The SF of Theory Baudrillard and Haraway PDF

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The SF of Theory: Baudrillard and Haraway (La SF de la Théorie: Baudrillard et Haraway)

Author(s): Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr.
Source: Science Fiction Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3, Science Fiction and Postmodernism (Nov., 1991),
pp. 387-404
Published by: SF-TH Inc
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THE SF OF THEORY:BAUDRILLARDAND HARAWAY 387
Istvan Csicsery-Ronay,Jr.
The SF of Theory: Baudrillardand Haraway

For the purposesof my argument,I offer the followingworkingdefinition:
SF namesnot a genericeffectsengine of literatureand simulationarts(the
usualsense of the phrase"sciencefiction"),so muchas a mode of aware-
ness, characterizedby two linkedformsof hesitation,a pair of gaps.
One gap extendsbetween,on the one hand,belief that certainideas and
images of scientific-technologicaltransformationsof the world can be
entertained,and, on the other, the rationalrecognitionthat they may be
realized(alongwith their ramificationsfor worldlylife). It is a gap that lies
between the conceivabilityof futuretransformations and the possibilityof
their actualization.In its other aspect,SF namesthe gap between,on the
one hand, belief in the immanent possibility(and perhaps inexorable
necessity)of those transformations, and,on the other,reflectionabouttheir
possibleethical,social,andspiritualinterpretations (i.e., abouttheirembed-
dednessin a web of social-historicalrelations).This gap stretchesbetween
conceivingof the plausibility,i.e., theprospectivefactual
reality,of historically
unforeseeableinnovationsin humanexperience(nova)1and their broader
ethicaland social-cultural implicationsandresonances.SF thusinvolvestwo
formsof hesitation-a historical-logical one (howplausibleis the conceivable
novum?) and an ethical one (how good/bad/altogetherdifferentare the
transformations thatwouldissuefromthenovum?)Thesegapscomposethe
blackbox in whichscientific-technological conceptions,ostensiblyunmediat-
ed by social and ethical contingencies,are transformedinto a rational,
"realistic"recognitionof theirpossiblematerialization andtheirimplications.
SF embeds scientific-technological concepts in the sphere of human
interestsand actions,explainingthem and explicitlyattributingsocialvalue
to them.This may take manyliteraryforms,fromthe resurrectionof dead
mythologies,pseudo-mimeticextrapolation,and satirical subversion,to
utopianAufjebung. It is an inherently,andradically,future-oriented process,
since the exact ontologicalstatusof the fictiveworldis suspended.Unlike
historicalfiction(of whichSF is a directheir),wherea less intensesuspense
operates because the outcome of the past is still in the process of being
completedin the present'spartisanconflicts,SF is suspendedbecauseall the
relevantinformationabout the futurehas not been createdyet, and never
can be.
Sincefuturedevelopmentsinfluencerevisionsof the past,SFs blackbox

388 SCIENCE-FICTION
STUDIES,VOLUME18 (1991)
also involves the past, in the hesitation that comes in anticipatingthe

completerevisionof origins.A past that is not yet knownis a form of the
future. So is a present unanticipatedby the past. Further,since SF is
concerned mainly with the role of science and technologyin defining
human-i.e., cultural-value,there can be as manykindsof SF as there are
theoriesof culture.Obviously,this conceptionof SF concernsthe rangeof
possible science fictions,manyof whichhave not been realized(for many
and variousreasons), and not just the actualhistoricalproductionof the
commercialgenre knownas ScienceFiction.
SF, then, is not a genre of literaryentertainmentonly, but a mode of
awareness,a complexhesitationabout the relationshipbetweenimaginary
conceptionsand historicalrealityunfoldinginto the future.2SF orientsitself
withina conceptionof historythatholdsthatscienceandtechnologyactively
participatein the creationof reality,and thus"implant"humanuncertainty
into the nonhumanworld.At the same time, SF's hesitationsalso involvea
sense of fatalityvis-a-vis instrumentalrationality's in transform-
inexorability
ing (or undermining)the conditionsof thoughtthatgaverise to it. The same
freedomthatdetachesnaturefroma mythologyof naturalnecessityrestores
thatnecessityironically,in the ineluctablepowerof humanscientificthought
to transformnature continuallyand without transcendentallimits. SFs
hesitationsare about the degree or extent of the assent with which one
greets the imaginaryconcepts of the rationalizedfuture,or indeed how
similaror differentthe future will be from the presentand our present
standardsfor makingjudgments.
SF has become a form of discoursethat directlyengages postmodern
languageand cultureandhas (for the momentat least) a privilegedposition
because of its generic interest in the intersectionof technology,scientific
theory,and social practice.Since the late 1960s,whenit becamethe chosen
vehiclefor bothtechnocraticandcriticalutopianwriting,SF has experienced
a steadygrowthin popularity,criticalinterest,andtheoreticalsophistication.
It reflectsand engagesthe technologicalculturethat is comingto pervade
everyaspectof humansociety.The irresistibleexpansionof communications
technologieshas drawnthe traditionalspheresof powerintoan ever-tighten-
ing web of instrumentalrationalization.Simultaneously,the culture of
informationhas rewrittenthe notionsof natureandtranscendencethathave
dominatedWesternsocietiesfor the pastfew centuries,replacingthemwith
an as yet inchoateworld-viewwe mightcall"artificialimmanence"-inwhich
every value that previousculturesconsideredtranscendentalor naturally
given is at least theoreticallycapableof artificialreplicationor simulation.
In this sense, SF has become a mode of discourseestablishingits own
domain linking literary, philosophical,and scientific imaginations,and
subvertingthe culturalboundariesbetween them, and in its narratives
producingand hyperbolizingthe new immanence.It regularlyemploys
drasticnew scientificconceptsof materialandsocialrelations,whichin turn
have influencedour conceptionsof what is imaginableor plausible.And it

