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De unitate intellectus contra

Averroistas
by
Thomas Aquinas
translated as
ON THE UNIQUENESS OF INTELLECT AGAINST
AVERROISTS
www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/8246/

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CONTENTS/CENTER>
1. Aristotle's position on the unity of the possible intellect
2. The relation of the possible intellect to man, according
to other Peripatetics
3. Reasons in favor of the unity of the intellect
4. Refutation of the opinion that all men have one intellect
5. Answer to objections against the multiplicity of
intellects

Prooemium INTRODUCTION

Sicut omnes homines [1] All men by nature desire


naturaliter scire to know the truth; they also
desiderant veritatem, ita have a natural desire to
naturale desiderium inest avoid error and to refute it
hominibus fugiendi when the opportunity arises.
errores, et eos cum Since we have been given an
facultas adfuerit intellect in order to know
confutandi. Inter alios truth and avoid error, it
autem errores seems singularly
indecentior videtur esse inappropriate to be mistaken
error quo circa about it. For a long time now
intellectum erratur, per there has been widespread
quem nati sumus an error concerning intellect
devitatis erroribus which originates in the
cognoscere veritatem. writings of Averroes. He
Inolevit siquidem iam seeks to maintain that what
dudum circa intellectum Aristotle calls the possible,
error apud multos, ex but he infelicitously calls the
dictis Averrois sumens material, intellect is a
originem, qui asserere substance which, existing
nititur intellectum quem separately from the body, is
Aristoteles possibilem in no way united to it as its
vocat, ipse autem form, and furthermore that
inconvenienti nomine this possible intellect is one
materialem, esse for all men. We have already
quamdam substantiam written much in refutation of
secundum esse a corpore this, but because those
separatam, nec aliquo mistaken on this matter
modo uniri ei ut formam; continue impudently to
et ulterius quod iste oppose the truth, it is our
intellectus possibilis sit intention once more to write
unus omnium hominum. against this error and in
Contra quae iam pridem such a way that it is
plura conscripsimus; sed decisively refuted.
quia errantium
impudentia non cessat
veritati reniti, propositum
nostrae intentionis est
iterato contra eumdem
errorem conscribere
aliqua, quibus manifeste
praedictus error
confutetur.

Nec id nunc agendum est [2] There is no need now to


ut positionem praedictam show that the foregoing
in hoc ostendamus esse position is erroneous
erroneam quia repugnat because repugnant to
veritati fidei Christianae. Christian faith: a moment’s
Hoc enim satis in reflection makes this clear to
promptu cuique apparere anyone. Take away from men
potest. Subtracta enim diversity of intellect, which
ab hominibus diversitate alone among the soul’s
intellectus, qui solus inter parts seems incorruptible
animae partes and immortal, and it follows
incorruptibilis et that nothing of the souls of
immortalis apparet, men would remain after
sequitur post mortem death except a unique
nihil de animabus intellectual substance, with
hominum remanere nisi the result that reward and
unicam intellectus punishment and their
substantiam; et sic difference disappear. We
tollitur retributio intend to show that the
praemiorum et paenarum foregoing position is
et diversitas eorumdem. opposed to the principles of
Intendimus autem philosophy every bit as
ostendere positionem much as it is to the teaching
praedictam non minus of faith. And, Latin writers on
contra philosophiae this matter not being to the
principia esse, quam taste of some, who tell us
contra fidei documenta. they prefer to follow the
Et quia quibusdam, ut words of the Peripatetics,
dicunt, in hac materia though of them they have
verba Latinorum non seen only the works of
sapiunt, sed Aristotle, the founder of the
Peripateticorum verba school, we will first show the
sectari se dicunt, quorum foregoing position to be in
libros numquam in hac every way repugnant to his
materia viderunt, nisi words and judgments.
Aristotelis qui fuit sectae
Peripateticae institutor;
ostendemus primo
positionem praedictam
eius verbis et sententiae
repugnare omnino.

Caput 1 CHAPTER 1
De sententia Aristotelis
circa unitatem
intellectus possibilis

Accipienda est igitur [3] Let us then take up the


prima definitio animae first definition of soul
quam Aristoteles in Aristotle gives in Book Two
secundo de anima ponit, of On the Soul (412b5): “the
dicens quod anima est first act of a physically
actus primus corporis organized body.” And lest
physici organici. Et ne some should say this
forte aliquis diceret hanc definition does not cover
definitionem non omni every soul, because of the
animae competere, earlier conditional remark,
propter hoc quod supra “If, then, we have to give a
sub conditione dixerat: si general formula applicable
oportet aliquid commune to all kinds of soul,”
in omni anima dicere, (412b4), which they take to
quod intelligunt sic mean that it cannot be done,
dictum quasi hoc esse the words which follow
non possit, accipienda should be taken into
sunt verba eius account. For he writes, “We
sequentia. Dicit enim: have now given a general
universaliter quidem answer to the question,
dictum est quid sit anima; What is soul? It is substance
substantia enim est quae in the sense which
est secundum rationem; corresponds to the account
hoc autem est quod quid of a thing.” (412a8-12), that
erat esse huius corporis, is, the substantial form of a
i. e. forma substantialis physically organized body.
corporis physici organici.

Et ne forte dicatur ab hac [4] The sequel answers


universalitate partem those who might say that
intellectivam excludi, hoc the intellective part is
removetur per id quod excluded from the range of
postea dicit: quod this definition. “From this it
quidem igitur non sit is clear that the soul is
anima separabilis a inseparable from its , or at
corpore, aut partes any rate that certain parts of
quaedam ipsius si it are (if it has parts)—for
partibilis apta nata est, the actuality of some of
non immanifestum est; them is the actuality of the
quarumdam enim parts themselves,”
partium actus est (413a4-7), which can only
ipsarum. At vero be understood of those
secundum quasdam nihil which belong to the
prohibet, propter id quod intellective part, namely
nullius corporis sunt intellect and will. From this it
actus. Quod non potest is clear that some parts of
intelligi nisi de his quae the soul he has defined as
ad partem intellectivam being the act of the body are
pertinent, puta acts of some parts of the
intellectus et voluntas. Ex body, whereas others are
quo manifeste ostenditur not the acts of any body. It
illius animae, quam supra is one thing for the soul to
universaliter definiverat be the act of body and
Aristoteles dicens eam another for some part of it
esse corporis actum, to be the act of body, as will
quasdam partes esse be argued below. In this
quae sunt quarumdam same chapter he shows the
partium corporis actus, soul to be the act of body
quasdam autem nullius because some of its parts
corporis actus esse. Aliud are acts of body: “We must
enim est animam esse apply what has been said [of
actum corporis, et aliud the whole] to the parts.”
partem eius esse (412b17)
corporis actum, ut infra
manifestabitur. Unde et in
hoc eodem capitulo
manifestat animam esse
actum corporis per hoc
quod aliquae partes eius
sunt corporis actus, cum
dicit: considerare oportet
in partibus quod dictum
est, scil. in toto.

Adhuc autem manifestius [5] From the sequel it is


apparet ex sequentibus even clearer that the
quod sub hac intellect is covered by this
generalitate definitionis general definition. The fact
etiam intellectus that the body no longer
includitur (per ea quae actually lives when soul is
sequuntur). Nam cum separated from it is taken to
satis probaverit animam be sufficient proof that soul
esse actum corporis, quia is the act of body. However,
separata anima non est because something could be
vivens in actu, quia said to be in act thanks to
tamen aliquid potest dici the presence of something
actu tale ad praesentiam other than form, of a mover,
alicuius, non solum si sit say, as the combustible
forma sed etiam si sit actually burns when fire is
motor, sicut combustibile present, and the moveable
ad praesentiam actually moves when the
comburentis actu mover is present, one might
comburitur, et quodlibet wonder whether the body
mobile ad praesentiam actually lives thanks to the
moventis actu movetur; presence of soul in the same
posset alicui venire in way that the mobile moves
dubium utrum corpus sic at the presence of the
vivat actu ad praesentiam mover, rather than as matter
animae, sicut mobile is in act thanks to the
movetur actu ad presence of form. The doubt
praesentiam motoris, an can feed on the fact that
sicut materia est in actu Plato said soul is united to
ad praesentiam formae; body not as form but rather
et praecipue quia Plato as mover and director. This
posuit animam non uniri is clear from Plotinus and
corpori ut formam, sed Gregory of Nyssa—whom I
magis ut motorem et mention because they were
rectorem, ut patet per Greeks not Latins. The
Plotinum et Gregorium Philosopher invites this
Nyssenum, (quos ideo doubt when, to what has
induco quia non fuerunt been quoted, he adds
Latini sed Graeci). Hanc “Further, we have no light on
igitur dubitationem the problem whether the
insinuat philosophus cum soul may not be the actuality
post praemissa subiungit: of its body in the sense in
amplius autem which the sailor is the
immanifestum si sit actuality of the ship.”
corporis actus anima (413a8-10).
sicut nauta navis.

Quia igitur post [6] It was because this


praemissa adhuc hoc doubt remained after what
dubium remanebat, he said that he concludes,
concludit: figuraliter “This must suffice as our
quidem igitur sic sketch or outline of the
determinetur et nature of soul”
describatur de anima, (413a11-13), because he
quia scil. nondum ad has not yet shown the truth
liquidum demonstraverat with full clarity.
veritatem.

Ad hanc igitur Therefore, in order to


dubitationem tollendam, remove this doubt, he
consequenter procedit ad proceeds to make manifest
manifestandum id quod that which is more certain
est secundum se et both in itself and in
secundum rationem definition through what is
certius, per ea quae sunt less certain in itself but
minus certa secundum se more certain for us, that is,
sed magis certa quoad through effects of the soul
nos, i. e. per effectus which are its acts. Thus he
animae, qui sunt actus immediately distinguishes
ipsius. Unde statim the works of the soul, saying
distinguit opera animae, that “what has soul in it
dicens quod animatum differs from what has not in
distinguitur ab inanimato that the former displays
in vivendo, et quod multa life,”(413a21-25) and that
sunt quae pertinent ad there are many levels of life,
vitam, scil. intellectus, namely, “intellect, sense,
sensus, motus et status motion and rest according to
secundum locum, et place,” the motion of
motus nutrimenti et nourishing and growth, such
augmenti, ita quod that anything in which one
cuicumque inest aliquid of these is found is said to
horum, dicitur vivere. Et live. Having shown how
ostenso quomodo ista se these [levels] are
habeant ad invicem, i. e. interrelated, that is, how one
qualiter unum sine altero of them might be found
horum possit esse, without the other, he
concludit in hoc quod concludes that the soul is
anima sit omnium the principle of them all both
praedictorum principium, because the soul “is
et quod anima specified (as by its parts)
determinatur, sicut per vegetative, sensitive,
suas partes, vegetativo, intellective and motor,”
sensitivo, intellectivo, (413b11-13) and because
motu, et quod haec all these happen to be found
omnia contingit in uno et in one and the same thing,
eodem inveniri, sicut in for example, in man.
homine.

Et Plato posuit diversas [7] Plato held that, insofar


esse animas in homine, as these diverse operations
secundum quas diversae pertain to man, there are
operationes vitae ei diverse souls in him.
conveniant. Consequently he [Aristotle]
Consequenter movet asks “whether each of these
dubitationem: utrum is a soul” by itself or a part
unumquodque horum sit of soul, and, if they are parts
anima per se, vel sit of one soul, whether they
aliqua pars animae; et si differ in definition alone or
sint partes unius animae, also in place, that is, by
utrum differant solum organ. And, he adds, “of
secundum rationem, aut some it is not difficult” to
etiam differant loco, i. e. see how it is, but there are
organo. Et subiungit others which give rise to
quod de quibusdam non doubt. (413b13-26)
difficile hoc videtur, sed Consequently, he
quaedam sunt quae shows(413b16-21) that in
dubitationem habent. this regard things are clear
Ostendit enim in vegetable and sensible
consequenter quod soul because some plants
manifestum est de his and animals go on living
quae pertinent ad when divided and all the
animam vegetabilem, et operations that were in the
de his quae pertinent ad whole appear in each part.
animam sensibilem, per When he adds that “We have
hoc quod plantae et no evidence as yet about
animalia quaedam decisa mind and the power to
vivunt, et in qualibet think,” (413b24-25) he
parte omnes operationes makes clear where the
animae, quae sunt in question arises. By saying
toto, apparent. Sed de this he doesn’t mean to
quibus dubitationem show that intellect is not
habeat, ostendit subdens soul, as the Commentator
quod de intellectu et and his followers perversely
perspectiva potentia nihil interpret him, for he clearly
adhuc manifestum est. says this in response to what
Quod non dicit volens was said earlier, “but some
ostendere quod present a difficulty”
intellectus non sit anima, (413b16). This should be
ut Commentator perverse understood thus: It is not
exponit et sectatores yet clear whether intellect is
ipsius; manifeste enim hic a soul or a part of soul, and
respondet ad id quod if it is a part of the soul,
supra dixerat: quaedam whether it is separate in
enim dubitationem place or in definition only.
habent. Unde
intelligendum est: nihil
adhuc manifestum est, an
intellectus sit anima vel
pars animae; et si pars
animae, utrum separata
loco, vel ratione tantum.

Et quamvis dicat hoc [8] Although he says it is not


adhuc non esse yet clear, nonetheless he
manifestum, tamen quid indicates what at first blush
circa hoc prima fronte appears to be the case by
appareat manifestat adding “It seems to be a
subdens: sed videtur widely different kind of soul”
genus alterum animae (413b25-26). This should
esse. Quod non est not be understood as it
intelligendum, sicut perversely is by the
Commentator et Commentator and his
sectatores eius perverse followers: namely, that the
exponunt, ideo dictum intellect is equivocally called
esse quia intellectus soul or that the foregoing
aequivoce dicatur anima, definition cannot be adapted
vel quod praedicta to it. How it ought to be
definitio sibi aptari non understood is clear from
possit; sed qualiter sit what he adds, “It alone is
hoc intelligendum capable of existence in
apparet ex eo quod isolation from all other
subditur: et hoc solum psychic powers.”
contingere separari sicut (413b26-27) Therefore it is
perpetuum a corruptibili. of another kind in the sense
In hoc ergo est alterum that intellect appears to be
genus, quia intellectus something perpetual,
videtur esse quoddam whereas the other parts of
perpetuum, aliae autem the soul are corruptible. And
partes animae because the perpetual and
corruptibiles. Et quia corruptible do not seem to
corruptibile et perpetuum characterize the same
non videntur in unam substance, apparently only
substantiam convenire this part of the soul, namely
posse, videtur quod hoc intellect, can be separated,
solum de partibus not indeed from body, as the
animae, scil. intellectus, Commentator perversely
contingat separari, non interprets, but from other
quidem a corpore, ut parts of the soul, lest they
Commentator perverse characterize the same
exponit, sed ab aliis substance, soul.
partibus animae, ne in
unam substantiam
animae conveniant.

Et quod sic sit [9] That this is how it should


intelligendum patet ex eo be understood is clear from
quod subditur: reliquae what he adds, “From these
autem partes animae remarks it is clear that the
manifestum est ex his other parts of the soul are
quod non separabiles not separable”
sunt, scil., substantia (413b27-28), namely from
animae vel loco. De hoc the substance of the soul or
enim supra quaesitum by place. When this was
est, et hoc ex supradictis asked earlier the question
probatum est. Et quod was resolved from what had
non intelligatur de just been said. That it is not
separabilitate a corpore, to be understood as
sed de separabilitate separability from body but
potentiarum ab invicem, as the separability of the
patet per hoc quod powers from one another, is
subditur: ratione autem clear from what he adds:
quod alterae, scil. sunt ad “that as understood they are
invicem manifestum. distinguishable by
Sensitivo enim esse et definition,” namely from one
opinativo alterum. Et sic another, “is clear,” for to
manifeste quod hic sense and to have an
determinatur, respondet opinion are different.”
quaestioni supra motae. (413b29-30) Thus what is
Supra enim quaesitum said here is manifestly in
est, utrum una pars response to the question
animae ab alia separata raised earlier when he asked
sit ratione solum, aut whether one part of the soul
etiam loco. Hic dimissa is separated from another in
quaestione illa quantum understanding alone or in
ad intellectum, de quo place. Having set aside this
nihil hic determinat, de question about intellect,
aliis partibus animae dicit concerning which he
manifestum esse quod determines nothing here, he
non sunt separabiles, says it is manifest with
scil. loco, sed sunt respect to the other parts of
alterae ratione. the soul that they are not
separable, that is in place,
but that they differ as
understood.

Hoc ergo habito quod [10] It being established


anima determinatur therefore that the soul is
vegetativo, sensitivo, defined by the vegetative,
intellectivo et motu, vult sensitive, intellective and
ostendere consequenter locomotive parts, he intends
quod quantum ad omnes to show next that, with
istas partes anima unitur respect to each of these, the
corpori non sicut nauta soul is united to body as
navi, sed sicut forma. Et form, not as a sailor to his
sic certificatum erit quid boat. And thus what was
sit anima in communi, previously established only
quod supra figuraliter in outline is made certain.
tantum dictum est. Hoc He proves this through the
autem probat per operations of the soul in this
operationes animae sic. way: It is manifest that that
Manifestum est enim whereby something first
quod illud quo primo operates is the act of the
aliquid operatur est one operating. For example,
forma operantis, sicut we are said to know both
dicimur scire anima, et through the soul and
scire scientia, per prius through science, but first of
autem scientia quam all through science rather
anima, quia per animam than through the soul—we
non scimus nisi in know through the soul only
quantum habet insofar as it has science;
scientiam; et similiter similarly we are said to be
sanari dicimur et corpore healed by the body and by
et sanitate, sed prius health, but first of all by
sanitate. Et sic patet health. Thus it is clear that
scientiam esse formam science is the form of soul
animae, et sanitatem and health of the body.
corporis.

Ex hoc procedit sic: [11] He continues thus:


anima est primum quo “The soul is that whereby we
vivimus (quod dicit first live,” referring to the
propter vegetativum), vegetative, “that whereby
quo sentimus (propter we sense” referring to the
sensitivum), et movemur sensitive, “and move”
(propter motivum), et referring to the locomotive,
intelligimus (propter “and understand,” referring
intellectivum); et to the intellective. He
concludit: quare ratio concludes “It follows that
quaedam utique erit et the soul must be an account
species, sed non ut and essence, not matter or a
materia et ut subiectum. subject.” (414a12-14)
Manifeste ergo quod Manifestly therefore he
supra dixerat, animam applies here what he said
esse actum corporis above, that the soul is the
physici, hic concludit non act of a physical body, not
solum de vegetativo, only to the sensitive,
sensitivo et motivo, sed vegetative and motive but
etiam de intellectivo. Fuit also to the intellective. It
ergo sententia Aristotelis was Aristotle’s judgment,
quod id quo intelligimus therefore, that that whereby
sit forma corporis we understand is the form of
physici. Sed ne aliquis the physical body. Should
dicat, quod id quo someone say that that with
intelligimus non dicit hic which we understand does
intellectum possibilem, not here mean the possible
sed aliquid aliud, intellect but something else,
manifeste hoc excluditur this is clearly excluded by
per id quod Aristoteles in what Aristotle says in Book
tertio de anima dicit, de Three of On the Soul
intellectu possibili speaking of the possible
loquens: dico autem intellect: “I call intellect that
intellectum, quo opinatur whereby the soul thinks and
et intelligit anima. understands.” (429a23)

Sed antequam ad verba [12] But before we turn to


Aristotelis quae sunt in what Aristotle says in Book
tertio de anima Three of On the Soul, let us
accedamus, adhuc linger on what he has said in
amplius circa verba ipsius Book Two so that his
in secundo de anima teaching on the soul may
immoremur, ut ex become apparent by
collatione verborum eius comparing his statements.
ad invicem appareat quae For, having defined the soul
fuerit eius sententia de in general, he begins to
anima. Cum enim animam distinguish its powers, and
in communi definivisset, says that the powers of the
incipit distinguere soul are “the vegetative,
potentias eius; et dicit sensitive, appetitive,
quod potentiae animae locomotive, intellective.”
sunt vegetativum, (414a31-32) And that the
sensitivum, appetitivum, intellective is the intellect is
motivum secundum evident from what he
locum, intellectivum. Et afterwards adds in
quod intellectivum sit explanation of the division,
intellectus, patet per id “In others, the thinking
quod postea subdit, faculty and intellect, as in
divisionem explanans: men.” (414b18) He holds
alteris autem therefore that the intellect is
intellectivum et a power of the soul which is
intellectus, ut hominibus. the act of body.
Vult ergo quod intellectus
sit potentia animae, quae
est actus corporis.

Et quod huius animae [13] And that he calls the


potentiam dixerit intellect a power of this soul
intellectum, et iterum and moreover that the
quod supra posita definition of soul given
definitio animae sit above is common to all the
omnibus praedictis aforesaid parts, is clear from
partibus communis, patet his conclusion: “It is now
per id quod concludit: evident that a single
manifestum igitur est definition can be given of
quoniam eodem modo soul in the same way that
una utique erit ratio one can be given of figure.
animae et figurae: neque For, as in that case there is
enim ibi figura est no figure apart from triangle
praeter triangulum et and those that follow in
quae consequenter sunt; order, so here there is no
neque hic anima praeter soul apart from the forms of
praedictas est. Non est soul just enumerated.”
ergo quaerenda alia (414b19-22) One ought not
anima praeter praedictas, then seek any soul apart
quibus communis est from those mentioned, to
animae definitio supra which the definition of soul
posita. Neque plus de given above is common.
intellectu mentionem Aristotle makes no further
facit Aristoteles in hoc mention of intellect in this
secundo, nisi quod second book except when he
postmodum subdit, quod says that “reasoning and
ultimum et minimum intellect” are “ultimately and
(dicit esse) rarely” (415a7) because
ratiocinationem et they are in fewer things, as
intellectum, quia scil. in the sequel makes clear.
paucioribus est, ut per
sequentia apparet.

Sed quia magna [14] Because there is a


differentia est, quantum great difference between the
ad modum operandi, ways intellect and
inter intellectum et imagination operate, he
imaginationem, subdit adds that “there is another
quod de speculativo account of speculative
intellectu altera ratio est. intellect” (415a11-12). This
Reservat enim hoc inquiry he reserves to the
inquirendum usque ad third book. And lest
tertium. Et ne quis dicat, someone suggest, as
sicut Averroes perverse Averroes perversely does,
exponit quod ideo dicit that Aristotle speaks of
Aristoteles, quod de another account of
intellectu speculativo est speculative intellect because
alia ratio, quia intellectus the intellect is “neither soul
neque est anima, neque nor a part of soul”, this is
pars animae; statim hoc immediately excluded at the
excludit in principio tertii, beginning of Book Three
ubi resumit de intellectu where he takes up again the
tractatum. Dicit enim: de treatment of intellect. For he
parte autem animae, qua says, “Concerning the part
cognoscit anima et sapit. of the soul whereby the soul
Nec debet aliquis dicere, knows and understands.”
quod hoc dicatur solum (429a10-11) Nor should
secundum quod anyone think that this is said
intellectus possibilis only insofar as the possible
dividitur contra agentem, intellect is divided against
sicut aliqui somniant. Hoc the agent intellect, as some
enim dictum est imagine, for the remark
antequam Aristoteles occurs before Aristotle
probet esse intellectum proves there is an agent and
possibilem et agentem; possible intellect. Hence he
unde intellectum dicit hic here means by intellect that
partem in communi, part in general, insofar as it
secundum quod continet contains both agent and
et agentem et possibilem, possible. In much the same
sicut supra in secundo way, early in the second
manifeste distinxit book, he manifestly
intellectum contra alias distinguished intellect from
partes animae, ut iam the other parts of the soul,
dictum est. as has already been pointed
out.

