any elective position. concurring application of different laws of two or more states (sanguinis and
o COMELEC says that Manzano admits to being registered as a soli). In the Philippines, Dual Citizenship is possible when
foreighner with the Bureau of Immigration but alleged that he is a o Fil parents born in a jus soli country
Filipino Citizen with both parents being Filipino. Manzano says he o Born in PH, of Fil mother and alien dad if by the laws of the alien’s
was born in the US and was thus considered an American Citizen country the anak is a citizen there
under US law. o Those who marry aliens if by the law of the alien’s country the
o COMELEC says that under the LGC, dual citizens are disqualified, former are considered citizens.
hence, Manzano’s COC was denied!  Dual Allegiance, on the other hand, is a situation where a person
 Manzano filed a MORE which remained unresolved even after the elections simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states.
were held. While DC is involuntary, DA is the result of an individual’s volition.
 The Board of Canvassers tabulated the votes cast for Vice Mayor of Makati o Supported by the use of allegiance in the Consti and as Blas Ople
City, but suspended the proclamation of the winner. explains it - a dual allegiance - is larger and more threatening than
 The MORE still being unresolved, Petitioner Mercado filed a Motion to that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and,
Intervene but it was denied. The COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of
– reversing the division decision, thus, Manzano is qualified to run for Vice mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not
Mayor of the City of Makati in the 1998 elections. question double citizenship at all.
o Born in the US and was brought by his parents into the PH  o DA can siphon national capital to nearby countries – some of the
registered with the Bureau of Immigration and with an American great commercial places in Taipei are Filipino owned. Capital
passport outflow!
o But this doesn’t change the fact that he was a citizen of the PH o DA became a larger problem when RP decided to re-establish
when he was born, and that the acts of his parents did not diplomatic relations with the PRC after which many Chinese-
renounce his PH citizenship Filipinos would go to Taipei and, perhaps merely as a festivity,
o In fact it’s undisputed that upon reaching the age of majority he renew their oath to a foreign government
registered himself as a voter and voted in the 1992, 1995, and 1998  Clearly therefore, in including IV-5’s citizenship requirement, the concern of
elections. This effectively renounces his US citizenship. Under PH the Con Comm was not with DCs per se but with naturalized citizens who
law, this means di na siya US Citizen. maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after
 Pursuant to the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of naturalization as Pinoys. DC AS USED IN THE LGC MUST BE UNDERSTOOD
Canvassers proclaimed Edu Manzano as the Vice-Mayor of the City of AS REFERRING TO DA!
Makati. o DC – for DCs, it should suffice if upon filing their COC, they elect
 Certiorari to SC by Mercado Philippine Citizenship to terminate their status as persons with DC
since their DC status is an unavoidable consequence of Conflict of
Laws
o When a DC elects Philippine Citizenship, they swear allegiance to
the PH and terminate allegiance to the foreign country, thus
terminating their DC status.
 Note na it doesn’t matter if the foreign country doesn’t
consider them as having lost citizenship when they
renounced their allegiance to them.
 As per the LGC discussion between Sens. Pimentel and
Enrile, we are taking all this from a PH law viewpoint –
 When a DC renounces all allegiance and fidelity to a foreign state, it’s similar
to that in the naturalization process - The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative
of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative
department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its
operation and application.
o i.e. may pake lang tayo sa law natin

Issue #3 – W/N Edu renounced his US citizenship? YES


 Not by voting in the Philippine election because the US statute which states
na nationality is lost this way was declared unconsti, but by filing a COC –
when he did so, he effectively elected PH citizenship and renounced his
American Citizenship.
o I’m a Filipino Natural Born Cit.
o Registered Voter of Brgy. San Lorenzo
o Not a Permanent Resident / Immigrant to a foreign country
o I’m eligible… support and defend the consti… maintain true faith
and allegiance thereto…

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen;


