Acts Asiatics 42 Cxypre) Bhartrhari on Meaning and Form: The Second Book of the Vakyapadiya, Karikés 325-347 AKAMATSU Akihiko PREAMBLE, More than half a century has passed since John Brough (1917-84) published in quick succession three influential articles: “Theories of General Linguistics in the Sanskrit Grammarians” (1951), “Audumbardyana’s Theory of Language” (1952), and “Some Indian Theories of Meaning” (1953). In the first article he discussed the sphofa theory, while in the remaining two he treated of discussions about the sentence and sentence-meaning, the main topic expounded on by Bhartrhari (ca. Sth century A.D.) in the second book (especially karikas 250-347) of his Vakyapadiya. The present article is intended to supplement Brough’s discussion and elucidate Bhartrhari’s views ‘on meaning and form as developed in VP II. 325-347. In the third article mentioned above, Brough explains the main gist of Bhartrhari’s theory of the sentence and sentence-meaning in the following terms: “Having characterized the sentence as ‘a single undivided utterance’? which conveys a single undivided meaning, Bhartrhari proceeds to indicate what he understands to be the nature of this sentence-meaning. One cannot claim that what he says is a definition, and indeed the theory itself really implies that definition as ordinarily understood is an impossibility. The important point is that the sentence-meaning is grasped as a unity.” (Brough 1953: 170) 1) Brough probably has in mind here the fourth of the definitions of a sentence given by Bhartrhari at the start of VP Il, ic, eko ‘navayavah Sabdah. Tt is also to be surmised that Brough’s discussion reflects the following summary given by Pupyaraja in his commentary: tatra vaiydkaranasyakhanda evaiko ‘navayavah sabdah sphotalaksano vakyam, pratibhaiva vakyarthah, adhyasas ca sambandha iti padavadipaksadiisanaparah param: tikakdro vyavasthdpayatity asya kandasya samksepah (VP TE: 4. 26-28) —"Summary of this book: the fikakara (=Bhartzhari), being intent on refuting the padavédin’s view, establishes that the sentence is ‘indivisible’ (akhanda) for the grammarian, namely, it is a single undivided linguistic unit (eko ‘navayavah sabdah); that the sentence-meaning is an instantaneous flash of insight (pratibha); and that the relation is superimposition (adhyasa).” vy ASLYINY2 AKAMATSU AKIHIKO Bhartrhari’s definition of sentence-meaning referred to here by Brough, which cannot really be described as a definition, corresponds to the well-known verses on the pratibha theory (VP II. 143-144). viechedagrahane ‘rthandm pratibhanyaiva jayate / vakyartha iti tam ahuh padarthair upapaditam // idam tad iti sanyesam andkhyeya kathamcana / praty@tmavrttisiddha sd kartrdpi na nirtipyate // When the meanings [of the words, which are unreal abstractions from the sentence] have been grasped separately, an instantaneous flash of insight (pratibha) arises as different from them [namely, the knowledge of the meanings of the words). They (= grammarians) call it the sentence-meaning. [And it is] made to appear by the meanings of the words [which are unreal abstractions from the sentence-meaning| This (pratibhd) cannot in any way be explained to others in terms such as ‘It is this’; its existence is ratified only in the individual’s experience of it, and the experiencer himself cannot describe it. (Brough 1953: 171, footnote 3) Since Brough translates only the second of these two verses, I have given my own translation of the first verse with reference to his discussion (Brough 1953: 170-171). It is no doubt true, as was noted by Brough in the passage quoted carlier, that the important point made in these verses is that by regarding the sentence-meaning as something that is grasped intuitively, it is deemed to be an indivisible unity. In other words, it is essentially impossible to understand the meaning of a sentence by breaking it down into the meanings of individual words. It is therefore only natural that the sentence-meaning cannot be explained predicatively to either oneself or others, and it also becomes impossible to define it. But is this way of understanding the meaning of a sentence actually valid when considered in light of our everyday experiences? For instance, when we encounter a difficult passage in a foreign text, we first break it down into its constituent words and try to understand the meaning of the sentence as a 2) In producing this translation, I have consulted Ogawa 1991; (236), note 1. That words are unreal Casatya) abstractions from the sentence is stated at VP TL.10ed (apoddharas tatha vakye paddndm upapadyate), while the fact that the meanings of words are unreal abstractions from the sentence-meaning is mentioned at VP 11.269 (vakyasparthat padarthindm apoddhare prakalpite).BHARTRHARI ON MEANING AND FORM 3 whole through the connections between the meanings of the individual words. When considered in this fashion, it would seem that our understanding of the sentence-meaning derives solely from our