Est autem consideranda [15] Notice the marvelous


mirabilis diligentia et care and order of Aristotle’s
ordo in processu procedure, beginning Book
Aristotelis. Ab his enim Three with the treatment of
incipit in tertio tractare the questions concerning
de intellectu quae in intellect left undetermined in
secundo reliquerat the second. There were two.
indeterminata. Duo First, whether intellect is
autem supra reliquerat separated from other parts
indeterminata circa of the soul only as
intellectum. Primo understood or in place too,
quidem, utrum intellectus which indeed he left
ab aliis partibus animae undetermined when he said,
separetur ratione solum, “We have no evidence as yet
aut etiam loco: quod about thought or the power
quidem indeterminatum of reflexion.” (413b24-25)
dimisit cum dixit: de First he takes up this
intellectu autem et question again when he says
perspectiva potentia nihil “Whether this is separable
adhuc manifestum est. Et from the others,” namely
hanc quaestionem primo from the other parts of the
resumit, cum dicit: sive soul, “in definition only, or
separabili existente (scil. spatially as well.”
ab aliis animae partibus), (429a11-12) `Spatially
sive non separabili separable’ here means the
secundum magnitudinem, same as `separable in place’
sed secundum rationem. above.
Pro eodem enim accipit
hic separabile secundum
magnitudinem, pro quo
supra dixerat separabile
loco.

Secundo, indeterminatum [16] Second, he left


reliquerat de differentia unanswered the question
intellectus ad alias concerning intellect’s
animae partes, cum difference from the other
postmodum dixit: de parts of the soul when he
speculativo autem said later, “Reflective
intellectu altera ratio est. thought presents a different
Et hoc statim quaerit, problem.” (415a11-12) And
cum dicit: considerandum he immediately begins to
quam habet differentiam. inquire into this when he
Hanc autem differentiam says, “We have to inquire
talem intendit assignare, what differentiates this
quae possit stare cum part...” (429a12) He intends
utroque praemissorum, to express this difference in
scil. sive sit separabilis such a way that it is
anima magnitudine seu compatible with both
loco ab aliis partibus, possibilities mentioned, that
sive non: quod ipse is, whether or not it is a soul
modus loquendi satis separable in size or place
indicat. Considerandum from the other parts, as this
enim dicit, quam habet way of speaking sufficiently
intellectus differentiam indicates. For he says we
ad alias animae partes, ought to consider what the
sive sit separabilis ab eis difference is between the
magnitudine seu loco, i. intellect and the other parts
e. subiecto, sive non, sed of the soul, whether it is
secundum rationem separable from them in size
tantum. Unde or place, that is in subject,
manifestum est quod non or not, or only in
intendit hanc differentiam understanding. Hence it is
ostendere, quod sit clear that he does not intend
substantia a corpore to give as the difference that
separata secundum esse it is a substance existing
(hoc enim non posset separately from the body, for
salvari cum utroque this would not be compatible
praedictorum); sed with the foregoing; rather, he
intendit assignare intends to assign a
differentiam quantum ad difference according to the
modum operandi; unde mode of operating. Hence he
subdit: et quomodo sit adds, “...and how thinking
quidem ipsum intelligere. takes place.” (429a13)
Sic igitur per ea quae ex Therefore, from what we can
verbis Aristotelis accipere learn from the words of
possumus usque huc, Aristotle up to this point, he
manifestum est quod ipse clearly held that intellect is a
voluit intellectum esse part of the soul which is the
partem animae quae est act of a physical body.
actus corporis physici.

Sed quia ex quibusdam [17] But because from some


verbis consequentibus, words following on these the
Averroistae accipere Averroists wish to take
volunt intentionem Aristotle’s intention to be
Aristotelis fuisse, quod that the intellect is not the
intellectus non sit anima soul which is the act of the
quae est actus corporis, body, or a part of such a
aut pars talis animae, soul, we must even more
ideo etiam diligentius carefully consider what he
eius verba sequentia goes on to say. Immediately
consideranda sunt. after he raised the question
Statim igitur post about the difference
quaestionem motam de between intellect and sense,
differentia intellectus et he asked in what intellect is
sensus, inquirit like sense and how the two
secundum quid differ. Earlier he established
intellectus sit similis two things about sense,
sensui, et secundum quid namely that sense is in
ab eo differat. Duo enim potency to sensible objects
supra de sensu and that sense is affected
determinaverat, scil. and corrupted by excessive
quod sensus est in sensible objects. That is
potentia ad sensibilia, et what Aristotle has in mind
quod sensus patitur et when he says, “If thinking is
corrumpitur ab like perceiving, it must be
excellentiis sensibilium. either a process in which the
Hoc ergo est quod soul is acted upon by what is
quaerit Aristoteles capable of being thought”
dicens: si igitur est (429a13-15) in such a way
intelligere sicut sentire, that the intellect would be
aut pati aliquid utique corrupted by something
erit ab intelligibili, ut scil. excessively intelligible as
sic corrumpatur sense is by an excessive
intellectus ab excellenti sensible object, “or a
intelligibili, sicut sensus process different from but
ab excellenti sensibili, aut analogous to that.” That is,
aliquid huiusmodi understanding is something
alterum; i. e. aut similar to sensing, but
intelligere est aliquid different in this that it is not
huiusmodi simile, scil. ei affected.
quod est sentire, alterum
tamen quantum ad hoc
quod non sit passibile.

Huic igitur quaestioni [18] He responds to this


statim respondet et question immediately,
concludit, non ex concluding—not from what
praecedentibus, sed ex went before but from what
sequentibus, quae tamen follows, which however is
ex praecedentibus manifested from what went
manifestantur, quod hanc before—that this part of the
partem animae oportet soul “must be impassible,”
esse impassibilem, ut non (429a15) in order that it not
corrumpatur sicut be corrupted like the senses.
sensus; (est tamen There is however another
quaedam alia passio eius, way of being acted upon
secundum quod characteristic of
intelligere communi understanding according to
modo pati dicitur). In hoc which it can be said to suffer
ergo differt a sensu. Sed in a general sense of the
consequenter ostendit in term. In this then it is
quo cum sensu different from the senses. He
conveniat, quia scilicet goes on to show in what it is
oportet huiusmodi like the senses, namely, that
partem esse susceptivam this part of the soul must be
speciei intelligibilis, et “capable of receiving the
quod sit in potentia ad form of the object”
huiusmodi speciem, et (429a15-16) and that it be
quod non sit hoc in actu in potency to this kind of
secundum suam form, not actually being it in
naturam; sicut et de its own nature; so too earlier
sensu supra dictum est, it was said of sense that it is
quod est in potentia ad potentially, not actually,
sensibilia et non in actu. sensibles. From this he
Et ex hoc concludit, quod concludes that “Thought
oportet sic se habere must be related to what is
sicut sensitivum ad thinkable, as sense is to
sensibilia sic intellectum what is sensible.”
ad intelligibilia. (429a16-18)

Hoc autem induxit ad [19] He brought this out to


excludendum opinionem exclude the opinion of
Empedoclis et aliorum Empedocles (see
antiquorum, qui 404b8-405b30) and other
posuerunt quod ancients who held that the
cognoscens est de natura knower is of the nature of
cogniti, utpote quod the known, as if we knew
terram terra earth through earth and
cognoscimus, aquam water through water.
aqua. Aristoteles autem Aristotle showed earlier
supra ostendit hoc non (417a2-9) that this is not
esse verum in sensu, quia true of sense, because the
sensitivum non est actu, sensitive power is potentially
sed potentia, ea quae not actually the things it
sentit; et idem hic dicit de senses, and he says the
intellectu. same here of intellect.

Est autem differentia There is however this


inter sensum et difference between sense
intellectum, quia sensus and intellect that sense is
non est cognoscitivus not capable of knowing
omnium, sed visus everything ( sight is of
colorum tantum, auditus colors alone, hearing of
sonorum, et sic de aliis; sounds, and thus with the
intellectus autem est others), whereas the
simpliciter omnium intellect is capable of
cognoscitivus. Dicebant knowing all things
autem antiqui philosophi, whatsoever. Ancient
existimantes quod philosophers,(see
cognoscens debet habere 405b10-17) thinking that
naturam cogniti, quod the knower must have the
animam, ad hoc quod nature of the known, said
cognoscat omnia, that in order for the soul to
necesse est ex principiis know all things it was
omnium esse necessary that the principles
commixtam. Quia vero of all things be mingled in it.
Aristoteles iam probavit Aristotle, having proved by
de intellectu, per analogy with sense that
similitudinem sensus, intellect is not actually but
quod non est actu id potentially what it knows,
quod cognoscit sed in concludes on the contrary
potentia tantum, that “intellect, because it
concludit e contrario, knows all things, must be
quod necesse est unmixed” (429a18); that is,
intellectum, quia not composed of all things,
cognoscit omnia, quod sit as Empedocles held.
immixtus, i. e. non
compositus ex omnibus,
sicut Empedocles
ponebat.

Et ad hoc inducit [20] In support of this he


testimonium Anaxagorae, invokes the testimony of
non tamen de hoc eodem Anaxagoras, (429a19) who
intellectu loquentis, sed is not however speaking of
de intellectu qui movet the same intellect, but
omnia. Sicut ergo rather of the intellect that
Anaxagoras dixit illum moves all things. It was in
intellectum esse order that it might command
immixtum, ut imperet by moving and separating
movendo et segregando, that Anaxagoras said the
hoc nos possumus dicere latter intellect is unmixed.
de intellectu humano, His subsequent proof of this
quod oportet eum esse is found in the Greek text:
immixtum ad hoc ut “For the co-presence of
cognoscat omnia; et hoc what is alien to its nature is
probat consequenter, et a hindrance and a block”
habetur sic sequens (429a20) This can be
littera in Graeco: intus understood from what is
apparens enim prohibebit similar in sight, for if there
extraneum et obstruet. were some intrinsic color of
Quod potest intelligi ex the pupil, this interior color
simili in visu: si enim would prevent an outer color
esset aliquis color from being seen and in that
intrinsecus pupillae, ille way would prevent the eye
color interior prohiberet from seeing others.
videri extraneum
colorem, et quodammodo
obstrueret oculum ne alia
videret.

Similiter, si aliqua natura [21] Similarly, if one of the


rerum, quas intellectus natures of the things the
cognoscit, puta terra aut intellect knows—earth or
aqua, calidum aut water, hot or cold, or some
frigidum, aut aliquid such thing—were intrinsic to
huiusmodi, esset intellect, that intrinsic nature
intrinseca intellectui, illa would impede it and in a way
natura intrinseca obstruct it from knowing
impediret ipsum et others.
quodammodo obstrueret,
ne alia cognosceret.

Quia ergo omnia Because it knows all things,


cognoscit, concludit quod therefore, he concludes that
non contingit ipsum “it can have no nature of its
habere aliquam naturam own, other than that of
determinatam ex naturis having a certain capacity”
sensibilibus quas (429a21-22). That is, its
cognoscit; sed hanc own nature is to be
solam naturam habet potentially those things it
quod sit possibilis, i. e. in understands; but it actually
potentia ad ea quae becomes them when it
intelligit, quantum est ex actually knows them, just as
sua natura; sed fit actu sense in act actually
illa dum ea intelligit in becomes the sensible, as
actu, sicut sensus in actu was said above in the
fit sensibile in actu, ut second book. Intellect
supra in secundo dixerat. before it actually
Concludit ergo quod understands, he therefore
intellectus antequam concludes, “is not actually
intelligat in actu nihil est any real thing” (429a24),
actu eorum quae sunt; which is the opposite of
quod est contrarium his what the ancients said,
quae antiqui dicebant, namely, that it actually is all
scil. quod est actu omnia. things.

Et quia fecerat [22] Because he mentioned


mentionem de dicto what Anaxagoras said in
Anaxagorae loquentis de speaking of the intellect
intellectu qui imperat which commands all things,
omnibus, ne crederetur lest he be taken to be saying
de illo intellectu hoc this of that intellect, he uses
conclusisse, utitur tali this manner of speaking:
modo loquendi: vocatus “That in the soul which is
itaque animae intellectus called intellect (by intellect I
dico autem intellectum mean that whereby the soul
quo opinatur et intelligit thinks and judges) is before
anima nihil est actu et it thinks, not actually any
cetera. Ex quo duo real thing...” (429a22-24)
apparent: primo quidem, From which two things are
quod non loquitur hic de clear: first, that he is not
intellectu qui sit aliqua speaking here of an intellect
substantia separata, sed which is a separated
de intellectu quem supra substance, but of the
dixit potentiam et partem intellect he earlier called a
animae, quo anima power and part of the soul
intelligit; secundo, quod whereby the soul
per supra dicta probavit, understands; second, that
scil. quod intellectus non he proved from what was
habet naturam in actu. said above that the intellect
actually has no a nature.

Nondum autem probavit [23] He has not yet proved,


quod non sit virtus in however, that it is not a
corpore, ut Averroes power in the body, as
dicit; sed hoc statim Averroes says, but
concludit ex praemissis; immediately concludes this
nam sequitur: unde from the foregoing: “For this
neque misceri est reason it cannot reasonably
rationabile ipsum corpori. be regarded as blended with
Et hoc secundum probat the body.” (429a25) This
per primum quod supra second conclusion he
probavit, scil. quod derives from the first, which
intellectus non habet he proved above, namely,
aliquam in actu de that intellect does not
naturis rerum actually have any of the
sensibilium. Ex quo patet natures of sensible things. It
quod non miscetur follows from this that it is
corpori: quia si not mixed with body,
misceretur corpori, because if it were mixed with
haberet aliquam de body, it would have some
naturis corporeis; et hoc corporeal nature. This is
est quod subdit: qualis what he adds: “If so, it
enim utique aliquis fiet, would acquire some quality,
aut calidus aut frigidus, si e.g. warmth or cold, or even
organum aliquod erit have an organ like the
sicut sensitivo. Sensus sensitive faculty.”
enim proportionatur suo (429a25-27) Sense is
organo et trahitur proportioned to its organ
quodammodo ad suam and is in a way akin to it in
naturam; unde etiam nature, hence with the
secundum immutationem immutation of the organ the
organi immutatur operation of sense too is
operatio sensus. Sic ergo changed. It is thus then that
intelligitur illud non the phrase, “is not mixed
misceri corpori, quia non with body,” should be
habet organum sicut understood: intellect does
sensus. not have an organ as sense
does.

Et quod intellectus [24] And that the soul’s


animae non habet intellect has no organ he
organum, manifestat per manifests through the
dictum quorundam qui saying of those who said
dixerunt quod anima est that “soul is the place of the
locus specierum, large forms,” (429a27-29)
accipientes locum pro understanding place broadly
omni receptivo, more for any receiver, in the
Platonico; nisi quod esse Platonist manner, except
locum specierum non that being the place of forms
convenit toti animae, sed is not true of the whole soul
solum intellectivae. but only of intellect. For the
Sensitiva enim pars non sensitive part does not
recipit in se species, sed receive species in itself, but
in organo; pars autem in the organ; whereas the
intellectiva non recipit intellective does not receive
eas in organo, sed in se them in an organ, but in
ipsa; item non sic est itself. Again it is not the
locus specierum quod place of the forms as having
habeat eas in actu, sed in them actually, but only in
potentia tantum. potency.

Quia ergo iam ostendit Since he has now shown


quid conveniat intellectui what belongs to intellect
ex similitudine sensus, from its similarity with
redit ad primum quod sense, he returns to what he
dixerat, quod oportet said first, that “the
partem intellectivam esse intellective part must be
impassibilem, et sic impassible,” (429a15) and
admirabili subtilitate ex thus with wonderful subtlety
ipsa similitudine sensus, concludes from its very
concludit similarity to sense its
dissimilitudinem. Ostendit dissimilarity, going on to
ergo consequenter quod show that “sense and
non similiter sit intellect are not impassible
impassibilis sensus et in the same way” (429a29-
intellectus, per hoc quod b5) because sense is
sensus corrumpitur ab destroyed by an excessive
excellenti sensibili, non sensible but intellect is not
autem intellectus ab destroyed by the excessively
excellenti intelligibili. Et intelligible. He gives as
huius causam assignat ex reason for this what was
supra probatis, quia proved above: “the reason is
sensitivum non est sine that while the faculty of
corpore, sed intellectus sensation is dependent upon
est separatus. the body, thought is
separable from it.”

Hoc autem ultimum [25] This is the favorite prop


verbum maxime of those who want to hold
assumunt ad sui erroris the error that intellect is
fulcimentum, volentes neither soul nor part of the
per hoc habere quod soul, but a separated
intellectus neque sit substance. But they too
anima neque pars quickly forget what Aristotle
animae, sed quaedam said only a little earlier: for
substantia separata. Sed just as here he says that
cito obliviscuntur eius “the sensitive is not without
quod paulo supra body and intellect is
Aristoteles dixit. Sic enim separate” so above he said
hic dicitur quod that intellect would “acquire
sensitivum non est sine some quality, e.g. warmth or
corpore et intellectus est cold, or even have an organ
separatus, sicut supra like the sensitive faculty.”
dixit quod intellectus (429a25-26) This is the
fieret qualis, aut calidus reason, therefore, that he
aut frigidus, si aliquod here says that the sensitive
organum erit ei, sicut is not without body but the
sensitivo. Ea igitur intellect is separate:
ratione hic dicitur quod because sense has an organ
sensitivum non est sine but intellect does not. Quite
corpore, intellectus obviously, therefore, and
autem est separatus, without any doubt so far as
quia sensus habet the text of Aristotle is
organum, non autem concerned, it is clear that
intellectus. his view is that possible
Manifestissime igitur intellect belongs to the soul
apparet absque omni which is the act of body,
dubitatione ex verbis such that the soul’s intellect
Aristotelis hanc fuisse has no bodily organ as the
eius sententiam de other powers of the soul
intellectu possibili, quod certainly have.
intellectus sit aliquid
animae quae est actus
corporis; ita tamen quod
intellectus animae non
habeat aliquod organum
corporale, sicut habent
ceterae potentiae
animae.

Quomodo autem hoc [27] It is not difficult to


esse possit, quod anima understand how the soul can
sit forma corporis et be the form of a body yet
aliqua virtus animae non some power of the soul not
sit corporis virtus, non be a power of body if one
difficile est intelligere, si takes into account other
quis etiam in aliis rebus things as well. For in many
consideret. Videmus enim things we see that a form is
in multis quod aliqua indeed the act of a body of
forma est quidem actus mixed elements and yet has
corporis ex elementis a power which is not the
commixti, et tamen habet power of any element, but
aliquam virtutem quae belongs to that form
non est virtus alicuius because of a higher
elementi, sed competit principle, namely a celestial
tali formae ex altiori body, e.g. the magnet has
principio, puta corpore the power to attract iron and
caelesti; sicut quod jasper of coagulating blood.
magnes habet virtutem And presently we shall see
attrahendi ferrum, et that insofar as forms are
iaspis restringendi nobler they have powers
sanguinem. Et paulatim which more and more
videmus, secundum quod surpass matter. Hence the
formae sunt nobiliores, ultimate form, the human
quod habent aliquas soul, has a power, namely
virtutes magis ac magis intellect, which wholly
supergredientes surpasses corporeal matter.
materiam. Unde ultima Thus the intellect is separate
formarum, quae est because it isn’t a power in
anima humana, habet the body but in the soul, and
virtutem totaliter soul is the act of the body.
supergredientem
materiam corporalem,
scil. intellectum. Sic ergo
intellectus separatus est,
quia non est virtus in
corpore, sed est virtus in
anima; anima autem est
actus corporis.

Nec dicimus quod anima, [28] Nor do we say that the


in qua est intellectus, sic soul, in which the intellect is,
excedat materiam so exceeds corporeal matter
corporalem quod non that it does not exist in the
habeat esse in corpore; body, but rather that
sed quod intellectus, intellect, which Aristotle
quem Aristoteles dicit calls a power of the soul, is
potentiam animae, non not the act of the body. For
est actus corporis. Neque the soul is not the act of
enim anima est actus body through the mediation
corporis mediantibus suis of its powers but is through
potentiis, sed anima per itself ( per se) the act of
se ipsam est actus body, giving to body its
corporis dans corpori specific existence. Some of
esse specificum. Aliquae its powers are acts of
autem potentiae eius certain parts of body,
sunt actus partium perfecting them for definite
quarumdam corporis, operations, but the power
perficientes ipsas ad which is intellect is not the
aliquas operationes; sic act of any body, because its
autem potentia quae est operation does not take
intellectus, nullius place by means of a bodily
corporis actus est, quia organ.
eius operatio non fit per
organum corporale.

Et ne alicui videatur quod [29] And lest it seem to


hoc ex nostro sensu anyone that we give this as
dicamus praeter our own reading, not
Aristotelis intentionem, Aristotle’s meaning, the
inducenda sunt verba words of Aristotle expressly
Aristotelis expresse hoc stating this must be cited.
dicentis. Quaerit enim in For in Book Two of the
secundo Physic., usque Physics he asks “to what
ad quantum oporteat degree it is necessary to
cognoscere speciem et know the species and
quod quid est; non enim quiddity”, for it is not the
omnem formam natural philosopher’s task to
considerare pertinet ad consider every form. And he
physicum. Et solvit solves this, adding, “to the
subdens: aut degree that the doctor must
quemadmodum medicum know sinew and the smith
nervum et fabrum aes, bronze,” that is, up to a
usquequo? I. e. usque ad point. And up to what point
aliquem terminum. Et he shows, adding, “until he
usque ad quem terminum understands the cause of
ostendit subdens: cuius each,” as if to say, the
enim causa doctor considers the nerve
unumquodque; quasi insofar as it pertains to
dicat: in tantum medicus health, and so too the
considerat nervum, in artisan bronze for the sake
quantum pertinet ad of the artifact. And because
sanitatem, propter quam the natural philosopher
medicus nervum considers form insofar as it
considerat, et similiter is in matter, for such is the
faber aes propter form of mobile body, so too
artificium. Et quia it should be understood that
physicus considerat the naturalist considers form
formam in quantum est in insofar as it is in matter.
materia (sic enim est
forma corporis mobilis),
similiter accipiendum
quod naturalis in tantum
considerat formam, in
quantum est in materia.

