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LESSONS OF THE GULF WAR: 1990-1991 Anthony H. Cordesman Revised July 2013 Note: This is

LESSONS OF THE GULF WAR: 1990-1991

Anthony H. Cordesman

Revised July 2013

Note: This is a rough draft of a book written with Abraham R. Wagner and published by Westview Press. Graphs and maps are missing. Some tables, data, and analyses are corrected in the published edition. It is being circulated only because the published work is out of print .

Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy acordesman@gmail.com

Lessons of the Gulf War

ii

KEY CONCLUSIONS

Anthony H. Cordesman

o Some general themes:

• Not a teflon war: memories of 1973

• Low losses in high tech wars

• Strain on resources

• Critical role of US forces, limits of US capabilities, two MRC issue

• Amount of preparation required.

• Importance of human factors

• Readiness as a forcing function

• Transitional nature of technology

• Strategic bombing

• Non-all weather air/IR/stand-off/BDA

• Uncertain integreation of combined arms and armor; importance digital battlefield

• Weakness of intelligence

o Main theme would like to explore today, however, is the assymteries between the US and Iraq in terms of militaryt capabilities; what -- for want of better term -- have called the two military cultures.

o Western Military Advantages and the "Military Revolution"

o

Decoupling of political and military responsibility: No war is ever free of command controversy or friction between political and military leadership. However, Coalition forces fought the Gulf War with an exceptionally effective delegation of responsibility for military decisions to military commanders. The fact this system worked was partly a matter of individual personalities, but it also reflected important changes in the way national command authority was exercised in the US in comparison with Korea and Vietnam and from the nature of coalition command in past wars

o

Unity of command: In spite of the formal Coalition command structure, effective unity of command took place at the level of USCINCENT. The planning and operational control of all Coalition forces, regardless of service, had a high degree of central coordination. There was no division of command by military service, or separation of operations and intelligence. National forces preserved a high degree of autonomy because they were assigned specific functions, areas, and

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responsibilities, but Coalition commanders supported de facto unit of command -- largely due to the support that Saudi Arabia, Britain, Egypt, and France were will to give the US. The level of unity of command, and "fusion," achieved during the Gulf War was scarcely perfect, but it was far more functional than in previous military conflicts.

o

Decisive force: There is nothing new about the desirability of seizing the initiative and concentrating decisive force in critical areas of the battle. The problem is in achieving this goal. Coalition forces had parity with Iraq in forces, but "decisive force" in the form of superior tactics, training, and technology.

o

Combined operations, combined arms, and the "Air-Land Battle": While US doctrine had always placed a pro forma emphasis on combined operations, many US operations in Vietnam did not properly integrate combined arms, common inter-service training in combined operations was limited, and air operations were not properly integrated into land operations. In the years that followed, the US reorganized to place far more emphasis on combined arms and combined operations. It greatly strengthened combined operations training and career rotations into joint commands. At the same time, it developed tactics that closely integrated air and land operations into what the US came to call the "air-land battle". These tactics were critical to the success of the ground battle.

o

Emphasis on maneuver: The US had emphasized firepower and attrition through the end of the Vietnam War. In the years that followed, it have converted its force structure to place an equal emphasis on maneuver and deception. This emphasis was supported by Britain and France, and was adopted by Saudi Arabia.

o

Emphasis on deception and strategic/tactical innovation: No country has a monopoly on the use of deception and strategic/tactical innovation. The Coalition, however, demonstrated capabilities that were far superior to those of Iraq.

o

"24 hour war" - Superior night, all-weather, and beyond visual range warfare:

"Visibility" is always relative in combat. There is no such thing as a perfect night vision or all-weather combat system, or way of acquiring perfect information at long ranges. US and British air and land forces, however, had far better training and technology for such combat than they had ever had in the past, and were the first forces designed to wage warfare continuously at night and in poor weather. Equally important, they were far more capable of taking advantage of the margin of extra range and tactical information provided by superior technology.

o

Near Real-Time Integration of C 3 I/BM/T/BDA: The Coalition took advantage of major US C 3 I/BM/T/BDA organization, technology, and software to integrate various aspects of command, control, communications, and intelligence (C 3 I; battle management (BM), targeting (T), and battle damage assessment (BDA) to achieve a near real time integration and decision making-execution cycle.

o

Integration of space warfare: The Coalition integrated US space-based intelligence, communications, and command and control assets into its tactics and organization. This "space advantage" would have been even greater if space-based imagery had been better disseminated at the theater and tactical levels.

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o

A new tempo of operations: The Coalition exploited a superiority in every aspect of targeting, intelligence gathering and dissemination, integration of combined arms and multi-service forces, and night and all-weather warfare to achieve both a new tempo of operations and one far superior to that of Iraq.

o

A new tempo of sustainability: The Coalition forces had maintainability, reliability, reparability, and the speed and overall mobility of logistic, service support, and combat support force activity that broadly matched their maneuver and firepower capabilities. The benefits of these new capabilities were reflected in such critical areas as the extraordinarily high operational availability and sortie rates of US aircraft, and the ability to support the movement of heliborne and armored forces during the long thrust into Iraq from the West.

o

Beyond visual range air combat, air defense suppression, air base attacks, and airborne C 4 I/BM: The Coalition had a decisive advantage in air combat training, in beyond visual range air combat capability, in anti-radiation missiles, in electronic warfare, in air base and shelter and kill capability, in stealth and unmanned long-range strike systems, in IFF and air control capability, and in airborne C 4 I/BM systems like the E-3 and ABCCC. These advantages allowed the Coalition to win early and decisive air supremacy,

o

Focused and effective strategic and interdiction bombing: While the Coalition strategic bombing effort had limitations, most aspects of offensive air power highly successful. The interdiction effort was successful in most respects. The Coalition organized effectively to use its deep strike capabilities to carry out a rapid and effective pattern of focus strategic bombing where planning was sufficiently well coupled to intelligence and meaningful strategic objectives so that such strikes achieved the major military objectives planner set. At the same time, targeting, force allocation, and precision kill capabilities had advanced to the point where interdiction bombing and strikes were far more lethal and strategically useful than in previous conflicts.

o

Expansion of the battle field: "Deep Strike": As part of its effort to offset the Warsaw Pact's superiority, US tactics and technology emphasized using air-land battle capabilities to extend the battlefield far beyond the immediate forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). The Coalition exploited the resulting mix of targeting capability, improved air strike capabilities, and land force capabilities in ways that played an important role in attriting Iraqi ground forces during the air phase of the war, and which helped the Coalition break through Iraqi defenses and exploit the breakthrough. This achievement is particularly striking in view of the fact that the US was not yet ready to employ some "deep strike" targeting technologies and precision strike systems designed to fight the Warsaw Pact that were still in development.

o Technological superiority in many critical areas of weaponry: The Coalition scarcely had a monopoly on effective weapons, but it had a critical edge in key weapons like tanks, other armored fighting vehicles, artillery systems, long range strike systems, attack aircraft. air defense aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, space,

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attack helicopters, naval systems, sensors, battle management and a host of other areas. As has been discussed in Chapter One, this superiority went far beyond the technical "edge" revealed by "weapon on weapon" comparisons. Coalition forces exploited technology in "systems" that integrated weapons into other aspects of force capability and into the overall force structures of the US, Britain, France, and the Saudi Air Force to a far greater degree than Iraq and most military forces in Third World states.

