01 - Religious Affairs v.

Bayot (1955) (advertisement) Doctrines:

• Law is a profession and not a trade.

• Section 25 of Rule 127 provides that “the practice of soliciting cases at law for purpose of gain, either
personally or thru paid agents of brokers, constitutes malpractice.”

Facts:

Attorney Estanislao Bayot is charged with malpractice for publishing an advertisement in the
Sunday Tribune on June 13, 2943. It states that he provides the service of securing marriage licenses and
performing marriage ceremonies. Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance & the
annoyance of delay publicity avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to wishes of parties.
Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105

Tel. 2-41-60.

Initially, he appeared in his own behalf and denied having the advertisement published.
Subsequently, he admitted, through his attorney, that he caused its publication. He asked for “the
indulgence and mercy” of the Court, promising “not to repeat such professional misconduct in the
future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of the law profession.” He added that it was only
published once and that he never had any case by reason of the advertisement.

Issues:

1. W/N the advertisement is a violation of legal ethics.

Held/Ratio:

YES. Section 25 of Rule 127 provides that “the practice of soliciting cases at law for purpose of
gain, either personally or thru paid agents of brokers, constitutes malpractice.” It is highly unethical for
an attorney to advertise his talents as a merchant advertises his wares. By advertising his services, the
lawyer degrades himself and his profession. “The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even
for a young lawyer, ... is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct.” (Canon 27,
Code of Ethics.)

In the Tagorda case, the attorney involved repeatedly made solicitations. As a result, he was
suspended from the practice of law. This case is less serious in nature. Considering Bayot”s plea
for leniency and his promise to not repeat his actions, the Court merely reprimanded Bayot.
03 - Ledesma v. Climaco (1974)

Doctrines:

• Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. The law is dedicated to the
ideal of service and not a mere trade.

Facts:

Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros
Occidental. He was also the counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala
of Judge Climaco. Because of his appointment, he filed a motion to withdraw as counsel de
parte. Judge Climaco denied Ledesma”s motion. Further, Judge Climaco appointed Ledesma as
counsel de oficio for the two defendants in the case. Ledesma then filed an urgent motion to be
allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Comelec to require full
time service. Judge Climaco denied this as well.

Issues:

1. W/N Ledesma should be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio?

Held/Ratio:

NO. Judge Climaco, in denying the urgent motion of Ledesma, said that when Ledesma
assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2 when trial
would resume. The case dragged on for almost a year because of the postponements obtained
by the defense. Judge Climaco noted that there was no incompatibility between the duty of
Ledesma to the accused and to the court and the performance of his task as an election registrar
of the Comelec and that the ends of justice would be served by allowing and requiring Ledesma
to continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution has already rested its case.

The SC held that Ledesma was less than duly mindful of his obligation as counsel de
oficio. Ledesma ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. It could be that for some lawyers being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome
chore. But for lawyers of repute and of eminence welcome such appointments. The law is
indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. Hence, a high degree
of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. The fact that a lawyers” services are
rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the
contrary.

A lawyer has an indispensable role in the defense of an accused in a criminal case. Such
should be enough to disallow Ledesma from withdrawing. Though Ledesma is an election
registrar, there is not likely an exorbitant demand on his time now. The SC said that Ledesma
should now exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with competence, if
not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the profession in
good standing.
 04 - Jesus Ma. Cui v. Antonio Ma. Cui, Romulo Cui (1964)

Doctrine:

• A Bachelor”s degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic
requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of
“abogado” is lawyer or attorneyat-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference
to that class of persons who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and
defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a
consequence.

Facts:

The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña
Benigna Cui (deceased) “for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated
and helpless persons.” It acquired corporate existence by Act No. 3239 and endowed with extensive
properties by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the deed of donation. When the
spouses died, administration eventually passed to Dr. Teodoro Cui.

Section 2 of the Act (in Spanish) gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case
of their incapacity or death, to “such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed
to them.”

Jesus Ma. Cui and Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the
nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui. Incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui,
resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a “convenio” entered into between them and embodied
in a notarial document. The next day, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had
no prior notice of either the “convenio” or of his brother”s assumption of the position.