understanding of the meanings of words. But the grammarians, typified by Bhartrhari, regard the analysis of a sentence into individual words as a method of linguistic analysis employed in grammar and consider it to be an artificial device. This would at first sight appear to be paradoxical. As Brough writes, “To Bhartrhari and his school words were, in fact, artificial constructions of the grammarians, and looked on from the point of view of language functioning in the world, they were unreal (asatya). This extraordinary relegation of words to the realm of fictions is not at all easy to grasp at first sight,...” (Brough 1953: 165) This idea that both words and the meanings of words are the products of grammatical analysis and therefore unreal would seem to negate the possibility of our everyday understanding of meaning and, as Brough says, it is indeed difficult to grasp at first sight. But if we return to the above verses, it is also stated that the existence of the sentence-meaning in the form of an instantaneous flash of insight (pratibha) is confirmed within individual speakers and hearers (“its existence is ratified only in the individual’s experience of it”). In other words, its existence is clear to the individual (pratyatmavrttisiddha), or self-evident, but its content cannot be explained to others. This may indeed be described as a characteristic of intuitive cognition. Does this mean then that Bhartrhari considered the meaning of a sentence to be something that can be neither communicated to others nor understood by others? This was not in fact the case. As we shall see in the next section, in VP 11.330 Bhartrhari succinctly defines “meaning” as that which is established in communication between the speaker and the hearer. DEFINITION OF MEANING yasminn uccarite Sabde yada yo 'rthah pratiyate / tam ahur artham tasyaiva ndnyad arthasya laksanam // Whenever a linguistic unit is uttered [by a speaker], a meaning is understood [by a hearer]. Then, they say that this meaning is the very meaning of that linguistic unit. There is no other definition of meaning.” 3) Brough makes no mention of this “definition of meaning” in any of his three articles However, Kunjunni Raja, who under the strong influence of Brough’s articles has discussed linguistic theories of ancient India, refers to this definition within the context of concerns similar to those raised in the present article (Kunjunni Raja 1977: 175)4 AKAMATSU AKIHIKO This definition of “meaning” matches the well-known definition of the linguistic unit (abda) given by Pataijjali (ca. 2nd century B.C.) in his Mahd- bhasya: atha gaur ity atra kak Sabdah....yenocearitena sdsna-Idingitla-kakuda-khura- visanindm sampratyayo bhavati sa Sabdah. What then is this word (Sabda) ‘cow”?... It is that by means of which, when uttered, there arises an understanding of creatures with dewlap, tail, hump, hooves, and horns. (Brough 1951: 31) Patafjali defines fabda as “that by means of which, when uttered, there arises an understanding,” while Bhartrhari defines “meaning” as “that which is understood whenever a Sabda is uttered.” These two definitions are, it could be said, widely recognized axioms. A relationship between Sabda as “that which is uttered” and meaning as “that which is understood” is indicated by these two axioms. But as has already been pointed out by Brough, “the word ‘uttered’ (ucearita) must mean something more than the mere production of sounds” (Brough 1951: 32). “That which is uttered” must be something that leads to an understanding of “meaning.”* But though it may be something more than mere sound, it is also a fact that it must be sound as well. Without using the “form” of the physical sound uttered by the speaker, the “meaning” is not conveyed to the hearer. And for both the speaker and the hearer “meaning” is something that arises in their own minds and is therefore something “self-evident” whose existence cannot be questioned. If that is so, then the question that must be asked when discussing communication between a speaker and a hearer in relation to the self-evident “meaning” will concern what is recognized as the “form” of sabda in its capacity as “that which is uttered” or “that which is heard.” If we anticipate the point at issue in the present discussion, it comes down to a question of whether the form of the linguistic unit (Sabda) is the sound, the word, or the sentence. Let us now return to the definition of “meaning” quoted above. What is being referred to here as “meaning” is actually “scntence-meaning.” The linguistic phenomenon that is at issue in the discussion in which this definition appears is the one-word sentence. For example, let us suppose that a speaker says, “A tree (vrksah).” (The word vrksah is formed from the noun stem vrksa ‘tree’, to which has been added the nominative singular ending, and this 4) With this as his starting point, Brough discusses the question of sphofa in his 1951 article.BHARTRHARI ON MEANING AND FORM 5 is the form in