1
CARMELITA TAN and RODOLFO TAN, petitioners,
vs. CA and FRANCISCO TAN (alias Tan Uh Bak
and Tan Seng Ka), respondents.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The present is a suit aimed at establishing a children-
to-father, illegitimate relationship between petitioners
and the principal respondent Francisco Tan, and to
compel the latter to support petitioners.
The background facts follow:
On July 22, 1955, petitioners, thru their mother
Celestina Daldo as guardian ad litem, sued respondent
Tan in the Court of First Instance of Manila for
acknowledgment and support (Civil Case 26909).
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On March 26, 1956, Celestina Daldo — after petitioners
had already presented oral and documentary evidence
and were about to rest their case — moved to dismiss
the foregoing civil case upon the ground that the
parties had come to an amicable settlement, and
prayed that the same be dismissed with prejudice and
without recourse of appeal.
On the same day, March 26, 1956, Celestina Daldo
subscribed before the clerk of the Court of First
Instance of Manila to an affidavit categorically stating
that respondent Francisco Tan, defendant in Civil Case
26909, "is not the father of my said minor children
named Carmelita and Rodolfo (herein petitioners) but
another person whose name I cannot divulge"; and
that she prepared said affidavit precisely "to record
what is true and to correct what misinterpretation may
arise in the future".
On March 26, 1956, the Court of First Instance of
Manila issued the following order:
As prayed for by plaintiffs in their motion filed today for
the dismissal of their complaint, on the ground that the
parties have already come to an amicable settlement,
with the conformity of counsel for defendant, the Court
hereby orders this case dismissed with prejudice and
without pronouncement as to costs.
On November 25, 1957 — one year and eight months
after Civil Case 26909 was dismissed — petitioners, this
time thru their maternal grandfather Servillano Daldo
as guardian ad litem, commenced the present action
before the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court (Civil
Case 00855) for acknowledgment and support,
involving the same parties, cause of action and subject
matter.
On September 10, 1960, then Judge Juan P. Enriquez
(Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila detailed
to preside over the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court
in the absence of the presiding Judge thereof who was
on leave rendered judgment declaring that "the
present case is res judicata by reason of the dismissal
with prejudice of Civil Case 26909 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila; and that, even on the merits,
plaintiffs [the present petitioners] have not made out
their case with sufficient evidence," and dismissed the
complaint, without costs.
On October 8, 1960, petitioners herein, plaintiffs
below, moved to reconsider.
On January 31, 1961, then Judge Natividad Almeda
Lopez reconsidered the decision of Judge Enriquez of
September 10, 1960, and rendered judgment, viz:
In view of the foregoing considerations, this Court
reconsider its decision of September 10, 1960, and
declares the minors Carmelita and Rodolfo Tan to be
the illegitimate children of the defendant Francisco Tan
alias Tan Uh Bak and Tang Seng Ka; and hereby orders
the defendant to support said minors in the amount of
P200.00 a month, said amount to be paid within the
first five (5) days of each month directly to Carmelita
Tan, for herself and for her younger brother Rodolfo;
and to help them defray their matriculation expenses,
to pay semi-annually, on June and November of such
year, an additional sum of P300; to reimburse
Servillano Daldo his expenses in supporting plaintiff
minors during the pendency of this case in the amount
of P2,000, or at the rate of P50 a month from
November 25, 1957; to pay plaintiff minors' attorney's
fees of P500; and to pay the costs of this proceedings.
Respondent Francisco Tan appealed to the Court of
Appeals.
On February 21, 1964, the Court of Appeals in turn
reversed the last-named judgment of Judge Natividad
Almeda Lopez, and dismissed the complaint with costs
against appellees in both instances.
Petitioners now come to this Court in forma pauperis
on appeal by way of certiorari.
1. Threshold question is the admissibility of Exhibits H
and I, testimony of petitioners' witnesses in the former
case. Petitioners balk at the ruling denying
admissibility.
The controlling statute is Section 37, Rule 123 of the
1940 Rules of Court, now Section 41, Rule 130, viz:
SEC. 41. Testimony at a former trial. — The testimony
of a witness deceased or out of the Philippines, or
unable to testify, given in a former case between the
same parties, relating to the same matter, the adverse
party having had an opportunity to cross-examine him,
may be given in evidence.
Concededly, the witnesses at the former trial were
subpoenaed by the Juvenile & Domestic Relations
Court a number of times. These witnesses did not
appear to testify.
But are their testimonies in the former trial within the
coverage of the rule of admissibility set forth in Section
41, Rule 130? These witnesses are not dead. They are
not outside of the Philippines. Can they be categorized
as witnesses of the class unable to testify?
The Court of Appeals, construing this term, held that

"subsequent failure or refusal to appear thereat
[second trial] or hostility since testifying at the first trial
does not amount to inability to testify, but such inability
proceeding from a grave cause, almost amounting to
death, as when the witness is old and has lost the
power of speech. (Griffith vs. Sauls, 77 Tex 630, 14
S.W. 230, 231; section 37 of Rule 123, Rules of Court)."
Here, the witnesses in question were available. Only,
they refused to testify. No other person that prevented
them from testifying, is cited. Certainly, they do not
come within the legal purview of those unable to
testify.
Besides in the situation here presented, petitioners are
not at all bereft of remedy. They could have urged the
court to have said witnesses arrested, punished for
contempt.1 After all, these remedies are in the statute
books to help litigants in the prosecution of their cases.
Petitioners failed to avail of these remedies, went
ahead and submitted their case.
We note petitioners' argument that to follow strictly the
law of admissibility of testimony in former trials, is to
permit party litigants to buy witnesses to dissuade
them from testifying again. Nothing extant in the
record will as much as intimate that respondent was
responsible for the non-appearance of these witnesses.
The danger of tampering with witnesses is a problem
that attends trials in many a time and in number of
imaginable situations. And, petitioners argument works
both ways. Because, witnesses at the former trial can
be bought not to testify at the second trial, in just the
same way that they could have been bought to give
their original testimony. Solution of this problem lies
elsewhere, not in the non-enforcement of Section 41,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
2. The procedural problem out of the way, we go direct
to the merits.
Petitioners tried to prove that Celestina Daldo and
respondent Francisco Tan lived together as husband
and wife for more than eight years commencing from
1936 to 1944. Petitioners Carmelita Tan and Rodolfo
Tan are allegedly the fruits of such cohabitation.
Respondent stoutly denies this claim, avers that he is
very much a married man with children. Celestina
Daldo, by her own admission, had been a nursemaid
(yaya) in respondent's residence but for l short period
of not less than one year in 1939. Carmelita was born
on May 8, 1942 and Rodolfo, on September 11, 1944.
The validity of the testimony of petitioners' witnesses
in the present case was considerably downgraded by
the affidavit of Celestina Daldo, heretofore adverted to,
attached to the record of the former Case 26909. In
that affidavit, Celestina deposed that petitioners were
not fathered by Francisco Tan, but, in Celestina's own
words, by "another person whose name I cannot
divulge."
Striking is the fact that this affidavit was executed after
2
petitioners in the former case had finished with their
oral and documentary evidence and were about to
submit their case. By then, their counsel had a grasp
of the situation. Petitioners and their guardian ad litem
could have known whether they had reasonably made
out a case against respondent.
Correctly then did the Court of Appeals rule out the
probative value of petitioners' evidence and found for
respondent. On this point the Court of Appeals said:
... we now come to the resolution of the second point;
i.e., whether or not the plaintiffs have sufficiently
proved their case. We have gone over and examined
thoroughly the arguments and evidence of the parties,
and we find that the evidence for the plaintiffs-
appellees fall short of the requirement of clear strong
and convincing evidence. Such evidence is necessary
whether to prove legitimate or illigitimate paternity and
filiation, considering the seriousness of the relationship
and its far-reaching consequences. As aptly expressed
in the case of Serrano v. Aragon, (22 Phil. 10),
"Public policy, indeed public necessity, demands that
before an illegitimate child be admitted into a
legitimate family, every requisite of the law be
completely and fully complied with. No one should ever
be permitted upon doubtful evidence to take from
legitimate children the property which they and their
parents have, by industry, fidelity, and frugality,
acquired. ..."
We agree with the findings of the trial court in its
original correctly appreciating the evidence of the
plaintiffs as unsatisfactory and insufficient, in view of
the following considerations;
(1) That Exhibits H and I, former testimonies of
witnesses in Civil Case No. 26909, are inadmissible. ...
(2) That the baptismal certificates, Exhs. A and C are
not admissible proofs of filiation (Malonda vs. Malonda,
45 O.G. 5468; Pareja vs. Pareja, G.R. L-3824, prom.
May 31, 1954; Capistrano vs. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135;
Adriano vs. De Jesus, 23 Phil. 350; Madridejo vs. Leon,
55 Phil. 1) The birth certificate Exhibit B is likewise
inadmissible against the defendant because it failed to
comply with Section 5 of Act 3753. The alleged
illegitimate father did not sign under oath the said birth
certificate (Roces vs. Local Civil Registrar of Manila, G.R. L-
10598, prom. February 14, 1958; Crisolo vs. Macadaeg, G.R.
L-7017 prom. April 29, 1954).
It should be noted that said baptismal certificates are
also useless to prove the dates of birth of the
appellees-minors, considering that the period of
cohabitation or any intimate relations at all between
their mother and the appellant has been denied and
that same has not been satisfactorily proved.
Stated in another way, the date of birth as appearing

in the birth certificate would be material only if it
coincides with the period of cohabitation as admitted
or sufficiently proved. To reason otherwise would be to
put the cart before the horse, so to speak.
(3) The oral evidence for the plaintiffs, consisting
principally of the testimonies of the grandfather and of
the mother of the minors, are unsatisfactory, being
inconsistent and contradictory on material points, and
unbelievable. The loose character of the mother of the
minors who admittedly had lived and begotten children
with several men of different nationalities, cannot also
be overlooked. Weighed against each other, the
evidence for the plaintiffs do not tip the scales in their
favor as against the defendant-appellant. We are not
convinced, by preponderance of evidence, that
appellant is the father of the minor appellees. ...
Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, formerly
Section 2, Rule 46 of the 1940 Rules, employs the
commanding language that "[o]nly questions of law
may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a
judgment of the Court of Appeals. That judgment,
jurisprudence teaches, is conclusive as to the facts. We
are not to alter said facts — they bind us, or to review
the questions of fact.2
Having reached the conclusion that, on the merits,
petitioners made no case, it is unnecessary for us to
pass upon the other questions raised on appeal.
For the reasons given, we vote to affirm the judgment
of the Court of Appeals under review. No costs in all
instances. So ordered.
DRA. LEILA A. DELA LLANA, petitioner, vs.
REBECCA BIONG, doing business under the
name and style of Pongkay Trading,
respondent.
G.R. No. 182356 | 4 December 2013
Facts:
 30 March 2000: Juan dela Llana (Juan) was driving
a car along North Avenue, QC with his sister, Dra.
Leila dela Llana (Dra. dela Llana) at the front
passenger seat and a certain Calimlim at the
backseat.
 While stopped across Veterans Hospital, a dump
drunk driven by Joel suddenly rammed the car
from the rear, violently pushing it forward.
 The car’s rear collapsed and its rear windshield
shattered. Apart from a few minor wounds caused
by the glass splinters, Dra. dela Llana did not
appear to have suffered other visible physical
injuries.
3
 May 2000: Dra. dela Llana started to feel pain on
the left side of her neck and shoulder, which
eventually became unbearable to the point that
she could no longer move her arm.
 Upon consultation with Dr. Milla, she was
diagnosed as having suffered from a whiplash
injury. Extensive physical therapy proved to be
futile and she had to undergo cervical spine
surgery after consultation with other doctors. As a
result of the surgery, Dra. dela Llana was
incapacitated from the practice of her profession.
 8 May 2001: Dra. dela Llana sued the owner of the
truck, Rebecca Biong (Rebecca), for damages
after the latter refused to compensate her for the
injuries she sustained.
 At trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an
ordinary witness and Joel as a hostile witness. She
testified that she lost the mobility of her arm due
to the vehicular accident. She identified and
authenticated a medical certificate issued by Dr.
Milla which stated that she suffered from a
whiplash injury. In defense, Rebecca testified that
Dra. dela Llana was physically fit when they met
days after the accident, and that she exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of Joel.
 RTC: Ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana. It held that
the proximate cause of the whiplash injury was
Joel’s reckless driving. It declared that Joel’s
negligence gave rise to the presumption that
Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision
of Joel. Accordingly, it found Rebecca vicariously
liable, and awarded Dra. dela Llana the amounts
of P570,000.00 as actual damages, P250,000.00
as moral damages, and the cost of the suit.
 CA: Reversed the ruling of the RTC. It held that
Dra. dela Llana failed to establish a reasonable
connection between the accident and her whiplash
injury by preponderance of evidence. It ruled that
courts will not hesitate to rule in favor of the other
party if there is no evidence or the evidence is too
slight to warrant an inference establishing the fact
in issue. (Nutrimix Feeds Corp. v. CA) Moreover, it
held that courts cannot take judicial notice that
vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. It also
declared as fatal to her claim her failure to present
an expert witness. No weight was given to the
medical certificate, it having no explanation how
and why the accident caused the injury.

Issues: (Note: I only focused on those related to
Evidence)
1. WON Dra. dela Llana has established by
preponderance of evidence that Joel’s
negligent act was the proximate cause of her
whiplash injury. [NO]
2. WON the medical certificate has probative
value. [NO]
3. WON Dra. dela Llana’s opinion (as testified by
her) has probative value. [NO]
4. WON the SC can take judicial notice that
vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries.
[NO]
Ratio:
1. NO, Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her
case by preponderance of evidence.
a. Dra. dela Llana must first establish
by preponderance of evidence the
three elements of quasi-delict before
the Court can determine Rebecca’s
liability as Joel’s employer. (see Art.
2176, NCC) She should show the
chain of causation between Joel’s
reckless driving and her whiplash
injury. Only after she has laid this
foundation can the presumption –
that Rebecca did not exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of
Joel – arise. Only after the
negligence, damages and proximate
causation are established can the
Court proceed with the application of
par. 5, Art. 2180, NCC.
b. In civil cases, a party who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it. He
who alleges has the burden of
proving his allegation by
preponderance of evidence or
greater weight of credible evidence.
Mere allegations are not evidence.
2. NO, it doesn’t. The medical certificate cannot
be considered because it was not admitted in
evidence.
a. The RTC did not admit in evidence
the medical certificate, hence, the
CA erred in even considering it in its
resolution of the case. It is a basic
4
rule that evidence which has not
been admitted cannot be validly
considered by the courts in arriving
at their judgments.
b. Even if it is considered, it has no
probative value for being hearsay.
Evidence is hearsay if its probative
value is not based on the personal
knowledge of the witness but on the
knowledge of another person who is
not on the witness stand. Hearsay
evidence, whether objected to or
not, cannot be given credence.
c. Admissibility of evidence should not
be equated with weight of evidence.
The former depends on its relevance
and competence, while the latter
pertains to evidence already
admitted and its tendency to
convince and persuade.
3. NO, her opinion has no probative value.
a. Under the RoC, there is a substantial
difference between an ordinary
witness and an expert witness. The
opinion of an ordinary witness may
be received in evidence regarding:
(a) identity of a person about whom
he has adequate knowledge; (b) a
handwriting with which he has
sufficient familiarity; and (c) the
mental sanity of a person with whom
he is sufficiently acquainted.
Furthermore, the witness may also
testify on his impressions of the
emotion, behavior, condition or
appearance of a person. On the
other hand, the opinion of an expert
witness may be received in evidence
on a matter requiring special
knowledge, skill, experience or
training which he is shown to
possess.
b. Even if admitted as expert
testimony, the Court does not
immediately accord it with probative
value. Its weight lies in the
assistance that the expert witness
may afford the courts by
demonstrating the facts which serve
as a basis for his opinion and the
 5

reasons on which the logic of his "Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, May 26, 1992.
conclusions is founded.
"(SGD.) FERNANDO G. CAGOCO

c. Dra. dela Llana was not presented as
an expert witness but as an ordinary
witness. As such, she was not
competent to testify on the nature,
and the cause and effects of
whiplash injury.
2nd Asst. Prov’l. Prosecutor" 1
Priorly filed by the Molave Chief of Police, Inspector
Motalib Banding, before the Municipal Trial Court
("MTC") of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, which
conducted the preliminary investigation, was the
complaint; viz.

4. NO, courts cannot take judicial notice that "COMPLAINT

vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries.
"The undersigned Chief of Police Molave Police Station,
a. This is not public knowledge, nor is Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, under oath accuses
it capable of unquestionable JOSEPH BARRIENTOS, of the crime of ‘ROBBERY WITH
demonstration, nor ought to be RAPE’, committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
known to judges because of their
judicial functions. "That on the 11th day of February 1992, at 5:30 PM.
more or less, at the compound of the Molave Regional
Pilot School, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Philippines,
WHEREFORE, assailed decision and resolution of the
and within the preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable
CA are hereby AFFIRMED and petition is hereby
Court, the above-named accused, by means of force
DENIED for lack of merit.
and intimidation armed with a Batangas knife, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, raped
and robbed the said complainant, Mrs. EXALTACION
LOPEZ right in her classroom.
[G.R. No. 119835. January 28, 1998.]
"CONTRARY TO LAW.
PEOPLE Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSEPH
BARRIENTOS, Accused-Appellant.
Molave, Zambo. del Sur, February 24, 1992.

"(SGD.) MOTALIB T. BANDING

"The undersigned Prosecutor II of Zamboanga del Sur,
Inspector, PNP
accuses JOSEPH BARRIENTOS, of the crime of DOUBLE
ROBBERY WITH RAPE, committed as follows:
Chief of Police
"That on February 11, 1992, at 5:30 o’clock in the
"SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 24th day
afternoon at the compound of the Molave Regional
of February 1992, at Molave, Zamboanga del Sur,
Pilot School, Poblacion, Municipality of Molave,
Philippines.
Province of Zamboanga del Sur, Republic of the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
"(SGD.) DIOSDADO C. ARRIESGADO
Court, the above-named accused with intent of gain
and with intent to lie while armed with a batangas
Municipal Trial Judge" 2
knife, threaten and by means of force and intimidation
did then and there, willfully unlawfully and feloniously
Substantiating the complaint was the sworn statement
have a sexual intercourse with one Exaltacion Lopez for
of the complainant, Exaltacion Lopez, which, in part,
two (2) times and thereafter by means of force and
stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously took from Exaltacion Lopez, the amount of
"02. Q What prompted you to appear (at) the Office of
One Hundred (P100.00) Pesos Philippine Currency, to
the Chief of Police Molave Police Station?
her great damage and prejudice in the afore-stated
amount.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A I am here to file complaint against Joseph Barrientos.
"CONTRARY to Article 294, paragraph 2, of the Revised
"03. Q What crime did he [commit] against you?
Penal Code.
A Because he raped me and then robbed.

