G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990 2.

On November 3, 1987, public

respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to
HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner, whom said complaint was assigned,
vs. sent to the petitioner the following
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as telegram:
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, and FERDIE YOU ARE HEREBY
MARQUEZ, respondents. DIRECTED TO
APPEAR BEFORE
SARMIENTO, J.: FERDIE MARQUEZ
POEA ANTI ILLEGAL
This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary RECRUITMENT UNIT
of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under 6TH FLR. POEA BLDG.
Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal EDSA COR. ORTIGAS
recruitment. AVE. MANDALUYONG
MM ON NOVEMBER 6,
1987 AT 10 AM RE
The facts are as follows:
CASE FILED AGAINST
YOU. FAIL NOT
xxx xxx xxx UNDER PENALTY OF
LAW.
1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro
of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay 4. On the same day, having ascertained
City, in a sworn statement filed with the that the petitioner had no license to
Philippine Overseas Employment operate a recruitment agency, public
Administration (POEA for brevity) respondent Administrator Tomas D.
charged petitioner Hortencia Achacoso issued his challenged
Salazar, viz: CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO.
1205 which reads:
04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw
ngayon ay narito at HORTY SALAZAR
nagbibigay ng salaysay. No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang
aking PECC Card ay Pursuant to the powers vested in me
ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and
manager. — Horty Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby
Salazar — 615 R.O. Santos, order the CLOSURE of your recruitment
Mandaluyong, Mla. agency being operated at No. 615 R.O.
Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and and the seizure of the documents and
ginawang panloloko sa paraphernalia being used or intended to
iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo? be used as the means of committing
illegal recruitment, it having verified that
S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar. you have —

06. T: Paano naman naganap ang (1) No valid license or

pangyayari? authority from the
Department of Labor
S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan and Employment to
ipinatawag niya ako. Kinuha recruit and deploy
ang PECC Card ko at sinabing workers for overseas
hahanapan ako ng employment;
booking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na
ako sa Phils. ay (2) Committed/are
hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So committing acts
lumipat ako ng ibang prohibited under Article
company pero ayaw niyang ibigay 34 of the New Labor
and PECC Card Code in relation to
ko. Article 38 of the same
code.

1
 This ORDER is without Order No. 1205 dated
prejudice to your November 3, 1987
criminal prosecution violates "due process of
under existing laws. law" guaranteed under
Sec. 1, Art. III, of the
Done in the City of Philippine Constitution.
Manila, this 3th day of
November, 1987. 2. Your acts also violate
Sec. 2, Art. III of the
5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director Philippine Constitution
on Licensing and Regulation Atty. which guarantees right
Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order of the people "to be
designating respondents Atty. Marquez, secure in their persons,
Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto houses, papers, and
Vistro as members of a team tasked to effects against
implement Closure and Seizure Order unreasonable searches
No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted and seizures of
by Mandaluyong policemen and whatever nature and for
mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's any purpose."
Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News
Today proceeded to the residence of the 3. The premises invaded
petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St., by your Mr. Ferdi
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it Marquez and five (5)
was found that petitioner was operating others (including 2
Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering policemen) are
the place, the team served said Closure the private residence of
and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. the Salazar family, and
Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed the entry, search as well
them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora as the seizure of the
Salazar informed the team that Hannalie personal properties
Dance Studio was accredited with belonging to our client
Moreman Development (Phil.). were without her
However, when required to show consent and were done
credentials, she was unable to produce with unreasonable force
any. Inside the studio, the team chanced and intimidation,
upon twelve talent performers — together with grave
practicing a dance number and saw abuse of the color of
about twenty more waiting outside, The authority, and constitute
team confiscated assorted costumes robbery and violation of
which were duly receipted for by Mrs. domicile under Arts. 293
Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by and 128 of the Revised
Mrs. Flora Salazar. Penal Code.

6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed Unless said personal

with POEA the following letter: properties worth around
TEN THOUSAND
Gentlemen: PESOS (P10,000.00) in
all (and which were
On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 already due for shipment
R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro to Japan) are returned
Manila, we respectfully request that the within twenty-four (24)
personal properties seized at her hours from your receipt
residence last January 26, 1988 be hereof, we shall feel free
immediately returned on the ground that to take all legal action,
said seizure was contrary to law and civil and criminal, to
against the will of the owner thereof. protect our client's
Among our reasons are the following: interests.

1. Our client has not We trust that you will

been given any prior give due attention to
notice or hearing, hence these important matters.
the Closure and Seizure

2
 7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA constitutional proscription has thereby
could answer the letter, petitioner filed been manifested that thenceforth, the
the instant petition; on even date, POEA function of determining probable cause
filed a criminal complaint against her and issuing, on the basis thereof,
with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal, warrants of arrest or search warrants,
docketed as IS-88-836.1 may be validly exercised only by judges,
this being evidenced by the elimination
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for in the present Constitution of the phrase,
prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are "such other responsible officer as may
alreadyfait accompli, thereby making prohibition too be authorized by law" found in the
late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view counterpart provision of said 1973
of the grave public interest involved. Constitution, who, aside from judges,
might conduct preliminary investigations
The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the and issue warrants of arrest or search
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the warrants. 4
Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and
seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:
It is also an issue squarely raised by the petitioner for
the Court's resolution. We agree that the Presidential Anti-
Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or
Under the new Constitution, which states: was meant to exercise, prosecutorial
powers, and on that ground, it cannot be
. . . no search warrant or warrant of said to be a neutral and detached
arrest shall issue except upon probable "judge" to determine the existence of
cause to be determined personally by probable cause for purposes of arrest or
the judge after examination under oath search. Unlike a magistrate, a
or affirmation of the complainant and the prosecutor is naturally interested in the
witnesses he may produce, and success of his case. Although his office
particularly describing the place to be "is to see that justice is done and not
searched and the persons or things to necessarily to secure the conviction of
be seized. 2 the person accused," he stands,
invariably, as the accused's adversary
and his accuser. To permit him to issue
it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and
search warrants and indeed, warrants of
arrest. 3 In one case, it was declared that mayors may
arrest, is to make him both judge and
not exercise this power:
jury in his own right, when he is neither.
That makes, to our mind and to that
xxx xxx xxx extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as
amended by Presidential Decree No.
But it must be emphasized here and now 2002, unconstitutional. 5
that what has just been described is the
state of the law as it was in September, Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now
1985. The law has since been altered. written, was entered as an amendment by Presidential
No longer does the mayor have at this Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President
time the power to conduct preliminary Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in
investigations, much less issue orders of the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment
arrest. Section 143 of the Local No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then
Government Code, conferring this Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory
power on the mayor has been powers:
abrogated, rendered functus officio by
the 1987 Constitution which took effect
(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly
on February 2, 1987, the date of its
authorized representative shall have the
ratification by the Filipino people.
power to recommend the arrest and
Section 2, Article III of the 1987
detention of any person engaged in
Constitution pertinently provides that "no
illegal recruitment. 6
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential
examination under oath or affirmation of Decree No. 1920, with the avowed purpose of giving
the complainant and the witnesses he more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment.
may produce, and particularly The Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and
describing the place to be searched and closure powers:
the person or things to be seized." The

3
 (b) The Minister of Labor and supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign
Employment shall have the power to affairs. We have held: 11
cause the arrest and detention of such
non-licensee or non-holder of authority if xxx xxx xxx
after proper investigation it is
determined that his activities constitute The State has the inherent power to
a danger to national security and public deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco
order or will lead to further exploitation of Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L.
job-seekers. The Minister shall order the Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That
closure of companies, establishment power may be exercised by the Chief
and entities found to be engaged in the Executive "when he deems such action
recruitment of workers for overseas necessary for the peace and domestic
employment, without having been tranquility of the nation." Justice
licensed or authorized to do so. 7 Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief
Executive finds that there are aliens
On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated whose continued presence in the
Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving the Labor Minister country is injurious to the public interest,
search and seizure powers as well: "he may, even in the absence of express
law, deport them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco
(c) The Minister of Labor and Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568,
Employment or his duly authorized 569; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).
representatives shall have the power to
cause the arrest and detention of such The right of a country to expel or deport
non-licensee or non-holder of authority if aliens because their continued presence
after investigation it is determined that is detrimental to public welfare is
his activities constitute a danger to absolute and unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai
national security and public order or will and Go Tam vs. Commissioner of
lead to further exploitation of job- Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104
seekers. The Minister shall order the Phil. 949, 956). 12
search of the office or premises and
seizure of documents, paraphernalia, The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens
properties and other implements used in for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power
illegal recruitment activities and the to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other
closure of companies, establishment cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is
and entities found to be engaged in the the sole domain of the courts.
recruitment of workers for overseas
employment, without having been
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question,
licensed or authorized to do so. 8
assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued,
is clearly in the nature of a general warrant:
The above has now been etched as Article 38,
paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.
Pursuant to the powers vested in me
under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and
The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby
dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its twilight order the CLOSURE of your recruitment
moments. agency being operated at No. 615 R.O.
Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a and the seizure of the documents and
judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. paraphernalia being used or intended to
Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial be used as the means of committing
process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, illegal recruitment, it having verified that
paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and you have —
of no force and effect.
(1) No valid license or
The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano authority from the
v. Vivo 9 is not well-taken. Vivo involved a deportation Department of Labor
case, governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised and Employment to
Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the recruit and deploy
Immigration Law. We have ruled that in deportation workers for overseas
cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the employment;
President or his duly authorized representatives, in
order to carry out a final decision of deportation is (2) Committed/are
valid. 10 It is valid, however, because of the recognized committing acts

4
 prohibited under Article 1) Toyota-Corolla,
34 of the New Labor colored yellow with Plate
Code in relation to No. NKA 892;
Article 38 of the same
code. 2) DATSUN, pick-up
colored white with Plate
This ORDER is without prejudice to your No. NKV 969;
criminal prosecution under existing
laws. 13 3) A delivery truck with
Plate No. NBS 542;
We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the
things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void, thus: 4) TOYOTA-
TAMARAW, colored
xxx xxx xxx white with Plate No. PBP
665; and
Another factor which makes the search
warrants under consideration 5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux,
constitutionally objectionable is that they pick-up truck with Plate
are in the nature of general warrants. No. NGV 472 with
The search warrants describe the marking "Bagong
articles sought to be seized in this wise: Silang."

1) All printing In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search

equipment, warrant which authorized the search for
paraphernalia, paper, "books, records, pamphlets, cards,
ink, photo equipment, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures,
typewriters, cabinets, recordings and other written instruments
tables, communications/ concerning the Communist Parties of
recording equipment, Texas, and the operations of the
tape recorders, Community Party in Texas," was
dictaphone and the like declared void by the U.S. Supreme
used and/or connected Court for being too general. In like
in the printing of the "WE manner, directions to "seize any
FORUM" newspaper evidence in connection with the violation
and any and all of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have
documents/communicati been held too general, and that portion
ons, letters and facsimile of a search warrant which authorized the
of prints related to the seizure of any "paraphernalia which
"WE FORUM" could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of
newspaper. the Connecticut General Statutes (the
statute dealing with the crime of
2) Subversive conspiracy)" was held to be a general
documents, pamphlets, warrant, and therefore invalid. The
leaflets, books, and description of the articles sought to be
other publications to seized under the search warrants in
promote the objectives question cannot be characterized
and purposes of the differently.
subversive
organizations known as In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme
Movement for Free court calls to mind a notable chapter in
Philippines, Light-a-Fire English history; the era of disaccord
Movement and April 6 between the Tudor Government and the
Movement; and English Press, when "Officers of the
Crown were given roving commissions
3) Motor vehicles used to search where they pleased in order to
in the suppress and destroy the literature of
distribution/circulation of dissent both Catholic and Puritan."
the "WE FORUM" and Reference herein to such historical
other subversive episode would not be relevant for it is not
materials and the policy of our government to suppress
propaganda, more any newspaper or publication that
particularly, speaks with "the voice of non-

5
 conformity" but poses no clear and 3. Devise a proper schedule of rate of wages for
imminent danger to state security. 14 all laborers.