which it functions as a word.) On hearing the form of the single word “(a) tree,” the hearer may take it to mean “A tree stands.” If then the speaker were to make an utterance in the form of the two-word sentence “A tree stands (vrksas tisthati),” what would the hearer take this to mean? In this case too he would of course take it to mean “A tree stands.” There is no ference in the meaning that is understood when the statement “A tree” is uttered and heard and when the statement “A tree stands” is uttered and heard. In terms of sentence-form, the latter is a more complete sentence, but insofar that the same meaning “A tree stands” is understood in both cases, it may turn out that both are the same in their capacity as sabda. But if they are the same, it is to be surmised that the grammarians’ theories would invite the following sort of criticism. (1) If the same meaning “A tree stands” is understood from the form of the sentence “A tree” as from the sentence “A tree stands,” then since it is clear that “(a) tree” is a word, this would mean that the sentence-meaning has been understood from a word, Would this not be at variance with the grammarians’ view that words are unreal? (2) In terms of its form, “A tree” would appear to be part of the sentence “A tree stands,” which means that in this instance one part of a sentence is acting to convey the meaning. But, as has already been noted, for the grammarians the sentence is a single indivisible unit, and therefore it ought not be possible for them to recognize within a sentence individual parts that have meaning. (3) How would it be if one were to suppose that “A tree” represents the form of an incomplete sentence and that it conveys to the hearer the meaning “A tree stands” through the supplementing of the word “stands”? Or what if one were to assume that the meaning “stands” is added to “a tree” as understood from “A tree”? Views such as these would be put forward by Mimamsakas, who place the word at the basis of our understanding of meaning. But the grammarians take the position that “meaning,” as was indicated by the earlier definition of “meaning,” is understood only from the form actually uttered by the speaker. Therefore, they cannot maintain that the meaning of a sentence is understood by supplementing the form of one sentence with another form or that its meaning as a complete sentence is understood by supplying another meaning. THE MIMAMSAKA VIEW The criticism posited above is chiefly criticism that might be levelled by the6 AKAMATSU AKIHIKO Mimi 4 school. I would next like to examine briefly the views about the sentence and sentence-meaning advocated by this school. First, in the Mimamsasiitra of Jaimini (ca. 2nd century B. C.), the basic text of the Mimamsa school, it is stated: arthaikatwad ekam vakyam sakanksam ced vibhage syat. (JS IH. 1. 46) ‘A group of words serving a single purpose forms a sentence, if on analysis the separate words are found to have akdiksd or mutual expectancy. (Kunjunni Raja 1977: 152) As has already been pointed out by Kunjunni Raja (1977: 152), the following Mimamsa definition of the sentence given by Bhartrhari (VP IJ. 4) is based on the above definition by Jaimini sdkaiksavayavam bhede paranakaikgasabdakam / karmapradhanam gunavad ekdrtham vakyam ucyate // The sentence, it is said, is something which has parts (= words) having mutual expectancy when they are treated separately, which consists of words having no expectation of words outside itself [to complete its meaning), which has a verb as the predominant word, which has qualifying words, and which serves a single purpose. ‘As for sentence-meaning, the following statement can be found in the commentary on the Mimamsasitra by Sabara (ca. 6th century A.D.).° In chronological terms, it probably comes a little after Bhartrhari. anekapadérthanurakto vakyarthah, sa ca padarthamiilah, na nirmiilah, na ca samketamilah. (SBh on JS 1. 1. 7) The sentence-meaning is coloured by many word-meanings; it has as its basis the word-meanings, and it is neither without a basis nor is it based on linguistic convention. In light of the above passages, it can probably be said that in the early Mimamsa school it was held that the sentence expresses a single meaning through the interconnections between its component words and that the 5) The relative dates of Bhartrhari and Sabara are problematic, but it is inconceivable that the former could have lived long before the latter, nor would there seem to be any grounds for supposing that he came after the latter. 