"04. Q When was that, and to wherein particular place
did it [happen]?
A Last February 11, 1992, at about 5:30 p.m., more or
less, right in my classroom situated at the Molave
Regional Pilot School Campus." 3
The defense, contending that the prosecution did not
have a strong case against the accused, applied for
bail. After conducting a hearing thereon, during which
Exaltacion Lopez, Inspector Motalib Banding, and
Cleofas Mendoza (a fellow teacher of the complainant)
were presented by the prosecution, the court, in an
order, dated 22 July 1992, 4 denied the petition for
bail. A motion for its reconsideration, as well as for the
quashal of the warrant of arrest, 5 was likewise denied
by the trial court in its order of 25 August 1992. 6
In the arraignment that followed, the accused pleaded
"not guilty" to the charge.
The evidence for the prosecution, incorporating the
evidence presented during the hearing on the petition
for bail (deemed reproduced during the trial), in most
part consisted of the statements at the witness stand
of Exaltacion Lopez, Inspector Motalib Banding, Cleofas
Mendoza and Dr. Vladimir Villaseñor (the examining
physician).
The complainant, Exaltacion Lopez, a 50-year old
teacher, testified that she was, at past 5:00 in the
afternoon of 11 February 1992, in her classroom at the
Molave Regional Pilot School in Molave, Zamboanga del
Sur, preparing to call it a day. While shutting down the
wooden jalousie windows of the classroom, she was
suddenly held from behind by a man in pink jogging
pants. The man was naked from waist up except for
his face which was wrapped in "ninja" fashion. The
intruder grabbed Exaltacion by her right hand, and
pointed a batangas knife at her neck. She attempted
to snatch the knife away but that did not work. He led
her to the corner of the room with the knife still being
poked on her. By the time she turned her head to
squarely face him, the man was already completely
naked except for the "ninja style" shirt that still partly
covered his face. She pleaded to be spared but he paid
no heed. He ordered her to lie down on the cemented
floor. Showing his impatience, by her refusal, the man
grabbed her by the blouse causing her to fall on the
floor. He rode on top of her, throwing her two hands
above her head. Then, holding the batangas knife with
one hand, he used the other in removing her panty.
Ultimately, he succeeded in having her. When he had
finished, he demanded P100.00 from her which she
hastily gave. He would not, however, let her go just
yet. After a while, he again forcibly took her. His lust
now fully satisfied, he wiped himself dry using the table
cloth hanging at the magazine rack. Shortly thereafter,
6
he departed. After recovering from the ordeal, she
closed the room and hurriedly repaired home. She
informed her husband of the incident that evening. 7
The following morning, her fellow teachers, to whom
she likewise narrated the incident, assisted in bringing
the matter up to the police authorities. 8
Cleofas Mendoza, a fellow teacher of Exaltacion Lopez,
stated that she went to the Molave Police Station on 12
February 1992 to report the rape. 9 Inspector Motalib
Banding, after receiving the report, promptly
conducted an investigation. He went to the crime scene
and interviewed Exaltacion who described the rapist to
be a man of medium built and with a fair complexion,
protruding eyes (botlogon ng mata) and a scar at the
right arm. 10 Banding took the table cloth used by the
rapist and sent it for laboratory examination to the PC
Crime Laboratory in Manila. He dispatched his police
officers to round up possible suspects on the basis of
the description given by the complainant. A week later,
or on 21 February 1992, he and policeman Cortez
invited accused Joseph Barrientos for questioning. 11
When Barrientos was presented to Exaltacion at the
police station, the latter immediately recognized him to
be the person who molested her. Barrientos asked
Exaltacion for her forgiveness; his words: "Ma’m,
pasaylo-a ko sa akong nahimo nimo, dili nato ni
kasohan, tabangan ta lagi ka Ma’m nga mawala ang
estorya nimo" (Ma’m, forgive me for what I have done
against you, we will not bring this to court, I will help
you Ma’m to eradicate the story against you). She
refused to forgive him. 12
The table cloth sent for examination was analyzed by
Dr. Vladimir Villaseñor. It was found positive for the
presence of seminal fluid stains.
The defense denied the accusation. Aside from the
accused, six other witnesses were presented to
corroborate appellant’s alibi and claim of maltreatment
by the police.
Appellant stated that in the morning of 11 February
1992, he had left Molave for Dumingag, Zamboanga
del Sur, where he stayed at the house of his brother
until the morning of 13 February 1992. He went to
Dumingag in order to borrow a fatigue uniform which
he would use for the ROTC summer camp training in
Sinacaban. The next day, 12 February 1992, he
attended the death anniversary of his brother’s father-
in-law. 13 He was able to return home to Molave only
in the afternoon of 13 February 1992. That same
afternoon, while watching a basketball game at the
Public Plaza of Molave, police officer Robert Cortez
invited him to the Police Station for questioning. After
a brief investigation, he was allowed to go home. 14
On 17 February 1992, he and a certain Dante Baguio,
a person of his size and built but with darker
complexion, were fetched by a police vehicle and

presented to two children at the Police Station. The
children, when asked if they could recognize appellant,
responded in the negative. Thereupon, he was allowed
to leave the station. 15 On 20 February 1992, while he
was on his way home, he was directed by Inspector
Banding, then driving a police service vehicle, to
proceed to the Molave Police Station. At the station, he
was asked to wait for Inspector Banding at the latter’s
office. After a little while, Inspector Banding arrived
with Lopez who pointed at him (the accused) as being
the man who had raped her. He vehemently denied the
accusation. 16 He was locked up in jail anyway. The
next day, he was mauled, blindfolded and maltreated
by Inspector Banding and his men for not agreeing to
confess to the crime. 17
After the presentation of evidence had closed, the
court, presided over by Hon. Camilo E. Tamin of the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Molave, Zamboanga del
Sur, Branch 23, promulgated its decision, dated 20
February 1995, which held accused Barrientos guilty of
the crime charged. The court
concluded:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, this court finds the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of rape
with robbery and hereby sentences him to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the offended party
Exaltacion Lopez moral damage in the sum of
P300,000.00, and the cost of the proceedings.
"SO ORDERED." 18
Interposing an appeal to this Court, the accused
asseverates that the trial court has erred —
"I. IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS A VALID COMPLAINT
SIGNED BY THE PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTY
SUFFICIENT IN LAW TO CONFER JURISDICTION TO
THE TRIAL COURT;
"II. IN ADMITTING THE TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE
OFFENDED PARTY AND CHIEF OF POLICE, MOTALIB
BANDING THE ACCUSED ASKED FORGIVENESS FROM
THE PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTY THEREBY
ADMITTING HIS GUILT
"III. ON RELYING ON THE SOLE TESTIMONY OF THE
PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTY THAT SHE COULD
IDENTIFY THE ACCUSED AS THE VERY PERSON WHO
RAPED AND ROBBED HER; and
"IV. IN NOT BELIEVING THE TESTIMONY OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS CORROBORATED BY HIS
WITNESSES." 19
Appellant assails both the complaint signed by the
Chief of Police and the Information filed by the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor as being insufficient to
7
confer jurisdiction on the court, arguing that the
prosecution for rape can only be done by means of a
valid complaint made by the offended party herself.
The contention lacks merit.
The term "complaint filed by the offended party" found
in Rule 110, Section 5, of the Rules of Court, said the
Court in People v. Sangil, 20 should be —
". . . given a liberal or loose interpretation meaning a
charge, allegation, grievance, accusation or
denunciation’ (p. 158, West’s Legal Thesaurus
Dictionary) — rather than a strict legal construction, for
more often than not the offended party who files it is
unschooled in the law. The purpose of the complaint in
Section 53 Rule 110, is merely to initiate or commence
the prosecution of the accused. The victim’s
‘sinumpaang salaysay’ which was prepared in the
vernacular, and the ‘complaint’ in English, which must
have been prepared for her by someone else,
complement each other, when read together, and
satisfy the legal definition of a ‘complaint’ as ‘a sworn
statement charging a person with an offense,
subscribed by the offended party . . .’ (Sec. 3, Rule 110,
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure). The Court is not
inclined to disregard her salaysay (complaint) for mere
lack of an oath for that would amount to suppressing
her anguished cry for redress." 21
The sworn statement of Exaltacion Lopez, the offended
party in the case at bar, was signed by Lopez herself in
the office of the Chief of Police (Motalib Banding). That
statement, in "question and answer" form and filed
with the Molave MTC to support the complaint signed
by the Chief of Police, was to this
effect:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"PRELIMINARY:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Mrs. Exaltacion Lopez Y Fernandez, you are being
informed that under Article 183 of the Revised Penal
Code, any person who knowingly making any
untruthful statement shall testify under oath before any
competent person duly authorized by law to administer
oath shall commit the crime of Perjury. Is this clearly
understood by you?
"ANSWER
Yes Sir.
"Q. Please state your name age and other personal
circumstances?
"A. Exaltacion Lopez Y Fernandez, 50 years old,
married, Public School Teacher and resident of Quezon
St, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur.

"Q. What prompted you to appear before the Office of
the Chief of Police Molave Police Station?
"A. I am here to file complaint against Joseph
Barrientos.
"Q. What crimes did he [commit] against you?
"A. Because he raped me and then robbed.
"Q. When was that, and to wherein particular place did
it [happen]?
"A. Last February 11, 1992, at about 5:30 P.M. more
or less, right in my classroom situated at the Molave
Regional Pilot School Campus.
"Q. Why did it [happen]?
"A. During that time, I was in my classroom working
my lesson plan, whom I noticed two female children
entered roaming inside of which I cautioned them and
they went out without any response.
"Q. What transpired after the two children left the
classroom?
"A. I closed the window purposely to go home,
suddenly somebody held my right arm tightly, at this
moment, I turned my head to clarify and I saw a certain
person whose head wrapped with a shirt (gibolokotan)
and only his eyes were vi[s]ible, as if Ninja style, aiming
the Batangas knife closely to my neck, at this juncture,
I attempt to grab the said Batangas knife but all in vain
since he aimed it closely to my neck, I asked him of
what was his purpose, despite he q[uo]ted words
‘HUBO’, at this critical situation, I plan to escape
walking towards the health corner waiting an
opportunity but subject person walked on behind me
closely still the Batangas knife positioning closely to my
neck, until we reached the health corner, sensing have
no chance to escape, I faced him and I was
frighten[e]d when I saw the said person already
[nude], at this juncture, I appeal to him saying words
to q[uo]te ‘AYAW KO INTAWON PAGHIBABTI DONG
KAY TIGULANG NA KO’ Meaning, ‘Please [don’t] touch
me I’m already old’, despite he ordered me to lie down
in the cemented flooring, sensing my life will be on
danger, and I observed his both eyes [were red], as if
he acted as drug craze person, I obey his order of
which accomplished him of his amorous desire to have
sexually [intercourse] with me since I feel the
discharged of his semen into my womb, after his first
sexual intercourse, by forced and intimidation he
demanded money of which I gave him the cash of
P100.00 peso bill which the only money I have, therein
expecting that he will be freed and or released me but
still I observed him playing the said Batangas knife on
and off then he told me to have another sexual
8
[intercourse] of which still he freed to accomplish same
of what he did for the first time.
"x x x
"Q. How come that you were able to identify Joseph
Barrientos to be the very suspect who raped and
robbed you, in fact according to you his head wrapped
with a shirt and only his eyes were vi[s]ible?
"A. Because of the scar at his right arm of which I saw
when I glanced to the Batangas knife he was holding,
and I noticed that his eyes is just protruding (Botlogon
ug Mata).
"Q. What else can you say with regards of his identity?
"A. His [voice] and the body posture.
x x x
"Q. How were you able to be sure enough that he is
the identical person?
A. Because he personally beg pardon and apology from
me in the presence of INSPECTOR MOTALIB T
BANDING PNP, Chief of Police of Molave Police Station
after he confessed of his wrong doings." 22
Verily, the situation is not beyond the context and the
ambit of the ruling in People v. Sangil. 23 The legal
requirement imposed in Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code, as has been so aptly observed in People v.
Ilarde, 24 is "out of consideration for the aggrieved
party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence
rather than go through the scandal of a public trial." 25
The overriding consideration in determining
compliance with the requirement is the intent and
determination of the aggrieved party to seek judicial
redress. Here, the sworn statement of the victim hardly
can cast doubt on her evident resolve to bring the
accused to justice.
In any event, the issue on the validity and sufficiency
of the complaint has been belatedly put up by
appellant. The matter could have been raised in a
motion to quash the information pursuant to Section 3,
26 Rule 117, of the Rules of Court which step he has
failed to do. The rule, according to the Court’s holding
in People v. Garcia, 27 is that —
". . . at any time before entering his plea, the accused
may move to quash the information on the ground that
it does not conform substantially to the prescribed
form. The failure of the accused to assert any ground
for a motion to quash before he pleads to the
information, either because he did not file a motion to
quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall

be deemed a waiver of the grounds for a motion to
quash, except the grounds of no offense charged, lack
of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of
the offense or penalty, and jeopardy.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
Appellant next faults the trial court for not rejecting the
testimony to the effect that the accused has sought
forgiveness from the complainant when made to
confront him, on 21 February 1992, at the office of the
Chief of Police. He claims that the confrontation
between him and the complainant is violative of his
right to counsel, he having been neither assisted, nor
advised of his right to be represented, by counsel at
the time.
The argument is misdirected.
There was no written confession or sworn statement of
the accused taken during any custodial investigation 28
that had been presented, nor even attempted to be
presented, in evidence. The matter testified to was
appellant’s spontaneous statement of having asked for
the forgiveness of the offended party. It was a
statement uttered by appellant, overheard by the Chief
of Police Motalib Banding, that had not been elicited
from him through any questioning. Incidentally, in
appellant’s own testimony in court, he disclaimed
having sought forgiveness from Exaltacion Lopez 29
but conceded that, in his counter-affidavit of 10 March
1992, he admitted having apologized to the
complainant, although, he added, it was only because
of the alleged mauling and torture he had received
from inspector Banding and his men.
Appellant questions his so-called warrantless arrest.
There is paucity of facts on record to substantiate this
claim but if, indeed, there has been an irregularity
attendant to his arrest, it should, not having been
raised at the opportune time, be deemed cured by his
having voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction
of the trial court. Not only did appellant enter his plea
during arraignment and actively participated at the
trial, 30 but he likewise has filed, even priorly, a
petition for bail which, itself, would have just the same
constituted a waiver of any supposed irregularity in his
arrest. 31
Neither is the Court convinced by the contention that
appellant has not been sufficiently identified to be the
culprit by the complainant. Familiarity with the physical
features of a person is an acceptable way for proper
identification. 32 As has so keenly been observed by
the trial court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"At the investigation by the police in the afternoon of
February 12, 1992, the complainant described the
person who ravished her as one of bulging eyes, of fair
complexion, sturdily built in body, and with a scar at
9
the right arm at the elbow joint. The accused fits the
description given by the offended party. At the
confrontation between the accused and the offended
party in the Office of the Chief of Police, the offended
party was able to positively identify the accused as the
person who ravished her twice in the afternoon of
February 11, 1992. She found the identifying scar in
the part of the body of the accused where she said the
same can be located. She was able to recognize the
voice, the fair complexion of the accused, his bulging
eyes and his body built." 33
The positive identification made by the complainant of
the person who took away her honor has placed the
defense of alibi unacceptable. Alibi cannot prevail over
positive identification. 34 Most importantly, alibi, to be
convincing and effective, requires proof not only of the
accused being at some other place at the time of
commission of the crime but also of being physically
impossible for him to be at the locus criminis 35 or
within its immediate vicinity. 36 These requirements
are not at all here extant.
The Court has gone over the records of the case,
examined the evidence on record and assessed anew
the testimony of witnesses. In its review, the Court has
not overlooked the now settled guidelines in evaluating
rape cases, to wit: (a) That an accusation for rape can
be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the accused, although innocent, to
disprove; (b) that, in view of the intrinsic nature of the
crime of rape where generally only two persons are
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) that, like in
any other ordinary criminal case, the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness
of the defense. 37 Accordingly guided, the Court is
more than convinced that the trial court did not err in
its findings and conclusions.
The testimony of the complainant suffers little, if any
really, from serious flaws. The Court quotes presently
the pertinent portions of her
testimony:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q: How many windows of the room were you able to
close when a man entered your room?
"A: I was about to close the last window.
"Q: Were you able to close the last window when a
man entered your room, is that correct?
"A: I was closing the last window when I noticed there
was a man at my back and who grabbed my hand and
when I looked at him to verify as to the person who
grabbed my hand, I saw the head wrapped with a cloth
and pointed his batangas knife right at my neck.

"Q: At the time you first noticed the man, he was not
yet naked?
"A: He was half naked and he was wearing a pink
jogging pants.
"Q: Was there an electric light at the room at the time
when you first noticed a man in your room?
A: There was a fl[ou]rescent lamp but I did not put the
light on because it was not yet dark.
"Q: Will you describe to the court, the nature of your
window of your room?
"A: It is wooden jalousie window.
"Q: In other words, when you closed the windows the
room would be dark?
"A: Not totally dark. How could it be dark when the
door was still [open].
"Q: You mean to say the door was not closed when you
were molested?
"A: Yes sir.
"Q: It was all the time [open]?
"A: Yes, it was [open] because I was about to go home.
I usually don’t close the door when I am about to go
home.
"Q: The man who entered the room did not close the
door?
"A: I do not know whether he closed the door. At that
time I was closing the window. My back was facing him
when I noticed somebody held my hand closely.
"x x x
"Q: Was this man who entered the room wearing any
shoes?
"A: No sir.
"Q: You said in your direct testimony that you were
brought to the health corner after closing the last
window. Then, you noticed a man who was already
naked?
"A: Yes sir. He was already naked.
"Q: Was he completely naked at that time?
"A: Yes, he was totally naked.
10
"Q: At that time, was he at your back or in front of you?
"A: He was at my back.
"Q: You said the pants he was wearing was pink in
color?
"A: Yes sir.
"Q: What was the color of the shirt?
"A: I do not know what color was that but I know it is
technicolor that was used in wrapping his head.
"Q: Will you tell the court, how long after he first
penetrated you. Did he finish the sexual act with you?
"A: I cannot tell how long but he really succeeded in
molesting me because I felt his semen entered my
vagina.
"Q. Was the first sexual intercourse lasted for about
five minutes?
"A: I do not know how many minutes,
"Q: After the first sexual intercourse with you, how long
did he do the second intercourse with you?
"A: I do not know how long he molested me.
"Q: Would the interval of the first intercourse to the
second intercourse was one hour?
"A: I cannot tell how many minutes or hour was the
interval. What I know he molested me again.
"Q: During the time he molested you in that room, did
you notice any person outside the room?
"A: I did not see any person outside. If there are
persons outside, I could have been saved.
"Q: When you went home, was it still light or already
dark?
"A: It was still light.
"Q: You were then wearing watch what you are
wearing now?
"A: Yes sir.
"Q: What time was it when you left that building?
"A: I did not look at my watch. I do not know what was
the time when I left because I was not in my right mind
and I did not notice the time anymore." 38

In affirming the conviction appealed from, the Court
has, too, adhered to the long established rule that an
appellate court does not just casually modify, let alone
discard, the factual findings of the trial court without
cogent reasons. It obviously should be, for a trial court
is in a preferred position in coming up with an accurate
impression of the testimony given by witnesses;
clearly, trial courts enjoy the advantage over appellate
courts of directly and at first hand observing and
assessing testimonial evidence. 39 The exception from
the rule, i.e., that there are facts of substance and
value evidently missed in the process of evaluation that
might affect the result of the case, are not here shown.
Finally, certain inaccuracies in the disposition by the
trial court of the case require to be addressed. After all,
an appeal by an accused in a criminal case opens the
whole case for review on any question of fact or law,
including those not raised by the parties, 40 as well as
of the penalty and indemnity decreed by the trial court.
41
The court a quo imposed reclusion perpetua on
appellant for what it had described to be the complex
crime of rape with robbery, holding that —
"On the basis of the evidences submitted, [the] court
is morally convinced that the accused committed the
two acts of rape against, and the robbery of P100.00
from, the complaining witness Exaltacion Lopez.
However, since the said acts were committed on the
same occasion, [the] court believes that there is only
one criminal intent and that, therefore, only one
complex crime of rape with robbery was committed by
the accused." 42
The trial court might have had in mind, instead, the
special complex crime of robbery with rape penalized
under Article 294(2) 43 of the Revised Penal Code. This
special complex crime contemplates a situation where
the culprit or culprits have an original design to take
personal property belonging to another with intent to
gain and rape is committed merely as an
"accompanying" crime; the principal offense is robbery
(a crime against property) and rape is perpetrated
incidental to the robbery. It is a public crime which can
be prosecuted de oficio and where a separate
complaint of the victim would not be indispensable. 44
Looking closely at the records of the instant case, it
would be quite difficult to conclude that the original
intention of appellant was to rob the victim (for the
crime to fall under Article 294, paragraph 2, of the
Revised Penal Code). On the contrary, it would appear
that the primary and real intent of appellant was to
commit rape and that his demand for cash from his
victim was just an afterthought when the opportunity
presented itself 45 specifically during a respite between
11
the first and the second sexual intercourse.
Appellant’s original lustful design is manifest from
appellant’s actions as so explicitly detailed by the
victim, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Pros. Magangcong:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q: On that particular date, did you remember if there
was an unusual incident that took place?
"A: Yes sir.
"Q: Will you please inform this court what is that
incident?
"A: That time, I was preparing my lesson plan when
there was a person entered my room.
"COURT:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q: Who was with you that time when the person
entered your room?
"A: I was alone.
"Pros. Magangcong:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q: Now, after the person entered your room, what did
he do to you?
"A: While I was closing the windows my back was
facing him, the person grab my right hand.
"Q: What happened next when that person grabbed
your right hand?
"A: I looked back at him to verify as to who the person
who grabbed my right hand. And what I saw is a
person whose head is wrapped with shirt.
"Q: After looking at him, did you attempt to run?
"A: When I turned my back to verify as to who was the
person holding my hand, I could not think what to do
because that person pointed his batangas at my right
neck.
"Q: Because you did not run, what happened next?
"A: I tried to grab his batangas but I did not succeed
in getting it from him because he was stronger than
me.
"Q: Because he was stronger, what did he do to you?
"A: He pointed his batangas on my neck.
"Q: After pointing his batangas, what happened next?