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm 4. The rate of wages for the mountain camps
the following principles: should be higher by 20 per cent over those given
in the town.
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987
Constitution, it is only judges, and no On June 2, 1939, and for some years prior thereto, the
other, who may issue warrants of arrest minimum wage paid by the petitioner to its employees
and search: was P0.70 a day regardless of whether the laborer was
employed in the poblaciones of the towns of Pañgil and
2. The exception is in cases of Famy, or in the mountain camps.
deportation of illegal and undesirable
aliens, whom the President or the In deciding demands Nos. 2 and 4 made by the
Commissioner of Immigration may order respondent on the petitioner as above set forth, the
arrested, following a final order of Honorable Leopoldo Rovira, one of the judges of the
deportation, for the purpose of Court of Industrial Relations. rendered the following
deportation. adjudication in decision adicional of September 19,
1939:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38,
paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared En su virtud, el Tribunal declara justificadas en
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The parte las dematidas bajo los numeros 2 y 4 que
respondents are ORDERED to return all materials afectan el tipo de jornal, y en su consecuencia
seized as a result of the implementation of Search and ordena a la compania recurrida a pagar a sus
Seizure Order No. 1205. obreros como salario justo y rezonable una
cantidad que no baje de P1 diario para los que
No costs. trabajen en las montanas, y para los que
realicen sus trabajos en los llanos una suma que
SO ORDERED. no baje de P0.90 diarios. a base de ocho (8)
horas diarios, con exclusion del "overtime," no
menos del veinticinco (25) por ciento sobre el
G.R. No. L-47178 November 25, 1940
jornal como queda fijado . . . .
THE INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER
On October 17, 1939, the petitioner filed a motion with
COMPANY, petitioner,
the Court of Industrial Relations in banc praying for
vs.
reconsideration of the DECISION ADICIONAL of the
THE PAÑGIL FEDERATION OF LABOR, respondent.
Honorable Leopoldo Rovira. While this motion for
reconsideration was pending resolution by the Court,
LAUREL, J.: the petitioner, on November 28. 1939, filed a motion
praying that said Court hold itself without jurisdiction to
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decide the question relating to demands Nos. 2 and 4,
resolution, dated December 23, 1939, of the Court of alleging (1) that the Court of Industrial Relations has no
Industrial Relations entered in its Case No. 103, entitled authority to determine minimum wages for an individual
"Pañgil Federation of Labor vs. International Hardwood employer in connection with a particular and specific
and Veneer Company. industrial dispute under the provisions of section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103; (2) that such authority
On June 2, 1939, the Secretary of Labor certified to the would constitute an undue delegation of legislative
Court of Industrial Relations that an Industrial dispute power to the Court of Industrial Relations and would
existed between the petitioner and certain of its deny the petitioner the equal protection of the laws, thus
employees who are members of respondent union, and rendering said section unconstitutional and void.
that the controversy was a proper one to be dealt with
by said Court in the public interest under section 4 of On December 23, 1939, the Court of Industrial
Commonwealth Act No. 103. The matter was thereupon Relations, by resolution in banc, denied the motion for
docketed as Case No. 103 of the Court of Industrial reconsideration as well as the motion of November 28,
Relations. 1939. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

The industrial dispute mentioned above referred to The only issue which the petitioner presents for
certain demands made by the respondent on the determination in the present proceedings is that raised
petitioner, among which were the following: in its motion of November 28, 1939, in which it assails
the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations to
2. Set the minimum daily wages of common decide the question relating to demands Nos. 2 and 4
laborers at one peso. as set forth above. The main question to be resolved,

6
therefore, is whether or not the Court of Industrial
Relations has the power to determine minimum wages
for an individual employer in connection with an
industrial dispute which said court might take
cognizance of under the provisions of section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, and if it has, whether or not
such grant of power is unconstitutional and void.
The petitioner contends that "the National Assembly, in
granting the Court of Industrial. Relations general power
to decide any industrial dispute under section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, could not have granted,
within such general power, authority to decide which has
been made determinable in another specific manner,"
and asserts that "the determination of minimum wages
for each and every employer in a given locality or given
industry has been specially provided for in section 5 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103" (p. 9 of the petition).
Section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 provides as
follows:
SEC. 5. Minimum wage and maximum "canon"
or rental. — Whenever conditions in a given
industry or in a given locality so warrant, and in
the interest of public welfare and for the
promotion of industrial peace and progress, the
President of the Philippines shall direct the Court
of Industrial Relations to investigate and study
all pertinent facts related to the industry
concerned or to the industries established in a
designated locality, with a view to determining
the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting
for such industry or locality a minimum wage or
share for laborers or tenants, or a maximum
"canon" or rental to be paid by the 'inquilinos.' or
tenants or lessees to land-owners.
In order to determine the necessity and fairness
of adopting such measures, and in order to
arrive at a proper, just, and reasonable minimum
wage or share or maximum "canon" or rental,
the court shall make a careful examination of the
amount of capital invested in the industry or in
tries concerned, the number of laborers
employed, the of production, insurance and
transportation, market prices benefits or gains
derived or losses suffered or expected, wages
and shares as well as other income of laborers
tenants, minimum cost of living and labor
conditions in general, and such other factors and
circumstances as may, in its opinion, be
necessary to fairly and adequately accomplish
the purpose of the investigation.
After such an examination, and after the Court
is satisfied of the necessity and fairness of fixing
and adopting a minimum wage or share or
maximum "canon" or rental, for such locality or
industry, it shall tentatively fix such minimum
wage or share maximum "canon" or rental as
would give the workingmen a just compensation
7
for their labor and an adequate income to meet
the essential necessity of civilized life, and at
same time allow the capital a fair return on its
investment.
When determining a minimum wage or share for
laborers and tenants engaged in a given
industry, the Court may, in its discretion, taking
into account the conditions prevailing in the
different localities where such industry is carried
on, fix different minimum wages or share,
according to localities or fix different minimum
wages or shares according to the industries
existing in that locality.
A minimum wage or share shall be determined
and fixed for laborers working by the hours, day
or month, or by piece work, and for tenants in
the crop or paid by measurement unit. Unless
otherwise expressly provided in the order fixing
a minimum wage, a minimum wage in industrial
or manufacturing enterprises shall be
understood to be fixed on the basis of eight hour
daily labor, and employees and laborers working
in excess of such number of hours shall be
entitled to a proportionate increase in their
wages.
The Court may, by so specifically providing in its
order fixing a minimum wage, exclude
apprentices from the provisions thereof, but the
number of such apprentices in an industrial firm,
or labor establishment shall not exceed twenty
per centum of the total number of laborers
employed therein.
Insofar as possible, and when deemed
necessary to better carry out the provisions of
this Act, the Court may classify or group the
laborers according to the kind and importance of
the work and the amount or degree of skill,
training, experience and knowledge required
and shall fix for each class or group a minimum
wage or compensation. In like manner, it may
classify or group the tenants or lessees
according to the kind of work they perform, the
terms of the contract with the landowners and
the productivity of the lands they occupy, and
shall fix their minimum share in the crop or the
maximum "canon" or rental to be paid to the
landowners.
After such minimum wage or share or maximum
'canon' or rental has been tentatively fixed by the
court, the court shall order the publication of
such tentative decision in three successive
issues of two newspapers of general circulation
in the localities affected, one published in
English and another in Spanish. All parties not
agreeing to such tentative decision may, within
forty-five days after the first publication submit to
the court their written objection. With due
 consideration to such objections, and after the arbitration, decision, and settlement, of any industrial or
expiration of the period given to question such agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or
tentative decision, the Court shall adopt a final lockout, arising from differences as regard wages,
minimum wage or share or maximum 'canon' or shares or compensation, dismissals, lay-offs, or
rental, which shall, with the approval of the suspensions of employees or laborers, tenants or farm-
President of the Philippines, be binding upon laborers, hours of labor, or conditions of tenancy or
everyone concerned and shall have the force employment, between employers and employees or
and effect of law thirty days after the approval by laborers and between landlords and tenants or farm-
the President duly promulgated in an executive laborers." Under section 1, the court has "jurisdiction
proclamation. over the entire Philippines, to consider. investigate,
decide, and settle all questions, matters controversies
It will be seen that under the above quoted provisions of or disputes arising between, and/or affecting employers
section 5, minimum wages are determinable in and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants
reference to a given industry or given locality, which or farm-laborers, and regulate the relations between
should be of general application and have the force and them, subject to the provisions of this Act" (as amended
effect of law, after approval by the President of the by Commonwealth Act No. 254); and by section 13, it is
Philippines. This section, however, does not provided that "in making an award, order or decision,
contemplate the arbitration and settlement of industrial under the provisions of section for of this Act, the court
or agricultural disputes causing or likely to cause a strike shall not be restricted to the specific relief or demands
or lockout, and is designed merely to provide for a made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural
workable device whereby a scheme of minimum wage dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision
or share for laborers or tenants in a given industry or any matter or determination which may be deemed
locality may be evolved, whenever conditions therein necessary to expedient for the purpose of setting the
warrant. Commonwealth Act No. 103 as originally dispute or of preventing further industrial agricultural
drafted (Bill No. 700 of the National Assembly) did not dispute."
contain what is now known as section 5 of the Act. This
section was originally embodied in a separate bill (Bill Under the view suggested by the petitioner, if an
No. 722) the explanatory statement of which is as industrial dispute between an employer and its
follows: employees causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout
arises from differences as regards a minimum wage, the
This proposed bill provides for a workable Court of Industrial Relations would be without authority
device by which a minimum wage for laborers to take cognizance of the dispute for arbitration and
and a minimum share for tenants may be fixed settlement unless the President of the Philippines, under
and accepted in a given industry or factory, section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, directs it to
whenever conditions therein warrant. investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the
industry concerned, with a view to determining the
On the other hand section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. necessity and fairness of fixing a minimum wage which
103, together with the other sections complementing it, shall apply generally to all the employers engaged in
is designed to provide for compulsory arbitration in order such industry. To adopt such a narrow construction
to prevent non-specific methods in the determination of would be to set at naught the plenary powers conferred
industrial and agricultural disputes. El presente proyecto upon the Court to enable it to "settle all question,
de ley," thus begins the explanatory statement of Bill No. matters, controversies, or disputes arising between,
700, "crea una Junta de Relaciones Industriales . . . y and/or affecting employers and employees" and to
provee el arbitraje obligatorio . . . de acuerdo con el frustrate the very objective of the law, namely, to create
articulo 6, Titulo XIII de la Constitucion, el cual provee an instrumentality through which the intervention of the
que 'El estado podra estaecer el arbitraje obligatorio"." Government could be made effective in order to prevent
Incorporating the conclusion reached by a committee non-pacific methods in the determination of industrial or
appointed a year or so before, it was observed that "bajo agricultural disputes. It is fundamental that the intention
la legislacion actual" evidently referring to Act No. 4055 and policy of the National Assembly, as expressed in the
— "no existe instrumento adecuado para evitar las enactment, should be effectuated, and the Act should
huelgas. El Departamento del Trabajo desempeña receive a construction that will lead to this result.
meramente el papel de pacificador entre las partes en
controversia y sus decisiones no son obligatorias ni para The petitioner claims that if section 4 of Commonwealth
los patronos ni para los obreros. El pueblo ha liegado a Act No. 103 is held to empower the Court of Industrial
un grado de desarollo industrial, que hace imperiosa el Relations to determine minimum wages in connection
que la intervencion del gobierno en estos conflictos sea with an industrial dispute, the section is unconstitutional
mas efectiva . . ." (Ang Tibay et al. vs. Court of Industrial as constituting an undue delegation of legislative power
Relations et al., G. R, No. 46496.) And in order that this to the Court at depriving the petitioner of the equal
declaration of policy may not just be an empty gesture, protection of the laws. In support of this claim, petitioner
Commonwealth Act No. 103, in various sections thereof, argues that the determination of minimum wages is a
has provided the means towards its realization. Thus in legislative function, and that section 4 of Commonwealth
section 4, the Court of Industrial Relations is empowered Act No. 103 "does not indicate in what manner. by what
to "take cognizance for purposes of prevention, standards, or in accordance with what rules, the Court
8
of Industrial Relations shall determine minimum wages greater powers by the legislature, and toward
under said section" (pp. 12-13 of the petition). Section the approval of the practice by the courts. (Dillon
20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 prescribes that in the Catfish Drainage Dist. v. Bank of Dillon, 141 S.
hearing, investigation and determination of any question E. 274, 275, 143 S. Ct. 178, State v. Knox
or controversy and in exercising any duties and power County, 54 S. W. 2d 973, 976, 165 Tenn. 319.)
under this Act, the court shall act according to justice In harmony with such growing tendency, this
and equity and substantial merits of the case, without Court, since the decision in the case of
regard to technicalities or legal forms. The National Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs.
Assembly has by this section furnished a sufficient Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 34 Phil..
standard by which the court will be guided in exercising 136, relied upon by the petitioner, has, in
its discretion in the determination of any question or instances, extended its seal of approval to the
controversy before it, and we have already ruled that the "delegation of greater powers by the legislature."
discretionary power thus conferred is judicial in (Inchausti Steamship Co. vs. Public Utility
character and does not infringe upon the principle of Commissioner, 44 Phil., 366; Alegre vs.
separation of powers, the prohibition against the Collector of Customs, 53 Phil., 394; Cebu
delegation of legislative function, and the equal Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus, 56 Phil., 446;
protection clause of the Constitution. Antamok Gold People vs. Fernandez & Trinidad, G. R. No.
Fields Mining Company vs. Court of Industrial Relations 45655, promulgated June 15, 1938; People vs.
et al., G. R. No. 46892, promulgated June 28, 1940.) Rosenthal & Osmeña, G. R. Nos. 46076, 46077,
promulgated June 12, 1939; and Robb and
Furthermore, in the case of Pangasinan Transportation Hilscher vs. People, G. R. No. 45866,
Co. vs. The Public Service Commission, G. R. No. promulgated June 12, 1939.)"
47065, promulgated June 26, 1940, we made the
following observation: The petition for certiorari is denied, with costs against
the petitioner. So ordered.
The theory of the separation of powers is
designed by its originators to secure action and G.R. No. L-5279 October 31, 1955
at the same time to forestall overreaction which
necessarily results from undue concentration of PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND
powers, and thereby obtain efficiency and UNIVERSITIES, ETC., petitioner,
prevent despotism. Thereby, the "rule of law" vs.
was established which narrows the range of SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and the BOARD OF
governmental action and makes it subject to TEXTBOOKS, respondents.
control by certain legal devices. As a corollary,
we find the rule prohibiting of legislative BENGZON, J.:
authority, and from the earliest time American
legal authorities have proceeded on the theory
The petitioning colleges and universities request that
that legislative power must be exercised by the
Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and
legislature alone. It is frankness, however, to
Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared
confess that as one delves into the mass of
unconstitutional, because: A. They deprive owners of
judicial pronouncement, he finds a great deal of
schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of
confusion. One thing, however, is apparent in
liberty and property without due process of law; B. They
the development of the principle of separation of
deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear
powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus
their children for civic efficiency; and C. Their provisions
non potest delegari or delegata potestas non
conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited
potest delegari, attributed to Bracton (De
power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards
Legibus el Consuetedinuos Angliae, edited by
constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
G. E. Wood-bine, Yale University Pres., 1922,
vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in
principle in the Roman Law (D. 17. 18. 3), has A printed memorandum explaining their position in
been made to adapt itself to the complexities of extenso is attached to the record.
modern governments, giving rise to the
adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of The Government's legal representative submitted a
"subordinate legislation" not only in the United mimeographed memorandum contending that, (1) the
States and England but in practically all modern matter constitutes no justiciable controversy exhibiting
governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional
Osmeña, G. R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, questions; (2) petitioners are in estoppel to challenge
promulgated June 12, 1939). Accordingly, with the validity of the said acts; and (3) the Acts are
the growing complexity of modern life, the constitutionally valid.
multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulation, and the increased difficulty of Petitioners submitted a lengthy reply to the above
administering the laws, there is a constantly arguments.
growing tendency toward the delegation of