Terminus ergo [30] The term of the


considerationis physici physicist’s consideration of
de formis, est in formis form is of forms which are in
quae sunt in materia some way in matter and in
quodammodo, et alio another way not in matter,
modo non in materia. for these forms are on the
Istae enim formae sunt in border of material and
confinio formarum separated forms. Hence he
separatarum et adds, “and concerning
materialium. Unde subdit: these,” namely, those forms
et circa haec (scil. which terminate the natural
terminatur consideratio philosopher’s consideration,
naturalis de formis) quae “which are separable but
sunt separatae quidem which do not exist apart
species, in materia from matter...” What these
autem. Quae autem sint forms are, he goes on to
istae formae, ostendit show: “For man is generated
subdens: homo enim by man and by the sun as
hominem generat ex well.” Man’s form therefore
materia, et sol. Forma is in matter and separate: in
ergo hominis est in matter indeed insofar as it
materia, et separata: in gives existence to body, for
materia quidem, thus it is the term of
secundum esse quod dat generation, separate
corpori (sic enim est however because of the
terminus generationis); power which is proper to
separata autem man, namely intellect.
secundum virtutem quae Therefore, It is not
est propria homini, scil. impossible for a form to be
secundum intellectum. in matter yet its power be
Non est ergo impossibile, separate, as was shown
quod aliqua forma sit in concerning intellect.
materia, et virtus eius sit
separata, sicut expositum
est de intellectu.

Adhuc autem alio modo [31] There is yet another


procedunt ad way in which they go about
ostendendum quod showing that Aristotle
Aristotelis sententia fuit taught that the intellect is
quod intellectus non sit not a soul nor a part of the
anima nec pars animae soul united to body as its
quae unitur corpori ut form. For Aristotle says in
forma. Dicit enim several places that the
Aristoteles in pluribus intellect is perpetual and
locis, intellectum esse incorruptible, as is clear in
perpetuum et Book Two of the On the Soul
incorruptibilem, sicut (413b26-27), where he
patet in secundo de says, “...differing as what is
anima, ubi dixit: hoc eternal from what is
solum contingere perishable; it alone is
separari, sicut perpetuum capable of being separated.”
a corruptibili; et in primo, And in Book One where he
ubi dixit quod intellectus says that intellect seems to
videtur esse substantia be a substance “incapable of
quaedam, et non being destroyed”
corrumpi; et in tertio, ubi (408b17-18). And in Book
dixit: separatus autem est Three, he says, “This alone
solum hoc, quod vere est, is truly separate and it alone
et hoc solum immortale is immortal and perpetual,”
et perpetuum est (430a22-23) although some
(quamvis hoc ultimum do not understand this last
quidam non exponant de to be about the possible
intellectu possibili, sed de intellect, but about the
intellectu agente). Ex agent intellect. From all
quibus omnibus verbis these texts it is clear that
apparet, quod Aristoteles Aristotle means that intellect
voluit intellectum esse is something incorruptible.
aliquid incorruptibile.

Videtur autem quod nihil [32] However, it seems that


incorruptibile possit esse nothing incorruptible could
forma corporis be the form of a corruptible
corruptibilis. Non enim body. It is not accidental to
est accidentale formae, form but belongs to it per se
sed per se ei convenit that it be in matter,
esse in materia; alioquin otherwise what comes to be
ex materia et forma fieret from matter and form would
unum per accidens. Nihil be accidentally one; but
autem potest esse sine nothing can exist without
eo, quod inest ei per se. that which belongs to it as
Ergo forma corporis non such; therefore the form of
potest esse sine corpore. body cannot be without
Si ergo corpus sit body. If then the body is
corruptibile, sequitur corruptible, it follows that
formam corporis the form of body is
corruptibilem esse. corruptible. Moreover, forms
Praeterea, formae separate from matter and
separatae a materia, et forms that exist in matter
formae quae sunt in are not of the same kind, as
materia, non sunt is proved in Book Seven of
eaedem specie, ut the Metaphysics. Much less
probatur in septimo can numerically one form be
Metaph. Multo ergo now in body and now apart
minus una et eadem from body. With the
forma numero potest destruction of the body,
nunc esse in corpore therefore, either the form of
nunc autem sine corpore. body is destroyed or it
Destructo ergo corpore, passes to another body. If
vel destruitur forma then intellect is the form of
corporis, vel transit ad body, it seems necessarily to
aliud corpus. Si ergo follow that intellect is
intellectus est forma corruptible.
corporis, videtur ex
necessitate sequi quod
intellectus sit
corruptibilis.

Est autem sciendum, [33] It should be known that


quod ratio haec this argument convinces
Platonicos movit. Nam many: thus Gregory of
Gregorius Nyssenus, Nyssa, making the reverse
imponit Aristoteli, e point, understood Aristotle
contrario, quod quia to teach that the soul is
posuit animam esse corruptible because he
formam, quod posuerit made the soul a form. Some
eam esse corruptibilem. maintain because of this
Quidam vero posuerunt that soul passes from body
propter hoc, animam to body. Others held that
transire de corpore in soul has a certain
corpus. Quidam etiam incorruptible body from
posuerunt, quod anima which it is never separate. It
haberet corpus quoddam must be shown, therefore,
incorruptibile, a quo from Aristotle’s words, that
nunquam separaretur. Et he held that the intellective
ideo ostendendum est soul is form and nonetheless
per verba Aristotelis, held it to be incorruptible.
quod sic posuit
intellectivam animam
esse formam quod tamen
posuit eam
incorruptibilem.

In undecimo enim [34] In Book Eleven of the


Metaph., postquam Metaphysics, after he had
ostenderat quod formae shown that forms do not
non sunt ante materias, exist before their matters,
quia quando sanatur because “when man is
homo tunc est sanitas, et healed then health exists,
figura aeneae sphaerae and the shape of the bronze
simul est cum sphaera sphere at the same time as
aenea; consequenter the bronze sphere,” he then
inquirit utrum aliqua asks whether any form
forma remaneat post remains after matter. In
materiam, et dicit sic, Boethius’s translation, “It
secundum translationem should be considered
Boetii: si vero aliquid whether anything remains
posterius remaneat (scil. afterward” namely, after
post materiam) matter, “for nothing stands
considerandum est. In in the way of this in some
quibusdam enim nihil things, as if the soul were of
prohibet, ut si anima this kind, not all but
huiusmodi est, non omnis intellect, or perhaps it is
sed intellectus; omnem impossible for them all.”
enim impossibile est What he clearly says,
fortasse. Patet ergo quod therefore, is that nothing
animam, quae est forma prevents the soul, which is a
quantum ad intellectivam form, from remaining after
partem, dicit nihil the body thanks to its
prohibere remanere post intellective part although it
corpus, et tamen ante did not exist prior to body.
corpus non fuisse. Cum For when he said absolutely
enim absolute dixisset, that moving causes are prior
quod causae moventes but not formal causes, he
sunt ante, non autem did not ask whether any
causae formales, non form were prior to matter,
quaesivit utrum aliqua and he says that nothing
forma esset ante prevents this in the case of
materiam, sed utrum the form which is soul with
aliqua forma remaneat respect to its intellective
post materiam; et dicit part.
hoc nihil prohibere de
forma quae est anima,
quantum ad intellectivam
partem.

Cum igitur, secundum [35] When then, in


praemissa Aristotelis accordance with the
verba, haec forma quae foregoing words of Aristotle,
est anima, post corpus this form which is the soul
remaneat, non tota, sed remains after the body, not
intellectus; the whole but intellect, we
considerandum restat must yet ask why the soul
quare magis anima remains after the body with
secundum partem respect to its intellective
intellectivam post corpus part rather than its other
remaneat, quam parts, and why other forms
secundum alias partes, et don’t remain after their
quam aliae formae post matters. The reason is to be
suas materias. Cuius found in the text of Aristotle.
quidem rationem ex ipsis He says “This alone is truly
Aristotelis verbis separate and this alone
assumere oportet. Dicit immortal and perpetual.”
enim: separatum autem (430a22-23) Thus the
est solum hoc quod vere reason he gives that it alone
est; et hoc solum seems to be immortal and
immortale et perpetuum perpetual is that it alone is
est. Hanc igitur rationem separate.
assignare videtur quare
hoc solum immortale et
perpetuum esse videtur:
quia hoc solum est
separatum.

Sed de quo hic loquatur, [36] But a question arises as


dubium esse potest, to what he is here speaking
quibusdam dicentibus, of, for some say he means
quod loquitur de possible intellect and others
intellectu possibili; that he means the agent
quibusdam, quod de intellect. But both of these
agente: quorum are seen to be false when
utrumque apparet esse Aristotle’s words are
falsum, si diligenter verba carefully considered, for
Aristotelis considerentur. Aristotle says both are
Nam de utroque separate. That it is the whole
Aristoteles dixerat ipsum intellective part which is said
esse separatum. Restat to be separate because it
igitur quod intelligatur de has no organ is clear from
tota intellectiva parte, the words of Aristotle.
quae quidem separata
dicitur, quia non est ei
aliquod organum, sicut ex
verbis Aristotelis patet.

Dixerat autem Aristoteles [37] In the beginning of On


in principio libri de the Soul, Aristotle said that
anima, quod si est aliquid “If there is any way of acting
animae operum aut or being acted upon proper
passionum proprium, to soul, soul will be capable
continget utique ipsam of separate existence.”
separari; si vero nullum (403a10-12) The reason for
est proprium ipsius, non the consequence is this:
utique erit separabilis. since anything acts
Cuius quidem according to the kind of
consequentiae ratio talis being it is, activity will
est: quia unumquodque belong to anything in the
operatur in quantum est same way in which it exists.
ens, eo igitur modo Forms therefore which have
unicuique competit no activity without the
operari quo sibi competit participation of their matter,
esse. Formae igitur quae do not themselves operate,
nullam operationem but the composite acts
habent sine through the form. Hence
communicatione suae forms of this kind do not
materiae, ipsae non themselves exist, but
operantur, sed something exists because of
compositum est quod them. Heat does not warm,
operatur per formam. but rather the hot thing; so
Unde huiusmodi formae too heat does not exist
ipsae quidem proprie properly speaking, but the
loquendo non sunt, sed thing is warm thanks to
eis aliquid est. Sicut enim heat. Because of this
calor non calefacit, sed Aristotle says in Book Eleven
calidum; ita etiam calor of the Metaphysics that one
non est proprie loquendo, does not truly say of
sed calidum est per accidents that they are
calorem; propter quod beings but that they are of
Aristoteles dicit in beings.
undecimo Metaph., quod
de accidentibus non vere
dicitur, quod sunt entia,
sed magis quod sunt
entis.

Et similis ratio est de [38] The same reasoning


formis substantialibus, applies to substantial forms
quae nullam operationem having no operation in which
habent absque matter does not take part,
communicatione except that such forms are
materiae, hoc excepto principles of being.
quod huiusmodi formae Therefore a form which has
sunt principium essendi an activity thanks to one of
substantialiter. Forma its powers or faculties in
igitur quae habet which its matter does not
operationem secundum participate has existence of
aliquam sui potentiam vel itself. It does not exist
virtutem absque simply because its
communicatione suae composite does, as is the
materiae, ipsa est quae case with other forms, but
habet esse, nec est per rather the composite exists
esse compositi tantum, thanks to it. Therefore, the
sicut aliae formae, sed composite being destroyed,
magis compositum est a form which exists thanks
per esse eius. Et ideo to the existence of the
destructo composito composite is destroyed,
destruitur illa forma, whereas a form through
quae est per esse whose existence the
compositi; non autem composite exists, not vice
oportet quod destruatur, versa, need not be destroyed
ad destructionem when the composite is
compositi, illa forma per destroyed.
cuius esse compositum
est et non ipsa per esse
compositi.

Si quis autem contra hoc [39] Against this might be


obiiciat, quod Aristoteles objected what Aristotle says
dicit in primo de anima, in Book One of On the Soul,
quod intelligere et amare “Thinking, loving, and hating
et odire non sunt illius are affections not of
passiones (i. e. animae), thought, but of that which
sed huius habentis illud, has thought, so far as it has
secundum quod illud it. That is why, when this
habet; quare et hoc vehicle decays, memory and
corrupto neque love cease; they were
memoratur neque amat: activities not of thought, but
non enim illius erant, sed of the composite which has
communis, quod quidem perished.” (408b25-29) The
destructum est; patet answer is clear from
responsio per dictum Themistius who, in
Themistii hoc exponentis, explaining this text, says
qui dicit: nunc dubitanti that Aristotle “now is more
magis quam docenti in the mode of the doubter
assimilatur Aristoteles. than the teacher.” For he has
Nondum enim not yet destroyed the
destruxerat opinionem opinion of those saying that
dicentium non differre intellect and sense do not
intellectum et sensum. differ.

Unde in toto illo capitulo [40] Hence in that whole


loquitur de intellectu chapter he speaks of
sicut de sensu. Quod intellect in the same way he
patet praecipue ubi does of sense. This is
probat intellectum especially evident where he
incorruptibilem per proves the intellect to be
exemplum sensus, qui incorruptible using the
non corrumpitur ex example of sense, which is
senectute. Unde et per not corrupted by age. Hence
totum sub conditione et throughout he speaks
sub dubio loquitur sicut conditionally and
inquirens, semper problematically as one
coniungens ea, quae sunt inquiring, always conflating
intellectus, his quae sunt intellect and sense. This is
sensus: quod praecipue chiefly apparent from this
apparet ex eo quod in that, in the beginning of the
principio solutionis dicit: solution, he says “We may
si enim et quam maxime admit to the full that being
dolere et gaudere et pained or please, or
intelligere et cetera. Si thinking, are movements,
quis autem pertinaciter etc.” (408b5-6) Were
dicere vellet quod anyone adamantly to insist
Aristoteles ibi loquitur that Aristotle speaks
determinando; adhuc decisively here, another
restat responsio, quia response remains.
intelligere dicitur esse Understanding is said to be
actus coniuncti non per the act of the composite, not
se, sed per accidens, in essentially but accidentally,
quantum scil. eius insofar as its object, the
obiectum, quod est phantasm, is in a bodily
phantasma, est in organo organ and not because this
corporali, non quod iste activity is exercised through
actus per organum a bodily organ.
corporale exerceatur.

Si quis autem quaerat [41] A further question


ulterius: si intellectus might be asked: If intellect
sine phantasmate non does not understand without
intelligit, quomodo ergo the phantasm, how can the
anima habebit soul have an intellectual
operationem operation after it is
intellectualem, postquam separated from body? The
fuerit a corpore questioner ought to know
separata? Scire debet qui that it is not the natural
hoc obiicit, quod istam philosopher’s task to solve
quaestionem solvere non this question. That is why
pertinet ad naturalem. Aristotle, speaking of soul in
Unde Aristoteles in Book Two of the Physics,
secundo Physic. dicit, de writes, “It is the business of
anima loquens: quomodo First Philosophy to resolve
autem separabile hoc se how this is separable and
habeat et quid sit, what it is..” For it should be
philosophiae primae opus seen that the soul when
est determinare. separated has a different
Aestimandum est enim way of understanding than it
quod alium modum does when conjoined, a way
intelligendi habebit similar to that of separate
separata, quam habeat substances. Hence it is not
coniuncta, similem scil. surprising that Aristotle
aliis substantiis should say, in Book Three of
separatis. Unde non sine On the Soul, “Whether it is
causa Aristoteles quaerit possible for it while not
in tertio de anima, utrum existing separate from
intellectus non separatus spatial conditions to think
a magnitudine intelligat anything that is separate, or
aliquid separatum. not, we must consider later.”
(431b17-19) This suggests
that it can understand
something in a separated
state that it cannot when
unseparated.

Per quod dat intelligere [42] What is especially to be


quod aliquid poterit noticed in these words is
intelligere separatus, that, while he said earlier
quod non potest non that both intellects, namely
separatus. In quibus the possible and agent, are
etiam verbis valde separate, here he says
notandum est, quod cum intellect is not separate. For
superius utrumque the separate is such insofar
intellectum (scil. as it is not the act of an
possibilem et agentem), organ and the non-separate
dixerit separatum, hic that which is a part or power
tamen dicit eum non of the soul which is the act
separatum. Est enim of body, as has been said.
separatus, in quantum Aristotle’s resolution of such
non est actus organi; non questions can be more
separatus vero, in certainly gathered from what
quantum est pars sive he wrote of separate
potentia animae quae est substances at the beginning
actus corporis, sicut of Book Twelve of the
supra dictum est. Metaphysics, ten books of
Huiusmodi autem which I have seen though
quaestiones certissime they are not yet translated
colligi potest, Aristotelem into our language.
solvisse in his quae patet
eum scripsisse de
substantiis separatis, ex
his quae dicit in principio
duodecimi Metaph., quos
etiam libros vidi numero
X, licet nondum in lingua
nostra translatos.

Secundum hoc igitur [43] Given this, therefore, it


patet quod rationes is clear that there are no
inductae in contrarium necessary arguments for the
necessitatem non habent. opposed position. For it is
Essentiale enim est essential to the soul that it
animae quod corpori be united to body and this is
uniatur; sed hoc accidentally impeded, not on
impeditur per accidens, its part, but on the part of
non ex parte sua sed ex the body which corrupts. In
parte corporis quod the same way it pertains as
corrumpitur; sicut per se such to what is light that it
competit levi sursum be above. “This is the
esse, et hoc est levi esse essence of what is light that
ut sit sursum, ut it be above,” as Aristotle
Aristoteles dicit in octavo says in Book Eight of the
Physic.; contingit tamen Physics, “but it can come
per aliquod about through some
impedimentum quod non impediment that it is not
sit sursum. above.”

Ex hoc etiam patet The response to the second


solutio alterius rationis. argument is clear from this.
Sicut enim quod habet Although there is a specific
naturam ut sit sursum, et difference between that
quod non habet naturam whose nature it is to be
ut sit sursum, specie above and that whose nature
differunt; et tamen idem it is not to be above, yet the
et specie et numero est thing whose nature it is to
quod habet naturam ut be above, although it
sit sursum, licet sometimes is and sometimes
quandoque sit sursum et is not, due to an
quandoque non sit impediment, is specifically
sursum propter aliquod and numerically the same
impedimentum: ita nature. In much the same
differunt specie duae way, a form whose nature it
formae, quarum una is to be united to body is
habet naturam ut uniatur specifically different from
corpori, alia vero non one whose nature it is not to
habet; sed tamen unum be united to body, yet a form
et idem specie et numero specifically and numerically
esse potest, habens the same can be such that
naturam ut uniatur its nature is to be united to
corpori, licet quandoque body although sometimes it
sit actu unitum, actually is and sometimes it
quandoque non actu is not because of an
unitum propter aliquod impediment.
impedimentum.

Adhuc autem ad sui [44] They seek yet another


erroris fulcimentum basis for this error in what
assumunt quod Aristotle says in the book On
Aristoteles dicit in libro the generation of Animals,
de generatione namely, “intellect comes
animalium, scil. only from without and it
intellectum solum de alone is divine.” But no form
foris advenire et divinum which is the act of matter
esse solum. Nulla autem comes to it from without, but
forma quae est actus is educed from the potency
materiae, advenit de of matter. Therefore the
foris, sed educitur de intellect is not the form of
potentia materiae. body.
Intellectus igitur non est
forma corporis.

Obiiciunt etiam, quod They object too that every


omnis forma corporis form of a mixed body is
mixti causatur ex caused by the elements;
elementis; unde si hence if the intellect were
intellectus esset forma the form of the human body,
corporis humani, non it would not be caused by
esset ab extrinseco, sed something else, but would
esset ex elementis be caused by the elements.
causatus.

Obiiciunt etiam ulterius They further object on this


circa hoc, quia score that it would follow
sequeretur quod etiam that the vegetative and
vegetativum et sensitive too would be from
sensitivum esset ab something else, which is
extrinseco; quod est contrary to Aristotle. This
contra Aristotelem, would be especially true
praecipue si esset una when there is a soul one in
substantia animae, cuius substance whose powers are
potentiae essent vegetative, sensitive and
vegetativum, sensitivum intellective. But, according
et intellectivum; cum to Aristotle, the intellective
intellectus sit ab is from without.
extrinseco, secundum
Aristotelem.

Horum autem solutio in [45] The solution of these


promptu apparet difficulties readily appears
secundum praemissa. from the foregoing, for when
Cum enim dicitur quod it is said that every form is
omnis forma educitur de educed from the potency of
potentia materiae, matter, it seems that what
considerandum videtur, this means ought to be
quid sit formam de understood. For if this is
potentia materiae educi. only matter’s first existing in
Si enim hoc nihil aliud sit potency to the form, nothing
quam materiam prevents our saying that
praeexistere in potentia corporeal matter first exists
ad formam, nihil prohibet in potency to the intellective
sic dicere materiam soul. Hence Aristotle says in
corporalem praeextitisse the book On the Generation
in potentia ad animam of Animals, “For at first all
intellectivam; unde such embryos seem to live
Aristoteles dicit in libro the life of a plant. And it is
de generatione clear that we must be
animalium: primum guided by this in speaking of
quidem omnia visa sunt the active and sensitive and
vivere talia (scil. separata rational soul. For all three
fetuum) plantae vita. kinds of soul must be
Consequenter autem possessed potentially before
palam quia et de they are possessed
sensitiva dicendum anima actually.”
et de activa et de
intellectiva; omnes enim
necessarium potentia
prius habere quam actu.

Sed quia potentia dicitur [46] Because potency is a


ad actum, necesse est ut correlative of act, a thing
unumquodque secundum must be in potency in the
eam rationem sit in same respect that being
potentia, secundum actual belongs to it. It has
quam rationem convenit already been shown that
sibi esse actu. Iam autem those forms which have no
ostensum est quod aliis activities that do not involve
formis, quae non habent matter are such that
operationem absque composites exist through
communicatione them and they themselves
materiae, convenit sic as it were coexist with
esse actu, ut magis ipsae composites rather than exist
sint quibus composita themselves. Hence just as
sunt, et quodammodo their whole existence is in
compositis coexistentes, concretion with matter, so
quam quod ipsae suum they are said to be totally
esse habeant; unde sicut educed from the potency of
totum esse earum est in matter. The intellective soul,
concretione ad materiam, however, since it has an
ita totaliter educi operation without body,
dicuntur de potentia does not exist solely in
materiae. Anima autem concretion with matter,
intellectiva, cum habeat hence it cannot be said to be
operationem sine educed from matter, but it is
corpore, non est esse rather from an extrinsic
suum solum in principle. And this is obvious
concretione ad materiam; from Aristotle’s words: “It
unde non potest dici remains, then, for the reason
quod educatur de alone so to enter and alone
materia, sed magis quod to be divine,” and he gives
est a principio extrinseco. the explanation when he
Et hoc ex verbis adds, “for no bodily activity
Aristotelis apparet: has any connection with its
relinquitur autem activity.”
intellectum solum de
foris advenire, et divinum
esse solum; et causam
assignat subdens: nihil
enim ipsius operationi
communicat corporalis
operatio.