has become an aspectof the quotidianconsciousnessof people livingin the

post-industrialworld,dailywitnessesto the transformations of theirvalues
and materialconditionsin the wake of technologicalaccelerationbeyond
their conceptualthreshold.
Two of the most interestingand acutetheoristsof the transformation of
SF into a discursive practice are Jean Baudrillard,especially in his
Simulationsperiod, and Donna Haraway.The trends of their arguments
differ greatly, and in this paper I will pit them againsteach other in a
contest of interpretationsof the science-fictionalization
of theory.But they
agree in at least three vital respects.They both begin with the axiomthat
science is a practicewithinthe field of representations,not the explication
of extradiscursivephenomena;they both hold that the developmentof
communications-technologies and the culturesurroundingthem has trans-
formedeveryconceivableaspectof humanandterrestriallife into an aspect
of a cyberneticcontrol model; and they both deal with the all-assimilat-
ing/all-eroding power of the information-paradigm with radical irony
-specifically the ironyof SF.
BothBaudrillardandHarawayhaveexplicitlyassociatedtheirtheoretical
workwith SF. Both have drawncentralconceptsfrom the thesaurusof SF
imagery.I would argue that two of theirworksin particular,Baudrillard's
"ThePrecessionof Simulacra"and Haraway's"A Manifestofor Cyborgs,"
are the most fully developed articulationsof the new fusion of SF and
theory, and together form the prolegomenato any futureSF and global
theory that seeks to generate a "futurology."3 Indeed, we can read the
differencesbetweenthem as differencesbetweenvectorsin the SF field, or
between an apocalyptic-dystopian-idealist axis and a utopian-pragmatic-
"openended"one.
1. The Year 2000 Has Already Happened.Baudrillard's"Simulacraand

ScienceFiction"is the most explicitreflectionby eitherauthoron the linkup
of SF and theory,and it providesa good startingpointfor my discussion.In
the essay,Baudrillarddistinguishesthree ordersof the imaginary,appropri-
ate to the three successiveordersof simulationin history.The first is the
utopian,the imaginaryrealmattendingthe orderof representation-inwhich
signsandvaluesare madeto counterfeita putativeoriginalorderof natural
signs.This is followedby the orderof productionand work,the simulation-
culture of the bourgeois order, in which signs and values strive for
equivalence,the reproductionof themselvesin a pureseries;its imaginary-
expressionis "science fiction."The third order is our currentone, the
simulationistorder of the hyperreal,the cyberneticstrivingfor complete
operationalcontrolover the generationof signs and values.Baudrillardis
not sure there is an imaginaryrealmfor this order."Theprobableanswer,"
he writes,"is thatthe good old imaginaryof sciencefictionis dead,andthat
some other sort of thing is beginningto come into being (and not only in
the novelisticmode, but also in theory).The same floatingand indetermi-

390 SCIENCE-FICTION STUDIES, VOLUME 18 (1991)
nacyhave put an end to both science fictionand theoryas specificgenres"

(305, above).
Baudrillardmerely mentions this equivalenceof theory and science
fiction,but it is worthpayingattentionto, for it is the basis for the specific
form of cybercritiquethat Baudrillardpractices.It implies that theory is
merelyone form of the strivingto workout, in the realmof the imaginary,
the contradictionin the real. In each historicalorder it will share the
strategiesof its literarycounterpart,utopia or science fiction.A certain
distance between the real and the imaginarywas required,Baudrillard
writes, for the concepts of utopia and even classical science-fictional
projectionto crystallize.The distancewas greatestin utopiaand in utopia's
individualized form,the romanticdream.The utopianimaginarysignifieda
radicallydifferent universe from the real. Science fiction narrowedthe
distanceconsiderably,bringingthe imaginarycloser to the real world of
production,but it also introduceda process of infinite reproduction(of
worlds, of technologies, of cultures, of scientific "facts,"etc.). In the
hyperreal,the gap disappearsaltogether.There is no need to differentiate
the imaginaryfrom the real; indeed, the relationshipbetween them is
inverted,and the real derivesfromthe model,fromthe operationalgenetic
code of which the real is merely the readout.This leaves no room for
fictionalanticipations,nor for anysort of transcendence.Fictiondisappears,
sinceit no longerhas a dialecticalother."Paradoxically," Baudrillard writes,
"it is the real that has become our utopia-but a utopiawhichis no longer
a possibility,a utopia we can do no more than dream about, like a lost
object"(310, above).
Baudrillard's"good old imaginaryof science fiction"is what I would
term classicalscience fiction,the genre of the fantastic,usuallytechnocen-
tric,fictionthat moreor less adheredto Gernsback'sandCampbell'snorms.
The "other sort of thing"that Baudrillardbelieves is replacing"science
fiction"in the thirdorderof simulationalreadyhas a name-or rather,an
insignia,a non-name:SF. In Baudrillard'saccount,the collapseof the dis-
tance betweenthe real and the imaginarysqueezesout utopianandscience
fiction-or perhaps"splattersthem"wouldbe a better phrase,distributing
the hesitationsand anticipationsthroughoutexperience.Projective"science
fiction"implodes:its tissueof mediatingconnectionsis compressed,untilall
that is left is its monogram,SF, an insigniathat clingsto its tracesbut has
no fLxedreferent.As I havearguedat the beginningof this paper,SF marks
the pointsat whichthe real andthe imaginaryare (as yet) indistinguishable,
and hence the implodedmonogramrefers not only to fiction,but to the
problematicautonomyof reality.SF thus includesotherimplosiveconcepts
at "contestedborderzones" (Haraway):VR ("virtualreality"),the cyborg
("cyberneticorganisms"),andAl ("artificialintelligence").Pervadingthem
all is SF-consciousness,the constantawarenessthat originsare subjectto
recall,that almostanythingmaybe technicallyconstructible,and that there
maybe no inherentlimitsto whattechnologicalcivilizations,andtechnologi-

callytransformedbodies, are capableof. From this point of view, "science

fiction"is dead because it is fiction. SF exists, in no small part, because
theoretical discourse like Baudrillard's(and Haraway's) discerns the
problematictopologythat SF is called upon to articulate.4
If we considerthat utopiasand sciencefictionsare alwaysthe imaginary
totalizationsof theories of technologyand culture,we can also say that
theoryis the abstractionand foregrounding of utopianandscience-fictional
principles.For theoryalso requiresa gap betweensign and real referent,
betweenvalue and "inertexistence,"whichit is theory'sself-conceivedrole
first to locate and then to dream up ways of bridging.Once the referent
becomes a readoutof the sign, and existencea readoutof controlmodels,
theory's condition of possibilityhas been absorbed in the operational
program.
Classicalscience fiction,in Baudrillard's
view,was characterizedby the
constantelaborationof the theme of expansion-of humanproductionand
exploration,of colonial culturation,of adventure.All of these can be
translatedinto projectionsof the Earth. Once the actual technologyof
space-explorationand colonizationcrosses a certainthreshold,the Earth
ceases to be a source of centrifugalexpansionand becomes the object of
centripetalcollapse.The implosionof SF occurs simultaneouslywith the
implosionof terrestrialism,with the virtuallytotal coding, mapping,and
saturationof the physicalworldandthe worldof signs.For Baudrillard,the
effect of the "conquestof space"was to bringan end to terrestrialreference
and a de-realizingof humanspace.The recurringicon of this implosionof
meaning in Baudrillard'swork is the satellite/space capsule, a work of
technologicalwizardrythatessentiallyreproducesthe banalityof the human
habitatin outer space-the two-rooms-kitchen-bath-and-shower launched
into orbit.The "conquest"leadsnot to transcendence, but to the absorption
of the cosmicocean-and the cosmicEarth-into the satellite:
The conquestof space constitutesin this sense an irreversiblethresholdin the
directionof the loss of the earthlyreferential.This is preciselythe hemorrhage
of realityas internalcoherenceof a limited universewhen its limits retreat
infinitely.The conquestof space followsthat of the planetas the same fantastic
enterpriseof extendingthejurisdictionof the real-to carryfor examplethe flag,
the technique, the two-rooms-and-kitchen to the moon-same tentative to
substantiatethe concepts or territorializethe unconscious-the latter equals
making the human race unreal, or to reversingit into the hyperrealityof
simulation.("The Ordersof Simulacra"158,verbatim)
What Baudrillardconsiders the traditionalcharms of science fic-
tion-projection,extrapolation,excessive"pantography"-become impossible,
because space no longer offers a scene for overcomingfundamentaldif-
ferences.SF will consequentlyno longerbe romanticnarrativeof expansion
and colonization;it will rather"evolveimplosivelyin the same way as our
image of the universe. It would seek to revitalize,to reactualize,to
rebanalizethe fragmentsof simulation-fragmentsof this universalsimula-
tion whichour presumed'real'worldhas now becomefor us" (311,above).

In another important essay, "The Year 2000 Has Already Happened,"

Baudrillardelaborates one of the implications of the notion of the hyperreal:
that the acceleration and proliferation of information, and the technical drive
to create exact replicas of phenomena (through digitization, for example),
leads to the emptying out of an object's meaning, and its replacement as a
simulacrum. This simulacrum is potentially capable of infinite serial
reproduction in the shoreless anti-context of operational control, an
emptying out that leaves a haunted absence that information pretends
relentlessly and impossibly to fill:
At the veryheartof informationis the eventthe historyof whichis hauntedby
its own disappearance. At the heartof hi-fi is music,hauntedby its disappear-
ance.At the heartof the most sophisticatedexperimentation is sciencehaunted
by the disappearanceof its object.At the heart of porn is sexualityhauntedby
its own disappearance.Everywherethe same effect of "rendering"of the
absoluteproximityof the real:the same effect of simulation.("Year2000"40).
In this process objects disappear into their own too perfectly simulated
presence. They have a technically controlled self-identity so complete that
it leaves no other domain against which to differentiate themselves, no
shadows. In exactly the same way SF disappears into its own presence.
"It is not necessary to write science-fiction: we have as of now, here and
now, in our societies, with the media, the computers, the circuits, the
networks, the acceleration of particles which has definitely broken the
referential orbit of things" (36). Or we might add in more homely terms, the
realization that the SF imaginaryhas become a whole new project, no longer
limited to UFOs bringing the Rapture and extraterrestrialimpregnators in
the supermarket checkout racks, but affecting the fate of the world, with
Star Wars, genetic engineering, Virtual Reality, and global satellite
surveillance. With the saturation of technologies of digital replication we
have the feeling that anything is technically reproducible-and in bulk. The
substantialization of SFs objects has created a new form of haunted
consciousness, haunted by the uncanny spectral actuality of its properly
imaginary objects.
Baudrillard names the SF writers whom he believes capture the hyper-
real: Borges, before the letter; Philip K. Dick, and the J.G. Ballard of Crash,
which Baudrillard calls the "first great novel of the universe of simulation"
(319, above). But Baudrillard is himself a virtuoso stylist of theory-SF, one
of the few (perhaps with Deleuze-Guattari) recent theorists who have at-
tempted to formulate a global theory in what is essentially a lyrical mode.
In contrast with Haraway, whose SF is justified primarilyby the struggle for
liberation, Baudrillard'scold apocalypse-an apocalypse revealing that there
is nothing to reveal-is a form of self-acknowledged nihilism:
I am no longerin a state to "reflect"on something.I can onlypush hypotheses
to their limits, snatch them from their criticalzones of reference,take them
beyondthe point of no return.I also taketheoryinto the hyperspaceof simula-
tion-in whichit loses all objectivevalidity,but perhapsit gainsa coherence,that
is, a real affinitywith the systemthat surroundsus. ("Year2000"37)

On the face of it, Baudrillard'sSF is intended to mime the secret

conditionof the present.Like a postmodernBaudelaireor Lautreamont,
Baudrillardwrites to reveal and realize the theoreticalconditionsof the
hyperrealthroughlogicaldelirium.Paradoxically-orperhapslogically-the
revolutionaryHarawaychooses the strategyof discretion,pushinga few
choice conceptsto their limits (the cyborg,the alien), while Baudrillard's
theoryexplodesin an intellectualrhapsody,unshackledby a causeandeffect
it studiouslyrefutes,and in whichthe proliferationof conceptsis bounded
onlyby the limitsof Baudrillard'sexplicittechniqueof "analogicaltransfer"
(37).
One cannotread Baudrillardwithoutbeing struckby the sheer volume
of conceitstakenfromcontemporaryscienceand engineeringto illuminate
socialphenomena.Fromthe "leukemiaof history"to "telefission,"fromthe
implosivechain reactionof historyneutralizingthe energyof an event to
surveysand tests as the microbiologicalwarfareagainstthe social,through
highlyoriginaland elaboratemetaphorslinkingcancer,the genetic code,
aerospacetechnology,informationtheory,astrophysics,computersciences,
high-energyparticle physics, and many other disparatesciences, to the
operationsof the hyperreal,Baudrillardwriteswhatis essentiallya visionary
SF poem or film-exuberantin its prodigiousmanufactureof associations,
but ultimatelyironicin the realizationthatthe associationsare all the same
ones.
Baudrillard'sscientific conceits are not illustrative,and they clarify
nothing in the way that scientificmetaphorsdo, by pointingtowardthe
constructionof possiblemodels.Nor do they embellishscientificconcepts
by overlayingmythologicalinterpretationson them. They are nonetheless
logical, for they are consistentlylinked to larger rhetorical turns in
Baudrillard'sarguments,where certainmotifs and themes dear to utopian
and scientificfiction are treated as actualizedphenomena.Amerique,for
example,recapitulatesagainandagainversionsof NewsfromNowhere,Road
Warior, and The Man Who Fell to Earth-in the vision of America as the
only achievedutopia, as the only remainingprimitivesociety, and as the
fadingorgyof history.Next to the lyricevocationsof speedingin the desert
is the panorama of the mall in Washingtonas a series of museums
encapsulatingour entire universefrom Stone Age to Space Age, a post-
modernversionof Morris'svisitto the BritishMuseumin News.And at the
center,a narratorseducedinto a fatalfascinationwitha brilliantnew world
that cuts him off from his own dyingplanetof Paris.
2. "TheboundarybetweenSF and social realityis an optical illusion."In