1 am of the view that Bhartrhari was probably a contemporary of Vritikdra of the Mimamsi school.BHARTRHARI ON MEANING AND FORM 7 meaning of a sentence is formed on the basis of the meanings of individual words; that is to say, words and their meanings are of primary importance. CONCLUSION: COMPLETENESS OF THE SENTENCE Anticipating counterarguments from a position attaching importance to words and word-meaning such as can be seen in the above views of the Mimamsakas, Bhartrhari, in VP II. 325-347, discusses sentence and sentence-meaning with reference to concrete examples of the aforementioned one-word sentence and the elliptical sentence in an attempt to prove the completeness of the sentence. Karikas 250-347,” in which this section is included, provide a general inquiry into the linguistic forms in a sentence and their meaning by analyzing a sentence into individual words and discussing the various principles, such as the context of the utterance (prakarana) and the textual context (artha), that analytically determine the meanings to be assigned to individual words in the sentence. The same questions are discussed in the first book of the Vakyapadiya (VP 1. 151-154) and its commentary (Vptti), using the same examples, and there the principles for determining meaning are positioned within a framework of logical and analytic thought. It could thus be said that, in Bhartrhari’s view, after the meaning of a sentence has been understood intuitively, the meanings of individual words in the sentence are established by means of analytic explanation. At the start of the section here under consideration (VP II. 325ab), he presents the basic thesis of his argument: riipam sarvapadarthanam vakyarthopanibandhanam / The nature of the meaning of all individual words is determined on the basis of the meaning of the sentence [composed of those words When viewed from the standpoint of Bhartrhari, who considered words and word-meanings to be unreal (asatya) and only the sentence and sentence-meaning to be real (satya), it would be only natural for the meaning of the sentence to be regarded as the basis of all meaning. Thus, the following responses can be given to the criticism posited earlier with reference to the one-word sentence “A tree.” (1) If the sentence-meaning “A tree stands” is understood from the utterance “A tree,” then since it conveys a self-sufficient meaning, it represents 6) Among these kdvikds, Brough discusses kk. 342-346 in detail as indicative of Audumbarayana’s theory of language (Brough 1952), and he also summarizes the questions of “implied” sense and literal sense discussed in kk. 250-324 (Brough 1953)8 AKAMATSU AKIHIKO a sentence even though it is a single word. (2) Though “A tree” and “A tree stands" may appear to convey the same meaning, the meaning of each is different, and therefore they each constitute separate complete sentences. This means that it is not the case that “A tree” as part of “A tree stands” is conveying the meaning of the sentence. (3) Since “A tree” is in itself a complete sentence that conveys the meaning of “A tree stands,” there is no reason to supply the form “stands” or the meaning “stands,” nor is there any need to do so. So long as it constitutes a sentence, a sentence conveys meaning and is complete as a form, and there does not exist anything such as a deficient “sentence.” It could be said that this was the conclusion that Bhartrhari tried to present in VP II. 325-347. SYNOPSIS OF VP II. 325-347 1. The meaning of words is determined on the basis of the meaning of the sentence. (k. 325ab) 2. A one-word sentence is a “sentence.” (kk, 325ed~330) 3. Synonymous sentences are separate linguistic units. (kk. 331-333) 4, [Objection] The meaning of “The door!” is understood by supplying other elements. (kk. 334-338) 5. “The door!” is both a noun and a verb, and it forms a complete sentence. (kk. 339-341) 6. Audumbarayana’s view: It is the sentence that has meaning. (kk. 342-347) APPENDIX: ANNOTATED TRANSLATION (The following translation and notes are based on Punyaraja’s commentary.) 325ab: The nature of the meaning of all individual words is determined on the basis of the meaning of the sentence [composed of those words]. Punyardja here refers to the views of the Samgraha quoted in Vrtti 77. 4 5 on VP I and confirms that this is the basic assertion of the grammarians: Samgrahe ‘pyuktam—na hi kificit padam nama riipena niyatam kvacit / padandm ripam arthah va vakyarthad eva jayate // (In the Samgraha too it says: Nowhere in that which is called a “word” is there anything whatsoever regarding its form that is fixed. The form and the meaning of individual words arise only from the meaning of the sentence.) On this Samgraha, see Akamatsu 1998a: 278. 325cd: But those sentence-meanings with an expectation [of other elements toBHARTRHARI ON MEANING AND FORM 9 complete their meaning] are the same as word-meanings. [They cannot be called sentence-meanings. 326: Even a single word may also be considered a sentence if it has the function [of conveying the meaning of a complete sentence] without a verb. This is because the sentence and so on display the duality [of being both a noun and a verb]. Even a word such as the noun “(a) tree” constitutes a sentence because, manifesting as it does within itself the verbal function of “stands,” it conveys a self-sufficient meaning without any expectation of other external elements. 