Volume11 PDF

Legal Writing
The Journal of the

Legal Writing Institute
VOLUME 11 ____________________________________________ 2005
IN MEMORIAM ....................................................................... vii
THE GOLDEN PEN AWARD

Remarks—Acceptance of
Golden Pen Award ..................................... Richard Wydick xi
ARTICLES
Scholarship by Legal Writing Professors:
New Voices in the Legal Academy
(with Bibliography) .....................................Terrill Pollman 3
Linda H. Edwards
The Legal Writing Institute
The Beginning: Extraordinary Vision,
Extraordinary Accomplishment ............ Mary S. Lawrence 213
Expanding Our Classroom Walls:

Enhancing Teaching and Learning
through Technology .................................. Kristin B. Gerdy 263
Jane H. Wise
Alison Craig
Is the Sky Falling? Ruminations on
Incoming Law Student Preparedness
(and Implications for the Profession)
in the Wake of Recent National
and Other Reports ............................... Cathaleen A. Roach 295
Taking the Road Less Traveled: Why

Practical Scholarship Makes Sense
for the Legal Writing Professor ........... Mitchell Nathanson 329
iv
Unusual Citings: Some Thoughts
on Legal Scholarship ................................ Colin P.A. Jones 377
SONGS
A Song Commemorating the 20th Anniversary of the LWI,
and Celebrating Its Move from Seattle
University School of Law to Mercer
University School of Law ......................... David S. Caudill 393
“Stuck in the Middle with You” ..................... Terri LeClercq 395
v
REMARKS—ACCEPTANCE OF GOLDEN
PEN AWARD
Richard Wydick
Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you for this handsome golden

pen. It is a great pleasure to be here, to see some old friends, and
to make some new friends.
My book, Plain English for Lawyers, was originally an article
in the 1978 volume of the California Law Review. After it ap-
peared, I got a phone call from Keith Sipe, who was starting a new
publishing house called Carolina Academic Press. He asked if I’d
be interested in having the article published as a little book. I said
sure! Thanks to Keith and his colleagues, the little book is in its
fourth edition. Now that I have a proper pen, I=m going to prepare
a fifth edition that will contain all new exercises. In due course, I
hope some of you will try out the fifth edition on your students.
What room are we meeting in tonight? Yes, the Corinthia
Room! And who remembers the name of the founder and first king
of Corinth? Nobody remembers? It was Sisyphus. We who try to
teach law students how to write in plain language have a frustrat-
ing task, much like the one assigned to Sisyphus. Sisyphus was a
cunning fellow who angered the gods, especially Hades, the god of
the underworld. When Sisyphus died, Hades assigned him to push
a huge boulder up a hill in Hell. Every time Sisyphus gets the
boulder to the top, it breaks loose and rolls back down again. And
Sisyphus must start all over, for all eternity.
Why is our task like the one assigned to Sisyphus? How many
of you have had a former student come back to the school and tell
you,
You know, professor, when I went to work in a law office, I tried
to write the way you taught us, using plain language. But my
boss told me that real lawyers don’t write that way. Real law-
yers use said instead of the or those because said is more pre-
cise. Real lawyers prefer the passive voice, because it sounds of-
ficial or because it sounds indirect and gentle. Real lawyers use
long, long sentences, because they write about very complicat-
ed, technical things that cannot be expressed in short sentenc-
es.

© 2005, Richard Wydick. All rights reserved.
xii The Journal of the Legal Writing Institute [11
So your former student has capitulated to the boss and now writes
like a “real” lawyer. The boulder has rolled back down the hill.
Why do our students capitulate to the boss so easily about le-
gal writing style? They aren’t so spineless about issues of substan-
tive law. They aren’t so spineless about issues of legal ethics. On
those issues, they show some grit—but not about legal writing
style. Where have we failed them?
Perhaps we have not exposed them enough to the modern lit-
erature on legal writing—the source books they could use in argu-
ing their position to the boss. For example, suppose the boss in-
sists that your former student use shall in drafting a contract, be-
cause shall is traditional and has a precise legal meaning.
Wouldn’t it be good if your former student knew about Joe Kim-
ble’s article on The Many Misuses of Shall published in the Scribes
Journal of Legal Writing.1 That article demonstrates that, far from
being precise, shall is one of the most frequently litigated terms in
our law.
How could we give our students better exposure to the modern
literature on legal writing? Here’s one suggestion: Go to your office
shelves and gather up an armload of legal writing books and arti-
cles that you regard as authoritative. Put them on reserve in the
library. Then give your students an exercise in which their hypo-
thetical boss demands that they commit a series of six, or ten, or
twelve writing abominations, listing some of the ones that you
have discussed in class. Ask the students to cite which of the books
and articles on reserve they would use to convince the boss to re-
pent and change his sinful ways. That exercise would accomplish
three things. First, it would give the students a bit of citation prac-
tice. Second, it would let them find their way through a good col-
lection of source materials, so they will know where to find support
for their arguments. Third, it would help them learn that the boss
isn’t always right—and that’s an important lesson.
When you leave tonight, please pick up one of the handouts
beside the door. It’s a sample of the kind of legal writing we should
all work to exterminate. The passage on the handout is part of a
2004 corporate merger agreement. Three of the Nation’s best-
known law firms helped put that deal together. The passage con-
tains one sentence, 451 words long. It contains some sub-parts, but
they are not indented, so they don’t help the reader understand
the structure of the sentence. I think the sentence says something
1 Joe Kimble, The Many Misuses of Shall, 3 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 61 (1992).
2005] Acceptance of Golden Pen Award xiii
like this: “If your company backs out of this deal and later does a
similar deal with somebody else, you will have to pay us so much
money it will make your ears bleed.” I think the maximum is one
billion, four hundred forty million dollars.
I invite you to revise that passage. It won’t be easy because it’s
complicated, and you have the disadvantage of seeing it out of con-
text. But give it a try. As an incentive, I hereby offer a prize to the
person who comes up with the best revision by January 31, 2005.
The prize is three bottles of excellent California wine, to remind
you of your rainy week in San Francisco.
Thank you for the lovely pen and for the honor of being with
you tonight.
SCHOLARSHIP BY LEGAL WRITING
PROFESSORS: NEW VOICES IN THE
LEGAL ACADEMY
Terrill Pollman
Linda H. Edwards
I have only one thing to fear in this enterprise; that isn’t to say
too much or to say untruths; it’s rather not to say everything,
and to silence truths.1
—Jean-Jacques Rousseau
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 4
II. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................. 6
III. WHAT THE BIBLIOGRAPHY SHOWS ............................................. 8
IV. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SCHOLARSHIP ............................... 14
V. WHAT IS A “LEGAL WRITING TOPIC”? ........................................ 18
A. Category One: The Substance or Doctrine of
Legal Writing ......................................................................... 20
B. Category Two: The Theoretical Foundations of
Legal Writing ......................................................................... 25
C. Category Three: The Theory and Practice Appropriate
to the Teaching of Legal Writing ........................................... 27

Terrill Pollman is the Ralph Denton Professor of Law and Director of the Lawyering
Process Program at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas William S. Boyd School of Law,
and Linda Edwards is Professor of Law at Mercer University School of Law. We are grateful
for insightful comments from Mary Beth Beazley, Ted Blumoff, Daisy Hurst Floyd, Lash
LaRue, Hal Lewis, Richard Morgan, and Michael Smith, none of whom can be blamed for
any inaccuracies or indiscretions we may have committed. We also are grateful for the in-
valuable research assistance of Kim Degonia, Adriana Fralick, Jennifer Linebarger, and
especially Jennifer Lloyd, who most recently spent countless hours on the project. The edi-
torial assistance of Mary Beth Beazley, Brooke Bowman, Darby Dickerson, Judith Fisher,
and Jim Levy has been superb, and we thank them. We thank each legal writing professor
who responded to our telephone calls and e-mails. Finally, we appreciate the financial sup-
port of our institutions and the less tangible but even more important support and encour-
agement of our colleagues there.
1 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Confessions bk. 4, in The Collected Writings of Rous-
seau vol. 5, 147 (Christopher Kelly et al. eds., Christopher Kelly trans., U. Press of New
Eng. 1995) (quoted in Peter Brooks, Storytelling without Fear? Confession in Law and Lit-
erature, in Law’s Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law 114, 114 (Peter Brooks & Paul
Gewirtz eds., Yale U. Press 1996)).
4 The Journal of the Legal Writing Institute [Vol. 11
D. Category Four: The Institutional Choices Affecting the

Teaching of Legal Writing ..................................................... 32
VI. RATIONALES USED TO DISCOUNT LEGAL
WRITING TOPICS ............................................................................. 34
A. Myth #1: Legal Writing Topics Do Not Qualify
as Scholarship........................................................................ 35
B. Myth #2: Non-Legal Writing Faculty Members
Do Not Know How to Evaluate
Legal Writing Articles............................................................ 42
VII. THE TROUBLE WITH CATEGORIES ............................................ 53
VIII. WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE US? ................................................... 55
I. INTRODUCTION
In this Article, we explore the questions of whether legal writ-

ing topics are subjects fit for scholarship and whether scholarship
on these topics could support promotion and tenure. We examine
the scholarship of today’s legal writing professors—what they are
writing and where it is being published—and we define the term
“legal writing topic,” identifying major categories of legal writing
scholarship and suggesting criteria for evaluation in this emerging
academic area.
The data we use derives in significant part from the bibliog-
raphy presented at the end of this Article, which lists publications
written by members of the academy who consider legal writing and
rhetoric a primary area of their expertise.2 The bibliography con-
tains entries for more than 300 authors. It includes entries for
more than 350 books, book chapters, and supplements, as well as
more than 650 articles published in traditional, student-edited law
reviews.
The bibliography serves several purposes. First, it provides a
database for those asking important questions about legal writing
scholarship: What do legal writing professors write? Where are
those articles being published? What is included in the category of
legal writing scholarship? What can constitute the body of work of
a legal writing scholar? What kinds of early writing can lead to the
development of mature scholarly work? The bibliography also
functions as a resource to assist legal writing professors in their
2 The list is not limited to publications about legal writing topics. Rather, it includes
publications by legal writing professors, no matter what the topic.
2005] New Voices in the Legal Academy 5
own scholarship. It provides a vehicle for finding and using schol-

arship created by legal writing colleagues, and it serves to stimu-
late ideas for new scholarship in this emerging field.
Finally, the bibliography disproves the assumption, some-
times recited in the legal academy, that legal writing professors do
not need support for scholarship because they do no scholarship.
Despite its circularity,3 the argument persists. The impressive
length of this bibliography demonstrates that even with reduced
support,4 legal writing professors write. One can imagine the
productivity that would result if all legal writing professors re-
ceived the institutional support their non-legal writing colleagues
deem so critical for the production of good scholarly work.5 And if
writing is important for the development of faculty members who
teach subjects other than writing, it is doubly important for the
development of those whose primary teaching area is the writing
process itself.
In the following discussion, we first set out the methodology
used to compile the bibliography and comment generally on what
the bibliography shows (Sections II and III). We note particularly
one important issue the bibliography raises—the surprisingly
3 The argument fails on grounds other than its circularity as well. For instance, cost
is the reason customarily offered for denying scholarship support. If, in fact, legal writing
professors do not write, administrators need not deny eligibility for scholarship support. If
legal writing professors would not write, they would not use the support, so eligibility for
research stipends would cost the institution nothing.
4 Historically, law schools did not provide scholarship support to teachers of legal
writing. Many law schools today provide their legal writing professors with the same schol-
arship support provided for other professors, but some schools still do not. According to the
results of the 2005 Survey by the Association of Legal Writing Directors and the Legal Writ-
ing Institute, 16 of the 178 responding schools reported either that their school does not
provide research grants at all or that the responders did not know their school’s policy. Of
the remaining 162 schools confirming the availability of research grants, only 77 reported
making that support available to their legal writing faculty members, and at least 11 of
those 77 reported awarding lesser amounts to legal writing faculty members. (Seventeen of
the responders did not know how the legal writing faculty’s scholarship grants compared to
those of other faculty members.) ALWD & Legal Writing Institute 2005 Survey Results,
questions 76 & 78, http://www.lwionline.org/survey/surveyresult.asp (accessed Sept. 6,
2005) [hereinafter LWI-ALWD 2005 Survey]. Since salaries for legal writing professors not
on a tenure track are, on average, significantly lower than the salaries of their non-legal
writing colleagues, Jan M. Levine & Kathryn M. Stanchi, Women, Writing & Wages: Break-
ing the Last Taboo, 7 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 551, 557, 582 (2001), the lack of summer
research stipends is especially problematic for legal writing faculty members.
5 Mary Beth Beazley, “Riddikulus!”: Tenure-Track Legal-Writing Faculty and the
Boggart in the Wardrobe, 7 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 79, 81–82 (1998–2000); Toni M. Fine,
Legal Writers Writing: Scholarship and the Demarginalization of Legal Writing Instructors,
5 Leg. Writing 225, 227–228 (1999); Susan P. Liemer, The Quest for Scholarship: The Legal
Writing Professor’s Paradox, 80 Or. L. Rev. 1007, 1020, 1021 (2001).
large percentage of non-legal writing topics among publications by

legal writing professors. We identify a number of legitimate factors
possibly contributing to this imbalance, but we also identify a par-
ticularly troubling factor—formal policies and informal attitudes
that discount scholarship about legal writing topics as a whole.
Since these policies and attitudes threaten the future of an en-
tire field of academic study, we devote the remainder of the Article
to testing their supporting premises. We first review the custom-
ary justifications for legal scholarship generally (Section IV), and
we clarify the definition of the term “legal writing topic” in Section
V. We then test two rationales used to discount legal writing top-
ics, the assumption that legal writing topics do not qualify as
scholarship, and the fear that non-legal writing faculty members
do not know how to evaluate legal writing articles (Section VI). We
conclude that neither rationale withstands reasoned analysis.
Both rationales rely on misconceptions about the substance and
breadth of the field and also may be tainted with a human re-
sistance to ideas that challenge one’s own.6 Because the second
rationale also signals some legitimate uncertainty about how to
evaluate publications in fields unfamiliar to one’s own, we offer
methodologies faculties can use to evaluate scholarship in legal
writing or in any other field with which they are unfamiliar.7
Finally, we conclude that, if legal academics are true to our
roles as lawyers, teachers, and scholars and if we are serious about
the justifications we routinely offer for legal scholarship, we
should not exclude legal writing topics from the legal canon. Ra-
ther, we should allow, even encourage, legal writing faculty mem-
bers to write in their own field, unearthing and exploring the
foundations of their discipline. If we do, we may be surprised at
what we will learn.
II. METHODOLOGY
We began this project in 2000, when we contacted legal writ-

ing directors or deans’ offices at each accredited law school and
obtained the names of each school’s legal writing professors. We
ran electronic searches for publications by each legal writing pro-
fessor, and we contacted each professor individually to double-
6 See infra n. 204 and accompanying text.

7 See infra nn. 188–235 and accompanying text.
check our results. We returned to the project in 2001, updating the

list by using the membership directories of two well-recognized
professional organizations, the Legal Writing Institute (LWI)8 and
the Association of Legal Writing Directors (ALWD).9
After compiling a preliminary list, we created a website for
the bibliography at http://www.legalwritingscholarship.org/. A no-
tice on the two prominent legal writing listservs10 announced the
list and asked legal writing professors to contact the authors or to
visit the list online to correct or supplement the list. Additionally,
conference attendees at the 2002 Biennial Conference of the Legal
Writing Institute in Knoxville, Tennessee received an announce-
ment in their registration materials asking them to visit the web-
site and edit their entries. Finally, we distributed a draft of the list
at the 2004 Biennial Conference at the University of Seattle.11 At a
plenary session describing the list, we requested updates and cor-
rections. Since 2004, publication updates have been solicited as
part of the annual ALWD-LWI survey of legal writing programs.12
The list includes publications of many sorts. Because part of
the list’s purpose is to discover what legal writing professors are
8 The Legal Writing Institute (LWI) was founded in 1984 at the University of Puget
Sound School of Law (now Seattle University School of Law), and now makes its home at
Mercer University School of Law. “The Institute is a non-profit organization dedicated to
improving legal writing by providing a forum for discussion and scholarship about legal
writing, analysis, and research.” LWI, Legal Writing Institute, http://www.lwionline.org/
(accessed Sept. 4, 2005). LWI currently has over 1,800 members.
LWI membership is open to anyone interested in the improvement of legal writing
and is not limited to those who teach legal writing in American law schools. Therefore, to
avoid including those LWI members whose primary focus lies in other areas, LWI members
listed in the 2002 LWI membership list were contacted personally by either telephone or e-
mail. They were asked whether they considered “the teaching of Legal Writing and Rhetoric
to be an area of primary interest and expertise.” The bibliography includes entries for only
those who answered affirmatively.
9 The Association of Legal Writing Directors “is a non-profit professional association
of directors and former directors of legal research, writing, analysis, and advocacy programs
from law schools throughout the United States, Canada and Australia.” ALWD, Association
of Legal Writing Directors, http://www.alwd.org (accessed Sept. 4, 2005).
10 Two listservs serve the legal writing community. DIRCON, the listserv of the Asso-
ciation of Legal Writing Directors (ALWD), is a closed listserv for ALWD members.
LRWPROF (formerly LWIONLINE) is a closed listserv for LWI members who teach legal
writing. Legal Writing Institute, http://www.lwionline.org/resources/listserv.asp (accessed
Oct. 24, 2005).
11 Nearly 400 people attended the 2002 Conference, and almost 500 people attended
the 2004 Conference. Almost all of the conference attendees teach legal writing.
12 Each year ALWD and LWI survey legal writing professors about curricular issues
and employment conditions in the legal writing programs in which they teach. The survey is
extraordinarily successful with a high response rate. For instance, the 2005 survey had a
response rate of 93%. LWI-ALWD 2005 Survey, supra n. 4.
writing, we did not limit the list to any particular kind of publica-
tion. The instructions asked participants to include books; book
chapters; articles in journals designed primarily for an academic
readership; articles in journals designed primarily for practition-
ers; and articles in newsletters, bar magazines, continuing legal
education publications, or law school development publications.
The instructions also invited miscellaneous entries under the clas-
sification of “other.”
The bibliography includes publications on any topic, but the
publication must have been written since beginning law school.13
The publication must either have appeared in print or be the sub-
ject of a commitment from a publisher; the bibliography does not
include self-published materials.
III. WHAT THE BIBLIOGRAPHY SHOWS
The most important observations pertain to the number,

scope, and variety of publications by legal writing professionals.
The list contains entries for nearly 300 authors. It includes more
than 350 books, book chapters, supplements, and editorships, and
over 650 law review articles. It includes at least that many articles
in peer-reviewed academic journals, specialty journals designed
primarily for practitioners, and other kinds of publications.14 By
any criteria, the content of the list is impressive.
Law review placements span the spectrum of the academy and
include journals at such schools as Harvard, Yale, Columbia,
N.Y.U., Cornell, Georgetown, Minnesota, Virginia, California,
Michigan, Duke, Wisconsin, Notre Dame, Stanford, and Chicago.
The subject areas represented are as broad as the legal academy
itself. Topics range from a variety of legal writing topics to topics
13 We used the beginning of law school as the starting point so that the database could
support a broad review of the writing histories of legal writing professors. Also, early sam-
ple data bases indicated that we would encounter questions about whether to include publi-
cations begun during law school but published later. We wanted a bright-line test that
would avoid those subjectivities.
14 The bibliography demonstrates that, in addition to more traditional scholarship
(books, student-edited law review articles, and articles in peer-reviewed academic journals),
legal writing professors are writing a vast array of smaller pieces, such as short essays and
substantive newsletter articles. These smaller pieces have created a rich and vibrant dis-
course on teaching, which is, after all, the other primary responsibility of the professoriate.
This discourse on teaching probably is unequaled elsewhere in the legal academy. See Mary
Beth Beazley, Better Writing, Better Thinking: Using Legal Writing Pedagogy in the “Case-
book” Classroom (without Grading Papers), 10 Leg. Writing 23, 30 (2004).
in other areas such as constitutional law, contracts, property,

criminal law, environmental law, employment discrimination, pro-
fessional responsibility, legal history, civil procedure, family law,
consumer law, bankruptcy, disability law, education law, media
law, and antitrust law.
The list demonstrates that newsletter articles, book reviews,
and other kinds of early writing are serving as an entry point for
legal writing professors, just as they often do for professors in oth-
er areas. Peer-reviewed journals such as the Legal Writing: The
Journal of the Legal Writing Institute, the Journal of the Associa-
tion of Legal Writing Directors, The Scribes Journal of Legal Writ-
ing, the Journal of Appellate Practice and Process, and the Journal
of Legal Education are publishing articles on legal writing topics,
but many student-edited law reviews are publishing legal writing
articles as well.
Uses of the bibliography are limited in some respects. First, it
is almost certainly incomplete. Despite its length, the nature and
scope of the undertaking virtually ensure that the bibliography
does not include all legal writing professors in the country. Fur-
ther, the list provides only a snapshot view of the publications of
current or recent legal writing professionals. It does not include
the scholarship of individuals who, for various reasons, had left
the field before entries were solicited. Also, entries have not been
updated for any who left the field during the project. Finally, since
scholarly work is ongoing, the entries for some authors will have
become incomplete by the time this Article appears in print. En-
tries for legal writing professors who are not members of LWI or
ALWD are almost certainly incomplete since requests for updates
have been made only through the listservs of those two organiza-
tions.
Also, the bibliography will not help answer some kinds of
questions. One cannot readily discern trends in scholarship by le-
gal writing professors since there is no earlier database to support
a comparison. One cannot draw useful inferences about average
productivity levels because the bibliography does not distinguish
between professors new to the field and professors who have been
teaching legal writing for twenty or more years.15 Nor can one
draw useful inferences about the number of mature scholars be-
15 The bibliography also does not reflect the greater-than-normal teaching loads of
most legal writing professors, so meaningful comparisons to productivity levels for casebook
faculty members are impossible.
cause the field is nascent and because, historically, institutional

policies have artificially increased the turnover in the field.16 And
since the list does not attempt to track law school graduation
dates, one cannot accurately subtract publications written before
law school graduation. Despite these limitations, the bibliography
does provide important information about scholarship by legal
writing professors and the scholarship about legal writing topics.
Among this important information is the comparison between
the number of law review articles about legal writing topics and
the number about non-legal writing topics. The bibliography re-
veals that approximately 75% of the law review articles legal writ-
ing professors have published are about topics in areas other than
legal writing, while only approximately 25% are about legal writ-
ing topics. Even using the broad definition of legal writing scholar-
ship described below,17 most of what legal writing professors have
published in the traditional venues for legal scholarship is outside
the field.
While the bibliography does not provide evidence of the rea-
sons for this perhaps surprising result, a number of factors may
contribute. Some entries include publications written before the
author began to teach legal writing. Some entries may have been
written soon after the transition out of practice and may deal with
a topic area in which the author had developed an expertise while
in practice. Also, a number of legal writing professors maintain
more than one area of expertise, just as do other law professors.
Naturally, law professors with several areas of expertise can be
16 Although law schools recognized the need for legal writing courses as early as the
1950s, it is only over the last fifteen years that the “graduate student or young associate”
model has been replaced by the “full time professional” model. Maureen J. Arrigo, Hierarchy
Maintained: Status and Gender Issues in Legal Writing Programs, 70 Temp. L. Rev. 117,
134, 144–45 (1997) (citing Allen Boyer, Legal Writing Programs Reviewed: Merits, Flaws,
Costs, and Essentials, 62 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 23 (1985)). One old staffing model involved full-
time teachers but imposed a limit of one to three years on the number of years a teacher
was permitted to teach the course. That staffing model has now been discarded in most law
schools. Terrill Pollman, Building a Tower of Babel or Building a Discipline? Talking about
Legal Writing, 85 Marq. L. Rev. 887, 912–913 (2002). Despite the marked trend toward
more professional programs, turnover may have remained a problem for some time. One
survey reported that in forty-five out of eighty-five schools, legal writing professionals
stayed three years or less. J. Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A
Revised View, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 35, 38 n. 8 (1994). Today, staffing models that force legal
writing faculty members to leave the position after a set number of years have all but died
out. The results of the LWI-ALWD 2005 Survey indicate that, of 119 schools responding, 105
(88%) impose no cap on the number of years a legal writing teacher can remain in the posi-
tion. Supra n. 4, at question 66.
17 Infra nn. 53–61 and accompanying text.
expected to write in those other areas as well. Undoubtedly, the

nascency of the field is a significant factor too. Only in recent years
has legal writing begun to develop as an academic field. Today,
most law schools have discarded outmoded staffing models in favor
of full-time professors with no arbitrary limits on the number of
years those professors are permitted to teach the course.18 There-
fore, for the first time in the history of legal education, the field of
legal writing can begin to develop a critical mass of experienced
scholars engaged in the serious and important work of developing
a vision of legal writing scholarship.19
These factors alone, however, cannot account for the number
of non-legal writing topics included in the bibliography. Another
more problematic factor—antipathy toward topics relating to legal
writing—most likely is at play. Some law faculties tell their legal
writing professors that legal writing articles will not be considered
for promotion and tenure. Even if a law school does not have a
formal policy, faculty mentors may discourage their legal writing
colleagues from writing in the author’s own area, predicting that
legal writing topics will be discounted. For instance, testimony
before the American Bar Association’s Section of Legal Education
and Admissions to the Bar Standards Review Committee demon-
strated that some legal writing professors have been advised not to
write on legal writing topics.20 Even without individualized advice,
18 Infra nn. 53–61 and accompanying text.

19 Michael R. Smith, The Next Frontier: Exploring the Substance of Legal Writing, 2 J.
ALWD 1, 26 (2004).
20 ALWD & Leg. Writing Inst., Quality Legal Writing Instruction and ABA Accredita-
tion Standard 405: Report and Recommendations to the ABA Standards Review Committee
of the ABA Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar (Aug. 23, 2004) (on file
with the Authors); see also Harold S. Lewis, Jr., Integrity in Research, 42 J. Leg. Educ. 607,
609 (1992) (“Concerns about academic freedom are probably more pertinent to untenured
faculty. Schools are uneven in assuring junior members that they will not be penalized for
tackling controversial issues, espousing unpopular positions, or pursuing topics considered
marginal when the more established faculty began their careers. Studies in clinical educa-
tion or legal writing, for instance, may pose real risks for untenured faculty. Given the
organized bar’s intense interest in these areas, it is at least somewhat troubling that they
are still in bad intellectual odor at many of our schools. Do we communicate to junior faculty
a sense that our institutions welcome these pursuits and deem them fair grist for the writ-
ings that lead to promotion and tenure? If we do, do we do so honestly? How many of us, for
example, could confidently advise a junior colleague that his toils in the vineyard of clinical
education will not be dismissed as falling within a disfavored category?” (emphasis in origi-
nal)).
But not all law schools take this view:
Some schools recognize that prescribing acceptable publication outlets . . .
forces candidates into what one school refers to as an “unfortunate byproduct”
of tenure guidelines—“a tendency to force all of the work of young faculty into
legal writing professors almost certainly will choose topics with an

“internal scholarly jury” in mind.21 Legal writing professors may
choose to avoid risk by refraining from writing in their own disci-
pline.22
One must ask whether a policy precluding or discouraging le-
gal writing articles makes sense. Would a law school promulgate a
policy that refuses to count torts articles written by a torts profes-
sor? Would a law school require the torts professor to write instead
in someone else’s field? Contracts, perhaps? And would the law
school then evaluate the torts professor’s contracts article against
the articles written by professors who actually teach contracts?
Such a counterintuitive policy should require a compelling justifi-
cation.
We speculate that three primary reasons account for the re-
sistance to legal writing topics. First and foremost, other faculty
members may misunderstand the content of a modern legal writ-
ing course, not realizing its breadth and depth, and especially not
realizing the intellectual content that underlies the course cover-
age. When faculties think of legal writing, they may think of clas-
ses on the passive voice and citation form. In fact, technical mat-
ters make up a relatively small percentage of most legal writing
courses today.23 Rather, as we discuss in later Sections, legal writ-
a common mold.” One law school cautions that “[t]he criteria are not intended
to restrict the range of intellectual investigation either as to method or subject
matter . . . .”
Report of the AALS Special Committee on Tenure and the Tenuring Process, 42 J. Leg. Educ.
477, 490 (1992) [hereinafter AALS Tenure Report].
21 See Julius Getman, The Internal Scholarly Jury, 39 J. Leg. Educ. 337, 337 (1989)
(“One important but rarely discussed technique by which legal scholars shape their work is
what may be referred to as the ‘internal scholarly jury.’ The jury is made up of those people
whom we imagine reading our work and whose presumed reactions of pleasure or disap-
pointment shape our decisions about such things as topic, approach, method of analysis,
and materials.”).
22 These suspicions are borne out when legal writing professors speak to each other at
conferences and on listservs. The same phenomenon has been noted with regard to clinical
scholarship. See Richard A. Boswell, Keeping the Practice in Clinical Education and Schol-
arship, 43 Hastings L.J. 1187, 1191 (1992); Peter Toll Hoffman, Clinical Scholarship and
Skills Training, 1 Clin. L. Rev. 93, 106–107 (1994); Peter A. Joy, Clinical Scholarship: Im-
proving the Practice of Law, 2 Clin. L. Rev. 385, 390 (1996).
The consequences of a constraining tenure process extend well beyond the period of
the process itself. As Duncan Kennedy has observed, “Five years of ‘being good’ on proba-
tion, subject to the notorious arbitrariness of the promotion process, chills all kinds of di-
vergent thinking, too often forever (the face becomes the mask).” Introduction, 73 UMKC L.
Rev. 231, 233 (2003).
23 An informal survey of the legal writing professors at our own schools indicates that
technical matters make up less than 15% of the typical legal writing course.
ing courses cover the role and function of the judicial system,
common law analysis, statutory interpretation, forms of legal rea-
soning, case synthesis, structural paradigms, and other rich and
complex subjects.24
Further, most schools offer advanced legal writing electives
that expand and deepen the coverage of the required courses.25 A
recent advanced legal writing text, Advanced Legal Writing: Theo-
ries and Strategies in Persuasive Writing,26 can serve as an exam-
ple of coverage in an advanced course. Professor Smith’s entire
text is devoted to such subjects as the cognitive dimensions of il-
lustrative narratives; a multidisciplinary study of the functions of
literary references; principles of classical rhetoric; the functions of
metaphor and simile; and the ethics and morality of advocacy.27
Many casebook faculty members would be surprised to learn that a
legal writing course syllabus can look like this table of contents.28
Second, some legal writing topics rely on sources from such
disciplines as rhetoric, literary criticism, composition theory, cog-
nitive psychology, and philosophy. Thus, these topics fall within a
somewhat controversial category of scholarship—interdisciplinary
scholarship. Law faculty members are divided about the value of
interdisciplinary scholarship. Some consider it an exciting and
promising scholarly development,29 while others are less inclined
to welcome its reliance on sources outside the law or its emphasis
on theory.30 An interdisciplinary legal writing topic, like any other
24 Ralph L. Brill et al., Sourcebook on Legal Writing Programs 5 (ABA 1997).

25 Of the 178 schools responding to the LWI/ALWD 2005 survey, only 18 reported not
offering advanced legal writing electives. LWI-ALWD 2005 Survey, supra n. 4, question 32;
see also Michael R. Smith, Alternative Substantive Approaches to Advanced Legal Writing
Courses, 54 J. Leg. Educ. 119, 119 (2004).
26 Michael R. Smith, Advanced Legal Writing: Theories and Strategies in Persuasive
Writing (Aspen L. & Bus. 2002).

27 Id. at xi–xx.
28 Old understandings of the content of the field largely account for the academy’s
historic undervaluation of legal writing as a part of the teaching curriculum as well. Some
faculty members today still operate out of these older attitudes, and so may allow a habitual
response to the field to distort their judgment. A more accurate understanding of the con-
tent of a legal writing course is critical not only to questions of scholarship but also to ques-
tions of curriculum and institutional status of legal writing faculty members.
29 See e.g. J.M. Balkin, Interdisciplinarity as Colonization, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
949, 970 (1996).

30 See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34 (1992) (criticizing legal scholarship as not
sufficiently helpful to practicing lawyers); see also Banks McDowell, The Audiences for Le-
gal Scholarship, 40 J. Leg. Educ. 261, 262–264 (1990) (questioning the value of much legal
scholarship).
interdisciplinary topic, may be subject to this larger scholarly de-

bate.
Third, many law schools have not yet settled the question of
whether legitimate legal scholarship can include sophisticated and
rigorous analyses of pedagogy or penetrating critiques of institu-
tional practices.31 Since some legal writing topics fall within these
controversial categories, those topics may be considered risky as
well.
In his carefully balanced article, Dean Edward Rubin, at Van-
derbilt University School of Law, observes that peer evaluation of
scholarship functions as a gatekeeper, setting the boundaries of a
discipline.32 He reminds us that the evaluation of scholarship is an
exercise of power that “determines which . . . groups are excluded
or included, marginalized or empowered.”33 These decisions will,
over time, limit the intellectual reach of the entire discipline to
only what we can now envision.34 So the stakes of our decisions are
high. We should not lightly exclude from our definition of permis-
sible scholarship an emerging field of study, for to do so is to reject
out-of-hand all potential insights long before we can predict their
nature or significance.
In the remainder of this Article, we analyze the propositions
usually offered to justify institutional resistance to scholarship on
legal writing topics. Two preliminary steps will facilitate the dis-
cussion, however. First, we should remind ourselves of the acade-
my’s normative understandings of the values and functions of
scholarship. Second, we must clarify the meaning of the term “le-
gal writing topic.”
IV. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SCHOLARSHIP
Law schools devote substantial resources to the production of

legal scholarship. As Banks McDowell has observed,
There are large economic costs—support for the ever-growing
host of law reviews, research grants, research collections of law
libraries, and compensation for student research assistants.
There are time and opportunity costs—the hours that faculty

32 Edward L. Rubin, On beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80
Cal. L. Rev. 889, 893 (1992).
33 Id.
34 See id. at 894.
spend on scholarly research and writing leave less time availa-

ble for teaching, counseling students, and engaging in universi-
ty and community service. Finally there are substantial psychic
costs to professors who worry about the quality and quantity of
their writing.35
The lost time and energy for teaching and counseling students
have even caused some to question the value of the entire enter-
prise.36
We do not agree that institutional and personal resources de-
voted to scholarship should be invested elsewhere. But because
scholarship costs are indeed sobering, law faculties must consider
seriously the values served and the purposes achieved by that in-
vestment. If law schools invest so much in scholarship, we have an
obligation to the profession and to our students37 to secure the
most value possible for that investment and to ensure that we are
serving multiple interests and audiences.38
One of the most important of these interests is the advance-
ment of knowledge for its own sake. Universities have a unique
obligation to advance human knowledge. We owe that obligation
not only to individual legal constituencies like judges and lawyers,
but also, and we hope not to fall victim to grandiosity here, to hu-
manity itself. We refer to the fundamental scholarly urge to un-
derstand—to find undiscovered information, to identify unrealized
effects, to uncover deep structures, to make new connections or
draw new parallels—in short, “to understand as fully and as fun-
damentally as possible.”39
Another commonly recited value of scholarship is the en-
hancement of teaching.40 Scholarship may enhance teaching if it
35 McDowell, supra n. 30, at 265.

36 See e.g. John Elson, The Case against Legal Scholarship or, If the Professor Must
Publish, Must the Profession Perish? 39 J. Leg. Educ. 343 (1989).
37 Students bear a significant portion of the expense and burden of institutional focus
on scholarly production. See McDowell, supra n. 30, at 265; see generally Elson, supra n. 36.
38 McDowell identifies at least nine possible audiences for legal scholarship: “(1) legal
academics, (2) other academics, (3) judges, (4) legal specialists, (5) general practitioners . . . ,
(6) law students, (7) students from the rest of the university interested in law as it relates to
[other disciplines], (8) legislators, and (9) the general public.” McDowell, supra n. 30, at 261.
39 Id. at 270; see also Stephen Carter, Academic Tenure and “White Male” Standards:
Some Lessons from the Patent Law, 100 Yale L.J. 2065, 2080 (1991) (“The purpose of schol-
arship is to increase human knowledge. The corollary is that the greater the degree of the
contribution to human knowledge, the greater the value of a particular scholarly work. Any
test for scholarly quality, then, should rest on answering the question: Does this scholarship
increase human knowledge, and if so, by how much?”).
40 See Ronald Benton Brown, A Cure for Scholarship Schizophrenia: A Manifesto for
expands the knowledge we can share with our students; if it be-

comes part of the text of a course;41 if it contributes to the moral
education of our students;42 if it provides examples of excellence;43
or if it enhances our own analytical abilities.44
Scholarship also provides a vehicle for improving the perfor-
mance of legal decision makers.45 Part of the justification for law
schools’ relatively low teaching loads is the obligation to assist
judges and lawyers. Because law faculty members have the luxu-
ries of time, an objective role, and significant institutional support,
we can assist lawyers to analyze thorny problems or think more
clearly and deeply about their own lawyering responsibilities. Le-
gal scholarship should anticipate social change and recommend
resolutions for emerging issues.46 Indeed, Dean Rubin maintains
that this prescriptive role is the primary purpose of scholarship.47
As Dean Rubin explains,
[T]he scholar may not literally be addressing the decisionmak-
er, nor need a decisionmaker ever see the work in question . . . .
The notion of a prescription addressed to a particular deci-
Sane Productivity and Productive Sanity, 13 Nova L. Rev. 39, 49–51 (1988); Clark Byse,
Legal Scholarship, Legal Realism and the Law Teacher’s Intellectual Schizophrenia, 13
Nova L. Rev. 9, 29–30 (1988).
41 James Boyd White, Why I Write, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1021, 1032 (1996).
42 Anthony T. Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 Yale
L.J. 955, 968 (1981) (A scholar’s pursuit of the truth can “preserve in his students an atti-
tude of friendship, or goodwill, towards those who seek the truth and indeed toward the
truth itself.”).
43 David L. Gregory, The Assault on Scholarship, 32 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 993, 1003
(1991) (“So why write? Fundamentally, the answer is a matter of vocation and ethics. The
aspiration to excellence breeds excellence in students and in legal audiences.”).
44 Id. at 999 (“Although scholarship as an intellectual pursuit is commendable for its
own worth, that is not its raison d’etre in the professional law school. If professors do not
engage in scholarship, they cannot fully foster critical analytical skills in their students,
because their own skills will atrophy.”).
45 See generally Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86
Mich. L. Rev. 1835, 1847–1848 (1988).

46 See e.g. Dennis Archer, The Importance of Law Reviews to the Judiciary and the
Bar, 1991 Det. C. L. Rev. 229, 236–237; Brown, supra n. 40, at 46; Michael J. Graetz &
Charles H. Whitebread II, Monrad Paulsen and the Idea of a University Law School, 67 Va.
L. Rev. 445, 454 (1981) (“A university law school is among the few institutions for anticipat-
ing future social needs and for relating the role of law to furthering those needs. It must
produce lawyers for tomorrow.”) (cited in Donald J. Polden, Scholarship in Legal Education,
24 Mem. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 2 n. 8 (1993)).
47 Rubin, supra n. 32, at 903–904 (“The purpose of legal scholarship is most accurately
described as prescription, or recommendation. . . . The entire field crackles with normativi-

ty . . . .”).
sionmaker describes the conceptual structure of the work, the

way in which its arguments are formulated.48
The academy also has an obligation to speak truth to power.49
That obligation can require confronting government in the persons
of judges, legislators, and governmental administrators. It can re-
quire confronting the profession in the persons of lawyers, judges,
and institutional structures such as bar associations and law
firms. And it can require confronting the structures and institu-
tions of legal education as well, for who is more able to critique
and improve the vital enterprise of legal education than those who
know it best?
Finally, scholarship is a powerful vehicle for personal and pro-
fessional transformation50 and for the sheer pleasure of doing a
difficult task well.51 While an author’s personal and professional
48 Id. at 904.
49 David R. Barnhizer, Prophets, Priests, and Power Blockers: Three Fundamental
Roles of Judges and Legal Scholars in America, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 127, 172 (1988) (“Hans
Morgenthau . . . claimed the intellectual was responsible for speaking ‘truth to power.’”).
Barnhizer finds Arthur Schlesinger “most powerful” when commenting on Morgenthau:
The contemporary intellectual, in [Morgenthau’s] view, lived in a world that
was distinct from, though potentially involved with, that of the politician. The
intellectual . . . seeks truth; the politician, power. And the intellectual . . . can
deal with power in four ways: by retreat into the ivory tower, which makes him
irrelevant; by offering expert advice, which makes him a servant; by absorption
into the machinery, which makes him an agent and apologist; or by “prophetic
confrontation.”
Of the four modes of response, the last seemed to him most faithful to the
intellectual’s obligation. The “genuine intellectual,” Hans Morgenthau wrote,
“. . . must be ‘the enemy of the people’ who tells the world things it either does
not want to hear or cannot understand.” The intellectual’s duty is to look “at the
political sphere from without, judging it by, and admonishing it in the name of,
the standards of truth accessible to him. He speaks, in the biblical phrase, truth
to power.”
Id. at 172–173 (quoting Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Intellectuals’ Role: Truth to Power? Wall St.
J. 28 (Oct. 12, 1983) (quoting Hans Morgenthau)).
50 As one scholar said,
The task the course set me, then, was the direct analogue of Thoreau’s task: to
write my way out of Concord, out of false and inauthentic forms of speech and
thought, to a kind of Walden, to a voice and language of my own. Writing to me
thus became a way of creating a voice with which to speak and be, with which
to represent and transform my own experience.
White, supra n. 41, at 1030.
51 Another scholar said,
And of course, for all that, legal scholarship is also something that produces
pleasure. I do not want to end this symposium on a note of pure Yellow-Book
aestheticism, but I defy any of the symposiasts (and at least many of the read-
ers) to deny that they’re also in the game . . . for those occasional moments
transformation and pleasure do not, alone, justify the resource ex-

penditure for scholarship, this transformation and pleasure have
their value for students, the profession, and the institutions we
serve. The best faculties are composed of curious people, people
who are constantly learning and adapting, people who are intellec-
tually engaged with law, its study, and its practice. Scholarship is
one of the best ways—perhaps the best way—to develop and main-
tain that kind of a faculty.
We join those who believe that these values justify the signifi-
cant institutional and personal costs of scholarly production. But
to claim these justifications, law faculties must take these underly-
ing values seriously when defining acceptable scholarly topics and
when evaluating individual scholarly efforts. Taken as a whole,
the spectrum of scholarship we produce should serve these articu-
lated values. If it does not, we cannot claim that legal scholarship
justifies the enormous investment it requires.
V. WHAT IS A “LEGAL WRITING TOPIC”?52
Most law professors would agree that the content of a particu-

lar field includes at least the topics covered by the texts commonly
adopted for those courses.53 For instance, if a property professor is
looking for a property topic on which to write, she may look first at
the table of contents of a property text. If she finds the category
“estates and future interests,” she can be fairly certain that a fu-
ture interests topic is a property topic. She may write an article
exploring a trend in future interests case law.54 She may write a
when they say, in some concise and illuminating way, something that appears
to be true. . . .
[T]o have crafted, on occasion, something true and truly put—whatever
the devil else legal scholarship is, is from, or is for, it’s the joy of that too.
Arthur A. Leff, Afterword, 90 Yale L.J. 1296, 1296 (1981).
52 Some have rightly questioned the use of categories to label kinds of scholarship. See
e.g. Leslie Espinoza, Labeling Scholarship: Recognition or Barrier to Legitimacy, 10 St.

Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 197, 206 (1991). We use the label “legal writing topic” for the purposes
of the discussion in this article, but we use it reluctantly and provisionally. See also infra
§ VII.
53 The content of a legal field usually is broader and deeper than its course texts. Cur-
ricular constraints limit the breadth of coverage, and the course context limits depth. Much
relevant material is more advanced or more theoretical than is appropriate for coverage in a
law school course, though it is important for the development of scholars and teachers in
the area.
54 See e.g. C. Dent Bostick, Loosening the Grip of the Dead Hand: Shall We Abolish
Legal Future Interests in Land? 32 Vand. L. Rev. 1061 (1979); Jesse Dukeminier, Perpetui-
more theoretical article analyzing the economic underpinnings of

future interests.55 She may write about a technique for teaching
future interests,56 or she may analyze the curricular resources law
schools devote to teaching various property topics, including future
interests.57 Our property professor has identified at least four cat-
egories of property topics: (1) the substance or doctrines of proper-
ty; (2) the theories underlying property; (3) the pedagogy of the
property class; and (4) the institutional choices affecting the teach-
ing of property. Those four categories may be valued differently by
her faculty colleagues, but they are all property topics.58 And they
all serve, in one way or another, the purposes of scholarship, that
is, they advance our understanding of the legal world in important
ways. They develop new and important ideas and bring them to
the people who need them—the legal academy, lawyers, and judg-
es.
Applying this same methodology to the field of legal writing
yields the same four categories. Just as in our property example,
legal writing topics include those related to (1) the substance or
doctrine legal writing professors teach; (2) the theories underlying
that substance; (3) the pedagogy used to teach that substance; and
(4) the institutional choices that affect that teaching.59 A brief ex-
ties: The Measuring Lives, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1648 (1985); Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S.
Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 Ind. L.J. 1 (1992).
55 See e.g. Robert C. Ellickson & Charles Dia. Thorland, Ancient Land Law: Mesopo-
tamia, Egypt, Israel, 71 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 321 (1995) (examining land tenure institutions to
argue that human beings have long behaved as rational economic maximizers).
56 See e.g. Peter A. Appel, The Embarrassing Rule against Perpetuities, 54 J. Leg.
Educ. 264 (2004) (proposing methods for teaching jurisprudential concepts in future inter-
ests); Robert J. Hopperton, Teaching the Rule against Perpetuities in First Year Property, 31
U. Toledo L. Rev. 55 (1999); John W. Weaver, Fear and Loathing in Perpetuities, 48
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1393 (1991).
57 See e.g. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall & Jerome M. Organ, The Contemporary Property
Law Course: A Study of Syllabi, 47 J. Leg. Educ. 205 (1997).

58 Topics may be relevant to more than one law school course. For instance, a future
interests topic may be relevant to courses in property, wills, trusts and estates, taxation,
and estate planning. A zoning topic may be relevant to courses in property, local govern-
ment law, constitutional law, and environmental law. A law and economics topic may be
relevant to a variety of courses. Faculty members in several subject areas may consider
these shared topics part of their own areas. This sort of scholarly cross-fertilization is desir-
able since it significantly broadens our view of each topic. Christopher D. Stone, From a
Language Perspective, 90 Yale L.J. 1149, 1155–1156 (1981) (“To define and approach the
same sorts of problems in different ways is a source of vitality.”).
59 For other purposes, legal writing scholarship can be categorized in other ways as
well. See Smith, supra n. 19, at 5–21.

ploration of each of these categories will clarify the scope of legal

writing scholarship.60
A. Category One: The Substance or Doctrine of Legal Writing
The first category—the substance or doctrine of legal writing—

includes course content fundamental to a legal writing course. Just
as in our property example, course textbooks provide the best
starting point for identifying this content. A review of legal writing
textbooks demonstrates that this course content includes such
basic legal topics as the roles and functioning of the judicial and
legislative systems; the doctrine of stare decisis; precedential val-
ues and appropriate uses of legal authority; the major forms of le-
gal reasoning; the principles of statutory construction; the ethical
duties of legal writers; the standards of appellate review; and oth-
er doctrines relating to appellate procedure.61
Nor are legal writing textbooks alone in identifying this course
content as basic to a legal writing course. The ABA’s Communica-
tion Skills Committee’s first articulated goal for a legal writing
program is to “introduc[e] students to the fundamentals of the le-
gal system: the structure of law-making bodies; the sources of
law . . . ; the rules governing conflicts between those sources; and
60 For an initial understanding of legal writing scholarship, it is useful to think in
terms of categories; but such artificial constructs do not reflect accurately the breadth of
many of the articles we shall discuss. On closer inspection, one would find that many legal
writing articles contain aspects of several or even all of the identified categories. For in-
stance, no bright line divides category-one articles (articles on the substance of legal writ-
ing) and category-two (theoretical) articles. Many category-one articles do address theory,
and most theoretical articles take a substantive point as their starting point. Many articles
about substance and theory also discuss the pedagogical implications of the article’s thesis,
and many primarily pedagogical articles include a significant substantive or theoretical
component. Finally, many articles about institutional choices (category-four articles) deal
with a substantive or theoretical misunderstanding that causes a misguided institutional
choice.
61 All of these examples are covered in each of the commonly adopted texts. See e.g.
Charles R. Calleros, Legal Method and Writing (4th ed., Aspen L. & Bus. 2002); John C.
Dernbach et al., A Practical Guide to Legal Writing & Legal Method (2d ed., Rothman &
Co.1994); Linda H. Edwards, Legal Writing and Analysis (Aspen L. & Bus. 2003); Richard
Neumann, Legal Reasoning and Legal Writing: Structure, Strategy, and Style (5th ed., As-
pen L. & Bus. 2005); Laurel Currie Oates et al., The Legal Writing Handbook: Analysis,
Research, and Writing (3d ed., Aspen L. & Bus 2002); Deborah A. Schmedemann & Christi-
na L. Kunz, Synthesis: Legal Reading, Reasoning, and Writing (2d ed., Aspen L. & Bus.
2003); Nancy L. Schultz & Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Legal Writing and Other Lawerying Skills
(4th ed., LexisNexis 2004); Helene Shapo et al., Writing and Analysis in the Law (4th ed.,
Found. Press 2003); Robin S. Wellford, Legal Reasoning, Writing, and Persuasive Argument
(LexisNexis 2002).
interpretive canons for judging the meaning and weight of those

sources.”62
Some of this legal writing course content can also arise in non-
legal writing courses.63 For instance, in a property course, the case
for the day may invite a discussion of some aspect of the judicial
system. Another case the next week may invite a discussion of the
concept of dicta. Periodically, the professor may invite considera-
tion of some aspect of policy-based reasoning. But the property
professor is unlikely to do more than offer a brief explanation of
such concepts. Rarely does a property professor assign any reading
material on the judicial system, dicta, or forms of legal reasoning
such as statutory construction. It is even more unlikely that a
property professor will hold students accountable for the material
by, for instance, including it on the course examination. Further, a
review of traditional case books demonstrates that these topics are
not part of the identified course coverage and certainly are not
treated in any intentional and comprehensive way.64
Indeed, the construction of most casebooks, at best, treats the
precedential values of particular authorities as irrelevant.65 For
example, consider the excellent text we each use for our property
courses, Jesse Dukeminier and Jim Krier’s Property.66 Acquisition
by capture is taught primarily by assigning Pierson v. Post67 (an
1805 case from the New York Supreme Court of Judicature, an
early New York court that had both trial and appellate functions);
Ghen v. Rich68 (an 1881 case from the federal trial court in Massa-
62 Brill et al., supra n. 24, at 5; see also id. at 15–19.

63 Non-legal writing professors sometimes write about legal methods topics such as
these, and just as in the case of our property example, supra n. 56, such scholarly cross-
fertilization is desirable.
64 Professor Brill has observed,
Only some of these reasoning skills can be taught in doctrinal courses, and
those that can be taught in doctrinal courses cannot be taught completely there.
For example, although two or three consecutive cases in a casebook can be syn-
thesized into a consistent doctrine on a particular issue, the synthesizing that
lawyers typically do is more complicated. A typical problem in the practice of
law might involve harmonizing half a dozen cases, all within the same jurisdic-
tion, none of which expressly states the rule for which it stands, and several of
which appear to come to inconsistent results.
Brill et al., supra n. 24, at 18 n. 12.
65 At worst, typical case book construction inadvertently suggests that all authorities
are equal.
66 Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property (5th ed., Aspen L. & Bus. 2002).
67 3 Cai. R. 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (1805) (cited in Dukeminer & Krier, supra n. 66, at
19).
68 8 F. 159 (D. Mass 1881) (cited in Dukeminer & Krier, supra n. 66, at 26).
chusetts); and Keeble v. Hickeringill69 (a 1707 case from an English

court of an unidentified level and not precisely on point). Note ma-
terials include a 1963 Mississippi case,70 a 1954 law review arti-
cle,71 a 1950 case from the Seventh Circuit on which certiorari was
denied by the United States Supreme Court,72 and a 1975 trea-
tise.73 Nowhere does this excellent text explain the vastly differing
precedential values of each of these authorities. Nor need the
property text cover this important subject, for the property student
is also taking a legal writing class, and she is learning the princi-
ples of precedential values there.
Legal writing course content also includes analytical processes
students are expected to use in all of their classes, but for which
they receive serious and sustained instruction usually only in their
legal writing class. Examples of these analytical processes include
common-law rule formulation; the construction of analogies; the
synthesis of related authorities; the use of rule-based or policy-
based reasoning; and the principles of statutory interpretation.
Finally, legal writing substantive content includes topics usu-
ally missing from other courses—topics such as the major struc-
tural paradigms of legal analysis; rhetorical principles of persua-
sion; the characteristics of legal readers; the stages of the legal
writing process; strategies for dealing with adverse facts; the im-
pact and use of narrative principles; and the standards of appel-
late review.74
Just as in the property example above, articles about legal
writing substance or doctrine (category one articles) analyze the
69 (1707), 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (Q.B.) (cited in Dukeminer & Krier, supra n. 66, at 31).
70 Carruth v. Easterling, 150 So. 2d 852 (1963) (cited in Dukeminer & Krier, supra
n. 66, at 36 n. 16).
71 Felix Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 Rutgers L. Rev. 357 (1954) (cited in
Dukeminer & Krier, supra n. 66, at 36 n. 16).

72 Sickman v. U.S., 184 F. 2d 616 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 939 (1951)
(cited in Dukeminer & Krier, supra n. 66, at 37).

73 Ray A. Brown, The Law of Personal Property (3d ed., Callaghan 1975) (cited in
Dukeminer & Krier, supra n. 66, at 16, 36, 53, 108, 110, 547).
74 Some, though certainly not all, of these topic areas relate directly to lawyering skills
rather than to the more theoretical exploration of law and legal reasoning. The marginal
relationship of theoretical scholarship to the practice of law has been roundly criticized,
with perhaps the best known recent example being that of Judge Harry Edwards. Edwards,
supra n. 30; see Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars and the Middle Ground, 91 Mich. L.
Rev. 2017, 2096 (1993); Judith S. Kaye, One Judge’s View of Academic Law Review Writing,
39 J. Legal Educ. 313, 320 (1989). To the extent that law faculties take that criticism to
heart, these more skills-oriented topic areas can build useful bridges between the academy
and law practice. Faculties less interested in serving the practice, however, should recog-
nize many theoretical topics among those taught most often in legal writing classes.
application of a doctrine or other topic, exposing questions and

proposing answers. For instance,
1. A legal writing article might explore the effect of raising
and deciding appellate cases sua sponte, without first al-
lowing the parties to brief the dispository issue.75
2. Another article might analyze the practice of manufactur-
ing a final judgment in order to obtain appellate review 76
or might propose a method for reducing intercircuit con-
flicts.77
3. An article might explore fiction-writing strategies lawyers
can use to construct a persuasive fact statement.78
4. Another article might demonstrate the inadequacy of re-
searching only legal sources when both the legal academy
and law practice have long since rejected a formalistic un-
derstanding of the law in favor of a broad legal realism.79
5. Yet another article might explore how bias typically ap-
pears in legal language and how it can infect legal analysis
and argument.80
6. Another might propose the use of object-oriented analysis
and design to improve legislative drafting81 or draw on
75 Adam Milani & Michael Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte Deci-
sions by Appellate Courts, 69 Tenn. L. Rev. 245 (2002). Professor Smith teaches legal writ-
ing at Mercer University School of Law, and the late Professor Milani taught legal writing
at Mercer University School of Law.
76 Rebecca Cochran, Gaining Appellate Review by Manufacturing a Final Judgment,
48 Mercer L. Rev. 979 (1997). Professor Cochran teaches legal writing at University of Day-
ton School of Law.
77 Mary Garvey Algero, A Step in the Right Direction: Reducing Intercircuit Conflicts
by Strengthening the Value of Federal Appellate Court Decisions, 70 Tenn. L. Rev. 605
(2003). Professor Algero teaches legal writing at Loyola University New Orleans School of
Law.
78 Brian Foley & Ruth Anne Robbins, Fiction 101: A Primer for Lawyers on How to Use
Fiction Writing Techniques to Write Persuasive Facts Sections, 32 Rutgers L.J. 459 (2001).
Professor Robbins teaches and Professor Foley formerly taught legal writing at Rutgers
School of Law–Camden.
79 Thomas McDonnell, Playing beyond the Rules: A Realist and Rhetoric-Based Ap-
proach to Researching the Law and Solving Legal Problems, 67 UMKC L. Rev. 285 (1998).
Professor McDonnell teaches legal writing at Pace University School of Law.
80 Anne Enquist & Lorraine Bannai, (Un)Examined Assumptions and (Un)Intended
Messages: Teaching Students to Recognize Bias in Legal Analysis and Language, 27 Seattle
U. L. Rev. 1 (2003). Professors Enquist and Bannai teach legal writing at Seattle University
School of Law.
81 Thomas Blackwell, Finally Adding Method to Madness: Applying Principles of Ob-
ject-Oriented Analysis and Design to Legislative Drafting, 3 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Policy
227 (2000). The late Professor Blackwell taught legal writing at the Appalachian School of
Law.
methods of statutory interpretation, literary criticism, and

musicology to propose a resolution to methodological dis-
putes over statutory interpretation. 82
7. Another article might identify the myths and realities sur-
rounding the “plain English” movement,83 or chronicle the
growing acceptance of electronic communication within the
American court system and use current research in rheto-
ric, cognition, and computer usability to suggest guidelines
for using electronic communication with courts.84
8. Still another article might explore the extent to which a
lawyer or a court legitimately can rely on non-legal mate-
rials in support of policy rationales.85
All of these articles are legal writing articles because they deal
with the substantive content of the typical legal writing course, and
all of these articles serve the purposes of legal scholarship. They
advance knowledge generally; they enhance teaching, often
demonstrating a close relationship between the scholarly topic and
actual course content; and they improve the performance of legal
decision-makers. These legal writing topics directly improve the
performance of judges and lawyers by improving their ability to
reason effectively, research thoroughly, and communicate clearly.
Some of these topics fulfill the purposes of scholarship in the
most traditional of ways. Many are examples of traditional anal-
yses of clearly legal issues, such as topics of appellate procedure,
uses of precedent, statutory construction, or professional responsi-
bility. Other category one topics explore new territory, using in-
sights from other disciplines to deepen our understanding of im-
portant issues of legal analysis. These examples of grounded inter-
disciplinary scholarship are directly useful to legal decision-
makers, offering new insights to improve the performance of law-
yers and judges. They offer the advantages of breaking new
ground and expanding the scope of our thinking about law and the
82 Scott Fruehwald, Pragmatic Textualism and the Limits of Statutory Interpretation:
Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 973 (2000). Professor Fruehwald
teaches legal writing at Hofstra University School of Law.
83 Joseph Kimble, Plain English: A Charter for Clear Writing, 9 Thomas M. Cooley L.
Rev. 1 (1992). Professor Kimble teaches legal writing at Thomas M. Cooley Law School.
84 Maria Perez Crist, The E-Brief: Legal Writing for an Online World, 33 N.M. L. Rev.
49 (2003). Professor Crist teaches legal writing at the University of Dayton School of Law.
85 Ellie Margolis, Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-Legal Materials in
Appellate Briefs, 34 U.S.F. L. Rev. 197 (2000). Professor Margolis teaches legal writing at
Temple University James E. Beasley School of Law.
profession,86 while avoiding the concern of being too theoretical to

be relevant to most legal audiences.87
B. Category Two: The Theoretical Foundations of Legal Writing
All legal fields rest upon theoretical foundations, and many

can claim theoretical ties to other disciplines such as economics,
history, political science, statistics, psychology, environmental sci-
ence, and philosophy. Legal writing topics, too, have theoretical
foundations. Those foundations include constitutional theory, legal
methods concepts, jurisprudence, composition theory, philosophy,
ethics, logic, political theory, rhetoric, literary theory, linguistics,
cognitive psychology, narrative theory, comparative law, and legal
history. For instance,
1. A legal writing article might challenge the use of un-
published and depublished opinions as a serious breach of
traditional understandings of the common law system, re-
sulting in a legal system much closer to a civil law sys-
tem.88
2. Another article might explore the relationship of narrative
to rule articulation, analogy, and policy-based reasoning.89
3. An article might use post-modern philosophy to critique
common approaches to the teaching of legal writing, 90 or
86 One strand in the conversation about legal scholarship laments the difficulty of
saying anything both important and new. See e.g. Christopher D. Stone, supra n. 58, at
1151. Speaking of treatise-writing, Professor Stone observes that “much of the most chal-
lenging, creative, and rewarding work . . . —the supplying of insight and system—has large-
ly been done in the major common-law fields.” Id.; see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Controversial
Scholarship and Faculty Appointments: A Dean’s View, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 73, 74 (1991)
(“Quite frankly, it is difficult to make a useful contribution at the cutting edge of legal
scholarship. Sometimes it seems that everything worth saying has been said.”). For a large-
ly unmined field like legal writing, however, the most important and most exciting work—
the work of unearthing patterns, making broad connections, unmasking misconceptions—
remains to be done.
87 See e.g. Edwards, supra n. 30 (discussing criticisms of overly theoretical scholar-
ship).
88 Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in U.S.
Courts, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1435 (2004). Until 2005, Professor Pether taught legal writing and
rhetoric at American University, Washington College of Law; she now teaches at Villanova
University School of Law.
89 Linda H. Edwards, The Convergence of Analogical and Dialetic Imaginations in
Legal Discourse, 20 Leg. Stud. Forum 7 (1996). Professor Edwards teaches legal writing at
Mercer University School of Law.
90 Joel Cornwell, Languages of a Divided Kingdom: Logic and Literacy in the Writing
Curriculum, 34 John Marshall L. Rev. 49 (2000) [hereinafter Languages]; Joel Cornwell,

discuss the relationship of emotions to the more rational

aspects of legal decision-making, showing that they work
together to construct legal meaning.91
4. Another article might compare the American common-law
system to other common-law systems, explaining how the
American system became uniquely writing-centered and
why the American reliance on writing results in a more ef-
fective and trustworthy system.92
5. An article might analyze the rhetorical forces at play in
Justice Scalia’s dissents93 or in the employment discrimi-
nation cases of the Supreme Court.94
6. Yet another article might analyze the legal writing process
in light of principles of composition theory.95
7. Another article might critique rhetorical strategies of legal
writers based on particular ethical principles.96
8. The theoretical possibilities of legal writing topics are vir-
tually limitless.
All of these articles serve the purposes of legal scholarship. They
advance knowledge about the law and the profession. Many of
them expressly discuss the application of theory to the profession
or to teaching, and thus they serve the purposes of improving
teaching and improving the profession. Other examples are highly
theoretical, but as Professor Rubin reminds us, the scholar’s work
Legal Writing as a Kind of Philosophy, 48 Mercer. L. Rev. 1091 (1997). Professor Cornwell
teaches legal writing at The John Marshall Law School.
91 Peter Brandon Bayer, Not Interaction but Melding—The “Russian Dressing” Theory
of Emotions: An Explanation of the Phenomenology of Emotions and Rationality with Sug-

gested Related Maxims for Judges and Other Legal Decision Makers, 52 Mercer L. Rev. 1033
(2001). Professor Bayer teaches legal writing at the William S. Boyd School of Law at Uni-
versity of Nevada, Las Vegas.
92 Suzanne Ehrenberg, Embracing the Writing-Centered Legal Process, 89 Iowa L. Rev.
1159 (2004). Professor Ehrenberg teaches legal writing at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
93 Michael Frost, Justice Scalia’s Rhetoric of Dissent: A Greco-Roman Analysis of Scal-
ia’s Advocacy in the VMI Case, 91 Ky. L.J. 167 (2000–2003). Professor Frost teaches legal
writing at Southwestern University School of Law.
94 Mary Ellen Maatman, Choosing Words and Creating Worlds: The Supreme Court’s
Rhetoric and Its Constitutive Effects on Employment Discrimination Law, 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
1 (1998). Professor Maatman teaches legal writing at Widener University School of Law,
Wilmington, Delaware.
95 Linda Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to Legal Discourse: The Ebb and Flow of
Reader and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J. Leg. Educ. 155 (1999). Professor Berger teaches
legal writing at the Thomas Jefferson School of Law.
96 Elizabeth Fajans & Mary Falk, Shooting from the Lip: United States v. Dickerson,
Role [Im]morality, and the Ethics of Legal Rhetoric, 23 U. Haw. L. Rev. 1 (2000). Professors
Fajans and Falk teach legal writing at Brooklyn Law School.
can serve legal decision-makers even if it is not addressed to that

audience, indeed, even if it is never seen by that audience.97 Some
of today’s best-known legal scholarship, though theoretical in na-
ture,98 serves legal decision-makers in just this way.
C. Category Three: The Theory and Practice Appropriate to the

Teaching of Legal Writing
Like other teaching areas, legal writing has been enriched by

articles about pedagogy. In fact, the pedagogical conversation
among legal writing professors may be more vibrant than that in
any other area of the legal academy. Since much of the content of a
legal writing course is focused on the teaching of a process, it is
natural that legal writing professors would focus scholarly atten-
tion on pedagogical issues. Further, many articles about pedagogy
take as their starting point a substantive (category one) or theoret-
ical (category two) point. Examples of possible pedagogical topics
are ample:
1. An article might analyze aspects of the legal environment
of law teaching, such as the application of the ADA to
learning disabled law students, 99 or the tension between
liability for peer-on-peer harassment under Title IX and
students’ rights of free expression under the First Amend-
ment.100
2. Another article might explore the effects on women and
minorities of particular institutional environments and
common classroom practices.101
97 Rubin, supra n. 32, at 904.

98 See e.g. infra nn. 148–158 and accompanying text (explaining that theoretical topics
related to legal writing have long been acceptable for legal scholarship).
99 Lisa Eichhorn, Reasonable Accommodations and Awkward Compromises: Issues
Concerning Learning Disabled Students and Professional Schools in the Law School Con-
text, 26 J.L. & Educ. 31 (1997). Professor Eichhorn teaches legal writing at the University of
South Carolina School of Law.
100 Susan Hanely Kosse, Student Designed Home Web Pages: Does Title IX or the First
Amendment Apply? 43 Ariz. L. Rev. 905 (2001). Professor Kosse teaches legal writing at the
Louis D. Brandeis School of Law at the University of Louisville.
101 Brook Baker, Transcending Legacies of Literacy and Transforming the Traditional
Repertoire: Critical Discourse Strategies for Practice, 23 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 491 (1997);
Judith D. Fischer, Portia Unbound: The Effects of a Supportive Law School Environment on
Women and Minority Students, 7 UCLA Women’s L.J. 81 (1996) (presenting a study at
Chapman University examining effects of various institutional practices on women and
minority students); Kathryn Stanchi, Resistance Is Futile: How Legal Writing Contributes to
the Law’s Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 Dick. L. Rev. 7 (1998) (exploring the two
3. Other articles might present a study of the effectiveness of

various academic support techniques 102 or critique present
practices of teaching legal research.103
4. Another article might analyze how the academic discipline
of legal writing has developed its doctrine by developing a
common professional language.104
5. Still other articles might explore the application of various
principles of learning theory to the law school classroom.105
6. An article might draw on emerging contextualist work in
cognitive research to critique existing clinical experiential
theory.106
7. Or an article might apply writing process principles to the
setting of the law school seminar paper.107
reigning pedagogies of legal writing and describing the linguistic model used to gauge how
teaching law as language marginalizes outsider voices). Professor Baker teaches legal writ-
ing at Northeastern University School of Law. Professor Fischer teaches legal writing at the
Louis D. Brandeis School of Law at the University of Louisville. Professor Stanchi teaches
legal writing at Temple University James E. Beasley School of Law.
102 Laurel Currie Oates, Beating the Odds: Reading Strategies of Law Students Admit-
ted through Special Admissions Programs, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 139 (1997) (presenting a study
exploring perceived differences in the ways academically challenged students read judicial
opinions). Professor Oates teaches legal writing at Seattle University School of Law.
103 McDonnell, supra n. 79; Terry Jean Seligmann, Beyond “Bingo!”: Educating Legal
Researchers as Problem Solvers, 26 Wm. Mitchell. L. Rev. 179 (2000); Marilyn Walter, Re-
taking Control over Teaching Research, 43 J. Leg. Educ. 569 (1993). Professor McDonnell
teaches legal writing at Pace University School of Law. Professor Seligmann teaches legal
writing at the University of Arkansas School of Law, Fayetteville. Professor Walter teaches
legal writing at Brooklyn Law School.
104 Terrill Pollman & Judith Stinson, IRLAFARC! Surveying the Language of Legal
Writing, 56 Me. L. Rev. 239 (2004) (presenting a study using correlation analyses and two-
sample t-test analyses to analyze the degree to which legal writing professors employ or
understand a common set of terms). Professor Pollman teaches legal writing at the William
S. Boyd School of Law at University of Nevada, Law Vegas. Professor Stinson teaches legal
writing at the Arizona State University College of Law.
105 Robin Boyle, Employing Active-Learning Techniques and Metacognition in Law
School: Shifting Energy from Professor to Student, 81 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 1 (2003); M.H.
Sam Jacobson, A Primer on Learning Styles: Reaching Every Student, 25 Seattle U. L. Rev.
139 (2001) (presenting research on common learning styles and exploring the impact of the
typical law school learning cycle upon students with those learning styles); Clifford Zim-
merman, “Thinking Beyond My Own Interpretation”: Reflections on Collaborative and Coop-
erative Learning Theory in the Law School Curriculum, 31 Ariz. St. L.J. 957 (1999) (review-
ing the history and theoretical bases of cooperative and collaborative learning, while critiqu-
ing the use of competitiveness, teacher control, authorship and individualism, and forms of
evaluation). Professor Boyle teaches legal writing at St. John’s University School of Law.
Professor Jacobson teaches legal writing at Willamette University College of Law. Professor
Zimmerman teaches legal writing at Northwestern University School of Law.
106 Brooke Baker, Beyond MacCrate: The Role of Context, Experience, Theory, and Re-
flection in Ecological Learning, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 287 (1994). Professor Baker teaches legal
writing at Northeastern University School of Law.
8. An article might analyze the use of the Socratic method in

law schools in general and in writing courses in particu-
lar.108
9. An article might review composition theory’s analysis of
the relationship between speech and writing and suggest
ways in which that analysis informs the teaching of writ-
ing in law school.109
10. Another article might argue that certain principles of rhet-
oric and literary criticism might serve as the foundations
for a coherent philosophy of law study;110 or use principles
of rhetorical criticism to argue that legal writing and first-
year casebook courses should be viewed as one ongoing
rhetorical activity;111 or examine possible definitions of le-
gal writing and their impact on the effectiveness of teach-
ing and learning in the academy;112 or identify the rhetori-
cal roots of legal reasoning and advocate that law schools
use classical rhetorical concepts and vocabulary to teach
deductive and analogical reasoning.113
11. Another article might compare the historical development
and the pedagogical and jurisprudential foundations of le-
107 Elizabeth Fajans & Mary Falk, Comments Worth Making: Supervising Scholarly
Writing in Law School, 46 J. Leg. Educ. 342 (1996). Professors Fajans and Falk teach legal
writing at Brooklyn Law School.
108 Mary Beth Beazley & Mary Kate Kearney, Teaching Students How to “Think Like
Lawyers”: Integrating Socratic Method with the Writing Process, 64 Temple L. Rev. 885
(1991). Professor Beazley teaches legal writing at Moritz College of Law at The Ohio State
University. Professor Kearney taught legal writing at Vermont Law School until the two-
year cap on her position expired. She now teaches at Widener University School of Law,
Harrisburg.
109 Susan DeJarnatt, Law Talk: Speaking, Writing and Entering the Discourse of Law,
40 Duq. L. Rev. 489 (2002). Professor DeJarnatt teaches legal writing at Temple University,
James E. Beasley School of Law.
110 Cornwell, Languages, supra n. 90. Professor Cornwell teaches legal writing at The
John Marshall Law School in Chicago.

111 Leigh Greenhaw, To Say What the Law Is: Learning the Practice of Legal Rhetoric,
29 Val. U. L. Rev. 861 (1995). Professor Greenhaw formerly taught legal writing and cur-
rently teaches Introduction to U.S. Law and Legal Methods to foreign students at Washing-
ton University School of Law.
112 Rideout & Ramsfield, supra. n. 16. Professor Rideout teaches legal writing at Seat-
tle University. Professor Ramsfield taught legal writing at Georgetown University Law
Center for many years, and now teaches legal writing at University of Hawaii at Mānoa,
William S. Richardson School of Law.
113 Kristen K. Robbins, Paradigm Lost: Recapturing Classical Rhetoric to Validate
Legal Reasoning, 27 Vt. L. Rev. 483 (2003). Professor Robbins teaches legal writing at
Georgetown University Law Center.
gal writing courses and casebook courses, demonstrating

how each kind of course complements the other. 114
12. An article might use research in cognitive science, psychol-
ogy, psychotherapy, composition theory, and critical dis-
course analysis to explore both the role of student confer-
ences and the institutional and individual constraints that
may impede learning.115
The value of scholarship about pedagogy is the subject of de-
bate within the legal academy,116 but a compelling case can be
made for including pedagogical analysis as part of legal scholar-
ship. Judge Harry Edwards begins his well-known critique of mod-
ern legal scholarship117 with an epigram from Felix Frankfurter:
“In the last analysis, the law is what the lawyers are. And the law
and the lawyers are what the law schools make them.”118 He re-
turns to Frankfurter again in the article’s conclusion and argues
for “practical scholarship and pedagogy.”119 He writes “I earnestly
believe that much of the growing disarray that we now see in the
profession is directly related to the growing incoherence in law
teaching and scholarship.”120
Judge Edwards is writing primarily to criticize highly theoret-
ical scholarship not readily usable by the profession, but his criti-
cism also says something important about taking seriously our role
in “making lawyers.” Tellingly, in this same article, Judge Ed-
wards decries inadequate law school attention to legal writing and
asserts that “far too few law professors recognize the gravity of the
problem.”121 He notes problems with matters of style and presenta-
tion in the practitioner writing he sees, but observes that “[t]he
114 David S. Romantz, The Truth about Cats and Dogs: Legal Writing Courses and the
Law School Curriculum, 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 105 (2003). Professor Romantz teaches legal
writing at The University of Memphis, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law.
115 Robin Wellford, The Law School Student-Faculty Conference: Towards a Trans-
formative Learning Experience, 45 S. Tex. L. Rev. 255 (2004). Professor Wellford teaches
legal writing at Chapman University School of Law.
116 See e.g. Larry Catá Backer, Defining, Measuring, and Judging Scholarly Productivi-
ty: Working toward a Rigorous and Flexible Approach, 52 J. Leg. Ed. 317 (2002); Jonathan
L. Entin, Scholarship about Teaching, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 847 (1998); Joy, supra, n. 22.
117 Edwards, supra n. 30.
118 Ltr. from Felix Frankfurter, Prof., Harv. L. Sch., to Mr. Rosenwald 3 (May 13, 1927)
(Felix Frankfurter papers, Harvard Law School library) (quoted in Rand Jack & Dana C.
Jack, Moral Vision and Professional Decisions: The Changing Values of Women and Men
Lawyers 156 (Cambridge U. Press 1989)).
119 Edwards, supra n. 30, at 77.
120 Id. at 75.
121 Id. at 63–65.
more serious problem is . . . lack of depth and precision in legal

analysis.”122
If Felix Frankfurter and Judge Edwards are right that the
lawyers we “make” define the future of the law, then surely peda-
gogy should not be excluded from our close, critical scholarly exam-
ination. Careful analysis of legal pedagogy serves all the identified
values of scholarship.123 It identifies and proposes solutions for a
serious legal problem; the problem of bad legal writing with its
attendant effects on clients and on the legal system.124 It improves
the performance of tomorrow’s legal decision-makers far more di-
rectly than can a doctrinal article about a particular, often esoteric
legal issue or a highly theoretical article addressed largely to other
highly theoretical scholars writing in the same specialized field. It
advances knowledge about one of our own professions, the profes-
sion of teaching.125 And given the marginalized status of legal writ-
ing programs and faculty members at many schools, scholarship
about legal writing pedagogy often must speak truth to power.
When we talk about scholarship, we should say what we
mean, and we should keep our stories straight. The claim that
scholarship enhances teaching is one of the primary justifications
for devoting so many institutional and personal resources to the
scholarship project.126 It is difficult to square that claim with insti-
tutional policies declaring pedagogy categorically off limits as an
area of scholarly inquiry.127 If serious scholarly treatment of law
122 Id. at 64–65.

123 We do not claim that all publications about pedagogy should be considered scholar-
ship. Rather, we claim that articles about pedagogy, like other kinds of articles, should be
taken seriously enough to be evaluated according to their merit.
124 Scholarship about better teaching to a broad group of students is especially im-
portant now that law schools no longer dismiss large percentages of their entering classes
for academic reasons. See Beasley, supra n. 14, at 30 nn. 5–7.
125 “The life of a law teacher . . . is dominated by two activities . . . : teaching and schol-
arship. . . . [T]eaching and scholarship are the principal activities of the academic lawyer,
the activities that reflect his primary professional interest and capabilities, and the institu-
tion in which he lives his professional life is deliberately organized to promote these activi-
ties. Teaching and scholarship are the raisons d’etre of the university.” Kronman, supra
n. 42, at 957.
126 Supra nn. 41–45 and accompany text; see also Mary Kay Kane, Some Thoughts on
Scholarship for Beginning Teachers, 37 J. Leg. Educ. 14, 14 (1987); Polden, supra n. 46, at
1–5.
127 Of course, one might argue that rigorous inquiry about pedagogy is valuable but
different from “scholarship.” The argument would go, “Professors should write ‘real’ schol-
arship, and if they write about pedagogy in their spare time, that’s good.” The problem with
this argument should be obvious. In the press of other obligations, most professors struggle
to find time to write at all. Writing requires stealing time–a lot of time–away from student
advising, from sponsoring co-curricular activities, from alumni events, from speaking en-
teaching is outside the boundary of acceptable scholarship, we

cannot claim truthfully that we write to improve our teaching.
D. Category Four: The Institutional Choices Affecting the

Teaching of Legal Writing
The final category of scholarship we have identified includes

articles critiquing the institutional choices affecting the teaching
of legal writing. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that
category four articles do not deal with the substance or theory of
legal writing. Many of these articles take as their starting point a
substantive or theoretical misunderstanding that causes a mis-
guided institutional choice. Certainly, misguided institutional
choices can severely impede pedagogy. For instance,
1. An article might explore Rousseau’s speech/writing hierar-
chy as it is manifested within the structures of the legal
academy and use a deconstructionist critique to show the
artificiality of separating speech and writing. 128
2. Another article, after comparing the pedagogical and juris-
prudential foundations of legal writing and casebook
courses, might identify and challenge some of the reasons
for the anti-intellectual bias against writing courses.129
3. An article might apply principles of rationality, academic
ethics, and the cardinal legal standards of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause to the disparate treatment and adverse em-
ployment conditions sometimes imposed on writing profes-
sors.130
gagements, from attending faculty development programs, from reading drafts of one’s
colleagues’ work and offering feedback, from institutional and professional service, not to
mention from family and some modicum of a life outside the law school. When a faculty
member has managed to hoard time for writing, what projects are likely to justify that
time? Certainly most faculty authors will choose projects that fulfill their obligation to pro-
duce scholarship. Even if a faculty member can manage two projects, the resulting article
about pedagogy often does not meet the standards applicable to other scholarship because
the author does not have time for a rigorous treatment of the subject. Hence, many articles
about pedagogy merely describe an interesting teaching idea without exploring underlying
learning theory or analyzing a significant empirical data base. See Entin, supra n. 116.
While those articles are valuable contributions to law teaching, they do not provide an ap-
propriate measure of the potential intellectual rigor of pedagogical topics as a whole.
128 Lisa Eichhorn, Writing in the Legal Academy: A “Dangerous Supplement”, 40 Ariz.
L. Rev. 105 (1998). Professor Eichhorn teaches legal writing at the University of South
Carolina School of Law.
129 Romantz, supra n. 114.
130 Peter Brandon Bayer, A Plea for Rationality and Decency: The Disparate Treatment
4. Other articles might present empirical studies to show the

disparate impact on women caused by institutional policies
affecting legal writing faculty members, 131 or present and
analyze survey results about staffing models, teaching
loads, curriculum and course content, institutional status,
and other aspects of legal writing programs.132
5. An article might argue for institutional support for schol-
arship by legal writing professors133 or for teaching loads
that include more than one area.134
6. Another article might explore the trend toward tenure-
track legal writing positions and the tenure criteria rele-
vant to them.135
7. Or after examining the uniquely writing-centered Ameri-
can common law system, an article might advocate for an
enhanced role for writing programs in legal education.136
Articles about institutional choices serve all of the identified val-
ues of legal scholarship as well. They advance individual and insti-
tutional knowledge; they directly enhance teaching; and they often
powerfully transform both people and law school programs. And
of Legal Writing Faculties as a Violation of Both Equal Protection and Professional Ethics,
39 Duquesne L. Rev. 329, 331 (2001). Professor Bayer teaches legal writing at the William
S. Boyd School of Law at University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
131 Jo Anne Durako, Occupational Segregation: The Legal Writing Caste, 73 UMKC L.
Rev. 253 (2004); Jo Anne Durako, Second-Class Citizens in the Pink Ghetto: Gender Bias in
Legal Writing, 50 J. Leg. Educ. 562 (2000); Levine & Stanchi, supra n. 4; Richard K. Neu-
mann, Jr., Women in Legal Education: What the Statistics Show, 50 J. Leg. Educ. 313
(2000); Kathryn M. Stanchi, Who Next, the Janitors? A Socio-Feminist Critique of the Status
Hierarchy of Law Professors, 73 UMKC L. Rev. 467 (2004). Professor Durako taught legal
writing at Rutgers School of Law–Camden, and now teaches legal writing at Stetson Uni-
versity College of Law. Professors Levine and Stanchi teach legal writing at Temple Uni-
versity James E. Beasley School of Law. Professor Neumann taught legal writing at Hofstra
University School of Law for many years.
132 Jo Anne Durako, 2000 Survey Results, 7 Leg. Writing 155 (2001); Jo Anne Durako,
A Snapshot of Legal Writing Programs at the Millennium, 6 Leg. Writing 95 (2000); Kristin
B. Gerdy, Continuing Development: A Snapshot of Legal Research and Writing Programs
through the Lens of the 2002 LWI and ALWD Survey, 9 Leg. Writing 227 (2003). Professor
Gerdy teaches legal writing at J. Reuben Clark Law School at Brigham Young University.
133 Liemer, supra n. 5. Professor Liemer teaches legal writing at Southern Illinois Uni-
versity School of Law.

