G.R. No. 127578 February 15, 1999 1. To pay plaintiff the sum of not less than P2,000.

1. To pay plaintiff the sum of not less than P2,000.00 per month for every month since June
1, 1987 as support in arrears which defendant failed to provide plaintiff shortly after her birth
in June 1987 up to present;
MANUEL DE ASIS, petitioner,
2. To give plaintiff a monthly allowance of P5,000.00 to be paid in advance on or before the
vs.
5th of each and every month.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JAIME T. HAMOY, Branch 130, RTC, Kalookan City and GLEN
3. To give plaintiff by way of support pendente lite a monthly allowance of P5,000.00 per
CAMIL ANDRES DE ASIS represented by her mother/guardian VIRCEL D.
month, the first monthly allowance to start retroactively from the first day of this month and
ANDRES, respondents.
the subsequent ones to be paid in advance on or before the 5th of each succeeding month.
4. To pay the costs of suit.
Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 oft he Revised Rules of Court seeking to nullify the decision of Plaintiff prays for such other relief just and equitable under the premises. 3
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court's Orders, dated November 25, 1993 and
February 4, 1994, respectively, denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint in Civil Case
On October 8, 1993, petitioner moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground of res judicata,
No. C-16107, entitled "Glen Camil Andres de Asis, etc. vs. Manuel de Asis", and the motion for
alleging that Civil Case C-16107 is barred by the prior judgment which dismissed with prejudice
reconsideration.
Civil Case Q -88-935.

The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the petition at bar are as follows:
In the Order dated November 25, 1993 denying subject motion to dismiss, the trial court ruled
that res judicata is inapplicable in an action for support for the reason that renunciation or waiver
On October 14, 1988, Vircel D. Andres, (the herein private respondent) in her capacity as the of future support is prohibited by law. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order met
legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and the same fate. It was likewise denied.
support against Manuel de Asis, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-935 before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, alleging that the defendant Manuel de Asis (the petitioner here)
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari. But on June 7, 1996, the Court of
is the father of subject minor Glen Camil Andres de Asis, and the former refused and/or failed to
Appeals found that the said Petition devoid of merit and dismissed the same.
provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands.

Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this court via the present petition, posing the question
In his Answer, petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor and theorized that he cannot
whether or not the public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
therefore be required to provide support for him.
excess of jurisdiction in upholding the denial of the motion to dismiss by the trial court, and
holding that an action for support cannot be barred by res judicata.
On July 4, 1989, private respondent Vircel D. Andres, through counsel, sent in a manifestation the
pertinent portion of which, reads;
To buttress his submission, petitioner invokes the previous dismissal of the Complaint for
1. That this proposed Amended Answer, defendant (herein petitioner) has
maintenance and support, Civil Case Q-88-935, filed by the mother and guardian of the minor,
made a judicial admission/declaration that "1). defendant denies that the said
Glen Camil Andres de Asis, (the herein private respondent). In said case, the complainant
minor child (Glen Camil) is his child 2) he (petitioner) has no obligation to the
manifested that because of the defendant's judicial declaration denying that he is the father of
plaintiff Glen Camil . . .
subject minor child, it was "futile and a useless exercise to claim support from defendant".
2. That with the aforesaid judicial admission/declarations by the defendant, it
Because of such manifestation, and defendant's assurance that he would not pursue his
seems futile and a useless exercise to claim support from said defendant.
counterclaim anymore, the parties mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the complaint.
3. That under the foregoing circumstances it would be more practical that
The motion was granted by the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, which then dismissed the case
plaintiff withdraws the complains against the defendant subject to the
with prejudice.
condition that the defendant should not pursue his counterclaim in the above-
entitled case, . . . 1
By virtue of the said manifestation, both the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to move for the Petitioner contends that the aforecited manifestation, in effect admitted the lack of filiation
dismissal of the case. Acting thereupon, the Regional Trial Court a quo issued the following Order between him and the minor child, which admission binds the complainant, and since the obligation
of August 8, 1989, dismissing Civil Case No. Q-88-935 with prejudice, to wit: to give support is based on the existence of paternity and filiation between the child and the
Acting on the manifestation of Atty. Romualdo C. delos Santos, counsel for putative parent, the lack thereof negates the right to claim for support. Thus, petitioner maintains
the defendant, that counsel for the plaintiff Atty. Ismael J. Andres has no that the dismissal of the Complaint by the lower court on the basis of the said manifestation bars
objection that this case be withdrawn provided that the defendant will the present action for support, especially so because the order of the trial court explicitly stated
withdraw the counterclaim, as prayed for, let the case be dismissed with that the dismissal of the case was with prejudice.
prejudice.
SO ORDERED.2
The petition is not impressed with merit.

On September 7, 1995, another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against
The right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Article
Manuel A. de Asis, this time in the name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by her legal
301 of the Civil Code, the law in point, reads:
guardian/mother, Vircel D. Andres. Docketed as Civil Case No. C-16107 before Branch 130 of the
Regional Trial Court of Kalookan, the said Complaint prayed, thus:
Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced, nor can it be transmitted to a third
person. Neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor. . . .
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that judgment
be rendered ordering defendant:
Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise.
 Art. 2035, ibid, provides, that:
No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime.
The raison d' etre behind the proscription against renunciation, transmission and/or compromise
of the right to support is stated, thus:
The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his existence,
he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning the
voluntary giving up of life itself. The right to life cannot be renounce; hence, support which is
the means to attain the former, cannot be renounced.
xxx xxx xxx
To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a person to
support is virtually to allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public burden.
This is contrary to public policy. 4
In the case at bar, respondent minor's mother, who was the plaintiff in the first case, manifested
that she was withdrawing the case as it seemed futile to claim support from petitioner who denied
his paternity over the child. Since the right to claim for support is predicated on the existence of
filiation between the minor child and the putative parent, petitioner would like us to believe that
such manifestation admitting the futility of claiming support from him puts the issue to rest and
bars any and all future complaint for support.
The manifestation sent in by respondent's mother in the first case, which acknowledged that it
would be useless to pursue its complaint for support, amounted to renunciation as it severed the
vinculum that gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim support from his putative parent, the
petitioner. Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the petitioner and respondent's
mother for the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the
dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. It
violates the prohibition against any compromise of the right to support.
Thus, the admission made by counsel for the wife of the facts alleged in a motion of the husband,
in which the latter prayed that his obligation to support be extinguished cannot be considered as
an assent to the prayer, and much less, as a waiver of the right to claim for support. 5
It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must first be shown between the
claimant and the parent. However, paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship
that must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence. It
cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.
The civil status of a son having been denied, and this civil status, from which the right to support is
derived being in issue, it is apparent that no effect can be .given to such a claim until an
authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause. 6
Although in the case under scrutiny, the admission may be binding upon the respondent, such an
admission is at most evidentiary and does not conclusively establish the lack of filiation.
Neither are we persuaded by petitioner's theory that the dismissal with prejudice of Civil Case Q-
88-935 has the effect of res judicata on the subsequent case for support. The case of Advincula
vs. Advincula 7 comes to the fore. In Advincula, the minor, Manuela Advincula, instituted a case
for acknowledgment and support against her putative father, Manuel Advincula. On motion of both
parties and for the reason that the "plaintiff has lost interest and is no longer interested in
continuing the case against the defendant and has no further evidence to introduce in support of
the complaint", the case was dismissed. Thereafter, a similar case was instituted by Manuela,
which the defendant moved to dismiss, theorizing that the dismissal of the first case precluded the
filing of the second case.
In disposing such case, this Court ruled, thus:
The new Civil Code provides that the allowance for support is provisional because the amount
may be increased or decreased depending upon the means of the giver and the needs of the
recipient (Art. 297); and that the right to receive support cannot be renounced nor can it be
transmitted to a third person neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the
obligator (Art .301). Furthermore, the right to support can not be waived or transferred to third
parties and future support cannot be the subject of compromise (Art. 2035; Coral v. Gallego,
38 O.G. 3135, cited in IV Civil Code by Padilla, p. 648; 1956 Ed.). This being true, it is
indisputable that the present action for support can be brought, notwithstanding the fact the
previous case filed against the same defendant was dismissed. And it also appearing that the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 3553, was not an adjudication upon the merits, as heretofore
shown, the right of herein plaintiff-appellant to reiterate her suit for support and
acknowledgment is available, as her needs arise. Once the needs of plaintiff arise, she has
the right to bring an action for support, for it is only then that her cause for action is accrues.. .
.
xxx xxx xxx
It appears that the former dismissal was predicated upon compromise. Acknowledgment,
affecting as it does the civil status of a persons and future support, cannot be the subject of
compromise (pars. 1 & 4, Art. 2035, Civil Code). Hence, the first dismissal cannot have force
and effect and can not bar the filing of another action, asking for the same relief against the
same defendant. (emphasis supplied).
Conformably, notwithstanding the dismissal of Civil Case Q-88-935 and the lower court's
pronouncement that such dismissal was with prejudice, the second action for support may still
prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition under consideration is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the
Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 128157. September 29, 1999] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. MANUEL MANAHAN, alias Maning, defendant-appellant.
MANUEL MANAHAN alias Maning was found guilty of rape and sentenced to death by the court a
quo. He was also ordered to indemnify the victim P50,000.00 as moral damages, pay the costs,
and acknowledge and support the offspring of his indiscretion.[1] This case is now before us on
automatic review.
Complainant Teresita Tibigar, 16 years old, worked at the Espiritu Canteen in Dagupan
City. As a stay-in waitress she slept at the second floor of the canteen. Manuel Manahan is the
brother-in-law of Josefina Espiritu, owner of the canteen. His wife Primadonna is the sister of
Josefina Espiritu. Manuel and Primadonna temporarily reside at the canteen together with the
family of Josefina as Primadonna was then pregnant.
On 5 January 1995, at about two oclock in the morning, Teresita who was asleep was
suddenly awakened when she felt someone beside her. Upon opening her eyes she saw accused
Manuel Manahan as he immediately placed himself on top of her. She tried to shout but the
accused covered her mouth. He then forcibly spread her legs. She cried; she pushed and kicked
him many times in an effort to free herself but the accused proved too strong for her. Soon
enough she became weary and exhausted. Her condition enabled the accused to pursue his
immoral intentions. He lifted her skirt, removed her panty and then inserted his penis into her
vagina. He succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. After satisfying his lust, the accused
warned the victim not to report the incident to anyone and threatened her that should she squeal
he would kill her and her family. Thereafter, he left her. She was terribly afraid and shaken and
could do nothing but cry until dawn.[2]
Within the month Teresita left the canteen and returned home to her parents in Mangaldan,
Pangasinan. The sexual encounter resulted in her pregnancy. When her parents discovered it and
learned of her story, they brought her to the hospital where she was examined by Dr. Casimero
Bacugan. From there they proceeded to the police station where a statement of Teresita was
taken by SPO1 Isagani L. Ico.Police Chief Inspector Wendy G. Rosario later endorsed the
complaining witness to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan City for appropriate legal
action. Thereafter, with the assistance of her mother, Teresita filed a criminal complaint accusing
Manuel Manahan alias Maning of rape.[3]
Meanwhile, on 2 October 1995, she gave birth to a healthy baby girl and christened her
Melanie Tibigar.
Accused Manuel Manahan has a different story. He denied having raped Teresita. He
claimed they were lovers. According to him, he met Teresita at the Espiritu Canteen in August
1994 and began courting her. Subsequently, they became sweethearts and their first sexual
intercourse occurred on 27 December 1994 followed by another on 28 December 1994. In the first
week of January 1995 they again had a tryst in the house of Teresitas Aunt Fely, their last
intercourse being on 7 May 1995 in the house of one Maura Manahan-Quinto, his sister.
Manuel further alleged that even after Teresita left the Espiritu Canteen there were several
occasions when they saw each other in front of the DBP in Dagupan City. In one of those
assignations Teresita allegedly told him that she wanted to have the child aborted as her father
might kill her if he discovered she was pregnant, but accused did not agree.
In September 1995, the accused was arrested in connection with the case filed by Teresita
but was later released. We fail to discern from the records the reason for his release. But on 15
March 1996 he was again arrested and detained at the Dagupan City Jail where Estrella,
Teresitas mother, supposedly visited him at least five (5) times to ask about his condition and
whether he was tortured in detention. The accused maintained that Estrella was trying to conceal
Teresitas condition from her father. She purportedly proposed to the accused to sell his land and
give the proceeds to Teresitas father as a form of settlement.
The accused assails in his appeal brief the credibility of the complaining witness. He asserts
that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and reiterates that he and
the complaining witness were lovers, and that their sexual congress was consensual.
We have painstakingly reviewed the records and we sustain the conviction of the
accused. The prosecution for rape almost always involves sharply contrasting and irreconcilable
declarations of the victim and the accused. At the heart of almost all rape cases is the issue of
credibility of the witnesses, to be resolved primarily by the trial court which is in a better position to
decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying. Accordingly, its findings are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood
or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which would otherwise affect
the result of the case. The exception is nowhere perceivable in the present case.
The accused banks heavily on his "sweetheart theory," a usual defense in rape cases, and
vigorously maintains that the sexual intercourse between him and Teresita was but the
culmination of a mutual passion. But we find otherwise primarily because the accused miserably
failed to prove that he and the complaining witness indeed had a romantic liaison as this claim
was categorically denied by her.Moreover, there was no substantial evidence, e.g., love notes,
mementos or pictures, presented to support it.
The testimony of defense witnesses Nelson de Venecia and Arvin Sereban that they used
to see Manuel and Teresita together in front of the DBP in Dagupan City, even if true, did not
confirm that there was indeed an amorous relationship between the two. [4] Likewise, the testimony
of Isabel Remandaban, another defense witness, that she saw the accused and the complaining
witness embracing each other in the house of Maura Manahan-Quinto can hardly be given
weight. The trifling manner by which she answered the questions propounded to her at the
witness stand even prompted the trial court to remark that she was not serious with her
testimony. Thus -
COURT: This is not a joke. The penalty [for] the accused [if convicted] is death. Do not testify
here as if you are joking, or you will be the one to [be] sen[t] to jail ahead of
Manahan. You want to be sent to jail?
WITNESS: No sir.
COURT: Why are you smiling? This is a serious matter. Put that on record the witness is
smiling. Not serious about her testimony (underscoring supplied).
Ultimately, the trial court disregarded altogether, and rightly so, the testimony of Isabel
Remandaban. To emphasize, the task of assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses in the
stand and weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court which forms first-hand impressions
of the witnesses testifying before it, and therefore more competent to discriminate between the
true and the false.[5] We find no trace of whim or arbitrariness on the court a quo in its assessment
of the testimony of this witness.
Also, Exh. "1" of the defense, a photograph showing Estrella talking to the accused while
carrying Melanie, the offspring of Teresita and Manuel, does not establish anything. As Estrella
explained, she visited the accused in jail not to show him Melanie but to ascertain that he was in
fact incarcerated,[6] and that she only brought the child with her incidentally during her visit
because Teresita was sick at that time and there was no one else to take care of the baby.[7]
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the accused and the victim were really lovers, that
fact alone would not negate the commission of rape. A sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex
against her will.Definitely, a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiancee and, worse,
employ violence upon her on the pretext of love. Love is not a license for lust.[8]
Equally untenable is the accused's contention that there can be no rape since the
prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the element of intimidation. One of the
modes of committing the crime of rape is by having carnal knowledge of a woman
using force and intimidation. Even if we concede the absence of intimidation in this case, the fact
remains that the accused employed force against his victim. Thus, testifying in a clear, definitive
and convincing manner as concluded by the trial court, Teresita established beyond any scintilla
of doubt the presence of force essential in rape -
Q: What were you doing then when Manuel Manahan accosted you?
A: I was sleeping, then suddenly I felt somebody near me and when I opened my eyes I saw
Manuel Manahan and then he immediately laid on top of me, sir.
Q: How did you come to know that it was Manuel Manahan who went, who laid on top of you?
A: I know him, sir.
Q: What did you do when Manuel Manahan laid on top of you?
A: I was about to shout but he covered my mouth and then he immediately spread my legs,
sir.
Q: What did you do when he did that to you?
A: I cried, sir.
Q: Before Manuel Manahan spread your legs, what did you do? Before he was able to spread
your legs?
A: I pushed him and I kicked him several times, sir.
Q: What happened when you pushed him and kicked him several times?
 A: I got weakened because he was strong that is why he was able to abuse me, sir. COURT: Then what did he do when you were able to dislodge him on top of you?