327: If in a single verb [specific] action-bearers (sadhana, karaka) limitedly [connected to the action expressed by the verb] are [simultaneously] understood, this too is said to be a sentence with a complete meaning. “Causes to rain (varsati)” is a single verbal word, but it implies a “god” as the agent and “water” as the object, and because this single word conveys the complete sentence-meaning “The god causes water to rain down,” it constitutes a “sentence. 328: [Objection] [There are instances in which] a notion concealed by a word {not directly heard] and based on a word not uttered [arises on hearing a certain sentence]. Such a notion, which arises on the basis of inference (anuména), is said to be the cause of the understanding of its meaning. Punyaraja identifies this with the position of the Mimams4 school. According to Punyaraja’s explanation, the opponent is here arguing that the meaning “A tree stands” is understood on hearing, for example, the word “(a) tree” because the word “stands” is posited on the basis of indirect knowledge or inference in the form of Srutdrthdpatti. This Srutarthapatti as explained here is discussed in detail in Yoshimizu 1999. 329: But others maintain that its meaning belongs only to that word. Its meaning is determined without any relation to other words. [There is no need to posit any other words.) 330: Whenever a linguistic unit is uttered [by a speaker], a meaning is understood [by a hearer]. Then they say that this meaning is the very meaning of that linguistic unit. There is no other definition of meaning. 331: [For example, on being told, “He goes to a film,” the hearer will take it to mean “He goes to see a film.”] Thus, the action expressed by an absent verb (e.g., “see”) is understood [by the hearer simply from the words “to a film,” and it is not specially posited by means of inference as maintained by the opponent}. Again, in cases of compounds, “gone from Kausambi" is understood from only niskausaémbih (“from Kausambi”) [and hence there is10 AKAMATSU AKIHIKO no need to specially posit the word “gone”]. The examples given by Punyaraja for the former instance are edhebhyo vrajati “he goes for firewood”) and edhan Ghartum vrajati (“he goes to get firewood”). 332: [For instance, “(a) tree (vrksah)” and “(a) tree stands (vrksas tisthati)”] are separate words, and they are just like synonyms in everyday usage. Moreover, their own specific meanings [in a sentence] are determined by the textual context (artha) and the context of the utterance (prakarana). 333: But for each person [the individual words whose meaning is determined by analysis of the sentence] are means for understanding the meaning of the sentence. On no account are they connected with the fact that should be known. 334: [Objection] Even when the meaning is understood incorrectly or when the meaning is conveyed wrongly, all words are established as having a permanent connection with their own meaning. 335: [Objection] Depending on the context of the utterance, when the object of an action such as “(the) door” (dvdram) is thus uttered as a concrete word, “Close!” or “Give!” is [indirectly] understood on the basis of those elements [such as the context of the utterance). 336: [Objection] In such a case, a word that has the function of an action-bearer and has an entity as its cause does not (simultaneously) directly signify the action to be accomplished, which is the chief meaning [of the sentence]. [That is to say, when one is told, “(the) door,” this word is understood only to signify the entity (= door) corresponding to the object, and the action to be performed in that particular situation is not understood from “(the) door.”] 337: [Objection] Therefore, a word having an expectation of other words completes its task once it has expressed only its own meaning. Meanwhile, its meaning conveys the proximity [of other elements] as being connected with it. 338: [Proponent] [The purpose of a word is to express its own meaning. But if it refers to other elements,] since there is no difference insofar that it exists for the sake of something else, the proximity of another word is not indicated by the word [uttered in this case], nor is the proximity of another word indicated by the meaning [of the word uttered in this case], nor is the proximity of the meaning [of another word] indicated by the word [uttered in this case]. ‘According to Punyaraja, these arguments were put forward by the proponent, an advocate of the indivisible unity of the sentence, in order to refute the views of advocates of srutdrthapatti. Since his commentary is ofBHARTRHARI ON MEANING AND FORM n interest also when considering the srutérthdpatti theory of the Mimamsa school, there follows a translation of the relevant section: “In the case of [the sentence] ‘Fat Devadatta here does not eat during the day,’ since it is impossible for Devadatta to become fat without eating, it is said to convey nighttime eating through the positing of a word that signifies this. In that case, (1) is that word indirectly indicated by [another] word? (2) is that word indicated by meaning? (3) is that meaning indicated by a word? or (4) is that meaning indicated by meaning? There are these four options. Among these, (1) it is impossible for a word to be indirectly indicated by [another] word, for the referential function of a word lies in conveying its own meaning. This is what is meant when it says, ‘The proximity of another word is not indicated by the word [uttered in this case].’ Then, if it is said that (2) a word is indirectly indicated by meaning, in response to this it is said, ‘Nor is the proximity of another word indicated by the meaning [of the word uttered in this case).’ Nor is it correct to say that the word itself is indirectly referred to [by meaning]. It is, however, correct to say that the referent is indirectly referred to by the signifier. Therefore, since [in this case] there is not established any relationship of a referent or a signifier [with the meaning of the word uttered) with respect either to the meaning of another word or to another word, how would it be possible for the word to be indirectly referred to by the meaning [of the word uttered in this case]? Alternatively, if it is said that (3) the meaning denoted by the word posited by means of srutdrthapatti is indirectly referred to by the uttered word, it was in order to indicate that this too is inappropriate that it is said, ‘Nor is the proximity of the meaning [of another word] indicated by the word [uttered in this case].’ The proximity of the meaning denoted by another word is not brought about by a word. This is because no relationship is established between the referent and the signifier. Therefore, how could there be an indirect denotation of the meaning [of a word not uttered in this case) by a word [uttered in this case]? Alternatively, it may be said that (4) meaning is understood by meaning. This is clearly inference (anumdna). The unity of the word expressed in the statement ‘The word has its own meaning’ is never abandoned. It is precisely for this reason that the exposition of these four assertions cannot be appropriate. Therefore, the unity of the word and its own meaning is never negated. Hence, this assertion that, with respect to a single-word [sentence], the understanding of the sentence-meaning is possible when another word is indirectly referred to by means of Srutarthdpatti serves no12 AKAMATSU AKIHIKO purpose whatsoever. It must be assumed that single-word [sentences] can each convey their own meaning on the basis of the context of the utterance and so on without any connections with other words.” 339: [Counterargument) If it were the case that the verb is implied by the word denoting the object [of an action] (e.g., “the door”) just as if it had lost its form, then both the action (bhava) [denoted by the verb] and the entity (sattva) [denoted by the noun} would simultaneously become the principal thing [in “the door”]. [Is this not an irrational conclusion? ] 340: [Answer] It is explained by them (= grammarians) that here the verb has the same form as the noun [namely, “the door” is a verb resembling a noun]. [The functions] of everyday language are allocated by means of agreement (anvaya) and difference (vyatireka). 341: [Answer] Furthermore, even though a doubt may arise because of [a similarity in] form, it does not cease being the signifier, just as when [the statement “half of Devadatta’s sacrificial animal” is made, it is not “half of Devadatta” but] “half of the sacrificial animal” that is established [as the meaning] on the basis of syntactical potential (sdmarthya). 342-346: see Brough 1952: 75-76. 347: Even when [sentence-meanings] are indirectly shown by references (linga) concretely expressed elsewhere or by other sentences, it is the meanings of each of those sentences themselves that is being understood, Because there is no distinction in their form, it is simply not realized [that both are separate sentences]. The example given here by Punyardja is the same as that appearing in the Vytti (208. 3-8) on VP I, and it also appears in the Vrtti (274. 16-25, 283, 15-19) on VP IL, References Texts and Abbreviations JS Jaiministtra. In Mimamsddarsana. Bd. by Kasinatha Vasudevasistri Abhayamkara and Pt. GaneSasistri Jos. Poona: Anandasrama, 1973-84 (Anandasrama Sanskrit Series, 97). ¥P Vakyapadiya. References to the karikas follow W. Rau’s critical edition (Rau 1977). VP 1 Vakyapadiya, Kanda 1. Vakyapadiya of Bhartrhari, with the Commentaries Vetti and Paddhati of Vrsabhadeva, Kanda I. Ba. by K. A. Subramania Tyer. Poona, 1966 (Deccan College Monograph Series). ¥P I Vakyapadtya, Kanda I. The Vakyapadiya of Bhartrhari, Kanda H, with the Commentary of Punyardja and the Ancient Vetti. Ed. by K. A. Subramania Iyer, with a Foreword by Ashok Aklujkar. Delhi, 1983.BHARTRHARI ON MEANING AND FORM 1B SBh Mimamsa Bhésya. In Mimémsddarsana (see JS). Secondary Literature Akamatsu Akihiko 21892. 1998a. 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