134 Brian Glassman, I Didn’t Take the Road Less Traveled, and What a Long, Strange
Trip It’s Been, 53 J. Leg. Educ. 295 (2003); Susan Liemer, Many Birds, One Stone: Teaching
the Law You Love, in Legal Writing Class, 53 J. Leg. Educ. 284 (2003). Professor Glassman
teaches legal writing at Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.
135 Jan M. Levine, Voices in the Wilderness: Tenured and Tenure-Track Directors and
Teachers in Legal Research and Writing Programs, 45 J. Leg. Educ. 530 (1995). Professor
Levine teaches legal writing at Temple University James E. Beasley School of Law.
136 Ehrenberg, supra n. 92, at 1195–1199.
more than any other kind of scholarship, articles about institu-

tion’s choices serve the crucial function of speaking truth to power.
In the final analysis, that function will have more cumulative im-
pact on legal education, and therefore, on the future of the legal
profession, than almost any other kind of scholarship.
Further, we in the academy claim that critiques of other insti-
tutions—courts, legislatures, agencies—fulfill a fundamentally im-
portant duty of the professoriate.137 If we value our role as critics
of others, we can hardly reject our role as critics of ourselves. As
Professor Rubin has observed, the very act of evaluating another’s
work is fundamentally self-critical. The evaluative process places
the criteria, and therefore, the norms of the discipline itself, at is-
sue.138 This self-testing is even more important and even more ef-
fective when the subject of the evaluation is itself an institutional
critique.139 We should hesitate to banish prophetic voices within
our own ranks. Whether the voices are “assimilated” or “rebel-
lious,”140 we need to hear what they have to say.
VI. RATIONALES USED TO DISCOUNT LEGAL

WRITING TOPICS
Even a casual look at the bibliography shows that legal writ-

ing professors are writing substantive, theoretical, and pedagogi-
cal articles, as well as political articles critiquing institutional
choices. In this Section, we examine and respond to claims used to
discount topics in all of these areas.141
137 See e.g. David A. Westbrook, Pierre Schlag and the Temple of Boredom, 57 U. Miami
L. Rev. 649, 652 (2003). Westbrook notes, “In this way, law professors fulfill a very tradi-
tional notion of their duties as public intellectuals—the task of the professor is to improve
the polity through criticism.” Id. at 652–653. He goes on to say that Pierre Schlag has
turned this criticism back onto the legal academy with great success. Id.
139 “The evaluation of another’s work involves a confrontation with it that provides one
of the best opportunities to develop an awareness of one’s own work and the beliefs that
underlie it.” Id. at 889.
140 See generally Larry Catá Backer, Pitied but Not Entitled: The Normative Limita-
tions of Scholarship Advocating Change, 19 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 59 (1997).

141 We focus here on claims about the topics themselves, not claims about the quality of
a particular article. To withstand logical challenge, claims discounting a particular topic

must presume an article in which the author has achieved all the topic would permit. Oth-
erwise, the claim is not addressed logically to the topic but rather to the sufficiency of a
particular effort.
A. Myth #1: Legal Writing Topics Do Not Qualify as Scholarship
One rationale sometimes offered to support a policy discount-

ing legal writing topics is the sweeping generalization that writing
on legal writing topics does not constitute scholarship. Even as-
suming the possibility of a static and universal definition of “legal
scholarship,”142 this assertion cannot sustain reasoned analysis.
First and at the very least, the assertion is overbroad. Recall
the topics in categories one and two described above, such as the
roles and functioning of the judicial and legislative systems; the
doctrine of stare decisis; precedential values and appropriate uses
of legal authority; the forms of legal reasoning; the principles of
statutory construction; relevant ethical duties of lawyers; the
standards of appellate review; and other doctrines relating to ap-
pellate practice. One can hardly deny that these topics qualify as
subjects of legal scholarship. Some of them have been well estab-
lished as subjects of legal scholarship for many years. Consider, for
example, such classics as Judge Benjamin Cardozo’s The Nature of
the Judicial Process;143 Karl Llewellyn’s Bramble Bush144 or his
famous “thrust and parry” article;145 Edward Levi’s classic book on
legal reasoning;146 David Mellinkoff’s The Language of the Law;147
or Robert Cover’s famous Forward to the Supreme Court 1982
Term, Nomos and Narrative.148
Other kinds of legal writing topics are more recent threads of
the legal conversation, but many have been received by the acad-
emy with fanfare.149 Consider, for instance, Steven Winter’s book
on the role of metaphor in law;150 Tony Amsterdam and Jerome
142 Linda S. Greene, Introduction: Scholarly Trends and Paradigms, 10 St. Louis U.
Pub. L. Rev. 181 (1991) (expressing skepticism about rigid definitions of scholarship in light
of the legal academy’s proliferating scholarship paradigms).
143 Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale U. Press 1921).
144 Karl N. Llewellyn, Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study (Oceana Publ. 1930).
145 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395 (1950).
146 Edwards H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (U. Chi. Press 1949).
147 David Mellinkoff, The Language of the Law (Little, Brown & Co. 1963).
148 Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1983).
149 “After several decades of interdisciplinary nourishment, one can hardly peruse a
law journal without encountering references to what once seemed the obscure texts of di-
vergent disciplines: Economics, sociology, philosophy, anthropology, literary criticism and
beyond.” David Kennedy, Critical Theory, Structuralism and Contemporary Legal Scholar-
ship, 21 New Eng. L. Rev. 209, 210 (1985–1986).
150 Steven L. Winter, A Clearing in the Forest: Law, Life and Mind (U. Chi. Press
2001). Professor Winter’s book was the subject of the symposium “Cognitive Legal Studies:
Bruner’s book, Minding the Law;151 James Boyd White’s book on

law as translation;152 Susan Bandes’s anthology on the role of emo-
tion in law;153 Lash LaRue’s book on the Constitution as narra-
tive;154 Fred Schauer’s book on rule-based reasoning;155 Peter
Brooks and Paul Gewirtz’s anthology on narrative and rhetoric in
the law;156 or Lawrence Solan’s book applying generative linguistic
theory to the issues of statutory construction.157
To exclude all legal writing topics from the category “legal
scholarship” would require excluding the work of such renowned
scholars as these and many more. Yet, unless the work of these
well-known legal scholars is excluded from the category of legal
scholarship, no reasoned justification can be advanced to discount
all legal writing topics. The only other possible explanation would
be that topics count as legal scholarship when Professors Cover,
LaRue, Bandes, Schauer, Solan, White, and Winter write about
them, but not when legal writing professors write about them.158
Categorization and Imagination in the Mind of Law.” (The proceedings of that conference
can be found in volume 67, issue 4, of the Brooklyn Law Review.)
151 Anthony G. Amsterdam & Jerome Bruner, Minding the Law (Harv. U. Press 2000).
152 James Boyd White, Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cutural and Legal Criticism
(Univ. Chi. Press 1990) (cited 204 times, Westlaw search Aug. 19, 2004) (reviewed by San-
ford Levinson, Conversing about Justice, 100 Yale L.J. 1855 (1991)). Professor White’s other
work in the area includes When Words Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitu-
tions of Language, Character, and Community (U. Chi. Press 1984) (cited 270 times); The
Legal Imagination: Studies in the Nature of Legal Thought and Expression (Little Brown &
Co. 1973) (cited 186 times); Acts of Hope: Creating Authority in Literature, Law, and Politics
(1994); Heracles’ Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law (U. Wis. Press 1985)
(cited 243 times).
153 Susan A. Bandes, The Passions of Law (N.Y.U. Press 1999).
154 Lewis H. LaRue, Constitutional Law as Fiction: Narrative in the Rhetoric of Author-
ity (Penn. St. U. Press 1995). Professor LaRue’s book was the subject of the symposium
Writing across the Margins, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 943 (1996).
155 Fred Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based
Decision-Making in Law and in Life (Clarendon Press 1991). Dean Schauer’s book and other
work was the subject of the symposium, The Works of Frederick Schauer: Can Law Survive
the Asymmetry of Authority? 19 QLR 463 (2000).
156 Law Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, supra n. 1 (reviewed by Richard A.
Posner, Legal Narratology, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 737 (1997)).

157 Lawrence M. Solan, The Language of Judges (U. Chi. Press 1993).
158 We cannot help but notice that virtually all of the well accepted, even nationally
acclaimed publications about legal writing topics—that is, those whose place as part of legal
scholarship is unquestioned even though they address topics covered primarily in the legal
writing classroom—have been written by men. We also notice that the vast majority of the
people who actually teach legal writing are women. Stanchi, supra n. 131, at 467 (“[An]
institutionalized and illegitimate status hierarchy operat[es] in American law schools. Like
any status hierarchy, its boundaries are well defined and well enforced. . . . [T]his hierarchy
is gendered, with the lowest rank overwhelmingly composed of women and the highest rank
overwhelmingly composed of men. The players in this status hierarchy are the faculties and
Certainly no one in the academy would advocate that we decide

what is legal scholarship based on the identity of the author. 159
Clearly, substantive or theoretical legal writing topics (articles in
categories one and two) are and long have been well within the
scope of acceptable, even admirable, legal scholarship.
Second, the question of whether an article about pedagogy or
institutional practice (categories three and four) constitutes “real”
scholarship is unrelated to whether the topic pertains to legal writ-
ing. The value of articles on pedagogy is the subject of an ongoing
debate in the academy.160 Nothing in that debate, however, distin-
guishes whether the article addresses teaching methods for a
casebook course,161 a seminar,162 or a legal writing course.163 Law
schools will have to decide how to value such articles as Todd
Rakoff’s The Harvard First-Year Experiment;164 Philip Kissam’s
Seminar Papers;165 Scott Burnham’s Teaching Legal Ethics in Con-
tracts;166 Cass Sunstein’s Risk Assessment and Resource Allocation
by Law Students;167 and Leonard Riskin’s Mindfulness: Founda-
administrations of American law schools. At the top are the tenured ‘doctrinal’ professors,
roughly 70 percent of whom are male; at the bottom are legal writing professors, roughly 70
percent of whom are female.”).
We hope that the concept of “traditional” scholarship is not gender-related, but it
may be. Professor Karin Mika observed a similar phenomenon in “traditional” constitution-
al scholarship. Karin Mika, Self-Reflection within the Academy: The Absence of Women in
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 9 Hastings Women’s L.J. 273, 305–306 (1998) (“However, the
bulk of writings by female authors tend to appear in the context of a gender-related discus-
sion. The majority of venerated constitutional law ‘scholars’ are overwhelmingly male. Alt-
hough there were many prolific female authors in the Nineteenth century who wrote elo-
quently about contemporary issues, their work usually does not appear in our legal texts.
This is, no doubt, because their work was not, and is still not, considered traditional legal
scholarship that could be used in conjunction with the case method of study.”).
159 For an interesting related point, see Carter, supra n. 39, at 2066 (“[O]ne claim that
seemed absolutely inadmissible is that either article might stand on its own. Evidently,
there is no “on its own” any longer. Not only must one know the context, one must know the
author. The more one knows about the author, the less work one has to do to evaluate the
argument.”).
160 See supra sec. 5(C).
161 See e.g. Kevin R. Johnson, Integrating Racial Justice into the Civil Procedure Survey
Course, 54 J. Leg. Educ. 242 (2004).

162 See e.g. Fajans & Falk, supra n. 107.
163 See e.g. Linda L. Berger, A Reflective Rhetorical Model: The Teacher as Reader and
Writer, 6 Leg. Writing 57 (2000).

164 Todd Rakoff, The Harvard First-Year Experiment, 39 J. Leg. Educ. 491 (1989).
165 Philip C. Kissam, Seminar Papers, 40 J. Leg. Educ. 339 (1990).
166 Scott J. Burnham, Teaching Legal Ethics in Contracts, 41 J. Leg. Educ. 105 (1991).
167 Christopher E. Houston & Cass Sunstein, Risk Assessment Resource Allocation and
Fairness: Evidence from Law Students, 48 J. Leg. Educ. 496 (1998).

tional Training for Dispute Resolution.168 Whatever a law school

decides about the value of pedagogical articles, clear-sighted and
fair-minded assessment requires that articles on torts pedagogy,
civil procedure pedagogy, seminar pedagogy, or legal writing peda-
gogy be treated the same way.169
Similarly, debate over the value of articles critiquing the insti-
tutional practices of legal education is ongoing,170 but nothing in
that debate distinguishes among topics challenging institutional
practices based on race, gender, jurisprudential school, skills
courses in general, or legal writing courses in particular. Whatever
a law school decides about the value of articles on institutional
practices, all rigorous articles critiquing institutional practices
should be treated alike.
At some law schools, pedagogical or political articles may be
counted as legal scholarship, and the relevant question is the qual-
ity of a particular article. Other law schools may take the opposite
view, refusing to consider any pedagogical or political article, no
matter what its intellectual rigor. But there is no basis for count-
ing a pedagogical or political article about another subject area
and not counting a similar article about legal writing.
In fact, most law schools that discount pedagogical or political
topics probably apply that policy across the board, to all subject
areas. Consider two recent articles, Teaching Civil Procedure
through Its Top Ten Cases, Plus or Minus Two171 and Making Con-
tracts Relevant: Thirteen Lessons for the First-Year Contracts
Course.172 Each article has something important to say. The civil
168 Leonard Riskin, Mindfulness: Foundational Training for Dispute Resolution, 54 J.
Leg. Educ. 79 (2004).

169 Christopher D. Stone, supra n. 58, at 1165 (“[The law] involves continual explana-
tion and justification. Justice requires that like cases be treated alike; analogies have to be
sorted into those that fit and those that do not. Metaphors have to be kept within the
bounds of judicious constraint.”).
170 See e.g. Keith Aoki, The Scholarship of Reconstruction and the Politics of Backlash,
81 Iowa L. Rev. 1467 (1996); Arthur Austin, Race and Gender Exclusivity in Legal Scholar-
ship, 4 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 71 (1997); Milner S. Ball, The Legal Academy and Minor-
ity Scholars, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1855 (1990) (response to Randall Kennedy, Racial Critiques
of Legal Academia, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1745 (1989)); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiog-
raphy and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me in the Legal Academy, 77 Va. L.
Rev. 539 (1991); Phoebe A. Haddon, Keynote Address: Redefining Our Roles in the Battle for
Inclusion of People of Color in Legal Education, 31 New Eng. L. Rev. 709 (1997); Natsu
Saito Jenga, Finding Our Voices, Teaching Our Truth: Reflections on Legal Pedagogy and
Asian American Identity, 3 Asian Pac. Am. L.J. 81 (1995).
171 Kevin M. Clermont, Teaching Civil Procedure through Its Top Ten Cases, Plus or
Minus Two, 47 St. Louis U. L.J. 111 (2003).

172 Robert M. Lloyd, Making Contracts Relevant: Thirteen Lessons for the First-Year
procedure article applies schema theory to argue that civil proce-

dure professors should give more attention to the subject’s land-
mark cases. The contracts article recommends a preventive law
focus in the first-year contracts course.
Most law schools that would discount an article about legal
writing pedagogy probably would discount these articles as well, at
least for tenure and promotion purposes. At many schools, howev-
er, the articulation of those two decisions would differ. For the ar-
ticle about civil procedure pedagogy, faculty members would say
that articles about pedagogy do not count as legal scholarship.
They would not say that civil procedure articles do not count. For
the article about legal writing pedagogy, however, faculty mem-
bers are not likely to say that articles about pedagogy do not count.
Instead, they are likely to say that legal writing articles do not
count.
Similarly, consider an article on valuing diversity in hiring for
doctrinal positions, such as Derrick Bell’s Diversity and Academic
Freedom.173 If a law school has adopted a policy that discounts ar-
ticles critiquing institutional practices, faculty members are likely
to explain the problem with this racial critique of law school hiring
and tenuring processes by saying that articles about law school
politics do not count. They are not likely to say that articles about
race do not count. If the article is about hiring practices affecting
legal writing professors, however,174 those same faculties may jus-
tify discounting the article by explaining that it is about legal writ-
ing.
These differences in description constitute errors in categori-
zation,175 perhaps prompted by a classic induction error—the erro-
Contracts Course, 36 Ariz. St. L.J. 257 (2004).

173 Derrick A. Bell, Diversity and Academic Freedom, 43 J. Leg. Educ. 371 (1993). Other
recent examples are Monte N. Stewart & H. Dennis Tolley, Investigating Possible Bias: The
American Legal Academy’s View of Religiously Affiliated Law Schools, 54 J. Leg. Educ. 136
(2004), and Deborah L. Rhode, Midcourse Corrections: Women in Legal Education, 53 J.
Leg. Educ. 475 (2003).
174 See e.g. Levine & Stanchi, supra n. 4; Neumann, supra n. 131. Professors Levine
and Stanchi teach legal writing at Temple University. Professor Neumann taught legal
writing at Hofstra University.
175 “A category is a set of things . . . treated as if they were, for the purposes at hand,
similar or equivalent or somehow substitutable for each other.” Amsterdam & Bruner, su-
pra n. 151, at 20. Professors Amsterdam and Bruner point out,
Acquiring and negotiating our categories is part of . . . learning . . . a profes-
sion. . . . Whether the categories deal with nearly universal human experi-
ence . . . or are found only in . . . legal digest headings[,] . . . we need to get them
neous assumption that legal writing articles are pedagogical or

political. And since induction and classification are steps in the
construction of analogies,176 these errors lead directly into errors of
analogical reasoning. The article on civil procedure pedagogy is
analogized to other articles on pedagogy, while the article on legal
writing pedagogy is analogized to other (unknown but imagined)
articles on legal writing topics. Essentially, the speaker is articu-
lating the conclusion of an unspoken syllogism.177 The induction
error occurs in the minor premise, but since the premises are un-
articulated, the error is “smuggled”178 into the reasoning process.
An examination of the actual categories of legal writing topics
would expose the analogical error.
We in the academy have a special responsibility to take seri-
ously our reasoning processes and to take care with our language.
As Professor Cover explained, language is power.179 Our language
creates and constrains the intellectual world we inhabit,180 and the
world of legal scholarship is no different. The categorization error
and the conclusion of the faulty syllogism produce a serious conse-
quence—they exclude an entire subject area from academic explo-
ration without offering a justification for the exclusion.
right both to make sense of the world and to communicate with one another
about it.
That means we are always at risk that our categories may lead us
astray. Indispensable instruments, they are also inevitable beguilers. To inter-
rogate their uses and their dangers is a necessary part of legal studies, as it is
of any preparation for considered thought and action.
Id. at 19.
176 Dan Hunter, No Wilderness of Single Instances: Inductive Inference in Law, 48 J.
Leg. Educ. 365, 374 (1998).

177 Major premise: Articles about pedagogy or politics do not count. Minor premise:
Legal writing articles are about pedagogy or politics. Conclusion: Legal writing articles do
not count.
178 Professor Rubin uses the term “smuggling” in discussing the evaluative criterion
that legal scholarship should state its normative premises. He writes,

The imagery of smuggling is quite precise here. One can smuggle contraband,
such as narcotics, but one can also smuggle perfectly legitimate items, such as
wristwatches. The defining characteristic of smuggling is that the material is
brought in clandestinely, and not subject to established rules of inspection.
Thus, there is no way to determine whether it is contraband or not, no way to
gauge its quality, and no way to control its effect upon the market.
Rubin, supra n. 32, at 916 n. 88.
179 See generally Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601 (1986).
180 “[L]anguage is no mere instrument which we can control at will; it controls us.”
Frederick Pollock & Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law vol. 1, 87 (2d
ed., Cambridge U. Press 1898).
When faculty members talk about legal scholarship, we should

speak clearly, precisely, and candidly. We can say that legal writ-
ing topics will not count for promotion and tenure only if we intend
also to exclude the work of many of today’s best-known legal schol-
ars. We can exclude legal writing topics as a category only if we
intend also to exclude topics like appellate procedure, forms of le-
gal reasoning, the functioning of the common law system, ethical
duties pertaining to advocacy, and the philosophy of language. But
if we do not mean to exclude the books and articles addressing
those topics, we should not say that “legal writing articles” will not
support promotion and tenure.
We can say that articles about pedagogy or politics will not
count. But if we take that position, we should not articulate differ-
ently our reasons for discounting an article on legal writing peda-
gogy and an article on civil procedure pedagogy. We should not say
that our decision in one case was based on the article’s relation-
ship to a particular course, such as legal writing, while our deci-
sion in the other case was based on the article’s pedagogical or po-
litical nature.
Or we can say that pedagogical and political articles can serve
important scholarly values by directly improving our ability to
make good lawyers, thereby improving the law and the legal pro-
cess.181 We can say that these articles will be evaluated like any
other kind of article182—that is, by looking at the intellectual rigor
the article required, the comprehensiveness of the research on
which it is based, its contribution to the scholarly conversation on
its topic, and its potential to advance the study and practice of
law.183 Some pedagogical articles clearly meet these standards;
some may not. Some authors may intend their pedagogical pieces
as service to the academy and would not claim that they represent
scholarship. But the evaluation process should be based on criteria
related to the function of legal scholarship rather than on factual
and logical errors.
And if we say that articles about pedagogy do not count, we
should not say that one of the primary reasons for spending mas-
181 See supra nn. 117–126 and accompanying text.

182 “[A law] school should commit itself to avoiding prejudice against any particular
methodology or perspective used in teaching or scholarship. When evaluating any work
embodying innovative or less widely pursued methodologies or perspectives, the standard
should be neither higher nor lower than the standard used for evaluating more traditional
work.” AALS Tenure Report, supra n. 20, at 505.
sive institutional and personal resources on scholarship is to en-

hance our teaching.
B. Myth #2: Non-Legal Writing Faculty Members Do Not Know

How to Evaluate Legal Writing Articles
The other rationale sometimes offered for discounting legal

writing topics is the concern that non-legal writing faculty mem-
bers do not know how to evaluate legal writing topics. This ra-
tionale essentially says, “Your scholarship does not count for pro-
motion and tenure because I do not know enough about your field.”
Or perhaps, as Judge Richard Posner put it, “what I do not know is
not knowledge.”184
One must question a rationale that, by its very definition, lim-
its scholarly inquiry to existing fields. Such a rationale flies in the
face of a fundamental purpose of scholarship in the academy: to
generate and disseminate new knowledge.185 If an evaluator feels
inadequate to evaluate a publication, perhaps a more appropriate
response is a combination of becoming more competent and seek-
ing review by others already competent in the field. Indeed, law
faculties have long evaluated legal scholarship outside their indi-
vidual areas of expertise in just this fashion.186
We do not mean to make light of the difficulty of evaluating an
article in an unfamiliar area. Evaluating works outside one’s own
area always requires some assessment of the place of that work in
184 Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 Yale L.J. 1113,
1129 (1981) (“[The difficulty] of fitting interdisciplinary research into the law-school
mold . . . is compounded by the well-known hostility of scholars to types of scholarship dif-
ferent from their own, a hostility captured in the adage, ‘what I do not know is not
knowledge.’”).
185 Am. Assn. U. Profs., General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and
Academic Tenure, 1 Am. Assn. U. Profs. Bull. 17 (1915) (reprinted in L. & Contemp. Probs.
393, 397 (Summer 1990)); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, supra n. 86, at 76 (“[L]aw schools
should always be open to new ideas. Scholarship should never be dismissed as unworthy
merely because it is unorthodox, controversial, or even deeply unsettling.”).
186 The American Association of Law Schools reported that
Nearly two-thirds [of law schools] indicated that the school assigns responsibil-
ity for scholarship assessment within the law school to more than one category
(e.g., faculty colleague with special knowledge, tenure committee, all tenured
faculty). . . . Nearly 70 percent use outside evaluations on a regular basis and
another 10 percent in “exceptional cases,” but not regularly. This compares with
40 percent in 1979 using outside evaluations regularly, and another 20 percent
using them in exceptional cases, meaning that in 1979 just under 60 percent
used outside evaluation at all compared to 80 percent in 1989.
AALS Tenure Report, supra n. 20, at 485.
the existing literature, a literature with which the evaluator is

unfamiliar. An evaluator whose own area is civil procedure, for
instance, faces this difficulty whether the subject of evaluation is
in the area of legal writing, sales, criminal law, or international
law. Since this sort of difficulty has never stopped faculties from
evaluating other scholarship, however, the concern must mean
something else.
And in fact it does. Faculty members concerned about their
ability to evaluate legal writing scholarship are seeing in some
articles a methodological difference with their own work. In other
articles, they sense an ideological difference. In still other articles,
they find both methodological and ideological differences.187 To
evaluate such articles is “to cross the conceptual divide that sepa-
rates one’s own views from the views of the author.”188 The journey
across that divide has enormous value, for to cross it is to see the
world in new ways. As lawyers, teachers, and scholars, this is pre-
cisely the kind of journey we have a duty to make, for all three
roles ask us to be ready to look at the world differently.189 And in
the case of tenure decisions, we have another kind of duty to make
that journey. As Professor Rubin chides, “[I]t is surely irresponsi-
ble to reject the work categorically and deny the person tenure. In
that situation, at least, legal academics are obligated to evaluate
the works of those in different subdisciplines as fairly and consci-
entiously as possible.”190
So how does a non-legal writing faculty member evaluate a le-
gal writing article? Again, we find that stereotypical generaliza-
tions about legal writing topics simply do not work. The field in-
cludes topics of precisely the kind law faculties have been evaluat-
ing for years. It also includes less traditional scholarship such as
interdisciplinary topics, skills topics, and highly theoretical topics.
These different kinds of articles present an evaluator with signifi-
cantly different situations.
For topics within the fold of traditional scholarship, evalua-
tion should proceed as it would for any other traditional article. No
187 Rubin, supra n. 32, at 940–941.

188 Id. at 941.
189 “Of course, importing foreign methods into the traditional categories of legal analy-
sis and synthesis can be dismissed as mere ‘academic stuff,’ but this dismissal is incon-
sistent with our professional traditions of flexibility, and comprehensiveness, and our will-
ingness to learn anything that will be necessary or helpful.” Phillip C. Kissam, The Evalua-
tion of Legal Scholarship, 63 Wash. L. Rev. 221, 241 (1988).
law faculty should have trouble evaluating a classic analytical ar-

ticle on some topic about precedent, procedure, or statutory con-
struction. Most faculties agree on at least some norms,191 such as
the intellectual rigor the article required, the comprehensiveness
of the research on which it is based, its contribution to the scholar-
ly conversation on its topic, and its value to the advancement of
the study of law. These norms apply easily to this variety of legal
writing scholarship.
Many articles meet those criteria by using a relatively stand-
ard schema. They (1) pose a question that matters; (2) present the
current scholarly thought on that question; (3) identify an inade-
quacy in that analysis; (4) and propose and support a new or sup-
plemental answer.192 Law faculties have been evaluating articles
like these ever since scholarship has been evaluated in the acade-
my. Non-legal writing professors can recognize good scholarship on
these traditional legal writing topics, just as a contracts professor
can recognize good scholarship in tax or intellectual property.
A more difficult question is whether less traditional legal writ-
ing scholarship can be evaluated fairly using such generally appli-
cable criteria. But this same question arises in other nontradition-
al areas193 and is debated there as well. Some argue that nontradi-
tional scholarship should be evaluated by a distinct set of crite-
ria.194 Such an approach would seem to require a distinct set of
criteria for each subdiscipline.195 Others argue that scholarship in
newer subdisciplines should be evaluated by the same criteria that
apply to all other legal scholarship.196 For instance, Stephen
Carter has argued that scholarship about race should be evaluated
191 AALS Tenure Report, supra n. 20, at 489–491.

192 For a similar schema, see Rubin, supra n. 32, at 903–904.
193 Other non-traditional areas include interdisciplinary and empirical scholarship,
clinical scholarship, and scholarship providing political, racial, feminist, or cultural critique.
194 Milner S. Ball, The Legal Academy and Minority Scholars, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1855
(1990); Robin D. Barnes, Race Consciousness: The Thematic Content of Racial Distinctive-
ness in Critical Race Scholarship, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1864 (1990); Leslie G. Espinoza, Masks
and Other Disguises: Exposing Legal Academia, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1878(1990); Alex M.
Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 Yale L.J. 2007 (1991); Joy, supra n. 22, at 393–
397; Duncan Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia,
1990 Duke L.J. 705.
195 We adopt Rubin’s definition of “subdiscipline” here. Rubin uses “subdiscipline” to
refer to “[w]orks that do not display qualitative differences from one another in either ideol-
ogy or methodology.” Rubin, supra n. 32, at 909.
196 E.g. Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 Harv. L. Rev.
1745 (1989).
using the same criteria as those more generally applicable. He

wrote
[T]he quality of a piece of scholarly work . . . turns on a demon-
strated mastery of the relevant material and the ability to con-
tribute to a dialogue, or to spark a new one. It turns on saying
something that not only is not in the prior literature, but is not
obvious in light of the prior literature. It turns, further, on mak-
ing a logical argument—not a correct one, necessarily, or even a
non-controversial one, but certainly one that is coherent. And it
turns on setting out fairly the possible objections and dealing
with them, or even noting, when appropriate, the extent to
which they successfully limit one’s own position. 197
The difficulties of applying these criteria to nontraditional
work are normal and even necessary for scholarly development of
a healthy discipline. Professor Kissam points out that our evalua-
tion always lags behind new developments in scholarship.198 In-
deed it must, for if mature work
is to be of high quality, significant originality, and substantial
importance or influence, the scholar, in most cases, will need to
break away from the more conventional approaches and meth-
ods exhibited by the earlier stages or perspectives of legal
scholarship.199
He writes that this break may “feature rich understandings of
practical professional contexts”200 or “may include knowledge of
more effective teaching and communication techniques, the tacit
knowledge of outstanding practitioners, or simply the knowledge
and methods of other academic disciplines.”201 Therefore, he
writes, our “formalist paradigm” is insufficient for evaluating
scholarship. It limits our vision of “the richer possibilities that
might accrue from pursuit of more innovative patterns in contem-
porary scholarship.”202
Professor Geoffrey Stone, then Dean of the University of Chi-
cago Law School, warned against three potential problems in eval-
uating newer forms of scholarship:
197 Stephen L. Carter, The Best Black, and Other Tales, 1 Reconstruction 6, 29 (Winter
1990).
198 Kissam, supra n. 189, at 223.
199 Id. at 246.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 247.
202 Id.
First, we may undervalue “good” work because we do not un-

derstand it. Aficionados of law and literature may not appreci-
ate the subtle elegance of a novel application of the Coase Theo-
rem. They may not understand why the work is original or use-
ful. Moreover, because they do not grasp the work’s substance,
they may tend to dismiss its significance. Even law professors
fall victim to human nature.
Second, we may undervalue “good” work because it suggests,
implicitly or explicitly, that the work we do is not valuable.
Practitioners of law and economics may feel that feminist theo-
ry rejects the basic premises of their work. An all-too-human
response is to dismiss those ideas that do not “appropriately”
value our own.
Third, we may undervalue “good” work because it promotes a
view of the legal system or society or human relations that is
fundamentally inconsistent with our own world view. Such
work may challenge not only the value of our work, but also our
broader sense of the appropriate order of things socially, eco-
nomically, politically, and personally. Work that casts doubt
upon everything we cling to is not likely to be embraced enthu-
siastically.203
Perhaps the two most thorough and thoughtful treatments of
evaluation of nontraditional scholarship are Professor Rubin’s On
beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship,204 and
Professor Kissam’s The Evaluation of Legal Scholarship.205 Profes-
sors Rubin and Kissam agree on many points. Both remind us that
we should evaluate scholarship in light of its purposes, and each
grounds his suggested evaluative approach expressly in those pur-
poses.206 Both support the value of nontraditional scholarship207
203 Geoffrey R. Stone, supra n. 86, at 74. Appropriately, Dean Stone also cautions that
scholarship is not necessarily good simply because it is new. Id.

204 Rubin, supra n. 32.
205 Kissam, supra n. 189.
206 Id. at 222, 230; Rubin, supra n. 32, at 902–903.
207 Kissam identifies six categories of legitimate legal scholarship. Kissam, supra
n. 189, at 230–239. The first four categories he considers traditional: legal analysis, legal
synthesis, the resolution of doctrinal issues, and teaching materials. Even these categories,
he observes, “are developing a new complexity” of values, subcategories, and methods. Id. at
239. The other two categories, scholarship of understanding and scholarship of critique, are
based on a perspective outside legal doctrine itself. Publications in these categories use a
broad array of methods and reflect diverse perspectives on law, the legal system, and legal
education. In the scholarship of understanding, Kissam includes scholarship such as clinical
or skills scholarship, that is, scholarship that “analyzes, reflects upon, and interprets legal
practices as opposed to legal doctrine.” Id. at 237 (emphasis added). Many legal writing
topics would fall within this category. Kissam observes that today’s scholarly pluralism has
and deal with the difficulties of evaluating scholarship when the

evaluator is outside the article’s subdiscipline, and therefore, un-
familiar with its literature, its ideology, and its methodologies. 208
Both conclude that fair, effective evaluation of nontraditional
scholarship is both important and achievable. Finally, both con-
clude that the key to effective evaluation is the evaluator’s duty to
notice, admit, and lay aside her own inherent perspectives and
biases.209
Professor Kissam’s approach is exhortatory. He urges faculties
to remain open to valuing a variety of kinds of scholarship and to
maintain a flexible approach to evaluation. An evaluator should
apply relevant criteria in light of the specific intended audience for
the piece,210 as well as its values, purposes, methods, and perspec-
tives.211 Further, the evaluator should be watchful for and mindful
of any social or political obstacles that might interfere with effec-
tive evaluation.212 Criteria for value should include whether the
work forges connections to larger projects; informs or inspires the
work of others; illuminates a difficult problem; provides practically
useful knowledge; disseminates knowledge to new audiences;
wades into the deep waters of theory; or even delights and inspires
its readers.213
Professor Kissam cautions that, despite the rhetoric we some-
times employ, we should not expect all scholarship to meet the
highest absolute standard,214 and this refreshingly honest state-
confused and disturbed us, but he writes, “My reason for noting the current welter of schol-
arly methods is not to damn them, however, but to praise them and to argue for a more
careful evaluation of contemporary legal scholarship.” Id. at 239–240.
Rubin is careful not to express his own view. This restraint is appropriate given his
primary thesis, which argues for transcending one’s own subjectivity. His unwavering in-
sistence that all evaluation is phenomenological, however, and his careful, sustained efforts
to provide a fair evaluative model for nontraditional scholarship provide strong evidence
that he values nontraditional voices. See generally Rubin, supra n. 32.
208 Kissam, supra n. 189, at 222; Rubin, supra n. 32, at 940–961.
209 Kissam, supra n. 189, at 252–255; Rubin, supra n. 32, at 897–902.
210 Kissam, supra n. 189, at 227.
211 Id. at 223.
212 Id. We would include here mindfulness of teaching loads and administrative duties
that impair the author’s ability to devote time to scholarship. We do not propose lowering
qualitative standards. Rather, the institution should adjust the legal writing faculty mem-
ber’s load to be more equivalent to that of other faculty members or provide sufficient re-
lease time to even the field. A law school should not burden legal writing members with
heavy teaching and administrative loads and then use the very loads they themselves im-
posed to argue that legal writing faculty members do not have the time to write, and there-
fore, should not be included as tenure-track faculty.
213 Id. at 223–230.
214 Id. at 229. Professor Rubin agrees; he writes that when law schools require that
ment applies to traditional and nontraditional scholarship alike.

According to Professor Kissam, we should (and most of us do) re-
quire only “good” scholarship, which he defines as scholarship that
is original and competent, measured by whether it is factually ac-
curate, well written, and based on appropriate methods.215 Wheth-
er a faculty agrees with Professors Kissam, Rubin, and Leff on this
point, a faculty must take care to hold traditional and nontradi-
tional scholarship to the same standard. If a faculty usually finds
traditional scholarship sufficient when it is original, factually ac-
curate, well written, and based on appropriate methods, the facul-
ty should not apply a higher standard to nontraditional scholar-
ship.216
Professor Rubin reaches the same conclusions about evalua-
tion but takes a route quite different from Professor Kissam’s
broader generalizations and exhortations. Professor Rubin uses
the work of Jürgen Habermas, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Martin
Heidegger, and Edmund Husserl to build a full theory of evalua-
tion. As a foundational matter, Professor Rubin reminds us that
all evaluation grows out of the phenomenological experience of the
evaluator217 and that therefore, all scholarship is historically and
subjectively contextualized.218 He proposes a theory of evaluation
that does not claim an objectivity it cannot achieve. Rather, his
theory assumes and accounts for the effect of differences in indi-
every tenure piece have a noticeable impact, “they are either claiming a false standard for
purposes of self-aggrandizement, or falling into the sort of misstatements that result from
an intuitive approach to evaluation.” Rubin, supra n. 32, at 937. As Arthur Leff has written,
“Legal scholarship is what legal scholars do. Like all craftsmen, some are luckier than oth-
ers. Some, I suppose, never attain the grace of doing anything particularly well. Most do
sometimes; some do more frequently; none does very often.” Arthur A. Leff, Afterword, 90
Yale L.J. 1296 (1981).
215 Kissam, supra n. 189, at 227–228.
216 Kissam defines other standards, in ascending order, as “important” scholarship
(which may have the potential to impact the lives and work of others or to resolve a particu-
larly difficult intellectual question) and “influential” or “outstanding” scholarship (which
“substantially affects the behavior of others or causes others to change fundamentally how
they think about difficult issues”). Id. at 228–229.
217 Professor Rubin stated the following:
Underlying the critique of methodology is an epistemology grounded in the per-

sonal experience of individual human beings. That experience is seen as the
starting point for all intellectual inquiry, the ultimate ground-plane or referent
for thought. Any claims about the world must be built upon the foundation of
individual experience—the ‘lifeworld’ that the individual inhabits—for nothing
else is real to that individual.
Rubin, supra n. 32, at 907.
218 Id. at 908.
vidual experience, particularly with regard to differences both of

methodology and of ideology.219
Professor Rubin proposes that all scholarship be evaluated by
the same criteria but that certain “sensitivities” be applied to
scholarship outside one’s own subdiscipline. Specifically, all schol-
arship should be evaluated according to (1) the degree to which it
identifies its foundational norms (its normative clarity); (2) the
degree to which it presents a logical rationale for its claims (its
persuasiveness); (3) its relationship to the historical development
of its field (its significance); and (4) the degree to which it contains
“an identifiable insight that the evaluator can grasp through ap-
plication”220 (its applicability).221 To evaluate a work, Professor
Rubin says, we must know “what scholars in the field are attempt-
ing to achieve.”222
Evaluating work in a subdiscipline different from one’s own
requires the evaluator to transcend her own subdiscipline,223 so
Professor Rubin suggests employing the “sensitivities” of doubt
and anxiety. Doubt is an act of will, an intellectual effort that al-
lows us to bracket our own natural experience of the world and
therefore recognize it as just that—our own phenomenological ex-
perience.224 Anxiety is more emotion-based, arising against our
will. Anxiety is a “sensation of uncertainty” about one’s own be-
liefs.225 Both doubt and anxiety “suggest an openness about one’s
own work, a willingness to stand apart from it and see it as merely
one position among many.”226 Professor Rubin writes,
If one finds oneself rehearsing one’s prior arguments, or articu-
lating refutations in one’s mind, or searching assiduously for
new ways to justify one’s conclusions, then a work which gener-
ates such responses should be judged to be of value. Thus, the
very process of formulating counter-arguments, which is a
mechanism for outright rejection of the author’s work when un-
219 By “methodology,” Rubin means a set of procedures generating research and resolv-
ing questions. By “ideology,” he means “an interlinked set of normative beliefs that generate
a comprehensive vision of a given subject.” Id. at 899.
220 Id. at 937.
221 Id. at 912–940.
222 Id. at 902.
223 Id. at 943.
224 Id. at 944–946.
225 Id. at 946.
226 Id.
critically performed, becomes a datum for assessing that work’s

quality in the context of a more disciplined evaluative theory.227
Thus, if the evaluator is willing to be both honest and self-aware,
the very distance between the evaluator and the article provides
the opportunity to gauge the article’s effectiveness.
According to Professor Rubin, the degree to which the work
differs from one’s own determines the degree of reliance on doubt
and anxiety.228 For work that differs in both methodology and ide-
ology, the sensitivities of self-doubt and anxiety should guide
judgments of all criteria except the degree to which the work iden-
tifies and remains consistently within its foundational norms.229
A word about the role of ideology is in order here. As we have
seen, Professor Rubin defines an ideology as “an interlinked set of
normative beliefs that generate a comprehensive vision of a given
subject.”230 He cautions that
those who subscribe to [an ideology] do not perceive it as an
ideology at all, but simply as the proper way to view the world.
When such an ideology is maintained by the majority of schol-
ars in an academic field, it will define the boundaries of the
field and regulate debate within it.231
Because Professor Rubin is writing primarily about scholarly
camps such as law and economics, critical legal studies, or feminist
legal theory, his examples of ideological differences all pertain to
different views of the legal system. But ideological differences cer-
tainly exist with regard to legal education as well. In fact, because
they place at issue the allocation of our own and our institutions’
finite resources, ideological differences over legal education can be
even more painfully divisive than jurisprudential differences. We
include both in the category of ideological differences, therefore,
and caution evaluators consciously to transcend their own ideolo-
gies of legal education as well.
If an evaluator has a negative attitude toward a legal writing
topic (without regard to the quality of the article’s analysis of that
topic), the evaluator should recognize that reaction as strong evi-
dence of an ideological difference. According to both Professors
227 Id.
228 Id. at 940–961.
229 Id. at 947–953.
230 Id. at 889 (emphasis added).
231 Id. at 900.
Kissam and Rubin, an evaluator should take great care to remove

from evaluation the effects of an ideological difference. Professor
Kissam’s approach reminds us generally to value broad, open dis-
course. Professor Rubin’s postmodern and phenomenological ap-
proach proposes a decisional model specifically designed to foster a
conscious skepticism about our own ideologies.
Under either approach, legal writing scholarship can be eval-
uated fairly and effectively by faculty members outside the field.
As we have seen, some legal writing topics are examples of tradi-
tional scholarship, presenting no added evaluative challenge. Such
articles can unearth assumptions, point out unnoticed or unex-
pected effects, or resolve troubling problems. Non-legal writing
faculty members should have no trouble evaluating legal writing
scholarship of this sort since, in Professor Rubin’s terms, it does
not differ from traditional scholarship in either methodology or
ideology.
Other legal writing articles—such as articles about interdisci-
plinary topics, topics using empirical methods, topics relating to
legal skills, pedagogical topics or topics about institutional choic-
es—may differ from traditional scholarship in methodology, ideolo-
gy, or both. Evaluating articles in these categories may require
more of the evaluator, but the burden is no greater because the
topic area is legal writing as compared to feminist legal theory,
clinical scholarship, critical race theory, law and literature, rheto-
ric, or law and philosophy. Professor Rubin’s theory of evaluation
is particularly useful here, because it recognizes different evalua-
tive stances depending on the combination of the particular evalu-
ator and the nature of the article. The degree to which the article
differs from one’s own work determines the degree of reliance on
Professor Rubin’s proposed sensitivities.
While Professors Rubin’s and Kissam’s approaches are both
theoretically sound, each has practical limitations. The usefulness
of Professor Kissam’s approach may be limited by its generality
and over-reliance on exhortation. Professor Rubin’s approach may
be limited by its complexity and abstraction. We offer a supple-
mental model intended to be more concrete than exhortation and
simpler, less abstract, and more broadly familiar to the legal acad-
emy than phenomenology and post-modern philosophy. We suggest
that, when evaluating an article using nontraditional methodolo-
gies or written from a nontraditional ideological perspective, the
evaluator adopt a role similar to that of an appellate court review-
ing factual findings. The appellate court does not substitute its
own judgment for the findings of the trial court. An appellate

judge, recognizing the distance between the trial court’s vantage
point and the cold appellate record, does not ask whether she
would have come to the same conclusions as did the trial court.
Rather, she assumes the rhetorical stance of the trial court judge
and evaluates the reasoning process the trial judge used. If there
is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s conclusions, the
appellate judge affirms.232
The distance between the cold appellate record and the trial
court’s vantage point can mimic the distance between an evaluator
and a work of scholarship significantly different from her own. The
evaluator should begin by recognizing the distance between the
subject text and her own work. She therefore approaches the text
with the same kind of tolerance for other views as is inherent in
the appellate review of facts. She is willing to admit the validity of
multiple perspectives and the fallibility of her own. She is pre-
pared to value conclusions with which she disagrees so long as
those conclusions meet fundamental standards of rationality, con-
sistency, and evidentiary sufficiency.
Professors Kissam and Rubin each make a compelling case
justifying this need to transcend individual perspectives. We join
them in urging faculty evaluators to focus on the quality of an ar-
ticle within its own field and according to its own methodological
and ideological perspectives. Also, we join Professors Kissam, Ru-
bin, and others who would apply standard criteria to evaluate le-
gal writing topics, but with the caution that those criteria should
be applied with the kind of openness, flexibility, curiosity, and self-
awareness that Professors Kissam and Rubin both describe.
Professor and former Dean Geoffrey Stone of the University of
Chicago offers some practical advice for achieving this kind of
evaluative process. To evaluate scholarship, especially newer
forms of scholarship, Dean Stone would first ask faculty members
to talk with each other, defining exactly what they like or dislike
about the article. Second, he would have them ask both what is
wrong with the article and what they can learn from it. Third, he
would ask those who understand and appreciate the article to
translate its point and its value into terms more familiar to the
doubters.233 Finally, Dean Stone reminds us of two ideals every
law school should strive to meet: openness to new ideas and insist-
232 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52; see also Pullman-Stand. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 291 (1982).
233 Stone, supra n. 86, at 75.
ence on excellence in scholarly research.234 With this kind of good

faith process, balancing concern for quality with desire for new
ideas, legal writing topics can be evaluated fairly and effectively by
those outside the field.
VII. THE TROUBLE WITH CATEGORIES
For the purposes of this Article, we have referred to a number

of categories of scholarship, but we cannot end this discussion
without recognizing the problems inherent in any attempt to cate-
gorize scholarly inquiry. Even a casual look at the literature re-
veals a confusing variety of taxonomies. Some discussions of legal
scholarship use categories based on jurisprudential schools such as
legal realism, critical legal studies, feminist legal theory, or law
and economics. Others distinguish categories based on differences
in the kinds of sources considered authoritative, such as tradition-
al scholarship based on legal sources, interdisciplinary scholarship
drawing on other disciplines, and empirical scholarship, which
gathers and analyzes particular data bases. Other commentators
categorize scholarship based on its primary audience, identifying
theoretical scholarship intended primarily for an academic audi-
ence, practical scholarship intended to be useful to the practition-
ers, and teaching scholarship, whose primary intended audience is
students. Still other categories are based on the purpose of the in-
dividual piece, for example, legal analysis, legal synthesis, resolu-
tion of doctrinal issues, teaching materials, understanding, and
critique.235 Clinicians use the category “clinical” scholarship.236
Judge Posner distinguishes doctrinal analysis (which “involves the
careful reading and comparison of appellate opinion with a view to
identifying ambiguities, exposing inconsistencies among cases and
lines of cases, developing distinctions, reconciling holdings, and
otherwise exercising the characteristic skills of legal analysis”)
from positive analysis using social science methods and from nor-
mative analysis.237
We have referred to a number of these categories and have
ourselves used the terms “legal writing topics” and “legal writing
scholarship.” But we do so provisionally, knowing that all classifi-
234 Id. at 76–77.

235 Kissam, supra n. 189, at 230–239.
236 E.g. Joy, supra n. 22.
237 Posner, supra n. 184, at 1113.
cations limit and distort, if only subtly. These categories are useful
primarily for their value in facilitating one kind of discussion or
another, but when the issue under discussion changes, a classifica-
tion may well lose its usefulness. The terms “legal writing scholar-
ship” or “legal writing topic” have helped us discuss the value of
scholarship on topics arising in legal writing courses. But this
classification misleads because, as we have seen, “legal writing”
topics overlap with other curricular subject areas, with classifica-
tions based on authoritative sources, with classifications based on
intended audiences and uses, and with ideological and jurispru-
dential categories. The same danger exists for the subcategories
within the larger category. We have discussed four subcategories
of legal writing scholarship—substance or doctrine; theory; peda-
gogy; and institutional choices—but we have seen that many arti-
cles span more than one. Indeed, the best articles almost always
do.
We hope that soon the question whether legal writing topics
can qualify as scholarship will be resolved so the need for a sepa-
rate category will disappear. When that day comes, we hope that
the relevant discussion will focus on the purpose and quality of a
particular scholarly effort, regardless of its underlying course con-
nection.
We join Dean Donald Polden in recommending the categories
set out in Ernest Boyer’s 1990 Carnegie Foundation report on aca-
demic scholarship. Boyer recommends four scholarly categories:
(1) scholarship of discovery (searching for knowledge, primarily for
its own sake); (2) scholarship of integration (connecting ideas
across areas of thought); (3) scholarship of application (testing and
amending theories by applying them to a practice); (4) scholarship
of teaching (gathering and communicating the subject’s material
or studying pedagogical methods).238 Categories such as these are
grounded firmly in the values to be served by scholarship, and
they focus evaluation directly on how well the publication accom-
plished its particular purpose. These categories admit the legiti-
macy of varying ideologies, authoritative sources, particular sub-
ject areas, and intended audiences. They focus the debate on the
merits of the particular scholarly work rather than on contention
between ideological camps. They accordingly advance the funda-
238
Ernest L. Boyer, Scholarship Reconsidered: Priorities of the Professoriate (Carnegie
Found. 1990) (cited and discussed in Polden, supra n. 46, at 3–5).
mental purposes of scholarly inquiry and set the stage for a more
accurate evaluation of individual scholarly efforts.
VIII. WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE US?
As the bibliography demonstrates, many legal writing profes-

sors are publishing. The nearly 300 authors listed here have pub-
lished more than 150 books, over 200 book chapters and supple-
ments, over 650 law review articles, and at least that many arti-
cles in peer-reviewed academic journals, specialty journals de-
signed primarily for practitioners, and many other kinds of publi-
cations. Placements include the most prestigious journals, and top-
ics include most legal subjects. Clearly, legal writing professors
have written much, often without the traditional kinds of institu-
tional support such as research stipends, research assistants, fac-
ulty development funds, formalized scholarship development pro-
grams, or informal mentoring by faculty colleagues.239 And of
course, the traditional institutional support, important as it is,
does not address the primary impediment to writing: heavy teach-
ing loads and high student/faculty ratios. When more legal writing
professors are given the same institutional support other faculty
members receive, undoubtedly they will write even more.
Since legal writing professors are writing and writing well, the
academy cannot postpone the question of what to do with legal
writing scholarship. First, law schools should use all the standard
formal and informal incentives to encourage their legal writing
faculty members to write. Unlike many doctrinal areas, which
have been mined for writing topics for many years, the young field
of legal writing is bursting with important unexplored ideas.240 We
know that writing is important to the substantive development of
all law faculty members because there is no better way to deepen
one’s understanding of an area than to write about it. But writing
is even more important to the development of professors who actu-
ally teach the writing process. Not only does the professor develop
her understanding of the substance of her field, but she develops
her understanding of the nature of the very process she teaches. A
law school should no more discourage a legal writing professor
239 Supra n. 4.
240 See supra n. 86 and accompanying text.
from writing than a tennis club should discourage its tennis coach
from picking up a racket.
Second, there is no legitimate reason to discourage legal writ-
ing professors from writing in their own field. Many legal writing
topics are solidly within the canon of legal scholarship, have been
the subject of work by well-respected legal scholars for many
years, and have been evaluated by law faculties with ease. Other
legal writing topics are more interdisciplinary, empirical, or oth-
erwise innovative. Those topics may be new to the imagination of
the legal academy, but their relationship to law and to the ad-
vancement of legal knowledge is clear. Still other legal writing top-
ics fall within the larger categories of pedagogical or political arti-
cles. The viability of those topics as legal scholarship depends not
on their relationship to legal writing but on a particular faculty’s
assessment of pedagogical or political scholarship in general.
Whatever a faculty decides about pedagogy or politics, the decision
should not be articulated with reference to any particular course.
As Judge Posner241 and others242 have observed, human na-
ture may cause some faculty members to resist new ways of think-
ing and new approaches to the law or to legal scholarship. Profes-
sor Rubin refers to a particular kind of conceptual bias—
ideological bias243—as one of the problems with evaluation of
scholarship. As Professor Rubin explains, “those who subscribe to
[an ideology] do not perceive it as an ideology at all, but simply as
the proper way to view the world.”244 Outdated attitudes toward
legal writing courses and professors function the same way. With-
out updating their knowledge and reassessing their attitudes in
light of that information, well-meaning faculty members simply
may not be able to see the world in any way other than the way it
looked when and where they studied law.245 We need to remind
ourselves, in Aviam Soifer’s words, to “[r]isk [t]oleration,”246 so we
can continue to learn, and to teach what we learn to tomorrow’s
lawyers.
241Posner, supra n. 184, at 1129.

242E.g. Rubin, supra n. 32, at 895.
243 Professor Rubin defines an ideology as “an interlinked set of normative beliefs that
generate a comprehensive vision of a given subject.” Id. at 899.

244 Id. at 900.
246 Aviam Soifer, MuSings, 37 J. Leg. Educ. 20, 24 (1987); id. at 23 (“Many of us seem
so determined to impose our own particular values on an indeterminate world” that we

never recognize “the abyss of uncertainty” right in front of us.).
Speaking about legal scholarship, Frederick Schauer has writ-

ten,
[A]ll disciplines . . . should find it useful to engage in serious
self-reflection and self-criticism. Without it, the contingent
methods and perspectives of the discipline begin to seem inevi-
table, making the exploration of alternatives less possible, and
the understanding of the discipline itself less rich. When a dis-
cipline challenges its own understandings, it takes a step to-
wards deeper appreciation of those understandings themselves.
[Without such self-reflection], there is a risk of forgetting
that . . . normativity is contingent and not inevitable.247
This Article calls for just such self-reflection.
Legal writing faculty members are beginning to find their own
voices. Many have begun the long, exciting process in which, as
Julius Getman writes,
[C]olleagues, cohorts in a movement, teachers, fellow law re-
view editors, and judges are largely replaced by one’s self. It oc-
curs when the writer becomes more concerned with expressing
his or her own vision of justice than with the reaction of others.
Developing one’s own voice is an important step toward scholar-
ly distinction.248
When legal writing faculty members have found their voices, every
part of the academy will be enriched by their contributions. But if
the academy does not allow these voices to develop—if, instead, we
tell them what they may and may not say—we will lose a vital
thread in the conversation about law, the legal profession, and le-
gal education. We will never know what we would have learned
had we been willing to listen.
247 Frederick Schauer, The Authority of Legal Scholarship, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1003,
1003 (1991).
248 Getman, supra n. 21, at 340.
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Taking Standards of Appellate Review Seriously: A Proposal to Amend
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Legal Drafting (Aspen L. & Bus. 1994) (co-authors Jane Rutherford,
Laurel A. Vietzan, and John C. Dernbach).
Brostoff, Teresa
Legal English: An Introduction to the Legal Language and Culture of
the United States (2d ed., Oceana Publications 2003).
English for Lawyers: A Preparatory Course for International Lawyers ,
7 Leg. Writing 137 (2001) (co-authors Ann Sinsheimer and Megan
Ford).
Using a Negotiation Simulation to Improve Analysis, 12 Second Draft

(newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 12 (Nov. 1997) (co-author Ann Sins-
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Busharis, Barbara J.
The Gordian Knot: Uniting Skills and Substance in Employment Dis-
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Rev. 303 (2000) (co-author Suzanne E. Rowe).
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Book Review, 51 DePaul L. Rev. 963 (2002) (reviewing Kristin Luker,
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Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston,
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Teaching the Law School Curriculum (Gerry Hess & Steven Friedland
eds., Carolina Academic Press 2004) (regarding teaching Contract
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Using Both Nonlegal Contexts and Assigned Doctrinal Course Material
to Improve Students’ Outlining and Exam-Taking Skills, 12 Persps.
91 (Winter 2004).
Effective Use of Simulation in CD-Rom or DVD Format in Teaching
Difficult Law Concepts, Proceedings of Winter Intl. Symposium on
Info. & Comm. Tech. (2004).
Demonstrations and Bilingual Teaching Techniques at the University
of Paris: Introducing Civil Law Students to Common Law Legal
Method, 12 Persps. 6 (Fall 2003).
Introducing Students to Legislative Process and Statutory Analysis
through Experiential Learning in a Familiar Context, 38 Gonzaga L.
Rev. 33 (2003).
Legal Method and Writing (4th ed., Aspen L. & Bus. 2002).
Using Classroom Demonstrations in Familiar Nonlegal Contexts to

Introduce New Students to Unfamiliar Concepts of Legal Method
and Analysis, 7 Leg. Writing 37 (2001).
In the Spirit of Regina Austin’s Contextual Analysis: Explo ring Racial
Context in Legal Method, Writing Assignments and Scholarship, 34
John Marshall L. Rev. 281 (2000).
Aguilar v. Avis Rent a Car System, Inc.: The California Supreme
Court Takes a Divided Freeway to Content-Oriented Regulation of
Workplace Speech, 34 U.S.F. L. Rev. 237 (2000).
Reading, Writing, and Rhythm: A Whimsical, Musical Way of Think-
ing about Teaching Legal Method and Writing, 5 Leg. Writing 1
(1999).
Same-Sex Harassment, Textualism, Free Speech and Oncale: Laying
the Groundwork for a Coherent and Constitutional Theory of Sexual
Harassment Liability, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1 (Fall 1998).
Preparing for the Worst—And Striving for the Best: Training Universi-
ty Employees to Respond Clearly, Constructively, and Constitution-
ally to Hateful Speech on Campus, 26 J.L. & Educ. 41 (1997).
Title VII and the First Amendment: Content-Neutral Regulation, Dis-
parate Impact, and the “Reasonable Person”, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 1217
(1997).
Conflict, Apology, and Reconciliation at Arizona State University: A
Second Case Study in Hateful Speech, 27 Cumb. L. Rev. 91 (1996–
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Title VII and Free Speech: The First Amendment Is Not Hostile to a
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The Meaning of “Sex”: Homosexual and Bisexual Harassment under
Title VII, 20 Vt. L. Rev. 55 (1995).
Training a Diverse Student Body for a Multicultural Society, 8 La Ra-
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Paternalism, Counterspeech, and Campus Hate-Speech Codes: A Reply
to Delgado and Yun, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 1249 (1995).
Reconciliation of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties after R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul: Free Speech, Antiharassment Policies, Multicultural Edu-
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Variations on the Problem Method in First-Year and Upper-Division
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ject-Matter Jurisdiction in Judicial Enforcement of EEOC Concilia-
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Title VII and Rule 52(a): Standards of Appellate Review in Disparate

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Colorado Juvenile Law: Cases and Materials (4th ed., Kendall Hunt
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Woman’s Law (William S. Hein & Co. 2000).
Bringing the Jail to the Forefront, 3 Corrections Mgt. Q. (June 1997)
(written as Marcia Minuck).
Cary, Eve
Appellate Advocacy: Principles and Practice (4th ed., LexisNexis 2004)
(co-author Ursula Bentele).
New York Criminal Law (rev. ed., Thomson West 2002) (co-authors
Martin Marcus, Lynn W.L. Fahey, and Richard A. Greenberg).
Road Blocks to Justice: Congressional Stripping of Federal Court Ju-
risdiction—Introduction, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 405 (2001) (Introduction
to the Edward V. Sparer Public Interest Law Fellowship Symposi-
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Police Violence: Causes and Cures (Brooklyn, N.Y., Apr. 15, 1998) 7
J.L. & Policy 81 (1998) (remarks at Brooklyn L. Sch.).
The Rights of Students: The Basic ACLU Guide to a Student’s Rights
(Alan H. Levine & Janet R. Price eds., 3d ed., S. Ill. U. Press 1997).
New York Criminal Law (Richard A. Greenberg ed., West Publg. Co.
1996 & annual Supps.) (contributed to the following chapters: Sex
Offenses, Kidnapping, Offenses against Public Order, Offenses
against the Right to Privacy, Megan’s Law, Escape, Obscenity, Pro s-
titution, Fireworks, and Unauthorized Recording).
Rights and Freedoms under the State Constitution, 13 Touro L. Rev.
59 (1996).
Death-Defying Feats: State Constitutional Challenges to New York’s
Death Penalty, 4 J.L. & Policy 161 (1995) (co-author Mary R. Falk).
People v. Scott and People v. Keta: “Democracy Begins in Conversa-
tion”, 58 Brook. L. Rev. 1279 (1993) (co-author Mary R. Falk).
The NYCLU Guide to Women’s Rights in New York State (Pantheon
Bks. 1978).
Woman and the Law (Natl. Textbook Co. 1977) (co-author Kathleen
Willert Peratis).
Caudill, David S.
Property: Cases, Documents, and Lawyering Strategies (LexisNexis
2004) (co-authors David Crump and David Charles Hricik).
Advocacy, Witnesses, and the Limits of Scientific Knowledge: Is There

an Ethical Duty to Evaluate Your Expert’s Testimony? 39 Idaho L.
Rev. 341 (2003).
Ibsen’s An Enemy of the People and the Public Understanding of Sci-
ence in Law, 16 Geo. Intl. Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (2003).
Lacan and the Discourse of Science in Law, 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 2331
(2003).
Lacan, Science, and Law: Is the Ethnography of Scientism Psychoan a-
lytic? 14 L. & Critique 123 (2003).
Law-and-Literature, Literature-and-Science, and Enhancing the Dis-
course of Law/Science Relations, 27 J. Leg. Prof. 1 (2003).
Post-Trilogy Science in the Courtroom, Part II: What Are the Judges
Still Doing? 15 J. Civ. Litig. 1 (2003) (co-author Lewis H. LaRue).
Professional Deregulation of Prosecutors: Defense Contact with Vic-
tims, Survivors, and Witnesses in the Era of Victims’ Rights, 17 Geo.
J. Leg. Ethics 103 (2003).
Race[,] Science, History, and Law, 9 Wash. & Lee Race & Ethnic An-
cestry L.J. 1 (2003).
Revisiting the Ethics of Representing Professional Athletes: Agents,
“Attorney-Agents,” Full-Service Agencies, and the Dream Team Mod-
el, 3 Va. Sports & Ent. L.J. 31 (2003).
Take It to the Limit, 12 Metascience 238 (2003) (reviewing Arkady
Plotnitsky, The Knowable and the Unknowable: Modern Science,
Nonclassical Thought, and the “Two Cultures” (U. Mich. Press
2002)).
Why Judges Applying the Daubert Trilogy Need to Know about the
Social, Institutional, and Rhetorical—and Not Just the Methodolog-
ical—Aspects of Science, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 1 (2003) (co-author Lewis
H. LaRue).
Barely Opening, Then Slamming Shut, Science’s “Black Box” in Law: A
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(2002).
Book Review, 37 Australian J. Pol. Sci. 204 (2002) (reviewing Peter
Fitzpatrick, Modernism and the Grounds of Law (Cambridge U.
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Ethnography and the Idealized Accounts of Science in Law, 39 San
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Foreword to the Survey: From Blueprints to Bricks: A Survey of Cur-
rent Baseball Stadium Financing Projects, 34 Urb. Law. 331 (2002).
Give Me a Line in a U.S. Supreme Court Opinion or in Official Com-
mentary to the Rules of Evidence for Admissibility of Experts in
Court, and I Will Move the [Legal] World, 39 Hous. L. Rev. 437
(2002).
Law, Science, and Science Studies: Contrasting the Deposition of a

Scientific Expert with Ethnographic Studies of Scientific Practice, 12
S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 85 (2002).
Scientific Narratives in Law: An Introduction, 14 L. & Literature 253
(2002).
Book Review, 16 J.L. & Religion 713 (2001) (reviewing Harold J. Ber-
man, Faith and Order: The Reconciliation of Law and Religion (Wil-
liam B. Eerdmans Publg. Co. 1993)).
A Calvinist Perspective on the Place of Faith in Legal Scholarship, in
Christian Perspectives on Legal Thought 307 (Michael W. McConnell
et al. eds., Yale U. Press 2001).
Law and Belief: Critical Legal Studies and Philosophy of the Law-
Idea, in Christian Perspectives on Legal Thought 109 (Michael W.
McConnell et al. eds., Yale U. Press 2001).
Law and Science: An Essay on Links and Socio-Natural Hybrids, 51
Syracuse L. Rev. 841 (2001).
Post-Trilogy Science in the Courtroom: What Are the Judges Doing? 13
J. Civ. Litig. 341 (2001) (co-author Lewis H. LaRue).
Junk Philosophy of Science: The Paradox of Expertise and Interdisci-
plinary in Federal Courts, 57 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 685 (2000) (co-
author Richard E. Redding).
“Law Does Not Ignore the Bed” and Other Aphorisms: The Encore of
Lacan’s Encore in English, 13 Intl. J. Semiotics L. 243 (2000) (re-
viewing Jacques Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love
and Knowledge: Encore, 1972–1973 (Bruce Fink trans., Jacques-
Alain Miller ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1998))).
The Anatomy in Property Law: “It’s Not about Sex,” or Is It? 20
Cardozo L. Rev. 1695 (1999) (reviewing Jeanne Lorraine Schroeder,
The Vestal and the Fasces: Hegel, Lacan, Property, and the Feminine
(U. Cal. Press 1998)).
Book Review, 4 J. Psychoanalysis Culture & Socy. 344 (1999) (review-
ing Anthony Elliott, The Mourning of John Lennon (U. Cal. Press
1999)).
Fabricating Authenticity: Law Students as Country Music Stars, 20
Cardozo L. Rev. 1573 (1999).
Law and the Science Wars: Introduction to the Forum, 23 S. Ill. U. L.J.
545 (1999).
Modes of Law: Music and Legal Theory—An Interdisciplinary Work-
shop Introduction, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 1325 (1999) (co-author Des-
mond Manderson).
On the Object of Arrigo’s Critique, 12 Intl. J. Semiotics L. 91 (1999).
The Sports Law Course as Advanced Legal Skills Training, 1 Va. J.
Sports & L. 246 (1999).
The Future of Freud in Law, in Freud 2000, at 262 (Anthony Elliott

ed., Polity Press 1998).
A Calvinist Perspective on Faith in Legal Scholarship, 47 J. Leg. Educ.
19 (1997).
Identifying Law’s Unconscious: Disciplinary and Rhetorical Contexts,
54 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1075 (1997).
Lacan and the Subject of Law: Toward a Psychoanalytic Critical Legal
Theory (Humanities Press Intl. 1997).
Law as Literature: The Second Half of the Law and Literature Move-
ment, 6 Educ. & Prac. 1 (Fall 1997).
Law’s Own Repressed Memory Syndrome, 3 L./Text/Culture 269 (1997)
(reviewing Peter Goodrich, Oedipus Lex: Psychoanalysis, History,
Law (U. Cal. Press 1995), and Peter Goodrich, Law in the Courts of
Love: Literature and Other Minor Jurisprudences (Routledge 1996)).
When You’re a Semiotician, in States, Citizens, and Questions of Sig-
nificance: Tenth Round Table on Law and Semiotics vol. 11, 7 (Se-
miotics & Human Sci. Series, John Brigham & Roberta Kevelson
eds., Peter Lang Publg. 1997).
Book Review, 31 Australian J. Pol. Sci. 442 (1996) (reviewing Anthony
Elliott, Subject to Ourselves: Social Theory, Psychoanalysis, and
Postmodernity (Polity Press 1996)).
Book Review, 1 J. Psychoanalysis Culture & Socy. 194 (1996) (review-
ing Anthony Elliot, Psychoanalytic Theory: An Introduction (Black-
well Publishers 1994)).
In the Wake, or at the Wake, of Psychoanalytic Jurisprudence? 20 Leg.
Stud. Forum 188 (1996).
Law’s Appropriations of Psychoanalysis, 1 J. Psychoanalysis Culture
& Socy. 127 (1996).
On the Naming of Paranoia in Legal Scholarship, 33 Hous. L. Rev. 215
(1996).
Why Would a Lacanian Socio-Legal Analyst Care About Scientific Va-
lidity? A Response to Redding, 75 Or. L. Rev. 811 (1996).
Introduction: Philosophy with a Focus, in Radical Philosophy of Law:
Contemporary Challenges to Mainstream Legal Theory and Practice
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Lacan and the Critique of Legal Ideology: Reason and Religion in Law
and Politics, 82 Psychoanalytic Rev. 683 (1995).
Lacan’s Social Psychoanalysis: Religion and Community in a Plural-
istic Society, 26 Cumb. L. Rev. 125 (1995) (reprinted in The Subject
of Lacan: A Lacanian Reader for Psychologists 297 (Kareen R.
Malone & Stephen R. Freidlander eds., SUNY Press 2000)).
Lacanian Ethics and the Desire for Law, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 793
(1995).
Radical Philosophy of Law: Contemporary Challenges to Mainstream

Legal Theory and Practice (David S. Caudill & Steven Jay Gold eds.,
Humanities Press Intl. 1995).
Re-Returning to Freud: Critical Legal Studies as Cultural Psychoanal-
ysis, in Radical Philosophy of Law: Contemporary Challenges to
Mainstream Legal Theory and Practice 45 (David S. Caudill & Ste-
ven Jay Gold eds., Humanities Press Intl. 1995).
Two Ideological Monsters: The Subject of the Bar and the Object of
Desire in Bleak House, in Legality and Illegality: Semiotics, Post-
modernism, and Law vol. 3, 79 (W. Richard Janikowski & Dragan
Milovanovic eds., Peter Lang Publg. 1995).
Pluralism and the Quality of Religious Discourse in Law and Politics,
6 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Policy 135 (1994).
Social Hysteria and Social Psychoanalysis: A Response to Brion’s The
Hidden Persistence of Witchcraft, 5 L. & Critique 31 (1994).
Two Critiques of Legal Ideology, in Political Theory and Christian V i-
sion 213 (J. Chaplin & P. Marshall eds., U. Press Am. 1994).
Coming to Terms with Lacan: Legal Discourse as Analysand, 6 Intl. J.
Semiotics L. 203 (1993) (reviewing Dragan Milovanovic, Postmodern
Law Disorder: Psychoanalytic Semiotics, Chaos and Juridic Exege-
ses (Deborah Charles Publications 1992)).
Judge John R. Brown: Enjoyment of Law as Enjoyment of Life, 14
Miss. C. L. Rev. 19 (1993).
“Name-of-the-Father” and the Logic of Psychosis: Lacan’s Law and
Ours, 16 Leg. Stud. Forum 421 (1993) (reprinted in Flux, Complexi-
ty, and Illusion: Sixth Round Table on Law and Semiotics vol. 6,
123 (Semiotics & Human Sci. Series, Roberta Kevelson ed., Peter
Lang Publg. 1993)).
Pierre Schlag’s “The Problem of the Subject”: Law’s Need for an Ana-
lyst, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 707 (1993).
Post-Postmodern Redemptions of Self, Text, and Event, 5 Cardozo
Stud. L. & Literature 137 (1993) (reviewing Norman N. Holland,
The Critical I (Columbia U. Press 1992); Richard H. Weisberg, Po-
ethics: And Other Strategies of Law and Literature (Colum. U. Press
1992); and Probing the Limits of Representation: Nazism and the
“Final Solution” (Saul Friedlander ed., Harv. U. Press 1992)).
Sympathy for the Devil? Reflections on the Crime-Fraud Exception to
Client Confidentiality, 8 St. John’s J. Leg. Commentary 369 (1993).
Sympathy for the Devil? The Crime Fraud Exception to Client Confi-
dentiality, 19 Soc. Resp. (Bus. Journalism L. Med.) 40 (1993).
Environmental Permits: Land Use Regulation and Policy Implementa-
tion in Texas, 23 St. Mary’s L.J. 841 (1992) (co-author William Terry
Bray et al.).
Jacques Lacan and Our State of Affairs: Preliminary Remarks on Law

as Other, in Law and the Human Sciences: Fifth Round Table on
Law and Semiotics 95 (Semiotics & Human Sci., vol. 3, Roberta
Kevelson ed., Peter Lang Publg. 1992).
Lacan and Law: Networking with the Big [O]ther, 1 Stud. Psychoana-
lytic Theory 25 (1992).
Lacan and Legal Language: Meanings in the Gaps, Gaps in the Mean-
ings, 3 L. & Critique 169 (1992).
The Politics of Legal Doctrine: A Case Study of Texas Land-Use Plan-
ning under the Shadow of Lucas, 5 Hofstra Prop. L.J. 11 (1992) (co-
authors William Terry Bray and Jack E. Owen, Jr.).
Psyche as Legal Text: Lacan’s Return to Freud the Semiotician, in Law
& Aesthetics vol. 11, 117 (New Stud. in Aesthetics Series, Roberta
Kevelson ed., Peter Lang Publg. 1992).
Contracts: Flash Cards (Spectra Publg. Co. 1991).
The French Revolution as Phantom of the Opera, 9 J.L. & Religion 243
(1991) (reviewing Harry Van Dyke, Groen van Prinsterer’s Lectures
on Unbelief and Revolution (Wedge Publg. Found. 1989)).
Freud and Critical Legal Studies: Contours of a Radical Socio-Legal
Psychoanalysis, 66 Ind. L.J. 651 (1991) (reprinted in Legal Studies
as Cultural Studies: A Reader in (Post) Modern Critical Theory 21
(Jerry Leonard ed., SUNY Press 1995)).
Once More, the Trilogy, in Retrospect: An Essay on the Virtues of De-
velopment Agreements in Texas, 32 S. Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1990) (co-
authors William Terry Bray and Jack E. Owen, Jr.).
Disclosing Tilt: Law, Belief and Criticism (Free U. Press 1989).
Disclosing Tilt: A Partial Defense of Critical Legal Studies and a
Comparative Introduction to the Philosophy of the Law-Idea, 72 Io-
wa L. Rev. 287 (1987).
New Wave Land Use Regulation: The Impact of Impact Fees on Texas
Lenders, 19 St. Mary’s L.J. 319 (1987) (co-authors William Terry
Bray and Jack E. Owen, Jr.).
The Town Lake Manifesto: Zoning on the Ragged Edge of Law and of
Texas Cities, 29 S. Tex. L. Rev. 83 (1987) (co-author R. James
George).
A Spectator’s Guide to Aguillard v. Edwards: Part I—Will the Clock
Strike Thirteen? 17 Cumb. L. Rev. 87 (1986).
Law and Worldview: Problems in the Creation-Science Controversy, 3
J.L. & Religion 1 (1985).
A Reconnaissance of Public Policy Restrictions upon Enforcement Con-
tracts between Cohabitants, 18 Fam. L.Q. 93 (1984) (co-author J.
Thomas Oldham).
Legal Recognition of Unmarried Cohabitation: A Proposal to Update

and Reconsider Common-Law Marriage, 49 Tenn. L. Rev. 537
(1982).
The Rechtsstaat: Magic Wall or Material Necessity? 4 Hous. J. Intl. L.
169 (1982).
Chestek, Kenneth D.
Reality Programming Meets LRW: The Moot Case Approach to Teach-
ing in the First Year, 38 Gonzaga L. Rev. 57 (2003).
Are Hospitals Truly Institutions of Charity? 73 Pa. B. Assn. Q. 4
(2002).
Are Hospitals Purely Public Charities? 7 Assessment J. 24 (2000).
WordPerfect for Windows 6 in the Law Office (Que Corp. 1996).
WordPerfect for Windows Power Macros (Que Corp. 1992).
Farmland Preservation Techniques: Some Food for Thought, 40 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 258 (1979).
Chin, William W.
Implausible Denial: The Government’s Denial of the Role of Race in Its
Prosecution of Wen Ho Lee, 5 Rutgers Race & L. Rev. 1 (2003).
Meeting the Needs of Asian Law Students, 18 Second Draft (newsltr. of
Basketball Fever, Portland C.A.C.A. Times (Chinese Am. Citizens Al-
liance, Portland, Or.) (Sept./Oct. 2002).
Life in America As Told by Asian American Authors, Portland
C.A.C.A. Times (July/Aug. 2002).
Appellate Practice—The Lawyer; the Law Student, Connections 4
(Spring/Summer 2002).
Living Spaces for Asian Americans in Portland’s Chinatown, Portland
C.A.C.A. Times (May/June 2002).
Wen Ho Lee: A Case of Racial Profiling, Portland C.A.C.A. Times
(Mar./Apr. 2002).
Portland Chinatown: Change and Renewal, Portland C.A.C.A. Times
(Jan./Feb. 2002).
Serving the Link between International Tension and Discrimination
against Asian and Arab Americans, 13 Intl. Leg. Persps. 8 (2002).
Lending a Helping Hand, Portland C.A.C.A. Times (Nov./Dec. 2001).
September 11, Portland C.A.C.A. Times (Sept./Oct. 2001).
An Emerging Awareness of the Chinese Experience, Portland C.A.C.A.
Times (July/Aug. 2001).
Affirmative Action and Chinese American Students, Portland C.A.C.A.
Times (May/June 2001).
The Performers of Asian/Pacific Islander Students in Oregon High

Schools, Portland C.A.C.A. Times (Mar./Apr. 2001).
Why Does the OLCC Want to Put a Bar Near the Chinese Language
School? Portland C.A.C.A. Times (Jan./Feb. 2001).
They Served with Pride, Portland C.A.C.A. Times (Nov./Dec. 2000).
Oregon Must Reacquire Control over Its Economy, Resources, Orego-
nian (Portland, Or.) B9 (Oct. 2, 2000).
The Portland INS: A Bureaucracy Disconnected from the Community,
Portland C.A.C.A. Times (Sept./Oct. 2000).
Oregon History: Chinese Gold Miners, Connections 16 (Summer/Fall
2000).
The Chinese Boy Who Was a Marine, Portland C.A.C.A. Times (Ju-
ly/Aug. 2000).
The Rise in the Number of Americans Adopting Chinese Babies, Port-
land C.A.C.A. Times (May/June 2000).
The Case of Wen Ho Lee: Due Process or Abuse of Process? Portland
C.A.C.A. Times (Mar./Apr. 2000).
The INS and a Jailed Chinese Girl, Portland C.A.C.A. Times
(Jan./Feb. 2000).
Oregon’s David Wu: Challenging China and Other Tasks, Portland
C.A.C.A. Times (Dec. 1999).
Cialkowski, Amanda Buttress

Engaging Students in Improving Technical Writing Skills, 14 Second
Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 12 (Nov. 1999).
Clary, Bradley G.
Advocacy on Appeal (2d ed., West 2004) (co-authors Sharon Reich
Paulsen and Michael Vanselow).
Thinking About Law School: The Big Picture, 80 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev.
467 (2003).
Successful Legal Analysis and Writing: The Fundamentals (Thom-
son/West 2003) (co-author Pamela Lysaght).
“To Note or Not to Note”, 10 Persps. 84 (Winter 2002).
Successful First Depositions (West 2001) (co-authors Sharon Reich
Paulsen and Michael Vanselow).
Roadmapping and Legal Writing, 8 Persps. 134 (Spring 2000) (co-
author Deborah N. Behles).
Relevant Market Analysis: Developments in Health Care Settings,
Hennepin Law. 4 (Sept.–Oct. 1995).
Physician Collective Bargaining: Antitrust Prospects and Pitfalls,
Minn. Med. 41 (Aug. 1995).
The Minnesotacare Antitrust Exceptions: A Policy Proposal Regarding

the State Action Doctrine As Applied to Healthcare Reform, 18 Ham-
line L. Rev. 131 (1994).
Primer on the Analysis and Presentation of Legal Argument (West
1992).
Cochran, Rebecca A.
Federal Court Certification of Questions of State Law to State Courts:
A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. Legis. 157 (2003).
Criminal Discovery for the Civil Litigator, in The Litigation Manual
(John Koetl & John Kiernan eds., 3d ed., ABA Sec. of Litig. 1999)
(co-author Candace Fabri).
Legal Research and Writing Programs as Vehicles for Law Student Pro
Bono Service, 8 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 429 (1999).
Conference Paper, “I Had Some Things That I Called Mine”: Dickinson
and the Perils of Property Ownership (Emily Dickinson Socy. Conf.
1999) (co-author James Guthrie).
Judicial Externships: The Clinic inside the Courthouse (2d ed., Ander-
son 1998).
Gaining Appellate Review By “Manufacturing” a Final Judgment
through Voluntary Dismissal of Peripheral Claims, 48 Mercer L.
Rev. 979 (1997).
Using Closed Universe Assignments to Teach Legal Analysis, Legal
Writing and Lawyering Skills, 1996 WL 403350, 1996 WL 403357,
1996 WL 403351 (co-author Maria Crist).
Evaluating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(5) as a Response to
Silent and Functionally Silent Privilege Claims, 13 Rev. Litig. 219
(1994).
Cohen, Beth D.
Instilling an Appreciation of Legal Ethics and Professional Responsi-
bility in First-Year Legal Research and Writing Courses, 4 Persps. 5
(Fall 1995).
Collins-McShane, Maureen
Don’t Just Say It—Present It, 89 Ill. B.J. 99 (2001).
The Lost Art of Drawing a Conclusion, 89 Ill. B.J. 45 (2001).
Bluebook Blues: Changes in the Seventeenth Edition, 88 Ill. B.J. 663
(2000).
A Civil Action, 88 Ill. B.J. 601 (2000).
Email and Attorney-Client Communications, 88 Ill. B.J. 541 (2000).
An Editing Checklist, 88 Ill. B.J. 415 (2000).
A Legal Writer’s Bookshelf, 88 Ill. B.J. 359 (2000).
Lawyer as Storyteller, 88 Ill. B.J. 289 (2000).