Miror autem unde [47] I wonder whence


secunda obiectio comes this second
processerit, quod si objection, namely, that if the
anima intellectiva esset intellective soul were the
forma corporis mixti, form of a mixed body it
quod causaretur ex would be caused by the
commixtione mingling of the elements. No
elementorum, cum nulla soul is caused by the
anima ex commixtione mingling of elements. Right
elementorum causetur. after the words just quoted
Dicit enim Aristoteles we read: “Now it is true that
immediate post verba the faculty of all kinds of
praemissa: omnis quidem soul seems to have a
igitur animae virtus altero connexion with a matter
corpore visa est different from and more
participare et diviniore divine than the so-called
vocatis elementis; ut elements; but as one soul
autem differunt differs from another in honor
honorabilitate animae et and utility, so differs also the
vilitate invicem, sic et nature of the corresponding
talis differt natura. matter. All have in their
Omnium quidem enim in semen that which causes it
spermate existit quod to be productive; I mean
facit generativa esse what is called a vital heat.
spermata, vocatum This is not fire nor any such
calidum; hoc autem non force, but it is the breath
ignis neque talis virtus included in the semen and
est, sed interceptus in the foam-like, and the
spermate et in spumoso natural principle in the
spiritus aliquis, et in breath, being analogous to
spiritu natura the element of the stars.”
proportionalis existens Therefore not even the
astrorum ordinationi. vegetable soul, let alone
Ergo, ex mixtione intellect, is produced from
elementorum necdum the mingling of elements.
intellectus, sed nec
anima vegetativa
producitur.

Quod vero tertio obiicitur, [48] The third objection,


quod sequeretur that it would follow that the
vegetativum et sensitive and vegetative too
sensitivum esse ab would be from an extrinsic
extrinseco, non est ad principle, is not relevant. For
propositum. Iam enim it is already evident from the
patet ex verbis words of Aristotle that he
Aristotelis, quod ipse hoc leaves indeterminate
indeterminatum relinquit, whether intellect differs from
utrum intellectus differat the other parts of the soul in
ab aliis partibus animae subject and place, as Plato
subiecto et loco, ut Plato said, or by understanding
dixit, vel ratione tantum. alone. Even if it were given
Si vero detur quod sint that they are the same in
idem subiecto, sicut subject, as is truer, still
verius est, nec adhuc nothing absurd would follow.
inconveniens sequitur. For Aristotle says in Book
Dicit enim Aristoteles in Two of On the Soul, “The
secundo de anima, quod cases of figure and soul are
similiter se habent ei exactly parallel; for the
quod de figuris, et quae particulars subsumed under
secundum animam sunt. the common name in both
Semper enim in eo quod cases—figures and living
est consequenter, est things—constitute a series,
potentia quod prius est, each successive term of
in figuris et in animatis; which potentially contains
ut in tetragono quidem its predecessor, e.g. the
trigonum est, in sensitivo square the triangle, the
autem vegetativum. sensory power the self-
nutritive.” (414b28-32)

Si autem idem subiecto [49] If however the


est etiam intellectivum intellective too is in the
(quod ipse sub dubio same subject, which he
relinquit), similiter leaves in doubt, it would
dicendum esset quod similarly have to be said that
vegetativum et the vegetative and sensitive
sensitivum sunt in are in the intellective as
intellectivo, ut trigonum triangle and square are in
et tetragonum in the pentagon. For the
pentagono. Est autem square is indeed a figure
tetragonum quidem a specifically different from
trigono simpliciter alia the triangle, but not from
figura specie, non autem the triangle potentially in it,
a trigono quod est no more than four is from
potentia in ipso; sicut nec the three which is its part,
quaternarius a ternario but only from the three
qui est pars ipsius, sed a existing apart. And if it
ternario qui est seorsum should happen that different
existens. Et si contingeret shapes are produced by
diversas figuras a diversis different agents, the triangle
agentibus produci, considered as apart and
trigonum quidem differing from the square
seorsum a tetragono would have a different cause
existens haberet aliam from the square, just as it
causam producentem has another species, but the
quam tetragonum, sicut triangle which is in the
et habet aliam speciem; square has the same
sed trigonum quod est in producing cause. Similarly
tetragono, haberet the vegetative existing apart
eamdem causam from the sensitive is another
producentem. Sic igitur species of soul and has a
vegetativum quidem different productive cause,
seorsum a sensitivo but there is the same
existens, alia species productive cause of the
animae est, et aliam sensitive and of the
causam productivam vegetative within the
habet; eadem tamen sensitive. If then it is said of
causa productiva est the vegetative and sensitive
sensitivi, et vegetativi which are in the intellective
quod inest sensitivo. Si that they are from the
ergo sic dicatur, quod extrinsic cause which
vegetativum et produces the intellective,
sensitivum quod inest nothing unacceptable
intellectivo, est a causa follows. For there is nothing
extrinseca a qua est absurd about the effect of a
intellectivum, nullum higher agent having the
inconveniens sequitur. power that the effect of a
Non enim inconveniens lesser agent has, even more
est, effectum superioris so. Hence the intellective
agentis habere virtutem soul, although it is from an
quam habet effectus external agent, nonetheless
inferioris agentis, et has the powers had by the
adhuc amplius; unde et vegetative and sensitive
anima intellectiva, souls which are produced by
quamvis sit ab exteriori inferior agents.
agente, habet tamen
virtutes quas habent
anima vegetativa et
sensitiva, quae sunt ab
inferioribus agentibus.

Sic igitur, diligenter [50] So it is that those who


consideratis fere omnibus carefully consider everything
verbis Aristotelis quae de Aristotle has to say of the
intellectu humano dixit, human intellect see clearly
apparet eum huius fuisse that his teaching was that
sententiae quod anima the human soul is the act of
humana sit actus the body and that its part or
corporis, et quod eius faculty is the possible
pars sive potentia sit intellect.
intellectus possibilis.

Caput 2
De relatione intellectus
possibilis ad hominem CHAPTER II
secundum alios
Peripateticos

Nunc autem considerare [51] Now we should


oportet quid alii consider what the other
Peripatetici de hoc ipso Peripatetics had to say
senserunt. Et accipiamus about all this. We will first
primo verba Themistii in take up the words of
commento de anima, ubi Themistius in his
sic dicit: intellectus iste Commentary On the Soul .
quem dicimus in potentia When he says: “This
(...) magis est animae intellect that we say is in
connaturalis (scil. quam potency is more connatural
agens); dico autem non to the soul,”—he means,
omni animae, sed solum than the agent intellect—“I
humanae. Et sicut lumen don’t mean to every soul,
potentia visui et potentia however, but only to the
coloribus adveniens, actu human. And just as light
quidem visum fecit et actu coming to potential seeing
colores, ita et intellectus and to colors in potency
iste qui actu (...) non makes them actual, so
solum ipsum actu when this intellect is in act
intellectum fecit, sed et it not only makes intellect
potentia intelligibilia actu to be in act, but also
intelligibilia ipse instituit. constitutes potential
Et post pauca concludit: intelligibles as actual
quam igitur rationem intelligibles.” And a little
habet ars ad materiam, later: “As art is to matter
hanc et intellectus factivus so is the factive intellect to
ad eum qui in potentia (...) that which is in potency.
propter quod et in nobis That is why we understand
est intelligere quando when we wish to. For it is
volumus. Non enim est ars not an art exterior to
materiae exterioris (...) sed matter, but a power
investitur toti potentia invested in the whole
intellectui qui factivus; ac intellect which is making,
si utique aedificator lignis just as, if the builder did
et aerarius aeri non ab not exist exterior to the
extrinseco existeret, per wood or the brazier to the
totum autem ipsum bronze, they would be able
penetrare potens erit. Sic to penetrate through and
enim et qui secundum through. Thus it is that the
actum intellectus intellect in act supervenes
intellectui potentia on intellect in potency,
superveniens, unum fit becoming one with it.”
cum ipso.

Et post pauca concludit: [52] And, a little later, he


non igitur sumus aut qui concludes, “Therefore we
potentia intellectus, aut are either the intellect in
qui actu. Si quidem igitur potency or the intellect in
in compositis omnibus ex act. And if in everything
eo quod potentia et ex eo composed of what is in
quod actu, aliud est hoc et potency and what is in act,
aliud est esse huic, aliud it is one thing and what it
utique erit ego et mihi is for it to exist is another,
esse. Et ego quidem est then I too and what it is for
compositus intellectus ex me to exist differ. And I am
potentia et actu, mihi an intellect composed of
autem esse ex eo quod potency and act, but what
actu est. Quare et quae it is for me to be comes
meditor et quae scribo, from that which is in act.
scribit quidem intellectus Wherefore what I think and
compositus ex potentia et write, an intellect
actu, scribit autem non composed of potency and
qua potentia sed qua actu; act writes, but it writes not
operari enim inde sibi as in potency but as in act;
derivatur. Et post pauca from it derives its activity.”
adhuc manifestius: sicut And a little further on yet
igitur aliud est animal et more clearly: “Just as
aliud animali esse, animali animal and what it is for
autem esse est ab anima animal to exist differ, the
animalis, sic et aliud latter being due to the
quidem ego, aliud autem animal’s soul, so too I and
mihi esse. Esse igitur mihi what it is for me to exist
ab anima, et hac non omni. differ. What it is for me to
Non enim a sensitiva, exist comes from soul but
materia enim erat not from every part, not
phantasiae. Neque rursum from the sensitive, which is
a phantastica, materia matter to the imaginative,
enim erat potentia nor indeed from the
intellectus. Neque eius qui imaginative, for it is matter
potentia intellectus, to possible intellect, nor
materia enim est factivi. A from that which is intellect
solo igitur factivo est mihi potentially, for it is as
esse. Et post pauca subdit: matter to the agent
et usque ad hunc intellect. From agent
progressa natura cessavit, intellect alone, therefore,
tanquam nihil habens comes what it is for me to
alterum honoratius, cui be.” And he adds a little
faceret ipsum subiectum. later, “And having
Nos itaque sumus activus progressed to this nature
intellectus. stops, there being nothing
more honorable which
could serve as subject to it.
We are therefore the agent
intellect.”

Et postea reprobans [53] And after rejecting the


quorundam opinionem opinion of some others, he
dicit: cum praedixisset says, “Since Aristotle said
(scil. Aristoteles) in omni that in every nature there
natura hoc quidem is that which is matter and
materiam esse, hoc autem that which moves and
quod materiam movet aut perfects matter, he says
perficit, necesse ait et in that these differences must
anima existere has also exist in soul, and that
differentias, et esse there must be an intellect
aliquem hunc talem that becomes all things
intellectum in omnia fieri, and another that makes it
hunc talem in omnia all things. For he says
facere. In anima enim ait there is in the soul such an
esse talem intellectum et intellect and it is the most
animae humanae velut noble part of the human
quamdam partem intellect.” A bit afterward
honoratissimam. Et post adding, “This same text
pauca dicit: ex eadem confirms that he, Aristotle,
etiam littera hoc contingit thinks that either we are
confirmare, quod putat the agent intellect or it is a
(scil. Aristoteles) aut nostri part of us.”
aliquid esse activum
intellectum, aut nos.

Patet igitur ex praemissis From the foregoing words


verbis Themistii, quod non of Themistius it is clear
solum intellectum that he not only holds that
possibilem, sed etiam the possible intellect is a
agentem partem animae part of the human soul, but
humanae esse dicit, et the agent as well, and he
Aristotelem ait hoc says that Aristotle taught
sensisse; et iterum, quod this; and further that man
homo est id quod est, non is what he is not because
ex anima sensitiva, ut of the sensitive soul, as
quidam mentiuntur, sed ex some falsely said, but from
parte intellectiva et the principal part, the
principaliori. intellective.

Et Theophrasti quidem [54] I have not seen the


libros non vidi, sed eius books of Theophrastus, but
verba introducit Themistius cites him in his
Themistius in commento, commentary, writing,
quae sunt talia, sic dicens: “However it is better to set
melius est autem et dicta forth the sayings of
Theophrasti proponere de Theophrastus concerning
intellectu potentia et de eo the intellect that is in
qui actu. De eo igitur qui potency and that which is
potentia haec ait: in act. Of that which is in
intellectus autem qualiter a potency he asks: How
foris existens et tanquam could intellect exist from
superpositus, tamen outside and as imposed
connaturalis? Et quae and yet be connatural? And
natura ipsius? Hoc quidem what is its nature? For it is
enim nihil esse secundum actually nothing yet
actum, potentia autem everything potentially, just
omnia bene, sicut et like sense. Nor should this
sensus. Non enim sic be taken to mean that it
accipiendum est ut neque itself is not, which is
sit ipse, litigiosum est carping, but it is as a kind
enim, sed ut subiectam of potential subject as is
quamdam potentiam, sicut found in material things.
et in materialibus. Sed hoc But this ought not to said
a foris igitur, non ut to be from without,
adiectum, sed ut in prima therefore, or something
generatione conjoined, but is included
comprehendens from the first coming into
ponendum. being.” (p. 242, II, 54-62)

Sic igitur Theophrastus, [55] So Theophrastus asks


cum quaesivisset duo: two things: first, how is the
primo quidem, quomodo possible intellect from an
intellectus possibilis sit ab extrinsic principle yet
extrinseco, et tamen nobis connatural to us, and
connaturalis; et secundo, second, what is the nature
quae sit natura intellectus of the possible intellect. He
possibilis; respondet primo answers the second
ad secundum: quod est in question first, saying that it
potentia omnia, non is potentially all things, not
quidem sicut nihil existens, indeed existing as nothing,
sed sicut sensus ad but in the way sense is
sensibilia. Et ex hoc related to sensibles. His
concludit responsionem answer to the first question
primae quaestionis, quod follows from this, that it
non intelligitur sic esse ab ought not so to be
extrinseco, quasi aliquid understood to be from
adiectum accidentaliter vel outside as if it were
tempore praecedente, sed something accidentally
a prima generatione, sicut conjoined or temporally
continens et prior, but is there in the
comprehendens naturam first coming into being, as
humanam. containing and
comprehending human
nature.

Quod autem Alexander [56] That Alexander held


intellectum possibilem the possible intellect to be
posuerit esse formam the form of the body,
corporis, etiam ipse Averroes himself admits,
Averroes confitetur, although, as I think, he
quamvis, ut arbitror, perversely understands
perverse verba Alexandri Alexander’s words just as
acceperit, sicut et verba he uses the words of
Themistii praeter eius Themistius beyond the
intellectum assumit. Nam meaning they bear. For he
quod dicit, Alexandrum claims that Alexander said
dixisse intellectum the possible intellect was
possibilem non esse aliud precisely the preparation in
quam praeparationem, human nature for agent
quae est in natura intellect and intelligibles,
humana, ad intellectum he understands this
agentem et ad intelligibilia: preparation to be nothing
hanc praeparationem nihil other than the soul’s
aliud intellexit, quam intellective potency to
potentiam intellectivam intelligible things.
quae est in anima ad Therefore he said that it is
intelligibilia. Et ideo dixit not a power in body
eam non esse virtutem in because such a power
corpore, quia talis potentia does not have a bodily
non habet organum organ. And not for the
corporale, et non ex ea reason Averroes attributes
ratione, ut Averroes to him, that no preparation
impugnat, secundum quod is a power in body.
nulla praeparatio est virtus
in corpore.

Et ut a Graecis ad Arabes [57] To turn from the


transeamus, primo Greeks to the Arabs, it is
manifestum est quod clear first of all that
Avicenna posuit Avicenna held intellect to
intellectum virtutem be a power of soul which is
animae quae est forma the form of body. For he
corporis. Dicit enim sic in says in his book On the
suo libro de anima: Soul, “The active, that is,
intellectus activus (i. e. practical intellect, needs
practicus) eget corpore et the body and bodily
virtutibus corporalibus ad powers for its own actions,
omnes actiones suas. but the contemplative
Contemplativus autem intellect does not always
intellectus eget corpore et and completely need the
virtutibus eius, sed nec body and its powers: for it
semper nec omnino. is sufficient unto itself.
Sufficit enim ipse sibi per None of these is the human
seipsum. Nihil autem soul, but the soul is what
horum est anima humana; has these powers and, as
sed anima est id quod we shall maintain later, is a
habet has virtutes et, sicut solitary substance, that is,
postea declarabimus, est is in itself, and has aptitude
substantia solitaria, i. e. for activities some of which
per se, quae habet are perfected only through
aptitudinem ad actiones, instruments and some use
quarum quaedam sunt of them, while others do
quae non perficiuntur nisi not need instruments in
per instrumenta et per any way.”
usum eorum ullo modo;
quaedam vero sunt, quibus
non sunt necessaria
instrumenta aliquo modo.

Item, in prima parte dicit Again, in the first part he


quod anima humana est says that “the human soul
perfectio prima corporis is the first perfection of a
naturalis instrumentalis, natural body with organs,
secundum quod attribuitur insofar as the ability to
ei agere actiones electione performs acts of deliberate
deliberationis, et choice, to discover by
adinvenire meditando, et inquiry. and to grasp
secundum hoc quod universals are attributed to
apprehendit universalia. it.” But it is true that later
Sed verum est quod postea he says and proves that
dicit et probat quod anima the human soul, because of
humana, secundum id that which is proper to it,
quod est sibi proprium, i. e. that is, according to its
secundum vim intellective power, “is not
intellectivam, non sic se related to body as form nor
habet ad corpus ut forma, require that an organ be
nec eget ut sibi supplied it.”
praeparetur organum.

Deinde subiungenda sunt [58] Next these words of


verba Algazelis sic Algazel should be added:
dicentis: cum commixtio “When the mingling of the
elementorum fuerit elements will have been of
pulchrioris et perfectioris a most beautiful and
aequalitatis, qua nihil perfect equality, than
possit inveniri subtilius et which nothing more subtle
pulchrius (...) tunc fiet and beautiful can be found,
apta ad recipiendum a then it became apt to
datore formarum formam receive from the giver of
pulchriorem formis aliis, forms a form more
quae est anima hominis. beautiful than other form,
Huius vero animae which is the soul of man.
humanae duae sunt There are two virtues of
virtutes: una operans et this human soul: one
altera sciens, quam vocat operative, the other
intellectum, ut ex knowing,” which, as is
consequentibus patet. Et clear from what follows,
tamen postea multis means intellect. Afterwards
argumentis probat, quod he proves with many
operatio intellectus non fit arguments that the
per organum corporale. operation of the intellect
does not take place
through a bodily organ.

Haec autem praemisimus, [59] We have set forth


non quasi volentes ex these things, not wishing
philosophorum to refute the above
auctoritatibus reprobare mentioned error by the
suprapositum errorem, sed authority of philosophers,
ut ostendamus, quod non but in order to show that
soli Latini, quorum verba not only Latin writers,
quibusdam non sapiunt, whose language some do
sed etiam Graeci et Arabes not savor, but also Greeks
hoc senserunt, quod and Arabs, thought that
intellectus sit pars vel intellect is a part or power
potentia seu virtus animae or faculty of the soul which
quae est corporis forma. is the form of body. So I
Unde miror ex quibus wonder from what
Peripateticis hunc errorem Peripatetics they boast to
se assumpsisse glorientur, have derived this error,
nisi forte quia minus volunt unless perhaps they have
cum ceteris Peripateticis less desire to think
recte sapere, quam cum correctly with other
Averroe oberrare, qui non Peripatetics than to err
tam fuit Peripateticus, with Averroes, who was not
quam philosophiae a Peripatetic but the
Peripateticae depravator. perverter of Peripatetic
philosophy.

Caput 3
Rationes ad probandum
CHAPTER III
unitatem intellectus
possibilis

Ostenso igitur ex verbis [60] Having shown from


Aristotelis et aliorum the words of Aristotle and
sequentium ipsum, quod those who followed him
intellectus est potentia that the intellect is a
animae quae est corporis potency of the soul which
forma, licet ipsa potentia, is the form of the body
quae est intellectus, non sit although that potency
alicuius organi actus, quia which is intellect is not
nihil ipsius operationi the act of any organ,
communicat corporalis “because its operation is
operatio, ut Aristoteles dicit; not shared by any bodily
inquirendum est per operation,” as Aristotle
rationes quid circa hoc says, we must now inquire
sentire sit necesse. Et quia, by way of arguments what
secundum doctrinam ought to be made of all
Aristotelis, oportet ex this. And since, according
actibus principia actuum to the teaching of
considerare, ex ipso actu Aristotle, it is from acts
proprio intellectus qui est that their principles are
intelligere, primo hoc known, our consideration
considerandum videtur. must begin with the
proper act of intellect,
namely, understanding.

In quo nullam firmiorem [61] Concerning which


rationem habere possumus there is no stronger
ea quam Aristoteles ponit, argument than that given
et sic argumentatur: anima by Aristotle when he
est primum quo vivimus et argues thus: “The soul is
intelligimus; ergo est ratio that whereby we first live
quaedam et species and understand, therefore
corporis cuiusdam. Et adeo it is a certain form and
huic rationi innititur, quod species” of some body.
eam dicit esse (414a12-14) He relies on
demonstrationem; nam in this argument, therefore,
principio capituli sic dicit: characterizing it as a
non solum quod quid est demonstration, for in the
oportet definitivam beginning of the chapter
rationem ostendere, sicut he says, “For it is not
plures terminorum dicunt, enough for a definitive
sed et causam inesse et formula to express as
demonstrare; et ponit most now do the mere
exemplum: sicut fact; it must include and
demonstratur quid est exhibit the ground also.”
tetragonismus, i. e. (413a13-20) By way of
quadratum per inventionem example, he says that
mediae lineae what a tetragon or square
proportionalis. is demonstrated through
the discovery of the
proportional mean.

Virtus autem huius [62] The power and


demonstrationis et irrefutability of this
insolubilitas apparet, quia demonstration is clear
quicumque ab hac via from the fact that
divertere voluerint, necesse whoever wishes to differ
habent inconveniens dicere. with it necessarily says
Manifestum est enim quod what is absurd. That this
hic homo singularis singular man understands
intelligit: nunquam enim de is manifest, for we would
intellectu quaeremus, nisi never ask about intellect
intelligeremus; nec cum unless we understood,
quaerimus de intellectu, de nor when we ask about
alio principio quaerimus, intellect are we asking
quam de eo quo nos about anything other than
intelligimus. Unde et that whereby we
Aristoteles dicit: dico autem understand. Thus
intellectum quo intelligit Aristotle says, “”I mean
anima. Concludit autem sic the intellect whereby the
Aristoteles: quod si aliquid soul understands,”
est primum principium quo (429a23) and concludes
intelligimus, oportet illud accordingly that if
esse formam corporis; quia something is the first
ipse prius manifestavit, principle whereby we
quod illud quo primo aliquid understand, it must be
operatur, est forma. Et patet the form of the body,
hoc per rationem, quia because he earlier
unumquodque agit in showed that that whereby
quantum est actu; est we first do anything is the
autem unumquodque actu form. And this is clear
per formam; unde oportet from argument: anything
illud, quo primo aliquid agit, acts insofar as it is in act;
esse formam. anything is in act through
its form; therefore that
through which something
first acts must be form.

