IN RE: EDILLON (AC 1928 12/19/1980) refusal to pay his membership dues” to the IBP Respondent Marcial A.
to the IBP Respondent Marcial A. Edillon is disbarred, and his
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed
practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the
name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the
provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of
par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining
to the organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and
suspension for failure to pay the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an
invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is
being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as
a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to
pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of
this compelled financial support of the said organization to
which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to
him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes
the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-
Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion
to pay his membership fee to the IBP.
HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which
every lawyer must be a member of as distinguished from
bar associations in which membership is merely optional and
voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment
a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The
Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and
it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to
associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the
meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to
vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to
which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court in order to further the State’s legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services,
may require thet the cost of the regulatory program – the
lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police
power of the State. The right to practice law before the
courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as
a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed
to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable
as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over
matters of admission, suspension, disbarment, and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court
may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their
annual dues.
(s) FACTS:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed
practicing attorney in the Philippines. On November 1975,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
unanimously recommended to the Court the removal of the
name of Edillon from its Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn
and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on
notwithstanding multiple due notices sent to him.
ISSUES:
1. WHETHER THE COURT IS WITHOUT POWER TO
COMPEL HIM TO BECOME A MEMBER OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
2. WHETHER THE PROVISION OF THE COURT
RULE REQUIRING PAYMENT OF A MEMBERSHIP
FEE IS VOID.
3. WHETHER THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE
PENALTY PROVISIONS WOULD AMOUNT TO A
DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS AND HENCE INFRINGES ON ONE OF
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
4. WHETHER THE POWER OF SC TO STRIKE THE
NAME OF A LAWYER FROM ITS ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS IS VALID.
HELD:
1. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated
Bar is not violative of Edillon’s constitutional freedom to
associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to
vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to
which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services,
may require that the cost of improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program — the lawyers.
But, assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense
compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of
the State.
2. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Court, to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of
law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X,
Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — from requiring
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a
reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation
of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent
that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and
purposes of integration.
3. Whether the practice of law is a property right, the
respondent’s right to practice law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory
measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But it must be emphasized that the practice of law is not a
property right but a mere privilege, and as such must
bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its
Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and
are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion.
name was ordered to be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys
of the Court.
Occena vs. Comelec
G.R. No. L-56350 April 2, 1981
Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings
against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments goes
further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional
infirmity. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is
the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the
fundamental law. The three Resolutions were: 1) Resolution
No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to
own a limited area of land for residential purposes 2)
Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly; and 3)
Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the
Commission on Elections. The three resolutions were
approved by the InterimBatasangPambansa sitting as a
constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981 which the
date of plebiscite has been set on April 7, 1981. It is thus
within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution.
Issues:(1) Whether or not the 1973 Constitution is a
fundamental law.
(2) Whether or not the Interim BatasangPambansa has the
power to propose amendments.
(3) Whether or not the three-fourth votes is
necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard
for proper submission.
(4) Whether or not the three BatasangPambansa
Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments are valid.
Held: Yes, the Interim BatasangPambansa has the power
and privilege to propose amendments. On January 17, 1973,
the present Constitution came into force and effect. With
such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the
recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme
Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be
obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as
a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973
Constitution is the fundamental law. The existence of this
power is indubitable as the applicable provision in the 1976
Amendments is quite
explicit.The Interim BatasangPambansa, sitting as a
constituent body, can propose amendments. In that
capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an
indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes
required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well
when it has been convened as the agency through which
amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement
as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. It is not a
requirement either when, as in this case,
the Interim BatasangPambansa exercises its constituent
power to propose amendments. Resolution No. 1 proposing
an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited
area of land for residential purposes was approved by the
vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the
Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the
National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention;
the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1
abstentionThe three resolutions were approved by
the InterimBatasangPambansa sitting as a constituent
assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981, thus making them
valid.
(s) FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A.
Gozales instituted a prohibiting proceedings against the
validity of three batasang pambansa resolutions (Resolution
No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to
own a limited area of land for residential purposes was
approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing
with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and
the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1
abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the
Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2
with 1 abstention.) The petitioners contends that such
resolution is against the constitutions in proposing
amendments:
ISSUE: 1) Is the 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law?
2) Is the Interim BatasangPambansa has the power to
propose amendments?
RULINGS:
1) YES, The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental
Law. The present constitution is in force and
effect as of January 17, 1973. In Javellana v. the
Executive Secretary, it has been concluded that
the new Constitution is in force and effective,
resolving all doubts. At least cases were
previously cited in the effectivity of the present
Constitution in the first years of its effectivity
alone.Hence, the court sits to uphold and apply
the Constitution. To contend otherwise is futile.