o

Integration of precision guided weapons into tactics and force structures: The Coalition exploited a decisive US technical edge in the capability of most of its precision guided weapons over Iraq, far more realistic training in using them, and the ability to link their employment to far superior reconnaissance and targeting capability.

o

Realistic combat training and use of technology and simulation: The US and Britain used training methods that were much superior to previous methods and which were coupled to a far more realistic and demanding system for ensuring the readiness of the forces involved. Equally important, they emphasized the need for the kinds of additional training than allowed US forces to adapt to the special desert warfare conditions of Desert Storm.

o

All volunteer military/higher entry and career standards:

British, French, US, and

Saudi forces were all-volunteer professional force. They had a decisive advantage

in professional standards, training levels, and merit-based promotion. 1

o

Emphasis on forward leadership and delegation: Virtually all of the successful Coalition forces were aggressively led from the front. Iraqi forces were led from the rear.

o

Heavy reliance on NCOs and enlisted personnel: There was nothing new about the heavy reliance Western forces placed on the technical skills, leadership quality, and initiative of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and experienced enlisted personnel. This is a reliance which is common to virtually every Western military force, and which have given them a major advantage over Soviet and those Third world forces which do not give the same authority and expertise to NCOs and career enlisted personnel. However, better educated, trained, and experienced NCOs and enlisted personnel were critical to the British, French, and US ability to exploit technology, and sustain high tempo operations.

o

High degree of overall readiness: Military readiness is a difficult term to define since it involves so many aspects of force capability. Western forces entered the Gulf War, however, with two great advantages. The first was far more realistic standards for measuring readiness and ensuring proper reporting. The second was adequate funding over a sustained period of time.

o

Clear Doctrine for Collateral Damage: The Coalition entered the Gulf War with explicit criteria for limiting collateral damage to Iraq's population and civilian

1 Brigadier General Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory: The United States Army in the Gulf War, Washington, Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1993, p. 6.

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facilities, and with the ability prosecute the war within those limits. It avoided significant direct damage to Iraqi civilians and tailored its strikes against civil facilities to sharply reduce damage to civilian buildings, plants, and infrastructure. This proved to be an important part of shaping the political side of the battlefield.

o Management of Media Relations: While the Coalition was often criticized after the war, for placing limits on the press and manipulating the information provided to the media, the fact remains that modern war is inevitably a struggle to shape media opinion. The Coalition showed superior capability to use the media access to achieve military goals.

o Countervailing Strategy and Limitations in Third World Armed Forces

o Authoritarianism and over-centralization of the effective command structure:

Many Third world states have rigid, compartmented, and over-centralized

C 3 I/BM systems. Their forces are structured so that each service reports through

a separate chain of command. C 4 I/BM systems often are structured to separate

the activity of regular forces from elite, regime security, and ideological forces.

Systems often ensure major sectors and corps commanders report to the political leadership, and separations occur within the branches of a given service. Intelligence is compartmented and poorly disseminated. Combined operations and combined arms coordination is poor, and command interference is common at the political level.

o Lack of strategic assessment capability: Many Third World nations lack

sufficient understanding of Western war fighting capabilities to understand the

impact of the military revolution, the role of high technology systems, and the impact of the new tempo of war.

o Major Weaknesses in battle management, command, control, communications, intelligence, targeting, and battle damage assessment. No Third World country has meaningful access to space-based systems, or advanced theater reconnaissance and intelligence systems. Most have no sophisticated reconnaissance, intelligence, and targeting assets, other than some RPVs. Most are limited to commercial level communications security and dissemination, and cannot provide the software and connectivity necessary to exploit even commercial or ordinary military systems. They lack the C 4 I/BM capability for deep strikes, effective electronic intelligence, and rapid cycles of reaction.

o Lack of cohesive force quality: Virtually all Third World forces have major land combat units and squadrons with very different levels of proficiency. Political, equipment supply, and historical factors often mean that even high priority units exhibit very different levels of real-world combat effectiveness. Further, imbalances in combat support, service support, and logistic support mean significant differences will exist in sustainability, operational effectiveness, defenses, and other activities by sector, and many states encourage a lack of cohesion by creating elite, politicized, or ideological divisions within their forces

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o Shallow offensive battlefields: Most Third World states cannot extended the

depth of the battlefield because they lack the survivable platforms and sensors, communications, and data processing to do so. These problems will be compounded in wars of maneuver, or where growing strain is placed on force cohesion.

o Manpower quality: The Iraqi Army is typical of many Third World forces in

its reliance on the mass use of poorly trained conscripts, and the failure to provide adequate status, pay, and training for NCOs and technicians. Many forces fail to provide for professional career development for officers and joint and combined arms training.

o Slow tempo of operations: Most Third World military forces have not fought a

high intensity air or armored battle. They are at best capable of medium tempo operations, and their pace of operations is often dependent on the survival of some critical mix of facilities or capabilities.

o Lack of Sustainability, Recovery, and Repair: These initial problems in the

tempo of operations are often exacerbated by a failure to provide for sustained air operations and high sortie rates, long range sustained maneuver, and battlefield/combat unit recovery and repair. Many Third World states dependent heavily on re-supply to deal with combat attrition where the US can use field recovery, maintenance, and repair.

o Inability to prevent air superiority: Many Third World states have far

greater air defense capability on paper than they do in practice. Most have not fought any kind of meaningful air action in the last decade, and many have never fought any significant air action in their history. The effort to transfer experience

from other nations often leaves critical gaps in national capability, even where some capabilities are effective.

o Problems air-to-air combat: Iraq's weaknesses in air-to-air combat are typical

of the problems of most Third World air forces. Air combat training levels are low and unrealistic. AWACS and ABCCC capabilities are lacking. EW capabilities are modified commercial grade capabilities. Most aircraft lack effective air battle management systems, and have limited beyond-visual-range and look down-shoot down capability. Most Soviet/Communist supplied air forces depend heavy on obsolete ground controlled vectoring for intercepts. Key radar and control centers are static and vulnerable to corridor blasting.

o Problems in land-based air defense: Most Third World states must borrow or

adapt air defense battle management capabilities from supplier states, and have limited independent capability for systems integration -- particularly at the software level. They lacked the mix of heavy surface-to-air missile systems to cover broad areas, or must rely on obsolete systems which can be killed, countered by EW, and/or bypassed. Most Third World short-range air defense systems do not protect against attacks with stand-off precision weapons or using stealth.