"A: I walked towards the health corner.
"Q: Did he also walk with you towards the health
corner?
"Atty. Acain:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Objection, Your Honor, leading.
"Pros. Magangcong:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q: How did you happen to go to the health corner
when the knife was pointed to your neck?
"A: He followed me towards the health corner while he
was holding the knife pointed at my neck.
"COURT:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. By the way, was there other classroom near your
classroom?
"A: Yes sir.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"Q: How many classroom adjacent to your classroom?
"A: Two adjacent classrooms and another, my room.
Three in all
"Q: At that time, the two classrooms adjacent to your
room have anybody inside?
"A: Nobody.
"COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Proceed.
"Pros. Magangcong:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q: Because he followed you in the health corner, what
happened there in the health corner?
"A. While he was following me, I faced him. When I
faced him, he was already naked.
"Q: Because he was already naked, did he say
anything?
"Atty. Acain:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Objection, Your Honor, leading.
"COURT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Ask what happened next.
"Pros. Magangcong:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
12
"Q. What happened why he was naked?
"A: I pleaded to him not to molest me because I am
already old but he ordered me to lie down on the
cemented floor.
"Q: What happened next after he ordered you to lie
down on the cemented floor?
"A: I did not lie down immediately on the cemented
floor. Instead, I looked at him trying to gaze what was
his intention towards me. And I saw my life is
endangered because his eyes are very red.
"COURT:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q: Despite the fact that he was already naked, you did
not know his intention?
"A: I know his intention that is why I pleaded to him
not to molest me because I am already old." 46
The question arises as to whether or not appellant may
be convicted of the separate offenses of two counts of
rape and one robbery notwithstanding the fact that the
offense charged in the Information is one of "Double
Robbery with Rape under Article 294, paragraph 2, of
the Revised Penal Code."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Court rules in the affirmative. Controlling in an
Information should not be the title of the complaint,
nor the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these
being, by and large, mere conclusions of law made by
the prosecutor, but the description of the crime
charged and the particular facts therein recited. 47
Neither is it the technical name given to the offense by
the prosecutor, more than the allegations made by
him, that should predominate in determining the true
character of the crime. There should also be no
problem in convicting an accused of two or more
crimes erroneously charged in one information or
complaint, but later proven to be independent crimes,
as if they were made the subject of separate
complaints or informations. 48
Parenthetically, in a number of cases decided by the
Court at the time when Article 294(2) and Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code imposed different sets of
penalties, the Court was divided on the question of
which provision should be applied in crimes of robbery
with rape when committed with the use of deadly
weapon or by two or more persons. The disagreement
focused on the applicable penalty considering that
Article 335 punished qualified rape with reclusion
perpetua to death against the penalty of reclusion
temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua for robbery
with rape under Article 294(2). There were more times

49 when the Court held Article 294(2) to be applicable
than when it ruled otherwise. 50 In People v. Mabag,
51 the votes of the Justices were stated by the
ponente, Mr. Justice Vicente Abad Santos, thus —
"The writer of this opinion together with Justices
Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., Ramon C. Fernandez,
Juvenal K. Guerrero and Pacifico P. de Castro are for
the affirmance in toto of the lower court’s decision.
Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera concurs with the
aforementioned members of the Court and adds the
observation that even in a prosecution for Robbery with
Rape, which can be prosecuted de oficio, the offended
woman should still file a complaint for Rape as a
jurisdictional requirement (sec. 4, Rule 110; Art. 344,
Revised Penal Code), and out of consideration for her.
But if the rape victim herself testifies in open Court, as
in this case, the purpose behind the requirement
should be deemed as having been met, it being
apparent that the victim, as in a complaint filed by her,
has decided to expose in a public trial the outrage on
her person. Justice Claudio Teehankee concurs in the
imposition of the death penalty but believes that not
one but three death penalties should be meted to the
accused. He has filed a separate opinion to this effect.
Justice Antonio P. Barredo’s vote is ‘that appellant
Paulino Mabag should be sentenced to three death
penalties because as I have already explained in
previous opinions, it is absurd to read Article 294 (2) of
the Revised Penal Code without taking into account the
latest amendment of Article 335. The construction of
laws must never result in absurdity.’ Justice Felix V.
Makasiar has filed a dissenting opinion to the effect
that the accused should be convicted and sentenced to
death for three separate crimes of robbery with rape.
However, Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando following
his opinion in People v. Carandang, L-31012, August
15, 1973, 52 SCRA 259, believes that the appropriate
penalty is reclusion perpetua and so does Justice
Ramon C. Aquino who has filed a dissenting opinion.
"It thus appears that nine members of the Court are
for the imposition of the death penalty in varying
numbers, while two members are for reclusion
perpetua only.
"WHEREFORE, for lack of the necessary votes the
decision appealed from is hereby modified in that the
accused shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
but is affirmed in all other respects. Costs de oficio." 52
It was during this period of diversity of opinion within
the Court that, relevant to the instant case, People v.
Mabag, 53 was decided where, for lack of the required
ten votes, the death sentence imposed on the accused
was modified to reclusion perpetua, and where, among
other things, it said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"As to the second assignment of error, the appellant
13
claims that even assuming, without admitting, that he
is guilty of the offense charged, he cannot be meted
the death penalty because Arts. 293, 294, par. 2 and
296 of the Revised Penal Code which are mentioned in
the information prescribe only the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua
when the robbery shall have been accompanied by
rape, among other crimes. [Presidential Decree No.
767 which took effect on August 15, 1975 has
amended Art. 294, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code by
adding the following: ‘PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT
WHEN THE ROBBERY ACCOMPANIED WITH RAPE IS
COMMITTED WITH THE USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON
OR BY TWO OR MORE PERSONS THE PENALTY SHALL
BE RECLUSION PERPETUA TO DEATH.’ This
amendment cannot of course be given retroactive
effect.]
"But the applicable provision is Art. 335 of the Revised
Penal Code the relevant portion of which reads:
‘Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use
of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty is reclusion perpetua to death.’ And this is the
provision mentioned in the dispositive portion of the
lower court’s decision quoted above. The fact that Art.
335 of the Revised Penal Code is not mentioned in the
information is unimportant and did not deprive the
appellant of his constitutional right to be informed of
the accusation against him. As former Chief Justice
Moran said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘It has been held, however, that if the above
requirement [Rule 110, Sec. 7, Rules of Court] is not
complied with and no name has been given to the
offense alleged to haven been committed, the defect is
merely of form which does not prejudice the substantial
rights of the defendant. This is especially so where the
facts pleaded are clearly constitutive of a specific
offense. In such cases, the real nature of the crime
charged is determined not by the title of the complaint,
nor by the specification of the provision of the law
alleged to have been violated, but by the facts recited
in the complaint or information. This is so because
‘from a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it
is of no concern to the accused what is the technical
name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no
way aids him in his defense on the merits . . . The real
question is not did he commit a crime given in the law
some technical and specific name, but did he perform
the acts alleged in the body of the information in the
manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no
consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure
or of substantive right, how the law denominates the
crime which those acts constitute . . . In the
designation of the crime, the accused never has a real
interest until the trial has ended. For his full and
complete defense, he need not know the name of the
crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the
protection of his substantial rights . . . It is the province

of the court alone to say what the crime is and what it
is named.’ Accordingly, the accused will not be
permitted ‘to stand by and watch the fiscal while he
guesses as to the name which ought to be applied to
the crime with which he charges the accused, and then
take advantage of the guess if it happens to be wrong,
while the acts and omissions upon which that guess
was made and which are the only real foundation of
the charges against him are clearly and fully stated in
the information.’ Otherwise, it would ‘change the
battleground in criminal cases from issues to guesses
and from facts to fancy." (IV Moran, Rules of Court, pp.
22-23, 1970 ed.)chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
"That the lower court did not err in applying Art. 355
of the Revised Penal Code is shown by the decision of
this Court in People v. Obtinalia, G.R. No. L-30190,
April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 651." 54
All taken, herein appellant must be convicted of two
counts of rape under Article 335, qualified by with the
use of deadly weapon (a batangas knife), and the
crime of robbery under Article 294, paragraph 5, of the
Revised Penal Code.
Article 335 of the Code, before the more onerous
amendatory provisions of Republic Act No. 7659 (1994)
and Republic Act No. 8353 (1997),
read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape
is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances.
"1. By using force or intimidation;
"2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
"3. When the woman is under twelve years of age,
even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in
the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
"The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
"Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use
of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the
victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.
"When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a
homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be likewise death.
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a
homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. (As
14
amended by Rep. Act No. 2632, approved June 18,
1960, and Rep. Act No. 4111, approved June 20,
1964.)"
When, such as in the case at bar, the crime of rape was
committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the
penalty prescribed would be reclusion perpetua to
death; there being neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance shown, the minimum thereof, or
reclusion perpetua, should be the appropriate penalty.
The penalty of death, in any event, could not be
imposed because of the then constitutional
proscription.
In turn, Article 294, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal
Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 294. Robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons-Penalties. — Any person guilty
of robbery with the use of violence against or
intimidation of any person shall
suffer:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x x x
"5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its medium period in other
cases. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 18.)"
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and absent
any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the full
range of the penalty that may be imposed is anywhere
from arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period, as the minimum
penalty, to prision mayor in its minimum period, as the
maximum penalty.
The trial court missed to order appellant to pay the
victim actual damages of P100.00 cash taken from her.
Conformably with recent court rulings, indemnity for
damages must likewise be awarded to the rape victim.
The purpose of this award is essentially one of
reparation, not punishment or correction, that
accounts for its being appropriately termed
"indemnity." Consistent with the prevailing rule, and
considering the circumstances of the case, the civil
indemnity is here fixed at P100,000.00 for the two
counts of rape committed.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the RTC of Molave
Zamboanga del Sur in Criminal Case No. 92-10267 is
MODIFIED by finding accused-appellant Joseph
Barrientos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
counts of rape and the separate crime of robbery. He
is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of two
(2) reclusion perpetua for the crimes of rape 55 and
the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to seven (7) years of prision mayor, as

maximum for the robbery committed. Accused-
appellant is ordered to indemnify the offended party
the sum of P100,000.00 and to restore the amount of
P100,000 taken from her.
Costs against Accused-Appellant.
SO ORDERED.
THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v.
OSMUNDO M. VILLANUEVA, Judge, MCTC,
Bagumbayan-Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat, and
HEIDE B. PACACO, Clerk of Court, MCTC,
Bagumbayan-Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat,
Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; HOW GENUINENESS
OF HANDWRITING PROVED; CASE AT BAR. — That the
signature appearing in Exhibit "D" actually belongs to
respondent Heide B. Pacaco was confirmed by
respondent Judge Villanueva when, upon being
confronted with said certificate of live birth, he testified
that it seems to be the signature of respondent Pacaco.
It is not denied that respondent Pacaco has been the
clerk of court of Judge Villanueva for about twelve
years, hence, it is safe to conclude that the latter is
very familiar with the former’s signature. Significantly,
respondent Pacaco did not counter the aforesaid
testimony of respondent Judge Villanueva, save for her
aforestated general denial of having signed Exhibit "D."
Under the present Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved
by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of
such person, because he has seen the person write, or
has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
witness has acted or been charged, and has thus
acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
The said section further provides that evidence
respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. As noted by
the investigating judge in his report, in the record of
this case is a copy of respondent Pacaco’s answer to
the complaint, the first and second pages whereof are
signed by her. We have carefully compared the
signatures "hbpacaco" thereon and the signatures
"hbpacaco" marked as Exhibits "D-4" and "D-5" on the
birth certificate a copy of which is in the record of this
case, and we are reasonably convinced of the
authorship by respondent Pacaco of the questioned
15
signatures on Exhibit "D," the birth certificate of Ceasar
Anthony Pacaco Villanueva.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT;
ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OVER LOWER
COURTS; ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT;
MAINTENANCE OF JUDICIARY’S GOOD NAME AND
STANDING IS THE IMPERATIVE AND SACRED DUTY
OF COURT PERSONNEL. — As we have heretofore
stated, the exacting standards of ethics and morality
imposed upon court employees and judges are
reflective of the premium placed on the image of the
courts of justice, and that image of a court of justice is
necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or
otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat,
from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel.
It thus becomes the imperative and sacred duty of each
and everyone in the court to maintain its good name
and standing as a true temple of justice.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On September 10, 1990, a complaint for gross
immorality was filed by the Office of the Court
Administrator against herein respondents, allegedly
committed and preliminarily investigated as
follows:chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
On June 7, 1990, the office of the undersigned received
an unsworn letter-complaint from (a) concerned citizen
of Sultan Kudarat explicitly alleging therein that the
respondent judge has a "querida" by the name of Heide
B. Pacaco, his Clerk of Court; that the respondent judge
has an illegitimate child with her named Caesar
Anthony P. Villanueva who is 4 years old.
On June 19, 1990, the undersigned directed Judge
German Malcampo, RTC, Branch 19, Isulan, Sultan
Kudarat to conduct a discreet investigation and report
on the matter.
In an indorsement dated July 24, 1990, the aforecited
Judge Malcampo confirmed substantially the truth of
the allegations in the letter-complaint of the said
concerned citizen. He further stated that the
information on the personal circumstances of Caesar
Anthony P. Villanueva was obtained from Montessori
Learning Center, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat where the
latter is enrolled. 1
In a resolution dated September 18, 1990, this Court
required respondents to comment thereon. 2

In separate answers, 3 respondents vehemently denied
the charges against them and presented a certification
issued by Mrs. Tessie la Torre, Directress of the
Montessori Learning Center at Isulan, Sultan Kudarat,
stating that Caesar Anthony P. Villanueva is the son of
Oscar M. Villanueva and Helen B. Paciente. Both prayed
for the dismissal of the complaint against
them.cralawnad
In its resolution dated December 11, 1990, this Court
referred the case to Judge German M. Malcampo,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat
for investigation, report and recommendation within
ninety (90) days from receipt of the records. 4
A joint motion for inhibition, dated March 7, 1991, was
filed by respondents which sought to inhibit Judge
Malcampo because of the initial investigation he had
made on the case, and prayed for the designation of
another investigating judge. 5 Consequently, we issued
a resolution on May 30, 1991, granting the motion to
inhibit and designating Judge Romeo S. Sucaldito, RTC,
Branch 20, Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat in lieu of Judge
Malcampo. 6
Three persons testified as witnesses for the
complainant, namely, Mila Villaflores, Gemma
Panagdato and Belen Lopez. Respondent Judge
Osmundo M. Villanueva testified in his behalf and also
presented Arcadio Ramos, Chief Documents Examiner
of the National Bureau of Investigation. Respondent
Heide B. Pacaco likewise testified and adopted the
testimonies of Judge Villanueva, Mila Villaflores and
Emma Panagdato as part of her evidence.
On December 17, 1991, respondent Judge Villanueva
filed his memorandum and alleged that the authenticity
of the only evidence submitted by the complainant,
which is the Certificate of Live Birth of Caesar Anthony
P. Villanueva, marked in evidence as Exhibit "D", is
doubtful because Belen Lopez, who identified Exhibit
"D" does not know who actually prepared it; she could
not remember the person who signed thereon; the
certificate was never subscribed before her nor was it
completely filled up; it contains alterations which were
never explained; and it has been proven that
respondent Villanueva’s supposed signature thereon is
not his signature. He further contended that the birth
certificate is inadmissible to prove filiation, especially if
the alleged illegitimate father did not sign the said birth
certificate under oath; that his alleged signature
appearing in the birth certificate is falsified; and that
no other evidence was presented to show that he is
guilty of immorality. He, therefore, prays for the
dismissal of the complaint against him.
Respondent Pacaco, in her memorandum, likewise
questions the authenticity and probative value of
Exhibit "D" based on substantially the same grounds
16
invoked by respondent Villanueva. She denies that the
signature appearing on the birth certificate is her
signature. In addition, she claims that while it is true
that there is a presumption of regularity in the
execution of a public document, such presumption has
been overcome in this case by reason of the
irregularities which attended the preparation of the
birth certificate of Caesar Anthony P. Villanueva, plus
the fact that the alleged signatures of respondents
were forged. Furthermore, respondent Pacaco
explained that the child Ceasar Anthony was merely left
in her care by her second cousin who is presently
abroad.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The commendable Report and Recommendation
thereafter submitted by Judge Romeo S. Sucaldito,
dated March 4, 1993, made the following extensive
findings and ratiocinative conclusions:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
1. Mila Villaflores is the Principal of Montessori Learning
Center in Isulan, Sultan Kudarat. As principal, she
personally knows Caesar Anthony P. Villanueva who is
one of their pupils. Mrs. Villaflores has not personally
met the parents of Caesar Anthony. His enrollment
form however states that his parents are Helen B.
Paciente and Oscar M. Villanueva. Mrs. Villaflores does
not know whether Caesar Anthony’s parents are still
alive.
In obedience to the subpoena issued, Mrs. Villaflores
brought the enrollment form (Exh. "A"), birth certificate
(Exh. "B") and the pre-elementary progress report card
or Form 138 of Caesar Anthony (Exh. "C") when she
testified. She can not recall who prepared Exhibit "A"
because of the number of enrollees at that time. Exhibit
"B" is only a machine copy. At Montessori, they do not
require the submission of the original copy of the birth
certificates of their pupils.
2. Miss Gemma Panagdato is a teacher at Montessori
in Isulan. She handled the nursery class during the
school year 1990-1991. One of her pupils during that
year was Caesar Anthony P. Villanueva. Caesar
Anthony resides at No. 1 Juan Street, Kalawag, Isulan,
Sultan Kudarat. He lives with respondent Heide Pacaco,
who is the neighbor of Gemma Panagdato.
Miss Panagdato does not know Helen B. Paciente, the
alleged mother of Caesar Anthony. She has never seen
Helen B. Paciente.
3. Mrs. Belen P. Lopez is the City Department Head of
the Local Civil Registry of General Santos. One of her
duties is to register births, marriages and deaths that
occurred in General Santos City. Complying with the
subpoena duces tecum issued to her, Mrs. Lopez
brought the certificate of live birth of Caesar Anthony
Pacaco Villanueva bearing Registry No. 86-05846 and

