Epza vs CHR

Issue: Does the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violators
of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of?
Held: The CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body. The constitutional provision directing the
CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have
been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so.
"Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication. Not being a court of
justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by
the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or
of the Supreme Court.

Fabella vs Ca
Issue: whether private respondents were denied due process of law.
Held: We agree with the Court of Appeals that private respondents were denied due process of law. In
administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or
constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real
opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's
favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a
person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said
tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in
the records or made known to the parties affected. In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS
to hear the administrative charges against private respondents did not include "a representative of the local or, in
its absence, any existing provincial or national teacher's organization" as required by Section 9 of RA 4670.
Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken
by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private
respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers' organization in these committees was indispensable
to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right
to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic
requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.

First Lepanto Ceramics vs CA

Issue: Brought to fore in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction is the
novel question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the Board of Investments (BOI) should be
filed.
Held: Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of the BOI should be brought
pertains only to procedure or the method of enforcing the substantive right to appeal granted by E.O. 226. In other
words, the right to appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be
respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of this agency to respondent Court
of Appeals and provided a different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an incursion
into the substantive right to appeal. The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasi-judicial agencies
found in the third sentence of Section 1 of Circular 1-91 does not mean that said circular does not apply to appeals
from final orders or decision of the BOI. Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O.
226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned.
Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme
Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.
Var Orient Shipping vs Achocoso
Issue: they were denied due process of law because the respondent Administrator resolved the case without any
formal hearing

Held: The petition is not meritorious.

The petitioners' allegation that the issuance of the writ of execution was premature because the decision had not
been received by their counsel is unconvincing, Atty. Figura's affidavit on the matter is self-serving. Petitioners
failed to submit an affidavit of the receptionist Marlyn Aquino explaining what she did with the decision which she
received for Atty. Figura. Under the circumstances, the respondent Administrator's ruling that the decision had
been properly served on petitioners' counsel and that it is now final and unappealable, should be sustained.

Equally unmeritorious is the petitioners 'allegation that they were denied due process because the decision was
rendered without a formal hearing. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard (Bermejo vs.
Banjos, 31 SCRA 764), or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side
(Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, 110 SCRA 438; Gas Corporation of the Phil. vs. Hon. Inciong, 93 SCRA 653; Cebu
Institute of Technology vs. Minister of Labor, 113 SCRA 257), or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of (Dormitorio vs. Fernandez, 72 SCRA 388).

Pal vs NLRC

Issue: First, whether the individual private respondents are regular employees of PAL. Second, whether
petitioner is liable to them for separation pay. The resolution of the first issue involves a determination of
(1) whether petitioner was a labor-only contractor; and (2) whether the individual private respondents
became regular employees of PAL because they were allowed to continue working for petitioner after the
expiration of the service contract.

Held: Answer # 2: Respondent NLRC found that petitioner was the individual private respondents'
employer, based primarily on the continued engagement of the employees after the expiration of the
service contract. It ruled: 21

Our taking cognizance of the fact that PAL, despite the expiration of its contract with
Stellar on December 31, 1990 continued with the service of some of the complainants "as
late as 1991", should have been enough notice for them to refute this fact come [the] . . .
motion for reconsideration.

But again, perusing PAL's motion for reconsideration, we note that . . . it never refuted the finding below
that it continued employing the complainants after its service contract with Stellar expired. We thus
cannot but hold on to our view that PAL should be answerable to the separation pay awarded below not
only for its engaging in a labor-only contract with Stellar but more importantly for its continued
employment of complainants after its service contract with Stellar (the argued employer of complainants)
expired.

Padilla vs Sto. Tomas

Issue: Petitioner contends that his constitutional right to due process was violated

Held: The essence of due process is that a party be afforded reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit
any evidence he may have in support of his defense. 10 In administrative proceedings such as the one at bench,
due process simply means the opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. 11 In the instant case, petitioner does not deny the fact that he was furnished a copy
of the charges against him wherein he was required to file an answer and to state whether he wanted a formal
investigation. Petitioner did file his answer. As to the scheduled hearing on April 20, 1989, petitioner admits that he
was notified. The fact that he filed a motion for postponement did not necessarily mean that his motion was granted,
hence, the scheduled hearing proceeded ex-parte. Consequently, a decision was rendered by the AAB-DOTC.
From said decision, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, on account of the liberality of the AAB-
DOTC, he was heard and was allowed to present his evidence. His motion for reconsideration having been denied,
he filed an appeal with the MSPB and, later on, a motion for reconsideration. Not satisfied, he again filed an appeal
with respondent CSC and, later on a motion for reconsideration. Clearly therefore, petitioner was given ample
opportunity to present his case. He was not denied his right to due process. One may be heard, not only by verbal
presentation but also, sometimes more eloquently, through pleadings. 12 "Due process is not semper et
ubiquejudicial process." 13 Hence, a formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all times, necessary. So long as a party is
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain his side, the requirement of due process is complied with.

Well-settled is the rule that where findings of an administrative body which has acquired expertise because its
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are amply supported by substantial evidence, such findings are accorded
not only respect but also finality.

University of the Phil Board of Regents vs CA

Issue: whether there was due process on respondent?

Held: Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's
side of a controversy or a chance seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.27 A party who has
availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process.28

In this case, private respondent was informed in writing of the charges against her29 and afforded opportunities to
refute them. She was asked to submit her written explanation, which she forwarded on September 25,
1993.30Private respondent then met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to
discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position.31

It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before the Board of
Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the
courts of justice.32 It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose cases are
included as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents.

Fortich vs Corona

Issue:

(1) The proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for review directly with the Court of
Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court;

(2) The petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution before filing the
present petition; and

(3) Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.

Held: