LLantero
Petition for certiorari
Facts
 JM Tuason Corporation instituted an action for
recovery of possession against petitioner – CFI
 TC: ordered petitioner
o to remove his house and other constructions
o to surrender possession
o to pay P20.00 a month from April 23, 1957
until possession is restored;
o to pay the costs
 Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals -affirmed
 Petitioner received a copy of the same on May 30,
1967.
 MR (reg mail) - erroneously placed as docket number
 judgment against petitioner became final,
 an entry of judgment was made
 the records of the case were remanded to the TC
 petitioner moved to set aside the entry of judgment
o ground: except for the mistake in docket
number, reconsideration was timely filed so
that the Decision had not yet become final
o denied
SC: We find the Petition groundless.
 Petitioner's Motion, although seasonably presented
from the foregoing standpoint, bore an erroneous
docket number
 it could not be attached to the expediente of the
correct case -> the Motion was legally inexistent.
 CA committed no error in remanding the case to the
Court of origin for execution of the judgment.
 counsel's oversight - not excusable
 Petitioner's arguments in his Motion for
Reconsideration were a mere reiteration of his
evidence presented to the trial Court. Clearly then,
the Motion for Reconsideration, even if correctly
numbered, was pro forma, filed to gain time, and
could not toll the running of the period of appeal.
 All the foregoing considered, the entry of judgment
made by respondent Appellate Court must be
upheld.
 WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby dismissed. Costs
against petitioner.
 PCIB v Ortiz
Special Civil Action for Certiorari
 depositors, Rogelio Maraviles- case - recovery of
damages resulting from the dishonor of two (2) of his
check -> PCIB
 Ledesma, Saludo & Associates appeared for PCIB
o lawyers failed to appear at the presentation of
evidence of PCIB
 Trial Court dictated an Order: for Reso
o judgment for the plaintiff
 PCIB's lawyers MR; explanation: Atty. Mangohig
suddenly resigned from the law firm; did no submit
report
 Mariveles opposed
 MR denied
 PCIB – filed notice of appeal and 2nd MR
 TC – denied 2nd MR
SC: notices served on the latter had been reaching the
former and that, in any event, the PCIB lawyers had
never protested such service on them "thru COMMEX."
 Protest: particular instance of service of notice of
the judgment on COMMEX
 PCIB, service was accepted by its lawyers "thru
COMMEX” for hearings
 PCIB's attorney's had acquiesced to and impliedly
adopted a different address
TC Correct: PCIB "PBIC- no good and valid defenses which
might change or alter the judgment of this Court if it were
to set (it) aside and ** (reopen the case)”
PCIB's unverified answer
 made up mostly of denials for lack of knowledge" 21
and an averment of "special and affirmative
defenses"
 no other defense has been asserted by PCIB,
whether in an affidavit of merit attached to its two
(2) motions for reconsideration or otherwise
 FAMEN – ground(M new Trial) - proved in the
manner provided for proof of motions
o "affidavits or depositions" unless the court
should direct that "the matter be heard wholly
or partly on oral testimony or depositions
o accompanied by two (2) affidavits:
 1. facts and circumstances alleged to
constitute – FAMEN
 2. affidavit of merits, setting forth the
particular facts claimed to constitute the
movant's meritorious COA/defense
o Otherwise- pro forma; not interrupt period
o Ground: excessive Damages- Affid not required
 proper motion for new trial interrupts the running of
the period of appeal
o time remaining to appeal only
o run again after notice
Rep v Asuncion (petition for review)
Facts:
 Asuncion and the Heirs of Felipe F. Asuncion
o applied for the registration of the titles
 Petitioner(rep by OSG)- opposed: inalienable forest
lands
 App's motion to admit an amended application –
granted
 compromise agreement – app and other opp
 TC – approved compromise; dismissed 2 applications
o Decision: ordered registration of 5 parcels
 OSG - MR 5 days after receipt – denied
 TC – “OSG in effect seeking new trial; mr – pro forma
– lacked affid of merit req S2R37”
 Notice of Appeal dismissed – filed out of time
o 7 days after receipt of denial
 Cert – CA – annulment of orders – dismissed
o CA- considered MR – as MNewTrial
o Pro forma – did not toll running
o MR denied
SC: motion for reconsideration is equivalent to a motion for
new trial if based on a ground for new trial:
1. FAMEN
2. Newly discovered evid
CAB - Solicitor General's motion for reconsideration did not
aver grounds for new trial.
 Not based on 1 or 2
 two main arguments raised by the Solicitor General
1. deprived petitioner of its right to present
evidence
2. tainted with serious errors of law and fact
SC: Mere reiteration of issues already passed upon by the
court does not automatically make a motion for
reconsideration pro forma. What is essential is compliance
with the requisites of the Rules.
OSG-alleged that the trial court had erred in considering the
1953 decision of CFI as res judicata. MR was not pro forma.
SG filed his notice of appeal on March 20, 2002 or seven
days after he received the denial of the motion-> within the
"fresh period" of 15 days to file the notice of appeal.
we find now that the Solicitor General improperly appeals
before this Court the trial court's decision in LRC Case No.
3681-M. We note that he had already appealed said
decision, by way of an ordinary appeal, when he filed the
notice of appeal with the trial court.34 In Marikina Valley
Dev't. Corp. v. Hon. Flojo, it should be pointed out, this
Court directed the trial court to give due course to the
notice of appeal.
G.R. No. 145336. February 20, 2013 -Reso
Reynante Tadeja, et al. Vs. People of the Philippines
Facts:
The prosecution witnesses testified that they saw Ruben
Bernardo on May 3, 1994 being hacked to death by the
brothers Reynante, Ricky, Ricardo, and Ferdinand and their
first cousin Plaridel – all surnamed Tadeja (herein
petitioners). As a result, Ruben died. On the other hand,
petitioners alleged that it was Ruben, together with his
sons, who first attacked Reynante. On 15 July 1994, an
Information for homicide for the death of Ruben was filed
against Reynante, Ricky, Ricardo, Ferdinand, and Plaridel.
