[G.R. No. 111107.
January 10, 1997] while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan,
LEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge
(OIC), Regional Executive Director (RED), Region
2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as
Community Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court
at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES
BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE
GUZMAN, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
Without violating the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, may an action for replevin prosper to
recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an
administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A
of P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code
of the Philippines?
Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives
empowered to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in
transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?
These are two fundamental questions presented before
us for our resolution.
The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19,
1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman
was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva
Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required
documents for the forest products found concealed in the
truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan,
issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck
and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to
submit an explanation why the truck should not be
forfeited. Private respondents, however, failed to submit the
required explanation. On June 22, 1989,[1] Regional Executive
Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner
Layugans action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of
the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705
as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents
filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the
June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director Baggayan, which
was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12, 1989.
[2] Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the
Secretary of DENR pursuant to private respondents statement
in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for
reconsideration would be denied then this letter should be
considered as an appeal to the Secretary.[3] Pending resolution
however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil
Case 4031, was filed by the private respondents against
petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan[4] with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan,[5] which issued a
writ ordering the return of the truck to private respondents.
[6] Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan filed a
motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that
private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied the
motion to dismiss in an order dated December 28, 1989.
[7] Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise
denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioners with
the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial
courts order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal
question.[8] Hence, this present petition,[9] with prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction,
seeking to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals was filed by the petitioners on September 9, 1993.By
virtue of the Resolution dated September 27, 1993,[10] the
prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order of
petitioners was granted by this Court.
Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally
entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under
administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of
P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. Private respondents, on
the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this
principle asserting that the instant case falls within the
exception of the doctrine upon the justification that (1) due
process was violated because they were not given the chance
to be heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on
the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his
representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and
(b) that the truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the
commission of the crime.
Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and
relevant jurisprudence on the matter, we are of the opinion that
the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order.
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held
that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before
courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation
of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action.
[11] Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the
case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action.
[12] This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was
not without its practical and legal reasons, for one thing,
availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses
and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no
less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of comity
and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system
of administrative redress has been completed and complied
with so as to give the administrative agency concerned every
opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the
case. However, we are not amiss to reiterate that the principle
of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery
of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one
and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and
uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a
case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of
due process,[13] (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question,[14] (3) when the administrative action is patently
illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,[15] (4) when
there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency
concerned,[16] (5) when there is irreparable injury,[17] (6) when
the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as
an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed
approval of the latter,[18] (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable,[19] (8) when it
would amount to a nullification of a claim,[20] (9) when the
subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
[21] (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.[22]
In the case at bar, there is no question that the
controversy was pending before the Secretary of DENR when
it was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners
of the motion for reconsideration of private respondents
through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989,[23] private respondents
clearly recognize the presence of an administrative forum to
which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of
their case. The letter, reads, thus:
xxx
If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable
action, then this letter should be considered as an appeal to
the Secretary.[24]
It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents
looked up to the Secretary for the review and disposition of
their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the
existence of an adequate and plain remedy still available and
open to them in the ordinary course of the law. Thus, they
cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, seek courts intervention by filing an
action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the
pendency of an administrative proceedings.
Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement
of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection,
development and management of forest lands fall within the
primary and special responsibilities of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. By the very nature of its
function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed
by judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well
within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the trial court,
therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents
constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the
administrative agencys prerogative. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.[25] In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy
Executive Secretary,[26] which was reiterated in the recent case
of Concerned Officials of MWSS vs. Vasquez,[27] this Court
held:
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and
multifarious problems caused by unbriddled exploitation of
these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of
cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere
in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and training of
such agencies.
To sustain the claim of private respondents would in
effect bring the instant controversy beyond the pale of the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall
within the ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated. However,
considering the circumstances prevailing in this case, we can
not but rule out these assertions of private respondents to be
without merit. First, they argued that there was violation of due
process because they did not receive the May 23, 1989 order
of confiscation of petitioner Layugan. This contention has no
leg to stand on. Due process does not necessarily mean or
require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be
heard.[28] One may be heard , not solely by verbal presentation
but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and
practicable than oral argument, through pleadings.[29] In
administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict
judicial sense.[30] Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be
heard on his motion for reconsideration,[31] as in the instant
case, when private respondents were undisputedly given the
opportunity to present their side when they filed a letter of
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however,
denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director
Baggayan. In Navarro III vs. Damasco,[32] we ruled that :
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be
heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal
or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances
essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute
lack of notice or hearing.
Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality
of seizure and forfeiture of the truck because the administrative
officers of the DENR allegedly have no power to perform these
acts under the law. They insisted that only the court is
authorized to confiscate and forfeit conveyances used in
transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the
second paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by
E.O. 277. The pertinent provision reads as follows:
SECTION 68. xxx
xxx
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the
government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered,
collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the
area where the timber or forest products are found. (Underline
ours)
A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go
along with private respondents thinking not only because the
aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor include
conveyances that can be the subject of confiscation by the
courts, but to a large extent, due to the fact that private
respondents interpretation of the subject provision unduly
restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces
the other provision of Section 68-A , which is quoted herein
below:
SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or
His Duly Authorized Representative To Order Confiscation. In
all cases of violation of this Code or other forest laws, rules
and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative, may order the confiscation of any forest
products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or
abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or
air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the
same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and
policies on the matter. (Underline ours)
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the
Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given
the authority to confiscate and forfeit anyconveyances utilized
in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations.
The phrase to dispose of the same is broad enough to
cover the act of forfeitingconveyances in favor of the
government. The only limitation is that it should be made in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the
matter. In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a
way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute.
[33] Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be
achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they
should be given such construction as will advance the object,
suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.[34] In
this wise, the observation of the Solicitor General is significant,
thus:
But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws more
responsive to present situations and realities and in view of the
urgency to conserve the remaining resources of the country,
that the government opted to add Section 68-A. This
amendatory provision is an administrative remedy totally
separate and distinct from criminal proceedings. More than
anything else, it is intended to supplant the inadequacies that
characterize enforcement of forestry laws through criminal
actions. The preamble of EO 277-the law that added Section
68-A to PD 705-is most revealing:
WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining
forest resources of the country for the benefit and welfare of
the present and future generations of Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved
and protected through the vigilant enforcement and
implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers
from technical difficulties, due to certain inadequacies in the
penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines; and
WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to
penalize certain acts more responsive to present situations and
realities;
It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision
authorizing the DENR to confiscate, not only conveyances, but
forest products as well. On the other hand, confiscation of
forest products by the court in a criminal action has long been
provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the
power on confiscation cannot be exercised except only through
the court under Section 68, then Section 68-A would have no
purpose at all. Simply put, Section 68-A would not have
provided any solution to the problem perceived in EO
277, supra.[35]
Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure
was illegal because the petitioners themselves admitted in the
Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan that
the truck of private respondents was not used in the
commission of the crime. This order, a copy of which was given
to and received by the counsel of private respondents, reads in
part , viz. :
xxx while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by
her in the commission of the crime, we uphold your claim that
the truck owner is not liable for the crime and in no case could
a criminal case be filed against her as provided under Article
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. xxx[36]
We observed that private respondents misread the
content of the aforestated order and obviously misinterpreted
the intention of petitioners. What is contemplated by the
petitioners when they stated that the truck "was not used in the
commission of the crime" is that it was not used in the
commission of the crime of theft, hence, in no case can a
criminal action be filed against the owner thereof for violation of
Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners did
not eliminate the possibility that the truck was being used in the
commission of another crime, that is, the breach of Section 68
of P.D.705 as amended by E.O. 277. In the same order of July
12, 1989, petitioners pointed out:
xxx However, under Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended and
further amended by Executive Order No.277 specifically
provides for the confiscation of the conveyance used in the
transport of forest products not covered by the required legal
documents. She may not have been involved in the cutting and
gathering of the product in question but the fact that she
accepted the goods for a fee or fare the same is therefor liable.
xxx[37]
Private respondents, however, contended that there is no
crime defined and punishable under Section 68 other than
qualified theft, so that, when petitioners admitted in the July 12,
1989 order that private respondents could not be charged for
theft as provided for under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code, then necessarily private respondents could not
have committed an act constituting a crime under Section
68. We disagree. For clarity, the provision of Section 68 of P.D.
705 before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of
Section 1 of E.O. No.277 amending the aforementioned
Section 68 are reproduced herein, thus:
SECTION 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or
other products without license. - Any person who shall cut ,
gather , collect , or remove timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public
lands, or from private lands, without any authority under a
license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall beguilty of
qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx. (Underscoring ours;
Section 68, P.D.705 before its amendment by E.O.277 )
SECTION 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.705, as
amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other
forest products without license. -Any person who shall cut,
gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any
forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land,
or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or
other forest products without the legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished
with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code xxx." (Underscoring ours; Section 1, E.O
No. 277 amending Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended)
With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277
amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of cutting, gathering,
collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without
authority constitutes a distinct offense independent now from
the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised
Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for
under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This
is clear from the language of Executive Order No. 277 when it
eliminated the phrase shall be guilty of qualified theft as
defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code and inserted the words shall be punished
with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code . When the statute is clear and explicit,
there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or
rationalization of the law.[38]
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for
replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners for the
subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative
forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D.
705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of
cause of action in view of the private respondents failure to
exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper
course of action by the lower court instead of assuming
jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ
ordering the return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in
the administrative forum, being a condition precedent prior to
ones recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an
element of private respondents right of action, is too significant
to be waylaid by the lower court.
It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is
founded solely on the claim that the defendant wrongfully
withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover
possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully detained.
[39] To detain is defined as to mean to hold or keep in custody,
[40] and it has been held that there is tortuous taking whenever
there is an unlawful meddling with the property, or an exercise
or claim of dominion over it, without any pretense of authority
or right; this, without manual seizing of the property is
sufficient.[41] Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in
replevin proceedings, that the plaintiff must show by his own
affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of property, that
the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging
the cause of detention, that the same has not been taken for
tax assessment, or seized under execution, or attachment, or if
so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual
value of the property.[42]Private respondents miserably failed to
convince this Court that a wrongful detention of the subject
truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the
truck was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting
forest products with out the required permit of the DENR in
manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended
by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended,
unquestionably warrants the confiscation as well as the
disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized
representatives of the conveyances used in violating the
provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued possession
or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative
forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence , no wrongful
detention exists in the case at bar.

Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a

procedural tool to question the orders of confiscation and
forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority
given under P.D.705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is
explicit that actions taken by the Director of the Bureau of
Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the
provisions of the said law are subject to review by the
Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the
decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action
for certiorari or prohibition. It reads :

SECTION 8 . REVIEW - All actions and decisions of the

Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon appeal of
any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose
decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty
(30) days from the receipt of the aggrieved party of said
decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance with G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989
Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The Decision of the
Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except
RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL
through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.
CASTILLO, ROLANDO BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIGAR, JUN
GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN "NINOY"
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision
ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO and ROLANDO
of the respondent Court of Appeals dated October 16, 1991
FADUL, petitioners, 

and its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE
vs.

AND REVERSED; the Restraining Order promulgated on
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondent.
September 27, 1993 is hereby made permanent; and the
Secretary of DENR is directed to resolve the controversy with
utmost dispatch. Ricardo C. Valmonte for and in his own behalf and his co-
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.
CORTES, J.:
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with
preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray
that respondent be directed:
(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban
who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the
February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the
then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or
(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the
documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or
(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the
subject information. (Petition, pp. 4-5; paragraphing supplied.]
The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote
respondent Belmonte the following letter:
June 4, 1986
Hon. Feliciano Belmonte

GSIS General Manager
 To the aforesaid letter, the Deputy General Counsel of the
Arroceros, Manila
Sir:
As a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our
Republic, I am requesting that I be furnished with the list of
names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang
Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million
each on guarranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We understand
that OIC Mel Lopez of Manila was one of those aforesaid MPs.
Likewise, may we be furnished with the certified true copies of
the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection
herewith shall be borne by us.
If we could not secure the above documents could we have
access to them?
We are premising the above request on the following provision
of the Freedom Constitution of the present regime.
The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions
or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such
limitation as may be provided by law. (Art. IV, Sec. 6).
We trust that within five (5) days from receipt hereof we will
receive your favorable response on the matter.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) RICARDO C. VALMONTE
[Rollo, p. 7.]
GSIS replied:
June 17, 1986
Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte

108 E. Benin Street

Caloocan City
Dear Compañero:
Possibly because he must have thought that it contained
serious legal implications, President & General Manager
Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred to me for study and reply your
letter to him of June 4, 1986 requesting a list of the opposition
members of Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a
clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda
Marcos.
My opinion in this regard is that a confidential relationship
exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it,
whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its
customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not
be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so
ordered by the courts.
As a violation of this confidentiality may mar the image of the
GSIS as a reputable financial institution, I regret very much
that at this time we cannot respond positively to your request.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) MEYNARDO A. TIRO