Si autem dicas quod [66] If however you


principium huius actus, qui should say that the first
est intelligere, quod principle of the act which
nominamus intellectum, non is understanding, what we
sit forma, oportet te call intellect, is not form,
invenire modum quo actio then you must find a way
illius principii sit actio huius in which the act of this
hominis. Quod diversimode principle can be an action
quidam conati sunt dicere. of this man. There are
Quorum unus, Averroes, those who have tried in
ponens huiusmodi various ways to do this.
principium intelligendi quod One of them, Averroes,
dicitur intellectus possibilis, held that the principle of
non esse animam nec understanding which is
partem animae, nisi called the possible
aequivoce, sed potius quod intellect is not a soul or a
sit substantia quaedam part of the soul, except
separata, dixit quod equivocally; rather, it is a
intelligere illius substantiae separated substance. He
separatae est intelligere mei said that the separate
vel illius, in quantum substance’s
intellectus ille possibilis understanding is mine or
copulatur mihi vel tibi per yours insofar as possible
phantasmata quae sunt in intellect is joined to me or
me et in te. Quod sic fieri you through the
dicebat. Species enim phantasms which are in
intelligibilis, quae fit unum me and you. He says that
cum intellectu possibili, cum comes about in this way:
sit forma et actus eius, the intelligible species
habet duo subiecta: unum which becomes one with
ipsa phantasmata, aliud the possible intellect as
intellectum possibilem. Sic its form and act has two
ergo intellectus possibilis subjects, one those
continuatur nobiscum per phantasms, the other the
formam suam mediantibus possible intellect.
phantasmatibus; et sic, dum Therefore the possible
intellectus possibilis intellect is continuous
intelligit, hic homo intelligit. with us through its form
by way of phantasms, and
thus when the possible
intellect understands, this
man understands.

Quod autem hoc nihil sit, [64] There are three ways
patet tripliciter. Primo of showing that this
quidem, quia sic continuatio amounts to nothing. First,
intellectus ad hominem non because then the union of
esset secundum primam intellect and man would
eius generationem, ut not come into being when
Theophrastus dicit et he does, as Theophrastus
Aristoteles innuit in secundo maintains and Aristotle
Physic., ubi dicit quod indicates in Book Two of
terminus naturalis the Physics where he says
considerationis de formis that the goal of the
est ad formam, secundum naturalist’s consideration
quam homo generatur ab of forms is the form
homine et a sole. according to which man is
Manifestum est autem quod generated by man and the
terminus considerationis sun. Intellect is obviously
naturalis est in intellectu. the goal of the naturalist’s
Secundum autem dictum consideration, yet,
Averrois, intellectus non according to what
continuaretur homini Averroes says, intellect is
secundum suam not united with man from
generationem, sed his generation, but
secundum operationem through the operation of
sensus, in quantum est sense insofar as he is
sentiens in actu. Phantasia actually sensing:
enim est motus a sensu imagination is “a
secundum actum, ut dicitur movement resulting from
in libro de anima. an actual exercise of a
power of sense,” as is
said in On the Soul.
(429a1-2)

Secundo vero, quia ista [65] Second, because this


coniunctio non esset union would have not one
secundum aliquid unum, but diverse causes. For
sed secundum diversa. clearly the intelligible
Manifestum est enim quod species as it exists in the
species intelligibilis, phantasm is understood
secundum quod est in only potentially, but
phantasmatibus, est abstracted from
intellecta in potentia; in phantasms, in the
intellectu autem possibili possible intellect, it is
est secundum quod est actually understood. If
intellecta in actu, abstracta then the intelligible
a phantasmatibus. Si ergo species is the form of
species intelligibilis non est possible intellect only
forma intellectus possibilis insofar as it is abstracted
nisi secundum quod est from phantasms, it
abstracta a follows that [possible
phantasmatibus, sequitur intellect] is not united
quod per speciem with phantasms through
intelligibilem non the intelligible species but
continuatur rather is separated from
phantasmatibus, sed magis them. Unless perhaps it is
ab eis est separatus. Nisi said that the possible
forte dicatur quod intellect is one with
intellectus possibilis phantasms in the way in
continuatur which the mirror is one
phantasmatibus, sicut with the man whose
speculum continuatur image is reflected in the
homini cuius species mirror; but such a union
resultat in speculo. Talis manifestly does not
autem continuatio suffice for the union of
manifestum est quod non the act. For it is obvious
sufficit ad continuationem that the act of the mirror,
actus; manifestum est enim which is to represent, is
quod actio speculi, quae est not on this account
repraesentare, non propter attributed to the man. No
hoc potest attribui homini: more could the action of
unde nec actio intellectus possible intellect on the
possibilis propter basis of the foregoing
praedictam copulationem conjunction be attributed
posset attribui huic homini to this man Socrates in
qui est Socrates, ut hic order that this man might
homo intelligeret. understand.

Tertio, quia dato quod una [66] Third, even granted


et eadem species numero that numerically one and
esset forma intellectus the same species were
possibilis, et esset simul in the form of the possible
phantasmatibus: nec adhuc intellect and at the same
talis copulatio sufficeret ad time in phantasms, such a
hoc, quod hic homo conjunction would not
intelligeret. Manifestum est suffice to explain that this
enim, quod per speciem man understands. For it is
intelligibilem aliquid obvious that just as
intelligitur, sed per something is sensed
potentiam intellectivam through a sensible
aliquid intelligit; sicut etiam species but one senses
per speciem sensibilem something through the
aliquid sentitur, per sensitive power, so
potentiam autem sensitivam something is understood
aliquid sentit. Unde paries, through the intelligible
in quo est color, cuius species, but one
species sensibilis in actu est understands something
in visu, videtur, non videt, through the intellective
animal autem habens power. Hence the wall in
potentiam visivam, in qua which the color is, whose
est talis species, videt. Talis sensible species is
autem est praedicta actually in sight, is seen,
copulatio intellectus and does not see; it is the
possibilis ad hominem, in animal having the power
quo sunt phantasmata of sight, in which such a
quorum species sunt in species is, that sees. The
intellectu possibili, qualis aforesaid union of the
est copulatio parietis in quo possible intellect with
est color, ad visum in quo man, in whom exist the
est species sui coloris. Sicut phantasms whose species
igitur paries non videt, sed are in the possible
videtur eius color; ita intellect, is like the union
sequeretur quod homo non of the wall, in which the
intelligeret, sed quod eius color is, with sight in
phantasmata intelligerentur which the species of its
ab intellectu possibili. color is. The wall does not
Impossibile est ergo salvari see, but its color is seen;
quod hic homo intelligat, thus it would follow that
secundum positionem man does not understand,
Averrois. but his phantasms are
understood, by the
possible intellect. It is
impossible, therefore, on
the basis of Averroes’s
position, to show that this
man understands.

Quidam vero videntes quod [67] Some, seeing that,


secundum viam Averrois on Averroes’s position, it
sustineri non potest quod cannot be sustained that
hic homo intelligat, in aliam this man understands,
diverterunt viam, et dicunt take another path and say
quod intellectus unitur that intellect is united to
corpori ut motor; et sic, in body as its mover, and
quantum ex corpore et thus, insofar as body and
intellectu fit unum, ut ex intellect become one as
movente et moto, intellectus mover and moved, the
est pars huius hominis; et intellect is part of this
ideo operatio intellectus man, and therefore the
attribuitur huic homini, sicut operation of intellect is
operatio oculi, quae est attributed to this man in
videre, attribuitur huic the same way that the
homini. Quaerendum est operation of the eye,
autem ab eo qui hoc ponit, seeing, is attributed to
primo, quid sit hoc singulare this man. He who says
quod est Socrates: utrum this must be asked, first,
Socrates sit solus what this singular thing
intellectus, qui est motor; Socrates is. Is he only
aut sit motum ab ipso, quod intellect which is a
est corpus animatum anima mover? Or is he what is
vegetativa et sensitiva; aut moved by it—a body
sit compositum ex utroque. animated by vegetative
Et quantum ex sua positione and sensitive soul? Or is
videtur, hoc tertium accipiet: he composed of both? So
quod Socrates sit aliquid far as his position can be
compositum ex utroque. discerned, it appears that
he adopts the third
possibility, namely, that
Socrates is composed of
both.

Procedamus ergo contra [68] Let us then proceed


eos per rationem Aristotelis against them making use
in Metaph.: quid est igitur of Aristotle’s argument in
quod facit unum hominem? Book Eight of the
Omnium enim quae plures Metaphysics, “What then
partes habent et non sunt it is that makes man
quasi coacervatio totum, one?” (1045a14) “In the
sed est aliquod totum case of all things which
praeter partes, est aliqua have several parts and in
ratio unum essendi: sicut in which the whole is not, as
quibusdam tactus, in it were, a mere heap, but
quibusdam viscositas, aut the totality is something
aliquid aliud huiusmodi (...) besides the parts, there is
palam autem quia si sic a cause of unity; for as
transformant, ut regards material things
consueverunt definire et contact is the cause in
dicere, non contingit some cases, and in others
reddere et solvere viscocity or some other
dubitationem. Si autem est such quality.”
ut dicimus: hic quidem (1045a8-12) “Clearly,
materia, illud vero forma, et then, if people proceed
hoc quidem potestate, illud thus in their usual manner
vero actu, non adhuc of definition and speech,
dubitatio videbitur esse. they cannot explain and
solve the difficulty. But if,
as we say, one element is
matter and another is
form, and one potentially
and the other actually, the
question will no longer be
thought a difficulty.”
(1045a20-25)

Sed si tu dicas, quod [69] But if you should say


Socrates non est unum quid that Socrates is not some
simpliciter, sed unum quid one thing absolutely, but
aggregatione motoris et one by the coming
moti, sequuntur multa together of mover and
inconvenientia. Primo moved, many
quidem, quia cum incoherencies follow.
unumquodque sit similiter First, indeed, that since
unum et ens, sequitur quod anything is one in the
Socrates non sit aliquod manner in which it exists,
ens, et quod non sit in it would follow that
specie nec in genere; et Socrates is not a being
ulterius, quod non habeat and does not belong in a
aliquam actionem, quia species or genus; and
actio non est nisi entis. further, that he would
Unde non dicimus quod have no action, because
intelligere nautae sit only beings act. Hence we
intelligere huius totius quod do not say that
est nauta et navis, sed understanding the sailor
nautae tantum; et similiter is the grasp of the whole
intelligere non erit actus made up of sailor and
Socratis, sed intellectus boat, but of sailor alone;
tantum utentis corpore similarly, understanding
Socratis. In solo enim toto would not be Socrates’
quod est aliquid unum et activity, but only that of
ens, actio partis est actio the intellect using the
totius; et si quis aliter body of Socrates. The
loquatur, improprie loquitur. action of a part is the
action of the whole only
when the whole is one
being. Anyone who says
otherwise speaks
improperly.

Et si tu dicas, quod hoc [70] And if you should


modo caelum intelligit per say that in this way the
motorem suum, est heaven understands
assumptio difficilioris. Per through its motor, this is
intellectum enim humanum to appeal to the more
oportet nos devenire ad difficult case. We must go
cognoscendum intellectus by way of the human
superiores, et non e intellect to grasp the
converso. higher intellects, not vice
versa.

Si vero dicatur quod hoc If it be said that this


individuum, quod est individual, Socrates, is a
Socrates, est corpus body animated by the
animatum anima vegetativa vegetative and sensitive
et sensitiva, ut videtur sequi soul—which seems to
secundum eos qui ponunt follow for those who hold
quod hic homo non that this man is not
constituitur in specie per placed in a species
intellectum, sed per animam because of intellect, but
sensitivam nobilitatam ex because of the sensitive
aliqua illustratione seu soul ennobled by an
copulatione intellectus illumination or
possibilis: tunc intellectus conjunction with possible
non se habet ad Socratem, intellect—then intellect
nisi sicut movens ad motum. relates to Socrates as
Sed secundum hoc actio mover to moved. But then
intellectus quae est the action of intellect
intelligere, nullo modo which is understanding
poterit attribui Socrati. can in no wise be
Quod multipliciter apparet. attributed to Socrates.
There are many ways in
which this consequence is
seen to be obvious.

Primo quidem per hoc quod [71] First, because of


dicit philosophus in nono what the Philosopher says
Metaph., quod quorum in Book Nine of the
diversum erit aliquid praeter Metaphysics, “Where,
usum quod fit, horum actus then, the result is
in facto est, ut aedificatio in something apart from the
aedificato, et contextio in exercise, the actuality is
contexto; similiter autem et in the thing that is being
in aliis, et totaliter motus in made, e.g. the act of
moto. Quorum vero non est building is in the thing
aliud aliquod opus praeter that is being built and
actionem, in eis existit actio, that of weaving in the
ut visio in vidente et thing that is being woven,
speculatio in speculante. Sic and similarly in all other
ergo, etsi intellectus cases, and in general the
ponatur uniri Socrati ut movement is in the thing
movens, nihil proficit ad hoc that is being moved; but
quod intelligere sit in when there is no product
Socrate, nedum quod apart from the actuality,
Socrates intelligat: quia the actuality is in the
intelligere est actio quae est agents, e.g. the act of
in intellectu tantum. Ex quo seeing is in the seeing
etiam patet falsum esse subject and that of
quod dicunt, quod theorizing in the
intellectus non est actus theorizing subject.”
corporis, sed ipsum (1050a30-36) So then,
intelligere. Non enim potest although intellect is said
esse alicuius actus to be united with Socrates
intelligere, cuius non sit as mover, this is of no
actus intellectus: quia help in locating
intelligere non est nisi in understanding in Socrates
intellectu, sicut nec visio nor in grounding the
nisi in visu; unde nec visio claim that Socrates
potest esse alicuius, nisi understands, for
illius cuius actus est visus. understanding is an
action which is in intellect
alone. From this too it is
clear that they speak
falsely who say that
understanding itself, not
intellect, is the act of
body: there can be no act
of understanding that is
not the act of intellect,
because understanding is
in intellect alone just as
seeing is in sight alone.
Seeing can only belong to
that whose act is sight.

Secundo, quia actio [72] Second, because the


moventis propria non proper act of the mover is
attribuitur instrumento aut attributed neither to the
moto, sed magis e converso, instrument nor to the
actio instrumenti attribuitur moved. On the contrary,
principali moventi: non enim the action of the
potest dici quod serra instrument is attributed to
disponat de artificio; potest the principal mover. It
tamen dici quod artifex cannot be said that the
secat, quod est opus serrae. saw makes the artifact,
Propria autem operatio although the artisan can
ipsius intellectus est be said to saw, which is
intelligere; unde, dato etiam the work of the saw.
quod intelligere esset actio Understanding is the
transiens in alterum sicut proper activity of intellect;
movere, non sequitur quod hence even granting that
intelligere conveniret understanding is an
Socrati, si intellectus action passing on to
uniatur ei solum ut motor. another like moving, it
does not follow that
understanding belongs to
Socrates if intellect us
united to him only as a
mover.

Tertio, quia in his quorum [73] Third, because in


actiones in alterum those things whose
transeunt, opposito modo activities are transitive,
attribuuntur actiones passing over into other
moventibus et motis. things, actions are
Secundum aedificationem attributed in opposite
enim aedificator dicitur ways to movers and
aedificare, aedificium vero moved. Thanks to building
aedificari. Si ergo intelligere the builder is said to build
esset actio in alterum and the building to be
transiens sicut movere, built. If then
adhuc non esset dicendum understanding were a
quod Socrates intelligeret, transitive action like
ad hoc quod intellectus motion, it still ought not
uniretur ei ut motor, sed be said that Socrates
magis quod intellectus understands because
intelligeret, et Socrates intellect is united to him
intelligeretur; aut forte quod as a mover, but rather
intellectus intelligendo that intellect understands
moveret Socratem, et and Socrates is
Socrates moveretur. understood. Or perhaps
that intellect by
understanding moves
Socrates and Socrates is
moved.

Contingit tamen [74] Sometimes it


quandoque, quod actio happens that the action
moventis traducitur in rem of the mover passes into
motam, puta cum ipsum the thing moved, as when
motum movet ex eo quod that which is moved
movetur, et calefactum moves because it is
calefacit. Posset ergo aliquis moved, e.g. when the
sic dicere, quod motum ab heated heats. In this way
intellectu, qui intelligendo someone might say that
movet, ex hoc ipso quod that which is moved by
movetur, intelligit. Huic the intellect, which in
autem dicto Aristoteles understanding moves,
resistit in secundo de understands by the very
anima, unde principium fact that it is moved.
huius rationis assumpsimus. Aristotle, from whom we
Cum enim dixisset quod id take the principle of this
quo primo scimus et argument, resists this
sanamur est forma, scil. claim in Book Two of On
scientia et sanitas, the Soul. For when he said
subiungit: videtur enim in that that whereby we first
patiente et disposito, know or are healed is a
activorum inesse actus. form, namely science and
Quod exponens Themistius health, he adds, “For the
dicit: nam etsi ab aliis activity of that which is
aliquando scientia et capable of originating
sanitas est, puta a docente change seems to take
et medico; tamen in place in that which is
patiente et disposito changed or altered.”
facientium inexistere actus (414a11-12) In
ostendimus prius, in his explaining this Themistius
quae de natura. Est ergo says, “Although
intentio Aristotelis, et knowledge or health are
evidenter est verum, quod sometimes from others,
quando motum movet et as from a a teacher or a
habet actionem moventis, physician, nonetheless we
oportet quod insit ei actus have shown that, in things
aliquis a movente, quo that are from nature, the
huiusmodi actionem habeat; activity of that which is
et hoc est primum quo agit, capable of originating
et est actus et forma eius, change is in what is
sicut si aliquid est changed or altered.” It is
calefactum, calefacit per Aristotle’s meaning,
calorem qui inest ei a therefore, and evidently
calefaciente. true as well, that when
the moved moves and has
the action of a mover,
there must be in it some
act from the mover
whereby it performs an
action of this kind; it is
thanks to this that it
primarily acts, and this is
its act and form. For
example, when something
heated heats from the
heat which is in it from
the heater.

Detur ergo quod intellectus [75] Given that the


moveat animam Socratis, intellect moves Socrates,
vel illustrando vel whether by illumining or
quocumque modo: hoc in some other way, then
quod est relictum ab the impression made on
impressione intellectus in Socrates by the intellect
Socrate, est primum quo is that whereby Socrates
Socrates intelligit. Id autem primarily understands.
quo primo Socrates However, Aristotle has
intelligit, sicut sensu sentit, proved (429a9-b5) that
Aristoteles probavit esse in that whereby Socrates
potentia omnia, et per hoc primarily understands, as
non habere naturam he senses by sense, is
determinatam, nisi hanc potentially all things and
quod sit possibilis; et per for this reason has no
consequens, quod non determinate nature other
misceatur corpori, sed sit than to be possible.
separatus. Dato ergo, quod Consequently it is not
sit aliquis intellectus mixed with body but
separatus movens separate. Granting then
Socratem, tamen adhuc that there is some
oportet quod iste intellectus separate intellect moving
possibilis, de quo Socrates, it would still be
Aristoteles loquitur, sit in necessary that the
anima Socratis, sicut et possible intellect of which
sensus, qui est in potentia Aristotle speaks is in the
ad omnia sensibilia, quo soul of Socrates just as
Socrates sentit. sense, which is that
whereby Socrates senses
and is potentially all
sensible things, is.

Si autem dicatur quod hoc [76] Should it be said,


individuum, quod est however, that this
Socrates, neque est aliquid individual, Socrates, is
compositum ex intellectu et neither composed of
corpore animato, neque est intellect and an animated
corpus animatum tantum, body, nor an animated
sed est solum intellectus; body alone, but only
haec iam erit opinio intellect, well, this was
Platonis, qui, ut Gregorius the view of Plato who, as
Nyssenus refert, propter Gregory of Nyssa says,
hanc difficultatem non vult “because of this difficulty
hominem ex anima et did not want man to be of
corpore esse, sed animam body and soul, but to be a
corpore utentem et velut soul using and as it were
indutam corpore. Sed et clothed with a body.” But
Plotinus, ut Macrobius Plotinus, as Macrobius
refert, ipsam animam reports, claimed that the
hominem esse testatur, sic soul itself is man, saying,
dicens: ergo qui videtur, non “Therefore the true man
ipse verus homo est, sed ille is not what is seen, but
a quo regitur quod videtur. that which rules what is
Sic, cum morte animalis seen. Thus when at death
discedit animatio, cadit animation departs from
corpus a regente viduatum; the animal, the body falls
et hoc est quod videtur in widowed from the ruler
homine mortale. Anima and it is this which is seen
vero, quae verus homo est, in man and is mortal.
ab omni mortalitatis Every mark of mortality is
conditione aliena est. Qui alien to the soul which is
quidem Plotinus, unus de truly man.” Yet Simplicius,
magnis commentatoribus, in his commentary on the
ponitur inter Categories, numbers
commentatores Aristotelis, Plotinus among the
ut Simplicius refert in greatest commentators
commento on Aristotle.
praedicamentorum.
Haec autem sententia nec a [77] This doctrine does
verbis Aristotelis multum not seem far distant from
aliena videtur. Dicit enim in the words of Aristotle,
nono Ethic., quod boni who says in Book Nine of
hominis est bonum the Nicomachean Ethics,
elaborare et sui ipsius “For it is characteristic of
gratia: intellectivi enim the good man to exert
gratia quod unusquisque himself for the good, and
esse videtur. Quod quidem he does so for his own
non dicit propter hoc quod sake, that is, for the sake
homo sit solus intellectus, of the intellectual element
sed quia id quod est in in him.” Of course, he
homine principalius est says this, not because
intellectus; unde in man is intellect alone, but
consequentibus dicit, quod because intellect is the
quemadmodum civitas chief thing in man. Hence
principalissimum maxime in the sequel he says that
esse videtur, et omnis alia “just as the state and
constitutio, sic et homo; every other organized
unde subiungit, quod whole seems to be that
unusquisque homo vel est which is the chief thing in
hoc, scil. intellectus, vel it, so too man,” and adds
maxime. Et per hunc that “any man either is
modum arbitror et this, namely intellect, or it
Themistium in verbis supra especially.” It is in this
positis, et Plotinum in verbis sense that I appraise
nunc inductis, dixisse quod Themistius’ words earlier
homo est anima vel and Plotinus’s now when
intellectus. they say that man is soul
or intellect.

Quod enim homo non sit [78] That man is not


intellectus tantum, vel intellect alone nor soul
anima tantum, multipliciter alone is proved in many
probatur. Primo quidem, ab ways. First, by Gregory of
ipso Gregorio Nysseno, qui Nyssa who, having
inducta opinione Platonis mentioned Plato’s view,
subdit: habet autem hic adds, “This saying is
sermo difficile vel puzzling and difficult: how
indissolubile quid. Qualiter can the soul be one with
enim unum esse potest cum its garment? For a tunic
indumento anima? Non and its wearer are not one
enim unum est tunica cum thing.” Second, because
induto. Secundo, quia Aristotle in Book Seven of
Aristoteles in septimo the Metaphysics proves
Metaph. probat quod homo that “man and horse and
et equus et similia non sunt the like” are not form
solum forma, sed totum alone, “but terms which
quoddam ex materia et are thus applied to
forma ut universaliter; individuals, but
singulare vero ex ultima universally, are not
materia ut Socrates iam est, substance but something
et in aliis similiter. Et hoc composed of this
probavit per hoc, quod nulla particular formula and
pars corporis potest definiri this particular matter
sine parte aliqua animae; et treated as universal, but
recedente anima, nec when we come to the
oculus nec caro dicitur nisi individual, Socrates is
aequivoce: quod non esset, composed of ultimate
si homo aut Socrates esset individual matter; and
tantum intellectus aut similarly in all other
anima. Tertio, sequeretur cases.” The proof of this
quod, cum intellectus non is that no part of the body
moveat nisi per voluntatem, can be defined
ut probatur in tertio de independently of some
anima, hoc esset de rebus part of soul and, the soul
subiectis voluntati, quod being gone, flesh and eye
retineret homo corpus cum are such only equivocally,
vellet, et abiiceret cum which would not be the
vellet: quod manifeste patet case if Socrates were
esse falsum. intellect or soul alone.
Third, it would follow that,
since intellect moves only
through the will, as is
proved in Book Three of
On the Soul, (433a22)
this would be among the
things subject to will that
man could keep his body
or shuffle it off when he
wished, which is
manifestly false.
Sic igitur patet quod [79] It is therefore
intellectus non unitur evident that the intellect
Socrati solum ut motor; et is not joined to Socrates
quod, etiam si hoc esset, as a mover; but, even if it
nihil proficeret ad hoc quod were, it would not
Socrates intelligeret. Qui advance the claim that
ergo hanc positionem Socrates understands.
defendere volunt, aut Those who wish to defend
confiteantur se nihil this position, therefore,
intelligere, et indignos esse must either admit that
cum quibus aliqui disputent, they themselves
aut confiteantur quod understand nothing and
Aristoteles concludit: quod are unworthy participants
id quo primo intelligimus est in the debate, or admit
species et forma. what Aristotle concludes:
that that with which we
first understand is species
and form.