When Dr. Teodoro Cui died, the plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant demanding that the
office be turned over to him. When it was not complied with, he filed the complaint in this case. Romulo
Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one
of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.

As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the
position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances would be
preferred pursuant to section 2. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed of donation
provides for a lawyer. If not a lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a
pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those
otherwise qualified.

The specific point in dispute is the meaning of the term “titulo de abogado.” Jesus Ma. Cui holds
the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas but is not a member of the Bar, not
having passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of
the Bar and although disbarred by this Court, was reinstated by resolution, about two weeks before he
assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio de Barili.
Issue:

1. W/N Jesus Ma. Chui is entitled to the office of administrator.

Held/Ratio:

NO. The term “titulo de abogado” means not mere possession of the academic degree of
Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of
law. In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the
Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the
lawyer”s oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his license to
practice the profession. For this purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable:
completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way.

The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have intended for an actual lawyer
because under Act No. 3239 the duties of the managers or trustees of the Hospicio do work that requires,
it is to be presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a
distinct asset.

Although the latter is a member of the Bar he is nevertheless disqualified by virtue of paragraph
3 of the deed of donation, which provides that the administrator may be removed on the ground of
ineptitude in the discharge of his office or lack of evident sound moral character. As far as moral character
is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement to the office of attorney cannot be less
exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is
disputed in this case. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and
disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.

As for the claim of intervenor, Romulo Cui, he is also a lawyer, grandson of Vicente Cui, one of
the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed of donation. He is further, in
the line of succession, than Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said
nephews. The intervenor contends that the intention of the founders was to confer the administration by
line and successively to the descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they are named.
Since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, the next
administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the intervenor belongs. This
interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation.

NOTE: The deed of donation provides: “a la muerte o incapacidad de estos administradores

(those appointed in the deed itself) pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que
descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente
Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado ... En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de
mas edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administration.” Besides being a nearer descendant
than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and therefore is preferred when the circumstances are
otherwise equal.
 VILLEGAS VS LEGASPI

This case is a consolidation of two cases involving the issue of whether or not a member of Congress
may appear before the regular courts as counsel for ordinary litigants.

Case 1

In September 1979, Raul Villegas filed a civil case against spouses Vera Cruz et al before the Court of
First Instance (CFI) Cebu. The Vera Cruz spouses filed their answer to the complaint and they were
represented by Valentino Legaspi, then a member of the Batasang Pambansa. Villegas then challenged
the representation made by Legaspi as counsel for the spouses on the ground that it is unconstitutional;
as pointed out by Villegas “no member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any
court without appellate jurisdiction”. The presiding judge however overruled Villegas’ challenged and
proceeded with the trial. The judge said that CFIs have appellate jurisdiction.

Case 2

In July 1979, Edgardo Reyes filed a civil case against N. V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken Excelsior-De
Maas, a corporation, before CFI Rizal. Estanisalo Fernandez appeared as counsel for the corporation.
Reyes questions the appearance of Fernandez as counsel for the corporation on the same ground
invoked in Case 1 because Fernandez is also a member of the Batasang Pambansa.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said members, Estanislao Fernandez and Valentino Legaspi, of the Batasang
Pambansa may appear as counsels before the said CFIs.

HELD: No. Members of Congress are prohibited to appear as counsel berfore CFI’s acting in their original
jurisdiction. CFI’s have dual personalities. They can be courts of general original jurisdiction (courts of
origin) or appellate courts depending on the case that they took cognizance of. In the cases at bar, CFI
Cebu and CFI Rizal acted as a courts of general original jurisdiction. Both cases were not elevated to the
said CFIs from any lower courts. Thus, the CFIs in the case at bar are “courts without appellate
jurisdiction”.