Deputy General Counsel
 To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised a
[Rollo, p. 40.]
On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply
of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS)
Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote
respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a
reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever
action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired
objective in pursuance of public interest." [Rollo, p. 8.]
On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners,
filed the instant suit.
On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item
reporting that 137 former members of the defunct interim and
regular Batasang Pambansa, including ten (10) opposition
members, were granted housing loans by the GSIS [Rollo, p.
41.]
Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and
the Solicitor General. After petitioners filed a consolidated
reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were
required to file their memoranda. The parties having complied,
the case was deemed submitted for decision.
In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the
issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which is that
petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager
are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS.
Petitioners, however, did not seek relief from the GSIS Board
of Trustees. It is therefore asserted that since administrative
remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no cause
of action.
purely legal issue, viz., whether or not they are entitled to the
documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to
information. Hence, it is argued that this case falls under one of
the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before
a party can be allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to
have exhausted all means of administrative redress available
under the law. The courts for reasons of law, comity and
convenience will not entertain a case unless the available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and the
appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and
correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.
However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is
when only a question of law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial
Board, 106 Phil. 466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R.
No. L-30396, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 210; Malabanan v.
Ramento, G.R. No. L-2270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.]
The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the
interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to
information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular
courts more competently than the GSIS or its Board of
Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the
exception of this case from the application of the general rule
on exhaustion of administrative remedies is warranted. Having
disposed of this procedural issue, We now address ourselves
to the issue of whether or not mandamus hes to compel
respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners to be
done, in pursuance of their right to information.
We shall deal first with the second and third alternative acts
sought to be done, both of which involve the issue of whether
or not petitioners are entitled to access to the documents
evidencing loans granted by the GSIS.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a
controversy directly involving the constitutional right to
information. In Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. 63915, April
24,1985, 136 SCRA 27 and in the recent case of Legaspi v.
Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987,150
SCRA 530, the Court upheld the people's constitutional right to
be informed of matters of public interest and ordered the
government agencies concerned to act as prayed for by the
petitioners.
The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111,
Sec. 7 which states:
The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The right of access to information was also recognized in the
1973 Constitution, Art. IV Sec. 6 of which provided:
The right of the people to information on 'matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions,
or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in
political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them,
and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues
thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned
under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican
system of government is delegation of power by the people to
the State. In this system, governmental agencies and
institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred
by the people. Denied access to information on the inner
workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the
whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been
delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust,
institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect
the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly
be were empty words if access to such information of public
concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by
implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.
Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both
the right to gather and the obligation to check the accuracy of
information the disseminate. For them, the freedom of the
press and of speech is not only critical, but vital to the exercise
of their professions. The right of access to information ensures
that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the
government's monopolizing pertinent information. For an
essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a
continuing dialogue or process of communication between the
government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that
the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the
end that the government may perceive and be responsive to
the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only
to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to
formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the
discussion are aware of the issues and have access to
information relating thereto can such bear fruit.
The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful
right to speech and expression. But this is not to say that the
right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore
restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of
speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information
goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public
disclosure * and honesty in the public service. ** It is meant to
enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental
decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government.
Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to
information is not absolute. As stated in Legaspi, the people's
right to information is limited to "matters of public concern," and
is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to
"transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law."
Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the
information sought is of "public interest" or "public concern,"
and is not exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee [Legazpi v. Civil Service Commission,
supra, at p. 542.]
The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms
"public interest" and "public concern". As observed in Legazpi:
In determining whether or not a particular information is of
public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied.
"Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes
exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of
subjects which the public may want to know, either because
these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters
naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citezen. In the final
analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case
basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance,
as it relates to or affects the public. [Ibid. at p. 541]
In the Tañada case the public concern deemed covered by the
constitutional right to information was the need for adequate
notice to the public of the various laws which are to regulate
the actions and conduct of citezens. In Legaspi, it was the
"legitimate concern of citezensof ensure that government
positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by
persons who are eligibles" [Supra at p. 539.]
The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of
reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa
belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans
from the GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986
election through the intercession of th eformer First Lady, Mrs.
Imelda Marcos.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government
and its employees and the administrator of various insurance
programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds
assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46
of P.D. 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual appropriations to
pay the contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts
payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as
the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes
or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the
GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost
prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or
rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that prompted
the revision of the old GSIS law (C.A. No. 186, as amended)
was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial
solvency of the funds administered by the System" [Second
Whereas Clause, P.D. No. 1146.] Consequently, as respondent
himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean
loans.'" [Comment, p. 8.] It is therefore the legitimate concern
of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly
with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to
the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed
borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa
who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were
therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS
performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that
an its transactions were above board.
In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and
the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the
information sought clearly a matter of public interest and
concern.
A second requisite must be met before the right to information
may be enforced through mandamus proceedings, viz., that
the information sought must not be among those excluded by
law.
Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists
between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy
of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of
information.
Yet, respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS
the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents
subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely
on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy
issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not
what the law should be. Under our system of government,
policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of
the government, and of the people themselves as the
repository of all State power.
Respondent however contends that in view of the right to
privacy which is equally protected by the Constitution and by
existing laws, the documents evidencing loan transactions of
the GSIS must be deemed outside the ambit of the right to
information.
There can be no doubt that right to privacy is constitutionally
protected. In the landmark case of Morfe v. Mutuc [130 Phil.
415 (1968), 22 SCRA 424], this Court, speaking through then
Mr. Justice Fernando, stated:
... The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof.
Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited
government has always included the idea that governmental
powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of
the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between
absolute and limited government. UItimate and pervasive
control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark
of the absolute. state, In contrast, a system of limited
government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the
individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which
the state can control. Protection of this private sector —
protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the
individual — has become increasingly important as modem
society has developed. All the forces of technological age —
industrialization, urbanization, and organization — operate to
narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In
modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this
enclave of private life marks the difference between a
democratic and a totalitarian society." [at pp. 444-445.]
When the information requested from the government intrudes
into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict between the
rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the
competing interests of these rights need not be resolved in this
case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the Court
in Morfe is that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in
his private capacity, and not to public and governmental
agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked
by juridical entities like the GSIS. As held in the case of Vassar
College v. Loose Wills Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982 (1912)], a
corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the entire
basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and
sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such
ground for relief.
Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the
respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The
right is purely personal in nature [Cf. Atkinson v. John Doherty
& Co., 121 Mich 372, 80 N.W. 285, 46 L.RA. 219 (1899);
Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22, 31 L.R.A. 286
(1895)), and hence may be invoked only by the person whose
privacy is claimed to be violated.
It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the
concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they
choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public
offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to
have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the
interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures,
most especially those holding responsible positions in
government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared
to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer
public scrutiny [Cf.Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, G.R.
Nos. 82380 and 82398, April 29, 1988; See also Cohen v.
Marx, 211 P. 2d 321 (1949).]
Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the
loan transactions of the GSIS are private in nature and hence,
are not covered by the Constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern which guarantees "(a)ccess
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions" only.
It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government
corporation performing proprietary functions, are outside the
coverage of the people's right of access to official records.
It is further contended that since the loan function of the GSIS
is merely incidental to its insurance function, then its loan
transactions are not covered by the constitutional policy of full
public disclosure and the right to information which is
applicable only to "official" transactions.
First of all, the "constituent — ministrant" dichotomy
characterizing government function has long been repudiated.
In ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and Government
Corporations and Offices (G.R. Nos. L-21484 and L-23605,
November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 6441, the Court said that the
government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or
running some business, discharges the same function of
service to the people.
Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was
exercising a proprietary function would not justify the exclusion
of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to
information.
Moreover, the intent of the members of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, to include government-owned and
controlled corporations and transactions entered into by them
within the coverage of the State policy of fun public disclosure
is manifest from the records of the proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).
Commissioner Suarez is recognized.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. May I ask the Gentleman a few
question?
MR. OPLE. Very gladly.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
When we declare a "policy of full public disclosure of all its
transactions" — referring to the transactions of the State —
and when we say the "State" which I suppose would include all
of the various agencies, departments, ministries and
instrumentalities of the government....
MR. OPLE. Yes, and individual public officers, Mr. Presiding
Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. Including government-owned and controlled
corporations.
MR. OPLE. That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions" which should
be distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or
whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the
consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract
itself?
MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here I suppose is generic
and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract,
and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations
leading to the consummation of the transaction.
MR. OPLE. Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the
national interest.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. [V Record of the Constitutional
Commission 24-25.] (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which,
though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless
persuasive, and considering further that government-owned
and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or
governmental functions are accountable to the people, the
Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS,
a government-controlled corporation created by special
legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be
informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency
in government dealings.
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents
evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable
regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the
manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to
or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference
with the duties of the custodian of the records may be
prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect
the records may be insured [Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80
Phil. 383, 387.] The petition, as to the second and third
alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is
meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act
sought by petitioners, i.e., "to furnish petitioners the list of the
names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans
immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda
Marcos."
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and,
pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the
Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians
of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and
the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of
public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to
issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain
legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative
duty of defendant to perform the act required. The
corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required
act must be clear and specific [Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No.
L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v.
Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.]
The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there
being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list
requested.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and
respondent General Manager of the Government Service
Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to
documents and records evidencing loans granted to Members
of the former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may specify,
subject to reasonable regulations as to the time and manner of
inspection, not incompatible with this decision, as the GSIS
may deem necessary.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-15901 December 30, 1961
ALIPIO GONZALES, petitioner-appellant, 