Recommendations for Rookie Writers, 88 Ill. B.J. 237 (2000).
Drafting with Style, 88 Ill. B.J. 173 (2000).
Drafting Transaction Documents: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 88 Ill. B.J.
110 (2000).
Politically Correct Speech: Readers Respond, 87 Ill. B.J. 335 (1999).
Writing with Your Audience in Mind, 87 Ill. B.J. 285 (1999).
Politically Correct Speech: A Call for Common Sense, 87 Ill. B.J. 223
(1999).
Saying What You Mean: The Sequel, 87 Ill. B.J. 171 (1999).
Much Ado About Nothing, 86 Ill. B.J. 395 (1998).
Read a Good Book Lately? 86 Ill. B.J. 283 (1998).
Reflections from the Jury Pool, 86 Ill. B.J. 167 (1998).
Communication as an Art Form, 86 Ill. B.J. 95 (1998).
Talking to Clients about Money, 86 Ill. B.J. 45 (1998).
The Fine Art of Drafting (Shhh) Bills, 85 Ill. B.J. 617 (1997).
Bearing Bad News, 85 Ill. B.J. 499 (1997).
Tips for a Successful Client Interview, 85 Ill. B.J. 441 (1997).
Cooney, Leslie Larkin

Lawyer, Heal Thyself: Bringing Rational Expectations to the Law Firm
Environment, 22 Whittier L. Rev. 967 (2001).
Classroom Associates: Creating a Skills Incubation Process for Tomo r-
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Beyond Core Skills and Values: Integrating Therapeutic Jurisprudence
and Preventive Law into the Law School Curriculum, 5 Psych. Pub.
Policy & L. 1123 (Dec. 1999) (co-author Pearl Goldman).
Ten Magic Tricks for an Interactive Classroom, 8 Persps. 1 (Fall 1999)
(co-author Judith Karp).
A Perfect World, 11 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 16
(Nov. 1997).
Discussion Boards and Legal Writing, 11 Second Draft (newsltr. of
Leg. Writing Inst.) 7 (May 1997).
Florida’s Revised Uniform Partnership Act, Tr. Advoc. Q. 6 (Oct.
1995).
1992 Survey of Florida Law Business Associations: 1992 Survey of
Florida Law, 17 Nova L. Rev. 7 (1992).
Agricultural Financing, in Secured Transactions in Florida ch. 12C
(Fla. B. 1996).
Equipment Financing in Secured Transactions in Florida ch. 12D (Fla.
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Scope of Article 9, in Secured Transactions in Florida ch. 2 (Fla. B.

1996).
Cooper, Davalene
The Ethical Rules Lack Ethics: Tort Liability When a Lawyer Fails to
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Harm or Death, 36 Idaho L. Rev. 479 (2000).
Book Review, 29 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 669 (1996) (reviewing Philip K.
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Evidence, in Mottla’s Proof of Cases in Massachusetts vol. 3 (1995 &
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Reverse Mortgages: Mandatory Counseling and Other Protections for
the Elderly Homeowner, 27 Clearinghouse Rev. 622 (1993).
Book Review, Bimonthly Rev. of Bks. (Jan.–Feb. 1992) (reviewing
Henry J. Sommer, Collier Family Law and the Bankruptcy Code
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Adopting the “Stepchild” into the Legal Academic Community: Creat-
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Promised Land or Land of Broken Promises? Political Asylum in the
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Legal Writing as a Kind of Philosophy, 48 Mercer L. Rev. 1091 (1997).
Smoking Canons: A Guide to Some Favorite Rules of Construction, 10
Chi. B. Assn. Rec. 43 (May 1996).
From Hedonism to Human Rights: Felix Cohen’s Alternative to Nihil-
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The Alienability of Contingent Reversionary Interests, 49 J. Mo. B. 373
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Totem and the God of the Philosophers: How a Freudian Vocabulary
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Imposing Religious Values, 25 Duq. L. Rev. 471 (1987).
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University of Chicago Manual of Legal Citation (U. Chi. Press
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Cotorceanu, Peter
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New, 70:9 J. Kan. B. Assn. 28 (Oct. 2001).
Initiating the Probate Process (Natl. Bus. Inst. 1994) (CLE materials).
Issues in Funding Trusts (Va. CLE 1993) (CLE materials).
Those Pesky Crummey Powers—How Now? 9 Trusts & Ests. Newsltr.
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Craig, Alison
Failing My ESL Students: My Plagiarism Epiphany, 12 Persps. 102
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Crist, Maria Perez

Courtroom Technology and the 21st Century Juror (OSBA, Jt.
Bench/B. Conf. of U.S. Dist. Cts., N. & S. Dists. of Ohio Oct. 3,
2003).
The Internet (OSBA CLE Inst. June 11, 2003).
The E-Brief: Legal Writing for an Online World, 33 N.M. L. Rev. 49
(2003).
The Internet: Research Skills for the Legal Services Advocate (Ohio St.
Leg. Servs. Assn. 2001).
Flying Solo: Internet Skills for the Solo Practitioner (OSBA CLE Inst.
Nov. 15, 2000).
Internet Resources for Corporate Counsel (Cincinnati B. Assn., Corp.
Counsel Seminar, Nov. 30, 1999).
Daily Use of the Internet in Law Practice: Beyond the Basics (OSBA
CLE Inst. July 7, 1999).
Techniques for Teaching Law 210–211 (Gerald F. Hess & Steven
Friedland eds., Carolina Academic Press 1999) (contributor).
Technology in the LRW Curriculum—High Tech, Low Tech, or No
Tech, 5 Leg. Writing 93 (1999).
An Ohio Lawyer’s Beginning Guide to the Internet (Ohio CLE Inst.
Mar. 27, 1998).
The Internet: Strategies for Effective Use in Law Practice (Ohio CLE
Inst. 1998).
Using Closed Universe Assignments to Teach Legal Analysis, Legal
Writing and Lawyering Skills, 1996 WL 403350, 1996 WL 403357,
1996 WL 403351 (co-author Rebecca Cochran).
Curtis, Debra Moss

Marketing for Minders, ABA L. Prac. Today (April 2004).
Wills and Trusts (BarCharts, Inc. Feb. 2004).
A Public View of Attorney Discipline in Florida: Statistics, Commen-
tary and Analysis of Disciplinary Actions against Licensed Attorneys
in the State of Florida, 1988–2002, 28 Nova L. Rev. 669 (2004) (co-
author Billie Jo Kaufman).
Venturing into the On-Line Wilderness: Some Lessons Learned, Jurist
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and Billie Jo Kaufman).
Supervise Your Lawyers and Staff, 16 Fla. B.J. 74 (Dec. 2002).
Trust Accounting: What Works? 16 Fla. B. News 18 (Oct. 2002).
Secured Transactions: Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (BarCharts, Inc. June 2002).
Bringing the Internet to the Classroom, Jurist Website (April 2002).
When Should You Bill? 15 Fla. B. News 16 (Mar. 2002).
Client Confidences: Is Your Workspace Telling Tales? 15 Fla. B. News
24 (Dec. 2001).
Tune In, Turn On (So They Won’t) Drop Out, 15 Fla. B. News 8 (Aug.
2001).
Bringing Your New Hires in on Your Marketing Plans, 15 Fla. B. News
23 (Mar. 2001).
Teach New Associates Your Billing Practices, 15 Fla. B. News 23 (Feb.
2001).
Counseling Students in Public Service, in Public Service Guide to Pub-
lic Interest Law (Natl. Assn. of L. Placement 1998).
The Pro Bono Clinic Connection, Bull. (Natl. Assn. of L. Placement) 7
(Aug. 1997).
Pro Bono Students Practice What They Teach, Fam. L. Commentary 30
(June 1996).
Pro Bono Students America, 5 Pub. Interest L. Sec. Newsltr. 6 (1996).
Dailey, Susan R.
Integrating Theory and Practice through Teacher Portfolios, 4 Leg.
Writing 149 (1998).
View from the Bench: Crosscurrents in American Law and Literature,
18 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 155 (1998) (reviewing Barry R. Schaller, A Vi-
sion of American Law: Judging Law, Literature, and the Stories We

Tell (Praeger 1997)).
Portfolios in Law School: Creating a Community of Writers, in Situat-
ing Portfolios: Four Perspectives 214 (Kathleen Blake Yancey & Ir-
win Weiser eds., Utah St. U. Press 1997).
In the Margins: Effective Responses to Student Writing, 9 Second Draft
(newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 8 (May 1995).
Writing Specialist as Pariah: Reflections on My First Year, 9 Second
Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 8 (May 1995).
Explorations in Law and Literature, 95 Leaflet (J. New Eng. Assn. of
Teachers of English) 5 (1995).
Daily, Melody Richardson

Damages: Using a Case Study to Teach Law, Dispute Resolution and
Lawyering, 2004 J. Disp. Res. 1.
The Shattered Mirror, in Instructor’s Manual to Dispute Resolution
and Lawyers (Leonard Riskin & James Westbrook eds., 2d ed., West
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Liberty and Justice: The Story of the Kansas City Metropolitan Bar
Association (CCA Publications, Inc. 1994).
Legal Research and Writing, 14 Tr. 12 (1991).
Instructor’s Resource Manual to the Dolphin Reader (2d ed., Houghton
Mifflin Co. 1990) (co-author Doug Hunt).
Instructor’s Guide to the Riverside Anthology of Literature (Houghton
Mifflin Co. 1988) (co-authors Doug Hunt and Raymond Smith).
Instructor’s Guide to the Dolphin Reader (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1986 &
2d ed., Houghton Mifflin Co. 1990) (co-author Doug Hunt).
Davis, Kirsten K.
The ALWD Citation Manual: A Practice-Driven Improvement, Ariz.
Atty. 24 (June 2004) (co-author Tamara Herrera).
Three Key Plays for the Writing Coach, Ariz. Atty. 12 (Mar. 2004).
Designing and Using Peer Review in a First-Year Legal Research and
Writing Course, 9 Leg. Writing 1 (2003).
Equal Protection for Women in India and Canada: An Examination of
Sex Equality Provisions in the Indian and Canadian Constitutions,
13 Ariz. J. Intl. & Comp. L. 31 (1996).
Ohio’s New Administrative License Suspension for Drunk Driving: E s-
sential Statute Has Unconstitutional Effect, 55 Ohio St. L.J. 697
(1994).
Davis, Peggy Cooper

Performing Interpretation: A Legacy of Civil Rights Lawyering in
Brown v. Board of Education, in Race, Law and Culture (Sutin Sa-
rat ed., Oxford U. Press 1997).
Davis, Wendy B.
Aviation Law: Cases and Problems (William S. Hein & Co. 2004).
Diffused Surface Water; Reasonable Use Has Become the Common En-
emy: An Overview of the Standards Applied to Diffused Surface Wa-
ter and the Resulting Depletion of Aquifers, 9 Albany L. Envtl. Out-
look J. 1 (2004).
Rhode Island Needs a Bottle Recycling Bill, 24 R.I. L. Wkly. 390 (Nov.
24, 2003).
Coalbed Methane: Degasification, Not Ventilation, Should Be R e-
quired, 2 Appalachian J.L. 25 (Spring 2003).
Elimination of the Depletion Deduction for Fossil Fuels, 26 Seattle U.
L. Rev. 197 (2002).
The Appalachian School of Law: Tried but Still True, 32 Stetson L.
Rev. 159 (2002).
You May Still Be Liable, Bristol Herald Courier 7A (Oct. 27, 2002).
Out of the Black Hole; Reclaiming the Crown of King Coal, 51 Am. U.
L. Rev. 905 (Spring 2002).
The Failure of the Federal Courts to Support Virginia’s Reluctance to
Pierce the Corporate Veil, 5 J. Small & Emerging Bus. L. 203 (2001).
Piercing the Corporate Veil: Investors Beware, 45 Boston B.J. 10
(Sept./Oct. 2001).
Ethical Billing Practices, 16 Paralegal Rev. (Middle Tenn. Paralegal
Assn.) 14 (Aug. 2001).
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 16:6 Paralegal Rev. 11 (June 2001).
Insider Trading, 26 Facts & Findings, J. Leg. Assts. (Natl. Assn. of
Leg. Assistants, Inc.) 23 (May 2000) (reprinted in 16:5 Paralegal
Rev. 12 (May 2001)).
When Ethical Conduct Seems Unfair, 26 Facts & Findings, J. Leg.
Assts. 34 (Nov. 1999) (reprinted in 16:4 Paralegal Rev. 13 (Apr.
2001)).
Investors Should Be Aware of Extent of Shareholder Liability, Boston
Bus. J. 52 (Dec. 17, 2000).
Synthesis of Case Analogies, 14 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing
Inst.) 8 (May 2000).
An Attorney’s Ethical Obligations Include Clear Writing, 72 N.Y. St.
B.J. 1 (2000).
No Physical Harm, No Asylum: Denying a Safe Haven for Refugees, 5

Tex. Forum Civ. Liberties & Civ. Rights 81 (2000) (co-author Angela
D. Atchue).
Consequences of Ineffective Writing, 8 Persps. 97 (Winter 2000).
Confidentiality for the New Millennium, 10 N.H. B. News 17 (Dec. 1,
1999) (reprinted in 2:1 Sec. Rev. (Mass. B. Assn.) 45 (Dec. 1999) (co-
author Philip Kaplan).
When Ethical Conduct Is Unfair, 27 Mass. Law. Wkly. 2897 (Aug. 30,
1999).
Negotiations for Paralegals, 26 Facts & Findings, J. Leg. Assistants 44
(Aug. 1999).
Protecting Intellectual Property Rights, 26 Facts & Findings, J. Leg.
Assistants 12 (Feb. 1999).
The Art and Ethics of Negotiation, 27 Mass. Law. Wkly. 711 (Dec. 7,
1998).
Corporations and Other Business Organizations, in Massachusetts
Paralegal Practice Manual (MCLE 1997) (reprinted in The Best of
MCLE (MCLE 1997) (co-author Joan Flores).
Intellectual Property, in Massachusetts Paralegal Practice Manual
(MCLE 1997) (co-author Joan Flores) (reprinted in The Best of
MCLE (MCLE 1997)).
New Hampshire’s Business Profits Tax: The Retreat from Worldwide to
Water’s Edge Unitary, 6:2 Interstate Tax Rpt. (1986); 29:2 N.H. B.J.
(Winter 1988).
DeJarnatt, Susan L.
The Philadelphia Story: The Rhetoric of School Reform, 72 UMKC L.
Rev. 949 (2004).
Law Talk: Speaking, Writing, and Entering the Discourse of Law, 40
Duq. L. Rev. 489 (2002).
Teaching Analysis, 14 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 9
(May 2000).
In Re MacCrate: Using Consumer Bankruptcy as a Context for Learn-
ing in Advanced Legal Writing, 50 J. Leg. Educ. 50 (2000).
Once Is Not Enough: Preserving Consumers’ Rights to Bankruptcy Pro-
tection, 74 Ind. L.J. 455 (1999).
Dernbach, John C.
Achieving Sustainable Development: The Centrality and Multiple Fac-
ets of Integrated Decisionmaking, 10 Ind. J. Global Leg. Stud. 247
(2003).
Toward a National Sustainable Development Strategy, 10 Buff. Envtl.
L.J. 69 (2003).
Sustainable Versus Unsustainable Propositions, 53 Case W. Res. L.

Rev. 449 (2002).
Moving the Climate Change Debate from Models to Proposed Legisla-
tion: Lessons from State Experience, 30 Envtl. L. Rep. 10933 (Nov.
2000).
A Practical Guide to Legal Writing and Legal Method (2d ed., William
S. Hein & Co. 1998) (co-authors Richard V. Singleton II, Cathleen S.
Wharton, and J. Ruhtenberg).
U.S. Adherence to Its Agenda, 21 Commitments: A Five-Year Review,
27 Envtl. L. Rep. 10504 (Oct. 1997).
Dickerson, A. Darby
Brown v. Board of Education: The Legacy Continues, the Struggle Con-
tinues, 34 Stetson L. Rev. 283 (2005) (co-author Robert D. Bickel).
Cyberbullies on Campus, 37 U. Tol. L. Rev. 51 (2005).
Deflating the Risks of Inflatables, NASPA Leadership Exch. 22 (Dec.
2005) (co-author Peter F. Lake).
Advancing Environmental Education through Moot Court, 1 Indian J.
Envtl. & Consumerism 63 (July–Dec. 2005) (co-author Royal C.
Gardner).
Motion Potion: Tips for Magical Briefs, 16 Prac. Law. 7 (May 2005).
The Dean of Hurricanes: Lessons in Crisis Management, NNLSO (Natl.
Network of L. Sch. Officers) J. 1 (Oct. 2004).
Too Busy to Vote? AAA Going Places 44 (Sept.–Oct. 2004).
Lessons in Leadership, 33 Stetson L. Rev. 29 (2003) (tribute to Dean
W. Gary Vause).
Staff Matter(s), 35 U. Tol. L. Rev. 199 (2003).
Essential ALWD Materials for Law Journal Editors (Aspen 2003 (CD-
ROM) & 2006 (web-based)).
Host Transition Guide (Natl. Conf. of L. Revs. 2001).
Speed Cite for the ALWD Citation Manual (Aspen L. & Bus. 2001).
ALWD Citation Manual: A Professional System of Citation (Aspen
2000, 2d ed. 2003, 3d ed. 2006) (with Teacher’s Manual).
Citation Frustrations—And Solutions, 30 Stetson L. Rev. 477 (2000).
In re Moot Court, 29 Stetson L. Rev. 1217 (2000).
Professionalizing Legal Citation: The ALWD Citation Manual, 47 Fed.
Law. 20 (Dec. 2000).
CALI Lesson for the ALWD Citation Manual, www.cali.org (Sept.
2000) (online and CD-Rom) (revised in 2003 for the second edition).
Scheduling Depositions: What Is Reasonable Notice? ABA Sec. of Litig.
(Pretrial Discovery Newsltr.) (Fall 1999).
It’s Time for a New Citation System, Scrivener 2 (Summer 1999).
Make Your Points with Power, 13 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writ-
ing Inst.) 9 (May 1999).
Book Review, 26 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1177 (1999) (reviewing Suzanne E.
Rowe et al., Florida Legal Research: Sources, Process, and Analysis
(Carolina Academic Press 1998)).
Credibility Is Key: Ethics and Appellate Briefwriting, in Stetson Appel-
late Advocacy CLE (1998).
Deposition Dilemmas: Vexatious Scheduling and Errata Sheet Chang-
es, 12 Geo. J. Leg. Ethics 1 (1998).
Ethics on the Web: An Annotated Bibliography of Legal Ethics Materi-
al on the Internet, 28 Stetson L. Rev. 369 (1998).
The Law and Ethics of Civil Depositions, 58 Md. L. Rev. 273 (1998).
It’s Time for a New Citation System, Scrivener (publication of Scribes)
2 (Summer 1998).
Less Is More: Using the Delete Key to Streamline Legal Writing, 85 Ill.
B.J. 185 (1997).
Oral Reports to Supervisors, 12 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing
Inst.) 13 (Nov. 1997).
Context Is Key, 11 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 6 (May
1997).
Seeing Blue: Ten Notable Changes in the New Bluebook, 6 Scribes J.
Leg. Writing 75 (1996–1997).
Writing Opposing Counsel, 84 Ill. B.J. 527 (1996).
Curtailing Civil RICO’s Long Reach: Establishing New Boundaries for
Venue and Personal Jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 1965, 75 Neb. L.
Rev. 476 (1996).
An Un-Uniform System of Citation: Surviving with the New Bluebook,
26 Stetson L. Rev. 53 (1996).
The Deposition Difference: A Question and Answer Session on the Ef-
fects of the 1993 Amendments, ABA/YLD Litig. Comm. Newsltr. 1
(Winter 1995).
Preparing for Your Deposition: A Guide for Witnesses (ABA/YLD Litig.
Comm. 1994).
Service Game: Step-by-Step Guide to Amended Rule 4(d), ABA/YLD
Litig. Comm. Newsltr. 4 (Fall 1994).
Public Image of Lawyers, 57 Tex. B.J. 712 (1994) (co-author David
Starnes).
Standing Issues Related to Franchise Associations, 12 Franchise L.J.
99 (Spring 1993) (co-author William B. Steele III).
A Gallery of Cartoons on Lawyers and Their Language, 3 Scribes J.
Contractual Jury Waivers: A Striking Idea, 39 Fed. B. News & J. 206
(Mar./Apr. 1992).
Literary Lottery, 3 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 152 (1992).

Local Affiliates Fight Illiteracy, 54 Tex. B.J. 365 (1991).
Mandatory Venue under Section 15.011 of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code: Boundaries and Procedures, 54 Tex. B.J. 162 (1991)
(co-author Stacey E. Jordan).
How Long Does It Take?: Making Partner in Texas, 53 Tex. B.J. 938
(1990) (co-author Cynthia L. Spanhel).
Wage Watch II: A Survey of Associate Salaries in Texas, 53 Tex. B.J.
466 (1990) (co-author Cynthia L. Spanhel).
Read These Words . . . Because Many Cannot, 53 Tex. B.J. 262 (1990).
Free Work Yields Priceless Results: Young Attorneys’ Involvement in
Pro Bono Activities, 52 Tex. B.J. 1277 (1989).
What’s Special about Specialization? 52 Tex. B.J. 951 (1989).
Wage Watch: A Survey of Starting Salaries in Texas, 52 Tex. B.J. 579
(1989).
Best Interest on the Move: Standards for Custodial Removal of Chil-
dren from Tennessee, 18 Memphis St. U. L. Rev. 399 (1988) (co-
author W. David Stalnaker).
Remedies for Wrongful Removal of Child from the Jurisdiction by the
Custodian, 2 Tenn. Fam. L. Ltr. 9 (July 1988) (co-author W. David
Stalnaker).
Student Author, Bailor Beware: Limitations and Exclusions of Liabil-
ity in Commercial Bailments, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 129 (1988).
Dickhute, Nancy Lawler

Jury Duty for the Blind in the Time of Reasonable Accommodations:
The ADA’s Interface with a Litigant’s Right to a Fair Trial, 32
Creighton L. Rev. 849 (1999).
Dimitri, James D.
Reusing Writing Assignments, 12 Persps. 27 (Fall 2003).
Donahoe. Diana R.
Analyzing the Writer’s Analysis: Will It Be Clear to the Reader? 72
N.Y. B.J. (Mar./Apr. 2000).
Teachinglaw.com: Bridging the Digital Divide between Law Professor
and Law Student, 5 Va. J.L. & Tech. 13 (2000).
“Could Have,” “Would Have:” What the Supreme Court Should Have
Decided in Whren v. United States, 34 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1193
(1997).
Fair Cross-Section Challenges in Maryland: An Analysis and Proposal,
25 U. Balt. L. Rev. 127 (1996) (co-authors John M. Copacino and
Richard Seltzer).
Drew, Melinda
The Nurse’s Role in Supporting Patients’ Treatment Decisions, 2:4 J.
Nursing L. (1996) (co-author Virginia Fleming).
Basic Law for the Allied Health Professions (Jones & Bartlett 1994)
(co-author Michael Cowdrey).
So You Think Your Job Is Secure? Maybe, Maybe Not, 1:4 J. Nursing
L. (1994) (co-author Virginia Fleming).
Dunnewold, Mary
Legal Writing Status Issues at Hamline University, AAUP News
(newsltr. of Hamline Ch. of Am. Assn. of U. Prof.) (Apr. 2004).
Teaching Atypical Students, 18 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing
Inst.) 1 (Dec. 2003).
A Tale of Two Issues: “Applying Law to Facts” Versus “Deciding What
the Rule Should Be”, 11 Persps. 12 (Fall 2002).
How Many Cases Do I Need? 10 Persps. 10 (Fall 2001).
Common First-Year Student Writing Errors, 9 Persps. 14 (Fall 2000).
Why Lawyers Write Like Lawyers, Hamline Mag. (Winter 1999).
Establishing and Maintaining Good Working Relationships with 1L
Writing Students, 8 Persps. 4 (Fall 1999).
Special Issue, Legal Research and Writing: A HUSL Specialty, Ham-
line U. Sch. of L. Advoc. 10 (1998).
“Feed-Forward” Tutorials, Not “Feedback” Reviews, 6 Persps. 105 (Fall
1998).
Reminding First-Year Law Students Not to Abandon Creativity, 12
Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 19 (Nov. 1997).
Durako, Jo Anne
Syllabus Bank, in Teaching the Law School Curriculum 262 (Steven
Friedland & Gerald F. Hess eds., Carolina Academic Press 2004).
Dismantling Hierarchies: Occupational Segregation of Legal Writing
Faculty in Law Schools: Separate and Equal, 73 UMKC L. Rev. 253
(2004).
Better Writing, Better Thinking: Introduction, 10 Leg. Writing 3
(2004).
A Critical Look at the Ivory Tower Panel: A Woman’s Place: Emplo y-
ment Patterns in Legal Writing, 6 Employee Rights & Empl. Policy
J. 129 (2002).
2000 Survey Results, Association of Legal Writing Directors/Legal
Writing Institute, 7 Leg. Writing 155 (2001).
1999 Survey Results, Association of Legal Writing Directors/Legal
Writing Institute, 6 Leg. Writing 123 (2000).
Second-Class Citizens in the Pink Ghetto: Gender Bias in Legal Writ-

ing, 50 J. Leg. Educ. 562 (2000).
A Snapshot of Legal Writing Programs at the Millennium, 6 Leg. Writ-
ing 95 (2000).
Stop the Presses: Gender-Based Differences Discovered in Legal Writ-
ing Programs, 7 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 85 (2000).
Stop the Presses: Gender Differences Discovered, 2000 Vill. Women’s
L.F. 090802 (available at http://vls.villanova.edu/publications/ wom-
enslawforum/articles.htm).
Peer Editing: It’s Worth the Effort, 7 Persps. 73 (Winter 1999) (re-
printed in Best of Persps. 52 (West Group 2001)).
Survey Results of ALWD/LWI National Survey of Legal Writing Pro-
grams, www.alwd.org/alwdResources/surveys/surveyNDX.htm (for
years 1999–2001).
High Tech, Low Tech, Right Tech, 13 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg.
Ending with a Bang: How to Get the Most Out of Oral Argument De-
briefing, 12 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 14 (Nov.
1997).
Building Confidence and Competence in Legal Research: Step By Step,
5 Persps. 87 (Spring 1997) (reprinted in Best of Persps. (West Group
2001)).
From Product to Process: Evolution of a Legal Writing Program, 58 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 719 (1997) (co-authors Kathryn M. Stanchi et al.).
Evolution of IRAC: A Useful First Step, 10 Second Draft (newsltr. of
DuVivier, K.K.
State Ballot Initiatives in the Federal Preemption Equation: A Medical
Marijuana Case Study, 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 221 (2005).
Lawmanac—Another Tool for the Shed or Your Computer Desktop, 32
Colo. Law. 69 (July 2003).
Nothing New under the Sun—Plagiarism in Practice, 32 Colo. Law. 53
(May 2003).
White Space—The Sequel, 32 Colo. Law. 51 (Mar. 2003).
Questions from Readers: Redbook Responses—Part II, 32 Colo. Law. 35
(Jan. 2003).
Questions from Readers: Redbook Responses—Part I, 31 Colo. Law. 53
(Nov. 2002).
You Can Judge a Book by Its Cover: The Redbook, 31 Colo. Law. 51
(Sept. 2002).
Nit-Picking or Significant Contract Choices?—Part III, 31 Colo. Law.
95 (July 2002).
Nit-Picking or Significant Contract Choices?—Part II, 31 Colo. Law.

57 (June 2002).
Nit-Picking or Significant Contract Choices?—Part I, 31 Colo. Law. 43
(Mar. 2002).
The Aikido Technique for Rebutting Opposing Authority, 31 Colo. Law.
65 (Jan. 2002).
Play It Again, Sam: Repetition—Part II, 30 Colo. Law. 49 (Nov. 2001).
Play It Again, Sam: Repetition—Part I, 30 Colo. Law. 65 (Sept. 2001).
Cross-References, as Stated Above, 30 Colo. Law. 87 (July 2001).
Footnote Citations? 30 Colo. Law. 47 (May 2001).
Writing Help at Your Fingertips—Readability Scale, 30 Colo. Law. 39
(Mar. 2001).
Are Some Words Better Left Unpublished?: Precedent and the Role of
Unpublished Decisions, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 397 (2001).
Parallel Citations—Past and Present, 30 Colo. Law. 25 (Jan. 2001).
A New Bluebook, 29 Colo. Law. 51 (Nov. 2000).
String Citations—Part II, 29 Colo. Law. 67 (Sept. 2000).
String Citations—Part I, 29 Colo. Law. 83 (July 2000).
Think Globally, Act Locally: The Role of State and Local Ballot Initi a-
tives in International Environmental Law, 2000 Colo. J. Intl. Envtl.
L. & Policy 25.
Legal Citations for the Twenty-First Century, 29 Colo. Law. 45 (May
2000).
Pesky Citations, 29 Colo. Law. 33 (Mar. 2000).
Details, Details: Questions from Readers, 29 Colo. Law. 29 (Jan. 2000).
Neuro-Linguistic Programming and Writing: A New Era of Communi-
cation—Part II, 28 Colo. Law. 28 (Nov. 1999).
Neuro-Linguistic Programming and Writing: A New Era of Communi-
cation—Part I, 28 Colo. Law. 45 (Sept. 1999).
Mooring Modifiers, 28 Colo. Law. 63 (Jul. 1999).
Further Saith Naught, 28 Colo. Law. 41 (May 1999).
Common Words with Uncommon Meanings, 28 Colo. Law. 47 (Mar.
1999).
Colorado Appellate Handbook (Janice B. Davidson, Jr. ed., 3d ed., CLE
Colo., Inc. 1999) (participated as an author in the revisions).
The Blackletter Law of Form, 28 Colo. Law. 31 (Jan. 1999).
Plain English Part VI: Negatives or the Power of Positives, 27 Colo.
Law. 35 (Nov. 1998).
Plain English Part V: Go Aggro over Argot, 27 Colo. Law. 61 (Sept.
1998).
Plain English Part IV: Keep It Straight, Tabulate, 27 Colo. Law. 67
(July 1998).
Plain English Part III: Choosing the Right Words, 27 Colo. Law. 31
(May 1998).
Plain English Part II: Shorter Sentences and Lighter Luggage, 27 Co-
lo. Law. 27 (Mar. 1998).
Plain English Part I: Secrets from the SEC, 27 Colo. Law. 35 (Jan.
1998).
Right Writing or Rite Riting? 26 Colo. Law. 61 (Nov. 1997).
The Volley of Canons, 26 Colo. Law. 59 (Sept. 1997).
Not Selected for Official Publication, 26 Colo. Law. 79 (July 1997).
The Footnote: An Interruption, 26 Colo. Law. 47 (May 1997).
Readers Speak Out, 26 Colo. Law. 45 (Mar. 1997).
Nothing So Destructive as Habit, 26 Colo. Law. 41 (Jan. 1997).
Professional Courtesy, 25 Colo. Law. 55 (Nov. 1996).
Pronoun References: Part II—A Case for Pronouns, 25 Colo. Law. 29
(Sept. 1996).
Pronoun References: Part I—When No Substitute Will Do, 25 Colo.
Law. 29 (July 1996).
Grammar and Style Check Programs: Machine v. Man, 25 Colo. Law.
27 (May 1996).
The Dash—“A Hasty Stroke of the Pen”, 25 Colo. Law. 31 (Mar. 1996).
The Apostrophe: Reports of Its Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 25 Colo.
Law. 17 (Jan. 1996).
The Common Comma: Part II, 24 Colo. Law. 2545 (Nov. 1995).
The Common Comma: Part I, 24 Colo. Law. 2151 (Sept. 1995).
The Period and Its Pals, 24 Colo. Law. 1737 (July 1995).
A Wise Passiveness, 24 Colo. Law. 1027 (May 1995).
Problems with the Passive Voice, 24 Colo. Law. 545 (Mar. 1995).
By Going Wrong All Things Come Right: Using Alternative Initiatives
to Improve Citizen Lawmaking, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1185 (1995).
Proper Words in Proper Places, 24 Colo. Law. 27 (Jan. 1995).
Gratifying Rules of Grammar, 23 Colo. Law. 2516 (Nov. 1994).
A Thousand Probabilities, 23 Colo. Law. 2082 (Sept. 1994).
The Lady Doth Protest Too Much, Methinks! 23 Colo. Law. 1511 (July
1994).
A False Economy, 23 Colo. Law. 1061 (May 1994).
Cease and Desist, 23 Colo. Law. 555 (Mar. 1994).
Are You Practicing an Uninformed System of Citation? 23 Colo. Law.
27 (Jan. 1994).
Power Verbs, 22 Colo. Law. 2369 (Nov. 1993).
Quotations Part II: Block Quotes, 22 Colo. Law. 1887 (Sept. 1993).
Quotations Part I: Fundamentals, 22 Colo. Law. 1439 (July 1993).
Letters from Readers, 22 Colo. Law. 947 (May 1993).
We All Lose with Constitutional Amendment by Initiative, Advoc. 3

(May 1993).
Misguided Metaphors, 22 Colo. Law. 507 (Mar. 1993).
Road Maps, 22 Colo. Law. 25 (Jan. 1993).
Gender Neutral II, 21 Colo. Law. 2373 (Nov. 1992).
Gender Neutral, 21 Colo. Law. 1873 (Sept. 1992).
Procrastination, 21 Colo. Law. 1391 (July 1992).
Be Plain, 21 Colo. Law. 909 (May 1992).
White Space, 21 Colo. Law. 441 (Mar. 1992).
Judges’ Pet Peeves II, 21 Colo. Law. 27 (Jan. 1992).
Judges’ Pet Peeves I, 20 Colo. Law. 2257 (Nov. 1991).
Getting Organized: Part II, 20 Colo. Law. 1809 (Sept. 1991).
Getting Organized: Part I, 20 Colo. Law. 1399 (July 1991).
Attorney Fees as Superfund Response Costs, Nat. Resources & Env. 34
(Summer 1991) (co-author Carolyn L. Buchholz).
Bold Beginnings, 20 Colo. Law. 919 (May 1991).
Slide Rules, Telegrams and Legal Writing, 20 Colo. Law. 485 (Mar.
1991).
Easton, Eric B.
Who Owns the “First, Rough Draft of History”? Reconsidering Copy-
right in News, 27 Colum. J.L. & Arts 521 (2004).
Public Importance: Balancing Proprietary Interests and the Right to
Know, 21 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 139 (2003).
The Right to Know in American Jurisprudence, 1 Const. & Admin. L.J.
140 (2002) (publication of Shandong University Law School, Jinan,
China).
Annotating the News: Mitigating the Effects of Media Convergence and
Consolidation, 23 UALR 143 (2000).
Incorporating Law Practice Experience in a Chinese-American Aca-
demic Exchange, in International Law School Dean’s Conference on
Legal Education for the 21st Century 387 (English), 396 (Chinese)
(1999) (book chapter).
The First Amendment in Cyberspace, in Learning Cyberlaw, in Cyber-
space (Lydia Loren ed. 1999) (online).
Values, Borders and the Internet—A Case Study (English), in Commu-
nication and Culture: China and the World Entering the 21st Centu-
ry 225 (D. Ray Heisey & Wenxiang Gong eds. 1998) (book chapter).
Sovereign Indignity? Values, Borders and the Internet: A Case Study,
21 Seattle U. L. Rev. 441 (1998).
Journalism Ethics and the Internet: Ethical Implications of Online

Defiance of a Canadian Publication Ban, 7:3 Elec. J. of Commun./La
Revue Electronique de Communication (1997) (online).
Values, Borders and the Internet—A Case Study (Chinese), 4 Journal-
ism & Commun. (Chinese Acad. of Soc. Sci., Inst. of Journalism) 16
(1997).
Introduction to Protecting Intellectual Property Rights through Civil
Litigation: A Symposium, 5 U. Balt. Intell. Prop. L.J. 1 (1997).
Two Wrongs Mock a Right: Overcoming the Cohen Maledicta That Bar
First Amendment Protection for Newsgathering, 58 Ohio St. L.J.
1135 (1997).
Closing the Barn Door After the Genie Is Out of the Bag: Recognizing a
“Futility Principle” in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 45 DePaul
L. Rev. 1 (1995).
Survey of Developments in Maryland Law, 1986–1987: Constitutional
Law, 47 Md. L. Rev. 758 (1988) (collaborative).
United States v. Harvey: Are Criminal Defense Fees More Vulnerable
Than Necessary? 47 Md. L. Rev. 322 (1987).
Edelman, Diane Penneys

It Began in Brooklyn: Expanding Boundaries for First-Year Law Stu-
dents by Internationalizing the Legal Writing Curriculum, 27 Brook.
J. Intl. L. 415 (2002).
Book Review, 44 Clarity 34 (Dec. 1999) (reviewing Mark E. Wojcik,
Introduction to Legal English: An Introduction to Legal Terminolo-
gy, Reasoning, and Writing in Plain English (Intl. L. Inst. 1998)).
Book Review, 13 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 10 (Nov.
1998) (reviewing Robin S. Wellford, Legal Analysis and Writing
(LexisNexis 1997)).
How They Write: Our Students’ Reflections on Writing, 6 Persps. 24
(Fall 1997).
From Product to Process: Evolution of Legal Writing Program, 58 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 719 (1997) (co-authors Kathryn M. Stanchi, Jo Anne
Durako, Brett M. Amdur, Lorray S.C. Brown, and Rebecca L. Con-
nelly).
Opening Our Doors to the World: Introducing International Law in
Legal Writing and Legal Research Courses, 5 Persps. 1 (Fall 1996).
Edwards, John D.
Iowa Legal Research Guide (John D. Edwards ed., William S. Hein &
Co. 2003).
Emerging Solutions in Reference Services: Implications for Libraries in
the New Millennium (John D. Edwards ed., Haworth Press 2001).
Planning and Constructing Law School Buildings: Ten Basic Guide-

lines, 90 L. Lib. J. 423 (1998).
Teaching Legal Research: Evaluating Options, in Expert Views on Im-
proving the Quality of Legal Research Education in the United
States (West 1992).
Elder Law, 3 Bowker’s Leg. Publg. Rev. 297 (1991).
LEXIS and WESTLAW Training Centers: Law School Opportunities,
80 L. Lib. J. 457 (1988).
Book Losses and Mutilation in Law School Libraries, 78 L. Lib. J. 443
(1986).
A Staff Exchange Program: Mid-America’s Experience, 76 L. Lib. J.
402 (1983).
LEXIS and WESTLAW Instruction in the Law School, 76 L. Lib. J. 605
(1983).
Affirmative Action in Special Libraries and Information Centers, in
Librarians’ Affirmative Action Handbook (Scarecrow 1982) (co-
author Laura Gasaway).
Edwards, Linda H.
Legal Writing and Analysis (Aspen L. & Bus. 2003).
Suggestions for New Scholars, Leg. Writing, Reasoning, & Research
(AALS sec. newsltr.) 3 (Fall 2002).
A Chance to Teach Analytical Skills Intentionally and Systematically,
16 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 1 (May 2002).
Joining the Club: Strategies for Inclusion, Leg. Writing, Reasoning, &
Research (AALS sec. newsltr.) 1 (Spring 2002).
Estates in Land and Future Interests: A Step-by-Step Guide (Aspen L.
& Bus. 2002).
Tribute to Mary Lawrence, 7 Leg. Writing xiii (2001).
Certificate Program in Advanced Legal Writing: Mercer’s Advanced
Writing Curriculum, 9 Persps. 116 (Spring 2001).
The Process and the Product: A Bibliography of Scholarship about Le-
gal Scholarship, 49 Mercer L. Rev. 741 (1998) (co-author Mary Beth
Beazley).
Message from the Chair, Leg. Writing, Reasoning, & Research (AALS
sec. newsltr.) 1 (Fall 1996).
Message from the Chair, Leg. Writing, Reasoning, & Research (AALS
sec. newsltr.) 1 (Spring 1996).
Legal Writing: Process, Analysis and Investigation (Little, Brown &
Co. 1996; 2d ed. 1999; 3d ed. 2002).
The Convergence of Analogical and Dialectic Imagination in Legal
Discourse, 20 Leg. Stud. Forum 7 (1996).
IRAC Format Accomplishes the Limited Purpose It Is Designed to

Achieve, 10 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 7 (Nov.
1995).
Teaching Legal Analysis, 2 Persps. 52 (Winter 1994) (co-author Paula
Lustbader).
1993 Section Program: Teaching Legal Analysis, Leg. Writing, Reason-
ing, & Research (AALS sec. newsltr.) 2 (Spring 1993) (co-author
Paula Lustbader).
Honoring the Law in Communities of Force: Terrell and Wildman’s
Teleology of Practice, 41 Emory L.J. 489 (1992) (co-author Jack Lee
Sammons, Jr.).
Civil Rights in Employment: The New Generation, 67 Den. U. L. Rev. 1
(1990).
Book Review, 1 Bowker’s Leg. Publg. Preview 14 (Mar. 1989) (review-
ing Lee Modjeska, Employment Discrimination Law (Clark Board-
man Callaghan 1993)).
Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., Preview of U.S. Sup. Ct. Cases
(Feb. 9, 1989).
The Use of Statistics to Prove Discrimination under Title VII, ABA
Preview 250 (1989).
Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank and Trust: The Changing Face of Disparate
Impact, 66 Den. U. L. Rev. 179 (1989).
A Comparison of Recent Publications in the Area of Wrongful Di s-
charge, 29 Advoc. 19 (May 1986) (co-author Candace Dale).
Disciplinary Summary, 24 Advoc. 2 (Feb. 1981).
A Profile of the Grieved Lawyer, 23 Advoc. 2 (Nov. 1980).
When and How to Call in a Specialist, 23 Advoc. 2 (Oct. 1980).
Interest on Late Accounts, 23 Advoc. 2 (Sept. 1980).
Startling Lawyer Malpractice Verdict Upheld in Minnesota, 23 Advoc.
2 (Aug 1980).
Lawyer’s Ethics: Far Reaching Changes Proposed, 23 Advoc. 3 (July
1980).
Take This Job and Shove It: or How to Ethically Withdraw from a
Case, 23 Advoc. 3 (June 1980).
Advertising Pitfalls—How to Avoid Them, 23 Advoc. 3 (May 1980).
Disciplinary Summary for 1979, 23 Advoc. 2 (Apr. 1980).
Confirming Letters—Cheap Insurance, 23 Advoc. 9 (Mar. 1980).
More CLE Tidbits, 23 Advoc. 2 (Jan. 1980).
Procedure for Ethics Inquiries, 22 Advoc. 2 (Nov. 1979).
Fee Agreements Prevent Disputes, 22 Advoc. 1 (Oct. 1979).
Bar Encourages Use of Fee Dispute Arbitration, 22 Advoc. 1 (Sept.
1979).
Ehrenberg, Suzanne
Embracing the Writing-Centered Legal Process, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1159
(2004).
Legal Writing Unplugged: Evaluating the Role of Computer Technology
in Legal Writing Pedagogy, 4 Leg. Writing 1 (1998).
Eichhorn, Lisa
The Chevron Two-Step and the Toyota Sidestep: Dancing around the
EEOC’s “Disability” Regulations under the ADA, 39 Wake Forest L.
Rev. 177 (2004).
Hostile Environment Actions, Title VII, and the ADA: The Limits of the
Copy-and-Paste Function, 77 Wash. L. Rev. 575 (2002).
The Legal Writing Relay: Preparing Supervising Attorneys to Pick Up
the Pedagogical Baton, 5 Leg. Writing 143 (1999).
Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major Life Activities: The Fail-
ure of the “Disability” Definition in the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, 77 N.C. L. Rev. 1405 (1999).
Applying the ADA to Mitigating Measures Cases: A Choice of Statutory
Evils, 31 Ariz. St. L.J. 1071 (1999).
Writing in the Legal Academy: A Dangerous Supplement? 40 Ariz. L.
Rev. 105 (1998).
Reasonable Accommodations and Awkward Compromises: Issues Con-
cerning Learning Disabled Students and Professionals Schools in
the Law School Context, 26 J.L. & Educ. 31 (1997).
Student Author, Social Science Findings and the Jury’s Ability to Dis-
regard Evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 52 L. & Con-
temp. Probs. 341 (1989).
Enquist, Anne
Teaching Students to Make Explicit Factual Comparisons, 12 Persps.
147 (Spring 2004).
The Semicolon’s Undeserved Mystique, 12 Persps. 105 (Winter 2004).
Should I Teach My Students Not to Write in Passive Voice? 12 Persps.
35 (Fall 2003).
(Un)Examined Assumptions and (Un)Intended Messages: Teaching
Students to Recognize Bias in Legal Analysis and Language, 27 Se-
attle U. L. Rev. 1 (2003) (co-author Lorraine Bannai).
Just Briefs (Aspen Publishers 2003) (co-author Laurel Currie Oates).
Just Memos (Aspen Publishers 2003) (co-author Laurel Currie Oates).
The Legal Writing Handbook: Research, Analysis, and Writing (3d ed.,
Aspen L. & Bus. 2002) (co-authors Laurel Currie Oates and Kelly
Kunsch).
Substantive v. Technical Editing: How Law Review Editors Do Their

Job, 30 Stetson L. Rev. 451 (2001).
Just Writing: Grammar, Punctuation, and Style for the Legal Writer
(Aspen L. & Bus. 2001) (co-author Laurel Currie Oates).
Sailing through Designing Memo Assignments, 5 Leg. Writing 193
(1999) (co-authors Lorraine Bannai, Judith Maier, and Susan
McClellan).
A History of Writing Advisors at Law Schools: Looking at Our Past,
Looking at Our Future, 5 Leg. Writing 55 (1999) (co-author Jessie
Grearson).
Critiquing and Evaluating Law Students’ Writing: Advice from Thirty-
Five Experts, 22 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1119 (1999).
Critiquing Law Students’ Writing: What the Students Say Is Effective,
2 Leg. Writing 145 (1996).
Does It Pay to Teach Part-Time? Wash. English J. (Spring 1984) (co-
author Gloria Campbell).
After-the-Fact Outlines: An Old Idea Put to a New Use, Wash. English
J. (Winter 1984).
Teaching Composition: A Bibliographical Essay, Wash. English J.
(Fall 1978).
Epstein, David M.
New York Evidence: 2004 Courtroom Manual (Anderson Publg. Co.
2004) (co-author Glen Weissenberger).
Eckstrom’s Licensing in Foreign and Domestic Operations (West 2003).
Fairman, Christopher M.
Ethics and Collaborative Lawyering: Why Put Old Hats on New
Heads? 18 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Res. 505 (2003).
Fajans, Elizabeth
Writing for Law Practice (Found. Press 2004) (co-authors Mary R.
Falk and Helene S. Shapo).
Shooting from the Lip: United States v. Dickerson, Role [Im]morality,
and the Ethics of Legal Rhetoric, 23 U. Haw. L. Rev. 1 (2000) (co-
author Mary R. Falk).
Scholarly Writing for Law Students: Seminar Papers, Law Review
Notes, and Law Review Competition Papers (2d ed., West 2000) (co-
author Mary R. Falk).
Writing and Analysis in the Law (4th ed., Found. Press 1999) (co-
authors Helene Shapo and Marilyn Walter).
Linguistics and the Composition of Legal Documents: Border Cross-
ings, 22 Leg. Stud. Forum 697 (1998) (co-author Mary R. Falk).
Double Talk and Twisted Thought: Reflections on Incoherence, 11 Sec-

ond Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 9 (May 1997).
Comments Worth Making: Supervising Scholarly Writing in Law
School, 46 J. Leg. Educ. 342 (1996) (co-author Mary R. Falk).
Notes and Law Review Competition Papers (West 1995) (co-author
Mary R. Falk).
Writing and Analysis in the Law (3d ed., Found. Press 1995) (co-
authors Helene Shapo and Marilyn R. Walter).
Against the Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking Back to Texts, 78 Cornell
L. Rev. 163 (1993) (co-author Mary R. Falk).
authors Helene Shapo and Marilyn R. Walter).
Writing and Analysis in the Law (Found. Press 1989) (co-authors He-
lene Shapo and Marilyn R. Walter).
Falk, Mary
Writing for Law Practice (Found. 2004) (co-authors Elizabeth Fajans
and Helene Shapo).
Shooting from the Lip: United States v. Dickerson, Role [Im]morality,
and the Ethics of Legal Rhetoric, 23 U. Haw. L. Rev. 1 (2000) (co-
author Elizabeth Fajans).
Notes, and Law Review Competition Papers (2d ed., West 2000) (co-
author Elizabeth Fajans).
Linguistics and the Composition of Legal Documents: Border Cross-
ings, 22 Leg. Stud. Forum 697 (1998) (co-author Elizabeth Fajans).
Comments Worth Making: Supervising Scholarly Writing in Law
School, 46 J. Leg. Educ. 342 (1996) (co-author Elizabeth Fajans).
Rights and Freedoms under the State Constitution, 13 Touro L. Rev.
59 (1996) (co-author Eve Cary).
Death-Defying Feats: State Constitutional Challenges to New York’s
Death Penalty, 4 J.L. & Policy 161 (1995) (co-author Eve Cary).
Scholarly Writing in Law School: Seminar Papers, Law Review Arti-
cles, Law Review Competition Papers (West 1995) (co-author Eliza-
beth Fajans).
People v. Scott and People v. Keta: “Democracy Begins in Conversa-
tion”, 58 Brook. L. Rev. 1279 (1993) (co-author Eve Cary).
Against the Tyranny of Paraphrase: Talking Back to Texts, 78 Cornell
L. Rev. 163 (1993) (co-author Elizabeth Fajans).
Feak, Christine
An ESP Program for Students of Law, in English for Specific Purposes
(Thomas Orr ed., TESOL 2002) (co-author Susan Reinhart).
Challenges and Issues in Developing an EAP Video Listening Place-
ment Assessment: A View from One Program (2001) (co-author Julia
Salehzadeh).
A Cognitive Modeling Approach to the Teaching of Critiques, in Link-
ing Literacies (Diane Belcher & Alan Hirvela eds., U. Mich. Press
2001) (co-author Barbara Dobson).
Academic Communications and the Graduate Student, 1:1 Pedagogy
176 (2001) (co-author John Swales).
Reflections on Collaborative Practice in EAP Materials Production, in
Academic Writing in Context: Implications and Applications (Martin
Hewings ed., U. Birmingham Press 2001) (co-author John Swales).
A Preliminary Analysis of Law Review Notes, 19:3 English for Specific
Purposes 197 (2000) (co-authors Susan Reinhart and Ann
Sinsheimer).
English in Today’s Research World: A Writing Guide (U. Mich. Press
2000) (co-author John Swales).
Japanese Version of Academic Writing for Graduate Students
(Taishokan Shoten 1998) (co-author John Swales).
Academic Writing for Graduate Students: Commentary (U. Mich. Press
1998) (co-author John Swales).
Academic Writing for Graduate Student (6th ed., U. Mich. Press 1998).
Teaching Legal English, Am. Lang. Rev. 4 (May 1997).
Trouble with the Law? 6 ESP Newsltr. 1 (1997).
Building on the Impromptu: A Source-Based Academic Writing As-
sessment, 6 College ESL 73 (1996) (co-author Barbara Dobson).
From Information Transfer to Data Commentary, in Discourse in the
Classroom 118–142 (Thomas Miller ed., USIA 1995) (co-author John
M. Swales).
Academic Writing for Graduate Students: Commentary 117 (U. Mich.
Press 1994).
Feeley, Kelly M.
Yes, You Will Really Use Algebra When You Grow Up: Providing Law
Students with Proof That Legal Research and Writing Is Essential in
the Real World, 10 Persps. 105 (Spring 2002) (co-author Stephanie
A. Vaughan).
Fischer, Judith D.
Pleasing the Court: Writing Ethical and Effective Briefs (Carolina Ac-
ademic Press 2005).
The Role of Ethics in Legal Writing: The Forensic Embroiderer, the

Minimalist Wizard, and Other Stories, 9 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 77
(2004).
The Use and Effects of Student Ratings in Legal Writing Courses: A
Plea for Holistic Evaluation of Teaching, 10 Leg. Writing 111 (2004).
Do the Write Thing (materials for Fam. Ct. Conf., Louisville, Ky. 2002)
(co-authored).
Family Law Judges’ Writing Seminar (materials for CLE presentation,
Louisville, Ky. 2002) (co-authored).
Public Policy and the Tyranny of the Bottom Line in the Termination
of Older Workers, 53 S.C. L. Rev. 211 (2002).
Commenting on Student Papers, 14 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg.
Walling Claims In or Out: Misappropriation of Human Gametic Mate-
rial and the Tort of Conversion, 8 Tex. J. Women & L. 143 (1999).
Misappropriation of Human Eggs and Embryos and the Tort of Con-
version: A Relational View, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 381 (1999).
A Century in the Life of a Lawyer: Reflections, 36 Cal. W. L. Rev. 77
(1999) (co-author Joseph A. Ball).
Bias in the Profession (Dec. 1997) (materials for Continuing Educ. of
B. presentation in Orange County, Cal. D.A.’s Off.).
Getting beyond Race in Assessing the O.J. Case, Orange Co. Reg. 6
(Feb. 11, 1997).
Bareheaded and Barefaced Counsel: Courts React to Unprofessional-
ism in Lawyers’ Papers, 31 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1 (1997).
Law School Is Often an Inhospitable Place for Women and Minority
Students, 38 Orange Co. L. 6 (Oct. 1996).
Book Review, Legal Ethics for Management and Their Counsel, 38 Or-
ange Co. L. 43 (June 1996).
Portia Unbound: The Effects of a Supportive Law School Environment
on Women and Minority Students, 7 UCLA Women’s L.J. 81 (1996).
Foul Is Fair: What Shakespeare Really Thought about Lawyers, 5
Scribes J. Leg. Writing 157 (1994–1995).
Dispelling the Dichotomy: The Practical Versus the Theoretical in the
Law School Classroom, Cin. B. Assn. Bull. 10 (Sept. 1993).
Materials for Legal Writing Workshop (May 1993) (CLE presentation
sponsored by the Cin. B. Assn.).
Hereby and Pursuant Are Not Terms of Art: The Law Schools and the
Plain English Movement (Feb. 1993) (materials for CLE presenta-
tion to the Lawyers’ Club of Cincinnati, Ohio).
Clear Legal Writing in Pleadings and Memoranda (Feb. 1992) (mate-
rials for CLE presentation to meeting of U.S. Bankr. Trustees for
the Sixth Cir., Cincinnati, Ohio).
Sharp Practices Tarnish Reputation of the Bar, 24 Long Beach B.

Assn. Bull. 2 (Apr. 1991).
Summary Judgment in Federal Court: Recent Ninth Circuit Develop-
ments after Celotex, 6 L.A. Co. B. Assn. Litig. Newsltr. 1 (Fall 1989).
Future Profits Damages: California Does Set Limits, 12 L.A. L. 34 (Ju-
ly–Aug. 1989) (co-author Joseph A. Ball).
Persuasive Writing: Wherefore the Hereinafters? 71 ABA. J. 118 (Dec.
1985).
Criminal Law in the Ninth Circuit, 13 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 591 (1980) (co-
authors Patricia Whelan Beaman et al.).
Flannery, Michael T.
Is Bird Nesting in the Best Interest of Children? 57 S.M.U. L. Rev. 101
(2004).
Affairs of the Heart, in Courting the Yankees: Legal Essays on the
Bronx Bombers (Ettie Ward ed., Carolina Academic Press 2004) (re-
printed in 10 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.J. 211 (2003)).
Philadelphia, in From Blueprint to Bricks: A Survey of Current Base-
ball Stadium Financing Projects, 34 Urban Law. 381 (2002).
First, Do No Harm: The Use of Covert Video Surveillance to Detect
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy—An Unethical Means of “Prevent-
ing” Child Abuse, 32 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 105 (1999).
Mandatory HIV Testing of Professional Boxers: An Unconstitutional
Effort to Regulate a Sport That Needs to Be Regulated, 31 U. Cal.
Davis L. Rev. 409 (1998) (co-author Raymond O’Brien).
Long-Term Care: Federal, State, and Private Options for the Future
(Haworth Press, Inc. 1997) (co-author Raymond C. O’Brien).
The Pennsylvania Bar Institute Custody Law Update (1995–1996)
(CLE materials).
Against All Odds: Representing Fathers in Custody Disputes, 31 Tr. 44
(Aug. 1995) (reprinted in 9 Minn. Fam. L.J. 49 (1995)).
Munchausen’s Syndrome by Proxy: Broadening the Scope of Child
Abuse, 28 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1175 (1994).
Norplant: The New Scarlet Letter? 8 J. Contemp. Health L. & Policy
201 (1992).
Court-Ordered Prenatal Intervention: The Final Means to the End of
Gestational Substance Abuse, 30 J. Fam. L. 519 (1991–1992).
The Pending Gauntlet to Free Exercise: Mandating That Clergy Report
Child Abuse, 25 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1 (1991) (co-author Raymond C.
O’Brien).
Fowler, Linda
Legislative Survey: Family, 21 Campbell L. Rev. 377 (1999) (co-author
Carey A. McAlister).
Friedman, Peter B.
The Class Listserv: Professor’s Podium or Students’ Forum? 8 Persps.
75 (Winter 2000).
Book Review, 2 J. App. Prac. & Process 219 (2000) (reviewing Bryan A.
Garner, The Winning Brief: 100 Tips for Persuasive Briefing in Trial
and Appellate Courts (Oxford U. Press 1999)).
Writing Effectively, in Skills for Effective Management of Non-Profit
Organizations (Richard L. Edward, John A. Yankey & Mary A. Alt-
peter eds., NASW Press 1998) (co-author Mary Kay Kantz and
Kathryn Mercer).
Frost, Michael
Rhetorical Question: What Would Aristotle Make of Scalia? 2 Leg. Af-
fairs (Mag. of Yale L. Sch.) 26 (Nov./Dec. 2003).
Justice Scalia’s Rhetoric of Dissent: A Greco-Roman Analysis of Scal-
ia’s Advocacy in the VMI Case, 91 Ky. L.J. 167 (2002–2003).
Introduction to Classical Legal Rhetoric: A Lost Heritage, 8 S. Cal.
Interdisciplinary L.J. 613 (1999).
The Unseen Hand in Administrative Law Decisions: Organizing Prin-
ciples for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 17 J. Natl. Assn.
of Admin. L. Judges 151 (1997).
Greco-Roman Analysis of Metaphoric Reasoning, 2 Leg. Writing 113
(1996).
Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, 99 Dick. L. Rev. 85 (1994).
Greco-Roman Legal Analysis: The Topics of Invention, 66 St. John’s L.
Rev. 107 (1992).
Brief Rhetoric—A Note on Classical and Modern Theories of Forensic
Discourse, 38 U. Kan. L. Rev. 411 (1990).
Issues of Audience in Legal Writing, 31 Proc. Am. Bus. Comm. Assn.
315 (1984).
Fruehwald, Scott
The Rehnquist Court and Horizontal Federalism: An Evaluation and a
Proposal for Moderate Constitutional Constraints on Horizontal
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Judge Weinstein on Personal Jurisdiction in Mass Tort Cases: A Cri-
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The Principled and Unprincipled Grounds of the New Federalism: A

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Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation: Judge Jack B. Weinstein
on Choice of Law in Mass Tort Cases, 31 Hofstra L. Rev 323 (2002).
Choice of Law for American Courts: A Multilateralist Method (Green-
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Pragmatic Textualism and the Limits of Statutory Interpretation: Dale
v. Boy Scouts of America, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 973 (2000).
If Men Were Angels: The New Judicial Activism in Theory and Prac-
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Choice of Law and Same-Sex Marriage, 51 Fla. L. Rev. 799 (1999).
Choice of Law in Federal Courts: A Reevaluation, 37 Brandeis L.J. 21
(1998–1999).
Constitutional Constraints on State Choice of Law, 24 U. Dayton L.
Rev. 39 (1998).
A Multilateralist Method of Choice of Law, 85 Ky. L.J. 347 (1997).
The Related to Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Bankruptcy Courts, 44
Drake L. Rev. 1 (1995).
The Parody Fair Use Defense after Campbell, 18 Colum.-VLA J.L. &
Arts 103 (1993).
Jury Trials in Bankruptcy Court after Granfinanciera, 24 Cumb. L.
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Representative Litigation in Maryland: The Past, Present and Future
of the Class Action in Maryland State Courts, 58 Md. L. Rev. 1510
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The Medical Monitoring of Medical Devices: An Industry-Based Solu-
tion Is Best, 10 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 239 (1998).
Hazardous Substance Litigation in Maryland: Theories of Recovery
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(1997).
Back to the Future? Product Liability Class Actions and Proposed Rule
23 Changes, 64 Def. Counsel J. 195 (1997) (co-authors Bruce R. Par-
ker and Donald L. DeVries).
Is the Tide Turning on Medical Device Claims? Wash. Leg. Found.
Newsltr. (reprinted in the following: Andrews Tobacco Indus. Litig.
Rptr., Andrews Diet Drug Litig. Rptr., Andrews Asbestos Litig.

Rptr., Andrews Medical Devices Litig. Rptr., and Andrews Toxic
Chemical Litig. Rptr.).
The Future of Civil Litigation? Wash. Leg. Found. Newsltr. (Rules Ad-
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Supreme Court’s Recent Decision Raises Class-Action Consciousness,
Daily Rec.
Md. Rule 23 in for Major Changes: Federal Conformity a Possibility,
Daily Rec.
Claim Bifurcation in Class Action Litigation: Questions of Constitu-
tionality, Practicality and Superiority, Intl. Assn. of Def. Counsel
(Prod. Liab. Comm. Newsltr.).
Garner, Bryan A.
Black’s Law Dictionary (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed., West 2004).
The Redbook: A Manual on Legal Style (West 2002).
The Elements of Legal Style (2d ed., Oxford U. Press 2002).
Black’s Law Dictionary (Bryan A. Garner ed., 2d ed., pocket ed., West
2001).
Legal Writing in Plain English: A Text with Exercises (U. Chi. Press
2001).
The Wit and Wisdom of Charlie Wright: 1927–2000, 7 Scribes J. Leg.
Writing 1 (1998–2000).
The Citational Footnote, 7 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 97 (1998–2000).
Black’s Law Dictionary (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., West 1999).
The Winning Brief: 100 Tips for Persuasive Briefing in Trial and Ap-
pellate Courts (Oxford U. Press 1999 & 2d ed. 2004).
Securities Disclosure in Plain English (CCH Inc. 1999).
Introduction, 52 S.M.U. L. Rev. 657 (1999).
The Wit and Wisdom of Charlie Wright, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1587 (1998).
Unclutter the Text by Footnoting Citations, 33 Tr. 87 (Nov. 1997).
Guidelines for Drafting and Editing Court Rules, 169 F.R.D. 176
(1997).
From the Editor, 6 Scribes J. Leg. Writing v (1997).
More Dictionary Reprints, 6 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 166 (1996–1997).
Tribute: Remembering Judge Thomas Gibbs Gee, 15 Rev. Litig. 169
(1996).
A Conversation on the Art of Legal Writing, West’s Leg. News L. Prac.
Mgt. (available on 11-15-96 WLN 12191).
The Uncivil Lawyer, 15 Rev. Litig. 177 (1996).
A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage (2d ed., Oxford U. Press 1995).
Two Publishers Reprint Historical Law Dictionaries, 5 Scribes J. Leg.

Writing 167 (1994–1995).
The Legal-Writing Skills Test, 5 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 107 (1994–
1995).
The Deep Issue: A New Approach to Framing Legal Questions, 5
Scribes J. Leg. Writing 1 (1994–1995).
In Praise of Simplicity but in Derogation of Simplism, 4 Scribes J. Leg.
Writing 123 (1993).
Colloquiality in Law, 3 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 147 (1992).
Insane Committees, 3 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 151 (1992).
On Beginning Sentences with But, 3 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 87 (1992).
Alliteritis, 2 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 145 (1991).
An Epistolary Essay: The Wright-Garner-Maugans Correspondence on
Complimentary Closes, 2 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 83 (1991) (co-
authors Charles Alan Wright and James D. Maugans).
An Approach to Legal Style: Twenty Tips for the Legal Writer, 2
Scribes J. Leg. Writing 1 (1991).
Vocabulary-Building in the First Circuit, 2 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 150
(1991).
From the Editor, 1 Scribes J. Leg. Writing v (1990).
An Uninformed System of Citation: The Maroonbook Blues, 1 Scribes
J. Leg. Writing 191 (1990) (review of The University of Chicago
Manual of Legal Citation (Bancroft-Whitney Co., Laws. Coop. &
Mead Data Co. 1989)).
Genty, Philip M.
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tal Incarceration, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1671 (2003).
Termination of Parental Rights, in Family Trial Advocacy, Supreme
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Incarcerated Parents and the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA):
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Permanency Planning in the Context of Parental Incarceration: Legal
Issues and Recommendations, in Children with Parents in Prison,
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Clients Don’t Take Sabbaticals: The Indispensable In-House Clinic and
the Teaching of Empathy, 7 Clin. L. Rev. 273 (2000).
Recent Developments in Child Custody Policy and Legislation: The
Impact of ASFA upon Incarcerated Parents and Their Families, 22
Fam. & Corrections Network Rpt. (Oct. 1999).
Confusing Punishment with Custodial Care: The Troublesome Legacy

of Estelle v. Gamble, 21 Vt. L. Rev. 379 (1996).
Termination of Parental Rights among Prisoners: A National Perspec-
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The Foster Care Handbook for Incarcerated Parents: A Manual of Your
Legal Rights and Responsibilities (Phillip M. Genty et al. eds., Chil-
dren’s Ctr. Bedford Hills Correctional Facility 1994).
Procedural Due Process Rights of Incarcerated Parents, in Termination
of Parental Rights Proceedings: A Fifty State Analysis, 30 J. Fam. L.
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Protecting the Parental Rights of Incarcerated Mothers Whose Children
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“Important” and “Irreversible” but Maybe Not “Unreviewable”: The
Dilemma of Protecting Defendants’ Rights through the Collateral
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Continuing Development: A Snapshot of Legal Research and Writing
Programs through the Lens of the 2002 LWI and ALWD Survey, 9
Teacher, Coach, Cheerleader, and Judge: Promoting Learning through
Learner-Centered Assessment, 94 L. Lib. J. 59 (2002).
The Internet Alternative, 19/3:4 Leg. Ref. Servs. Q. 119 (2001).
Making the Connection: Learning Style Theory and the Legal Research
Curriculum, 19/3:4 Leg. Ref. Servs. Q. 71 (2001).
What Is the Difference between Substantive and Procedural Law? And
How Do I Research Procedure? 9 Persps. 5 (Winter 2000).
Seventh Annual National Legal Research Teach-In Training Kit (West
1999).
Sixth Annual National Legal Research Teach-In Training Kit (West
1998).
Cost-Effective Legal Research: Integrating Manual and Online

Sources, Fifth Annual Legal Research Teach-In Training Kit (West
1997) (co-author Kory D. Staheli).
Many Utah Firms Are Adding CD-ROMs to Their Research Arsenal—
Are They for You? Utah B.J. 18 (Aug./Sept. 1996) (co-author Kory D.
Staheli).
Legal Research Training Seminar-Legal Practice Materials, Fourth
Annual Legal Research Teach-In Training Kit (West 1996) (co-
author Kory D. Staheli).
Gewirtzman, Doni
Symposium: Civil Rights Law in Transition: The Forty-Fifth Anniver-
sary of the New York City Comission on Human Rights, 27 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 1105 (2000).
Gilligan, Francis A.
Bringing the “Opening the Door” Theory to a Close: The Tendency to
Overlook the Specific Contradiction Doctrine in Evidence Law, 41
Santa Clara L. Rev. 807 (2001) (co-author Edward J. Imwinkelried).
Courtroom Criminal Evidence (3d ed., LexisNexis 1998 & Supp. 2001)
(co-authors Paul C. Giannelli, Edward J. Imwinkelried, and Fredric
I. Lederer).
Cyberspace: The Newest Challenge for Traditional Legal Doctrine, 24
Rutgers Comp. & Tech. L.J. 305 (1998) (co-author Edward J. Im-
winkelried).
Court-Martial Procedure, in Principles and Practice of Military Foren-
sic Psychiatry (Charles Thomas Publg. Co. Supps. 1997, 1999 &
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The Theory of “Unconscious Transference”: The Latest Threat to the
Shield Laws Protecting the Privacy of Victims of Sex Offenses, 38
B.C. L. Rev. 107 (1996) (co-authors Edward J. Imwinkelried and
Elizabeth F. Loftus).
Court-Martial Procedure (Michie Publg. Co. 1991 & Supp. 1998) (con-
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Courtroom Criminal Evidence (2d ed., Michie Publg. Co. 1993 & Supp.
1997) (co-authors Edward J. Imwinkelried & Paul C. Giannelli).
Supreme Court—1989 Term, Part VI, Army Law. 58 (Nov. 1990) (co-
author Stephen D. Smith).
Supreme Court—-1989 Term, Part V, Army Law. 54 (Sept. 1990) (co-
Supreme Court—1989 Term, Part IV, Army Law. 53 (Aug. 1990) (co-
Supreme Court—1989 Term, Part III, Army Law. 77 (June 1990) (co-
Supreme Court—1989 Term, Part II, Army Law. 85 (May 1990) (co-
Supreme Court—1989 Term, Part I, Army Law. 87 (Apr. 1990) (co-
Dept. of Army Pamphlet, No. 27–22, Evidence (1987) (co-authored).
The Bill of Rights and Service Members, Army Law. 3 (Dec. 1987).
Courtroom Criminal Evidence (Michie Publg. Co. 1987 & Supp. 1989)
(co-authored).
Vehicle Identification Numbers, Army Law. 56 (Apr. 1986).
Application Falsehoods as Basis for Impeachment, Army Law. 50 (Feb.
1986).
Criminal Law Notes: Character Evidence, 109 Mil. L. Rev. 83 (1985).
Criminal Law Notes: Eyewitness Identification in Military Law, 110
Mil. L. Rev. 1 (1985) (co-author Alan K. Hahn).
Credibility of Witness in the Military, 46 Ohio St. L.J. 595 (1985).
Uncharged Misconduct, Army Law. 1 (Jan. 1985).
Of Good Faith and Good Law: United States v. Leon and the Military
Justice System, Army Law. 1 (Nov. 1984) (co-author Stephen J. Ka-
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Field Circular, No. 19–105, Apprehension, Searches, and Seizure
(1984).
The Procurement and Presentation of Evidence in Courts-Martial:
Compulsory Process and Confrontation, 101 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (1983)
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Seizure (1977).
Continuing Evisceration of [the] Fourth Amendment, 14 San Diego L.
Rev. 823 (1977).
Replacing the Exclusionary Rule with Administrative Rulemaking, 28
Ala. L. Rev. 533 (1977) (co-author Frederic I. Lederer).
Searches by Dogs, 3 Search & Seizure L. Rpt. (Jan. 1976).
Let’s Do away with the Exclusionary Rule, L. Enforcement J. (Winter
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Prison Searches and Seizures: “Locking” the Fourth Amendment out of

Correction Facilities, 62 Va. L. Rev. 1045 (1976) (co-author Paul C.
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The Federal Rules of Evidence, Army Law. 12 (Aug. 1975) (co-author
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Doing Away with the Exclusionary Rule, Army Law. 12 (Aug. 1975)
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The Aftermath of Robinson-Gustafson, 2 Search & Seizure L. Rpt.
(Mar. 1975).
Dept. of Army Pamphlet, No. 27–22, Evidence (1975).
Fourth Amendment in Military Practice (1975).
The Federal Tort Claims Act—An Alternative to the Exclusionary
Rule? 66 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1 (1975).
Issues Raised by Military Warrants, Army Law. 4 (Aug. 1974).
The Unconstitutional Burden of Article 15: A Rebuttal, 83 Yale L.J.
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Attacking the Probable Cause Equation, 65 Mil. L. Rev. 115 (1974).
Expectation of Privacy—A Two-Edged Sword as to Standing, Army
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Search of Premises, Vehicles, and the Individual Incident to Apprehen-
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Eyewitness Identification, 58 Mil. L. Rev. 183 (1973).
Probable Cause and the Informer, 60 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (1973).
Inspections, Army Law. 1 (Nov. 1972).
Gionfriddo, Jane Kent

The President’s Column on 405c Status for All Legal Writing Profes-
sionals, 15 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 1 (Jan.
2001).
President’s Opening Remarks on the Status of Legal Writing, 7 Leg.
Writing vii (2001).
LR&W Should Begin at the Beginning: Reading Legal Authority, 14
Using Fruit to Teach Analogy, 12 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writ-
Dangerous! Our Focus Should Be Analysis Not Formulas Like IRAC,
10 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 2 (Nov. 1995).
Glaser, Cathy
The Lawyer’s Craft: An Introduction to Legal Analysis, Writing, Re-
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Glashausser, Alex
Of Digests and Parties, in Teaching the Law School Curriculum (Ste-
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A Global Enterprise, in Courting the Yankees: Legal Essays on the
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Juggling Failure and Success, L. Teacher 3 (Fall 2003).
Citation and Representation, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 59 (2002).
From Electoral College to Law School: Research and Writing Lessons
from the Recount, 10 Persps. 1 (Fall 2001).
What Is “Lecturing,” Alex? 8 Persps. 73 (Winter 2000).
The Treatment of Foreign Country Convictions as Predicates for Sen-
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(1994).
Goldman, Pearl
Alternative Dispute Resolution as a Vehicle for Promoting Collabora-
tive Learning, 15 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 6
(June 2001).
How to Push an Elephant through a Straw: Using Wireless Technology
in a Web-Enhanced Skills Program, 15 Intl. Rev. L. Comp. & Tech.
281 (2001) (co-author Billie Jo Kaufman).
Book Review, 24 Leg. Stud. Forum 721 (2000) (reviewing Peter M. Ti-
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Legal Education and Technology: An Annotated Bibliography, 93 L.
Lib. J. 423 (2000).
A Guide to Researching Bankruptcy Law on the Internet, 8 J. Bankr. L.
& Prac. 449 (July–Aug. 1999).
Using Technology to Enhance Learning in the Lawyering Skills Class-
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Beyond Core Skills and Values: Integrating Therapeutic Jurisprudence
and Preventive Law into the Law School Curriculum, 5 J. Psychol.,
Pub. Policy & L. 1123 (1999) (co-author Leslie Cooney).
Book Review, 23 Leg. Stud. Forum 611 (1999) (reviewing James Kin-
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Book Review, Am. Scientist 276 (May–June 2001) (reviewing Leah
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Second Spanish Translation of Jorge R. Talbot, La Ciencia de la Escri-

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Spanish Translation of Victor W. Gonzalez Lauck, La Ciencia de los
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Book Review, 17 Stud. in Age of Chaucer 223 (1995) (reviewing Robert
L. Kindrick, Henryson and the Medieval Arts of Rhetoric (Garland
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Japanese Translation of Yosuke Kawachi, A Collection of Geologic
Sample Sentences: A Guide for Scientific Writing 293–313 (1994).
The Professor and the Professionals: Teaching Writing to Lawyers and
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Legal Writing: A Bibliography, 1 Leg. Writing 93 (1991) (co-author
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Controlling Contexts: Interpretation and Expert Testimony, 65 Am.
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Book Review, 89 J. English & Germanic Philology 215 (1990) (review-
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The Science of Scientific Writing, 78 Am. Scientist 550 (1990).
What’s an Assignment Like You Doing in a Course Like This? Writing
to Learn Mathematics, 21 College Math J. 2 (1990) (co-author David
A. Smith).
Legal Writing from the Perspective of the Reader: An Approach That
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Book Review, 11 Stud. in Age of Chaucer 241 (1989) (reviewing Joseph
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Theme and Variations: The Concept of Audience, in Collective Source-
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The State of Legal Writing: Res Ipsa Loquitur, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 333
(1987).
Private Grief into Public Action: The Rhetoric of John of Gaunt in
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Robert Henryson’s Moral Fables (Notre Dame U. Press 1987) (critical
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Let the Buyer in the Ordinary Course of Business Beware: Suggestions
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The English Teacher and English Song: A Sequel, 47 College English
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The Essential Seriousness of Robert Henryson’s Moral Fables: A Study

in Structure, 82 Stud. in Philology 42 (1985).
Every Spring a New Haystack: A Method for the Annual Evaluation of
New Composition Textbooks, 7 Writing Prog. Admin. 17 (1984).
Rhyme and Reason: Why the Study of Poetry Is the Best Preparation
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Perceiving Structure: Teaching Writing at Law Schools, 35 Harv. L.
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Book Review, 82 J. English & Germanic Philology 436 (1983) (review-
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A Rare Book’s Odyssey, 10 Antiquarian Bk. Mthly. Rev. 52 (1983).
Prostitution and the Writing Consultant: A View of a View, in Tech-
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A Question of Cash and Credit: Writing Programs at Law Schools, 3 J.
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Translation of Georges Dumezil, Notes on the Cosmic Bestiary of the
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Gore, Jeffrey
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The Architecture behind the Architecture of Passive Voice, 15 Second
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A Case for Modesty, Newsltr. S. Asia Resource Ctr. (U. Chi.) (review-
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To See-Between the Conclusion and Its Questions: Interviewing Tech-
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of English (Winter 1997).
Peace in the Information Age, Strong Coffee (July 1997) (poem).
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The Hearsay Rules in Texas Civil Litigation (U. Houston L. Found.
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Insurance Claims and Litigation after Tort Reform ’95 (U. Houston L.
Found. CLE 1995).
New Directions in Texas Insurance Bad Faith Law, Declarations (Win-
ter 1994–1995) (co-authored).
Elements of Liability under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(U. Houston L. Found. CLE 1994) (co-authored).
Student Author, Bad Faith, Punitive Damages, and Vicarious Liabil-
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Student Author, The At-Will Doctrine in Admiralty, 64 Tul. L. Rev.
949 (1990).
Greenhaw, Leigh (Hunt)

Book Review, 16 J.L & Religion 315 (2001) (reviewing T. Jeremy
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Drugs, Religion, and the Law, in Religion and American Law: An En-
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Public Proselytizing, Solicitation, and Sale of Religious Literature, in
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“To Say What the Law Is”: Learning the Practice of Legal Rhetoric, 29
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Use of Social Science Materials in Teaching within the Standard, Gen-
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Four Pointers to Effective Use of PowerPoint in Teaching, 10 Persps.
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Using Images to Help Teach Legal Research, 10 Training Resources
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Getting Started, 17 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 16
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Armies of the Everyday, 23 Jabberwock Rev. 2 (Spring 2002)
Overcoming a Writer’s Reluctance, 15 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg.
Writing Inst.) 12 (Jan. 2001).
An Email from the Writing Center, 14 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg.
Gin Rummy, Fine Print (1998) (Authors in the Park Competition Fi-
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Honey Girl: A True Story, 34 Colo. N. Rev. (1992).
Daisy’s Stories, 4 N.A. Rev. (1992).
Milk and Honey, 3 N.A. Rev. (1991).
Happy to Be a Writer, 70 Writer’s Dig. (Nov. 1990).
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Dinner with Friends, 7 Woman’s World (Feb. 4, 1986).
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How to Mangle Court Rules and Jury Instructions, 8 Scribes J. Leg.
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Plain Words (Part I), 80 Mich B.J. 72 (Aug. 2001).
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The Great Myth That Plain Language Is Not Precise, 7 Scribes J. Leg.
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A Modest Wish List for Legal Writing, 36 Tr. 89 (Jan. 2000) (reprinted
in 79 Mich. B.J. 1574 (Nov. 2000)).
How to Write an Impeachment Order, 36 Ct. Rev. 8 (Summer 1999)
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The Lessons of One Example, 42 Clarity 59 (Sept. 1998).
Lawyers Need to Learn the Elements of Style, Natl. L.J. A21 (Nov. 10,
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Writing for Dollars, Writing to Please, 6 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 1
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A South African Diary: New Laws for a New Country, Briefs (Ingham
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Notes toward Better Legal Writing, 75 Mich. B.J. 1072 (Oct. 1996).
In Defense of IRAC (As Far As It Goes), 10 Second Draft (newsltr. of
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On Legal-Writing Programs, 2 Persps. 43 (Winter/Spring 1994).
The Influence of a Little Column, 73 Mich. B.J. 32 (Jan. 1994).