2) YES, the Interim of BatasangPambansahas the
power to propose amendments, vested by the
provisions of the 1976 amendments, having
same function with National Assembly, which
one is to propose amendments, and of the 1973
Constitution, in its transitory provisions, upon
special call by the Prime Minister.
No argument against the validity of the amendment of the
law because amendment includes revision or total overhaul
of the Constitution. Whether the case, it would become
immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign
people. Moreover, necessary votes to approve the
proposition were met by the majority of its members.
Therefore, the petitions were dismissed for lack of merit.
Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro
39 Phil. 660 – Political Law – Delegation of Powers – Liberty
and due process
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the
province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial
governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their
native habitat and to established themselves on a
reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to
remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they
escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a
reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation
under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian
tribe who were considered to be of “very low culture”.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the
reservation but was later caught and was placed in prison at
Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An
application for habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi
and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by
virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro
creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of
their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code, which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the
provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is
deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct
such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved
by the provincial board.
was challenged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative
Code constitutes undue delegation. Whether or not the
Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.
HELD:
I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained
the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative
Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a
better position to determine whether or not to execute the
law but the provincial governor. It is optional for the
provincial governor to execute the law as circumstances may
arise. It is necessary to give discretion to the provincial
governor. The Legislature may make decisions of executive
departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has
committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions
of fact.
II. No. Among other things, the term “non-Christian” should
not be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but
that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The
term “non-Christian” it was said, refers not to religious
belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly
to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of
civilization. In this case, the Manguianes were being
reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and to
arrest their seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle
them down where they can adapt to the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial
board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class
legislation, and stated among other things: “. . . one cannot
hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with
when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is
considered. They are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due
process of law has not been followed. To go back to our
definition of due process of law and equal protection of the
laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it
is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.”
(s)Issues: (1) Whether or Not Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty without
due process of law.
(2) Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code
of 1917 isconstitutional.
Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative
Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due
process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations
in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery
and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion
that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate
exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the
Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of
Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be
read, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1)
The failure of former attempts for the advancement of the
non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only
successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to
oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-
General adds the following; (3) The protection of the
Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which
they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs
among the Manguianes.
Considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the
courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its
rightful authority. It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that
power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic
remedy. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is
unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of
the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their
own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can
one say that due process of law has not been followed.
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except
by due process of law. To constitute "due process of law," as
has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always
necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are
not requisite a rule which is especially true where much
must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in
applying a law to particular cases.
The idea of the provision in question is to unify the people of
the Philippines so that they may approach the highest
conception of nationality. The public policy of the
Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view
to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in
order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for
a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of
the country.
Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or
restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not
issue.
Lorenzo vs. Director of Health [GR 27484, 1
September 1927] First Division, Malcolm (J): 6
concur
Facts: Angel Lorenzo was a leper. He filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus with the Court of First Instance of
Manila, alleging that his confinement in the San Lazaro
Hospital in the City of Manila was in violation of his
constitutional rights. Lorenzo was confined in said hospital in
conformity with the provisions of section 1058 of the
Administrative Code. The trial court sustained the law
authorizing the segregation of lepers, and denied the
petition for habeas corpus, by requiring the trial court to
receive evidence to determine if leprosy is or is not a
contagious disease. Lorenzo appealed.
Issue: Whether the Administrative Code provision on the
confinement of lepers violative of the latter’s constitutional
rights on freedom of travel.
Held: The Philippine law pertaining to the segregation of
lepers is found in article XV of chapter 37 of the
Administrative Code. Codal section 1058 empowers the
Director of Health and his authorized agents "to cause to be
apprehended, and detained, isolated, or confined, all leprous
persons in the Philippine Islands." In amplification of this
portion of the law are found provisions relating to arrest of
suspected lepers, medical inspection and diagnostic
procedure, confirmation of diagnosis by bacteriological
methods, establishment of hospitals, detention camps, and a
leper colony, etc. Section 1058 of the Administrative Code
was enacted by the legislative body in the legitimate
exercise of the police power which extends to the
preservation of the public health. It was placed on the
statute books in recognition of leprosy as a grave health
problem. The methods provided for the control of leprosy
plainly constitute due process of law. Judicial notice will be
taken of the fact that leprosy is commonly believed to be an
infectious disease tending to cause one afflicted with it to be
shunned and excluded from society, and that compulsory
segregation of lepers as a means of preventing the spread of
the disease is supported by high scientific authority. Upon
this view, laws for the segregation of lepers have been
provided the world over. Similarly, the local Legislature has
regarded leprosy as a contagious disease and has authorized
measures to control the dread scourge. It would require a
much stronger case than the present case for the Court to
sanction admitting the testimony of expert or other
witnesses to show that a law of this character may possibly
violate some constitutional provision.
Caunca v Salazar; G.R. No. L-2690; 01 Jan 1949; 82
Phil 851
FACTS: Estelita Flores was brought from the province to
Manila and stayed in the house of respondent who is
running an employment agency. Estelita was prevented from
going with her cousin, the petitioner, unless the money
advanced for her fare and other transportation expenses be
paid first.
ISSUE(S): Whether or not an employment agency has the
right to restrain and detain a maid until the latter has
returned the payment advanced to her.
RULING: NO. An employment agency, regardless of the
amount it may advance to a prospective employee has
absolutely no power to curtail the freedom of movement of
said employee. The fact that power to control said freedom
may be an effective means of avoiding monetary losses to
the agency is no reason for jeopardizing a fundamental
human right. The fortunes of business can not be controlled
by controlling a fundamental human freedom. Human dignity
is not a merchandise appropriate for commercial barters or
business bargains. Fundamental freedoms are beyond the
province of commerce or any other business enterprise.
Petition is GRANTED.
MARCOS VS MANGLAPUS
Posted by kaye lee on 1:16 PM
G.R. No. 88211 September 15 1989
FACTS:
Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three
year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the Philippines.
The call is about to request of Marcos family to order the
respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the
petition of the President's decision to bar their return to the
Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers
granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
RULING: Yes. According to Section 1, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution: "The executive power shall be vested in
the President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does
not define what is meant by executive power although the
same article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the
President such as appointing power during recess of the
Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures,
after conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty
making power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section
20), budgetary power (Section 22), informing
power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it
cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in
the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to
be executive.
(s)Facts: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was
deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people
power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his
deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines
to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire
consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the
stability of government is threatened from various directions
and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward,
has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos
and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats
& following supervening events:
1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos
leaders
2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries
aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms
dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble
from afar
4. Honasan’s failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of
1. accumulated foreign debt
2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to
order the respondents to issue them their travel documents
and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s
decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines.
Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the
country. He also questioned the claim of the President that
the decision was made in the interest of national security,
public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the
President acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their
right to life, liberty, property without due process and equal
protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them
of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3
of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
Issue:
1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers
granted by the Constitution, the President may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when she determined
that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines
poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare and decided to bar their return.
Decision:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Separation of power dictates that each department has
exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the
1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines.” However, it does
not define what is meant by “executive power” although in
the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by
the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the
laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations
and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the
constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not
defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers
not stated in the Constitution which include the power to
protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to
protect the people, promote their welfare & advance
national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution).
Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate
that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in
the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest
discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American
President) and that the president has to maintain peace
during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day
operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re
flexible depending on the circumstances. The request of the
Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot
be considered in the light solely of the constitutional
provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to
travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which
clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar
to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers
of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and
protect general welfare. In that context, such request or
demand should submit to the exercise of a broader
discretion on the part of the President to determine whether
it must be granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine
is whether or not there exist factual basis for the President
to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the
return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that
there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening
events that happened before her decision are factual. The
President must take preemptive measures for the self-
preservation of the country & protection of the people. She
has to uphold the Constitution.
Fernan, Concurring
1. The president’s power is not fixed. Limits would
depend on the imperatives of events and not on
abstract theories of law. We are undergoing a
critical time and the current problem can only be
answerable by the President.
2. Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would
pose a clear & present danger. Thus, it’s the
executive’s responsibility & obligation to prevent
a grave & serious threat to its safety from
arising.
3. We can’t sacrifice public peace, order, safety &
our political & economic gains to give in to
Marcos’ wish to die in the country. Compassion
must give way to the other state interests.
Cruz, Dissenting
1. As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos’ right to
return, live & die in his own country. It is a right
guaranteed by the Consti to all individuals,
whether patriot, homesick, prodigal, tyrant, etc.
2. Military representatives failed to show that
Marcos’ return would pose a threat to national
security. Fears were mere conjectures.
3. Residual powers – but the executive’s powers
were outlined to limit her powers & not expand.
Paras, Dissenting
1. AFP has failed to prove danger which would
allow State to impair Marcos’ right to return to
the Philippines. .
2. Family can be put under house arrest & in the
event that one dies, he/she should be buried
w/in 10 days.
3. Untenable that without a legislation, right to
travel is absolute & state is powerless to restrict
it. It’s w/in police power of the state to restrict
this right if national security, public safety/health
demands that such be restricted. It can’t be
absolute & unlimited all the time. It can’t be
arbitrary & irrational.
4. No proof that Marcos’ return would endanger
national security or public safety. Fears are
speculative & military admits that it’s under
control. Filipinos would know how to handle
Marcos’ return.
Padilla, Dissenting
Sarmiento, Dissenting
1. President’s determination that Marcos’ return
would threaten national security should be
agreed upon by the court. Such threat must be
clear & present.
G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989
Marcos, V. Manglapus, respondent (Part 2)
Facts: In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court
by a vote of eight to seven, dismissed the petition, after
finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former
President Marcos and his family pose a threat to national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the
Philippines. On September 28, 1989, Marcos died in
Honolulu, Hawaii.