vs.

HON. SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., City Mayor of Cebu, THE
MUNICIPAL BOARD, The CITY TREASURER and The CITY
AUDITOR, all of the City of Cebu, respondents-appellees.
Hermosisima and Tormis for petitioner-appellant.

The City Fiscal and Quirico del Mar for respondents-appellees.
PADILLA, J.:
On 21 May 1957 Alipio Gonzales filed a petition in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu praying for a writ to declare null and
void the abolition by the respondent municipal board of his
position as deputy detective inspector in the Cebu City Police
Department and the termination by the respondent city mayor
of his services as such; to order the respondent city mayor to
reinstate him to his position as deputy detective inspector; the
respondent municipal board to appropriate the corresponding
amount for the payment of back salaries to the petitioner from
1 January 1957 until his reinstatement; the respondent city
auditor to pass in audit the voucher for the payment of the
petitioner's back salaries and the city treasurer pay him his
back salaries; the respondent city mayor to pay him (the
petitioner) P10,000 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages and P5,000 as attorney's fees; and for
other just and equitable relief. In support of his prayer, the
petitioner alleged that he is a civil service eligible, having
passed the examination for patrolman with a rating of 83.5%,
and held the position of deputy detective inspector in the Cebu
City Police Department with compensation at the rate of P1440
per annum; that on or about 28 December 1956 he was served
with a letter signed by the respondent city mayor informing him
that pursuant to the provisions of Ordinance No. 220,
abolishing the position he holds, his services were "terminated
effective at the close of office hours on December 31, 1956;"
that as of the last mentioned date he has served in various
capacities in the Cebu City Police Department for a period of
19 years, 9 months and 2 days; that the respondent city auditor
and the respondent city treasurer have refused to pass in audit
the voucher for the payment of the petitioner's salary and to
pay his salary from 1 January 1957; that on 3 April 1957 he
sought in writing his reinstatement with back salaries but the
respondents refused to accede to his demands despite the fact
that he was willing and anxious to return to his position and
physically fit to discharge the duties thereof; that by the
abolition of his position without the approval of the department
head and the termination of his services as deputy detective
inspector he has been unlawfully excluded from the use and
enjoyment of an office to which he is lawfully entitled; that the
respondents, with grave abuse of discretion, manifest injustice
and in violation of law, have unlawfully neglected the
performance of an act specifically enjoined as a duty resulting
from their respective offices; that the respondents have
discriminated against the petitioner because others with
efficiency ratings lower than his have been retained in the
service; and that because of the respondents' unlawful acts the
petitioner has suffered mental anguish and untold worries for
which the former are liable to pay to the latter moral and
exemplary damages (civil No. 5085).
On 18 June 1957 the respondents filed an answer to the
petitioner's complaint stating that while it is true that the
petitioner was served with notice terminating his service as
deputy detective inspector in the Cebu City Police Department
due to the abolition of his position, yet he was simultaneously
extended another appointment to a position in the uniformed
division of the same Department, with the same rank and a
higher salary, but the petitioner refused to accept the position;
that the petitioner could not be reinstated to his former position
with back salaries because it had been abolished by the
respondent municipal board in the lawful exercise of its
legislative power; and that the abolition of the said position
need not be approved by the department head because the
Chief Executive only has general supervision over local
governments; and setting up the following affirmative defenses;
that the abolition of positions in the detective division and
creation of positions in the uniform division of the Cebu City
Police Department, upon recommendation of the chief of
police, was resorted to meet the public demand for more
uniformed police officers and to make more systematic and
efficient the reorganization and function of the detective
division; that the city government of Cebu has the power to
create and abolish positions in its various departments; that the
abolition of positions and creation of new ones in the city
budget do not need the approval of the department head; that
the abolition of positions and creation of new ones were done
in good faith and without any personal or political regard to the
persons occupying them; that the respondent city mayor never
intended to separate the petitioner from the service because
simultaneously with the termination of his services as deputy
detective inspector he was extended an appointment in the
uniformed division with the same rank and higher salary but he
refused to accept the appointment; and that there is a defect of
parties; and that the petitioner has other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As
counterclaim the respondents alleged that the petitioner had no
valid cause of action and instituted the suit against them to
harass and prejudice them; and that by reason of such unjust,
malicious and illegal act, the respondents have suffered
compensatory, moral and exemplary damages in the total
amount of P25,000. They prayed that the petition be
dismissed; that the petitioner be ordered to pay to them
compensatory, moral and exemplary damages in the total
amount of P25,000 and double costs of the suit; and that they
be granted other just and equitable relief.
On 27 June 1957 the petitioner filed a reply to the respondents'
answer and answer to their counterclaim, alleging that new
appointment extended to him in the uniformed division is
tantamount to a demotion because there were other deputy
detective inspectors whose efficiency ratings were below his
and were new in the service but were retained in that capacity;
that the appointment extended to him was temporary in nature
because it was subject to the condition that it was "good until
revoked" by the respondent city mayor; that there is no defect
in the parties because the respondent city mayor is sued
personally for the payment of back salaries; that he had sought
relief from the administrative branch of the government but the
latter had failed to act on his respect, thus depriving him of
other remedies in the ordinary course of law except this action
for mandamus; that he has a valid cause of action against the
respondents; that this suit is not merely to harass and
prejudice the respondents, hence they could not have suffered
any damages; and that he is merely seeking redress against
the unlawful acts of the respondents; and praying for the
dismissal of the respondents' counterclaim.
On 9 July 1958 the petitioner filed a "motion to amend petition"
to implead the incumbent city mayor, the chief of police and the
City of Cebu and to substitute the former city auditor by the
incumbent, Sulpicio Paredes, as respondents. Attached to the
motion was the amended petition. On 11 July 1958 the
respondents filed a motion stating that they do not object to the
inclusion of the incumbent city mayor and city auditor, but
object to the inclusion of the City of Cebu and the Chief of
Police as new parties because the period of one year from the
date of dismissal from office on 31 December 1956 to the filing
of the amended petition on 9 July 1958, to include the City of
Cebu and Chief of Police as respondent, already had elapsed,