a certified machine copy thereof (Exh. "D" when she
testified. Both the original and the machine copy of the
birth certificates bear her signatures.
As shown by the birth certificate and Exhibit "D",
Caesar Anthony Pacaco Villanueva appears to have
been born on September 15, 1986 (Exh. "D-3" at
General S. District Hospital in General Santos City. The
name "Haide Pacaco" appears as his mother. His father
is mentioned therein as "Osmundo Villanueva." The
informant of birth is "Haide P. Villanueva" whose
"relationship to child" is stated therein as "mother."
There is a signature above the typewritten name
"Haide P. Villanueva," informant, which clearly reads
"hbpacaco" (Exh. "D-4"). The same is written in green
ink in the original copy of the certificate.
At the back of Exhibit "D" are entries written in green
ink under the title "Affidavit of Acknowledgment" (Exh.
"D-5"). The ink used in writing these entries is the
same or similar to the ink used in writing the signature
"hbpacaco" in Exh. "D-4." The names "Osmundo M.
Villanueva and "Heide B. Pacaco" are written therein as
father and mother, respectively. In the space for the
signature of father is an illegible signature which is also
written in green ink. The signature in the space for the
signature of mother is also written in green ink and the
same clearly reads "hbpacaco."cralaw virtua1aw library
The birth of Caesar * Anthony Pacaco Villanueva was
registered on October 2, 1986.
Mrs. Belen Lopez also brought with her the certificate
of live birth of Caesar * Anthony Paciente Villanueva
when she testified. During her testimony, the said
certificate was compared with the certified machine
copy thereof (Exh. "E") that she also admitted. Exh. "E"
is a faithful copy of the original certificate.
The original certificate shows that Caesar Anthony
Paciente Villanueva was born on September 13, 1985
at San Roque, Makar, General Santos City. His parents
are named therein as "Oscar Mallari Villanueva" and
"Helen Bibet Paciente." The informant is "Helen Bibet
Paciente" who is mentioned therein as his mother. The
birth of Caesar Anthony Paciente Villanueva was
registered in the Local Civil Register of General Santos
City on January 9, 1991 under the late registration
system.
4. Respondent Judge Osmundo M. Villanueva denied
having an illicit relationship with his co-respondent
Heide Pacaco. He also denied having a child with her.
He testified that his relationship with her is merely that
of a superior to a subordinate.
Judge Villanueva denied authorship of the signature
above the printed word "Signature of Father" in the
Affidavit of Acknowledgment (Exh. "D-5") of Exh. "D."
17
He alleged that the said signature is a forgery. He
testified that he came to know of said signature after
Exhibit "D" was marked in evidence during the hearing.
After he learned about it, he immediately wrote a letter
to Mrs. Belen P. Lopez, the Local Civil Registrar of
General Santos City (Exh. "1-Villanueva" and Exh. "1-
A-Villanueva"). He informed Mrs. Lopez that his alleged
signature in Exh. "D-5" is a forgery. He also informed
Mrs. Lopez of his intention to have the said signature
examined by (a) handwriting expert of the National
Bureau of Investigation.
During his testimony, respondent Judge admitted that
he is familiar with the signature of his co-respondent
Heide Pacaco because the latter has been his Clerk of
Court for about ten years. He was shown Exh. "I-4",
which is the signature "hbpacaco" above the
typewritten words "Heide P. Villanueva," "Mother." He
was asked whether the same is the signature of Heide
Pacaco. Judge Villanueva answered: "It looks like her
signature, Your Honor." (tsn, pp. 11 to 12, hearing of
June 15, 1991). Judge Villanueva also testified that the
signature above the printed words "Signature of
Mother" in Exhibit "D-5" "seems to be that of the Clerk
of Court, Heide Pacaco. (tsn., page 13, hearing of June
18, 1991).
He further testified that he had confronted Heide
Pacaco about Exh. "D." When he asked her why she
placed the surname Villanueva as the surname of
Ceasar Anthony, respondent Pacaco answered: "You
are not the only Villanueva in the world." (tsn, page 12,
hearing of June 18, 1991).
Judge Villanueva also asked Heide Pacaco why she
appears to have given birth to a child named Ceasar
Anthony as shown by Exh. "D" but Pacaco was evasive
and "antagonistic." She could not answer Judge
Villanueva whether Ceasar Anthony is her son or not.
She did not deny or admit that Ceasar Anthony is her
son. (tsn, pp. 14 to 16, hearing of June 18, 1991).
Before this case was filed, Judge Villanueva had seen
Ceasar Anthony in the company of Heide Pacaco.
Judge Villanueva does not know why he was charged.
He, however, attributed the filing of this case to
disgruntled litigants who lost their cases in his court.
5. Respondent Heide Pacaco is still single and resides
at Kalawag I. Isulan, Sultan Kudarat. She has been the
Clerk of Court of the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Bagumbayan-Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat, for about
twelve years. Before she became a Clerk of Court, she
was the stenographer of the Municipal Trial Court of
Isulan.
Respondent Heide Pacaco denied having an illicit
relationship with Judge Villanueva. She also denied

having a child with him. She explained that Ceasar
Anthony Villanueva, who lives with her, is actually the
son of her second cousin, Helen Paciente and her
husband Oscar Villanueva. Helen Paciente works in
Saudi Arabia. She and her husband are separated.
Their separation took place before she went to Saudi
Arabia. Before she left, Helen entrusted Ceasar
Anthony to Heide Pacaco, Ceasar Anthony was only
one year old when he was entrusted to Miss Pacaco.
The whereabouts of the alleged father Oscar Villanueva
is not known. Heide Pacaco does not know where he
is.
Helen Paciente allegedly went home on vacation in
December, 1990. Upon her arrival, she was asked by
Heide Pacaco about the birth certificate of Ceasar
Anthony. She could not produce any because the birth
of Ceasar Anthony was not registered, Heide then told
Helen to register his birth. Following Heide’s advice,
Helen registered Ceasar Anthony’s birth in the Civil
Register of General Santos City on January 9, 1991. A
certificate of live birth was thereafter issued (Exh. "E",
Exh. "2-Villanueva" and Exhibit "1-Pacaco").
Heide Pacaco inquired about Ceasar Anthony’s birth
certificate because of the misconception of many
people that the latter is her son. Moreover, at that time
she had already learned of the charge against her.
During her testimony, Heide Pacaco was asked
whether the signature (Exh. "D-4") above the
typewritten name "Heide P. Villanueva," "Mother" is
hers. She denied authorship of the same. She was
further asked whether the signature above the printed
words "Signature of Mother" in Exh. "D-1" belongs to
her. She likewise denied it.
Respondent Pacaco admitted that she was confronted
by Judge Villanueva about the Certificate of Live Birth
of Ceasar Anthony and that she evaded answering him.
She however explained that her antagonism and
outburst at Judge Villanueva was due to her state of
mind at that time. She was then confused and bothered
of (sic) the charge. She further admitted that she has
answered Judge Villanueva that he is not the only
Villanueva in the world when asked about Exhibit "D."
She explained that she had insolently answered him
because she was irritable at that time (tsn., pp. 8 and
9, hearing of August 26, 1991).
Respondent Pacaco contends that the complaint
against her and Judge Villanueva is meant to destroy
the latter because of some decisions that he had
rendered. She had observed that some litigants are not
contented with his decisions.
6. Arcadio A. Ramos is the Chief Documents Examiner
of the National Bureau of Investigation. He has been
18
with the NBI since 1961, starting as interrogator of the
complaint section, moving to the interrogation unit of
the clearance section in 1963, to the questioned
documents division in 1965, and then as a document
examiner in 1966. He was promoted senior document
examiner in 1972 and as supervising document
examiner in 1979. He became the Officer-In-Charge of
the division in 1979 and held that position until 1988.
Finally in 1989, he was appointed Chief Documents
Examiner.
Mr. Ramos has attended several seminars conducted
by the NBI Academy on questioned documents. He was
sent to Hongkong in 1981 on a grant from the British
Government to broaden his expertise on questioned
documents. He is a member of (the) International
Association for Identification and American Academy of
Forensic Sciences of which he is the only Filipino
member. He had examined thousands of questioned
documents and had testified in Court in thousands of
cases involving questioned documents.
In compliance with the order of October 9, 1991, which
was issued at the instance of Judge Villanueva, Mr.
Ramos examined the questioned signature in the
Certificate of Live Birth of Ceasar Anthony Pacaco
Villanueva and the eight (8) standards or sample
signature(s) of said respondent which are marked
Exhibits "4-Villanueva" to "11-Villanueva," inclusive.
The examination was made for the purpose of
determining whether the questioned signature and the
standards submitted were written by one and the same
person.
Exhibits "4-Villanueva" to Exhibit "11-Villanueva" are
signatures of Judge Villanueva on seven official
documents that he signed in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Bagumbayan-Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat. These
signatures were affixed on dates contemporaneous, or
near the date of, the registration of the Certificate of
Live Birth of Ceasar Anthony Villanueva which is
October 2, 1986. These dates are September 24, 1986
(Exh. "6"), October 2, 1986 (Exhs. "7" and "8"),
October 6, 1986 (Exh. "9") and October 9, 1986 (Exh.
"10").
Exhibit "11-Villanueva" contains six (6) signatures of
Judge Villanueva which he affixed on August 22, 1991
during the hearing of this case.
Six other standards or samples of Judge Villanueva’s
signatures were also examined by Mr. Ramos. These
standards were earlier sent by Judge Villanueva to the
NBI for examination on his own accord. These
standards which are marked Exhs. "14", "15", "16",
"17", "18" and "19", inclusive, appear to have been
affixed on October 2, 1986 (Exh. "14"), October 29,
1986 (Exh. "15", November 5, 1986 (Exh. "16"),

December, 1986 (Exh. "17"), July 20, 1991 (Exh. "18")
and July 20, 1991 (Exh. "19"), respectively.
Mr. Ramos examined the questioned signature and the
standards or samples submitted with the use of a
stereoscopic microscope. He took pictures of the
questioned signature and standards. He had the
photographs developed and enlarged. He prepared a
comparison chart (Exh. "13") wherein he attached the
enlarged photographs of the questioned signature
(Exh. "13-A") and the standards submitted upon order
of the Court and those that Judge Villanueva
submitted. (Exhs. "13-B" to "13-U", inclusive).
Thereafter, Mr. Ramos made a comparison of the
questioned signature and sample signatures.
Mr. Ramos found significant differences in handwriting
characteristics between the questioned signature and
the standards or sample signatures. The following are
the differences: first, the questioned signature has a
very poor line quality, while the standards submitted
have smooth line quality; second, the initial stroke of
the questioned signature starts below the base line,
while in the sample signatures the same starts from
either above or from the base line and that the said
characteristic is consistent in all the samples; third, the
loops in the questioned signature, especially the two
(2) middle ones, are big and irregular, while in the
sample signatures the loops are regular and uniform;
fourth, the upward stroke in the questioned signature
is shorter and perpendicular to the base line and it
abruptly ends downward with a loop, while in the
standards submitted the same curves towards the left;
fifth, the loop of the terminal stroke in the questioned
signature is on the base line, while in the sample
signatures the same goes beyond the base line (tsn.,
pp. 8 to 10, hearing of November 8, 1991).
Mr. Ramos concluded that the questioned signature
and the sample signature(s) were not written by one
and the same person. He had prepared a report of his
examination and findings. The report is captioned
Questioned Documents Report No. 590-991 and bears
the date October 23, 1991 (Exhs. "12", "12-A" and "12-
B").
Based on the evidence presented, the following are
clearly established: that a child named Ceasar Anthony
P. Villanueva was enrolled in the nursery class of
Montessori Learning Center in Isulan, Sultan Kudarat
during the school year 1990-1991; that said child lives
with respondent Heide Pacaco at No. 1 Juan Street,
Kalawag I, Isulan, Sultan Kudarat; that said Ceasar
Anthony P. Villanueva and Heide Pacaco are the
neighbors of Miss Gemma Panagdato, the teacher who
handled the nursery class of Montessori during the
above-mentioned school year; and that both Gemma
Panagdato and Mila Villaflores, the principal of
Montessori, have not seen the parents of Ceasar
19
Anthony P. Villanueva.
The evidence also established the following: that on
October 2, 1986, the birth of Ceasar Anthony Pacaco
Villanueva was registered in the Local Civil Register of
General Santos City; that after the same was
registered, a certificate of live birth was issued; that in
said birth certificate, the parents of Ceasar Anthony
appear to be "Haide Pacaco" and "Osmundo
Villanueva" ; that as shown further in said certificate,
the informant of the birth of Ceasar Anthony is the
mother "Haide P. Villanueva" ; that the signature of
said informant reads "hbpacaco" ; that Ceasar Anthony
appears to have been born on September 15, 1986 at
General S. District Hospital in General Santos City; that
at the back of the birth certificate under the heading
Affidavit of Acknowledgment, there is another
signature which reads "hbpacaco" above the printed
words "Signature of Mother" ; that the signature of the
informant and the signature above the printed words
"Signature of Mother" in the affidavit of
acknowledgment are both written in green ink and are
strikingly similar to each other; and that the color of
the ink used in writing the signature above the printed
words "Signature of Father" is also green.
The evidence further established the following: that on
January 9, 1991, the birth of one Caesar Anthony
Paciente Villanueva was registered in the Civil Register
of General Santos City; that a certificate of live birth
under Register No. 91-0029 was issued; that as
appearing in said birth certificate, the parents of Caesar
Anthony Paciente Villanueva are Helen Bibit Paciente
and Oscar Mallari Villanueva; that the informant
appears to be "Helen Villanueva", "Mother" and that
said child appears to have been born on September 13,
1985 in San Roque, Makar, General Santos City.
All the evidence presented had been thoroughly
analyzed. But the undersigned found no direct
evidence that shows or tends to show that respondents
have an illicit relationship. No witness testified
establishing said relationship. No letter, postcard, or
picture showing the existence of an illicit affair between
the respondents has been introduced in evidence.
The fact that Ceasar Anthony P. Villanueva exists in
person has been however established. His existence
has been clearly established by the testimonies of Mrs.
Mila Villaflores and Miss Gemma Panagdato of
Montessori Learning Center where the said child was
enrolled as a nursery pupil during the school year 1990-
1991.
Judge Villanueva and Heide Pacaco both testified about
Ceasar Anthony P. Villanueva. Miss Pacaco even admits
that Ceasar Anthony lives with her.
Whose child is Ceasar Anthony P. Villanueva? who are

his parents? Is he the illegitimate son of the
respondents? Again, no direct evidence has been
presented on this point. The only evidence that links
the respondents to the said child is Exh. "D", the
certificate of live birth of Ceasar Anthony Pacaco
Villanueva which was issued by the Local Civil Registrar
of General Santos City. As earlier stated, the said birth
certificate contains data that link respondents to the
child. It also contains signatures which purportedly
belong to the respondents.
The respondents attack Exh. "D" on the following
grounds: that the same is a falsified document; that it
was not known who submitted it to the Local Civil
Registrar of General Santos City; that the Civil
Registrar, Mrs. Belen Lopez, could not recall whether
respondent Heide Pacaco appeared and signed the
same before her; that the affidavit of acknowledgment
was not subscribed and sworn as required; and that it
contains unexplained alterations.
Exhibit "D" is a public document. To destroy it, a clear,
convincing and overwhelming evidence of falsity is
needed. It is well-settled that public documents
executed with the solemnities of law can not be set
aside on light and flimsy evidence. (Asido v. Guzman,
37 Phil. 652; Mendoza v. Phil. Sugar Estates
Development Co., 41 Phil. 475; El Hogar Filipino v.
Olviga, 60 Phil. 17).
The respondents ha(ve) not presented sufficient
evidence to render Exh. "D" invalid in toto. Assuming
that some entries therein are false, the falsities of some
do not render the whole document invalid.
In registration of births, it is not required that the Local
Civil Registrar must have personal knowledge of the
person registering the birth. The fact that the one
registering the birth is not known to the registrar is of
no consequence.
The respondents vigorously hammer on the fact that
Mrs. Belen Lopez, the Local Civil Registrar of General
Santos, could not recall whether respondent Heide
Pacaco has signed the certificate before her. Mrs. Belen
Lopez has fully explained her inability to recall. She
attributed this to the fact that there are about 1,000
births that they register monthly. Because of the
volume, she can not recall whether a particular
informant, mother or father has appeared or signed in
her presence. The explanation of Mrs. Lopez is not
without merit. It is logical, natural and in accord with
the natural course of things. Moreover, Mrs. Lopez had
explained that their manual allows hospitals, doctors,
nurses and even trained "hilots" to prepare the birth
certificate based on the information given by the
informant.
The fact that the affidavit of acknowledgment was not
20
sworn to can not be faulted on the Local Civil Registrar.
Probably, the alleged father or mother did not appear
before Mrs. Lopez. It was probably for this reason that
Mrs. Lopez did not administer the oath as required. But
there is nothing illegal in her failure to subscribe the
acknowledgment. What she did was proper because it
is illegal to subscribe and administer an oath to
someone who has not appeared before her.
There is no intentional alteration made in Exh. "D." The
only correction in said certificate is in its registry
number. Mrs. Lopez says that the number is 5846. The
correction is not initialed. Mrs. Lopez however
attributes the lack of initial to oversight on their part.
They could not avoid making mistakes or errors
because of the volume of registration(s) that they
make daily.
What is the probative value of Exh. "D" against Judge
Villanueva? Does it establish his paternity of Ceasar
Anthony P. Villanueva? The answer is no. Although
Exh. "D" is a public document, it is evidence only of the
fact that gave rise to its execution and of the date of
the latter. (Sec. 23, Rule 132). Stated otherwise, it
constitutes evidence only of the fact of birth of Ceasar
Anthony P. Villanueva on September 15, 1986. It does
not prove that Judge Villanueva is the father even if his
name is stated therein as the father. Proof of his
paternity must be established by other competent
evidence.
The other entries therein are mere hearsay insofar as
Judge Villanueva is concerned. The truth of said entries
must be shown by other competent evidence.
There is another compelling reason why Exh. "D" can
not be considered as evidence of Judge Villanueva’s
paternity of Ceasar Anthony P. Villanueva. The
signature in the space for the "Signature of Father" in
Exh. "D-5" is not Judge Villanueva’s signature. Arcadio
Ramos, the NBI handwriting expert, had examined said
signature and Judge Villanueva’s sample signatures.
Mr. Ramos concluded that the questioned signature in
Exh. "D-5" and the standards or sample signatures of
Judge Villanueva (Exh. "4" to "11" and Exhs. "14" to
"19") were not written by one and the same person.
(See Exh. "12", "12-A" and "12-B." Clearly, Judge
Villanueva did not affix the questioned signature in
Exh. "D-5" .
The findings of Mr. Ramos is (sic) solidly grounded. He
had explained the significant differences in handwriting
characteristics between the questioned signature and
the sample signatures. The differences can be clearly
discerned by a layman. (See Exhs. "13" to "13-U"). He
had testified on the procedure that he took when he
made the examination. He is an expert on questioned
documents. His expertise was acquired from his long
years of experience and from studies that he had