9
Act No. 2706 approved in 1917 is entitled, "An Act action and it is not sufficient that he has merely
making the inspection and recognition of private schools a general to invoke the judicial power to
and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public determine the validity of executive or legislative
Instruction." Under its provisions, the Department of action he must show that he has sustained or is
Education has, for the past 37 years, supervised and interest common to all members of the public.
regulated all private schools in this country apparently (Ex parte Levitt, 302 U. S. 633 82 L. Ed. 493.)
without audible protest, nay, with the general
acquiescence of the general public and the parties Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of
concerned. a law upon the complaint of one who fails to
show that he is injured by its operation.
It should be understandable, then, that this Court should (Tyler vs. Judges, 179 U. S. 405;
be doubly reluctant to consider petitioner's demand for Hendrick vs. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610;
avoidance of the law aforesaid, specially where, as Coffman vs. Breeze Corp., 323 U. S. 316-325.)
respondents assert, petitioners suffered no wrong—nor
allege any—from the enforcement of the criticized The power of courts to declare a law
statute. unconstitutional arises only when the interests
of litigant require the use of that judicial authority
It must be evident to any one that the power to for their protection against actual interference, a
declare a legislative enactment void is one hypothetical threat being insufficient. (United
which the judge, conscious of the fallability of the Public Works vs. Mitchell, 330 U .S. 75; 91 L.
human judgment, will shrink from exercising in Ed. 754.)
any case where he can conscientiously and with
due regard to duty and official oath decline the Bona fide suit.—Judicial power is limited to the
responsibility. (Cooley Constitutional decision of actual cases and controversies. The
Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. I, p. 332.) authority to pass on the validity of statutes is
incidental to the decision of such cases where
When a law has been long treated as conflicting claims under the Constitution and
constitutional and important rights have become under a legislative act assailed as contrary to the
dependent thereon, the Court may refuse to Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in the
consider an attack on its validity. (C. J. S. 16, p. last resort, and as necessity in the determination
204.) of real, earnest, and vital controversy between
litigants. (Tañada and Fernando, Constitution of
As a general rule, the constitutionality of a the Philippines, p. 1138.)
statute will be passed on only if, and to the
extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved Mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education
in a justiciable controversy and is essential to might under the law withdraw the permit of one of
the protection of the rights of the parties petitioners does not constitute a justiciable controversy.
concerned. (16 C. J. S., p. 207.) (Cf. Com. ex rel Watkins vs. Winchester Waterworks
(Ky.) 197 S. W. 2d. 771.)
In support of their first proposition petitioners contend
that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is And action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose,
guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring nay, to obtain actual and positive relief.
previous governmental approval or permit before such (Salonga vs. Warner Barnes, L-2245, January, 1951.)
person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions
of previous restraint, a practice abhorent to our system to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however
of law and government. Petitioners obviously refer to intellectually solid the problem may be. This is specially
section 3 of Act No. 2706 as amended which provides true where the issues "reach constitutional dimensions,
that before a private school may be opened to the public for then there comes into play regard for the court's duty
it must first obtain a permit from the Secretary of to avoid decision of constitutional issues unless
Education. The Solicitor General on the other hand avoidance becomes evasion." (Rice vs. Sioux City, U.
points out that none of the petitioners has cause to S. Sup. Ct. Adv. Rep., May 23, 1995, Law Ed., Vol. 99,
present this issue, because all of them have permits to p. 511.)
operate and are actually operating by virtue of their
permits.1 And they do not assert that the respondent The above notwithstanding, in view of the several
Secretary of Education has threatened to revoke their decisions of the United States Supreme Court quoted by
permits. They have suffered no wrong under the terms petitioners, apparently outlawing censorship of the kind
of law—and, naturally need no relief in the form they objected to by them, we have decided to look into the
now seek to obtain. matter, lest they may allege we refuse to act even in the
face of clear violation of fundamental personal rights of
It is an established principle that to entitle a liberty and property.
private individual immediately in danger of
sustaining a direct injury as the result of that

10
Petitioners complain that before opening a school the
owner must secure a permit from the Secretary of
Education. Such requirement was not originally included
in Act No. 2706. It was introduced by Commonwealth
Act No. 180 approved in 1936. Why?
In March 1924 the Philippine Legislature approved Act
No. 3162 creating a Board of Educational Survey to
make a study and survey of education in the Philippines
and of all educational institutions, facilities and agencies
thereof. A Board chairmaned by Dr. Paul Munroe,
Columbia University, assisted by a staff of carefully
selected technical members performed the task, made
a five-month thorough and impartial examination of the
local educational system, and submitted a report with
recommendations, printed as a book of 671 pages. The
following paragraphs are taken from such report:
PRIVATE-ADVENTURE SCHOOLS
There is no law or regulation in the Philippine
Islands today to prevent a person, however
disqualified by ignorance, greed, or even
immoral character, from opening a school to
teach the young. It it true that in order to post
over the door "Recognized by the Government,"
a private adventure school must first be
inspected by the proper Government official, but
a refusal to grant such recognition does not by
any means result in such a school ceasing to
exist. As a matter of fact, there are more such
unrecognized private schools than of the
recognized variety. How many, no one knows,
as the Division of Private Schools keeps records
only of the recognized type.
Conclusion.—An unprejudiced consideration of
the fact presented under the caption Private
Adventure Schools leads but to one conclusion,
viz.: the great majority of them from primary
grade to university are money-making devices
for the profit of those who organize and
administer them. The people whose children
and youth attend them are not getting what they
pay for. It is obvious that the system constitutes
a great evil. That it should be permitted to exist
with almost no supervision is indefensible. The
suggestion has been made with the reference to
the private institutions of university grade that
some board of control be organized under
legislative control to supervise their
administration. The Commission believes that
the recommendations it offers at the end of this
chapter are more likely to bring about the
needed reforms.
Recommendations.—The Commission
recommends that legislation be enacted to
prohibit the opening of any school by an
individual or organization without the permission
of the Secretary of Public Instruction. That
before granting such permission the Secretary
11
assure himself that such school measures up to
proper standards in the following respects, and
that the continued existence of the school be
dependent upon its continuing to conform to
these conditions:
(1) The location and construction of the
buildings, the lighting and ventilation of the
rooms, the nature of the lavatories, closets,
water supply, school furniture and apparatus,
and methods of cleaning shall be such as to
insure hygienic conditions for both pupils and
teachers.
(2) The library and laboratory facilities shall be
adequate to the needs of instruction in the
subjects taught.
(3) The classes shall not show an excessive
number of pupils per teacher. The Commission
recommends 40 as a maximum.
(4) The teachers shall meet qualifications equal
to those of teachers in the public schools of the
same grade.
xxx xxx xxx
In view of these findings and recommendations, can
there be any doubt that the Government in the exercise
of its police power to correct "a great evil" could validly
establish the "previous permit" system objected to by
petitioners? This is what differentiates our law from the
other statutes declared invalid in other jurisdictions. And
if any doubt still exists, recourse may now be had to the
provision of our Constitution that "All educational
institutions shall be under the supervision and subject to
regulation by the State." (Art. XIV, sec. 5.) The power to
regulate establishments or business occupations
implies the power to require a permit or license. (53 C.
J. S. 4.)
What goes for the "previous permit" naturally goes for
the power to revoke such permit on account of violation
of rules or regulations of the Department.
II. This brings us to the petitioners' third proposition that
the questioned statutes "conferring on the Secretary of
Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe
rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of
legislative power."
This attack is specifically aimed at section 1 of Act No.
2706 which, as amended, provides:
It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public
Instruction to maintain a general standard of
efficiency in all private schools and colleges of
the Philippines so that the same shall furnish
adequate instruction to the public, in accordance
with the class and grade of instruction given in
them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his
 duly authorized representative shall have At any rate, petitioners do not show how these
authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said standards have injured any of them or interfered with
schools and colleges in order to determine the their operation. Wherefore, no reason exists for them to
efficiency of instruction given in the same, assail the validity of the power nor the exercise of the
power by the Secretary of Education.
"Nowhere in this Act" petitioners argue "can one find any
description, either general or specific, of what True, the petitioners assert that, the Secretary has
constitutes a 'general standard of efficiency.' Nowhereissued rules and regulations "whimsical and capricious"
in this Act is there any indication of any basis or and that such discretionary power has produced
condition to ascertain what is 'adequate instruction toarrogant inspectors who "bully heads and teachers of
the public.' Nowhere in this Act is there any statement of
private schools." Nevertheless, their remedy is to
conditions, acts, or factors, which the Secretary of challenge those regulations specifically, and/or to ring
Education must take into account to determine the those inspectors to book, in proper administrative or
'efficiency of instruction.'" judicial proceedings—not to invalidate the law. For it
needs no argument, to show that abuse by the officials
The attack on this score is also extended to section 6 entrusted with the execution of a statute does not per
which provides: se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute.

The Department of Education shall from time to Anyway, we find the defendants' position to be
time prepare and publish in pamphlet form the sufficiently sustained by the decision in Alegra vs.
minimum standards required of primary, Collector of Customs, 53 Phil., 394 upon holding the
intermediate, and high schools, and colleges statute that authorized the Director of Agriculture
granting the degrees of Bachelor of Arts, to "designate standards for the commercial grades of
Bachelor of Science, or any other academic abaca, maguey and sisal" against vigorous attacks on
degree. It shall also from time to time prepare the ground of invalid delegation of legislative power.
and publish in pamphlet form the minimum
standards required of law, medical, dental, Indeed "adequate and efficient instruction" should be
pharmaceutical, engineering, agricultural and considered sufficient, in the same way as "public
other medical or vocational schools or colleges welfare" "necessary in the interest of law and order"
giving instruction of a technical, vocational or "public interest" and "justice and equity and substantial
professional character. merits of the case" have been held sufficient as
legislative standards justifying delegation of authority to
Petitioners reason out, "this section leaves everything to regulate. (See Tañada and Fernando, Constitution of
the uncontrolled discretion of the Secretary of Education the Philippines, p. 793, citing Philippine cases.)
or his department. The Secretary of Education is given
the power to fix the standard. In plain language, the On this phase of the litigation we conclude that there has
statute turns over to the Secretary of Education the been no undue delegation of legislative power.
exclusive authority of the legislature to formulate
standard. . . .." In this connection, and to support their position that the
law and the Secretary of Education have transcended
It is quite clear the two sections empower and require the governmental power of supervision and regulation,
the Secretary of Education to prescribe rules fixing the petitioners appended a list of circulars and
minimum standards of adequate and efficient instruction memoranda issued by the said Department. However
to be observed by all such private schools and colleges they failed to indicate which of such official documents
as may be permitted to operate. The petitioners contend was constitutionally objectionable for being "capricious,"
that as the legislature has not fixed the standards, "the or pain "nuisance"; and it is one of our decisional
provision is extremely vague, indefinite and uncertain"— practices that unless a constitutional point is specifically
and for that reason constitutionality objectionable. The raised, insisted upon and adequately argued, the court
best answer is that despite such alleged vagueness the will not consider it. (Santiago vs. Far Eastern, 73 Phil.,
Secretary of Education has fixed standards to ensure 408.)
adequate and efficient instruction, as shown by the
memoranda fixing or revising curricula, the school We are told that such list will give an idea of how the
calendars, entrance and final examinations, admission statute has placed in the hands of the Secretary of
and accreditation of students etc.; and the system of Education complete control of the various activities of
private education has, in general, been satisfactorily in private schools, and why the statute should be struck
operation for 37 years. Which only shows that the down as unconstitutional. It is clear in our opinion that
Legislature did and could, validly rely upon the the statute does not in express terms give the
educational experience and training of those in charge Secretary complete control. It gives him powers to
of the Department of Education to ascertain and inspect private schools, to regulate their activities, to
formulate minimum requirements of adequate give them official permits to operate under certain
instruction as the basis of government recognition of any conditions, and to revoke such permits for cause. This
private school. does not amount to complete control. If any of such