President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in
the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of
Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for
the tranquility and order of the state and society, she did not
allow the remains of Marcos to be brought back in the
Philippines.
A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners
raising the following arguments:
1. Barring their return would deny them their
inherent right as citizens to return to their
country of birth and all other rights guaranteed
by the Constitution to all Filipinos.
2. The President has no power to bar a Filipino
from his own country; if she has, she had
exercised it arbitrarily.
3. There is no basis for barring the return of the
family of former President Marcos.
Issue:
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that the
Marcoses be allowed to return in the Philippines be granted.
Decision:
No. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion for
Reconsideration denied because of lack of merit.
Ratio:
1. Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason
to warrant reconsideration.
2. Factual scenario during the time Court rendered
its decision has not changed. The threats to the
government, to which the return of the Marcoses
has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect,
have not been shown to have ceased. Imelda
Marcos also called President Aquino “illegal”
claiming that it is Ferdinand Marcos who is the
legal president.
3. President has unstated residual powers implied
from grant of executive power. Enumerations are
merely for specifying principal articles implied in
the definition; leaving the rest to flow from
general grant that power, interpreted in
conformity with other parts of the Constitution
(Hamilton). Executive unlike Congress can
exercise power from sources not enumerates so
long as not forbidden by constitutional text
(Myers vs. US). This does not amount to
dictatorship. Amendment No. 6 expressly
granted Marcos power of legislation whereas
1987 Constitution granted Aquino with implied
powers.
4. It is within Aquino’s power to protect & promote
interest & welfare of the people. She bound to
comply w/ that duty and there is no proof that
she acted arbitrarily
Jovito Salonga vs Rolando Hermoso
 Right to travel is not suspended during martial
law
 A republican State under martial law must still
abide by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights
 Basic constitutional rights are still protected
during martial law
97 SCRA 121 – Political Law – Right to Travel Even During
Martial Law
During the time of Martial Law, Jovito Salonga filed a case
for mandamus against Rolando Hermoso of the Travel
Processing Center to compel the latter to issue a certificate
of eligibility to travel in favor of Salonga.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to travel may be prohibited
during martial law.
HELD: No. This issue became moot and academic because
it appears that Hermoso did issue and did not deny
Salonga’s request for a certificate of eligibility to travel.
The issuance of the certificate was in pursuant to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the Right to
Travel. The Philippines, even though it is under martial law,
shall in no instance facilitate the erosion of human rights.
The Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost
care to avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous of
exercising their constitutional right to travel could be
subjected to inconvenience or annoyance – this is to avoid
such similar cases to face the Court which needlessly expire
the Court’s effort and time.
RICARDO C. SILVERIO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, as Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, G.R. No. 94284 April 8, 1991
Facts: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20
(4) of the Revised Securities Act in Criminal Case of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for
his provisional liberty.
More than two (2) years after the filing of the Information,
respondent People of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte
Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-
departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground
that he had gone abroad several times without the
necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the
arraignment and scheduled hearings.
Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court issued an
Order directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel
Petitioner’s passport or to deny his application therefor, and
the Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from
leaving the country. This order was based primarily on the
Trial Court’s finding that since the filing of the Information,
“the accused has not yet been arraigned because he has
never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his
arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone
abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court”.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Issue: Whether or not the right to travel may be impaired
by order of the court
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the foregoing
condition imposed upon an accused to make himself
available at all times whenever the Court requires his
presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel.
A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the
Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to
return. So it is also that “An accused released on bail may be
re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts
to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of
the Court where the case is pending.
Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the
1987 Constitution recognizes the power of the Courts to
curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by
law, it restricts the allowable impairment of the right to
travel only on grounds of interest of national security, public
safety or public health, as compared to the provisions on
freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
(s) Facts: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2
(4) of the revised securities act. Respondent filed to cancel
the passport of the petitioner and to issue a hold departure
order. The RTC ordered the DFA to cancel petitioner’s
passport, based on the finding that the petitioner has not
been arraigned and there was evidence to show that the
accused has left the country with out the knowledge and the
permission of the court.
Issue: Whether or Not the right to travel may be impaired
by order of the court.
Held: The bail bond posted by petitioner has been cancelled
and warrant of arrest has been issued by reason that he
failed to appear at his arraignments. There is a valid
restriction on the right to travel, it is imposed that the
accused must make himself available whenever the court
requires his presence. A person facing criminal charges may
be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if
abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz,
Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An
accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the
necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the
Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the
case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd
par. ]).
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be
interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be
impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate
executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed
with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can
impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public
safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a
limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The
Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition,
1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987
Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel
imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel
Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to
travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga
vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April
1980, 97 SCRA 121).
Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the
Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must
be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so
that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The
offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of
the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal
prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality
without undue delay, with an accused holding
himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes
DOMINADOR C. BALDOZA, vs.
HON. JUDGE RODOLFO B. DIMAANO
FACTS: Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges
Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same
municipality, with abuse of authority in refusing to allow
employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal
docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in
connection with their contemplated report on the peace and
order conditions of the said municipality.
Respondent stated that:
1. there has never been an intention to refuse
access to official court records;
2. although court records are among public
documents open to inspection not only by the
parties directly involved but also by other
persons who have legitimate interest to such
inspection, yet the same is always subject to
reasonable regulation as to who, when, where
and how they may be inspected.
3. a court has unquestionably the power to prevent
an improper use or inspection of its records and
the furnishing of copies therefrom may be
refused where the person requesting is not
motivated by a serious and legitimate interest
but acts out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity
or to gratify private spite or to promote public
scandal.
Restrictions are imposed by the Court for fear of an abuse in
the exercise of the right. For fear that the dirty hands of
partisan politics might again be at play, Some of the cases
filed and decided by the Court after the declaration of
Martial Law and years after the election still bore the stigma
of partisan politics as shown in the affidavits and testimonies
of witnesses.
Without casting aspersion on any particular individual, it is
worth mentioning, that the padlocks of the door of the Court
has recently been tampered by inserting papers and
matchsticks.
Under the circumstances, to allow an indiscriminate and
unlimited exercise of the right to free access, might do more
harm than good to the citizenry of Taal. Disorder and chaos
might result defeating the very essence of their request. The
undersigned is just as interested as Mr. Baldoza in the
welfare of the community and the preservation of our
democratic principles.
Be that as it may, a request of this magnitude cannot be
immediately granted without adequate deliberation and
upon advisement, especially so in this case where the
undersigned doubts the propriety of such request.
The case was thereupon referred to Judge Francisco Mat.
Riodique for investigation and report. At the preliminary
hearing Taal Mayor Corazon A. Caniza filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint to preserve harmony and (cooperation
among officers in the same municipality. This motion was
denied by the Investigating Judge, but after formal
investigation, he recommended the exoneration of
respondent.
Pertinent portion of his report reads as follows:
* * * When this case was heard, complainant Dominador
Baldoza informed the Court that he is aware of the motion to
dismiss filed by Mayor Corazon A. Caniza and that he is in
conformity with the dismissal of the administrative charge
against Judge Rodolfo Dimaano. The Court asked him if he
could prove his case and he said he can. So, the Court
denied his oral motion to dismiss and required him to
present his evidence. Complainant only manifested to the
Court that he has no oral evidence. The only evidence he
has are the exchanged communication which were all in
writing and attached to the record between him and the
respondent. The Court asked the respondent what he has to
say on the documentary evidence of the complainant. He
manifested that all his answers to the complaint are all
embodied in his answers filed with the Court.
A careful perusal, scrutiny, and study of the communications
between the complainant and the respondent, together with
the answers filed by the latter, reveal that there is no
showing of abuse of authority on the part of the respondent.
The respondent allowed the complainant to open and view
the docket books of the respondent under certain conditions
and under his control and supervision. Complainant admitted
that he was aware of the rules and conditions imposed by
the respondent when he went to his office to view his docket
books for the purpose mentioned in his communication. He
also agreed that he is amenable to such rules and conditions
which the respondent may impose. Under these conditions,
therefore, the Court finds that the respondent has not
committed any abuse of authority.
ISSUE: WON respondent acted arbitrarily in the premises
HELD: Case dismissed.
We find that the respondent did not act arbitrarily in the
premises. As found by the Investigating Judge, the
respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the
docket books of respondent certain conditions and under his
control and supervision. it has not been shown that the rules
and conditions imposed by the respondent were
unreasonable. Undoubtedly in a democracy, the public has a
legitimate interest in matters of social and political
significance. In an earlier case, 1 this Court held that
mandamus would lie to compel the Secretary of Justice and
the Register of Deeds to examine the records of the latter
office. Predicating the right to examine the records on
statutory provisions, and to a certain degree by general
principles of democratic institutions, this Court stated that
while the Register of Deeds has discretion to exercise as to
the manner in which persons desiring to inspect, examine or
copy the records in his office may exercise their rights, such
power does not carry with it authority to prohibit.
Citing with approval People ex rel. Title Guarantee & T. Co.
vs. Railly, 2 this Court said:
The subject is necessarily committed, to a great degree, 'to
his (register of deeds') discretion as to how much of the
conveniences of the office are required to be preserved for
the accomodation of these persons. It is not his duty to
permit the office to be thronged needlessly with persons
examining its books of papers, but it is his duty to regulate,
govern, and control his office in such a manner as to permit
the statutory advantages to be enjoyed by other persons not
employed by him as largely and extensibly as that
consistently can be done * * *. What the law expects and
requires from him is the exercise of an unbiased and
impartial judgment, by which all persons resorting to the
office, under legal authority, and conducting themselves in
an orderly manner, shall be secured their lawful rights and
privileges, and that a corporation formed in the manner in
which the relator has been, shall be permitted to obtain all
the information either by searches, abstracts, or copies, that
the law has entitled it to obtain.