undergone both here and abroad. With his
qualifications and expertise, there is no reason why his
testimony, backed up by chart and documents, can not
be given weight.
The absence of Judge Villanueva’s signature in Exh. "D"
renders said exhibit inadmissible in evidence. On this
point, it has been held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"If birth certificates, which are unsigned by the
presumed father as required by Section 5 of Act No.
3753, and Art. 250 of the Civil Code, are incompetent
evidence even to prove paternity alone, with more
reasons are birth certificates incompetent evidence to
prove recognized filiation." Victoria Baluyot, Et Al.,
represented by Norma Urbano v. Felicidad Baluyot and
the Honorable Court of Appeals, decided June 14,
1990, Case Digest of Supreme Court Decisions, Vol. 7,
No. 1, June 1-27, 1990, page 440).
Since Exh. "D" is not admissible against Judge
Villanueva as proof of his filiation to Ceasar Anthony P.
Villanueva and there is no other direct and primary
proof showing that he ha(d) an illicit affair with his co-
respondent, his exoneration is therefore in order.
Clearly, there is no clear and convincing evidence
against him.
Respondent Pacaco admits having (the) care and
custody of Ceasar Anthony. Aside from her admission,
there are other competent evidence showing that said
child is under her care.
Exhibit "D" contains entries that show or tend to show
that she is the mother of Ceasar Anthony. The middle
name of the child is stated therein as "Pacaco." (Exh.
"D-2"). The mother’s maiden name is stated as "Haide
Pacaco." (Exh. "D-4"). The signature of the informant
clearly reads "hbpacaco." (Exh. "D-4"). In the affidavit
of acknowledgment (Exh. "D-5"), the name "Heide B.
Pacaco" is clearly written therein. In the space for the
signature of the mother is the signature which clearly
reads "hbpacaco." The signature in Exh. "D-4" and the
handwritten entries in Exh. "D-5", including the
signature "hbpacaco," are all written in green ink in the
original birth certificate.
It has been stated above that public documents are
evidence only of the facts which gave rise to their
execution and of the date of the latter. Pursuant
thereto, only the fact of birth of Ceasar Anthony on
September 15, 1986 may be admitted as evidence
against respondent Pacaco. But there are compelling
factors that negate the application of said rule insofar
as respondent Heide Pacaco is concerned. These
factors are discussed below.
The signatures "hbpacaco" in the column for the
informant (Exh. "D-4") and in the affidavit of
21
acknowledgment (Exh. "D-5") are strikingly similar to
the signatures that said respondent affixed to her
answer to the complaint. (See pages 15 & 16 of the
record). The similarities can be clearly discerned. One
need not be a handwriting expert to notice the
similarities.
Respondent Pacaco has been the Clerk of Court of
Judge Villanueva for about twelve years. Considering
their official relationship during that period, it is but
natural for Judge Villanueva to acquire knowledge of
Heidi Pacaco’s handwriting. He had always seen her
write. He had probably seen her affixed (sic) her
signatures for countless times. He had seen writings
purporting to be hers upon which he had acted or been
charged. Because of their long association, Judge
Villanueva can undoubtedly identify Heide Pacaco’s
handwriting or signature. And this is precisely what he
did in this case. When he was shown the signature
"hbpacaco" in Exh "D-4", he answered that the said
signature looks like Pacaco’s signature. (tsn., pages 11
to 12, hearing of June 18, 1991). When he was shown
the signature "hbpacaco" in Exh. "D-5", he also
answered that the same "seems to be that of the Clerk
of Court, Heide Pacaco." (tsn., page 13, hearing of
June 18, 1991). Judge Villanueva’s identification of the
above signatures constitutes proof that respondent
Pacaco owns those signatures.
Mr. Arcadio Ramos, the NBI handwriting expert, when
shown the signatures "hbpacaco" in Exhs. "D-4" and
"D-5", testified that said signatures appear to have
been written by one and the same person. He based
his opinion on the fact that both signatures have good
line quality, the same pictorial appearance and the
same letter combination (tsn., pp. 37 to 38, hearing of
November 8, 1991).
Because of the foregoing considerations, the
undersigned is convinced that the signatures
"hbpacaco" in the certificate of live birth of Ceasar
Anthony Pacaco Villanueva belong to respondent Heide
Pacaco.
Is respondent Heide Pacaco the mother of Ceasar
Anthony P. Villanueva, the child who was enrolled in
the nursery class of Montessori in Isulan in school year
1990-1991? The undersigned is convinced that she is
the mother. The signatures that she affixed in the birth
certificate of Ceasar Anthony are admissions of her
filiation with the latter. They are evidence against her.
"The act, declaration or admission of a party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him."
(Sec. 26, Rule 132).
Judge Villanueva has testified about the antagonism,
insolence and evasiveness of Heide Pacaco when he
confronted her about Exh. "D." This fact was confirmed

by Pacaco. Instead of explaining or denying, she acted
unnaturally. Her outburst is contrary to human
experience and behavior. Instead of admitting or
denying that Ceasar Anthony is her son, she told Judge
Villanueva that the latter is not the only Villanueva in
the world. (tsn., page 12, hearing of June 18, 1991).
The undersigned is not convinced that Ceasar Anthony
P. Villanueva is Caesar Anthony Paciente Villanueva,
the son of spouses Helen Paciente and Oscar
Villanueva, who was entrusted to the care of
respondent Pacaco. Said respondent could not even
recall when the child was entrusted to her by her
alleged second cousin Helen Paciente. She alleged that
she has a very close relationship with the latter yet she
could not recall when her second cousin left for Saudi
Arabia. She does not know when Helen allegedly got
married to Oscar Villanueva. These things, trivial they
may seem, are competent gauge (sic) in determining
when one is telling the truth or not.
Helen Paciente is allegedly communicating with her
and sending her money for the sustenance and
schooling of Caesar Anthony. Yet respondent Pacaco
was unable to present in evidence any letter, telegram,
postcard or picture that her cousin might have sent her.
She has not presented any advice or notice from Helen
evidencing remittances of money that the latter sent to
her from Saudi Arabia. No bankbook showing deposits
of money that she made in behalf of Caesar Anthony
has been presented. Moreover, if the child had actually
been entrusted to her care, she could have taken the
pain of enrolling him at Montessori or signing his
progress report card or Form 138. She could not have
entrusted the said chores to a mere "yaya" like Judith
Barraca. She could have attended programs or school
activities of Montessori, considering that she is the
guardian of Caesar Anthony. She could have
introduced Helen Paciente To Gemma Panagdato, the
teacher of Caesar Anthony and her neighbor, when the
former allegedly went home on vacation in December
1990. She could have brought Helen to Ceasar
Anthony’s school and introduced her to the teachers
and the principal.cralawnad
As per Exhibit "1-Pacaco", the birth of Caesar Anthony
Paciente Villanueva was registered under the late
registration system. The same was registered after the
filing of this case. Its registration was effected on
January 9, 1991 upon respondent Pacaco’s advice. Said
respondent allegedly advised Helen Paciente to register
the birth of Caesar Anthony because of the
misconception of people that she is the mother. The
undersigned is not convinced.
Caesar Anthony Paciente Villanueva was allegedly born
in San Roque, Makar, General Santos City on
September 13, 1985. His birth was allegedly attended
by Dr. Jesus Alicarte. The parents were supposedly
22
married. Despite these considerations, his birth was
not registered.
General Santos City is highly urbanized. As a matter of
fact, it is one of (the) growth centers not only of
Mindanao but of the Philippines. It is unbelievable that
a physician, who is connected with a government
hospital and well-versed in the registration of births,
would forget to register the birth of a child which he
attended. Exhibit "1-Pacaco" is clearly a belated
attempt on the part of respondent Pacaco to hid(e) her
maternity of Ceasar Anthony Pacaco Villanueva.
Who is the father of Ceasar Anthony Pacaco
Villanueva? There is no evidence presented as to his
paternity.
The absence of evidence as to the paternity of Ceasar
Anthony Pacaco Villanueva is not however of utmost
importance insofar as the resolution of this case is
concerned. What matters is whether or not the offense
charged has been committed.
Having a child with a man, though unknown, is gross
immorality for an unmarried woman in government
service. It constitutes just cause for administrative
sanction.
The undersigned finds that there exists substantial and
convincing evidence against respondent Heide Pacaco
for gross immorality. 7
Investigating Judge Sucaldito consequently
recommended the separation from the service of
respondent Heide B. Pacaco and the exoneration of
respondent Judge Osmundo M. Villanueva for lack of
evidence against him.
We have thoroughly reviewed the testimonial and
documentary evidence IVs-a-vis the findings and
conclusion of the investigating judge and we find that
respondent Heide B. Pacaco is indeed guilty as
charged. The only defense resorted to by respondent
Pacaco, that of mere denial, is glaringly weak and
unavailing. She simply denies that the signature
appearing on the Certificate of Live Birth of Ceasar
Anthony Pacaco Villanueva, marked in evidence as
Exhibit "D," belong to her. However, when the
investigating judge suggested during the hearing that
her signature be likewise submitted to the NBI for
examination, her counsel manifested that he will
consult the NBI expert when the latter is presented as
witness for respondent Judge Villanueva. 8 But then
the records will show that the same was never done by
respondent Pacaco nor her counsel, despite the fact
that a favorable result could necessarily have bolstered
her assertions of innocence and her claim that she did
not sign Exhibit "D." There was nothing to prevent
respondent Pacaco from submitting her questioned

signature for examination, and she could not have
been unaware of the importance thereof. The lame
excuse offered by her counsel, that they might not be
able to shoulder the expenses, is unacceptable
considering that the investigating judge had already
informed them that the examination could be made
without expense since respondent Pacaco is a
government employee.
That the signature appearing in Exhibit "D" actually
belongs to respondent Heide B. Pacaco was confirmed
by respondent Judge Villanueva when, upon being
confronted with said certificate of live birth, he testified
that it seems to be the signature of respondent Pacaco.
It is not denied that respondent Pacaco has been the
clerk of court of Judge Villanueva for about twelve
years, hence, it is safe to conclude that the latter is
very familiar with the former’s signature. Significantly,
respondent Pacaco did not counter the aforesaid
testimony of respondent Judge Villanueva, save for her
aforestated general denial of having signed Exhibit "D."
Under the present Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved
by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of
such person, because he has seen the person write, or
has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
witness has acted or been charged, and has thus
acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The said section further provides that evidence
respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. As noted by
the investigating judge in his report, in the record of
this case is a copy of respondent Pacaco’s answer to
the complaint, the first and second pages whereof are
signed by her. 9 We have carefully compared the
signatures "hbpacaco" thereon and the signatures
"hbpacaco" marked as Exhibits "D-4" and "D-5" on the
birth certificate a copy of which is in the record of this
case, 10 and we are reasonably convinced of the
authorship by respondent Pacaco of the questioned
signatures on Exhibit "D," the birth certificate of Ceasar
Anthony Pacaco Villanueva.
As we have heretofore stated, the exacting standards
of ethics and morality imposed upon court employees
and judges are reflective of the premium placed on the
image of the courts of justice, and that image of a court
of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official
or otherwise, of the men and women who work
thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest of its
personnel. It thus becomes the imperative and sacred
duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its
good name and standing as a true temple of justice. 11
23
We consequently agree with and hereby APPROVE the
report and recommendation submitted by Investigating
Judge Romeo S. Sucaldito finding respondent Heide B.
Pacaco, Clerk of Court of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Bagumbayan-Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat,
GUILTY of gross immorality and recommending her
separation from the service. Accordingly, said
respondent is hereby dismissed from her present
position with forfeiture of retirement benefits, except
accrued leave credits, and with disqualification from
any appointive position in the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. The
complaint against Judge Osmundo M. Villanueva is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. Nos. 134074-75. January 16, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
EMILIANO DURANAN, a.k.a. Kalbo,accused-appellant.
DECISION
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, xxx, finding accused-appellant Emiliano
Duranan, a.k.a. Kalbo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two counts of rape and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape
and to indemnify private complainant AAA in the
amount of P50,000.00.
The information in Criminal Case No. Q-94-55711
alleged
That on or about the 8th of March 1994, in xxx,
Philippines, said accused with lewd designs and by
means of force and intimidation, to wit, by then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously taking
advantage of undersigned complainant, AAAs
feeblemindedness and thereafter have carnal
knowledge with (sic) the undersigned complainant
against her will and without her consent.
Contrary to law.
The information in Criminal Case No. Q-94-55712
averred
That on or about the 7th of March 1994, in xxx,
Philippines, the said accused with lewd designs and by
means of force and intimidation, to wit, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously taking (sic)
advantage of the undersigned (sic) feeblemindedness,
and thereafter have carnal knowledge with (sic) the
undersigned complainant against her will and without
her consent.
Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not
guilty to each charge of rape against him, whereupon
he was tried.
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely,
complainant AAA, complainants mother BBB, and the
attending medico-legal officer at Camp Crame, Dr.
Rosalina O. Cosidon.
Complainant AAA, who was 25 years old at the time of
the incidents in question, is considered to be retarded
and finished up to the sixth grade only. She is
unemployed and simply does household chores for her
family. Accused-appellant lived with the complainants
family in the same apartment in xxx where he rented a
room that he shared with several other people.
The first rape took place in the afternoon of March 7,
1994. AAA was standing by the door of her
grandfathers house when accused-appellant suddenly
placed his arm on her neck and dragged her inside the
common bathroom.
Complainant said that accused-appellant kissed her
and then removed her shorts and underwear as he held
her hands with his other hand. She did not cry for help
because accused-appellant threatened her that he
would get angry if she did.
She claimed that accused-appellant was able to rape
her while standing up despite her resistance.
After the incident, complainant was sent out of the
bathroom and went directly home.
The second incident occurred in the early morning of
March 8, 1994, according to complainant. She said she
was cleaning the premises of her family residence
when accused-appellant pulled her from her house and
took her to his room. According to complainant,
accused-appellant asked his brother, who was then
cooking, to leave the room. As soon as his brother had
left, accused-appellant laid her on the floor and raped
her.
Complainant said she was forced to submit to accused-
appellants lust because of his threats.
After the incident, accused-appellant sent her letters
professing love for her and telling her how beautiful
she was. Complainant said she tore up the letters after
reading them.
In another incident, on March 12, 1994, accused-
appellant asked complainant to let him use their
bathroom. However, after being given permission, he
grabbed complainant by the hand, pulled her inside the
bathroom,
and started kissing her on the lips and neck after
24
closing the door behind them. He only stopped
molesting her when he heard somebody coming.
BBB testified that she saw her daughter leave the
bathroom, quickly followed by accused-appellant. BBB
noticed that her daughters lower lip was bruised. When
she confronted her daughter about it, the latter
revealed for the first time what had happened to her.
BBB went to Camp Karingal, together with complainant
and her other children, CCC and DDD, where they filed
affidavits and two informations. They then took
complainant to Camp Crame for examination. Dr.
Rosalina O. Cosidon, who examined complainant,
submitted a report which contained the following
findings:
GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female
subject. Breasts are hemispherical with pale brown
areola and nipples from which no secretions could be
pressed out. Abdomen is flat and soft. There is injury
noted at the head;
Contusion, mucosa of the lower lip, measuring 1.2 x
0.3 cm, and 1 cm left of the anterior midline.
GENITAL
There is an abundant growth of pubic hair. Labia
minora are full, convex and gaping with the pinkish
brown and congested labia minor presenting in
between. On separating, the same is disclosed an
abraded posterior fourchette and an elastic, fleshy type
hymen with shallow healing laceration at 5 oclock
position. External vaginal orifice offers strong
resistance to the introduction of the examining index
finger and the virgin-sized vaginal speculum. Vaginal
canal is narrow with prominent rugosities.
CONCLUSION
Cervix is normal in size, color and consistency.
Findings are compatible with recent loss of virginity.
Barring unforeseen complications, it is estimated that
the above injury will resolve in 7 to 9 days
REMARKS
Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative for
gram-negative diplococci and for spermatozoa.
Dr. Cosidon explained that the term congested used in
reference to the labia minora meant that there was
some inflammation that could have been caused by
friction due to intercourse.
Taken together with the presence of a shallow hymenal
laceration, this finding indicates the possibility of
intercourse that caused complainants loss of virginity
within the last five days.

Accused-appellant filed a demurrer to the evidence, but
the trial court denied it in its November 17, 1995 order.
The defense thereafter presented its witnesses,
namely, accused-appellant Emiliano Duranan, accused-
appellants alleged roommates, Rico Bariquit and Carlito
Catubig, and his wife Carlita Duranan.
With respect to the first incident of rape, which
allegedly took place in the afternoon of March 7, 1994,
it is contended that accused-appellant could not have
committed such, because his daily schedule was such
that he was not at home at that time. He said that
because of his work, he used to leave the house at 3
a.m., arrive home at 1 p.m., and leave for work again
at 3 p.m. and arrive home at 6:30 p.m.
He also alleged that on March 7, 1994 he left and was
with Rico Bariquit throughout the day.
As to the second incident of rape, accused-appellant
contends that it was impossible for him to commit rape
in his room because there were at least six other
people there at the time (i.e., morning of March 8,
1994) of the alleged rape.
He charged that the complaints were filed against him
because complainants family wanted to evict him and
his housemates from their house.
Rico Bariquit and Carlito Catubig confirmed accused-
appellants schedule.
Bariquit claimed that he was always with accused-
appellant and knew where he was all the time. Both
witnesses said rape could not have been committed in
a room where at least five other people were sleeping.
BBB and complainant denied seeing Rico Bariquit and
Carlito Catubig before the two testified in court.
Based on the evidence of the parties, the trial court
rendered a decision on April 22, 1998, finding the
accused-appellant guilty of two counts of rape. The
dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court
finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
principal for two (2) counts of rape punishable under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11 of R. A. 7659, and sentences him to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of two (2) counts of
reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties and
to indemnify the private complainant the amount of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50, 000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Hence this appeal.
Accused-appellant assigns two errors as having been
allegedly committed by the trial court:
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE
25
OFFENDED PARTY IS DEPRIVED OF
REASON DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF
TESTIMONY BY A COMPETENT MEDICAL
EXPERT TO THAT EFFECT AND DESPITE
STRONG EVIDENCE ON THE RECORD TO
THE CONTRARY.
II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
ALTERNATIVELY HOLDING THAT THE
ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF RAPING THE
PRIVATE OFFENDED WOMAN THROUGH
FORCE AND INTIMIDATION.
First. Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be
convicted of rape since the victims mental age was not
proven.
He argues that under Art. 335(2) of the Revised Penal
Code, an essential element for the prosecution for rape
of a mental retardate is a psychiatric evaluation of the
complainants mental age to determine if her mental
age is under twelve.
He further claims that only in cases where the
retardation is apparent due to the presence of physical
deformities symptomatic of mental retardation can the
mental evaluation be waived.
The contention has no merit.
Rule 130, 50 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides:
Opinion of Ordinary witnesses. -- The opinion of a
witness for which proper basis is given may be received
in evidence regarding ---
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has
adequate knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient
familiarity; and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he
is sufficiently acquainted.
Discussing this provision of the Rules on Evidence, Sen.
Vicente J. Francisco writes in his treatise:
The mother of an offended party in a case of rape,
though not a psychiatrist, if she knows the physical and
mental condition of the party, how she was born, what
she is suffering from, and what her attainments are, is
competent to testify on the matter.
....