12
Department circulars or memoranda issued by the educational institution equivalent to one percent
Secretary go beyond the bounds of regulation and of the total amount accruing from tuition and
seeks to establish complete control, it would surely be other fees: . . . and non-payment of the
invalid. Conceivably some of them are of this nature, but assessment herein provided by any private
besides not having before us the text of such circulars, school, college or university shall be sufficient
the petitioners have omitted to specify. In any event with cause for the cancellation by the Secretary of
the recent approval of Republic Act No. 1124 creating Instruction of the permit for recognition granted
the National Board of Education, opportunity for to it.
administrative correction of the supposed anomalies or
encroachments is amply afforded herein petitioners. A Petitioners maintain that this is a tax on the exercise of
more expeditious and perhaps more technically a constitutional right—the right to open a school, the
competent forum exists, wherein to discuss the liberty to teach etc. They claim this is unconstitutional,
necessity, convenience or relevancy of the measures in the same way that taxes on the privilege of selling
criticized by them. (See also Republic Act No. 176.) religious literature or of publishing a newspaper—both
constitutional privileges—have been held, in the United
If however the statutes in question actually give the States, to be invalid as taxes on the exercise of a
Secretary control over private schools, the question constitutional right.
arises whether the power of supervision and regulation
granted to the State by section 5 Article XIV was meant The Solicitor General on the other hand argues that
to include control of private educational institutions. It is insofar as petitioners' action attempts to restrain the
enough to point out that local educators and writers think further collection of the assessment, courts have no
the Constitution provides for control of Education by the jurisdiction to restrain the collection of taxes by
State. (See Tolentino, Government of the Philippine injunction, and in so far as they seek to recover fees
Constitution, Vol. II, p. 615; Benitez, Philippine Social already paid the suit, it is one against the State without
Life and Progress, p. 335.) its consent. Anyway he concludes, the action involving
"the legality of any tax impost or assessment" falls within
The Constitution (it) "provides for state control of all the original jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance.
educational institutions" even as it enumerates certain
fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the There are good grounds in support of Government's
development of moral character, personal discipline, position. If this levy of 1 per cent is truly a mere fee—
civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and and not a tax—to finance the cost of the Department's
instruction in the duties of citizenship. (Malcolm & duty and power to regulate and supervise private
Laurel, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1936.) schools, the exaction may be upheld; but such point
involves investigation and examination of relevant data,
The Solicitor General cities many authorities to show which should best be carried out in the lower courts. If
that the power to regulate means power to control, and on the other hand it is a tax, petitioners' issue would still
quotes from the proceedings of the Constitutional be within the original jurisdiction of the Courts of First
Convention to prove that State control of private Instance.
education was intended by the organic law. It is
significant to note that the Constitution grants power to The last grievance of petitioners relates to the validity of
supervise and to regulate. Which may mean greater Republic Act No. 139 which in its section 1 provides:
power than mere regulation.
The textbooks to be used in the private schools
III. Another grievance of petitioners—probably the most recognized or authorized by the government
significant—is the assessment of 1 per cent levied on shall be submitted to the Board (Board of
gross receipts of all private schools for additional Textbooks) which shall have the power to
Government expenses in connection with their prohibit the use of any of said textbooks which it
supervision and regulation. The statute is section 11-A may find to be against the law or to offend the
of Act No. 2706 as amended by Republic Act No. 74 dignity and honor of the government and people
which reads as follows: of the Philippines, or which it may find to be
against the general policies of the government,
SEC. 11-A. The total annual expense of the or which it may deem pedagogically unsuitable.
Office of Private Education shall be met by the
regular amount appropriated in the annual This power of the Board, petitioners aver, is censorship
Appropriation Act: Provided, however, That for in "its baldest form". They cite two U. S. cases (Miss.
additional expenses in the supervision and and Minnesota) outlawing statutes that impose previous
regulation of private schools, colleges and restraints upon publication of newspapers, or curtail the
universities and in the purchase of textbook to right of individuals to disseminate teachings critical of
be sold to student of said schools, colleges and government institutions or policies.
universities and President of the Philippines
may authorize the Secretary of Instruction to Herein lies another important issue submitted in the
levy an equitable assessment from each private cause. The question is really whether the law may be

13
enacted in the exercise of the State's constitutional G.R. No. L-26136 October 30, 1978
power (Art. XIV, sec. 5) to supervise and regulate private
schools. If that power amounts to control of private THE BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC. and/or
schools, as some think it is, maybe the law is valid. In "BACHRACH TRANSPORTATION CO., INC", as
this connection we do not share the belief that section 5 operator of the RURAL TRANSIT, petitioner,
has added new power to what the State inherently vs.
possesses by virtue of the police power. An express THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and
power is necessarily more extensive than a mere RURAL TRANSIT EMPLOYEES
implied power. For instance, if there is conflict between ASSOCIATION, respondents.
an express individual right and the express power to
control private education it cannot off-hand be said that MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:
the latter must yield to the former—conflict of two
express powers. But if the power to control education
In 1958 the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. and/or the
ismerely implied from the police power, it is feasible to
"Bachrach Transportation Co., Inc.", now petitioner in
uphold the express individual right, as was probably the
this case, was in the transportation business and
situation in the two decisions brought to our attention, of
operated what was then known as the "Rural Transit". In
Mississippi and Minnesota, states where constitutional
that year the Rural Transit Employees Association went
control of private schools is not expressly produced.
on strike and the dispute between the management and
the union reached the Court of Industrial Relations for
However, as herein previously noted, no justiciable compulsory arbitration. The case was docketed as Case
controversy has been presented to us. We are not No. 22- IPA entitled: Rural Transit Employees
informed that the Board on Textbooks has prohibited Association vs. Bachrach Motor Co., and Bachrach
this or that text, or that the petitioners refused or intend
to refuse to submit some textbooks, and are in danger
Transportation Co. The Court of Industrial Relations
of losing substantial privileges or rights for so refusing.
(CIR for short) immediately issued an order on August
7, 1958 by which the strikers were ordered to return to
The average lawyer who reads the above quoted work and the management to take them back under the
section of Republic Act 139 will fail to perceive anything terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose. 1
objectionable. Why should not the State prohibit the use
of textbooks that are illegal, or offensive to the Filipinos
While this labor dispute was pending with the
or adverse to governmental policies or educationally
CIR Bachrach filed a "Petition for Authority to discharge
improper? What's the power of regulation and
driver Maximo Jacob from the service", dated July 24,
supervision for? But those trained to the investigation of
1961. The reasons given for the petition were alleged
constitutional issues are likely to apprehend the danger
violations of the Motor Vehicle Law by Maximo Jacob
to civil liberties, of possible educational dictatorship or
resulting in damage to property and injuries to third
thought control, as petitioners' counsel foresee with
parties, the latest of which occurred on June 9, 1961
obvious alarm. Much depends, however, upon the
resulting in the "total destruction of bus 170" of the
execution and implementation of the statute. Not that
company.
constitutionality depends necessarily upon the law's
effects. But if the Board on Textbooks in its actuations
strictly adheres to the letter of the section and wisely An "Answer and Counter-Petition" was filed in behalf of
steers a middle course between the Scylla of Maximo Jacob by the Rural Transit Employees
"dictatorship" and the Charybdis of "thought control", no Association whereby it denied the charges and alleged
cause for complaint will arise and no occasion for judicial that the June 9, 1961 accident was due to a mechanical
review will develop. Anyway, and again, petitioners now defect of the bus which was beyond the control of the
have a more expeditious remedy thru an administrative driver Jacob, hence, the latter's suspension from the
appeal to the National Board of Education created by service was not justified.
Republic Act 1124.
The petition of Bachrach docketed as Case No. 22-IPA
Of course it is necessary to assure herein petitioners, (11) was heard on January 23, 1963, during which
that when and if, the dangers they apprehend petitioner presented its one and only witness, Mr.
materialize and judicial intervention is suitably invoked, Joseph Kaplin, general manager of Rural Transit, and
after all administrative remedies are exhausted, the various documents marked as Exhibits "1" to "8-F"
courts will not shrink from their duty to delimit inclusive. After Mr. Kaplin, concluded his direct
constitutional boundaries and protect individual liberties. testimony, with agreement of the parties, the hearing
was scheduled for another date for purposes of cross-
examination of the witness. The case was reset on
IV. For all the foregoing considerations, reserving to the
various dates but Mr. Kaplin failed to appear because
petitioners the right to institute in the proper court, and
he had left for abroad.
at the proper time, such actions as may call for decision
of the issue herein presented by them, this petition for
prohibition will be denied. So ordered. Sometime on March 8 1965, the employee's association
filed a motion praying that:

14
 (a) the testimony of Mr. Joseph Kaplin Joseph Kaplin was not cross-examined
be stricken from the records by the respondent union.

(b) the petition of the Company for V

authority to dismiss Maximo Jacob from
the service be denied: and
(c) the Company be ordered to reinstate
Maximo Jacob immediately with
backwages from June 9, 1961 up to the
date of his actual reinstatement. 2
In an order dated March 1, 1966, the CIR through then
Presiding Judge Arsenio I. Martinez dismissed the
company's petition, lifted the suspension of driver
Jacob, and ordered his reinstatement with backwages
from the date of his suspension up to his actual
reinstatement. 3
Bachrach's motion for reconsideration 4 having been
denied 5, it filed the instant Petition for certiorari on June
15, 1966 which in the Court's Resolution of July 18,1966
was given due course. 6
The following errors are now assigned
petitioner, viz: 7
The respondent court erred in granting
backwages to Maximo Jacob from the
date of his suspension up to actual
reinstatement without evidence to prove
that he has exercised reasonable
diligence to secure other employment
during the time of his alleged
suspension.
VI
The respondent court erred in not
holding that the union has the burden to
prove that Maximo Jacob is entitled to
backwages.
VII
The respondent court erred in not holding that, if at all,
by Maximo Jacob is only entitled to three months
backwages according to the Sta. Cecilia Sawmill case.

I 1. Respondent court did not err in ordering the dismissal

The respondent court erred in
dismissing the petition of the herein
petitioner, after ordering the testimony of
Joseph Kaplin to be stricken off the
record, notwithstanding the fact that the
service records of Maximo Jacob, upon
the basis of which his dismissal could be
justified were admitted by it.
of Bachrach's petition to discharge Maximo Jacob.
Petitioner presented only one witness, Joseph Kaplin to
prove its case against driver Jacob. The witness failed
however to appear at the scheduled hearings for his
cross-examination for the simple reason that he left for
abroad. Having been deprived, without fault on its part,
of its right to cross-examine Kaplin, respondent
association was entitled to have the direct testimony of
the witness stricken off the record.

II The right of a party to confront and

cross-examine opposing witnesses in a
The respondent court erred in not judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in
admitting the petitioner's exhibits nature, or in proceedings before
unqualifiedly and in admitting them "for administrative tribunals with quasi-
whatever worth they may have" only to judicial powers, is fundamental right
disregard them entirely thereafter on the which is part of due process. (Savory
alleged ground that "the contents of the Luncheonette v. Lakas ng
same were not proven. Manggagawang Pilipino, et al., 1975, 62
SCRA 258)
III
In Ortigas Jr. v. Luftansa German Airlines, 1975,
The respondent court erred in not defendant's witness failed to appear at the continuation
ordering the dismissal of Maximo Jacob. of hearing during which the witness was to be cross-
examined by plaintiff's counsel. The trial court denied
defendant's motion for postponement and ordered the
IV
unfinished testimony of the witness Lazzari stricken off
the record. In sustaining said order, this Court held inter
The respondent court erred in granting alia:
the respondent union's counter-petition
without reception of evidence, especially
Oral testimony may be taken into
after it earlier dismissed the petitioner's
account only when it is complete, that is,
petition on the technical ground that
if the witness has been wholly cross-
examined by the adverse party or the
15
 right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in the veracity of the contents of the documents; not having
part thru the fault of such adverse party. done so, petitioner must now suffer the consequences.
But when cross-examination is not and Exhibits "1" to "8-F" were admitted by respondent court
cannot be done or completed due to only for "whatever they may be worth." Evaluating them,
causes attributable to the party offering however, it did not consider said documents, and rightly
the witness, the uncompleted testimony so, as competent proof of the truthfulness of their
is thereby rendered incompetent. contents without the supporting testimony of witness
Kaplin. As stated in the order under review "(N)o other
The right of a party to cross-examine the witness was presented by respondent company (now
witness of his adversary is invaluable as petitioner) to testify on the intrinsic value of those
it is inviolable in civil cases, no less than exhibits"; consequently, they are hearsay. Inasmuch as
the right of the accused in criminal the testimony of Joseph Kaplin is stricken off the record
cases. The express recognition of such and the contents of Exhibits "1" to "8-F" are hearsay,
right of the accused in the Constitution and there is no other evidence which substantiates the
does not render the right thereto of charges against Maximo Jacob, the dismissal of the
parties in civil cases less constitutionally company's petition to discharge Jacob from its service
based, for it is an indispensable part of is in order.
the due process guaranteed by the
fundamental law. ... Until such cross- 2. No error was committed when the CIR, without
examination has been finished, the receiving evidence, granted relief to private respondent
testimony of the witness cannot be herein on its counter-petition.
considered as complete and may not,
therefore, be allowed to form part of the At the time Bachrach filed its petition to discharge
evidence to be considered by the court Maximo Jacob, there was a pending labor dispute in the
in deciding the case. (64 SCRA 610, CIR between the company and the employee's union.
636- 637; emphasis supplied) The CIR ordered the strikers to return to work. The
company in the meantime suspended its driver Maximo
Parenthetically, the situation in Savory Luncheonette v. Jacob after the alleged June 9, 1961 accident. 10
Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et al., supra, was
different. There, the witness, Atty. Morabe, had finished Considering the dismissal of Bachrach's petition to
his direct testimony and he was ready and available for discharge Maximo Jacob, the lifting of the latter's
cross-examination. Motions for postponement of the suspension and his reinstatement in the service were
cross-examination were made however by the adverse but a necessary consequence thereof. For obvious
counsel from time to time until one day Atty. Morabe reasons, the relief could be granted without need of
succumbed to a fatal heart attack without the cross- evidence. The onus probandi was on the company, now
examination having been accomplished. On motion of petitioner, to justify the suspension of Jacob and his
the respondents the Court of Industrial Relations eventual separation from the service. Having failed to
ordered the testimony of Atty. Morabe deleted from the discharge that burden, there were no valid grounds for it
record. On a petition for certiorari by Savory to keep its employee away from his work.
Luncheonette, this Court set aside the order and held
that by their own actuations, respondents 3. On the matter of backwages, We agree with
were considered to have impliedly waived and petitioner's counsel that the judicial trend is to fix a
thereupon lost their right to cross-examine the witness, reasonable period for the payment of backwages, the
for such a right may be forfeited by a party litigant philosophy being to avoid protracted delay in post-
through his own conduct. Petitioner contends however judgment hearings to prove or disprove earnings of the
that it was ready to present another witness, Mrs. Ursula worker elsewhere during the period he had not been
Silva, to Identify the documents, Exhibits "1" to "8-F", but reinstated to his employment." 11Following this principle,
it did not proceed to call the witness for the reason that We hold that payment of backwages for a period of three
during the hearing of January 16, 1965, respondent's (3) years is fair and reasonable under the circumstances
counsel, Atty. Santiago, manifested that he was of the case.
admitting the signatures of Joseph Kaplin on the
aforesaid documents. 8 However true that may be, what
WHEREFORE, We hereby render judgment affirming
Atty. Santiago admitted merely was the signature of Mr.
the order of respondent Court of Industrial Relations
Kaplin and not the truth of the contents of the
dated March 1, 1966, now under review, with the sole
documents. 9 The opposing party was still entitled to
modification that petitioner shall pay its driver Maximo
cross-examine the witness on the matters written on
Jacob three (3) years backwages at the rate of the last
Exhibits "1" to "8-F" especially if they adversely affected
salary received before he was suspended, without
the substantial rights of the party against whom they
qualification and deduction. With costs against
were being presented, namely, driver Maximo Jacob.
petitioner. Order modified.
When Atty. Santiago admitted that the signature
appearing in Exhibits "1" to "8-F" was that of witness
Kaplin, the counsel of petitioner then, Atty. Joven Enrile, SO ORDERED.
should have inquired if the party was admitting likewise