that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will
defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as
a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his
education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
Coquilla vs. COMELEC Issue #2 – W/N Coquilla had been a resident for at leasy 1 year before the elections
Mendoza were held on May 14, 2001 as he represented in his COC. He had not.
 Coquilla was born of Filipino Parents in Eastern Samar. He grew up in Samar  39(a) of the LGC requires that an elective local official be a resident for at
til 1965 (27 y.o.) when he joined the US Navy, and was subsequently least 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election. The SC says that
naturalized as a US Citizen. He visited the PH only thrice and after his this should be interpretd not as a dwelling or habitation but rather a
retirement he stayed at the US. domicile or legal residence (permanent home, no matter where he may be
 In 1998 Coquilla went back to the PH and took out a residence certificate found, wherein he intends to return and remain)
although made several trips to the US, the last of which took place on July  In the case at bar, Coquilla lost his residence-at-birth by becoming aa US
6, 2000 and lasted until August 5, 2000 (1 month) Citizen. From then on, when he reacquired Philippine Citizenship in 2000, he
o Goods Repatriated - Subsequently, Coquilla applied for had been alien without a right to reside in the PH save as our immigration
repatriation under RA 8171, through the special committee on laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien.
naturalization. His application was approved on November 7, 2000, o Proof: US law requires residence therein to be naturalized. Hence,
and on November 10 he took his oath as a citizen of the PH since he was naturalized, we can conclude that he changed
 Right after his repatriation, Coquilla applied for registration as a voter in residences.
Samar. This application was approved by the Election Registrar Board.  Coquilla was only able to re-establish his Philippine residence in November
 After registering as a voter, Coquilla filed his COC stating therein that he had of 2000, less than a year prior to the election and proclamation. The status
been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for at least 2 years. of an alien and of a non-resident can be waived separately
Incumbent mayor alvarez running for a re-election sought the cancellation of o NR – obtaining an immigrant VISA
Coquilla’s COC, on the ground that Coquilla had made material misrepresentations in o Alienness – naturalization, repatriation, act of Congress
his COC because he only actually resided there for around 6 months since November o In this case, in 1998, Coquilla entered the Philippines through RA
10, which was when he took the oath as a citizen. 6768 which was the Balikbayan program, allowing former Filipino
 COMELEC left it undecided. Coquilla received the highest number of votes citizens who have been naturalized elsewhere to visit the country
(379 lamang lang). visa-free for a period of 1 year. Hence he only became a resident
 The M-BOC proclaimed Coquilla as Mayor of Oras talaga when he already re-acquired his citizenship in November
However, a month later, COMELEC-D granted Alvarez’s petition. COMELEC ordered 2000.
the cancellation of Petitioner’s candidacy on the basis of:  That he was a Registered voter is not conclusive. Nuval vs. Guray –
 Frequent/regular trips to the US cannot be considered as a waiver of his registration as a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent case
status as a permanent resident or immigrant to the US as would qualify him questioning a candidate’s lack of residency
to be within the residency requirement under LGC-39(a)  DP not denied. Formal hearing not a requisite sa COMELEC
 The 1 year requirement requires 1 year of actual residence where he seeks
to be elected. Disqualification – SC says that the COMELEC was justified in ordering the cancellation
of his COC for making a false representation of a material fact in the COC.
Issue #1 – W/N out of time? No.  OEC 78 - Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
 Rule 19 Section 2 of the COMELEC rules of proc provide for a 5-day period A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
to file a MORE. If it’s not pro-forma, suspended. candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
 In this case hindi naman pro-forma.the 16 page motion suffers from none of material representation contained therein as required under Section 74
the defects of a pro-forma MoRe hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-
o 2nd More five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall
o Doesn’t specify findings and conclusions contrary to law or not be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before
supported by the evidence the election.
o Failed to substantiate the alleged errors
Limbona vs COMEELC & Alingan Hence when Norlainie filed her COC, it produced legal effects and the withdrawal of
Nachura the same did not render nugatory the legal proceedings it had set in motion. Besides,
 Petitioner Norlainie Limbona and her husband Mohammad Limbona each her filing a second COC in substitution of her husband puts her qualifications in issue.
filed a COC for Mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. Mark Bobby Alingan filed
a disqualification case against the husband Mohammad before the That she was allowed to run as a substitute candidate does not mean na COMELEC
Provincial Election Supervisor (ProvES). Mark Bobby Alingan also filed a DQ can no longer decide on her qualifications to run. The bases for giving due course to