Drafting Documents in Plain Language (rev. ed., Bus. Forms Mgt.
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Yes to Plain English, 7 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 2
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I’m Ready: Learning Research and Reasoning through Audiotapes, 3
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Protecting Your Writing from Law Practice, 66 Mich. B.J. 912 (Sept.
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A Plain English Primer, 33 Prac. Law. 83 (1987).
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Memorializing Our Nation’s Heroes: A Legislative Proposal to Amend
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Religious Liberty in Central Asia, 22 CSCE Dig. 33 (1999).
The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative History: The
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The Supreme Court Cries “Foul” to Patronage Contracting: Where Have
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Kordesh, Maureen Straub

Reinterpreting ABA Standard 302(f) in Light of the Multistate Perfor-
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Rolling Up Their Sleeves: Using a Single Case to Teach Multi-Faceted

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Navigating the Dark Morass: A First-Year Student’s Guide to the Li-
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Rule Based Legal Writing Problems: A Pedagogical Approach, 3 Leg.
Writing 143 (1997) (co-authors Gail Anne Kintzer and C. Ann
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“I Will Build My House with Sticks”: The Splintering of Property Inter-
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Little White Lies That Destroy Children’s Lives—Recreating Fraud
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Nature v. Nurture: Children Left Fatherless and Family-Less When
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The Day the Family Dies: The Bald Eagle, DNA and Money Privilege
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Kosse, Susan Hanley

Try, Try Again, Will Congress Ever Get It Right? A Summary of Inte r-
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Virtual Child Pornography, A United States Update, 9:1 Tolley’s
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The Rx for Burnout: Serve Others, 18 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg.
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Buffalo Creek Prevents Legal Writing Class Disaster, 10 L. Teacher 14
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How Judges, Practitioners, and Legal Writing Teachers Assess the
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Leg. Educ. 80 (2003) (co-author David T. Ritchie).
Expedited Appeals in KY, 4 J. App. Prac. & Process 1 (Spring 2002)
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Lessons from the Past—A History of American Law in Times of Crises,
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Let Bush and Gore Teach Persuasion, 16 Second Draft (newsltr. of
Putting One Foot in the Front of the Other: The Importance of Teach-
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What Happens When the Internet Becomes X-Rated: How Do We Keep
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Student Designed Home Web Pages—Does Title IX or the First
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Teaching Negotiable Instruments Can Be Fun, 8 L. Teacher 9 (Fall
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Teaching Legal Analysis to the “Seers, Hearers, and the Doers”, 14
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Improving Legal Writing Courses: Perspectives from the Bench and
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Synthesis: Legal Reading, Reasoning, and Writing (2d ed., Aspen L. &
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Teaching First-Year Contracts Students How to Read and Edit Con-
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The 2000 Draft of UCC Article 2: Part Six on Breach, Repudiation, and
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Click-through Agreements: Strategies for Avoiding Disputes on Validi-
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Winning the Font Game: Limiting the Length of Students’ Papers, 4
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“Standardized” Assignments in First-Year Legal Writing, 3 Persps. 65
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Midpoint Commentary on the Revision of the Uniform Commercial
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Terminating Research, 2 Persps. 6 (Fall 1993) (co-author Helene S.
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Winds of Curricular Change, William Mitchell Mag. 23 (Summer
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Lawrence, Mary S.
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Legal Research without Cost on the Internet, 11 Experience (newltr. of
ABA Senior Laws. Div.) 15 (Fall 2000) (co-authored).
Surviving Sample Memos, 6 Persps. 90 (Fall 1998).
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(co-author Helene S. Shapo).
Writing as a Thinking Process (2d ed., U. Mich. Press. 1996).
Legal Research and Writing and the Blind Student, Leg. Writing, Rea-
soning, & Research (AALS sec. newsltr.) (1991) (co-authored).
A Review from Three Perspectives, 55 Brook. L. Rev. 1301 (1990) (re-
viewing Helene S. Shapo, Marilyn R. Walter & Elizabeth Fajans,
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Fair Use: Evidence of Change in a Traditional Doctrine, 27 ASCAP
Copy. L. Symposium (1982).
The University of Oregon School of Law 1884–1903: The Thornton
Years, 59 Or. L. Rev. 249 (1980).
Reading, Thinking, Writing (U. Mich. Press. 1975).
Enquiry Method and Problem Solving in the EFL Classroom, TESL
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Leatherman, Don
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Dispositions, Spin-offs, Jt. Ventures, Financings, Reorgans. & Re-
structurings 9.
Why Rite Aid Is Wrong, 52 Am. U. L. Rev. 811 (2003).
Current Developments for Consolidated Groups, 18 Tax Strategies for
Corp. Acquisitions, Dispositions, Spin-offs, Jt. Ventures, Financings,
Reorgans. & Restructurings 793 (P.L.I. 2002).
Notice 2001-45 and Consolidated Groups, 15 J. Taxn. of Fin. Instns. 9
(Mar./Apr. 2002).
Recent Developments for Consolidated Groups, 17 Tax Strategies for
Current Developments for Consolidated Groups, 15 Tax Strategies for
United Dominion and the Consolidated Return Regulations, 91 Tax
Notes 1319 (May 21, 2001).
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(Matthew Bender 2000).
Are Separate Liability Losses Separate for Consolidated Groups, 52
Tax Law. 663 (1999).
Musings on Current Consolidated Issues, 14 Tax Strategies for Corp.

Acquisitions, Dispositions, Spin-offs, Jt. Ventures, Financings, Re-
organs. & Restructurings 220 (P.L.I. 1999).
Extraordinary Gain and Loss Disallowance—Formulas to Compute the
Extraordinary Gain Disposition Factor, 12 Tax Strategies for Corp.
Acquisitions, Dispositions, Spin-offs, Jt. Ventures, Financings, Re-
organs. & Restructurings 182 (P.L.I. 1998).
Shifting of Member Stock Basis under Section 1.302-2(c), 13 Tax
Strategies for Corp. Acquisitions, Dispositions, Spin-offs, Jt. Ven-
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Current Developments for Consolidated Groups, 50 Tax Law. 897
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The Use of Partnerships by Consolidated Groups, 12 Tax Strategies for
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(2003).
Creating the Federal Judicial Center’s New Illustrative “Model” Plain
Language Action Notices, 13 Class Actions & Derivative Suits 10
(Spring 2003) (co-author Todd Hilsey).
The Federal Judiciary Center’s Model Plain Language Class Action
Notices: A New Tool for Practitioners and the Judiciary, 4 Bureau of
Natl. Affairs 182 (Mar. 2003) (co-author Todd Hilsee).
In the Time of Shoes and Butterflies, 7 Hispanic J.L. & Policy 56 (Fall
2001).
Teaching Student Editors to Edit, 9 Persps. 124 (Spring 2001).
People, Traffic Jams, Minarets, Donkeys—Cairo!, Austin Am.-
Statesman (Mar. 25, 2001).
A Texas Death, English in Tex. 63 (Fall/Winter 2000).
A Guide to Legal Writing Style (2d ed., Aspen L. & Bus. 2000).
The Nuts and Bolts of Article Selection and Criteria, 30 Stetson L.

Rev. 437 (2000).
Writing Guru Discourses Speaks, 6 Tex. Paralegal J. 25 (2000).
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Failure to Teach: Due Process and Law School Plagiarism, 49 J. Leg.
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Seven Principles of Higher Education—Principle 4: Good Practice
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Doctrine of the Last Antecedent: The Mystifying Morass of Ambiguous
Modifiers, 2 Leg. Writing 81 (1996).
Expert Legal Writing (U. Tex. Press 1995).
U.S. News & World Report “Notices” Legal Writing Programs, 3 Per-
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Writing Exercise Is Exercise, 58 Tex. B.J. 30 (1995).
Power Editing, 57 Tex. B.J. 256 (1994).
An English Professor’s Perspective: “Writing Like a Lawyer”, 1 Persps.
47 (Winter 1993).
I Use Them! Law School Portfolios, Leg. Writing, Reasoning, & Re-
search (AALS sec. newsltr.) (Apr. 1993).
Quick Tricks for Organization, 56 Tex. B.J. 512 (1993).
Avenue Writers, Pecan Press (Austin, Tex.) 10 (Nov. 1992).
That Sophisticated Semicolon, 55 Tex. B.J. 1076 (1992).
Beware of Ambiguous Modifiers, 55 Tex. B.J. 868 (1992).
Jurors, Not Serfs, Tex. Law. 14 (July 1992).
A Reference Library for Drafters, 55 Tex. B.J. 622 (1992).
Cast Your Vote: Doctrine of the Last Antecedent, Second Draft
(newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 2 (Apr. 1992).
Teaching Advice from a Professional Writer, Second Draft (newsltr. of
Leg. Writing Inst.) 3 (Apr. 1992).
The Craft of Successful Drafting, 54 Tex. B.J. 1248 (1991).
The Secret Arguments against Plain English, Second Draft (newsltr. of
Leg. Writing Inst.) (Oct. 1991).
Punctuating with Commas, 54 Tex. B.J. 622 (1991).
What’s New in Rhetoric: Writing Centers, Second Draft (newsltr. of
Leg. Writing Inst.) 2 (June 1991).
Writing’s a Touchy Subject, 54 Tex. B.J. 454 (1991).
Deliberate Sentence Structure, 54 Tex. B.J. 151 (1991).
The Premature Deaths of Writing Instructors, Integrated Leg. Re-

search 4 (Winter 1990–1991).
Ready Writing Handbook (2d ed., U. Interscholastic League 1990) (co-
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Grammar Rules Versus Suggestions, 53 Tex. B.J. 1314 (1990).
Sophisticated Language: Allusions and Word Play, 53 Tex. B.J. 620
(1990).
What’s Happening in Rhetoric? Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing
Inst.) (Apr. 1990).
Can Legal Writing Be Saved? 52 Tex. B.J. 1144 (1989).
Emulating the Pro’s Prose: Stylistic Consciousness, 52 Tex. B.J. 654
(1989).
Compound Adjectives and Noun Strings, 52 Tex. B.J. 316 (1989).
First Aid for Sentences, Part III: Of Marshmallows, 51 Tex. B.J. 1148
(1988).
First Aid for Sentences, Part II: Left-Handed Sentences, 51 Tex. B.J.
935 (1988).
First Aid for Sentences, Part I: The Long Sentence, 51 Tex. B.J. 814
(1988).
Reference Books for Legal Writers, 51 Tex. B.J. 696 (1988).
Attorneys and Writer’s Block, 51 Tex. B.J. 592 (1988).
Coordination and Subordination: Defining Relationships, 51 Tex. B.J.
372 (1988).
Editing Workbook for Attorneys (U. Tex L. Sch. 1983–1988) (CLE sem-
inars for practicing attorneys).
Words and Their Meanings, 50 Tex. B.J. 1242 (1987) (reprinted in In
Res. (L. Lib. Publications) (Jan. 1988)).
Clip-and-Save Writing Guides, 50 Tex. B.J. 1116 (1987).
Help or Hinder: Partners Affect Associates’ Writing, 50 Tex. B.J. 984
(1987).
“Question Marks?” She Queried. Or, the Arbitrary Rules Surrounding
Quotation Marks, 50 Tex. B.J. 398 (1987).
The Success-and Failure-of IRAC, 50 Tex. B.J. 222 (1987).
A Case against Case Names: Examination of the Structure of Legal
Sentences, 50 Tex. B.J. 24 (1987).
Let’s Test Your Basics, 49 Tex. B.J. 1108 (1986).
Re-Vision before Editing, 49 Tex. B.J. 838 (1986) (reprinted in L. Of-
fice Econs. Sec. Newsltr. (Fla. B.) (Oct. 1987)).
Cycle of Discontent: Lawyers and Judges, 49 Tex. B.J. 794 (1986) (re-
printed as Legal Double-Talk Confusing? Okla. Co. B. Assn.’s Brief-
case (Aug. 1986)).
Comma, Comma, and Comma, 49 Tex. B.J. 648 (1986).
Trouble Spots: Salutations and “Prosecutrix”, 49 Tex. B.J. 480 (1986).
Organization and the Deductive Thrust, 49 Tex. B.J. 290 (1986).

Focus on Density, 49 Tex. B.J. 176 (1986).
Sex and the Singular Pronoun, 49 Tex. B.J. 60 (1986).
Editing Workbook for Opinion Writers (U. Tex L. Sch. 1984–1986)
(CLE seminars for practicing attorneys).
Min(d)ing the Field: Appellate Judges Speak out, 48 Tex. B.J. 1350
(1985).
Trouble Spots: “That/Which” and “Only”, 48 Tex. B.J. 1104 (1985).
Jargon 2: Just When You Thought It Was Safe, 48 Tex. B.J. 852
(1985).
Jargon: Manure, Margarine, and Moderation, 48 Tex. B.J. 412 (1985).
Writing Like a Lawyer, 48 Tex. B.J. 362 (1985) (reprinted in 1 Persps.
47 (Winter 1993)).
Editing Workbook for Students (U. Tex L. Sch. 1984) (co-author Fred
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Alsatian Architecture in Medina County, in Texas Buildings (Encino
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The Law School Guide to Windows-Based Computing (forthcoming
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Legal Research and Writing: What Schools Are Doing, and Who Is Do-
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Four Rules to Advance the Status of Legal Writing Faculty, Leg. Writ-
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Words from the Podium, Scrivener (newsltr of Scribes) (Winter 1996–
Spring 2002) (quarterly column).
Women, Writing & Wages: Breaking the Last Taboo, 7 Wm. & Mary J.
Women L. 551 (2001) (co-author Kathryn M. Stanchi).
Designing Assignments for Integrating Legal Analysis, Research and
Writing, 3 Persps. 58 (Spring 1995) (reprinted in Best of Persps. 3
(West Group 2001)).
Gender and Legal Writing: Law Schools’ Dirty Little Secrets, 16
Berkely Women’s L.J. 3 (2001) (co-author Kathryn M. Stanchi).
ing the Teaching, 7 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 51 (1998–2000).
Seven Short Suggestions for Using Your Computer to Teach LRW Bet-
ter, 13 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 13 (May 1999).
Some Concerns about Legal Writing Scholarship, 7 Persps. 69 (Winter
1999).
Legal Writing Scholarship: Point/Counterpoint, 7 Persps. 68 (Winter

1999) (co-author Grace C. Tonner).
Leveling the Hill of Sisyphus: Becoming a Professor of Legal Writing ,
26 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1067 (1999).
The Politics of Legal Writing: Proceedings of a Conference for Legal
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Status and Salary, in The Politics of Legal Writing: Proceedings of a
Conference for Legal Research and Writing Program Directors (Jan
M. Levine, Rebecca Cochran & Steve Johansen eds., West & ALWD
1996).
Response: “You Can’t Please Everyone, So You’d Better Please Your-
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29 Val. U. L. Rev. 611 (1995).
Voices in the Wilderness: Tenured and Tenure-Track Directors and
Teachers in Legal Research and Writing Programs, 45 J. Leg. Educ.
530 (1995).
Standards for Evaluating LR&W Teachers, 9 Second Draft (newsltr. of
The Final Word, 8 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 12
(Mar. 1994).
Figure Out How You Fit into the Law School Academy, 8 Second Draft
(newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 3 (Mar. 1994).
Analytical Assignments for Integrating Legal Research and Writing
(Adams & Ambrose 1991, 1993–1996) (co-author in 1995 & 1996:
Kathryn A. Sampson).
Emergency Medical Technician Liability, in Behavioral Emergencies: A
Field Guide for EMT’s and Paramedics (Ellen L. Bassuk ed., Little,
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Guardianship and Conservatorship in Massachusetts: An Attorney’s
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Worcester County B. Assn. 1981).
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Mental Retardation and the Law (Jan M. Levine ed., President’s
Comm. on Mental Retardation Dec. 1979 & June 1980).
The Use of Human Tissue in Experimentation, Ethics Advisory Board
Report and Conclusions: DHEW Support of Research Involving Hu-
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Why Most People Can’t Write: A Neurologist Suggests Some Answers,
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Brain (Houghton Mifflin 2004)).
Three Views of Visiting, 18 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing
Inst.) 1 (June 2004) (co-authors Samantha Moppett and Terrill
Pollman).
Teaching the Law School Curriculum (Steven Friedland & Gerald F.
Hess eds., Carolina Academic Press 2004) (selected articles).
We Teach Thinking, Not Writing, 17 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg.
Writing Inst.) 12 (July 2003).
Motivating Students to Learn, 9 L. Teacher 14 (Spring 2002).
Be a Classroom Leader, 10 Persps. 12 (Spring 2001).
Better Research Instruction through “Point of Need” Library Exercises,
7 Leg. Writing 87 (2001).
The Cobbler Wears No Shoes—A Lesson for Research Instruction, 51 J.
Leg. Educ. 39 (2001).
“Can’t We All Just Get Along?”—Cooperative Legal Writing Assign-
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2001).
Legal Research and Writing Pedagogy—What Every New Teacher
Needs to Know, 8 Persps. 103 (Spring 2000) (reprinted in Best of
Persps. 39 (West 2001)).
Escape to Alcatraz: What Self-Guided Museum Tours Can Show Us
about Teaching Legal Research, 44 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 387 (2000).
Book Review, Leg. Writing, Reasoning, & Research (AALS sec.
newsltr.) (Fall 2000) (reviewing Gerald Amada & Michael Clay
Smith, Coping with Misconduct in the College Classroom: A Practi-
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50,000,000 Elvis Fans Can’t Be Wrong: The Socratic Method Works, 14
Critiquing Student Papers—The Quick and the Dead, 14 Second Draft
(newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 5 (Nov. 1999).
Dead Bodies and Dueling: Be Creative in Developing Ideas for the
Open Universe Memoranda, 7 Persps. 13 (Fall 1998).
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Adopts Proposed Rule of Evi-
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Topic Surveys: Evidence, 19 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 415 (1985).
Excited Utterance Exception to Hearsay Rule Encompasses Remarks

Elicited during Post-Robbery Questioning, 19 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 424
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Constitutional Challenges to Withdrawal Liability under the Multiple
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Lewis, Robin
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Meditations on Theory and Craft, Press at James Pond (2003).
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The Lawyer’s Craft: An Introduction to Legal Analysis, Writing, R e-
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Legalization, in International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral
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(Oct. 23, 1999).
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Dialogue Press, Inc., Supps. 1999–2003).
The Art of the Fact, 5 Leg. Writing 25 (1999).
Book Review, 13 N.Y. L. Sch. J. Hum. Rights 699 (1997) (reviewing
Silencing the Opposition: Government Strategies of Suppression of
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The Evolving Constitution: How the Supreme Court Has Ruled on Is-
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Business Law and the Legal Environment (3d ed., Harcourt Brace Jo-
vanovich 1992) (co-author George J. Siedel).
Harlan without Relish, 36 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 243 (1991) (reviewing
Tinsley E. Yarbrough, John Marshall Harlan: Great Dissenter of the
Warren Court (Oxford U. Press 1992)).
Toward a Theory of Injury, in Pernicious Ideas and Costly Conse-
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Ctr. for Pub. Interest 1990).
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Ca. Press 2002) (co-author Tom Goldstein).
Lessons from a Writing Audit, 75 ABA J. 86 (Oct. 1989) (co-author
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The Rule of Experts: Occupational Licensing in America (Cato Inst.
1987)).
Stroock, Stroock & Lavan: An Informal History of the Early Years ,
1876 to 1950 (Stroock, Stroock & Lavan 1987).
The Enduring Constitution (West & HarperCollins Publg. 1987).
Why Have Lawyers Proliferated? N.Y. Times A27 (Aug. 6, 1986) (co-
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Book Review, 71 ABA J. 86 (June 1985) (reviewing Lawrence M.
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The Manager’s Guide to Resolving Legal Disputes, Better Results with-
out Litigation (Harper & Row 1985) (co-author James F. Henry).
Salvation: Idle the Lawyers, Wash. Post B5 (Aug. 12, 1984).
Book Review, 70 ABA J. 94 (June 1984) (reviewing Lois G. Forer, Mon-
ey and Justice: Who Owns the Courts? (W.W. Norton & Co. 1984)).
The Role of Courts in American Society (Jethro K. Lieberman ed., West
1984).
To Reach and Teach the Public, Write Better, in Understanding the
Law: A Handbook on Educating the Public 9 (Robert S. Peck &
Charles J. White eds., ABA Press 1983) (reprinted 32 Va. B. News
(Oct. 1983)).
Book Review, Venture 111 (Aug. 1983) (reviewing William F. Buckley,

Jr., Overdrive: A Personal Documentary (Doubleday 1983)).
Book Review, N.Y. Times Bk. Rev. 13 (June 5, 1983) (reviewing Jerold
S. Auerbach, Justice under the Law? (Oxford U. Press 1982)).
Book Review, Venture 115 (Feb. 1983) (reviewing Richard L. Ru-
benstein, The Age of Triage (Beacon Press 1982)).
When Should Lawyers Squeal on Their Clients? Wash. Post C1 (Dec.
21, 1982).
The Litigious Society (Basic Bks. 1981; Harper Colophon 1983 & Jap-
anese trans., Toshiaki Hasegawa Publg. 1993).
Corporate Dispute Management (Jethro K. Lieberman ed., Matthew
Bender & Co. 1982).
Book Review, 27 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 695 (1981) (reviewing Marvin E.
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Checks and Balances, the Alaska Pipeline Case (Lothrop, Lee & Shep-
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court Brace Jovanovich 1981) (originating editor of series).
Free Speech, Free Press, and the Law (Lothrop, Lee & Shepard Bks.
1980).
Putting Law into Ethics, Liberal Educ. 250 (Summer 1979).
Some Reflections on Self-Regulation, in The Professions and Public
Policy 89–97 (Philip Slayton & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., U. Toron-
to Press 1978).
Privacy and the Law (Lothrop, Lee & Shepard Co. 1978).
Crisis at the Bar: Lawyer’s Unethical Ethics and What to Do about It
(W. W. Norton Co. 1978).
The Aleph Solution (Stein & Day 1978; British Commonwealth ed.,
Melbourne House 1978; Berkley Bks. 1981; Italian trans., Reazioni
a Catena, Arnoldo Mondadori Editore 1981; New English Lib. 1982;
Swedish trans. Gislan Tagen, Manhattan Publg. 1982) (writing as
Webster Mews with Sandor Frankel).
Legal Briefs for Editors, Publishers, and Writers (case ed., McGraw-
Hill 1977–1978).
Suing Fever, 22 Skeptic Mag. 38 (Nov./Dec. 1977).
The Relativity of Injury, 7 Philosophy & Pub. Affairs 60 (Fall 1977).
How Much Government? 10 Ctr. Mag. 63 (May/June 1977).
Book Review, N.Y. Times Bk. Rev. 16 (Jan. 16, 1977) (reviewing Law,
Business, and Economics: A Roundup Review).
Will the Courts Meet the Challenge of Technology? 60 Judicature 84
(Aug./Sept. 1976).
New Ways to Cut Legal Fees, N.Y. Mag. 83ff (Feb. 14, 1976).
Milestones! 200 Years of American Law (West & Oxford U. Press

1976).
The Complete CB Handbook (David McKay 1976 & paperback eds.,
Avon Bks. 1976–1980).
How to Avoid Lawyers, in Verdicts on Lawyers 105–117 (Ralph Nader
& Mark Green eds., Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1976).
The Race Admissions Case, Juris Doctor 22 (June 1974).
Bus. Week (1973–1982) (Legal Affairs ed. and authored over 250 sto-
ries, including 6 cover stories and 17 book reviews).
How the Government Breaks the Law (Stein & Day Publishers 1972 &
Penguin 1973).
Cafeteria Workers Revisited: Does the Commander Have Plenary Power
to Control Access to His Base? 25 JAG J. 53 (Fall 1970).
The Obscenity Report: Pornography and Obscenity in America (Stein &
Day Publishers 1970 & British ed., Macgibbon & McKee 1970) (a
satire, writing anonymously).
The Tyranny of the Experts, How Professionals and Specialists Are
Closing the Open Society (Walker & Co. 1970).
Developments in Antitrust during the Past Year, 39 Antitrust L.J. 578
(1970).
Are Americans Extinct? (Walker & Co. 1968).
Understanding Our Constitution (Walker & Co. 1967 & paperback ed.,
Fawcett Crest Bks. 1968).
The Finance Cases, 42 Harv. L. Rec. 5 (April 14, 1966).
Court in Session (Sterling Publg. Co. 1966).
Student Author, Elfbrandt v. Russell and Loyalty Oaths, 2 Harv. Civ.
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Staffing Models & Other Personnel Issues; Hiring a Director; Admin-
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chapters) (co-author Jan M. Levine).
ing the Teaching (Three Years Later), 9 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 1
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Many Birds, One Stone: Teaching the Law You Love, in Legal Writing
Class, 53 J. Leg. Educ. 284 (2003).
Not Ready for PowerPoint? Rediscovering an Easier Tool, 11 Persps.
82 (Winter 2003) (co-authors Melissa Shafer and Sheila Simon).
Who Votes at Law School Faculty Meetings in the United States,
www.alwd.org (2002) (periodically updated).
One Small Step: Beginning the Process of Institutional Change to Int e-

grate the Law School Curriculum, 1 J. ALWD 218 (2002) (co-author
Suzanne E. Rowe).
Being a Beginner Again: A Teacher Training Exercise, 10 Persps. 87
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Advocacy Lessons from Madison Avenue, 16 Second Draft (newsltr. of
Every Case Has Two Stories, 8 L. Teacher 12 (Spring 2001) (reprinted
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Verbs Are It, 89 Ill. B.J. 151 (Mar. 2001).
A Millennium of Legal Writing, Scrivener 1 (Winter 2001) (reprinted
in 15 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 24 (June 2001)).
Memo Structure for the Left and Right Brain, 8 Persps. 95 (Winter
2000).
Artist Wins Using Visual Artists Rights Act, Artfirst 10 (Winter 2000).
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The New Jersey Legal Research Handbook chs. 3–5 (1st ed., Paul Axel-
Lute 1984).
Nathanson, Mitchell J.
It’s the Economy (and Combined Ratio) Stupid: Examining the Medical
Malpractice Litigation Crisis Myth and the Factors Critical to Re-
form, 108 Pa. St. L. Rev. 1077 (2004).
The Tell-All Hurler: Jim Bouton and “Ball Four”, in Courting the Yan-
kees: Legal Essays on the Bronx Bombers (Ettie Ward ed., Carolina
Academic Press 2004).
Celebrating the Value of Practical Knowledge and Experience, 11 Per-
sps. 104 (Spring 2003).
Litigation & Regulatory Issues Affecting Managed Care, in Treatise on
Health Care Law vol. 1, ch. 8A (Matthew Bender & Co. 1996) (co-
author).
The Growth of Enterprise Liability in the Managed Care Arena, Health
Care L. Mthly. (Feb. 1996).
Hospital Corporate Negligence: Enforcing the Hospital’s Role of Ad-
ministrator, 28 Tort & Ins. L.J. 575 (1993).
Neumann Jr., Richard K.

Conflicts of Interest in Bush v. Gore: Did Some Justices Vote Illegally?
16 Geo. J. Leg. Ethics 375 (2003).
Legal Reasoning and Legal Writing (4th ed., Aspen L. & Bus. 2001)
(with Teacher’s Manual).
Comments in Reply, 51 J. Leg. Educ. 151 (2001).
Women in Legal Education: What the Statistics Show, 50 J. Leg. Educ.
313 (2000).
Donald Schön, the Reflective Practitioner, and the Comparative Fail-
ures of Legal Education, 6 Clin. L. Rev. 401 (2000).
Persuasive Fact Analysis (2d ed., Aspen L. & Bus. 2003) (with
Teacher’s Manual) (co-author Stefan Krieger).
authors Ralph L. Brill, Susan L. Brody, Christina L. Kunz, and
Marilyn R. Walter).
After an Insurrection, 3 Yale J. L. & Humanities 157 (1991).
On Strategy, 59 Fordham L. Rev. 299 (1990).
A Preliminary Inquiry into the Art of Critique, 40 Hastings L.J. 725
(1989).
Newby, Thomas R.
Law School Writing Programs Shouldn’t Teach Writing and Shouldn’t
Be Programs, 7 Persps. 1 (Fall 1998).
Dumbing It Down, 82 Ill. B.J. 387 (1994).
Maintaining Your Credibility in Argumentative Writing—Part Two, 81
Ill. B.J. 387 (1993).
Maintaining Your Credibility in Argumentative Writing—Part One, 81
Ill. B.J. 155 (1993).
Indiana Environmental Law: An Examination of 1989 Legislation, 23
Ind. L. Rev. 329 (1990) (co-authors Stanley H. Rorick, Kevin W.
Betz, and Timothy L. Tyler).
Newman, Leslie
Applied Law and Literature in Two Traditions, 10 Cardozo Stud. L. &
Literature 125 (1998).
Jewish Federation of Delaware, 15 Del. Law. 34 (Spring 1997).
Children and Families First, 15 Del. Law. 28 (Spring 1997).
Oates, Laurel Currie

Just Memos (Aspen L. & Bus. 2002) (co-author Anne Enquist).
Just Briefs (Aspen L. & Bus. 2002) (co-author Anne Enquist).
The Legal Writing Handbook: Research, Analysis and Writing (3d ed.,
Aspen L. & Bus. 2002) (co-authors Anne Enquist and Kelly Kusch).
Just Writing: Grammar, Punctuation, and Style for the Legal Writer
(Aspen L. & Bus. 2001) (co-author Anne Enquist).
The Paperless Writing Class, 15 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing
Inst.) 18 (June 2001).
I Know That I Taught Them How to Do That, 7 Leg. Writing 1 (2001).
Beyond Communication: Writing as a Means of Learning, 6 Leg. Writ-
ing 1 (2000).
Education’s Promise, 3 Leg. Writing 1 (1997) (co-author Samuel Wine-
burg).
Beating the Odds: Reading Strategies of Law Students Admitted
through Special Admissions Programs, 83 Iowa L. Rev 139 (1997).
Legal Writing Institute Publishes Journal and Holds Fifth Biennial
Conference, 1 Persps. 62 (Winter 1993).
O’Neill, Kathleen
Against Dicta: A Legal Method for Rescuing Fair Use from the Right of
First Publication, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 369 (2001).
Adding an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Perspective to a Tr a-
ditional Legal Writing Course, 50 Fla. L. Rev. 709 (1998).
Formalism and Syllogisms: A Pragmatic Critique of Writing in Law
Schools, 20 Leg. Stud. Forum 51 (1996).
The Little Girl Book (Ballantine Bks. 1992) (co-author David Laskin).
A Writer’s Guide to Copyright (2d ed., Poets & Writer’s Inc. 1990).
Book Review, 15 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 415 (1986–1987) (re-
viewing Peter H. Schuck, Agent Orange on Trial: Mass Toxic Disas-
ters in the Courts (Harv. U. Press 1986)).
Virgil’s The Aeneid (Bk. Notes, Barron’s Educ. Series 1984).
Oreskovic, Johanna
Capturing Volition Itself: Employee Involvement and the TEAM Act, 19
Berkeley J. Empl. & Lab. L. 229 (1998).
O’Toole, Michael
The Significance of Jail Administration in an Era of Public Competi-
tion, 4 Corrections Mgt. Q. (Nov. 1998).
Ouellette, Alicia R.
When Vitalism Is Dead Wrong: The Discrimination Against and Tor-
ture of Incompetent Patients by Compulsory Life-Sustaining Treat-
ment, 79 Ind. L.J. 1 (2004).
Discriminatory Treatment on the Roadways, 4 Govt. L. & Policy J. 41

(2002)
Freestyle Lawyering: Taking an Expedited Appeal in the New York
State Courts, 4 J. App. Prac. & Proc. 243 (2002).
Parker, Carol McCrehan

A Liberal Education in Law: Engaging the Imagination through Re-
search and Writing beyond the Curriculum, 1 J. ALWD 130 (2002).
Camping Trips and Family Trees: Must Tennessee Physicians Warn
Their Patients’ Relatives of Genetic Risk? 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 585
(1998).
Writing throughout the Curriculum: Why Law Schools Need It and
How to Achieve It, 76 Neb. L. Rev. 561 (1997).
Parker, Deborah Leonard

Plagiarism: Pilfered Paragraphs, Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writ-
ing Inst.) (Apr. 1993) (contributor).
Oral Argument on Appeal: Conversation and Jazz, N.C. Acad. of Tr.
Laws.’ Tr. Brs. (Spring 1993).
Payne, Lucy Salsbury

Bibliography of Works by John T. Noonan, Jr., 76 Notre Dame L. Rev.
1075 (2001).
The Senate Power of Advice and Consent on Judicial Appointments: An
Annotated Research Bibliography, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 106 (1989)
(co-authors Michael J. Slinger and James Lloyd Gates, Jr.).
Peltz, Richard J.
The Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (4th ed., M&M Press 2004)
(co-author John J. Watkins).
Circles of Indecency (in First Amendment Law), in Teaching the Law
School Curriculum (Steven Friedland & Gerald F. Hess eds., Caro-
lina Academic Press 2004).
The Self-Directed LRW Assignment, in Teaching the Law School Cur-
riculum (Steven Friedland & Gerald F. Hess eds., Carolina Academ-
ic Press 2004).
On a Wagon Train to Afghanistan: Limitations on Star Trek’s Prime
Directive, 25 UALR L. Rev. 635 (2003).
Plagiarism Policies Work When “Why” Is Understood, Media L. Notes 3
(Fall 2003).
Use “the Filter You Were Born with”: The Unconstitutionality of Man-
datory Internet Filtering for the Adult Patrons of Public Libraries,
77 Wash. L. Rev. 397 (2002).
What Every JMC Grad Should Know: Exposing Students to Legal Re-
search, Media L. Notes 1 (Fall 2001).
Sixth Circuit Holds Student Yearbook Is Public Forum with Expressive
Content: But Stay Mindful of Policy and Practice, Media L. Notes 4
(Winter 2001).
Censorship Tsunami Spares College Media: To Protect Free Expression
on Public Campuses, Lessons from the “College Hazelwood” Case, 68
Tenn. L. Rev. 481 (2001).
Sixth Circuit Sits En Banc in College Censorship Case, Media L. Notes
(2000).
Introduction to the Ben J. Alzheimer Symposium, 23 UALR L.J. 19
(2000).
Book Review, Bi-Monthly Rev. L. Bks. 17 (May/June 1999) (reviewing
The Burger Court: Counter-Revolution or Confirmation? (Bernard
Schwartz ed., Oxford U. Press 1998)).
Pether, Penelope
Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in U.S.
Courts, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1435 (2004).
Hardy and the Law, 1 Thomas Hardy J. 28 (Feb. 1991) (reprinted in
Short Story Criticism vol. 60, 183 (Janet Witalec ed., Gale)).
Censorship, Repression or Denial? Unpacking the Symptom of People
v. Wu, 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 2451 (2003).
Measured Judgments? Histories, Pedagogies, and the Possibility of
Equity, 14 L. & Literature 489 (2002).
Review Essay, 13 Cardozo Stud. L. & Literature 323 (2001) (reviewing
Dieter Paul Polloczek, Literature and Legal Discourse: Equity and
Ethics from Sterne to Conrad (Cambridge U. Press 1999), and Lynne
Marie De Cicco, Women and Lawyers in the Mid-Nineteenth Century
English Novel: Uneasy Alliances and Narrative Misrepresentation
(Edwin Mellen 1996)).
Discipline and Punish: Dispatches from the Citation Manual Wars and
Other (Literally) Unspeakable Stories, Law’s Cultural Mediations,
10 Griffith L. Rev. (2001).
The Prime Time Election, from Courtroom to Newsroom: The Media
and the Legal Resolution of the 2000 Presidential Election, 13
Cardozo Stud. L. & Literature 1 (2001).
Book Review, 7 Persps. 116 (Spring 1999) (reviewing David S. Ro-
mantz & Kathleen Elliott Vinson, Legal Analysis: The Fundamental
Skill (Carolina Academic Press 1998), and Margaret Z. Johns, Pro-
fessional Writing for Lawyers: Skills and Responsibilities (Carolina
Academic Press 1998)).
Feminist Methodologies in Discourse Analysis: Sex, Property, Equity?
in Culture and Text: Discourse and Methodology in Social Research
and Cultural Studies (Cate Poynton & Alison Lee eds., Allen & Un-
win 1999) (co-author Terry Threadgold).
Critical Discourse Analysis, Rape Law and the Jury Instruction Sim-
plification Project, 24 S. Ill. U. L.J. 53 (1999).
On Foreign Ground: Grand Narratives, Situated Specificities, and the
Praxis of Critical Theory and Law, 10 L. & Critique 211 (1999).
Semiotics; or Wishin’ and Hopin’? 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 1615 (1999).
“We Say the Law Is Too Important to Get One Kid”: Refusing the Cha l-
lenge of Ebatarinja v. Deland & Ors, 21 Sydney L. Rev. (1999).
Book Review, 23 Alternative L.J. (1998) (reviewing Anthony Black-
shield & George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theo-
ry: Commentary and Materials (2d ed., Fedn. Press 1998)).
Principles or Skeletons? Mabo and the Discursive Constitution of the
Australian Nation, 4 L./Text/Culture 115 (1998).
Re-Writing Skills Training in Law Schools—Legal Literacy Revisited,
9 Leg. Educ. Rev. (1998) (co-author Dean Bell).
(Re)Centering, 10 Cardozo Stud. L. & Literature 131 (1998).
Pursuing the Unspeakable: Towards a Critical Theory of Power, Eth-
ics, and the Interpreting Subject in Australian Constitutional Law,
20 Adelaide L. Rev. (1998).
Law in Literature: An Annotated Bibliography of Law-Related Works
(Elizabeth Villiers Gemmette ed., Whitston Publg. Co. 1998) (con-
tributor).
Book Review, 22 Alt. L.J. 259 (1997) (reviewing Courts of Final Juris-
diction: The Mason High Court in Australia (Cheryl Saunders ed.,
Fedn. Press 1996)).
Book Review, 22 Alt. L.J. 259 (1997) (reviewing How Many Cheers for
Engineers? (Michael Coper & George Williams eds., Fedn. Press
1997)).
Book Review, 22 Alt. L.J. 153 (1997) (reviewing A Woman’s Constitu-
tion? Gender and History in the Australian Commonwealth (Helen
Irving ed., Hale & Iremonger 1996)).
Book Review, 3 L./Text/Culture 276 (1997) (reviewing James Boyd
White, Acts of Hope: Creating Authority in Literature, Law, and Pol-
itics (U. Chi. Press 1995)).
Jangling the Keys to the Kingdom: Some Reflections on The Crucible,
on an American Constitutional Paradox, and on Australian Judicial
Review, 8 Cardozo Stud. L. & Literature 317 (1996).
Book Review, 21 Alt. L.J. 196 (1996) (reviewing Anthony Black-
shield & George Williams, Australian Constitutional Law and Theo-
ry: Commentary and Materials (Fedn. Press 1994)).
E.M. Forster’s A Passage to India: A Passage to the Patria? in New
Macmillan Casebook on E.M. Forster (Jeremy Tambling ed., Mac-
millan & St. Martin’s 1995).
Teaching Law Students How to Write, 33 Clarity 40 (1995).

Book Review, 14 Australasian J. Am. Stud. 86 (1995) (reviewing Julie
D’Acci, Defining Women: Television and the Case of Cagney and
Lacey (U.N.C. Press 1994)).
Book Review, 13 Australasian J. Am. Stud. 102 (1994) (reviewing John
Grisham, The Client, The Firm, A Time to Kill, and The Pelican
Brief).
Sex, Lies and Defamation: The Bush Lawyer of Wessex, 6 Cardozo
Stud. L. & Literature 171 (1994).
Sex, Lies and Defamation: The Bush Lawyer of Wessex, in The Happy
Couple: Law and Literature (J. Neville Turner & Pamela Williams
eds., Fedn. Press 1994).
True, Untrue or (Mis)represented?—Section 40(1)(a) of the NSW
Crimes Act, 16 Sydney L. Rev. 114 (1994).
Book Review, 18 Alternative L.J. 245 (1993) (reviewing Cross-Cultural
Communication in Legal Settings (Anne Pauwels ed., Austrl. Mo-
rash U. 1992)).
Book Review, 12 Australasian J. Am. Stud. 71 (1993) (reviewing Mal-
colm Bradbury, The Modern American Novel (Oxford U. Press 1992),
and Linda Wagner-Martin, The Modern American Novel, 1914–1945:
A Critical History (Twayne Publishers 1991)).
Trouble with Iphigenia: Feminist Critiques of Feminist Crime Fiction
and the Case against Sara Paretsky, 9 Australian J.L. & Socy. 3
(1993).
Their Fathers’ House: Forster, Woolf and the Aesthetics of Patriotism,
Literature & Aesthetics 35 (Spring 1992).
E.M. Forster’s A Passage to India: A Passage to the Patria? 17 Sydney
Stud. in English 88 (1991–1992).
Literature and Law, 7 Australian J. L. & Socy. (1991).
Fiduciary Duties: Congreve’s The Way of the World, 7 Australian J.L.
& Socy. 71 (1991).
Hardy and the Law, 7 Thomas Hardy J. 28 (1991) (reprinted in Short
Story Criticism vol. 60, 183 (forthcoming Janet Witalec ed., Thomas
Gale 2003)).
Book Review, 4 Antithesis 186 (reviewing Ian Hunter, Culture and
Government, “And after the Time of Cholera?”).
Phelps, Teresa Godwin

Review of Martha C. Nussbaum’s Cultivating Humanity: A Classical
Defense of Reform in Liberal Education, 25 J.C. & U.L. 185 (1998)
(reviewing Martha C. Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical
Defense of Reform in Liberal Education (Harvard U. Press 1997)).
Tradition, Discipline, and Creativity: Developing Strong Poets in Legal
Writing, 20 Leg. Studs. Forum 89 (1996).
Gendered Space and the Reasonableness Standard in Sexual Harass-

ment Cases, 12 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Policy 265 (1998).
“If Power Changes Purpose”: Images of Authority in Literature and
Film, in The Moral Imagination: How Literature and Films Can
Stimulate Ethical Reflection in the Business World (U. Notre Dame
Press 1998).
Syndrome Logic, 59 Rev. of Pol. 949 (1997) (reviewing Donald Alexan-
der Downs, More Than Victims: Battered Women, the Syndrome So-
ciety, and the Law (U. Chi. Press 1996)).
The Power of Persuasion, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 377 (1994).
The Margins of Maycomb: A Rereading of To Kill a Mockingbird, 45
Ala. L. Rev. 511 (1994).
The Coach’s Wife: A Notre Dame Memoir (W.W. Norton & Co. 1994).
Law as Patriarchal Institution, 55 Rev. of Pol. 23 (1993) (reviewing
Feminist Jurisprudence) (Patricia Smith ed., Oxford U. Press
(1993)).
Pollyanna, Alice and Other Women in the Law, 6 Notre Dame J.L.,
Ethics & Pub. Policy 283 (1992).
Book Review, 42 J. Leg. Educ. 143 (1992) (reviewing David Ray Papke,
ed., Narrative and the Legal Discourse: A Reader in Storytelling and
the Law (Deborah Charles Publications 1991)).
Voices from Within: Community and Law in Three Prison Narratives,
15 J. Am. Culture 69 (1992).
The Sound of Silence Breaking: Catholic Women, Abortion, and the
Law, 59 Tenn. L. Rev. 547 (1992).
No Place to Go, No Story to Tell: The Missing Narratives of the Sanc-
tuary Movement, 48 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 123 (1991).
Problems and Cases for Legal Writing (Natl. Inst. Tr. Advoc. 1990)
(Teacher’s Manual).
Narratives of Disobedience: Breaking/Changing the Law, 40 J. Leg.
Educ. 143 (1990).
Stories of Women in Self Defense, 2 Yale J.L. & Feminism 189 (1989)
(reviewing Cynthia A. Gillespie, Justifiable Homicide: Battered
Women, Self Defense, and the Law (Ohio St. U. Press 1989)).
Book Review, 39 J. Leg. Educ. 463 (1989) (reviewing Wayne C. Booth,
The Company We Keep: An Ethics of Fiction (U. Cal. Press 1988)).
Protest and Perplexities, 51 Rev. of Pol. 469 (1989) (reviewing Richard
Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation (Harvard U.
Press 1988)).
The Story of the Law in Huckleberry Finn, 39 Mercer L. Rev. 889
(1988).
In the Law the Text Is King, in Worlds of Writing 363–374 (Carolyn
Matalene ed., Random House 1988).
The Tribune and the Tutelar: The Tension of Opposite in The Sleeping
Lord, in David Jones: Man and Poet 331–350 (John Matthias ed.,
Natl. Poetry Found. Press 1988).
Writing Strategies for Practicing Attorneys, 23 Gonz. L. Rev. 155
(1988).
The New Legal Rhetoric, 40 Sw. U. L. Rev. 1089 (1986).
Questioning the Text: The Significance of Phenomenological Herme-
neutics for Legal Interpretation, 29 St. Louis L.J. 353 (1985) (re-
printed in Statutes and Statutory Construction (6th ed., Sutherland
1986)).
Book Review, Chi. Trib. Bk. World 31 (Sept. 1, 1985) (reviewing Alice
Adams, Return Trips (Alfred A. Knopf 1985)).
Subordinate to Persuade, 1 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing
Inst.) 12 (Oct. 1985).
The Question for Our Time: How Do We Educate Our Children? 1
Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Policy 421 (1985).
Book Review, Chi. Trib. Bk. World 43 (Sept. 9, 1984) (reviewing Helen
Hooven Santmeyer, Ohio Town (Harper 1963)).
Book Review, 30 Prac. Law. 87 (1984) (reviewing C. Terry Cline, The
Attorney Conspiracy (Arbor House Publg. Co. 1983)).
Problems and Cases for Legal Writing (2d ed., Natl. Inst. Tr. Advoc.
1984).
The Criminal as Hero in American Fiction, 4 Wis. L. Rev. 1427 (1983).
Book Review, Chi. Trib. Bk. World 42 (Oct. 30, 1983) (reviewing Brian
Moore, Cold Heaven (Holt Rinehart & Winston 1983)).
Problems and Cases for Legal Writing, Teacher’s Manual and Admin-
istrative Guide (Natl. Inst. Tr. Advoc. 1983).
Book Review, 29 Prac. Law. 83 (1983) (reviewing Louis Auchincloss,
Narcissa and Other Fables (Houghton Mifflin Co. 1983)).
Problems and Cases for Legal Writing (Natl. Inst. Tr. Advoc. 1982).
David Jones “The Hunt” & “The Sleeping Lord”: The Once and Future
Wales, Poetry Wales 64 (1982).
Empress of the Labyrinth: The Feminine in David Jones’s Poetry
(1980) (dissertation).
Pocock, Sharon
Training Students in the Basics, 17 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg.
Writing Inst.) 8 (July 2003).
Writing Facts Persuasively: An Active-Learning Exercise, 16 Second
Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 10 (Dec. 2001).
Using an Elaborated Correction Key for Basic Writing Problems, 14
Pollman, Terrill
Double Jeopardy and Nonmember Indians in Indian Country, 82 Neb.
L. Rev. 889 (2004).
IRLAFARC! A Survey on the Language of Legal Writing, 56 Me. L.
Rev. 239 (2004) (co-author Judith M. Stinson).
Inst.) 1 (June 2004) (co-authors James Levy and Samantha A. Mop-
pett).
Further Thoughts on Better Writing, Leg. Writing, Reasoning, & Re-
search (AALS sec. newsltr.) 8 (Spring 2003).
Building a Tower of Babel or Building a Discipline? Talking about
Legal Writing, 85 Marq. L. Rev. 887 (2002).
The Lawyering Process Program: Building Competence and Confi-
dence, 9 Nev. Law. 15 (Dec. 2001) (co-author Jennifer Anderson).
Book Review, 8 Nev. Lawyer 23 (2001) (reviewing ALWD & Darby
Dickerson, ALWD Citation Manual: A Professional System of Cita-
tion (Aspen L. & Bus. 2000)) (co-author Leah Kane).
A Writer’s Board and a Student-Run Writing Clinic: Making the Writ-
ing Community Visible at Law Schools, 3 Leg. Writing 277 (1997).
Maynard v. Cartwright: Channeling Arizona’s Use of the Heinous,
Cruel, or Depraved Aggravating Circumstance to Impose the Death
Penalty, 32 Ariz. L. Rev. 193 (1990).
Pratt, Diana
Legal Writing: A Systematic Approach (4th ed., West 2004).
Representing Non-Mainstream Clients to Mainstream Judges: A Chal-
lenge of Persuasion, 4 Leg. Writing 79 (1998).
Selecting and Designing Effective Legal Writing Problems, 3 Leg. Writ-
ing 163 (1997) (co-author Grace Tonner).
Raeker-Jordan, David
Environmental Law: Pollution Control Act Held Not Retroactive, 39
S.C. L. Rev. 85 (1987).
Workers’ Compensation Law: Status of Traveling Employees Rule Un-
clear, 39 S.C. L. Rev. 235 (1987).
Ramirez, Mary
Enron and the New Paradigm of Economic Crime, 40 Cir. Rider 4
(Fall/Winter 2002).
Student Author, Homicide Liability for the Furnishing of Dangerous
Narcotics, 6 Pub. L. Rev. 161 (1987).
Ramsfield, Jill J.
Culture to Culture: A Guide to U.S. Legal Writing (Carolina Academic
Press 2004).
Bridges in Legal Discourse: From Socrates to Social Constructivism,
Knowledge & Discourse Conf. Proceedings (2002).
The Law as Architecture: Building Legal Documents (West 2000).
Legal Writing: Getting It Right and Getting It Written (3d ed., West
2000) (co-author Mary Barnard Ray).
The When and Why in Writing about Writing, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/
lawbooks (last updated 1998) (reviewing Myra A. Harris, Legal Re-
search: FUN-damental Principles (Prentice Hall 1997), and Myra A.
Harris, Legal Writing: Principles of Juriography (Prentice Hall
1996)).
Is “Logic” Culturally Based? A Contrastive, International Approach to
the U.S. Law Classroom, 47 J. Leg. Educ. 157 (1997).
Legal Writing in the Twenty-First Century: A Sharper Image, 2 Leg.
Writing 1 (1996).
Scholarship in Legal Writing, 1 Leg. Writing Dirs. Conf. 87 (1996) (co-
author J. Christopher Rideout).
Writing High Impact Briefs, 30 Tr. Law. 54 (1994).
Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 35 (1994) (co-author
J. Christopher Rideout).
Expect the Unexpected: Time Management for Lawyers, 29 Tr. Law. 1
(1993).
Legal Writing in the Twenty-First Century: The First Images—A Sur-
vey of Legal Research and Writing Programs, 1 Leg. Writing 123
(1991).
Legal Writing: The Last Frontier, Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writ-
ing Inst.) (1990).
Ramy, Herbert
Navigating the Internet: Legal Research on the World Wide Web (Wil-
liam S. Hein & Co. 2000) (co-author Samantha Moppett).
The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth: Will Commonwealth v.
Lanigan Lead to the Use of Polygraph Test Results in Criminal Tri-
als? 80 Mass. L. Rev. 48 (1995).
Official Torture as a Violation of the Law of Nations under the Alien
Tort Claims Act: In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights
Litigation, 17 Suffolk Transnatl. L. Rev. 578 (1994).
Ray, Mary Barnard

Beyond the Basics: A Text for Advanced Legal Writing (2d ed., West
2003) (co-author Barbara J. Cox).
Common Confusing Usage Rules, Some Rules Bear Repeating: Fewer

and Less, Affect and Effect, Correspond to and Correspond with, Dif-
ferent from and Different Than, and Oral and Verbal Are Just a
Few, 73 Wis. Law. 49 (June 2000).
Skill Is Key to Crafting Memorable Quotes: Here Is an Exercise That
Helps Writers Understand the Bones of English, the Grammar That
Can Make It Eloquent and Memorable, 73 Wis. Law 57 (Mar. 2000)
Legal Writing: Getting It Right and Getting It Written (3d ed., West
2000) (co-author Jill J. Ramsfield).
How to Use Legalese, 72 Wis. Law. 34 (July 1999).
Finding the Perfect Tense: Different Verb Tenses Can Be Coordinated
in One Passage to Express Actions That Happen at Different Times,
That Happen Because of Each Other, or That Happen Only in the
Context of Another Action, 72 Wis. Law. 28 (Apr. 1999).
Pet Peeves of Improper English Usage: Readers Sound off on Pet Peeves
of Their Own, 72 Wis. Law. 53 (Mar. 1999).
Reversing Ripley: Telling a Story Your Reader Can Believe: Three
Writing Techniques Can Make the Unlikely Seem Natural-
Foreshadowing the Surprise, Establishing a Solid Foundation, and
Showing More Than Telling, 72 Wis. Law. 29 (Feb. 1999).
Transitions Enable Readers to Follow the Writer’s Thinking, Legal
Writers Need to Use Enough Accurate Signals to Guide Their Rea d-
ers through the Complex Terrain of Most Legal Reasoning, 72 Wis.
Law. 35 (Oct. 1999).
How Individual Differences Affect Organization and How Teachers
Can Respond to These Differences, 5 Leg. Writing 125 (1999).
Write Crisp Sentences: Use Periods. A Liberal Sprinkling of Periods
Will Help Your Writing Be Clear, Straightforward, and Easy to
Read, 71 Wis. Law. 59 (July 1998).
A Dear John Letter . . . . Or How to Construct Your Litigation Docu-
ments, 71 Wis. Law. 49 (Apr. 1998).
When Weaving Emotional Arguments into Legal Logic Remember to
Focus Your Fire, Use Writing Techniques That Add Drama and
Force, and Have Faith in the Quality of Your Argument, 71 Wis.
Law. 47 (Mar. 1998).
Pet Peeves of Improper English Usage, 70 Wis. Law. 51 (Dec. 1997).
Writing Good News and Bad News Letters, 70 Wis. Law. 45 (Sept.
1997).
Spell Checkers, Proofreading and the Lack of Free Lunches, 70 Wis.
Law. 47 (May 1997).
Logic and the Legal Reader, 70 Wis. Law. 28 (Feb. 1997).
Avoiding Colon Trouble, 69 Wis. Law. 47 (Oct. 1996).
The Uses and Abuses of Procrastination, 69 Wis. Law. 49 (Aug. 1996).
Reichard, Cynthia J.
William J. Holloway & Michael J. Leech, Employment Termination:
Rights & Remedies (Cynthia J. Reichard ed., 2d ed., BNA 1993).
Student Author, Due Process in the Administration of General Assis-
tance: Are Written Standards Protecting the Indigent? 59 Ind. L.J.
443 (1984).
Reinhart, Susan
An ESP Program for Students of Law, in English for Specific Purpos-
es: Case Studies in TESOL Practice (Thomas Orr ed., Teachers of
English 2002) (co-author Christine Feak).
Giving Academic Presentations (U. Mich. Press 2002).
A Preliminary Analysis of Law Review Notes, 19:3 English for Specific
Purposes 197 (2000) (co-authors Christine Feak and Ann Sinsheim-
er).
A Review of Legal Dictionaries, Am. Language Rev. (Jan. 1998) (co-
author Christine Feak) (unabridged manuscript available).
Meeting the Needs of Non-Native Students, Am. Language Rev. (May
1997) (co-author Christine Feak).
Ressler, Jayne
Privacy, Plaintiffs, and Pseudonyms: The Anonymous Doe Plaintiff in
the Information Age, 53 U. Kan. L. Rev. 195 (2004).
Richmond, Jane
Legal Writing: Form and Function (Natl. Inst. Tr. Advoc. 2001).
How to Start a Legal Writing Column at Your Firm, AILTO Insider
(Am. Inst. for L. Training within Off.) (Summer 1997).
Language for the Law Office, Ohio Law. Mag. (Ohio St. B. Assoc.) (Fall
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Law Regarding Protection of the Environment during Wartime, in En-
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Environmental Damage Resulting from the NATO Military Action
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Bringing Arkansas Special Education Law into Focus (MEDS/PDN
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Step-by-Step: A Guide to Disciplining Children with Disabilities, 2002
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Legal Research and Writing, Ark. L. Rec. 18 (Fall/Winter 2002).
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Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 180 (2000).
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Book Review, Bimonthly Rev. L. Bks. (Oct. 1995) (reviewing Kent
Greenawalt, Fighting Words: Individuals, Communities, and Liber-
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Video Reviews: Opening Statement, Closing Argument, What Every
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Seymour, Thomas H.
Scope of Employment: Have the Rules Changed in Massachusetts? 20
W. New Eng. L. Rev. 211 (1998).
Choosing and Using Legal Authority: The Top Ten Tips, 6 Persps. 1
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Surviving Sample Memos, 6 Persps. 90 (Winter 1998) (co-author Mary
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Designing the First Writing Assignments, 5 Persps. 94 (Spring 1997)

(co-author Mary S. Lawrence).
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Winning the Font Game: Limiting the Length of Students’ Papers, 4
Persps. 10 (Fall 1995) (co-author Christina L. Kunz).
“Standardized” Assignments in the First-Year Legal Writing Class, 3
Persps. 65 (Spring 1995) (co-author Christina L. Kunz).
The MacCrate Report Conference: A Review, 2 Persps. 54 (Winter
1994).
Teaching Citation Form and Technical Editing: Who, When and What,
3 Persps. 4 (Fall 1994).
Implications of Cognitive Theory for Teaching Writing, 2 Persps. (Win-
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Brutal Choices, 2 Persps. 6 (Fall 1993).
Notes from Legal Writing Organizations, 2 Persps. (Fall 1993).
A Tale of Two Systems: Anglo-American Problems in the Moderniza-
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Siegel, Martha
“Seven Edits Make Perfect?” The Saga of a Legal Writing Instructor, 5
Persps. 30 (Fall 1996).
A Practitioner’s Guide to Feminist Jurisprudence, 37 B.B.J. 6 (1993).
Simon, Sheila
Survey of Illinois Law: Family Law—The Illinois Domestic Violence
Act, 27 S. Ill. U. L.J. 719 (2003).
Top 10 Ways to Use Humor in Teaching Legal Writing, 11 Persps. 125
(Spring 2003).
I Swear by My Tattoo, 10 L. Teacher 3 (Spring 2003).
82 (Winter 2003) (co-authors Sue Liemer and Melissa Shafer).
Order What Are Your Words In? How Foreign Languages Can Help
You Teach the Structure of Legal Writing, 10 Persps. 124 (Spring
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Austin Powers: A Shagadelic Focus on Family Law, Baby, Picturing
Justice, On-Line J.L. & Pop. Culture (Jan. 16, 2002).
Eunice & Pablo, 5 Green Bag 2d 233 (Winter 2002).
But Words Can Never Harm Me —Review of Women Escaping Violence
Empowerment through Narrative by Elaine Lawless, 7 ISBA Cata-
lyst 7 (Dec. 2001).
Take My Garbage-Please! Teaching Persuasion through Arguments
Anyone Can Make, 16 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 7
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Yikes—The Students Are Editing My Writing, 15 Second Draft
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Getting the Better of the Batterer—How to Negotiate with Respondents
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Teaching Active Reading, 8 L. Teacher 11 (Spring 2001).
In Sentence of Death, There Can Be No Doubt, Chi.-Sun Times 26 (De-
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Divorce: A Client’s Guide (Justice Publications 1993).
Lawyers, Hearing Impaired Clients, and the Americans with Disabili-
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Sirico Jr., Louis J.

A Primer on Organ Donation, 17 J.L. & Health 1 (2002–2003).
Judging: A Book for Student Clerks (LexisNexis 2003).
What the Legal Writing Faculty Can Learn from the Doctrinal Faculty,
11 Persps. 97 (Spring 2003).
Teaching a Collaborative Seminar, 9 L. Teacher 5 (Fall 2002).
Life and Death: Stories of a Heart Transplant Patient, 37 Real Prop.
Prob. & Trust J. 553 (2002).
Why Law Review Students Write Poorly, 10 Persps. 117 (Spring 2002).
Ask Your Students, 8 L. Teacher 3 (Spring 2001).
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isNexis Matthew Bender 2001) (co-author Nancy Schultz).
Reading Out Loud in Class, 10 Persps. 8 (Fall 2001).

The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: 1971–1999, 75 Ind.
L. Rev. 1009 (2000).
Materials for Teaching Plain English: The Jury Instructions in
Palsgraf, Revisited, 8 Persps. 137 (Spring 2000).
Review Sessions: Proceed Productively, 7 L. Teacher 12 (Fall 1999).
Teaching Professionalism, in Fresh Looks at Teaching and Learning
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Advising Clients on Organ Transplants, New Matter (Newsltr., Ches-
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The Trial of Charles I: A Sesquicentennial Reflection, 16 Const. Com-
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Legal Research and the Summer Job . . . Advice from the Law School,
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Teaching Paragraphs, 8 Persps. 13 (Fall 1999).
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Teaching Oral Argument, 7 Persps. 17 (Fall 1998).
Cardozo’s Statement of Facts in Palsgraf, Revisited, 6 Persps. 122
(Spring 1998).
Conducting Exit Interviews, 2 L. Teacher 6 (1998).
Getting Respect, 3 Leg. Writing 293 (1997).
Book Review, New Directions 130 (1997) (reviewing Anne Strick, In-
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Advanced Legal Writing Courses: Comparing Approaches, 5 Persps. 63
(Winter 1997).
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Inclusive Law, Inclusive Religion, and the Shakers, 34 J. Church & St.
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Fiddling with Footnotes, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1273 (1992) (reviewing The
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Avoiding Violent Words, 24 Conn. L. Rev. 487 (1992).
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Empirical Analysis, 45 U. Miami L. Rev. 1051 (May 1991) (co-author
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Vietnam Haiku, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 1228 (1989).
Future Interest Haiku, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 171 (1989).
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Scaling down the Constitution Extravaganza, Phila. Bus. J. 7 (May 4–
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Supreme Court Haiku, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1224 (1986).
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55 Fordham L. Rev. 335 (1986).
The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study ,
34 UCLA L. Rev. 131 (1986) (co-author Jeffrey B. Margulies).
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Amendment and School Aid, 50 Mo. L. Rev. 321 (1985).
Deficiency Judgments in Pennsylvania: A Reply, 30 Vill. L. Rev. 1152
(1985).
Constitutional Dimensions of Church Property Disputes, 59 Wash. U.
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Book Review, 1 Am. J. Crim. L. 125 (1972) (reviewing Anthony J.
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Student Author, Prisoner Classification and Administrative Deci-
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Student Author, The Open and Obvious Nature of a Design Defect Does
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Erasing Lines: Integrating the Law School Curriculum, 1 J. ALWD 3
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Basic Legal Research Workbook (Aspen L. & Bus. 2002) (co-author
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Creating Effective Legal Research Exercises, 7 Persps. 8 (Fall 1998)
(reprinted in Best of Persps. 30 (West Group 2001)).
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Slotkin, Jackquelyn
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You Really Have Come a Long Way: An Analysis and Comparison of
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(1996).
An Institutional Commitment to Minorities and Diversity: The Evol u-
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Comma Abuse: A Comma Can Cause Trouble by Its Absence, Its Pres-
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Smith, Craig T.
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The Uncertain Limits of the European Court of Justice’s Authority:
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Teaching Students How to Learn in Your Course: “The Learning-
Centered” Course Manual, 12 Persps. 1 (Fall 2003).
New Transatlantic Tension and the Kagan Phenomenon: A Primer, 6
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More Disagreement over Human Dignity: The Federal Constitutional
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Technology & Legal Education: Negotiating the Shoals of Technocen-
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An American’s View of the Federal Constitutional Court: Karlsruhe’s

Justices “Speak Softly but Carry a Big Stick”, 2 German L.J. no. 9
(June 1, 2001).
Synergy and Synthesis: Teaming “Socratic Method” with Computers
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Teaching Synthesis in High-Tech Classrooms: Using Sophisticated
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Specifics of Justice: Inga Markovits’s Firsthand Account of German
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Depositions and the Court, 32 Tort & Ins. L.J. 635 (1997) (co-author
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Published Translation of Municipality and County Code of the Free
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Einseitige prajudizielle Rechtskraftwirkungzugunsten Dritter im US-
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U.S. Civil Procedure], 73 Deutsche Richterzeitung 94 (1995)
(presented at Germany’s Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof), May
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Book Review, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1963 (1990) (reviewing Louis Henkin,
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For. Rel. Press 1989)).
Smith, Michael R.
Alternative Substantive Approaches to Advanced Legal Writing Cour s-
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The Next Frontier: Exploring the Substance of Legal Writing, 2 J.
ALWD 1 (2004).
Advanced Legal Writing: Theories and Strategies in Persuasive Writ-
ing (Aspen L. & Bus. 2002).
Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions by Appellate
Courts, 69 Tenn. L. Rev. 245 (2002) (co-author Adam A. Milani).
Student Author, Considering the “Totality of the Circumstances,” in
Determining Probable Cause for a Search Warrant Based on Inform-
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The Judge’s Evidence Bench Book (Thomson 2004) (co-authors Leo H.
Whinery and Theodore P. Roberts).
Last Hurrah of the James-Younger Gang (Okla. Press 2001).
Daltons! The Raid on Coffeyville, Kansas (Okla. Press 1999).
Men at War: True Stories of Heroism and Honor (William Morrow &
Co. 1997 & Euromedia 2001).
Practical Legal Writing for Legal Assistants (West-Delmar 1996 &
forthcoming 2d ed.) (co-author Celia C. Elwell).
To the Last Cartridge (William Morrow & Co. 1994 & Robinson 1996).
The Literate Lawyer: Legal Writing and Oral Advocacy (3d ed., Michie-
Butterworth 1995).
The Best of Wild West (Natl. Historical Socy. 1996) (four chapters).
All Alone, the Death of HMS Glowworm, World War II History (Mar.
2004).
Revenge for Cawnpore, Mil. History (Feb. 2004).
Bank Robbery in Meeker, Wild West (Dec. 2003).
HMS Upholder, World War II History (Nov. 2003).
Wellington’s Camp Followers, Mil. History (June 2003).
Murder by Moonlight, Wild West (June 2003).
The Greatest Raid of All: St. Nazaire, World War II (Feb. 2003).
Strike from the Sea. The Vaagso Raid, World War II History (Jan.
2003).
Britain’s Bastard River War, Mil. History (Oct. 2002).
The Sinking of Scharnhorst, World War II History (Sept. 2002).
Strike from the Sky, the Assault on the Orne Bridges, World War II
(July 2002).
The Raid on Bruneval, World War II History (July 2002).
PIAT, World War II History (May 2002).
A Sinking off Sumatra: The Tragic Voyage of Junyo Maru, World War
II (Mar. 2002).
Silent Blitzkrieg: The Fall of Eben Emael, World War II History (Mar.
2002).
Blackpool: Darkest Hour for the Chindits, World War II (May 2001).
Born Bad: The Outlaw Christian Brothers, Wild West (Dec. 2000).
In Order to Die: The Legion at Tuyen Quang, Vietnam (Feb. 2000).
A Second Career: The Odyssey of Elmer McCurdy, Wild West (June
1999).
Interview: Mad Mike Calvert, World War II (Feb. 1999).
When Outlaws Ruled No Man’s Land, Wild West (Feb. 1999).
When the Paths of Glory Led but to the Pulpit, 26 Okla. City U. L. Re-
vue (1998).
Book Review, Vietnam (Dec. 1998) (reviewing Vietnam Stories).
The Victoria Cross, World War II (Mar. 1998).
Kill the Gringos! The El Paso Salt War, Wild West (Feb. 1998).
Tu-Le: Retreat from Hell, Vietnam (Oct. 1997).
The Great Western, Wild West (Aug. 1997).
Miracle at Albuera, Mil. History (Mar. 1997).
Introduction to Feuer, Commando! The M/Z Units’ Secret War against
Japan (Praeger 1996).
King Fisher, Wild West (Dec. 1996).
Final Verdict at Nuremberg, World War II (Nov. 1996).
Judgment at Tokyo, World War II (Sept. 1996).
The Short, Nasty Life of Dave Rudabaugh, Wild West (June 1996).
When Mad Mike Calvert Took Umbrage, World War II (May 1996).
Introduction to Imperato, into Darkness (Howell Press 1995).
Nuremberg: Final Chapter for the Thousand-Year Reich, World War II
(Nov. 1995).
Critters, in Perspectives, Vietnam (Oct. 1995).
The Dalton Gang’s Mystery Rider, Wild West (Oct. 1995).
Madame la Parachutiste, Vietnam (Aug. 1995).
Lawyers and Judges, Badmen and Lawmen: Law Enforcement in Ear-
ly Oklahoma (Carl Albert Ctr., U. Okla. July 1995).
“A Damned Nice Thing” at Waterloo, Mil. History (June 1995) (re-
printed in The Age of Napoleon (Summer 1998), and Great Battles of
the 19th Century (Mar. 2004)).
Bad Night in Newton, Wild West (Apr. 1995).
Bass Reeves, Wild West (Feb. 1995).
A Century of French Conquest in Vietnam, Vietnam (Dec. 1994).
Fate and Glory, Mil. History (Oct. 1994).
Jeff Milton, Wild West (July 1994).
The Doctor of Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam (June 1994).
The West’s Deadliest Dentist, Wild West (Apr. 1994).
The James Boys Go to War, Civil War Times Illustrated (Feb. 1994).
Susan Travers, World War II (Jan. 1994).
The Angel of Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam (Dec. 1993).
Texas John’s Odyssey, Wild West (Dec. 1993) (reprinted in Best of Wild
West (Cowles History Group 1996)).
A Matter of Honor, Wild West (Oct. 1993).
The Calcutta Light Horse at Marmagoa, World War II (Mar. 1993).
To Die Alone in the Silence, Vietnam (Oct. 1992).
Shootout at Ingalls, Wild West (Oct. 1992) (reprinted in Best of Wild

West (Cowles History Group 1996)).
Battle of Pierre’s Hole, Wild West (June 1992).
Killer in Deacon’s Clothing, Wild West (Aug. 1992) (reprinted in Best
of Wild West (Cowles History Group 1996)).
Battalion Meat Grinder, Vietnam (Apr. 1992) (reprinted in Great Bat-
tles (Sept. 1993)).
Biggest Indian Fight, Wild West (Apr. 1992) (reprinted in Great Bat-
tles (Jan. 1995), and in Best of Wild West (Cowles History Group
1996)).
Hot Shot, Cold Steel, Mil. History (Dec. 1991) (reprinted in Great Bat-
tles (July 1993)).
No God West of Fort Smith, Wild West (Oct. 1991).
Volunteer Force’s Epic March, Wild West (June 1991).
Trail of Black Hawk, Wild West (Apr. 1991) (reprinted in Great Bat-
tles (Mar. 1993)).
The Death of Groupe Mobile 100, Vietnam (Apr. 1991).
Gamble for Needed Victory, World War II (Mar. 1991).
Walther Wenck at Stalingrad, World War II (Nov. 1990).
Prelude to Disaster, Vietnam (Feb. 1990).
May God Strike Me Dead If I Did It, British Heritage (Feb. /Mar.
1989).
Run down in Neutral Waters, World War II (July 1988).
When the Bugle Sounded, Wild West (June 1988).
Commentary: Persuasion on Appeal, 41 Okla. L. Rev. 463 (1988).
Making Sense: Some Reflections on Legal Writing, 56 Okla. B. J., 2563
(1985) (reprinted in ABA B. Leader (Autumn 1985)).
Soonpaa, Nancy
Content in First-Year Courses, in Sourcebook on Legal Writing Pro-
grams (forthcoming 2d ed., ABA 2004).
Goals of a First-Year Legal Writing Course, in Sourcebook on Legal
Writing Programs (forthcoming 2d ed., ABA 2004).
Pedagogical Methods in First-Year Courses, in Sourcebook on Legal
Writing Programs (forthcoming 2d ed., ABA 2004).
Pop Culture Prognostication, in Teaching the Law School Curriculum
272 (Carolina Academic Press 2004).
Stress in Law Students: A Comparative Study of First-Year, Second-
Year, and Third-Year Law Students, 36 Conn. L. Rev. 353 (2004).
Whom Are We Teaching? Independent Students Who Defy Categoriza-
tion, 18 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 7 (Dec. 2003).
What Are We Teaching Our Students? Competence and Confidence, 17

Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 1 (July 2003).
Fifth Circuit Survey: Civil Rights Cases, 34 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 597
(2003).
A Retrospective on Three Teaching Experiences and Resultant Ideas
about Structuring a Three-Semester Course, 16 Second Draft
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Strategies for Enhancing the Status of Legal Research and Writing
and of Legal Research and Strategies to Improve Writing Faculty’s
Status, Leg. Writing, Reasoning, & Research (AALS sec. newsltr.) 3
(Spring 2002).
Five Simple Exercises for Teaching Persuasion, 16 Second Draft
(newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 13 (Dec. 2001).
The Art of Legal Analysis in the Legal Writing Classroom, 14 Second
Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 10 (May 2000).
Some Thoughts on Commenting, 14 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg.
Considering Audience: Using a Writing Concept to Enhance Legal
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Variety—The Spice of Teaching Life, 12 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg.
Using Composition Theory and Scholarship to Teach Legal Writing
More Effectively, 3 Leg. Writing 81 (1997).
The Continued Vitality of IRAC, 10 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg.
The Pill in the Applesauce: Making Grammar, Punctuation, and Usage
Palatable, 9 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 5 (Nov.
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Spanbauer, Julie M.
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Kimel and Garrett: Another Example of the Court Undervaluing Indi-
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Scarlett O’Hara as Feminist: The Contradictory, Normalizing Force of
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Her Say Editorial, Making Cosmetic Changes Alone Won’t Ensure
Safety of Breast Implants, Chi. Trib. Womanews 8 (Sept. 6, 1998).
Breast Implants as Beauty Ritual: Woman’s Sceptre and Prison, 9 Yale
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Current Developments in Federal Employment Discrimination Law, 15
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The John Marshall Manual for Community Developers and Social
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The First Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of
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Judicial Bias Claims of Homosexual Persons in the Wake of Lawrence
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All in the Family: Recognizing the Unifying Potential of Same-Sex
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Notice Students’ Similarities—Not Differences, 18 Second Draft
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Citation Form in New Hampshire: You May Want to Consult the New
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Book Review, 12 Risk: Health, Safety & Envt. 339 (Fall 2001) (revie w-
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Placement 2000) (co-author Mary B. Sheffer).
Using Rubrics, 14 Second Draft (newsltr. of Leg. Writing Inst.) 16
(Nov. 1999).
More Steps to Improve the Quality of Life for Lawyers, N.H. B. News
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Giving Women Positive Role Models, N.H. B. News (July 6, 2001).
Book Review, 6 Risk: Health, Safety & Envt. 89 (Winter 1995) (revie w-
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Anonymity in Online Communications, in Encyclopedia of American
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Dr. King, Bull Connor, and Persuasive Narratives, 2 J. ALWD 209
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Electronic Surveillance, in Ethics (forthcoming John K. Roth ed., Sa-
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Nevada Case Threatens to Expand Terry Stops, Boston B.J. 27 (Mar.–
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Security vs. Privacy: Reframing the Debate, 79 Denv. U. L. Rev. 519
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Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 San Diego L.
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CyberSLAPP Suits and John Doe Subpoenas: Balancing Anonymity
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36 Rutgers L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2005).
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THE LEGAL WRITING INSTITUTE
THE BEGINNING: EXTRAORDINARY
VISION, EXTRAORDINARY
ACCOMPLISHMENT
Based on Interviews with Laurel Currie

Oates and J. Christopher Rideout, and
Documents from the Archives of the
Legal Writing Institute
Mary S. Lawrence1
DEDICATION
For Marjorie D. Rombauer, Legal Writing Icon, Mentor, and
Friend. With gratitude, love, and deepest respect.
I. FOREWORD: A PERSONAL NOTE
In 2004, members of the Legal Writing Institute celebrated its

twentieth anniversary. Today, we rightly and justifiably consider
ourselves legal writing professionals, integral members of legal
academia. We are no longer regarded, as we were over twenty
years ago, as temporary, disposable law school employees. We owe
this dramatic professional transformation in large measure to the
Legal Writing Institute and to the vision of its founders, Chris
Rideout and Laurel Oates. The Institute helped make us who we
now are. In a sense, it gave us our profession.
1 © 2005, Professor Emerita, University of Oregon. Writing this history has been a
privilege and a joy. It brought back many happy memories; it gave me the opportunity to
spend extensive time with Laurel, Chris, and Marjorie. My gratitude to Seattle University
School of Law cannot be overstated: for printing the monograph, but, much more vital to the
project, for Lori Lamb’s time. Without her dedication, this history could not have been com-
pleted. She transcribed the audiotapes, typed the manuscript through numerous drafts, and
arranged for the printing. With this project, she continued the exemplary service she has
always given to the Legal Writing Institute.
I acknowledge with thanks the contributions of my dear friends and colleagues who
responded to questions and sent us data: Jill Ramsfield, Anne Enquist, Joe Kimble, Chris
Kunz, and Ralph Brill. Their reminiscences were invaluable.
I was fortunate to begin my legal writing career under a dean

who saw a future for legal writing as an essential part of the law
school curriculum. I was even luckier to attend the 1984 legal writ-
ing conference at the University of Puget Sound School of Law. It
was at that conference that the concept of the Institute was con-
ceived. Out of that 1984 conference came the first newsletter,
which later became the Second Draft; Legal Writing: The Journal
of the Legal Writing Institute; the Idea Bank; a mentoring pro-
gram; plans for national conferences; and the very idea of the In-
stitute itself.
But the effects of the early meetings at Puget Sound went far
beyond the formation of an organization. Those first conferences
were extraordinary: intimate, exciting, heartwarming, and exhila-
rating. Whenever I think of them, I smile. We had a sense of pure
joy in being with people who shared common goals and in learning
from each other. Together we felt persuaded that legal writing
held great promise; we were inspired to keep working in the field.
From feeling isolated and unconnected to like-minded profession-
als, we created a sense of community—a community built on re-
spect, trust, and genuine affection, free of self-promotion and com-
petitiveness. We made friendships at those early conferences,
friendships that continue decades later.
For me, legal writing as a profession is unique in academic
disciplines. It is not hierarchical; its members support each others’
careers. It is not parochial; its members strive to improve legal
writing instruction nationally. Legal writing is more a community,
a family. We owe these unique characteristics to many people but
especially to the wisdom of Marjorie Rombauer, pioneer in legal
writing at the University of Washington, who inspired us all on
behalf of the profession through her program, her publications,
and her work in the Association of American Law Schools. This
unique sense of commonality also sprang from the vision of the
founders of the Legal Writing Institute, Chris Rideout and Laurel
Oates. This history is my tribute to their extraordinary accom-
plishments.
Without Chris and Laurel, there would be no Legal Writing
Institute. Chris used part of a grant from the National Endowment
for the Humanities (NEH) as seed money for the 1984 conference
at the University of Puget Sound. He and Laurel pledged their
salaries to cover any shortfall. Together, they did all the exhaust-
ing work of organizing the 1984 conference. Their dedication to a
vision of legal writing as a profession made the Institute possible.
2005] The Beginning of the Legal Writing Institute 215
Today, the Institute has many members who are, I imagine,

unaware of how it began and unaware to whom we, all of us, owe
gratitude and admiration. The occasion of the twentieth anniver-
sary, together with the transition of the Institute’s home from Se-
attle University to Mercer University School of Law, made this an
appropriate time to memorialize the Institute’s beginning years.
II. GETTING STARTED
August 15 and 16, 1984, were auspicious days for legal

writing as a profession. On those two days, the University of
Puget Sound School of Law held a conference, “Teaching Le-
gal Writing.” From that conference grew the Legal Writing In-
stitute.
A grant from the National Endowment for the Humani-
ties (NEH) for Writing-across-the-curriculum provided seed
money for the conference. The conference was held at the Uni-
versity of Puget Sound because Chris Rideout, then an Eng-
lish professor there, was one of the NEH grant recipients. To
the great fortune of legal writing as a discipline, Chris
Rideout and Laurel Oates of the University of Puget Sound
School of Law collaborated to organize the 1984 legal writing
conference.
CR:2 I had some money left over from a National Endowment

for the Humanities (NEH) Grant—Writing-across-the-curriculum
Grant that I was a part of in 1979. I joined people from five other
Northwest schools so there were six of us: University of Puget
Sound, University of Oregon, University of Washington, Lewis and
Clark College, the Evergreen State College in Olympia, and Pacific
Lutheran University. We got the grant in 1981. So it was a three-
year project.
In the first two years, I think it was, I ran a faculty develop-
ment workshop through the English Department at the University
of Puget Sound, and in the last year, I decided to run a faculty de-
velopment workshop through the law school. These were work-
shops in how to teach writing, especially for people who were not
in English departments.
Anyway, I got near the end of the grant, and as I recall, I had
about $3,000 left. So, I went to Laurel and I said, “I’ve got $3,000
2 Mary Lawrence (ML), Marjorie Rombauer (MR), Laurel Oates (LO), and Chris
Rideout (CR).
left of NEH money. Let’s have a conference—a legal writing con-

ference.”
LO: When we approached our dean, Fredric C. Tausend, about
doing a conference, he said, “Sure.” He asked us where we were
going to get the money. We told him that we had some grant mon-
ey. He said, “Is this enough?” And we said, “No.” He said, “That’s
fine. We’ll advance you some money, but if you don’t break even, it
comes out of your paychecks.” So Chris and I essentially agreed
that if the conference did not break even, we would pay the differ-
ence.
CR: That’s right. But we thought it was worth taking the risk.
LO: It was one of those things where it was difficult even to
come up with a list of who should be invited because it was hard to
tell who in the country was teaching legal writing. When we sent
out the invitations, we weren’t sure that anyone would respond.
When over eighty people came, we were thrilled.
CR: Yes. So, we just got the addresses of all the law schools,
and sent a mailing to them. We put together a brochure. Laurel
and I just made it up ourselves. We called some people that we
knew. Anyway, we got some presenters, put together a brochure,
and mailed it to legal writing directors, and then to the address of
each law school.3 Initially, the only person we heard from was He-
lene Shapo, who told us about Scribes.4
Our dean, Fredric C. Tausend, was very supportive. The law
school covered the cost of work-study people to work at registra-
tion and for things like paper and phone calls. We made between
200 and 300 long-distance calls for each of the early conferences,
so paying for phone calls was a substantial contribution.
3 App. A (also available at http://www.lwionline.org/about/history/brochure1984.pdf).