16
G.R. No. 134625 August 31, 1999 Classes of Vessels Constructed and Employed by the
Natives of the Coasts of Coromandel, Malabar, and the
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF Island of Ceylon for their Coasting Navigation" in the
REGENTS, CHANCELLOR ROGER POSADAS, DR. Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland
2
EMERLINDA ROMAN, DEAN CONSUELO PAZ, DR. Journal, volume I, pp. 1-14 (1833).
ISAGANI MEDINA, DR. MARIA SERENA DIOKNO,
DR. OLIVIA CAOILI, DR. FRANCISCO NEMENZO II, Nonetheless, private respondent was allowed to defend
DEAN PACIFICO AGABIN, CARMELITA GUNO, and her dissertation on February 5, 1993. Four (4) out of the
MARICHU LAMBINO, petitioners, five (5) panelists gave private respondent a passing
vs. mark for her oral defense by affixing their signatures on
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and AROKIASWAMY the approval form. These were Drs. Manuel, Quiason,
WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE, respondents. Skandarajah, and Teodoro. Dr. Quiason added the
following qualification to his signature:
MENDOZA, J.:
Ms. Arokiaswamy must incorporate the
For review before the Court is the decision of the Court suggestions I made during the successful
1
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42788, dated December defense of her P.D. thesis.3
16, 1997, which granted private respondent's
application for a writ of mandatory injunction, and its Dr. Medina did not sign the approval form but added the
resolution, dated July 13, 1998, denying petitioners' following comment:
motion for reconsideration.
Pipirmahan ko ang pagsang-ayon/di pagsang-
The antecedent facts are as follows: ayon kapag nakita ko na ang mga revisions ng
dissertation.4
Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret
Celine is a citizen of India and holder of a Philippine Dr. Teodoro added the following note to his signature:
visitor's visa. Sometime in April 1988, she enrolled in the
doctoral program in Anthropology of the University of the Kailangang isagawa ang mga mahahalagang
Philippines College of Social Sciences and Philosophy pagbabago at ipakita sa panel and bound
(CSSP) in Diliman, Quezon City. copies.5

After completing the units of course work required in her In a letter, dated March 5, 1993 and addressed to her
doctoral program, private respondent went on a two- thesis adviser, Dr. Manuel, private respondent
year leave of absence to work as Tamil Programme requested a meeting with the panel members, especially
Producer of the Vatican Radio in the Vatican and as Dr. Medina, to discuss the amendments suggested by
General Office Assistant at the International Right to Life
the panel members during the oral defense. The
Federation in Rome. She returned to the Philippines in meeting was held at the dean's office with Dean Paz,
July 1991 to work on her dissertation entitled, "Tamil private respondent, and a majority of the defense panel
Influences in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines." present.6 During the meeting, Dean Paz remarked that
a majority vote of the panel members was sufficient for
On December 22, 1992, Dr. Realidad S. Rolda, a student to pass, notwithstanding the failure to obtain
chairperson of the U.P. Department of Anthropology, the consent of the Dean's representative.
wrote a letter to Dr. Maria Serena Diokno, CSSP
Associate Dean and Graduate Program Director, On March 24, 1993, the CSSP College Faculty
certifying that private respondent had finished her Assembly approved private respondent's graduation
dissertation and was ready for her oral defense. Dr. pending submission of final copies of her dissertation.
Rolda suggested that the oral defense be held on
January 6, 1993 but, in a letter, dated February 2, 1993, In April 1993, private respondent submitted copies of
Dr. Serena Diokno rescheduled it on February 5, 1993. her supposedly revised dissertation to Drs. Manuel,
Named as members of the dissertation panel were Drs. Skandarajah, and Quiason, who expressed their assent
E. Arsenio Manuel, Serafin Quiason, Sri Skandarajah, to the dissertation. Petitioners maintain, however, that
Noel Teodoro, and Isagani Medina, the last included as private respondent did not incorporate the revisions
the dean's representative.1âwphi1.nêt suggested by the panel members in the final copies of
her dissertation.
After going over private respondent's dissertation, Dr.
Medina informed CSSP Dean Consuelo Joaquin-Paz Private respondent left a copy of her dissertation in Dr.
that there was a portion in private respondent's Teodoro's office April 15, 1993 and proceeded to submit
dissertation that was lifted, without proper her dissertation to the CSSP without the approvals of Dr.
acknowledgment, from Balfour's Cyclopaedia of India Medina and Dr. Teodoro, relying on Dean Paz's March
and Eastern and Southern Asia (1967), volume I, pp. 5, 1993 statement.
392-401 (3 v., Edward Balfour 1885 reprint) and from
John Edye's article entitled "Description of the Various

17
Dr. Teodoro later indicated his disapproval, while Dr. Apparently, however, Dean Paz's letter did not reach the
Medina did not sign the approval form.7 Board of Regents on time, because the next day, April
22, 1993, the Board approved the University Council's
Dean Paz then accepted private respondent's recommendation for the graduation of qualified
dissertation in partial fulfillment of the course students, including private respondent. Two days later,
requirements for the doctorate degree in Anthropology. April 24, 1993, private respondent graduated with the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology.
In a letter to Dean Paz, dated April 17, 1993, private
respondent expressed concern over matters related to On the other hand, Dean Paz also wrote a letter to
her dissertation. She sought to explain why the private respondent, dated April 21, 1993, that she would
signature of Dr. Medina was not affixed to the revision not be granted an academic clearance unless she
approval form. Private respondent said that since she substantiated the accusations contained in her letter
already had the approval of a majority of the panel dated April 17, 1993.
members, she no longer showed her dissertation to Dr.
Medina nor tried to obtain the latter's signature on the In her letter, dated April 27, 1993, private respondent
revision approval form. She likewise expressed her claimed that Dr. Medina's unfavorable attitude towards
disappointment over the CSSP administration and her dissertation was a reaction to her failure to include
charged Drs. Diokno and Medina with maliciously him and Dr. Francisco in the list of panel members; that
working for the disapproval of her dissertation, and she made the revisions proposed by Drs. Medina and
further warned Dean Paz against encouraging Teodoro in the revised draft of her dissertation; and that
perfidious acts against her. Dr. Diokno was guilty of harassment.

On April 17, 1993, the University Council met to approve
the list of candidates for graduation for the second
semester of school year 1992-1993. The list, which was
endorsed to the Board of Regents for final approval,
included private respondent's name.
On April 21, 1993, Dean Paz sent a letter to Dr. Milagros
Ibe, Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, requesting
the exclusion of private respondent's name from the list
of candidates for graduation, pending clarification of the
problems regarding her dissertation. Her letter reads:8
Abril 21, 1993
In a letter addressed to Dean Paz, dated May 1, 1993,
Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with
plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted
to her be withdrawn.9
On May 13, 1993, Dean Paz formed an ad
hoc committee, composed of faculty members from
various disciplines and chaired by Eva Duka-Ventura, to
investigate the plagiarism charge against private
respondent. Meanwhile, she recommended to U.P.
Diliman Chancellor, Dr. Emerlinda Roman, that the
Ph.D. degree conferred on private respondent be
withdrawn.10

Dr. Milagros Ibe In a letter, dated June 7, 1993, Dean Paz informed
11
Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs private respondent of the charges against her.
Unibersidad ng Pilipinas
Quezon Hall, Diliman, Q.C. On June 15, 1993, the Ventura Committee submitted a
report to Dean Paz, finding at least ninety (90) instances
Mahal na Dr. Ibe, or portions in private respondent's thesis which were
lifted from sources without proper or due
Mahigpit ko pong hinihiling na huwag munang isama acknowledgment.
ang pangalan ni Ms. Arokiaswam[y] William Margaret
Celine sa listahan ng mga bibigyan ng degri na Ph.D. On July 28, 1993, the CSSP College Assembly
(Anthropology) ngayon[g] semester, dahil sa mga unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw
malubhang bintang nya sa ilang myembro ng panel para private respondent's doctorate degree and forwarded its
sa oral defense ng disertasyon nya at sa mga recommendation to the University Council. The
akusasyon ng ilan sa mga ito sa kanya. University Council, in turn, approved and endorsed the
same recommendation to the Board of Regents on
Naniniwala po kami na dapat mailinaw muna ang ilang August 16, 1993.
bagay bago makonfer ang degri kay Ms. Arokiaswam[y].
Kelangan po ito para mapangalagaan ang istandard ng On September 6, 1993, the Board of Regents deferred
pinakamataas na degree ng Unibersidad. action on the recommendation to study the legal
implications of its approval.12
(Sgd.)
Meanwhile, in a letter, dated September 23, 1993, U.P.
CONSUELO JOAQUIN-PAZ, Ph.D. Diliman Chancellor Emerlinda Roman summoned
Dekano private respondent to a meeting on the same day and
asked her to submit her written explanation to the
charges against her.
18
During the meeting, Chancellor Roman informed private In a letter to Chancellor Posadas, dated September 1,
respondent of the charges and provided her a copy of 1994, private respondent requested that the Zafaralla
the findings of the investigating committee.13 Private committee be provided with copies of the U.P. Charter
respondent, on the other hand, submitted her written (Act No. 1870), the U.P. Rules and Regulations on
explanation in a letter dated September 25, 1993. Student Conduct and Discipline, her letter-response to
Chancellor Roman, dated September 25, 1993, as well
Another meeting was held on October 8, 1993 between as all her other communications.
Chancellor Roman and private respondent to discuss
her answer to the charges. A third meeting was On September 19, 1994, Chancellor Posadas obtained
scheduled on October 27, 1993 but private respondent the Zafaralla Committee's report, signed by its
did not attend it, alleging that the Board of Regents had chairman, recommending the withdrawal of private
already decided her case before she could be fully respondent's doctorate degree. The report stated:16
heard.
After going through all the pertinent documents of the
On October 11, 1993, private respondent wrote to Dr. case and interviewing Ms. Arokiaswamy William, the
Emil Q. Javier, U.P. President, alleging that some following facts were established:
members of the U.P. administration were playing politics
in her case.14 She sent another letter, dated December 1. There is overwhelming evidence of massive
14, 1993, to Dr. Armand Fabella, Chairman of the Board lifting from a published source word for word
of Regents, complaining that she had not been afforded and, at times, paragraph by paragraph without
due process and claiming that U.P. could no longer any acknowledgment of the source, even by a
withdraw her degree since her dissertation had already mere quotation mark. At least 22 counts of such
been accepted by the CSSP.15 documented liftings were identified by the
Committee. These form part of the
Meanwhile, the U.P. Office of Legal Services justified approximately ninety (90) instances found by
the position of the University Council in its report to the the Committee created by the Dean of the
Board of Regents. The Board of Regents, in its February College and subsequently verified as correct by
1, 1994 and March 24, 1994 meetings, further deferred the Special Committee. These instances
action thereon. involved the following forms of intellectual
dishonesty: direct lifting/copying without
On July 11, 1994, private respondent sent a letter to the acknowledgment, full/partial lifting with improper
Board of Regents requesting a re-investigation of her documentation and substitution of terms or
case. She stressed that under the Rules and words (e.g., Tamil in place of Sanskrit,
Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, it was Tamilization in place of Indianization) from an
the student disciplinary tribunal which had jurisdiction to acknowledged source in support of her thesis
decide cases of dishonesty and that the withdrawal of a (attached herewith is a copy of the documents
degree already conferred was not one of the authorized for reference); and
penalties which the student disciplinary tribunal could
impose. 2. Ms. Arokiaswamy William herself admits of
being guilty of the allegation of plagiarism. Fact
On July 28, 1994, the Board of Regents decided to is, she informed the Special Committee that she
release private respondent's transcript of grades without had been admitting having lifted several portions
annotation although it showed that private respondent in her dissertation from various sources since
passed her dissertation with 12 units of credit. the beginning.