and prayed for the dismissal of the case for non-joinder of the
City of Cebu as a party respondent in the original petition.
On 12 July 1958 the petitioner filed a "reply to respondents'
opposition" and on 14 July 1958 "additional arguments in
support of motion to amend petition and in support of reply to
opposition."
On 15 July 1958 the Court entered an order denying the
petitioner's motion to admit the amended petition impleading
the City of Cebu and the Chief of Police as respondents, but
allowing the inclusion of the incumbent city mayor and city
auditor as respondents.
At the hearing of the case on 18 February 1959 the parties
agreed to submit a stipulation of facts and the Court postponed
the hearing to 23 February 1959. On the last mentioned date,
the parties submitted the stipulation of facts and the Court
granted the parties three days within which to submit their
respective memoranda simultaneously. On 24 February 1959
the parties submitted an amended stipulation of facts
superseding the original stipulation. The amended stipulation
of facts reads, as follows:.
COME now both parties, by their respective counsel, and to
this Honorable Court respectfully submit the following
REVISED AGREED STIPULATION OF FACTS;
1. That petitioner is of legal age and resident of the City of
Cebu; that respondent Hon. Sergio Osmeña, Jr., is of legal
age, and resident of the City of Cebu; that he is being sued in
his private and/or official capacity as then City Mayor of the
City of Cebu; that respondent Ramon Duterte is now the
incumbent City Mayor by operation of law, succeeding
respondent Sergio Osmeña, Jr., when the latter vacated the
position to run for Congress in 1957;
2. That respondent Municipal Board is the duly constituted and
incumbent municipal board of the City of Cebu and is
composed of the following: Hon. Ramon Abellanosa, Vice-
Mayor and presiding officer, who succeeded respondent
Ramon Duterte when the latter succeeded respondent Sergio
Osmeña, Jr., as City Mayor; Honorables Casimiro V.
Madarang, Joaquin L. Panis, Carlos J. Cuizon, Osmundo J.
Rama, Florencio S. Urot, Ceferina U. del Rosario, Pedro V.
Clavano, Generoso Jaca, and Cecilia de la Victoria, as
members;
3. That respondents City Treasurer Felipe B. Pareja is of legal
age and the incumbent City Treasurer; that respondent City
Auditor Restituto B. Cantos has been replaced already by Atty.
Sulpicio Paredes;
4. That petitioner is a civil service eligible for patrolman with a
rating of 83.5%; that he has served in the police department of
the City of Cebu in various capacities for 19 years, 9 months
and two days until December 31, 1956, when he was served
notice of termination of his services in the police department as
deputy detective inspector, which position he held under a
permanent appointment and with compensation at the rate of
P1,440.00 per annum, which termination order is literally as
follows:
In view of the abolition of your position pursuant to Ordinance
No. 220, as published in two (2) Cebu newspapers of general
circulation in the City, please be advised that your services are
hereby terminated effective at the close of office hours on
December 31, 1956. Very respectfully, (SGD) SERGIO
OSMEÑA, JR., Mayor, City of Cebu.
and that simultaneously he was extended a new appointment
for the position provided for him in the uniformed division of the
same Department as police sergeant, which appointment is
literally as follows:
By virtue of the powers vested in me by Section 21 of
Commonwealth Act No. 58, as amended by Section 6 of
Commonwealth Act No. 129, you are hereby appointed as
Police Sergeant in the office of Police Department, City of
Cebu, with compensation at the rate of ONE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED EIGHTY (P1,680.00) PESOS per annum effective
January 1, 1957, and good until revoked. Very respectfully,
(SGD) SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., Mayor.
Chargeable to: Police
Item No. 6, Dept.
Gen. Fund Budget, 195—5—.
5. That by reason of the aforequoted letter of the respondent
City Mayor, terminating petitioner's services, respondents City
Treasurer and City Auditor refused and failed and still refuse
and fail to pay petitioner's salary since January 1, 1957, as
deputy detective inspector;
6. That petitioner refused to accept the new appointment
tendered to him by respondent City Mayor, which appointment
is quoted above; and that on April 3, 1957, petitioner, through
his counsel, sought in writing a reinstatement to his position as
deputy detective inspector with back salaries, which written
demand is as follows:
In behalf of my client, Mr. ALIPIO GONZALES, I have the
honor to request that he be reinstated to his position as deputy
detective inspector in the Cebu Police Department.
It appears that the termination of his services was without the
previous approval of the President of the Philippines or the
Department Head as required by Executive Order No. 506, s.
1934; Executive Order No. 175, s. 1938; Provincial Circulars
dated January 11, 1952, and April 3, 1954; consequently such
termination is null and void in accordance with the Supreme
Court decision in the case of Pulutan v. Dizon, et al., 52 Off.
Gaz. 3047. It also appears that, as may be seen in the semi-
annual efficiency report as of December 31, 1956, submitted
by the Chief of Police, Mr. Gonzales ranks third in efficiency
among the seven deputy detective inspectors; hence, he has a
better right to the position than those he has outranked.
It is most respectfully reiterated that he be reinstated to his
position, with back salaries since January 1, 1957, within a
period of five (5) days from receipt of this letter, otherwise, my
client will be compelled to file the corresponding action for a
writ of mandamus and to avail of such other remedies and
damages as provided by law.
Thanking you for your kind and immediate attention to this
request, I am Very respectfully, (SGD) ANTONIO ABAD
TORMIS.
but respondents refused and failed and still refuse and fail to
reinstate the petitioner to his position; and that petitioner is
ready, willing and able to return to his position and is physically
fit to discharge the duties appertaining thereto;
7. That the abolition of petitioner's position was made without
the consent of the proper department head;
8. That failing to get favorable action on his demand for
reinstatement, petitioner, through counsel wrote and sent the
following letter to the President of the Philippines on April 30,
1957:
In behalf of my client, Mr. Alipio Gonzales, I have the honor to
request and appeal to your Office to intercede in his behalf in
the name of justice and law. As of December 31, 1956, the
Honorable Mayor of Cebu City, alleging abolition of his position
as deputy detective inspector, terminated his services,
discriminating against him in favor of those whose services are
less efficient and who have been in the government shorter in
period he had been than he had been. Mr. Gonzales has been
in the government for 19 years and devoted the best years of
his life as a humble public servant. Last April 3, 1957, I wrote
His Honor, the Municipal Board, the City Treasurer and the City
Auditor requesting the reinstatement of my client with back
salaries. Except the Municipal Board all these officials ignored
my letter. The Board, however, through its secretary informed
me in writing that my letter was being referred to the municipal
board, but to date no action has been taken, at least, I have
not been informed of any action whatsoever. I am enclosing
herewith a copy of this letter.
In view of the fact that my appeal for reinstatement of my client
had been ignored, I am appealing to Your Excellency. Hoping
Your Excellency will heed my appeal and order the
reinstatement of my client, and thanking Your Excellency for an
early and favorable action, I remain, very respectfully, (SGD)