The RTC issued a decision finding herein petitioners guilty
of homicide. Except for Plaridel, who absconded, all the
other accused (petitioners herein) appealed to the Court
of Appeals (CA). CA sustained the decision. SC issued a
Decision dated 21 July 2006 affirming the Decision of the
CA. On 23 October 2006, SC denied the motion with
finality.
On 6 November 2006, petitioners filed a Motion with
Leave of Court to Vacate Judgment to remand the case to
the RTC for further reception of evidence. Later,
petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion to Motion with
Leave of Court to Vacate Judgment Due to Supervening
Event alleging that on 29 November 2006, the police had
finally arrested Plaridel. Attached was a statement
executed by Plaridel admitting therein that he had killed
Ruben. SC treated the motion as a second motion for
reconsideration of the 21 July 2006 Decision and denied it
on the ground that it was a prohibited pleading under the
Rules. In a letter addressed to then Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno, Ferdinand prayed for the reopening of the case on
the basis of the confession of Plaridel.
Issue: Whether or not there reopening of the case is
permitted by law in the case at bar.
Held: No, it is not. We resolve to DENY petitioners’ motion
to reopen the case for reception of further evidence in the
trial court. Section 1 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court
provides that a new trial may only be granted by the court
on motion of the accused, or motu proprio with the
consent of the accused "(a)t any time before a judgment
of conviction becomes final." In this case, petitioners’
judgment of conviction already became final and executory
on 26 July 2007 – the date on which the Decision of this
Court denying the petition and affirming the ruling of the
CA was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.
Thus, pleas for the remand of this case to the trial court for
the conduct of a new trial may no longer be entertained.
Furthermore, petitioners premise their motion for a new
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, i.e.
Plaridel’s extrajudicial confession. Newly discovered
evidence refers to that which (a) is discovered after trial;
(b) could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) is
material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching; and (d) is of such weight that it would
probably change the judgment if admitted.
The most important requisite is that the evidence could
not have been discovered and produced at the trial even
with reasonable diligence; hence, the term "newly
discovered." The confession of Plaridel does not meet this
requisite. He participated in the trial before the RTC and
even gave testimony as to his defense. It was only after he
and petitioners had been convicted by the trial court that
he absconded. Thus, the contention that his confession
could not have been obtained during trial does not hold
water.
SJS v Lim – RESOLUTION
25 Nov 2014 dec - declared Ordinance 8187(continued stay
of oil terminals) UNCONSTITUTIONAL and INVALID
intervenor oil companies – MR, Clarification
MR by Shell:
 not supported by evidence
o reliance on the factual pronouncements
o Adoption of "imagined fears
o no substantial difference between the
conditions in 2001 and the present setup
SC: MR Must be DENIED
 grounds relied on being mere reiterations of the
issues
 effect and disposition of a motion for
reconsideration:
o R52- does not impose on the Court the
obligation to deal individually and specifically
with the grounds relied upon <- useless
formality or ritual invariably
As succinctly put by then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa in
Ortigas and Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Judge Velasco8 on the
effect and disposition of a motion for reconsideration:
The filing of a motion for reconsideration, authorized by
Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, does not impose on the Court
the obligation to deal individually and specifically with the
grounds relied upon therefor, in much the same way that
the Court does in its judgment or final order as regards the
issues raised and submitted for decision. This would be a
useless formality or ritual invariably involving merely a
reiteration of the reasons already set forth in the judgment
or final order for rejecting the arguments advanced by the
movant; and it would be a needless act, too, with respect to
issues raised for the first time, these being, as above stated,
deemed waived because not asserted at the first
opportunity. It suffices for the Court to deal generally and
summarily with the motion for reconsideration, and merely
state a legal ground for its denial (Sec. 14, Art. VIII,
Constitution); i.e., the motion contains merely a reiteration
or rehash of arguments already submitted to and
pronounced without merit by the Court in its judgment, or
the basic issues have already been passed upon, or the
motion discloses no substantial argument or cogent reason
to warrant reconsideration or modification of the judgment
or final order; or the arguments in the motion are too
unsubstantial to require consideration, etc.
In anticipation of further attempts to delay the
enforcement of this Court's Decision dated 25 November
2014, the parties to these cases are hereby REMINDED of
the pronouncements in Ortigas and Co. Ltd. Partnership v.
Judge Velasco23 on the import of the denial of a motion for
reconsideration. Thus:
The denial of a motion for reconsideration signifies that
the grounds relied upon have been found, upon due
deliberation, to be without merit, as not being of sufficient
weight to warrant a modification of the judgment or final
order. It means not only that the grounds relied upon are
lacking in merit but also that any other, not so raised, is
deemed waived and may no longer be set up in a
subsequent motion or application to overturn the
judgment; and this is true, whatever may be the title given
to such motion or application, whether it be "second
motion for reconsideration" or "motion for clarification" or
"plea for due process" or "prayer for a second look," or
"motion to defer, or set aside, entry of judgment," or xxx,
etc..24 (Emphasis supplied)
This Resolution is final. Under pain of contempt, no further
pleadings, motions or papers in the guise of the above-
enumerated submissions shall, thus, be entertained in
these cases.
G.R. No. 115595 November 14, 1994
ANTONIO DEMETRIOU, HARRIET DEMETRIOU, ET AL.,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE RHODIE A. NIDEA, and
HILDA RALLA-ALMINE, respondents.
FACTS:
1. PET: action to annul judgment of RTC before CA,
which ordered the Register of Deeds to issue a new
owner's duplicate certificate of title to PRIVATE
RESPONDENT – DENIED on ground of fraud alleged therein
was not extrinsic fraud but, if at all, only intrinsic fraud
which did not justify setting aside the final decision of the
trial court.THEN filed PET FOR REV before SC.
2. PET allege that the property in question is in the
name of Pablo Ralla, private respondent's deceased father,
wherein they are co-owners.
3. that petitioners acquired two-thirds of the property
by DOS was ratified and confirmed by virtue of an order
date 11 May 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Fifth
Judicial Region, Branch 8 Legaspi City
4. that at the time of the sale of the Property to the
petitioners, there was a ten-year lease contract over the
property which was scheduled to expire on 15 July 1991, for
this reason, the petitioners decided to await the
termination of the lease before registering the sale and
obtaining a new title in their name;
5. that soon after the expiration of the lease contract,
the father of the petitioners went to the Register of Deeds
to have the deed of sale registered and to obtain new title
in the name of the petitioners and learned from the
Register of Deeds that by an order of Judge Rhodie A. Nidea
of the RTC of Tabaco, Albay, Branch 16, the owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. T-65878 in the possession of the
petitioner had been declared of no further force and effect
and that a new second owner's duplicate copy of said title
has been issued to the private respondent; that
subsequent investigation by the petitioners disclosed that
on Sept. 20, 1990 private respondent filed a petition with
the RTC of Tabaco, Albay, Branch 16 and docketed as CAD
Case No. T-1024 wherein she falsely and fraudulently
alleged that "the owner's duplicate copy of the said
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-65878 was lost and/or
destroyed while in the possession and custody of herein
petitioner.
6. Respondent Judge Rhodie A. Nidea, the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay, Branch
16, issued an order dated Dec. 7, 1990 ordering the
Register of Deeds to issue a second owner's duplicate copy
of transfer certificate of title No. T-65878 with all the
annotations and encumbrances thereon, which shall be of
like faith and credit as the one lost and declaring the lost or
destroyed owner's duplicate copy of the TCT No. T-65878
of no further force and effect, and that pursuant to the
order, the Register of Deeds issued a new second owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. T-65878 to the private
respondent; that despite repeated demands by petitioners
and despite protracted attempts at settlement, private
respondent refused to deliver or turn over to the
petitioners the second owner's duplicate copy of TCT No.
65878 issued pursuant to the aforesaid order of Judge
Rhodie A. Nidea; that the aforesaid order of Judge Rhodie
A. Nidea has become final and executory
7. SO: CA said FRAUD is only INTRINSIC not EXTRINSIC
a. An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of
fraud will lie only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in
character.
b. EXTRINSIC FRAUD REFERS to any fraudulent act of
the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed
outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party
has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the
case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
c. INTRINSIC FRAUD takes the form of "acts of a party
in a litigation during the trial such as the use of forged or
false document or perjured testimony, which did not affect
the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just
determination of the case".
d. In the present petition, the allegation of fraud
involves admission by the respondent court of an alleged
false affidavit of loss, which alleged fraud is intrinsic in
character. THUS, AS THE ALLEGED FRAUD COMMITTED BY
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS NOT EXTRINSIC IN
CHARACTER, THE INSTANT PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF
THE SAID DECEMBER 1, 1990 ORDER OF THE LOWER COURT
SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
ISSUE: WON CA is correct in denying the pet to annul RTC
judgment
HELD: NO.
8. TAMA sa fraud na pwede na annul. The use of the
alleged false affidavit of loss by private respondent is
similar to the use during trial or forged instruments or
perjured testimony.
9. But a judgment otherwise final may be annulled not
only on the ground of extrinsic fraud but also because of
lack of jurisdiction of the court which rendered it.
10. In Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals, on facts analogous
to those involved in this case, this Court already held that if
A CERTIFICATE OF TITLE HAS NOT BEEN LOST but is in fact
in the possession of another person, the RECONSTITUTED
TITLE IS VOID and the COURT RENDERING THE DECISION
HAS NOT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION. Consequently the
decision may be attacked any time. Indeed, Rep. Act No. 26,
§ 18 provides that "in case a certificate of title, considered
lost or destroyed be found or recovered, the same shall
prevail over the reconstituted certificate of title." It was,
therefore, error for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the
petition for annulment of judgment of the petitioners.
11. FORUM SHOPPING: While they indeed alleged that
private respondent had obtained a second owner's
duplicate of TCT T-65878 knowing that 2/3 of the land
covered by the certificate had been sold to them and that
the "2nd owner's copy should be cancelled and recalled
considering the fact that the original is in fact still existing
and not lost, "the allegation was made more for the
purpose of demanding a partition, recognizing that private
respondent is the owner of 1/3 of the land. Petitioner's
intervention is thus different from their action in the Court
of Appeals which is solely for the purpose of seeking the
annulment of the judgment in CAD Case No. T-1024
granting private respondent's petition for the issuance of a
new owner's duplicate certificate of title.
Laureano Arcilla vs. Basilisa Arcilla et. al.
special civil action for certiorari and PROHIBITION
Facts: Petitioner was among the several defendants in an
action for Annulment of Sale with Damages filed by herein
private respondents before the CFI of Cebu.
Defendants (petitioner being one of them) was declared in
default for failure to appear. Judgment was rendered in
favor of the plaintiffs.
TC - ordered the deed of sale as null and void and declaring
the 8 children of Seguna Arcilla (including defendant
Laureano) as co-owners.
Copy of the decision was sent to and received by
defendants’ counsel of record on November 8, 1976.
On March 25, 1977, herein petitioner Laureano filed a
motion to lift order of default and set aside the decision
dated October 27, 1976 which was denied by respondent
Judge in his order dated April 12, 1997.
Petitioner filed a petition for Relief from Judgment on
April 16, 1977 saying that he knew only of the October 27,
1976 decision on March 24, 1997. He seeks to set aside and
lift the effects of the said decision on mistake and/or
excusable neglect for their failure to inquire from their
lawyer.
Respondent Judge issued the assailed order denying
petitioner’s Petition for Relief premised on the opposition
of the plaintiff(herein respondents) that the contention of
the respondents that they only came to know of the
decision on March 24, 1997 cannot be given weight
because notice to the counsel is deemed notice to the
client.
Issue: Whether or not the Petition for Relief was filed out
of time
Held: This special civil action is DISMISSED for the reasons
herein below stated.
In an order for petition for relief filed under Rule 38 to be
entertained, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that
he has faithfully complied with the provisions of Rule 38.
In assailing the lower court’s dismissal of his petition for
relief being filed out of time, it is incumbent upon herein
petitioner to show that the said petition was filed within
the reglementary period specified in sec. 3, rule 38 (within
60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, order
or other proceeding to be set aside and not more than 6
months after such judgment or order was entered or such
proceeding was taken, accompanied by affidavits showing
fraud, accident mistake or excusable negligence relied
upon and the facts constituting the petitioner’s good and
substantial cause of action or defense).
CAB – Pet - failed to do so, instead e argues on the merits
of his petition for relied, without first showing that the
same was filed on time in the court below. On this ground
alone, the instant case should be dismissed.
The SC agrees with the respondent Judge that the petition
for relief was filed late. We note that the decision set to be
set aside was rendered on October 27, 1976. Petitioner,
through counsel, received a copy of the said decision on
November 8, 1976, and he filed his petition for relief of
judgment only on April 18, 1977.
Examining the petition for relief filed by petitioner, while
the same appears verified and accompanied by an
affidavit of merit, the allegations of facts made therein do
not prove either fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence not show a valid defense in favor of the party
seeking relief. The general allegation made therein to the
effect that “petitioner has a good and valid defense
considering that the late Segunda de Arcilla voluntarily and
willingly executed the document of sale” is not sufficient
compliance with the rules.
Ibabao v CA
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus
2 Conso Cases
1. Civil case - action for quieting of title, recovery of
possession
2. cadastral proceeding
CFI - dismissing Civil Case; declaring Pantaleon Ibabao to be
the true and lawful owner; respondents were ordered to
vacate
Cadastral Case – 3 lots - adjudicated in favor of private
respondents
- no appeal -> final and exec
Respondents filed on August 14, 1979, a Petition for Relief
 fire burned the provincial capitol of Romblon
resulting in the loss of the records of- the petition
 petitioners filed a Petition for Reconstitution –
granted
 dismissing the Petition for Relief for lack of merit.
o Appealed
o Pending appeal: respondents filed an
entireIy separate and independent case for
Annulment of Judgment with preliminary
injunction
IAC - dismissed the petition for annulment
private respondents appealed the appellate court's decision
to this court by way of a petition for review on certiorari
SC Resolution dated June 11, 1984: dismissed the petition
for lack of merit.
 issued an entry of judgment, rendering our decision
therein final and executory.
 petitioners filed a motion for execution of the
Regional Trial Court's decision in the two
consolidated case – granted
Intermediate Appellate Court issued a
resolution(espondents' appeal in their petition for relief
from judgment) - requiring the parties to inform the court
of their willingness to dispense with the oral and
documentary evidence
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
IAC - Resolution remanding the case -> reconstitution and
retrial
rivate respondents filed an urgent motion - Regional Trial
Court be ordered to recall the writ of execution
IAC -denied herein petitioners' motion to dismiss the
respondents' petition for relief on the ground that
respondents' appeal had already been perfected.
SC:
bone of contention lies in the effect of our decision in G.R.
No. 66141 dated June 11, 1984 on the petition for review of
judgment filed by the respondents before the respondent
Court of Appeals. The petitioners seek the dismissal of the
latter case on the ground of res judicata
SC’s decision on respondents' action for annulment of
judgment, was a pronouncement on the merits of the case,
both final and executory.
a perusal of the private respondents' petitions for relief
and for annulment of judgment establishes the clear
Identity of parties, subject matter, causes of action and
relief sought such that any judgment rendered' in one
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in the other action.
petition for relief from judgment
 seeks the reconsideration and setting aside of
respondent trial court's decision in Civ and Cad Cases
 grounds
o respondent cadastral court's alleged lack of
jurisdiction to adjudicate the lots in question
o respondent trial court's finding of petitioners'
compliance with homestead requirements
when final proof thereof had not yet been
approved and the petitioners' application itself
was rejected.
 The respondents' action to annul judgment
duplicates these. Only a different form of action was
availed of by respondents. However, it is well-settled
that a party cannot, by varying the form of action or
adopting a different method of presenting his case,
escape the operation of the principle that one and
the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated
Relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court against whom a decision or order is entered into
through FAMEN
When a party had another adequate remedy available to
him, which was either a motion for new trial or appeal
from the adverse decision of the lower court, and he
was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking
the appeal, he cannot avail himself of the relief provided
in Rule 38
not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from
the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy
at law was due to his own negligence,
 From the decision of the trial court from which G.R. No. 138500 September 16, 2005
respondents seek relief, a motion for reconsideration
was filed but this was, however, withdrawn for being
fatally defective ANDY QUELNAN, Petitioners,

 failed to contain a notice of the time and place of vs.

hearing as required by the Rules of Court.
VHF PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
 no appeal was filed by the respondents causing
the trial court's decision to become final and
executory.
DECISION
 no reasons were offered for their failure to
appeal
 no assertion that the decision of the Court
GARCIA, J.:
sought to be set aside was entered against them
through such fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence.
Under consideration is this petition for review on certiorari
 Thus, as the trial court held in its decision dated
to nullify and set aside the decision1 dated September 17,
July 13, 1983, dismissing the respondent's
1997 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. SP-41942,
petition for relief from judgment, "Plaintiffs"
and its resolution2 dated April 27, 1999, denying
failure to appeal within the reglementary period
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
of perfecting an appeal is NOT a ground to grant a
petition for relief from judgment."

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is The factual backdrop:

hereby GRANTED
In an ejectment suit (Civil Case No. 139649-CV) filed by
respondent VHF Philippines, Inc. against petitioner Andy
Quelnan, involving a condominium unit at the Legaspi
Towers 300 at Roxas Boulevard, Manila which respondent
claimed to have been leased by petitioner, the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, on its finding
that "summons together with a copy of the complaint was
served [on petitioner] thru his wife on August 25, 1992 by
substituted service" and that petitioner "failed to file his
answer within the reglementary period", came out with a
decision dated November 23, 19923 rendering judgment
for respondent, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of [respondent] and against herein
[petitioner] ordering the latter to vacate the premises
located at Unit 20-G Legaspi Towers 300, Vito Cruz, corner
Roxas Blvd., Manila and restore possession of the same to
[respondent]; ordering [petitioner] to pay [respondent] the
amount of P1,077,497.77 as of June 1992 and the further
sum of P25,000.00 and P1,500.00 as monthly rental for the
condominium unit and parking lot respectively with legal
interest thereon and to pay the sum of P15,000.00 as and
for attorney’s fees with costs against defendant.
SO ORDERED. (Words in bracket ours).
Copy of the aforementioned decision was served on
petitioner by registered mail but the same was returned
unclaimed on account of petitioner’s failure to claim the
same despite the postmaster’s three (3) successive notices
on November 25, 1992, December 7, 1992 and December
11, 1992.
No appeal having been taken by the petitioner, the MeTC
decision became final and executory.
On May 18, 1993, a writ of execution, a notice of levy and a
notice to vacate were served on petitioner’s wife who
acknowledged receipt thereof.
On May 24, 1993, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) at Manila a Petition for Relief from Judgment
With Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or temporary
restraining order,4 thereunder alleging, inter alia, that he
was never served with summons and was completely
unaware of the proceedings in the ejectment suit, adding
that he learned of the judgment rendered thereon only on
May 18, 1993 when a notice of levy on execution came to
his knowledge. He thus prayed the RTC to annul and set
aside the MeTC decision and the writs issued in connection
therewith.
In a decision dated June 3, 1996,5 the RTC granted
petitioner’s petition for relief and set aside the MeTC
decision. The RTC explained that petitioner had been
unduly deprived of a hearing and had been prevented from
taking an appeal for the reason that petitioner’s wife, in a
fit of anger, tore the summons and complaint in the
ejectment suit in the heat of a marital squabble. To the RTC,
this constituted excusable negligence as would justify the
filing of the petition for relief from judgment.
Respondent sought reconsideration of the RTC decision but
its motion was denied by said court in its order of July 5,
1996.6
Therefrom, respondent directly went to this Court on a
petition for review, which petition was remanded by this
Court to the Court of Appeals (CA), whereat the same was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41942.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the appellate court, in a
decision dated September 17, 1997,7 upon a finding that
petitioner’s petition for relief was filed with the RTC beyond
the 60-day mandatory period therefor under Section 3, Rule
38 of the Rules of Court, reversed and set aside the RTC
decision and reinstated that of the MeTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated
June 3, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
16 is SET ASIDE. The decision dated November 23, 1992 of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 30 is
REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
In time, petitioner moved for a reconsideration but his
motion was denied by the appellate court in its resolution
of April 27, 1999.8
With this turn of events, petitioner is now the one with us
via the present recourse urging us to nullify and set aside
the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
on the following grounds:
A. THE RESPONDENT IN ITS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT QUESTION THE
ORDERS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA
DATED OCTOBER 26, 1995 AND JANUARY 26, 1996.
B. THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF MANILA NEVER
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITIONER, HENCE ITS
DECISION CANNOT BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
C. THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD
AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS FINAL AND
CONCLUSIVE.9
As we see it, the principal questions to be resolved are: (1)
if a party fails to claim his copy of the adverse decision
which was sent through registered mail, when is he deemed
to have knowledge of said decision? (2) will the
presumption of completeness of service of a registered mail
matter under Rule 13, Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure10 apply in relation to the 60-day period for filing
a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38, Section 3
of the Rules?
It is petitioner’s posture that the 60-day period for filing a
petition for relief from judgment must be reckoned from
the time a party acquired knowledge of the judgment.
Hence, prescinding from his premise that he became aware
of the MeTC decision only on May 18, 1993 when a notice
to pay and vacate was served on him by the sheriff,
petitioner submits that his petition for relief from judgment
was timely filed on May 24, 1993.
We are not persuaded.
Relief from judgment under Rule 38 is a legal remedy
whereby a party seeks to set aside a judgment rendered
against him by a court whenever he was unjustly deprived
of a hearing or was prevented from taking an appeal, in
either case, because of fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable neglect.11
Section 3 of Rule 38 reads:
SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. —
A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections
of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days
after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or
other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6)
months after such judgment or final order was entered, or
such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with
affidavits, showing the fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence relied upon and the facts constituting
the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action or
defense, as the case may be. (Emphasis supplied)
Clear it is from the above that a petition for relief from
judgment must be filed within: (a) 60 days from knowledge
of judgment, order or other proceedings to be set aside;
and (b) six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order
or other proceeding. These two periods must concur. Both
periods are also not extendible and never interrupted.12
Strict compliance with these periods stems from the
equitable character and nature of the petition for relief.
Indeed, relief is allowed only in exceptional cases as when
there is no other available or adequate remedy. As it were,
a petition for relief is actually the "last chance" given by law
to litigants to question a final judgment or order. And
failure to avail of such "last chance" within the grace period
fixed by the Rules is fatal.13
We do not take issue with petitioner that the 60-day period
under Section 3, Rule 38, supra should be reckoned from
the time the aggrieved party has knowledge of the
judgment. The Rule expressly says so. We cannot, however,
go along with his contention that it was only on May 18,
1993 when he became aware of the judgment subject of his
petition for relief.
The records clearly reveal that a copy of the MeTC decision
was sent to petitioner through registered mail at his given
address on November 25, 1992. It should be noted that
petitioner was not represented by counsel during the
proceedings before the MeTC. The first notice to him by the
postmaster to check his mail was on November 25, 1992.
Thereafter, subsequent notices were sent by the
postmaster on December 7, 1992 and December 11, 1992.
For sure, a certification that the registered mail was
unclaimed by the petitioner and thus returned to the
sender after three successive notices was issued by the
postmaster. Hence, service of said MeTC decision became
effective five (5) days after November 25, 1992, or on
November 30, 1992, conformably with Rule 13, Section 10
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 10. Completeness of Service. − Personal service is
complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary mail is
complete upon the expiration of ten (10) days after mailing,
unless the court otherwise provides. Service by registered
mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee, or
after five (5) days from the date he received the first notice
of the postmaster, whichever date is earlier. (Emphasis
supplied)
There is no doubt that under the Rules, service by
registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the
addressee. However, if the addressee fails to claim his mail
from the post office within five (5) days from the date of
the first notice, service becomes effective upon the
expiration of five (5) days therefrom.14 In such a case,
there arises a presumption that the service was complete at
the end of the said five-day period. This means that the
period to appeal or to file the necessary pleading begins to
run after five days from the first notice given by the
postmaster. This is because a party is deemed to have
received and to have been notified of the judgment at that
point.
With the reality that petitioner was first notified by the
postmaster on November 25, 1992, it follows that service of
a copy of the MeTC decision was deemed complete and
effective five (5) days therefrom or on November 30, 1992.
Necessarily, the 60-day period for filing a petition for relief
must be reckoned from such date (November 30, 1992) as
this was the day when actual receipt by petitioner is
presumed. In short, petitioner was deemed to have
knowledge of the MeTC decision on November 30, 1992.
The 60-day period for filing a petition for relief thus expired
on January 29, 1993. Unfortunately, it was only on May 24,
1993, or 175 days after petitioner was deemed to have
learned of the judgment that he filed his petition for relief
with the RTC. Indubitably, the petition was filed way
beyond the 60-day period provided by law.
Moreover, the records are bereft of any showing why
petitioner failed to claim his copy of the MeTC decision. For
sure, petitioner has not offered any explanation as to why
he was not able to obtain a copy of said decision despite
the three notices sent to him by the postmaster. The failure
to claim a registered mail matter of which notice had been
duly given by the postmaster is not an excusable neglect
that would warrant the reopening of a decided case.15
The RTC, in giving due to petitioner’s petition for relief,
ruled that the presumption of completeness of service does
not find application in this case for purposes of reckoning
the 60-day period because the said 60-day period starts
only after the aggrieved party learns of the judgment. It
opined that herein petitioner never acquired knowledge of
the MeTC judgment due to the excusable neglect of his wife
who destroyed and threw away the summons and
complaint in the ejectment suit.
We disagree. As correctly pointed out by the appellate
court, to which we are in full accord:
xxx. The view espoused by the RTC is not only subject to
abuse by any party by deliberately delaying the reckoning
of the 60-day period but is also contrary to jurisprudence.
xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
Nonetheless, the RTC granted Quelnan’s relief from
judgment without sufficient basis. What it considered as
perhaps excusable negligence is the act of Quelnan’s wife in
tearing the summons/complaint because of marital
disharmony. This is extending a plethora of leniency of the
rules to the point of defeating justice to the other party.
xxx.
To stress, Rule 13 is intended to embrace and govern the
filing of all pleadings, judgments, orders, notices and other
papers, as well as the service thereof.16 Whenever
necessary and expedient, the presumption of completeness
of service ought to be applied, as in this case. While it is
true that the rule on completeness of service by registered
mail only provides for a disputable presumption, the
burden is on petitioner to show that the postmaster’s
notice never reached him and that he did not acquire
knowledge of the judgment. Sadly, petitioner failed to
discharge his burden. In fact, petitioner’s denial of receipt
of the notice is belied by the postmaster’s certification that
the mail was not claimed by petitioner despite the three
notices to him. In the situation obtaining in this case, the
postmaster’s certification is the best evidence to prove that
the first notice was sent and delivered to the addressee.17
Similarly, the Court cannot accept petitioner’s argument
that the MeTC decision could not become final and
executory because that court never acquired jurisdiction
over his person by reason of his wife’s act of tearing the
summons and complaint for ejectment. The records show
that the service of summons upon petitioner’s wife was
effected in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 14 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,18 the law that provides for
substituted service of summons.
Given the above, it is safe to conclude that the MeTC
decision became final on December 15, 1992, or fifteen (15)
days from November 30, 1992 when the postmaster’s first
notice of November 25, 1992 was deemed served.
Obviously, petitioner cannot question by his belated
petition for relief the effects of the final and executory
judgment in the ejectment suit. He cannot, by that petition,
render the final judgment abortive and impossible of
execution. The Court has invariably held that the doctrine
of finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice that at
the risk of occasional error, judgments of courts must
become final at some definite date fixed by law.19 The
Court views with disfavor the unjustified delay in the
enforcement of the final orders and decision in this case.
Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the
prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his
victory by some subterfuge devised by the losing party.20
Verily, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be
relieved from the effects of a judgment when the loss of
the remedy at law was due to his own negligence or a
mistaken mode of procedure; otherwise, petitions for relief
will be tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has
already been lost.21 It is a well-known maxim that "equity
aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights."22
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED and the
challenged decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161864 April 27, 2007
SPS. ROLANDO DELA CRUZ and TERESITA DELA CRUZ,
Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. FELICIANO ANDRES and ERLINDA AUSTRIA, and the
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Resolutions
dated October 21, 20031 and January 21, 20042 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67966, which dismissed
the petition for relief from judgment instituted by
petitioners and denied their motion for reconsideration,
respectively.
The petition stemmed from the following factual
antecedents:
Spouses Rolando Dela Cruz and Teresita Dela Cruz filed a
complaint for annulment of title and/or reconveyance with
damages against spouses Feliciano Andres and Erlinda
Austria and the Director of Lands on July 28, 1993. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 523 and assigned to the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Laur and Gabaldon
in Laur, Nueva Ecija.
The MCTC ordered the Director of Lands to cancel Original
Certificate of Title No. 11859 insofar as the 410 square
meters owned and occupied by petitioners were
concerned. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Palayan
City, Branch 40, reversed and set aside the decision of the
MCTC.
On December 4, 2001, petitioners, assisted by Atty. Rafael
E. Villarosa, filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 67966.3 The appellate
court dismissed the petition since the Certification of Non-
Forum Shopping was signed by Atty. Villarosa instead of
petitioners in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.4 Petitioners moved for
reconsideration but it was denied.
Thereafter, Atty. Villarosa withdrew his appearance. On
March 20, 2002, petitioners, assisted by Atty. Guillermo M.
Hernandez, Jr., requested for an extension of time to file
their petition before this Court. Later, they abandoned the
motion and the case was declared closed and terminated.
On May 6, 2002, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals II.
a petition for relief from judgment praying that the
dismissal of their petition for review be set aside since the
gross negligence of their previous counsel did not bind Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its
them.5 The appellate court, however, denied their petition. discretion in not finding that the petitioners’ previous
It ruled that petitioners were bound by the action of their counsel’s acts are to be considered as gross negligence;
counsel as well as by his mistake or negligence. It added
that petitioners could not belatedly complain on petition or
appeal about their counsel’s incompetence since they could III.
have easily dismissed him at the initial or trial stage if they
were not satisfied with his performance. Since petitioners
slept on their rights, they had no one to blame but Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its
themselves. discretion in finding that the petitioners have allegedly slept
on their right to complain about the incompetence of their
previous counsel and to dismiss such counsel; and
With the denial of their motion for reconsideration,
petitioners came to this Court raising the following issues:
IV.

I.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion in not considering the case on the merits.6
Whether or not the filing of a Petition [for] Relief from
Judgment pursuant to Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is available when the case is already pending
with the Court of Appeals and/or with this Honorable Court;
The threshold issue before us is: Can petitioners avail of a
petition for relief under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure from a judgment of the Court of Appeals due to
their counsel’s negligence when he signed the Certification
of Non-Forum Shopping?
Petitioners plead that they be spared the consequences of
their procedural lapse since it was caused by their counsel’s
gross negligence in ignoring a well-established rule that it is
the party himself who should verify and certify the
pleading.
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that petitioners’
counsel was not negligent and in fact did his best since he
filed the petition for review on time.
After considering the submission of the parties, we deny
the petition for lack of merit.
A petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an equitable remedy that is
allowed only in exceptional cases when there is no other
available or adequate remedy.7 It may be availed of only
after a judgment, final order or other proceeding was taken
against the petitioner in any court through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence.8
While the law uses the phrase "any court," it refers only to
Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts.9 The
procedure in the Court of Appeals and this Court are
governed by separate provisions of the Rules of Court and
may, from time to time, be supplemented by additional
rules promulgated by this Court through resolutions or
circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of Court nor the
Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals allows the
remedy of petition for relief in the Court of Appeals.10
Moreover, under Section 1(b), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, the denial of a petition for relief from
judgment is subject only to a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65. In seeking to reverse the appellate
court’s decision denying their petition for relief from
judgment by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45, petitioners have availed of the wrong remedy twice.11
Nevertheless, even if this Court were to delve into the
merits of this petition, the same must still be denied. What
petitioners’ counsel did in this case was to attach an
improper Certification of Non-Forum Shopping to their
petition for review with the appellate court. While this
omission can plausibly qualify as simple negligence, it does
not amount to gross negligence to justify the annulment of
the proceedings below.
For a claim of counsel’s gross negligence to prosper,
nothing short of clear abandonment of the client’s cause
must be shown.12 The negligence of counsel must be so
gross that the client is deprived of his day in court, the
result of which is that he is deprived of his property without
due process of law. Thus, where a party was given the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he
cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for
this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due
process.13 Here, the case underwent a full-blown trial.
Both parties were adequately heard, and all issues were
ventilated before the decision was promulgated.
excusable nor gross negligence amounting to a denial of
due process, meritorious defenses cannot alone be
considered.
While it is true that rules of procedure are not cast in stone,
it is equally true that strict compliance with the Rules is
indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for
the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business.15
Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by
harking on the policy of liberal construction.16
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed Resolutions dated October 21, 2003 and
January 21, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
67966, are AFFIRMED.

It should be pointed out that in petitions for relief from

judgment, meritorious defenses must be accompanied by
Purcon Jr. vs. MRM Phil
the ground relied upon, whether it is fraud, accident,
mistake, excusable negligence, extrinsic fraud or lack of Facts:
jurisdiction.14 In the instant case, there being neither
The case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner for
reimbursement of medical expenses, sickness allowance
and permanent disability benefits with prayer for
compensatory, moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees before the Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
In his verified position paper, petitioner alleged that on
January 28, 2002, respondent MRM Philippines, Inc. hired
him as a seaman on board the vessel M/T SARABELLE 2. He
signed a contract for three (3) months with a monthly
salary of $584.00. According to petitioner, his work
involved a day-to-day activity that required exertion of
strenuous effort, and that he often worked overtime due to
the pressure of his work. His contract was extended for
another three (3) months. On the second week of June
2002, he felt an excruciating pain in his left testicle. After
being examined by a doctor at the port of France, he was
diagnosed with hernia. On June 26, 2002, he was
repatriated due to his ailment.
Upon petitioner's return to the Philippines, he was
examined by Dr. Alegre, the company physician, who
prescribed certain medication. On July 24, 2002, Dr. Alegre
declared that he was fit to resume work. When he
reported to MRM Philippines, Inc. hoping to be re-hired for
another contract, he was told that there was no vacancy for
him.
