5.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS

PEOPLE V. ALBOFERA
FACTS: Sometime in June or July 1980, accused Albofera and 3 others killed
Teodoro Carancio a forester. Rodrigo Esma was at the house of one of the
accused but did not participate in the killing.

The matter was later brought to the attention of the authorities by a certain
Sisneros and accused Albofera was arrested. The accused Lawi-an was
subsequently arrested.

Albofera executed an extra-judicial confession before the Municipal Circuit

Judge. He stated therein that he was forced to join the NPA movement for fear
of his life; that said group had ordered the “arrest” of the victim, Carancio, and
that the group “sentenced him (the victim) to die by stabbing.”

Esma testified against the accused during the trial. While in prison, accused
Albofera sent a letter to Esma. Said letter was thereafter introduced as evidence
by prosecution. In his letter, accused Albofera was asking Esma to change his
declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his favor instead. Later the accused
were convicted of murder.

ISSUE: Whether the Albofera’s letter to Esma should be excluded as evidence

in light of alleged unwarranted intrusion or invasion of the accused’s privacy?

HELD: No. The production of that letter by the prosecution was not the result
of an unlawful search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion
or invasion into Albofera’s privacy. Albofera admitted having sent the letter and
it was its recipient, Rodrigo Esma himself, who produced and identified the
same in the course of his testimony in Court. Besides, there is nothing really
self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change his
declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera’s) favor. Furthermore,
nothing Alboferas tated in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at a
determination of his culpability.

PEOPLE V. CAPITIN
Under the Galit doctrine as now embodied (and even strengthened) in Article
III, Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution, the written waiver of the right to
counsel must be made with the assistance and in the presence of counsel. This
was not done in the case at bar, as the statement itself plainly discloses. It is
recalled that even before that doctrine was formally announced, our earlier
decisions had already required that the waiver be made intelligently, after
proper notification of his rights to the suspect, with full understanding by him
of the effects of such waiver. Assuming such valid waiver, we have also insisted
that the confession itself be understandable to the person signing it, both as
to its language and its contents, and must not have been simply prepared
beforehand, details and all for the suspect’s signature. If we have outlawed
confessions written in advance by the police for persons of limited intelligence
or educational attainment, we see no reason why a confession signed by a
person whose sanity is dubious, as in the present case, should receive any less
disapprobation. Leticia’s intelligence was not only limited but impaired.

PEOPLE V. HIZON
We agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence
his extrajudicial confession. Even granting that the appellant failed to
substantiate his claim that he was coerced into executing an extrajudicial
confession, that does not suffice to make his confession admissible in court. A
careful perusal of the records of the case reveals that the appellant has been
deprived of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. It was not sufficiently shown that his rights under the
above-quoted constitutional provision have been protected fully. True, it is
shown in his alleged confession that after he was informed of his constitutional
right to remain silent and to counsel, he waived the same. It is now however
settled in this jurisdiction that while the right to counsel may be waived, such
waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, and made in the presence
of the accused’s lawyer. And nowhere in the records of the case is it indicated
that the accused-appellant, Mauricio Nolasco, was assisted by counsel in
making his waiver. This defect nullifies and renders inadmissible in evidence
his confession.

6. PRESUMPTIONS

PEOPLE V. JARA
 PEOPLE V. ABANO

PEOPLE V. TOLENTINO

PEOPLE V. TRINIDAD

7. ADMISSIBILITY/INADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE; DOCTRINE OF FRUIT OF

THE POISONOUS TREE

8. TESTIMONY OF ARRESTING OFFICER ON THE ALLEGED ORAL

CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED

PEOPLE V. DY 158SCRA111

XIV. RIGHT TO BAIL

DE LA CAMARA V. ENAGE

PEOPLE V. DONATO

VILLASENOR V. ABANO

PEOPLE V. IAC 147SCRA219

ALMEDA V. VILLALUZ

PEOPLE V. SAN DIEGO

1. SECTION 10, RULE 114

 PEOPLE V. AGBAYANI

XV. DUE PROCESS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

PEOPLE V. TERROBIAS

1. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE; ORDER OF TRIAL; EQUIPOISE RULE

PEOPLE V. DE LOS SANTOS 355SCRA415

PEOPLE V. SATURNO

ALEJANDRO V. PEPITO

SACAY V. SANDIGANBAYAN

PEOPLE V. DRAMMAYO

2. RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF OR BY COUNSEL

PEOPLE V. HOLGADO

DELGADO V. CA

PEOPLE V. CUISON

PEOPLE V. NADERA
PEOPLE V. YAMBOT

PEOPLE V. BANIHIT