hergroundbreaking, iconoclasticessay,"AManifestoforCyborgs,"Haraway
makes similar points, albeit without constructingan alternatehistorical
phenomenology.For Haraway,like Baudrillard,"theboundarybetweenSF
and social realityis an optical illusion"(66). Harawaycontendsthat the
various scientific discoursesand technologiesstrive to establish and to

legitimate themselves through narratives that have the power to inscribe

myths of origin and telos into their instruments and objects. Although these
legitimation narratives are often outspoken, they are part of the essence of
any tool or concept. Hence tools and technologies are signs in ideological
systems. In the same move, legitimation narratives are deployed as
instruments of power. In the culture of information this ambiguityof science
and technology ceases to be a matter of disguised rhetoric; since the
ultimate legitimating structure of science and technology is information (i.e.,
the hypostasis of language), there is no loss of explanatory "credibility"in
making the code/language paradigm manifest:
[C]ommunications sciencesand modembiologiesare constructedby a common
move-the translationof the worldinto a problemof coding, a search for a
commonlanguagein whichall resistanceto instrumental controldisappears,and
all heterogeneitycan be submittedto disassembly,reassembly,investmentand
exchange.(82-83)
Haraway'sposition here is congruent with Baudrillard'sconception of the
hyperreal, with one fundamental difference. For Haraway, the process of
hyperrealizationis still fluid, occurringwhere contestation and disruptionare
possible once one has accepted the inexorability,the validity, and even the
desirability of the categorical breakdowns and generalized ambivalence
resulting from the all-pervasive effects of informatics. For Baudrillard, SF
represents the necessary fatality of consciousness coming to grips with the
actually existing conditions of hyperreality;SF is the name for imaginative-
theoretical adequacy in the hyperreal. For Haraway, SF is, over and above
this, the necessary hopefulness that comes with knowing that neither the
initial conditions (the origin) nor the outcome (the apocalypse) of any
process, no matter how highly rationalized, can be determined. By placing
scientific fact in a field full of "promising monsters," Haraway makes
scientific discourse resonate with fiction, i.e., alternative constructions, and
consequently lose some of its fatality:
worlds.
SF is a territoryof contestedculturalreproductionin high-technological
Placingthe narrativesof scientificfact withinthe heterogeneousspace of SF
producesa transformedfield. The transformedfield sets up resonancesamong
all its regions and components.No region or componentis 'reduced'to any
other,but readingandwritingpracticesrespondto eachotheracrossa structural
space.Speculativefictionhas differenttensionswhen its field also containsthe
inscriptionpracticesof scientificfact.The scienceshavecomplexhistoriesin the
constitution of imaginativeworlds and of actual bodies in modern and
postmodern'firstworld'cultures.(PrimateVisions5)
(It is interesting to note the spatial metaphors: "territory,""heteroge-
neous space," "transformed field," "structural space," "regions." Most of
these images allude to virtualspaces, particularlymathematical or computer-
simulation space. Hence they evoke the sense of a virtualscene, as if dis-
course might operate like a cybernetic combinatorial-device in which
possible relationships among meanings can be simulated. There is a sense
in which the chapters of Primate Visions can be read as a series of "screens"

THE SF OF THEORY: BAUDRILLARD AND HARAWAY 395
of actual combinationsof possibleprimatologicalwork.The combinations

include historical evolution, but Haraway dwells very little on future
transformationsof the field, projectedfromthe historicalcombinationsand
the parametersof the structuralspace.That futureis open.)
3. ManifestCyborgs.For an open futureeven to be conceivableat least two

thingsare required:the dissolutionof the mythsof time thathaveinformed
westerntechnologyand mythology(frominnocentorigin,fall out of nature,
and apocalypticreunion);and the emergenceof a conceptionof virtual
timespace,where many possibilitiesmight be realized fatelessly.Such a
reformulationof culturaltimespace,and necessarilyalso of conceptionsof
humanfreedom,cannotcome aboutby theoreticalfiat.The theorizationof
an open futuredependson a conditionof existencethat can no longerbe
seen as essential,self-enclosed,and infinitelyself-productive.
For Haraway
that conditionexists at the site of the cyborg.
Harawayfinds the name for the new conditionsin one of the most
revered of SF conventions.Traditionally,the cyborg is an ontologically
mongrelcreaturethat combinesmechanical-artificial elementswithorganic
andnaturalones. SF has neverbeen exclusiveaboutthiscategory:it includes
a wide range of types, from the supermechanizedBorg of the recentStar
Trek,to Anne McCaffreysheroic-romantic "ShipWho Sang,"to the tragic
genetically-alteredspacepilotsof CordwainerSmith's "ScannersLive in
Vain."Recent literarySF favorsthe cyborgperhapsaboveall otherthemes;
the cyberpunkgenre can be defined by its vision of a dystopianfuture
saturatedby cyborgtechnologies.Historically,the cyborghas stood for the
radicalanxietyof humanconsciousnessabout its own embodimentat the
momentthat embodimentappearsalmostfullycontingent.Cyborganxiety
has stood for a panicoscillationbetweenthe "human"element(associated
with affections, eros, error, innovation,projects begun in the face of
mortality)and the "machine"element (the desire for long life, health,
physicalimpermeability, self-containedcontrolprocesses,dependability,
and
hence the abilityto fulfillpromisesover a long term).
The classicalSF cyborgis a site of panicpsychology(to borrowa term
fromArthurKroker),the exaggerationof the body/intellectdualisminto a
form of literaryprosthesis.The cyborggeneratesand absorbsdread,pre-
cisely becausehumanbeings,withoutknowledgeof the originalconditions
of our construction,have no way of knowingthe degreeto whichbodyand
mind can be considereddistinct(if they can at all); and we have no other
way of approachingthe problemthan throughour constructions-i.e.,our
mentaland physicalcombinatorymodels,our cyborgs.These are inevitably
parodic,since they alreadyassumethe differencewe ask them to test.
The classicalcyborgcontestthus reversesthe termsof Platonicdualism,
in whichthe body is linkedwith illusionand mutability,the mindwith the
perceptionsof eternal values. The cyborgis a creationof the cultureof
artificialimmanence,of exteriorizationof knowledgewith respect to the