Except, perhaps, when it is clear that the purpose of the
examination is unlawful, or sheer, Idle curiosity, we do not
believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to
concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects
of the person seeking access to the records. It is not their
prerogative to see that the information which the records
contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is
not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the contents of the
records, it is the legislature and not the officials having
custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy. As
to the moral or material injury which the publication might
inflict on other parties, that is the publisher's responsibility
and lookout. The publication is made subject to the
consequences of the law.
The concurring opinion of Justice Briones predicated such
right not on statutory grounds merely but on the
constitutional right of the press to have access to
information as the essence of press freedom.
The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the
people are entitled to information on matters of public
concern and thus are expressly granted access to official
records, as well as documents of official acts, or
transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations
imposed by law. 4 The incorporation of this right in the
Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free
exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no
realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems,
nor a meaningful democratic decision making if they are
denied access to information of general interest. Information
is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the
exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed:
"Maintaining the flow of such information depends on
protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination
since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably
ceases. " 5 However, restrictions on access to certain records
may be imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions imposed
to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a
showing of immediate and impending danger that renders
ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order.
G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987 VALENTIN L. LEGASPI v.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to information
on matters of public concern is invoked in this special civil
action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L.
Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The
respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for
information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons
employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu
City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and
Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil
service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations
for sanitarians.
ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access
government records to validate the civil service eligibilities of
the Health Department employees
HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on
matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open
every door to any and all information. Under the
Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are
"subject to limitations as may be provided by law" The law
may therefore exempt certain types of information from
public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security It
follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a
particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature
of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or
one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being
exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or
not the information sought is of public interest or public
concern. This question is first addressed to the government
agency having custody of the desired information. However,
as already discussed, this does not give the agency
concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of
denial of access, the government agency has the burden of
showing that the information requested is not of public
concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been
exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To
hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As
aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous
position to marshall and interpret arguments against release
. . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard
the constitutional right, every denial of access by the
government agency concerned is subject to review by the
courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by
a writ of Mandamus Public office being a public trust it is the
legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government
positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only
by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all times
accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for
their respective positions. In the instant, case while refusing
to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent
has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which
would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who
are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the
fact that the names of those who pass the civil service
examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure
examinations for various professions, are released to the
public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil
service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request
is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when,
as in this case, the government employees concerned claim
to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen,
has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil
Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of a
sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of
express limitations under the law upon access to the register
of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the
respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service
eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes
imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies
People’s Movement for Press Freedom vs. Manglapus
GR 84642, September 13, 1988
FACTS:
 Petitioners, consisted of members of the mass
media, were seeking information from the
Presidents representatives on the state of the
then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military
Bases Agreement.
 A collision between governmental power over the
conduct of foreign affairs and the citizen’s right
to information.
ISSUE: Whether the information sought by the petitioners
are of public concern and are still covered by the doctrine of
executive privilege?
HELD: The Court adopted the doctrine in U.S. v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp. that the President is the sole organ of
the nation in its negotiations with foreign countries. The
Court denied the petition, stressing that "secrecy of
negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the
constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the
press nor of the freedom of access to information."
GARCIA VS BOARD OF INVESTMENTS
G.R. No. 92024 November 9 1990
FACTS: The Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), a
Taiwanese private corporation, applied for registration with
the Board of Investments (BOI) in February 1988 as a new
domestic producer of petrochemicals in the Philippines. It
originally specified the province of Bataan as the site for the
proposed investment but later submitted an amended
application to change the site to Batangas. Unhappy with the
change of the site, Congressman Enrique Garcia of the
Second District of Bataan requested a copy of BPC’s original
and amended application documents. The BoI denied the
request on the basis that the investors in BPC had declined
to give their consent to the release of the documents
requested, and that Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments
Code protects the confidentiality of these documents absent
consent to disclose. The BoI subsequently approved the
amended application without holding a second hearing or
publishing notice of the amended application. Garcia filed a
petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the BoI committed grave abuse of
discretion in yielding to the wishes of the investor, national
interest notwithstanding.
RULING: The Court ruled that the BoI violated Garcia’s
Constitutional right to have access to information on matters
of public concern under Article III, Section 7 of the
Constitution. The Court found that the inhabitants of Bataan
had an “interest in the establishment of the petrochemical
plant in their midst [that] is actual, real, and vital because it
will affect not only their economic life, but even the air they
breathe” The Court also ruled that BPC’s amended
application was in fact a second application that required a
new public notice to be filed and a new hearing to be held.