Lessons of the Gulf War

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o Lack of effective survivable long range strike systems: Many Third World

nations have the capability to launch long range air and missile strikes, but severe operational problems. Refueling capabilities do not exist or are present in such small numbers as to be highly vulnerable. Long range targeting and BDA capabilities are lacking. Training is limited and unrealistic in terms of penetrating effective air defenses. Platforms are export systems without the full range of supplier avionics or missile warheads. Assets are not survivable, or lose much of their effective strike capability once dispersed.

o Combined (Joint) Operations, Combined Arms, and the Air-Land Battle: Most

Third World states do not provide an adequate emphasis on any of the key advances in the integration of Western war fighting capabilities during the last decade. When they do, serious individual gaps exist in national warfighting capability.

o Rough/Special terrain warfare: Although many Third World forces have

armed helicopters and large numbers of tracked vehicles, and can create effective rough terrain defenses if given time, they have severe problems in such operations in high tempo operations. Many tend to be road-bound for critical support and combined arms functions, and lack training for long range, high intensity engagements in rough terrain. Many do not properly train to exploit the potential advantages of their own region, and are garrison forces or rely on relatively static operations in pre-determined field positions. These problems are often compounded by a lack of combat engineering and barrier crossing equipment.

o Night and All-Weather Warfare: Most Third World forces lack adequate

equipment for night and poor weather warfare, and particularly for long range direct and indirect fire engagement, and cohesive, sustainable, large scale maneuver.

o Failure to defend in the proper depth - the shallow defensive battlefield: Many

Third World states have doctrines and defense concepts that attempt to hold fairly long forward lines, and that use only one major belt of barrier and mine defenses. Many keep artillery and immediate support units too close to the forward line -- enhancing vulnerability to air operations and armored penetration. They are vulnerable to Western forces relying on swift deep penetrations armored, modern combat engineering, and air power.

o Misuse and maldeployment of reserves: Iraq is scarcely unique in relying on

uses of reserve forces which assume adequate air cover and sufficient time to react. The problems in Third World tempos of maneuver, combined with improving US and other Western "look deep/strike deep" capabilities provide

added capability to disrupt the enemy concept of battle.

o Infantry operations: Many Third World units maintain low quality infantry

units which they use for defensive purposes. Many of these forces lack training, and the capability to maintain cohesion in the event of disruptive air attacks, or

outflanking maneuver. Many differ sharply in actual manning and equipment levels between individual units. Exploiting the character of individual units, as

Lessons of the Gulf War

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distinguished from relying on generalized OB/TO&E analysis, allows the West to exploit these weaknesses effectively.

o Armored operations: Third World forces generally have sharply different

levels of armored warfare proficiency within their armored and mechanized forces. None have advanced training and simulation facilities. Many have severe interoperability and standardization problems within their force structure -- particularly in the case of other armored fighting vehicles where they often deploy a very wide range of types. Many are very tank heavy, without the mix of other capabilities necessary to deploy infantry, supporting artillery, and anti-tank capabilities at the same speed and maneuver proficiency as tank units. Most have poor training for night and poor weather warfare, and for maneuver and overall battle management at the force -- as distinguish from major combat unit level.

o Artillery operations: Many Third World states have very large numbers of

artillery weapons, but serious problems in training and tactics. They lack long range targeting capability and the ability to rapidly shift and effectively allocate

fire. Many rely on towed weapons with limited mobility, or lack off-road support vehicles. Many are only effective in using mass fire against enemies that maneuver more slowly than they do.

o Combat training: Third World military training generally has serious problems and gaps, which vary by countries. Units or force elements over differ sharply in training quality, and have training problems complicated by conversion and expansion, conscript turnover, and a lack of advanced technical support for realistic armored, artillery, air-to-air, surface-to-air, and offensive air training. Mass sometimes compensates, but major weaknesses remain

o Inability to use weapons of mass destruction effectively: Arguably, Third

World states are acquiring long range missiles and weapons of mass destruction with very limited exercise and test and evaluation capabilities. Many will have to improvise deployments, doctrine, and war fighting capabilities. In many cases, they will leave weaknesses and vulnerabilities, or only be able to exploit a limited amount of the potential lethality of such systems

o The Other Side of Countervailing Strategy: Weaknesses in US and Western Capabilities for Regional Warfare

o Accepting the true politics of war: Much of the writing on the "military revolution" still assumes that the West will only have to use military force where there is clear popular and legislative support, and tacitly assumes that any action by the US and/or its allies will have broad international support. There are two problems with this approach. The first is that the defense of strategic interests cannot always be tied to an act of naked aggression like Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The second is that popular, legislative, and international support is always conditional and often volatile. Beginning a conflict or peace action is only the start of the political nature of war. If the enemy can exploit the political situation, there will be no contract between the military and society that will guarantee continued support.

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o Low intensity realism: Low intensity wars are almost invariably fought in confused political circumstances against people, not things. Such wars must be both highly political and focus on killing rather than destroying weapons and facilities. Western preparation for using the military revolution in peace keeping and low intensity conflict sometimes tacitly denies this political reality, while policy makers often commit military forces on the basis of expectations of success without fully assessing the risks. While it may be argued that the West has learned from Somalia, it is not clear what or how. The current peacekeeping effort in Bosnia, for example, still presents similar risks, and characterization of Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim forces during the crisis has scarcely been a model that can support a countervailing strategy.

o Taking casualties: Rightly or wrongly, many potential threat nations believe that the US and other Western states face the same problem as Israel: They cannot take serious casualties in any war other than an existential threat. While such expectations may be exaggerated, efforts to exploit this weakness and produce the kind of retreat the U.S. made from Beirut and Somalia can be taken for granted, and Western success in any future major regional contingency may be dependent on relatively quick, decisive, and low casualty success.

o Inflicting casualties: Increasingly, the West must plan to fight at least low and mid-intensity conflicts in ways which both limit enemy casualties and show that the West is actively attempting to do so. At the same time, the "military revolution" has often avoided coming to grips with the prospect of extend combat with enemy forces where manpower is the principal target and king people, as distinguished from things, dominates the tactical situation. The assumption is often tacitly made that the U.S. will not engage in such fighting -- an assumption that has already help lead to the U.S. defeat in Somalia.

o

Collateral damage: Western states will operate under growing and even more severe constraints regarding inflicting damage on enemy civilians and civilian facilities.

o

Urban and Built-Up Area Warfare: Western military forces never came fully to grips with the issue of urban warfare in NATO, assuming that it would either exploit largely evacuated urban/ areas or could largely bypass these areas. The reluctance to fight in populated areas was at least a passing factor shaping the nature of conflict termination during the Gulf War. Western forces are not trained or equipped to deal with sustained urban warfare in populated areas in regional combat -- particularly when the fighting may affect large civilian populations on friendly soil.

o

Mountain Warfare and Warfare in Forested or Jungle Areas: Many of the systems and tactics the Coalition exploited in the Gulf War were only possible because of the relatively flat terrain and wide-open nature of that terrain. They would be much less decisive if better cover was available.