On August 17, 1994, Chancellor Roger Posadas issued In view of the overwhelming proof of massive lifting and
Administrative Order No. 94-94 constituting a special also on the admission of Ms. Arokiaswamy William that
committee composed of senior faculty members from she indeed plagiarized, the Committee strongly
the U.P. units outside Diliman to review the University supports the recommendation of the U.P. Diliman
Council's recommendation to withdraw private Council to withdraw the doctoral degree of Ms. Margaret
respondent's degree. With the approval of the Board of Celine Arokiaswamy William.
Regents and the U.P. Diliman Executive Committee,
Posadas created a five-man committee, chaired by Dr. On the basis of the report, the University Council, on
Paulino B. Zafaralla, with members selected from a list September 24, 1994, recommended to the Board of
of nominees screened by Dr. Emerenciana Arcellana, Regents that private respondent be barred in the future
then a member of the Board of Regents. On August 13, from admission to the University either as a student or
1994, the members of the Zafaralla committee and as an employee.
private respondent met at U.P. Los Baños.
On January 4, 1995, the secretary of the Board of
Meanwhile, on August 23, 1994, the U.P. Diliman Regents sent private respondent the following letter:17
Registrar released to private respondent a copy of her
transcript of grades and certificate of graduation. 4 January 1995

19
Ms. Margaret Celine Arokiaswamy William Appeals, which on December 16, 1997, reversed the
Department of Anthropology lower court. The dispositive portion of the appellate
College of Social Sciences and Philosophy court's decision reads:21
U.P. Diliman, Quezon City
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is
Dear Ms. Arokiaswamy William: hereby reversed and set aside. Respondents
are ordered to restore to petitioner her degree of
This is to officially inform you about the action taken by Ph.D. in Anthropology.
the Board of Regents at its 1081st and 1082nd meetings
held last 17 November and 16 December 1994 No pronouncement as to costs.
regarding your case, the excerpts from the minutes of
which are attached herewith. SO ORDERED.

Please be informed that the members present at the Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend:
1081st BOR meeting on 17 November 1994 resolved,
by a majority decision, to withdraw your Ph.D. degree as I
recommended by the U.P. Diliman University Council
and as concurred with by the External Review Panel
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION
composed of senior faculty from U.P. Los Baños and
OF LAW IN GRANTING THE WRIT
U.P. Manila. These faculty members were chosen by lot
OF MANDAMUS AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO
from names submitted by the University Councils of U.P.
RESTORE RESPONDENT'S DOCTORAL DEGREE.
Los Baños and U.P. Manila.
II
In reply to your 14 December 1994 letter requesting that
you be given a good lawyer by the Board, the Board, at
its 1082nd meeting on 16 December 1994, suggested THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION
that you direct your request to the Office of Legal Aid, OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTORAL
College of Law, U.P. Diliman. DEGREE GIVEN RESPONDENT BY U.P. CANNOT BE
RECALLED WITHOUT VIOLATING HER RIGHT TO
ENJOYMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
Sincerely yours,
TO JUSTICE AND EQUITY.
(Sgd.)
III
VIVENCIO R. JOSE
Secretary of the University
and of the Board of Regents THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION
OF LAW IN DEPRIVING PETITIONERS OF THEIR
RIGHT TO SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS.22
On January 18, 1995, private respondent wrote a letter
to Commissioner Sedfrey Ordoñez, Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights, asking the commission's Petitioners argue that private respondent failed to show
intervention.18 In a letter, dated February 14, 1995, to that she had been unlawfully excluded from the use and
Secretary Ricardo Gloria, Chairman of the Board of enjoyment of a right or office to which she is entitled so
Regents, she asked for a reinvestigation of her case. as to justify the issuance of the writ of mandamus. They
She also sought an audience with the Board of Regents also contend that she failed to prove that the restoration
and/or the U.P. President, which request was denied by of her degree is a ministerial duty of U.P. or that the
President Javier, in a letter dated June 2, 1995. withdrawal of the degree violated her right to the
enjoyment of intellectual property.
On August 10, 1995, private respondent then filed a
petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of On the other hand, private respondent, unassisted by
preliminary mandatory injunction and damages, which counsel, argue that petitioners acted arbitrarily and with
was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-24690 and grave abuse of discretion in withdrawing her degree
assigned to Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of even prior to verifying the truth of the plagiarism charge
Quezon City.19 She alleged that petitioners had against her; and that as her answer to the charges had
unlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification and not been forwarded to the members of the investigating
without affording her procedural due process. She committees, she was deprived of the opportunity to
prayed that petitioners be ordered to restore her degree comment or refute their findings.
and to pay her P500,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages and P1,500,000.00 as compensation for lost In addition, private respondent maintains that petitioners
of earnings. are estopped from, withdrawing her doctorate degree;
that petitioners acted contrary to §9 of the U.P. Charter
On August 6, 1996, the trial court, Branch 227, rendered and the U.P. Rules and Regulations of Student Conduct
a decision dismissing the petition for mandamus for lack and Discipline of the University, which according to her,
of merit.20 Private respondent appealed to the Court of does not authorize the withdrawal of a degree as a
20
penalty for erring students; and that only the college It is worthy to note that during the proceedings
committee or the student disciplinary tribunal may taken by the College Assembly culminating in its
decide disciplinary cases, whose report must be signed recommendation to the University Council for
by a majority of its members. the withdrawal of petitioner's Ph.D. degree,
petitioner was not given the chance to be heard
We find petitioners' contention to be meritorious. until after the withdrawal of the degree was
consummated. Petitioner's subsequent letters to
Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, the U.P. President proved unavailing.26
board or person to do the act required to be done when
it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act As the foregoing narration of facts in this case shows,
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting however, various committees had been formed to
from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes investigate the charge that private respondent had
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office committed plagiarism and, in all the investigations held,
to which such other is entitled, there being no other she was heard in her defense. Indeed, if any criticism
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary may be made of the university proceedings before
course of law.23 In University of the Philippines Board of private respondent was finally stripped of her degree, it
Regents v. Ligot-Telan,24 this Court ruled that the writ is that there were too many committee and individual
was not available to restrain U.P. from the exercise of its investigations conducted, although all resulted in a
academic freedom. In that case, a student who was finding that private respondent committed dishonesty in
found guilty of dishonesty and ordered suspended for submitting her doctoral dissertation on the basis of
one year by the Board of Regents, filed a petition which she was conferred the Ph.D. degree.
for mandamus and obtained from the lower court a
temporary restraining order stopping U.P. from carrying Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence of
out the order of suspension. In setting aside the TRO due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's
and ordering the lower court to dismiss the student's side of a controversy or a chance seek reconsideration
petition, this Court said: of the action or ruling complained of.27 A party who has
availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot
28
[T]he lower court gravely abused its discretion in tenably claim to have been denied due process.
issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of May
29, 1993. The issuance of the said writ was In this case, private respondent was informed in writing
based on the lower court's finding that the of the charges against her29 and afforded opportunities
implementation of the disciplinary sanction of to refute them. She was asked to submit her written
suspension on Nadal "would work injustice to explanation, which she forwarded on September 25,
the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing 1993.30Private respondent then met with the U.P.
his course, and consequently, in getting a chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee
decent and good paying job." Sadly, such a to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters
ruling considers only the situation of Nadal to the U.P. authorities explaining her position.31
without taking into account the circumstances,
clearly of his own making, which led him into It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she
such a predicament. More importantly, it has was entitled to have an audience before the Board of
completely disregarded the overriding issue of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does
academic freedom which provides more than not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the
ample justification for the imposition of a courts of justice.32 It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules
disciplinary sanction upon an erring student of do not require the attendance of persons whose cases
an institution of higher learning. are included as items on the agenda of the Board of
Regents.33
From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the
lower court should have restrained itself from Nor indeed was private respondent entitled to be
assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed by furnished a copy of the report of the Zafaralla committee
Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful as part of her right to due process. In Ateneo de Manila
cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on University v. Capulong,34 we held:
the part of the petitioner being required. It is of
no avail against an official or government Respondent students may not use the argument
agency whose duty requires the exercise of that since they were not accorded the
discretion or judgment.25 opportunity to see and examine the written
statements which became the basis of
In this case, the trial court dismissed private petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they were
respondent's petition precisely on grounds of academic denied procedural due process. Granting that
freedom but the Court of Appeals reversed holding that they were denied such opportunity, the same
private respondent was denied due process. It said: may not be said to detract from the observance
of due process, for disciplinary cases involving
students need not necessarily include the right

21
 to cross examination. An administrative has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does
proceeding conducted to investigate students' not terminate upon the "graduation" of a student, as the
participation in a hazing activity need not be Court of Appeals held. For it is precisely the "graduation"
clothed with the attributes of a judicial of such a student that is in question. It is noteworthy that
proceeding. . . the investigation of private respondent's case began
before her graduation. If she was able to join the
In this case, in granting the writ of mandamus, the Court graduation ceremonies on April 24, 1993, it was
of Appeals held: because of too many investigations conducted before
the Board of Regents finally decided she should not
First. Petitioner graduated from the U.P. with a have been allowed to graduate.
doctorate degree in Anthropology. After
graduation, the contact between U.P. and Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to
petitioner ceased. Petitioner is no longer within institutions of higher learning, for the constitutional grant
the ambit of the disciplinary powers of the U.P. of academic freedom, to quote again from Garcia
As a graduate, she is entitled to the right and v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
enjoyment of the degree she has earned. To Theology, "is not to be construed in a niggardly manner
recall the degree, after conferment, is not only or in a grudging fashion."
arbitrary, unreasonable, and an act of abuse, but
a flagrant violation of petitioner's right of Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the
enjoyment to intellectual property. highest governing body of the University of the
Philippines.38 It has the power confer degrees upon the
39
Second. Respondents aver that petitioner's recommendation of the University Council. If follows
graduation was a mistake. that if the conferment of a degree is founded on error or
fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject
Unfortunately this "mistake" was arrived at after to the observance of due process, to withdraw what it
almost a year after graduation. Considering that has granted without violating a student's rights. An
the members of the thesis panel, the College institution of higher learning cannot be powerless if it
Faculty Assembly, and the U.P. Council are all discovers that an academic degree it has conferred is
men and women of the highest intellectual not rightfully deserved. Nothing can be more
acumen and integrity, as respondents objectionable than bestowing a university's highest
themselves aver, suspicion is aroused that the academic degree upon an individual who has obtained
alleged "mistake" might not be the cause of the same through fraud or deceit. The pursuit of
withdrawal but some other hidden agenda which academic excellence is the university's concern. It
respondents do not wish to reveal. should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take
measures to protect itself from serious threats to its
integrity.
At any rate, We cannot countenance the plight
the petitioner finds herself enmeshed in as a
consequence of the acts complained of. Justice While it is true that the students are entitled to
and equity demand that this be rectified by the right to pursue their educaiton, the USC as
restoring the degree conferred to her after her an educational institution is also entitled to
compliance with the academic and other related pursue its academic freedom and in the process
requirements. has the concomitant right to see to it that this
freedom is not jeopardized.40
Art. XIV, §5 (2) of the Constitution provides that
"[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions In the case at bar, the Board of Regents determined,
of higher learning." This is nothing new. The 1935 after due investigation conducted by a committee
Constitution35 and the 1973 Constitution36 likewise composed of faculty members from different U.P. units,
provided for the academic freedom or, more precisely, that private respondent committed no less than ninety
for the institutional autonomy of universities and (90) instances of intellectual dishonesty in her
institutions of higher learning. As pointed out by this dissertation. The Board of Regents' decision to withdraw
Court in Garcia vs. Faculty Admission private respondent's doctorate was based on
Committee, Loyola School of Theology,37 it is a freedom documents on record including her admission that she
granted to "institutions of higher learning" which is thus committed the offense.41
given "a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to
the choice of the students." If such institution of higher On the other hand, private respondent was afforded the
learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, opportunity to be heard and explain her side but failed
it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the to refute the charges of plagiarism against her. Her only
honor and distinction of being its graduates. claim is that her responses to the charges against her
were not considered by the Board of Regents before it
Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or rendered its decision. However, this claim was not
distinction was obtained through fraud, a university has proven. Accordingly, we must presume regularity in the
the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it

22
performance of official duties in the absence of proof to ROMEO M. ENRIQUEZ AND DIRECTOR GENERAL
the contrary.42 DIONISIO R. SANTIAGO, Respondents.