Q: After Manuel Manahan was able to spread your legs, what did he do? A: He went again on top of me, sir.
[9]
A: And then he inserted his penis, sir x x x x Q: Did you again struggle to resist him or no more?

Again, during the cross-examination the victim recounted how she was forced to have
sexual intercourse with the accused, thus -
Q: Did you spread your legs voluntarily or did he force open your legs?
A: He forced me, sir.
Q: What did he do to force open your legs?
A: By the use of his legs, sir.
Q: He did that while he was on top of you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What legs did he use, was it the right leg or both legs?
A: Both legs, sir.
Q: You mentioned about crossing his legs and then forced open your legs, will you please
demonstrate how he forced open your legs by the use of this pencil and ballpen
illustrate your legs with these two other ballpens where the legs of Manuel Manahan,
will you please demonstrate how he forced open his legs when you said first he put
together his legs and then open your legs, will you please do it?
A: He went on top of me and he put his legs between my legs and also his legs, sir.
INTERPRETER: Witness demonstrating by spreading both ends of the ballpen.
A: No more because I already felt weak, sir x x x x[10]
Evidently, complainant offered a tenacious resistance to the criminal acts of the accused,
but the serious determination of the latter to accomplish what he intended to do eventually
weakened complainant and shocked her into insensibility. It is quite understandable that, at a
tender age of 16 and innocent in the ways of the world, complainant is no match to the accused, a
28-year old married man endowed with physical strength she could not possibly overcome.
Neither could she shout to alert the other occupants of the house as the accused prevented
her by covering her mouth with his right hand. The accused however claims that complainant had
the opportunity to shout for help at that precise moment he was removing his pants and brief, but
she did not. Suffice it to say, in this connection, that not every victim of a crime can be expected to
act reasonably and conformably with the expectations of mankind. Different people react to similar
situations dissimilarly. While the normal response of a woman about to be defiled may be to shout
and put up a wild struggle, others become virtually catatonic because of the mental shock they
experience and the fear engendered by the unexpected occurrence. Yet it can never be
successfully argued that the latter are any less sexual victims than the former.[11]
The failure of complainant to disclose the outrage on her person to anybody, including her
parents, is due to the threats on her life and that of her family. Indeed, one cannot expect her to
act like an adult or a mature experienced woman who would have the courage and intelligence to
disregard the threat to her life and complain immediately that she had been sexually assaulted. It
is not uncommon for young girls to conceal for sometime the assaults on their virtue because of
the rapists threats to their lives. Delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not
necessarily impair the credibility of the witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained, as in this
case.[12]

Q: And then by doing so, by spreading his legs between your legs, he was able to insert his In the instant case, the complaining witness may not have even filed the rape charge had
penis? she not become pregnant. This Court has taken cognizance of the fact that many of the victims of
rape never complain or file criminal charges against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy
A: Yes, sir. in painful silence rather than reveal their shame to the world and risk the rapists making good their
threats to kill or hurt their victims.[13]
Q: At that precise moment when he was on top of you and also your legs, where was the right
hand of Manuel Manahan? That accused also asserts that the rape case is a mere face-saving device of the victim to
escape the anger of her father. Again, we are not convinced. It taxes credulity that a
A: He closed my mouth with his right hand. simple barrio lass[14] like the victim, a minor and a mere elementary graduate at that, could
contrive such an unthinkable solution to save herself from the imagined wrath of her father; what
Q: What about his left hand? is more, concoct such a good rape story convincing enough to withstand the rigors of cross-
A: He used his left hand in pulling up my dress. examination, and sway the judge to impose on the accused the extreme penalty of death.

Q: At that precise moment when he was doing the push and pull, was his right hand still with Indeed, it is very unlikely that the victim would make up a story of rape with all its attendant
your mouth? scandal and humiliation. Considering the modesty and timidity of a typical Filipina, especially one
from the rural areas, it is hard to accept that the victim would fabricate facts which would seriously
A: Yes, sir. cast dishonor on her maidenhood. No young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit she
had been raped unless that was the truth. It is her natural instinct to protect her honor. As we
Q: What about his left hand after raising your skirt, what was his left hand doing? have long held, when a woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has been committed. Her testimony is credible where she has no
A: He was squeezing my neck, sir x x x x motive to testify against the accused.[15]
Q: During your direct testimony you mentioned about having resisted him, now, at what On the matter of acknowledgment and support of the child, a correction of the view of the
precise moment did you try to resist him? court a quo is in order. Article 345 of The Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape
shall also be sentenced to "acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from
A: When he went on top of me I struggled, sir.
doing so," and "in every case to support the offspring." In the case before us, compulsory
Q: Were you able to dislodge him from being on top of you? acknowledgment of the child Melanie Tibigar is not proper there being a legal impediment in doing
so as it appears that the accused is a married man. As pronounced by this Court in People v.
A: Yes, sir. Guerrero,[16] "the rule is that if the rapist is a married man, he cannot be compelled to recognize
the offspring of the crime, should there be any, as his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate."
Consequently, that portion of the judgment under review is accordingly deleted. In any case, we On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing the
sustain that part ordering the accused to support the child as it is in accordance with law.
children with her (then all minors), after a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with
Finally, we do not agree with the trial court that the proper penalty to be imposed on the
accused is death, it appearing that the crime committed was merely simple rape, i.e., not the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described a very compromising
committed with or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances enumerated under Art. 335
of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 11, RA 7659, under which the death penalty is situation.[3]
authorized.[17] In this case, the proper imposable penalty should only be reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40, dated
28 November 1996, convicting accused MANUEL MANAHAN alias Maning of the crime of rape is Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano
AFFIRMED subject however to the modification that the death sentence imposed on the accused
is reduced to reclusion perpetua. The portion of the decision of the trial court ordering the (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The
accused, a married man, to acknowledge the child Melanie Tibigar is DELETED being contrary to
law and jurisprudence. trial court ordered Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000 pendente lite.[4]
The Ruling of the Trial Court
SO ORDERED.

SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and G.R. No. 163209

FILOMENA LIM,
On 31 January 1996, the trial court rendered judgment ordering Edward and petitioners
Petitioners,
Present:
to jointly provide P40,000 monthly support to respondents, with Edward shouldering P6,000 and
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
QUISUMBING,* petitioners the balance of P34,000 subject to Chua Giaks subsidiary liability.[5]
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - PERALTA, and The defendants sought reconsideration, questioning their liability. The trial court, while
ABAD,** JJ.
MA. CHERYL S. LIM, denying reconsideration, clarified that petitioners and Chua Giak were held jointly liable with
for herself and on behalf of
her minor children LESTER Edward because of the latters inability x x x to give sufficient support x x x.[6]
EDWARD S. LIM, CANDICE
GRACE S. LIM, and MARIANO Promulgated: Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals assailing, among others, their liability to support
S. LIM, III,
Respondents. October 30, 2009 respondents. Petitioners argued that while Edwards income is insufficient, the law itself sanctions
The Case
its effects by providing that legal support should be in keeping with the financial capacity of the
[1] [2]
For review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 28 April 2003, ordering petitioners family under Article 194 of the Civil Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family

Prudencio and Filomena Lim (petitioners) to provide legal support to respondents Cheryl, Lester Code of the Philippines).[7]

Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III, all surnamed Lim (respondents).
The Facts The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim (Edward), son of In its Decision dated 28 April 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. On the issue

petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children, respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and material to this appeal, that is, whether there is basis to hold petitioners, as Edwards parents,

Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in Forbes Park, liable with him to support respondents, the Court of Appeals held:

Makati City, together with Edwards ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim
(Mariano). Edwards family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of P6,000,
shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady source of income.
The law on support under Article 195 of the Family Code is clear on this
matter. Parents and their legitimate children are obliged to mutually support one
another and this obligation extends down to the legitimate grandchildren and great
grandchildren.

In connection with this provision, Article 200 paragraph (3) of the Family Code clearly
provides that should the person obliged to give support does not have sufficient
means to satisfy all claims, the other persons enumerated in Article 199 in its order
shall provide the necessary support. This is because the closer the relationship of the
 relatives, the stronger the tie that binds them. Thus, the obligation to support is
imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default is the of the parents but also for the latters inability to provide sufficient support. As we observed in
obligation moved to the next nearer relatives and so on.[8]
another case raising the ancillary issue of an ascendants obligation to give support in light of the

Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied their motion in the Resolution fathers sufficient means:
dated 12 April 2004.