NOTE: Under Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:

No Senator or member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any
court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise
or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office.
He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

Appearance of the legislator is now barred before all courts of justice, regardless of rank, composition,
or jurisdiction. The disqualification also applies to the revived Electoral Tribunal and to all administrative
bodies, like the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission.
Courts martial and military tribunals, being administrative agencies, are included.
[ GR No. L-12817, Apr 29, 1960 ]

JULIO D. ENRIQUEZ v. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ +

DECISION

107 Phil. 932

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition filed under the provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 2 (c) of
Commonwealth Act No. 327 for a review of a decision of the Auditor General dated 24 June 1957.
On 18 June 1955 Republic Act No. 1383 creating the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority as a
public corporation and vesting in it the ownership, jurisdiction, supervision and control over all territory
embraced by the Metropolitan Water District as well as all areas served by existing government-owned
waterworks and sewerage and drainage systems within the boundaries of cities, municipalities, and
municipal districts in the Philippines, and those served by the Waterworks and Wells and Drills Section of
the Bureau of Public Works, was passed. On 19 September 1955 the President of the Philippines
promulgated Executive Order No. 127 providing, among others, for the transfer to the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority of all the records, properties, machinery, equipment, appropriations,
assets, choses in actions, liabilities, obligations, notes, bonds and all indebtedness of all government-
owned waterworks and sewerage systems in the provinces, cities, municipalities and municipal districts
(51 Off. Gaz. 4415-4417). On 31 March 1956 the municipal council of Bauan, Batangas, adopted and
passed Resolution No. 152 stating "that it is the desire of this municipality in this present administration
not to submit our local Waterworks to the provisions of the said Republic Act No. 1383." (Annex A.) On 20
April 1956 the municipal mayor transmitted a copy of Resolution No. 152 to the Provincial Fiscal through
the Provincial Board requesting him to render an opinion on the matter treated therein and to inform the
municipal council whether he would handle and prosecute its case in court should the council decide to
question and test judicially the legality of Republic Act No. 1383 and to prevent the National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority from exercising its authority over the waterworks system of the municipality
(Annex B). On 2 May 1956 the provincial fiscal rendered an opinion holding that Republic Act No. 1383 is
valid and constitutional and declined to represent the municipality of Bauan in an action to be brought
against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority to test the validity and constitutionality of the
Act creating it (Annex C). On 26 May 1956 the municipal council adopted and passed Resolution No. 201
authorizing the municipal mayor to take steps to commence an action or proceedings in court to challenge
the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 and to engage the services of a special counsel, and
appropriating the sum, of P2,000 to defray the expenses of litigation and attorney's fees (Annex D). On 2
June 1956 the municipal mayor wrote a letter to the petitioner engaging his services as counsel for the
municipality in its contemplated action against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Annex
F.) On 27 June 1956 the Provincial Board of Batangas adopted and passed Resolution No. 1829 approving
Resolution No. 201 of the municipal council of Bauan (Annex E). On 28 June 1956 the petitioner wrote to
the municipal mayor accepting his offer in behalf of the municipality under the following terms and
conditions: that his professional services shall commence from the filing of the complaint up to and
including the appeal, if any, to the appellate courts; that his professional fee shall be P1,500 and payable
as follows: P500 upon the filing of the complaint, P500 upon the termination of the hearing of the case in
the Court of First Instance, and P500 after judgment shall have become final or, should the judgment be
appealed, after the appeal shall have been submitted for judgment to the appellate court; and that the
municipality shall defray all reasonable and necessary expenses for the prosecution of the case in the trial
and appellate courts including court and sheriff fees, transportation and, subsistence of counsel and
witnesses and cost of transcripts of stenographic notes and other documents (Annex G). On the same
date, 28 June 1956, the petitioner filed the necessary complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas
(civil No. 542, Annex I). On 9 July 1956 the municipal mayor wrote to the petitioner agreeing to the terms
and conditions set forth in his (the petitioner's) letter of 28 June 1956 (Annex H). On 16 July 1956 the
defendant filed its answer to the complaint (Annex J). On 24 July 1956 the petitioner wrote a letter to the
municipal treasurer requesting reimbursement of the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee
and payment of the sum of P500 as initial attorney's fee. Attached to the letter were the pertinent
supporting papers (Annex K). The municipal treasurer forwarded the petitioner's claim letter and
enclosures to the Auditor General through channels for pre-audit. On 24 June 1957 the Auditor General
disallowed in audit the petitioner's claim for initial attorney's fees in the sum of P500, based upon an