4 Scribes began in 1953. It publishes a quarterly newsletter called “The Scrivener.”
The earliest newsletter was published in 1973. Scribes Journal of Legal Writing published
its first volume in 1990. By 2003, Scribes had published eight volumes. (The Table of Con-
tents for each volume can be found at www.scribes.org/publications.html.)
III. THE FIRST CONFERENCE
One hundred and eight representatives from fifty-six law

schools in the United States and Canada attended the 1984
conference.5
ML: The 1984 conference was a huge success. I remember be-

ing both amazed and impressed by the number of people who
came.
LO: Yes. Given the fact that most of the people who came to
the conference did not have travel budgets, it was a significant
number of people. If I am remembering correctly, more than half of
the people who attended the conference paid their own way. The
same was true of the second conference. Even in 1986, most people
who were teaching legal writing did not receive any type of travel
budget from their schools.
ML: Laurel, I recall that even in 1984 you had good geograph-
ic representation. People didn’t just come from the Northwest.
LO: Right. I think that the people who were from the North-
west were those of us from the University of Puget Sound, Lynn
Squires and Marjorie from the University of Washington, and you
from the University of Oregon. Some people came from Lewis and
Clark and Willamette. There was, however, a relatively large
group from the Chicago area and a number of people from the East
Coast and California. People had to make a real effort just to make
it to those early conferences at the University of Puget Sound.6
MR: Many people recognized the names of the presenters and
that helped too.
LO: Right. Because of Chris’s contacts within the rhetoric and
the composition fields, we were able to have people like Joe Wil-
liams and George Gopen as presenters.
CR: We got people to make presentations on fairly basic
things: how to design a writing assignment, how to evaluate writ-
ing, etc. It seemed at that time that people really needed help with
the basics. There just weren’t many resources to go to. What I had
felt when I went into legal writing (because I had gone into it in
5 Laurel Currie Oates & J. Chris Rideout, Legal Writing Institute Established, 1
Newsltr. Leg. Writing Inst. 1 (Jan. 1985) (available in the Legal Writing Institute Archives).
6 For a list of schools represented at the 1984 Legal Writing Institute conference, see
Appendix B (also found in the Legal Writing Institute Archives).

1981), was that there were a lot of resources available for college
composition programs that legal writing folks didn’t know about.
So I felt that the conference would be a great way to disseminate
that information, and you know, for the next ten years or so, I
would always try to find someone to speak at the conferences who
had something to offer from the college composition world.7
ML: We had judges as well as academics. Judge Re was at the
1990 conference in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Judge Lynn Hughes
spoke on plain English at the next conference in 1992. Justice
Rosalie Wahl gave a keynote address in 1996.8
MR: The conferences helped us develop a legal writing peda-
gogy particularly because they included professionals from other
fields as well as from diverse law schools.
LO: Yes. We were a diverse group. Public schools, private
schools, schools that had different kinds of programs. The common
denominator was a desire to do better. Almost everyone who came
to the 1984 and 1986 conferences came because they wanted to
improve their program and because they wanted to become better
teachers. People came because they wanted to do a better job
teaching legal research, because they wanted to do a better job
teaching their students to write, and because they wanted to find
ways to motivate their students. I still remember some of those
conversations about developing problems, about teaching methods,
and about critiquing papers. Although now these seem like “old”
topics, at that time we were probably the only group that was talk-
ing about these issues in depth, and it was very exciting. I remem-
ber being exhausted at the end of each conference but being really
motivated to go back and teach. I know it made me a better teach-
er.
The 1984 conference was held not at the University of

Puget Sound School of Law, which was in downtown Tacoma,
but on the campus of the University itself, in a typical North-
west setting with lots of trees and grass. Very idyllic.
CR: The University of Puget Sound campus was a perfect

place for a conference because it’s small. It was, as you know, real-
ly pleasant to be on the University of Puget Sound campus in the
7 App. A.
8 Supra nn. 27–28 and accompanying text.
summer. The climate was temperate, and people just really

seemed to get to know each other.
ML: I made many friends at the early conferences—friends I
still cherish today.
CR: In those days, there was a conference on freshman and
sophomore English at the University of Wyoming every summer
that was kind of a big deal. Lots of people went. You stayed in the
dorms, which made it fairly inexpensive. There were myriad
presentations, and then there were barbeques afterwards, or we
would go to a rodeo. So you really got to know people. I had at-
tended. So I said to Laurel, “I’ve got a model for this thing—the
Wyoming conference.” We could stay in the dorms, we’ll have pic-
nics, and cruises or barbeques, or whatever, and it will be an op-
portunity for people to get to know each other. So that was kind of
the model that we had for the 1984 conference.
ML: The conference was very grassroots, very collegial.
CR: Right, exactly. We felt that would generate goodwill and a
sense of belonging. When we planned those conferences (as you
know, Laurel and I did the early conferences by ourselves), we
were always careful to include activities that would bring people
together: a picnic, a boat cruise, a barbeque. We always felt that
was a big part of it.
ML: Well, living in the dorms helped too, I think.
CR: Yes, right.
ML: We all ate together. I do remember Jill Ramsfield playing
the piano in that lounge.
CR: It had that grand piano in there, yes.
ML: It was just a very, very good gathering place.
CR: That’s right. We specifically requested that Jill play the
piano. We always had a reception the evening before the confer-
ence started so people could get a drink, mingle, and get to know
each other, and we always asked Jill to play the piano. That’s
right, that’s an important detail.
ML: The 1984 conference was the most collegial and friendly
conference I had ever attended.
LO: I was never a fan of the traditional academic conference.
For example, at about the same time that we held our first confer-
ence, I went to Conference on College Composition and Communi-
cation (CCCC) where everyone stood up and read papers. I said to
myself, “No, no, no. We’re not going to have a conference where
people come to read.” So we urged our presenters to make their
presentations very interactive. Although our participants wanted
to hear other people’s ideas, they also wanted a chance to talk

about their own ideas.
Because most of the sessions at the early conferences were
small, that system worked. People went to a session, they listened,
and then they talked to each other. I think that’s what people saw
as making our conference unique among academic conferences.
The sessions were lively, everyone participated, and then we went
out in the evenings and played volleyball.
It was very non-hierarchical and very inclusive. We said that
anybody who wanted to come could come. We had, of course, those
people who worked in the trenches teaching legal writing, but we
also had at least one or two deans. For example, at our second con-
ference, we had librarians, we had people who were directors, we
had people who were adjuncts, and we had people who were teach-
ers on short-term contracts. One of the decisions that we made
very early on was that we would never put a person’s title on his or
her name tag.
ML: That’s a splendid idea. But, you know, I confess that I
didn’t notice. I do notice, though, that at some other meetings,
people look at my name tag for title and school before they decide
to talk to me. I find that annoying, amusing, too.
LO: Yes. Also, during those first conferences, we took every-
body’s picture and put them up on the picture board. Again, we
never identified or segregated people according to their status.
ML: I believe that one of the major values of the Legal Writ-
ing Institute was that it was so inclusive. I think that since those
early conferences, that’s been one of the major strengths of the le-
gal writing profession. That inclusiveness and reaching out to new
people has characterized the profession. It has been a pretty im-
portant characteristic of legal writing. For me, being inclusive is
what distinguishes us from other academic disciplines.
LO: I agree. I think those of us who teach legal writing are a
unique group. It makes sense, though. If your primary motivation
is status or money, you would not choose to teach legal writing.
For the most part, all of us who teach legal writing teach it be-
cause we love teaching. In addition, some of us were rebelling
against the hierarchies that we saw in our own schools. We didn’t
want to re-create that within our own Institute. Thus, our primary
goal has been to enhance the teaching of legal writing across the
country.
ML: You kept the cost of the conferences low enough so that a
lot of people could attend.
LO: One of the reasons that we held so many of the early con-
ferences at the University of Puget Sound was because it was a
cheap place to have a conference. The University charged us al-
most nothing and people could stay in the dorms. I do think, how-
ever, that the food was one of the highlights of those early confer-
ences. We had an inexpensive but great catering company, and we
would save the leftovers. Late at night, people would come down to
the lounge and spend hours eating and talking. It was during
those late nights that some strong bonds developed. Because the
conferences were relatively small and we all lived together, by the
end of the conference, everyone knew everyone else, and what kind
of program they had.
IV. FORMING THE LEGAL WRITING INSTITUTE
At the close of the 1984 conference, participants wanted

to find ways to maintain the relationships begun at the con-
ference. They wanted to continue the exchange of information
and ideas about writing programs and teaching.9
MR: Legal writing faculty had a depressing sense of isolation.

ML: There was a real concern about this sense of isolation.
People felt the conference was the one chance they had to feel like
real professionals with other real professionals.
LO: I think that’s what motivated Chris and me to put on the
first conference. We wanted to meet other people who were teach-
ing legal writing. Although our own faculty was interested in
teaching, teaching legal writing is very different from teaching
contracts or torts or constitutional law.
ML: Lack of job security and lack of status exacerbated that
sense of isolation.
LO: Although we talked about status issues during those ear-
ly conferences, our focus was on teaching. Most of the conference
presentations dealt with teaching. It wasn’t until the profession
grew a bit that status issues became kind of a second agenda. Af-
ter a while, we learned that one of the ways in which you can im-
prove a program is to improve the status of the people who teach
in that program. In particular, we were interested in getting the
caps lifted. If we were going to improve the teaching of legal writ-
9 Oates & Rideout, supra n. 5.

ing, people need to be able to teach at the same school for an indef-
inite period.
MR: Many of the informal discussions at the 1984 conference
and at almost every subsequent conference centered on status.
ML: Jill Ramsfield and Teresa Phelps drafted a proposal on
status that Jill presented at that first conference in 1984. It was
the forerunner of the profession’s attempts to change the ABA
standards.
Statement on Security in Employment for

Legal Writing Professionals 1984
At last summer’s conference, “Teaching Legal Writing,”
one of the conference participants, Thomas John Allen of
UCLA, raised the issue of job security for legal writing in-
structors.
The issue quickly became the focus of many informal dis-
cussions among participants. During these discussions, in-
structors from many schools complained that because most
law schools have a policy of limiting the number of years in-
structors can serve, each new group of instructors must devel-
op its own program and materials for teaching legal writing.
As a result, many legal writing programs are poorly thought-
out and organized, effective materials are not developed, and
few instructors develop the expertise or teaching skills needed
to effectively teach legal writing. The instructors agreed that
those who suffer the most from the “revolving door” policy are
the students and, ultimately, the profession.
Although recognizing that the idea of tenured legal writ-
ing instructors is a new and sometimes unwelcome one, Jill
Ramsfield from the University of Puget Sound School of Law
suggested that the conference provided a good forum for dis-
cussing the issue and suggested that a proposal be drafted
and presented to the participants at the conference.
At the closing meeting of the conference, Jill Ramsfield
read the following proposal to conference participants.
Statement on Security in Employment for

Legal Writing Professionals
The participants in the Conference on Teaching Legal
Writing find that a major impediment to the effective teaching
of legal writing in North American law schools is the lack of
security in employment for legal writing professionals, both
teachers and administrators. The prevailing practice is to ap-
point these professionals for a limited term, often as short as
one year. This “revolving door” policy has the following ad-
verse effects:
(1) What these professionals learn from their experience
often cannot be used either by them or by their schools.
Their expertise is lost, and incoming teachers often
find themselves “reinventing the wheel.”
(2) Much-needed research and scholarship on legal writ-
ing and its teaching become virtually impossible.
(3) Relationships with other law faculty, which could fa-
cilitate the integration of legal writing into the law
school curriculum, are cut short.
(4) Any recognition by the law schools and the bar that
good writing is crucial to the study and practice of
law loses credibility in the absence of support for the
professional status of legal writing teachers and ad-
ministrators.
(5) Qualified people are strongly discouraged from enter-
ing or remaining in the field of legal writing, where
they have no future. Those who work in legal writing
programs, in general, cannot hope to make careers
there; rather, they must be willing to defer or interrupt
careers elsewhere.
The conference participants therefore urge that law
schools extend to legal writing teachers and administrators
the security in employment equal to that available to other
law faculty.10
ML: Conference participants were then asked to vote on the

proposal. The options were as follows:
 Yes. I endorse the proposal.
 Yes. I would like the proposal to be published in the pro-
ceedings from this conference.
10 Id. at 3–5.
 Yes. I would like the proposal to be sent to my dean.

 No. I do not endorse the proposal.
All the conference participants except one endorsed the pro-
posal and asked that it be published in the proceedings. Partici-
pants had mixed feelings about sending the results to their deans.
The one participant who did not endorse the proposal thought that
it was a good one but premature.11
MR: That first conference was a success far beyond attracting
the surprising number of people who attended.
The 1984 conference was the genesis of the Legal Writing

Institute. It was the model for the subsequent conferences,
and laid the ground work for the newsletter, the journal, and
for the surveys.
LO: I think we were at the right place at the right time, and if
we had tried to have the 1984 conference five or six years earlier,
it might not have worked. In the mid 1980s, law schools began to
develop their legal writing programs, and the AALS Section be-
came more active.
MR: Yes. The AALS had its first legal writing conference in
1980 in Louisville, Kentucky.
LO: As a result, there was a potential community, and the In-
stitute was one way of cementing the contacts that people were
making.
ML: The people who attended the 1984 conference and the
1980 AALS in Louisville were eager for professional development.
LO: Yes. After the 1984 conference, we sent out question-
naires to those who had attended. We got thirty-eight responses.
All thirty-eight said they wanted to establish an Institute. In re-
sponse to the query about what activities the Institute should
sponsor, we got the following feedback:
11 Id. at 1.
ESTABLISH LEGAL WRITING INSTITUTE?12

Yes No
38 0
Activity Sponsor Do Not Sponsor

Newsletter 33 3
Journal 30 3
Conference 38 0
Research 23 6
Twenty-six favored a yearly conference. Nine preferred a con-

ference every second year.
ML: I have read letters written to you, Laurel, and to Chris
after the 1984 conference. People were just ecstatic about it. They
said things like, “We need a newsletter.” “We must have more con-
ferences like this.” You decided to make it an Institute rather than
just having conferences without any underlying organization?
CR: Well, we wanted to include people. I think that Laurel
and I felt that if we just put on a series of conferences that at some
point, the conferences would become overly associated with us, and
people wouldn’t feel like they were a part of it. So we wanted to
make it something that people felt they belonged to. That’s why we
decided to have an Institute.
LO: The 1984 conference was a great success. People learned
a lot, had a chance to meet others who taught legal writing, and
had a good time. Before e-mail and listservs, it was hard to develop
contacts. We were also lucky in that the following year, 1985, the
AALS held its second Legal Research and Writing Conference in
Chicago. It was at that conference that a lot of people began to say,
“We need to do this on a regular basis. It isn’t enough to meet once
every five or six years.” So it was at a lunch at the AALS Confer-
ence in Chicago that we decided to form an organization. That was
the beginning of the Legal Writing Institute.
ML: Marjorie and I were both at that conference. We were
coming to the lunch meeting when you formed the Legal Writing
Institute. We got lost, and never did get to the meeting.
MR: We were in Chicago.
LO: Yes. It was the meeting of people with long legs who
walked quickly. I do remember getting there, sitting down at the
12 Id.
table, and someone saying, “Where are Mary and Marjorie?” I ac-
tually think it was Joe Kimble who went out on the street to look
for you, and couldn’t find you. I don’t think you ever made it to
that meeting.
ML: That’s right. We followed you, because you’re all tall, we
could see you ahead of us. We followed you for a while, and then in
the crosswalk we got stopped, and we lost sight of you. We had no
idea where we were. So we missed the meeting, but we didn’t miss
it because we were uninterested in forming the Legal Writing In-
stitute.
LO: There were about fourteen people who came to that lunch
from a variety of different law schools and a variety of different
geographic regions. That’s where we decided that we really wanted
it to be a national institute.
CR: We incorporated as a 501(c)(3) organization. Laurel and I
wrote the bylaws and incorporated the Institute in the State of
Washington. We filed the bylaws with the State. You’ll see that the
original Articles of Incorporation has the signature of three offic-
ers. Under state law, you must have the signatures of three offic-
ers, and we really didn’t have any officers yet. So I signed it, Lau-
rel signed it, and we kind of appointed our dean, who then was Jim
Bond, to sign it. We thought that it would be good to get him to
support the idea; that the Law School would contribute to tele-
phone bills, work-study money, and things like that. So, those are
the three initials on the Articles of Incorporation. As you know, the
Bylaws were changed in the mid 1990s, but that’s how it started.13
ML: It was your intention from the beginning to make it na-
tional?
CR: Yes, absolutely. And I think you know at the time I had a
joint appointment and taught in an English department as well as
at a law school. And I was very aware of the national organizations
that were available to college English teachers, and I thought that
legal writing people needed something like that. I didn’t think it
necessarily needed to be as official or hierarchical as something
like the National Council of Teachers of English or the Modern
Language Association, but I felt we needed a national organization
for an identity. I felt this was a group that needed an identity, and
an Institute would give us that.
13
Leg. Writing Inst., Bylaws of the Legal Writing Institute (Jan. 12, 1987) (available at
www.lwionline.org/about/history/bylaws.doc).
LO: Yes. We incorporated as a non-profit organization. The

certificate is in my office, and it is dated April 3, 1986.
The first meeting of the Legal Writing Institute was held

on Saturday, March 23, 1985, in Chicago. Fifteen persons
were selected to be members of the first Board of Directors of
the Legal Writing Institute at that first meeting.14
 James Bond, Wake Forest University School of Law
 Susan Brody, John Marshall School of Law
 Lynne Capehart, University of Florida College of Law
 Daisy Floyd, University of Georgia School of Law
 Ellen Mosen James, City University of New York Law
School at Queens
 Noel Lyon, Queens University Faculty of Law
 Christine Metteer, Southwestern University School of Law
 Michele Minnis, University of New Mexico School of Law
 Laurel Currie Oates, University of Puget Sound School of
Law
 Teresa Phelps, Notre Dame Law School
 Chris Rideout, University of Puget Sound School of Law
 Renee Hausman Shea, Law School Admissions Council
 Chris Simoni, Willamette University College of Law
 Jim Stratman, Carnegie-Mellon University
 Christine Woolever, Northeastern University School of
Law
ML: Each board member was also appointed to one of the

standing committees: By-laws and Finance; Newsletter; Journal;
or Conference.15
MR: Your survey from the 1984 conference demonstrated that
people really wanted more conferences (38 to 0) and that the ma-
jority (33 to 3) wanted a newsletter. When did the newsletter
start?
ML: I remember that at least one informal newsletter was
published after the 1984 conference and before the March 1985
meeting in Chicago. It is dated January 1985. In the newsletter,
Laurel and Chris reported on the 1984 conference. The article an-
14 Board of Directors Selected for Legal Writing Institute, 1 Newsltr. Leg. Writing Inst.
1 (May 1985) (available from the Legal Writing Institute Archives) (Pagination has been
added to assist the readers. The early newsletters were not paginated because the newslet-
ters were typed on a typewriter, copied, and stapled and mailed to the members.).
15 Id.
nounced that The University of Puget Sound School of Law had

agreed to establish the Legal Writing Institute.
CR: During its first year, the newly formed Institute planned
to publish two newsletters, and the first issue of the journal with
support from the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH).
We knew that after the first year, NEH financial support would no
longer be available.
ML: The Legal Writing Institute really had its origins in your
NEH grant—in Writing-across-the-Curriculum.
CR: I’ve always felt that some very good things came out of
the NEH grant. The Evergreen State College started a writing in-
struction outreach program that became a teaching outreach pro-
gram. It is to this day very prominent in the State of Washington.
The Legal Writing Institute was an unanticipated, and, I believe,
really important product of that NEH grant.
LO: Originally, our goal was to use the newsletter to continue
the conversations that had started at the conference. We wanted
the newsletter to be a place where people could share ideas about
teaching. At first, the newsletter was just mimeographed or photo-
copied, but it served its purpose. Because we didn’t have e-mail,
communication was difficult, and the newsletter was a way to keep
the community together between conferences. Now the newsletter
is more sophisticated, and it’s online.
ML: Personally, I think the newsletter was critically im-
portant in helping people keep in contact. Once they were back at
their own institutions, they felt a sense of isolation, as if they were
the only persons in the world teaching legal writing. Also the
Notes and Comments16 Section let people know “who was doing
what where.” That Section started in October 1985.
CR: When we first started talking about forming an Institute,
we felt that its primary activity would be the conference, but we
felt that the two other things that we could do were a newsletter
and a journal. The newsletter seemed like the easier of the two to
start. Laurel is the one who took the primary responsibility for
that and she started the newsletter. We published our first issue of
the newsletter in 1985. And Laurel is the one who kept that going
for a number of years until finally someone else volunteered to do
it.
16 3 Second Draft (newsltr. of the Leg. Writing Inst.) 1 (Oct. 1985).

ML: The earliest newsletters came out with the heading:
Then in May 1985, just two months after the founding of the Insti-
tute at the Chicago meeting, the Legal Writing Institute asked
readers for suggestions for a name and logo for the newsletter. The
new logo and name were inaugurated in the October 1985 issue.
The Second Draft

Newsletter of The Legal Writing Institute
In January 1985, the Legal Writing Institute published

its first newsletter. In that issue, and in the issue that fol-
lowed in May, we asked our readers to suggest a name and
logo for the newsletter. We received several suggestions and
from those suggestions we selected the name and logo that you
see above.
The name, The Second Draft, was suggested by J. Denny
Haythorn, Director of the Law Library and Professor of Law
at Whittier College School of Law. In suggesting the name,
Professor Haythorn wrote that the name “indicates a draft of
our work, not the first or the last, but merely our progress to-
ward our goal. . . .” We agreed with Professor Haythorn, and,
because we thought the name reflected what we wanted this
newsletter to be, a place where we could share work in pro-
gress, we adopted his suggestion.
The first logo was designed by Susan Brody of The John
Marshall School of Law. 17
What about the Institute logo and its color, the one we are all
now familiar with. How did that come about?
CR: We owe those to Chris Wren. As you know, Chris Wren
was one of the early attendees, and at the time, Chris and his wife
Jill were associated with Ambrose Publishing. They had a graphic
designer. And Ambrose agreed to volunteer their graphic design-
er’s time to design a logo for the Legal Writing Institute.
ML: Oh, I didn’t know that.
CR: They sent us some test logos. There was some debate
about whether each line should be the same size or whether they
should be in ascending order. We also had some debate about the
color. I think in there is a color chip that the graphic designer sug-
gested because she said that color is a very important part of iden-
tity. But, at that time, we just used the University of Puget
Sound’s print shop. The Print Shop couldn’t quite match the de-
signer’s colors, so the official color of the Legal Writing Institute
became the color chip that the UPS Print Shop had (the color that
came the closest to the designer’s color chip).
MR: Laurel and Chris initiated and carried out an incredible
number of projects within an even more astonishing short time
after the 1984 conference. Within less than a year, we had an In-
stitute with a board of directors and standing committees, a news-
17 Id.
letter, a journal, and plans for a second conference in 1986. I am in

awe of what you accomplished.
ML: I’m curious and I think Marjorie is too—I don’t know how
you did all this. At about the same time as the Legal Writing Insti-
tute was born, Laurel, your daughter was born.
LO: Yes.
ML: And you were running a program.
LO: Yes.
ML: Starting an institute while teaching classes and learning
about composition theory.
LO: Actually, there are days now I sit back and say, “How
come I can’t do that today, or how did I do that?” All I can say is
that being young and loving what you’re doing and being enthusi-
astic about it clearly gives you a lot of energy. But again, it was
never doing it completely on my own. I mean, I think one of the
major things that has helped us at the University of Puget Sound
is that there has been a group of us who have kind of come up
through it together, and we share the same values. We are willing
to bail each other out when we need to be bailed out. The support
that existed was especially necessary in those early years. Plus, it
was just very exciting to do it. I do look back and I think, “I wonder
how I could have done this,” but I can also remember many a night
when I left school thinking teaching and having young children is
probably the best thing. I would go in the morning, and I would
stay there until three or 3:30 p.m. and then I would go home and
be with my kids during dinner, and I would come back and teach
in the early evening. There were more days than one when I didn’t
get home until midnight. Then it just started all over again the
next day.
ML: You have to like what you’re doing.
LO: Yes, I think that’s the key. You can do any job as long as
you like what you’re doing.
ML: In the 1980s, law schools’ interest in the teaching of legal
writing increased.
CR: For example, I counted eleven presentations on legal
writing at the Conference on College Composition and Communi-
cation (CCCC), held in Minneapolis on March 21–23, 1985. That
figure does not include other presentations that, to my knowledge,
also mentioned legal writing or legal writing programs. Increasing-
ly, I would say, legal writing was becoming a visible area for re-
search and teaching, as its presence on the program for a confer-
ence as large and diverse as CCCC’s indicates.
ML: Another example: the AALS held that first conference in

Kentucky in 1980 and followed up with the second AALS legal
writing conference in Chicago only five years later. That was a
coup for the AALS Section. And in 1984, the American Bar Associ-
ation Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar asked
ABA-approved law schools to describe their legal writing pro-
grams. One hundred and three schools responded. The results of
the survey were published in 1985.18
LO: As I said, we were at the right place at the right time. It
was absolutely fortuitous that I got to know Chris through the
NEH Writing-across-the-Curriculum project for undergraduate
programs. But for the fact that Chris had been involved in the
writing process and composition theory, we might not have had an
Institute.
MR: Nevertheless, you being at the right place at the right
time, as you say, does not diminish what you accomplished.
V. THE LWI JOURNAL
In January 1985, the newsletter outlined

proposals for a journal.
Journal. The Journal, tentatively titled the Journal of
Legal Analysis and Legal Writing, will be published once a
year. The first half of each journal will be devoted to schola r-
ly articles; the second half of the journal will feature more
practical articles describing how ideas and materials can be
used in the classroom.
The first issue of the journal is scheduled to be published
in early April. The theme of the issue will be “Teaching Legal
Writing,” and included in the issue will be articles by Joseph
Williams on writing and socialization and on style and coher-
ence in writing, an article describing a theoretical basis for
teaching legal writing, and a series of short articles on teach-
ing legal research, evaluating student writing, teaching style
and syntax, teaching lawyers to teach writing, and using col-
laborative learning to teach legal writing. 19
LO: The Journal was not published that quickly though. That
proposed publication date seems unrealistically ambitious now.
18 Id. at 2.
19 1 Newsltr. Leg. Writing Inst. (Jan. 1985).
CR: We got off to a good start with the newsletters, thanks to

Laurel. The Journal was harder because you had to have articles
to publish. My model for the Journal was not a law review, and
not even a mainstream academic journal, but rather a journal like
something called Pretext. I always felt that Pretext ran very high-
quality articles. It seemed to come out when the editor felt he had
enough articles to put together an issue, and so—it seemed to
me—that that might be the best model for us at least initially. We
formed a committee after the 1988 conference to try to solicit arti-
cles. The problem was trying to find articles. I had always invited
one or two composition people to those first few conferences, in-
cluding Joe Williams, who I think came to the first three. In one of
his presentations, he applied some of his cognitive developmental
work to legal writing.
ML: I remember that one.
CR: Yes.
ML: That was a terrific talk.
CR: It was a great talk. Joe agreed to let us publish it. So we
had one article. I think Jim Stratman also had something.
ML: Yes, he did. I remember.
CR: Yes. And so then we had to find some other articles, and
it took a while to put together enough for volume one, but we final-
ly got it together. I think it came out in 1991. I was very happy
about that, but the day after it came out the question was, “What
are we going to publish in volume two?” And it just became very
difficult to get articles. The other thing that happened was that
people were starting to get onto tenure tracks in legal writing, and
there was pressure for the journal to be a vehicle to publish our
own people. That was hard for me because I felt that if we were
going to have respect in the academic world, we had to avoid being
perceived as just promoting ourselves.
ML: That’s correct. And faculty tenure committees often have
a bias toward traditional academic journals.
CR: And that became a tension that existed in the journal. In
February 1995, when the Journal board had a retreat in Chicago,
it became very clear during that retreat that the majority of the
people felt that we just had to publish regularly. We also decided, I
think it was at that retreat, to publish conference proceedings—to
use the conference as the source of material for the Journal. It
clearly meant that the Journal would go in the direction of peda-
gogical pieces that weren’t necessarily research or theory oriented,
but even then we had difficulty finding material for the off-year
issue.
And we still do to this day. And we’re still trying to walk the
line. It’s not that the doors were thrown wide open. The Journal
has always rejected quite a few pieces, but it’s still a difficulty, you
know. The Journal became something other than the kind of aca-
demic journal I thought it needed to be to garner us the kind of
respect we wanted in academia. Still, I’m very proud of it. I think
establishing the Journal has been a great contribution to our pro-
fession.
VI. THE SECOND CONFERENCE AND BEYOND
The University of Puget Sound hosted its second legal

writing conference in July 1986. The theme of the conference
was “Legal Writing: The Next Step.”
MR: You must have started planning for the 1986 conference
almost immediately after the first one.
LO: I remember doing a de-briefing at the end of the first con-
ference and thinking about what we should do differently the next
time. Although we came up with some things that we wanted to do
differently, on the whole, we were surprised that the 1984 confer-
ence went as well as it did. As a result, when it came time to do
the second conference in 1986, we decided to model it after the
first one. We decided to use the same location, we picked a similar
format, and we tried to create an environment in which people
could sit down, talk to each other, and share ideas.
ML: In terms of the Legal Writing Institute conferences, you
started off with a surprising number of participants at that first
conference, and the number has grown almost every year, hasn’t
it?
LO: Yes, we haven’t had any one year when there was a major
dramatic increase, but attendance has grown every single year. We
started out with around 100, and then we had 150 and we’ve been
over 275–300 for probably the last ten years, and the 2002 confer-
ence at Knoxville, Tennessee, I think was our highest. I think we
had close to 425 at that last conference. And so, when you start
talking about active members, we have a fairly high percentage of
our active members who come to the conferences.
MR: How many listed members do we have now?
LO: I think we have close to 1,500 members. Of that number I
would think probably half are active members who either attend a
conference or who participate in a committee, or participate on a

fairly regular basis on the listserv, or in some way do more than
just have their names on our membership list. So, it’s a fairly sub-
stantial number. I think we probably have at least one active
member from about 85–90% of the law schools in the country, so
it’s a very well-represented group. Even some of the unaccredited
law schools have people who are reasonably active in the group.
Again, it really depends on the program. Programs with people
who are long-term tend to have a much larger group of active
members than programs taught by adjuncts, by fellows, or short-
term teachers. It’s a fairly substantial number although there are
considerably more than 1,500 people teaching legal writing na-
tionwide.
ML: How does this growth affect collegiality—the sense of
community we achieved in the 1980s?
LO: The question is whether membership will continue to
grow, and how do we, as a Legal Writing Institute, accommodate
that many people and still keep some of the positive characteris-
tics of when it was smaller. At the end of the last conference, I
hadn’t even talked to everybody who was there, let alone did I
know the names of everyone. What we don’t want to have happen
is that people come to a conference and feel isolated. We have gone
from 108 attendees at the first conference in 1984 to 473 attendees
in 2004.
MR: When did you decide to move the Legal Writing Institute
conferences from Tacoma in alternate years? Was that an experi-
ment, or?
LO: When we started the Institute, we didn’t have a long-term
plan for the Institute. We did know, though, that we wanted the
Institute to be national. Thus, instead of running the Institute
from Tacoma, we asked individuals from a number of different
schools to serve on the board. Later, board members were elected,
as is the practice today.20 Similarly, early on we decided that the
best approach would be to have Legal Writing Institute confer-
ences only in even numbered years. In addition, we decided that it
would be a good idea to alternate between Seattle and other loca-
tions around the country. Our plan was that we would have na-
tional Legal Writing Institute conferences in even-numbered years
20 For a list of all past directors of the Legal Writing Institute, see Legal Writing Insti-
tute Board of Directors, at www.lwionline.org/about/history/bod.doc.
and that in the odd-numbered years there would be regional con-

ferences.
Dates and Locations of Legal

Writing Institute Conferences
1984 TACOMA, WASHINGTON
1990 ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN
1994 CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
1996 SEATTLE, WASHINGTON
1998 ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN
2002 KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE
ML: How did you decide where the conferences would be held?
LO: We first asked for people who were willing to take on the
task whose institutions could house the conference. We then tried
to move the conferences to different parts of the country. For ex-
ample, we held the 2002 conference in Knoxville, Tennessee, be-
cause we had never had a conference in the southern half of the
country.
CR: The board decided that every other conference would be
somewhere else, and the first one was at the University of Michi-
gan in 1990. I remember I was the chair then, and Diana Pratt
was hosting the conference in Ann Arbor, Michigan. I just called
her constantly and said, “No matter what you do, you can’t lose
money.” You have to overestimate on everything, and at least
break even. But I said if you make money that’s okay too, because
this is the Institute’s only source of income to pay for the Journal,
the surveys, newsletters, and so on. We were always very miserly
with the Institute’s money. Our only source of income was the sur-
plus from the conference. Anne Enquist was treasurer. Actually,
she served as treasurer for twelve years, 1986–1998.21 But by then
21 As the Legal Writing Institute Treasurer, Anne Enquist filed annual financial re-
ports and prepared the Institute’s taxes from 1986–1998. At the end of her tenure as treas-
urer, these records were passed on to the subsequent treasurers—Steve Johansen followed
by Davalene Cooper and Carol Parker.
Anne Enquist reports:
we had had three conferences—1984, 1986, and 1988. They were

all at the University of Puget Sound. Laurel and I had put all
three together. So it was a great relief for us to have someone else
do a conference. We had made money on each. So we had money in
reserve. We weren’t making big bucks in those days, but we clearly
had a cushion. And Diana made money as well.
ML: Putting on a conference is a tremendous amount of work.
Diana worked very hard on that conference, and so did her hus-
band.
CR: She did a great job.
ML: Her husband worked at the conference and so did her
son.
CR: Her son helped register everybody—that’s right.
ML: And she used the dorms for that conference. I thought
that was a successful conference.
CR: It was very successful, and not just because it didn’t lose
money. It was at that conference in 1990 that the Board of Direc-
tors decided to have a program committee. That was the point at
which the responsibility for putting together the program went to
a committee rather than just Laurel and me, which was good for
us. It was so much work.
ML: Having a program committee must have relieved you and
Laurel of a good deal of the burden you’d been carrying.
CR: We always had a legal writing work-study student, and
increasingly it turned out that about half of the student’s time was
spent working on Institute work, and the University never com-
plained. The University always let us use that student. Then the
legal writing program hired Lori Lamb in July 1988. And by the
late 1980s or early 1990s, that was a big part of Lori’s job. As you
know, it was very grassroots. We had lots of volunteers who
helped, especially with the conference, and that was wonderful.
And I think Laurel and I always wanted to keep it kind of grass-
roots. But as attendance at the conferences grew and the member-
Any profit from the conferences went toward paying for future conferences;
LWI expenses, such as stationery; the journal; newsletters; mailing costs; and
the surveys.
The Journal was distributed free to Legal Writing Institute members and
all law libraries.
Any profit from conferences was invested in certificates of deposit. Typical-
ly we bought one CD that came due before the conference (in case we needed
the cash then) and another that was longer term.
For ready cash, we estimated our expenses for the upcoming two years and
held that amount plus a small cushion in our checking account.
ship list expanded, Lori became indispensable. Today, many peo-

ple, when they think of the “Legal Writing Institute,” they think of
Lori Lamb.
MR: Since the first conferences, what kind of support (finan-
cial or other) has the Legal Writing Institute received?
LO: We have had diverse support for the conferences. We
have been able to keep the registration fees relatively low and also
make a profit. Who have been the key supporters for the Institute?
Well, the University of Puget Sound, and Seattle University obvi-
ously. Also the publishers have helped us.
The publishers now attend the conferences. They set up dis-
plays. Sometimes they give demonstrations. On occasion, they
sponsor a lunch or dinner. We take the publishers’ book bags, their
pens, right? And their coffee cups? I think it’s in some way a sign
of the respect that the publishers have for us as a profession. Pub-
lishing is the place where the market is and indirectly where deci-
sions are being considered about how programs should be run and
what kinds of materials might be used in programs.
ML: At the time of the first conferences, that was a time when
there weren’t that many texts available. There wasn’t that much
material available.
LO: You are right. When I first started teaching, there were
only a couple of books available. Marjorie’s book, Legal Problem
Solving22 came out in 1973 and Lynn Squires and Marjorie’s Nut-
shell23 came out in 1982, and there were a few research books, but
that was about all. As a result, the conferences gave us an oppor-
tunity to share materials and think about developing additional
materials. It wasn’t too much later that a number of people began
writing legal writing books. So the publishers were helpful to us as
a discipline. They were out there to ask, “What kind of resources
do you guys need?” and they were hoping to publish some of those
resources. They encouraged the development of the teaching of
legal writing and research.
ML: The Legal Writing Institute conferences made an innova-
tive and very practical contribution to the development of re-
sources through the Problem Bank and Idea Bank. The Idea Bank
is now online.24
22 Marjorie Dick Rombauer, Legal Problem Solving: Analysis, Research and Writing
(West 1973).
23 Lynn B. Squires, Marjorie Dick Rombauer & Lynn Bahrych, Legal Writing in a
Nutshell (West 1982).

24 Leg. Writing Inst., Idea Bank, http://www.lwionline.org/ (password protected). For
One of the Institute’s great contributions to the profession has

been the survey.
VII. THE LWI SURVEY
In 1990, Jill Ramsfield conducted the Legal Writing In-

stitute’s first national survey of legal writing. It was pub-
lished in the first issue of Legal Writing: The Journal of The
Legal Writing Institute (Fall 1991).
The report on the first survey was titled “Legal Writing
in the Twenty-First Century: The First Images.” 25 In the arti-
cle, the first survey is likened to the Hubble telescope, then
new.
Jill Ramsfield did subsequent surveys in 1992, 1994, and
1996. The later surveys, like the Hubble, produced “sharper
images.” Hence, the title of Jill Ramsfield’s 1996 article, “Le-
gal Writing in the Twenty-First Century: A Sharper Image.” 26
LO: In 1990, Jill Ramsfield at Georgetown came up with the

idea of doing a national survey that would show the status of legal
writing professionals across the country. It was designed essential-
ly to give us information first about ourselves, but then also to give
the larger legal community information about who was teaching
legal writing, and under what conditions legal writing was taught.
Jill did the first four surveys for the Legal Writing Institute. It
was a horrendous job because essentially Jill developed a ques-
tionnaire and sent it out to people and maybe 25 to 30% of them
sent it back. So she would telephone and get people to give her the
information, and then after that she did a wonderful statistical
analysis. Basically, she did the entire project by hand.
Since then, we have computers and consequently the later
surveys have become more and more sophisticated, primarily un-
der the direction of Lou Sirico, Jo Anne Durako, and Kristin
the genesis of the Idea Bank, see the Special Alert from the Legal Writing Institute: Call to
Action, announcing the creation of the LWI Resource Center. Memo. from Leg. Writing Inst.
to All Leg. Writing Colleagues, Special Alert from the Legal Writing Institute: Call to Action
(Sept. 20, 1998) (available in the Legal Writing Institute Archives) (discussing George Go-
pen’s address in which he discusses several new efforts, including the creation of a resource
center). Legal memorandum assignments contributed by members would be reproduced and
made available to all conference participants.
25 Jill Ramsfield, Legal Writing in the Twenty-First Century: The First Images, 1 Leg.
Writing 123 (1991).

26 Jill Ramsfield, Legal Writing in the Twenty-First Century: A Sharper Image, 2 Leg.
Writing 1 (1996).
Gerdy, to the point now where the survey is online. The results are
tabulated; the surveys have charts and graphics.
ML: When I asked Jill about the surveys, she pointed out that
she did them by hand. For the 1990 survey,
I just made up a bunch of questions. I know that, later in
the process, I asked for feedback and suggestions for questions,
but I just made up 100 of them from the beginning. I think we
have copies of all the original surveys if you want to see them. I
had listened to the complaints, concerns, and questions of our
colleagues. I had also talked to (uninformed) deans and faculty.
I decided to just start in on the basics of geographical locations
and demographics. Then I just called on my own knowledge of
the field to invent questions about what was taught in the class,
how many drafts, who taught research, etc. As for status, I ob-
served all the models being used and tried to ask questions
about all of them. This was the hardest part because I didn’t
want people to have to answer all 100 questions, just the ques-
tions about their model. I also wanted to allow for hybrids. So
we used different colors of paper!! We also worked hard on the
types of questions and choices of answers. I had a computer-
savvy student and a faculty colleague help me make the survey
look good, but it was not until 1994 that we got help from the
main Georgetown campus in compiling the data. We did it by
hand for the first two.
I was also determined to get a statistically significant re-
sponse. I knew deans and faculty would scoff at anything less.
So we just got on the phone and harassed people. They were
wonderful about responding because we shared the same inter-
ests. Thus, all my surveys had about an 80% response rate, not
bad for paper copies.
Jill is very modest about these early surveys, and, of course, they
don’t look as professional as the recent ones. But they were done
by hand. I think they were a magnificent achievement. They had a
positive effect on the profession. And they won the attention of
administrators, ABA committees, and judges.
MR: How did legal writing teachers use the early surveys?
ML: I know that Jill’s surveys had an influence beyond legal
writing programs. In 1996, Justice Rosalie E. Wahl of the Minne-
sota Supreme Court attended the Institute conference at the invi-
tation of Chris Kunz. Justice Wahl referred to Jill’s 1990 survey in
her speech at the Institute conference in Seattle.27 That speech is
27 Justice Rosalie E. Wahl was the first woman to serve on the Minnesota Supreme
worth reading today. It’s reprinted in the 1997 Legal Writing: The
Journal of the Legal Writing Institute.28 Justice Wahl quoted ex-
tensively from Jill’s article on the surveys, confirming for us the
importance of the surveys.
LO: What the survey did is to give us a database of infor-
mation that individuals could use in talking to their own faculty
and their own deans about legal writing. It allowed, I think initial-
ly, for people to talk about salary issues and discrepancies of pay
among people who were teaching legal writing within their own
schools, and then across the country. Second of all, it started show-
ing people about the various levels of status—people who previous-
ly had short-term contracts were getting long-term contracts, peo-
ple moving into tenure positions.
I do think that the survey may be the one single piece of in-
formation that has been most influential in persuading faculties
and deans to change the status of their legal writing faculties. For
example, our school is currently (in 2003) reviewing the status of
the legal writing faculty, and the primary data that our faculty is
looking at are the data from that survey. Based on that survey
they are saying, “We’re falling behind.” Therefore, the faculty seem
to be willing to consider making changes. I think, first of all, sala-
ry. Second, I think it helped get rid of the caps on legal writing
positions. Third, I think it is helping people move from quasi-
short-term/long-term contracts into some kind of official long-term
contracts with voting rights or some type of tenure whether it be
tenure restricted to legal writing or general tenure.
So, the surveys as they have developed have changed dramat-
ically the number of topics that Jill used to ask people about. She
would simply sit down and figure out which questions to ask. The
good news is that it has shown that status and salary have just
improved dramatically. The difference between the first survey
data and the current survey data is actually pretty remarkable.
MR: Does the Legal Writing Institute sponsor the surveys?
Court. Appointed to the court in 1977, she was elected to serve in 1978, and successively re-
elected in 1984 and 1990. Justice Wahl chaired the Section of Legal Education and Admis-
sions to the Bar of the American Bar Association in 1987–1988. She proposed the formation
of a study to examine the continuum between legal education and practice. The study was
headed by Robert MacCrate. It resulted in the influential MacCrate Report published in
July 1992. The report sought to define the skills and values needed to practice law. Justice
Wahl chaired the subcommittee that drafted a statement on lawyering skills. In 2003, Wil-
liam Mitchell College of Law dedicated its Legal Practice Center, naming it for Justice
Wahl.
28 Justice Rosalie E. Wahl, All the World’s a [Page], 3 Leg. Writing 67 (1997).
LO: It is now a joint project between the Legal Writing Insti-

tute and the Association of Legal Writing Directors29 (ALWD).
Both organizations pay half the costs of producing it. It’s expen-
sive. It started with the Legal Writing Institute and now it’s a
joint project between the two groups.
VIII. CONTINUED GROWTH, CONTINUED SUCCESS
LEGAL WRITING INSTITUTE

MISSION STATEMENT
“The Legal Writing Institute is a non-profit corporation
founded (1) to promote an exchange of information and ideas
about legal writing and (2) to provide a forum for research
and scholarship about legal writing and legal analysis. . . .”30
MR: The Legal Writing Institute has been hugely successful.

And even though very much larger, it hasn’t swerved from its orig-
inal mission.
LO: That’s right. Its main emphasis is still on teaching, espe-
cially at the conferences. The Legal Writing Institute has always
had as its primary purpose to enhance the teaching of legal writ-
ing. So we had always had a primary focus on pedagogy, and
scholarship about the teaching of legal writing. There were ques-
tions in the early and mid-1990s about what kind of political role
the Legal Writing Institute should take. In the early to mid-1990s,
the Legal Writing Institute’s members started talking about
whether it should be primarily an educational group or whether it
should also take on a political role. Again, this is not something
that we all sat down and voted on. It just kind of evolved, but it
became clear that probably the Legal Writing Institute could be
truer to itself if it did not become a political group. As a result, the
second group, ALWD, was formed, and it also has, of course,
evolved. But ALWD has by far a more political nature than the
Legal Writing Institute. Still, there is a huge overlap between the
people who are active in both organizations. So sometimes it is
hard to tell whether somebody is actually acting on behalf of the
29 The Association of Legal Writing Directors was founded by Jan Levine, who was its
first president.
30 J. Christopher Rideout drafted the Legal Writing Institute’s first Mission State-
ment. As the Legal Writing Institute’s membership grew, its primary mission did not
change.
Legal Writing Institute or ALWD. For example, when we’ve spo-

ken at ABA meetings on the status of legal writing faculty, I think
most of us have identified ourselves as belonging to both groups.
The distinction between the two groups, I think, is that the Legal
Writing Institute is open to everyone who is in any way touched by
or involved in the teaching of legal writing and has as its primary
purpose the pedagogy of teaching legal writing, whereas ALWD is
limited to directors or people of stature in the legal writing com-
munity.
ML: The emphasis on teaching must also mean that the focus
of the Legal Writing Institute programs has changed somewhat
from the way it used to be when we first started.
LO: Right.
ML: And that now when we have people who have been teach-
ing longer, the program has to change to address different levels of
experience.
LO: Yes, it does. I think, in some ways that’s how we have
dealt with the numbers. The problem is that we don’t want differ-
ent “tracks” of people. We still want groups to be interacting with
each other. For the last three or four conferences, we’ve had a new
teacher’s track, so that at each time slot there was something de-
signed for people who are in their first or second year of teaching—
for example, designing assignments, conducting effective classes,
conducting conferences, or critiquing, all of those kind of issues.
In many ways, that allows our most experienced members of
the Legal Writing Institute to interact with our newest people be-
cause we have tried to keep those groups relatively small and not
to talk at them, but to provide a lot of workshops. For example, for
the session that Dan Barnett and Anne Enquist put together on
critiquing student papers, there was an initial introduction of in-
formation and resources. But then the new teachers divided into
relatively small groups with each group having a mentor so they
could deal with practicing how you do it, and dealing with people’s
questions, and again the sharing that has been so important a part
of the Legal Writing Institute. The new people have great insights
that those of us who have been around for maybe too long have
forgotten. It’s fun to listen.
ML: Mentoring has been an important contribution of the Le-
gal Writing Institute. It started informally. I remember getting
lots of phone calls. Marjorie did too. New people can now send e-
mail. And now mentoring is more formally organized; that grew
out of the buddy system we had at the 1990 Ann Arbor conference.
LO: I think one of the very positive things that the Legal
Writing Institute has done in the last four or five years is to estab-
lish a new member outreach committee. Now, when we identify
somebody as a new member of the legal writing community, the
new member committee sends new people a letter and a list of re-
sources. When they come to the conferences, they have a mentor
who will be their buddy throughout the conference and make sure
that they get introduced to a variety of people. So I think we have
taken some steps to stay inclusive. The larger the Legal Writing
Institute gets, however, the more isolated people can feel. We’re
thrilled that it’s large, but we also need now to figure out what to
do about that.
MR: How have the conference programs changed to accommo-
date legal writing professionals, people dedicated to legal writing
careers, at different stages in their careers?
LO: To accommodate the people who are at different places of
their careers, we now offer a larger variety of sessions. For exam-
ple, while at the first few conferences, the focus was on teaching
and not on scholarship, now we have a number of sessions that
deal with scholarship. We have forums for people to share their
scholarship, forums on how to do scholarship, and how to get
scholarship published. In addition, we continue to try to branch
out and to learn from the other disciplines, which I think is some-
thing both the newer and the more experienced people benefit
from. So, you know, we have presentations by people from rhetoric
sometimes. We’ve had people, sometimes, who have more special-
ized knowledge in areas of learning theory. People like Jim Strat-
man with his research on reading, and people who are not teachers
of legal writing. We try to take the best of what other professions
offer, and then use that information to improve the teaching of
legal writing.
ML: Many of the presenters at the first two conferences were
from other disciplines—for example, George Gopen, Jim Stratman,
Lynn Squires, Joe Williams, and Stephen Witte. It’s good to con-
tinue that tradition. Your own program and the Legal Writing In-
stitute itself illustrate the benefits of cross-disciplinary exchange.
The Legal Writing Institute grew out of Writing-across-the-
Curriculum.
LO: Without Chris and Anne, those of us at the law school
would never have learned about some of the things that were going
on in the composition area. And as a result we would not have cre-
ated the program that we did. We learned from each other. Our
curriculum, for example, is based on spiraling. I got that concept

from Mary.
ML: And that theory, in turn, I had adapted from Jerome
Bruner.
LO: Yes. I think that our program benefited from the fact that
Chris and Anne were trained in composition theory and not law. In
addition, I think that our program benefited from the fact that
Anne and I had degrees in education. So again, it was really three
disciplines interacting with each other: composition, basic educa-
tional psychology and practice, and then the law itself.
MR: It was a good combination. You must have had strong in-
stitutional support from your dean.
LO: We have to credit Fred Tausend for being willing to ac-
cept people from other disciplines into the law school environment
and recognizing the needs of the legal writing program. Having a
practitioner as dean was very important; plus, we had a very ac-
tive board of visitors at that point. They sent formal recommenda-
tions to our faculty. There was some lobbying that the skills cours-
es be given a fair amount of attention. So having Chris and Anne
there as writing specialists, particularly in the early years at the
University of Puget Sound, was extremely important. Some of our
students did not enter law school with all the skills they needed.
Chris and Anne were there to help those students. It was really
important to have Chris and Anne there when the legal writing
faculty rotated in and out every two years. Our program is proof
that having writing advisors helps not only the students, but has a
positive impact on the writing program itself.
ML: Writing advisors have their own organization now. Anne
helped found it with Betsy Fajans and Mary Ray in 1988: The As-
sociation of Writing Specialists.
MR: What are the most challenging aspects of putting togeth-
er an Institute conference program?
LO: It is a challenge to try to come up with a program that is
interactive. It means that where we used to, at the most, have two
concurrent sessions, now at the last several conferences, we have
at least six things going on at the same time. Even when you di-
vide 400 people into six groups, you still have large numbers.
We’re beginning to reach a facility limit, too, for locations for
the conference where you can have (maybe in the future) groups of
forty. Ideally we would like each of these sessions to have maybe
no more than forty people in them, to provide an opportunity for
people to interact. Most United States law schools have problems
when you start asking for ten rooms that are available at the same
time and that are conducive to the kinds of presentations and
workshops we want to do.
There are challenges to putting on an Institute conference, but
the truth of the matter is the new people keep coming back, the
people of mid-range keep coming back, and the experienced people
keep coming back. So they must be coming back for a reason. Part
of that, I think, is clearly the presentations. I think that we had
over 100 individuals at the last two conferences make presenta-
tions. So there is huge group of people who are getting an oppor-
tunity either on their own or as part of a panel to share what they
are doing. We instituted a “one presentation per person” rule so
that those of us who have been around a long time would not dom-
inate the program.
ML: The need for this rule just shows how much legal writing
has grown since 1984. Then we wouldn’t have dreamed we’d need
a rule like that. It is also proof, Laurel, that the Institute is still
inclusive.
LO: Right. People are attending not only to listen, but are giv-
en an opportunity to share what they are doing. People keep com-
ing back to make connections, socialize, and renew associations
and friendships.
MR: It’s fellowship.
LO: Fellowship.
MR: And, being with people who appreciate what you are do-
ing and just keeping up with who’s new and who’s still there.
LO: Right.
MR: It’s a really tight-knit community even though it’s wide-
spread in this country.
LO: It is very widespread. I do think the group is probably
closer than it ever has been in part because of the listserv.
ML: Ralph Brill set up the first legal writing listserv in 1993.
This was prior to the 1994 Legal Writing Institute conference in
Chicago. It was, Ralph says, “To enable attendees to participate in
topics presented at the Conference.” After the conference, the
listserv was continued for all the people who attended the confer-
ence and then to further subscribers.
LO: Not everybody participates in the listserv, but a large
number of people do participate by writing and even larger num-
bers read it. Part of it, they go to conferences and they keep say-
ing, “I’ve been waiting for e-mails” or “I’ve been reading his e-
mails,” and “You know, she e-mailed me this or whatever—I want
to meet this person.” So in some ways the contacts are now being
established before conferences. Particularly for the new people.
Then they can put faces with names.
But as I said, an aspect of this is troubling to me because I
worry that when I look around sometimes at conferences, I think
that person is standing over in the corner by himself or herself and
not having anyone to engage with. That’s the problem when you
get a larger group. But, for the most part I think when a person
appears to be isolated at a conference, somebody will approach
that person and start up a conversation.
I think it’s clear that many of us attend to socialize. I am in-
terested in what my colleagues are doing, but I also, just like other
professionals, want to catch up on the news, right?
ML: One advantage in these conferences is that many people
can use them to demonstrate professional growth to their institu-
tion. Not just those considered for tenure. We have so many more
people who have the opportunity to be presenters. That really
helps people who have to go before a personnel committee to renew
their contracts. That’s one aspect of inclusiveness that has always
worked well.
LO: And I think that we figured that out pretty early on; we
are kind of at two levels. One was that people were more likely to
be able to come to conferences if they were presenters or workshop
leaders or moderators; then their schools would pay for them to
attend. Second of all, people who wanted to stay in the profession
for a long time were going to have to show professional develop-
ment. The Legal Writing Institute conferences are the perfect
place for people to be able to do that, and having been on the pro-
gram committee a number of times, I know that we conscientiously
go through the topics that people are preparing and kind of the
bibliographies that they put together. We also attempt particularly
to find people who are in their second, third, or fourth years of
teaching who have never presented before.
MR: Yes. That’s a good policy.
LO: And if there’s a choice between a senior person and a per-
son who’s been around two, three, four years, we have, on a major-
ity of occasions, elected to give the slot to the person who’s newer.
Simply because, one, we may not have heard his or her voice be-
fore. Second, it should help them professionally to be able to put on
his or her application for reapplication for reappointment or for
tenure that he or she made a presentation at a national confer-
ence.
ML: Yes. Deans and committees accord more respect to na-

tional meetings.
LO: And the fact that it’s a large conference—
ML: Yes, lots of people. That’s very helpful.
LO: Yes. Professors and most deans are impressed. There are
relatively few professional groups in the legal profession that con-
sistently draw such large numbers. I don’t think the contracts pro-
fessors, you know, do they draw up to 400 people to a contracts
conference?
MR: Only at the AALS meetings, and I would guess they nev-
er get that high in any of the AALS sections.
LO: And again, I think it’s been relatively recently that any
significant number of legal writing faculty have been funded to go
to AALS meetings. It’s only been very recently, maybe in the last
five years, that our dean would pay expenses for my own legal
writing faculty to attend. My recollection is that in the early years,
there were relatively few people who taught legal writing full-time
who would show up. It was one reason we didn’t have board meet-
ings there for a while because not enough people were able to at-
tend. There were more people who were essentially teaching legal
writing with a doctrinal course or who were librarians.
MR: Librarians were in the AALS at the beginning; there
were a substantial number of librarians in the writing section.
Then, gradually, they dropped off as the focus was more and more
on legal writing and legal thinking. The librarians formed their
own AALS Section.
ML: Eventually, academic support people, who had been part
of the writing section, formed their own section too.
LO: The number of people at the Legal Writing Section meet-
ing in January is substantially larger now than it was ten/fifteen
years ago. More people get money from their schools to be able to
go to the AALS conferences. Interest and support for legal writing
has increased.
ML: Right. In recent years for our AALS Section meetings, the
room has been absolutely packed, and you couldn’t find a place to
sit.
LO: It is not unusual now to have 200 people at those Section
meetings. They’re not necessarily all people who have the primary
teaching responsibility of teaching legal research and writing. The
programs probably draw people outside legal writing depending on
the topic. “Better Thinking, Better Writing” was the topic of the
2003 AALS Section meeting, which should have an appeal to peo-
ple besides those who just teach legal writing. Such topics broaden
awareness of legal academics about legal writing programs.
ML: In recent years, the Legal Writing Institute has had a
formal presence at the AALS annual meetings with Institute re-
ceptions for two awards it sponsors: the Golden Pen Award and
the Thomas Blackwell Award. The latter is sponsored jointly by
the Legal Writing Institute and ALWD. It honors the life and
memory of Thomas Blackwell, whose tragic death in 2002 was a
great loss to the legal writing community.31 The Blackwell Award
recipients to date have been Richard Neumann (Hofstra), Pamela
Lysaght (Detroit Mercy), and Ralph Brill (Chicago-Kent).
LO: The Blackwell award reception has been packed. Tom’s
family and members of the Appalachian faculty—Tom was legal
writing director there—have attended.
ML: The Golden Pen Award had a very different inception. It
grew out of the Plain English Movement. Joe Kimble was its fore-
most advocate at Legal Writing Institute conferences. He was in-
strumental in setting up the award. Recipients of the Golden Pen
Award have been Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman; Donald LeDuc,
Dean, Thomas M. Cooley School of Law; Linda Greenhouse, Unit-
ed States Supreme Court reporter for The New York Times; Judge
Robert E. Keeton, Founder of the Style Subcommittee on Federal
Court Rules; and Professor Richard Wydick of Berkeley, author of
Plain English for Lawyers.32
LO: Members of the Legal Writing Institute devoted a good
deal of discussion. . .
ML: Sometimes heated.
LO: Right, to whether to adopt a Plain English resolution that
Joe promoted.
ML: I remember Judge Lynn N. Hughes of the U.S. District
Court for Houston, Texas, argued in favor of the resolution at the
1992 conference.33 And one entire issue of the Second Draft news-
letter was devoted to Plain English.34
31 Thomas F. Blackwell (1961–2002) died shockingly and tragically while director of
legal writing at Appalachian School of Law, where he was killed by a former student. The
entire legal writing community mourns his loss. Moving tributes to Blackwell can be read in
Pamela Lysaght, Molly Warner Lien & Clinton W. Shinn, In Memory of Thomas F. Black-
well, 8 Leg. Writing 1 (2002).
32 Richard C. Wydick, Plain English for Lawyers (5th ed., Carolina Academic Press
2005).
33 Judge Lynn N. Hughes, Do We Need Charters for Plain English? 8 Second Draft 1
(Nov. 1992).
34 7 Second Draft 1 (Oct. 1991).
LO: I think we voted on the resolution in 1992.

ML: Yes. It passed nearly unanimously.
PLAIN LANGUAGE RESOLUTION ADOPTED

At the 1992 conference of the Legal Writing Institute,
which has 900 members world-wide, the participants adopted
the following resolution:
1. The way lawyers write has been a source of complaint
about lawyers for more than four centuries.
2. The language used by lawyers should agree with the
common speech, unless there are reasons for a difference.
3. Legalese is unnecessary and no more precise than plain
language.
4. Plain language is an important part of good legal writ-
ing.
5. Plain language means language that is clear and readily
understandable to the intended readers.
6. To encourage the use of plain language, the Legal Writing
Institute should try to identify members who would be
willing to work with their bar associations to establish
plain language committees like those in Michigan and
Texas.35
LO: That was a bit of a departure for the Legal Writing Insti-
tute. Conference programs only very rarely focused on political
issues. Programs generally centered on teaching, especially in the
early years.
MR: To what extent have you found that you’re recycling some
of the conference topics that you have used in the past, and do you
do that intentionally? Or does it just happen?
ML: You mean at the conferences?
LO: At the conferences. I think that part of it is intentional. I
think you want to have those basic core topics for the new people
that will always be there at every conference. So my guess is that
probably at every conference that we’ve ever had, there’s been a
session on designing assignments and one on having student con-
ferences. So there are certain perennial topics. I think that is ac-
tually a very good thing.
MR: Especially for the newcomers.
35 8 Second Draft 1 (Nov. 1992).

LO: Other topics are quite varied, depending on what inter-

ests people in any particular year. So there’s some repetition. For a
while, we had a large number of technology presentations because
people were experimenting with technology. We went through a
stage where we had a large number of presentations on learning
theories and different diagnostic tools to determine learning styles.
In the last several years, we’ve had emphasis on teaching diverse
students (disabled students, ESL students), teaching professional
responsibility. A lot more about bias, both in legal analysis and
writing.
LO: An attendee can now look at a program and say, “I have
six choices. Yes, I heard that topic last time, but, this is where I
am right now, and I’m going to choose a different topic.”
MR: It is clearly a challenge for those people who are schedul-
ing the conference program.
LO: Now we have the capability, if we choose to do so, to put
the conference presentations on digital tape and upload the tapes
to the Internet. The advantage of doing that is it makes presenta-
tions more widely available. My basic concern about doing this,
however, is that people may choose not to come to the conference,
which means they only get a fraction of what the Legal Writing
Institute offers. You may get the information, but you miss out on
the discussions after the presentations.
MR: You lose the collegiality.
LO: The planning committee has to make a decision about
how to proceed. We’ll probably start slowly; maybe tape all the
sessions for brand new people—the people who come on board af-
ter our conference.
ML: That could provide a teacher training packet for directors
who can’t bring all their teachers to a conference.
LO: Exactly.
ML: And for people who can’t attend. Sometimes the new
teachers can’t get there.
LO: That’s exactly right. That seems to be the way to start it.
MR: Yes. The next step might be something patterned after
our CLE Best-of-the-Year.
LO: Exactly.
MR: Best-of-the-Year and then a small packet of what seems
to be the cutting edge.
LO: Exactly. Maybe down the road twenty years from now—
maybe we will only have virtual conferences. But the good thing is
that many people will still want to go to Seattle in the summer.
ML: I noticed on the program brochure for the Legal Writing

Institute conference from 1986 that the conference was called “The
Next Step.” What do you see as the next step twenty years after
1986 when you thought up “The Next Step” title?
LO: I do think the next twenty years are going to be a time of
remarkable change for the legal profession. Part of that is due
simply to the technology that is available to us as lawyers, and the
technology that we will be expected to use. I think another change
is in the nature of law firms themselves and that the mentoring
that historically was done by law firms may not take place in the
future. Plus, I think, to some extent, that there is a far more di-
verse group of people who need and want access to legal services.
Thus, as a profession, we face huge challenges. Those of us who
teach legal writing need to keep reminding ourselves that we’re
not training students to do what we did ten years ago. Instead, we
need to look toward the future.
MR: So the Legal Writing Institute has been evolving in many
ways.
LO: To some extent, it has been the vision all along that the
Institute needed a place to start, but it wasn’t necessarily the
place where it was going to stay. We started with a national board
of directors. Because it was pretty simple, initially all the func-
tions came out of the University of Puget Sound very quickly. We
decided the conference shouldn’t be every four or five years, but
every two. We decided we needed to have a newsletter, and now
the newsletter rotates amongst schools. Each time we rotate, there
is probably a little competition, maybe some improvement. The
next editors have to produce a newsletter at least as good as that
of the previous editors—or better. I think that’s great. Then there’s
the Journal. Essentially we realized that one person could not do a
journal, and it has now started rotating. The Journal really
doesn’t have a physical location at all. It’s just produced volume by
volume.
During the first six or seven years, the presidency was at the
University of Puget Sound. The secretary and treasurer were at
the University of Puget Sound. We quickly decided we were tired.
So the presidencies also started rotating. The conferences were
held in other locations.
ML: Now the home base will move too.
IX. MOVING ON . . .
LEGAL WRITING INSTITUTE

HAS A NEW HOME
I am pleased to announce that the Legal Writing Insti-
tute has found a new home. Over the course of the next few
months, we will transfer our base of operations from Seattle
University to Mercer University School of Law in Macon,
Georgia, where Linda Edwards will take on the responsibility
for overseeing the Institute’s operations. While we are very
excited that Mercer will be our new home, the selection pro-
cess was quite challenging. Several schools submitted out-
standing proposals, and it was difficult to choose among
them. It is a tribute to the strength of our discipline that so
many schools were willing and able to take on this chal-
lenge.36
LO: To some extent, the move is much easier to do now be-

cause so much of the data can be transferred easily electronically.
We do have some boxes of records, etc. that we’ll have to send to
the new home base in Georgia, but for the most part, we’re talking
about who maintains the mailing list, who maintains the member-
ship, who maintains the website, and who maintains the listserv,
and pretty much with a click of the button we can send all of our
data to the new home of the Legal Writing Institute, and then
Mercer University School of Law can take over.
ML: But a switch to a new home base is more than just a me-
chanical transfer of information. It can also be a break in continui-
ty.
LO: The major problem I actually foresee in the transfer is
losing our institutional memory. Lori Lamb has been with us for so
long now. Lori recognizes names and knows where people are. I
mean there is a wealth of information that’s in her head. It’s going
to take a while for the next person to be able to acquire that
knowledge. When somebody calls with a question, Lori knows im-
mediately who can answer that question. She is amazing.
I’m not sure that if we asked people who have been in the Le-
gal Writing Institute fewer than ten years where the home of the
Legal Writing Institute was in 2002 that most people would know.
The Journal comes from one mailing address. The newsletter
36 Steve Johansen, The President’s Column, 17 Second Draft 3 (July 2003).

comes from another mailing address, the listserv is a private serv-

er. The website—I don’t think there is anything on it that identi-
fies it as from a particular institution. I mean, I’m not sure that
the Legal Writing Institute has a physical location in most people’s
minds anymore. I think that is good.
ML: I think it’s admirable that you can say you opened up the
operation of the Legal Writing Institute to lots of the new people.
That we don’t think of the Legal Writing Institute as a location.
The Institute is people, not a place. That’s one thing about legal
writing—it’s a community as well as a discipline.
MR: That’s one of its strengths.
ML: Many people realize, you know, that you, Chris, Anne,
and Lori put this together. It was a major accomplishment that
made a difference to all of us. It still makes a difference and will in
the future. That should not be forgotten.
MR: Amen.
ML: I don’t think we should forget what people have done just
because life goes on. Things change, but let’s not forget, for exam-
ple, what Marjorie has done. What you and Chris have done. I
have always felt that the Northwest was in a sense the cradle of
legal writing as a profession, with Marjorie’s program at the Uni-
versity of Washington and the Legal Writing Institute at the Uni-
versity of Puget Sound. It’s been a fortunate congruence of people
and their interests. So let’s not forget the contributions people like
Marjorie, like Ralph Brill made. Who you and Chris are.
LO: But I think in part the success of the Legal Writing Insti-
tute is that it is not identified with one a single person.
ML: You and Chris certainly were not self-promoting. But we
all knew how much effort you put into it. And at the beginning, we
all had strong feelings about the camaraderie at the University of
Puget Sound conferences. I, for one, made many of my best friends
there.
LO: In some ways, it’s kind of fun now when the chairpeople
don’t have a clue who I am. So, you know, I’m just another person.
ML: And that makes me sad.
LO: I have to keep remembering there’s a history, and things
that are gains can also be lost. We need to make sure we don’t lose
our sense of continuity.
MR: The sense of fellowship.
LO: I guess one of my greatest fears is that for those of us who
teach legal writing in legal writing programs, the Legal Writing
Institute may become less like we have been in the past, and be-
come more like the rest of the academic world. That’s a system
based on hierarchy. It’s a system that often doesn’t put the student
first, and I really feel strongly about that. When I go to work every
day, I try to put the students first. We need to make sure in striv-
ing to become professional, we don’t become what we were protest-
ing against.
MR: In legal writing we’ve been friends, not competitors.
LO: I almost always think of the Legal Writing Institute in
terms of my daughter because she was born about the same time
the Legal Writing Institute was conceived. The first conference
was in 1984. Just as my daughter has grown up, so has the Legal
Writing Institute. Letting the Legal Writing Institute go find its
home someplace else is a kind of natural progression. I am sure
that at Mercer the Legal Writing Institute will prosper.
Bowman’s Edits (c) 12/2/2005 8:56:07 AM
EXPANDING OUR CLASSROOM WALLS:

ENHANCING TEACHING AND LEARNING
THROUGH TECHNOLOGY*
Kristin B. Gerdy**
Jane H. Wise***
Alison Craig****
I. INTRODUCTION
A wide range of factors supports a decision to incorporate

technology into law teaching. These factors range from the theoret-
ical to the practical and from pedagogical to professional, but three
factors are particularly important: trends in law practice, technical
experience of law students, and cognitive processing. First, tech-
nology is particularly well suited for legal education, and especial-
ly for legal research and writing instruction, because the nature of
law practice is becoming increasingly technical.1 Modern lawyers
need a much higher level of technological competence to succeed—
it is no longer enough to employ a legal secretary to type briefs.
Current trends toward electronic filing, digital presentation of evi-
dence, and electronic conferencing and collaboration require the
lawyer to possess a level of technical competence.2 This is the re-
sponsibility of legal educators to prepare students for the realities
of practice, and that includes an introduction to the realities of
technology in the law.3
* This Article is based on a presentation given at the Conference of the Legal Writing
Institute in Seattle, Washington, in July 2004.

** Associate Professor and Director, Rex E. Lee Advocacy Program, J. Reuben Clark
Law School, Brigham Young University.

*** Instructor, Rex. E. Lee Advocacy Program, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham
Young University.
**** Writing Specialist, Rex E. Lee Advocacy Program, J. Reuben Clark Law School,
Brigham Young University.

1 Stephen M. Johnson, www.lawschool.edu: Legal Education in the Digital Age, 2000
Wis. L. Rev. 85, 101–103.

2 See Maria Perez Crist, Technology in the LRW Curriculum—High Tech, Low Tech,
or No Tech, 5 Leg. Writing 93, 96–97 (1999).

3 Johnson, supra n. 1, at 101; see generally Pamela Lysaght & Danielle Istl, Integrat-
ing Technology: Teaching Students to Communicate in Another Medium, 10 Leg. Writing

163 (2004) (describing the reasoning behind and implementation of a technology unit within
Second, most modern law students have used computers both

in the classroom and at home since their early elementary school
days, leading them to expect technology to play a role in their legal
education as well.4 According to a report published by the National
Center for Education Studies in 2003, about 90% of American chil-
dren and teenagers, ages five through seventeen, used computers
in 2001, with nearly 60% using the Internet.5 By the time they
reach high school, nearly three-quarters of American students are
online.6 Use of computers and the Internet in educational settings
has increased significantly since the early 1980s. In 1984, 27% of
students from elementary school through college used computers
in school. In 1989, 43% of students used computers at school, and
by 1997 69% of students reported using computers in their clas-
ses.7 According to a 2002 study on Internet use by college students
conducted by the Pew Internet Project, 20% of college students
were introduced to computers by the time they were eight years
old, and all were using computers by the time they turned eight-
een.8 The vast majority (86%) of college students use the Internet,
compared to nearly 60% of the general U.S. population.9
Increasingly, Internet use is becoming part of the undergrad-
uate educational experience. For example, during Winter Semester
2004, Brigham Young University reported that more than 80% of
its undergraduate students utilized the online course software
Blackboard.10 American college students find the Internet central
to their educational experience, using it to communicate with
teachers and other students, to research and to access library ma-
the law school’s legal writing course; the unit requires students to use and assess technolo-
gy for research and as a vehicle for communicating with clients.).
4 Johnson, supra n. 1, at 101.
5 Matthew DeBell & Chris Chapman, Computer and Internet Use by Children and
Adolescents in 2001: Statistical Analysis Report iv (U.S. Dept. Educ., Natl. Ctr. for Educ.
Stud. 2003) (available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2004014).
6 Id. at 3.
7 Id.
8 Steve Jones, The Internet Goes to College: How Students Are Living in the Future
with Today’s Technology 2 (Pew Internet & Am. Life Project 2002) (available at http://www
.pewinternet.org/reports/toc.asp?Report=71). The project surveyed more than 2,000 under-
graduate and graduate students at twenty-seven colleges and universities between March
and June 2002. Id. at 21. Survey data has a margin of error of plus or minus two percentage
points. Id.
9 Id. at 2.
10 Data provided by Brigham Young University Center for Instructional Design. E-
mail from Candace Berrett, Evaluation & Research Asst., BYU, to Kristin Gerdy, Assoc.
Prof. & Dir., Rex E. Lee Advocacy Program, BYU, Blackboard Information (May 26, 2004)
(copy on file with Authors).
2005] Expanding Our Classroom Walls 265
terials, and to handle administrative tasks like reporting absenc-

es.11 These students overwhelmingly report that Internet use has
positively impacted their college experience.12
The Internet has also changed the way students approach
their education. For example, while students used to depend on
the campus library for the majority of their research needs, today’s
students opt for Internet searching, with almost three-quarters
using the Internet more than the library and slightly less than
10% preferring the library.13 Because these trends are escalating
in secondary and undergraduate education, more and more law
students will enter law school expecting, if not demanding, that
professors incorporate technology into their courses. This trend
will increasingly be true as more and more undergraduate univer-
sities incorporate technology into their curricula.
The third and perhaps most important reason to consider im-
plementing technology into legal education is that the advent of e-
mail, instant messaging, and readily accessible Internet browsing
has influenced the way students learn. According to Carole A.
Barone, head of the National Learning Infrastructure Initiative,
students who regularly use these technologies expect their learn-
ing to be more “hands on” than passive (“they expect to try things
rather than hear about them”), and they tend to learn more visual-
ly and socially.14 Because of their familiarity with the Internet and
the way it “links” information, today’s students expect and learn
best from information presented in a “non-linear, dynamic, and
interactive way.”15 The online-cyber environment presents infor-
mation in multiple formats, such as text, pictures, video, and
graphics, and allows users to link information from various loca-
tions throughout the Internet seamlessly and dynamically. This
connectivity, and students’ experience with it, has changed the
way students conceive of information and learn from it.16 Law stu-
11 Jones, supra n. 8, at 2–3.

12 Id. at 3. Slightly more than one-third of surveyed students (34.3%) strongly agreed
with the proposition that the Internet had a positive impact on their college academic expe-
rience in general, while an additional 44.2% agreed with the proposition. Id. at 8 tbl. 3.
Sixteen percent were “neutral” and only 3.5% disagreed. Id.
13 Id.
14 Carole A. Barone, Technology and the Changing Teaching and Learning Landscape,
“Students Think Differently,” http://aahebulletin.com/member/articles/educause.asp?pf=1

(accessed Feb. 27, 2005).
15 Rogelio Lasso, From The Paper Chase to the Digital Chase: Technology and the
Challenge of Teaching 21st Century Law Students, 43 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1, 22 (2002).
16 Id. at 23.
dents’ experiences are arguably no different.17 In this Article, we

will provide a brief overview of learning theory, discuss the
thoughtful use of technology, and describe four specific projects we
have created at BYU Law School.
II. LEARNING THEORY AND LEARNING STYLE
To more fully understand how technological advances impact

learning, it is useful to consider a short summary of learning theo-
ry, focusing particularly on learning styles and student-centered
learning principles.18 Learning has been described as the “process
of progressive change from ignorance to knowledge, from inability
to competence, and from indifference to understanding.”19 The way
learners progress through the spectrum from ignorance to
knowledge is often referred to as a learning style.20 In his leading
work on learning styles, educational theorist James W. Keefe de-
fined learning style as “characteristic cognitive, affective, and psy-
chological behaviors that serve as relatively stable indicators of
how learners perceive, interact with, and respond to the learning
environment.”21 Learning style does not reflect upon a person’s
intelligence, and one style is not superior to another. While learn-
ing style is likely to be relatively stable throughout a person’s life,
it is not unalterable and often must be adjusted to enable the stu-
dent to learn in a less than ideal environment.
Professor Paula Lustbader summarized: “Theories about
learning styles indicate that learners have a preferred mode of
learning, that people learn in different ways, that a variety of
17 See id. at 23, 30 (discussing the “communication revolution” during the second half
of the twentieth century, arguing that such a revolution significantly affected the learning
style of twenty-first century law students, and explaining how law faculty can incorporate
electronic technology into the curriculum to advance legal education).
18 For an extended discussion of learning styles, adult or student-centered learning
theory, instructional preferences, and the Kolb model of experiential learning, see Kristin B.
Gerdy, Making the Connection: Learning Style Theory and the Legal Research Curriculum,
19 Leg. Ref. Servs. Q. 71 (2001).
19 Cameron Fincher, Learning Theory and Research, in Teaching and Learning in the
College Classroom 47–48 (Kenneth A. Feldman & Michael B. Paulson eds., Ginn Press
1994).
20 See generally Rita Dunn & Kenneth Dunn, Teaching Secondary Students through
Their Individual Learning Styles: Practical Approaches for Grades 7–12 (Allyn & Bacon
1993); Robin A. Boyle & Rita Dunn, Teaching Law Students through Individual Learning
Styles, 62 Alb. L. Rev. 213 (1998); M.H. Sam Jacobson, A Primer on Learning Styles: Reach-
ing Every Student, 25 Seattle U. L. Rev. 139 (2001).
21 James W. Keefe, Learning Style Theory and Practice 5 (Natl. Assn. of Secondary
Sch. Principals 1987).

learning styles will be present in any classroom, and that no one

teaching method is effective for all students.”22 The idea that peo-
ple learn in different ways emerged in educational literature as
early as 1892; however, the specific phrase “learning style” was
probably first used in the 1950s by Thelan in his discussion of the
dynamics of work groups.23 Since that time many educational the-
orists and researchers have explored the concept of learning style,
leading to the creation of numerous models and theories.24 This
multiplicity of theories all categorized under the same descriptor
often leads to confusion. To comprehend learning style theory more
accurately, it is necessary to understand that learning style theo-
ries exist on four different levels. According to Professor M.H. Sam
Jacobson, “Learning styles are affected by a number of character-
istics, including a person’s intelligence, personality, information
processing mechanisms, social interaction needs, and instructional
preferences.”25 The deepest layer of learning style theory focuses
on personality models.26 Learning style at the personality level
tends to be the most stable throughout a person’s life.27 A second
layer assesses how students process information while learning.28
The third layer is behavioral and focuses on how students interact
in learning settings.29 The fourth layer explores learners’ instruc-
tional preferences—the ways in which they like to be taught.30 The
four levels are not isolated since each influences the others.31
22 Paula Lustbader, Teach in Context: Responding to Diverse Student Voices Helps All
Students Learn, 48 J. Legal Educ. 402, 405–406 (1998).