ANTONIO ABAD TORMIS.
but up to the present the President has taken no action on said
appeal whatsoever;
9. That as per certificate of the respondent City Treasurer
based on the semi-annual efficiency report submitted Chief of
Police, the efficiency ratings of the seven deputy detective
inspectors as of December 31, 1956, are as follows:
Enrique Villaflor
92%
Alipio Gonzales
89%
Terencio Garciano
86%
Manuel Bacud
84%
Teodoro Abesia
88%
Rafael Navaja
82%
Vicente Basak
93%
10. That there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law except this action for a writ
of mandamus;
11. That petitioner was extended a new appointment as
sergeant in the uniformed division of the police department of
Cebu City after his position as deputy detective inspector in the
detective division was abolished by the city budget approved
during the administration of the then City Mayor Jose V.
Rodriguez, this after the city fiscal of Cebu had opined that a
new appointment is necessary to adjust to the said city budget.
WHEREFORE, this Honorable Court is most respectfully
prayed to render judgment in accordance with the foregoing
REVISED AGREED STIPULATION OF FACTS. The parties
hereto have mutually agreed to withdraw, as it is hereby
withdrawn, the first agreed stipulation of facts, dated February
23, 1959.
Respectfully submitted on this 24th day of February, 1959.
After the parties had submitted their respective memoranda, on
27 February 1959 the Court rendered judgment holding that
following the case of Gacho vs. Osmeña, 55 Off. Gaz. 10079,
the petitioner should be reinstated to his former position and
should be allowed "to continue holding the same with all the
rights appurtenant thereto, in accordance with law;" but, relying
on the case of Angara vs. Gorospe, 53 Off. Gaz. 4480, not
entitled to back salaries, because "The City of Cebu should be
made a party respondent, if it is sought to make it pay with its
funds for back salaries of the petitioner," and directing the
respondent city mayor to reinstate him to his former position,
with costs against the respondent city mayor.
On 4 March 1959 the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of that part of the judgment denying his claim
for back salaries from 1 January 1957 until his reinstatement
and prayed that the respondents be ordered to pay him his
back salaries from the date of his dismissal to the date of his
reinstatement or, in the alternative, the respondent Sergio
Osmeña, Jr., be ordered to pay him out of his own funds. On 5
March 1959 the respondents filed an objection to the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration. On 7 March 1959 the
Court denied his motion for reconsideration. On 16 March 1959
the petitioner filed a notice of appeal from that part of the
judgment which denies "his claim for back salaries" and a
"motion for immediate execution of judgment pending appeal"
and a "motion for approval of appeal bond after resolution of
motion for immediate execution of judgment." On 19 March
1959 the respondents filed an "opposition to motion for
immediate execution of judgment." On 21 March 1959 the
Court entered an order granting the petitioner's motion for
execution of the judgment pending appeal "insofar as it orders
the petitioner's reinstatement only." On 31 March 1959 the
Court approved the appealed bond filed by the
petitioner.lawphil.net
The respondents have not appealed.
The recent case of Mangubat vs. Osmeña, Jr., G.R. No.
L-12837, 30 April 1959, upholds the appellant's claim for back
salaries. Said this Court in that case —
In support of the first proposition (that the case must dismissed
for lack of an indispensable party), appellants assert that the
City of Cebu is an indispensable party on account of
petitioners' claim for back salaries, and that in view of the fact
that said City has not been made a respondent in this case, the
same should be dismissed. ....
xxx xxx xxx
The necessity of making the City a respondent herein is based
upon its right to defend itself, as demanded by the
requirements of due process. However, those requirements
have been substantially complied with in the case at bar. The
parties therein have handled the case, and the same was
heard and decided in the lower court, as if the City had been
named respondent in the pleadings. The officer required by law
"to cause to be defended all suits against the City", namely, its
mayor (Sec. 8, Commonwealth Act No. 58), is respondent in
his official capacity. The officer charged with the duty to
represent the City "in all civil cases wherein the city ... is a
party" — to wit, its City Attorney (Sec. 17, Commonwealth Act
No. 58) — is counsel for respondents herein. In addition
thereto, the auditor, the treasurer and even the municipal board
of the City of Cebu, are parties respondents.
There is no reason to believe that these officers and the City
Mayor would have exerted greater efforts, than those already
displayed by them, in protecting the interests of the City of
Cebu, were it formally a respondent herein. Indeed, it is only
logical to expect that, having been individually named as
respondents, said officers must have taken as much concern, if
not more, in warding off petitioner's claim. Under the foregoing
circumstances, we would be subordinating the substance to
the form if the action for mandamus — insofar as the claim for
back salaries is concerned — were, either dismissed, or
remanded to the lower court, for the corresponding
amendment of the pleadings and a repetition of the
proceedings held for the last five (5) years, in order to reach
the same decision rendered by the lower court and the same
conclusions set forth in decision, as regards the substantive
rights of the parties. It is our considered opinion, therefore, that
the ends of justice and equity would be served best if the
inclusion of the City of Cebu, as one of the respondents herein,
were considered a mere formality and deemed effected as if a
formal amendment of the pleadings had been made.
In the case at bar the incumbent City Mayor, the municipal
Board, City Auditor and City Treasurer have been named as
respondents and it will be recalled that the appellant had
sought the inclusion of the City of Cebu as a respondent in
these proceedings. For the same reasons given in Mangubat
vs. Osmeña, Jr., supra, "the ends of justice and equity would
be served best if the inclusion of the City of Cebu, as one of
the respondents herein, were considered a mere formality and
deemed effected, as if a formal amendment of the pleadings
had been made."
The appellees contend that the appellant's refusal to accept
the promotional appointment of police sergeant precludes him
from demanding back salaries. The appointment foisted upon
the appellant was temporary only because it was "good until
revoked," and being a civil service eligible holding a permanent
position, he had all the right to decline it.
The part of the judgment appealed from is reversed and the
respondents directed to pay the appellant back salaries from 1
January 1957 until his reinstatement in the service, without
pronouncement as to costs.
PROSECUTOR LEO C. TABAO, Regional Chairman,
Special Task Force on Environment and Natural
Resources (STF-ENR) of Region 8, Tacloban
City, complainant, vs. JUDGE FRISCO T.
LILAGAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Leyte, Branch 34, and SHERIFF IV LEONARDO V.
 AGUILAR, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional
Trial Court, Tacloban City, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Leo C.
Tabao, Assistant City Prosecutor of Tacloban, in his capacity as
Regional Chairman of the Region 8 Special Task Force on
Environment and Natural Resources, against (1) Judge Frisco
T. Lilagan, presiding judge of the Leyte Regional Trial Court,
Branch 34, for gross ignorance of the law, gross abuse of
judicial authority, and willful disobedience to settled