opinion rendered on 10 May 1957 by the Secretary of Justice who held that the Provincial Fiscal was not
disqualified to handle and prosecute in court the case of the municipality of Bauan and that its municipal
council had no authority to engage the services of a special counsel (Annex L), but offered no objection to
the refund to the petitioner of the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee (Annex M). On 15
August 1957 the petitioner received notice of the decision of the Auditor General and on 11 September
1957 he filed with the Auditor General a notice of appeal from his decision under section 4, Rule 45, of the
Rules of Court (Annex N). On 13 September 1957 the petitioner filed this petition for review in this Court.
The Revised Administrative Code provides:
SEC. 2241. Submission of questions to provincial fiscal. When the council is desirous of securing a legal
opinion upon any question relative to its own powers or the constitution or attributes of the municipal
government, it shall frame such question in writing and submit the same to the provincial fiscal' for
decision.
SEC 1682. Duty of fiscal as legal adviser of province and provincial subdivisions. The provincial fiscal
shall be the legal adviser of the provincial government and its officers, including: district health officers,
and of the mayor and council of the various municipalities and municipal districts of the province. As such
he shall, when so requested, submit his opinion in writing upon any legal question submitted to him by
any such officer or body pertinent to the duties thereof.
SEC. 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation. The provincial
fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except
in cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or
municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other
municipality or municipal district in the same province. When the interests of a provincial government
and of any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.
When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a
province, a special attorney may be employed by its council.
Under the foregoing provisions of law, the Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor and counsel
of the various municipalities of a province and it is his duty to represent the municipality in any court
except when he is disqualified by law. When he is disqualified to represent the municipality, the municipal
council may engage the services of a special attorney. The Provincial Fiscal is disqualified to represent in
court the municipality if and when original jurisdiction of the case involving the municipality is vested in
the Supreme Court; when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some
other municipality in the same province ;[1] and when in the case involving the municipality, he, or his
wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise. [2] The fact that the Provincial
Fiscal in the case at bar was of the opinion that Republic Act No. 1383 was valid and constitutional, and,
therefore, would not be in a position to prosecute the case of the municipality with earnestness and vigor,
could not justify the act of the municipal council in engaging the services of a special counsel. Bias of
prejudice and animosity or hostility on the part of a fiscal not based on any of the conditions enumerated
in the law and the Rules of Court do not constitute a legal and valid excuse for inhibition or
disqualification.[3]And unlike a practising lawyer who has the right to decline employment, [4] a fiscal
cannot refuse the performance of his functions on grounds not provided for by law without violating his
oath of office, where he swore, among others, "that he will well and faithfully discharge to the best of his
ability the duties of the office or position upon which he is about to enter * * *." [5] Instead of engaging the
services of a special attorney, the municipal council should have requested the Secretary of Justice to
appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who had declined to handle and
prosecute its case in court, pursuant to section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code. The petitioner
claims that the municipal council could not do this because the Secretary of Justice, who has executive
supervision over the Government Corporate Counsel, who represented the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority in (the case filed against it by the municipality of Bauan (civil No. 542, Annex J) and
direct supervision and control over the Provincial Fiscal, would be placed in an awkward and absurd
position of having control of both sides of the controversy. The petitioner's contention is untenable.
Section 83 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 94, series of 1947 and
further amended by Executive Order No. 392, series of 1950, 46 Off. Gaz., 5913, 5911, provides that the
Secretary of Justice shall have executive supervisionover the Government Corporate Counsel
and supervision and control over Provincial Fiscals. In Mondano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil., 143; 51 Off. Gaz.,
2884, 2888, this Court distinguished supervision from control as follows:
* * * In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take
such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand,
means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.* * *
The fact that the Secretary of Justice had, on several occasions, upheld the validity and constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 1383 does not exempt the municipal council of Bauan from requesting the Secretary of
Justice to detail a provincial fiscal to prosecute its case.
The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and mayor without authority
of law, the Auditor General was correct in disallowing in audit the petitioner's claim for payment of
attorney's fees.
The decision under review is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.
SALCEDO VS. HERNANDEZ