23 Keefe, supra n. 21, at 7.
24 See e.g. David A. Kolb, Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source of Learning
and Development 20–21 (Prentice Hall 1983). Basing his theory of experiential learning on
the work of three earlier educational researchers, including Dewey, who saw “learning as a
dialectic process integrating experience and concepts, observations, and action,” Lewin, who
placed emphasis on experience to test abstract concepts and on feedback processes, and
Piaget, who believed the key to learning “lies in the mutual interaction of the processes of
accommodation of concepts or schemas to experience in the world and the process of assimi-
lation of events and experiences from the world into existing concepts and schemas,” David
A. Kolb’s learning theory emphasizes the central role of experience in the learning process.
Id. According to Kolb, true learning combines experience, perception, cognition, and behav-
ior. Under this theory, “knowledge is continuously derived from and tested out in the expe-
riences of the learner.” Id.
25 Jacobson, supra n. 20, at 146.
26 Charles S. Claxton & Patricia H. Murrell, Learning Styles: Implications for Improv-
ing Educational Practices 7 (Jonathan D. Fife ed., Assn. for Study of Higher Educ. 1987).
27 Id.
28 Id. at 21.
29 Id. at 46.
30 Id. at 36.
31 Id. at 7.
Although learning style is linked to the individual student,

understanding the concept of learning style is arguably as im-
portant to the teacher, and its application can dramatically im-
prove teaching, especially when the teacher attempts to incorpo-
rate technology into class activities. Traditional theories of educa-
tion were based on the model that teachers, as repositories of in-
formation, were simply responsible for dispensing that information
to their students. If a student did not learn the material, it was
viewed as the student’s fault entirely. That teaching paradigm did
not include adapting teaching style to facilitate learning when
students failed to learn; students alone were expected to adjust.
With the introduction and acceptance of learning style theories,
this paradigm has shifted, and overall education is improving—
beginning with the individual student’s recognition of how he or
she learns and progressing to the teacher’s ability, if not responsi-
bility, to adjust teaching style to best facilitate learning.32
Although understanding and adapting teaching to accommo-
date different learning styles is advisable, taking the concept to
the extreme can be detrimental. If students are allowed to learn
using only their preferred style because it feels comfortable, they
can be seriously hindered in their ability for future learning and
development. Students can, and should, learn to use different
learning strategies, but they are most comfortable with assign-
ments within their learning style preference. Students can feel
alienated if they are forced to stay out of their comfort zone too
long, and this discomfort may be significant enough to interfere
with their learning. Thus, one of the objectives of true education
should be to teach students to learn in both their preferred and
less preferred styles.33 Although formal assessment of a learner’s
style is unrealistic in many situations, merely acknowledging and
understanding that there are different learning styles is the first
step in accommodating those styles. One seemingly constant char-
acteristic of law student learning style is that law students can be
classified as “adult learners” and learn best when they are able to
incorporate principles of adult or student-centered learning.
In the early 1970s, Malcolm Knowles introduced adult learn-
ing theory.34 Called “andragogy,” his theory outlined the distinct
32 See Keefe, supra n. 21, at 31–32; see also Jacobson, supra n. 20, at 142–146 (discuss-
ing the significant ways in which teaching to diverse learning styles helps all students
learn).
33 Richard M. Felder, Matters of Style, 6 ASEE Prism 18, 18 (Dec. 1996).
34 See Malcolm Knowles, The Adult Learner: A Neglected Species 39–63 (4th ed., Gulf
characteristics distinguishing how adults learn from traditional

pedagogical theory used with children—“andra” meaning adult as
opposed to “peda” meaning child. Modern educational literature
refers to these concepts by the less age-specific term, student-
centered learning. Student-centered learning is based on four
main premises.35
The first premise posits that learners are self-directing, mean-
ing that they prefer to make their own decisions and manage
themselves rather than having the will of the teacher imposed up-
on them.36 Thus, learning is enhanced by mutual inquiry by stu-
dent and teacher.37 One means of including self-direction is by
providing flexibility and options when possible, thereby allowing
individual students to decide for themselves the option that works
best for them. Flexibility that allows the student to be self-directed
enhances learning and is perfectly suited to learning activities
that involve technology. Students can use technological learning
tools at their own pace and often can self-select the sequence and
timing of their learning.
The second premise of student-centered learning is that learn-
ing occurs best experientially.38 This premise particularly holds
true for older students (including law students) who can call upon
greater reservoirs of experience, the most effective basis for learn-
ing. Students learn most efficiently and effectively when material
is introduced sequentially—taking the student step-by-step from
simple concepts through complex concepts while relating those
concepts to the students’ experience. Students encounter more
learning difficulties when new information is presented without
such context. The best way to provide context is to begin with an
overview of the material to be presented and to end with a sum-
mary of how it all fits together. But it is not enough to provide a
context solely within the scope of the material to be covered in the
class; learners need a framework tied to information or experience
Publg. 1990) [hereinafter Adult Learner]; Malcolm S. Knowles, The Modern Practice of
Adult Education: From Pedagogy to Andragogy 41 (Follett Publg. Co. 1980).
35 See generally Stephen D. Brookfield, Understanding and Facilitating Adult Learn-
ing: A Comprehensive Analysis of Principles and Effective Practices (Open U. Press 1986); K.
Patricia Cross, Adults as Learners: Increasing Participation and Facilitating Learning
(Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers 1981); Jack Mezirow, Transformative Dimensions of Adult
Learning 189 (Jossey-Bass Publishers 1991); Robert M. Smith, Learning How to Learn:
Applied Theory for Adults (Follett Publg. Co. 1982).
36 See Knowles, Adult Learner, supra n. 34, at 57–58.
37 Id. at 53–60.
38 See id. at 55–60.
already within their grasp in which to place the information they

receive. With such a framework the learners can see how each in-
dividual skill or concept fits into the overall structure or “big pic-
ture” that extends beyond the scope of the course itself and how it
fits into their existing experience. In fact, a key to successful adult
learning is the use of examples or questions—small and insignifi-
cant as they may seem—that cause students to examine their ex-
perience and recall a context into which new information can be
placed. Electronic materials, particularly those posted on Internet
sites or on internal course pages, allow students access to such
context and examples. Technological tools are well-suited for
providing background information and other “big picture” sum-
maries that do not require extended discussion.
The third premise of student-centered learning is that the
student must be “ready to learn.”39 Knowles asserts that curricu-
lum must be timed to coordinate the subjects or skills taught with
the concurrent tasks facing the student.40 Students learn best
when they understand the importance of material they are learn-
ing and see that it is linked to performance that is expected of
them in their social role. They must be motivated to learn,41 and
that motivation comes from a belief that what they are learning is
relevant and important to their lives—both short term (in prepar-
ing for and succeeding in the current course) and long term (in
their professional lives). Again, technological tools are particularly
well-suited for point-of-need learning. When better for a student to
sit down and actually discover and appreciate the finer points of
legal citation than when struggling with the student’s draft of a
research memorandum? Certainly in-class teaching is important
and necessary, but out-of-class access to supplemental materials
online can aid students at their point of greatest need—when they
are truly “ready to learn.”
The final premise of student-centered learning concerns the
concept of orientation to learning, which stresses the presentation
of material in the context of problems students are likely to face in
the “real world”; thus, instruction becomes problem-centered ra-
ther than subject-centered.42 The totality of legal research and
39Id. at 60–61.
40Id.
41 For a more extensive discussion of the importance of motivation in law student
learning, see Gerald F. Hess, Heads and Hearts: The Teaching and Learning Environment
in Law School, 52 J. Leg. Educ. 75, 99–100 (2002); Jacobson, supra n. 20, at 165–167.
42 See Knowles, Adult Learner, supra n. 34, at 61–63.
writing pedagogy is based on this premise of student-centered

learning—nearly all that we do is grounded in the philosophy that
students must solve problems and act as practicing lawyers would.
The use of technology in so doing is merely an added component of
the “reality.”
The results of a survey of graduate students conducted in the
early 1990s confirm these principles. When asked about their pre-
ferred learning methods, the students involved cited “orderly
presentation of material interspersed with . . . drill and practice.”43
“They did not like to read text[books], but preferred discussion
where they could listen to other students’ ideas.44 Application-type
essays were the preferred method of evaluation.”45
III. USING TECHNOLOGY TO FURTHER LEARNING
By keeping the fundamental concepts of learning style and the

four premises of student-centered learning in mind when imple-
menting technology, faculty will better serve their students and
enhance learning. For example, because law students are familiar
with “surfing” the Internet, they gravitate toward course infor-
mation placed on class websites.46 When teachers post course in-
formation on the Internet rather than (or at least in addition to)
providing such materials in hard copy, students benefit because
they can access the information from a distance at any time they
find necessary (so long as the students can connect to the Inter-
net), thus accommodating student schedules and learning styles.47
Technological tools can provide a “visual architecture” for the class
through course outlines, posted assignments and dates, Power-
Point lectures, sample assignments and answers, additional refer-
ences, tutorials, and other online components.48
43 Samuel Hinton, Presentation, The Learning Style Preferences of Students in Gradu-
ate School 7 (Annual Mtg., Mid-S. Educ. Researches Assn., Knoxville, Tenn., Nov. 11–13,
1992) (available at ERIC Doc. Reprod. Servs. No. ED 354 807).
44 Id.
45 Id. For examples of how law professors have applied principles of adult learning, see
generally Frank S. Bloch, The Andragogical Basis of Clinical Legal Education, 35 Vand. L.
Rev. 321 (1982); Paul S. Ferber, Adult Learning Theory and Simulations—Designing Simu-
lations to Educate Lawyers, 9 Clin. L. Rev. 417 (2002); Janet Motley, Self-Directed Learning
and the Out-of-House Placement, 19 N.M. L. Rev. 211 (1989); Fran Quigley, Seizing the
Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning Theory and the Teaching of Social Justice in Law
School Clinics, 2 Clin. L. Rev. 37 (1995).
46 Lasso, supra n. 15, at 30–31.
47 Id. at 31.
48 Natl. Learning Infrastructure Initiative, Supporting Learning through Technology:
Providing handouts and other materials online in advance can

also improve class discussion and make class time more effective.49
Materials using graphics, video, audio streaming, and online simu-
lations can supplement traditional class content and vastly im-
prove the learning of visual and kinesthetic learners.50 In addition
to catering to students’ preferred learning styles, faculty can use
technology to encourage or require students to use different learn-
ing styles and skills by implementing print, graphical, and experi-
ential components in their teaching.51 Along with formal course
materials, less formal online services, like online writing centers,
can encourage student learning and adapt to different learning
styles.52 Further, because students’ learning appears to be influ-
enced by the fluid and connected nature of online materials, stu-
dents are arguably more likely to understand complex concepts
and relationships when presented online.53 Online exercises, read-
ings, and discussion forums help students assess their own under-
standing of course concepts.54 Technology can provide an effective
way to present information outside of class, but when using tech-
nology in such a way, teachers must be sure to involve students
and establish a dialogue about the information (either in a class
setting or through technological means like e-mail or electronic
discussion boards) to avoid establishing a passive/dependent learn-
ing style.55 Faculty can help enhance individual understanding
through e-mail, online discussion and conferencing, and other
communication technologies to expand course dialogue beyond the
finite class period.56 Technology can also encourage students to
Principle-Based Technology and Learning Environment Design, http://www.educause.edu/ir/

library//html/nlii_ar_2003/supportlearning.asp (accessed May 12, 2005).
49 See Lasso, supra n. 15, at 39.
50 Johnson, supra n. 1, at 101–103.
51 See Arthur W. Chickering & Stephen C. Ehrmann, Implementing the Seven Princi-
ples: Technology as Lever, 49 AAHE Bull. 3 (Oct. 1996) (available at http://www.tltgroup

.org/programs/seven.html) (describing seven principles for excellent teaching and illustrat-
ing how technology can be used to enhance each).
52 Susan R. Dailey addresses the online legal writing center (OWL) in her article,
Linking Technology to Pedagogy in an Online Writing Center, 10 Leg. Writing 181 (2004).
Professor Dailey reviews scholarship on OWLs, discusses the ways an online legal writing
center could support the general law school curriculum, and addresses the pedagogical
implications of using the online legal writing center to meet the needs of students. See gen-
erally id.
53 Lasso, supra n. 15, at 31.
55 See Anthony F. Grasha & Natalia Yangarber-Hicks, Integrating Teaching Styles
and Learning Styles with Instructional Technology, 48 College Teaching 2 (2000).

56 Natl. Learning Infrastructure Initiative, supra n. 48.
take part in self-reflection and self-evaluation and can provide

structure for students who need structure while leaving flexibility
for others.57 Finally, since technological activities allow students to
work at their own pace, students who quickly master concepts and
skills can easily move forward while students who struggle can
spend additional time and access additional resources and feed-
back.58 All of these supplemental materials can be used at the stu-
dents’ own pace and on their own time schedules, which increases
both the students’ abilities to internalize the material as well as
their satisfaction with the learning process itself.59
A. Technology and Learning Objectives
While technology can definitely contribute to student learning,

it is critical for teachers to have a sound reason for using particu-
lar technologies in their courses.60 It is not enough to use technolo-
gy for its own sake, either because it is new and exciting or be-
cause it may enhance learning in general, because, when used im-
properly, technology can actually hinder student learning.61 In-
stead, each technological application needs to have a specific pur-
pose, must meet a specific educational need or learning objective,
and should be suited for that objective. Hence, a professor should
not simply use PowerPoint because he or she has it on the comput-
er or because he or she wants to try something different.
Technology helps students improve performance when it di-
rectly supports some concrete learning objective. Therefore, learn-
ing objectives and standards must be clear to the students for
technology to be effective.62 Some technologies are better suited for
some learning activities and objectives than others would be—
technologies are simply tools, and some tools are better for certain
jobs than they are for others.63 Technology can be used to change
educational activities, but unless the activities themselves are ef-
57 See id.
58 See id.
60 See Richard Warner, Stephen D. Sowle & Will Sadler, Teaching Law with Comput-
ers, 24 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 107, 171 (1998) (including a checklist of criteria for
faculty to consider when using technology in their classes).
61 See Craig T. Smith, Technology and Legal Education: Negotiating the Shoals of
Technocentrism, Technophobia, and Indifference, 1 J. ALWD 247, 247 (2002).

62 John Cradler et al., How Does Technology Influence Student Learning? 29 Learning
& Leading with Tech. 46, 47 (May 2002).

63 See Chickering & Ehrmann, supra n. 51.
fective, adding technology is not likely to change the outcome;

therefore, the effectiveness of technology is more accurately a
measure of the effectiveness of the activity.64
Effective planning for implementing technology involves three
key components.65 First, faculty members must determine the aca-
demic goals—the educational goals or outcomes—the faculty
members want students to achieve.66 Articulating academic goals
and learning outcomes requires faculty members to assess the
needs and expectations of the students, the faculty, and the larger
institution.67 Second, faculty members must determine what activ-
ities or resources will help students reach those goals.68 This eval-
uation should not be tied to particular technologies, but instead
should focus on what the student needs to do or to access to
achieve the desired outcome.69 Third, faculty members then de-
termine which technologies are appropriate for those activities or
resources.70 It is only at this point that the faculty member should
consider “the role technology could play in improving those activi-
ties [or resources].” 71
IV. INCORPORATING TECHNOLOGY INTO

AN LRW PROGRAM
Our faculty in the Rex E. Lee Advocacy Program at BYU im-

plemented this three-step process when deciding how to incorpo-
rate technology into our first-year legal research and writing
course.72 Our first step was to conduct a simple needs analysis to
64 Stephen C. Ehrmann, Computer-Intensive Academic Program: How to Evaluate,
Plan, Support, and Implement (in That Order) Your Campus Technology Investments, 53
AAHE Bull. 7 (Nov. 2000) (available at http://aahebulletin.com/public/archive/computer
.pdf).
65 Id. at 7–8.
66 Id. at 8.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. Factors common to successful implementation of technology include (1) “well-
chosen software integrated into a well thought-out program of instruction,” (2) “technology
that’s used to reinforce, enhance and elaborate on teacher-taught concepts,” (3) “software
training and support for teachers,” and (4) “student access to updated software and well-
functioning computers.” Mary Lou Santovec, The Seven Myths of Online Learning: Which
Do You Believe? 6 Distance Educ. Rpt. 1 (Nov. 2002).
72 Unlike situations in which faculty implement these instructional design principles
to create a new course, we used these principles to improve an existing course that was
working very well; therefore, we did not analyze every aspect of the course, but only those
examine the needs of our students, the instructors, and the insti-
tution, and to determine the specific learning objectives we wanted
to target. Although each member of the Advocacy faculty has a
minimum of three years of law teaching experience, we decided to
follow the advice of instructional designers on campus to undergo a
formal analysis of student experience and needs rather than simp-
ly work from our preconceived ideas and current learning objec-
tives. While much of this information was second nature to us, it
was a good reminder to put down on paper what we often overlook.
First we examined our students: all first-year students at the
J. Reuben Clark Law School are required to take Introduction to
Legal Research and Writing and Introduction to Advocacy (togeth-
er these classes are often referred to simply as “Advocacy”). Every
student in Advocacy has an undergraduate degree from an accred-
ited institution and has successfully completed the Law School
Admissions Test and the rigorous law school application process.73
However, their levels of writing proficiency vary widely.74 While
most have a working knowledge, if not a mastery, of many of the
technical aspects of writing,75 few have experience with legal dis-
course. The same is true for their research skills. While most, if
not all, have completed primary research on some topic during
their undergraduate education, few have experience working with
legal materials or addressing the authority issues involved with
assessing legal materials. Finally, very few, if any, have experi-
ence with the analytical processes involved in identifying, proving,
and applying legal principles and rules.76
Next we tried to articulate the institutional goals that impact
our course and evaluate the way our course “fits” within the over-
all curriculum. Instruction in modern law schools is founded on
the notion of teaching each student to “think like a lawyer,” and
we felt needed specific attention. Thus, the description of the process that follows reflects
our analysis of only those specific course elements and will be noticeably incomplete.
73 Entering students in the class of 2007 had a median LSAT score of 164 and a medi-
an GPA of 3.7.
74 Anecdotal reports from students show that their undergraduate writing experiences
range from formal honors theses requiring in-depth research in primary sources and final
written product exceeding fifty pages, fully referenced and showing sophisticated analysis,
to “senior papers” topping out at ten pages and requiring very little research.
75 The majority of J. Reuben Clark law students received their undergraduate degrees
from BYU, which requires all students to complete an “advanced writing” course to gradu-
ate. As indicated above, however, the requirements of these “advanced writing” courses vary
widely.
76 Even those students with prior legal experience often grossly overestimate their
abilities to conduct legal research and analysis.

the Advocacy faculty at BYU shares that notion; the added dimen-
sion in Advocacy is that we also teach students the basics of writ-
ing and speaking “like a lawyer.” In Advocacy, students learn to
use their analytical skills to identify and solve legal problems—in
essence, Advocacy provides the laboratory for applying the analyti-
cal skills students are gaining in their other courses. In turn, these
analytical and writing skills help students to succeed in their other
courses.
By the end of the Advocacy course, law school faculty and ad-
ministration expect students to be able to research, analyze, solve,
write about, and present orally their analysis of complex legal is-
sues and problems, both objectively or predictively and persuasive-
ly. This aim should be achieved with the least amount of intrusion
into the time they spend on their other classes.77
After examining our course’s “fit” within the law school, we
examined the relevance of our course to the larger legal discipline
and outside stakeholders. Again, the results were fairly obvious,
but being forced to put them down on paper helped to focus our
inquiry. We determined that lawyers are professional thinkers,
researchers, and writers. The lawyer’s stock in trade is her ability
to reason and write. According to the “MacCrate Report,” a docu-
ment created by the American Bar Association Task Force on Le-
gal Education and the Bar, there are ten “fundamental lawyering
skills.”78 The Advocacy curriculum directly addresses six of them,
including problem solving; legal analysis and reasoning; legal re-
search; communication; litigation procedures; and organization
and management of legal work.
The final step of the initial “needs analysis” stage required us
to articulate instructional objectives or learning goals on which we
would focus the remainder of our inquiry and our ultimate learn-
ing activities and use of technology. After considering the numer-
ous learning objectives we had previously identified for our stu-
dents, we decided that seven were particularly important and
would be our current focus. Although there are many ways to
phrase learning objectives, we chose to state our objectives as
77 In other words, while we could teach enough material to consume every waking
hour the students have to devote to law school, we have to restrain ourselves and fill only
three hours of in-class time and approximately six hours of out-of-class time each week
during the fall semester and two hours in-class and four hours out-of-class during the win-
ter semester.
78 ABA Sec. Leg. Educ. & Admis. to Bar, Legal Education and Professional Develop-
ment—An Educational Continuum: Report of the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profes-
sion: Narrowing the Gap 138–140 (ABA Sec. of Leg. Educ. & Admis. to B. 1992).
questions to the students. This format focuses on the students ra-

ther than on the instructor, something we have attempted to do
throughout our curricular design. Our seven learning objectives
ask
1. Can you identify and explain the relevant facts, procedural
posture, legal rules, and principles within a court’s opin-
ion?
2. Can you identify and articulate the reasoning behind a rule
and its application as explained within a court’s opinion?
3. Can you write a complete and coherent proof of a conclu-
sion of law that shows your reader the conclusion you pre-
dict, states the rules that govern that conclusion, explains
and analyzes those rules and shows how they operate, and
applies them to the facts of your case?
4. Can you draw meaningful analogies or make relevant dis-
tinctions between the facts of precedent cases and the facts
of your client’s case?
5. Can you apply the reasoning drawn from precedent cases
to the facts of your case to show your reader why and how
that reasoning should lead to the same or a different re-
sult?
6. Can you communicate in “plain English” with appropriate
punctuation, grammar, and style to avoid legalese, unnec-
essary jargon, and other styles that call attention to the
writing itself or that in other ways obscure or distract at-
tention from your meaning?
7. Can you identify, plan, and implement a complete and ef-
fective research strategy to solve a legal problem? As you
research, can you use finding tools, primary and secondary
sources, and updating tools?
A. Our Specific Projects
With these learning objectives in mind, we were ready to con-

sider the instructional resources and learning activities that would
enable students to meet the stated objectives. Again, we had sev-
eral existing learning activities we had used successfully in our
classes, but for purposes of this project, we tried to start with a
clean slate. After discussing a long list of potential activities and
resources, we decided to focus our efforts on four initiatives. First,
we chose to create an instructional activity to help students learn
to read cases more effectively. Second, we decided to create a data-

base of annotated sample memoranda highlighting organization,
analysis, and application to show students a variety of examples of
legal analysis and writing. We believed that coupled with instruc-
tion and discussion of these principles in class and individual con-
ferences, the annotated samples would give the students concrete
references to which they could turn. Third, we wanted to find a
way to improve the lecture portion of our legal research instruction
and make that instruction more accessible for student use and re-
view. Finally, we decided to make our existing grammar, punctua-
tion, and usage diagnostic test available to students for pre-school
use in an attempt to have students arrive in class ready to move
forward. We also wanted to make the feedback mechanism of the
diagnostic more useful for the students and more comprehensive
for the faculty.
After we identified these four activities and resources, we
were finally ready to examine how technology might fit into our
instructional design. The remainder of this Article will describe
each of the four activities; explain how we chose to implement
technology in their creation and delivery; illustrate the technolo-
gies used and resources required; and discuss our experiences
with—and our students’ reactions to—the activities.
1. Reading Cases Video
Our first project was aimed at helping students accomplish

our first two learning objectives: identifying the elements of a
court’s opinion and articulating the reasoning behind a rule and its
application. (While an in-class lecture or discussion could be used
to teach principles for reading cases, we lack the time in the first-
year Orientation Week to teach this material.) But research has
tied critical case reading to a student’s ability to write about his or
her analysis of complex legal issues and problems,79 so mastering
strategies for reading cases is fundamental in progressing as a le-
gal writer. Technology-based instruction outside of the classroom
seemed heaven-sent to teach students how to read cases like a
lawyer.
The reading strategies we wanted to teach students were
based on work done by Mary A. Lundeberg, who had observed and
79See Dorothy H. Evensen, To Group or Not to Group: Students’ Perceptions of Collab-

orative Learning Activities in Law School, 28 S. Ill. U. L.J. 343 (2004).
analyzed the reading practices of law professors and practicing

attorneys with at least two years experience.80 Lundeberg’s meth-
od involved observing those experts along with an equal number of
“novices”: men and women with at least a Master’s degree who
were assumed to be “good readers.” They were all asked to read
two contracts cases that were typical of first-year contracts cases
in difficulty, length, and style of writing. They were then asked
what the relevant facts in the cases were, what the issues were,
what the rules in the cases were, and what the judges’ reasoning
was all about—the same things we ask our students to do. To en-
courage her subjects to think aloud, Lundeberg interjected ques-
tions based on the subjects’ actions such as, “‘What are you looking
at?’ ‘What are you smiling at?’ ‘What caused you to say, “Aha!?”’81
She recorded the time each subject took to read each page as well
as the verbal and nonverbal messages she heard or observed.82
Lundeberg identified six strategies used by the experts in
reading the cases: (1) context (“attending to (a) headings, (b) the
parties involved in the case, (c) the type of court, (d) the date [of
the opinion], and (e) the name of the judge”); (2) overview (pre-
viewing the length of the opinion and the decision rendered, mark-
ing the procedural posture while reading, summarizing the facts);
(3) rereading analytically (selective rereading and marking the
text); (4) underlining the text; (5) synthesis (pulling together the
underlying threads, tying together the facts, issue, rule, and ra-
tionale into a cohesive whole); and (6) evaluation (approving or
disapproving of the judge’s ruling).83
Not surprisingly, the novices all experienced confusion in
reading the cases. Some attributed the defect to themselves: “I feel
like an idiot. Why is this so hard for me to figure out? I didn’t get
much sleep last night. I don’t have any idea what the issue is: I
lost my concentration on the second page.”84 Some attributed the
defect to the text rather than to themselves: “Now I know why law
students drink so much. Do law students really have to read this
junk?”85
80 Mary A. Lundeberg, Metacognitive Aspects of Reading Comprehension: Studying
Understanding in Legal Case Analysis, 22 Reading Research Q. 407 (1987).

81 Id. at 410–411.
82 Id. at 411.
83 Id. at 412–414.
84 Id. at 416.
85 Id.
With these reading strategies identified, we next asked our-

selves what kind of an instructional format we could use to teach
those strategies.
The acquisition of expertise of any kind is linked with the use
of stories, in part because they provide a context and allow stu-
dents to relate new information to something familiar. Stories can
engage students in this learning objective through practical rea-
soning. An anthropological study of Xerox repair technicians con-
cluded that not only did they learn from formal training programs,
but also through examining actual problems.86 In particular, they
learned from the “stories tech-reps tell each other around the cof-
fee pot, in the lunchroom, or while working together on a particu-
larly difficult problem.”87 A story format would work well in our
instructional format because from our first picture books to the
most sophisticated plays and novels, stories usually engage us the
most.88
In fact, cases themselves are the perfect story format. The
drama in law is most apparent in cases, for the very nature of the
adversarial system entails conflict: each case must involve two or
more parties whose interests are in opposition. What we needed
was a terrifically interesting case that would be accessible to first-
year law students, one with a controversy implicit in the facts and
with an interesting cast of characters. In a case, the stories are not
developed as much as those by a skilled author with a sense of pac-
ing and emotional nuance.89 Cases turn rather technical when they
turn away from the facts—the story—but there are reasons for the
dryness, and these were things we wanted the students to observe:
the role of the judiciary, the nature of a legal system, and the poli-
cy reasons behind the issues. These abstractions become what are
most important because the system is premised on cases being de-
cided according to the rules, and so the opinions discuss the rules
much more than they discuss the underlying facts. But for first-
year law students, the facts had to be accessible and compelling
86 John Seely Brown, Research That Reinvents the Corporation, 68 Harv. Bus. Rev.
102 (Jan./Feb. 1990).

87 Id.
88 Mary Whisner, Story Time in the Law Library, 96 L. Lib. J. 371 (2004).
89 Foundation Press has begun publishing a series of books including essays examin-
ing the stories behind leading cases. See e.g. Tax Stories: An In-Depth Look at Ten Leading
Federal Income Tax Cases (Paul L. Caron ed., Found. Press 2003); Tort Stories (Robert L.
Rabin & Stephan D. Sugarman eds., Found. Press 2003).
and set the stage for the abstractions we wanted to teach through
Lundeberg’s strategies.
Enter Costanza v. Seinfeld,90 a case used in our textbook.91 In
the case, Plaintiff Michael Costanza, a college roommate of enter-
tainer Jerry Seinfeld, claimed that his name and likeness were
being appropriated by the show Seinfeld. He claimed that, like
him, the television character George Costanza from Jerry Sein-
feld’s television series was short, fat, and bald; that like the televi-
sion character, Michael Costanza also knew Jerry Seinfeld from
college; that both Michael Costanza and the character George Cos-
tanza purportedly came from Queens, New York. The plaintiff as-
serted that the self-centered nature and unreliability of the char-
acter George Costanza were being attributed to him, and this hu-
miliated him. Because most of the law students would be familiar
with this television series, students would already have a context
for the case; the facts would be accessible, compelling, and set the
stage for learning Lundeberg’s strategies.
We wrote the script for our film, Reading Cases Like a Law-
yer,92 with the case Costanza v. Seinfeld as a centerpiece. To point
out the discrepancies between how lawyers and students read cas-
es, the characters in the film are attorneys and film students at-
tending a “Media and the Law Seminar,” where the case will be
read and discussed. The film was to be short; we did not have
enough resources to embark on a major motion picture, so the key
principle in the film became the message that lawyers read cases
differently than undergraduates or graduate students do and that
we can teach them how to read like lawyers. There is also the hint
that lawyers write differently and research differently than incom-
ing first-year students.
The film begins with a voice-over as the title of the film and
the credits roll by:
By now you’re adept at figuring out what your professors have
wanted and then regurgitating it back. It doesn’t work that way
in law school. Simply figuring out what “they want” isn’t
enough. Instead, within the confines of legal precedent, it’s your
90 Costanza v. Seinfeld, 693 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1999).
91 Richard K. Neumann, Jr., Legal Reasoning and Legal Writing 49–50 (5th ed., Aspen
Publishers 2005).
92 A copy of this film, Reading Cases Like a Lawyer, can be obtained from Kristin
Gerdy, Director of the Rex E. Lee Advocacy Program, Brigham Young University, 457
JRCB, Provo, Utah 84602. Please enclose a check for $5.00 made payable to J. Reuben
Clark Law School with your request to cover copying and mailing costs.
originality that matters. What is the right answer? Well, in the

law there is never just one right answer. Thinking like a lawyer
means seeing all the angles, and that begins with reading cas-
es. There are strategies for reading cases. Let me show you.
Next, a man and a woman are shown watching an episode of Sein-
feld in their home. The man is identified as a lawyer “who knows
how to read cases.” There is a cut to another woman and man in
another house watching the same Seinfeld episode. The woman is
identified as a broadcast journalism student “who has never read a
legal case.”
The next scene occurs in a “Media and the Law Seminar,” and
the camera scans an audience of lawyers and non-lawyers with
“our” lawyer and “our” broadcast journalism student both present
as attendees. A preliminary discussion of the case, Costanza v.
Seinfeld, is going on with the instructor passing out copies of the
case for everyone to read. The lawyers obviously know what they
are doing and take out pens to annotate the case as they read. The
non-lawyers’ facial expressions show that they are confused and
slow in understanding what they are reading.
The instructor calls time and begins questioning the at-
tendees: what are the facts of the case, the issues before the court,
the rules the court applied, and the rationale behind the court’s
holding? The film makes it obvious that the lawyers in the group
have had no trouble reading and understanding this case; they are
able to answer the instructor’s questions with ease. The non-
lawyers are hard-pressed to state what the facts are or to identify
issues, holdings, or the court’s rationale.
The narrator next identifies the strategies lawyers use for
reading cases, starting with the premise that lawyers always have
a purpose for reading cases, for instance, reading to see how the
law has changed or for understanding an area of law that is not
clearly defined. The film then identifies the strategies for reading
cases like lawyers do, speaking directly to the viewer and showing
the strategies being used:
1. Put the case in context. This strategy includes identifying
the parties, the court hearing the case, the date of the deci-
sion, the judge writing the opinion, any headings in the
case, and the number of pages in the case.
2. Read the case for an overview. The overview reveals the
case’s structure because most cases follow a pattern:
(a) First, there will be a summary of previous legal pro-
ceedings and who won in the prior court. A case will have a
longer procedural history if it has been appealed to a high-

er court. (b) Next, the issue or dispute, or why this particu-
lar case is in court, will be identified. (c) Then the facts fol-
low. They tell what happened, to whom, and why.
(d) Finally, the decision is often found at the end of the
case, and the rule is usually stated in the paragraph or two
preceding the decision in language like, “The rule is not
disputed . . .” or “We are asked to hold that . . . .”
3. Reread analytically. This rereading is the third strategy
and is the time to identify legal terms and to make sure
that the readers grasps the facts, the rule of the case, and
the decision the court made on each particular issue.
4. Mark certain key information such as the date of the deci-
sion, issues, rules and any important terms that need to be
identified.
5. Synthesize the elements of the case. How do the issue, the
decision, the rule and reason for the rule fit together? Do
you understand why the court decided the case as it did?
Once these main ideas of the case come together, you can
generate hypothetical questions and situations. For in-
stance, what would have happened if some of the facts had
been different? What would have made the court decide dif-
ferently?
6. Evaluate the result. Do you approve or disapprove of what
the judge did? How did the judge make the decision?
The film ends with both the lawyer and the student in his and
her respective home watching another episode of Seinfeld.
How does a law school go about making a movie? BYU has an
excellent film program attached to its Department of Theatre and
Media Arts. After inquiring, we found out that our project would
qualify for a senior film student’s required project. As a senior film
project, all camera use would be without charge, and the student
director93 and the camera crew would receive university credit for
their work, and there would be no charge for their services. We
drafted law students, faculty members, and friends to be actors,
and used university sites and family members’ homes for sets.
We met with a film faculty mentor and committee in the thea-
tre department with a budget (worked out by the senior film stu-
dent) and schedule for filming. The film department gave permis-
93Our very capable and talented director was Christian Sanford, then a senior in
BYU’s film department.
sion for equipment use and location, and approved the school cred-
it for the senior film student and student camera crew.
We next met with the dean and technology committee in the
law school with a budget, a schedule, and the reason for the film;
they approved our budget. The order of whom we approached first
and when was tricky: we needed a fleshed-out project before we
could see the dean and get approval for the budget. The budgeted
items were for film, film processing, editing, transfer charges,
food,94 and some props. Our total cost was about $2,300.95
The entire production process was completed in a matter of
weeks. We handed the senior student director a completed script
in June; we filmed for three days in July; the film was processed
and edited in late July; the final editing with titles, music, and
credits was finished in early August; and we posted the film to the
law school web page before school started at the end of August.
We require our incoming students to watch the film, Reading
Cases Like a Lawyer, before the first day of class through our law
school’s web page. About two weeks into the semester, we hold a
workshop with the students where we show the film again and
review in depth Lundeberg’s strategies for reading cases. Not only
do the students enjoy this assignment, but since we have been us-
ing the film, we have noticed that students are clearer on what
“rules” are in cases, and how those rules can be applied in their
memoranda right from the beginning of the first semester. This
has been especially helpful because our Legal Writing and Re-
search program is now able to teach students to think like lawyers
in practical contexts even before the first class. Students trans-
form doctrinal learning into action by integrating legal analysis
with practical skills—the most important of which is writing. By
offering students information on how to critically read cases like
lawyers before the first class even begins, we met our teaching ob-
jective through the application of technology.
2. Sample Memo Database
Our second project was designed as a first step toward our

students’ accomplishing our third, fourth, and fifth learning objec-
94 Actors’ caveat: they may work gratis, but they will not work hungry.
95 Another film project at the law school concurrent with ours had been budgeted at
$20,000. We came in under our budget, and that project had cost overruns of $5,000. Need-
less to say, the dean was very happy with our project.
tives: writing a complete and coherent legal analysis, drawing

meaningful analogies and distinctions, and applying reasoning
from precedent cases to the facts of their case. As all legal writing
professors know, students beginning to do legal analysis and writ-
ing need to see a variety of samples; these samples serve as models
for both their writing and their analytical processes.
Our second learning resource was a database of annotated
sample memoranda highlighting organization, analysis, and appli-
cation, and was designed to show students a variety of examples of
legal analysis and writing and to explain both the elements and
the strengths involved therein. We decided to create the database
in an electronic format and believed this project would be an effec-
tive and productive use of technology because it would “reinforce,
enhance and elaborate on teacher-taught concepts.”96
The annotated memos would reside on our course websites
and would be available to all Advocacy students at any time
throughout the course. These sample documents were designed to
be used as supplements both to in-class instruction and discussion
of these principles and to individual conferences with both faculty
and teaching assistants. The annotated samples would give the
students concrete references to which they could turn for explana-
tion and modeling. Admittedly, this was not a novel idea and was
simply built upon sample memos we had all distributed in our
classes. In the past, we have had a limited number of annotated
and unannotated sample memoranda available to students. What
made the resource more meaningful was the depth of the collec-
tion. Instead of giving students access to one or two memos, this
online collection would be able to provide not only a greater num-
ber of sample memos, but also a wider variety of sophistication in
the analysis and writing styles and means of organizing them in a
way that shows students a progression from very simple to highly
complex legal questions.
Creating this resource did not require any new technology.
Because we use Microsoft Word’s revising and commenting fea-
tures to critique student papers, we were able to easily incorporate
these same tools to annotate the sample memos.97 This format also
assisted our students as they referred to the samples before their
96Santovec, supra n. 71.

97Although we created the annotated documents in Word, we posted them in .pdf
format on our course websites, so students could not download and use the documents as
templates for their own memos.
first assignments were due, thus preparing them for the look and
feel of the critiques they would receive on their own memos. Some
of us went so far as using some of the same language or referring
specifically to comments on the annotated samples while critiquing
early student memos.
The students responded well to the online samples. They ap-
preciated their availability and the depth of the annotations—they
commented that they wished there were more samples available
(which is something we are continuing to work on, time permit-
ting). Further, problems we had encountered when distributing a
single sample memo were lessened, if not eliminated, because of
the variety of sample documents. For example, when we distribut-
ed a single sample memorandum dealing with a standing issue,
several first-year students would submit their first memos (which
did not involve a standing issue) with reference lines, questions
presented, and conclusion statements that made reference to their
clients’ “standing” in the case. In hindsight we realized that the
students were merely copying the language from the sample memo
without understanding its relevance to the issue in the case. With
a variety of sample memos addressing different issues, students
were more easily able to see that standing was merely an issue in
the case and not something that would be replicated in all memos.
3. Legal Research Videos
Our third learning activity was aimed at our seventh learning

objective: identifying, planning, and implementing complete and
effective research strategies. The project was initially designed to
address an issue common to many legal research and writing
courses: a need to improve the lecture portion of our legal research
instruction and make that instruction more accessible for student
use and review.98 This activity involved creating a series of seven
legal research “lectures” that were distributed to students on CD-
ROM and posted on the course website.99
98 Although that need was the impetus for the project, the learning activity became
much more important as a law school faculty decision not to begin any classes early meant
that we lost nearly six hours of instruction time during Orientation Week—the time during
which the majority of our in-class legal research lectures were held.
99 Unlike the other learning resources and activities discussed in this Article, the
research videos were prepared by a single faculty member for use in a single section of the
course. The reason for this limitation is two-fold: first, the activity was a fairly radical de-
parture from the norm and as such was entered into with a bit more caution, and second,
the section in which the videos are used is the only section in which research is taught by
The legal research video series is based on a “blended learn-

ing” model that involves (1) technology-based delivery (content in
electronic format that the students can access and revisit at their
own pace); (2) face-to-face processing (an in-class component,
which we believe is necessary because contact and interaction are
required for deeper understanding and application of the con-
cepts); and (3) creating “deliverables” and working collaboratively
(assignments and other tangible evidence that students have ac-
quired the knowledge and skills taught and that allow them to
share insights and knowledge with other students).100 The videos
themselves present the content. After the students viewed the vid-
eos outside of class, we were able to discuss the concepts in class,
answer questions, and discuss how the research resources would
be used to solve the problems posed in their memoranda assign-
ments. We were also able to use some class time to go together to
the law library and practice using the sources themselves. Finally,
students had to work collaboratively to demonstrate their mastery
of the content and its application by completing a series of re-
search questions about both the results and the process of their
research.
We created the videos after having used a series of Power-
Point presentations as the basis for in-class lectures for several
semesters.101 Using these presentations as the basis, we used Mi-
crosoft Producer, a free add-on to PowerPoint, to create and add
video content. We filmed the video using a simple web-camera
mounted on a computer monitor in a faculty office. The faculty
member being filmed simply gave her regular lecture to the cam-
era and used a computer mouse to synchronize the PowerPoint
slides with the video.102 The final result is a presentation with the
PowerPoint slides in the main screen and video of the professor in
a smaller screen to the side of the slides. Students can fast-
forward, rewind, or jump to individual slides within the presenta-
the legal writing professor and not by a law librarian team-teaching the course.
100 Craig Barnum & William Paarmann, Bringing Induction to the Teacher: A Blended
Learning Model, “The Model,” www.thejournal.com/magazine/vault/a4158.cfm (Sept. 2002).

101 A copy of the legal research video CD-ROM can be obtained from Kristin Gerdy,
Director of the Rex E. Lee Advocacy Program, Brigham Young University, 457 JRCB, Provo,
Utah 84602. Please enclose a check for $5.00 made payable to J. Reuben Clark Law School
with your request to cover copying and mailing costs.
102 The technical details of video production are beyond the scope of this article, but
suffice it to say that Producer is an intuitive program that does not require previous experi-
ence with video production or editing. In fact, creating the video presentations took only
slightly longer than creating the original PowerPoint slides did.
tion using standard navigation buttons and a “table of contents”

view of slide titles.
While developing these videos, two hallmarks of quality online
instruction were reinforced for us. First, we found that it was es-
sential to develop a template for the lectures so they would have a
consistent look and feel.103 Second, we found it necessary to ex-
plain offline how to use the materials.104 While most students were
familiar with the CD-ROM format and were able to access the vid-
eo materials easily, a few encountered serious frustrations that
could have been alleviated by simple, written instructions pack-
aged with the CD-ROM itself—something we will include for fu-
ture classes.
Student reactions to the videos were overwhelmingly positive.
The students enjoyed the ability to watch the lectures on their own
time and at their own pace. They also appreciated the ability to
review material they did not fully understand on first viewing.
While we had wondered whether a simple narrated PowerPoint
presentation would produce the same results, the students com-
mented that they liked the video box showing their professor sit-
ting in her office “talking to them.”
The videos also appear to have helped the students learn the
legal research concepts involved as well as the in-class lectures
would. During the fall 2004 semester, one section used the video in
place of in-class legal research lectures. The videos were supple-
mented with short in-class discussions of the research processes
involved and with hands-on research assignments. At the end of
the semester, these students were given the same legal research
exam as the other five sections of the course that had experienced
live, in-class lectures. There was no measurable difference in
scores between the students who were instructed by video and
those who were instructed in the classroom. Overall, the legal re-
search videos were among the most successful of our learning ac-
tivities.
103 Marianne C. Bickle & Jan C. Carroll, Checklist for Quality Online Instruction: Out-
comes for Learners, the Professor, and the Institution, 37 College Student J. 208, 212–213
(2003) (stating that “learners benefit from consistency in the format of lecture presentation
notes”).
104 Id. at 214.
4. Online Grammar, Punctuation, and Usage Diagnostic

Test
Our final learning activity was aimed at our sixth learning ob-
jective: communicating in “plain English” with appropriate punc-
tuation, grammar, and style. This project involved converting our
existing grammar, punctuation, and usage diagnostic test to an
online format so that it would be available to students for pre-
school use, allowing us to know where each student stood as early
in the semester as possible.105 The online format would make eval-
uation much faster and would also make the feedback mechanism
of the diagnostic more useful for the students and more compre-
hensive for the faculty.
In the past, students took a pencil and paper version of the di-
agnostic test during Orientation Week. Some test preparation tools
were available to the students online, but few took advantage of
them because they were so busy during Orientation Week that
they did not want to take the time to prepare for a test that would
not become part of their Advocacy grade. Because the students
took the test before the university semester began, the university’s
testing center and scantron equipment were not available for us to
use, so the test had to be scored by hand. Then the Advocacy secre-
tary had to record the scores, e-mail the students a list of the ques-
tions they missed, and tally up how many students missed that
question. She also had to keep track of the students who had not
taken the test and notify them.
When the students received their e-mail from the Advocacy
secretary telling them which questions they had missed, they also
received a grid that listed the questions on the test by error type.
They were asked to find the question numbers they missed, so
they could identify which types of problems they needed to work
on. Because the students had to fill in the grid themselves, very
105 Before writing our diagnostic, Alison Craig, the Legal Writing Specialist, created a
list of what she felt were students’ most frequent and most glaring errors. After consulting
with the rest of the legal writing faculty, she had a list of twenty-five types of punctuation,
grammar, and usage problems on which we wanted to test the students. Similar to the
diagnostic used at Seattle University, Diagnostic Test for Grammar, Punctuation, and Me-
chanics in Laurel Currie Oates et al., The Legal Writing Handbook: Research, Analysis, and
Writing, A-1 to A-11 (Prof. annot. ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1993), our diagnostic is based on
a piece of legal writing: using a sample office memo written by a teaching assistant concern-
ing a simple legal problem. Professor Craig adapted the memo to include from three to five
examples of each type of problem, some of them correct and some incorrect. Like the Seattle
University diagnostic, our diagnostic asks students to identify underlined portions of the
memo as correct or incorrect.
few students took the time to do it, so they did not understand the
kinds of problems they consistently missed and thus did not know
what punctuation, grammar, and usage rules they needed to
study. The students encountered another problem with feedback: if
they wanted explanations of the questions missed, they had to
read a booklet containing the explanations in the reserve library,
another time-consuming exercise. Not surprisingly, only a few stu-
dents took the time to read the explanations to learn from their
mistakes. The Advocacy faculty also worried about placing the an-
swer key on reserve because of the risk a student would simply
copy the entire booklet so students in future years would have the
answers to all of the questions. In terms of feedback on the test,
the faculty was also handicapped: the only report they received
simply listed their students’ scores on the diagnostic.
Because the pencil and paper version of the test was so cum-
bersome, we felt the diagnostic was ideally suited to being made
available on the Internet. Since the law school has an excellent
technology support staff,106 we approached them about converting
our diagnostic to an online tool. We discussed how the students
would access the test, how the test would appear on the computer
screen, how students would receive feedback at the end of the test,
and what information from the test would be provided to the Advo-
cacy faculty.
We met with the technology staff in June. By mid-July, they
had created a sample of the test. As we tried out the test and dis-
cussed it with each other and with the technology staff, we worked
together to solve the problems we encountered. Since we did not
have a way to set a time limit on the test—as we had done with
the pencil and paper version—we decided instead to tell the stu-
dents how long we expected the test to take and that the length of
time they took on the test would be recorded and sent to their writ-
ing professor along with their score. We reasoned that the student
who was tempted to take the test in fifteen minutes might decide
to spend more time on the test; likewise, the student who wanted
to spend three hours on the test might also reconsider. Although
we told students to expect to take the test in fifty to seventy-five
minutes (seventy-five minutes being the time limit for the pencil
and paper version), students took the online version more quickly:
106 Our thanks especially to Vance Everett, Systems Manager, who provided the tech-
nological skills to make the diagnostic available online.
the median time for the taking the online version was thirty
minutes.
We also wanted to allow students to take the test more than
once if they wanted to—something that required too much work
and supervision with the pencil and paper version. However, we
did not want to receive the students’ scores after they had taken
the test multiple times. Our technology staff suggested that the
first time the students took the test, their scores would be reported
to their Advocacy professor. Thereafter they could retake the test
as many times as they liked, but those scores would not be report-
ed.
We found our problems with feedback could also be easily
solved online. When the students finish the online test, they re-
ceive their score and see the grid that shows them their errors
grouped by problem type. Thus, they immediately see the pattern
of their errors and know, for example, whether they missed one,
two, three, or more questions on commas with items in a series. If
the students want to see an explanation for any question, they
simply click on that problem number on the grid, and they see an
explanation for that question only.
The reports for the Advocacy teachers show the entire class
and each section with highest, lowest, and median scores as well
as the amount of time each student took to complete the test. The
computer tallies the number of students who missed each ques-
tion, and the professors can see and print each student’s error grid.
In addition, the computer tracks which students have and have
not taken the test.
The complete diagnostic was online two weeks before the se-
mester started, and after some testing, it was made available to
the students along with the online preparation aids: a two-page
description of the rules they would be required to know on the test,
a short practice test, a fifty-minute PowerPoint presentation on
most of the rules, and a second fifty-minute PowerPoint presenta-
tion that reviewed the more difficult rules and explained the rest
of the rules they would encounter on the test. As in the past, the
students were required to take the diagnostic before the semester
began, but now all the information they needed, all the prepara-
tion tools, and all the feedback were available to them in one con-
venient location: online.
We believed our plan was good, but we wondered just how
much students made use of the extra time and online tools. Alt-
hough we had not collected data from previous years when the
students took the pencil and paper version of the test, our impres-
sion has been and anecdotal reports from students have confirmed
that almost none of the students used any of the preparation tools
because the students were too busy with other work; thus, even
though the same four tools were available online, the students
made almost no use of them. To gauge the effectiveness of the new
format, we asked the students to participate in a survey—online,
of course. The survey clearly shows that our work to put the diag-
nostic online did make a big difference in how the students pre-
pared for the diagnostic and how much they used the available
feedback. According to information from the survey, most of the
students, approximately 77%, used at least one of the four online
preparation tools available to them. Approximately 18% used all
four online tools; another 13% of the students used three of the
tools, and 25% used two online tools.
The survey results showed the students’ use of the online
feedback for the diagnostic was even more impressive. In the past
we usually found that only one or two students had done more
than just look at their scores because the feedback mechanism re-
quired so much work on their part. This year, in contrast, 93% of
the students did more than just look at their score: 80% looked at
the grid that showed their errors grouped by question type—
perhaps not surprising because their overall score was displayed
on the same page as the grid; 47% looked at the explanations for
some of the questions they missed—now accessible at the click of
the mouse on the error grid; 20% looked at the explanations for all
of the questions they missed; and 21% printed out or saved copies
of the grid showing their errors by question type.
In addition to the advantages to the students, the faculty
members were also able to see not just their students’ scores but
also how long each student took on the test, which types of ques-
tions they missed, and average and median scores.107 Finally, the
information gained from the diagnostic this year will be used by
the writing specialist to evaluate the effectiveness of the diagnos-
tic, something she has not been able to study as thoroughly in the
past.
To sum up, we found that when we put the diagnostic online,
it became the evaluation and teaching tool we had always wanted
107 We found that one student who took the test in less than nine minutes had clearly
guessed on every answer—her score was less than 50%! We required her to retake the test,
print out her score sheet, and deliver it to her professor and to the writing specialist.
it to be. The students were able to take the diagnostic before the
rush of other work; they had time to use the online preparation
tools; they received immediate and detailed feedback; and the stu-
dents who wanted—or needed—to retake the test were able to do
so. The professors also received more feedback that they and the
writing specialist can use to help the students improve their writ-
ing. With the information we have from the online version of the
diagnostic, we can even improve the diagnostic itself.
V. CONCLUSION
Three factors motivated us in our desire to use technology to

enhance our teaching and expand our classroom walls: the trend in
legal practice toward the use of more technology, the technological
expertise of our students, and our understanding of student-
centered learning theory. Despite these general benefits, we see
technology as a tool that should be used only when it fulfills a spe-
cific purpose and is suited to a specific learning objective.
Based on our learning objectives, we identified four activities
in which technology could help us teach our students. The case
reading video helps students understand that they will need to
learn to read in a different way, helping us fulfill our first two
learning objectives. The video provides an interesting introduction
to the subject of reading cases using a case that the students can
relate to from their past experience. The sample memo database
helps us with our third, fourth, and fifth objectives: students need
to be able to write a complete and coherent proof of a conclusion of
law and make meaningful analogies and distinctions. The legal
research videos provide the students with information to help
them effectively research a legal problem, our final objective. The
online diagnostic gives the Advocacy faculty and students feedback
on their ability to follow legal conventions of punctuation, gram-
mar, and usage, another of our learning objectives.
We have been able to create and put into use these tools with
modest amounts of money and in a reasonable time period of a few
weeks over the summer. We believe that if technology is thought-
fully used and learning objective-focused, it can be more than just
a new way to present the same information. It can become a pow-
erful tool that helps us in our task of teaching students to become
effective legal researchers and writers.
IS THE SKY FALLING? RUMINATIONS ON
INCOMING LAW STUDENT
PREPAREDNESS (AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE PROFESSION) IN THE WAKE OF
RECENT NATIONAL AND OTHER
REPORTS
Cathaleen A. Roach
The Legal Writing Institute’s Twentieth Anniversary Confer-

ence theme, “Horizons,” exhorts legal writing professionals to do
two things: first, to review and celebrate the accomplishments
since the Institute’s inception, and next, to look out and gauge
what the next as-yet-uncharted waters may bring.
In only twenty years—an amazingly short period of time—
research on legal process, learning theory, and other topics has
revolutionized law school pedagogy.1 The LWI has helped to
change the way young law students think. It has also helped to
change the way many law professors think about teaching. It has
affected legal education directly, dramatically, and beneficially in
the last twenty years.
With these formidable changes in pedagogy finally achieved,
however, this Article now asks the new question: If our law-
students-of-the future are changing in fairly dramatic ways, must
our hard-won “pedagogy” change too?
A flurry of recently released national reports—including the
National Commission Report on Writing released in April 2003,2

© 2005, Cathaleen A. Roach. All rights reserved. Cathaleen A. Roach taught writing
for many years and in various capacities at DePaul University College of Law in Chicago,
Illinois. Currently, she is a writing consultant in the Chicagoland area and may be reached
at crofilosa@sbcglobal.net or Cathaleen Roach, c/o: CR Training & Communications, 103
Gale Ave., River Forest, IL, 60305. She greatly thanks Journal board members Jim Levy,
Kirsten Davis, and Craig Smith, and assistant editors Amy Stein and Christine Venter for
their generosity and many hours spent carefully editing this Article.
1 See e.g. Cathaleen A. Roach, A River Runs through It: Tapping into the Informa-
tional Stream to Move Students from Isolation to Autonomy, 36 Ariz. L. Rev. 667, 669 (1994)
(containing a general discussion of learning theory and law school pedagogy).
2 Natl. Commn. on Writing in Am.’s Schs. & Colleges & The College Bd., The Neglect-
ed “R”—The Need for a Writing Revolution (Apr. 2003) (available at www

.writingcommission.org/prod_downloads/writingcom/neglectedr.pdf) [hereinafter Writing
Report]. Later, the National Commission on Writing issued two additional reports to the
and the National Endowment of the Arts survey released in July

2004,3 and the recently released National Assessment of Adult Lit-
eracy survey4—suggest, by implication, that because the fabric of
American culture has changed so dramatically in twenty years,
incoming law students may also be changing and may come to us
less prepared than in past years.
The National Commission on Writing’s report, The Neglected
“R”: The Need for a Writing Revolution (Writing Report), the Na-
tional Endowment for the Arts’ Reading at Risk: A Survey of Liter-
ary Reading in America (Reading Report), and the new National
Assessment of Adult Literacy survey, suggest that there are seis-
mic changes in the culture in which our incoming law students
grew up. These seismic changes evidence an American culture that
reads far less than it did twenty years ago and has drastically re-
duced the amount of writing that it generally requires of its school-
age children.
Moreover, a recent information literacy survey (AALL Infor-
mation Literacy Survey) examines law students in particular and
concludes that even those in top-tiered schools are arriving with
less than adequate basic research skills.5 These ground-breaking
studies require us to take a harder look and to “know the times we
live in.”6
Over the next few years, the essential inquiry should be
whether a causal relationship exists between broader cultural
changes and reduced levels of law student preparedness. In short,
we must ask, “Is the sky falling?” That is, “is the preparedness lev-
el of our incoming law students in the next one to ten years declin-
ing, and if so, how dramatically?” In particular, how does less ex-
posure to writing and reading affect what first-year law students
United States Congress, Writing: A Ticket to Work . . . Or a Ticket Out, a Survey of Business
Leaders (released Dec. 2004) (more informally referred to as Business Roundtable Report),
and Writing: A Powerful Message from State Government (released July 2005). Both subse-
quent reports are also available at the same website, http://www.writingcommission.org/
members.html.
3 Natl. Endowment for the Arts, Reading at Risk: A Survey of Literary Reading in
America, Research Division Report #46, http://www.nea.gov/pub/ReadingatRisk.pdf (last

accessed Mar. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Reading Report].
5 Kathryn Hensiak, Stephanie Burke & Donna Nixon, AALL/Aspen Publishers Grant
Program, Final Report (2004) (prepared for the 2004 American Association of Law Libraries
Annual Meeting in Boston, Mass.) (generously forwarded to my attention by Professor Molly
Lien of The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Ill.). The AALL report is available at
www.allnet.org/products/2004-54.pdf (abstracts provided on the website; full report is avail-
able from the AALL Committee upon request, and is on file with the Author).
6 1 Chronicles 12:32.
2005] Is the Sky Falling? 297
bring to our law schools—regardless of their LSAT standardized

test scores?
This Article argues that “yes, the sky is falling” or, at the very
least, we’d better take a good, long look at the question. Wide-
spread cultural changes, resulting in overall declining student
writing levels and reading efforts, will likely affect incoming law
student preparedness for law schools at every tier level.
This Article first discusses the anecdotal impetus for my in-
quiry into incoming law student preparedness levels. Next, the
Article examines the national Writing Report, the national Read-
ing Report, and the AALL Information Literacy Survey (regarding
law students), in some depth. It also briefly references other re-
cently published surveys on literacy levels including the National
Assessment of Adult Literacy. Thereafter, it considers the implica-
tions of the reports and the literacy survey regarding the bottom
line on incoming student skill levels. Finally, it offers suggestions
and calls for a “climate change” within the law school community,
concomitant curriculum changes, and aggressive data collection
efforts.
I. THE INQUIRY
I became interested in this topic when I returned to teaching

part-time. Earlier, I’d worked full-time for a number of years
teaching lower- and upper-level writing courses and developing
DePaul University College of Law’s nascent Academic Support
Program. I took almost six years off 7 and then returned to teach a
section of first-year legal research and writing.
When I first arrived, I thought I had experienced an im-
portant change, but I did not know whether that change was per-
sonal in me (the “returning dinosaur” syndrome), or had to do with
the “morphing” of my law students (some perplexing cultural
trend) in my nearly six-year absence. While I am still not con-
vinced that the change isn’t a little bit of both the dinosaur syn-
drome and some cultural morphing, the dissonance between what
I left and what I returned to was great enough that for two concur-
rent years, in 2003 and 2004, I informally queried my small group
7I discuss this decision and others in an essay. Cathaleen A. Roach, The Essential:
An Essay (1997) (copy on file with the Author; copies made available upon request).
of law students to get at the root of my perceived changes in atti-

tude.8
Specifically, and in a nutshell, what I was trying to address
was the seemingly marked change in my students’ comfort level
with fairly rudimentary, pedestrian writing exercises (i.e., we
hadn’t even gotten to the tough stuff yet). I saw marked discomfort
with and genuine concern about breaking down large numbers of
cases, and large numbers of ideas, into first, primary subdivisions.
I hadn’t remembered them “freaking out” in the way they current-
ly had when approaching a mass amount of material that then
required systematic whittling away to get at some core ideas and
basic divisions. This was the cursory, initial “whittling” phase and
they were already flummoxed. Of course, what I came later to
surmise was that my students’ comfort level had decreased, possi-
bly because their exposure to and experience with large, complex
writing projects had decreased as well.
It may also be noteworthy that a number of these students
came from highly regarded Ivy League and Big Ten institutions,
that is, not schools traditionally thought of as weak on academics.
Thus, the source of this heightened anxiety at such rudimentary,
beginning phases was truly puzzling.
Consequently, in a highly unscientific and statistically insig-
nificant inquiry (but, of course, highly informative and relevant for
my own limited use), I asked a few questions of my students to
assess how much undergraduate writing they had done before law
school.9 My theory is that they were panicking more because they
had done intensive writing less.
To use a wonderful analogy proffered by Professor Myron
Moskovitz,10 I wondered whether my students had less experience
8 I informally, anonymously queried each of my two, year-long LRW classes. These
were simple inquiries of approximately ten questions. I designed the questions to try to get
an inexact and general idea of how many exams the students had written (as distinguished
from scantron multiple-choice exams) and how many long research papers they had written
in their undergraduate years. I was trying to get a picture of how frequently the student
wrestled with amassing large amounts of data and reducing that data to formal papers or
essays, both in a timed situation (exams) and more standard research papers. Informal
survey results on file with the Author.
9 Id.
10 I cite Professor Moskovitz extensively in my piece on academic support programs. In
his article, Professor Moskovitz likens the experience of taking final exams (for those who
do not utilize practice problems) to a young tennis player who studies all of the rules of
tennis but will not actually play tennis until the final exam, whereupon his entire grade
will be based upon that single performance. Roach, supra n. 1, at 669, 673 (citing Myron
Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method: It’s Time to Teach with Problems, 42 J. Leg. Educ. 241
(1992)).
“hitting the tennis balls” than I had hoped and, as a result, were
less comfortable and confident in their ability to do so.
My inquiries provided some useful information. For example,
there was a large disparity—even within my own little class-
room—in how much writing my students had completed in under-
grad. In my fall 2004 class, one student reported writing only two
exams in four years of college. The rest of this student’s exams ap-
parently were scantron machine graded exams.
In contrast, another student in the same section reported writ-
ing thirty exams in college. In addition, that same student self-
reported having prepared sixty to seventy research papers in four
years of college.
As an interesting corollary, subsequent to my own inquiries, I
started looking to see whether others had studied this same ques-
tion of declining law student writing experience. I found only two
inquiries: the first, by Washington University, as described by Pro-
fessor David Becker, which polled all entering first-year law stu-
dents,11 and the second, the recent law student information litera-
cy survey described above.12
Professor Becker reported that Washington University for a
time surveyed its applicants to determine the writing experience of
students at their respective colleges.13 Although these statistics
were never tracked formally, Professor Becker reported that writ-
ing requirements and writing experience in undergraduate pro-
grams have “declined precipitously, although not uniformly.”14
In the second survey, law librarians at Boston University,
Northwestern University, and University of North Carolina re-
ported their survey of 330 self-selected law student survey re-
spondents. As discussed in far greater detail below, this survey
may be useful because it is the first statistically significant survey
that looks at the question of incoming law student preparedness
from a “generic research skills” perspective.15 The survey authors
11 See David M. Becker, My Two Cents on Changing Times, 76 Wash. U. L.Q. 45
(1998). After I began my research, Professor Becker generously shared his thoughts with
me on the changing writing abilities of incoming law students. Importantly, the two ques-
tions asked of applicants to Washington University were not used for admission purposes,
nor were the responses formally tracked. The questions no longer appear on the application
to the law school. (Copies of notes on file with the Author).
12 See Hensiak, Burke & Nixon, supra n. 5.
13 Becker, supra n. 11, at 56.
14 Id.
15 See Hensiak, Burke & Nixon, supra n. 5, at 1.
concluded that even students in their upper-tiered law schools ar-

rive with inadequate basic research skills.16
II. SEISMIC CULTURAL CHANGES—THE NEW DATA
Although I found little research specific to law students, my

return to teaching coincided with a busy time for the statistical
study of reading and writing at a national level.
The Writing Report came out in April 2003. One year later, in
July 2004, the highly regarded Reading Report and the American
Association of Law Librarians (AALL) Information Literacy Study
were released.
Further, as this Article was going to press, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education released a report in December 2005, indicating
that skill levels for average college graduates and those with grad-
uate studies/degrees are in decline.17 Pursuant to its National As-
sessment of Adult Literacy survey, the U.S. Department of Educa-
tion reports that only 31% of U.S. graduates scored at the “profi-
cient level” for high-level English skills (termed “prose literacy”),
meaning that “[the graduates] were able to read lengthy, complex
English texts and draw complicated inferences.”18 This was a de-
cline of 9% from the previous study done ten years earlier.19 “Doc-
ument literacy” declined for college graduates by 10%, and for
those with graduate studies/degrees, “prose literacy” declined 12%
and “document literacy” declined 14%.20 “Prose literacy” and “doc-
ument literacy” closely track essential skills required of lawyers,
including the skills needed to synthesize and analyze documents
and to make complex inferences.21
In short, these national reports and law student surveys may
confirm what many of us may have been experiencing anecdotally,
that is, that law students may be entering school less prepared to
16 Id. at 11.
17 Natl. Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, National Assessment of Adult Literacy: A First Look
at the Literacy of America’s Adult in the 21st Century 15 (U.S. Dept. of Educ. Dec. 15, 2005)
(available at: http://nces.ed.gov/NAAL/PDF/2006470.PDF); see also Sam Dillon, Literacy
Falls for Graduates from College, Testing Finds, N.Y. Times A28 (Dec. 16, 2005). According
to a telephone conversation on February 1, 2006, with Sheida White, Statistician at the
National Center for Education Statistics, a more comprehensive report with further analy-
sis will be released in June 2006.
18 Dillon, supra n. 17, at A28.
19 Natl. Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, supra n. 17, at 15.
20 Id. at 15.
21 Id. at 3.
jump into research and writing. For the first time, there are some
actual numbers, (instead of “gut feelings” or raised eyebrows) that
we can start to analyze; and second, more importantly, these re-
ports suggest that the situation is going to get worse in the next
ten years, before it gets better—if at all.
These reports and survey are sufficiently statistically sound
and sufficiently relevant that they may “jump start” an important
new dialogue at our law schools. They might be particularly useful
because for the first time we have some actual numbers with
which to analyze the challenges legal writing faculty and students
will face in the coming years.
A. The National Commission on Writing Report:

The Neglected “R”—The Need for a Writing Revolution
The National Commission on Writing in America’s Schools

and Colleges (currently named the National Commission on Writ-
ing for America’s Families, Schools and Colleges) is a group of ap-
proximately twenty national leaders in education, including presi-
dents and provosts from such institutions as the University of
Texas, the University of Kansas, Vanderbilt University, and
Bowdoin College. The College Board—a not-for-profit group that
represents 4,300 schools and universities but is perhaps best
known for its administration of the SAT—commissioned this group
to examine the state of writing in the Nation’s schools and colleg-
es.22
The Writing Commission used National Assessment of Educa-
tional Progress (NAEP) survey data, which is also known as “the
Nation’s Report Card” and is published by the United States De-
partment of Education. Analyzing 1998 data, the Writing Commis-
sion declared that of the traditional three “Rs”—reading, writing
and arithmetic—writing in our Nation’s schools was the “Neglect-
ed ‘R’”; it also noted that the status and decline of writing instruc-
tion in our Nation’s elementary and high schools was so trouble-
some that it called for nothing short of a “cultural transfor-
mation”23 and a “writing revolution”24 in order to address the writ-
ing crisis.
22 See Writing Report, supra n. 2, at 7.

Specifically, the Commission noted that the recent school re-

forms in math and reading meant teachers now neglected the writ-
ing “R” in education. More troubling for our purposes as law teach-
ers, the Writing Report also noted the following:
 Most elementary students spend less than three hours per
week writing, which is approximately 15% of the time they
watch television per week;25
 The traditional research project in high school, for example,
the extended research paper or “senior thesis,” is dead be-
cause teachers don’t have the time to grade them any-
more;26
 Even in English class, only about one-half of high school
seniors report that they are assigned papers that exceed
three or more pages once or twice a month. 27
 Approximately 40% of high school seniors never receive or
hardly ever receive assignments of three pages or longer in
English class;28
 One in four students was deemed “proficient” in writing;29
and
 One in 100 students was deemed an “advanced” writer.30
The Commission reported, “Writing, always time-consuming for
student and teacher, is today hard-pressed in the American class-
room . . . . Of the three R’s, writing is clearly the most neglected.”31
In an astonishing parallel to the pedagogy of legal writing, the
Writing Report strongly suggests that our Nation’s students are
not writing and therefore are not learning critical thinking and
analytical skills. The Commission also noted in the Writing Report
that
[i]f students are to make knowledge their own, they must
struggle with the details, wrestle with the facts and rework raw
information and dimly understood concepts into language they
25Id. at 20.
26Id.
27 Id.; see also Erika Hayasaki, 2 R’s Left in High School, L.A. Times A1 (May 19,
2003); Editorial Op., Losing the Art of Writing, Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio) B8 (May 16,
2003).
28 Writing Report, supra n. 2, at 20.
29 Id. at 16.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 3.
can communicate to someone else. In short, if students are to

learn, they must write.32
The Commission made the following five recommendations:
1. Create a “National Writing Agenda” to heighten the nation-
al awareness of and sense of urgency about the writing ne-
glect; this agenda recommended doubling the amount of
time spent writing in the classrooms and recommended that
writing be introduced into every class, including e.g., sci-
ence and mathematics classes;33
2. Establish uniform, accurate procedures to assess and meas-
ure results;34
3. Create a National Educational Technology Trust to finance
hardware and software for the training and assessment of
teachers and students;35
4. Concentrate on professional development with dramatically
increased emphasis on the National Writing Project36 and
the infusion of millions of dollars over the next five years,
with the ultimate goal of 100 million dollars within five
years,37 to go toward training teachers to include writing
throughout their curriculums;38
5. Create a (subsequent) new group charged with implement-
ing the action agenda called “the National Challenge
Group.”39
The Writing Report identified and quantified a national crisis
in the teaching of writing and for the first time provided real num-
bers to support its “crisis” theory.
The Commission did not want the Writing Report to be anoth-
er report that collects dust on a shelf. As Phase II of the project, it
32 Id. at 9.
33 Id. at 3.
34 Id. at 4.
35 Id.
36 Initially developed at the University of California, Berkeley, the National Writing
Project is now more than thirty years old and focuses its efforts at training local teachers—
at approximately 146 sites throughout the nation—to return to their school districts and
incorporate new writing techniques throughout their local school curricula (available at
http://www.writingproject.org).
37 Telephone interview with Alan Heaps, V.P., College Bd. & Spec. Asst. to the Pres.
(July 2, 2004) (notes on file with the Author).

38 Writing Report, supra n. 2, at 5.
39 Id. at 6.
created a “National Challenge Group” to implement the five rec-

ommendations over a five-year period. Led by former United
States Senator Robert Kerrey (Democrat from Nebraska), now
President of the New School University in New York, this group is
working with The College Board on a number of fronts, including a
widespread public awareness campaign and financing.40
For example, the National Challenge Group is charged with
creating publicity to bring writing back to the nation’s conscious-
ness.41 Thus, in December 2004, it published a second report that
focused on the effects of the writing crisis and the cost to the busi-
ness community.42 This amazing report, Writing: A Ticket to
Work . . . Or a Ticket out; A Survey of Business Leaders (Business
Roundtable Report), estimates the Fortune 100 companies that
responded to the survey may spend as much as $3.1 billion annu-
ally to address and remedy writing deficiencies of its workforce,
including its professional workforce.43 In addition to publicizing
the costs of the writing problem to business, the Business
Roundtable Report was designed to recognize the importance of
writing generally.44 Later, in July 2005, the National Commission
on Writing published a third report, Writing: A Powerful Message
from State Government, and discussed the costs to state govern-
ments of reduced employee writing skills.45
As noted above, the Writing Report, out of necessity, used the
1998 NAEP figures. After the Writing Report’s spring 2003 release,
however, the NAEP released the Year 2002 NAEP numbers for the
writing assessments. These numbers—taken four years after the
test results used by the Commission in its report—indicate that for
purposes of law school educators, the problem is getting more se-
vere, at least for the short run.46
The 2002 figures show that twelfth grade writing scores are
down from the already-low numbers discussed in the Writing Re-
port.47 The fourth and eighth graders tested showed some slight
40 Id. at 35; see also Business Roundtable Report, supra n. 2, at 5.

41 Id.
42 Business Roundtable Report, supra n. 2.
43 Id. at 4.
44 Id. at 3–5.
45 Natl. Commn. on Writing in Am.’s Families, Schs. & Colleges & The College Bd.,
Writing: A Powerful Message from State Government (July 2005) (available at www
.writingcommission.org/members.html).
46 Tamar Lewin, New Report on Students’ Skills Reinforces Good News and Bad, N.Y.
Times A9 (July 11, 2003).

47 Id.
improvement from their 1998 NAEP numbers;48 however, less

than one in three of those students were deemed “proficient” writ-
ers.49
Interestingly, the twelfth graders tested in 1998 for the Writ-
ing Report should be arriving at our law schools right about now.
Similarly, the 2002 NAEP tested twelfth graders who should theo-
retically arrive at our law schools in approximately three or four
more years. Perhaps even more alarmingly, these numbers at least
suggest that the low writing scores are a systemic problem and
may be prevalent for years to come.
This has huge implications for law schools and the practice of
law.
B. The National Endowment for the Arts: Reading at Risk Report
A second report portends a pincer effect.

In July 2004, the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) re-
leased its own report, Reading at Risk: A Survey of Literary Read-
ing in America.50 The Reading Report summarized the results of a
study on reading in America. It paints an equally bleak portrait of
the seismic cultural changes that may affect our incoming law stu-
dents.
At the request of the NEA, and as part of a supplement survey
conducted by the United States Bureau of the Census in 1982,
1992, and 2002, this census study surveyed adults (not elementary
and high school students) and tracked “arts participation” across
America.51 The Bureau polled over 17,000 Americans, making it
one of the most reliable, largest, and most respected census sur-
veys of its kind.52
The Reading Report used the 2002 census study statistics and
issued ten findings including the following:
48 Id. The fourth graders’ scores rose four points from the 1998 test scores, and the
average scores for the eighth graders rose three points.

49 Scott Stephens, U.S. Students Writing Better but Most Aren’t Proficient, Plain Deal-
er (Cleveland, Ohio) B1 (July 11, 2003).

50 See Reading Report, supra n. 3.
51 Id. at vii. The study defines “arts participation” as, “a variety of art forms, including
attendance at live concerts, plays, and dance performances; visits to art museums and his-
torical sites; and participation through broadcasts, recorded media, and the Internet.” Id. at
1.
52 Id.
 All types of book reading (that is, both literary and non-
literary reading) have declined. Only 56.6% of survey re-
spondents read a book of any kind in the previous year,
which is down from 60.9% a decade earlier;
 The number of adult Americans reading literature of any
sort has declined 10% in 20 years and is now 46.7%; 53
 Further, the amount of literary reading has decreased in all
education groups including a 15% decline in 20 years in col-
lege-educated readers and readers with graduate educa-
tions;54
 Incredibly, while college-educated readers and those with
graduate education are much more likely to be “readers,”
nonetheless, one in three Americans polled with a college
education (approximately 37%) did not read a single novel,
play, or poetry in the previous year.55 One in four with a
graduate education (approximately 25%) did not read litera-
ture in the previous 12 month period;56
 Finally, over the past 20 years, young adults (18–24 years)
have declined 28%—from the group most likely to read lit-
erature, to the group least likely to read literature (with the
exception, only, of those older than 75 years) 57—and the
rate of decline for the youngest adults is 55% greater than
that of the total adult population (a 28% decline in 20 years
versus an 18% decline in 20 years).58
The dismal figures in the Reading Report prompted these remarks
by Chairman Dana Gioia:
Although the news in the report is dire, I doubt that any careful
observer of contemporary American society will be greatly sur-
prised—except perhaps by the sheer magnitude of decline.
Reading at Risk merely documents and quantifies a huge cul-
tural transformation that most Americans have already noted—
our society’s massive shift toward electronic media for enter-
tainment and information.59
53 Id.
54 Id. at xi.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 9.
57 Id. at xi.
58 Id.
59 See id. at vii.
Pointing specifically to the problem of “passivity” with a Nation

that chooses not to read, NEA Chairman Gioia continues in the
Reading Report,
Reading a book requires a degree of active attention and en-
gagement, indeed, reading itself is a progressive skill that de-
pends on years of education and practice. By contrast, most
electronic media such as television recordings and radio often
require no more than passive participation. Even interactive
electronic media, such as video games and the Internet, foster
shorter attention spans and accelerated gratification . . . print
culture affords irreplaceable forms of focused attention and con-
templation that make complex communications and insights
possible. To lose such intellectual capability—and the many
sorts of human continuity it allows—would constitute a vast
cultural impoverishment.60
Author Andrew Solomon agrees that reading is not a passive
experience but instead, “it requires effort, concentration, attention.
In exchange it offers the stimulus to and the fruit of thought and
feeling.”61 In a masterful—and heartbreaking—assessment of
what we as a nation might lose with a continued decline in read-
ing, Solomon continues,
The metaphoric quality of writing—the fact that so much can be
expressed through the rearrangement of 26 shapes on a piece of
paper—is as exciting as the idea of a complete genetic code
made up of four bases: man’s work on a par with nature’s. Dis-
cerning the patterns of those arrangements is the essence of
civilization.62
C. The Information Literacy Survey of Law Students
The AALL Information Literacy Survey,63 also published in

July 2004, is important, not because it is a “national report” but
rather, because it is apparently the first report that attempts to
statistically measure a decline in the preparedness skills of upper-
tier first-year law students. This Survey starts to quantify the ef-
60 Id. (emphasis added).

61 Andrew Solomon, The Closing of the American Book, N.Y. Times A29 (July 10,
2004).
62 Id.
63 See Hensiak, Burke & Nixon, supra n. 5.
fects of the national reading and writing crisis described above, as

it relates to the readiness of incoming law students.
In this Survey, law librarians from Northwestern University,
Boston University, and the University of North Carolina conduct-
ed a survey of 330 self-selected first-year law students at those
same law schools between September and October of 2003.64
The Survey asked thirty questions of the first-year law stu-
dents using a web-based survey tool called “Survey Monkey.”65 The
Survey questions were designed to assess the generic research ca-
pabilities (e.g., the difference between types of research indexes) of
incoming law students.66
This Survey, although not extensive in its research questions,
is important for two reasons. First, the number of law students
surveyed (330) and the upper-tier-status of the law schools sur-
veyed lend a gravitas to the Survey. Second, it may be the first
survey that looks specifically and meaningfully at the generic
“preparedness” of incoming law students in a quantifiable form.
In their report on the Survey, the Survey authors hypothe-
sized that
[our] recent personal experiences teaching students revealed
that many students who should have had research experience
in secondary school, college/university, or both, do not have
even a foundational understanding of how to conduct research.
Many of these students have not used an online catalog, are
unaware that everything is NOT online, do not know the differ-
ence between a full text and an index search, and do not know
to consult the index of a set of books, such as an encyclopedia.
At the commencement of law study, these incoming law students
are then not simply facing the challenge of using legal research
tools for the first time, but using any research tool.67
After a review of the Survey responses, the law librarians con-
cluded,
The data gathered from this survey confirms . . . that students
begin law school without basic research skills . . . . The survey
also revealed that despite their lack of research experience and
knowledge, students view themselves as adequate if not good
researchers. . . . Based on the survey data, it appears that we
64 Id. at 1–2.
65 Id. at 1 (citing SurveyMonkey.com, http://www.surveymonkey.com).
66 Id. at 6–11.
67 See id. at 1 (emphasis added).
need to start with some foundational research skills rather than

jumping into digests, statutes and treatises. If we meet stu-
dents at their entry point, rather than 10 steps down the road,
it is very likely that students will be more successful learning
legal research skills . . . .68
The Information Literacy Survey at least suggests that the
problem of law student preparedness is at our doorstep already
and is so pervasive a problem as to be present in the upper-tier
law schools as well as other law schools. When juxtaposed with the
national reports, it also suggests that a causal relationship may
exist between reduced research readiness in law school and the
generic decline in students’ writing abilities and reading exposure
that results, presumably, from reduced thesis and research paper
writing in high school and college.
III. IS THERE ANY GOOD NEWS?
The national Writing Report, the Reading Report, the newly

released National Assessment of Adult Literacy Survey, and the
AALL Information Literacy Survey paint a bleak picture for those
of us trying to anticipate the academic needs and abilities of our
incoming first-year students in the next coming years. There are,
however, a few noteworthy trends that may lessen the severity of
the encroaching deficits.
A. Publicity
Briefly, the National Challenge Group hopes to implement the

National Commission on Writing’s five recommendations in part
by increasing publicity and public involvement. If, for example, the
Challenge Group succeeds at getting the Writing Project budget to
$100 million in five years to educate more teachers on how to teach
writing, we may see a greater national commitment to writing in-
struction.
Additionally, the Reading Report received much more national
“press” than the Writing Report received one year earlier. Finally,
the Business Roundtable Report received a great deal of media at-
tention when it was delivered to Congress in December 2004.69
68
Id. at 11.
69
See e.g. Sam Dillon, What Corporate America Cannot Build: A Sentence, N.Y. Times
A23 (Dec. 4, 2004); Editorial, Writing Wrongs, Boston Globe A22 (Dec. 14, 2004); Laura
B. SAT and ACT Changes
More immediately, both the SAT and the ACT70 have changed
the college entrance tests to include writing assessments. Changes
to the SAT are mandatory. For example, in March 2005, the SAT
added 800 new points (and thereby increased the test total from
1,600 points to 2,400 points) that are devoted exclusively to writ-
ing assessment.71 This is likely to have a corresponding increase in
college-bound students’ demand for increased writing instruction
at the high-school level, before they take the SAT.
With the SAT, two-thirds of the new 800 points will be
scantron tested grammar correction and usage. One-third will be a
twenty-five minute essay that will be graded by two human beings
and not a machine.72
C. Undergraduate Changes
Some university programs are already starting to respond to

the reading and writing crisis. Writing programs at Duke Univer-
sity and Princeton have been recently revamped, primarily in re-
sponse to complaints of their professors that their undergraduate
students cannot construct lengthy, sophisticated research papers.73
Columbia, Bowdoin, and Brown are also scheduled to follow suit
and revamp their freshman writing programs.74
Generally, when revamping writing programs, these schools
eliminate graduate assistants who teach the writing courses and
bring in post-doctoral students who are trained to teach writing.75
Duke University has added a second intensive writing class to its
required curriculum.76
Vanderkam, Writing a Wrong, USA Today 21A (Dec. 1, 2004).

70 Joshua Benton, See Jane Outscore the Boys, Dallas Morn. News 1A (July 11, 2003);
Universities of Michigan and Texas Will Require Applicants to Take a Writing Exam, Chron.
Higher Educ. 35 (Jan. 31, 2003).
71 See e.g. Eric Hoover, College Board Approves Major Changes for SAT, Chron. Higher
Educ. 34 (July 5, 2002); Richard Rubin, How to Survive the New SAT, Newsweek 52 (Aug.
23, 2004).
72 See id.; see also Ramin Setoodeh, SAT, What’s Your Score? 145 Newsweek 9 (Apr. 4,
2005).
73 Thomas Bartlett, Why Johnny Can’t Write, Even Though He Went to Princeton,
Chron. Higher Educ. 39 (Jan. 3, 2003).