Hence, this petition. Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand support directly
from their grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of nearest degree) who
The Issue are capable of supporting them. This is so because we have to follow the order
of support under Art. 199. We agree with this view.
The issue is whether petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to xxxx
respondents.
There is no showing that private respondent is without means to support his son;
The Ruling of the Court neither is there any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the paternal grandmother,
was willing to voluntarily provide for her grandson's legal support. x x
We rule in the affirmative. However, we modify the appealed judgment by limiting x[18] (Emphasis supplied; internal citations omitted)
petitioners liability to the amount of monthly support needed by respondents Lester Edward,
Candice Grace and Mariano III only. Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her obligation to provide sufficient
Petitioners Liable to Provide Support
but only to their Grandchildren legal support to her children, then all school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of

support Edward is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is insufficient to meet

By statutory[9] and jurisprudential mandate,[10] the liability of ascendants to provide legal support to
respondents basic needs. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their
their descendants is beyond cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much they limit their petition to
children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the
the narrow question of when their liability is triggered, not if they are liable. Relying on
paternal (petitioners) and maternal[19] lines, following the ordering in Article 199. To hold
[11]
provisions found in Title IX of the Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners
otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of
theorize that their liability is activated only upon default of parental authority, conceivably either by
tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of parental inability to give adequate
its termination[12] or suspension[13]during the childrens minority. Because at the time respondents
support even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able to fill the void.
sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised parental authority over their children,[14] petitioners
However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word
submit that the obligation to support the latters offspring ends with them.
is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree. As
Neither the text of the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence supports this severe constriction of
petitioners grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano
the scope of familial obligation to give support. In the first place, the governing text are the
III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryls right to receive support from the Lim family extends
relevant provisions in Title VIII of the Civil Code, as amended, on Support, not the provisions in
only to her husband Edward, arising from their marital bond. [20] Unfortunately, Cheryls share from
Title IX on Parental Authority. While both areas share a common ground in that parental authority
the amount of monthly support the trial court awarded cannot be determined from the records.
encompasses the obligation to provide legal support,[15] they differ in other concerns including
Thus, we are constrained to remand the case to the trial court for this limited purpose.[21]
[16]
the duration of the obligation and its concurrence among relatives of differing degrees. Thus,

although the obligation to provide support arising from parental authority ends upon the Petitioners Precluded from Availing of the Alternative Option Under Article 204 of the Civil Code, as Amended

emancipation of the child,[17] the same obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of the option in Article 204 of the Civil Code,

ideally lasts during the obligee's lifetime.. Also, while parental authority under Title IX (and the as amended, and pray that they be allowed to fulfill their obligation by maintaining respondents at

correlative parental rights) pertains to parents, passing to ascendants only upon its termination or petitioners Makati residence. The option is unavailable to petitioners.