396 SCIENCE-FICTION
knower (Lyotard), in which the creations of the intellect are directly

translatableinto technologicalembodiment.The intellectthereforecomes
to representthe superbody,the bodytransformedin the mind'simageof the
invulnerableandmaintainablelife-supportsystem;whilethe archaicorganic
body comes to representthe scene of tragicknowledgeof eternitythrough
mortality,the necessarypreconditionfor value-generatingsacrifice.Thus,
classically,the cyborghas fit into one of two niches:the Supermanor the
tragic technologicalmonster.Traditionally,the cyborgis recuperatedfor
"humanity," demonstrating-usually throughsentimentalnostalgia("human
envy")-the superiorvalueof God'sfavoritecreaturejust the wayHe made
him.
Haraway'scyborgis not classical.For her, the cyborgis a theoretical
objectfor whichthe schizophysicalbody is not necessary,in the same way
Turing considereda machine to be a set of operations,relations,and
algorithms,not necessarilya physicalobject.
Harawayintendsto save the cyborgfrom its neuroticrole in high-tech
powerdreamsand the technophobiaof humanists.Her cyborgis a state-of-
the-arttheoreticalconstruction:simultaneouslyobjectand subject,without
gender, withoutspecies, without"kingdom"even, and hence free of the
conventionaldialecticsor narrativesof power. Haraway-in a move also
favoredby Baudrillard-literalizes the SF metaphorinto a theoreticalbeing
and detects the existence of the cyborgin actuality,where it has not yet
receivedits new,accurate,alienname.Indeed,comparedwithmostworkof
theory,all of Haraway'sdescriptionsof actuallyexistingconditionsare SF:
she describesa context that is so radicallytransformedand alien to the
comforting essentialist categories of the dominant form of theoretical
discourse,or the hyperabstract categoriesof most post-structuralist
theory,
that it fulfillsthe most rigorousconditionsof cognitiveestrangement,while
attemptingrigorouslyto describethe real.
Cyborgsrepresentfor Harawaybeings that combine mechanicaland
organicqualities,or animaland humanqualities,withinthe limitsof their
physical bodies. But for Haraway these are localizationsof a set of
systematicrelations in postmodern,high-techcultures.The diffusionof
informatictechnologiesthroughoutthe worldhascreateda conditionof fluid
chaosregardingthe essential,objectivenatureof anylivingbeingor system.
The cyborgis the site of a categoricalbreakdown,a systemof transgressions,
andan irrecoverableone, since the conditionsof cyborgexistencecannotbe
reversed,essentialdifferencescannotbe restoredwith the laser-scalpelof
classicalrationalities.For Haraway,cyborgdoes not necessarilyname the
tragic confusion of identities that follows on scientific hubris. On the
contrary,it may name the condition of freedom from the illegitimate
categoriesof "nature"(race,gender,species,kingdom)-a freedomthatcan
only emerge with the destructionof those rationalitiesand of the mytholo-
gies of essentialidentity.
The urge to hope and to take pleasurein the possibilitiesoffered by

THE SF OF THEORY: BAUDRILLARD AND HARAWAY 397
technologicalrationalizationis evident throughout"Manifesto."Haraway

linksthe cyborgto the conceptof utopia;the essay,she writes,is written"in
the utopiantraditionof imagininga worldwithoutgender,whichis perhaps
a worldwithoutgenesis, but maybealso a worldwithoutend. The cyborg
incarnationis outside salvation history" (66). "Salvationhistory,"the
totalizingmythologythat legitimatesthe patriarchal,capitalist,heterosexist
questfor reunionwitha MotherNatureit was alienatedfromat The Origin,
representsfor Harawaythe conceptualprison circumscribingall political
language,includingmany of the languagesof feminist resistance.Every
name within the global taxonomyof historicalpatriarchyconjuresup the
samesystemof relations.Onlya trulyradicalbreakwithfundamentaldiffer-
ences-especiallywithinnature/cultureandbody/mind-canoffera wayout:
Perhaps, ironically, we can learn from our fusions with animals and machines
how not to be Man, the embodiment of Western logos. From the point of view
of pleasure in these potent and taboo fusions, made inevitable by the social rela-
tions of science and technology, there might indeed be a feminist science. (92)
"Manifesto,"then,is a formof utopianwriting,a programbasedon imagin-
ing an alternativerealitythat can serveas a modelfor actionin reality-and
furthermore,actionthatseeks to realize the model,cognatewiththe waySF
seeks to literalizethe metaphorsof science.First,neitherthe programnor
the alternativevision is protectedfrom chanceand historyby the aura of
myth(i.e., theyare subjectto reality);andsecond,boththe programandthe
alternativeactuallyexist in the present (i.e., we are cyborgsand we are
learningto take responsibilityfor it). Thus the title of the essay is a rich
pun, like "utopia"itself:for the thingto be achievedis already"manifest,"
albeit in inchoateform.
Harawaynever names her utopia,her vision of emancipatedrelations.
She does not go beyondprofessionsof hope andthe critiqueof domination.
This restraintcomes from a precise sense of the historicallesson: utopia
articulatedtends to become the pretextfor-and even the name of-the
methodicaldominationof rationalization.
Haraway'soriginality,in termsequallyvalidfor criticaltheoryandSF, is
her notion of imaginingutopia by movingthroughthe heart of dystopia.
Recoveringthe cyborgfromits role as ideologicallegitimator(for conserva-
tive humanistsand naive technophilesboth), Harawayattemptsto clear a
new path for utopianrationalitythroughthe sprawlof instrumentalratio-
nalization
4. The Cyborg Future is Unimaginable.Utopia has been the epic of

rationality.
Science fictionhas been the epic of rationalization.
Utopia has told the storyof the accessionof true rationalrelationships,
often neglectingto imagine the instrumentalityrequiredto give them a
"body."
Sciencefictionhas told the storyof the heroicquestfor tools of material