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o Hostage taking and terrorism: Western governments still tend to sharply overreact to hostage taking, often making deals or concessions for political or humanitarian reasons when long experience had shown that hostages deals almost inevitably fail. Similarly, the West still have uncertain military capabilities to deal with terrorism and unconventional warfare.

o

Sudden attack: One of the key lessons potential threats are likely to draw from Desert Storm is the potential advantage of sudden and decisive action, and the potential value of exploiting the problems in the power projection capabilities of the US and other Western military forces. Western strength may often deter war, but when deterrence fails, it is important to understand that threat powers are likely to escalate suddenly and stress surprise. It is equally important to understand that threat nations actively exploit reporting on shifts in Western defense spending and force levels, and will focus on the problems in Western power projection capabilities revealed in budget documents, legislative debates and the media.

o

Extended deterrence and battles of intimidation: At present, the West is better prepared for war fighting than to define a clear structure of regional deterrence based on exploiting the weaknesses of threat nations and reassuring and strengthening allies. Many crises and regional issues, however, are decided by "no intensity" conflict. They are the product of whether one nation can intimidate another, often to win limited victories that do not threaten the survival or ruling elite in neighboring states. The current Iranian build-up in the Gulf seems to have this focus. So do some aspects of North Korea's manipulation of its nuclear threat, (or threat or nuclear), and the Chinese build-up of capabilities that may affect decisions on control of the South China Sea. The problem the U.S. faces in countering such pressures and in extending deterrence to a regional level is one it is only beginning to address.

o Weapons of mass destruction: The Coalition emerged from Desert Storm claiming a victory over Iraq in destroying its weapons of mass destruction that it never achieved. It had firmly identified only two of 21 major Iraqi nuclear facilities before the war, struck only 8 by the time the war ended, did not proper characterize the functions of more than half the facilities it did strike, and never completed effective BDA. Coalition. strikes on Iraqi chemical facilities left 150,000 munitions intact -- most of which suffered far more from design defects than Coalition attacks. Iraq's biological warfare capabilities seem to have been evacuated and remain largely intact. The Coalition "Scud Hunt" failed and never produced a confirmed kill. Future wars are certain to present far more serious and time urgent threats, and involve far more developed threat nation planning to try to exploit possession of such weapons.

o Ecological and environmental warfare:; water and infrastructure warfare: The burning oil fields and oil spills of the Gulf War did not materially affect the ecology of Kuwait and the Gulf. They did, however, set a precedent for environmental warfare that may be more important in the future. There also is often only a narrow line between military actions that affect the environment and actions that affect key aspects a human survival like attacks on water facilities,

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power facilities that affect key human services and attacks on fuel facilities. Weapons of mass destruction are not the only way of achieving large-scale damage or high civilian casualties.

o

Limits of U.N./cooperative/Coalition warfare: While coalition warfare offers many potential advantages, it also confronts the West. with the practical problem of understanding the strengths and weaknesses of potential and actual allied nations and forces, and integrating them into the "military revolution". Britain, France, and the US deployed to Saudi Arabia in Desert Storm under conditions where it took several months to realistically assess Saudi forces and begin efforts to develop more interoperable war fighting capabilities. The fact that Egypt and Syria were reluctant to execute an offensive into Kuwait came as a surprise to USCINCENT, although this should scarcely have been a surprise in the case of Syria.

o

Extended conflict and occupation warfare: Not all wars can be quickly terminated and many forms of warfare -- particularly those involving peace keeping and peace enforcement -- require prolonged military occupations. Western states, and certainly the US, are increasingly reluctant to engaged in extended conflict at any level of warfare, and have shown little interest in prolonged military occupations and in dealing with the politico-military aftermath of conflict and peacekeeping exercises.

o Several broad conclusions, some of which belabor obvious

• Strengths in Gulf War are very real, but scarcely universal.

• Much depended on readiness, human factors, sheer scale of US military capabilities.

• US only nation with many capabilities.

• Need both adequate readiness/power projection base

• Need and to exploit countervailing strategy

• Need suitably focus intelligence and net assessment for MRCs

• Need to consider both how to best exploit the revolution in military affairs to reinforce strengths and how to modify to correct weaknesses.

Lessons of the Gulf War

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Table of Contents

Lessons of the Gulf War

xiv

KEY CONCLUSIONS

II

o

Western Military Advantages and the "Military Revolution"

ii

o

Countervailing Strategy and Limitations in Third World Armed Forces

vi

CHAPTER ONE: ANALYZI NG THE LESSONS OF TH E CONFLICT

1

S OURCES AND M ETHODS

2

Reliance on Official Sources

2

Methodology and Value Judgments

4

C RITIQUE V ERSUS C RITICISM

5

T HE G ULF W AR AS A G ENERAL AND AS A U NIQUE C ASE

6

T HE A NALYSIS OF S TRATEGIC L ESSONS AND I SSUES

8

T HE A NALYSIS O F T HE T ACTICAL L ESSONS O F T HE C ONFLICT

12

T HE A NALYSIS O F T HE T ECH NICAL L ESSONS O F T HE C ONFLICT

15

T HE A NALYSIS O F H UMAN F ACTORS

22

T HE A NALYSIS O F M AJOR A REAS O F C ONTROVERSY

25

A NALYSIS AND THE P ROBLEM OF U NCERTAINTY

28

CHAPTER TWO: DESERT SHIELD: THE HISTORIC AL FRAMEWORK

32

I RAQ : G UNS , B UTTER , AND B ANKRUPTCY

32

Military Spending Becomes a National Crisis

33

Fear and Ambition: The Other Reaso ns for Iraq's Invasion

35

Iraq's Actions Before Its Invasion of Kuwait

36

C RISIS M ANAGEMENT : T HE C OST OF S TRATEGIC I NDIFFERENCE

38

The Kuwaiti and Arab Reaction

38

US and Western Crisis Management: The Lesson of Strategic Warning

39

Intelligence Failures Versus Policy Failures: The Lesson of Deterrence

43

I RAQ ' S I NVASION OF K UWAIT

45

D IPLOMACY VERSUS W AR : B UILDING THE C OALITION , THE E MBARGO , AND I RAQ ' S R ESPONSE

48

Table 2.1

49

UN Security Council Resolutions Affecting the Gulf War: 1990 - 1991

49

US Reactions and Coalition Building

52

The Iraqi Threat to Saudi Arabia

53

Testing the Limits of US Power Projection Capabilities

55

The Reaction of the Arab World and Iran

57

The Reaction of Europe and the Soviet Union

58

T HE P RELUDE TO THE C ONFLICT : D ESERT S HIELD

60

First Steps in Power Projection

60

Table 2.2

63

US Air Force Aircraft Deploying Into Theater

63

Through September 1990

63

Closing the Window of Vulnerability

64

Restructuring Coalition Defense: The Les son of International Command

66

Making the Coalition Effective: The Lessons of Adaptation, Training, and Readiness

68

M ARITIME O PERATIONS B EFORE D ESERT S TORM : T HE C ONTINUING I MPORTANCE OF S EAPOWER . 70

Enforcing the Embargo: Lessons in Using Seapower to Intercept Cargoes and Merchant

Vessels

70

The Impact of the Interdiction Effort: The Limits of Embargoes and Sanctions

73

T HE P REL UDE TO THE C ONFLICT : P LANNING FOR D ESERT S TORM

75

The Race to Save Kuwait and the Problem of Foreign Hostages

75

Initial Steps in Planning an Offensive to Liberate Kuwait

77

A "One Corps" versus a "Two Corps" Offensive

78

Continuing Problems in Power Projection and the Build - Up of Heavy Forces

80

Lessons of the Gulf War

xv

A Further Build - Up of Coalition and Iraqi Forces

82

 

Ta ble 2.3

84

The Growth of the US and British Forces Through Mid - January 1991 - Part One

84

Table 2.3

86

The Growth of the US and British Forces Through Mid - January 1991 - Part Two

86

Force Deployments in the New Offensive Plan

 

87

Operational Imperatives

and the Lesson

of Deception

87

The US Decision to Go to War: The Lesson of "Consensus" and the Need For Changes in

the War Powers

Act

89

T HE F INAL P REPARATION FOR D ESERT S TORM

 