It is competent for the ordinary witness to give his
opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a person,
provided the witness has had sufficient opportunity to
observe the speech, manner, habits, and conduct of
the person in question. Generally, it is required that the
witness details the factors and reasons upon which he
bases his opinion before he can testify as to what it is.
As the Supreme Court of Vermont said: A non-expert
witness may give his opinion as to the sanity or insanity
of another, when based upon conversations or dealings
which he has had with such person, or upon his
appearance, or upon any fact bearing upon his mental
condition, with the witness own knowledge and
observation, he having first testified to such
conversations, dealings, appearance or other observed
facts, as the basis for his opinion.
In the case at bar, BBB testified on the mental
condition of her daughter, thus:
Q: How would you described your daughter? (sic)
A: When she was still a child while walking she
accidentally bumped her head and then on she acted
quite not normal from then on we noticed changes
because she acted like a child.
Q: How old is (sic) AAA when this happened?
A: 3 to 4 years old.
Q: At the age of 25, how would you described? (sic)
A: She still thinks like a child but from her narration or
statement we can see that her declaration are (sic) true
or believable.
Q: You mean to say that she could be intelligent.
A: Yes, ma'am. She finished her elementary and I can
say she is quite intelligent.
Q: So she can somewhat understand what is
happening around us?
A: Yes, she can understand things around as along as
she would be provided some basis and some reference
inorder (sic) to establish time, places and incident (sic).
Q: At your house do you still assigned (sic) household
chores(?)
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Could she relied (sic) upon madam witness?
A: Yes maam.
To rebut this, accused-appellant points to the mothers
statement that complainant is quite intelligent. The
statement that complainant is quite intelligent must be
read in the context of BBBs previous statement that
complainant thinks like a child but from her narration
or statement we can see that her declaration are (sic)
true or believable. Thus, what complainants mother
meant was that complainant, although she thought like
a child, nevertheless could tell others what happened
to her. Indeed, even the trial court admonished the
defense counsel not to use inculpatory questions
because complainant might give inculpatory answers.
At another stage of the trial, the trial court reminded
counsel,
26
The witness [complainant] is not very intelligent. I
think the witness cannot even distinguish dates.
Thus, the trial court itself found in dealing with
complainant that she was mentally deficient. The rule
that findings of fact of the trial court should not be
disturbed since the trial court is in the best position to
determine the findings of fact cannot be more apt than
in this case.
Accused-appellant cites the medico-legal report which
describes complainant as coherent and contends that
this is an evaluation of the mental state of complainant.
This contention is totally without basis. The
medicolegal report categorically states that the
purpose of the medical examination is limited to
determining whether the complainant had been
sexually abused.
In other words, the purpose of the examination was to
determine her physical, not her mental, state.
Second. On the alternative, accused-appellant argues
that indeed, complainant could not be a competent
witness if she is a retardate. Under Rule 130, 20, any
person who can perceive and make known his/her
perception is qualified to be a witness. In this case,
although complainant is a retardate, she was
nevertheless able to tell the court what accused-
appellant had done to her and to answer the questions
of both the prosecutor and the defense counsel. This is
clear from her testimony, thus:
Q: Now, you said that you were raped by Emiliano
Duranan. Where did this happen?
A: In the bathroom of my Tiya Ineng.
Q: Where is this bathroom of your Tiya Ineng?
A: This bathroom is located at an alley, a pasillo
towards our house.
Q: Where is your house, Miss Witness?
A: Our house is located at xxx.
Q: You said that you were raped inside the bathroom
of your Tiya Ineng. How were you able to get inside
that bathroom of your Tiya Ineng?
A: I was able to get inside the bathroom of Tiya Ineng
because Emiliano Duranan pulled me inside.
Q: How did Emiliano Duranan pulled you? (sic)
A: He pulled me inside the bathroom by holding his arm
against my neck, pulling me towards the bathroom.
....
Q: When Emiliano Duranan pulled you inside the
bathroom, what happened after that?
A: He kissed me.
(Witness is gesturing his (sic) hands towards her neck)
And he had my panty removed.
Q: Now, you said that when you were inside the
bathroom of your Tiya Ineng, Emiliano Duranan kissed
you in (sic) your lips?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: Aside from kissing you, what did Emiliano do, if any?
A: Aside from kissing me on my lips and my neck, he

removed my underwear, my panty and he inserted his
sex organ into my sex organ.
Q: When Kalbo inserted his sex organ in your sex
organ, what position were you then?
A: We were standing.
Q: Inside the bathroom?
A: Yes, maam.
Q: AAA, do you know how to tell the days of the week?
A: No, maam.
Q: How about the dates?
A: No, maam.
Q: Do you know what day is today?
A: Wednesday.
Q: How about yesterday, what date was that?
A: Tuesday.
Q: Do you know what date is today?
COURT:
She knows that today is Wednesday but she doesnt
know the exact date.
....
Q: You also testified before that you were rape (sic) by
Kalbo twice, is that correct?
A: Yes, Maam.
Q: When was the second time?
A: The second time at their house that was Tuesday.
Q: Is that the next day? After the incident in the
bathroom?
A: Yes, Maam.
....
Q: So you said that you were laid down by Kalbo on
the floor and then Kalbo kissed you, where did Kalbo
kiss you?
A: From (sic) my lips.
Q: After that what did Kalbo do if any?
A: Proceeded to removed (sic) my panty and inserted
his organ to mine.
At all events, any objection to the competency of
complainant to testify should have been raised by the
defense at the outset. It cannot be raised for the first
time in this appeal.
It has been held:
A party may waive his objections to the competency of
a witness and permit him to testify.... [I]f, after such
incompetency appears, there is failure to make timely
objection, by a party having knowledge of the
incompetency, the objection will be deemed waived,
whether it is on the ground of want of mental capacity
or for some other reason. If the objection could have
been taken during the trial, a new trial will be refused
and the objection will not be available on writ of error.
Third. Accused-appellant contends that the absence of
injury sustained by complainant negates the presence
of any force and intimidation. This contention is
likewise without merit. The presence or absence of
injuries is not essential in proving rape. What is
27
essential is proof that sexual intercourse with a woman
was accomplished without her consent. In this case,
the absence of consent is shown by the fact that
complainant is a mental retardate vulnerable to
intimidation by accused-appellant.
Indeed, the degree of force or intimidation required for
the act to constitute rape is relative, and must be
viewed in the light of the complainants perception and
judgment at the time of the commission of the offense.
What is vital is that such force or intimidation be
sufficient to consummate the purpose that accused-
appellant had in mind.
In this case, due to the complainants mental
retardation, the force or intimidation required is not
very great since it does not take much to force a child
into submission. Indeed, complainant said she
submitted to accused-appellants demands because she
was afraid he would get angry at her if she refused
them.
In People v. Rosare, it was held that, in the instances
where the victim is so weak in intellect that she is
incapable of rational consent, the force applied may be
constructive.
In sum, the mental retardation of the complainant is
proven by the testimony of her mother, the trial courts
observations during the trial of her demeanor,
behavior, and her intelligence, while the fact of sexual
intercourse is proven by the medico-legal certificate. In
addition, the prosecution proved the presence of force
and intimidation, and the court appreciated such.
The intimidation, in this case, is constituted by the
threats that accused-appellant made to the
complainant, not to mention the force employed by
accused-appellant in placing his arm on the
complainants neck and holding her hands while
undressing her.
However, the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
should be doubled because there are two counts of
rape. In addition, complainant should also be awarded
P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape,
or a total of P100,000.00 in accordance with our
rulings.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, xxx, finding accusedappellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED,
with the modification that the award of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity is increased to P100,000.00 and, in
addition, accused-appellant is ordered to pay
complainant AAA the further sum of P100,000.00 as
moral damages.

G.R. No. 207662, April 13, 2016 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. FABIAN
URZAIS Y LANURIAS, ALEX BAUTISTA, AND RICKY
BAUTISTA, Accused.; FABIAN URZAIS Y LANURIAS,
Accused-Appellant.
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 207662, April 13, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v. FABIAN URZAIS Y LANURIAS, ALEX BAUTISTA,
AND RICKY BAUTISTA, Accused.
FABIAN URZAIS Y LANURIAS, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us for review is the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in C.A. G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04812 dated 19
November 2012 which dismissed the appeal of
accused-appellant Fabian Urzais y Lanurias and
affirmed with modification the Judgment2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City, Branch
27, in Criminal Case No. 13155 finding accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of carnapping with homicide through the use of
unlicensed firearm.
Accused-appellant, together with co-accused Alex
Bautista and Ricky Bautista, was charged with Violation
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539, otherwise known as
the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, with homicide through the use of an
unlicensed firearm. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of November, 2002, or
prior thereto, in the City of Cabanatuan, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating with and abetting one another, with
intent to gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, steal and carry away, a Isuzu
Highlander car, colored Forest Green, with Plate No.
UUT-838 of one MARIO MAGDATO, valued at FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00)
Philippine Currency, owned by and belonging to said
MARIO MAGDATO, against his will and consent and to
his damage and prejudice in the aforestated amount of
P500,000.00, and on the occasion of the carnapping,
did assault and use personal violence upon the person
of one MARIO MAGDATO, that is, by shooting the latter
with an unlicensed firearm, a Norinco cal. 9mm Pistol
28
with Serial No. 508432, thereby inflicting upon him
gunshot wound on the head which caused his
death.3ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
At his arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not
guilty. The trial proceeded against him. His two co-
accused remain at large.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Shirley
Magdato (Shirley), Senior Police Officer 2 Fernando
Figueroa (SPO2 Figueroa) and Dr. Jun Concepcion (Dr.
Concepcion).
Shirley, the widow of the victim, testified mainly
regarding her husband's disappearance and discovery
of his death. She narrated that her husband used to
drive for hire their Isuzu Highlander with plate number
UUT-838 from Pulilan, Bulacan to the LRT Terminal in
Metro Manila. On 12 November 2002, around four
o'clock in the morning, her husband left their house in
Pulilan and headed for the terminal at the Pulilan Public
Market to ply his usual route. When her husband did
not return home that day, Shirley inquired of his
whereabouts from his friends to no avail. Shirley went
to the terminal the following day and the barker there
told her that a person had hired their vehicle to go to
Manila. Shirley then asked her neighbors to call her
husband's mobile phone but no one answered. At
around 10 o'clock in the morning of 13 November
2002, her husband's co-members in the drivers'
association arrived at their house and thereafter
accompanied Shirley to her husband's supposed
location. At the Sta.Rosa police station in Nueva Ecija,
Shirley was informed that her husband had passed
away. She then took her husband's body home.4
Shirley retrieved their vehicle on 21 November 2002
from the Cabanatuan City Police Station. She then had
it cleaned as it had blood stains and reeked of a foul
odor.5
SPO2 Figueroa of the Philippine National Police (PNP),
Cabanatuan City, testified concerning the
circumstances surrounding accused-appellant's arrest.
He stated that in November 2002, their office received
a "flash alarm" from the Bulacan PNP about an alleged
carnapped Isuzu Highlander in forest green color.
Thereafter, their office was informed that the subject
vehicle had been seen in the AGL Subdivision,
Cabanatuan City. Thus, a team conducted surveillance
there and a checkpoint had been set up outside its
gate. Around three o'clock in the afternoon of 20
November 2002, a vehicle that fit the description of the
carnapped vehicle appeared. The officers apprehended
the vehicle and asked the driver, accused-appellant,
who had been alone, to alight therefrom. When the
officers noticed the accused-appellant's waist to be
bulging of something, he was ordered to raise his shirt
and a gun was discovered tucked there. The officers
confiscated the unlicensed 9mm Norinco, with
magazine and twelve (12) live ammunitions. The

officers confirmed that the engine of the vehicle
matched that of the victim's. Found inside the vehicle
were two (2) plates with the marking "UUT-838" and a
passport. Said vehicle contained traces of blood on the
car seats at the back and on its flooring. The officers
detained accused-appellant and filed a case for illegal
possession of firearm against him. The subject firearm
was identified in open court.6
Dr. Concepcion testified about the wounds the victim
sustained and the cause of his death. He stated that
the victim sustained one (1) gunshot wound in the
head, the entrance of which is at the right temporal
area exiting at the opposite side. The victim also had
several abrasions on the right upper eyelid, the tip of
the nose and around the right eye. He also had blisters
on his cheek area which could have been caused by a
lighted cigarette.7
Accused-appellant testified in his defense and
interposed the defense of denial.
Accused-appellant testified that he had ordered in
October 2002 from brothers Alex and Ricky Bautista,
an owner-type jeepney worth P60,000.00 for use in his
business. The brothers, however, allegedly delivered
instead a green Isuzu Highlander around half past
three o'clock in the afternoon of 13 November 2002.
The brothers told accused-appellant that his
P60,000.00 would serve as initial payment with the
remaining undetermined amount to be paid a week
after. Accused-appellant agreed to this, amazed that
he had been given a new vehicle at such low price.
Accused-appellant then borrowed money from
someone to pay the balance but the brothers never
replied to his text messages. On 16 November 2002,
his friend Oscar Angeles advised him to surrender the
vehicle as it could be a "hot car." Accused-appellant
was initially hesitant to this idea as he wanted to
recover the amount he had paid but he eventually
decided to sell the vehicle. He removed its plate
number and placed a "for sale" sign at the back. On 18
November 2002, he allegedly decided to surrender the
vehicle upon advice by a certain Angie. But when he
arrived home in the afternoon of that day, he alleged
that he was arrested by Alex Villareal, a member of the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of
Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija.8 Accused-appellant also
testified that he found out in jail the owner of the
vehicle and his unfortunate demise.9 On cross-
examination, accused-appellant admitted that his real
name is "Michael Tapayan y Baguio" and that he used
the name Fabian Urzais to secure a second passport in
2001 to be able to return to Taiwan.10
The other defense witness, Oscar Angeles (Angeles),
testified that he had known the accused-appellant as
Michael Tapayan when they became neighbors in the
AGL subdivision. Accused-appellant also served as his
29
computer technician. Angeles testified that accused-
appellant previously did not own any vehicle until the
latter purchased the Isuzu Highlander for P30,000.00
from the latter's friends in Bulacan. Angeles advised
accused-appellant that the vehicle might have been
carnapped due to its very low selling price. Angeles
corroborated accused-appellant's testimony that he did
not want to surrender the car at first as he wanted to
recover his payment for it.11
On 18 October 2010, the RTC rendered judgment
finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged.
The RTC anchored its ruling on the disputable
presumption that a person found in possession of a
thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the
taker and the doer of the whole act.12 It held that the
elements of carnapping were proven by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt through the
recovery of the purportedly carnapped vehicle from the
accused-appellant's possession and by his continued
possession thereof even after the lapse of one week
from the commission of the crime.13 The dispositive
portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court
finds accused Fabian Urzais alias Michael Tapayan y
Lanurias GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of carnapping as defined and penalized by Republic Act
6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) as amended by
R.A. 7659 with homicide thru the use of unlicensed
firearm. Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua.
In the service of the sentence, accused shall be
credited with the full time of his preventive detention if
he agreed voluntarily and in writing to abide by the
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners
pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused is further sentenced to indemnify the heirs of
Mario Magdato the sum of Php50,000.00 as death
indemnity, Php50,000.00 as moral damages, and
Php672,000.00 as loss of earning
capacity.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 22
December 2010.15
On 19 November 2012, the CA rendered the assailed
judgment affirming with modification the trial court's
decision. The CA noted the absence of eyewitnesses to
the crime yet ruled that sufficient circumstantial
evidence was presented to prove accused-appellant's
guilt, solely, accused-appellant's possession of the
allegedly carnapped vehicle.
Accused-appellant appealed his conviction before this
Court. In a Resolution16 dated 12 August 2013,
accused-appellant and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) were asked to file their respective

supplemental briefs if they so desired. Accused-
appellant filed a Supplemental Brief17 while the OSG
manifested18 that it adopts its Brief19 filed before the
CA for the purpose of the instant appeal.
Before the Court, accused-appellant vehemently
maintains that there is no direct evidence that he
robbed and murdered the victim; and that the lower
courts erred in convicting him based on circumstantial
evidence consisting only of the fact of his possession
of the allegedly carnapped vehicle. Accused-appellant
decries the appellate court's error in relying on the
disputable presumption created by law under Section 3
(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court to conclude that by
virtue of his possession of the vehicle, he is considered
the author of both the carnapping of the vehicle and
the killing of its owner. Accused-appellant asserts that
such presumption does not hold in the case at bar.
The Court agrees.
Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to
prove two (2) things: 1. The fact of the crime, i.e. the
presence of all the elements of the crime for which the
accused stands charged; and (2) the fact that the
accused is the perpetrator of the crime. The Court finds
the prosecution unable to prove both aspects, thus, it
is left with no option but to acquit on reasonable doubt.
R.A. No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as
amended, defines carnapping as the taking, with intent
to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another
without the latter's consent, or by means of violence
against or intimidation against persons, or by using
force upon things.20 By the amendment in Section 20
of R.A. No. 7659, Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act
now reads:
SEC. 14. Penally for Carnapping. Any person who is
found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in
Section two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value
of the motor vehicle taken, be punished by
imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and
eight months and not more than seventeen years and
four months, when the carnapping is committed
without violence or intimidation of persons, or force
upon things, and by imprisonment for not less than
seventeen years and four months and not more than
thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by
means of violence or intimidation of any person, or
force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner,
driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is
killed or raped in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Emphasis
supplied)
Three amendments have been made to the original
Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act: (1) the penalty
of life imprisonment was changed to reclusion
30
perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the change
of the phrase "in the commission of the carnapping" to
"in the course of the commission of the carnapping or
on the occasion thereof." This third amendment
clarifies the law's intent to make the offense a special
complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs
1 to 4 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with
violence against or intimidation of persons. Thus,
under the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-
Carnapping Act, the prosecution has to prove the
essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide
or murder of the victim, and more importantly, it must
show that the original criminal design of the culprit was
carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated "in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof." Consequently, where the elements
of carnapping are not proved, the provisions of the
Anti-Carnapping Act would cease to be applicable and
the homicide or murder (if proven) would be
punishable under the Revised Penal Code.21
In the instant case, the Court finds the charge of
carnapping unsubstantiated for failure of the
prosecution to prove all its elements. For one, the trial
court's decision itself makes no mention of any direct
evidence indicating the guilt of accused-appellant.
Indeed, the CA confirmed the lack of such direct
evidence.22 Both lower courts solely based accused-
appellant's conviction of the special complex crime on
one circumstantial evidence and that is, the fact of his
possession of the allegedly carnapped vehicle.
The Court notes that the prosecution's evidence only
consists of the fact of the victim's disappearance, the
discovery of his death and the details surrounding
accused-appellant's arrest on rumors that the vehicle
he possessed had been carnapped. Theres is
absolutely no evidence supporting the prosecution's
theory that the victim's vehicle had been carnapped,
much less that the accused-appellant is the author of
the same.
Certainly, it is not only by direct evidence that an
accused may be convicted, but for circumstantial
evidence to sustain a conviction, following are the
guidelines: (1) there is more than one circumstance;
(2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is as such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.23 Decided cases expound
that the circumstantial evidence presented and proved
must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused,
to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. All
the circumstances must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other
rationale except that of guilt.24

In the case at bar, notably there is only one
circumstantial evidence. And this sole circumstantial
evidence of possession of the vehicle does not lead to
an inference exclusively consistent with guilt.
Fundamentally, prosecution did not offer any iota of
evidence detailing the seizure of the vehicle, much less
with accused-appellant's participation. In fact, there is
even a variance concerning how accused-appellant was
discovered to be in possession of the vehicle. The
prosecution's uncorroborated evidence says accused-
appellant was apprehended while driving the vehicle at
a checkpoint, although the vehicle did not bear any
license plates, while the latter testified he was arrested
at home. The following testimony of prosecution
witness SPO2 Figueroa on cross-examination raises
even more questions:
Q:
You mentioned the car napping incident, when was
that, Mr. witness?
ATTY. GONZALES:
Your Honor, I noticed that every time the witness gave
his answer, he is looking at a piece of paper and he is
not testifying on his personal knowledge.
xxxx
COURT:
The witness is looking at the record for about 5 min.
now. Fiscal, here is another witness who has lapses on
the mind.
FISCAL MACARAIG:
I am speechless, Your Honor.
WITNESS:
It was not stated in my affidavit, sir the time of the
carnapping incident.
ATTY. GONZALES:
Your Honor, if he can no longer remember even the
simple matter when this car napping incident happened
then he is an incompetent witness and we are deprive
(sic) of the right to cross examine him. I move that his
testimony would be stricken off from the record.
xxxx
Q:
Mr. Witness, what is the date when you arrested the
accused Fabian Urzais?
A:
It was November 20, 2002 at around 3 o'clock in the
afternoon, sir.
Q:
You said earlier that on November 3, 2002 that you
met the accused is that correct, Mr. Witness?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
Why did you see the accused on November 3, 2002,
Mr. Witness?
A:
During that time, we conducted a check point at AGL
were (sic) the Highlander was often seen, sir.
31
Q:
So, since on November 3, 2002, you were conducting
this check point at AGL, it is safe to assume that the
carnapping incident happened earlier than November
3, 2002?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
Were you present when this vehicle was car napped,
Mr. Witness?
A:
No, sir.
Q:
Since you were not present, you have no personal
knowledge about this car napping incident, right, Mr.
Witness?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
No further question, Your Honor.25
Considering the dearth of evidence, the subject vehicle
is at best classified as "missing" since the non-return
of the victim and his vehicle on 12 November 2002.
Why the check-point had begun before then, as early
3 November 2002, as stated by the prosecution witness
raises doubts about the prosecution's version of the
case. Perhaps, the check-point had been set up for
another vehicle which had gone missing earlier. In any
event, accused-appellant's crime, if at all, was being in
possession of a missing vehicle whose owner had been
found dead. There is perhaps guilt in the acquisition of
the vehicle priced so suspiciously below standard. But
how this alone should lead to a conviction for the
special complex crime of carnapping with
homicide/murder, affirmed by the appellate court is
downright disturbing.
The application of disputable presumption found in
Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, that a
person found in possession of a thing taken in the
doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of
the whole act, in this case the alleged carnapping and
the homicide/murder of its owner, is limited to cases
where such possession is either unexplained or that the
proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view
of independent evidence inconsistent thereto.26 In the
instant case, accused-appellant set-up a defense of
denial of the charges and adhered to his unrebutted
version of the story that the vehicle had been sold to
him by the brothers Alex and Ricky Bautista. Though
the explanation is not seamless, once the explanation
is made for the possession, the presumption arising
from the unexplained possession may not anymore be
invoked and the burden shifts once more to the
prosecution to produce evidence that would render the
defense of the accused improbable. And this burden,
the prosecution was unable to discharge. In contrast to
prosecution witness SPO2 Figueroa's confused,