Very much the opposite of the position of the Court of DECISION

Appeals that, since private respondent was no longer a
student of the U.P., the latter was no longer within the
"ambit of disciplinary powers of the U.P.," is private
respondent's contention that it is the Student
Disciplinary Tribunal which had jurisdiction over her
case because the charge is dishonesty. Private
respondent invoke §5 of the U.P. Rules and Regulations
on Student Conduct and Discipline which provides:
Jurisdiction. — All cases involving discipline of
students under these rules shall be subject to
the jurisdiction of the student disciplinary
tribunal, except the following cases which shall
fall under the jurisdiction of the appropriate
college or unit;
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court1 filed by IA1 Erwin L.
Magcamit (Magcamit) from the March 17, 2011
decision2 and the August 9, 2011 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 108281. The
CA upheld the March 17, 2009 decision of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) denying Magcamit's appeal
from the May 20, 2008 memorandum of the Internal
Affairs Service of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (JAS-PDEA), which found Magcamit guilty of
grave misconduct and, consequently, recommending
his dismissal from the service.

(a) Violation of college or unit rules and THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

regulations by students of the college, or
In a letter dated April 13, 2008, addressed to Director
(b) Misconduct committed by students of General Dionisio R. Santiago, a person
the college or unit within its classrooms named Delfin gave information about an alleged
or premises or in the course of an official extortion done to his mother by Magcamit and other
activity; PDEA agents. The PDEA agents denied the
irregularities imputed to them and maintained that the
Provided, that regional units of the University letter-complaint was made only to destroy their
shall have original jurisdiction over all cases reputation.
involving students of such units.
On May 5, 2008, Magcamit and his co-agents, namely,
Private respondent argues that under §25 (a) of the said IO3 Carlo Aldeon, IO2 Renato Infante, IO2 Ryan Alfaro,
Rules and Regulations, dishonesty in relation to one's and IO2 Apolinario Mationg, Jr., were formally charged
studies (i.e., plagiarism) may be punished only with with Grave Misconduct for demanding and/or obtaining
suspension for at least one (1) year. P200,000.00 from Luciana M. Jaen (Jaen) in exchange
for her release after she was apprehended in a buy-bust
As the above-quoted provision of §5 of the Rules and operation in Lipa City. After they had submitted their
Regulations indicates, the jurisdiction of the student Answer, their case was submitted for recommendation
disciplinary tribunal extend only to disciplinary actions. and action.
In this case, U.P. does not seek to discipline private
respondent. Indeed, as the appellate court observed, In a memorandum dated May 20, 2008, Special
private respondent is no longer within "the ambit of Investigator V Romeo M. Enriquez (SI V Enriquez) found
disciplinary powers of the U.P." Private respondent Magcamit and his co-agents liable for grave misconduct
cannot even be punished since, as she claims, the and recommended that they be dismissed from the civil
penalty for acts of dishonesty in administrative service. Accordingly, they were dismissed on June 5,
disciplinary proceedings is suspension from the 2008.
University for at least one year. What U.P., through the
Board of Regents, seeks to do is to protect its academic SI V Enriquez gave credence to Jaen’s narration of
integrity by withdrawing from private respondent an events that when she sought help from the team leader
academic degree she obtained through fraud. of the buy-bust team, she was referred to SPO1 Peter
Sistemio (SPO1 Sistemio) as the person who would
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is facilitate her release; that SPO1 Sistemio bluntly
hereby REVERSED and the petition for mandamus is demanded money in exchange; that she had initially
hereby DISMISSED.1âwphi1.nêt offered P50,000.00 but SPO1 Sistemio rejected it
outright; and that, eventually, they agreed on
G.R. No. 198140 P200,000.00.

IA1 ERWIN L. MAGCAMIT, Petitioner, After the agreed monetary consideration was produced,
vs. the PDEA agents allegedly instructed Jaen’s son, Delfin,
INTERNAL AFFAIRS SERVICE - PHILIPPINE DRUG to wait at the ATM machine outside PDEA. Jaen still
ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, as represented by SI V remained in detention after a lapse of several hours.
23
The narration was reinforced by the sworn statements In its March 17, 2011 decision, the CA denied the
dated April 15, 2008 and April 17, 2008, of Compliance petition for review and upheld the March 17, 2009 CSC
Investigator I Dolorsindo M. Paner (CI Paner) who decision.
recalled that IO2 Renato Infante (IO2 Infante) told him
to meet him at the office for an important matter about The CA held that the CSC, in investigating complaints
their operation; and that when IO2 Infante arrived, he against civil servants, is not bound by technical rules of
handed the money to CI Paner who then counted it on procedure and evidence applicable in judicial
the spot. This incident was allegedly captured by a proceedings; that rules of procedure are to be construed
surveillance camera. liberally to promote their objective and to assist the
parties in obtaining a just, speedy, and inexpensive
On July 10, 2008, Magcamit filed his motion for determination of their respective claims and defenses.
reconsideration arguing that the IAS-PDEA committed
errors of law and/or irregularities prejudicial to his The CA found that the CSC correctly appreciated CI
interest; its decision, too, was not supported by the Paner’s sworn statement which described Magcamit’s
evidence on record. link to the extortion. The CA said that apart from his bare
and self-serving claim, Magcamit failed to show that CI
Aside from the procedural lapses Magcamit claimed the Paner was actuated by ill motive or hate in imputing a
IAS-PDEA had committed, he raised the fact that his serious offense to him.
name never came up in the sworn statements
submitted to SI V Enriquez. Moreover, he argued that On August 9, 2011, the CA denied Magcamit’s motion
the application of the "doctrine of implied conspiracy" for reconsideration; hence, the present petition for
was misplaced because the evidence on record did not review on certiorari before this Court.
show any act showing that he participated in the alleged
extortion. THE PETITION

On July 23, 2008, SI V Enriquez denied the motion for Magcamit filed the present petition on the following
reconsideration of Magcamit and his co-agents as they grounds:
had been duly afforded administrative due process and
had been given a fair and reasonable opportunity to
1. his right to due process was denied because
explain their side. He added that the absence of a
gross irregularities attended the administrative
preliminary investigation was not fatal to their case.
investigation conducted by the IAS-PDEA; and
Lastly, he maintained that direct proof is not necessary
to establish conspiracy as long as it is shown that the
parties demonstrate they concur with the criminal design 2. the evidence on record does not support his
and its objective. dismissal.

Magcamit responded by filing a notice of appeal and Magcamit contends that the anonymous letter-complaint
elevating his case to the CSC. of a certain Delfin should not have been given due
course as it was not corroborated by any documentary
or direct evidence and there was no obvious truth to it.
In its March 17, 2009 decision, the CSC denied
Worse, the letter-complaint had no narration of relevant
Magcamit’s appeal and affirmed his dismissal from the
and material facts showing the acts or omission
civil service. It ruled that administrative tribunals
allegedly committed by Magcamit and his co-agents.
exercising quasi-judicial powers – such as the IAS-
Further, the letter-complaint only referred to him as
PDEA – are unfettered by the rigidity of certain
"Erwin" and did not specifically identify him.
procedural requirements especially when due process
has been fundamentally and essentially observed. It
found that Magcamit was positively identified by CI Magcamit claims that he was deprived of his right to
Paner in his sworn statement as the person who seek a formal investigation because the IAS-PDEA
identified the members of the group who received their deliberately failed to inform him of this right.
respective shares from the P200,000.00, thus,
establishing his participation in the extortion. The CSC Magcamit questions how the IAS-PDEA never
noted that Magcamit failed to controvert this allegation presented him with pieces of evidence – specifically CI
against him. Paner’s sworn statement – that were considered against
him. He emphasizes that the CSC and the CA affirmed
Reiterating the grounds he relied upon in his appeal to his dismissal based on an affidavit of complaint
the CSC, Magcamit filed a petition for review under Rule executed by CI Paner on May 7, 2008, that was only
43 with the CA, imputing error on the part of the CSC in attached to the IAS-PDEA’s comment before the CSC.
affirming his dismissal from the service.
As to his alleged participation in the extortion, Magcamit
THE CA DECISION alleges that he never had any discussion with CI Paner
about each agent’s share in the P200,000.00. He
argues that he could not have refuted the allegation
against him since he was not even aware of CI
24
Paner’s sworn statement until the case was brought The cardinal primary rights and principles in
up before the CSC. administrative proceedings that must be respected are
those outlined in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v.
Magcamit claims support for his case after the dismissal Court of Industrial Relations, quoted below:
of the criminal complaint filed against him and his co-
agents. In its June 18, 2010 resolution, the Quezon City
Prosecutor’s Office found the evidence against them
insufficient to prove that they requested or received any
money from Jaen.
Finally, Magcamit maintains that the purported
surveillance video is inadmissible as evidence because
it was not authenticated nor shown to him.
OUR RULING
We GRANT the present petition because Magcamit’s
dismissal was unsupported by substantial evidence.
Although Magcamit assails that the letter-complaint
should not have been entertained to begin with as it was
not in accord with the Revised Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service (RACCS),4 we do not find any
need to dwell on this point. The administrative complaint
was initiated when Jaen and Delfin executed sworn
statements and filed them with the IAS-PDEA. As the
CA correctly pointed out, the letter-complaint did not, by
itself, commence the administrative proceedings against
Magcamit; it merely triggered a fact-finding investigation
by the IAS-PDEA. Accordingly, these sworn statements
– together with the letter-complaint – were used as
pieces of evidence to build a prima facie case for
extortion warranting a formal charge for grave
misconduct.
Administrative determinations of contested cases are by
their nature quasi-judicial; there is no requirement for
strict adherence to technical rules that are observed in
truly judicial proceedings.5 As a rule, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are relaxed in administrative
proceedings in order "to assist the parties in obtaining
just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their
respective claims and defenses."6 By relaxing technical
rules, administrative agencies are, thus, given leeway in
coming up with a decision.
Nonetheless, in deciding disciplinary cases pursuant to
their quasi-judicial powers, administrative agencies
must still comply with the fundamental principle of due
process. Administrative tribunals exercising quasi-
judicial powers are unfettered by the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements, subject to the observance of
fundamental and essential requirements of due process
in justiciable cases presented before them.7
Due process in administrative cases, in essence, is
simply an opportunity to explain one’s side or to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling. For as long as the
parties were given fair and reasonable opportunity to be
heard before judgment was rendered, the demands of
due process were sufficiently met.8
25
9
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a
hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose
the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support its decision.
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it
is a nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence
must be substantial. "Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its
judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts
of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in
all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the
authority conferred upon it.
The first of the enumerated rights pertains to the
substantive rights of a party at the hearing stage of the
proceedings.10
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of
the Ang Tibay requirements are reinforcements of the
right to a hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable
at the deliberative stage, as the decision maker
decides on the evidence presented during the
hearing.11 These standards set forth the guiding
considerations in deliberating on the case and are the
material and substantial components of decision
making.12
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and
substance of the decision of a quasi-judicial body,
further complements the hearing and decision-making
due process rights and is similar in substance to the
constitutional requirement that a decision of a court must
state distinctly the facts and the law upon which it is
based.13
At the hearing stage, while Magcamit was never
afforded a formal investigation, we have consistently
ruled that there is no violation of procedural due process
even if no formal or trial-type hearing was conducted,
where the party was given a chance to explain his side
of the controversy.
required them to submit their respective position papers
on the administrative charge. Notably, both
affidavits never mentioned the name of Magcamit.
SI V Enriquez’s memorandum/decision dated May 20,
2008 – which found Magcamit and his four co-accused
guilty of grave misconduct, and recommended their
dismissal from the service – relied on the affidavits of CI
Paner dated April 15, 2008 and April 17, 2008,
respectively, which it considered to have "reinforced the
allegations" of Jaen and her son, Delfin. CI Paner’s two
affidavits were never shown to Magcamit. At any
rate, CI Paner’s two affidavits, like the affidavits of
Jaen and Delfin, did not mention Magcamit.

Before the IAS-PDEA, Magcamit had the opportunity to
deny and controvert the complaint against him when he
filed his reply to the letter-complaint and his answer to
the formal charge. Dissatisfied with the IAS-PDEA’s
decision, he elevated his case to the CSC which likewise
found him guilty of conspiring with his co-agents,
rendering him liable for gross misconduct. From these
developments, it can hardly be said that the IAS-PDEA
and the CSC denied Magcamit his opportunity to be
heard.
Probably realizing that the April 17, 2008 affidavit of
Jaen, the April 17, 2008 affidavit of Delfin, and the April
15, 2008 and April 17, 2008 affidavits of CI Paner did
not mention the involvement of Magcamit in the
extortion, the CSC’s Resolution No. 090431 dated
March 17, 2009, used as basis another affidavit of CI
Paner (dated May 7, 2008) in affirming the May 20, 2008
decision of the IAS-PDEA. Curiously, the CSC termed
this affidavit as CI Paner’s ‘original affidavit’ although it
was the third affidavit that CI Paner had executed.