In 1935, Atty. Vicente Francisco was the counsel for Felipe Salcedo in a case entitled Felipe
Salcedo vs Francisco Hernandez. Salcedo lost in that case and Atty. Francisco filed a Motion
for Reconsideration.
The trial court however ordered Atty. Francisco to explain why he should not be disciplined.
It appears that in the Motion filed by Atty. Francisco, he expressed his disagreement with the
judgment by stating that the judgment is “absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to
the right of [Salcedo]” and “a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the
Municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas” – (so this could be an election case); that the court should
rectify itself or else the voters in Tiaong might “resort to the press publicly to denounce… the
judicial outrage” and that if uncorrected, the judgment will lead to the “increase [of] the
proselytes (new converts) of “sakdalism” and make the public lose confidence in the
administration of justice.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. He is guilty of contempt. A lawyer owes respect to the courts. A lawyer is duty
bound to uphold the court’s dignity and authority and to defend its integrity. The language
used by Atty. Francisco is uncalled for and unjustified. In order to appeal to reason and
justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats. Even if assuming
that the trial court did err in its judgment, Atty. Francisco should still use temperate and
respectful language in advancing the cause of his client.
His insinuations that the voters in Tiaong, Tayabas might resort to sakdalism (a seditious
movement) is a suggestion to the people there of what they should do should his client not
get a favorable judgment. This is a veiled threat to the courts. It promotes distrust to the
courts.
It is laudable for Atty. Francisco to defend his client with all fervor and energy but he must do
so with respect to the dignity of the courts. The lawyer was fined and reprimanded.
Note: Justice Malcolm dissented; Atty. Francisco is protected by Freedom of Speech.
05 - Alawi v. Alauya (1997) (attorney v. counsellor)

Doctrines:

• The term “attorney” is reserved for those who pass the Philippine Bar. It cannot be used by those who
only took and passed the Shari”a Bar.

• Public officials and employees must, at all times, respect the rights of others and refrain from doing
any acts contrary to law, good morals, public policy, good customs, and public order.

Facts:

Alawi and Alauya were high school classmates and were friends. However, Alauya, the Executive
Clerk of Court from the 4th District Shari”a District of Marawi City alleged that Alawi obtained his
signature on a blank piece of paper through fraud and gross misrepresentation. He alleges that Alawi
used this to make it look as if he was buying a house from Villarosa & Co., where Alawi worked as a real
estate sales agent. Moreover, because of that same transaction, Alauya was able to receive a loan from
the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, also without his consent. Because of this, he sent
strongly-worded letters to the president and VP of Villarosa, as well as to the NHMFC, detailing in
acerbic language Alawi”s supposed fraudulent and deceitful acts. One of the letters, though sent by
mail, did not have any postage stamp. Instead, the phrase “Free Postage — PD 26” was typewritten in
the upper right corner. In all of these letters, Alauya referred to himself as “Attorney Ashary M. Alauya.”

Because of the letters, Alawi filed a complaint against Alauya before the SC, alleging that he
imputed malicious and libelous charges against her w/ no solid ground, that he used the franking
privilege given to the judiciary without authority, and that he usurped the title “attorney”. According to
Alauya, his reactions were merely normal from someone who was distraught and has been victimized of
fraud. He says that the word “Attorney” is synonymous with “Counsellorat-law” or “Counsellor”, which
is the title reserved for those who pass the Shari”a Bar. Alauya says that he prefers “attorney” because
most mistake “counselor” for “councilor” or konsehal. With regard to the alleged improper use of the
free postage service, Alauya says that he actually gave a subordinate P20 to mail the letters, and that to
the best of his knowledge, the letters were sent using that money. This was supported by an affidavit of
one of his subordinates.