Potest etiam hoc concludi [80] This can also be


ex hoc, quod hic homo in concluded from the fact
aliqua specie collocatur. that this man is placed in
Speciem autem sortitur some species. The
unumquodque ex forma. Id species is derived from
igitur per quod hic homo form; therefore that
speciem sortitur, forma est. through which this man
Unumquodque autem ab eo has a species is form. But
speciem sortitur, quod est each thing has its species
principium propriae from that which is the
operationis speciei. Propria principle of the proper
autem operatio hominis, in activity of the species; the
quantum est homo, est proper operation of man
intelligere; per hoc enim as man is understanding:
differt ab aliis animalibus: et it is in this that he differs
ideo in hac operatione from the other animals
Aristoteles felicitatem and that is why Aristotle
ultimam constituit. locates ultimate
Principium autem quo happiness in this activity.
intelligimus est intellectus, But the principle thanks
ut Aristoteles dicit. Oportet to which we understand is
igitur ipsum uniri corpori ut the intellect, as Aristotle
formam, non quidem ita says; therefore it must be
quod ipsa intellectiva united to the body as
potentia sit alicuius organi form, not indeed in such a
actus, sed quia est virtus way that the intellective
animae, quae est actus power is the act of some
corporis physici organici. organ, but because it is a
power of the soul which is
the act of a physically
organized body.

Adhuc, secundum istorum [81] Moreover, the


positionem, destruuntur position under discussion
moralis philosophiae would destroy the
principia: subtrahitur enim principles of moral
quod est in nobis. Non enim philosophy, for it would
est aliquid in nobis nisi per take away what is in our
voluntatem; unde et hoc power. Something is in
ipsum voluntarium dicitur, our power thanks to will,
quod in nobis est. Voluntas which is why the
autem in intellectu est, ut voluntary is defined as
patet per dictum Aristotelis that which is in our power.
in tertio de anima; et per But will is in intellect, as
hoc quod in substantiis is evident from Aristotle in
separatis est intellectus et Book Three of On the Soul
voluntas; et per hoc etiam, (432b5) and from the fact
quod contingit per that intellect and will are
voluntatem aliquid in found in separate
universali amare vel odire, substances as well as
sicut odimus latronum from the fact that
genus, ut Aristoteles dicit in something is loved or
sua rhetorica. hated universally. We hate
the genus of robbers, as
Aristotle says in the
Rhetoric.

Si igitur intellectus non est [82] If then intellect is not


aliquid huius hominis ut sit something of this man
vere unum cum eo, sed such that it is truly one
unitur ei solum per with him, but is united to
phantasmata, vel sicut him only through
motor, non erit in hoc phantasms or as a mover,
homine voluntas, sed in will would not be in man,
intellectu separato. Et ita but in the separated
hic homo non erit dominus intellect. And thus a man
sui actus, nec aliquis eius would not have dominion
actus erit laudabilis vel over his acts, nor could
vituperabilis: quod est anyone be praised or
divellere principia moralis blamed for his acts, which
philosophiae. Quod cum sit is to destroy the
absurdum, et vitae humanae principles of moral
contrarium (non enim esset philosophy. And since
necesse consiliari, nec leges that is absurd and out of
ferre), sequitur quod keeping with human life—
intellectus sic uniatur nobis it would be unnecessary
ut vere ex eo et nobis fiat to take counsel or to pass
unum; quod vere non potest laws —it follows that
esse nisi eo modo quo intellect is united to us in
dictum est, ut sit scil. such a way that we are
potentia animae quae unitur truly one with it, which
nobis ut forma. Relinquitur can only be in the way
igitur hoc absque omni suggested, namely, that it
dubitatione tenendum, non be a power of the soul
propter revelationem fidei, which is united to us as
ut ipsi dicunt, sed quia hoc our form. It follows then
subtrahere est niti contra that this must be held
manifeste apparentia. without any doubt, not
because of the revelation
of faith, as our opponents
say, but because to deny
it is go against things
manifestly obvious.

Rationes vero quas in [83] It is an easy matter


contrarium adducunt, non to refute the arguments
difficile est solvere. Dicunt put forward on behalf of
enim quod ex hac positione the opposite view. For
sequitur quod intellectus sit they say that it follows
forma materialis, et non sit from their position that
denudata ab omnibus intellect is a material
naturis rerum sensibilium; form, and is not free of
et quod per consequens every sensible nature,
quidquid recipitur in with the consequence
intellectu, recipietur sicut in that whatever is received
materia individualiter et non in intellect is received as
universaliter. Et ulterius, in matter, individually and
quod si est forma materialis, not universally. And
quod non est intellecta in further that if it is a
actu; et ita intellectus non material form, that it is
poterit se intelligere, quod not understood in act,
est manifeste falsum: nulla and thus intellect is
enim forma materialis est incapable of
intellecta in actu sed in understanding itself,
potentia tantum; fit autem which is manifestly false.
intellecta in actu per No material form is
abstractionem. understood in act, but
only in potency: it
becomes understood in
act through abstraction.

Horum autem solutio The answer is obvious


apparet ex his quae from what has been said
praemissa sunt. Non enim earlier. For we do not say
dicimus animam humanam that the human soul is the
esse formam corporis form of body according to
secundum intellectivam the intellective power,
potentiam, quae, secundum which according to
doctrinam Aristotelis, Aristotle’s teaching is not
nullius organi actus est: the act of any organ.
unde remanet quod anima, (429a27-28) The soul,
quantum ad intellectivam with respect to the
potentiam, sit immaterialis, intellective power, is
et immaterialiter recipiens, immaterial and receives
et se ipsam intelligens. immaterially and
Unde et Aristoteles understands itself. Hence
signanter dicit quod anima Aristotle significantly says
est locus specierum, non that soul is the place of
tota, sed intellectus. forms “not the whole
soul, but the intellect.”
(429a28-29)

Si autem contra hoc [84] If it be objected to


obiiciatur, quod potentia this that a power of the
animae non potest esse soul cannot be more
immaterialior aut simplicior immaterial or simpler
quam eius essentia: optime than its essence—well,
quidem procederet ratio si that would be a good
essentia humanae animae argument if the essence
sic esset forma materiae, of the human soul were
quod non per esse suum the form of matter in such
esset, sed per esse a way that it did not exist
compositi, sicut est de aliis of itself but only in
formis, quae secundum se dependence on the
nec esse nec operationem existence of the
habent praeter composite. Other forms
communicationem materiae, have no existence or
quae propter hoc materiae operations of themselves
immersae dicuntur. Anima without a sharing in
autem humana, quia matter, and are therefore
secundum suum esse est, said to be immersed in
cui aliqualiter communicat matter. The human soul
materia non totaliter exists in its own right and
comprehendens ipsam, eo is to a degree united with
quod maior est dignitas a matter that does not
huius formae quam wholly capture it—this
capacitas materiae; nihil form is greater in dignity
prohibet quin habeat than to be a capacity for
aliquam operationem vel matter. Nothing prevents
virtutem ad quam materia its having some operation
non attingit. or power to which matter
does not attain.

Consideret autem qui hoc [85] Let him who says


dicit, quod si hoc this consider that if this
intellectivum principium, intellective principle
quo nos intelligimus, esset whereby we understand
secundum esse separatum existed separate and
et distinctum ab anima quae distinct from the soul
est corporis nostri forma, which is the form of our
esset secundum se body, it would be of itself
intelligens et intellectum; et understanding and
non quandoque intelligeret, understood and not
quandoque non; neque sometimes
etiam indigeret ut se ipsum understanding,
cognosceret per intelligibilia sometimes not. Nor would
et per actus, sed per it need to understand
essentiam suam, sicut aliae itself by way of
substantiae separatae. intelligibles and acts, but
Neque etiam esset would do so through its
conveniens quod ad own essence like other
intelligendum indigeret separated substances and
phantasmatibus nostris: it would not be fitting that
non enim invenitur in rerum it need our phantasms in
ordine quod superiores order to understand. The
substantiae ad suas order of things is not such
principales perfectiones that higher substances
indigeant inferioribus require lower substances
substantiis, sicut nec for their own principal
corpora caelestia formantur perfection, no more than
aut perficiuntur ad suas celestial bodies are
operationes ex corporibus formed or perfected in
inferioribus. their operations by lower
bodies.

Magnam igitur The claim that the


improbabilitatem continet intellect is some principle
sermo dicentis quod separated in substance
intellectus sit quoddam and yet is perfected and
principium secundum comes actually to
substantiam separatum, et understand through
tamen quod per species a species taken from
phantasmatibus acceptas phantasms is, therefore,
perficiatur et fiat actu improbable in the
intelligens. extreme.

Caput 4
Reprobatur sententia
ponentium unum CHAPTER IV
intellectum in omnibus
hominibus

His igitur consideratis, [86] So much for the


quantum ad id quod contention that intellect is
ponunt intellectum non not the soul which is the
esse animam quae est form of our body nor a part
nostri corporis forma, of it but some kind of
neque partem ipsius, sed separate substance. There
aliquid secundum remains to discuss the
substantiam separatum; claim that there is one
considerandum restat de possible intellect for
hoc quod dicunt everybody. There would
intellectum possibilem perhaps be some reason
esse unum in omnibus. for saying this of agent
Forte enim de agente hoc intellect, and many
dicere, aliquam rationem philosophers do say it, for
haberet, et multi nothing absurd seems to
philosophi hoc posuerunt. follow from several things
Nihil enim inconveniens being perfected by one
videtur sequi, si ab uno agent, as by one sun the
agente multa perficiantur, visual powers of all animals
quemadmodum ab uno are able to see. Although
sole perficiuntur omnes this is not Aristotle’s
potentiae visivae intention—he holds that
animalium ad videndum; the agent intellect is in the
quamvis etiam hoc non sit soul—he nonetheless
secundum intentionem compares it to a light, and
Aristotelis, qui posuit Plato, holding that the
intellectum agentem esse intellect is one separate
aliquid in anima, unde thing, likened it to the sun,
comparavit ipsum lumini. as Themistius tells us, for
Plato autem ponens there is one sun but many
intellectum unum lights diffused from it for
separatum, comparavit the sake of seeing. But,
ipsum soli, ut Themistius however it be with the
dicit. Est enim unus sol, agent intellect, to say that
sed plura lumina diffusa a the possible intellect is one
sole ad videndum. Sed for all men appears
quidquid sit de intellectu impossible in many ways.
agente, dicere intellectum
possibilem esse unum
omnium hominum,
multipliciter impossibile
apparet.

Primo quidem, quia si [87] First, because if the


intellectus possibilis est possible intellect is that
quo intelligimus, necesse whereby we understand, of
est dicere quod homo an individual man who
singularis intelligens vel understands it must be said
sit ipse intellectus, vel either that he is intellect
intellectus formaliter ei itself or that intellect
inhaereat, non quidem ita formally inheres in him, not
quod sit forma corporis, indeed in such a way that it
sed quia est virtus animae be the form of the body but
quae est forma corporis. rather a power of the soul
Si quis autem dicat quod which is the form of the
homo singularis est ipse body. Should anyone say
intellectus, consequens that the singular man is
est quod hic homo intellect itself, it would
singularis non sit alius ab follow that this singular
illo homine singulari, et man would not differ from
quod omnes homines sint another singular man and
unus homo, non quidem that all men are one man,
participatione speciei, sed not by sharing in the same
secundum unum species, but as one
individuum. Si vero individual. But if intellect is
intellectus inest nobis in us formally, it would
formaliter, sicut iam follow, as has already been
dictum est, sequitur quod said, that there are
diversorum corporum sint different forms of different
diversae animae. Sicuti bodies. For just as man is
enim homo est ex corpore composed of body and
et anima, ita hic homo, ut soul, so this man, Callias or
Callias aut Socrates, ex Socrates, is composed of
hoc corpore et ex hac this body and this soul. If
anima. Si autem animae souls differ, however, and
sunt diversae, et the possible intellect is the
intellectus possibilis est power of the soul whereby
virtus animae qua anima the soul understands, they
intelligit, oportet quod must differ numerically, for
differat numero; quia nec it is impossible to imagine
fingere possibile est quod numerically one power of
diversarum rerum sit una different things. Should
numero virtus. Si quis someone say that man
autem dicat quod homo understands through
intelligit per intellectum possible intellect as by
possibilem sicut per something of his own,
aliquid sui, quod tamen which however is not a part
est pars eius, non ut forma of him as a form but rather
sed sicut motor; iam as a mover, it has already
ostensum est supra quod been shown above [79]
hac positione facta, nullo that on this view it can in
modo potest dici quod no wise be said that
Socrates intelligat. Socrates understands.

Sed demus quod Socrates [88] But let us grant that


intelligat per hoc quod Socrates understands
intellectus intelligit, licet because the intellect
intellectus sit solum understands although
motor, sicut homo videt intellect is only a mover, as
per hoc quod oculus videt; a man sees because the
et, ut similitudinem eye sees. And, to keep to
sequamur, ponatur quod the analogy, let us posit
omnium hominum sit unus that there is numerically
oculus numero: one eye for all men. Now
inquirendum restat, utrum we ask whether all men are
omnes homines sint unus one seeing entity or many.
videns vel multi videntes. To discover the truth of the
Ad cuius veritatis matter, it should be noted
inquisitionem considerare that the first mover differs
oportet quod aliter se from the instrument, for if
habet de primo movente, many men use numerically
et aliter de instrumento. Si one instrument we say
enim multi homines there are many agents, for
utantur uno et eodem example, when many use
instrumento numero, one machine for the
dicentur multi operantes; throwing of stones or for
puta, cum multi utuntur elevation. If however the
una machina ad lapidis chief agent is one, but uses
proiectionem vel many instruments, there is
elevationem. Si vero nonetheless one agent
principale agens sit unum, even though many
quod utatur multis ut instruments are needed for
instrumentis, nihilominus it, though perhaps a
operans est unum, sed diversity of operations
forte operationes diversae because of the diversity of
propter diversa instruments. Sometimes
instrumenta; aliquando however there is one
autem et operatio una, operation although many
etsi ad eam multa instruments are required
instrumenta requirantur. for it. The unity of the one
Sic igitur unitas operantis acting is read not from the
attenditur non secundum instruments but from the
instrumenta, sed chief agent who uses the
secundum principale quod instruments.
utitur instrumentis.

Praedicta ergo positione Thus on the position


facta, si oculus esset described earlier, if the eye
principale in homine, qui were what is principal in a
uteretur omnibus potentiis man and it would uses all
animae et partibus powers of the soul and
corporis quasi parts of the body as
instrumentis, multi instruments, many having
habentes unum oculum one eye would be one
essent unus videns. Si seeing thing. But if the eye
vero oculus non sit were not what is principal
principale hominis, sed in man, but something
aliquid sit eo principalius higher that uses the eye
quod utitur oculo, quod and is diversified in diverse
diversificaretur in diversis, men, there would indeed be
essent quidem multi many seeing but with one
videntes sed uno oculo. eye.

Manifestum est autem [89] But obviously it is


quod intellectus est id intellect that is principal in
quod est principale in man and uses all the
homine, et quod utitur powers of the soul and
omnibus potentiis animae bodily members as organs.
et membris corporis Hence Aristotle’s careful
tanquam organis; et remark that man is intellect
propter hoc Aristoteles “or especially it.” If then
subtiliter dixit quod homo there were one intellect for
est intellectus vel maxime. all, it would necessarily
Si igitur sit unus follow that there is only one
intellectus omnium, ex who understands and
necessitate sequitur quod consequently only one who
sit unus intelligens, et per wills and of his own free will
consequens unus volens, uses all those things thanks
et unus utens pro suae to which men are diverse
voluntatis arbitrio from one another. From
omnibus illis secundum which it follows further that
quae homines there would be no
diversificantur ad invicem. difference between men as
Et ex hoc ulterius sequitur to the free choice of will but
quod nulla differentia sit it would be the same for all,
inter homines quantum ad if indeed intellect, in which
liberam voluntatis resides the principality and
electionem, sed eadem sit dominion of using all the
omnium, si intellectus, others, is one and
apud quem solum residet undivided in all. But this is
principalitas et dominium clearly false, impossible
utendi omnibus aliis, est and repugnant to what is
unus et indivisus in obvious; it destroys the
omnibus: quod est whole of moral science and
manifeste falsum et all those things which
impossibile. Repugnat pertain to civil interchange,
enim his quae apparent, et which is natural to man, as
destruit totam scientiam Aristotle says.
moralem et omnia quae
pertinent ad
conversationem civilem,
quae est hominibus
naturalis, ut Aristoteles
dicit.

Adhuc, si omnes homines [90] Again, if all men


intelligunt uno intellectu, understand by one
qualitercumque eis intellect, however it be
uniatur, sive ut forma sive united to them, whether as
ut motor, de necessitate form or as mover, it
sequitur quod omnium necessarily follows that of
hominum sit unum numero all men there would be
ipsum intelligere quod est numerically one act of
simul et respectu unius understanding which is
intelligibilis: puta, si ego both simultaneous and of
intelligo lapidem et tu one intelligible object. For
similiter, oportebit quod example, if I understand a
una et eadem sit stone and you do likewise,
intellectualis operatio et it would be necessary that
mei et tui. Non enim my intellectual activity and
potest esse eiusdem activi yours be one and the same.
principii, sive sit forma The operation of the same
sive motor, respectu active principle, be it form
eiusdem obiecti, nisi una or mover, with respect to
numero operatio eiusdem the same object at the
speciei in eodem tempore; same time, must be
quod manifestum est ex numerically one, as is clear
his quae philosophus from what the Philosopher
declarat in quinto Physic. says in Book Five of the
Unde si essent multi Physics. So, if there were
homines habentes unum many men having one eye,
oculum, omnium visio non the seeing of all with
esset nisi una respectu respect to the same object
eiusdem obiecti in eodem at the same time could only
tempore. be one.

Similiter ergo, si [91] So too if there were


intellectus sit unus one intellect for all, it would
omnium, sequitur quod follow that there is but one
omnium hominum idem intellectual operation of all
intelligentium eodem men understanding the
tempore, sit una actio same thing at the same
intellectualis tantum; et time, especially since
praecipue cum nihil nothing in terms of which
eorum, secundum quae men differ from one
ponuntur homines differre another would share in the
ab invicem, communicet in intellectual operation. For
operatione intellectuali. phantasms are preambles
Phantasmata enim to the action of intellect, as
praeambula sunt actioni colors are to the act of
intellectus, sicut colores vision, hence the action of
actioni visus: unde per intellect would not be
eorum diversitatem non diversified because of their
diversificaretur actio differences, especially with
intellectus, maxime regard to one intelligible.
respectu unius They distinguish the
intelligibilis, secundum knowledge of this one from
quae tamen ponunt the knowledge of that one
diversificari scientiam because the one
huius a scientia alterius, in understands those things
quantum hic intelligit ea of which he has phantasms
quorum phantasmata and the other those of
habet, et ille alia quorum which he has phantasms.
phantasmata habet. Sed in But when two know and
duobus qui idem sciunt et understand the same thing,
intelligunt, ipsa operatio intellectual activity itself
intellectualis per can in no way be diversified
diversitatem by the diversity of
phantasmatum nullatenus phantasms.
diversificari potest.

Adhuc autem [92] Further, it should be


ostendendum est quod pointed out that this
haec positio manifeste position manifestly
repugnat dictis Aristotelis. conflicts with the teaching
Cum enim dixisset de of Aristotle. For when he
intellectu possibili, quod says of possible intellect
est separatus et quod est that it is separate and
in potentia omnia, potentially all things, he
subiungit quod cum sic adds that “When thought
singula fiat (scil. in actu), has become each thing in
ut sciens dicitur qui the way in which a man
secundum actum, i. e. hoc who actually knows is said
modo sicut scientia est to do so,” that is, in the way
actus, et sicut sciens that knowledge is an act
dicitur esse in actu in and the knower is said to
quantum habet habitum. be in act insofar as he has
Unde subdit: hoc autem the habit, he adds, “this
confestim accidit cum happens when he is now
possit operari per able to exercise the power
seipsum. Est quidem igitur on his own initiative; its
et tunc potentia condition is still one of
quodammodo, non tamen potentiality, but in a
similiter sicut ante different sense from the
addiscere aut invenire. Et potentiality which preceded
postea, cum quaesivisset the acquisition of
si intellectus simplex est knowledge by learning or
et impassibile et nulli nihil discovery.” (429b5-9) Later
habet commune, sicut he asks, “If intellect is
dixit Anaxagoras, simple and impassible and
quomodo intelliget, si has nothing in common
intelligere pati aliquid est? with anything else, as
Et ad hoc solvendum Anaxagoras says, how can
respondet dicens quod it come to think at all if
potentia quodammodo est thinking involves a kind of
intelligibilia intellectus, passivity?” (429b23-25)
sed actu nihil antequam And in reply says, “intellect
intelligat. Oportet autem is in a sense potentially
sic sicut in tabula nihil est whatever is thinkable,
actu scriptum; quod though actually it is
quidem accidit in nothing until it has
intellectu. Est ergo thought. What it thinks
sententia Aristotelis quod must be in it just as
intellectus possibilis ante characters are said to be on
addiscere aut invenire est a writing-table on which as
in potentia, sicut tabula in yet nothing actually stands
qua nihil est actu written: this is exactly what
scriptum; sed post happens with intellect.”
addiscere et invenire est (429b30-430a2) It is the
actu secundum habitum teaching of Aristotle,
scientiae, quo potest per therefore, that the possible
seipsum operari, quamvis intellect is in potency prior
et tunc sit in potentia ad to learning or discovery,
considerare in actu. like a table on which
nothing is yet written, but
after learning and
discovery it is in act by the
habit of science, thanks to
which it can actuate itself
even though it is then in
potency to actually
considering.