case against Norlainie Limbona. a certificate of candidacy are totally different from those of enunciating that the
o Both the DQ cases were premised on the lack of the 1-year candidate is not disqualified.
residency requirement and that neither of them were registered  Also, Under the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (RA 6646) the COMELEC is
voters of Pantar. authorized to try and decide petitions for DQ even after elections. “If for any
 Petitioner filed an Affidavit of withdrawal of her COC. After its approval, reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to
petitioner moved to have the case for her DQ dismissed. be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
 Come election day, there was no final list of candidates yet and so COMELEC in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and
resolved to move the election day. A special election was scheduled on July hearing of the action, inquiry or protest”
23 (from May 14)
 COMELEC issued a resolution disqualifying Mohammad. At any rate, Norlainie did not meet the 1 year residence requirement. Residence as
o Norlainie then filed her COC this time as substitute for her husband used in the election law is synonymous with domicile which includes not only the
o Alingan then filed a DQ case against Norlainie on the same ground intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled
– lack of the 1 year residence required under the law. with conduct indicative of such intention.
 Norlainie, being allowed by the COMELEC to substitute her husband, won
the election, took her oath, and assumed office. For purposes of election law, residence is mainly one of intention. As such, we follow
 However, the COMELEC – 2D ruled that Norlainie was disqualified because the rules on residence
Norlainie became a resident only on November 2006 (mid-2007 palang),  Person must have a residence
plus the fact na she wasn’t a registered voter in the municipality and the  Remains established til a new one is established
nullity of her COC for having been filed at a place other than the Office of  One domicile at a time
the Election Officer
o Domcile of Origin – Maguing, Lanao Del Norte where she was born In order to acquire a domicile by choice (Animus manendi + animus non-revertendi)
o By reason of marriage, Norlainie became a resident of Brgy.  Residence or bodily presence in a new locality
Rapasun, Marawi City, where Mohammad was a Brgy. Chairman  Intention to remain therein
 COMELEC cited the family code in concluding that  Intention to abandon the old one.
Norlainie resided in Marawi City.
 COMELEC en banc denied Norlainie’s Motion for Reconsideration Norlainie’s claim that she had been physically present in Pantar for almost 20 months
 Norlainie filed this instant case is self-serving and unsubstantiated because walang independent and competent
evidence to corroborate her statement.
SC – We dismiss the petition
Furthermore, we presume that Husband and Wife live together. Since it had been
The withdrawal of a COC does not necessarily render such Certificate Void Ab Initio. concluded that Norlainie’s husband only changed residences in November 2006, we
Once filed, its legal effects remain even after the certificate is subsequently assume na the same is the case for Norlainie since H&W live together in one legal
withdrawn. OEC 73 - The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not residence as per FC 68, 69.
affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have
incurred. DQ to run for failure to comply with the residency requirement BUT doesn’t entitle
Malik’s proclamation who came in 2nd during the special election – Vice Mayor shall
become the mayor in case of permanent vacancy (including failure to qualify!)
Caasi vs. CA  The act must be independent of and done prior to the filing of COC
Grino-Aquino otherwise, he is disqualified!
 Consolidated cases for the DQ of pr Merito Miguel for the position of  No proof of waiver  DQ
Municipal Mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan to which he was elected in January
18, 1988. The case was based on the fact that he was a Green Card Holder The law has laid down the clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective
thus a permanent resident of the US public office those citizens who possess dual loyalties and allegiances and it has
 Merito admits to being a green card holder but denied permanent residency reserved the privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with the PH without
in the US. He says that he obtained the green card for convenience in order mental reservations or purposes of evasion.
that he may freely enter the US for his periodic medical exams and to visit  The assumption being, those residing elsewhere are incapable of such entire
his kids there. devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland.
o Voted in all past elections including ratification of the 1987  Even if what Miguel says is true, that he never had the intention to stay in
Constitution the US permanently, the court will not allow it to become a party to this
 COMELEC dismissed the petitions on the ground that the possession of a duplicity, giving him the “best of both worlds”
Green Card does not sufficiently establish abandonment of Philippine
residence. COMELEC gave weight to the fact that he still votes therein Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and
o One commissioner (Badoy Jr) dissented – his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is
a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The
OEC – 68, Disqualifications - Any person who is a permanent resident of or an waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it.
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws.