suspension, the obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default

The application of Article 204 which provides that
The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either
by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling
the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be
availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto. (Emphasis supplied)
is subject to its exception clause. Here, the persons entitled to receive support are
petitioners grandchildren and daughter-in-law. Granting petitioners the option in Article 204 will
secure to the grandchildren a well-provided future; however, it will also force Cheryl to return to
the house which, for her, is the scene of her husbands infidelity. While not rising to the level of
a legal obstacle, as indeed, Cheryls charge against Edward for concubinage did not prosper for
insufficient evidence, her steadfast insistence on its occurrence amounts to a moral impediment
bringing the case within the ambit of the exception clause of Article 204, precluding its application.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 28
April 2003, and its Resolution dated 12 April 2004 with the MODIFICATION that petitioners
Prudencio and Filomena Lim are liable to provide support only to respondents Lester Edward,
Candice Grace and Mariano III, all surnamed Lim. We REMAND the case to the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 140, for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165166 August 15, 2012
CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner,
vs.
DIVINA BULING, Respondent.
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari, 1 filed by petitioner Charles Gotardo, to challenge
the March 5, 2004 decision2 and the July 27, 2004 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA
GR CV No. 76326. The CA decision ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support
to his minor son, Gliffze 0. Buling. The CA resolution denied the petitioner's subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte, Branch 25, for compulsory recognition and support pendente
lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze. 4
In his answer, the petitioner denied the imputed paternity of Gliffze.5 For the parties’ failure to
amicably settle the dispute, the RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings.6 Trial on the merits
ensued.
The respondent testified for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez as witness. Evidence for the
respondent showed that she met the petitioner on December 1, 1992 at the Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte branch where she had been hired as a
casual employee, while the petitioner worked as accounting supervisor. 7 The petitioner started
courting the respondent in the third week of December 1992 and they became sweethearts in the
last week of January 1993.8 The petitioner gave the respondent greeting cards on special
occasions, such as on Valentine’s Day and her birthday; she reciprocated his love and took care
of him when he was ill.9
Sometime in September 1993, the petitioner started intimate sexual relations with the respondent
in the former’s rented room in the boarding house managed by Rodulfo, the respondent’s uncle,
on Tomas Oppus St., Agbao, Maasin, Southern Leyte.10 The petitioner rented the room from
March 1, 1993 to August 30, 1994.11 The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and became
more frequent in June 1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994, the respondent found out that she
was pregnant.12 When told of the pregnancy, the petitioner was happy and made plans to marry
the respondent.13 They in fact applied for a marriage license.14 The petitioner even inquired about
the costs of a wedding reception and the bridal gown.15 Subsequently, however, the petitioner
backed out of the wedding plans.16
The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Maasin,
Southern Leyte for damages against the petitioner for breach of promise to marry. 17 Later,
however, the petitioner and the respondent amicably settled the case.18
The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9, 1995. 19 When the petitioner did not
show up and failed to provide support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on July 24, 1995
demanding recognition of and support for their child.20 When the petitioner did not answer the
demand, the respondent filed her complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente
lite.21
The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He denied the imputed
paternity,22 claiming that he first had sexual contact with the respondent in the first week of August
1994 and she could not have been pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three (3) months) when he
was informed of the pregnancy on September 15, 1994.23
During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondent’s motion, 24 granted a ₱2,000.00
monthly child support, retroactive from March 1995.25
THE RTC RULING
In its June 25, 2002 decision, the RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence
proving Gliffze’s filiation. It found the respondent’s testimony inconsistent on the question of when
she had her first sexual contact with the petitioner, i.e., "September 1993" in her direct testimony
while "last week of January 1993" during her cross-testimony, and her reason for engaging in
sexual contact even after she had refused the petitioner’s initial marriage proposal. It ordered the
respondent to return the amount of support pendente lite erroneously awarded, and to pay ₱
10,000.00 as attorney’s fees.26
The respondent appealed the RTC ruling to the CA.27
THE CA RULING
In its March 5, 2004 decision, the CA departed from the RTC's appreciation of the respondent’s
testimony, concluding that the latter merely made an honest mistake in her understanding of the
questions of the petitioner’s counsel. It noted that the petitioner and the respondent had sexual
relationship even before August 1994; that the respondent had only one boyfriend, the petitioner,
from January 1993 to August 1994; and that the petitioner’s allegation that the respondent had
previous relationships with other men remained unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set aside
the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated
the RTC order granting a ₱ 2,000.00 monthly child support.28
When the CA denied29 the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,30 the petitioner filed the present
petition for review on certiorari.
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the CA committed a reversible error in rejecting the RTC’s appreciation
of the respondent’s testimony, and that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove paternity.
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT
The respondent submits that the CA correctly explained that the inconsistency in the respondent’s
testimony was due to an incorrect appreciation of the questions asked, and that the record is
replete with evidence proving that the petitioner was her lover and that they had several intimate
sexual encounters during their relationship, resulting in her pregnancy and Gliffze’s birth on March
9, 1995.
THE ISSUE
The sole issue before us is whether the CA committed a reversible error when it set aside the
RTC’s findings and ordered the petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son
Gliffze.
OUR RULING
We do not find any reversible error in the CA’s ruling.
We have recognized that "[f]iliation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity
but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in this
case) or inheritance. [In paternity cases, the burden of proof] is on the person who alleges that the
putative father is the biological father of the child."31
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws.32 We have held that such other proof of one's filiation may be a
"baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which his name has been entered,
common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by silence, the [testimonies] of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court." 33
In Herrera v. Alba,34 we stressed that there are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action that parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child. 35 We explained
that a prima facie case exists if a woman declares — supported by corroborative proof — that she
had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the
putative father.36 We explained further that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative
father are: (1) incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to either physical absence or
impotency, or (2) that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception. 37
In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father
of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner,
at the time of her conception.38Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that the petitioner and the
respondent had intimate relationship.39
On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual encounters with the respondent,
only that it occurred on a much later date than the respondent asserted, such that it was
physically impossible for the respondent to have been three (3) months pregnant already in
September 1994 when he was informed of the pregnancy.40 However, the petitioner failed to
substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore,
cannot be given credence for lack of evidentiary support. The petitioner’s denial cannot overcome
the respondent’s clear and categorical assertions.
The petitioner, as the RTC did, made much of the variance between the respondent’s direct
testimony regarding their first sexual contact as "sometime in September 1993" and her cross-
testimony when she stated that their first sexual contact was "last week of January 1993," as
follows:
ATTY. GO CINCO:
When did the defendant, according to you, start courting you?
A Third week of December 1992.
Q And you accepted him?
A Last week of January 1993.
Q And by October you already had your sexual intercourse?
A Last week of January 1993.
COURT: What do you mean by accepting?
A I accepted his offer of love.41
We find that the contradictions are for the most part more apparent than real, having resulted from
the failure of the respondent to comprehend the question posed, but this misunderstanding was
later corrected and satisfactorily explained. Indeed, when confronted for her contradictory
statements, the respondent explained that that portion of the transcript of stenographic notes was
incorrect and she had brought it to the attention of Atty. Josefino Go Cinco (her former counsel)
but the latter took no action on the matter.42
Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness, his testimony must be
considered in its entirety instead of in truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is
not to consider only its isolated parts and to anchor a conclusion based on these parts. "In
ascertaining the facts established by a witness, everything stated by him on direct, cross and
redirect examinations must be calibrated and considered."43 Evidently, the totality of the
respondent's testimony positively and convincingly shows that no real inconsistency exists. The
respondent has consistently asserted that she started intimate sexual relations with the petitioner
sometime in September 1993.44
Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is obliged to
support his child, whether legitimate or illegitimate. 45 Support consists of everything indispensable
for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping
with the financial capacity of the family.46 Thus, the amount of support is variable and, for this
reason, no final judgment on the amount of support is made as the amount shall be in proportion
to the resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. 47 It may be reduced or
increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient
and the resources or means of the person obliged to support.48
In this case, we sustain the award of ₱ 2,000.00 monthly child support, without prejudice to the
filing of the proper motion in the RTC for the determination of any support in arrears, considering
the needs of the child, Gliffze, during the pendency of this case.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. The March 5, 2004 decision and
the July 27, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 76326 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 175279-80 June 5, 2013
SUSAN LIM-LUA, Petitioner,
vs.
DANILO Y. LUA, Respondent.
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner seeks to set aside the
Decision1 dated April 20, 2006 and Resolution2 dated October 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dismissing her petition for contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 01154) and granting respondent's
petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 01315).
The factual background is as follows:
On September 3, 2003,3 petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-29346 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 14.
In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children, petitioner sought the
amount of ₱500,000.00 as monthly support, citing respondent’s huge earnings from salaries and
dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad.4
After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order5 dated March 31, 2004
granting support pendente lite, as follows:
From the evidence already adduced by the parties, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
(₱250,000.00) Thousand Pesos would be sufficient to take care of the needs of the plaintiff. This
amount excludes the One hundred thirty-five (₱135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical
attendance expenses needed by plaintiff for the operation of both her eyes which is demandable
upon the conduct of such operation. The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being
a commendable act of defendant, should be continued by him considering the vast financial
resources at his disposal.
According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is demandable from the time plaintiff needed
the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand. Since the instant complaint
was filed on 03 September 2003, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (₱250,000.00) Thousand
should be paid by defendant to plaintiff retroactively to such date until the hearing of the support
pendente lite. ₱250,000.00 x 7 corresponding to the seven (7) months that lapsed from
September, 2003 to March 2004 would tantamount to a total of One Million Seven Hundred Fifty
(₱1,750,000.00) Thousand Pesos. Thereafter, starting the month of April 2004, until otherwise
ordered by this Court, defendant is ordered to pay a monthly support of Two Hundred Fifty
Thousand (₱250,000.00) Pesos payable within the first five (5) days of each corresponding month
pursuant to the third paragraph of Art. 203 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The monthly
support of ₱250,000.00 is without prejudice to any increase or decrease thereof that this Court
may grant plaintiff as the circumstances may warrant i.e. depending on the proof submitted by the
parties during the proceedings for the main action for support.6
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,7 asserting that petitioner is not entitled to spousal
support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their children
and respondent has continued to support the family for their sustenance and well-being in
accordance with family’s social and financial standing. As to the ₱250,000.00 granted by the trial
court as monthly support pendente lite, as well as the ₱1,750,000.00 retroactive support,
respondent found it unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not having
considered the needs of the respondent.
In its May 13, 2004 Order, the trial court stated that the March 31, 2004 Order had become final
and executory since respondent’s motion for reconsideration is treated as a mere scrap of paper
for violation of the threeday notice period under Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, and therefore did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal.
Respondent was given ten (10) days to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of the
court for disregarding the March 31, 2004 order granting support pendente lite. 8
His second motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA.
On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision,9 finding merit in respondent’s contention that the
trial court gravely abused its discretion in granting ₱250,000.00 monthly support to petitioner
without evidence to prove his actual income. The said court thus decreed:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this petition is given due course. The assailed
Orders dated March 31, 2004, May 13, 2004, June 4, 2004 and June 18, 2004 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil Case No. CEB No. 29346 entitled "Susan Lim
Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua" are hereby nullified and set aside and instead a new one is entered
ordering herein petitioner:
a) to pay private respondent a monthly support pendente lite of ₱115,000.00 beginning the
month of April 2005 and every month thereafter within the first five (5) days thereof;
b) to pay the private respondent the amount of ₱115,000.00 a month multiplied by the number
of months starting from September 2003 until March 2005 less than the amount supposedly
given by petitioner to the private respondent as her and their two (2) children monthly support;
and
c) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.10
Neither of the parties appealed this decision of the CA. In a Compliance11 dated June 28, 2005,
respondent attached a copy of a check he issued in the amount of ₱162,651.90 payable to
petitioner. Respondent explained that, as decreed in the CA decision, he deducted from the
amount of support in arrears (September 3, 2003 to March 2005) ordered by the CA --
₱2,185,000.00 -- plus ₱460,000.00 (April, May, June and July 2005), totaling ₱2,645,000.00, the
advances given by him to his children and petitioner in the sum of ₱2,482,348.16 (with attached
photocopies of receipts/billings).
In her Comment to Compliance with Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Execution, 12 petitioner
asserted that none of the expenses deducted by respondent may be chargeable as part of the
monthly support contemplated by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.
On September 27, 2005, the trial court issued an Order13 granting petitioner’s motion for issuance
of a writ of execution as it rejected respondent’s interpretation of the CA decision. Respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration and subsequently also filed a motion for inhibition of Judge
Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. On November 25, 2005, Judge Yrastorza, Sr. issued an
Order14 denying both motions.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, both motions are DENIED. Since a second
motion for reconsideration is prohibited under the Rules, this denial has attained finality; let,
therefore, a writ of execution be issued in favor of plaintiff as against defendant for the
accumulated support in arrears pendente lite.
Notify both parties of this Order.
SO ORDERED.15
Since respondent still failed and refused to pay the support in arrears pendente lite, petitioner filed
in the CA a Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 01154
("Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua"). Respondent, on the other hand, filed CA-G.R. SP No.
01315, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court ("Danilo Y. Lua versus Hon.
Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
Branch 14, and Susan Lim Lua"). The two cases were consolidated.
By Decision dated April 20, 2006, the CA set aside the assailed orders of the trial court, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages filed
by Susan Lim Lua against Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP. CA-GR No. 01154;
b) GRANTING Danilo Y. Lua’s Petition for Certiorari docketed as SP. CA-GR No. 01315.
Consequently, the assailed Orders dated 27 September 2005 and 25 November 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil Case No. CEB-29346 entitled "Susan
Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and instead a new one is
entered:
i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of Ph₱2,482,348.16 plus 946,465.64, or a total of
PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim
Lua and their two (2) children;
ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his monthly support of Ph₱115,000.00 pesos
starting from the time payment of this amount was deferred by him subject to the deductions
aforementioned.
iii. DIRECTING the issuance of a permanent writ of preliminary injunction.
SO ORDERED.16
The appellate court said that the trial court should not have completely disregarded the expenses
incurred by respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two cars, payment of
tuition fees, travel expenses, and the credit card purchases involving groceries, dry goods and
books, which certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two children, but their mother
(petitioner) as well. It held that respondent’s act of deferring the monthly support adjudged in CA-
G.R. SP No. 84740 was not contumacious as it was anchored on valid and justifiable reasons.
Respondent said he just wanted the issue of whether to deduct his advances be settled first in
view of the different interpretation by the trial court of the appellate court’s decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 84740. It also noted the lack of contribution from the petitioner in the joint obligation of
spouses to support their children.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition raising the following errors allegedly committed by the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING RESPONDENT GUILTY OF
INDIRECT CONTEMPT.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE DEDUCTION OF THE
AMOUNT OF PH₱2,482,348.16 PLUS 946,465.64, OR A TOTAL OF PH₱3,428,813.80
FROM THE CURRENT TOTAL SUPPORT IN ARREARS OF THE RESPONDENT TO
THE PETITIONER AND THEIR CHILDREN.17
The main issue is whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted
from the total support in arrears owing to petitioner and her children pursuant to the Decision
dated April 12, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.
The pertinent provision of the Family Code of the Philippines provides:
Article 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall
include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of
majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place
of work. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner argues that it was patently erroneous for the CA to have allowed the deduction of the
value of the two cars and their maintenance costs from the support in arrears, as these items are
not indispensable to the sustenance of the family or in keeping them alive. She points out that in
the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740, the CA already considered the said items which it
deemed chargeable to respondent, while the monthly support pendente lite (₱115,000.00) was
fixed on the basis of the documentary evidence of respondent’s alleged income from various
businesses and petitioner’s testimony that she needed ₱113,000.00 for the maintenance of the
household and other miscellaneous expenses excluding the ₱135,000.00 medical attendance
expenses of petitioner.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that disallowing the subject deductions would result in
unjust enrichment, thus making him pay for the same obligation twice. Since petitioner and the
children resided in one residence, the groceries and dry goods purchased by the children using
respondent’s credit card, totalling ₱594,151.58 for the period September 2003 to June 2005 were
not consumed by the children alone but shared with their mother. As to the Volkswagen Beetle
and BMW 316i respondent bought for his daughter Angelli Suzanne Lua and Daniel Ryan Lua,
respectively, these, too, are to be considered advances for support, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family. Respondent stressed that being children of parents belonging to the upper-
class society, Angelli and Daniel Ryan had never in their entire life commuted from one place to
another, nor do they eat their meals at "carinderias". Hence, the cars and their maintenance are
indispensable to the children’s day-to-day living, the value of which were properly deducted from
the arrearages in support pendente lite ordered by the trial and appellate courts.
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship
is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the
giver and to the needs of the recipient.18 Such support comprises everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family.
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for
annulment of voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time during the proceeding,
the court, motu proprio or upon verified application of any of the parties, guardian or designated
custodian, may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final
order.19 Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of
the case before it can settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is
determine the kind and amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the
application. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence
appearing in the record.20
In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for petitioner and her two children was
determined after due hearing and submission of documentary evidence by the parties. Although
the amount fixed by the trial court was reduced on appeal, it is clear that the monthly support
pendente lite of ₱115,000.00 ordered by the CA was intended primarily for the sustenance of
petitioner and her children, e.g., food, clothing, salaries of drivers and house helpers, and other
household expenses. Petitioner’s testimony also mentioned the cost of regular therapy for her Q Okay. Let’s have piece by piece. Have you asked the Doctor how much would it cost you for
scoliosis and vitamins/medicines. the operation of that scoliotic?
A Yes before because I was already due last year. Before, this eye will cost ₱60,000.00 and the
other eyes ₱75,000.00.
ATTY. ZOSA:
Q So for both eyes, you are talking of ₱60,000.00 plus ₱75,000.00 is ₱135,000.00?
xxxx
A Yes.
Q How much do you spend for your food and your two (2) children every month?
xxxx
A Presently, Sir?
Q You talk of therapy?
ATTY. ZOSA:
A Yes.
Yes.
Q So how much is that?
A For the food alone, I spend not over ₱40,000.00 to ₱50,000.00 a month for the food alone.
A Around ₱5,000.00 a week.21
xxxx
ATTY. ZOSA:
Q What other expenses do you incur in living in that place? As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond doubt that he can solely provide for the
A The normal household and the normal expenses for a family to have a decent living, Sir. subsistence, education, transportation, health/medical needs and recreational activities of his
Q How much other expenses do you incur? children, as well as those of petitioner who was then unemployed and a full-time housewife.
WITNESS: Despite this, respondent’s counsel manifested during the same hearing that respondent was
A For other expenses, is around over a ₱100,000.00, Sir. willing to grant the amount of only ₱75,000.00 as monthly support pendente lite both for the
Q Why do you incur that much amount? children and petitioner as spousal support. Though the receipts of expenses submitted in court
A For the clothing for the three (3) of us, for the vitamins and medicines. And also I am having a unmistakably show how much respondent lavished on his children, it appears that the matter of
special therapy to straighten my back because I am scoliotic. I am advised by the Doctor to hire a spousal support was a different matter altogether. Rejecting petitioner’s prayer for ₱500,000.00
driver, but I cannot still afford it now. Because my eyesight is not reliable for driving. And I still monthly support and finding the ₱75,000.00 monthly support offered by respondent as insufficient,
need another househelp to accompany me whenever I go marketing because for my age, I cannot the trial court fixed the monthly support pendente lite at ₱250,000.00. However, since the
carry anymore heavy loads. supposed income in millions of respondent was based merely on the allegations of petitioner in
xxxx her complaint and registration documents of various corporations which respondent insisted are
ATTY. FLORES: owned not by him but his parents and siblings, the CA reduced the amount of support pendente
xxxx lite to ₱115,000.00, which ruling was no longer questioned by both parties.
Q On the issue of the food for you and the two (2) children, you mentioned ₱40,000.00 to
₱50,000.00?
Controversy between the parties resurfaced when respondent’s compliance with the final CA
A Yes, for the food alone.
decision indicated that he deducted from the total amount in arrears (₱2,645,000.00) the sum of
Q Okay, what other possible expenses that you would like to include in those two (2) items? You
₱2,482,348.16, representing the value of the two cars for the children, their cost of maintenance
mentioned of a driver, am I correct?
and advances given to petitioner and his children. Respondent explained that the deductions were
A Yes, I might need two (2) drivers, Sir for me and my children.
made consistent with the fallo of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordering him to pay
Q Okay. How much would you like possibly to pay for those two (2) drivers?
support pendente lite in arrears less the amount supposedly given by him to petitioner as her and
A I think ₱10,000.00 a month for one (1) driver. So I need two (2) drivers. And I need another
their two children’s monthly support.
househelp.
Q You need another househelp. The househelp nowadays would charge you something between
₱3,000.00 to ₱4,000.00. That’s quite… The following is a summary of the subject deductions under Compliance dated June 28, 2005,
A Right now, my househelp is receiving ₱8,000.00. I need another which I will give a duly supported by receipts22:
compensation of ₱5,000.00.
Q Other than that, do you still have other expenses? Car purchases for Angelli Suzanne - Php1,350,000.00
A My clothing.
COURT: and Daniel Ryan - 613,472.86
How about the schooling for your children?
WITNESS: Car Maintenance fees of Angelli - 51,232.50
A The schooling is shouldered by my husband, Your Honor. Suzanne
COURT:
Credit card statements of Daniel Ryan - 348,682.28
Everything?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Car Maintenance fees of Daniel Ryan - 118,960.52
xxxx
ATTY. FLORES:
Q Madam witness, let us talk of the present needs. x x x. What else, what specific need that you
Php2,482,348.16
would like to add so I can tell my client, the defendant.
WITNESS:
A I need to have an operation both of my eyes. I also need a special therapy for my back because
I am scoliotic, three (3) times a week. After the trial court disallowed the foregoing deductions, respondent filed a motion for
Q That is very reasonable. [W]ould you care to please repeat that? reconsideration further asserting that the following amounts, likewise with supporting receipts, be
A Therapy for my scoliotic back and then also for the operation both of my eyes. And I am also considered as additional advances given to petitioner and the children23:
taking some vitamins from excel that will cost ₱20,000.00 a month.
 into account that spouse’s earning capacity, earned and unearned income, assets, and
Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua Php 42,450.71 standard of living; and (10) any other factor the court may deem just and equitable.
Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan 11,500.00
(d) The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary
Travel expenses of Susan Lim-Lua 14,611.15 of the spouse.

Credit card purchases of Angelli 408,891.08

Sec. 3. Child Support.–The common children of the spouses shall be supported from the
Suzanne
properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership.
Salon and travel expenses of Angelli 87,112.70
Suzanne Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent or both may be ordered to give an
amount necessary for the support, maintenance, and education of the child. It shall be in
School expenses of Daniel Ryan Lua 260,900.00 proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.