74 Id. at 39.
75 Id.
76 Id.
Changes in media attention, in college admissions testing, and

undergraduate writing programs may provide some reasons to be
optimistic. However, I am skeptical for several reasons. First, re-
vamped programs in writing are highly labor intensive and are
therefore expensive. Cost is still the tail that wags the dog in this
issue. For example, Princeton calls its new program “the million
dollar difference.”77 Yet, how likely is it that public universities
and others will have the funds necessary to “ivy see—ivy do?”78
Even adding writing requirements to a college curriculum may
hardly be enough to stem the cultural declines in writing and read-
ing that might typically span a ten-year educational path for our
incoming students.
Noteworthy, for example, was the July 2004 Illinois state leg-
islature’s decision—fully one year after the Writing Report was
released to much fanfare and publicity—to drop writing assess-
ment from its ISAT student testing as part of cost-cutting
measures to save $6.2 million.79 This testing change virtually
guaranteed that fewer Illinois schools would have focused on writ-
ing skills (because they were no longer tested). Many expected that
fewer districts would invest in training teachers on better writing
if they knew their school performance was not judged on writing
because “you [only] treasure what you measure.”80
Second, legitimate concern exists regarding adverse effects on
poorer schools that cannot, or choose not to, increase the funding
required for such labor-intensive changes to the curriculum.81
In short, we simply have a huge problem that is now only
starting to be quantified for us with survey statistics. This problem
implicates cultural forces, technological forces, and economic defi-
ciencies that will take a long time to remedy, if they may be reme-
died at all.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Tracy Dell’Angela, State Drops Its Writing Tests; Social Studies Exams Are Also
Out, Chi. Trib. Metro 1 (July 27, 2004).

80 Id. (quoting Becky McCabe, a principal in Urbana, Illinois). Just prior to going to
press with this Article, however, the Illinois legislature reinstated the writing testing re-
quirement beginning in the 2006–2007 academic year, as a response, in part, to national
criticism of Illinois’ earlier decision to eliminate the testing, as reported by Diana Rado.
Diana Rado, State Revives Writing Exam, Chi. Trib. Metro 1 (June 23, 2005) (available at
www.StudentsFirst.us).
81 Id.; see also Andrea Kayne Kaufman & Cathaleen Roach, Legislature Must Require
Writing Tests, Chi. Sun-Times 33A (Apr. 10, 2005).

IV. IMPLICATIONS
A. Skill Level—The Bottom Line
The Writing Report, the Reading Report, the National Assess-

ment of Adult Literacy Survey, and the AALL Information Literacy
Survey have important implications for law schools and for the
legal profession generally. Student skill levels are affected, and
student attitudes may be affected as well.
First, and most importantly, these reports suggest that when
we think about incoming law students, we may have to rethink our
traditional notions of standard “preparedness” levels. The high
school seniors in the Writing Report may be at our doorstep very
soon. The college graduates referenced in the 2005 National As-
sessment of Adult Literacy Survey82 (with a 31% proficiency level
for “prose literacy” and a 25% proficiency level for “document liter-
acy”) may be applying to law schools today. The AALL Information
Literacy Survey83 suggests that our students-in-need might be pre-
sent in law schools already.
There is a recurrent theme seen throughout the elementary,
high school, and college statistics in the reports, and confirmed in
the AALL Information Literacy Survey, regarding a dearth of de-
manding writing and research assignments. These numbers point
to a generation of students that is not as experienced in the rigors
of extensive research papers and senior thesis-writing as genera-
tions past.
Specifically, the Writing Report explains that the senior re-
search paper is “dead.” Moreover, even modest efforts at theme
writing and synthesis in English class appear to be limited to an
average of three pages, for up to 40% of high-schoolers.
This means that many students come to college (and later, to
law school), without meaningful experience in gathering lots of
information and absorbing, assimilating, breaking down and re-
organizing that same information . . . and then repeating those
same tasks over and over and over again, an additional one thou-
sand times!
Additionally, the unfunded mandates required by the federal
government in the No Child Left Behind Act will only exacerbate

83 See supra n. 5.
the existing crisis in writing instruction.84 This is because the em-

phasis that the federal legislation places on assessment and in-
class reading and math instruction means there will be even less
in-class training and time for writing exercises that are labor in-
tensive and time-intensive.85
Thus, by the time these students get to college, many of these
students—even perhaps those judged “good” students or even “ex-
cellent” students by their school administrators—may not know
how to do these research papers at all. Moreover, potentially even
those with rudimentary experience will not be terribly proficient at
it.
The law librarians echo similar concerns. Their report ex-
plains that even at the post-university level many incoming law
students are inexperienced with general research strategies and
basic resources.
In other words, while it is generally felt that some students
are pretty good at gathering information, as a writing teacher of
Princeton undergrads put it, “Almost none of them are capable of
turning [all that gathering] into a real paper with a real thesis and
an argument.”86
Or, put slightly differently, as Professor Molly Lien stated in
her ground-breaking research on law and technology, we must be
concerned that “students appear to equate the ability to access the
material with mastery of the material. They view downloaded in-
formation as learned information.”87
If Princeton is seeing difficulties, there is likely a problem in
other colleges and universities as well.
The reports portend writing skill deficits and raise the possi-
bility of incoming reading deficits as well. The Reading Report ex-
plains that even at the highest professional levels, Americans are
84 See e.g. Taking a Sword to the Pen, Chi. Trib. 14 (Aug. 14, 2004) (criticizing the
State of Illinois’s decision to drop the writing test for the ISAT, which tests third, fifth, and
eighth graders, and stating “If eliminating the tests encourages schools to stop teaching
how to write, we’ve got a big problem.”); see also Cathaleen Roach & Andrea Kaufman, The
Writing Equity Gap: Disparities in Writing Achievement between Disadvantaged and Privi-
leged School Districts (current working title for work in progress); but see supra n. 80 (re-
garding Illinois reinstatement of the test as this Article went to press).
85 See Taking a Sword to the Pen, supra n. 84; see also Kaufman & Roach, supra n. 81
(suggesting that this unwittingly further promotes disparities between poor and wealthier
school districts that can purchase writing programs and assessments).
86 See Bartlett, supra n. 73.
87 Molly Lien, Technocentrism and the Soul of the Common Law Lawyer, 48 Am. U. L.
Rev. 85, 118 (1998).

not reading the way they once did, and that the steepest decline in
reading is among the eighteen to twenty-four year olds.
In short, if rigorous training in writing and reading is re-
quired to develop a student’s “analytic template”88 before the stu-
dent arrives at law school, these studies suggest we may have to
set the bar back a little and prepare for more remedial work—
regardless of incoming LSAT scores and regardless of the upper-
tier status of the undergraduate or law school institution.
Consequently, as writing and research teachers on the front
line, we may have to anticipate at least three areas of reduced
skills: (1) significantly diminished organizational skills as a result
of little or no exposure to complex writing assignments and
lengthy research papers; (2) diminished reasoning and analytical
skills—the poorly molded “analytical templates” referred to
above—which may profoundly impact a student’s ability to ap-
proach difficult legal problem sets; and (3) decreased competency
in basic grammar and compositional skills.
To borrow Professor Moskovitz’s tennis ball analogy again,89
we can no longer presume that our incoming students have hit the
tennis ball 2,000 times before they arrive at law school. We should
prepare for and anticipate these remedial needs.
Moreover, this is no short-term crisis. These reports also sug-
gest that this crisis in writing preparedness and in reading may
not be a temporary blip, but in fact, may be a problem for at least
another ten years because the NAEP numbers (“the nation’s report
card”) show the deficits beginning in third-grade testing and con-
tinuing on through high school testing.90
88 For discussion on schema theory, analytic templates, and the necessity for law stu-
dents to create context, see generally Brook K. Baker, Transcending Legacies of Literacy
and Transforming the Traditional Repertoire, 23 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 491, 506 nn. 50, 51
(1997) (citing Linda Flower et al., Reading to Write: Exploring a Cognitive and Social Pro-
cess (Oxford U. Press 1990)); Paula Lustbader, Themes in Academic Support for Law
Schools: Construction Sites, Building Types, and Bridging Gaps: A Cognitive Theory of the
Learning Progression of Law Students, 33 Willamette L. Rev. 315 (1997); John B. Mitchell,
Current Theories on Expert and Novice Thinking: A Full Faculty Considers the Implications
for Legal Education, 39 J. Leg. Educ. 275 (1989); and Roach, supra n. 1.
89 See supra n. 10.
90 See supra n. 39.
B. Passivity—The Bottom Line
Lack of writing and reading experiences can yield writers who

have only poorly framed or inadequately formed analytic tem-
plates. Of course, this can affect law school readiness.
More troubling, however, and more ephemeral, is the passivity
referenced by the Reading Report. Increased passivity could be
most threatening to the demanding study and practice of law. If
reading is not valued and complex writing is not learned and prac-
ticed, what will happen to the very ethos—and the work ethic—of
legal research and study, which typically exalts in the ability to
review large amounts of information and distill it to concrete and
contextual argument?91 When students get so much of their infor-
mation electronically, and when between one in three or one in
four of the college graduates or graduate students may not be
reading literature at all but instead are passively receiving all or
most of their information, we may risk churning out increased
numbers of highly passive, disengaged learners. This passivity
could obviously affect law students’ research efforts. It may also
affect attention spans and levels of contemplation.
We should monitor whether our law students, like the general
population, may be losing the “irreplaceable forms of focused at-
tention and contemplation” referred to by NEA Chairman Gioia,92
even if universities make the modest curricular reforms to writing
programs referenced above, for example, with Princeton and Duke.
Additionally, grade inflation may affect student participation
and passivity levels, too. Academic debate legitimately questions
the effect of widespread campus grade inflation on the quality of
undergraduate learning.93 If, for example, 91% of Harvard seniors
graduate with honors, 80% of grades at the University of Illinois
are As and Bs and 50% of Columbia students are on the dean’s
91 See Lien, supra n. 87. Professor Lien asks this essential question about technology
and the law. I would like to expand the inquiry to include changes in the work ethic and
ethos as a result of cultural changes in levels of reading and writing training and thus,
steady declines in critical thinking and writing skills.
93 John Merrow, Grade Inflation: It’s Not Just an Issue for the Ivy League, Carnegie
Persps. (June 27, 2004) (available at www.carnegiefoundation.org/perspectives/

perspectives2004.June.htm). A version of this piece appeared in the March/April 2004 edi-
tion of the Dartmouth Alumni Magazine and a February 2003 issue of USA Today and was
cross-posted on the lawprof listserv by Professor M.H. Sam Jacobsen of Willamette Univer-
sity College of Law. See also John Merrow, The Undergrad Experience; Survival of the Fit-
test, N.Y. Times 21 (Apr. 24, 2005) (providing an in-depth discussion of “the invisible stu-
dent: lost amid large lectures, low expectations and party time at a big public university”).
list,94 one might wonder whether simply revamping undergraduate

writing curricula will do enough to stem the tide of a culture-wide
decline in undergraduate expectations and overall standards for
writing and research. Similarly, a newly released report reviewing
90,000 high school students in twenty-six states suggests that
grade inflation may be a problem in high schools as well: 65% of
students who studied no more than three hours a week nonethe-
less reported getting mostly As and Bs.95
A decline in expectations and standards in both high school
and undergraduate learning will likely further negatively impact
the amount and quality of writing experiences of incoming law
students. Moreover, it may be problematic that, like the students’
self-assessment of their own research skills in the AALL Infor-
mation Literacy Survey (“despite their lack of research experience
and knowledge, students view themselves as adequate if not good
researchers”),96 inflated grades and lowered expectations at the
high school and college levels may yield similar disconnects in how
students perceive their own writing experiences and abilities.
It is important not to “blame the victim,” but rather simply to
understand and respond to this new cultural milieu from which
our students emerge. A decline in writing experiences and expecta-
tions in high school and college contrasts sharply with the rigorous
expectations of first-year law curricula. Anticipating student inex-
perience or confusion will be key to revamping and providing them
with the tools they will need in the future.
V. SUGGESTIONS
How law schools and the legal community at large should re-
spond to this pincer effect of diminished reading and writing train-
ing is a question worthy of deep respect, great compassion, and
introspection. Why we should care about this is obvious, but what
we should do about it and who should be responsible, are much
trickier questions.
94 Id. (citing former Harvard Dean Henry Rosovsky’s 2002 study for the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences).

95 Thomas L. Friedman, Where Have You Gone, Joe DiMaggio? N.Y. Times A23 (May
13, 2005).
96 Hensiak, Burke & Nixon, supra n. 5, at 11.
A chief purpose of this Article, therefore, is to get the legal

writing community ready to anticipate these student casualties
instead of simply reacting to them when they arrive.
Written twenty-five years ago, Professor Gale’s words ring
more true now than ever: “It will no longer suffice to blame the
grammar school, the high schools and the colleges for graduating
the inept; law schools owe themselves and their profession more
than a lame apology for failing where others before them have also
failed.”97
Law schools interested in anticipating and studying incoming
student under-preparedness might well begin with four topics:
climate changes; data collection; curriculum; and finances and
technology.
A. Climate Changes
1. National Scope: Climate Changes for Law Schools and

Bar Associations.
One way to fix the problem is to change the climate in which it

is studied. As of this writing, the United States Congress has re-
ceived three separate reports from the National Commission on
Writing since April 2003. A nationally known former senator now
heads “phase two” of the National Commission’s national plan. In
the interim, the venerable institution of the National Endowment
of the Arts was so concerned about the reading crisis that it stud-
ied more than 17,000 American households to look at the problem.
Additional national education reform attempts (albeit flawed) are
evidenced by the federal No Child Left Behind Act. Finally, the
U.S. Department of Education released its separate study as-
sessing high-level English skills of U.S. college graduates.98
All of these efforts reflect a national leadership that is en-
gaged in and alarmed by reading and writing deficits. Because
these reports might imply that to some degree those deficits may
reach the hallways of our law schools—and perhaps more im-
portantly—the hallways of our courtrooms, they must be viewed
by law schools with the same level of concern and seriousness that
other educators and leaders around the country view them.
97 Mary Ellen Gale, Legal Writing: The Impossible Takes a Little Longer, 44 Alb. L.
Rev. 298, 301 (1980).

The first order of business, therefore, is to use these national

groups, that is, the National Commission on Writing, the NEA, the
Congress, the U.S. Department of Education, and the Fortune 100
companies’ responses to the crisis, to spur the legal academy to
study the issue with a proportionate amount of interest and indus-
try.
2. A Climate Change for Law Students
Also, we must be mindful of the NEA Chairman’s concern

about intellectual “passivity” resulting from diminished reading,
and we must take heed of the National Commission’s concern that
students who don’t write may view “writing” mostly as “self ex-
pression” and “fail to grasp the importance of writing as a means
for learning.”99 They may under-appreciate—or may be downright
hostile to—the idea of writing as learning, as analytical training,
as making something knowable, and as a process to assist in “con-
necting the dots.”100
Consequently, as part of our attempts to achieve climate
change in law school administration, we should think about cli-
mate change in law students as well. Students will need to see our
efforts not as a denouncement of their generation, but rather as a
partnership created to provide them with skills to which they may
not have been sufficiently exposed in their earlier education. If this
training is successful, these students may see greater value in
LRW and its importance in assisting their law school education.
B. Data Collection
The two reports and survey described above, and the corollary
Business Roundtable Report, are a start at creating awareness and
a climate change in our law schools and with our law students.
The pursuit of hard data, more specific to law students, how-
ever, must be the next push. At the time of this writing, the AALL
Survey is the first and only study of law students. It studied three
top-tier schools and used only thirty questions. Now might be an
excellent time to continue that good effort and pursue a law stu-
dent survey broader in reach and scope. New, broader studies
99 See Writing Report, supra n. 2.

100 Id. at 3, 14.
should be designed to include lower-tiered schools and thereby in-

clude students of even more varied educational backgrounds.
Data-collection efforts should be at least three-tiered:
(1) surveys of incoming students, (2) testing of third-year students,
and (3) studies of young lawyers in practice.
1. Data Collection First Year: Incoming Assessment Efforts

to Get “Baseline Numbers”
We should survey incoming students to get a base-line sense

of the amount and quality of undergraduate research and writing
they performed prior to their arrival to law school.101 Next, we
should conduct diagnostic testing on three levels and watch for
changes in: (1) basic grammatical and composition skills;
(2) reading ability, global thinking, analytical depth and creative
quality of analysis; and (3) basic “library research strategy skills.”
These incoming assessments not only would be useful for the indi-
vidual students, but also would be equally useful to monitor
groups of incoming students over many years.
2. Data Collection during the Third Year, before Gradu-

ation
Three years later, these same students should be tested again

prior to graduation. This separate data collection would be ex-
tremely useful for both law school administration and the individ-
ual students. Students could be tested, preferably in the fall of
their third year, with the same or similar composition and gram-
mar diagnostic tests as in their first year, and thereby track their
own improvement and progress. Students not progressing could
then be advised and take extra efforts to remedy deficits prior to
taking the bar exam and beginning law practice.
3. Data Collection in the Profession
Law schools should partner up with national and local bar as-
sociations to study the effects of cultural changes in reading and
writing patterns on the legal profession. They should study the
effects on the practice by our young lawyers, as well as changes
101 See e.g. Becker, supra n. 11.

relative to our clients resulting from cultural changes in reading

and writing training.
Professor Lien’s broad-ranging work on technological changes
in the legal workplace would be an excellent place to start.102 She
theorizes that cultural changes in technology will affect legal prac-
tice and ultimately the law itself. Such studies might be expanded
to determine whether and how cultural changes in writing and
reading patterns (in addition to changes in technology) will affect a
practitioner’s skills.
C. Curriculum
Climate changes and data collection must be the first priori-

ties. Once assessments of incoming first-years are completed, how-
ever, we can take that data and change the curriculum according-
ly. One option is to divide curriculum changes into curriculum
changes “outside” of LRW and those changes “within” LRW.
1. Curricular Changes outside LRW
a. Integrate National Commission Report Suggestions in the

Law School.
Professor Carol Parker argues persuasively that the National

Commission’s remedies to the national writing crisis are a good
starting point for law schools to address the writing concerns of
incoming law students.103 The Commission identified a comprehen-
sive five-year “action agenda” to move the nation to genuine re-
form of the crisis. Thereafter, it divided its action agenda into dis-
tinct parts. Briefly, these included: (1) creation of a national Writ-
ing Agenda, (2) a doubling of in-class writing time and writing
throughout all class subjects, (3) creation of a national Educational
Technology Trust to explore technology in self-correction exercises,
assessment and measurement of writing competence, and
(4) professional development.
102
See Lien, supra n. 87.
103
Carol Parker, Dir., Leg. Writing, U. Tenn. College of L., Presentation, Writing Is
Everyone’s Business: Reflections on the National Commission Writing Report (Seattle,
Wash., July 22, 2004) (notes available through Professor Parker or Author).
Professor Parker took the five parts of the National Commis-

sion’s Recommendations and integrated each part into a proposed
law school reform agenda.
Two areas she reviewed are especially noteworthy here. First,
Professor Parker argues that—like the creation of a national writ-
ing agenda—law schools must create a comprehensive writing pol-
icy and ask what kind of research and writing curriculum it would
take for the school to fully comply with the ABA standards. Just as
the National Commission stated that every state should revisit its
education standards to make sure that includes a comprehensive
writing policy, Professor Parker contends that the writing crisis
requires that each law school do the same.
Next, the National Commission recommended that the
amount of time students spend writing (and the scale of financial
resources devoted to writing) be at least doubled. The National
Commission further recommended that writing should be assigned
across the curriculum, for example, in math and science classes.
Professor Parker argues that this dovetails perfectly with the
movement in “writing across the curriculum” in law schools today.
b. Writing throughout the Curriculum
In fact, five years prior to the Commission Recommendations,

Professor Parker advocated that law schools adopt “Writing
throughout the Curriculum” for many of the same reasons that
were argued later by the National Commission when it advocated
that grade and high schools adopt writing across the curriculum.104
Professor Parker suggests that a law school writing program
should not be envisioned simply in terms of its first-year legal
writing course, but rather throughout all three years in law school.
She argues persuasively that the “development of communicative
skills is inseparable from the development of analytic skills”105 and
notes that “within too many law schools the notion has persisted
that writing is a discrete skill to be taught only in ‘legal writing’
classes in the first year of law school.”106 She advocates that writ-
ing be integrated throughout the curriculum and that law schools
change the definition of “a law school writing program” so that it
refers not only to those courses in which primary emphasis is on
104 Carol Parker, Writing throughout the Curriculum: Why Law Schools Need It and
How to Achieve It, 76 Neb. L. Rev. 561 (1997).

105 Id. at 562.
106 Id.
written communication, but also to writing opportunities present

in doctrinal courses, seminars and clinical courses as well”107 be-
cause “neither a single ‘rigorous writing experience’ [the old ABA
standard for law school accreditation] nor a first-year legal writing
class is sufficient to provide basic competence in written communi-
cation.”108
Requiring law students to write more in doctrinal and clinical
classes, and not just in LRW, increases essential opportunities to
write and involves the entire faculty in the collective endeavor.
Scholars point to Southern Illinois University College of Law as
one that has very successfully begun to integrate writing across
the curriculum.109
c. Other Curricular Changes “outside” LRW
Next, research developments in reading theory—as it relates

to law students—including research by Ruth Ann McKinney110 and
Laurel Oates111 might greatly inform teaching efforts “outside” the
traditional LRW classroom as well. In individual studies, these
authors look at reading in law school to analyze whether underly-
ing analytical problems originate in poor or underdeveloped read-
ing strategies. Others teach the careful reading of statutes, for ex-
ample, by having students write statutes.112
Beyond new research and course development efforts in read-
ing, expanding the law librarians’ role also might be extremely
useful. It seems likely that we will need expanded courses on
“basic research strategy” (i.e., pre-legal research), which might
provide lots of “layered” projects to try to address the dearth of
107 Id.
108 Id. at 563.
109 See Parker, supra n. 104. Also see her handout for LWI July 2004 Conference
Presentation, on the Writing throughout the Curriculum Program, at Southern Illinois

University College of Law. Professor Sue Liemer is the LRW Director at Southern Illinois
University in Carbondale, Illinois.
110 Ruth Ann McKinney, Reading Like a Lawyer (Carolina Academic Press 2005).
111 See Laurel Currie Oates, Presentation, Teaching Students to Read, Analyze, and
Synthesize Statutes and Cases (Seattle, Wash., July 23, 2004). Oates suggests that many
“thinking” problems law students encounter may stem from underlying problems in how
students read the cases. Laurel Currie Oates, Beating the Odds: Reading Strategies of Law
Students Admitted through Alternative Admission Programs, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 139 (1997).
112 Parker, supra n. 104, at 576 n. 58 (citing Jack Stark, Teaching Statutory Law, 44 J.
Leg. Educ. 579, 580 (1994)); see also Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the Tyranny
of Paraphrase: Talking Back to Texts, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 163 (1993).
research experiences students are likely to have been exposed to in

high school and at the university level.113
Incoming student assessment data would be useful to separate
those students with adequate or superior research experiences114
from those students who did not receive such training earlier.
Such a “basic research strategy and resources” course might
be part of an expanded first-year library introduction class and
taught by the staff of the library.
There is also interesting new research coming out which ex-
amines whether the “google-trained” generation has difficulty in
discriminating among and between types of research resources
available on the internet.115 Thus, an effective introductory “re-
search class” might respond to the reading and writing crisis by
including the nuts and bolts of research strategies and hard cover
resources, as well as online resources and how to discriminate be-
tween them.
2. Curriculum Changes within LRW
It seems clear that old academic curricular structures will not

be sufficient to address the encroaching law school “preparedness”
crisis. In turn, this likely alters LRW curriculum as well.
None of the suggested reforms is possible without a commit-
ment to slowing down the process of teaching research and writ-
ing. We must abandon the hurriedness of trying to shoehorn re-
search and writing training into two or three required semesters of
standard LRW training. It likely was never a good idea to limit
such training to two or three semesters in the first place; it is now
apparent, given the remedial needs of many incoming law stu-
dents, that the standard required two or three semesters is defi-
nitely not adequate.
LRW faculties need to be mindful that long-term deficits in
writing exposure yield at least two distinct types of deficiencies:
(1) the relatively easy to diagnose-and-fix types of deficiencies seen
in grammar and compositional skill problems; and (2) the more
113 See John Merrow, supra n. 93, at 20, 22 (describing the dearth of writing opportuni-
ties for some students in large public universities).

114 See supra nn. 8–11 and accompanying text (discussing the vast differences in un-
dergraduate writing exposure among my own students, including one of whom who wrote
sixty to seventy papers, and another who wrote only two exams in four years).
115 See e.g. Measuring Literacy in a World Gone Digital, N.Y. Times C1, 2 (Jan. 17,
2005).
systemic, more difficult “analytic template” deficiencies which re-

sult from years-long deprivation in the frequency and difficulty of
writing, synthesis and research experiences.
In short, it would appear that these reports and other data
will require LRW faculties to amend or expand their curricula on
two ends: (1) a remedial end (that is, to supplement that which the
students may be no longer receiving in high school and college
training), and (2) a more advanced end (using upper-level courses
to provide increased opportunities to write more, to research more,
and to develop more thoroughly their analytic templates).
At that point, it is fairly easy to argue that LRW courses need
to be increased from two to three credit hours, and that law
schools need to go beyond the traditional two or three semester
mandatory writing requirement.
D. Finances and Technology
All of this is likely to cost more money. At the national level,

as described above, we have seen enormous amounts of money di-
rected to the research and remedying of this problem: three Re-
ports have been sent to Congress; the National Writing Project
hopes to have spent $100 million dollars on this crisis within five
years; the College Board responded by amending its SAT and add-
ing 800 points to writing; the Business Roundtable estimates that
Fortune 100 companies may spend as much as 3.1 billion dollars
annually addressing writing deficiencies in their work force; and
various state legislatures have responded by funding statewide
writing testing.116
Law schools should respond in kind.
Technology, however, can be an enormous help. For example, I
directed my students to the grammar websites that accompany the
Diana Hacker text that they use for grammar.117 Law professors
have studied highly useful ways to integrate technology into the
classroom118 including using data projectors and computers to help
116 Dell’Angela, supra n. 79 (explaining that an increasing number of states are adding
writing assessments to their standardized exams, in hopes they will increase writing in-
struction for grade and high schools in those states).
117 Diana Hacker, A Writer’s Reference (5th ed., Bedford/St. Martin’s 2003); see Diana
Hacker, A Writer’s Reference, http://www.dianahacker.com/writersref/ (last updated Mar.

27, 2005).
118 For an in-depth and highly informative overview on strategies and blueprints for
law schools to use to integrate electronic technology into the curriculum, see Rogelio Lasso,
teach legal synthesis119 using course web pages,120 and using com-
puter tutorials on an array of law school subjects by requiring stu-
dents to interact with the information by answering simple ques-
tions or completing exercises as part of the tutorial requirement.121
Similarly, the National Writing Commission advocates that
the federal government create a National Educational Technology
Trust with millions of dollars made available to finance hardware,
software, and training for every student and teacher in the nation.
They argue that new technologies should be applied to the teach-
ing and assessment of writing including technologies that help to
identify grammatical mistakes, assess writing samples, and meas-
ure student writing competence.
Although the National Commission extols the virtues of using
and creating technology to alleviate the time-crunch and teacher
pressure, nonetheless, the idea that technology can get us out of
this mess is problematic.
Technology, after all, helped us to get into this situation.
First, our culture is now so electronic media-centric that families
read fewer books and newspapers and turn to technology for sig-
nificant portions of their entertainment. One result, laments the
NEA, is that we are less trained in deep, contextual reading and
nuance. Additionally, for many high school and university stu-
dents, technology in the form of the ubiquitous scantron test has
usurped myriad opportunities for testing organization and synthe-
sis skills presented by the old “bluebook essay testing.” We have
lost something major with the development of the 300 and 400-
person university lecture courses, many of which by necessity are
graded by scantron test and/or graduate teachings assistants.
In short, we have to remember that while technology can as-
sist teachers and reduce time pressures, and might speak to new
generations raised on technology, it simply cannot replace teacher
time.
From The Paper Chase to the Digital Chase: Technology and the Challenge of Teaching 21st
Century Law Students, 43 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1 (2002).
119 Craig T. Smith, Synergy and Synthesis: Teaming “Socratic Method” with Computers
and Data Projectors to Teach Synthesis to Beginning Law Students, 7 Leg. Writing 113
(2001).
120 Jennifer Jolly-Ryan, Coordinating a Legal Writing Program with the Help of a
Course Webpage: Help for Reluctant Leaders and the Technology-Challenged Professor, 22
Quinnipiac L. Rev. 479 (2004).
121 Tracy L. McGaugh, Generation X in Law School: The Dying of the Light or the Dawn
of a New Day, 9 Leg. Writing 119, 136 (2003).

Even the National Commission in its section on “measuring

results” reports that assessments of student writing must go be-
yond multiple-choice, machine-scorable items and should require
students to actually create a piece of prose.122 The College Board’s
SAT exam also illustrates this by having the writing portion,
which is one-third of its total score, graded by human beings and
not machine scored.123
Instinct tells me that many of the answers will lie with human
beings—the old-fashioned, highly labor-intensive slogging through
drafts, drafts and more drafts. Highly labor-intensive endeavors
require smaller class sizes, lots more reading and grading of writ-
ten exercises, and increased staffing. This will require concomitant
increases in funding or at the very least, a reallocation of existing
resources.
The great challenge, therefore, becomes how to use technology
to augment teacher time and training (such as grammatical and
compositional testing assessments and self-correction opportuni-
ties), but not allow administrators to conclude that this problem
can be fixed exclusively with technology and without significant
increases in staffing.
It is not a stretch to conclude that the law schools have lagged
behind the national reporting and leadership efforts regarding re-
cent developments in reading and writing data. The good news is
that LRW is the perfect vehicle to bring this new information,
thoughtfulness, and pedagogy into the twenty-first century, as it
did so ably in the latter half of the twentieth century.
LRW pedagogy, because it has been so flexible and responsive
to research like learning theory and technology, which it has inte-
grated into its discourse, is perfectly poised to quantify and adapt
to the changing preparedness levels of our incoming law stu-
dents.124 Our pedagogy has been hard-won and enormously useful
to the law school community at large.
It is time to alert our law school communities to this cultural
data and to lead the way with more sophisticated data and analy-
sis relative to law schools in particular, in order to remedy these
seemingly pervasive societal problems presented in law student
readiness and under-preparedness.
122 See supra n. 2.

123 See Setoodeh, supra n. 72, at 9.
124 I thank my colleague Ruth Ann McKinney for our fall 2004 telephone and e-mail
conversations and for her guidance and thoughtfulness formulating these conclusions.
National efforts show us what kind of money and effort that

genuine reform will require.
We’ll need to convince our law school communities that while
it is one thing to say, “The sky is falling!” it is another thing, en-
tirely, to try and fix the problem.
TAKING THE ROAD LESS TRAVELED:
WHY PRACTICAL SCHOLARSHIP MAKES
SENSE FOR THE LEGAL WRITING
PROFESSOR
Mitchell Nathanson
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the perks that comes with a position in my school’s le-

gal writing program is the opportunity to receive a stipend for
summer scholarship. Because this stipend represents a substantial
percentage of my salary, the decision to accept it was a no-brainer.
That was the easy part. The more difficult part came soon after,
when I had to sit down and figure out just what it was I was going
to write about. Because legal writing professors at my school, like
the legal writing faculty at most law schools, are not required to
publish,1 I had never developed a scholarship “game plan”2 and
had never seriously considered the issue beforehand. Now, with a
sizable economic carrot dangling before me, I had to confront
something that, the more I thought about it, became stickier and
stickier.
Frankly, I doubt topic selection is an issue that many of my
doctrinal brethren have given much consideration. After all, it is a
relatively simple process for a torts or criminal law professor, for
example, to choose their field of scholarship. If they wish, they on-
ly need to peruse the docket of the court of their choosing to find a
topic. Of course, given the unfortunate absence of “legal writing”
cases on most dockets, this did not solve my dilemma.

Associate Professor of Legal Writing, Villanova University School of Law. I would
like to thank Dean Diane Edelman for her insightful comments on earlier drafts of this
Article.
1 See ALWD & LWI, Legal Writing Institute 2004 Survey Results, 62 question 81,
http://www.alwd.org/alwdResources/surveys/2004surveyresults.pdf (accessed Feb. 11, 2005)

[hereinafter ALWD/LWI Survey] (noting that of the schools responding to the 2004 survey,
twenty required their legal writing faculties to produce scholarship, seven expected them to
produce scholarship, twenty-nine encouraged their legal writing faculties to produce schol-
arship, and seventy-two neither required or expected their legal writing faculties to produce
scholarship).
2 See William R. Slomanson, Legal Scholarship Blueprint, 50 J. Leg. Educ. 431, 433–
434 (2000) (discussing the need for a scholarship “game plan”).

Moreover, a plethora of helpful articles guides the new doctri-

nal professor in choosing appropriate scholarly topics to write on.3
Many of these advise the new professor to limit her focus and to
become an expert in her particular field rather than write on
whatever legal issue interests her at the time.4 This advice, once
again, did not help me because I was still unclear about what my
particular field is. The fact that I teach legal writing was of little
help to me in this regard given, as noted above, the absence of sub-
stantive law on this topic.5
Analyzing the scholarly writings of my legal writing col-
leagues proved to be of little help as well. The vast majority of the
legal writing professoriate who choose to write seems to have dis-
regarded the doctrinal advice to specialize in one particular field,
choosing instead to write on myriad topics.6 Some of these topics
have a legal writing connection, but many do not.7 This is true
even among professors with a scholarship requirement. More
commonly, the legal writing professor with a scholarship require-
ment will adopt the scattershot approach of his legal writing col-
leagues when it comes to topic selection, with some proclaiming
that they do not intend to write about legal writing at all.8
This is good news and bad news all at once. For when it comes
to scholarship, it appears as if a legal writing professor “can” write
about whatever he wants. Although this is certainly a liberating
concept, it does not, however, answer the more difficult question
3 See e.g. David P. Bryden, Scholarship about Scholarship, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 641
(1992); Slomanson, supra n. 2; Donald J. Weidner, A Dean’s Letter to New Law Faculty
about Scholarship, 44 J. Leg. Educ. 440 (1994).
4 See Slomanson, supra n. 2, at 434 (noting that law professors may receive differing
advice about whether to specialize in their scholarship or publish in multiple areas, and
discussing the competing merits of each approach).
5 While other authorities have proposed that legal writing professors should develop
scholarship on the substance of legal writing itself, see e.g., Michael R. Smith, The Next
Frontier: Exploring the Substance of Legal Writing, 2 J. ALWD 1, 5 (2004) (noting that the
journal of the ALWD calls specifically for “scholarship on the ‘substance’ of legal writing . . .
[t]hat is, . . . scholarship that focuses on the doing of legal writing rather than the teaching
of legal writing”), the Author does not consider the substance of legal writing itself to be a
viable field for legal scholarship, because of the lack of a doctrinal-law basis for the subject.
6 See Terrill Pollman & Linda Edwards, Legal Writing Scholarship Survey,
http://www.legalwritingscholarship.org (accessed Feb. 3, 2005) (collecting “publications by

teachers of legal writing and rhetoric”).
7 Id. The survey found that approximately 75% of law review articles published by
legal writing professors are on topics other than legal writing. Terrill Pollman & Linda H.
Edwards, Scholarship by Legal Writing Professors: New Voices in the Academy, 11 Leg.
Writing 3, 10 (2005).
8 See Jan M. Levine, Voices in the Wilderness: Tenured and Tenure-Track Directors
and Teachers in Legal Research and Writing Programs, 45 J. Leg. Educ. 530, 545 (1995).
2005] Taking the Road Less Traveled 331
(and the one I was seeking an answer to) which is, what should a
legal writing professor write about? If specialization makes sense
for the rest of the faculty, then should not it make just as much
sense for the legal writing faculty? And if so, given that legal writ-
ing is a “legal skills” rather than “substantive law” course, what
exactly is our area of expertise, at least relative to the rest of the
faculty? As mentioned above, the more I explored this area, the
more difficult and murky these issues became—which led to an
initial sigh of relief. For “difficult” and “murky” are good. “Diffi-
cult” and “murky” are the stuff of law review articles. At last, I had
my topic. With that out of the way, I was now ready to begin.
I started with the assumption that, in general, legal writing
professors should engage in scholarship, regardless of its impact
on salary or promotion. Even if it plays no formal role in a legal
writing professor’s career, the value of scholarship is still signifi-
cant. As other legal writing professors have noted, scholarship
heightens the prestige of the legal writing faculty, not only among
our colleagues, but among our students, who will be less likely to
view us as second-class citizens.9 Moreover, scholarship enables us
to retain the strong writing and research skills needed for our
job.10 For this reason alone, scholarship makes perhaps more sense
to the legal writing faculty than anyone else.
In addition, as legal writing professors become more en-
trenched in our overall law faculties, scholarship makes sense for
the same reasons that it makes sense to the rest of the faculty. It
allows our students to recognize us as influential figures in the
development of the law and gives us an opportunity to set an ex-
ample to them; “to give [legal writing professors] the confidence
they need to assume leadership in the proper development of the
law. . . . [and] . . . to demonstrate that helping in the proper devel-
opment of the law is a great public service that can be an im-
mensely satisfying part of their future.”11 It also serves our institu-
tions because “the [v]alue of a law degree from [our] school will be
enhanced significantly if the depth of faculty expertise is made
known.”12 Finally, and more simply, it allows us to grow and be-
9 See Toni M. Fine, Legal Writers Writing: Scholarship and the Demarginalization of
Legal Writing Instructors, 5 Leg. Writing 225, 227–228 (1999).

10 Susan P. Liemer, The Quest for Scholarship: The Legal Writing Professor’s Paradox,
80 Or. L. Rev. 1007, 1024–1025 (2001).

11 Weidner, supra n. 3, at 442.
12 Id.
come stronger, more able academics.13 All of these general ideas

apply to everyone on a law faculty. It is only when the legal writ-
ing professor gets to the specifics, to try to determine the best way
to achieve all of the above goals given his unique role on the facul-
ty, that all of this advice becomes hazy.
The old adage that you should “write what you know” applies
universally—to fiction as well as non-fiction and to scholarship
written by the legal writing professor as well as to the doctrinal
professor.14 The overarching question, then, that I will attempt to
answer in this Article is this: Just what is it that legal writing pro-
fessors, at least as compared to our doctrinal counterparts, know?
If this can be determined, then the question of what our scholarly
focus should (as opposed to “can”) be becomes a simple one. What-
ever our relative area of expertise is among our faculty colleagues
should be the focus of our scholarship. Given that, as a group, we
tend to take a different path to academia than our doctrinal col-
leagues,15 the key to our collective area of expertise may very well
be found through an examination of our pre-teaching experience. 16
In addition, this Article will focus not merely on what we
should publish but where we should publish it once it is written.
Although at first blush it may appear to be little more than an ac-
ademic exercise to focus on these issues, given that legal writing
professors at most law schools are free to write on whatever they
choose and then publish it wherever they can, these are, in fact,
issues with greater ramifications. Because scholarship is consid-
ered by many to be perhaps the most exalted and important of a
law professor’s academic obligations,17 it is inexorably tied with
the issue of status: an issue close to the heart of anyone in the le-
gal writing community who has struggled to obtain greater footing
in the legal academy for the past several years. Therefore, even if
scholarship plays no tangible role in our salary, retention, or pro-
motion, what we publish and where we publish it are nevertheless
important factors in our ongoing effort to raise our academic pro-
file and achieve equality with our doctrinal peers. In fact, given
13 Id.
14 See Fine, supra n. 9, at 230.
15 See infra sec. II(A)(2)–(4).
16 Infra sec. II(A)(2)–(4).
17 See Slomanson, supra n. 2, at 432–433 (discussing the three components of a law
teacher’s academic obligations: teaching, scholarship and service); see also Weidner, supra
n. 3, at 441 (“You will not be a complete person as an academic unless you produce, on a
regular basis, scholarship that is read and relied on by people who work in your area.” (em-
phasis added)).
that scholarship is the single most important status factor on most

law faculties,18 and is done by doctrinal professors not merely to
inform but to increase prestige,19 legal writing professors would do
well to consider how scholarship can work likewise for us. As part
of the legal writing community’s effort to obtain equal status on
law faculties, an examination of this overriding status factor in the
doctrinal community is needed. This Article will attempt to under-
take this analysis—to examine the legal writing professor’s schol-
arly role within the legal academic community in an effort to de-
termine where we best fit in. Or, better yet, stand out.
II. WHAT SHOULD WE PUBLISH? DETERMINING THE

LEGAL WRITING PROFESSOR’S FIELD OF EXPERTISE
To some who have written about scholarship and the legal

writing professor, the question of content is more or less a non-
issue. Some argue that because most legal writing professors have
significant experience in some substantive field to draw upon, this
field can be a source for scholarship.20 Others argue that irrespec-
tive of personal experience, legal writing professors can simply
draw upon current events to identify an interesting legal angle
that can form the basis of a law review article.21 Still others sug-
gest an interdisciplinary approach, given the recent popularity of
interdisciplinary scholarship.22
The inherent fault contained in each of these approaches
stems from the same faulty assumption. Each approach assumes
that the resulting work of scholarship should look and feel no dif-
ferent than the scholarship produced by doctrinal professors.23 The
legal writing professor, however, is uniquely handicapped in this
regard irrespective of the approach she chooses.
18 See Slomanson, supra n. 2, at 432–433 (noting the existence of “a counterproposi-
tion to the supposed triangulation of excellence [that] underlies the question ‘why law pro-
fessors must make scholarship their single most important task’” (quoting Robert M. Jarvis,
Why Law Professors Should Not Be Hessian-Trainers, 13 Nova L. Rev. 69, 72 (1988))).
19 See Bryden, supra n. 3, at 643 (“Academic prestige derives almost entirely from
one’s reputation as a scholar, and the scholarly reputation of one’s faculty.”).

20 Liemer, supra n. 10, at 1029.
21 Fine, supra n. 9, at 231.
22 Id. at 234.
23 See Liemer, supra n. 10, at 1029. Professor Liemer’s article attempts to assuage the
fears of law school administrators and doctrinal faculty members by stating that “law
school[s] need not worry that [they] will only end up with ‘bar journal’ type articles to [their]
credit.” Id. This statement contains the assumption that the scholarship of the legal writing
faculty will ultimately resemble that of their doctrinal colleagues.
For example, those choosing to draw upon their substantive

law experience in an effort to complete a traditional law review
article will most likely draw upon their experience as practition-
ers. Unfortunately, and as will be discussed more fully in Section
II, traditional legal academics tend to disparage practitioner’s
problems and, as a result, law review articles that are practice-
based, as opposed to theoretical, are generally less well-regarded
and more likely to be relegated to less-prestigious journals.24 If
considering not merely what a legal writing professor can write
about but what she should write about (with an eye on scholarship
as status symbol), this approach may not be the most prudent.
In addition, choosing the “current events” approach presents
additional problems unique to the legal writing professor, for there
is a strong likelihood that the substantive topic chosen, be it prac-
tical or, worse, theoretical, will be one in which the legal writing
professor is not an expert, at least not compared with his doctrinal
colleagues.25 Choosing to write on the constitutional issues raised
in the 2000 Bush-Gore election may be interesting, but the legal
writing professor needs to be aware that the “true” experts, the
constitutional law scholars in the academic community, will also
likely be writing in this area and their work will necessarily exhib-
it a deeper understanding of the issue than the non-expert’s.26 This
is not to suggest that a legal writing professor is incapable of pro-
ducing valuable scholarship on constitutional issues, only that it is
more difficult for a legal writing professor than for a doctrinal ex-
pert. Again, when the issue of status is taken into account, the de-
termination of what to write about becomes multi-faceted. Choos-
ing a topic that a legal writing professor is likely to produce supe-
rior, as opposed to merely good, work becomes paramount. Other-
24 See Fine, supra n. 9, at 235; see also Slomanson, supra n. 2, at 437 (“Traditional
wisdom counsels against topics involving the practical aspects of law practice. The leading
thou-shalt-not is the production of ‘[p]ractice-oriented materials for continuing legal educa-
tion, bar journals, and practice manuals. This may include digests or summaries of recent
opinions or cases being litigated.’” Id. at 437 (quoting Alfred C. Yen, Advice for the Begin-
ning Legal Scholar, 38 Loy. L. Rev. 95, 96 (1992))).
25 See Fine, supra n. 9, at 233. The author notes that the most apparent danger of the
“current events” approach is “that a writer may be seduced into approaching these topics
without having any real expertise in the field.” Id. This danger is only highlighted, she
concludes, given the likelihood that the true experts, those who teach and specialize in the
areas of law relevant to the current event, will also write on the topic, thereby making the
differences in knowledge only more obvious. Id.
26 See id. (recommending an interdisciplinary approach only for those who have “for-
mal academic training in another discipline”).

wise, scholarship will not be an effective means toward achieving

increased status.
Finally, the interdisciplinary approach merely shifts, rather
than resolves, the substantive law dilemma and ultimately pre-
sents the same problems as the current events approach. Although
those who have had formal academic training in another academic
field should use this to their advantage,27 those who lack such
training will be venturing into the same uncharted waters as those
attempting to write on constitutional topics for the first time. Ap-
plying learning theory to a legal writing issue, for example, can
certainly result in useful scholarship, but its usefulness will likely
depend on the author’s expertise in this interdisciplinary field.
One who lacks the thorough understanding that comes with years
of study of a discipline and who instead has come about her
knowledge by way of study of a few (or even several) articles on the
topic will most likely produce scholarship that only scratches the
surface of the issue. Regardless of the amount of time spent read-
ing up on the interdisciplinary field, the reader will never become
the “true” expert that a pre-eminent scholar is expected to be.28
Moreover, research in diverse fields can result in wasted time from
the author’s standpoint as she is forced to reinvent the wheel, so to
speak, to conduct her research.29
A. Professional Background Survey
Having found each of the above-noted scholarly approaches to

selecting content lacking when applied to the legal writing profes-
sor, I decided to conduct a survey in the hopes of resolving this
dilemma. My goal was simple: I wanted to determine what, if any-
thing, the typical legal writing professor brings to the academic
table relative to her doctrinal colleagues. I wanted to find out
whether we are different in any relevant way, with the assumption
that any relevant differences would highlight our area of expertise
relative to the rest of our faculties. To determine this, I focused on
post-law school, pre-initial teaching position experience. This was
done based on the assumption that once a professor enters aca-
demia, she begins the process of building upon and dispensing the
knowledge that she has accumulated up to that point. The post-
27 Id. at 234.
28 See id.
29 Slomanson, supra n. 2, at 434.
law school, pre-teaching years are the ones that lay the foundation
for the areas of expertise of a particular professor later on. Many
constitutional law scholars draw upon their experiences as Su-
preme Court clerks; I wanted to determine which experiences we,
as legal writing professors, draw upon once we enter academia.
1. Method
The 2003–2004 AALS Directory of Law Teachers30 served as

the exclusive basis for the information gathered in my survey. I
randomly selected fifty doctrinal professors31 and fifty legal writ-
ing professors32 and compared their post-law school,33 pre-initial
teaching position backgrounds. I excluded adjunct professors, and
I also excluded individuals who currently held administrative posi-
tions to avoid intermingling the potentially differing expertise and
backgrounds needed to be a dean or other administrator with
those needed to be a pure professor. Finally, because complete bi-
ographies were not included by everyone who responded to the
2003–2004 AALS Directory, I eliminated from my survey those
whose biographies contained more than one unaccounted-for post-
law school year.
Pursuant to these guidelines and limitations, my method in-
volved randomly selecting biographies from the Directory. When-
ever a biography violated one of the above guidelines, I made an-
other blind selection from the same page. The results of my survey
are summarized below.
30 Assn. Am. L. Schs., The AALS Directory of Law Teachers 2003–2004, at 9 (Found.
Press 2003).
31 I defined “doctrinal” professors as those who listed courses other than legal writing
or legal research and writing as the courses they currently teach.

32 I defined “legal writing” professors as those who listed legal writing or legal re-
search and writing as a course they currently teach.

33 I defined “post-law school” as subsequent to the award of the initial legal degree.
For purposes of the survey, the award of an LL.M. was considered “post-law school.”
2. Survey Results
I. General Information Doctrinal Legal Writing

n % n %
Male respondents 27 54% 15 30%
Female respondents 23 46% 35 70%
Mean number of years between law school 5.42 8.04
graduation and initial law teaching position
II. Work Experience Prior to Teaching Doctrinal Legal Writing

n % n %
Mean number of years law firm experience 2.12 4.5
prior to initial law teaching position34
Mean number of years law firm experience 3.53 7.4
of those with some law firm experience
No law firm experience 20 40% 10 20%
More than one year law firm experience 23 46% 38 76%
More than three years law firm experience 19 38% 34 68%
Public interest law experience prior to first 6 12% 4 8%
teaching position35
Mean number of years public interest law 0.52 0.4
experience prior to initial law teaching posi-
tion
Mean number of years public interest law 4.33 5
experience of those with some public inter-
est law experience prior to first teaching po-
sition
Governmental experience prior to first 12 24% 12 24%
teaching position36
Mean number years government experience 1.22 1.16
prior to first teaching position
Mean number years government experience 5.08 4.83
of those with some government experience
prior to first teaching position
Corporate/in house experience prior to first 0 0% 6 12%
teaching position37
34 This number includes twenty doctrinal and ten legal writing professors with no law
firm experience.
35 I defined “public interest law experience” as experience working full time or having
as one’s primary employment, employment with a not-for-profit organization.

36 I defined “government experience” as experience working full time or having as
one’s primary employment, non-clerkship employment with a branch of the federal govern-
ment or a state government or public sector organization.
37 I defined “corporate/in-house experience” as experience working full time or as one’s
primary employment, employment with a non-law firm, private sector corporate entity.
Mean number of years corporate/in house 0 0.38

experience prior to first teaching position
Mean number of years corporate/in house 0 3.17
experience of those with some corporate/in
house experience prior to first teaching po-
sition
III. Clerkship Breakdown Doctrinal Legal Writing

Fed. State Fed. State
Clerkship experience 16 1 13 6
Doctrinal clerkship court breakdown
—Supreme 4 1 0 1
—Intermediate 7 0 4 638
—District/trial 739 0 9 0
IV. Academic Breakdown Doctrinal Legal Writing

n % n %
Initial law degree from top 20 schools40 29 58% 21 28%
Initial law degree from Harvard Law School 14 42% 3 6%
3. Survey Summary
While the survey yielded many similarities, there were some

striking differences as well. Legal writing professors take on aver-
age 33% longer to secure their initial law teaching positions (8.04
years versus 5.42 years). When this time differential is broken
down, we see that although there are no significant differences in
public interest, government, or corporate experience, the average
legal writing professor has more than twice as much (4.5 years
versus 2.1 years) law firm experience as the doctrinal professor
(with 40% of doctrinal professors having no law firm experience as
compared with 20% of legal writing professors). This discrepancy
38 Includes one respondent who had both a state and federal clerkship.
39 Includes two respondents who had multiple federal clerkships.
40 A “top-twenty school” means a law school ranked in the top twenty of the U.S.
News & World Report law school rankings. This list includes twenty-two schools, as three
schools (George Washington, Notre Dame, and Washington University in St. Louis) tied for
twentieth place in the U.S. News & World Report rankings. The “top-twenty” schools, sorted
by rank are as follows: Yale, Harvard, Stanford, Columbia, New York University, Universi-
ty of Chicago, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, University of Pennsylvania, University of
Virginia, Duke, Northwestern, Cornell, University of California-Berkeley, Georgetown,
University of Texas-Austin, University of California-Los Angeles, Vanderbilt, University of
Southern California, University of Minnesota-Twin Cities, George Washington, Notre
Dame, Washington University in St. Louis. America’s Best Graduate Schools 2006, U.S.
News & World Rpt., www.usnes.com/usnews/edu/grad/rankings/law/brief/lawrank_brief.php
(accessed Feb. 11, 2005).
is highlighted more dramatically by looking at only those with law

firm experience. Here, the difference in experience becomes even
more pronounced (7.4 years for the typical legal writing professor
versus 3.5 years for the typical doctrinal professor).41 Overall, 68%
of legal writing professors surveyed had three or more years of law
firm experience, while only 38% of doctrinal professors had three
or more years of law firm experience.
These differences in law firm experience, both in kind and in
degree, are significant. In many law firms, particularly the larger
ones, an associate’s initial years are spent mostly in the library or
as a background member of a team of attorneys. Although the
transformation from a complementary to a leading role often oc-
curs gradually over time, it is typically in approximately the asso-
ciate’s third year that she emerges from the shadows and begins to
assume a more proactive role in handling files. This is typically the
point when she begins to take a more active role with clients and
in making significant strategic decisions. In short, the attorney
with simply no law firm experience but significant experience is
able to obtain a more complete and accurate understanding of the
myriad issues confronting a practicing attorney. This attorney,
should she decide to enter academia, is also significantly more
likely to become a legal writing professor than a doctrinal one, ac-
cording to the results of my survey.
4. Application of Survey Results
If looking at differences in professional backgrounds for clues

about the legal writing professor’s area of expertise, the above-
noted distinctions are instructive, for it appears as if legal writing
professors bring significantly more practical experience to the aca-
demic table than do our doctrinal counterparts. As such, within
41 I acknowledge that the survey results represent merely a randomly selected sam-
pling of law teachers and that more detailed studies may result in slightly varying statisti-
cal results. However, these results can be confirmed anecdotally, and moreover, are bol-
stered by a recent, more extensive survey on the backgrounds of recently hired doctrinal
faculty, see Richard Redding, “Where Did You Go to Law School?” Gatekeeping for the Prof-
essoriate and Its Implications for Legal Education, 53 J. Leg. Educ. 594 (2004), which like-
wise concentrated on the AALS Directory of Law Teachers for its database, using the 2000–
2001 edition and focusing on new faculty hires between 1996 and 2000. Id. at 597. Professor
Redding surveyed 443 teachers and found that 45% had some law firm or corporate experi-
ence prior to entering academia, and that the average number of years of experience among
those with some legal practice experience was less than four years. Id. at 600–601. The
statistical results in the professional background survey conducted by the Author are meant
to serve as a springboard for the discussion that follows.
the law school community, we are the relative experts on the is-
sues that confront the practicing attorney, and our scholarship
should be directed to take advantage of our expertise.
Initially, these results appear to be unfortunate from the
standpoint of the legal writing professor. This is because, as noted
above, practical (or practice-based) scholarship is traditionally
frowned upon by the academy and afforded less prestige than
scholarship with a theoretical focus.42 Accordingly, upon first
blush, it appears as if doing the scholarship we are most qualified
to do would not be beneficial to us in our quest for increased sta-
tus. Our dual scholarship and status goals appear to be at odds.
However, the well-chronicled societal need for more practical
scholarship from the legal academy may alter this conclusion con-
siderably. As stated by Donald Weidner, Dean of Florida State
University College of Law, in a 1994 letter to the law school’s first-
year faculty, the
productive scholars are the ones who know how many areas are
crying out for analysis and comment. They are the ones who
know how many improvements [can] be made to the law, if only
people focused on them.43
Fortunately for the legal writing professor, the cries for practical
scholarship—her field of expertise—are loud and getting louder.44
Legal writing professors thus have the opportunity to fulfill our
scholarly role by stepping into this breach and focusing our schol-
arly efforts on analyzing and solving practice-based problems. As
will be discussed throughout the remainder of this Article, the
growing disconnect between the academy and practicing bar45 ap-
pears to be something that can best be solved through the scholar-
ship efforts of the legal writing professoriate.46 The following Sec-
42 See Fine, supra n. 9, at 234; see also Bryden, supra n. 3, at 643.

43 Weidner, supra n. 3, at 442.
44 See generally Joan S. Howland & William H. Lindberg, The MacCrate Report, Build-
ing the Educational Continuum (West 1994). At the keynote address before the conference
on the MacCrate Report, the speaker quoted the following statement of Christopher Colum-
bus Langdell of Harvard: “What qualifies a person, therefore, to teach law, is not experience
in the work of a lawyer’s office, not experience in dealing with men, not experience in the
trial or argument of cases, not experience, in short, of using law, but experience in learning
law.” Id. at 7 (quoted in Alberto-Bernabe-Riefkohl, Tomorrow’s Law Schools: Globalization
and Legal Education, 32 San Diego L. Rev. 137, 142 n. 23 (1995)).
45 See Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34 (1992) (the author focuses on what he perceives as a
widening of the gap between the legal academy and practicing bar).
46 See id. at 34 (discussing the need for more practical teaching and scholarship).
tion analyzes this disconnect in an attempt to obtain a better un-

derstanding of where it originated, why it exists today, and how
legal writing professors can use their relative area of expertise to
effectively fill the gap in such a way that likewise increases our
status within the legal academic community.
B. The Divergence between Traditional Legal

Scholarship and the Practicing Bar
1. Judge Edwards’s Lightning Rod
In his now famous (or infamous, depending on one’s perspec-

tive) article, District of Columbia Circuit Court Judge Harry Ed-
wards took the legal academy to task for failing, in his opinion, to
produce enough scholarship relevant to the problems typically
faced by the judiciary and practicing bar.47 He “feared that . . . law
schools and law firms [were] moving in opposite directions,” result-
ing in a decline in the type of scholarship most needed by the prac-
ticing bar—practical scholarship.48 Judge Edwards defined “practi-
cal scholarship” as follows:
It is prescriptive: it analyzes the law and the legal system with
an aim to instruct attorneys in their consideration of legal prob-
lems; to guide judges and other decisionmakers in their resolu-
tion of legal disputes; and to advise legislators and other poli-
cymakers on law reform. It is also doctrinal: it attends to the
various sources of law (precedents, statutes, constitutions) that
constrain or otherwise guide the practitioner, decisionmaker,
and policymaker.49
To solve this problem, Judge Edwards called for law schools to
hire more “practical scholars”: scholars familiar with the issues
facing the judiciary, legislature, and practicing bar and skilled in
analyzing and commenting on them; scholars focused less on theo-
ry and more on concrete problems.50 He encouraged schools to hire
47 Id. at 77 (arguing for “ethical practice, and ‘practical’ scholarship and pedagogy”).
48 Id. at 34.
49 Id. at 42–43 (emphasis in original).
50 Id. at 50–51; see also Redding, supra n. 41, at 605 n. 25. Professor Redding’s statis-
tical analysis confirms many of Judge Edwards’s statements. His survey found that there
was “a negative relationship between the number of years in practice and the quality of the
hiring law school, indicating that few faculty hired at highly ranked schools have extensive
practical experience.” Redding, supra n. 41, at 605 n. 25. This finding may explain why
Judge Edwards believed that those who normally would be called upon first to comment on
scholars who make the focus of their work on the problems that
face the practicing attorney on a daily basis and who seek practical
solutions—solutions that can be readily reached through the use of
the legal tools available to the practitioner in her practice. The
absence of such scholars, Judge Edwards argued, has led to the
resolution of far too many important issues without the input of
academic lawyers, as judges and practitioners currently have little
use for much of the scholarship now produced by the legal acade-
my.51
It is significant that Judge Edwards recognized the im-
portance of academic commentary. His argument was not a mere
rehash of the familiar refrain on the irrelevance of the ivory tower.
Rather, his article was a cry for assistance from the academic
community in resolving the problems he faces on the bench on a
daily basis. As he stated in his article, he believed that legal aca-
demics were obligated to assist the practicing bar in administering
our system of justice.52
Importantly, in calling for an increase in practical scholars
and scholarship, Judge Edwards did not discount the importance
of theoretical scholarship in the development of the law.53 He was
simply calling for a better balance between the two.54 Other schol-
ars who have commented on this issue agree that a balance be-
tween “practical” and “theoretical” scholarship is what is needed—
not an argument over which is better or more worthy or im-
portant.55 Without such a balancing of interests, the current state
of legal scholarship is, as one scholar described it, disheartening,
as ever more law review articles are produced that fail to reflect
the interests of society at large or those who work in the profes-
sion.56
Subsequent to the publication of his article, Judge Edwards
has come under attack for, among other things, the anecdotal ba-
the most pressing legal matters of the day increasingly had nothing to add to the debate.
52 Id. at 38.
53 See e.g. id. at 36 (“In the ideal law faculty, there is a healthy balance of theory and
doctrine.” (emphasis in original)).

54 Id.
55 See also William J. Turnier, Tax (and Lots of Other) Scholars Need Not Apply: The
Changing Venue for Scholarship, 50 J. Leg. Educ. 189, 203–204 (2000) (discussing Edwards,
supra n. 45); see e.g. id. at 197 (expressing “hope that the scholarship in the major law re-
views would reflect [the] multifaceted obligation of legal education,” to provide both a
“broad liberal education regarding the legal system, and . . . a professional education to
students who will make their careers in that system”).
56 Id. at 197.
ses for his conclusions.57 As is evidenced in his article, much of

what Judge Edwards concluded was the result of his personal
opinion and the opinion of his law clerks.58 Unfortunately, the
merit of his conclusions has become lost in a seemingly never-
ending dissection of the methods he used to reach them,59 especial-
ly since the research that has emerged in the wake of Edwards’s
article supports many of his opinions, despite protestations to the
contrary.
A 1996 study of legal scholarship by University of Iowa pro-
fessor Michael Saks and others, undertaken in large part to test
the merit of Edwards’s conclusions, found that, consistent with
Edwards’s opinion, legal scholarship is of increasingly greater val-
ue to other legal scholars and of no increased value to practition-
ers.60 A comparative study of law review articles published in 1960
and 1985 found that their utility increased most significantly
among scholars, marginally significantly during this time among
judges and legislators and not significantly among practitioners.61
Dividing the potential readership of law reviews into “consumer
groups,” consisting of (1) scholars, (2) judges and legislators, and
(3) practitioners, the Saks study asked its panel of “reviewers” to
determine the relevance of a particular article to each consumer
group. Although the reviewers (and hence, the authors of the
study) concluded that overall, law review articles were of more
utility to the general legal populace in 1985 than in 1960, they
nevertheless conceded that this was not the case with regard to
practitioners.62 As the lack of utility of legal scholarship to the
practicing bar was the premise for most of Judge Edwards’s con-
clusions, it is curious that the authors claimed to have neverthe-
less disproved him.
57 See e.g. Michael J. Saks et al., Is There a Growing Gap Among Law, Law Practice,
and Legal Scholarship? A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles One Generation
Apart, 30 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 353, 355–360 (1996) (summarizing the plethora of academic
commentary generated as a result of Edwards’s 1992 article, some of it critical of his conclu-
sions, some of it critical of his methods).
58 See e.g. Edwards, supra n. 45, at 52, 52 n. 54 (referring to discussions with law
clerks).
59 See Saks et al., supra n. 57.
60 Id. at 369.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 369, 369 n. 68 (noting that “[t]here was no statistically detectable change for
the utility to practitioners” and noting in the footnote that “most, if not all, of our article
raters began with the . . . assumption . . . [of] growing disutility of law review articles to
anyone [but] legal scholars”).
2. The Causes of Disjunction between Academic and

Practicing Lawyers
a. Lack of Practical Experience
As Judge Edwards stated and the Saks study showed, much of

the traditional legal scholarship is not responsive to the needs of
practicing attorneys. Moreover, this may be because, as my profes-
sional background survey indicates, on average, doctrinal profes-
sors lack the expertise to fully appreciate and analyze the issues
confronting the practicing bar.63 Judge Edwards recognized this in
his article when he stated disparagingly (and in a statement that
no doubt was an open invitation to the academic criticism that in-
evitably followed) that “‘many law professors see themselves as
intellectually superior [and] disconnected from the rest of the pro-
fession.’”64 More fairly and accurately, it is probably the simple
lack of long-term practical experience and the comparatively quick
transition from student to professor that results in the feeling that
many doctrinal professors have that they are primarily academics
rather than lawyers. This may be why some practitioners believe
that, “[i]ncreasingly, law professors see themselves more as col-
leagues of sociologists, economists, and philosophers [rather] than
of judges and lawyers.”65 Because many doctrinal professors be-
lieve that their most important constituency is not the general
public or the practicing bar but their fellow scholars, they write
articles that many times speak to each other rather than attorneys
outside of the academic realm.66
63 See supra sec. II(A); see also Redding, supra n. 41, at 612. Professor Redding’s sur-
vey found that as the prestige of a law school increases, the average number of years in
practice of its professors decreases. Id. While he noted that the average length of practice
time of doctrinal professors overall was short—less than four years—this number decreased
even more as the prestige of the hiring law school increased. Id. “This likely reflects the fact
that while law schools prefer to hire those with some professional experience, practical
lawyering skills are less important to the elite schools, which tend to emphasize theory
more and practice skills less than the lower-ranked schools.” Id.
64 Edwards, supra n. 45, at 75 (quoting one of the author’s former law clerks).
65 Seth P. Waxman, Rebuilding Bridges: The Bar, the Bench, and the Academy, 150 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1905, 1909 (2002). Those legal academicians who feel a kinship toward their
fellow scholars from other disciplines rather than the practitioners in their own field suffer
from a displaced loyalty. In many of the humanities and sciences (such as sociology, eco-
nomics, and philosophy, for example), the academics and practitioners are one and the
same. Practicing sociologists reside mostly within universities rather than in separate “so-
ciology firms.” As a result, the scholarly work produced by these academics is, in effect,
written for the practitioners in their fields as well.
66 See Bryden, supra n. 3, at 643.
b. The Predominance of Theory and Limitation of

Range of Topics in Elite Law Reviews
Of course, even if more doctrinal professors wished their

scholarship to speak to the practicing bar, tenure and promotion
issues pressure many of them away from this approach. In order to
reach the goal of tenure, there is great pressure on tenure-track
professors to publish in elite law reviews. This once again leads to
unfortunate results for the practicing bar because these journals
tend to favor theoretical rather than practical approaches to legal
issues and are increasingly narrowing the scope of acceptable top-
ics for publication within their pages.67 As a result, many of the
articles that appear in these top journals are on topics that are of
little value to the vast majority of practicing lawyers.
Returning to Saks’s 1996 study, the authors found that, on the
whole, the top-quintile journals—the ones most prized for those
pursuing tenure—focus more on theory than on practical problems
and produce the articles rated the least useful to practitioners.68
They “have increasingly become the province of legal scholars and
the most experimental kind of scholarship, and less a forum for
exchanges among legal scholars, practitioners, and judges.”69
Thus, those scholars interested in securing tenure are naturally
encouraged to avoid practical scholarship to increase the likelihood
of being published in one of these journals.
The range of topics most likely to be accepted by these top
journals also discourages scholars from addressing issues of rele-
vance to the practicing bar. A 2000 study conducted by University
of North Carolina professor William Turnier on the decrease of tax
law scholarship in law reviews found that an inordinate percent-
age (over 27%) of law review articles published in his survey of
seventeen top-quintile journals were on the topics of constitutional
or criminal law.70 Comparing the frequency of topics selected by
these journals over the past fifty-five years, Turnier found that
these two topics are becoming increasingly more dominant as time
moves on.71 He concluded that the increasing predominance of con-
stitutional law topics during the 1990s was particularly interest-
67 Infra nn. 68–74.

68 Saks et al., supra n. 57, at 374.
69 Id.
70 Turnier, supra n. 55, at 195 tbl. 2.
71 Id. at 195–196.
ing given the “relative inactivism by the Supreme Court” during

this time.72 Including other topics such as race, civil procedure,
and civil rights (which often have constitutional components or
underpinnings) with constitutional and criminal law results in a
whopping 41% of all articles published by these top journals in the
1990s on these five topics alone.73 On the other end of the spec-
trum, Turnier found that the number of articles on international
law decreased dramatically from the 1960s to the 1990s despite
increased globalization during this time and the presumed increas-
ing need of the practicing bar for scholarship that addresses this
growing field.74 This increasing reliance on these limited topics by
top journals is so well known that it has become fashionable in
some academic circles to advise new law teachers that it is in their
interest to add a constitutional angle to their articles to increase
the likelihood of acceptance by a top-twenty law review.75
This advice may very well be sound career advice for the bud-
ding academic, but it ignores the needs and concerns of the practic-
ing bar. In an attempt to quantify the amount of time attorneys
spend on various fields of law, the American Bar Foundation un-
dertook a long-term study of the Chicago bar.76 It found that the
members of the Chicago bar’s attention to business litigation in-
creased sevenfold from 1975–1995 and that as of 1995, 64% of
lawyers’ time was allocated to the business fields of antitrust,
business litigation, real estate, corporate tax, labor, and securi-
ties.77 However, business-related fields represented (charitably)
less than 11% of the topics selected in 1991 and 1996 by the seven-
teen top-quintile law reviews discussed above.78 By contrast, those
topics most favored by these law reviews (constitutional law, crim-
72 Id. at 195.
73 Id. at 195–196 tbl. 2.
74 Id. at 195.
75 See Slomanson, supra n. 2, at 445–446.
76 John P. Heinz et al., The Changing Character of Lawyers’ Work: Chicago in 1975
and 1995, 32 L. & Soc. Rev. 751 (1998).

77 Id. at 766–767.
78 See Turnier, supra n. 55, at 195 tbl. 2. The 11% figure (more precisely, 10.6%) is
charitable because it includes articles on these topics that most likely were not business-
related. Id. Turnier’s findings on the number of articles published on business-related topics
in 1991 and 1996 were as follows: twenty securities, sixteen corporate, sixteen tax, ten
antitrust, eleven labor/employment, ten commercial/sales, four creditor/debtor, zero busi-
ness planning, and zero real estate transactions. Id. This totaled eighty-seven articles or
roughly 10.6% of all articles published within these journals during this time period. Id.
However, there exists the likelihood that some of the tax articles focused on personal rather
than business tax issues, and articles on other subjects may similarly have focused on non-
business aspects.
inal law, race, civil rights, and civil procedure) represented only
8% of total practicing attorneys’ time, with constitutional law (the
overwhelming favorite topic of these journals) failing to draw
enough interest to even register on the American Bar Foundation’s
survey results.79 Clearly, there exists a gap between the scholar-
ship in these elite journals and the issues faced by the practicing
bar. And because publication in these top journals is a goal of
many doctrinal professors, there is a disincentive for them to do
the type of scholarship that responds to practical problems.
c. The Inability of the Traditional Legal Scholarship

System to Respond to Practical Problems
Interestingly, this disincentive has not always been present.

The most prestigious of all law journals, the Harvard Law Review,
began with the goal of serving the practicing bar. In its initial vol-
ume, published in 1887, the purpose of the Harvard Law Review
was stated as follows:
Our object, primarily, is to set forth the work done in the school
with which we are connected, to furnish news of interest to
those who have studied law in Cambridge, and to give, if possi-
ble, to all who are interested in the subject of legal education,
some idea of what is done under the Harvard system of instruc-
tion. Yet we are not without hopes that the Review may be ser-
viceable to the profession at large.80
The University of Pennsylvania’s law review, founded as the Amer-
ican Law Register in 1852, was conceived as a journal, “‘published,
written and edited by practicing lawyers for practicing lawyers.’”81
Even after control of the Register was transferred to the law school
and editorial control ceded to student editors in 1895, it remained
a publication focused on service to practitioners.82 In fact, a 1923
statement of the editorial board indicated a desire to form a closer
bond with the practicing bar, such that the review, “‘[would] be in
79 Heinz et al., supra n. 76, at 765 tbl. 3.

80 Editors of Harv. L. Rev., Notes, 1 Harv. L. Rev. 35 (1887) (emphasis added).
81 Waxman, supra n. 65, at 1908 (correction in original) (quoting Edwin J. Greenlee,
The University of Pennsylvania Law Review: 150 Years of History, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1875,
1880 (2002)).
82 Id.
a position to render to the legal profession a service second to none

to that of no other law school publication.’”83
Today, however, as noted above, formal, traditional scholar-
ship largely fails in this mission.84 Further evidence of the dimin-
ishing value of scholarship to the practicing bar comes from a 1998
study that found that judges’ citations to legal scholarship has de-
creased by almost 50% over the last twenty years.85 Consistent
with Judge Edwards’s conclusions, the practicing bar is increasing-
ly turning elsewhere for assistance in solving most of society’s
problems. This is the area of law crying out for analysis and com-
ment that Dean Weidner spoke of in his 1994 speech. This is
where current scholarly effort should be directed. However, the
traditional legal scholarship system is ill-equipped to adequately
respond.
The lack of adequate practical knowledge on both the editorial
and authorial side of the traditional legal scholarship system ren-
ders this system incapable of satisfactorily addressing the full
range of practical issues calling out for academic scholarship. Be-
cause most traditional law reviews are student-run and edited, the
student editors understandably are more comfortable selecting
articles on topics with which they have some familiarity. This re-
sults in the selection of articles based more on theory than on
practice (after all, these editors have been exposed as students to
theory but have not, by definition, been exposed to practice), as
well as articles on topics covered in their favorite classes.86 While
insurance law may be a course offered at practically all law
schools, the comparative enrollment between that course and
courses on constitutional law or civil rights should quickly explain
the differences in frequency that these topics appear in law re-
views.
In addition, as stated above, the backgrounds of many doctri-
nal professors likewise render them uncomfortable with many
practical topics. As noted by one doctrinal professor:
83 Id.
84 See generally Richard Posner, Against the Law Reviews, www.legalaffairs.org/issues/
November-December-2004/review_posner_novdec04.html (accessed Feb. 2005).
85 Waxman, supra n. 65, at 1909, 1090 n. 18 (citing Michael D. McClintock, The De-
clining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical Study, 51 Okla. L. Rev. 659, 660
(1998)).
86 See Turnier, supra n. 55, at 194 (concluding that student editors do not appreciate
the importance of tax issues and instead consider constitutional and human rights issues
more pressing).
It is difficult, or at least seems difficult, to write intelligently

about commodities futures, regulation of an industry, taxation
of foreign shareholders’ interests in domestic corporations and
the like without considerable hands-on experience. Small won-
der, then, that we prefer to work on original meaning of the Es-
tablishment Clause, or any other topic on which our credentials
are equal or superior to those of the most seasoned lawyer.87
Given the issues faced by both editors and authors, it is no
wonder that law reviews have shied away from practical scholar-
ship. Regardless of the cause, however, it is a problem that is cry-
ing for a solution. My professional background survey indicates
that legal writing professors are equipped with the skills to step in
and help to resolve it. Given that, on average, legal writing profes-
sors are the relative experts in the area in which there exists a
major gap in scholarship, Dean Weidner would most likely suggest
that it is our duty as scholars to step in and fill this gap.88
When considering the ancillary status question, however, this
solution is not as simple. Two important questions are raised that
require answers before the appropriate scholarly role of legal writ-
ing professors can be answered in full: (1) is it tactically appropri-
ate for legal writing professors to highlight our relative differences
from, rather than our similarities to, our doctrinal colleagues when
attempting to achieve equivalent status? And (2) is it wise to focus
our scholarly efforts on practitioners’ problems given that these
topics are traditionally accorded the least amount of scholarly re-
spect? The following Section will tackle the first question. The
practical scholarship dilemma will be addressed in Section III.
C. The Wisdom of Highlighting Differences in an

Effort to Achieve Equality
Although at first blush it may seem counter-intuitive to high-

light one’s differences from a group in an attempt to achieve simi-
lar status, further analysis of this issue as it applies to the unique
situation of the legal writing professor in the legal academic com-
munity shows why it makes sense here.
87
Bryden, supra n. 3, at 645.
88
Weidner, supra n. 3, at 442 (“The productive scholars are the ones who know how
many areas are crying out for analysis and comment. They are the ones who know how
many improvements could be made to the law, if only people focused on them.”).
As anyone who has spent significant time as a member of a le-

gal writing faculty can attest, legal writing is often trivialized ei-
ther institutionally or by certain members of a school’s doctrinal
faculty.89 Although certainly this is not a view shared by all (or
even most) members of the doctrinal community today, the fact
remains that at many schools, the legal writing faculty remains on
the fringes of academia:90 often paid significantly less than our
doctrinal colleagues,91 most often not on tenure-track,92 and usual-
ly subjected to a series of one-year or short-term contracts.93 All of
this occurs despite the fact that judges and practitioners repeated-
ly cite legal research and writing as the most important legal skills
of a new attorney.94 Clearly, the vast majority of law schools do not
provide equal status to their legal writing faculties.
Although it is tempting for the legal writing community to
strive to achieve integration through assimilation—to proclaim to
our doctrinal peers that, in essence, “we deserve equal treatment
because we are no different than you,” this argument does not
work in an environment where even minute differences in the tra-
ditional status indicators are significant. In fact, we are similar to
our doctrinal peers in many ways, but there exist demonstrable
differences between us with regard to several of these indicators
that most likely have prevented legal writing professionals from
achieving equal footing with our doctrinal colleagues.
As noted in the professional background survey in Section
II(A)(2), legal writing professors are less likely to have attended a
top-twenty law school than doctrinal professors (42% versus
58%).95 This discrepancy is consistent with the findings of an earli-
er study that found that only 25% of tenured or tenure-track legal
89 See Peter Brandon Bayer, A Plea for Rationality and Decency: The Disparate Treat-
ment of Legal Writing Faculties as a Violation of Both Equal Protection and Professional
Ethics, 39 Duq. L. Rev. 329, 353–354 (2001) (explaining how legal writing professors are
subjected to less desirable employment terms and conditions than other full-time profes-
sors).
90 See Fine, supra n. 9, at 26–27.
91 See ALWD/LWI Survey, supra n. 1, at 55 question 75. The average salary for a full-
time teacher of legal writing in 2004 was between $49,419 and $59,395. Id.
92 Id. at 5 question 10. In 2004, only six legal writing programs had in place a staffing
model that utilized tenured or tenure-track teachers hired specifically to teach legal writ-
ing. Id.
93 Id. at 48 question 65. Of those legal writing programs responding in 2004, twenty-
four had professors with tenure or on tenure-track, thirty-six had professors with contracts
of three years in length or more, twenty-four had two-year contracts, and sixty had one-year
contracts. Id.
95 Supra sec. II(A)(2) (in part IV of the chart, discussing the academic breakdown).
writing professors graduated from a top-twenty law school, as

compared with 60% of doctrinal professors.96 More specifically, le-
gal writing professors are far less likely to have attended Harvard
Law School (6% versus 28%).97
An analysis of clerkship experience likewise highlights some
significant differences in status indicators. According to the find-
ings of the professional background survey, although legal writing
professors and doctrinal professors were roughly equally likely to
have had clerkship experience (38% versus 34%), the type of clerk-
ship experience differed. Doctrinal professors were more likely to
have had a federal clerkship than a state court clerkship and were
likewise more likely to have had a United States Supreme Court or
intermediate appellate clerkship as opposed to a district court
clerkship.98 The most likely clerkship experience for a legal writing
professor would be at an arguably less prestigious state court ra-
ther than at a federal one and at the trial level rather than at the
appellate.
An additional status indicator that highlights the differences
between legal writing and doctrinal professors is the practical ex-
perience factor. Historically, practical experience has been viewed
within the legal academy as a negative when assessing faculty
candidates.99 While some may argue that this viewpoint is anti-
quated and no longer the norm, the lack of practical scholarship
discussed above indicates that practical experience, if not dispar-
aged today, is certainly not embraced.
These, albeit relatively minor, differences between legal writ-
ing and doctrinal professors are nonetheless significant. They per-
haps explain why the “integration through assimilation”100 strate-
96 Levine, supra n. 8, at 542; see also Redding, supra n. 41, at 600 tbl. 1 (reporting that
86% of new faculty hires at all law schools between 1996 and 2000 received their J.D. de-
grees from a top-twenty-five school as ranked by the 1999 U.S. News & World Report Law
School Rankings).
97 See supra sec. II(A)(2); see also Redding, supra n. 41, at 599 (reporting that 18% of
all new doctrinal faculty hires between 1996 and 2000 received their J.D. degree from Har-
vard).
98 Redding, supra n. 41, at 600 (finding that 57% of the doctrinal faculty hires in his
survey had completed a clerkship, with 46% having a federal clerkship and 10% a United
States Supreme Court clerkship).
99 See Bryden, supra n. 3, at 642–643; see also Redding, supra n. 41, at 612 (noting
that the amount of practical experience of new faculty hires decreases with the prestige of
the hiring law school). Redding’s findings give credence to the conclusion that the most
desirable faculty candidates are those without significant practical experience.
100 Pursuant to this strategy, legal writing faculties are encouraged to assert them-
selves as integrated members of their faculties in the hope that eventually their doctrinal
colleagues will realize that there are essentially no differences between the two groups and
gy of legal writing professionals in many programs has gotten us

closer in status to our doctrinal colleagues but has failed to result
in true equality. It has successfully demonstrated that legal writ-
ing faculty members are more similar to our doctrinal colleagues
than many doctrinal faculty members previously believed and has
resulted in great strides in status and security. In many law
schools, legal writing professors are no longer considered the “low-
ly mechanics”101 of the faculty and have been elevated and com-
pensated in accordance with this revised understanding of our
skills. However, perhaps because of the above-noted status indica-
tor differences, we are still considered somewhat beneath our doc-
trinal colleagues on the status scale. We may be closer to them
than they originally believed us to be, but we are still somewhat
lesser scholars in many of their eyes because of these differences.
These differences cannot be easily overcome and illustrate the lim-
itations of the “integration through assimilation” strategy. We may
tout our similarities and assert our equality all we want, but be-
cause we are not truly similar in all relevant ways, these differ-
ences ultimately prevent us from crossing the threshold to true
equality.
The mindset that legal writing professors are lesser because of
these differences is well-ingrained in many law schools and con-
tinues to flourish because of the makeup of doctrinal faculty hires.
As the professional background survey found, the elite law schools
continue to be the most fertile ground for faculty hiring. At least
one study has found that as many as 74% of law teachers received
either a primary (J.D.) or secondary (LL.M.) legal degree from a
top-twenty school.102 Coincidentally (or perhaps not), these top tier
schools were also far less likely to hire legal writing professors to
tenured or tenure-track positions. In fact, a 1995 study found that
the schools typically ranked in the bottom half of the U.S. News &
World Report’s law school rankings were far more likely to appoint
legal writing faculty to these types of positions.103
Given the amount of weight in the doctrinal faculty hiring
process that apparently is placed on law school attended, it is not
will thus accept them as such.