power, in a universe of proliferating instruments and mediations, often

neglecting to reflect on the purposes and varieties of power.
In "A Manifesto for Cyborgs," Haraway attempts to bridge the chasm
between the two imaginaries. In her ironic myth, the very power of
instrumental rationality to create the conditions that undermine the
categorical basis of substantive rationality carries it right out of its power to
control its systems-the way a projectile employs a gravity sling to boost its
acceleration with the aid of a planetary gravitational field.5
In this cyborg system, which is itself a "promising monster," Haraway
repeatedly calls for an intellectual alertness that will allow the possibilities
for utopian progress to be distinguished from technological domination:
[IJnthe consciousnessof our failures,we risklapsinginto boundlessdifferences
and givingup on the confusingtask of makingpartial,real connection.Some
differences are playful. Some are poles of world historical domination.
'Epistemology'is aboutknowingthe difference.(79)
Ambivalencetowardthe disruptedunitiesmediatedbyhigh-techculturerequires
not sortingconsciousnessinto categoriesof 'clear-sightedcritiquegroundinga
solid politicalepistemology,'but subtle understandingof emergingpleasures,
experiencesandpowerswithseriouspotentialfor changingthe rulesof the game.
(91)
These are not immoderate claims. Still, one can question whether they
are grounded in theoretical necessity or in acts of will. One could argue that
this is a form of whistling in the dark, rather than the result of compelling
analysis. And indeed, it is out of the SF context that the rejoinder should
come. Fredric Jameson, in his essay "Progress Versus Utopia; or, Can We
Imagine the Future?" confronts the problem facing all people who try to
imagine a utopian negation of the totality of domination in present. Since
the language of the negation is itself part of the language of domination,
there is an ironic shadow cast over the conception of emancipated relations-
or, to alter the image, a Trojan Horse carried into the wish for the utopian
future, from which issue the terms and relations of the present, which then
set out to colonize the future. Jameson discerns this absolute terminus of
language to be the informing aporia of SF. It is SF's
deepestvocation...todemonstrateandto dramatizeourincapacityto imaginethe
future,to body forth, throughapparentlyfull representationswhichprove on
closerinspectionto be structurally and constitutivelyimpoverished, the atrophy
of whatMarcusehas calledthe utopian imagination, the imaginationof othemess
and radicaldifference,and to serveas unwittingand even unwillingvehiclesfor
a meditationwhich,settingforthfor the unknown,findsitself irrevocably mired
in the all-too familiar,and therebyunexpectedlytransformedinto a contempla-
tion of its own limits.(153)
Reading Haraway's "Manifesto," I sometimes feel that the claims for
"epistemology"-the practice of seeing the difference between playful and
dominating differences-is merely a sleight of hand, a gesture against a
nihilism that might describe the undermining of patriarchal value just as
well. The notion of subtly understandingpowers "with serious potential for

changingthe rules of the game" may be prematurewhen we don't even

understandthe game.6
5. Theoryas SF. Before leavingthe themeof Haraway'stheory-SF,we must

distinguishbetween "A Manifestofor Cyborgs"and PrimateVisions.The
two workstreat the SF of theoryin differentways."Manifesto"is, to my
mind,a workof SF. It positsa mythand a concretesocialcontext,andeven
a formof appropriateirony,aboutthe emergenceof humansocietyinto the
future. Haraway'sirony is cognate to the structuralirony of SF, for we
cannotjudge how muchof her manifestorefersto the actualfuture,when
human consciousnessand bodies will be furtherchangedby the global
rationalizationof communicationsand the "editingof the body,"and how
much to the present, in which our actual state (as cyborgs)only seems
futuristicfrom the perspectiveof the archaicessentialistcategoriesmany
peoplepersistin thinkingin. Furthermore,the questionof the "real"cyborg
conditionresonateswith SFs libraryof depictionsof ethicaland material
possibilities.The gap betweenthe conceptandthe materialbodyno longer
exists. The gap is between the materializationof the concept and its
possibilitiesof futuredevelopment-thecharacteristicproblematicof SF.
Furthermore,"Manifesto"is writtenin the voice of a forerunner,whose
ratiocinationis ultimatelya dense rhetoricalinstrumentfor the warrantof
hope, for a utopiathat may or may not be materially,"literally'realizable.
It attemptsto depict the resurrectionof a utopia of ends out of the SF
dystopiaof unbridled,unreflective,fatal instrumentality.It is also a cyborg
text in its performance,combiningthe earnestvoice of a politicalpolemicist
writingin the SocialistReview,andthe voice of an SF cyborgleader,like the
Roy Baty of Blade Runner,resonatingin a space outsidethe real.
PrimateVisions,by contrast,is the manifesto'sinversion;it uses SF as a
tool for illuminatingthe social,textual,and materialhistoryof primatology
in the US. Wherethe hesitationsof SF in "Manifesto"give the SF notion
of the cyborga sense of actuality,Harawayuses SF in PrimateVisionsto
demystify-i.e., to "de-actualize"-thepatriarchalmythologiesfor which
primatologybecame a particularlyimportantlegitimatingdiscipline.In the
one, SF acts to create convictionin an (ironic)myth;in the other,it serves
to deconstructother myths.
Like Baudrillard,Harawaynamesthe SF writersshe treatsas modelsof
the imaginativeelaborationof the cyborgproject:VondaMcIntyre,Joanna
Russ,JamesTiptree,SamuelDelany,JohnVarley,Anne McCaffrey,Ursula
Le Guin, and aboveall, OctaviaButler.One can feel the presenceof these
writersin "Manifesto."In PrimateVisions,Harawayespeciallyemphasizes
Butler'swork.The concludingchapter,an accountof Dawn,the firstvolume
in Butler'sXenogenesisseries,is intendedto standas a signpostfor the sort
of imaginativework that should complementthe study of such mytho-
sciencesof humandefinitionas ethnologyand primatology.In a sense, the
invocationof Butler'snovel pointsthe readerbackto "Manifesto."