jurisprudence; and (2) Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar of the
Leyte RTC, Office of the Clerk of Court, for gross irregularity in
the performance of official duties, giving unwarranted benefits
to a private individual, violation of Section 1(b) and (c) of P.D.
No. 1829, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.
The records of this case reveal the following facts.
On February 24, 1998, a water craft registered under the
name M/L Hadija, from Bongao, Tawi-tawi, was docked at the
port area of Tacloban City with a load of around 100 tons of
tanbark. Due to previous irregular and illegal shipments of
tanbark from Bongao, agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation in Region 8 (NBI-EVRO #8) decided to verify the
shipments accompanying documents as the M/L Hadija was
unloading its cargo to its consignee, a certain Robert
Hernandez.
The NBI agents found the documents irregular and
incomplete, and consequently they ordered the unloading of
the cargo stopped. The tanbark, the boat M/L Hadija, and three
cargo trucks were seized and impounded.
On March 5, 1998, NBI-EVRO #8 Regional Director
Carlos S. Caabay filed a criminal complaint for violation of
Section 68 (now Section 78) of P.D. No. 705,[1] the Forestry
Reform Code of the Philippines (as amended), against the
captain and crew of the M/L Hadija, Robert Hernandez,
Tandico Chion, Alejandro K. Bautista, and Marcial A.
Dalimot.Bautista was a forester while Dalimot was a
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer
(CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) office in Tacloban City. Bautista and
Dalimot were, thus, also charged with violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
[2] along with Habi A. Alih and Khonrad V. Mohammad of the
CENRO-Bongao, Tawi-tawi. The complaint was docketed as
I.S. No. 98-296 at the Prosecutors Office of Tacloban City.
In an order dated March 6, 1998,[3] complainant directed
the seizure by the DENR of the M/L Hadija, its cargo, and the
three trucks pending preliminary investigation of the
case.DENR thus took possession of the aforesaid items on
March 10, 1998, with notice to the consignee Robert
Hernandez and the NBI Regional Director.
On March 11, 1998, Hernandez filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Leyte a case for replevin to recover the items seized
by the DENR. The case was raffled off to Branch 34 of said
court and docketed as Civil Case No. 98-03-42.
On March 16, 1998, subpoenas were issued to the
respondents in I.S. No. 98-296. On March 17, 1998,
confiscation proceedings were conducted by the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO)-Leyte,
with both Hernandez and his counsel present.
On March 19, 1998, herein respondent Judge Frisco T.
Lilagan issued a writ of replevin and directed respondent
Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar to take possession of the items
seized by the DENR and to deliver them to Hernandez after
the expiration of five days.[4] Respondent sheriff served a copy
of the writ to the Philippine Coast Guard station in Tacloban
City at around 5:45 p.m. of March 19, 1998.
Thus, the filing of this administrative complaint against
respondents via a letter addressed to the Chief Justice and
dated April 13, 1998, by Atty. Tabao.
Complainant avers that replevin is not available where
the properties sought to be recovered are involved in criminal
proceedings for illegal logging. He points out that this is a well-
settled issue and cites several decisions[5] of this Court and the
Court of Appeals on the matter. He argues that respondent
judge should have known of the existing jurisprudence on this
issue, particularly since they are subject to mandatory judicial
notice per Section 1, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Complainant submits that respondent judge is either
grossly ignorant of the law and jurisprudence or purposely
disregarded them. But he avers that it is respondent judges
duty to keep abreast of developments in law and
jurisprudence.
Complainant claims that respondent judge cannot claim
ignorance of the proceedings in I.S. No. 98-296 for the
following reasons: (1) the defendants in the replevin case were
all DENR officers, which should have alerted respondent judge
to the possibility that the items sought to be recovered were
being held by the defendants in their official capacities; and (2)
the complaint for replevin itself states that the items were
intercepted by the NBI for verification of supporting documents,
which should have made respondent judge suspect that the
same were being held by authority of law.
As regards respondent sheriff Leonardo V. Aguilar,
complainant states that it was incumbent upon Aguilar to
safeguard the M/L Hadija and prevent it from leaving the port of
Tacloban City, after he had served a writ of seizure therefor on
the Philippine Coast Guard. However, on March 19, 1998, the
vessel left the port of Tacloban City, either through respondent
sheriffs gross negligence or his direct connivance with
interested parties, according to complainant. As of the time of
the filing of the complaint, according to complainant, the
whereabouts of the vessel and its crew were unknown.
Moreover, complainant points out that respondent sheriff
released the seized tanbark to Hernandez on March 20 and
21, 1998, or within the five-day period that he was supposed to
keep it under the terms of the writ. Complainant argues that the
tanbark formed part of the peoples evidence in the criminal
complaint against Hernandez and the others. By his act,
respondent sheriff effectively altered, suppressed, concealed,
or destroyed the integrity of said evidence. For this act,
complainant contends that respondent sheriff may be held
liable under Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829, Penalizing Obstruction
of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders.
[6] Respondent sheriffs acts also constitute gross irregularity in
the performance of his duty as a court employee.
Complainant notes that respondent sheriff was absent
from his office from March 20 to March 24, 1998. This period
included the dates he was supposed to have released the
tanbark to Hernandez. Complainant contends that respondent
sheriff not only unlawfully released the tanbark, he also made it
appear that he was not physically present when such act was
done.
In separate indorsements dated September 9, 1998, then
Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo referred this
administrative matter to both respondents for comment.
In his comment dated October 12, 1998,[7] respondent
judge calls the attention of the Office of the Court Administrator
to a pending motion to dismiss filed by the defendants in the
replevin case that effectively prevented him from commenting
on the issue. The discussions that would have to be included in
the comment, he says, would also resolve the pending motion
to dismiss. Respondent judge contends that complainant
should have been prudent enough to wait for the resolution of
the motion to dismiss before filing the instant administrative
case.
Respondent judge claims that he was unaware of the
existence of I.S. No. 98-296. He only learned of the criminal
case from an urgent manifestation dated March 20, 1998, filed
by complainant. He argues that he issued an order dated
March 25, 1998, suspending the transfer to Hernandez of
possession of the subject items, pending resolution of the
urgent manifestation.
Respondent judge stresses that the writ of replevin was
issued in strict compliance with the requirements laid down in
Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court. He also points out that
said writ was issued provisionally and was not intended to be
the final disposition of the replevin case.
Respondent judge avers that the charge of gross
ignorance of the law is premature since he has not made a