Cash given to Daniel and Angelli 121,000.00

In determining the amount of provisional support, the court may likewise consider the following
factors: (1) the financial resources of the custodial and non-custodial parent and those of the
TOTAL - Php 946,465.64 child; (2) the physical and emotional health of the child and his or her special needs and
aptitudes; (3) the standard of living the child has been accustomed to; (4) the non-monetary
contributions that the parents will make toward the care and well-being of the child.
GRAND TOTAL - Php 3,428,813.80
The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional support from the salary of the parent.

The CA, in ruling for the respondent said that all the foregoing expenses already incurred by the
respondent should, in equity, be considered advances which may be properly deducted from the Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the CA was not appealed by either
support in arrears due to the petitioner and the two children. Said court also noted the absence of party, there is no controversy as to its sufficiency and reasonableness. The dispute concerns the
petitioner’s contribution to the joint obligation of support for their children. deductions made by respondent in settling the support in arrears.

We reverse in part the decision of the CA. On the issue of crediting of money payments or expenses against accrued support, we find as
relevant the following rulings by US courts.

Judicial determination of support pendente lite in cases of legal separation and petitions for
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage are guided by the following provisions of the Rule
on Provisional Orders24
Sec. 2. Spousal Support.–In determining support for the spouses, the court may be guided by the
following rules:
(a) In the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses,
the spouses may be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership.
In Bradford v. Futrell,25 appellant sought review of the decision of the Circuit Court which found
him in arrears with his child support payments and entered a decree in favor of appellee wife. He
complained that in determining the arrearage figure, he should have been allowed full credit for all
money and items of personal property given by him to the children themselves, even though he
referred to them as gifts. The Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled that in the suit to determine
amount of arrears due the divorced wife under decree for support of minor children, the husband
(appellant) was not entitled to credit for checks which he had clearly designated as gifts, nor was
he entitled to credit for an automobile given to the oldest son or a television set given to the
children. Thus, if the children remain in the custody of the mother, the father is not entitled to
credit for money paid directly to the children if such was paid without any relation to the decree.