Although Article 81 of the Omnibus Investments Code
provides that “all applications and their supporting
documents filed under this code shall be confidential and
shall not be disclosed to any person, except with the consent
of the applicant,” the Court emphasized that Article 81
provides for disclosure “on the orders of a court of
competent jurisdiction”. The Court ruled that it had
jurisdiction to order disclosure of the application, amended
application, and supporting documents filed with the BOI
under Article 81, with certain exceptions.
The Court went on to note that despite the right to access
information, “the Constitution does not open every door to
any and all information” because “the law may exempt
certain types of information from public scrutiny”. Thus it
excluded “the trade secrets and confidential, commercial,
and financial information of the applicant BPC, and matters
affecting national security” from its order. The Court did not
provide a test for what information is excluded from the
Constitutional privilege to access public information, nor did
it specify the kinds of information that BPC could withhold
under its ruling.
(s)COURT RULING: The Supreme Court found the BOI to
have committed grave abuse of discretion in this case, and
ordered the original application of the BPC to have its plant
site in Bataan and the product naphta as feedstock
maintained.
The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Court’s
judicial power to settle actual controversies as provided for
by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before
he wrote the reasons as to how the Court arrived to its
conclusion. He mentioned that nothing is shown to justify
the BOI’s action in letting the investors decide on an issue
which, if handled by our own government, could have been
very beneficial to the State, as he remembered the word of
a great Filipino leader, to wit: “.. he would not mind having a
government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to
foreign dictation”.
Justice Griño Aquino, in her dissenting opinion, argued that
the petition was not well-taken because the 1987
Investment Code does not prohibit the registration of a
certain project, as well as any decision of the BOI regarding
the amended application. She stated that the fact that
petitioner disagrees with BOI does not make the BOI wrong
in its decision, and that petitioner should have appealed to
the President of the country and not to the Court, as
provided for by Section 36 of the 1987 Investment Code.
Justice Melencio-Herrera, in another dissenting opinion,
stated that the Constitution does not vest in the Court the
power to enter the realm of policy considerations, such as in
this case.
VALMONTE v BELMONTE
FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus
with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information
and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish
petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa
members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were
able to secure clean loans immediately before the February
7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then
First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners
with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their
respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to
the public records for the subject information On June 20,
1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the
Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy
General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent
another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply,
"(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever
action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired
objective in pursuance of public interest."
ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens and
taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans
given by the former First Lady Imelda Marcos to Batasang
Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban
political parties.
HELD : Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the
GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the
documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently
based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does
not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the
law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of
government, policy issues are within the domain of the
political branches of the government, and of the people
themselves as the repository of all State power. The
concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they
choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public
offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged
to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of
the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public
figures, most especially those holding responsible positions
in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as
compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject
to closer public scrutiny The "transactions" used here I
suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps
leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract,
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution
which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless
persuasive, and considering further that government-owned
and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary
or governmental functions are accountable to the people,
the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the
GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by
special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right
to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of
transparency in government dealings. Although citizens are
afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are
entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does
not accord them a right to compel custodians of official
records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in
their desire to acquire information on matters of public
concern.
MA. CARMEN G. AQUINO-SARMIENTO v. MANUEL L.
MORATO (in his capacity as Chairman of the MTRCB)
and the MOVIE & TELEVISION REVIEW AND
CLASSIFICATION BOARD .
FACTS : In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of
respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she
be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the
voting slips accomplished by the individual board members
after a review of the movies and television productions. It is
on the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or
classified accordingly. Petitioner's request was eventually
denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever
the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their
decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake
the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and
completely private and personal On February 27, 1989,
respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the
MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by
petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17) members of the
board voted to declare their individual voting records as
classified documents which rendered the same inaccessible
to the public without clearance from the chairman.
Thereafter, respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to
examine the voting slips. However, it was only much later,
i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued
Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private
and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and
the voting slips of the members.
ISSUE : W/N Resolution No. 10-89 is valid? (which declared
as confidential, private and personal, the decision of the
reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members)
HELD : The term private has been defined as "belonging to
or concerning, an individual person, company, or interest";
whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or
affecting a nation, state, or community at large. As may be
gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent
classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence
is public is character. it is an office created to serve public
interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid
claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the
individual acting in his private capacity and not to a
governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in,
the discharge of public duties. the decisions of the Board
and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members
concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions,
and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but
rather public in character. They are, therefore, public
records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no
less than the fundamental law of the land
Right to Information, access to public documents
CHAVEZ vs PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT
Facts: -Petitioner Francisco I Chavez (in his capacity as
taxpayer, citizen and a former government official) initiated
this original action seeking
(1) to prohibit and “enjoin respondents [PCGG and its
chairman] from privately entering into, perfecting and/or
executing any agreement with the heirs of the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and concerning the
properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the
Philippines and/or abroad — including the so-called Marcos
gold hoard"; and
(2) to “compel respondent[s] to make public all negotiations
and agreement, be they ongoing or perfected, and all
documents related to or relating to such negotiations and
agreement between the PCGG and the Marcos heirs."
-Chavez is the same person initiated the prosecution of the
Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated
plunder of the public treasury and the systematic
subjugation of the country's economy; he says that what
impelled him to bring this action were several news reports 2
bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in
September 1997. These news items referred to (1) the
alleged discovery of billions of dollars of Marcos assets
deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss banks; and (2)
the reported execution of a compromise, between the
government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how
to split or share these assets.
-PETITIONER DEMANDS that respondents make public any
and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG's
task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. He claims
that any compromise on the alleged billions of ill-gotten
wealth involves an issue of "paramount public interest,"
since it has a "debilitating effect on the country's economy"
that would be greatly prejudicial to the national interest of
the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right
to know the transactions or deals being contrived and
effected by the government.
-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that they do not deny forging a
compromise agreement with the Marcos heirs. They claim,
though, that petitioner's action is premature, because there
is no showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the
negotiations and the Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG
may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure, since the
proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not
become effective and binding.
-PETITIONER INVOKES
Sec. 7 [Article III]. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
Sec. 28 [Article II]. Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy
of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
-RESPONDENT ANSWERS that the above constitutional
provisions refer to completed and operative official acts, not
to those still being considered.
Issue: Whether or not the Court could require the PCGG to
disclose to the public the details of any agreement,
perfected or not, with the Marcoses.
Ruling: “WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
General and Supplemental Agreement dated December 28,
1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are
hereby declared NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law
and the Constitution. Respondent PCGG, its officers and all
government functionaries and officials who are or may be
directly ot indirectly involved in the recovery of the alleged
ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their associates are
DIRECTED to disclose to the public the terms of any
proposed compromise settlment, as well as the final
agreement, relating to such alleged ill-gotten wealth, in
accordance with the discussions embodied in this Decision.
No pronouncement as to cost.”
RD: - The "information" and the "transactions" referred to in
the subject provisions of the Constitution have as yet no
defined scope and extent. There are no specific laws
prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may
be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged.
However, the following are some of the recognized
restrictions:
(1) national security matters and intelligence information
- there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure
with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic
and other national security matters. 24 But where there is
no need to protect such state secrets, the privilege may not
be invoked to withhold documents and other information, 25
provided that they are examined "in strict confidence" and
given "scrupulous protection."
(2) trade secrets and banking transactions
-trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual
Property Code 27 and other related laws) as well as banking
transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act
28) are also exempted from compulsory disclosure
(3) criminal matters
- Also excluded are classified law enforcement matters, such
as those relating to the apprehension, the prosecution and
the detention of criminals, which courts neither may nor
inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution.
Efforts at effective law enforcement would be seriously
jeopardized by free public access to, for example, police
information regarding rescue operations, the whereabouts of
fugitives, or leads on covert criminal activities.
(4) other confidential information.
- The Ethical Standards Act 31 further prohibits public
officials and employees from using or divulging "confidential
or classified information officially known to them by reason
of their office and not made available to the public." Other
acknowledged limitations to information access include
diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings
and executive sessions of either house of Congress, as well
as the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.
- In Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr., the Court emphasized that
the information sought must be "matters of public concern,"
access to which may be limited by law. Similarly, the state
policy of full public disclosure extends only to "transactions
involving public interest" and may also be "subject to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law."
- As to the meanings of the terms "public interest" and
"public concern," the Court, in Legaspi v. Civil Service
Commission, elucidated: “In determining whether or not a
particular information is of public concern there is no rigid
test which can be applied. “ “Public concern" like "public
interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms
embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may
want to know, either because these directly affect their lives,
or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest
of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts
to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at
issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects
the public.”
-As to whether or not the above cited constitutional
provisions guarantee access to information regarding
ongoing negotiations or proposals prior to the final
agreement, this same clarification was sought and clearly
addressed by the constitutional commissioners during their
deliberations,
MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions" which should
be distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or
whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to
the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the
contract itself?
MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here, I suppose, is
generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a
contract, and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding
Officer.
MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations
leading to the consummation of the transaction?
MR. OPLE. Yes, subject to reasonable safeguards on the
national interest.
- Considering the intent of the Constitution, the Court
believes that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers,
as well as other government representatives, to disclose
sufficient public information on any proposed settlement
they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and
holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must
pertain to definite propositions of the government, not
necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations
or communications during the stage when common
assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are
in the "exploratory" stage. There is a need, of course, to
observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in
general, as discussed above— such as on matters involving
national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence
and other classified information.