Ubi tria notanda sunt. [93] Three things should be


Primum, quod habitus noted here. First, that the
scientiae est actus primus habit of science is the first
ipsius intellectus act of the possible intellect
possibilis, qui secundum which, thanks to it, comes
hunc fit actu et potest per to be in act and can
seipsum operari. Non operate on its own. Science
autem scientia est solum is not only according to
secundum phantasmata illumined phantasms, as
illustrata, ut quidam some say, or a faculty
dicunt, vel quaedam which we acquire by
facultas quae nobis frequent meditation and
acquiritur ex frequenti exercise, in order that we
meditatione et exercitio, ut might be linked with
continuemur cum possible intellect by way of
intellectu possibili per our phantasms. Second, it
nostra phantasmata. should be noted that before
Secundo, notandum est we learn or discover, the
quod ante nostrum possible intellect itself is in
addiscere et invenire ipse potency as a table on which
intellectus possibilis est in nothing is written. Third,
potentia, sicut tabula in that through our learning
qua nihil est scriptum. or discovering the possible
Tertio, quod per nostrum intellect becomes actual.
addiscere seu invenire,
ipse intellectus possibilis
fit actu.

Haec autem nullo modo [94] None of these things


possunt stare, si sit unus could be if there were only
intellectus possibilis one possible intellect for all
omnium qui sunt et erunt who are, were or will be. It
et fuerunt. Manifestum est is obvious that species are
enim quod species conserved in the intellect,
conservantur in intellectu for it is the place of forms,
est enim locus specierum, as the Philosopher said
ut supra philosophus above (On the Soul, III,
dixerat; et iterum scientia 429127-28); moreover,
est habitus permanens. Si science is a permanent
ergo per aliquem habit. If then one of the
praecedentium hominum foregoing men becomes
factus est in actu actual with respect to some
secundum aliquas species intelligible species and is
intelligibiles, et perfectus perfected by the habit of
secundum habitum science, that habit and
scientiae, ille habitus et those species remain in
illae species in eo him. Since any recipient
remanent. Cum autem does not have what it
omne recipiens sit receives, it will be
denudatum ab eo quod impossible that through my
recipit, impossibile est learning or discovering
quod per meum addiscere those species be acquired
aut invenire, illae species by the possible intellect.
acquirantur in intellectu For although someone
possibili. Etsi enim aliquis might say that through my
dicat, quod per meum discovering the possible
invenire intellectus intellect can newly come to
possibilis secundum be in act with respect to
aliquid fiat in actu de something, for example if I
novo, puta si ego aliquid should discover some
intelligibilium invenio, knowable thing never
quod a nullo before discovered, yet this
praecedentium est could not come about
inventum: tamen in through learning, for I can
addiscendo hoc only learn what the teacher
contingere non potest; knew. It would therefore be
non enim possum pointless to say that the
addiscere nisi quod intellect was in potency
docens scivit. Frustra ergo prior to learning or
dixit quod ante addiscere discovering.
aut invenire intellectus
erat in potentia.

Sed et si quis addat, [95] Were someone to add


homines semper fuisse that, according to the
secundum opinionem opinion of Aristotle, there
Aristotelis: sequitur quod have always been men, it
non fuerit primus homo would follow that there was
intelligens; et sic per never a first man who
phantasmata nullius understood and thus
species intelligibiles sunt intelligible species are
acquisitae in intellectu acquired by possible
possibili, sed sunt species intellect through no one’s
intelligibiles intellectus phantasms but are
possibilis aeternae. intelligible species of an
Frustra ergo Aristoteles eternal possible intellect. In
posuit intellectum vain therefore did Aristotle
agentem, qui faceret posit an agent intellect to
intelligibilia in potentia make potentially intelligible
intelligibilia actu. Frustra things actually intelligible;
etiam posuit, quod in vain too did he posit that
phantasmata se habent ad phantasms are to the
intellectum possibilem possible intellect as colors
sicut colores ad visum, si are to sight, if the possible
intellectus possibilis nihil a intellect receives nothing
phantasmatibus accipit. from phantasms. For this
Quamvis et hoc ipsum too seems irrational that a
irrationabile videatur, quod separated substance
substantia separata a should receive from our
phantasmatibus nostris phantasms and that it
accipiat, et quod non cannot understand itself
possit se intelligere nisi save through our learning
post nostrum addiscere or understanding. But
aut intelligere; quia Aristotle added to the
Aristoteles post verba foregoing, “and it can then
praemissa subiungit: et understand itself,” (429b9)
ipse seipsum tunc potest namely, after learning or
intelligere, scil. post discovering.
addiscere aut invenire.
Substantia enim separata
secundum seipsam est
intelligibilis: unde per
suam essentiam se
intelligeret intellectus
possibilis, si esset
substantia separata; nec
indigeret ad hoc speciebus
intelligibilibus ei
supervenientibus per
nostrum intelligere aut
invenire.

Si autem haec [96] Should they wish to


inconvenientia velint evade these absurdities by
evadere, dicendo quod claiming that Aristotle says
omnia praedicta all those things about the
Aristoteles dicit de possible intellect insofar as
intellectu possibili it is made one with us and
secundum quod not as it is in itself, it must
continuatur nobis, et non first be said that Aristotle’s
secundum quod in se est: words do not mean that.
primo quidem dicendum Indeed he speaks of the
est quod verba Aristotelis possible intellect in terms
hoc non sapiunt; immo de of what is proper to it and
ipso intellectu possibili insofar as it is
loquitur secundum id quod distinguished from the
est proprium sibi, et agent. Then, if no help is
secundum quod forthcoming from
distinguitur ab agente. Aristotle’s words, let us
Deinde si non fiat vis de posit, as they say, that the
verbis Aristotelis, possible intellect eternally
ponamus, ut dicunt, quod has intelligible species
intellectus possibilis ab through which it is made
aeterno habuerit species one with us according to
intelligibiles, per quas the phantasms which are in
continuetur nobiscum us. It is necessary that the
secundum phantasmata intelligible species which
quae sunt in nobis. are in the possible intellect
Oportet enim quod species and the phantasms that are
intelligibiles quae sunt in in us be related in one of
intellectu possibili, et three ways. The first is that
phantasmata quae sunt in the intelligible species
nobis, aliquo horum trium which are in the possible
modorum se habeant: intellect are taken from the
quorum unus est, quod phantasms which are in us,
species intelligibiles quae as Aristotle’s words
sunt in intellectu possibili, suggest. That this is ruled
sint acceptae a out by the position under
phantasmatibus quae sunt consideration has been
in nobis, ut sonant verba shown. The second way is
Aristotelis; quod non that the species are not
potest esse secundum taken from phantasms but
praedictam positionem, ut are shone upon our
ostensum est. Secundus phantasms, for example, if
autem modus est, ut illae there were species in the
species non sint acceptae eye shining on the colors
a phantasmatibus, sed which are in the wall. The
sint irradiantes supra third way is that the
phantasmata nostra; puta, intelligible species are
si species aliquae essent neither received in the
in oculo irradiantes super possible intellect from the
colores qui sunt in pariete. phantasms nor imprint
Tertius autem modus est, something on the
ut neque species phantasms.
intelligibiles, quae sunt in
intellectu possibili, sint
receptae a
phantasmatibus, neque
imprimant aliquid supra
phantasmata.

Si autem ponatur [98] If the second way is


secundum, scil. quod taken, namely that the
species intelligibiles intelligible species illumine
illustrent phantasmata et the phantasms and in this
secundum hoc way are understood, it
intelligantur: primo would follow, first, that the
quidem sequitur quod phantasms come to be
phantasmata fiunt intelligible in act not
intelligibilia actu, non per through the agent intellect
intellectum agentem, sed but through the possible
per intellectum possibilem intellect and its species.
secundum suas species. Second, that such an
Secundo, quod talis illumination of phantasms
irradiatio phantasmatum could not make phantasms
non poterit facere quod intelligible in act:
phantasmata sint phantasms do not become
intelligibilia actu: non enim intelligible in act except
fiunt phantasmata through abstraction; but
intelligibilia actu nisi per this would be more like a
abstractionem; hoc autem receiving than an
magis erit receptio quam abstracting. Again, since
abstractio. Et iterum, cum any reception is according
omnis receptio sit to the nature of the
secundum naturam receiver, the illumining of
recepti, irradiatio the intelligible species
specierum intelligibilium which are in the possible
quae sunt in intellectu intellect will not be of
possibili, non erit in phantasms which are in us
phantasmatibus quae sunt in an intelligible mode, but
in nobis, intelligibiliter, sed sensibly and materially.
sensibiliter et materialiter; Thus we could not
et sic nos non poterimus understand the universal
intelligere universale per thanks to this kind of
huiusmodi irradiationem. illumination. But if the
Si autem species intelligible species of the
intelligibiles intellectus possible intellect are
possibilis neque neither taken from
accipiuntur a phantasms nor shone upon
phantasmatibus, neque them, they will be wholly
irradiant super ea, erunt disparate, having no
omnino disparatae et nihil similarity, and phantasms
proportionales habentes, would have nothing to do
nec phantasmata aliquid with understanding, which
facient ad intelligendum; flies in the face of the
quod manifeste repugnat. obvious. Thus there is no
Sic igitur omnibus modis possible way in which the
impossibile est quod possible intellect could be
intellectus possibilis sit one and the same for all
unus tantum omnium men.
hominum.

Caput 5
Solvuntur rationes contra CHAPTER V
pluralitatem intellectus

Restat autem nunc solvere [99] Arguments intended


ea quibus pluralitatem to exclude a plurality of
intellectus possibilis possible intellects remain
nituntur excludere. Quorum to be dealt with. The first
primum est, quia omne is this: Whatever is
quod multiplicatur multiplied by a division of
secundum divisionem matter is a material form,
materiae, est forma which is why substances
materialis: unde separate from matter
substantiae separatae a cannot be many members
materia non sunt plures in of the same species. If
una specie. Si ergo plures then there were a plurality
intellectus essent in of intellects in many men
pluribus hominibus, qui who are numerically
dividuntur ad invicem distinguished from one
numero per divisionem another by the division of
materiae, sequeretur ex matter, it would
necessitate quod necessarily follow that
intellectus esset forma intellect is a material form.
materialis: quod est contra But that goes against the
verba Aristotelis et words of Aristotle and the
probationem ipsius qua argument in which he
probat quod intellectus est proves the intellect is
separatus. Si ergo est separate. If then it is
separatus et non est forma separate it is not a
materialis, nullo modo material form and can in
multiplicatur secundum no way be multiplied
multiplicationem corporum. according to the
multiplication of bodies.

Huic autem rationi tantum [100] So attached are


innituntur, quod dicunt they to this argument that
quod Deus non posset they say God could not
facere plures intellectus make many intellects of
unius speciei in diversis the same species in
hominibus. Dicunt enim diverse men, because,
quod hoc implicaret they say, this would imply
contradictionem: quia a contradiction: to have a
habere naturam ut nature that can be
numeraliter multiplicetur, numerically multiplied is
est aliud a natura formae other than the nature of
separatae. Procedunt separated form. They go
autem ulterius, ex hoc beyond this, however, and
concludere volentes quod want to conclude from this
nulla forma separata est that no separate form is
una numero nec aliquid numerically one nor an
individuatum. Quod dicunt individuated thing. They
ex ipso vocabulo apparere: say this is apparent from
quia non est unum numero the word itself, for only
nisi quod est unum de that is numerically one
numero; forma autem which is one of a number
liberata a materia non est of things, but form freed
unum de numero, quia non from matter is not one of a
habet in se causam numeri, number because it does
eo quod causa numeri est a not have within it the
materia. cause of number, which is
matter.

Sed ut a posterioribus [101] To begin at the end,


incipiamus, videntur vocem they seem not to
propriam ignorare in hoc understand their own
quod ultimo dictum est. words in what was just
Dicit enim Aristoteles in said. For Aristotle, in Book
quarto Metaph., quod Four of the Metaphysics,
cuiusque substantia unum says that “the essence of
est non secundum each thing is one in no
accidens, et quod nihil est merely accidental way”
aliud unum praeter ens. and that “similarly it is
Substantia ergo separata si from its very nature
est ens, secundum suam something that is.” If
substantiam est una; separated substance is
praecipue cum Aristoteles being, therefore, it must be
dicat in octavo Metaph., one substance, especially
quod ea quae non habent since Aristotle says in
materiam, non habent Book Eight of the
causam ut sint unum et Metaphysics that things
ens. Unum autem, in quinto which have no matter have
Metaph., dicitur no cause of their being or
quadrupliciter, scil. of their being one. In Book
numero, specie, genere, Five of the Metaphysics,
proportione. Nec est four kinds of unity are
dicendum quod aliqua distinguished, namely,
substantia separata sit numeric, specific, generic
unum tantum specie vel and proportional. It cannot
genere, quia hoc non est be said that any separate
esse simpliciter unum. substance is one only
Relinquitur ergo quod specifically or generically,
quaelibet substantia since this is not to be one
separata sit unum numero. simply speaking. There
Nec dicitur aliquid unum remains that a separate
numero, quia sit unum de substance is numerically
numero: non enim numerus one. Nor is it said to be
est causa unius, sed e numerically one because it
converso, sed quia in is one among numbers
numerando non dividitur; —number is not the cause
unum enim est id quod non of the one but vice versa—
dividitur. but because in numbering
it is not divided: one is that
which is undivided.
Nec iterum hoc verum est, [102] Nor is it true to say
quod omnis numerus that every number is
causetur ex materia: caused by matter, for then
frustra enim Aristoteles Aristotle would have
quaesivisset numerum inquired in vain after the
substantiarum number of separated
separatarum. Ponit etiam substances. For Aristotle
Aristoteles in quinto says in Book Five of the
Metaph. quod multum Metaphysics that “many”
dicitur non solum numero, is said not only
sed specie et genere. Nec numerically but
etiam hoc verum est, quod specifically and
substantia separata non sit generically. Nor is it true
singularis et individuum that separate substance is
aliquid: alioquin non not singular and
haberet aliquam individuated, otherwise it
operationem, cum actus would have no operation,
sint solum singularium, ut since acts belong only to
philosophus dicit; unde singulars, as the
contra Platonem Philosopher says; hence
argumentatur in septimo he argues against Plato in
Metaph., quod si ideae sunt Book Seven of the
separatae, non Metaphysics that if the
praedicabitur de multis Idea is separate, it will not
idea, nec poterit definiri, be predicated of many, nor
sicut nec alia individua will it be definable any
quae sunt unica in sua more than other
specie, ut sol et luna. Non individuals which are
enim materia est unique in their species,
principium individuationis like the sun and moon.
in rebus materialibus, nisi Matter is the principle of
in quantum materia non est individuation in material
participabilis a pluribus, things insofar as matter is
cum sit primum subiectum not shareable by many,
non existens in alio. Unde since it is the first subject
et de idea Aristoteles dicit not existing in another.
quod, si idea esset Hence Aristotle says that if
separata, esset quaedam, i. the Idea were separate “it
e. individua, quam would be something, that
impossibile esset is, an individual, which it
praedicari de multis. would be impossible to
predicate of many.”

Individuae ergo sunt [103] Separate


substantiae separatae et substances, therefore, are
singulares; non autem individual and singular, but
individuantur ex materia, they are individuated not
sed ex hoc ipso quod non by matter but by this that
sunt natae in alio esse, et it is not their nature to
per consequens nec exist in another and
participari a multis. Ex quo consequently to be
sequitur quod si aliqua participated in by many.
forma nata est participari From which it follows that
ab aliquo, ita quod sit actus if any form is of a nature to
alicuius materiae, illa be participated in by
potest individuari et something, such that it be
multiplicari per the act of some matter, it
comparationem ad can be individuated and
materiam. Iam autem multiplied by comparison
supra ostensum est, quod with matter. It has already
intellectus est virtus been shown above that the
animae quae est actus intellect is a power of the
corporis. In multis igitur soul which is the act of the
corporibus sunt multae body. Therefore in many
animae, et in multis bodies there are many
animabus sunt multae souls and in many souls
virtutes intellectuales quae there are many intellectual
vocantur intellectus; nec powers, that is, intellects.
propter hoc sequitur quod Nor does it follow from this
intellectus sit virtus that the intellect is a
materialis, ut supra material power, as has
ostensum est. been shown.

Si quis autem obiiciat quod, [104] Should anyone


si multiplicantur secundum object that, if the many
corpora, sequitur quod souls are multiplied
destructis corporibus, non according to bodies, it
remaneant multae animae, follows that they will not
patet solutio per ea quae remain when the bodies
supra dicta sunt. have been destroyed, the
Unumquodque enim sic est response is obvious from
ens, sicut unum, ut dicitur what has already been
in quarto Metaph. Sicut said. A thing is one in the
igitur esse animae est way it is a being, as is said
quidem in corpore in in Book Four of the
quantum est forma Metaphysics; therefore, for
corporis, nec est ante the soul to be is to be in
corpus; tamen destructo the body as its form, nor is
corpore, adhuc remanet in it prior to body,
suo esse: ita unaquaeque nonetheless it remains in
anima remanet in sua existence after the body is
unitate, et per consequens destroyed: thus each soul
multae animae in sua remains in its unity and
multitudine. consequently many souls
in their manyness.

Valde autem ruditer [105] They argue most


argumentantur ad crudely to show that God
ostendendum, quod hoc cannot bring it about that
Deus facere non possit, there should be many
quod sint multi intellectus, intellects, believing this to
credentes hoc includere involve a contradiction.
contradictionem. Dato enim For even granting that it is
quod non esset de natura not of the nature of
intellectus quod intellect that it be
multiplicaretur, non propter multiplied, it does not
hoc oporteret quod follow from this that the
intellectum multiplicari multiplying of intellect
includeret contradictionem. involves a contradiction.
Nihil enim prohibet aliquid Nothing prevents a thing’s
non habere in sua natura getting from another
causam alicuius, quod something that it is not of
tamen habet illud ex alia its nature to have: it is not
causa: sicut grave non of the nature of the heavy
habet ex sua natura quod to be above, yet for the
sit sursum, tamen grave heavy to be above does
esse sursum, non includit not involve a contradiction
contradictionem; sed grave although for the heavy to
esse sursum secundum be above by its very nature
suam naturam would involve a
contradictionem includeret. contradiction. Thus if the
Sic ergo si intellectus intellect were naturally one
naturaliter esset unus for all because it had no
omnium, quia non haberet natural cause of
naturalem causam multiplication,
multiplicationis, posset multiplication could
tamen sortiri nonetheless come about
multiplicationem ex through a supernatural
supernaturali causa, nec cause without involving
esset implicatio any contradiction. We say
contradictionis. Quod this not because of the
dicimus non propter present question but lest
propositum, sed magis ne this form of arguing be
haec argumentandi forma extended to other cases,
ad alia extendatur; sic enim for in this way one could
possent concludere quod conclude that God cannot
Deus non potest facere bring it about that the
quod mortui resurgant, et dead should rise and the
quod caeci ad visum blind have their sight
reparentur. restored to them.

Adhuc autem ad [106] To bolster their


munimentum sui erroris error they bring forth
aliam rationem inducunt. another argument. They
Quaerunt enim utrum ask whether what is
intellectum in me et in te understood in me and in
sit unum penitus, aut duo you is completely one or
in numero et unum in numerically two but
specie. Si unum specifically one. If what is
intellectum, tunc erit unus understood is one, there
intellectus. Si duo in will be one intellect. If
numero et unum in specie, numerically two but
sequitur quod intellecta specifically one, it follows
habebunt rem intellectam: that they will have as
quaecumque enim sunt things understood the
duo in numero et unum in thing understood.
specie, sunt unum Wherever there are
intellectum, quia est una numerically two but
quidditas per quam specifically one there is
intelligitur; et sic one thing understood,
procedetur in infinitum, because there is one
quod est impossibile. Ergo quiddity through which
impossibile est quod sint understanding takes place,
duo intellecta in numero in and thus to infinity, which
me et in te; est ergo unum is impossible. Therefore it
tantum, et unus intellectus is impossible that there be
numero tantum in omnibus. numerically two things
understood in me and you.
There is one alone, then,
and numerically only one
intellect in all.

Quaerendum est autem ab [107] It ought to be asked


his qui tam subtiliter se by those who consider
argumentari putant, utrum themselves to argue so
quod sint duo intellecta in subtly whether for things
numero et unum in specie, understood to be
sit contra rationem numerically two but
intellecti in quantum est specifically one is contrary
intellectum, aut in quantum to the notion of the
est intellectum ab homine. understood insofar as it is
Et manifestum est, understood, or insofar as it
secundum rationem quam is understood by man. It is
ponunt, quod hoc est clear from the argument
contra rationem intellecti in they formulate that it is
quantum est intellectum. contrary to the notion of
De ratione enim intellecti, the thing understood. For
in quantum huiusmodi, est it is of the notion of the
quod non indigeat quod ab thing understood as such
eo aliquid abstrahatur, ad that nothing need be
hoc quod sit intellectum. abstracted from it in order
Ergo secundum eorum that it be understood.
rationem simpliciter Therefore, on the basis of
concludere possumus quod their argument, we can
sit unum intellectum conclude, not just that
tantum, et non solum unum there is only one thing
intellectum ab omnibus understood by all men, but
hominibus. Et si est unum that there is simply one
intellectum tantum, thing understood. And if
secundum eorum rationem, there is but one thing
sequitur quod sit unus understood, on their
intellectus tantum in toto reasoning it follows that
mundo, et non solum in there is only one intellect
hominibus. Ergo intellectus in the whole world, not
noster non solum est only for men. Therefore
substantia separata, sed not only is our intellect a
etiam est ipse Deus; et separate substance, it is
universaliter tollitur also God Himself, and the
pluralitas substantiarum plurality of separated
separatarum. substances is wholly swept
away.

Si quis autem vellet [108] One who sought to


respondere quod respond that the thing
intellectum ab una understood by one
substantia separata et separate substance and
intellectum ab alia non est that understood by
unum specie, quia another are not
intellectus differunt specie, specifically one because
seipsum deciperet; quia id the intellects differ
quod intelligitur specifically, would deceive
comparatur ad intelligere himself because that which
et ad intellectum, sicut is understood is related to
obiectum ad actum et understanding and to
potentiam. Obiectum intellect as an object to act
autem non recipit speciem and potency. The object
ab actu neque a potentia, does not take its species
sed magis e converso. Est from either the act or the
ergo simpliciter power, but rather the other
concedendum quod way around. Therefore it
intellectum unius rei, puta must simply be conceded
lapidis, est unum tantum that the understanding of
non solum in omnibus one thing, say a stone, is
hominibus, sed etiam in one alone not only in all
omnibus intelligentibus. men but also in all
intelligences.

Sed inquirendum restat [109] But it remains to ask


quid sit ipsum intellectum. what is the understood
Si enim dicant quod itself. For if they say that
intellectum est una species the thing understood is
immaterialis existens in one immaterial species
intellectu, latet ipsos quod existing in the intellect, in
quodammodo transeunt in a way they unwittingly
dogma Platonis, qui posuit slide into the teaching of
quod de rebus sensibilibus Plato who taught that
nulla scientia potest haberi, there can be no science of
sed omnis scientia habetur sensible things, but every
de forma una separata. science is of one
Nihil enim refert ad separated form. It is not
propositum, utrum aliquis relevant whether someone
dicat quod scientia quae says that the knowledge of
habetur de lapide, habetur a rock is of one separated
de una forma lapidis form of rock or of one form
separata, an de una forma of rock that is in the
lapidis quae est in intellect. In either case it
intellectu: utrobique enim follows that sciences are
sequitur quod scientiae not of the things that are
non sunt de rebus quae here, but only of separated
sunt hic, sed de rebus things. Because Plato
separatis solum. Sed quia taught that immaterial
Plato posuit huiusmodi forms of this kind are of
formas immateriales per se themselves subsistent, he
subsistentes, poterat etiam could maintain along with
cum hoc ponere plures this that many intellects
intellectus, participantes derive from one separate
ab una forma separata form knowledge of one
unius veritatis truth. But those who posit
cognitionem. Isti autem immaterial forms of this
quia ponunt huiusmodi kind—which they call the
formas immateriales (quas things understood—in the
dicunt esse intellecta) in intellect, have to say that
intellectu, necesse habent there is only one intellect,
ponere quod sit unus not only for all men, but
intellectus tantum, non absolutely speaking.
solum omnium hominum,
sed etiam simpliciter.