apprehensive and uncorroborated testimony accused-
appellant unflinchingly testified as follows:
Q:
Will you please tell us how you came into possession
of this Isuzu Highlander with plate number UTT 838?
A:
That vehicle was brought by Ricky Bautista and Alex
Bautista, sir.
xxxx
Q:
Do you know why Alex and Ricky Bautista gave you
that Isuzu Highlander?
A:
Actually that was not the vehicle I ordered form (sic)
them, I ordered an owner type jeep worth Php60,000
but on November 13, 2002 they brought that Isuzu
Highlander, sir.
Q:
Why did you order an owner type jeep from them?
A:
Because I planned to install a trolley, cause I have a
videoke for rent business, sir.
xxxx
Q:
What happened upon the arrival of this Alex and Ricky
Bautista on that date and time?
A:
I was a little bit surprise (sic) because Alex alighted
from an Isuzu Highlander colored green, sir.
Q:
What happened after that?
A:
I told them that it was not I ordered from you and my
money is only Php60,000, sir.
Q:
What did he told (sic) you?
A:
He told me to give them the Php60,000 and they will
leave the vehicle and when I have the money next
week I will send text message to them, sir.
Q:
What was your reaction?
A:
I was amazed because the vehicle is brand new and
the price is low, sir.
xxxx
Q:
Did you find out anything about the Isuzu highlander
that they left to you?
A:
When I could not contact them I went to my friend
Oscar Angeles and told him about the vehicle then he
told me that you better surrender the vehicle because
maybe it is a hot car, sir. "Nung hindi ko na po sila
makontak ay nagpunta ako sa kaibigan kong si Oscar
Angeles at sinabi ko po yung problema tungkol sa
sasakyan at sinabi nya sa akin na isurrender na lang at
baka hot car yan"27
32
xxxx
Q:
Mr. Witness, granting for the sake that what you are
saying is true, immediately on the 16th, according to
your testimony, and upon confirming it to your friend,
you then decided to surrender the vehicle, why did you
not do it on the 16th, why did you still have to wait
until you get arrested?
A:
Because I was thinking of my Sixty Thousand Pesos
(Php60,000.00) at that time, and on how I can take it
back, sir. ("Kasi nanghinayang po ako sa Sixty
Thousand (Php60,000.00) ko nung oras na un ... pano
ko po yun mabawi sabi ko".)
xxxx
Q:
So Mr. Witness, let us simplify this, you have purchased
a carnapped vehicle, your intention is to surrender it
but you never did that until you get caught in
possession of the same, so in other words, that is all
that have actually xxx vehicle was found dead, the
body was dumped somewhere within the vicinity of
Sta. Rosa, those are the facts in this case?
A:
I only came to know that there was a dead person
when I was already in jail, sir.
Q:
What about the other facts that I have mentioned, are
they correct or not?
A:
When I gave the downpayment, I do not know yet that
it was a hot car and I came to know it only on the 16th,
sir.28
Significantly, accused-appellant's testimony was
corroborated by defense witness Angeles who had
known accused-appellant by his real name "Michael
Tapayan y Baguio," to wit:
Q:
Do you know if this Michael Tapayan owns any vehicle
sometime in 2002?
A:
At first none, sir, he has no vehicle.
Q:
What do you mean when you say at first he has no
vehicle?
A:
Later, sir, I saw him riding in a vehicle.
xxxx
Q:
Did Michael Tapayan tell you how much he bought that
vehicle?
A:
I remember he told me that he bought that vehicle for
Thirty Thousand (Php30,000.00) Pesos, sir.
Q:
What was your reaction when you were told that the
vehicle was purchased for only Thirty Thousand Pesos
(Php30,000.00)?

A:
I told him that it's very cheap and also told him that it
might be a carnap (sic) vehicle.
Q:
What was the reaction of Michael Tapayan when you
told him that?
A:
He thought about it and he is of the belief that the
person who sold the vehicle to him will come back and
will get the additional payment, sir.
Q:
Aside from this conversation about that vehicle, did you
have any other conversation with Michael Tapayan
concerning that vehicle?
A:
After a few days, sir, I told him to surrender the said
vehicle to the authorities because the persons who sold
it to him did not come back for additional payment.
Q:
What was the reaction of Michael Tapayan to this
suggestion?
A:
He told me that he will think about it because he was
thinking about the money that he already gave to
them.29
Evidently, the disputable presumption cannot prevail
over accused-appellant's explanation for his possession
of the missing vehicle. The possession having been
explained, the legal presumption is disputed and thus,
cannot find application in the instant case. To hold
otherwise would be a miscarriage of justice as criminal
convictions necessarily require proof of guilt of the
crime charged beyond reasonable doubt and in the
absence of such proof, should not be solely based on
legal disputable presumptions.
The carnapping not being duly proved, the killing of the
victim may not be treated as an incident of carnapping.
Nonetheless, even under the provisions of homicide
and murder under the Revised Penal Code, the Court
finds the guilt of accused-appellant was not established
beyond reasonable doubt.
There were no eyewitnesses to the killing of the victim,
Mario Magdato. Again, both courts relied only on the
circumstantial evidence of accused-appellant's
possession of the missing vehicle for the latter's
conviction. Shirley, the widow, testified that her
husband and their vehicle went missing on 12
November 2002. Dr. Concepcion gave testimony on the
cause of death of Mario Magdato and the injuries he
had sustained. Most glaringly, no connection had been
established between the victim's gunshot wound which
caused his death and the firearm found in the person
of accused-appellant. Only SPO2 Figueroa's testimony
gave light on how allegedly accused-appellant was
found to have been in possession of the missing vehicle
of the victim. But even if this uncorroborated testimony
was true, it does not link accused-appellant to the
33
carnapping, much less, the murder or homicide of the
victim. And it does not preclude the probability of
accused-appellant's story that he had merely bought
the vehicle from the Bautista brothers who have
themselves since gone missing.
The equipoise rule states that where the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused and the other consistent with
his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfil the test of
moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction. The equipoise rule provides that where the
evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the
constitutional, presumption of innocence tilts the scales
in favor of the accused.30
The basis of the acquittal is reasonable doubt, which
simply means that the evidence of the prosecution was
not sufficient to sustain the guilt of accused-appellant
beyond the point of moral certainty. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt, however, is a burden particular to
the prosecution and does not apply to exculpatory facts
as may be raised by the defense; the accused is not
required to establish matters in mitigation or defense
beyond a reasonable doubt, nor is he required to
establish the truth of such matters by a preponderance
of the evidence, or even to a reasonable probability.31
It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present
its side with clarity and persuasion, so that conviction
becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion.
What is required of it is to justify the conviction of the
accused with moral certainty. Upon the prosecution's
failure to meet this test, acquittal becomes the
constitutional duty of the Court, lest its mind be
tortured with the thought that it has imprisoned an
innocent man for the rest of his life.32 The
constitutional right to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.33
In the final analysis, the circumstances narrated by the
prosecution engender doubt rather than moral
certainty on the guilt of accused-appellant.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 19 November 2012 in C.A.
G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04812 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
FABIAN URZAIS Y LANURIAS alias Michael Tapayan y
Baguio is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt of the crime
of carnapping with homicide, without prejudice to
investigation for the crime of fencing penalized under
Presidential Decree 1612. His immediate release from
confinement is hereby ordered, unless he is being held
for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.

JOSIE GO TAMIO, petitioner, vs. ENCARNACION
TICSON, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In general, a lessee is not allowed to challenge the title
of the lessor. Indeed, it is immaterial whether the
lessor had any title at all to the property at the time
the lease was commenced. However, due to the
peculiar circumstances in the present case, the Court
makes an exception to this rule. Otherwise, it would
sanction unjust enrichment in favor of the respondent
and cause unjust poverty to the petitioner.
The Case
The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] seeks to
set aside the February 28, 2002 Decision[2] and the
April 30, 2002 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-GR SP No. 62908. The dispositive portion of
the challenged Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED
DUE COURSE and DISMISSED. The Decision, dated
March 24, 1999, is hereby AFFIRMED.[4]
The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration of the
foregoing disposition.
The March 24, 1999 Decision[5] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC)[6] of Manila, upheld by the CA, disposed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby
affirmed with modification, to wit:
1) Ordering [petitioner] to pay [respondent] the
amount of P86,000 as payment for rental arrearages
covering the period September, 1996 to June, 1997
and from July, 1997 to December, 1997 at a monthly
rate of P5,000 and P6,000 respectively.
2) [Petitioners] counterclaim is hereby dismissed
for lack of merit.[7]
On the other hand, the Decision[8] of the Metropolitan
Trial Court (MTC)[9] of Manila (Branch 5), which was
affirmed with modification by the RTC, dismissed
respondents complaint for unlawful detainer against
the petitioner.
The Facts
The CA summarized the facts in this manner:
The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM) is
the owner of an apartment unit originally leased to Mr.
Fernando Lopez Lim. After the demise of Mr. Fernando
Lim, [his] children became the occupants thereof. One
of [them, Valentine Lim] requested respondent
Encarnacion Ticson, for financial assistance [in order]
to purchase the apartment unit from RCAM. In
exchange, Valentine Lim executed a waiver in favor of
respondent.
On June 15, 1996, respondent executed a contract of
lease [in favor of petitioner], on the basis of the waiver
from Valentine Lim respecting the apartment unit, for
a period of three (3) months. After signing the contract
and paying the rentals, [petitioner] discovered that the
apartment was actually owned by RCAM.
Meanwhile, after the expiration of the three (3) month
lease, respondent demanded petitioner to vacate the
34
premises for the use of the formers family members.
Petitioner failed to comply, giving rise to the instant
case for unlawful detainer.
After trial, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) found
respondent guilty of concealment [amounting to] fraud
when she misrepresented that she was the owner or
authorized lessor of the apartment. Consequently, the
contract did not produce any legal effect, much less,
rights or obligations. Thus, the MTC ordered the
dismissal of the complaint for unlawful detainer.
Unsatisfied therewith, respondent appealed the
dismissal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). After
review thereof, the RTC found that the concealment
did not amount to fraud, but [was merely due] to
respondents honest belief that she became or will
eventually become the owner of the property by reason
of the said waiver.
Moreover, the RTC found that if [petitioner] has indeed
questioned the [respondents] title, she should have
communicated with RCAM immediately since she came
to know of RCAMs ownership over the subject property
early on.
On the basis thereof, the RTC ordered petitioner to pay
respondent P86,000.00 as rental arrearages from
September 1996 to June 1997 and from July 1997 to
December 1997 at a monthly rate of P5,000.00 and
P6,000.00 respectively, and dismissed petitioners
counterclaim for lack of merit.[10]
Meanwhile, on March 3, 1998, petitioner entered into
a Contract of Lease[11] over the same property with
RCAM for a term of one year, commencing from
January 1, 1998 to December 31, 1998. In that
Contract, petitioner assumed to pay the rent
corresponding to her use and occupation of the
property prior to its execution; that is, from June 1,
1996 to December 31, 1997.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA agreed with the RTC that the misrepresentation
of respondent as the owner or lessor of the property
did not amount to fraud, but was merely an error under
Article 1343 of the Civil Code. The appellate court
added that she must have acquired legal possession
over the apartment unit as an assignee thereof,
considering the waiver/assignment executed in her
favor by the previous lessees.
The appellate court added that petitioner herself had
been negligent in not immediately communicating with
the owner of the property -- the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila (RCAM) -- regarding her
discovery, thereby implying her acknowledgment of
respondents right to sublease the property.
Consequently, while holding that, as found by the
lower court, RCAM and petitioner entered into a new
Contract of Lease that rendered the instant case moot
and academic, the CA ordered petitioner to pay rental
arrearages to respondent for the period September
1996 to December 1997.
Hence, this Petition.[12]
Issue

The lone issue presented for our consideration is as
follows:
Whether or not petitioner should be held liable to pay
respondent the amount of P86,000.00 representing the
alleged rental arrearages from September 1996 to
December 1997.[13]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has merit.
Lone Issue:
Entitlement to Rental Arrearages
Petitioner contends that she is not bound by her lease
agreement with respondent, because the latter never
acquired legal possession of the property. The
assignment/waiver of rights executed by Valentine Lim
was null and void, as the lease of her father (Fernando)
with RCAM had long been terminated for nonpayment
of rentals. With the invalidity of the assignment,
respondent acquired no rights that she could transmit.
Assuming arguendo that Valentines lease was still
subsisting, petitioner argues that the consent of RCAM
should have been obtained.
Petitioner further avers that under her Contract with
RCAM, she undertook to pay rentals corresponding to
the holdover period. Hence, she would in effect be
paying the rental twice, if she were still to pay
respondent. The latter would be unjustly enriched at
petitioners expense, which should not be allowed by
the Court.
The assignment of a lease by the lessee involves a
transfer of rights and obligations pertaining to the
contract; hence, the consent of the lessor is
necessary.[14] Article 1649 of the Civil Code is explicit:
Art. 1649. The lessee cannot assign the lease without
the consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation
to the contrary.
The objective of the law in prohibiting the assignment
of the lease without the lessors consent is to protect
the owner or lessor of the leased property.[15] In the
case of cession or assignment of lease rights on real
property, there is a novation by the substitution of the
person of one of the parties -- the lessee.[16] The
personality of the lessee, who dissociates from the
lease, disappears; only two persons remain in the
juridical relation -- the lessor and the assignee who is
converted into the new lessee.[17]
In the instant case, RCAM never assented to the
assignment of the lease. This is apparent from the
December 11, 1997 letter[18] of its counsel, Atty.
Socrates R. Rivera, stating that Fernando Lim was no
longer its tenant for his failure to pay the rentals as of
August 1988. As a rule, this letter may not necessarily
result in the cessation of Mr. Fernandos right to
possess the leased premises. Under the law, mere
nonpayment of rentals without the lessors demand to
pay and vacate is not sufficient to oust the lessee from
the leased premises.[19] The letter, however,
demonstrates the lessors lack of consent to the
assignment.
35
There is no evidence to show that RCAM subsequently
agreed to the substitution of the original lessee by
respondent. In fact, the only lessee it ever recognized
was Fernando Lim. In the same letter, it was stated
that neither [petitioner] nor [respondent] have the
right to [possess] said apartment considering that it
[was] Mr. Fernando Lopez Lim whom our client RCAM
ha[d] contractual relationship; unfortunately said
tenant [has ceased] to be such.
Neither does respondent appear to have paid monthly
rents to RCAM to apprise it sufficiently of her
occupation of the subject premises. Hence, it cannot
be charged with knowledge of, much less implied
consent to, this fact.
As against RCAM, which has not consented to the
assignment, respondent-assignee obtains no rights to
the leased premises. Consequently, the sublease
between her and petitioner is not binding on it. With
the abandonment of the lease by the original lessee
through his unauthorized assignment, the right to the
possession of the apartment reverted to the owner.
Being the owner, RCAM enjoys the prerogative to enter
into a new lease contract over the property with
anyone it chooses.[20] Unfortunately for respondent, it
chose to grant to petitioner leasehold rights to the
subject premises by virtue of the Contract entered into
on March 3, 1998. It was agreed thereunder that
petitioner would pay RCAM reasonable compensation
for the entire period of her occupancy of the property.
To allow respondent to receive from petitioner rental
arrearages for the period September 1996 to
December 1997, notwithstanding the latters
agreement with the owner to pay rent for her
occupancy of the property, would constitute unjust
enrichment at the expense of petitioner. Under Article
22 of the Civil Code, there is unjust enrichment when
(1) a person is unjustly benefited, and (2) such benefit
is derived at the expense of or with damages to
another.[21]
Prior to the March 3, 1998 Contract, petitioner and
respondent were technically strangers to the property;
both were unlawfully withholding its possession from
the owner. Petitioner cannot therefore be faulted in
assuming to pay a reasonable value for her occupancy
of the property as a sign of good faith. On the other
hand, nonpayment of rentals of respondent to RCAM -
- notwithstanding her receipt from petitioner of the
rental covering the term of the sublease contract -- is
indicative of bad faith.
Having assumed to pay the rentals to RCAM, petitioner
should no longer be required to pay rental arrearages
to respondent. To do so would be to sanction unjust
enrichment in favor of respondent and to cause unjust
poverty to the petitioner. A double burden would be
imposed upon the latter, because she would be paying
twice for her use of the same premises for the same
period of time.

We are not unmindful of the standing rule that a lessee
is estopped or prevented from disputing the title of the
landlord in an action for recovery of possession of the
leased premises.[22]
In Geminiano v. Court of Appeals,[23] we stated:
x x x. The private respondents, as lessees who had
undisturbed possession for the entire term under the
lease, are then estopped to deny their landlords title,
or to assert a better title not only in themselves, but
also in some third person while they remain in
possession of the leased premises and until they
surrender possession to the landlord. This estoppel
applies even though the lessor had no title at the time
the relation of lessor and lessee was created, and may
be asserted not only by the original lessor, but also by
those who succeed to his title.[24]
Indeed, the relation of lessor and lessee does not
depend on the formers title but on the agreement
between the parties, followed by the possession of the
premises by the lessee under such agreement.[25] As
long as the latter remains in undisturbed possession, it
is immaterial whether the lessor has a valid title -- or
any title at all -- at the time the relationship was
entered into.[26] Between the present parties, the lease
-- which was actually a sublease -- was effective. And
respondent had a colorable right to lease the premises
by virtue of the assignment even if, as against the
owner, both the assignment and the sublease were
ineffectual.
However, considering the peculiar circumstances
availing in the present case, equity demands that such
rule be relaxed. As discussed earlier, it would be
grossly unjust if, after having paid the owner prior
rentals for June 1996 to December 1997, petitioner
would still be required to pay again the same rental
arrearages to respondent for the latters retention of
the property after the termination of sublease contract.
Note that the sublease had already expired, and that
the arrearages refer to a subsequent period not
covered by the said sublease.
It is worth reminding everyone of our pronouncement
in Air Manila v. CIR:[27] Equity as the complement of
legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and to complete justice
where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their
rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to
the special circumstances of cases, are incompetent to
do so. Equity regards the spirit and not the letter, the
intent and not the form, the substance rather than the
circumstance, as it is variously expressed by different
courts.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and
the assailed Decision and Resolution SET ASIDE. The
dispositive portion of the August 14, 1998 Decision of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila is hereby
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
36
G.R. No. 166875 July 31, 2007
DIGNA CONSUMIDO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. REYNALDO G. ROS, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33,
RAMON SAURA, JR., and FATIMA SAURA,
respondents.
TINGA, J.:
The instant Rule 45 petition assails the Decision1 dated
13 September 2004 and the Resolution2 dated 24
January 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
75285. The appellate court’s Decision affirmed the
Regional Trial Court’s (RTC) reversal3 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court’s (MeTC) judgment4 dismissing
the ejectment complaint filed against petitioner while
the Resolution denied her motion for reconsideration.5
In their ejectment6 complaint before the MeTC of
Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 170458, respondent
spouses Ramon, Jr. and Fatima Saura averred that
sometime in 1995, they entered into two lease
contracts with petitioner Digna Consumido, wherein
they leased to her Unit 982 and Unit 980 located on
A.H. Lacson Street, Sampaloc, Manila and she, in turn,
undertook to pay rentals at P6,400.00 per month and
P6,000.00 per month, respectively.7
According to respondents, petitioner started defaulting
on rental payments on Unit 982 and Unit 980 in the last
quarter of 1996 and August 1997, respectively. Despite
repeated demands, petitioner failed to pay the accrued
rentals and to vacate the leased premises,8 prompting
respondents to file the complaint. They asked for
judgment ordering petitioner to vacate the premises
and pay the accrued rentals totaling P615,000.00, plus
attorney’s fees.9
In her Answer,10 petitioner averred that she entered
into the said lease contracts not with respondents but
with the late Ramon Saura, Sr., father of respondent
Ramon, Jr. The father organized Villa Governor Forbes
Corporation (VGFC), the administrator of the leased
premises, petitioner added.11
According to petitioner, until June 1999, she religiously
paid the rentals to respondents, who had assumed the
administration of the leased premises after the death
of Ramon Saura, Sr., not knowing that as early as 18
April 1995, Sandalwood Real Estate Development
Corporation (SREDC) had already bought the leased
premises from VGFC. After discovering that the leased
premises had already been titled to SREDC, petitioner
negotiated with SREDC for her to continue occupancy
of the leased premises.12 Thus, she claimed that she
ignored the demands of respondents for just and legal
grounds.