(b) The court may award support to either spouse in such amount and for such period
of time as the court may deem just and reasonable based on their standard of living
during the marriage.
(c) The court may likewise consider the following factors: (1) whether the spouse
seeking support is the custodian of a child whose circumstances make it appropriate for
that spouse not to seek outside employment; (2) the time necessary to acquire
sufficient education and training to enable the spouse seeking support to find
appropriate employment, and that spouse’s future earning capacity; (3) the duration of
the marriage; (4) the comparative financial resources of the spouses, including their
comparative earning abilities in the labor market; (5) the needs and obligations of each
spouse; (6) the contribution of each spouse to the marriage, including services
rendered in home-making, child care, education, and career building of the other
spouse; (7) the age and health of the spouses; (8) the physical and emotional
conditions of the spouses; (9) the ability of the supporting spouse to give support, taking
In the absence of some finding of consent by the mother, most courts refuse to allow a husband
to dictate how he will meet the requirements for support payments when the mode of payment is
fixed by a decree of court. Thus he will not be credited for payments made when he unnecessarily
interposed himself as a volunteer and made payments direct to the children of his own accord.
Wills v. Baker, 214 S. W. 2d 748 (Mo. 1948); Openshaw v. Openshaw, 42 P. 2d 191 (Utah 1935).
In the latter case the court said in part: "The payments to the children themselves do not appear
to have been made as payments upon alimony, but were rather the result of his fatherly interest in
the welfare of those children. We do not believe he should be permitted to charge them to plaintiff.
By so doing he would be determining for Mrs. Openshaw the manner in which she should expend
her allowances. It is a very easy thing for children to say their mother will not give them money,
especially as they may realize that such a plea is effective in attaining their ends. If she is not
treating them right the courts are open to the father for redress." 26
In Martin, Jr. v. Martin,27 the Supreme Court of Washington held that a father, who is required by a
divorce decree to make child support payments directly to the mother, cannot claim credit for
payments voluntarily made directly to the children. However, special considerations of an
equitable nature may justify a court in crediting such payments on his indebtedness to the mother,
when such can be done without injustice to her.
The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a divorce decree to pay to the
mother money for the support of their dependent children and the unpaid and accrued
installments become judgments in her favor, he cannot, as a matter of law, claim credit on
account of payments voluntarily made directly to the children. Koon v. Koon, supra; Briggs v.
Briggs, supra. However, special considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in
crediting such payments on his indebtedness to the mother, when that can be done without
injustice to her. Briggs v. Briggs, supra. The courts are justifiably reluctant to lay down any
general rules as to when such credits may be allowed.28 (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by respondent to be credited
against the accrued support pendente lite. As earlier mentioned, the monthly support pendente
lite granted by the trial court was intended primarily for food, household expenses such as
salaries of drivers and house helpers, and also petitioner’s scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence, the
value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost,
travel expenses of petitioner and Angelli, purchases through credit card of items other than
groceries and dry goods (clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the
judgment awarding support pendente lite. While it is true that the dispositive portion of the
executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordered herein respondent to pay the support in
arrears "less than the amount supposedly given by petitioner to the private respondent as her and
their two (2) children monthly support," the deductions should be limited to those basic needs and
expenses considered by the trial and appellate courts. The assailed ruling of the CA allowing
huge deductions from the accrued monthly support of petitioner and her children, while correct
insofar as it commends the generosity of the respondent to his children, is clearly inconsistent
with the executory decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. More important, it completely ignores the
unfair consequences to petitioner whose sustenance and well-being, was given due regard by the
trial and appellate courts. This is evident from the March 31, 2004 Order granting support
pendente lite to petitioner and her children, when the trial court observed:
While there is evidence to the effect that defendant is giving some forms of financial assistance to
his two (2) children via their credit cards and paying for their school expenses, the same is,
however, devoid of any form of spousal support to the plaintiff, for, at this point in time, while the
action for nullity of marriage is still to be heard, it is incumbent upon the defendant, considering
the physical and financial condition of the plaintiff and the overwhelming capacity of defendant, to
extend support unto the latter. x x x29
On appeal, while the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 reduced the amount of monthly support
fixed by the trial court, it nevertheless held that considering respondent’s financial resources, it is
but fair and just that he give a monthly support for the sustenance and basic necessities of
petitioner and his children. This would imply that any amount respondent seeks to be credited as
monthly support should only cover those incurred for sustenance and household
expenses.1avvphi1
In the case at bar, records clearly show and in fact has been admitted by petitioner that aside
from paying the expenses of their two (2) children’s schooling, he gave his two (2) children two (2)
cars and credit cards of which the expenses for various items namely: clothes, grocery items and
repairs of their cars were chargeable to him which totaled an amount of more than One Hundred
Thousand (₱100,000.00) for each of them and considering that as testified by the private
respondent that she needs the total amount of ₱113,000.00 for the maintenance of the household
and other miscellaneous expenses and considering further that petitioner can afford to buy cars
for his two (2) children, and to pay the expenses incurred by them which are chargeable to him
through the credit cards he provided them in the amount of ₱100,000.00 each, it is but fair and
just that the monthly support pendente lite for his wife, herein private respondent, be fixed as of
the present in the amount of ₱115,000.00 which would be sufficient enough to take care of the
household and other needs. This monthly support pendente lite to private respondent in the
amount of ₱115,000.00 excludes the amount of One Hundred ThirtyFive (₱135,000.00) Thousand
Pesos for medical attendance expenses needed by private respondent for the operation of both
her eyes which is demandable upon the conduct of such operation. Likewise, this monthly support
of ₱115,000.00 is without prejudice to any increase or decrease thereof that the trial court may
grant private respondent as the circumstances may warrant i.e. depending on the proof submitted
by the parties during the proceedings for the main action for support.
The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a commendable act of petitioner,
should be continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his disposal. 30 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Accordingly, only the following expenses of respondent may be allowed as deductions from the
accrued support pendente lite for petitioner and her children:
1âwphi1
Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua Php 42,450.71
Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan 11,500.00
Credit card purchases of Angelli 365,282.20
(Groceries and Dry Goods) 228,869.38
Credit Card purchases of Daniel Ryan
TOTAL Php 648,102.29
As to the contempt charge, we sustain the CA in holding that respondent is not guilty of indirect
contempt.
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority,
justice, and dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s order, but
such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into
disrepute or, in some manner, to impede the due administration of justice. 31 To constitute
contempt, the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper purpose. 32 The good
faith, or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor should be considered.33
Respondent admittedly ceased or suspended the giving of monthly support pendente lite granted
by the trial court, which is immediately executory. However, we agree with the CA that
respondent’s act was not contumacious considering that he had not been remiss in actually
providing for the needs of his children. It is a matter of record that respondent continued
shouldering the full cost of their education and even beyond their basic necessities in keeping with
the family’s social status. Moreover, respondent believed in good faith that the trial and appellate
courts, upon equitable grounds, would allow him to offset the substantial amounts he had spent or
paid directly to his children.
Respondent complains that petitioner is very much capacitated to generate income on her own
because she presently maintains a boutique at the Ayala Center Mall in Cebu City and at the
same time engages in the business of lending money. He also claims that the two children have
finished their education and are now employed in the family business earning their own salaries.
Suffice it to state that the matter of increase or reduction of support should be submitted to the
trial court in which the action for declaration for nullity of marriage was filed, as this Court is not a
trier of facts. The amount of support may be reduced or increased proportionately according to the
reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person
obliged to support.34 As we held in Advincula v. Advincula35
…Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such nature that its
allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to
support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with his increased or
decreased needs, and with the means of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final
determination.36
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated April 20, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 01154 and 01315 is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages
filed by Susan Lim Lua against Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP. CA-G.R. No. 01154;
b) GRANTING IN PART Danilo Y. Lua's Petition for Certiorari docketed as SP. CA-G.R. No.
01315. Consequently, the assailed Orders dated 27 September 2005 and 25 November 2005
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil Case No. CEB-29346 entitled
"Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and instead a
new one is entered:
i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of Php 648,102.29 from the support pendente lite
in arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two (2) children;
ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his monthly support of Ph₱115,000.00
pesos starting from the time payment of this amount was deferred by him subject to the
deduction aforementioned.
iii. DIRECTING the immediate execution of this judgment.
SO ORDERED."
G.R. No. 201043 June 16, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Finance Center (AFPFC), Petitioner,
vs.
DAISY R. YAHON, Respondent.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to nullify and set
aside the Decision1 dated November 29, 2011 and Resolution2 dated March 9, 2012 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) Mindanao Station in CA-G.R. SP No. 02953-MIN. The CA affirmed the orders
and decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 22 granting
temporary and permanent protection orders, and denying the motion to lift the said temporary
protection order (TPO).
Daisy R. Yahon (respondent) filed a petition for the issuance of protection order under the
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,3 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004," against her husband, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon (S/Sgt.
Yahon), an enlisted personnel of the Philippine Army who retired in January 2006. Respondent
and S/Sgt. Yahon were married on June 8, 2003. The couple did not have any child but
respondent has a daughter with her previous live-in partner.
On September 28, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, as follows:
Finding the herein petition for the Issuance of Protection Order to be sufficient in form and
substance and to prevent great and irreparable injury to the petitioner, a TEMPORARY
PROTECTION ORDER is forthwith issued to respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON directing
him to do the following acts:
1. Respondent is enjoined from threatening to commit or committing further acts of
physical abuse and violence against the petitioner;
2. To stay away at a distance of at least 500 meters from petitioner, her residence or
her place of work;
3. To refrain from harassing, annoying, intimidating, contacting or communicating with
petitioner; 4. Respondent is prohibited from using or possessing any firearm or deadly
weapon on occasions not related to his job;
5. To provide reasonable financial spousal support to the petitioner.
The Local Police Officers and the Barangay Officials through the Chairman in the area where the
petitioner and respondent live at Poblacion, Claveria, Misamis Oriental and Bobuntogan, Jasaan,
Misamis Oriental are directed to respond to any request for assistance from the petitioner for the
implementation of this order. They are also directed to accompany the petitioner to their conjugal
abode at Purok 2, Bobuntogan, Jasaan, Misamis Oriental to get her personal belongings in order
to insure the safety of the petitioner.
The Deputy Sheriff of this Court is ordered to immediately serve the Temporary Protection Order
(TPO) upon the respondent personally and to seek and obtain the assistance of law enforcement
agents, if needed, for purposes of effecting the smooth implementation of this order.
In the meantime, let copy of this order and petition be served upon the respondent for him to file
an OPPOSITION within a period of five (5) days from receipt hereof and let a Preliminary
Conference and hearing on the merits be set on October 17, 2006 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon.
To insure that petitioner can receive a fair share of respondent’s retirement and other benefits, the
following agencies thru their heads are directed to WITHHOLD any retirement, pension and other
benefits of respondent, S/SGT. CHARLES A. YAHON, a member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines assigned at 4ID, Camp Evangelista, Patag, Cagayan de Oro City until further orders
from the court:
1. Commanding General/Officer of the Finance Center of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;
2. The Management of RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City;
3. The Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St., Cagayan de Oro City.
VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW.
IF THE RESPONDENT APPEARS WITHOUT COUNSEL ON THE DATE OF THE
PRELIMINARYCONFERENCE AND HEARING ON THE MERITS OF THE ISSUANCE OF A
PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER, THE COURT SHALL NOT RESCHEDULE OR
POSTPONE THE PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND HEARING BUT SHALL APPOINT A
LAWYER FOR THE RESPONDENT AND IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH THE SAID
HEARING.
IF THE RESPONDENT FAILS TO APPEAR ON THE DATE OF THE PRELIMINARY
CONFERENCE AND HEARING ON THE MERITS DESPITE PROPER NOTICE, THE COURT
SHALL ALLOW EX-PARTE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE BY THE PETITIONER AND
RENDER JUDGMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE PLEADINGS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
NO DELEGATION OF THE RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE SHALL BE ALLOWED.
SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis supplied.)
S/Sgt. Yahon, having been personally served with copy of the TPO, appeared during the
scheduled pre-trial but informed the court that he did not yet have a counsel and requested for
time to hire his own counsel. However, he did not hire a counsel nor file an opposition or answer
to the petition. Because of his failure to appear in the subsequent hearings of the case, the RTC
allowed the ex-parte presentation of evidence to determine the necessity of issuance of a
Permanent Protection Order (PPO).
Meanwhile, as prayed for by respondent who manifested that S/Sgt. Yahon deliberately refused to
give her spousal support as directed in the TPO (she claimed that she had no source of livelihood
since he had told her to resign from her job and concentrate on keeping their house), the RTC
issued another order directing S/Sgt. Yahon to give respondent spousal support in the amount of
₱4,000.00 per month and fifty percent (50%) of his retirement benefits which shall be
automatically deducted and given directly to respondent.5
In her testimony, respondent also said that S/Sgt. Yahon never complied with the TPO as he
continued making threats and inflicting physical abuse on her person, and failed to give her
spousal support as ordered by the court.
On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision,6 as follows:
After careful review and scrutiny of the evidence presented in this case, this court finds that there
is a need to permanently protect the applicant, Daisy R. Yahon from further acts of violence that
might be committed by respondent against her. Evidences showed that respondent who was a
member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines assigned at the Headquarters 4ID Camp
Evangelista, Cagayan de Oro City had been repeatedly inflicting physical, verbal, emotional and
economic abuse and violence upon the petitioner. Respondent in several instances had slapped,
mauled and punched petitioner causing her physical harm. Exhibits G and D are medical
certificates showing physical injuries suffered by petitioner inflicted by the respondent at instances
of their marital altercations. Respondent at the height of his anger often poked a gun on petitioner
and threatened to massacre her and her child causing them to flee for their lives and sought
refuge from other people. He had demanded sex from petitioner at an unreasonable time when
she was sick and chilling and when refused poked a gun at her. Several police blotters were
offered as evidence by petitioner documenting the incidents when she was subjected to
respondent’s ill temper and ill treatment. Verbally, petitioner was not spared from respondent’s
abuses by shouting at her that he was wishing she would die and he would celebrate if it happens
and by calling and sending her threatening text messages. These incidents had caused petitioner
great psychological trauma causing her [to] fear for her life and these forced her to seek refuge
from the court for protection. Economically, petitioner was also deprived by respondent of her
spousal support despite order of the court directing him to give a monthly support of Php4,000.00.
In view of the foregoing, this court finds a need to protect the life of the petitioner not only
physically but also emotionally and psychologically.
Based on the evidence presented, both oral and documentary, and there being no controverting
evidence presented by respondent, this Court finds that the applicant has established her case by
preponderance of evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition, thus,
pursuant to Sec. 30 of A.M. No. 04-10-1-SC, let a PERMANENT PROTECTION ORDER be
issued immediately and respondent, S/Sgt. CHARLES A.YAHON is ordered to give to petitioner,
DAISY R. YAHON the amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (Php4,000.00) per month by way of
spousal support.
Pursuant to the order of the court dated February 6, 2007, respondent, S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon is
directed to give it to petitioner 50% of whatever retirement benefits and other claims that may be
due or released to him from the government and the said share of petitioner shall be automatically
deducted from respondent’s benefits and claims and be given directly to the petitioner, Daisy R.
Yahon.
Let copy of this decision be sent to the Commanding General/Officer of Finance Center of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City; the Management of
RSBS, Camp Emilio Aguinaldo, Quezon City and the Regional Manager of PAG-IBIG, Mortola St.,
Cagayan de Oro City for their guidance and strict compliance.
SO ORDERED.7 (Emphasis supplied.)
Herein petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center (AFPFC), assisted by the Office
of the Judge Advocate General (OTJAG), AFP, filed before the RTC a Manifestation and Motion
(To Lift Temporary Protection Order Against the AFP)8 dated November 10, 2008. Stating that it
was making a limited and special appearance, petitioner manifested that on August 29, 2008, it
furnished the AFP Pension and Gratuity Management Center (PGMC) copy of the TPO for
appropriate action. The PGMC, on September 2, 2008, requested the Chief, AFPFC the
temporary withholding of the thirty-six (36) Months Lump Sum (MLS) due to S/Sgt. Yahon.
Thereafter, on October 29, 2008, PGMC forwarded a letter to the Chief of Staff, AFP for the
OTJAG for appropriate action on the TPO, and requesting for legal opinion as to the propriety of
releasing the 36 MLS of S/Sgt. Yahon. Petitioner informed the RTC that S/Sgt. Yahon’s check
representing his 36 MLS had been processed and is ready for payment by the AFPFC, but to date
said check has not been claimed by respondent.
Petitioner further asserted that while it has initially discharged its obligation under the TPO, the
RTC had not acquired jurisdiction over the military institution due to lack of summons, and hence
the AFPFC cannot be bound by the said court order. Additionally, petitioner contended that the
AFPFC is not a party-in-interest and is a complete stranger to the proceedings before the RTC on
the issuance of TPO/PPO. Not being impleaded in the case, petitioner lamented that it was not
afforded due process and it was thus improper to issue execution against the AFPFC.
Consequently, petitioner emphasized its position that the AFPFC cannot be directed to comply
with the TPO without violating its right to procedural due process.
In its Order9 dated December 17, 2008, the RTC denied the aforesaid motion for having been filed
out of time. It noted that the September 28, 2006 TPO and July 23, 2007 Decision granting
Permanent Protection Order (PPO) to respondent had long become final and executory.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied under the RTC’s Order10 dated March
6, 2009.
On May 27, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA praying for the nullification
of the aforesaid orders and decision insofar as it directs the AFPFC to automatically deduct from
S/Sgt. Yahon’s retirement and pension benefits and directly give the same to respondent as
spousal support, allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Respondent filed her Comment with Prayer for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction, manifesting
that there is no information as to whether S/Sgt. Yahon already received his retirement benefit
and that the latter has repeatedly violated the TPO, particularly on the provision of spousal
support.
After due hearing, the CA‘s Twenty-Second Division issued a Resolution11 granting respondent’s
application, viz:
Upon perusal of the respective pleadings filed by the parties, the Court finds meritorious private
respondent’s application for the issuance of an injunctive relief. While the 36-month lump sum
retirement benefits of S/Sgt. Charles A. Yahon has already been given to him, yet as admitted by
petitioner itself, the monthly pension after the mentioned retirement benefits has not yet been
released to him. It appears that the release of such pension could render ineffectual the eventual
ruling of the Court in this Petition.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let a WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION issue enjoining the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center, its employees, agents, representatives, and any
all persons acting on its behalf, from releasing the remaining pension that may be due to S/Sgt.
Charles A. Yahon.
SO ORDERED.12
By Decision dated November 29, 2011, the CA denied the petition for certiorari and affirmed the
assailed orders and decision of the RTC. The CA likewise denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
In this petition, the question of law presented is whether petitioner military institution may be
ordered to automatically deduct a percentage from the retirement benefits of its enlisted
personnel, and to give the same directly to the latter’s lawful wife as spousal support in
compliance with a protection order issued by the RTC pursuant to R.A. No. 9262.
A protection order is an order issued by the court to prevent further acts of violence against
women and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary relief.
Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their
daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. 13 The protection
orders issued by the court may be a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) or a Permanent
Protection Order (PPO), while a protection order that may be issued by the barangay shall be
known as a Barangay Protection Order (BPO).14
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9262 enumerates the reliefs that may be included in the TPO, PPO or BPO,
to wit:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally
or through another, any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act;
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or
otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly;
(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent from the residence of the petitioner,
regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of
protecting the petitioner, or permanently where no property rights are violated, and if
respondent must remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a
law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there
until respondent has gathered his things and escort respondent from the residence;
(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from petitioner and any designated family or
household member at a distance specified by the court, and to stay away from the
residence, school, place of employment, or any specified place frequented by the
petitioner and any designated family or household member;
(e) Directing lawful possession and use by petitioner of an automobile and other
essential personal effects, regardless of ownership, and directing the appropriate law
enforcement officer to accompany the petitioner to the residence of the parties to
ensure that the petitioner is safely restored to the possession of the automobile and
other essential personal effects, or to supervise the petitioner’s or respondent’s removal
of personal belongings;
(f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody of a child/children to the petitioner;
(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled
to legal support. Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an
appropriate percentage of the income or salary of the respondent to be withheld
regularly by the respondent's employer for the same to be automatically remitted
directly to the woman. Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance of
support to the woman and/or her child without justifiable cause shall render the
respondent or his employer liable for indirect contempt of court;
(h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use or possession of any firearm or deadly
weapon and order him to surrender the same to the court for appropriate disposition by
the court, including revocation of license and disqualification to apply for any license to
use or possess a firearm. If the offender is a law enforcement agent, the court shall
order the offender to surrender his firearm and shall direct the appropriate authority to
investigate on the offender and take appropriate action on matter;
(i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the violence inflicted, including, but not
limited to, property damage, medical expenses, child care expenses and loss of
income;
(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate agency to provide petitioner temporary
shelter and other social services that the petitioner may need; and
(k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the court deems necessary to protect and
provide for the safety of the petitioner and any designated family or household member,
provided petitioner and any designated family or household member consents to such
relief. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner argues that it cannot comply with the RTC’s directive for the automatic deduction of
50% from S/Sgt. Yahon’s retirement benefits and pension to be given directly to respondent, as it
contravenes an explicit mandate under the law governing the retirement and separation of military
personnel.
The assailed provision is found in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1638, 15 which states: Section 31.
The benefits authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be subject to
attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall they be assigned,
ceded, or conveyed to any third person: Provided, That if a retired or separated officer or enlisted
man who is entitled to any benefit under this Decree has unsettled money and/or property
accountabilities incurred while in the active service, not more than fifty per centum of the pension
gratuity or other payment due such officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this Decree may
be withheld and be applied to settle such accountabilities. (Emphasis supplied.)
A similar provision is found in R.A. No. 8291, otherwise known as the "Government Service
Insurance System Act of 1997," which reads:
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien -- x x x
xxxx
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies
corresponding to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment,
execution, levy or other processes issued by the courts, quasi-judicial agencies or administrative
bodies including Commission on Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of
the members, including his pecuniary accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his
exercise or performance of his official functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection
with his position or work except when his monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor of
the GSIS.
In Sarmiento v. Intermediate Appellate Court,16 we held that a court order directing the Philippine
National Bank to refrain from releasing to petitioner all his retirement benefits and to deliver one-
half of such monetary benefits to plaintiff as the latter’s conjugal share is illegal and improper, as it
violates Section 26 of CA 186 (old GSIS Law) which exempts retirement benefits from execution.
The foregoing exemptions have been incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, which governs execution of judgments and court orders. Section 13 of Rule 39
enumerates those properties which are exempt from execution:
SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution.– Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:
xxxx
(l) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such support, or any
pension or gratuity from the Government;(Emphasis supplied.)
It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the
later enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. 17 Statutes must
be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence.18 However, if several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to
the later enactment. The later law is the latest expression of the legislative will. 19
We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as
laying down an exception to the general rule above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt
from execution. The law itself declares that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of
the income or salary of the respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically remitted
directly to the woman "[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary."
We disagree.
Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term "employer," which includes in its coverage
the military institution, S/Sgt. Yahon’s employer. Where the law does not distinguish, courts
should not distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all employers, whether private or
government.
It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and child support, is a support
enforcement legislation.1âwphi1 In the United States, provisions of the Child Support
Enforcement Act24 allow garnishment of certain federal funds where the intended recipient has
failed to satisfy a legal obligation of child support. As these provisions were designed "to avoid
sovereign immunity problems" and provide that "moneys payable by the Government to any
individual are subject to child support enforcement proceedings," the law is clearly intended to
"create a limited waiver of sovereign immunity so that state courts could issue valid orders
directed against Government agencies attaching funds in their possession." 25
This Court has already ruled that R.A. No. 9262 is constitutional and does not violate the equal
protection clause. In Garcia v. Drilon26 the issue of constitutionality was raised by a husband after
the latter failed to obtain an injunction from the CA to enjoin the implementation of a protection
order issued against him by the RTC. We ruled that R.A. No. 9262 rests on real substantial
distinctions which justify the classification under the law: the unequal power relationship between
women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the
widespread bias and prejudice against women.
We further held in Garcia that the classification is germane to the purpose of the law, viz:
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to
address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy,
as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.– It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women
and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to
protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to
their personal safety and security.