91

The Build - Up of the Coalition Forces

91

Coalition Forces in Mid - January, 1991: Racing Heavy Forces int o the Theater

92

 

Table 2.4

94

Smaller Allied Contingents in the Coalition Forces in Desert Storm

94

Iraq's Strategy, Defenses, and Force Strength

95

The Ratio of Coalition to Iraqi Forces At the Onset of Desert Storm

97

L ESSONS FOR P OWER P ROJECTION

97

CHAPTER THREE: THE F ORCES ENGAGED - OPPOSING MILITARY CU LTURES AND THE

HUMAN ELEMENT

102

Table 3.1

104

Iraqi vs. UN Coalition Forces at the Start of the Gulf War

104

Table 3.1

105

Iraqi vs. UN Coalition Theater Forces at the Start of the Gulf War

105

P REPARING FOR THE P AST : I RAQI M ILITARY F ORCES A T THE B EGINNING OF G ULF W AR

107

Table 3.2: The Iraqi Order of Battle 1990 to 1991

108

Table 3.3

109

Major Qualitative Limitations in the Iraqi Armed Forces

109

The Iraqi Army

114

Table 3.5

115

The Iraqi Divisional Land Order of Battle at the Time of Desert Storm

115

Table 3.6

117

Iraqi Division Organization

117

The Iraqi Air Force

118

Table 3.7

121

Iraq's Air Order of Battle Before the Gulf War

121

Iraq's Land Based Air Defenses

127

Table 3.8

129

Deployment of Iraq's Air Defense Weapons Before the Gulf War

129

The Iraqi Navy

130

T HE P ROM ISE OF THE "R EVOLUTION IN M ILITARY A FFAIRS ": US F ORCES AND C APABILITIES AND THE

L ESSON OF THE "A IR L AND B ATTLE "

131

The Unique Character of US Forces

131

The Problem of Interoperability

132

Table 3.9:The Growth of the US Forces for Desert Storm - Part One

134

Table 3.9

135

The Growth of the US Forces for Desert Storm - Part Two

135

Table 3.9

136

The Growth of the US Forces for Desert Storm - Part Three

136

Table 3.9

137

The Growth of the US Forces for Desert Storm - Part Four

137

The "New" US Military

138

Table 3.10

145

The New US Military: The "Revolution in Military Affairs"

145

T HE S TRENGTHS AND W EAKNESSES OF E UROPEAN P OWER P ROJECTION : L ESSONS FROM B RITISH F ORCES AND C APABILITIES

150

Lessons of the Gulf War

xvi

British Ground Forces

152

Table 3.11

156

The Size of British Ground Forces in Desert Storm

156

British Air Forces

157

British Naval Forces

159

T HE S TRENGTHS AND W EAKNESSES OF E UROPEAN P OWER P ROJECTION : L ESSONS FROM F RENCH F ORCES AND C APABILITIES

160

The French Ground Forces

162

The French Air Fo rce

165

French Naval Forces

166

O THER W ESTERN M ILITARY F ORCES

167

L ESSONS FOR C OOPERATIVE S ECURITY : S AUDI F ORCES AND C APABILITIES

167

Table 3.12

169

The Arab Land Order of Battle in Desert Storm

169

The Saudi Army

171

Saudi Land Forces and the Battle of Khafji

175

Saudi Land Forces During the Land Campaign

177

The Saudi National Guard

181

The Saudi Air Force

182

Saudi Naval and Air Defense Forces

187

L ESSONS FOR C OOPERATIVE S ECURITY : E GYPTIAN F ORCES AND C APABIL ITIES

189

L ESSONS FOR C OOPERATIVE S ECURITY : S YRIAN F ORCES AND C APABILITIES

192

L ESSONS FOR C OOPERATIVE S ECURITY : K UWAITI F ORCES AND C APABILITIES

194

Kuwait's Military Forces Durin g the Gulf War

198

The Cost of Unpreparedness Before and After the War

200

L ESSONS FOR C OOPERATIVE S ECURITY : O THER A RAB F ORCES

201

T HE L ESSONS OF A W AR B ETWEEN M ILITARY "C ULTURES ": F IGHTING W ORLD W AR III VERSUS F IGHTING W ORLD W AR I

202

CHAPTER FOUR: COMMAN D, CONTROL, COMMUNIC ATIONS, COMPUTERS, A ND BATTLE MANAGEMENT

203

T HE N EED FOR J OI NT C ENTRAL C OMMAND AND S PECIALIZED US S UPPORT : C OALITION C OMMAND ,

C ONTROL , C OMMUNICATIONS , A ND I NTELLIGENCE (C 4 I) S YSTEMS

205

The Lesson of Joint Saudi - US Command

205

Figure 4.1

207

Command Structure for UN Coalition Forces in the Gulf War

207

Drawing On Specialized US Command Expertise

208

Lessons For High

209

H IGH T ECHNOLOGY C ENTRAL A IR B ATTLE M ANAG EMENT : C 4 I/BM IN THE A IR W AR

213

The Role of the Joint Forces Air Command (JFACC)

213

The Tactical Air Control Centers (TACC)

214

The Special Planning Group or "Black Hole"

215

The Master Attack Plan

217

The Air Tasking Order (ATO):

219

Air Space Management

221

Key Tools Supporting Command and Control of the Air War: The ABCCC, AWACS, Rivet

Joint, and

E - 2C

222

Dealing With Inter - Service Command Problems

224

Lessons from C 4 I/BM During the Air War:

226

Lessons of the Gulf War

xvii

The Impact of US Air Capabilities on UN Coalition Air Command, Control, Electronic

Warfare and Reconnaissance Capabilities O THER L ESSONS FOR J OINT W ARFARE

T HE N EED FOR A N EW S TRUCTURE OF C 4 /BM FOR T HE A IR L AND B ATTLE IN H IGH T EMPO MID AND

229

230

H IGH I NTENSITY C ONFLICT

233

The Key Role of Satellite Communications

233

Table 4.2

236

The Space Order of Battle in Desert Storm

236

The Need for Improved Tactical Communications

237

Tactical Communications and C4I/BM: The Potential For "Fusion"

238

Lessons for Future Medium/High Intensity and Coalition Warfare

239

L ESSONS FOR C OUNTERVAILING S TRATEGY : I RAQI C OMMAND , C ONTROL , C OMMUNICATIONS , AND

B ATTLE M ANAGEMENT (C 4 /BM)

242

Table 4.3

245

Iraqi Command and Control Centers and Related Facilities

245

Involved in the Gulf War

245

L ESSONS F OR C OALITION W ARFARE A ND I NTERNATIONAL P EACE M AKING : D ESERT S TORM V ERSUS

F UTURE W ARS

246

CHAPTER FIVE: INTELL IGENCE AND NET ASSES SMENT

248

L ESSONS FOR THE F UTURE : K EY W EAKNESSES IN THE C OALITION AND US I NTELLIGENCE E FFORTS

248

Table 5.1

250

Coalition Intelligence Weaknesses In Desert Storm

250

F INDING A LTERNATIVES TO US I NTELLIGENCE : T HE P ROBLEM OF C OALITION D EPENDENCE O N US

A SSETS

252

The Impact of Intelligence Satellites

252

Table 5.2

253

US Intelligence Satellites Use d in Desert Storm

253

The Role of Key Airborne Platforms

255

Table 5.3

257

Major US Intelligence and Reconnaissance Aircraft Used

257

in Desert Storm - Part One

257

Table 5.3

258

Major US Intelligence and Reconnaissance Aircraft Used in Desert Storm - Part Two

 

258

Table 5.3

259

Major US I ntelligence and Reconnaissance Aircraft Used in Desert Storm - Part Three

 

259

Table 5.3

260

Major US Intelligence and Reconnaissance Aircraft Used

260

in Desert Storm - Part Four

260

Dissemination Issues

261

Support of Coalition Warfare

262

I MPROVING THE P OLICY M AKER : T HE P ROBLEM OF S TRATEGIC W ARNING

263

T HE N EED FOR I MPROVED N ATIONAL O RGANIZATION TO S UPPORT W ARFIGHTING : F AILURE T O D EVELOP A DEQUATE C APABILITIES T O E XPLOIT S PACE I NTELLIGENCE A SSETS A ND N ATIONAL T ECHNICAL M EANS I N R EGIONAL C ONFLICTS

264

T HE N EED FOR I N T HEATER C APABILITY : T HE I NABILITY OF N ATIONAL I NTELLIGENCE O RGANIZATIONS T O M EET T HEATER N EEDS

265

T HE N EED F OR F OCUSED R EGIONAL E XPERTISE : T HE L ACK O F P RIOR US C OLLECTION A ND A NALYSIS P RIORITY :

269

T HE N EED FOR C OUNTERVAILING S TRATEGY : L ACK O F Q UALITATIVE A NALYSIS A ND O VER - E MPHASIS O N O RDER O F B ATTLE A ND Q UANTITATIVE M EASURES

270

Lessons of the Gulf War

xviii

Table 5.4

273

Intelligence Problems in Estimating the Size of I raqi Forces in the KTO

273

C REATING C ONTINGENCY T ARGETING C APABILITIES F OR R EGIONAL C ONFLICTS : L ACK O F A N E FFECTIVE T ARGETING S YSTEM

274

T HE N EED T O M EASURE E FFECTIVENESS : L ACK O F B ATTLE D AMAGE A SSESSMENT ( BDA) C APABILITY :

278

T HE N EED F OR A DDITIONAL T HEATER AND T ACTICAL A SSETS

284

The Need for Improved Tactical Intelligence Capability at the Service Level

284

Joint Surveillance and T arget Attack Radar System (JSTARS)

288

Pioneer Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)/Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV)

292

Table 5.5

295

The Role of UAVs During Desert Shield/Desert Storm

295

The Digital Video Imagery Transmission System

296

T HE C RITICAL I MPORTANCE O F W EAPONS O F M ASS D ESTRUCTION : T HE I NABILITY T O P REDICT I RAQI C APABILITY T O P RODUCE A ND D ELIVER W EAPONS O F M ASS D ESTRUCTION

297

Intelligence on Nuclear Facilities

297

Intelligence on Biological and Chemical Warfare Capabilities

298

The Need for Better Intelligence on Regional threats

2 99

P REPARING TO F IGHT A T HEATER M ISSILE T HREAT : I NABILITY T O P ROPERLY C HARACTERIZE I RAQI

S CUD F ORCES A ND T ARGET T HEM

300

The Failure of Air Strikes

301

The Failure of Special Forces

303

The Overall Effectiveness of the "Scud Hunt"

303

The Intelligence Lessons of the "Scud Hunt"

304

I NTELLIGENCE A ND C ONFLICT T ERMINATION : I NABILITY T O P REDICT T HE I MPACT O F C OALITION A CTIONS O N I RAQ ' S P OLITICS A FTER T HE C EASE - F IRE :

305

Battle Damage and Conflict Termination

306

Table 5.6

308

The Size of Iraqi Forces in the KTO Killed During the Ground War:

308

Differences Between the USCENTCOM and GWAPS Estimates

308

Strategic Intelligence Analysis and Conflict Termination

309

D EFINING R ESPONSIBILITY F OR A SSESSING R ISK : T HE P ROBLEM O F E STIMATES O F P ROBABLE US A ND C OALITION C ASUALTIES I NTELLIGENCE O N H UMAN L OSSES : T HE C HOICE N OT T O A NALYZE I RAQI C ASUALTIES :

311

313

Iraqi Casualtie s and Killing Mechanisms: The Problem for Analysis

313

Table 5.7

316

Estimates of Iraqi Casualties in the Gulf War - Part One

316

Table 5.7

318

Estimates of Iraqi Casualties in the Gulf War - Part Two

318

The Pros and Cons of Intelligence Analysis of Enemy Casualties

319

I RAQI I NTELLIGENCE : T HE L IMITS OF T HIRD W ORLD A UTHORITARIANISM

322

Iraqi Intelligence Organization

322

Iraqi Intelligence Technology

324

S UMMARIZING THE I NTELLIGENCE L ESSONS OF THE G ULF W AR

325

The Need to Measure Effectiveness: The Problem of Battle Damage Assessment

326

Lack Of A Clear Doctrine Relating To Direct Intelligence Support Of Battlefield Commanders:

328

The Need For A Better Intellige nce Communications Architecture: Inadequate Secure

Communications And Dissemination

The Need for Integrated Planning, Operations, and Intelligence Efforts, and Integrated

330

National Intelligence Support of Operations: The Problem of "Fusion"

330

Ensuring Suitable Reaction Times: Lack Of Adequate Near Real Time Capabilities:

332

Lessons of the Gulf War

xix

CHAPTER SIX: DESERT STORM: SHAPING COALI TION AIR POWER AND T HE AIR CAMPAIGN, AND FIGHTI NG THE WAR FOR AIR SUPREMACY

333

T HE U NIQUE C ONDITIONS OF THE A IR W AR

333

C OMPARATIVE A IR S TRENGTH A ND C APABILITIES

335

Table 6.1

337

The Impact of Coalition Air Forces: Number of Sorties by Mission Type - Part One

337

Table 6.1

338

The Impact of Coalition Air Forces: Number of Sorties by Mission Type - Part Two

338

The Role of US Air Forces

339

Table 6.2

340

US Air Force Strength In Theater

340

Table 6.3

341

US Air Power Deployed in Desert Storm on February 24, 1991 - Part One

341

Table 6.3

342

US Air Power Deployed in Desert Storm on February 24, 1991 - Part Two

342

Table 6.3

343

US Air Power Deployed in Desert Storm on February 24, 1991 - Part Four

343

Table 6.3

344

US Air Power Deployed in Desert Storm on February 24, 1991 - Part Four

344

Table 6.3

345

US Air Power Deployed in Desert Storm on February 24, 1991 - Part Five

345

T HE I RAQI A IR F ORCE

346

Table 6.4

348

Iraqi Air Strength in Desert Storm

348

Figure 6.1

351

Iraqi Air Activity During Desert Storm

351

C OALITION A IR W AR P LANNING AND T HE I MPORTANCE OF A IR S UPREMACY

352

Strategic Bombing and "Instant Thunder"

352

The CENTAF Air Campaign Plan and the AirLand Battle

353

Planning for Air Supremacy and the Shift to Simultaneity

356

Table 6.5

358

Coalition Theater Campaign Plan and Military Objectives

358

The Iraqi Air War Plan -- or Lack of It

358

W INNING A IR S UPERIORITY

359

Air to Air Combat

361

Figure 6.2

364

Iraqi Air Activity Versus Coalition Air - to Air Combat Activity

364

Table 6.6

365

Coalition Air Losses in Combat During Desert Storm

365

Table 6.7

366

Coalition Air Attrition in Desert Storm Due to All Causes

366

The Role of Key Aircraft Types in Air Combat

Table 6.8

367

Air - to - Air Missiles and the Imp ortance of Beyond Visual Range Air Combat

368

371

Iraqi Air Losses in Air to Air Combat

371

T HE C OALITION B ATTLE A GAINST I RAQI S URFACE - TO - A IR M ISSILE F ORCES

372

The Counter Surface - to - Air missile Effort and the Value of Penetrating Bombs

372

Strikes Against Iraq's Ground - Based Air Defense System

374

The Value of Anti - Radiation Missiles and Decoys in Air Defense Suppression

375

Figure 6.3

379

Range of Iraqi Early Warning Radars and Heavy Surface - to - Air Missiles

379

Figure 6.4

380

Iraqi Surface - to - Air Missile/EW Radar Activity During the Gulf War

380

Iraq's Shorter Range Surface - to - Air Missiles: The Other Side of the Story

381

A IR B ASE A TTACKS AND K ILLING I RAQI A IRCRAFT IN T HEIR S HEL TERS

383

Lessons of the Gulf War

xx

Attacking Iraqi Airfields and Aircraft in Their Shelters

386

Table 6.9

39 0

Iraqi Aircraft Seized by Iran after the Gulf War

390

T HE I MPACT OF E LECTRONIC W ARFARE

391

Table 6.10

393

US. Electronic Warfare Aircraft in the Gulf War - Part One

393

Table 6.10

394

US. Electronic Warfare Aircraft in the Gulf War - Part Two

394

J ANUARY 27, 1991: "A IR S UPREMACY " AND E NVIRONMENTAL W ARFARE

395

T HE C OST OF THE G ULF W AR TO THE I RAQI A IR F ORCE

395

Table 6.11

396

Iraqi Combat Aircraft Losses in Desert Storm

396

T HE R EVOLUTION OR N ON - R EVOLUTION IN D EFENSIVE A IR W ARFARE

398

CHAPTER SEVEN: OFFEN SIVE AIR POWER, STRA TEGIC BOMBING AND PR EPARATION

FOR THE GROUND OFFEN SIVE

400

T HE O VERALL S TRUCTURE OF C OALITION O FFENSIVE A IR P OWER

401

Table 7.1

402

UN Coalition Air Strikes by Mission During Desert Storm

402

Airpower in Transition: The Role of Key Weapons and Technologies

403

No Aircraft is Smarter than its C 4 /BM system

403

T HE S TRIKE /A TTACK A IRCRAFT IN THE G ULF W AR : M ISSION P ACKAGES AND "H IGH - L OW " C APABILITIES

404

Table 7.2

406

The Role of Key Strike/Attack Aircraft During Desert Storm

406

Precision and Non - Precision Offensive Aircraft

407

Table 7.3

409

Bomb Capabilities of Key Coalition Aircraft By Type

409

The Value of Mixed Packages of Aircraft

410

Simultaneous, Constant, and Cumulative Pressure

410

The Role of Bombers: The B - 52

411

Quasi - Precision: Radar and Infrared Assisted Bombing

413

Modern Strike Fighters: The Role of the F - 15E

414

Old Platforms: Modern Avionics: The F - 111F

415

Old Platforms: Modern Avionics: The A - 6E

417

Stealth Technology With Limited Attack Capability: The F - 117A

418

Multi - Mission Fighters with Moderate Strike/attack Technology: The F/A - 18

422

Multi - Mission Fighters with Moderate Strike/attack Technology: The F - 16

424

Close Air Support Aircraft With Specialized Technology: The A - 10

426

Close Air Support Aircraft With Specialized Technology: The AV - 8B

430

The Lesson of Precision and Sophistication: Change Since the Gulf W ar

431

M UNITIONS AND L ESS T HAN S URGICAL B OMBING

435

Table 7.4

438

Key Munitions Used by US Aircraft in the KTO

438

T HE B OMBS , R OCKETS AND G UNS U SED IN THE G ULF W AR

439

Table 7.5

441

Major Guided and Unguided Bombs Used in Desert Storm

441

T HE G UIDED M ISSILES U SED IN THE G ULF W AR

445

Table 7.6

448

Major Guided Missiles Used in Desert Storm - Part One

448

Table 7.6

449

Major Guided Missiles Used in Desert Storm - Part Two

449

S TRATEGIC B OMBING

451

Lessons of the Gulf War

xxi

Table 7.7

453

Bomb Tonnage Statistics: Gulf War vs. Previous wars

453

Improvising Strategic Bombing Durin g the Gulf War

453

Table 7.8

457

The Growth of Target Sets During the Gulf War

457

Setting Grand Strategic Objectives for Strategic Bombing

458

T HE A TTACKS ON I RAQ ' S L EADERSHIP AND C 4 C APABILITIES

458

The Scale and Nature of the Attacks

459

The Attack on the Al - Firdos Bunker

459

The Hunt For Saddam Hussein

460

The Overall Impact of the Strikes on Leadership Targets

460

The Overall Impact of the Strikes on C 4 Targets

461

A TTACKS ON I RAQI E LECTRICAL AND O IL F ACILITIES

462

Attacks on Electrical Facilities

463

Attacks on Oil and Refining Facilities

463

A TTACKS ON I RAQI L INES OF C OMMUNICATION

464

A TTACKS ON I RAQI G ROUND F ORCES B EFORE THE G ROUND O FFENSIV E

467

Lessons from the Battle of Khafji

468

Making Attacks on Iraqi Ground Forces More Effective

468

"Kill Boxes"

469

"Killer Scouts"

470

"Tank Plinking" With Laser Guided Bombs

472

The A - 10, Maverick, and Battle Damage Assessment

473

The Impact of Weather on Air Attacks on Iraqi Ground Forces

473

Levels of Dam age to Iraqi Forces Before the Ground War Began: 50% or Not?

474

Table 7.9

475

USCENTCOM Estimate of Cumulative Air Damage to

475

Iraqi Major Combat Equipment in the KTO

475

D IRECT A IR S UPPORT TO THE G ROUND B ATTLE

477

"Flow CAS" and "Demand Pull"

477

Support of the Breaching Operation

479

Air Support in Preparing for the Land Battle

479

Close Air Support During the Land Battle

480

The Role of Interdiction Attacks

483

The Role of Individual Coalition Air Forces and Ai rcraft During the Land Battle

485

Table 7.10

487

Coalition Sortie Rates in Close Air Support/Interdiction Missions

487

By Aircraft Type During the Land War - Part One

487

Table 7.10

488

Coalition Sortie Rates in Close Air Support/Interdiction Missions

488

By Aircraft Type During the Land War - Part Two

488

Table 7.10

489

Coalition Sortie Rates in Close Air Support/Interdiction Missions

489

By Aircraft Type During the Land War - Part Three

489

The Impact of the Cease - Fire and the Overall Impact of Ai rpower on the Land Battle . 490

Table 7.11

493

The Impact of Coalition Air and Land Forces on Iraqi Equipment Strength S OURCE : A DAPTED BY THE AUTHOR FROM E LIOT C OHEN , ED ., G ULF W A R A IR P OWER S URVEY ,

493

V OLUME II, S ECTION II , PP . 259 -

493

T HE O THER S IDE OF A IRPOWER : R EADINESS AND H UMAN F ACTORS

494

Readiness and Maintenance

494

Table 7.12

497

Aircraft Operational Availability and Readiness Rates in Desert Storm

497

Lessons of the Gulf War

xxii

Refueling and Sustained Operations

497

Training and Readiness

498

S TRATEGIC AND T HEATER A IRLIFT

499

T HE R EVOLUTION OR N ON - R EVOLUTION IN O FFENSIVE A IR W ARFARE

501

CHAPTER EIGHT: THE A IRLAND BATTLE

504

C OMPARATIVE L AND S TRENGTH A ND C APABILITIES

504

The Coalition Ground Forces

505

Table 8.1

508

The Coalition Ground Force Order of Battle in Desert Storm -- Part One

508

Table 8.1

510

The Coalition Ground Force Order of Battle in Desert Storm -- Part Two

510

Coalition Movements to Prepare for the Land Attack and the Lesson of Logistics and Lessons Regarding Requirements and Lift

512

Figure 8.1

515

The Location of Coalition Ground Forces on February 23, 1991 (G - 1)

515

Iraqi Army Strength at the Time of the Ground Campaign: Perceived and Real

516

Table 8.2

520

Iraqi Army Deployments in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO)

520

Qualitative and Leadership Problems in Iraqi Land Forces

521

Figure 8.2

524

The Location and Condition of Iraqi Ground Forces on February 23, 1991 (G - 1)

524

Iraqi Forward Barrier Defenses: Perceived and Real

525

Force Ratios and The Art Of Operations

529

Table 8.3

530

Coalition Advantages in the Conceptual Approach to AirLand Warfare

530

T HE F INAL C OALITION B ATTLE P LAN

531

Figure 8.3

535

The Final Coalition Attack Plan

535

P REPARING THE B ATTLEFIELD

536

Focusing on Iraqi Artillery

536

Psychological Warfare and Deception

537

Probing and Blinding Iraqi Forces

538

Probing Into Iraq

539

G - D AY : F EBRUARY 24, 1991

540

Figure 8.4

542

The Initial Coalition Attack on G - Day (February 24, 1991)

542

The Thrust by the XVIII Cor ps

543

Figure 8.5

546

The XVIII Corps Attack on G - Day (February 24, 1991)

546

The Thrust by the VII Corps

547

Figure 8.6

553

The V II Corps Attack on G - Day (February 24, 1991)

553

Joint Forces Command - North

553

The 1st Marine Expeditionary Force

554

Table 8.4

556

I MEF Battle Statistics

556

Figure 8.7

559

The I MEF Attack on G - Day (February 24, 1991)

559

Table 8.5

560

Impact of Air Power on Iraqi Forces on G - Day in t he Line of Advance of I MEF

560

Joint Forces Command - East

563

Figure 8.8

564

The JFC - E Attack on G - Day (February 24, 1991)

564

G - D AY + 1: F EBRUARY 25, 199 1

565

Lessons of the Gulf War

xxiii

Coalition Advances on G+1 (February 25, 1991)

566

The Advance By XVIII Corps

567

The Advance By VII Corps

568

Figure 8.10

571

The VII Corps Attack on G - +1 (February 25, 1991)

571

Joint Forces Command - North

572

The Advance by I MEF

572

T he Advance by Joint Forces Command - East

573

The Situation at the End of G+1

573

G+2: F EBRUARY 26, 1991

574

Figure 8.11

577

Coalition Advances on G+2 (Febr uary 26, 1991)

577

The Advance By XVIII Corps

578

The Advance by the VII Corps

579

The Advance by Joint Task Force - North

586

The Advance by I MEF

5 86

The Advance by Joint Forces Command East

588

The Situation at the End of G+2

589

G - D AY + 3: F EBRUARY 27, 1991

590

Figure 8.12

591

C oalition Advances on G+3 (February 27, 1991)

591

The Advance by XVIII Corps

592

The VII Corps Advance

594

Figure 8.13

599

Key Iraqi Positions on G+3 (Febru ary 27, 1991)

599

The Advance of Joint Forces Command - North

600

The Advance of the I MEF

600

The Advance of Joint Forces Command - East

601

The Situation at the End of G+3

601

G+4: F EBRUARY 28, 1991

602

Figure 8.14

603

Coalition Advances on G+4 (February 28, 1991)

603

Final Advances by the XVIII Corps

604

Final Advances by the VII Corps

604

Final Advances by Joint Forces Command - North

605

Final Advances by the I MEF

605

Final Advances by Joint Forces Command - East

606

The Situation at the End of G+4

606

G - D AY +5 AND B EYOND

607

The Battle With the Hammurabi Division

608

T he Incident at Safwan and Uncertain Terms For Ending the Conflict

609

T HE I MPACT OF THE G ULF W AR ON THE I RAQI A RMY

609

Table 8.6

611

The Impact of Coalition Air and Land Forces on Iraqi Equipment Strength

611

At the Time of the Cease - Fire

611

T HE S TRATEGIC O UTCOME OF THE L AND B ATTLE

616

LAND WARFARE: PREPAR ATION, COMBAT, AND POWER PR OJECTION

619

K EY U NCERTAINTIES IN A NALYZING THE D ETAILED L ESSONS OF THE L AND B ATTLE

619

T HE I MPORTANCE OF M ANPOWER AND T RAINING

621

C OMBINED A RMS , C OMBINED O PER ATIONS , J OINTNESS , AND R OLES AND M ISSIONS

624

A IR L AND I NTEGRATION

626

Lessons of the Gulf War

xxiv

E VOLVING T OWARDS THE E LECTRONIC B ATTLEFIELD : C OMMAND , C ONTROL , C OMMUNICATIONS , B ATTLE M ANAGEMENT , I NTELLIGENCE , T ARGETING AND D AMAGE A SS ESSMENT

627

T HE N EW T EMPO OF A RMORED O PERATIONS

633

T HE C HANGING N ATURE OF T ANK W ARFARE

635

The M - 1A1 Abrams Versus the Soviet T - 55, T - 62, T - 72, and T - 72M Tanks

635

The Challenger

638

Armored Recovery Vehicles and Heavy Equipment Transporters

639

I NFANTRY A ND M ECHANIZED I NFANTRY C OMBAT

640

The M - 2/M - 3 Bradley

641

The M - 113A1 Generation of Armored Fighting Vehicles

643

The AAV Assault Amphibian Vehicles

644

The Guardian Light Armored Infantry Vehicle

645

The Warrior

645

Russian and French Armored Fighting Vehicles

646

Mixes of Tanks and Other Armored Fighting Vehicles: The Role of Armored Cavalry

648

T UBE A RTILLERY , M ULTIPLE R OCKET L AUNCHERS , AND A SSAULT W EAPON S

650

Table 9.1

654

Maximum Nominal Range of Artillery Weapons Used in the Gulf War

654

Tube Artillery and Battle Management Aids