The Green Card


 The application for the green card in the handwriting of Merito Miguel
stated that he is applying for a “PERMANENT” Length of stay.
 The Green Card, on its face, contains the words “RESIDENT ALIEN” and that
“the person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and
work in the US”

SC: Miguel’s immigration to the US constituted an Abandonment of his domicile and


residence in the PH – he didn’t go to the US merely to visit his kids or his doctor there.
He went there with the intention of staying permanently also shown by the fact that
he applied for an immigrant’s and not a visitor or tourists Visa
 an Immigrant refers to a person who removes into a country for permanent
residence.

And so the issue now is


#2 – W/N Merito Miguel had already waived his status as a permanent resident of
the US to do away with the disqualification provided under the law? NO. NO PROOF
 Mere act of filing a COC is not the waiver because otherwise, the
requirement wouldn’t be in the law na bec. necessarily to run syempre may
COC
Rodriguez vs. COMELEC  RODY ISN’T A FUGITIVE  When he arrived in the PH, there was yet any filed
Francisco felony complaints in the Los Angeles Court. It was only 5 months later na
 Petitioner Rodriguez and PR Marquez were candidates for the Governor of nagka-felony complaint and arrest warrant na.
Quezon Province in the 1992 elections. Petitioner Rodriguez won the  COMELEC decision which 180-d the previous one should be adopted.
election and was proclaimed the duly-elected governor. o Marquez: should’ve known na because of the nature of such
 Marquez filed a QW proceeding before the COMELEC. Marquez revealed crimes, investigations were already under way
that Rodrigue left the US where a charge is pending against Rodriguez for o SC/COMELEC: investigations are almost always shrouded in
fraudulent insurance claims, grant theft, and attempted grand theft. mystery. i.e., we can’t presume na Rody knows.
Marquez argues that Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice and should  Evidence shows na bumalik siya to rally against Marcos
therefore be disqualified under LGC-40(e) which was why after Marcos’s ouster, Rody maintained
o COMELEC dismissed the QW petition and denied the MORe posts in public service.
 The case reached the SC which remanded it back to the COMELEC, but not o Furthermore, that Rody had already left the US before a case was
before making the pronouncement that the ‘Fugitive from Justice” refers filed against him was hardly his fault. Rody had every right to depart
not only to those who flee after conviction but also those who flee after a therefrom and return to the PH.
charge is made against them. o Also no obligation to retun now that a ase is filed. The fact na he
 The Marquez-Rodriguez rivalry was renewed for the same Governship post didn’t return now that may case na doesn’t make him a fugitive of
in Quezon come the 1995 elections naman. Marquez file a petition for DQ the law. As a public officer he had every reason to devote his tie to
based on the same ground – fugitive from justice. the service of his office.
o COMELEC rendered the same decision – that Rodriguez was a
fugitive from justice. Marquez: re-define the Marquez doctrine. It should include all instances na the
o Basis was a Warrant of Arrest issued by the LA Municipal Court fugitive fleed the country regardless of kelan niya nalaman na may pending charge.
against Rodriguez, allowed to be presented ex-parte after SC: Nope. Law of the Case Doctrine (opinion delivered on a former appeal)
Rodriguez walked out of the hearing of the case.
 Rodriguez again emerged as the one who garnered the highest number of
votes for the Governor position  Urgent motion to suspend Rod’s
proclamation  granted
o P-BOC nonetheless proclaimed Rodriguez as the winning
candidate.
 Marquez sought to nullify the proclamation and to hold the PBOC in
contempt. COMELEC granted both.
 SC ordered the COMELEC to receive and evaluate evidence re:
o This time, COMELEC made a 180-degree turnaround holding na Rod
is NOT a fugitive as defined in the Marquez Decision because there
was no intent to evade, Rod having arrived in the PH long before
the criminal charge was instituted in the Los Angeles Court