400 SCIENCE-FICTION
Harawayoftenmakesself-reflectivecommentson PrimateVisionswithin
the text itself. Interestingly,these are ultimatelyless self-deconstructions
than remindersof the ultimateutopiandimensionof difficult,magisterial,
analyticstudy.PrimateVisionsclearlyhas, like "Manifesto,"a polemical
purpose,and its languageis fittedto its complexaudience-a verydifferent
one from that of "Manifesto."In PrimateVisions,Haraway'slanguageis
relativelydiscreetandprudent.Partof the difficultyof her argumentresults
fromherevidentdesireto balanceseveralkindsof analyticdiscourse,indeed
of differentrationalities(includingdifferentdiscourseswithin feminism,
socialism,and the philosophyand sociologyof science).She works-to use
her image-in contested border-zones.But against the clearlyidentified
cyborgironyof "Manifesto,"in PlimateVisionsHarawayis carefulto keep
her grasp on her not necessarilysympatheticaudience.Consequently,the
book has the voice of the ethnographicguide, the discretionof an urbane
revolutionary,or the pantographyof a FutureHumanpatientlyexplaining
the as-yet-unseento the not-yet-emerged.
EspeciallywhencontrastedwithBaudrillard's writing,one cansense that
Haraway'scommitmentto a utopiannew orderemergingout of the chaos
of the contemporarydiscursiveborderwarsis in itselfa projectof discretion.
It is foundedon the need to discoverhope, the tracesof the novum,and a
common ground without a common language. The difficult irony of
"Manifesto"is requiredjust as much as the analyticprecisionof Primate
Visions.Harawaydrawsthe cool languageof consideredtheoryup against
the hot technocraticjive of patriarchalapocalyptics;she coaxes us to shift
our gaze to where it has not gone before.
I believe that this strategyof discretionis not only a tacticalchoicebut
in fact definesPrimateVisionsmuchmore thanHarawaylets on in the text.
It marksanotheraspect of Haraway'sirony,one that linksPrimateVisions
to an SF text very differentfrom the ones invokedby the forerunner.For
me, the book'svoice resemblesthatof the narrator-protagonist of Stanislaw
Lem'sSolaris,Kris Kelvin,as he pondersthe impossibilityof arrivingat a
methodof makingcontactwith the sentientplasmoidocean that is Solaris.
The narratorof PrimateVisions,like Kelvin,cannot,will not, discardthe
discourse of scientific rationality,even though it cannot be trusted.
Ultimately,the voice in PrimateVisionshas a utopiangoal like Kelvin's,the
dissolutionof the mental/ideologicalprestructuring that preventscontact
with the Other-or rather,whichdissolvesthe distinctionsbetweenSelf and
Other withoutannihilatingthe intellect.Like Solaris,PrimateVisionsis a
workof rationalitycritiquingrationalization, utopiacriticizingsciencefiction.
Both Kelvinand the Harawayof PrimateVisionsformulatethe problemof
the prisonof rationaldiscourse-anthropocentrism for Lem, androcentrism
for Haraway.But like Kelvin,Harawaydoes not abandonmeta-science.
In Solanis, Kelvinretiresto the libraryof the SolarisStationto studythe
evolutionof Solaristics,the projectto make contactwith the Alien. That
historyrecapitulatesin miniaturethe historyof romantic,questingscience,

the project of uniting with the Other which will somehow lead either to a
cosmic hypostasis or a superior proof of the power of Man. (The structure
of the history of Solaristics lends itself to deconstruction in terms of
Haraway's discussion of "salvation history.") Haraway, too, reconstructs the
historical phases of primatology like books in a station library orbiting the
Planet of the Apes. Her tone, like Kelvin's, is deeply skeptical, but not
dismissive. For just as Kelvin learns more about human Solarists (and
scientists in general) than about the sentient ocean, Haraway reveals that
primatology reveals more about primatologists (and scientists in general)
than about primates.
Both works conclude with a certain sense of the exhaustion of narratives.
The juxtaposition of so many discrete narratives of scientific mythopoesis
reveals their historical contingency and the impossibility of anticipating the
novum, the new arrangements and relations of sentient beings to others.
Neither Kelvin nor Haraway believes in the conclusions of these contingent,
projective scientific methods; but neither discards anything either.7
6. Baudrillard and Haraway. There is much more that might be said about
the new conception of theory developing in the contest of Baudrillard'sand
Haraway's writings. There are surprising points of complementarity. One
could hardly ask for a better account of simulation than Haraway's
description of Akeley's dioramas in the Museum of Natural History in
Primate Visions. Nor could one ask for a better account of the patriarchal
project's desire for all-consuming apocalypse and extra-terrestrialismthan
that in Baudrillard'smeditations on hyperrealityand the "satellization of the
earth." And in the thesis of his remarkable essay "Les Betes"-that science
is bent on breaking the silence of nature through experimentation on
animals-Baudrillard offers what may be both a strong counterargumentand
a complement to Haraway's implicit acceptance of the cyborgization of
animal life in Primate Visions.
At stake in the study of Haraway and Baudrillard and in the theorizing
and imaginative writing that will come from their work is whether theory can
engage a world in which its historical concepts and attitudes are, at best,
nostalgic distractions from the way things are, and at worst, instruments of
a domination of thought no theory has yet been able to bring itself to
theorize. For all their differences, Haraway and Baudrillard are convincing
us, seducing us to shift our gaze and see our place in a world we have made
but have not yet recognized.
NOTES
1. AlthoughI have adoptedthe term from ErnstBloch and DarkoSuvin,I am
usingit less as a literarytopos than as a necessaryfuturologicalconcept.Historyis
distinguishedfrom mythologypreciselyto the degree that it assumesthat things
changeunforeseeably,and thereforecannotbe anticipated.Anyeventor knowledge
that causes such transformations is a novum. It can be arguedthat nova are the