102 Donna Fossum, Law Professors: A Profile of the Teaching Branch of the Legal Pro-
fession, 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 501, 520 (1980); see also Redding, supra n. 41, at 600
tbl. 1 (finding that more than 86% of all new doctrinal faculty hires from 1996–2000 came
from a top twenty-five school).
103 Levine, supra n. 8, at 539.
surprising that the elite schools hire their doctrinal faculty from
similarly elite schools at greater than the 74% national average.
One recent study of new faculty hires found that more than 96% of
doctrinal faculty hires at the top twenty-five schools received their
J.D. degrees from these same top twenty-five schools.104 Converse-
ly, the less prestigious schools hire doctrinal faculty members who
attended a greater variety of law schools and are more than six
times as likely to hire new doctrinal faculty members from schools
outside of the top twenty-five.105
These statistics, which seemingly relate solely to doctrinal
professors, are of great importance to legal writing professors—
they demonstrate why the lesser status of legal writing professors
continues. Because doctrinal faculties in all schools continue to
replenish themselves with members who attended law schools that
were more likely to consider their legal writing faculties as some-
what inferior (perhaps because of the emphasis of these schools on
theory over practical skills and experience), it is only natural that
these faculties would adopt a similar view of their present legal
writing colleagues. This viewpoint is likely more deeply ingrained
in the elite schools (which most likely hire a greater percentage of
doctrinal faculty members from elite schools) and somewhat less
well-established in lesser schools as the faculty pool widens to con-
sider candidates who attended lower-ranked schools—schools that
are also more likely to have afforded equal or increased status to
their legal writing faculties. This may be why the 1995 study of
tenure and the legal writing professoriate concluded that while it
is likely that more and more schools will allocate tenure track po-
sitions to teachers of legal writing in the future, the schools most
likely to do so would likely continue to be those that are lower-
ranked.106
1. The Legal Writing Professors’ Dilemma
The legal writing faculties at the majority of law schools today

face a dilemma. Unquestionably, positive changes in the status of
legal writing professors have occurred with great frequency over
104 Redding, supra n. 41, at 600 tbl. 1.

105 Id. While less than 4% of doctrinal faculty hires at the top twenty-five schools re-
ceived their J.D. degrees from a top fifty or lower-ranked school, more than 25% of doctrinal
faculty hires at all other schools came from schools other than the top twenty-five. Id.
106 Levine, supra n. 8, at 548–549.
the past several years. (The fact that an ever increasing number of
legal writing teachers are officially titled “professors” rather than
“instructors” for example, is testament to these changes.)107 How-
ever, true equality with our doctrinal peers has not been reached
in most law schools, and a barrier still exists between our doctrinal
colleagues and ourselves. The legal writing community is thus pre-
sented with a choice: it can either stay the course and hope for
conditions to improve as ever more doctrinal faculty members are
hired from lesser schools (schools that gave equal status to their
legal writing faculty) by a wider range of law schools, or it can
shift the focus of the debate to clear the final, and biggest, hurdle
to equality. The former option may very well take decades as in-
crementally, a greater number of viable doctrinal faculty candi-
dates graduating from schools that treated their legal writing fac-
ulties as equals emerges. This process, by definition, will be a mul-
ti-generational one, leaving many of those currently teaching legal
writing to do so without realistic hope of achieving true equality
with their doctrinal peers during their professional lifetimes.
Alternatively, as stated above, the legal writing professoriate
can decide to shift the focus of the debate in an effort to achieve
the same results much more quickly and efficiently. The goal of
equality would remain the same but now, the argument for equali-
ty would focus not on our similarities with our doctrinal peers but
rather on our unique role within our faculties—a role that enables
us to fill a void that only we are qualified to fill. It would center on
our ability to bring something unique to the academic table, and
for which we hold the competitive advantage. By focusing on our
strengths (practical knowledge) rather than our relative weak-
nesses, we stand a greater chance of ultimate success. Thus, prac-
tical scholarship makes unique sense for the legal writing commu-
nity.
Although practical scholarship is not considered as prestigious
as traditional scholarship, this mindset ignores the problem as
identified by judges and the practicing bar, who are crying out for
“thorough, thoughtful, concrete legal advice.”108 In addition, more
articles focused on legal practice are needed to fully prepare the
modern law student for the issues he or she will likely face as a
107 See ALWD/LWI Survey, supra n. 1, at 49 question 68. In 2001, fifty-seven of the
schools responding to the survey indicated that they used the “professor” title in one form or
another with regard to their legal research and writing faculty members. By 2004, this
number had increased to eighty-four. Id.
practicing lawyer.109 As the members of our faculties with, on av-

erage, the most significant amount of practical experience, we
should focus our scholarship on this area of law.
It is important to remember that our relative strength in this
area does not highlight a weakness in the academic makeup of our
doctrinal colleagues but is, rather, merely a reflection of our differ-
ent backgrounds and resulting talents. Because of the greater like-
lihood that doctrinal professors attended the traditional academic
“feeder schools,” had federal appellate clerkships, and made com-
paratively quick transition from student to teacher, they are well-
trained in the theoretical aspects of the law. This knowledge is
vital to the development of the law.110 Legal writing professors,
because of their differing backgrounds, simply bring a different
area of expertise to the academic table. Neither skill is more signif-
icant than the other, and both are equally integral to the develop-
ment of the law and service to the legal community.
2. Toward a Law School of “Position Players”
This highlighting of differences is consistent with the view-

point that law faculties should optimally be places where people of
different backgrounds and skills can come together and comple-
ment each other. In his article on the role of scholarship among
tenure-track faculty, Professor Kenneth Lasson called for faculties
to aspire to “mold [themselves] as position players, not as clones of
one another.”111 Although Lasson was speaking on the value of
scholarship among doctrinal faculty members, his advice rings
true as it applies to scholarship by all members of a law school’s
faculty. To the extent that a particular member of a faculty has an
academic strength relative to the rest of the faculty, that strength
should be encouraged and be allowed to flourish.112 It is detri-
mental, not merely to the individual faculty member but to the law
school and society as well, to force that faculty member to conform
to a traditionally accepted role in order for him or her to achieve
recognition and the full range of benefits from his or her col-
leagues.
109 E.g. Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Disso-
nance between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1231 (1991).
110 See Edwards, supra n. 45, at 35–36.
111 Kenneth Lasson, Scholarship Amok: Excesses in the Pursuit of Truth and Tenure,
103 Harv. L. Rev. 926, 949 (1990).

112 See id.
Theoretical and practical scholarship can and should peaceful-

ly coexist in a law school community. It is not an issue of “us ver-
sus them” for scholarly supremacy, but rather, the entirety of a
law school faculty complementing each other for the ultimate bet-
terment of the greater legal community.113 If one supposes that the
purpose of law is to better society,114 then lawyers who write about
the law should have this goal in mind when choosing their top-
ics.115 Because the legal academy is the branch of the law charged
with the obligation of analyzing and writing about it,116 it is vital
that all aspects of society are considered when making these choic-
es. Working together, doctrinal and legal writing professors can
discharge this obligation in its entirety.117
3. Practical Knowledge and the “Generation X”

Law Student
Similarly, doctrinal and legal writing professors can and

should use our differing skills to work together to prepare students
for the practice of law. A proper legal education focuses both on the
theoretical as well as the practical aspects of the law. Recent legal
scholarship has noted an increase in student unease with regard to
the completeness of their legal education.118 Many students are
dissatisfied with the skill set they are taking with them from law
school into the legal marketplace and feel that they are not pre-
pared to tackle much of what will be thrown at them by their em-
ployers after graduation.119 As these concerns focus on a practical
113 Id.
114 See id. at 943.
115 See Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 Va. L. Rev. 38, 42 (1936) (“[I]f any
among the lawyers might reasonably be expected to carry a torch or shoot a flashlight in the
right direction, it is the lawyers who write about the law.”).
116 See id.
117 See generally Edwards, supra n. 45, at 38–39 (discussing the academicians’ obliga-
tion to serve the system of justice).

118 E.g. Rogelio Lasso, From The Paper Chase to the Digital Chase: Technology and the
Challenge of Teaching 21st Century Law Students, 43 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1, 15 (2002)
(“Law students across the country complain that their legal education leaves much to be
desired.” Id. at 16.).
119 See Rodney O. Fong, Panel Presentation, Generation X: Students in the 21st Centu-
ry, part of panel, The Challenges of Connecting with 21st Century Students (Opening Plena-
ry AALS 2002 Annual Meeting, New Orleans, La., Jan. 2, 2002) (available at www
.aals.org/am2002/workshop.html). Professor Fong discussed the “ultra-consumerism” out-
look of the modern law student and how many students are dissatisfied with the skills set
they leave law school with after paying thousands of dollars for a legal education. In their
opinion, this investment entitles them to concrete knowledge they can apply directly to
rather than a theoretical legal knowledge gap, the practical schol-

arship of legal writing professors can step in here as well to help
fill it.
Research on the topic of educating Generation X students has
shown that today’s law students differ from their predecessors in
several important ways.120 Unlike their parents, they take a con-
sumer-oriented approach to their education and see law school not
as a purely intellectual experience but as an extensive financial
investment toward a career as a lawyer.121 This change in mindset
is significant in that they believe that they should receive “value,”
as they rather that their professors define it, in exchange for the
payment of tuition.122 Knowledge for its own sake takes a back
seat in the eyes of many students.123 Instead, they seek knowledge
that can be applied directly to their careers as practitioners.124
While the wisdom of allowing these students to dictate the pa-
rameters of the entirety of their legal education is certainly debat-
able, the practical knowledge of the legal writing professoriate can
be utilized to help allay student fears somewhat and respond to
some of their concerns. Theory, regardless of its perceived utility
in the eyes of the Generation X student, is a prerequisite to even
the most basic understanding of the workings of the law. Thus, to
a large degree, these students will be compelled to take their med-
icine regardless of how distasteful they may find it. However,
scholarship on practical issues and concerns can help satisfy these
students’ cravings for knowledge and information directly relevant
to the issues they will be facing as practitioners in a few short
years.125 In the eyes of the Generation X student, scholarship that
their careers as practitioners, and they are frustrated that, oftentimes, they do not receive
it.
120 See id.; see also Rodney O. Fong, Retaining Generation X’ers in a Baby Boomer
Firm, 29 Capital U. L. Rev. 911 (2002) (defining a “Generation X” student as a child of a

baby boomer, typically between nineteen and thirty-seven years old); Tracy L. McGaugh,
Generation X in Law School: The Dying of the Light or the Dawn of a New Day? 9 Leg. Writ-
ing 119 (2003) (discussing the differences, both perceived and actual, between Generation X
students and their predecessors).
121 Fong, supra n. 119.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 See ABA Sec. Leg. Educ. & Admis. to B., Teaching and Learning Professionalism:
Report of the Professionalism Committee 13–18 (ABA 1996). To adequately respond to the
call for an increase in training in professionalism in law schools and to better respond to
types of issues many students will soon face as practitioners, the committee recommended
the hiring of faculty with extensive practical experience and urged law schools to overcome
“the apparent reluctance . . . to hire lawyers with extensive practice experience as tenure
addresses their concrete needs is merely different than the

knowledge the students are otherwise exposed to, not lesser.126
The current disconnect between many doctrinal faculty mem-
bers and their Generation X students comes in part from the na-
ture of traditional scholarship. Because doctrinal legal scholars see
each other as their constituency,127 they may have less to say to
their students outside of class on the major substantive issues of
the day.128 In a scholarly sense, students are neophytes, and as
such, can be made to feel left on the fringes of the debate between
scholars.129 This, in turn, may result in increased angst in students
who feel as if their needs and opinions are being ignored. Because
practical scholarship speaks directly to practitioners and aspiring
practitioners, it brings students back into the fold by focusing on
issues that are important to them and their burgeoning careers.
The wealth of practical knowledge stored within the combined le-
gal writing professoriate should be tapped so as to enable us to
step in and help round out the modern law students’ legal educa-
tion.
4. Professional Education as a Blending of Practical and

Theoretical Knowledge
It is interesting to note that, with the possible exception of the

clinical programs and faculty, legal education stands out among
the professional educational disciplines as the only one that frowns
upon practical knowledge.130 Business, medical, and architecture
schools all embrace practitioners on their faculties.131 Most, if not
track faculty.” Id. at 17. The committee concluded that such faculty members would “serve
as excellent role models for law students. . . . [T]hey can give a real-world perspective to
ethics and professionalism issues, because of their real-world experiences, and can readily
integrate those issues into their courses.” Id. at 18.
126 See Fong, supra n. 119.
128 See Weidner, supra n. 3, at 441–442.
129 Id. Dean Weidner commented that “the biggest pitfall of academia [is] spending the
bulk of [one’s time] interacting [with] novices in your areas of expertise. The more years you
spend as a legal academic, the less satisfying it will be to have something to say only to your
students, who as a group tend to know relatively little about the area you are teaching
them.” Id. at 442.
130 Although clinical programs appear to be ever-increasing components of legal educa-
tion, clinical faculty members often face their own status issues and marginalization by the
doctrinal faculty. An analysis of the role of scholarship of clinical faculty members is, how-
ever, beyond the scope of this Article.
131 See Waxman, supra n. 65, at 1910 (noting, in addition, that the nature of many
academic disciplines dictates that many scholars throughout academia are likewise, de
all, medical schools count as full fledged faculty members those

who are also or have been practicing physicians.132 As many as
two-thirds of the faculty at numerous top-tier schools of architec-
ture are either practitioners or have significant practical experi-
ence.133 There is no inherent theoretical difference between medi-
cal and architectural education on the one hand and legal educa-
tion on the other that would justify an embrace of practical
knowledge in the former and a distaste for it in the latter. The dif-
ference between them comes down simply to a difference in mind-
set. To change the culture of inequality within legal faculties, the
legal writing professoriate must work to change the ingrained, in-
stitutional mindset rather than continue to fight a battle that will
invariably result in unequal status for the legal writing professor
for years to come.
The focus of the debate over equality must be changed to one
that highlights the strengths of the legal writing professoriate ra-
ther than our perceived “weaknesses.” It must address the greater
concerns of modern legal education and service to the legal com-
munity rather than ignore these important and influential factors.
As the legal scholarly market is literally crying out for more prac-
tice-based scholarship from the academy—scholarship that re-
sponds to the issues that vex the practicing attorney on a daily
basis and proposes workable solutions—the legal writing profes-
soriate has not only a golden opportunity but a responsibility to
step forward into this breech.
This Article is not the first to call upon the legal academy to
do a better job of imparting practical knowledge to the legal com-
munity. In fact, during his keynote address at the University of
Pennsylvania’s Sesquicentennial Anniversary Banquet in 2002,
Seth Waxman, a partner at Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering and a
former Solicitor General of the United States, addressed this very
issue when he said:
facto, practitioners). As a result, many faculties across the academic spectrum include
scholars who are also practitioners. See Thomas R. Fisher, Speech, Models from Other Dis-
ciplines: What Can We Learn from Them? (2001 ALWD Conf., U. Minn. L. Sch., July 27,
2001) (copy of transcript contained in 1 J. ALWD 165, 168 (2002), wherein Thomas Fisher,
Dean of the University of Minnesota College of Architecture and Landscape Architecture,
noted “that there are a number of schools—Minnesota, Columbia and Yale are three note-
worthy ones—where as much as two-thirds of the faculty are practitioners”).
132 See Waxman, supra n. 65, at 1910 (noting that most members of medical faculties
are also practicing physicians).

133 See Fisher, supra n. 131, at 168.
Premier law schools . . . need to make affirmative efforts to hire

gifted people who have been successful in practice, public and
private. I’m referring not just to adjunct professors who rush in
and out. I’m referring not simply to the need for more clinical
faculty. I’m . . . talking about practitioner-scholars who are fully
integrated into the academic faculty.134
The call for such scholars has already been made. It is our respon-
sibility as legal writing professors to stand up and let our doctrinal
and practitioner colleagues know that we’re already here.
III. WHERE SHOULD WE PUBLISH? DETERMINING THE

APPROPRIATE VENUES FOR PRACTICAL
SCHOLARSHIP
Once the legal writing professor has completed her practical

scholarship, the next question becomes where she should submit it
for publication. Traditional status indicators suggest that she
should submit it to a number of student-edited law reviews and
hope for acceptance from an elite journal. After all, formal law re-
view articles published in these journals are vested with the great-
est level of respect from the legal academy.135 This poses a problem
for the legal writing professor, however, because, as stated above,
practical scholarship is often relegated to the lower-tiered, less
prestigious journals.136 Moreover, the most appropriate forum for
practical scholarship is often in the bar journals and practice
manuals that reach her intended audience but that rank at the
bottom of the prestige scale, even below the least prestigious law
reviews.137 Therefore, it appears that for the legal writing profes-
sor to write in her field of expertise, she must sacrifice prestige.
This flies in the face of the “integration through assimilation” ap-
proach to equality for the legal writing professoriate, which would
naturally counsel legal writing professors to seek to publish formal
law review articles in the same journals that publish the scholar-
ship of our doctrinal colleagues. However, traditional, student-
edited law reviews are uniquely inappropriate venues for the
134 Waxman, supra n. 65, at 1912.

136 See Slomanson, supra n. 2, at 434–435 (“One general list of priorities divides legal
writing into four broad categories, in ascending order of worthiness: practice-oriented mate-
rials (bar journals and manuals); academic short subjects (essays, book reviews, and brief
case notes); law review articles; and books.” (emphasis in original.)).
137 Id.
scholarship of the legal writing professoriate for several reasons

relating to how they work and whom they reach.
A. Five Reasons Why Student-Edited Law Reviews Are Improper

Scholarly Venues for Legal Writing Professors
1. The Predominance of Theory-Based Articles in Top

Journals
As stated in Section I of this Article, law reviews have been

criticized, notably by Judge Edwards but by others as well, for
abandoning practical legal problems and increasingly choosing
instead to focus on theory.138 Judge Edwards gave voice to the
many critics, both within and outside the academy, who believe
that practical scholarship has declined in law reviews and that the
crucial link between the legal academy and our system of justice
has been severed by this rising tide of theory-based scholarship.139
In reality, this criticism appears to be somewhat of a generali-
zation. The 1996 Saks et al. study remarked that because there
are thousands of law review articles published annually (more
than any one person could ever possibly hope to read), Judge Ed-
wards’s anecdotal comments are most likely the result of his famil-
iarity with a limited number of journals and articles and cannot
possibly cover the entirety of legal scholarship.140 The Saks et al.
study of a range of law reviews across the prestige hierarchy found
that only the top quintile journals were guilty of the sins espoused
in Judge Edwards’s article.141 They contained the highest propor-
tion of articles focused on theory while lesser journals contained a
greater proportion of the practice-based articles Judge Edwards
claimed had all but disappeared.142 In conclusion, the Saks et al.
study stated that focusing merely on these top quintile journals
results in a misperception regarding the state of legal scholarship
overall and suggested that courts look to a wider range of law re-
views for advice in an effort to reestablish the link that Judge Ed-
wards claimed was missing.143

139 Id. at 42, 57.
140 Saks et al., supra n. 57, at 360.
141 Id. at 374.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 374–375.
The Saks et al. study may have effectively discussed the rela-
tionship between the law reviews and the judicial system, but it
only highlights the problem as these reviews apply to the legal
writing community. As the Saks et al. study found, the top quintile
journals—those journals that also rank highest on the prestige
scale—are far more likely to accept theory-based articles than
practical ones.144 As a result, those who choose to focus on practical
scholarship will be more likely to find their work accepted by the
less prestigious journals and ignored by the top ones.
Mere publication of an article in a law review article does lit-
tle to affect one’s academic status because of the sheer number of
journals (more than 800 at last count) and articles published an-
nually (more than 5,000 according to some).145 Given the likelihood
that some editor somewhere is short on submissions and facing a
deadline, the bar has been lowered to the point where “reasonably
intelligent copy” is all that is needed to ensure publication at least
in some lesser law reviews.146 Because practically everyone in the
legal academy is publishing work somewhere, it is the status of the
journal in which one’s work is accepted that is the overriding fac-
tor in determining the scholarly status of the individual. By re-
peatedly having our work published in these lesser journals, our
“lesser scholar” status will only continue to be perpetuated. Part I
of this Article concluded that legal writing professors are different,
not lesser scholars. Therefore, we need to be conscious to avoid
that perception at all costs.
2. The Limited Subject-Matter Focus of Student-Edited

Law Reviews
As noted above, Professor Turnier’s 2000 study found that a

limited range of closely related subjects receive an overwhelming
amount of attention in the elite law reviews.147 It should come as
no surprise that constitutional law and criminal law and proce-
dure were the most popular topics with civil procedure, civil rights,
and race (topics that often have constitutional underpinnings) not
far behind.148 Overall, constitutionally based topics (constitutional
144 Id. at 374.

145 Lasson, supra n. 111, at 928.
146 Slomanson, supra n. 2, at 435.
147 Turnier, supra n. 55, at 195–196.
148 Id.
law, civil procedure, civil rights, and race) accounted for nearly
32% of all articles published by these elite journals in 1991 and
1996.149 Moreover, the top five topics combined (constitutional law,
criminal law and procedure, race, administrative law, and women
and the law) accounted for nearly half of all articles published
within these journals.150 The predominance of these topics is nei-
ther surprising to anyone who has perused a law review nor un-
known to those within the legal academy. As stated above, some
professors, in fact, believe it prudent to add a constitutional angle
to their scholarship so as to increase their chances of being accept-
ed by one of these journals.151
One who makes practical scholarship his or her focus does not
have a similar luxury, however. Because so few practitioners prac-
tice constitutional law,152 or even remotely address constitutional
issues in their practices, adding a constitutional angle to a practi-
cal subject risks alienating the market we are dedicated to serving.
However, ignoring constitutional or other issues popular with the
elite journals will lessen our chances of publication with them.
Although our work nonetheless will likely be published some-
where,153 it will likely be with a lesser journal, thus once again
perpetuating our “lesser scholar” stigma.
3. The Predominance of Footnotes and Turgid Prose154
There are as many theories on why legal scholarship looks

and reads the way it does as there are footnotes in the average law
review article. Regardless of the reasons behind the generally ac-
cepted style of law review writing, the style itself presents issues
unique to the legal writing community.
Unlike doctrinal peers, legal writing professors teach, in part,
writing style. Some focus on it explicitly; others may focus more
overtly on analytical technique in their classes but cannot help but
consider the nature of how it is presented when reviewing their
students’ work. We are teachers of legal writing, after all. We
149Id. at 195 tbl. 2.

150Id. at 196.
151 See Slomanson, supra n. 2, at 445–446.
152 See Heinz et al., supra n. 76, at 765 tbl. 3. In fact, constitutional law was so sparsely
practiced that it failed to even register within the Chicago study. Id.
154 See Lasson, supra n. 111, at 942 (“Law review prose is predominantly bleak and
turgid.” Id.).
counsel our students to write simply and clearly, avoid excess

words, legalese, and the passive voice, among other stylistic sins.
Our intellectual honesty may justifiably be called into question if
we fail to practice in our scholarship what we preach in class.
Even though publication may not be a formal requirement for
promotion or retention, scholarship makes sense for the legal writ-
ing professoriate simply to enable us to hone our writing skills.155
In this sense, and unlike our doctrinal peers, scholarship directly
impacts the quality of our teaching: the better writers we are, the
better teachers of writing we will become. We are not, however,
honing these skills if we write in a style that contradicts what we
instruct in class. In his now famous article, Professor Fred Rodell
remarked that there are two things wrong with almost all scholar-
ly legal writing: “One is its style. The other is content.”156 As we
teach style, we need to be particularly sensitive to this concern.
Rodell’s article goes on to chronicle the most egregious sins, in
his eyes, of the typical law review article—sins that, if anything,
have become even more pervasive in the almost seventy years
since his article was published in 1936.157 One such sin is the pro-
liferation of footnotes. “Every legal writer is presumed to be a liar
until he proves himself otherwise with a flock of footnotes,” he
wrote.158 He continued, writing that footnotes are the result of
“sloppy thinking” and “clumsy writing.”159 Along the same lines,
Justice Arthur Goldberg noted that footnotes ‘“cause more prob-
lems than they solve.’”160 It is perhaps for these and many other
reasons that the legal writing texts we teach from counsel against
the use of footnotes either absolutely or advise a sparing use at
best.161 Regardless of the rationale behind the use of the footnote,
few would disagree that they are the antithesis of the simple and
clear writing style we attempt to instill in our students each year.
155 See Liemer, supra n. 10, at 1024.

156 Rodell, supra n. 115, at 38.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 41.
159 Id.
160 Lasson, supra n. 111, at 940 (quoting Arthur Goldberg, The Rise and Fall (We Hope)
of Footnotes, 69 ABA J. 255, 255 (1983)).

161 See e.g. Nancy L. Schultz & Louis J. Sirico, Legal Writing and Other Lawyering
Skills 312 (3d ed., Lexis 1998). In discussing the proper format for the argument section of
an appellate brief, the authors advise students to “[u]se footnotes sparingly. Generally, if
the thought is worthy of a footnote, you can fit it into your argument. Footnotes are unde-
sirable because they interrupt the flow of the argument.” Id.
Another sin of particular concern to the legal writing commu-

nity is the proliferation of passive voice and other stylistic offenses
contained in many law review articles. As one commentator noted,
“The style of legal scholarship violates every precept in a manual
of expository writing: it is abstract, plodding, pompous, and pro-
lix.”162 Rodell highlighted the legal scholar’s fascination with
hedged, impersonal statements by pointing out a well-worn
phrase, still in (over)use today: “‘It would seem—,’ the matriarch of
mollycoddle phrases, still revered by the law reviews in the dull
name of dignity.”163 Reliance on the passive voice, excess words,
awkward syntax, and an emphasis on saying things complicatedly
rather than simply—all things we instruct our students to avoid—
flourish with abundance in the law reviews. Even if we are not
aware of it, we teach our students according to Rodell’s closing
credo: “that the English language is most useful when it is used
normally and naturally.”164 Is it then not improper for us to then
violate our own teachings in the name of legal scholarship?
Our doctrinal colleagues do not face a similar ethical crisis.
Not only do they not teach style, the traditional law review style
may very well benefit them in ways that do not inure to us. Be-
cause their most important constituency is other scholars,165 their
scholarship is written for each other rather than the general public
or practicing bar.166 As in any profession, there inevitably develops
a unique jargon among insiders, impenetrable to those outside of
the loop that enables them to communicate with one another in a
specialized manner they can readily understand.167 By contrast,
because practical scholarship is meant to be utilized by the practic-
ing bar, it must be written in a style that is easily accessible to lay
attorneys. While doctrinal legal scholars may very well communi-
cate with one another via their specialized jargon, legal writing
scholars, as experts in practical knowledge, must communicate
with their constituency in the simpler language in which they reg-
ularly communicate (if we have taught them well when they were
our students).
In addition, to the extent that traditional legal writing style
can be considered “bad” writing, it does not handicap doctrinal pro-
162 Bryden, supra n. 3, at 647.

163 Rodell, supra n. 115, at 39.
164 Id. at 45.
166 Id.
167 See Lasson, supra n. 111, at 944.
fessors as it does legal writing professors. “Good” writing is consid-

ered good mainly because it is easily accessible to the reader.168 In
general, the demands of the marketplace require good writing be-
cause if the reader (the consumer) determines a piece of writing to
be “plodding, pompous, and prolix,”169 he can set it aside and
choose to read something else.170 In this marketplace, good writing
will be read (and theoretically rewarded) and bad writing ig-
nored.171 A professional writer must respond to the wishes of his
audience if he wants to continue to be a professional writer.172
This market does not exist in the world of doctrinal legal
scholarship.173 There is no need to respond to the desires of the
marketplace when a doctrinal professor can merely assign his
work to his students.174 Fellow doctrinal scholars are likewise re-
quired to read their colleagues’ work regardless of its style as a
courtesy and when making a tenure or promotion decision.175 Alt-
hough theoretically, “plodding, pompous, and prolix”176 writing can
affect this determination, it appears highly unlikely that someone
would be denied tenure based on his or her writing style.
If legal writing scholars are going to focus on practical schol-
arship, however, we will be subject to traditional market forces.
Given practicing bar members’ busy schedules, they will only read
that which is easily accessible to them. If we want to effectively
and continually reach our intended audience, we must write in a
simple, clear style that grabs their attention and makes them
want to read what we have to write. In short, to effectively com-
municate with our readers, we must practice in our scholarship
what we teach in our classes.
4. The Limited Audience for Law Review Articles
Publication in traditional law reviews does not make sense to

legal writing professors if for no other reason than the simple fact
that many members of our audience do not read law review arti-

169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
175 See id. at 927.
cles. Many practitioners have been trained through experience to

avoid law reviews because there typically is not much contained in
them that is relevant to their practices.177 This is evidenced by the
fact that the overwhelming majority of law review articles are cit-
ed not by courts or legislators but by one another.178 It is the rare
law review article that is cited in case reports or annotated
codes.179 Moreover, as discussed in Part II(B)(2)(c), a 1998 study
found that the frequency of judges’ citations to law review articles
is declining rapidly: almost 50% in the prior twenty years with the
greatest decline occurring in the ten most recent prior years.180
While some complain “that [many] law review [articles are] made
to be written and not read,”181 it is clear that whatever audience
exists for them exists within the academic realm.182 On the other
hand, practitioners utilize those scholarly resources that are more
likely to address their concrete problems: bar journals, practice
manuals, and continuing legal education materials. For the legal
writing professoriate to reach its audience, it is only natural that
we focus our scholarly attention on these publications rather than
traditional law reviews.
Practitioners utilize these alternative scholarly resources
simply because these resources are better equipped to respond
more quickly and efficiently to the issues faced in their practices.
For example, much of the scholarship that takes place in the field
of tax law occurs within the pages of Tax Notes, a weekly journal
that is designed to provide the scholarly debate over a particular
issue to practitioners quickly: three weeks lead time between sub-
mission and publication is all that is required.183 By way of con-
trast, a traditional law review article typically takes about two
years to go from idea to publication.184 Because of this, “tax schol-
ars who wish to affect the national legislative agenda find that
student-edited law reviews provide a ponderously slow vehicle.”185
Many of the issues confronting practitioners move so quickly that
the traditional law reviews, even if the above-noted style and sub-
177 See Edwards, supra n. 45, at 54.

179 Id. at 932–933.
184 Id. at 193.
185 Id.
stance issues were resolved, do not provide an effective scholarly

vehicle for them.186
Of course, the sticking point when it comes to the use of bar
journals and the like as conduits for legal scholarship is that, at
best, bar journals, practice manuals, and continuing legal educa-
tion materials are considered at the bottom of the prestige scale
within the legal academy and, at worst, are not even considered
scholarship at all.187 Publication in the least prestigious law re-
view is considered to be more desirable.188 Although there is an
unfixable status issue with regard to publication in lesser journals
(for publication within them will always be considered lesser than
publication in the elite journals that most likely rejected the arti-
cle), the status issue is a correctable one when publishing in a dif-
ferent rather than a lesser journal. Because legal writing profes-
sors bring different skills, and expertise in a different area than
our doctrinal colleagues, it should naturally follow that we should
publish our work in different journals. As our scholarly mission
differs, so should our scholarly publications.
This is not to suggest that convincing our doctrinal colleagues
to accept this change in mindset will be a simple task. However,
continuing to publish in lesser journals does nothing but perpetu-
ate the stereotype that legal writing professors are lesser scholars
than our doctrinal peers. Ultimately, it is easier to demonstrate
that a bar journal article responding to the needs of the practicing
bar is worthy scholarship than a traditional article that finds its
home in a bottom-tier law review mainly because it had previously
been rejected by all of the more prestigious ones.
5. Virtually All Law Reviews Are Student-Edited
Legal scholarship is unique among its academic brethren in

that it is the only discipline in which the work is primarily dictat-
ed and under the control of student-edited journals.189 Virtually all
other disciplines rely most heavily on peer-edited journals.190 This
186 Id.
188 Cf. Slomanson, supra n. 2, at 437 (noting that traditional wisdom counsels against
writing for practice manuals, bar journals, and continuing legal education materials).
189 Id. at 444–445; see also Posner, supra n. 84 (presenting a detailed critique of the
shortcomings of law reviews, starting with the problems inherent in student-edited scholar-
ly journals).
190 Slomanson, supra n. 2, at 444–445; Posner, supra n. 84.
has led some to comment that this relationship, in which students

dictate the research parameters of the faculty, stands academia on
its head.191 Once again, this relationship between student and fac-
ulty presents unique problems to legal writing scholars.
Regardless of the wisdom of this editorial relationship, doctri-
nal professors are not unduly affected by it. Scholarship is a re-
quirement for them, and publication in elite journals greatly en-
hances their chances for promotion and tenure;192 so ultimately, it
matters little to them if they have to capitulate somewhat to the
whims of their student editors with regard to content or style if
doing so means publication in an appropriate journal for their ad-
vancement. Ceding control of content and style to their students
may not be academically desirable, but it is a necessary evil to-
ward achieving their goals of tenure and promotion.193
The vast majority of legal writing professors are not tenured
or on tenure-track. Indeed, as of 2004, legal writing professors at
only twenty-four law schools can claim such status.194 Accordingly,
most legal writing faculty positions do not carry with them a pub-
lication requirement.195 Therefore, as a preliminary matter, there
exists no greater goal for the typical legal writing professor that
justifies the ceding of this control. More importantly, capitulating
to the whims of student editors uniquely frustrates many of the
goals of the legal writing scholar.
Because, by definition, students lack practical legal experi-
ence, allowing them to determine which articles are accepted and
which are not invariably results in an overwhelming focus on top-
ics irrelevant to the practicing bar. As discussed in Section
I(B)(2)(b), it should come to no one’s surprise that constitutional
law and constitutionally based topics dominate the student-edited
journals. These are the subjects they are familiar and comfortable
with from their classes and ones that do not require practical ex-
perience in order to comprehend, at least in theory.196

193 Id.
194 See ALWD/LWI Survey, supra n. 1, at 48 question 65 (indicating that only twenty-
four of the 176 schools responding to the 2004 ALWD Survey offer tenure or tenure-track
status to their legal faculty).
195 Id. at 62 question 81 (twenty of the 129 schools that responded to this question
responded that their legal writing faculties were required to produce written scholarship).
196 See Turnier, supra n. 55, at 194.
An informal survey I conducted with regard to student note

topics in Philadelphia-area law reviews confirms the suspicion
that student editors are overly enamored of constitutional law-
based subjects.197 My survey of student notes that appeared in the
2001–2002 editions of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review,
Villanova Law Review, and Temple Law Review revealed that a
whopping 58.6% were constitutional law-based, with the Universi-
ty of Pennsylvania topping the list at nearly 73%.198 Constitutional
law is what the overwhelming majority of student editors are com-
fortable with as writers, so naturally, it should come as no surprise
that these same students would select an overabundance of consti-
tutionally based articles to work on as editors. This results in law
review editions that provide little guidance to practitioners and
that make for poor venues for the propagation of practical scholar-
ship.
Of larger concern to legal writing scholars are the problems
that result from placing students in an editorial role over the
scholars’ work. This shifting of roles between student and profes-
sor causes many student-editors to become understandably uncom-
fortable. Suddenly, they are the teachers and placed in a supervi-
sory role over their professors, despite their awareness that they
possess far less knowledge on the subject of the article they are
editing than their faculty “students.” Reluctant to challenge the
substantive assertions and conclusions contained therein, many
student-editors focus instead on style and citation issues.199 De-
termined to satisfy their editorial obligations and with little else to
comfortably focus on, many student editors spend a considerable
number of hours ‘“translat[ing] a witty sentence into a tired one,
and a sprightly metaphor into tedious, if literal, prose.’”200 This
may not present a problem to doctrinal scholars, for they do not
197 While this informal survey is by no means scientific (after all, it is an “informal
survey”), it serves as the springboard for the discussion that follows. This survey was un-
dertaken to confirm the anecdotal suspicion that law review students significantly favor
constitutional law-based topics over all other topics. Although it is beyond the scope of this
Article to undertake a more detailed study on this hypothesis, the results of the informal
survey overwhelmingly confirmed the anecdotal suspicion. Although a more detailed study
may produce slightly different results, the overall thesis would likely be similarly proven.
198 The results were as follows: University of Pennsylvania Law Review (volume 150:
eight of eleven student notes contained a constitutional law element (73%)); Temple Law
Review (volume 74, numbers 3 and 4, and volume 75, numbers 1 and 2: three of five (60%));
Villanova Law Review (volume 47: six of fourteen (43%)).
199 See Slomanson, supra n. 2, at 445.
200 Id. (quoting Richard A. Epstein, Faculty-Edited Law Journals, 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev.
87, 88 (1994)).
teach style. Tired sentences may not be what they had envisioned
when sending their drafts off to their student editors, but since the
substance of their articles is likely to remain relatively untouched,
the resulting article effectively serves its purpose and reflects well
upon its author.
Because legal writing professors teach style, at least in part,
an article replete with tired sentences and tedious prose will re-
flect negatively on us, regardless of its substantive merit. This
concern is heightened because our practice-based articles are more
likely to be published in lower-tiered or specialty journals, our
student editors are more likely to be weaker students than those
who populate the editorial staffs of the elite journals.201 This
leaves our work in the editorial hands of students who may very
well be poor writers. Our reputations as effective teachers of legal
writing are thereby endangered by ceding editorial control of our
scholarly work to struggling students who will invariably attempt
to “fix” what we know best.
B. The Value of Peer-Edited and Practice Journals as Scholarly

Outlets for Legal Writing Professors
To the extent that legal writing professors continue to write

traditional law review-type articles, the more proper venue would
be peer-edited journals. Although not traditionally as prestigious
as the student-edited journals (particularly the top-quintile stu-
dent journals), they are gaining in prominence, perhaps due to “a
level of experience and knowledge” of their editorial staffs that far
exceeds that of even the most prestigious student-edited jour-
nals.202 Hybrid journals that use a combination of student and fac-
ulty editors are also beginning to emerge and may prove to be an
additionally worthy outlet for the legal writing scholar.203 Profes-
sional periodicals staffed by practitioners, such as bar journals,
practice manuals, and the like provide similarly attractive alterna-
tives. These professional editors can offer effective criticism on the
substance of our scholarship in ways students simply cannot.204 All
of these professionally edited journals may not make the most
sense for the rest of the legal academy, but they respond most ef-
201 See id. at 446.

203 See Slomanson, supra n. 2, at 445.
fectively to the unique skills and concerns of the legal writing

professoriate.
Law schools themselves are just beginning to recognize the
value of practical scholarship. Yale Law School recently sponsored
a new magazine, Legal Affairs, that contains articles that focus on
current legal issues and is written in a style that appeals to a
broader audience than the typical law review.205 More such publi-
cations are needed, and articles in such publications need to be
recognized as legitimate academic scholarship.
Although this Article has focused on the differences between
doctrinal and legal writing faculties, we are similar in the most
basic sense. We are both comprised of academics who need to stay
connected with our field(s) of expertise.206 It is merely the means
by which we need to stay connected that differ. Doctrinal scholars
do this through traditional law reviews; legal writing scholars
need to do this through those journals that speak to practicing
lawyers and that do so in a language these readers readily under-
stand.
For our purposes, practical scholarship satisfies the definition
of “scholarship” as defined by most law schools.207 It is “‘analytical,’
‘significant,’ ‘learned,’ ‘well-written,’ and ‘disinterested.’”208 Simply
because it appears in forums other than traditional law reviews is
of no matter. In fact, the “significance” of our scholarship would be
greatly compromised if it was contained in publications that rarely
reach our constituent audience. It is illogical to conclude that
scholarship that effectively fills a need voiced by the legal profes-
sion for many years is not worthwhile merely because it appears in
a bar journal. Good writing is valuable to the legal academy and
the greater legal community regardless of where it technically ap-
pears in print.209 To put it succinctly: scholarship is scholarship.
The fact that it takes a different form does not justify a classifica-
tion of it as lesser, particularly when it serves our system of justice
by reaching out to fill an acknowledged scholarly void.210

206 See Liemer, supra n. 10, at 1025; see also Weidner, supra n. 3, at 441–442.
208 See id. (citing a variety of law school faculty handbooks defining “scholarship”).
209 See id. at 949 (“Let’s recognize good writing as valuable, even if it’s not in a law
review . . . .”).
210 See Edwards, supra n. 45, at 38–39.
IV. ACHIEVING INSTITUTIONAL RECOGNITION FOR

PRACTICAL SCHOLARSHIP: THE “PROFESSOR OF
PRACTICE” MODEL
If the ideal in the academic world is to create an environment

in which differences in scholarly opinion and focus are not merely
tolerated but embraced, those who choose to concentrate on practi-
cal scholarship need to be made to feel welcome, both in job securi-
ty and in compensation. The “professor of practice” title, which is
gaining in popularity in some undergraduate departments211 (as
well as in some law school clinical programs),212 may provide a
model for those law schools that understand the value that their
legal writing professors add to their faculties and who seek to for-
mally recognize it.
A relatively new title, professors of practice are typically full-
time, non-tenure-track faculty members, who are evaluated pri-
marily on their teaching but who are still required to produce
scholarship, albeit with a practical bent.215 Columbia University’s
School of Social Work describes its “Professors of Professional
Practice” as members of its faculty “with a unique blend of practice
experience, teaching experience and scholarship.”213 Syracuse Uni-
versity established the Professor of Practice title in 2002 after
identifying the “need to bring expert practitioners into the acade-
my (as full-fledged members of the community) to make closer
connections and integrations between the world of academic re-
search and teaching and the world of professional practice and de-
cision-making.”214 The desires to integrate theory and practice and
to promote a greater integration between academic scholarship
211 See Piper Fogg, For These Professors, ‘Practice’ Is Perfect, Chron. Higher Educ. A12
(Apr. 16, 2004) (available to subscribers at http://chronicle.com/weekly/v50/i32/32a01201

.htm).
212 For example, the University of Pennsylvania Law School maintains a “practice
professor” position within its clinical faculty (see www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/faculty.cfm

?Position_ID=1), while Quinnipiac University School of Law has a Distinguished Professor
of Dispute Resolution Law from Practice who is a retired insurance industry vice president
with that law school’s Alternative Dispute Resolution program (see http://law.quinnipiac
.edu/x541.xml).
215 Fogg, supra n. 211, at A12.
213 Columbia U. Sch. Soc. Work, CUSSW Welcomes New Professors of Professional
Practice, www.columbia.edu/cu/ssw/news/dec03/newprof.htm (accessed May 13, 2004).

214 Syracuse U., Proposal for Professors of Practice (POPs) at Syracuse University, Feb-
ruary 2002, 1, www.universitysenate.syr.edu/profofpractice.pdf (last revised Feb. 18, 2002).

and the “public/private sphere” were cited as rationales for propos-

ing this new faculty rank.215
Although the parameters of these positions vary among
schools (with some, such as Syracuse and Massachusetts Institute
of Technology’s Sloan School of Business, reserving the professor of
practice title for persons with a national or worldwide reputation
for excellence,216 while others such as Columbia and Duke open
these positions up to a wider range of practitioners), professors of
practice often have renewable contracts lasting from three to ten
years, with an average minimum contract of five years.217 Along
with the increased security that comes with these long-term con-
tracts are salaries that typically are comparable to the salaries of
tenured and tenure-track faculty members in their departments.218
Currently, approximately 10% of Duke University’s total faculty
are professors of practice, with the largest percentage of them re-
siding in the arts, biology, languages, mathematics, and statistics
departments.219
At Duke (which has had this position in place the longest—
more than ten years), professors of practice are evaluated both on
their teaching and scholarship, with the teaching evaluation carry-
ing the greatest weight.220 The scholarship component is evaluated
as well, but the scholarship of the professor of practice can differ
from that of his or her tenure-track colleagues in that it can have
an applied focus.221 While professors of practice at Duke are re-
quired to “maintain a national profile in [their] field,” just like
their tenured and tenure-track colleagues, professors of practice
achieve this in part through scholarship that reaches the practi-
tioners in their fields.222 For example, a professor of practice in
Duke’s statistics department satisfies her scholarly requirements
by editing a magazine that focuses on practical applications of sta-
tistics in various fields.223 Similarly, “a language professor of the
practice might be expected to produce a textbook or articles on
215 Id.
216 Id; see also MIT Alumni Assn., Open Door: Ideas and Voices from MIT, Professors of
Practice, http://alumweb.mit.edu/opendoor/200104/practice.shtml (Apr. 2001).
217 See Fogg, supra n. 211, at A12.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id. at A13.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id. (noting that the professor also edited two books on applied statistics and wrote
more than sixty papers).

teaching, while public performances might suffice for a music pro-

fessor of the practice.”224 These scholarly efforts are not theory-
based but rather practical applications of these professors’ exper-
tise, designed to connect them with the practitioners in their
fields. Those schools that have adopted the professor of practice
position have found them to be critical in their mission to provide a
first-rate curriculum for their students.225 As a corollary, this title
recognizes and rewards people who do important work and who
help maintain a healthy academic balance between theory and
practice.226
V. CONCLUSION
Returning to Judge Edwards’s criticism of the decline of prac-

tical legal scholarship, one can perhaps challenge his conclusions
by focusing on his reliance on anecdotal evidence rather than sta-
tistics, but his overall conclusion should not be ignored—that it is
not enough to merely hire more practical scholars and then consid-
er the problem solved.227 Rather,
[t]he law school must make itself a congenial place for concrete,
“practical” analysis—a place where scholars of different ap-
proaches and ideologies accord each other the mutual respect
they deserve. Otherwise, “practical” scholars will be discour-
aged in their work, and prospective scholars deterred from en-
tering the academy.228
Phase one of Judge Edwards’s blueprint has already been
achieved in virtually every law school in the nation. Through their
legal writing faculties, law schools can count numerous practical
scholars among their professoriate. That these scholars have not
been identified to date is not solely the fault of the law schools or
their doctrinal faculties. Legal writing professors first need to rec-
ognize their unique area of expertise among law faculties, and
then stand up and be counted. A concerted effort needs to be made
to highlight our unique skills to our administrations and doctrinal
colleagues and to impress upon them the scholarly importance of
these skills. It is crucial that they understand that although our
224 Id. at A14.

225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Edwards, supra n. 45, at 51 (citations omitted).
228 Id.
skills may make us different than them, they do not make us less-
er scholars or our presence on our faculties any less vital to the
education of our students and service to the greater legal commu-
nity.
It is only then that the most important phase—the achieve-
ment of appropriate respect from our colleagues and full integra-
tion into our faculties—can even begin to take place. The professor
of practice model may provide an example of how this can be done
within law schools. Recognizing and embracing the unique skills
brought to the academic table by the legal writing professoriate is
crucial to the retention of these gifted practical scholars and to
encourage the type of scholarship desperately needed by the prac-
ticing bar. In addition, making these scholars feel welcome
through increased salaries and job security will encourage addi-
tional practical scholars to join the academy, thus helping the legal
academic community achieve the healthy balance between practi-
cal and theoretical scholars it has long been criticized for lack-
ing.229 Not until this is accomplished will the academy be able to
fully discharge its obligation to serve the system of justice.230
229 Id.; see also Waxman, supra n. 65, at 1912.

230 See Edwards, supra n. 45, at 38.
UNUSUAL CITINGS:
SOME THOUGHTS ON LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP
Colin P.A. Jones
Not to start out immodestly (don’t worry, it doesn’t last long),

but I am a cited author. I’m not Richard Posner or Laurence Tribe,
but try doing a LexisNexis or Google search on my name and you
will find cites to one or more of my legal publications. Send me a
self-addressed, stamped envelope in care of this publication, and I
will send you an autograph.
But seriously, this may seem like a mean-spirited Article, as it
deals with the process by which my limited body of published writ-
ings came to be cited, and questions whether other writers should
even be referring to me as an authority in their own writings. In
fact, as I will explain, my belief is that I should probably not have
been cited most of the times that I was. This Article will try to ex-
plain why I probably should not have been, but nevertheless was
cited, and what we can maybe learn from this.
Why am I doing this? Certainly not just as a form of self-
abuse. Rather, I think that the fact that, as of December 2004, I
am cited as an authority in at least eight other law review articles
can teach us something about the way many journals are edited,
the way our future lawyers are trained, and even the way law is
practiced. Readers who like closure should be warned that I don’t
come to any great conclusions, but rather make points and ask
questions, which I hope will lead to further discussions of the sub-
ject matter. Scholarly debate is what these journals are about, af-
ter all. Or is it?
By now the skillfully built-up suspense has probably become
close to unbearable, so let me start by elaborating about my publi-
cations. All of my publications were written when I was still a law
student. The first was a student note on proposed amendments to
Japan’s banking law and what they were expected to do to the
banking system at the time.1 This note was published in the jour-

Associate Professor, Doshisha University School of Law (Kyoto). A.B., University of
California at Berkeley, 1986; LL.M., Tohoku University, 1990; J.D./LL.M., Duke University
School of Law, 1993.
1 Colin P.A. Jones, Japanese Banking Reform: A Legal Analysis of Recent Develop-
ments, 3 Duke J. Comp. & Intl. L. 387 (1993).

nal of which I was one of the Articles Editors. (I had no part in the
decision to publish the Note—honestly.) I will refer to this publica-
tion as “Japanese Banking.” My qualifications for writing Japa-
nese Banking consisted of (a) having taken a class in United States
banking law and (b) being able to read Japanese materials on the
subject. I had no experience in the financial industry anywhere, let
alone in Japan.
Second, at the request of one of my professors, I wrote an
analysis on the latest installment of Japan’s epic saga to finish
building its principal international airport in Narita, near Tokyo.2
I wrote this paper for a special issue of a reputable but fairly ob-
scure (and now defunct, I believe) publication, Law in Japan, and
will refer to it in this Article as “Japanese Airport.” My qualifica-
tions for writing this paper were (a) the professor’s faith in my
ability to do so, (b) some knowledge of Japan’s legal system, and
(c) again, the ability to read Japanese statutes, court decisions,
and reference materials.
Finally, in a third-year seminar course on Law and National
Defense, I wrote a paper about the then-controversial sale of F-16
fighters by the United States to Taiwan and its relation to the
Taiwan Relations Act that governs United States relations with
the island.3 I was fairly pleased with how this paper turned out
and, on a whim, sent it to a number of journals, one of which very
kindly published it. As to my qualifications to write on this subject,
I confess to having none, other than having done some background
reading about the topic and having been interested in the unique
status of Taiwan in international law and politics.4 I will refer to
this article as “Taiwan F-16s.”
There you have it. That is my oeuvre of published and cited
scholarly legal writings.5 All were written at least ten years ago,
2 Colin P.A. Jones, Narita Airport and the Japanese Constitution: A Case Study, 24 L.
Japan 39 (1991). Perversely, due to various delays, the 1991 issue of Law in Japan was not
actually published until 1994, and my piece for it was written in 1992.
3 Colin P.A. Jones, United States Arms Exports to Taiwan under the Taiwan Rela-
tions Act: The Failed Role of Law in United States Foreign Relations, 9 Conn. J. Intl. L. 51
(1993).
4 Having said this, being interested in the topic is probably the most important quali-
fication to writing about anything.

5 Well, all right, I have some other recent publications that are more technical or
professional in nature, and seem much less likely to be cited, for reasons that we will get to.
I also have a translation of an essay on military history published in a book. Kiyoshi Ikeda,
JIsaburo Osawa, Men of War: Great Naval Captains of World War II (Stephen Howarth ed.,
1993). A Google Search now also turns up the following: Colin P.A. Jones, Japan’s Tele-
communications Business Dispute Resolution Committee, 6 World Telecom L. Rep. (newsltr.
2005] Unusual Citings 379
and all on topics I have largely forgotten about. This is probably a

good thing because if I had too many more publications out there
that were cited by yet further publications, this Article would
probably not be possible; it would contain more footnotes than ei-
ther reader or author would be prepared to deal with.
To recap, as of December 2004, my works have been cited in at
least eight other scholarly works.6 I say “at least,” because that is
all I could find online. For all I know, I may be cited as an authori-
ty in hundreds of books, magazines, periodicals, or other media
that are not amenable to online searching. This illustrates one of
the points I discuss.
I should make it clear at this point that I have no intention of
making any explicit judgments regarding the merits of any of the
pieces that cite my work. Indeed, I confess to not having even read
any of them in full. This may sound like laziness on my part, and
of course it is, but it also helps to illustrate yet another of my
points.
Before getting to those and other points, however, I will briefly
summarize the ways in which my works have been cited. Japanese
Banking is the most popular of my works, accounting for six of the
eight citations I have generated.7 In contrast, Japanese Airport
of BNAI Servs.) 23 (May 2003). Finally, a short essay on law and morality was published in
spring 2004, after the current Article was submitted for publication. Colin P.A. Jones, Law
and Morality in Evolutionary Competition (and Why Morality Loses), 15 U. Fla. J.L. & Pub.
Policy 285 (2004).
6 I promise that this will be the longest footnote this Article contains. The publica-
tions in question are the following: Dennis Bower, Student Author, An Evaluation of the
Proposed Fair Trade in Financial Services Act, 27 Case W. Res. J. Intl. L. 407, 433 n. 210
(1995) (citing Japanese Banking); Christopher J. Carolan, Student Author, The “Republic of
Taiwan”: A Legal-Historical Justification for a Taiwanese Declaration of Independence, 75
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429, 435 nn. 39–40, 436 n. 50, 438 n. 65 (2000) (citing Taiwan F-16s); An-
drew Chin, Spoiling the Surprise: Constraints Facing Random Regulatory Inspections in
Japan and the United States, 20 Nw. J. Intl. L. & Bus. 99, 118 n. 141 (1999) (citing Japa-
nese Banking); Christopher A. Ford, The Indigenization of Constitutionalism in the Japa-
nese Experience, 28 Case W. Res. J. Intl. L. 3, 36 nn. 151–153 (1996) (citing Japanese Air-
port); Akiko Karaki, Regulation and Compliance in Japanese Financial Institutions, 14
Colum. J. Asian L. 327, 339 n. 18 (2001) (citing Japanese Banking); Lawrence L.C. Lee, The
Basle Accords As Soft Law: Strengthening International Banking Supervision, 39 Va. J. Intl.
L. 1, 2 n. 7 (1998) (citing Japanese Banking); Brian Arthur Popper, Student Author, The
Japanese Financial Reform of 1993: Will Reform Spark Innovation? 28 Cornell Intl. L.J.
525, 526 n. 9, 530 n. 41, 531 n 47, 546 n. 148, 547 n. 154, 550 n. 174, 558 n. 224 (1995) (cit-
ing Japanese Banking); and Eric C. Sibbitt, A Brave New World for M&A of Financial Insti-
tutions in Japan: Big Bang Financial Deregulation and the New Environment for Corporate
Combinations of Financial Institutions, 19 U. Pa. J. Intl. Econ. L. 965, 977 n. 49, 983 n. 81,
989 n. 107, 991 n. 119 (1998) (citing Japanese Banking).
7 See supra n. 6 (discussing the articles by Dennis Bower, Andrew Chin, Akiko Kara-
ki, Lawerence L.C. Lee, Brian Arthur Pomper, and Eric C. Sibbitt). Just to be clear, when I
refer to a number of citations, I am referring to the number of articles that cite my works,
and Taiwan F-16s merited only one citation each.8 Of my eight

citations, three are contained in student-written notes, and five
are articles by practicing lawyers (or persons who had become
practicing lawyers by the time their articles were published, as
was the case with two of my own articles).
Based on these citations, we can see several things. The first
is that apparently I am, or at least was, an authority on Japanese
banking law. Granted, I have practiced law in Japan for a number
of years and worked on securities offerings for Japanese banks,
but this came after I wrote Japanese Banking. Even with the bene-
fit of practical experience, I can’t say I ever really thought of my-
self as an authority. I have some familiarity with the banking sys-
tem in Japan and how the financial system works in that country,
but I think I would be hard pressed to fill more than a handwrit-
ten page with what I can coherently express as my “knowledge” of
Japanese banking law. As noted above, my qualifications for writ-
ing Japanese Banking consisted at the time of having taken a class
in United States banking law and being able to read Japanese
(and being willing to do the work, which is no small thing, of
course).
None of this should necessarily detract from my ability to
write on the subject of banking law in Japan or any other subject,
if by doing so I make a contribution to the scholarship on the sub-
ject—if I add something new to the field. But looking at the cita-
tions to Japanese Banking, virtually all of them are to expository
parts of the piece in which I give factual descriptions of what was
happening in the Japanese banking system at the time and why.
The cites, therefore, are directly or indirectly to factual material
that I myself did not generate or analyze but rather gathered from
newspapers, magazines, and other sources. By reading and sum-
marizing Japanese-language materials on the subject, I may have
provided a service to authors who are not able to do so.9 But this
does not change the basic nature of my contribution. One writer,
for example, cites me as “identifying 1991 banking scandals as im-
petus for Financial System Reform Act” being implemented in Ja-
rather than the number of footnotes. Generally, an article that cites my work does so on
multiple occasions.
8 See supra n. 6 (discussing the articles by Christopher J. Carolan and Christopher A.
Ford).
9 That said, most authors citing Japanese Banking appear to have the necessary
language skill to do so without my intermediation.

pan.10 Another flatters me by both quoting and citing me in a

lengthy footnote as a source for his summary description of the
history of Japan’s financial industry, and as a source for facts re-
garding the reforms I wrote about.11 Yet another cites me as one of
many sources of background on events in individual countries that
led to the need for increased international banking supervision.12
And I am cited to support the assertion that United States Glass-
Steagall type banking-security style segregation was alien to the
Japanese financial industry.13 I won’t bore you with describing the
rest of the citations to Japanese Banking, other than to note that
they are of a similar character. In summary, therefore, my contri-
bution is limited to my role as a compiler and transmitter of factu-
al materials already available elsewhere, rather than as an author
making useful insights about law.
The note citing Taiwan F-16s also uses my work several times
as a factual source; I am apparently an authority on Chinese his-
tory. Thus, I am cited as a source for the fact that the Communist
Chinese under Mao defeated Chiang Kai-shek in the Chinese Civil
War of 1949, that the United States treated Taiwan as a “strate-
gic” ally for some time thereafter, and a couple of other startlingly
well-known (I hope) historical facts.14 Because I was not required
to provide citations for some of these facts (the Nationalists’ 1949
defeat by the Communists, for example) in Taiwan F-16s, I have
effectively become a primary historical source.
My contribution to the scholarship of others through Japanese
Airport is in a pair of quotes in which I characterize the Japanese
Supreme Court decision that I was analyzing and the evaluation of
my views expressed in these quotes by Mr. Ford, the author citing
my work. This evaluation is contained in his own analysis of the
indigenization of constitutionalism in Japan.15 According to Mr.
Ford, my comments may overstate the novelty of the Narita hold-
ing (the Japanese Supreme Court decision I wrote about)—but
they do not overstate its impact upon constitutionally guaranteed
individual rights.16
10 Chin, supra n. 6, at 118 n. 141.

11 Sibbitt, supra n. 6, at 977 n. 49, 983 n. 81.
12 Lee, supra n. 6, at 2 n. 7.
13 Bower, supra n. 6, at 433, n. 210.
14 See Carolan, supra n. 6, at 435 nn. 39–40, 436 n. 50, 438 n. 65.
15 Ford, supra n. 6, at 36.
16 Id.
I include the last quote not to inflate my own ego, but because
I consider these two quotations of mine and Mr. Ford’s analysis to
be my only true published contribution to the legal scholarship of
others as of December 2004. Virtually every other citation to my
work is to me not as a legal scholar, but to me as a gatherer, com-
piler, and translator of factual information. Whether I am a quali-
fied and reliable source of information on Japanese banking and
Chinese history is open to debate; I like to think that I did my
homework, but will also be the first to admit that there is a large
body of published writers on the subjects in question who were and
are far more authoritative than I can ever hope to be. And yet I am
the one who was cited.
This brings me to some of the points I want to raise about the
way lawyers are trained at United States law schools, as evidenced
by the student-edited law review process. First, do we really need
all those citations? The note citing Taiwan F-16s in several places
is thirty-nine pages long and contains 251 footnotes, an average of
more than six footnotes per page. While it is, of course, flattering
to be cited in this work, the idea that Mao winning the Chinese
Civil War needs support for the benefit of anyone intelligent
enough to be reading the New York University Law Review, is sur-
prising to say the least. And it is perhaps also counterproductive,
because most intelligent readers don’t like having that intelligence
insulted through underestimation.17 But if we accept that this
statement of fact is needed, it is perhaps even more surprising that
the requirement can then be satisfied by referring to me. Referring
to my work might even be forgivable if that led into a further
“chain of evidence” that took the reader to a more reputable factu-
al source, but as I explained, it does not.
But perhaps the footnotes are all necessary, and the quality of
the support does not need to be dealt with. Perhaps. If you accept
that editing a law review and writing a note are part of the educa-
tional process provided by law schools (typically to its top stu-
dents), then the unnatural rigor by which the support for factual
assertions in a published article must both be provided by its au-
thor and demanded by the publication’s editorial staff might make
17 In the process of editing a piece on law and morality that was published after this
Article was first submitted for publication, Law and Morality in Evolutionary Competition
(and Why Morality Loses), supra n. 5, I was asked by the publishing journal’s student edito-
rial staff to produce a citation in support of the fact that President Clinton received fellatio
from an intern in the White House. I declined to do so on the grounds that providing a cite
for such an infamous happening would actually detract from the quality of the article.
sense, if they are regarded as being a part of this educational pro-

cess. Perhaps it is part of the training that goes into generating
the level of excessive attention to detail in young lawyers that is
deemed desirable by law firms and other prospective employers.
Thus, just as many law school exams include unrealistic fact pat-
terns, student-edited publications that unrealistically require ex-
cessive citations to prove well-known facts may also make sense as
part of the educational process—if the primary goal is to produce
lawyers who have the discipline to back up every statement they
make, that is.
But wait a minute. Do we really want lawyers to be this way?
Surely we want lawyers, or at least legal scholars, who are trained
to back up their statements with the best possible authorities, not
just any authority. And here is my second point: Where is the qual-
ity control and the sense of context in the authorities chosen?
Surely these are as important to a legal argument as the reasoning
they support. It is admirable to demand that all factual assertions
be supported by outside evidence. Indeed, this may be required of
lawyers in litigation in the absence of stipulations to the contrary.
But not all information is equal, and a multitude of “facts” does not
equal true knowledge or even a correct conclusion.18 I hope I would
be laughed out of any court in which I was presented as an expert
witness on the subject of Chinese history. And unlike litigation, in
which the adversarial process may help to weed out ridiculous as-
sertions, there is no such overtly adversarial process involved in
editing a law review, nor am I saying that there should be. But
even the adversarial process and the detailed evidentiary rules
involved in litigation do not (apparently) prevent so-called “junk
science” science and other similar “support” from putative experts
from becoming an endemic problem in American courtrooms.19 Is it
18 For example, what then of facts? They are meant to be the building blocks of ration-
ality.
It is a fact that the world is flat. It is a fact that Thalidomide stops morning
sickness. It is a fact that feeding dead sheep to cows is an effective method for
raising livestock. . . . That cigarettes do not cause cancer. That men are more
rational than women. That the Maginot Line will stop the German army. . . .
That spraying asbestos on our walls and ceilings creates an effective insulation
for buildings. . . .
Among all of these, the fact to last the longest as a fact is the one which
states that the world is flat. It must therefore be the truest of the group. Indeed,
the most rational.
John Ralston Saul, On Equilibrium: Six Qualities of the New Humanism 296 (Four Walls
Eight Windows 2004).
19 See e.g. Robert L. Park, Voodoo Science: The Road from Foolishness to Fraud (Ox-
any different to require that all assertions of fact in a publication

be supported by sources but then to allow the requirement to be
satisfied simply by providing a cite—any cite?20 Is it any wonder
that the practice of law has evolved into a search for any plausible
“factual” support for a claimant’s factual assertions, rather than a
more considered attempt to find (cynicism filters on, please)—the
truth?21
In fact, I would suggest, and this is point number three, that
the apparent focus on quantity of cites over quality may engender
a sort of intellectual laziness on the part of authors and editors
alike, a laziness that may not be serving the legal profession well
in the long run. This laziness is undoubtedly heightened by the
availability of most recent law review articles online in searchable
databases such as LexisNexis, which is made available to law
schools. While such databases are valuable research tools, they
also makes it easy for the users to seek support for their writings
in the law review database, even when the support needed is out-
ford U. Press 2000). Regarding United States courts’ response to some of these issues, see
e.g. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595–596 (1993) (“Respondent ex-
presses apprehension that abandonment of ‘general acceptance’ as the exclusive require-
ment for admission [of scientific evidence] will result in a ‘free-for-all’ in which befuddled
juries are confounded by absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions. In this regard
respondent seems to us to be overly pessimistic about the capabilities of the jury and of the
adversary system generally. Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence,
and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of
attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”). Of course, despite what a jury might ultimately
think of it, pseudo-scientific evidence may suffice to establish a prima facie case as part of
an effort to force a pretrial settlement that is of course doubtless the goal of some lawyers.
20 This is an oversimplification of the realities of the law review editing process, of
course. Student editors who happen to have common sense and possibly some knowledge of
the subject area may require more when cites provided by an author are clearly inadequate.
I personally spiked the publication of an article about China when, among other things, the
author persisted in citing a Fodor’s travel guide for statistical information about that coun-
try.
21 The framers of the Constitution intended the civil jury to be drawn from the same
community as the litigants, “informed by community values,” and intended to assist the
trial judge in finding the “just” conclusion as to both fact and law without the arbitrary
fact/law to which their role is subject in modern courts. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of
Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 84, 88–89 (Yale U. Press 1998). Similarly, one original
reason for the importance of public trials in American law was that members of the public
might actually have knowledge relevant to the case at hand—to “infuse public knowledge
into the trial itself, and, in turn, to satisfy the public that truth had prevailed at trial.” Id.
at 113. By contrast, juries in modern trials have become anonymous groupings of people
who must provide a very simple output (“not guilty” or “negligent”) based upon input con-
trolled by the most complex evidentiary rules in the world. A key requirement for becoming
a juror is the absence of any knowledge or connection with the case at issue or the parties
involved. This evolution contributes to the willingness of some lawyers to back their claims
with dubious factual support, as a juror or fact-finding judge may have limited time, incen-
tive, or even ability to examine the quality of such support.
side the realm of legal scholarship. I would speculate that most of

the citations to my work can be attributed to online searches by
authors seeking material on subjects related to their own that can
be used to support their own assertions regarding the Japanese
banking system, the Chinese Civil War, or whatever. This specula-
tion is based on personal experience: In Taiwan F-16s, I found my-
self having been guilty of citing another law review article repeat-
edly to support a number of factual matters, such as the date of
establishment of the People’s Republic of China.22 The fact that the
cited law review article may be one, two, or three steps removed
from primary sources, or not refer to them at all, does not seem to
matter much in the editorial process.
It may also be a coincidence, but the one article in which I
consider to have contributed (albeit minutely) to legal scholarship,
appeared in a publication—Law in Japan—that to my knowledge
is not available anywhere online. My other more recent publica-
tions are also in books or BNA publications that are not, to my
knowledge, readily searchable online.
This leads us to point number four. I know from personal ex-
perience that when editors demand that I provide cites to support
factual assertions, it is much easier to find such support online in
an isolated paragraph than to go to a library and find proper au-
thority in a book one has actually read enough of to be satisfied
that it actually supports the assertion. Searchable databases may
allow for great efficiencies: “the-heroin-is-free-until-you-graduate”
online access provided to students by LexisNexis and Westlaw cer-
tainly provides one of the easiest ways of finding “authoritative”
support for just about anything. The LexisNexis LAWREV data-
base is a particularly fruitful source of law review articles that
contains all sorts of citable factual information. But if all that
happens is that an editor demands that a cite be produced, and the
author finds a law review article online that contains a paragraph
or a footnote that satisfies the requirement, the whole process
seems meaningless and can probably be satisfied in fifteen or
twenty minutes (speaking again from personal experience). In an
ideal world, though, the source cited should have played a part in
the article being written in the first place.
22 E.g. Jones, Taiwan F-16s, supra n. 3, at 52 n. 3 (citing Christian C. Day, Maintain-
ing the Dragon’s Teeth: Balanced Sales of Advanced Weapons and High Technology to the
Two Chinas—An Exercise in Balance of Power Policies by the United States, 13 Syracuse J.
Intl. L. & Com. 29, 42 (1986)).
I am by no means decrying the convenience of databases as a

research tool, but if I am correct about the level of reliance on
them, there is an even more significant implication to such reli-
ance. That is this—to the extent that most databases require some
sort of keyword search, a researcher must have some preconceived
notion about what is being sought for him or her to even formulate
the necessary search terms. Translated into the practice of law, a
lawyer could reach a preferred conclusion, and then simply formu-
late a database search that will support that conclusion. It be-
comes irrelevant that finding such support online may be the re-
sult of a keyword search and have nothing to do with the author
first making the statement for which such support was deemed
necessary.
Because what we know is infinitely less than what we do not,
serendipity is a highly underrated yet important force in expand-
ing that knowledge. Browsing the stacks of a library or table of
contents of a book or journal can lead us to sources and lines of
thinking that we would not otherwise have imagined. Yet by rely-
ing on technology that works primarily through reliance on
searches using specific search terms, we limit ourselves to the
knowledge from which such keywords are derived. Thus, we may
be inculcating our law students—our lawyers—not with a sense of
inquiry, but with a mentality that seeks to support conclusions
that have been formed before the support for them was even pro-
duced. Or, to put it more bluntly, I should not be cited as an au-
thority for anything related to the history of the Chinese Civil War
just because I showed up in a database search. There are plenty of
books on the subject by historians who have devoted their lives to
the subject, at least one of whom should probably have been read
by anyone writing about the issue of Taiwanese independence.
The issue of technology in research leads to my fifth point. It
is much easier now than it was twenty years ago to produce a cita-
tion on short notice. But the mere state of being online may have
the effect of rendering all online sources equal in stature, particu-
larly when any citation will satisfy a busy editor. The Internet is a
wonderful thing, as are the online legal databases, but the Inter-
net also makes the border between what is available online and
what is not much less enticing to cross. Unfortunately, this border
is not one of quality, but of convenience, and may result in the
marginalization of authoritative publications that are not availa-
ble online. Or put another way, the easy availability of online
sources makes it easier for authors and editors alike to use what is
easy to find, rather than what is authoritative.
Most people in the legal profession are able to access online
legal databases, the content of which is created primarily by legal
professionals. And yet, as I have tried to show, legal databases are
often used as a source of information by writers on non-legal sub-
jects—in my case history, but perhaps science, psychology, and
other fields—where, absent unique qualifications, the writings of a
lawyer should probably not constitute even a secondary source of
information.
What can be done? It is probably unreasonable to expect law
students (and maybe other part-time editors) to judge the suitabil-
ity of the sources used in each article they edit. However, a few
simple rules might improve the reliability and credibility of their
publications.
First, absent special circumstances, law review articles should
not be permissible sources except with respect to assertions, facts,
and conclusions about law or related fields. Authors should be re-
quired to do their homework and provide proper support for their
writings from authorities in the appropriate fields, be it Chinese
history, physics, or sanitary engineering. There will be a certain
amount of gray area in making this determination, but certain
types of citation (e.g., to me as an authority on Chinese history)
will, I hope, be clearly unacceptable.
Second, a certain degree of respect should be afforded the in-
telligence of the target audience of law review articles. Most read-
ers of law review articles will be intelligent people with law de-
grees and professional qualifications, i.e., lawyers. Thus, the basic
writing principle of “assume your reader knows nothing” should be
discarded, not only because it may be vaguely insulting to readers
to have their intelligence underestimated, but because it would
also save pages and unnecessary effort on the part of authors and
editors alike if legal scholars did not have to state the obvious.
Time is finite for all of us, and the less time authors and editors
have to spend finding cites for facts known by intelligent readers,
the more time they can spend on the more controversial portions of
an article.
Third, any cite to a source that was found online should be
given particular attention by editorial staff. The entire source
should be reviewed to ensure that the portion cited is not being
taken out of context or otherwise cited in a way inconsistent with
the original author’s overall thesis. It should, unfortunately, be
assumed that a citation to an online source was produced after the

article was first written, and therefore, does not directly play a
part in the evolution of the author’s thinking when he or she wrote
the piece. This assumption may not always be true, of course, but
editors should at least keep it in mind.
Fourth, the principles that apply to scholarship in other fields
should be kept in mind in all law review publications. More than
other disciplines perhaps, those writing about law are by training
more inclined to focus on advocacy—upon coming up with a plau-
sible argument. In addition, law is unique in academia in having a
substantial number of scholarly publications that are edited by
students. This means that these publications are not peer-
reviewed journals that are typical in other fields. While this prob-
ably contributes to the dissemination of a greater diversity of
views in legal scholarship than is perhaps possible in other disci-
plines, it poses a different problem—the necessarily limited famil-
iarity of law students with much of the subject matter they must
edit. To the extent that faculty members or practicing lawyers who
know something about the subject in question are available to re-
view a particular piece, they should be asked to do so. This would
add at least an element of peer review to the publication process.
Since the audience for law reviews will not expand with the sup-
ply, those publications that develop a reputation for quality control
and relevance to practicing lawyers and legal scholars alike are
more likely to succeed in influencing these audiences.
Finally, we should probably reacquaint ourselves with a basic
truth—that facts are not the same as knowledge. Just because we
can find online dozens, hundreds, maybe thousands of sources that
relate to what we are writing, their mere existence does not add to
our understanding of the subject matter unless we invest the time
and thought in acquiring the knowledge that such understanding
entails. If anything, the availability of so much information at our
fingertips should be humbling; it should remind us that we may
need to work harder to understand the underlying subject matter
rather than just narrow our search parameters to find a paragraph
or sentence that satisfies a citation requirement. Facts and infor-
mation do not become knowledge until processed and put into con-
text by the human mind. By having so much information so readily
available and allowing this information to be used in a pointillist
fashion as post-facto support for asserted knowledge, we may be in
danger of disengaging our minds from key aspects of the learning
process. The publication process should not just encourage advoca-
cy and the accumulation of information; it should encourage the

formulation and dissemination of knowledge.
A SONG COMMEMORATING THE 20TH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE LWI, AND
CELEBRATING ITS MOVE FROM
SEATTLE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL
OF LAW TO MERCER UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW
David S. Caudill
Everyone knows, the Institute is in Seattle.

Everyone knows in the Northwest, you’ve got a friend.
But imagine a conference with a deep southern accent,
’Cause the LWI is now “gone with the wind.”1
Chorus:
“Make me an angel”2
who can fly down to Georgia.
Give me a town where it’s a hundred-and-five.
And that’s not a dry heat—There’s no cool summer mornings,
You need air-conditioning, in Macon, to stay alive.3
If we ever meet at Mercer, there’s no high snowy mountain.

There’s pine trees and red dirt and nothin’ obstructing your view.
There ain’t no harbor, no chilly dinner cruises,
But there’ll be an open field, filled with pork BBQ.
I hate to sound mushy, or romanticize this LEXIS luncheon,

But this is an audience, where metaphors are no joke.
If dreams were lightning, and hard work was thunder,
“This old house would’ve burned down, a long time ago.”4

To be sung to the melody of John Prine’s “Angel from Montgomery” (Sour Grapes
Music/Walden Music 1972), as performed by Susan Tedeschi on her CD, Just Won’t Burn
(Tone-Cool 1998).

Professor of Law and Arthur M. Goldberg Family Chair in Law, Villanova Universi-
ty School of Law. Professor Caudill performed this song at the LWI Anniversary Luncheon
on July 23, 2004; special thanks to Jay Boone, the “Soul Proprietor” of Emerald City Gui-
tars in Seattle, for providing the away-from-home gear.
1 To avoid plagiarism, which phenomenon is the subject of an ongoing project of LWI,
the phrase “gone with the wind” should be attributed to Margaret Mitchell, the author of
the novel by that name and published by Scribner in 1936.
2 “Make me an angel” is also the opening line of the chorus in Prine’s “Angel from
Montgomery.” Supra n. *.
3 This chorus would have been much more humorous but for the fact that a heat wave
struck Seattle during the 2004 LWI conference; the weather was actually much more pleas-
ant that week in Macon, Georgia.
4 Prine’s “Angel from Montgomery,” includes the phrase, “If lightning was desire, and
dreams were thunder, this old house would’ve burned down a long time ago.” Supra n. *.
“STUCK IN THE MIDDLE

WITH YOU”
Terri LeClercq
I’m in the law firm 18 hours a day,

And I don’t know how it turned out this way.
I get a feeling that I’m playing the fool; 1
Hell, I might as well go teach at law school.
Deadlines to the left of me, billing hours to the right,

Here I am, stuck in the middle with you.
Yes, I dreamed of intellectual peers,

No memos stacked way passed my ears.
But I have students who can’t jump-start their brains,
And faculty that don’t know my name. 2
Dean to the left of me, stacks of paper to the right,

And here I am, stuck in the middle with you.
Well, you make a difference and are proud to be teaching law,

And your students come running and begging for help and say,
“Please, please!”
So I’m doing this job for almost free,

No time for lunch but for lots of coffee,
I’ve finally learned to teach analysis, 3
But the 3-year cap is my good-bye kiss.4
Because deans to the left of me, stacks of papers on my right,

Here I am, stuck in the middle with you, stuck in the middle with you.

A satire based on Keith Urban’s lyrics for Stealers Wheel’s eponymous song, first
recorded in 1973. Keith Urban, In the Ranch (Capitol 2004) (CD). This song was used in
conjunction with the plenary speech, “The Past, Present, and Future: The Legal Writing
Institute,” in Knoxville, Tennessee, in 2002.

Lecturer and Fellow, Norman Black Professorship in Ethical Communication in
Law, University of Texas School of Law.
1 This depression does not reflect the view of the Author or anyone she has ever
talked to (or at least officially documented).

2 Author’s prerogative; here, “faculty” is plural and thus easier to fit into the line.
3 See every legal writing/analysis text ever published for background help in achiev-
ing this goal.

4 The antiquated dinosaur of caps needs to die and become fossil fuel for other legal
writing advancements.

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Legal Writing

The Journal of the

VOLUME 11 ____________________________________________ 2005

IN MEMORIAM ....................................................................... vii

THE GOLDEN PEN AWARD

Expanding Our Classroom Walls:

Taking the Road Less Traveled: Why

“Stuck in the Middle with You” ..................... Terri LeClercq 395

Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you for this handsome golden

D. Category Four: The Institutional Choices Affecting the

In this Article, we explore the questions of whether legal writ-

own scholarship. It provides a vehicle for finding and using schol-

large percentage of non-legal writing topics among publications by

We began this project in 2000, when we contacted legal writ-

6 See infra n. 204 and accompanying text.

check our results. We returned to the project in 2001, updating the

III. WHAT THE BIBLIOGRAPHY SHOWS

The most important observations pertain to the number,

in other areas such as constitutional law, contracts, property,

cause the field is nascent and because, historically, institutional

expected to write in those other areas as well. Undoubtedly, the

18 Infra nn. 53–61 and accompanying text.

legal writing professors almost certainly will choose topics with an

24 Ralph L. Brill et al., Sourcebook on Legal Writing Programs 5 (ABA 1997).

Writing (Aspen L. & Bus. 2002).

949, 970 (1996).

interdisciplinary topic, may be subject to this larger scholarly de-

IV. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SCHOLARSHIP

Law schools devote substantial resources to the production of

31 See infra nn. 161–184 and accompanying text.

spend on scholarly research and writing leave less time availa-

35 McDowell, supra n. 30, at 265.

expands the knowledge we can share with our students; if it be-

Mich. L. Rev. 1835, 1847–1848 (1988).

described as prescription, or recommendation. . . . The entire field crackles with normativi-

sionmaker describes the conceptual structure of the work, the

transformation and pleasure do not, alone, justify the resource ex-

V. WHAT IS A “LEGAL WRITING TOPIC”?52

Most law professors would agree that the content of a particu-

e.g. Leslie Espinoza, Labeling Scholarship: Recognition or Barrier to Legitimacy, 10 St.

more theoretical article analyzing the economic underpinnings of

Law Course: A Study of Syllabi, 47 J. Leg. Educ. 205 (1997).

well. See Smith, supra n. 19, at 5–21.

ploration of each of these categories will clarify the scope of legal

A. Category One: The Substance or Doctrine of Legal Writing

The first category—the substance or doctrine of legal writing—

60 For an initial understanding of legal writing scholarship, it is useful to think in

interpretive canons for judging the meaning and weight of those

62 Brill et al., supra n. 24, at 5; see also id. at 15–19.

chusetts); and Keeble v. Hickeringill69 (a 1707 case from an English

Dukeminer & Krier, supra n. 66, at 36 n. 16).

(cited in Dukeminer & Krier, supra n. 66, at 37).

application of a doctrine or other topic, exposing questions and

methods of statutory interpretation, literary criticism, and

82 Scott Fruehwald, Pragmatic Textualism and the Limits of Statutory Interpretation:

profession,86 while avoiding the concern of being too theoretical to

B. Category Two: The Theoretical Foundations of Legal Writing

All legal fields rest upon theoretical foundations, and many

Curriculum, 34 John Marshall L. Rev. 49 (2000) [hereinafter Languages]; Joel Cornwell,

discuss the relationship of emotions to the more rational

of Emotions: An Explanation of the Phenomenology of Emotions and Rationality with Sug-

can serve legal decision-makers even if it is not addressed to that

C. Category Three: The Theory and Practice Appropriate to the