ruling yet on the motion to dismiss filed in the replevin case. He
contends that it was too much to ask from him to take note of
the fact that the defendants in said case were officials of DENR
and make assumptions based on such fact. Moreover,
respondent judge submits that while the complaint alleged that
the cargo of tanbark was intercepted by the NBI, it also alleged
that the consignee thereof produced documents to prove that
the shipment was legal.
In conclusion, respondent judge points out that no
apprehension report was issued by the NBI regarding the
shipment. Neither did the DENR issue a seizure
report. Respondent judge contends that the validity of the
seizure of the subject items by the DENR is a matter that will
have to be resolved in relation to the motion to dismiss.
For his part, respondent sheriff submits[8] that he served
the writ of replevin on the Coast Guard precisely to prevent the
departure of the subject vessel, since he does not have the
means to physically prevent said vessel from sailing. The
Coast Guard commander should have examined the vessel
and its crew after being served the writ, to determine whether
or not they were engaged in any illegal activity.
Respondent sheriff narrates that no cargo was on board
the vessel when he served the writ on the Coast Guard. He
verified the cargos status with DENR, which furnished him a
copy of a fax transmission stating that the tanbark came from
legitimate sources except that the shipment documents were
not in order.[9]
Respondent sheriff contends that it was his ministerial
duty to serve the writ of replevin, absent any instruction to the
contrary. He argues further that since the items subject of the
writ are in the custody of the court and could be disposed of
only through court order, there could not be any unwarranted
benefit to a private individual as claimed by complainant.
Noting that the questioned shipment of tanbark was not
covered by either an NBI apprehension report or a DENR
seizure report, respondent sheriff contends that complainant
should have taken steps to protect the integrity of the shipment
instead of heaping blame upon others for his own
negligence. Respondent sheriff avers that it was not his
intention to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of
criminal offenders, contrary to complainants claim.
Respondent sheriff refutes complainants claim that he
was absent from his office from March 20 to March 24, 1998,
and alleges that it was complainant who was absent from court
hearings on several occasions, in violation of his duty as a
prosecutor.
Respondent submitted two supplemental comments
dated October 30, 1998,[10] and May 3, 1999,[11] (1) reiterating
his contention that the tanbark seized by the DENR and
subject of the replevin case had been found to come from a
legitimate source, per an order signed by the Regional Director
(Region 8) of the DENR,[12] and (2) informing the OCA that the
main replevin case was dismissed per an order of respondent
judge dated November 27, 1998.[13]
 As required by resolution of the Court dated January 24,
2001, the parties herein separately manifested that they are
willing to have the present case resolved based on the record
on hand.
We note that in its report dated April 8, 1999, the OCA,
after reviewing the case, recommended that respondent judge
be fined in the amount of P15,000.00 for gross ignorance of
the law. At the same time, the OCA recommended that the
charges against respondent sheriff be dismissed for lack of
merit.
The recommendation of the OCA is well taken, except for
the amount of the fine to be imposed on said respondent
judge.
The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment
of tanbark as well as the vessel on which it was loaded were
seized by the NBI for verification of supporting documents.[14]It
also states that the NBI turned over the seized items to the
DENR for official disposition and appropriate action.[15] A copy
of the document evidencing the turnover to DENR was
attached to the complaint as Annex D.[16] To our mind, these
allegations would have been sufficient to alert respondent
judge that the DENR has custody of the seized items and that
administrative proceedings may have already been
commenced concerning the shipment. Under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases
pending before administrative agencies of special competence.
[17] Note, too, that the plaintiff in the replevin suit who seeks to
recover the shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the
administrative remedies available to him.[18] The prudent thing
for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin
suit outright.
Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the
DENR secretary or his authorized representatives may order
the confiscation of forest products illegally cut, gathered,
removed, or possessed or abandoned, including the
conveyances used in the commission of the offense.
In this regard, we declared in Paat v. Court of Appeals:
the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the
protection, development and management of forest lands fall
within the primary and special responsibilities of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By the
very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free
hand unperturbed by judicial intrusion to determine a
controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption
by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private
respondents constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the
domain of the administrative agencys prerogative. The doctrine
of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto
itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. xxx[19]
Respondent judges act of taking cognizance of the
subject replevin suit clearly demonstrates ignorance of the
law. He has fallen short of the standard set forth in Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, that a judge must
be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and
independence. To measure up to this standard, judges are
expected to keep abreast of all laws and prevailing
jurisprudence.[20] Judges are duty bound to have more than
just a cursory acquaintance with laws and
jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal commands
constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may
be excused, not even a judge.[21]
We find, however, that respondent judge had already
vacated the Writ of Seizure he issued on March 19, 1998, in a
subsequent Order dated November 27, 1998, dismissing the
Civil Complaint for replevin filed by Robert Hernandez against
the Regional Director of the DENR and other officers. He also
directed in said order the sheriff to return to CENRO, Tacloban
City, all the chattels confiscated by virtue of the Writ of Seizure.
[22]

Further, we find that Sheriff Aguilar in his Final Return of

the Writ, dated December 15, 1998, had already delivered to
CENRO the 102 tons and 120 kilos of tanbark duly receipted
by CENRO representative Marcial A. Dalimot on the same
date.[23]

The OCA recommends that respondent judge be fined in

the amount of P15,000.00. Under the circumstances,
considering that this is the first complaint against him, we
deem a fine of P10,000.00 to be sufficient.
Regarding the charges against respondent sheriff, we
agree with the OCA that they should be
dismissed. Respondent sheriff merely complied with his
ministerial duty to serve the writ with reasonable celerity and to
execute it promptly in accordance with its mandates.[24]

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan is

hereby found liable for gross ignorance of the law and is
accordingly ordered to pay a FINE of P10,000.00, with a
WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will
be dealt with more severely. The complaint against respondent
Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.