Issue #1 – W/N Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice? NO


 According to the Marquez Decision, a Fugitive from Justice is one who flees
either after conviction to avoid punishment or after being charged to avoid
prosecution. Hence, there must be an intent to evade which can only be the
case when, upon the act of fleeing, the person is already aware of an
instituted indictment or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
Dela Torre vs. COMELEC o 4 - intent to gain for himself or for another
Francisco
 Dela Torre filed the instant petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of Same rule even if unknown but ought to have known had he been a person of
2 COMELEC resolutions in a case for his disqualification in the 1995 elections reasonable prudence and intelligence. Verily, circumstances normally exist to
(Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna) forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that the object of the sale may
 The disqualification case against him was grouned on 40(a) of the LGC have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. Such circumstances include
pertaining to the disqualification of those sentenced by final judgment for the time and place of the sale, both of which may not be in accord with the usual
an offense involving moral turpitude, punishable by one year or more, practices of commerce. The nature and condition of the goods sold, and the fact that
within 2 years after serving sentence the seller is not regularly engaged in the business of selling goods may likewise
o The COMELEC found that Dela Torre was gound guilty of the Anti- suggest the illegality of their source, and therefore should caution the buyer. This
Fencing Law. Conviction became final on January 18, 1991. The justifies the presumption found in Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 that mere possession of
COMELEC stated in its decision that the nature of the offense under any goods, x x x, object or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or
PD 1612 certainly involved moral turpitude. thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing- a presumption that is, according to
 The second resolution was the motion for reconsideration wherein Dela the Court, reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the
Torre argued that since probation was granted, the execution of his established fact of x x x possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
judgment of conviction, and all other legal consequences following
therefrom, rendered LGC-40 inapplicable.
All told, the COMELEC did not err in disqualifying the petitioner on the ground that
Issue #1 – W/N the crime involved moral turpitude? YES the offense of fencing of which he had been previously convicted by final judgment
 MT – baseness, vileness, depravity in the private duties which a person owes was one involving moral turpitude.
his fellows or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between men and women, or contrary to justice, Re: probation
honesty, modesty, or good morals. Probation only suspends the execution of the sentence. Conviction still stands and
 What crimes involve MT, is for the courts to decide. Still, the SC finds still disqualifies Dela Torre from the Mayorship position
guidelines in the rule that Mala in se crimes involve MT while Mala Prohibita
crimes do not.
o MT implies immorality in itself, regardless of being punished or not.
Hence, Mala Prohibita crimes do not involve MT.
o But the SC admitted in a previous case na this isn’t as clear cut a
rule as we think it to be – crimes can be mala in se yet do not involve
moral turpitude
o Conclusion: Ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends
on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.
 MT is deductible from the third requisite of Fencing
o 1 – robbery or theft has been committed
o 2 – the accused who is not a principal nor accomplice in the R/T
buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, or sells the
item or object
o 3 – accused knows or should’ve known na product of R/T (MT is
seen here because same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s
rightful property as in the case of robbery or theft) court then went
on to cite the Human Relations Provisions of the Civil Code as well
as Solutio Indebiti
Magno vs. COMELEC rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more
Corona than eighteen (18) months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
 Private Respondent Carlo Montes filed for the disqualification of Magno as disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary
mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, during the 2001 elections on the ground pardon, or granted amnesty.
that Magno had been convicted by the Sandiganbayan of 4 counts of
DIRECT BRIBERY and as such was sentenced to 3 months and 11 days of AM The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed
as minimum to 1 year and 8 months of PC as maximum for each upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had
o COMELEC granted the petition for DQ on the basis of OEC – 12 been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of
(ANNEX) sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
 On appeal to the SC, Magno claimed that Direct Bribery did not involve
moral turpitude. Moreover, instead of OEC – 12, LGC – 40 dapat which
speaks of a 2-year after sentence service rule
o He claims that he finished serving his sentence in 1998, and the 2
year period lapsed in 2000. Hence, since 2001 elections na, G na!
 Meanwhile, Sonia Lorenzo was proclaimed by the COMELEC as the Mayor of
San Isidro, Nueva Ecija.

#1 – W/N direct bribery involves moral turpitude? YES


 MT (Black’s Law Dictionary) is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or
depravity in the private duties which a person owes his fellows or society in
general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,
or good morals
 Applied for probation  admission. So we look at w/n elements show na
may MT
o Offender is a public officer
o Offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present
by himself or through another
o Such is with a view of committing some crime, or in consideration
of some act which isn’t a crime but is unjust, or to refrain from
doing something the officer is duty-bound to do
o Connected with the performance of his official duties.
 Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element – it shows a
malicious intent to renege on his duties to his fellowmen.

NB: Follow 2-year prescriptive period. The LGC of 1991, being a later act (OEC was
1985), should be followed. The legis is presumed to know effects of passing LGC 1991.
 Apart from being later in time, the LGC is also the more special law because
it applies only to local government positions and not any public office.

Annex
OEC – 12 Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
Lingating vs. COMELEC  As opposed to the Reyes case where the admin case was brought and
Mendoza became final during the original term during which the misconduct
 Petition to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc reversing the happened.
COMELEC-D. The en banc dismissed the petition for the DQ of Sulong as
candidate of Mayor of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur, in the May 14, 2001 But the Reyes case cannot be applied to this case because the Sangguniang
elections Panlalawigan decision is not yet final. After the MORE by Sulong was filed, Lingating
o The petition filed by Lingating was grounded on DQ LGC-40(b) had yet to comment nor has the SP resolved the MORE.
talking about removal from office as a result of an administrative
case. It appears that Sulong had previously won as mayor of Hence, there is no decision finding Sulong guilty to speak of. Neither can the
Lapuyan in 1988, in 1992, and again in 1995 he was elected. succession of the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, and the highest
o Lingating alleges that in 1991, during his first term as mayor of ranking municipal councilor of Lapuyan, Romeo Tan, to the offices of mayor and vice-
Lapuyan, Sulong was charged with various offenses and the mayor, respectively, be considered proof that the decision in AC No. 12-91 had
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur found him become final because it appears to have been made pursuant to 68 of the Local
guilty of the offenses charged and ordered his removal from Government Code, which makes decisions in administrative cases immediately
office. Consequently, yung Vice Mayor ang tumapos. executory.
 Sulong denies the finality of the admin case. He says that
he filed a MORE for the same and Lingating was asked to
comment which he failed to do so, thus, pending pa rin!
 Election was conducted and Sulong won by some 1200 votes over Lingating.
The Municipal BOC proclaimed Sulong as Mayor of Lapuyan, ZDS.
 COMELEC-D declared Sulong disqualified, seeing as the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan resolution had attained finality
o MORE based on a certificate from the provincial secretary that the
decision in the admin case had not yet become final and executory
o Lingating opposed the MORE – Governor had already ordered
enforcement of his removal, Sulong even filed a usurpation of
office case vs. the vice-mayor!
 COMELEC-EB reversed the division, holding that Sulong was qualified. “said
provision no longer applies if the candidate whose qualification is
questioned got re-elected to another term. In Aguinaldo vs. Santos, 212
SCRA 768, the Supreme Court ruled that re-election renders an
administrative case moot and academic.” AGUINALDO DOCTRINE
o Tantamount to a condonation of the SP decision finding him guilty