Petitioner further contends that the directive under the TPO to segregate a portion of S/Sgt.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and
Yahon’s retirement benefits was illegal because said moneys remain as public funds, citing the
children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the
case of Pacific Products v. Ong.20 In that case, this Court sustained the CA when it held that the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All
garnishment of the amount of ₱10,500 payable to BML Trading and Supply while it was still in the
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
possession of the Bureau of Telecommunications was illegal and therefore, null and void. The CA
international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party. 27
therein relied on the previous rulings in Director of Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion21 and
Avendano v. Alikpala, et al.22 wherein this Court declared null and void the garnishment of the
salaries of government employees. Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child support specifically address one form of
violence committed against women – economic abuse.
Citing the two aforementioned cases, we thus declared in Pacific Products:
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent
which includes, but is not limited to the following:
A rule, which has never been seriously questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers,
although it may be due government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in
the process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty may not be 1. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any
sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature, and to subject its legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the
officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited directly. Another reason is other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article
that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they remain in the hands of the disbursing officer 73 of the Family Code;
of the Government, belong to the latter, although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to
a specific portion thereof. And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every
2. Deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and
consideration of public policy forbids it.23
enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
 3. Destroying household property;
4. Controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal
money or properties.28
The relief provided in Section 8(g) thus fulfills the objective of restoring the dignity of women who
are victims of domestic violence and provide them continued protection against threats to their
personal safety and security.
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party
is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves
to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated
family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from
committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the
court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to
prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."29
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated November 29, 2011
and Resolution dated March 9, 2012 of the Court of Appeals Mindanao Station in CA-G.R. SP No.
02953-MIN are AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013
NARCISO SALAS, Petitioners, v.ANNABELLE MATUSALEM, Respondent.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision1dated July 18, 2006 and Resolution2 dated October 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64379.
The factual antecedents:
On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a complaint for Support/Damages
against Narciso Salas (petitioner) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofCabanatuan City (Civil Case
No. 2124-AF).
Respondent claimed that petitioner is. the father of her son Christian Paulo Salas who was born
on December 28, 1994. Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as she was then
only 24 years old, making her believe that he is a widower. Petitioner rented an apartment where
respondent stayed and shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child, including the cost of
caesarian operation and hospital confinement. However, when respondent refused the offer of
petitioner’s family to take the child from her, petitioner abandoned respondent and her child and
left them to the mercy of relatives and friends. Respondent further alleged that she attempted
suicide due to depression but still petitioner refused to support her and their child.
Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly support in the amount of
P20,000.00, as well as actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
Petitioner filed his answer4 with special and affirmative defenses and counterclaims. He described
respondent as a woman of loose morals, having borne her first child also out of wedlock when she
went to work in Italy. Jobless upon her return to the country, respondent spent time riding on
petitioner’s jeepney which was then being utilized by a female real estate agent named Felicisima
de Guzman. Respondent had seduced a senior police officer in San Isidro and her charge of
sexual abuse against said police officer was later withdrawn in exchange for the quashing of drug
charges against respondent’s brother-in-law who was then detained at the municipal jail. It was at
that time respondent introduced herself to petitioner whom she pleaded for charity as she was
pregnant with another child. Petitioner denied paternity of the child Christian Paulo; he was
motivated by no other reason except genuine altruism when he agreed to shoulder the expenses
for the delivery of said child, unaware of respondent’s chicanery and deceit designed to
“scandalize” him in exchange for financial favor.
At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo testified. Petitioner was declared to have
waived his right to present evidence and the case was considered submitted for decision based
on respondent’s evidence.
Respondent testified that she first met petitioner at the house of his “kumadre” Felicisima de
Guzman at Bgy. Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. During their subsequent meeting, petitioner told
her he is already a widower and he has no more companion in life because his children are all
grown-up. She also learned that petitioner owns a rice mill, a construction business and a housing
subdivision (petitioner offered her a job at their family-owned Ma. Cristina Village). Petitioner at
the time already knows that she is a single mother as she had a child by her former boyfriend in
Italy. He then brought her to a motel, promising that he will take care of her and marry her. She
believed him and yielded to his advances, with the thought that she and her child will have a
better life. Thereafter, they saw each other weekly and petitioner gave her money for her child.
When she became pregnant with petitioner’s child, it was only then she learned that he is in fact
not a widower. She wanted to abort the baby but petitioner opposed it because he wanted to have
another child.5
On the fourth month of her pregnancy, petitioner rented an apartment where she stayed with a
housemaid; he also provided for all their expenses. She gave birth to their child on December 28,
1994 at the Good Samaritan Hospital in Cabanatuan City. Before delivery, petitioner even walked
her at the hospital room and massaged her stomach, saying he had not done this to his wife. She
filled out the form for the child’s birth certificate and wrote all the information supplied by petitioner
himself. It was also petitioner who paid the hospital bills and drove her baby home. He was
excited and happy to have a son at his advanced age who is his “look-alike,” and this was
witnessed by other boarders, visitors and Grace Murillo, the owner of the apartment unit petitioner
rented. However, on the 18th day after the baby’s birth, petitioner went to Baguio City for a medical
check-up. He confessed to her daughter and eventually his wife was also informed about his
having sired an illegitimate child. His family then decided to adopt the baby and just give
respondent money so she can go abroad. When she refused this offer, petitioner stopped seeing
her and sending money to her. She and her baby survived through the help of relatives and
friends. Depressed, she tried to commit suicide by drug overdose and was brought to the hospital
by Murillo who paid the bill. Murillo sought the help of the Cabanatuan City Police Station which
set their meeting with petitioner. However, it was only petitioner’s wife who showed up and she
was very mad, uttering unsavory words against respondent.6
Murillo corroborated respondent’s testimony as to the payment by petitioner of apartment rental,
his weekly visits to respondent and financial support to her, his presence during and after delivery
of respondent’s baby, respondent’s attempted suicide through sleeping pills overdose and
hospitalization for which she paid the bill, her complaint before the police authorities and meeting
with petitioner’s wife at the headquarters.7
On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision8 in favor of respondent, the dispositive
portion of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant to give as monthly support of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00)
PESOS for the child Christian Paulo through the mother;
 2. Directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 by way of litigation
expenses; and
3. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.9
Petitioner appealed to the CA arguing that: (1) the trial court decided the case without affording
him the right to introduce evidence on his defense; and (2) the trial court erred in finding that
petitioner is the putative father of Christian Paulo and ordering him to give monthly support.
By Decision dated July 18, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal. The appellate court found
no reason to disturb the trial court’s exercise of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for
postponement on April 17, 1998, the scheduled hearing for the initial presentation of defendant’s
evidence, and the motion for reconsideration of the said order denying the motion for
postponement and submitting the case for decision.
On the paternity issue, the CA affirmed the trial court’s ruling that respondent satisfactorily
established the illegitimate filiation of her son Christian Paulo, and consequently no error was
committed by the trial court in granting respondent’s prayer for support. The appellate court thus
held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Christian Paulo, in instant case, does not enjoy the benefit of a record of birth in the civil registry
which bears acknowledgment signed by Narciso Salas. He cannot claim open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
It had been established by plaintiff’s evidence, however, that during her pregnancy, Annabelle
was provided by Narciso Salas with an apartment at a rental of P1,500.00 which he paid for (TSN,
October 6, 1995, p. 18). Narciso provided her with a household help with a salary of P1,500.00 a
month (TSN, October 6, 1995, ibid). He also provided her a monthly food allowance of P1,500.00
(Ibid, p. 18). Narciso was with Annabelle at the hospital while the latter was in labor, “walking” her
around and massaging her belly (Ibid, p. 11). Narciso brought home Christian Paulo to the rented
apartment after Annabelle’s discharge from the hospital. People living in the same apartment units
were witnesses to Narciso’s delight to father a son at his age which was his “look alike”. It was
only after the 18th day when Annabelle refused to give him Christian Paulo that Narciso withdrew
his support to him and his mother.
Said testimony of Annabelle aside from having been corroborated by Grace Murillo, the owner of
the apartment which Narciso rented, was never rebutted on record. Narciso did not present any
evidence, verbal or documentary, to repudiate plaintiff’s evidence.
In the cases of Lim vs. CA (270 SCRA 1) and Rodriguez vs. CA (245 SCRA 150), the Supreme
Court made it clear that Article 172 of the Family Code is an adaptation of Article 283 of the Civil
Code. Said legal provision provides that the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural
child x x “3) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father”.
In fact, in Ilano vs. CA (230 SCRA 242, 258-259), it was held that–
“The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that practically covers all the other
cases in the preceding paragraphs. ‘Any other evidence or proof’ that the defendant is the father
is broad enough to render unnecessary the other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence
submitted in the action for compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet [the] requirements of
the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph. This paragraph permits
hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate
filiation.”
As a necessary consequence of the finding that Christian Paulo is the son of defendant Narciso
Salas, he is entitled to support from the latter (Ilano vs. CA, supra).
It “shall be demandable from the time the person who has the right to recover the same needs it
for maintenance x x.” (Art. 203, Family Code of the Philippines).10
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.
Hence, this petition submitting the following arguments:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. THE VENUE OF THE CASE WAS IMPROPERLY LAID BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF CABANATUAN CITY CONSIDERING THAT BOTH PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT ARE ACTUAL RESIDENTS OF BRGY. MALAPIT, SAN ISIDRO, NUEVA ECIJA.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PRONOUNCING THAT PETITIONER
WAS AFFORDED THE FULL MEASURE OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND IN
UPHOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT GRAVELY ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DECIDED THE INSTANT
CASE WITHOUT AFFORDING PETITIONER THE RIGHT TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE IN HIS
DEFENSE.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FILIATION OF
CHRISTIAN PAULO WAS DULY ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 175 IN RELATION
TO ARTICLE 172 OF THE FAMILY CODE AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AND
THEREFORE ENTITLED TO SUPPORT FROM THE PETITIONER.11
We grant the petition.
It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for the convenience of
the plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle that choosing the
venue of an action is not left to a plaintiff’s caprice; the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. 12
In personal actions such as the instant case, the Rules give the plaintiff the option of choosing
where to file his complaint. He can file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them resides,
or (2) where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found. 13 The plaintiff or the
defendant must be residents of the place where the action has been instituted at the time the
action is commenced.14
However, petitioner raised the issue of improper venue for the first time in the Answer itself and
no prior motion to dismiss based on such ground was filed. Under the Rules of Court before the
1997 amendments, an objection to an improper venue must be made before a responsive
pleading is filed. Otherwise, it will be deemed waived.15 Not having been timely raised, petitioner’s
objection on venue is therefore deemed waived.
As to the denial of the motion for postponement filed by his counsel for the resetting of the initial
presentation of defense evidence on April 17, 1998, we find that it was not the first time
petitioner’s motion for postponement was denied by the trial court.
Records disclosed that after the termination of the testimony of respondent’s last witness on
November 29, 1996, the trial court as prayed for by the parties, set the continuation of hearing for
the reception of evidence for the defendant (petitioner) on January 27, February 3, and February
10, 1997. In the Order dated December 17, 1996, petitioner was advised to be ready with his
evidence at those hearing dates earlier scheduled. At the hearing on January 27, 1997,
petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Rolando S. Bala, requested for the cancellation of the February 3
and 10, 1997 hearings in order to give him time to prepare for his defense, which request was
granted by the trial court which thus reset the hearing dates to March 3, 14 and 17, 1997. On
March 3, 1997, upon oral manifestation by Atty. Bala and without objection from respondent’s
counsel, Atty. Feliciano Wycoco, the trial court again reset the hearing to March 14 and 17, 1997.
With the non-appearance of both petitioner and Atty. Bala on March 14, 1997, the trial court upon
oral manifestation by Atty. Wycoco declared their absence as a waiver of their right to present
evidence and accordingly deemed the case submitted for decision. 16
On July 4, 1997, Atty. Bala withdrew as counsel for petitioner and Atty. Rafael E. Villarosa filed his
appearance as his new counsel on July 21, 1997. On the same date he filed entry of appearance,
Atty. Villarosa filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 14, 1997 Order pleading for liberality
and magnanimity of the trial court, without offering any explanation for Atty. Bala’s failure to
appear for the initial presentation of their evidence. The trial court thereupon reconsidered its
March 14, 1997 Order, finding it better to give petitioner a chance to present his evidence. On
August 26, 1997, Atty. Villarosa received a notice of hearing for the presentation of their evidence
scheduled on September 22, 1997. On August 29, 1997, the trial court received his motion
requesting that the said hearing be re-set to October 10, 1997 for the reason that he had
requested the postponement of a hearing in another case which was incidentally scheduled on
September 22, 23 and 24, 1997. As prayed for, the trial court reset the hearing to October 10,
1997. On said date, however, the hearing was again moved to December 15, 1997. On February
16, 1998, the trial court itself reset the hearing to April 17, 1998 since it was unclear whether Atty.
Wycoco received a copy of the motion.17
On April 17, 1998, petitioner and his counsel failed to appear but the trial court received on April
16, 1998 an urgent motion to cancel hearing filed by Atty. Villarosa. The reason given by the latter
was the scheduled hearing on the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction in another case under
the April 8, 1998 Order issued by the RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 36 in Civil Case No.
1946. But as clearly stated in the said order, it was the plaintiffs therein who requested the
postponement of the hearing and it behoved Atty. Villarosa to inform the RTC of Gapan that he
had a previous commitment considering that the April 17, 1998 hearing was scheduled as early
as February 16, 1998. Acting on the motion for postponement, the trial court denied for the
second time petitioner’s motion for postponement. Even at the hearing of their motion for
reconsideration of the April 17, 1998 Order on September 21, 1998, Atty. Villarosa failed to
appear and instead filed another motion for postponement. The trial court thus ordered that the
case be submitted for decision stressing that the case had long been pending and that petitioner
and his counsel have been given opportunities to present their evidence. It likewise denied a
second motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Villarosa, who arrived late during the hearing
thereof on December 4, 1998.18
A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right, but a request addressed to the
sound discretion of the court. Parties asking for postponement have absolutely no right to assume
that their motions would be granted. Thus, they must be prepared on the day of the
hearing.19 Indeed, an order declaring a party to have waived the right to present evidence for
performing dilatory actions upholds the trial court’s duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the
deliberate delay and refusal to proceed on the part of one party.20
Atty. Villarosa’s plea for liberality was correctly rejected by the trial court in view of his own
negligence in failing to ensure there will be no conflict in his trial schedules. As we held in Tiomico
v. Court of Appeals21:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Motions for postponement are generally frowned upon by Courts if there is evidence of bad faith,
malice or inexcusable negligence on the part of the movant. The inadvertence of the defense
counsel in failing to take note of the trial dates and in belatedly informing the trial court of any
conflict in his schedules of trial or court appearances, constitutes inexcusable negligence. It
should be borne in mind that a client is bound by his counsel’s conduct, negligence and mistakes
in handling the case.22
With our finding that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the motion for
postponement filed by petitioner’s counsel, petitioner’s contention that he was deprived of his day
in court must likewise fail. The essence of due process is that a party is given a reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense.
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he
cannot complain of deprivation of due process. If the opportunity is not availed of, it is deemed
waived or forfeited without violating the constitutional guarantee. 23
We now proceed to the main issue of whether the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that
respondent’s evidence sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate child of
petitioner.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate filiation may be established in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (Underscoring supplied.)
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth24 (Exhibit “A-1”) of Christian Paulo Salas in
which the name of petitioner appears as his father but which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it
was only respondent who filled up the entries and signed the said document though she claims it
was petitioner who supplied the information she wrote therein.
We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in
the preparation of the certificate.25 Thus, if the father did not sign in the birth certificate, the placing
of his name by the mother, doctor, registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of
paternity.26 Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a recognition in a public instrument 27 and
it has no probative value to establish filiation to the alleged father.28
As to the Baptismal Certificate29 (Exhibit “B”) of Christian Paulo Salas also indicating petitioner as
the father, we have ruled that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents,
they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacraments on the dates so specified.
They are not necessarily competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to the
child’s paternity.30
The rest of respondent’s documentary evidence consists of handwritten notes and letters, hospital
bill and photographs taken of petitioner and respondent inside their rented apartment unit.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the alleged father are inconclusive
evidence to prove paternity.31 Exhibits “E” and “F”32 showing petitioner and respondent inside the
rented apartment unit thus have scant evidentiary value. The Statement of Account 33 (Exhibit “C”)
from the Good Samaritan General Hospital where respondent herself was indicated as the payee
is likewise incompetent to prove that petitioner is the father of her child notwithstanding
petitioner’s admission in his answer that he shouldered the expenses in the delivery of
respondent’s child as an act of charity.
As to the handwritten notes34 (Exhibits “D” to “D-13”) of petitioner and respondent showing their
exchange of affectionate words and romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish
Christian Paulo’s filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner and contained no
statement of admission by petitioner that he is the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes
were authentic, they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-à- vis Article 175 of the Family Code
which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private
handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. 35
Petitioner’s reliance on our ruling in Lim v. Court of Appeals36 is misplaced. In the said case, the
handwritten letters of petitioner contained a clear admission that he is the father of private
respondent’s daughter and were signed by him. The Court therein considered the totality of
evidence which established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was indeed the father of
private respondent’s daughter. On the other hand, in Ilano v. Court of Appeals,37 the Court
sustained the appellate court’s finding that private respondent’s evidence to establish her filiation
with and paternity of petitioner was overwhelming, particularly the latter’s public acknowledgment
of his amorous relationship with private respondent’s mother, and private respondent as his own
child through acts and words, her testimonial evidence to that effect was fully supported by
documentary evidence. The Court thus ruled that respondent had adduced sufficient proof of
continuous possession of status of a spurious child.
Here, while the CA held that Christian Paulo Salas could not claim open and continuous
possession of status of an illegitimate child, it nevertheless considered the testimonial evidence
sufficient proof to establish his filiation to petitioner.
An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by “any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,” like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission,
a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree,
admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.38Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondent’s
evidence insufficient to establish that petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.
The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth of Christian Paulo,
petitioner’s financial support while respondent lived in Murillo’s apartment and his regular visits to
her at the said apartment, though replete with details, do not approximate the “overwhelming
evidence, documentary and testimonial” presented in Ilano. In that case, we sustained the
appellate court’s ruling anchored on the following factual findings by the appellate court which was
quoted at length in the ponencia:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of Merceditas (sic) at the Manila
Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to the delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal examination
accompanied by Artemio (TSN, p. 33, 5/17/74). After delivery, they went home to their residence
at EDSA in a car owned and driven by Artemio himself (id. p. 36).
Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of “Ilano” since birth without any objection on the part of
Artemio, the fact that since Merceditas (sic) had her discernment she had always known and
called Artemio as her “Daddy” (TSN, pp. 28-29, 10/18/74); the fact that each time Artemio was at
home, he would play with Merceditas (sic), take her for a ride or restaurants to eat, and
sometimes sleeping with Merceditas (sic) (id. p. 34) and does all what a father should do for his
child — bringing home goodies, candies, toys and whatever he can bring her which a child enjoys
which Artemio gives to Merceditas (sic) (TSN, pp. 38-39, 5/17/74) are positive evidence that
Merceditas (sic) is the child of Artemio and recognized by Artemio as such. Special attention is
called to Exh. “E-7” where Artemio was telling Leoncia the need for a “frog test” to know the status
of Leoncia.
Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) was sometimes
in the form of cash personally delivered to her by Artemio, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (Exhs. “E-2”
and “E-3”, and “D-6”), or thru Merceditas (sic) herself (TSN, p. 40, 5/17/74) and sometimes in the
form of a check as the Manila Banking Corporation Check No. 81532 (Exh. “G”) and the signature
appearing therein which was identified by Leoncia as that of Artemio because Artemio often gives
her checks and Artemio would write the check at home and saw Artemio sign the check (TSN, p.
49, 7/18/73). Both Artemio and Nilda admitted that the check and signature were those of Artemio
(TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77; TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78).
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, Artemio has shown
concern as the father of Merceditas (sic). When Merceditas (sic) was in Grade 1 at the St. Joseph
Parochial School, Artemio signed the Report Card of Merceditas (sic) (Exh. “H”) for the fourth and
fifth grading period(s) (Exh. “H-1” and “H-2”) as the parent of Merceditas (sic). Those signatures of
Artemio [were] both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas (sic) because Artemio signed Exh. “H-1”
and “H-2” at their residence in the presence of Leoncia, Merceditas (sic) and of Elynia (TSN, p.
57, 7/18/73; TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73). x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of Cavite[,] Artemio gave Leoncia his
picture with the following dedication: “To Nene, with best regards, Temiong”. (Exh. “I”). (pp. 19-20,
Appellant’s Brief)
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to offset the totality of the evidence
indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate of Live
Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as married does not mean that Leoncia
is not appellee’s daughter. This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself in
order to avoid embarrassment.39
In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves are not competent
proof of paternity and the totality of respondent’s evidence failed to establish Christian Paulo’s
filiation to petitioner.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity
and filiation. An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may
be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or
filiation is established by clear and convincing evidence. 40
Finally, we note the Manifestation and Motion41 filed by petitioner’s counsel informing this Court
that petitioner had died on May 6, 2010.
The action for support having been filed in the trial court when petitioner was still alive, it is not
barred under Article 175 (2)42 of the Family Code. We have also held that the death of the putative
father is not a bar to the action commenced during his lifetime by one claiming to be his
illegitimate child.43 The rule on substitution of parties provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, thus applies.
SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. – Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the
claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty
(30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for
disciplinary action.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the
action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring
the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for
the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be
substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named
shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a
specified time to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the
deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court
charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 18,
2006 and Resolution dated October 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 64379
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2124-AF of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 26 is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal
case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as
Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as
the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen
(16) years of age.3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued
by the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months
old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines. 6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the
amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or
less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never
gave support to the son, Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu,
and since then, have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a business
known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu
City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City. 11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter. 12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No.
9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. 13 Respondent
submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-
affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending
the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of
Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and
still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old
minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY
TO LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail. 17 Petitioner
also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his
Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned.19 Subsequently, without
the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription
of the crime charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant
criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which
states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an
offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case
DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is
hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s
obligation to support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so
makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who
are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality." 24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the
memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the
accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a
parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of
violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively established
that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he
is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the
considered opinion of the court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence,
the case should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262
for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.27
issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying
with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by
petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support. 32 Respondent also
added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial
support.33