In addition, Magcamit was duly represented by counsel The evidence on record shows that CI Paner executed
who could properly apprise him of what he is entitled to three (3) affidavits with different dates,18 relating to the
under law and jurisprudence.1âwphi1 Thus, he cannot manner the members of the PDEA-SES tried to give him
claim that he was deprived of his right to a formal a share of the P200,000.00 they extorted from Jaen. It
hearing because the IAS-PDEA failed to inform him of must be noted, however, that it was only the Affidavit of
such right. Complaint dated May 7, 2008, that linked Magcamit to
the scheme. Curiously, this affidavit was never
With the issue on due process at the hearing stage mentioned, despite being a more complete narration of
resolved, we now move on to discuss the merits of the what transpired, in SI V Enriquez’ recommendation
petition before us. dated May 20, 2008. In fact, the investigating officer
referred only to the affidavits dated April 15, 2008 and
19
Claiming that he was not involved in the extortion, April 17, 2008.
Magcamit argues that the CSC and the CA
misappreciated the facts when they considered the Surprisingly, the CSC ruled that the statements of CI
affidavit of complaint CI Paner executed on May 7, 2008, Paner in his May 7, 2008 affidavit "was never
as substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that controverted by Magcamit" although the latter had not
he conspired with his co-agents. This issue involves a been furnished this document. It was only when
question of fact as there is need for a calibration of the Magcamit requested for certified true copies of the
evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses Comment and the other documents submitted by the
and the existence and the relevancy of specific IAS-PDEA to the CSC that he discovered the existence
surrounding circumstances, their relation to one another of Paner’s May 7, 2008 affidavit.
and to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation.14
As the CSC did, the CA ruled that Magcamit participated
In cases brought before us via a petition for review in the extortion on the basis of Paner’s May 7, 2008
on certiorari, we are limited to the review of errors of alone. Accordingly, it affirmed the CSC’s
15
law. We, however, may review the findings of fact resolution.1âwphi1
when they fail to consider relevant facts that, if properly
taken into account, would justify a different conclusion Under these circumstances, the CA erred in affirming
or when there is serious ground to believe that a the CSC’s dismissal of the respondent on the basis of
possible miscarriage of justice would result.16 Paner’s May 7, 2008 affidavit – a document that was not
part of the proceedings before the IAS-PDEA.
We recall that only the April 17, 2008 affidavit of Jaen
and the April 17, 2008 affidavit of Delfin were attached Given how the evidence against him came out, we find
to the formal charge for grave misconduct against that Magcamit could not have adequately and fully
Magcamit and four (4)17 other members of the PDEA‒ disputed the allegations against him since during the
Special Enforcement Service (SES). This formal charge administrative investigation he was not properly

26
apprised of all the evidence against him. We point out
that Magcamit could not have refuted the May 7, 2008
affidavit of Paner, which was the sole basis of the CSC’s
and the CA’s finding of Magcamit’s liability; notably, the
formal charge requiring him and his co-accused to file
their position papers was dated May 5, 2008. Corollarily,
Magcamit and his co-agents were not even furnished a
copy of the affidavits of CI Paner dated April 15, 2008
and April 17, 2008 before the recommendation for
dismissal came out. Magcamit was thus blindsided and
forced to deal with pieces of evidence he did not even
know existed.
Thus, the requirement that "[t]he decision must be
rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing,
or at least contained in the record AND disclosed to
the parties affected," was not complied with. Magcamit
was not properly apprised of the evidence presented
against him, which evidence were eventually made the
bases of the decision finding him guilty of grave
misconduct and recommending his dismissal.
Although, in the past, we have held that the right to due
process of a respondent in an administrative case is not
violated if he filed a motion for reconsideration to refute
the evidence against him, the present case should be
carefully examined for purposes of the application of this
rule. Here, the evidence of Magcamit’s participation was
made available to him only after he had elevated the
case to the CSC. Prior to that, or when the IAS-PDEA
came up with the decision finding him guilty of gross
misconduct, there was no substantial evidence proving
Magcamit was even involved.
We consider, too, that even if we take into account CI
Paner’s May 7, 2008 affidavit, we find this document to
be inadequate to hold – even by standards of substantial
evidence – that Magcamit participated in the PDEA’s
extortion activities.
We note that the CSC and the CA linked Magcamit to
the alleged extortion in paragraph 13 of CI Paner' s May LABRADOR, J.:
7, 2008 affidavit of complaint, which reads:
13. That pretending nothing had happened and yet
projecting to the group that I am a bit apprehensive as
to the evident inequality in the sharing of the extorted
money from subject Jaen, I was able to talk with Agent
Erwin Magcamit, one of the members of the arresting
team, and asked the latter as to how the group came up
with the Php21,500.00 sharing for each member out of
the Php200,000.00; from which Agent Magcamit simply
said to me that such was the sharing and everybody
except me seemed to have consented; in addition
thereto, Agent Magcamit vividly mentioned all other
members who got their share of the Php21,500.00,
namely, [1] Carlo S. Aldeon, [2] P03 Emerson
Adaviles, [3], P02 Reywin Bariuad, [4] 102 Renato
Infante, [S] 102 Apolinario Mationg, [6] 102 Ryan
Alfaro, and [7] P03 Peter Sistemio.20
27
We discern no showing from this allegation that
Magcamit extorted money from Jaen, or that he was
among those who took part in the division of the money
allegedly extorted from Jaen. For conspiracy to exist, it
must be proven or at least inferred from the acts of the
alleged perpetrator before, during, and after the
commission of the crime. It cannot simply be surmised
that conspiracy existed because Magcamit was part of
the team that took part in the buy-bust operation which
resulted in Jaen's arrest. In other words, respondents
failed to pinpoint Magcamit's participation in the
extortion that would make him administratively liable.
After evaluating the totality of evidence on record, we
find that the records are bereft of substantial evidence
to support the conclusion that Magcamit should be held
administratively liable for grave misconduct; Magcamit
was dismissed from the service based on evidence that
had not been disclosed to him. By affirming this
dismissal, the CA committed a grave reversible error.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the
present petition.1avvphi1 The March 17, 2011 decision
and the August 9, 2011 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 108281 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency is ORDERED to reinstate
IA1 Erwin L. Magcamit to his previous position without
loss of seniority rights and with full payment of his
salaries, backwages, and benefits from the time of his
dismissal from the service up to his reinstatement.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-5948 April 29, 1953
FORTUNATO F. HALILI, petitioner,
vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION and CAM TRANSIT
CO., INC., respondents.
This is petition for writ of certiorari seeking the
revocation and annulment of an order dated July 3,
1952, of the respondent Public Service Commission
issued in cases Nos. 36450 and 36855, changing part
of the route of the bus service established by the
respondent CAM Transit Co., Inc., between Balara and
City Hall, Manila. Petitioner herein is the holder of
various certificates of public convenience to operate
auto-truck services between Balara and various points
in the city of Manila and its suburbs. Some were granted
previous to the last war. The last one was granted in a
decision of the respondent Commission in case No.
52272 dated February 13, 1951. The route fixed in
petitioner's certificate of public convenience for
Sañgandaan-Balara, Pandacan-Balara, Bonifacio
Monument-Balara, and Balara-Piers pass through
Silañgan Avenue and end at Balara. Respondent CAM
Transit Co., Inc., also holds a certificate of public
convenience to operate a line of trucks between Balara
and City Hall, Manila. This certificate was obtained by it
through assignment, with the approval of the Public
Service Commission, from Benjamin Encarnacion. One
of the original lines granted to Benjamin Encarnacion.
now operated by the respondent CAM Transit Co., Inc.,
is the Balara-City Hall (Manila), via Kamuning line,
starting at Balara fifter plant, passing through Barangka
road, Marikina-San Juan road, Highway 54, Kamuning
road, etc. (Appendix C.)
On July 2, 1952, CAM Transit Co., Inc., filed a petition
with the respondent Commission, alleging that the route
authorized in its City Hall (Manila)-Balara line, and
passing along the Marikina-Barangka road, Marikina-
San Juan road, and Highway 54, is entirely different
from that supported by the evidence presented in the
hearing, and praying that the certificate be amended so
that the route authorized should be along Highway 54,
Silañgan Avenue, U.P. site, ending at Balara, instead of
Highway 54, Marikina San Juan road, Barangka road,
ending at Balara. Acting upon this petition, the
respondent Commission on the following day, July 3,
1952, and without a previous notice to the petitioner or
a previous hearing thereon, ordered the modification of
the line in accordance with the petition.
The question now squarely presented to us for decision
is whether the order for each amendment if the route,
without notice to the petitioner and other interested
parties, or hearing in which the latter may be given
opportunity to be present, was lawfully and validly
issued by the Commission. It will be noted that the
Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 146)
expressly defines the powers of the respondent
Commission which may be exercised by it "upon proper
notice and hearing," or without previous hearing.
(Section 16 and 17.) The act of the Commission in
issuing the order of July 3, 1952, does not fall under any
of the powers enumerated in the above sections of the
law, and consequently the question at issue must be
resolved in accordance with fundamental principles of
law and justice.
A cursory perusal of the existing routes between the
Balara Filter and the Kamuning Avenue, or the
University of the Philippines and Kamuning Avenue (see
Annex A),which route are the subject of controversy,
readily discloses that the change or amendment ordered
by the respondent Commission in the route of
respondent operator is one of substance, not nominal or
innocent change. It does not seem to us to be a
correction a mere clerical, innocent mistake or error. To
us the grant of the route along the Barangka and the
Marikina roads to respondent operator was for the
purpose of giving service to people living along these
roads and at Balara. On the other hand, petitioner herein
Halili, then oppositor to the application of respondent
operator's predecessor in interest, was already given
the University of the Philippines, Silañgan Avenue, to
Kamuning line, to serve students of the University and
people living along this route. Inasmuch as the terminal
of respondent operator's line is Balara, not the
University, it could not have been the purpose and
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intention of the original certificate issued to allow it to
serve students of the University of the Philippines. The
supposed justification for the issuance of the disputed
order therefore, is not borne out by the original decision
granting the certificate of respondent operator's
predecessor.
But assuming, for the sake of argument, that the
respondent Commission committed an error, in the
appreciation of the supposed evidence offered (which
was not mentioned), it appears that the change in the
route authorized in the order clearly affects the right and
privilege granted the petitioner in his certificate of public
convenience to pass from Kamuning road through
Silañgan Avenue, to the University of the Philippines,
who without a change in the respondent operator's line,
could not ride in the latter's buses because these
operate only up to Balara, without reaching the
University of the Philippines,and pass only through
Barangka and Marikina roads. The amendment ,
therefore of the respondent operator's lines affect the
rights granted and guaranteed by the certificate of public
convenience of the petitioner. To allow the respondent
Commission to authorize the amendment, without giving
the petitioner opportunity to be heard and express his
objections thereto, is clearly a deprivation of a precious
right and privilege without due process of law.
Respondent operator cites the decisions of this Court in
the case of Ablaza Transportation Co., Inc., vs.
Feliciano Ocampo,1 et al., G.R. No. L-3563, and the
case of Eliseo Silva vs. Hon. Feliciano Ocampo,2et
al., G.R. No. L-5162, which decisions hold that the
Commission may issue provisional permits without
hearing for new services, and argues that if this can be
done, with more reason may the said Commission be
authorized to correct errors that it has committed; that
the Commission is not bound in matters of procedure by
technical rules established for judicial proceedings, etc.
In the first place, the power to issues provisional permits
is expressly authorized. In the second place, the change
ordered is not provisional merely, like that granted in a
provisional permit, but final and permanent in character.
In the third place, even if the Commission is not bound
by the rules in judicial proceedings, it must bow its head
to he constitutional mandate that no person shall be
deprived of a right without due process of law. The "due
process of law" clause of the Constitution binds not only
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, but
also each and everyone of its branches, agencies, etc.
(16 C.J.S., 1149.)"Due process of law, or, in the mean
accord with the procedure outlines in the law, or, in the
absence of express procedure, under such safeguards
for the protection of individual rights as the settled
maxims of law permit and sanction for the particular
class of cases to which the one in question belongs," (16
C.J.S., 1141.) In the case at bar, the Public Service Act
does not included the amendment made in the disputed
order among those may be ordered without notice or
hearing in accordance with Section 17 of the Act. Is the
amendment, without notice or hearing, permitted by the
well settled maxims of law? We declare it is not,
because due process of law guarantees notice and
opportunity to be heard to persons who would be affectd
by the order or act contemplated.

In a General sense it means the right to be heard

before some tribunal having jurisdiction to
determine the question in dispute.(Albin vs.
Consolidated School District No. 14 of
Richardson Country, 184 NW 141, 106 Neb.
719, cited in 16 C.J. S., 1143, footnote.)

By "due process of law" is meant orderly

proceeding adopted to the nature of the case,
before a tribunal having jurisdiction, which
proceeds upon notice, with an opportunity to bee
heard, with full power to grant relief. (Footnotes),
16 C.J.S., 1144.)

Some legal procedure in which the person

proceeded against, if he is to be concluded
thereby, shall have an opportunity to defend
himself. (Doyle, Petitioner, 16 R.I., 537, 538, 21
Am. Jur., 759,5 L.R.A., 309, cited in 12 C.J.,
1193.)

A course of proceeding according to these rules

and principles which have been established in
our system of jurisprudence for the protection
and enforcement of private rights. (12 C.J.,
1191-1192.)

We, therefore, hold that the amendment authorized by

the order of the respondent Commission of July 3,1952,
is not authorized by the facts contained in the decision
granting the certificate of public convenience in favor of
the predecessor in interest of the respondent operator,
and that even if there was really an error in the original
decision fixing the route , in that the said routes were not
in accordance with the evidence submitted, the
issuance of the order without proper notice to the
petitioner and opportunity on the part of the latter to be
heard in relation to the petition, is a violation of the
petitioner's right not be deprived of his property without
due process of law.

The order of July 3, 1952, is hereby declared null and

void and ordered revoked, with costs against the
respondent CAM Transit Co., Inc.

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