Lingating contends that Aguinaldo vs. Santos doesn’t apply. What instead applies is
the Sc ruling in Reyes vs. COMELEC wherein it was held that an elective local executive
official, removed before the expiration of his term, is DQ from being a candidate for
a local elective position under LGC-40(b)
 In the reyes case, the rationale of Aguinaldo was explained to be that
removal does not extend beyond the term during which the alleged
misconduct was committed. Hence, a public official not removed before his
term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter re-
elected for another term.
Flores vs. Drilon (Exec Sec) President as head of the economic and planning agency; the Vice-President, who may
Bellosillo be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be
 Mayor Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed as Chairman and Chief designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
Executive officer (CEO) of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). RA
7227, the Bases Conversion and Development Act is being challenged in this Gordon: SBMA posts are merely ex-officio for the position of Mayor of Olongapo City
case. SC: wrong premise. Congress did not make the SBMA post an ex-officio post or one
o RA 7227 states that the president shall appoint a professional automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of
manager as admin of the Subic Authority. Provided, that for the 1st appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed” unquestionably shows the intent to
year of its operations from the effectivity of this act, the mayor of make the subject positions appointive.
Olongapo City shall be appointed as the chairman and chief  Senate Deliberations show na Senators were aware na baka ma-strike down
executive officer of the Subic Authority through IX-B-7 but they left the matter to the courts.
 Petitioner taxpayers and employees of the US Facility in Zambales argue that  Senate deliberations ignored the suggestion of Senator Saguisag to change
this section (13-d) violate the Constitutional Provision IX-B-7 that “no it so that the Mayor shall be the chairman in order to foreclose the IX-B-7
elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any issue.
capacity to any public office or position during his tenure”
o They also cited VII-16 which states that the president shall appoint Issue #2 – W/N it encroaches upon the president’s power to appoint?
from those allowed by law eh the OEC disallows it raw as an  Appointment refers to the designation of a person by the person or persons
election offense (???) having authority therefor, to discharge the duties of some office or trust, or
 Issue: W/N the last part of Section 13(d) of RA 7227 violates IX-B-7 the selection or designation of a person to fill in an office or function.
 Concerning that appointment comes with the selection, it necessarily
IX-B-7 discussion comes with discretion.
 This prohibition expresses the policy against the concerntration of power in  Hence, when congress gives the power to appoint, it cannot, at the same
one person, so that the delivery of public services remain efficient, public time, limit the choice of the president to only one candidate.
office being a full-time job. o It’s a manifest abuse of congressional authority to prescribe
qualifications where only one person can qualify.
Issue #1 – W/N RA 7227 violates IX-B-7? YES
 The law directs the president to appoint an elective official to another How 2 fix – resign from elective position. The ineligibility extends only for the tenure
governmental post. That Mayor Gordon’s expertise be proper for the of the official and not his term, such that resignation terminates the disqualification
position is of no moment.
 It’s argued na the LGC allows the appointment of local elective officials to Effect – when Gordon was appointed, he did not automatically forfeit his elective
another post if allowed by law but pointless argument since Consti > statute position nor remove his ineligibility imposed by the Consti. Since an incumbent
elective official is not eligible to the appointive position, his appointment cannot be
In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if valid in view of his disqualification
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-cut  As opposed to the rule for Congressmen under VI-13. The difference
difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. between the two provisions is significant in the sense that incumbent
national legislators lose their elective posts only after they have been
IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple appointed to another government office, while other incumbent elective
offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of officials must first resign their posts before they can be appointed, thus
his position, running the risk of losing the elective post as well as not being appointed to
the other post. It is therefore clear that ineligibility is not directly related
The first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to with forfeiture of office
the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to the government
post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g., the
NB: his acts weren’t invalidated. He was deemed a de facto officer – one whose acts,
though not those of a lawful officer, upon principles of policy and justice, will hold
valid so far as they involve the interest of public and third persons.

Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:

No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to


any public office or position during his tenure.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no


appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Garvida vs. Sales II. the EN BANC also committed another error when it didn’t comply with the formal
Puno requirements of pleadings under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
 The Sangguniang Kabataan elections were scheduled to be held on May 6,  Only 2 out of the required 10 copies of the petition were filed
1996 nationwide. Petitioner Lynette Garvida applied for registration as a  The EN BANC ruling was based on a FACSIMILE faxed by Sales, and not by
voter of the KATIPUNAN ng KABATAAN of Brgy. San Lorenzo, Ilocos Norte. registered mail as required by the ROP
o The BET denied her application because she was 21 years and 10 o Faxes are not sanctioned by the COMELEC ROP much less by the
months old. The BET said she exceeded the age limit Rules of Court. These are not considered genuine and authentic
 Garvida filed a Petition for Inclusion before the MCTC. The court found her pleadings.
qualified and ordered her registration as a member and voter in the KK. o At best, it’s an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original.
 The BET appealed to the RTC – Bangui. The RTC inhibited himself as he had Without the original, there’s no way of determining on its face
a close relationship with Garvida. whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was
 Garvida then filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Chairman, originally signed by the party and his counsel
SK of Brgy San Lorenzo.
o An Election Officer RIOS, as per advice of the Provincial Election MAIN
Supervisor, disapproved the COC due to her age. III. Age
 Unknown to the Election Officials, Rival Sales filed with the COMELEC En  The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created via a Presidential Decree
Banc a petition for the denial / cancellation of Garvida’s COC for falsely (PD 684) in 1975 as the Kabataang Barangay, a barangay youth organization
representing her age in her COC. composed of all residents of the barangay who were at least 15 years old
o On the same day RIOS sent Garvida a memorandum telling her to but less than 18 ears of age.
show reason why it shouldn’t be denied, the COMELEC en banc o Medium to express views and opinions and participate in issues
issued an order directing the BET and the BOC to suspend the o Youth Chairman + 6 Youth Leaders
proclamation of petitioner in the event she won in the election.  The LGC of 1991 changed the Kabataang Barangay into the Katipunan ng
 Garvida won 78-76. the Board of Tellers did not proclaim her as winner Kabataan. It, however, retained the age limit of the members laid down in
because that’s what the COMELEC en banc ruled. Hence, Garvida filed this the old Local Government Code
instant petition for certiorari on May 27, 1996 o 15- “not more than 21”
o However, after filing the petition, Garvida was proclaimed by the o Chairman + 7 members. The chairman is an ex officio member of
BET as the winner “without prejudice to further action by the the Baranggay Sanggunian
COMELEC” o Holds office for 3 years unless sooner removed for cause
o Garvida would go on to be elected as the Auditor of the Pambayang  Membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject to qualifications under
Pederasyon ng mga SK LGC-424, while candidacy under 428. Both of these have an age
qualifification na “15 but not more than 21 years of age”
I. LGC-532 gives COMELEC supervision over the conduct of the SK elections, governed o But may distinction – For elective Sk officials, 428 states sets the
by the OEC. COMELEC rules of Procedure, in connection with the OEC, provide that it maximum age at 21 years on the day of his election
is the COMELEC-DIVISIOn, and not EN BANC which has jurisdiction over a petition to o The member may be more than 21 years of age on election day or
cancel a certificate of candidacy on the day he registers as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan.
 Only motions to reconsider decisions, resolutions, orders or rulings of the The elective official, however, must not be more than 21 years old
COMELEC in Division are resolved by the COMELEC en banc on the day of election. The distinction is understandable
 Cases before a Division may only be entertained by the COMELEC en banc considering that the Code itself provides more qualifications for an
when the required number of votes to reach a decision, resolution, order elective SK official than for a member of the Katipunan ng
or ruling is not obtained in the Division. Kabataan.
 Hence, NO JD since it didn’t refer to a division instead  The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21
years of age on the day of the election is very clear. The LGC talks of YEARS,
NOT MONTHS NOR DAYS
o Ige remember how dad talks about years na after you reach your
21st birthday, you’re already starting your 22nd year
 i.e. Not more than 21 cycles. For this law you stop being
21 after the 21st cycle ends. Hence, the day after your 21st
birthday, di ka na puwede!
o Note how the original law was “at least 15 but less than 18 years
of age”
 Hence it contemplates a situation where above 17 years
na with a fraction, as long as less than 18 years
 As opposed to not more than 21 wherein a fraction above
21 already disqualifies.
 This conclusion is supported by the explanation of Senator Pimentel that the
Katipunan ng Kabataan was created, replacing the Kabataang Barangay
because most, if not all Kabataang Baranggay members were beyond 21
years of age

Applying this to the instant case, Garvida was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16,
1996, the day she registered as voter for the May 6, 1996 elections, Garvida was
already 21 years and 9 months old. On the day of the election, Garvida was 21 years
and 11 months, and 5 days old. On the day she took office, she was merely 10 days
away from turning 22.
 While she was qualified to be a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan
(remember na walang “on the day of election”), she was definitely over the
limit for elective SK officials.

Extra: Garvida’s ineligibility does not automatically give Sales the right to be declared
the winner.
 435 only applies when the elected member refuses, fails to qualify, is
convicted, resigns, dies, or is incapacitated.
o Age: eligibility / capability of being chosen. Inelegibility or the lack
of eligibility does not fall under 435

Extra: to avoid Hiatus, Court ordered that the vacancy be filled in by the SK member
chosen by the incumbent SK members of the barangay San Lorenzo
Risos-Vidal vs. COMELEC  Pet also cites LGC-40 and OEC-12, that Plunder is both punishable by a year
Leonardo-De Castro and involves moral turpitude.
o OEC-12 exception doesn’t apply raw pag conditional pardon lang.
In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for  RPC 36 – Pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public
the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua office, or the right of suffrage.
and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and  RPC 41 – Reclusion P/T includes perpetual absolute disqualification w/c the
perpetual absolute disqualification. offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to the principal penalty

On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended
executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada, explicitly stating HELD
that he is restored to his civil and political rights. Held:
 Note that the whereas clauses included Estrada publicly committing to no
longer seek any elective position or office. Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and
political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the
In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former
the 3 disqualification cases against him prospered. The COMELEC stated that the President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise
pardon granted to him restored his right to vote and be voted for in public office. unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable,
However, he only placed second in the results. objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the
same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate
of Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by
Manila. former President Estrada does not actually specify which political right is restored, it
could be inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise
Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was the
conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s text.
with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code I. The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.
(OEC), regarding DQ on the basis of committing crimes involving moral turpitude
The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-
The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant
Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
While appeal to the SC was pending, Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes, intervened and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and
praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of
all the Members of the Congress.
Arguments
 Petitioner argues that the pardon granted was conditional as evidence by xxxx
the fact that Estrada had to accept the third whereas clause referring to
non-seeking of public office.
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek
election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the public elective office have been restored.
favorable recommendation of the Commission.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as
which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an
(2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the
violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form
recommendation coming from the COMELEC. part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative
language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral
Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to
to delimit the pardoning power of the President. make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment
of the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
II. The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where
that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand
included in the pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.
civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to
the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s
41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the promise never to seek a public office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make
expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule
that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon
III. The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in extended to former President Estrada.
relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute
pardon granted to him ANNEX

While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded OEC – 12 Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by
in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final
– a plenary pardon or amnesty. judgmentfor subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has
been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
In other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any public office,
pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. (Emphases supplied.)
turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national
position. Um Leonen Dissent I guess
The Dissent of Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen agreed with Risos-Vidal that there was
IV. The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon no express remission and/or restoration of the rights of suffrage and/or to hold public
conditional. office in the pardon granted to former President Estrada, as required by Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e.,
"[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any Justice Leonen posits in his Dissent that the aforementioned codal provisions must
elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate be followed by the President, as they do not abridge or diminish the President's
power to extend clemency. He opines that they do not reduce the coverage of the
President's pardoning power. Particularly, he states:
Articles 36 and 41 refer only to requirements of convention or form. They only
provide a procedural prescription. They are not concerned with areas where or the
instances when the President may grant pardon; they are only concerned with how
he or she is to exercise such power so that no other governmental instrumentality
needs to intervene to give it full effect.

All that Articles 36 and 41 do is prescribe that, if the President wishes to include in
the pardon the restoration of the rights of suffrage and to hold public office, or the
remission of the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification, he or she
should do so expressly. Articles 36 and 41 only ask that the President state his or her
intentions clearly, directly, firmly, precisely, and unmistakably. To belabor the point,
the President retains the power to make such restoration or remission, subject to a
prescription on the manner by which he or she is to state it.

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