After summary proceedings, the MeTC rendered a
decision13 on 19 April 2002 dismissing the ejectment
suit.
The MeTC found that the ownership of the leased
premises had been the subject of a pending litigation
between respondent Ramon Saura, Jr. on one hand
and SREDC, VGFC, and the other heirs of the late
Ramon Saura, Sr. on the other.
It also found that SREDC, as successor-in-interest of
VGFC, had previously instituted an ejectment suit
against petitioner and other lessees occupying the
other units but the same had been dismissed with
finality pending the determination of ownership of the
leased premises.
Based on the foregoing and the findings that VGFC was
the lessor and respondents had acted merely as
administrators and/or representatives of VGFC upon
the execution of the lease agreements, the MeTC
declared respondents as not the real parties-in-
interest.14
The RTC reversed the MeTC decision.15 Based on its
finding that petitioner continued to remit the rentals to
respondents when they assumed administration of the
leased premises after the death of Ramon Saura, Sr.,
it held that respondents were entitled to the material
possession of the leased premises.16 The RTC also
found that the leased premises was previously the
ancestral home of respondents, who remained in
possession thereof even after the disputed sale of the
leased premises by VGFC to SREDC.
In its Decision dated 17 September 2002, the RTC
disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is
REVERSED. The defendant is ordered:
1. To vacate the leased premises;
2. To pay the plaintiffs the rental in arrears for both
units the amount of Php714,800.00 representing the
unpaid rentals from 1996 to December 2001, as well
as rental that are unpaid, until the time the defendant
has actually vacated the leased premises;
3. To pay the amount of Php20,000.00 as attorney’s
fees; and
4. To pay the cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.17
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision18
on 13 September 2004, dismissing petitioner’s appeal,
and on 24 January 2005, its assailed Resolution19
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC’s conclusion
that the material possession of the leased premises
pertained to respondents as it was bolstered by
petitioner’s admission that she remitted rentals to them
37
before she allegedly discovered that respondents were
not the registered owners of the leased premises. It
also held that petitioner was precluded from
controverting the title of her landlord, asserting any
rights adverse to that title or setting up any
inconsistent right to change the relation existing
between them.20
Hence, the instant petition ascribing the following
errors to the Court of Appeals:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF FACT AND LAW WHEN IT
RULED THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE THE REAL
PARTIES IN INTEREST TO FILE THE EJECTMENT SUIT, AS
SUCH RULING IS BASED ON PURE CONJECTURES AND
PRESUMPTIONS.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD THE RIGHT TO EJECT
PETITIONER HAVING ESTABLISHED A BETTER RIGHT OF
POSSESSION.21
The crux of the controversy is whether there was a
subsisting lease agreement between petitioner and
respondents, which, upon the breach thereof by
petitioner, entitled respondents, as the real parties-in-
interest, to institute the ejectment suit. In short, the
question is who is the landlord?
Petitioner maintains that respondents instituted the
ejectment suit in their personal capacities and not in
representation of the VGFC, the previous owner of the
leased premises.
On the other hand, respondents contend that petitioner
is estopped from asserting that no landlord-lessee
relationship exists between them because petitioner
previously admitted in her answer that she religiously
remitted rentals to respondents. They theorize that
petitioner’s act of continuously remitting rentals to
respondents after the death of Ramon Saura, Sr. is an
acknowledgement that respondents are her landlords
and successors-in-interest of the late Ramon Saura, Sr.
The petition is meritorious.
One who has no right or interest to protect cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in
action for it is jurisprudentially ordained that every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest.22
"Interest" within the meaning of the rules means
material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected
by the decree as distinguished from mere interest in
the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. A
real party in interest is one who has a legal right.

Since a contract may be violated only by the parties
thereto as against each other, in an action upon that
contract, the real parties-in-interest, either as plaintiff
or as defendant, must be parties to the said contract.
The action must be brought by the person who, by
substantive law, possesses the right sought to be
enforced.23
In an action for unlawful detainer, the real party in
interest is the landlord, vendor, vendee or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination
of his right to hold possession, by virtue of a contract,
express or implied.
The records show that petitioner did not enter into the
lease agreement with respondents. Other than their
bare allegations, respondents failed to present
sufficient evidence showing that they are the landlords
of the leased premises or its successors-in-interest or
are authorized to institute the ejectment suit in the
name of the real party in interest.
The MeTC’s finding that VGFC is the landlord appears
to be more plausible under the circumstances. Since a
corporation is only a juridical person, it must act
through its officers or agents in the normal course of
business. Petitioner admitted that she entered into the
lease contracts with the late Ramon Saura, Sr. While
no written lease agreement was ever submitted in
evidence, it is likely that at the time of the agreement,
the late Ramon Saura, Sr. was acting on behalf of
VGFC, which, since 1979, had been the registered
owner of the leased premises before its purported sale
to SREDC, the present registered owner.
That respondents were parties to the lease agreement
is not supported by the evidence on record.
Respondents were able to establish only as far as
accepting the rental payments from petitioner.
However, this fact alone cannot vest in them the right
of a landlord but of a mere administrator or
representative of the late Ramon Saura, Sr. and/or
VGFC. Thus, as pointed out by the MeTC, respondents
cannot institute the ejectment suit in their personal
capacities. They must present their authority to
prosecute the ejectment suit in the name of the real
party in interest. This respondents failed to do.
In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. If
he claims a right granted or created by law, he must
prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely
on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of his opponent.24 And he, having the
burden of proof, will be defeated if no evidence were
given on either side.25
38
Respondents as plaintiffs in the action for unlawful
detainer had the burden of proving their allegations
inasmuch as they claim that they were parties to the
lease contracts. Respondents failed miserably to meet
the burden of proof.
Respondents argue that petitioner is estopped from
denying the landlord-lessee relationship between the
parties because of her admission that she paid rentals
to respondents in her belief that the former were the
owners of the premises.
For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto
must be unequivocal and intentional because, if
misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.26
Estoppel is a principle that, as a rule, can be invoked
only in highly exceptional and legitimate cases.27 The
essential elements of estoppel in respect to the party
claiming it are: (a) lack of knowledge and of the means
of knowledge of the truth as the facts in question; (b)
reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or statements
of the party to be estopped; and (c) action or inaction
based thereon of such character as to change the
position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to
his injury, detriment, or prejudice.28
The first element is absent in the instant case.
Respondents cannot claim estoppel against petitioner
because they knew fully well that they were accepting
rentals from petitioner in their capacity as mere
administrators of the leased premises or only on behalf
of the late Ramon Saura, Sr. and/or VGFC.
Respondents cannot assert that they did not know for
a fact that they were never parties to the lease
agreement. The fact that petitioner initially thought
respondents were the owners of the leased premises
does not put her in estoppel because respondents were
expected to know in what capacity they accepted the
payments.
Neither is petitioner estopped in denying respondents’
title. The conclusive presumption set forth in Rule 131,
Section 2(b)29 of the Rules of Court applies only when
the landlord and tenant relationship has been
sufficiently established. In the case at bar, this is
precisely the issue to be resolved as petitioner has
consistently alleged that there was no lease agreement
between the parties. Moreover, respondents
themselves have not asserted ownership over the
leased premises, the truth of the matter being that
respondents were never the registered owners of the
leased premises.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
GRANTED and the Decision dated 13 September 2004 and
Resolution dated 24 January 2005 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 75285 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28 of
Manila in Civil Case No. 170458 is REINSTATED.
Costs against respondents.

SAMELO v. MANOTOK SERVICES
BRION, J.:
Background Facts
Manotok Services, Inc. (respondent)
alleged that it is the administrator of a parcel of land
known as Lot 9-A, Block 2913, situated at 2882
Dagupan Extension, Tondo, Manila. On January 31,
1997, the respondent entered into a contract with the
petitioner for the lease of a portion of Lot 9-A, Block
2913, described as Lot 4, Block 15 (subject premises).
The lease contract was for a period of one (1) year,
with a monthly rental of P3,960.00. After the expiration
of the lease contract on December 31, 1997, the
petitioner continued occupying the subject premises
without paying the rent. On August 5, 1998, the
respondent, thru its President Rosa Manotok, sent a
letter to the petitioner demanding that she vacate the
subject premises and pay compensation for its use and
occupancy. The petitioner, however, refused to heed
these demands.
On November 18, 1998, the respondent
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the
petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
Branch 3, Manila. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 161588-CV. The respondent prayed, among
others, that the petitioner and those claiming rights
under her be ordered to vacate the subject premises,
and to pay compensation for its use and occupancy.
In her answer, the petitioner alleged that the
respondent had no right to collect rentals because the
subject premises are located inside the property of the
Philippine National Railways (PNR). She also added that
the respondent had no certificate of title over the
subject premises. The petitioner further claimed that
her signature in the contract of lease was obtained
through the respondents misrepresentation. She
likewise maintained that she is now the owner of the
subject premises as she had been in possession since
1944.
The MeTC Ruling
The MeTC, in its judgment of March 28,
2002, decided in favor of the respondent, and ordered
the petitioner to vacate the subject premises and to
deliver their peaceful possession to the respondent.
The MeTC held that the only issue to be resolved in an
unlawful detainer case is physical possession or
possession de facto, and that the respondent had
established its right of possession over the subject
premises. It added that the petitioners right under the
lease contract already ceased upon the expiration of
the said contract. It further ruled that the petitioner is
already estopped from questioning the right of the
39
respondent over the subject premises when she
entered into a contract of lease with the respondent.
The dispositive portion of the MeTC judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against
defendant, ordering the latter and all persons claiming
rights under her:
1. To vacate the premises located at
2882 Dagupan Extension, Tondo, Manila,
and deliver the peaceful possession
thereof to the plaintiff[;]
2. To pay plaintiff the sum of
P40,075.20 as compensation for the use
and occupancy of the premises from
January 1, 1998 to August 30, 1998, plus
P4,554.00 a month starting September 1,
1998, until defendant and all person[s]
claiming rights under her to finally vacate
the premises[;]
3. To pay plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00
for and as attorneys fees; and
4. To pay the cost of suit.
The RTC Decision
The petitioner filed an appeal with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 50, Manila. The
RTC, in its decision of July 1, 2004, set aside the MeTCs
decision, and dismissed the complaint for unlawful
detainer. The RTC held, among others, that the
respondent had no right to collect rentals as it failed to
show that it had authority to administer the subject
premises and to enter into a contract of lease with the
petitioner. It also ruled that the subject premises,
which were formerly owned by the PNR, are now
owned by the petitioner by virtue of her possession and
stay in the premises since 1944.
The CA Decision
Aggrieved by the reversal, the respondent
filed a petition for review with the CA, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 85664. The CA, in its decision of June 21,
2005, reversed and set aside the RTC decision, and
reinstated the MeTC judgment. The CA held that the
petitioner is now estopped from questioning the right
of the respondent over the subject property. It
explained that in an action involving the possession of
the subject premises, a tenant cannot controvert the
title of his landlord or assert any rights adverse to that
title, without first delivering to the landlord the
premises acquired by virtue of the agreement between
themselves. The appellate court added that the
petitioner cannot claim that she repudiated the lease
contract, in the absence of any unequivocal acts of

repudiation.
The CA further held that the only issue in
an ejectment suit is physical or material possession,
although the trial courts may provisionally resolve the
issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining
the issue of possession. It explained that the issue of
ownership is not required to determine the issue of
possession since the petitioner tacitly admitted that she
is a lessee of the subject premises.
The petitioner moved to reconsider this
decision, but the CA denied her motion in its resolution
dated November 10, 2005.
In presenting her case before this Court,
the petitioner argued that the CA erred in ruling that a
tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord.
She maintained that the respondent is not the owner
or administrator of the subject premises, and insisted
that she had been in possession of the land in question
since 1944. She further added that she repudiated the
lease contract by filing a case for fraudulent
misrepresentation, intimidation, annulment of lease
contract, and quieting of title with injunction before
another court.
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious.
Respondent has a better right of possession over the
subject premises
An action for unlawful detainer exists when a person
unlawfully withholds possession of any land or building
against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other
persons, after the expiration or termination of the right
to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express
or implied.
The only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer
case is physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any
of the parties involved. Thus, when the relationship of
lessor and lessee is established in an unlawful detainer
case, any attempt of the parties to inject the question
of ownership into the case is futile, except insofar as it
might throw light on the right of possession.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the petitioner
and the respondent entered into a contract of lease.
We note in this regard that in her answer with
affirmative defenses and counterclaim before the
MeTC, the petitioner did not deny that she signed the
lease contract (although she maintained that her
signature was obtained through the respondents
misrepresentations). Under the lease contract, the
petitioner obligated herself to pay a monthly rental to
40
the respondent in the amount of P3,960.00. The lease
period was for one year, commencing on January 1,
1997 and expiring on December 31, 1997. It bears
emphasis that the respondent did not give the
petitioner a notice to vacate upon the expiration of the
lease contract in December 1997 (the notice to vacate
was sent only on August 5, 1998), and the latter
continued enjoying the subject premises for more than
15 days, without objection from the respondent. By the
inaction of the respondent as lessor, there can be no
inference that it intended to discontinue the lease
contract.
An implied new lease was therefore created pursuant
to Article 1670 of the Civil Code, which expressly
provides:
Article 1670. If at the end of the contract the lessee
should continue enjoying the thing leased for fifteen
days with the acquiescence of the lessor, and unless a
notice to the contrary by either party has previously
been given, it is understood that there is an implied
new lease, not for the period of the original contract,
but for the time established in Articles 1682 and 1687.
The other terms of the original contract shall be
revived.
An implied new lease or tacita reconduccion will set in
when the following requisites are found to exist: a) the
term of the original contract of lease has expired; b)
the lessor has not given the lessee a notice to vacate;
and c) the lessee continued enjoying the thing leased
for fifteen days with the acquiescence of the lessor.
As earlier discussed, all these requisites have been
fulfilled in the present case.
Article 1687 of the Civil Code on implied new lease
provides:
Article 1687. If the period for the lease has not been
fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the
rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it
is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly;
and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily.
Since the rent was paid on a monthly basis, the period
of lease is considered to be from month to month, in
accordance with Article 1687 of the Civil Code. [A]
lease from month to month is considered to be one
with a definite period which expires at the end of each
month upon a demand to vacate by the lessor.
When the respondent sent a notice to vacate to the
petitioner on August 5, 1998, the tacita reconduccion
was aborted, and the contract is deemed to have
expired at the end of that month. [A] notice to vacate
constitutes an express act on the part of the lessor that
it no longer consents to the continued occupation by

the lessee of its property. After such notice, the lessees
right to continue in possession ceases and her
possession becomes one of detainer.
Estoppel of tenant
We find no merit in the petitioners allegation that the
respondent had no authority to lease the subject
premises because the latter failed to prove that it is its
owner or administrator.
The Rules of Court protects the respondent, as lessor,
from being questioned by the petitioner, as lessee,
regarding its title or better right of possession over the
subject premises. Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court states that the tenant is not permitted to deny
the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant
between them. Article 1436 of the Civil Code likewise
states that a lessee or a bailee is estopped from
asserting title to the thing leased or received, as
against the lessor or bailor.
These provisions bar the petitioner from contesting the
respondents title over the subject premises. The
juridical relationship between x x x [a] lessor and x x x
[a lessee] carries with it a recognition of the lessor's
title. As [lessee, the petitioner is] estopped [from
denying the] landlord's title, or to assert a better title
not only in [herself], but also in some third person
while [she remains] in possession of the subject
premises and until [she surrenders] possession to the
landlord. This estoppel applies even though the lessor
had no title at the time the relation of [the] lessor and
[the] lessee was created, and may be asserted not only
by the original lessor, but also by those who succeed
to his title. Once a contact of lease is shown to exist
between the parties, the lessee cannot by any proof,
however strong, overturn the conclusive presumption
that the lessor has a valid title to or a better right of
possession to the subject premises than the lessee.
The Court thus explained in Tamio v.
Ticson:
Indeed, the relation of lessor and lessee does not
depend on the formers title but on the agreement
between the parties, followed by the possession of the
premises by the lessee under such agreement. As long
as the latter remains in undisturbed possession, it is
immaterial whether the lessor has a valid title or any
title at all at the time the relationship was entered into.
[citations omitted]
The issue of ownership
We are likewise unpersuaded by the petitioners claim
that she has acquired possessory rights leading to
ownership over the subject premises, having been in
41
possession thereof since 1944. We emphasize that
aside from her self-serving allegation, the petitioner did
not present any documentary evidence to substantiate
her claim that she stayed on the subject premises since
1944. That the petitioner presented certificates of title
of the Manila Railroad Company over certain properties
in Tondo, Manila, which allegedly cover the subject
premises, is of no moment. One cannot recognize the
right of another, and at the same time claim adverse
possession which can ripen to ownership, thru
acquisitive prescription. For prescription to set in, the
possession must be adverse, continuous, public, and to
the exclusion of [others].
Significantly, the RTC decision failed to state its basis
for concluding that the petitioner stayed in the subject
premises since 1944.
At any rate, we hold that no need exists to
resolve the issue of ownership in this case, since it is
not required to determine the issue of possession; the
execution of the lease contract between the petitioner,
as lessee, and the respondent, as lessor, belies the
formers claim of ownership. We reiterate that the fact
of the lease and the expiration of its term are the only
elements in an action for unlawful detainer. The
defense of ownership does not change the summary
nature of [this] action. x x x. Although a wrongful
possessor may at times be upheld by the courts, this is
merely temporary and solely for the maintenance of
public order. The question of ownership is to be settled
in the proper court and in a proper action.
Interest on rentals due
Additionally, the petitioner is liable to pay interest by
way of damages for her failure to pay the rentals due
for the use of the subject premises.
We reiterate that the respondents extrajudicial demand
on the petitioner was made on August 5, 1998. Thus,
from this date, the rentals due from the petitioner shall
earn interest at 6% per annum, until the judgment in
this case becomes final and executory. After the finality
of judgment, and until full payment of the rentals and
interests due, the legal rate of interest to be imposed
shall be 12%.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, we DENY the
petition. The decision and the resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated June 21, 2005 and November 10, 2005,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 85664 are AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the unpaid rentals shall earn a
corresponding interest of six percent (6%) per annum, to be
computed from August 5, 1998 until the finality of this
decision. After this decision becomes final and executory, the
rate of legal interest shall be computed at twelve percent
(12%) per annum from such finality until its satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.
 42

DEL SOCORRO VS.
WILSEM
G.R. No. 193707 Dec 10, 2014
FACTS:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately,
their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce
Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.
Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the
Philippines. According to Norma, Ernst made a promise
to provide monthly support to their son. However,
since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo.
Respondent remarried again a Filipina and resides
again the Philippines particulary in Cebu where the
petitioner also resides. Norma filed a complaint against
Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s
unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.
The trial court dismissed the complaint since the facts
charged in the information do not constitute an offense
with respect to the accused, he being an alien
It is incumbent upon Ernst to plead and prove that the
national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon
the parents the obligation to support their child.
Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must
be alleged and proved. Moreover, foreign law should
not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the
forum. To give justice is the most important function
of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is
obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of
Conflict of Laws. Applying the foregoing, even if the
laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s
obligation to support his child nor penalize the non-
compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly
enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of
great injustice to the child to be denied of financial
support when the latter is entitled thereto.
2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A
9262) because the foreigner is living here in the
Philippines and committed the offense here.

ISSUES:

1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to

support his minor child under the Philippine
law?

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held

criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.

RULING:

1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a

citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with
the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country,
not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to
give support to his child, as well as the consequences
of his failure to do so.

This does not, however, mean that Ernst is not obliged

to support Norma’s son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a

foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden
of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst
hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter
of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst
pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he
never proved the same.