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 34 of the New
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite
Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 35 of
the fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in
the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws
Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a
are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to
ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating
Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
by their national law with respect to family rights and duties. 36

x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since
this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that
the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is
petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law.
subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support
In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the
to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. 37
RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment
was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2)
by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of
questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the
the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by
CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appealis
their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign
elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)
country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39

There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt
under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the
Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. 29
altogether.

Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response thereto
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or
burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a
not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and
whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do
capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
so.
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does
concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable
not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the
under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The inimitability of
issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated
the factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which
that:
will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition
and remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts.
Thus, in the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
justice should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts. takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. 43

Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do
not fully agree with petitioner’s contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that
the legal obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to
support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is
not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our
local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the
obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed
to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their
children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign
land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality
principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does
not completely show that he is notliable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was
issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid
covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically stated,46 which was not
disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states
that parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable
by law, said law would still not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and
SA v. American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded
and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence
laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public
policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for
their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent-
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice
to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law;
hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles
of Conflict of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to
support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly
enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of
financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his
former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis, 49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe
considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of
the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be
one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section
5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to
wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include,
butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due
her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x
x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support
or custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's child/children. 51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered anact of violence against women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New
Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public
security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject
to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is
indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with
petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the
Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged
against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired
upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is
a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has
been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262,
which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in
twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing
offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in
the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child
calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and
falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-
Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1,
2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on
the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.