Est ergo dicendum [110] In keeping with the


secundum sententiam teaching of Aristotle,
Aristotelis quod therefore, it ought to be
intellectum, quod est said that the understood
unum, est ipsa natura vel thing which is one is the
quidditas rei. De rebus very nature or quiddity of
enim est scientia naturalis the thing: natural science
et aliae scientiae, non de and the other sciences are
speciebus intellectis. Si of things, not of
enim intellectum esset non understood species. For if
ipsa natura lapidis quae est the thing understood were
in rebus, sed species quae not the very nature of rock
est in intellectu, sequeretur which is in things, but the
quod ego non intelligerem species which is in the
rem quae est lapis, sed intellect, it would follow
solum intentionem quae that I do not understand
est abstracta a lapide. Sed the thing that is a stone,
verum est quod natura but only the intention
lapidis prout est in which is abstracted from
singularibus, est intellecta the stone. It is true that
in potentia; sed fit the nature of stone as it is
intellecta in actu per hoc in singulars is only
quod species a rebus potentially understood,
sensibilibus, mediantibus but it comes to be actually
sensibus, usque ad understood because the
phantasiam perveniunt, et species come from
per virtutem intellectus sensible things, through
agentis species the mediation of the
intelligibiles abstrahuntur, senses, to imagination,
quae sunt in intellectu from which the intelligible
possibili. Hae autem species which are in the
species non se habent ad possible intellect are
intellectum possibilem ut abstracted by the power of
intellecta, sed sicut species the agent intellect. These
quibus intellectus intelligit species, however, do not
(sicut et species quae sunt relate to possible intellect
in visu non sunt ipsa visa, as what is understood, but
sed ea quibus visus videt), as species through which
nisi in quantum intellectus the intellect understands,
reflectitur supra seipsum, just as the species which
quod in sensu accidere non are in sight are not the
potest. things seen, but that
whereby sight sees, save
insofar as the intellect
reflects upon itself, which
cannot happen in the case
of sense.

Si autem intelligere esset [111] If however


actio transiens in understanding were a
exteriorem materiam, sicut transitive action passing
comburere et movere, into exterior matter, like
sequeretur quod intelligere burning and moving, it
esset secundum modum would follow that
quo natura rerum habet understanding exists in
esse in singularibus, sicut the way the nature of
combustio ignis est things exists in singulars
secundum modum just as the combustion of
combustibilis. Sed quia fire exists according to the
intelligere est actio in ipso manner of the
intelligente manens, ut combustible. But because
Aristoteles dicit in nono understanding is an action
Metaph., sequitur quod which remains in the one
intelligere sit secundum understanding, as Aristotle
modum intelligentis, i. e. says in Book Nine of the
secundum exigentiam Metaphysics, it follows that
speciei qua intelligens understanding is
intelligit. Haec autem, cum according to the mode of
sit abstracta a principiis the one understanding,
individualibus, non that is, according to the
repraesentat rem demands of the species
secundum conditiones whereby the understander
individuales, sed secundum understands. But this,
naturam universalem since it is abstracted from
tantum. Nihil enim individual principles, does
prohibet, si aliqua duo not represent the thing in
coniunguntur in re, quin its individual conditions
unum eorum repraesentari but only according to the
possit etiam in sensu sine universal nature. If two are
altero: unde color mellis vel conjoined in a thing,
pomi videtur a visu sine nothing prevents one of
eius sapore. Sic igitur them being represented in
intellectus intelligit sense without the other:
naturam universalem per hence the color of honey
abstractionem ab or of the apple is seen by
individualibus principiis. sight without its taste. Just
so the intellect
understands the universal
nature by abstraction from
individual principles.
Est ergo unum quod [112] Therefore there is
intelligitur et a me et a te, one thing that is
sed alio intelligitur a me et understood by me and
alio a te, i. e. alia specie you, but it is understood
intelligibili; et aliud est by means of one thing by
intelligere meum, et aliud me and by means of
tuum; et alius est another by you, that is, by
intellectus meus, et alius different intelligible
tuus. Unde et Aristoteles in species, and my
praedicamentis dicit understanding differs from
aliquam scientiam esse yours and my intellect
singularem quantum ad differs from yours. Hence
subiectum, ut quaedam Aristotle in the Categories
grammatica in subiecto says that knowledge is
quidem est anima, de singular with respect to its
subiecto vero nullo dicitur. subject, “the individual
Unde et intellectus meus, knowledge of grammar is
quando intelligit se in a subject, the soul, but
intelligere, intelligit is not said of any subject.”
quemdam singularem Hence when my intellect
actum; quando autem understands itself to
intelligit intelligere understand, it understands
simpliciter, intelligit aliquid some singular activity;
universale. Non enim when however it
singularitas repugnat understands
intelligibilitati, sed understanding simply, it
materialitas: unde, cum understands something
sint aliqua singularia universal. It is not
immaterialia, sicut de singularity that is
substantiis separatis supra repugnant to intelligibility,
dictum est, nihil prohibet but materiality; thus, since
huiusmodi singularia they are immaterial
intelligi. singulars, as was said of
separate substances
above, nothing prevents
such singulars from being
understood.

Ex hoc autem apparet [113] Thus it is clear how


quomodo sit eadem there can be the same
scientia in discipulo et science in the learner and
doctore. Est enim eadem teacher. For it is the same
quantum ad rem scitam, with respect to the thing
non tamen quantum ad known, but not with
species intelligibiles quibus respect to the intelligible
uterque intelligit; quantum species whereby each
enim ad hoc, individuatur knows—in that respect,
scientia in me et in illo. Nec science is individuated in
oportet quod scientia quae me and you. Nor is it
est in discipulo causetur a necessary that the
scientia quae est in knowledge which is in the
magistro, sicut calor aquae learner be caused by the
a calore ignis; sed sicut knowledge that is in the
sanitas quae est in infirmo, teacher as the heat of
a sanitate quae est in water by the heat of fire,
anima medici. Sicut enim in but as the health in matter
infirmo est principium is caused by the health
naturale sanitatis, cui that is in the mind of the
medicus auxilia physician. Just as in the
subministrat ad sanitatem patient there is a natural
perficiendam, ita in principle of health to which
discipulo est principium the physician supplies aids
naturale scientiae, scil. in order that health might
intellectus agens et prima be perfected, so in the
principia per se nota; learner there is a natural
doctor autem subministrat principle of knowledge,
quaedam adminicula, namely the agent intellect
deducendo conclusiones ex and the first self-evident
principiis per se notis. principles. The teacher
Unde et medicus nititur eo supplies certain aids,
modo sanare quo natura deducing conclusions from
sanaret, scil. calefaciendo principles known in
et infrigidando; et magister themselves. Thus the
eodem modo inducit ad physician strives to heal in
scientiam, quo inveniens the way nature would heal,
per seipsum scientiam namely, by heating and
acquireret, procedendo chilling; similarly the
scil. de notis ad ignota. Et master leads to science in
sicut sanitas in infirmo fit the way in which one
non secundum potestatem discovering it for himself
medici, sed secundum would acquire it,
facultatem naturae; ita et proceeding, that is, from
scientia causatur in the known to the unknown.
discipulo non secundum And just as health in the
virtutem magistri, sed sick person does not come
secundum facultatem about by the power of the
addiscentis. physician but by the
capacity of nature, so too
knowledge is not caused in
the learner by the power
of the master, but by the
capacity of the learner.

Quod autem ulterius [114] As to the further


obiiciunt, quod si objection that if, their
remanerent plures bodies having been
substantiae intellectuales, destroyed, many
destructis corporibus, intellectual substances
sequeretur quod essent should remain, it would
otiosae; sicut Aristoteles in follow that they are otiose,
undecimo Metaph. since Aristotle in Book XI
argumentatur, quod si of the Metaphysics argued
essent substantiae that if there were
separatae non moventes separated substances
corpus, essent otiosae: si which did not move
bene litteram Aristotelis bodies, they would be
considerassent, de facili otiose. But if one carefully
possent dissolvere. Nam considers the text of
Aristoteles, antequam hanc Aristotle, the difficulty is
rationem inducat, easily solved. For Aristotle,
praemittit: quare et before giving this
substantias et principia argument, says, “the
immobilia tot rationabile unmovable substances
suscipere; necessarium and principles may
enim dimittatur fortioribus reasonably be taken to be
dicere. Ex quo patet quod just so many; the assertion
ipse probabilitatem of necessity must be left to
quamdam sequitur, non more powerful thinkers.” It
necessitatem inducit. is clear from this that he is
pursuing a kind of
probability and not
claiming necessity.
Deinde, cum otiosum sit [115] Since that is otiose
quod non pertingit ad which does not attain the
finem ad quem est, non end for which it is
potest dici etiam designed, they cannot say
probabiliter quod even with probability that
substantiae separatae the separated substances
essent otiosae, si non are otiose if they do not
moverent corpora; nisi move bodies, unless
forte dicatur, quod perhaps they mean that
motiones corporum sint the motions of bodies are
fines substantiarum the ends of separated
separatarum, quod est substances, which is
omnino impossibile, cum completely impossible,
finis sit potior his quae since the end is higher
sunt ad finem. Unde nec than the things that are for
Aristoteles hic inducit quod the sake of the end. Nor
essent otiosae si non does Aristotle here
moverent corpora, sed conclude that they would
quod omnem substantiam be otiose if they did not
impassibilem secundum se move bodies, but that
optimum sortitam finem “every being and every
esse oportet existimare. substance which is
Est enim perfectissimum immune from change and
uniuscuiusque rei ut non in virtue of itself has
solum sit in se bonum, sed attained to the best must
ut bonitatem in aliis causet. be considered an end.” It
Non erat autem is the most perfect state of
manifestum qualiter any thing that it not only is
substantiae separatae good in itself, but also
causarent bonitatem in causes goodness in
inferioribus, nisi per motum others. But it was not clear
aliquorum corporum. Unde how separated substances
ex hoc Aristoteles would cause goodness in
quamdam probabilem inferior bodies save by the
rationem assumit, ad motion of some bodies,
ostendendum quod non hence Aristotle derived
sunt aliquae substantiae from this a probable
separatae, nisi quae per argument to show that
motus caelestium there are as many
corporum manifestantur, separate substances as
quamvis hoc necessitatem are manifested by the
non habeat, ut ipsemet heavenly bodies, although
dicit. as he himself says this has
no claim to necessity.

Concedimus autem quod [116] We concede that the


anima humana a corpore human soul separated
separata non habet from body does not have
ultimam perfectionem suae the ultimate perfection of
naturae, cum sit pars its nature, since it is a part
naturae humanae. Nulla of human nature: no part
enim pars habet has complete perfection if
omnimodam perfectionem it is separated from its
si a toto separetur. Non whole. But it is not for this
autem propter hoc frustra reason frustrated, for the
est; non enim est animae end of the human soul is
humanae finis movere not to move the body, but
corpus, sed intelligere, in to understand, in which its
quo est sua felicitas, ut happiness consists, as
Aristoteles probat in Aristotle proves in Book
decimo Ethic. Ten of the Ethics.

Obiiciunt etiam ad sui [117] In advancing their


erroris assertionem, quia si error they also say that if
intellectus essent plures there were many intellects
plurium hominum, cum for many men, since
intellectus sit intellect is incorruptible, it
incorruptibilis, sequeretur would follow on Aristotle’s
quod essent actu infiniti view, since he held the
intellectus secundum world to be eternal and
positionem Aristotelis, qui men to have always
posuit mundum aeternum existed, that there would
et homines semper fuisse. be an actual infinity of
Ad hanc autem intellects. Algazel
obiectionem sic respondet responded to this in his
Algazel in sua metaphysica: Metaphysics saying that
dicit enim quod in “in anything where there is
quocumque fuerit unum one of these without the
istorum sine alio, quantitas other,” that is, quantity or
vel multitudo sine ordine, a multitude without order,
infinitas non removebitur “infinity will not be taken
ab eo, sicut a motu caeli. Et from it, as in the case of
postea subdit: similiter et the movement of the
animas humanas, quae heaven.” And later he
sunt separabiles a adds, “Similarly we grant
corporibus per mortem, that human souls, which
concedimus esse infinitas are separable from the
numero, quamvis habeant body at death, are infinite
esse simul, quoniam non in number, although they
est inter eas ordinatio exist at the same time,
naturalis, qua remota since there is no natural
desinant esse animae: eo ordering among them by
quod nullae earum sunt the removal of which souls
causae aliis, sed simul would cease to exist; none
sunt, sine prius et of them is the cause of the
posterius natura et situ. others, but in nature and
Non enim intelligitur in eis position they are
prius et posterius simultaneously without
secundum naturam nisi prior and posterior. There
secundum tempus is no prior and posterior in
creationis suae. In them according to nature
essentiis autem earum, save according to the time
secundum quod sunt of their creation. In their
essentiae, non est ordinatio essences insofar as they
ullo modo, sed sunt are essences there is no
aequales in esse; e ordering in any way, but
contrario spatiis et they are equal in
corporibus et causae et existence, unlike spaces
causato. and bodies and cause and
effect.”

Quomodo autem hoc [118] We cannot know


Aristoteles solveret, a nobis what Aristotle’s solution to
sciri non potest, quia illam this might have been
partem metaphysicae non because we don’t possess
habemus, quam fecit de that part of the
substantiis separatis. Dicit Metaphysics in which he
enim philosophus in deals with separated
secundo Physic., quod de substances. In Book Two
formis quae sunt of the Physics the
separatae, in materia Philosopher says that of
autem (in quantum sunt the forms “the mode of
separabiles), considerare existence of the
est opus philosophiae separable” insofar as they
primae. Quidquid autem are separable, “it is the
circa hoc dicatur, business of first
manifestum est quod ex philosophy to define.” But
hoc nullam angustiam it is obvious that whatever
Catholici patiuntur, qui he says about this would
ponunt mundum incepisse. cause no distress to
Catholics, who hold that
the world began.

Patet autem falsum esse [119] They speak


quod dicunt hoc fuisse falsehood who say that it
principium apud omnes was a principle with all
philosophantes, et Arabes those who philosophize,
et Peripateticos, quod both Arabs and
intellectus non Peripatetics, if not for the
multiplicetur numeraliter, Latins, that the intellect is
licet apud Latinos non. not multiplied numerically.
Algazel enim Latinus non Algazel was an Arab, not a
fuit, sed Arabs. Avicenna Latin. And Avicenna too,
etiam, qui Arabs fuit, in suo who was an Arab, speaks
libro de anima sic dicit: thus in his book On the
prudentia et stultitia et alia Soul, “Prudence, stupidity,
huiusmodi similia, non sunt opinion can only inhere in
nisi in essentia animae (...) the essence of the soul.
ergo anima non est una sed Therefore the soul is not
est multae numero, et eius numerically one but many
species una est. though of one species.”

Et ut Graecos non [120] And lest we omit the


omittamus, ponenda sunt Greeks, we should cite the
circa hoc verba Themistii in words of Themistius in his
commento. Cum enim commentary. For when he
quaesivisset de intellectu asked of the agent intellect
agente, utrum sit unus aut whether it was one or
plures, subiungit solvens: many, he answered: “Or
aut primus quidem the first illuminator is one
illustrans est unus, but the illumined and
illustrati autem et illumining many: for the
illustrantes sunt plures. Sol sun is one, but you will say
quidem enim est unus, that light is in some way
lumen autem dices modo imparted to sight. For this
aliquo partiri ad visus. reason Aristotle proposes
Propter hoc enim non light rather than the sun in
solem in comparatione the comparison, but Plato
posuit (scil. Aristoteles), proposes the sun.” It is
sed lumen; Plato autem clear from these words of
solem. Ergo patet per verba Themistius that neither the
Themistii quod nec agent intellect, of which
intellectus agens, de quo Aristotle speaks, is the one
Aristoteles loquitur, est who is illuminator, nor the
unus qui est illustrans, nec possible that which is
etiam possibilis qui est illumined. There is indeed
illustratus. Sed verum est one principle of
quod principium illumination, namely a
illustrationis est unum, scil. certain separated
aliqua substantia separata, substance which is either
vel Deus secundum God, according to
Catholicos, vel intelligentia Catholics, or the ultimate
ultima secundum intelligence according to
Avicennam. Unitatem Avicenna. Themistius
autem huius separati proves the unity of this
principii probat Themistius separate principle by the
per hoc, quod docens et fact that the teacher and
addiscens idem intelligit, learner understand the
quod non esset nisi esset same thing, which would
idem principium illustrans. not be the case if there
Sed verum est quod postea were not the same
dicit quosdam dubitasse de illuminating principle.
intellectu possibili, utrum What he says later, that
sit unus. some doubt whether the
possible intellect is one, is
certainly true.

Nec circa hoc plus loquitur, [121] But he says no more


quia non erat intentio eius of this because his
tangere diversas opiniones intention was not to
philosophorum, sed discuss the diverse
exponere sententias opinions of philosophers,
Aristotelis, Platonis et but to explicate the
Theophrasti; unde in fine teachings of Aristotle,
concludit: sed quod quidem Plato and Theophrastus.
dixi pronunciare quidem de Hence at the end he
eo quod videtur concludes, “What I said to
philosophis, singularis est express what seemed to
studii et sollicitudinis. Quod philosophers to be the
autem maxime aliquis case is of singular
utique ex verbis quae difficulty and concern.
collegimus, accipiat de his From what I have said one
sententiam Aristotelis et can gather the views of
Theophrasti, magis autem Aristotle and
et ipsius Platonis, hoc Theophrastus, and
promptum est propalare. especially of Plato, about
Ergo patet quod Aristoteles them.” It is evident,
et Theophrastus et therefore, that Aristotle
Themistius et ipse Plato and Theophrastus and
non habuerunt pro Themistius and Plato
principio, quod intellectus himself did not hold as a
possibilis sit unus in principle that the possible
omnibus. Patet etiam quod intellect is one for all.
Averroes perverse refert Averroes, it is clear,
sententiam Themistii et distorts in reporting it the
Theophrasti de intellectu thought of Themistius and
possibili et agente. Unde Theophrastus concerning
merito supradiximus eum possible and agent
philosophiae Peripateticae intellects, so we rightly
perversorem. Unde mirum said above that he is the
est quomodo aliqui, solum perverter of Peripatetic
commentum Averrois philosophy. How wonderful
videntes, pronuntiare then that some, consulting
praesumunt, quod ipse only the commentary of
dicit, hoc sensisse omnes Averroes, presume to
philosophos Graecos et pronounce that what he
Arabes, praeter Latinos. says is the common view
of all philosophers, Greek
and Arab, if not the Latins.

Est etiam maiori [122] It is yet more


admiratione vel etiam wonderful, indeed worthy
indignatione dignum, quod of indignation, that anyone
aliquis Christianum se professing himself to be a
profitens tam irreverenter Christian should presume
de Christiana fide loqui to speak so irreverently of
praesumpserit; sicut cum the Christian faith as to
dicit quod Latini pro say that, “The Latins do
principio hoc non recipiunt, not accept this as a
scil. quod sit unus principle,” namely, that
intellectus tantum, quia there is only one intellect,
forte lex eorum est in “perhaps because their
contrarium. Ubi duo sunt law is contrary to it.” There
mala: primo, quia dubitat are two evils in this. First,
an hoc sit contra fidem; to doubt whether this is
secundo, quia se alienum against the faith; second,
innuit esse ab hac lege. Et to give the nod to what is
quod postmodum dicit: alien to this law. Afterward
haec est ratio per quam he said, “This is the reason
Catholici videntur habere why Catholics seem to
suam positionem, ubi hold their position,” where
sententiam fidei positionem the judgment of the faith is
nominat. Nec minoris called a position! Nor is
praesumptionis est quod there less presumption in
postmodum asserere what he dares later to
audet: Deum non posse assert, namely that God
facere quod sint multi cannot bring it about that
intellectus, quia implicat there are many intellects,
contradictionem. because this implies a
contradiction.

Adhuc autem gravius est [123] Even more serious is


quod postmodum dicit: per this subsequent remark:
rationem concludo de “Through reason I
necessitate, quod conclude necessarily that
intellectus est unus intellect is numerically
numero; firmiter tamen one, but I firmly hold the
teneo oppositum per fidem. opposite by faith.”
Ergo sentit quod fides sit Therefore he thinks faith is
de aliquibus, quorum of things whose contrary
contraria de necessitate can be necessarily
concludi possunt. Cum concluded; since the only
autem de necessitate thing that can be
concludi non possit nisi necessarily concluded is a
verum necessarium, cuius necessary truth whose
oppositum est falsum opposite is false and
impossibile, sequitur impossible, it follows from
secundum eius dictum this statement that faith is
quod fides sit de falso of the false and
impossibili, quod etiam impossible, which not even
Deus facere non potest: God can bring about and
quod fidelium aures ferre the ears of the faithful
non possunt. Non caret cannot bear. He does not
etiam magna temeritate, lack the high temerity to
quod de his quae ad presume to discuss what
philosophiam non does not pertain to
pertinent, sed sunt purae philosophy but is purely of
fidei, disputare praesumit, faith, such that the soul
sicut quod anima patiatur suffers from the fire of hell,
ab igne Inferni, et dicere and to say that the
sententias doctorum de teaching of the doctors
hoc esse reprobandas. Pari concerning these things
enim ratione posset should be reprobated. By
disputare de Trinitate, de equal right one could
incarnatione, et de aliis dispute concerning the
huiusmodi, de quibus Trinity, the Incarnation and
nonnisi caecutiens the like, concerning which
loqueretur. he speaks only in
ignorance.

Haec igitur sunt quae in [124] This then is what we


destructionem praedicti have written to destroy the
erroris conscripsimus, non error mentioned, using the
per documenta fidei, sed arguments and teachings
per ipsorum of the philosophers
philosophorum rationes et themselves, not the
dicta. Si quis autem documents of faith. If
gloriabundus de falsi anyone glorying in the
nominis scientia, velit name of false science
contra haec quae wishes to say anything in
scripsimus aliquid dicere, reply to what we have
non loquatur in angulis nec written, let him not speak
coram pueris qui nesciunt in corners nor to boys who
de tam arduis iudicare; sed cannot judge of such
contra hoc scriptum arduous matters, but reply
rescribat, si audet; et to this in writing, if he
inveniet non solum me, qui dares. He will find that not
aliorum sum minimus, sed only I, who am the least of
multos alios veritatis men, but many others
zelatores, per quos eius zealous for the truth, will
errori resistetur, vel resist his error and correct
ignorantiae consuletur. his ignorance.

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