Issues:

1. W/N the Alauya”s actions violated his duties as a public officer

2. W/N his use of the title “Attorney” was valid

3. W/N the his use of the franking privilege was valid

Held/Ratio:

1. YES, public officers are always expected to act with proper decorum. As a member of the
Shari”a Bar and an officer of the Court, Alauya is impressed with an even stricter and more stringent
standard of conduct. Righteous indignation or vindication does not allow one to use virulent or insulting
language, most especially name-calling. As a man of the law, he is expected to act with restraint and
dignity. While his actions may be mitigated, they cannot be excused.

2. NO, the title “attorney” is reserved for those who pass the Philippine Bar. While both Shari”a
Bar and Philippine Bar passers are considered “counsellors”, if one only took and subsequently passed
the Shari”a Bar, he is still not entitled to use the title “attorney”.

3. The Court did not decide on this matter citing lack of evidence. In the end, the Court
reprimanded Alauya for his actions.
 PANGAN VS. DIONISIO RAMOS

93 SCRA 87 – Legal Ethics – Lack of Candor by a Lawyer – Proper name to be used by a

lawyer
In 1979, a pending administrative case filed by Santa Pangan against Atty. Dionisio Ramos
was delayed because Atty. Ramos allegedly appeared before a court in Manila. When the
records of the said case was checked (one which Atty. Ramos appeared in), it was found that
he used the name “Atty. Pedro D.D. Ramos”. In his defense, Atty. Ramos said he has the
right to use such name because in his birth certificate, his name listed was Pedro Dionisio
Ramos. “D.D.” stands for Dionisio Dayaw with Dayaw being his mother’s surname. However,
in the roll of attorneys, his name listed was Dionisio D. Ramos.
ISSUE: Whether or not what Atty. Ramos did was correct.
HELD: No. The attorney’s roll or register is the official record containing the names and
signatures of those who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a
name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law. The official
oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood. As an officer in the
temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of truthfulness, candor and
frankness. In representing himself to the court as “Pedro D.D. Ramos” instead of “Dionisio D.
Ramos”, respondent has violated his solemn oath and has resorted to deception. The
Supreme Court hence severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a similar infraction
will warrant suspension or disbarment.
 06 - Philippine Lawyers Association v. Celedonio Agrava (1959)

Doctrine:

• The practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal principle, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training or experience.

• In the exercise of police power, the legislature may regulate the practice of law by requiring
further examination in order to practice before any quasi-judicial or administrative agency.

Facts:

In 1957, Director Agrava of the Philippine Patent Office issued a circular announcing that he had
scheduled an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent
attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar,
engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said
examination. The Philippine Lawyer”s Association (PLA) opposed the circular and claims that one who
has passed the bar examinations, licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and
who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office. Furthermore,
PLA contends the issuance of such circular is in excess of Agrava”s jurisdiction. On the other hand,
Agrava maintains that the prosecution of patent cases “does not involve entirely or purely the practice
of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that,
as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers.”
Director Agrava further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes
the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before the
United States Patent Office, he is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law, as it is patterned from
the Patent Law of the United States of America.

Issue:

1. W/N the Circular is issued in excess of Director Agrava”s jurisdiction.

Held/Ratio:

1. Yes.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law or where
the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind although the
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, and those that may
become involved in litigation require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill which only
a member of the bar can provide. The Supreme Court so believes that the practice of law
includes such appearance before the Patent Office. The transaction of business in the Patent
Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training,
still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other
laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance
with law. Moreover, the proceedings undertaken in the Patent Office, if circumstances so
require, will be elevated to the Supreme Court on appeal, a process which cannot be
undertaken by anyone but a lawyer. It is then reasonable to hold that a member of the bar,
because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent
Office, without further examination or other qualification. On the contention of Director
Agrava that he was authorized by law to conduct such examinations, the Court ruled that his
claim finds no basis in the law. There is no provision in the Patent Law which explicitly
confers upon the Director the authority to conduct such examinations in order to screen
who may be admitted to the patent office. What the law merely authorizes is the
submission of application as well as other documents which prove that the applicant does
possess the skill needed to properly carry out the duties and tasks in the Patent office.