Respondents, on the other hand, countered that since
petitioner's ailment, hernia, is not work-related, he is not
entitled to disability benefit and related claims. In fact, he
was declared fit to resume work on July 23, 2002 by the
company-designated physician. Respondents likewise
argued that his ailment is not to be considered a permanent
disability as this is easily correctable by simple surgery. The
fact that he was not re-hired by respondent did not mean
that he was suffering from disability. In short, the real
reason was not his disability but because there was no
more vacancy. More importantly, petitioner signed a
Quitclaim and Release which was notarized. The Labor
Arbiter sided with the respondents and dismissed the
complaint for utter lack of merit, on Mar. 31, 2005.
On May 5, 2005, petitioner filed a memorandum of appeal
with the NLRC Third Division which was also dismissed. On
December 20, 2005, the motion for reconsideration was
dismissed for lack of merit. On January 27, 2006, the NLRC
resolution became final and executory and was recorded in
the Book of Entries of Judgments.

On March 2, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with the CA.
However, on June 7, 2006, the CA dismissed the case due to
formal infirmities. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration
was denied. On September 29, 2006, the CA resolution
became final and executory.
On May 9, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure assailing the June 7, 2006 and September 5,
2006 Resolutions of the CA, which dismissed his petition for
certiorari.
In a Resolution dated July 16, 2007, SC denied the petition
for the following reasons: (1) the petition was filed beyond
the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days fixed in Section
2, Rule 45 in relation to Section 5(a), Rule 56, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended; (2) failure to pay on time
docket and other fees and deposit for costs in violation of
Section 3, Rule 45, in relation to Section 5(c) of Rule 56; and
(3) insufficient or defective verification under Section 4,
Rule 7. SC likewise held that petitioner failed to sufficiently
show that the CA committed any reversible error in the
challenged resolutions as to warrant the exercise of this
Court's discretionary appellate jurisdiction. He was not able
to convince this Court why the actions of the Labor Arbiter,
the NLRC and the CA, which have passed upon the same
issue, should be reversed. Consequently, on October 9,
2007, an Entry of Judgment was issued.
On May 6, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition for
relief from judgment before the SC interposing the
following grounds:
1. Labor Arbiter committed a GROSS MISTAKE when he
based his decision on the fit to work certification issued by
the company-designated physician and on the Quitclaim
and Release executed by the complainant and in adopting
irrelevant jurisprudence cited by the respondents and by
adopting it in his decision
2. The factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, and the
NLRC Third Division, are not based on substantial evidence
and that their decisions are contrary to the applicable law
and jurisprudence; and
ISSUE: Can petitioner avail of a petition for relief from
judgment under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure from an SC resolution denying his petition for
review?
HELD: NO. A petition for relief from judgment is not an
available remedy in the Supreme Court.
First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that when a
judgment or final order is entered through fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence, a party in any court may
file a petition for relief from judgment, this rule must be
interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which enumerates the
original cases cognizable by the Supreme Court and a
petition for relief from judgment is not included in the list
of Rule 56 cases originally cognizable by this Court.
Moreover, according to jurisprudence,
a petition for relief from judgment is not an available
remedy in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. The
Court explained that under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, the petition for relief must be filed within sixty
(60) days after petitioner learns of the judgment, final order
or other proceeding to be set aside and must be
accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident,
mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts
constituting petitioner's good and substantial cause of
action or defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it
should be filed with the same court which rendered the
decision. (Dela Cruz v. Andres, reiterating Mesina v. Meer)
Second, while Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court," it refers
only to Municipal/Metropolitan and Regional Trial Courts.
As revised, Rule 38 radically departs from the previous rule
as it now allows the Metropolitan or MTC which decided
the case or issued the order to hear the petition for relief.
Under the old rule, a petition for relief from the judgment
or final order of Municipal Trial Courts should be filed with
the Regional Trial Court. The procedural change in Rule 38
is in line with Rule 5, prescribing uniform procedure for
Municipal and Regional Trial Courts and designation of
Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Courts as courts of record.
Third, the procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are
governed by separate provisions of the Rules of Court. It
may, from time to time, be supplemented by additional
rules promulgated by the Supreme Court through
resolutions or circulars. As it stands, neither the Rules of
Court nor the Revised Internal Rules of the CA allows the
remedy of petition for relief in the CA. The procedure in the
CA from Rules 44 to 55, with the exception of Rule 45 which
pertains to the SC, identifies the remedies available before
said Court such as annulment of judgments or final orders
or resolutions (Rule 47), motion for reconsideration (Rule
52), and new trial (Rule 53). Nowhere is a petition for relief
under Rule 38 mentioned.
for that matter; otherwise the petition for relief will be
tantamount to reviving the right of appeal which has
already been lost, either because of inexcusable negligence
or due to a mistake of procedure by counsel.

The exception to the above-mentioned rule is when the

If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the
remedies available in the CA, with more reason that this
remedy cannot be availed of in the SC. This Court
entertains only questions of law. A petition for relief raises
questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, which are beyond the concerns of this Court.
mistake of counsel is so palpable that it amounts to gross
negligence, in which case a party may be afforded a second
opportunity to vindicate his right. But this opportunity is
unavailing in the instant case, especially since petitioner has
squandered the various opportunities available to him at
the different stages of this case.

Nevertheless, even if the merits of the petition are

considered, the same must still be dismissed. The late filing
of the petition for review does not amount to excusable
negligence. Petitioner's lack of devotion in discharging his
duty, without demonstrating fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, cannot be a basis for judicial relief.
For a claim of counsel's gross negligence to prosper,
nothing short of clear abandonment of the client's cause
must be shown. The relief afforded by Rule 38 will not be
granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects
of the judgment when the loss of the remedy of law was
due to his own negligence, or mistaken mode of procedure