402 STUDIES,VOLUME18 (1991)
SCIENCE-FICTION
elemental units of any futurology. (For Suvin's account of the novum, see
Metamorphoses 63-66.)
2. This conception of SF is similar to Todorov's conception of the fantastic to the
degree that, in Todorov, the diegetic hesitation inscribed in the narrative depends on
extraliterary metaphysical-ontogical hesitation and is derived from the reader's
uncertainty about the world. Todorov's fantastic, however, seems retrospective-
concerned with the status of origins and initial ontological conditions, i.e., fates-
while SF is concerned with the possible reconstruction of origins through as-yet-only-
imagined future transformations. (For Todorov on hesitation in the fantastic, see pp.
31-35.)
3. The need for a futurological dimension in every area of research should be as
obvious in the postmodern age as the need for a historical one. Only by attempting
to limn the possible directions of evolution, and to clarify the ethical principles that
one wishes to see guiding action, can intellectual work maintain a sense of connec-
tion with the breakneck acceleration of technological innovation.
Stanislaw Lem has articulated this (in a rather more positivistic tone) in his essay
"Metafuturology":
[Ejach of the existing branches of science should devote some its efforts to
futurology. Just as there is no 'universal history of everything that has ever
happened' but rather the history of nations, of living organisms, of mathematics,
of law, of art, of physics, of literature, etc., so there should be an analogous
branch of the individual sciences, dealing with the future. At the moment, there
is no humanistic 'counterweight' to the instrumental pragmatism of futurology....
It is futile to expect literature, whether it is fantastic or non-fantastic, to right the
existing imbalance. The task is certainly beyond the powers of all the arts
combined. At the same time, it is extremely important for literature to participate
in this reorientation of thought and action. Since 'conventional' literature keeps
its distance from this task, so-called 'science fiction' has an even greater
responsibility. If futurology has an 'instrumental bias,' then literature must be
true to its traditions by challenging it. After all, it has been literature's task from
time immemorial to integrate the values and concepts that make up the horizon
of human life. (263-64)
4. Because we must make a distinction between Baudrillard'snotion of science
fiction, the imaginary of the second-order simulation, and SF, we deviate from the
usual SFS practice of using SF as a one-to-one substitute for science fiction. In the
present context, science fiction and SF refer to different things.
5. Utopia in these terms is hardly distinguishable from the current use of the
term chaos associated with dynamical systems theory. And indeed, there are many
similarities between Haraway's cyborg world and recent interpretations of chaos
science and dynamical systems as a source of hope in a world deprived of all other
certainties, which appears to underlie much of the attraction that chaos holds for
humanists.
6. I have given short shrift to the feminist aspect of the cyborg, which Haraway
has considered basic-perhaps even essential-for its theorization. I did this not out
of antipathy. Haraway also states, in a recent interview, that "the cyborg is a figure
for whom gender is incredibly problematic" (Penley 23). It seems certain to me that
the cyborg's future is inconceivable in terms of contemporary feminist discourse-or
indeed any political or disciplinarydiscourse-no matter what its initial conditions of
construction may have been. It is an aspect of Haraway'sirony that her emancipatory
theoretical construct must escape from its initial context. It is also an inherent trait

of SF constructsto resiststerncontextualization-theyhesitateon the brinkof actual

existence,and alwayshintthat they,like all actualthings,can andwill inhabitmany
previouslyunforeseencontexts.
7. An extendedstudyof Solarisin termsof Haraway'sformulationswould be
extremelyfruitful.It woulddoubtlesscenteron the role of the "Visitor"Rheya,the
simulacrumof Kelvin'sdead wife, who "returns"from Kelvin'sunconsciousto
restorehim to questingpotency,and then sacrificesher immortality.
WORKSCITED
Jean.America. Trans.ChrisTurner.London,1989.
Baudrillard,
. "Ballard'sCrash."Above, 313-20.
Simulacreset Simulations.
. "Les Betes. Territoireet Metamorphoses."
Paris,1981.189-206.
"The Orders of Simulacra."Simulations 83-159.
"ThePrecessionof Simulacra." Simulations1-79.
"Simulacraand ScienceFiction."Above, 309-12.
Simulations.Trans. Paul Foss, Paul Patton, and Philip Betjeman.NY,
1983.
. "TheYear 2000Has AlreadyHappened."Trans.Nai-feiDing & Kuang-
Hsing Chen. Body Invaders: Panic Sex in America. Ed. Arthur & Marylouise
Kroker.NY, 1987.35-44.
Haraway,Donna. "A Manifesto for Cyborgs:Science,Technology,and Socialist
Feminismin the 1980s."SocialistReview#80 (1985):65-107.
. Primate Visions. NY, 1990.
Jameson,Fredric."ProgressVersusUtopia;or, Can We Imaginethe Future?"SFS
9 (1982):147-58.
Lem,Stanislaw."Metafuturology." Jr. SFS 13 (1986):
Trans.IstvanCsicsery-Ronay,
261-71.
. Solaris.Trans.Fred Cox & JoannaKilmartin.NY: Harcourt,1987.
Penley, Constance,& Andrew Ross. "Cyborgsat Large:Interviewwith Donna
Haraway."Social Text #25/26 (1990): 8-23.
Suvin, Darko. Metamoiphoses of Science Fiction. New Haven, CT, 1979.
RESUME
Istvan Csicsery-Ronay,Jr. La SF de la Th6orie: Baudrillard et Haraway.-

Avec l'expansion de la construction technologique de la vie sociale dans le
monde postmodeme, SF cesse d'etre un genre artistiqueet devientplutot un
mode de conscience quotidienne.Au coeur de ce mode se trouventdeux he'si-
tations: 1. les transformationstechno-scientifiquesrestent-ellesseulement au
niveau du concevable ou bien sont-elles vraimentrealisables,et 2. quelles sont
les implications de leur realisation.Au moment ousdes conditions sociales a
peine imaginables auparavantcommemcent a se manifestergrace a des effets
technologiques--enparticulierla technologiede l'informatique-les objets de la
theorie culturelledeviennent concrets, et la reflexiontheIoriquesur leur avenir
devient indifferenciablede la SF. Jean Baudrillard et Donna Haraway sont
parmi les theoriciens les plus perspicaces de mode SF. Baudrillardsoutient
que, a l'epoque de l'hyperrealite,aucune distance ne subsiste entrela r'alite et
les modNes imaginairesutilise'spour la concevoir.La science fiction, sorte de

404 STUDIES,VOLUME 18 (1991)
SCIENCE-FICTION
modele imaginairepour la periode bourgeoise-productivistede l'histoire,cesse

s'existerdes que la realite la dipasse. Haraway avance la notion du "cyborg"
comme 6trerevolutionnaire,defini a la fois par la technologie et par l'aspir-
ation emancipatrice.Les deux th6eoricienscommentent des topoi de science
fiction tout en erivant une theorie suspendue entre la fiction et l'explication
rationnelle-comme la SF. (ICR/ABE)
Abstract.-With the expansion of the technological constructionof social life

in the postmodem period, SF ceases to be a genre of art and becomes instead
a mode of quotidian awareness.At the heart of this mode are two hesitations:
a) about whetherscientific-technologicaltransformationsare merely conceiv-
able or actually realizable, and b) about the possible implications of their
realization.As previously barely imaginable social conditions emerge through
the effects of technology-particularly infornatic technology-the objects of
cultural theory become concrete, and theoreticalreflection about theirfuture
becomes indistinguishablefrom SF. Jean Baudrillardand Donna Harawayare
two of the most acute theoristsin the SF mode. Baudrillardarguesthat in the
age of hyperreality,no distance remains between reality and the imaginary
models used to conceive it. Science fiction, the type of imaginary model
appropriatefor the bourgeois-productionistphase of history, ceases to exist
when reality surpasses it. Haraway proposes the notion of the cyborg as a
revolutionarybeing,simultaneouslydefined by technologyand by emancipatory
aspiration.Both theoristselaborateSF topoi, while writingtheorythat is poised
betweenfiction and rational explanation-just like SF. (ICR)


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