Impulsos Regionales

KATHRYN A.
FOSTER*
University at Buffalo
ABSTRACT: Spurred by fiscal pressure, persistent city-suburban disparities, and the

imperatives of the global economy, public and academic interest in metropolitan
regionalism is as vigorous now as it was in the 1950s. The resurgence of interest com-
pels analysis in this article of I0 regional impulses-natural resource, macroeconomic,
centrality, growth, social, fiscal, equity, political, legal, and historical-the operation
of which determine regional outcomes, such as regional service delivery, partnerships,
and practices, in metropolitan areas. A case study of regional impulses in the Buffalo
metropolitan area jinds that fiscal, legal, political, and historical impulses are most
salient in influencing regional outcomes. The study demonstrates the utility of the
regional impulses framework for comparative metropolitan analysis and understand-
ing why some regionsfunction more regionally than others.
P u s h e d by fiscal pressure and city-suburban disparities and pulled by the promise of glo-
bal competitiveness and regional excellence (Dodge, 1996), US metropokn areas have
rediscovered regionalism. Municipalities are forging intermunicipal agreements to consol-
idate service delivery. County governments are expanding their portfolios through func-
tional transfers from subcounty governments. Regionwide special-purpose governments
continue to proliferate, integrating services in many metropolitan areas. The rise of “pri-
vatopia” (McKenzie, 1994), profit-driven service providers, and privatization are reorder-
ing relations between citizens, their governments, and the business sector. Multisector
coalitions of private, nonprofit, and academic institutions-“civic regionalists” (Foster,
1997a)-a1-e gaining prominence as agents for regional agendas, policy, and outcomes.
* Direct all correspondence to: Kathryn A. Foster, Department of Planning, Universify at Buffalo, Hayes Hall,
3435 Main Street, Buffalo, NY 14214-3087. E-mail: foster@arch.buffalo.edu
JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS, Volume 19, Number 4, pages 375-403

Copyright 0 1997 by JAI Press Inc.
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
ISSN: 0735-2166.
376 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 79/No. 4/7997
The resurgence of activity in regionalism prompts investigation in this paper of “regional

impulses.” Regional impulses are factors that motivate local governments and other inter-
est groups to achieve regional outcomes. Regional outcomes include structures, such as a
regionwide multipurpose or single-purpose service entity; processes, such as a regional
forum in which citizens deliberate issues of regional significance; partnerships, such as
intergovernmental and intersectoral (public, private, nonprofit, civic, and higher educa-
tion) agreements; and practices, such as areawide embrace of regional identity and norms.
Theory suggests that the presence of or strong regional impulses should pave the way for
regional outcomes, while the absence of or weak impulses should thwart them. Analyzing
the nature and patterns of regional impulses in metropolitan areas provides a useful frame-
work for understanding why some regions are more apt than others to achieve regional
outcomes.
This article is in four parts. In the first, I describe 10 regional impulses and their theoret-
ical bases. Part two elaborates on the regional impulses framework, including the
methodology of measuring regionalism and regional outcomes. In part three, I apply the
regional impulses framework to a case study of the Buffalo metropolitan area, a prototyp-
ical northeastern metropolitan region with a declining central city, uneasy city-suburban
relations, intense local loyalties backed by strong home rule powers, and considerable pres-
sure from taxpayers and private enterprise for regionalization. In the final section, I
highlight five findings suggested by the analysis and conclude that the regional impulses
framework holds considerable promise for understanding metropolitan regionalism.
REGIONAL IMPULSES: A THEORETICAL REVIEW

Studies of regionalism focus typically on one of two different, though theoretically
related, varieties of regionalism. The first comprises the distinctiveness of a region qua
region and the development of regional identity. The primary focus is on a region’s exter-
nal relations, self-consciousness, and outward face with respect to other regions. A large
and long-standing literature examines this type of regionalism (Garreau, 1981; Isard, 1980;
Isserman, 1993; Odum & Moore, 1938; Solinger, 1977; Zelinsky, 1973).
The second variety of regionalism, on which this study concentrates, refers to the ways
in which localities within a region forge administrative, political, economic, social, or other
ties to create regional outcomes. The focus in this instance is on internal relations and links
among independent units within a region. This variety of regionalism has also spawned a
large and diverse body of analysis (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations,
1987; Hallman, 1977; Teaford, 1979; Williams et al., 1965; Wood, 1961).
Of significance for present purposes is that hypotheses about external and internal
regionalism are often identical, albeit presumed to operate on a different scale. In practice,
issues that arise among regions typically mirror issues that arise among subgroups within
regions (Holden, 1964; Kincaid, 1989). For example, peppered throughout public debates
on devolution or multinational regional coalitions like the European Union or the Associa-
tion of South East Asian Nations are familiar intrametropolitan themes of jurisdictional
competition, parochialism, mutual benefit, compromise, equity, and power sharing (Hor-
mats, 1994; Kingsley, 1996; Nathan, 1996).
I Regional Impulses I 377
TABLE 1
Summary of Regional Impulses

Impulse Proregional Factors Antiregional Factors
Natural Resource Shared resources (e.g., streams, air) Natural barriers within region (e.g.,
rivers, mountains)
Macroeconomic Common mode of production (e.g., Mixed modes of production
industrial or agricultural)
Centrality High central city dominance; High Low central city dominance; Low
center-peripheryinterdependence center-peripheryinterdependence
Growth Common growth and development Uneven growth and development
experiences experiences
Social Similar cross-jurisdiction Dissimilarcross-jurisdiction
socioeconomic status socioeconomic status
Fiscal Similar cross-jurisdictionfiscal Dissimilarcross-jurisdictionfiscal
capacity; Potential for economies of capacity; Fiscal exploitation (for
scale; Fiscal exploitation (for exploiting party)
exploited party)
Equity Support for redistribution Resistance to redistribution
Political Common political affiliation; Desire Mixed political affiliations; Geographi-
for united front cally concentrated minority groups
Legal State and federal incentives favoring State and federal incentives
regionalization constraining regionalization
Historical History of interjurisdictional History of interjurisdictionalantago-
cooperation and successful regional nism and failed regional efforts; Long-
efforts standina local Dolitical borders
Categories of Regional Impulses

I identify 10 categories of regional impulses: natural resource, macroeconomic, central-
ity, growth, social, fiscal, equity, political, legal, and historical. Each category includes
proregional impulses that promote regionalism and antiregional impulses that hinder it, as
summarized in table 1.
1. Natural Resource Impulses
There are several resource-based impulses for regionalism. The most fundamental is the
physical geographic reality that the absence of natural barriers facilitates regional ties,
while the presence of natural barriers hinders them. Adjacent jurisdictions separated by a
mountain range or river, for example, are less apt to collaborate with one another than are
adjacent jurisdictions that flow seamlessly from one to another without physical
obstruction.
In broader terms, jurisdictions with common interests in valuable natural resources have
economic and environmental rationales to manage resource use on a regional basis. To do
otherwise is to invite a “tragedy of the commons” in which individual parties-localities in
the case of a region-overuse a scarce asset to the detriment of all (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom,
1990). The practice of regional planning itself originates in a natural resource-based
response to urbanization of the countryside (Friedmann & Weaver, 1979; Luccarelli,
1995). Early regional planners hoped to strike a balance between city and county, thereby
protecting natural systems from industrial expansion. Although suburbanization and indus-
trialization proceeded apace, observers from bioregionalists to mainstream economists
agree that because air, water, energy, species, and other natural phenomena transcend local
political borders, management of natural systems warrants regional coordination (Camp-
bell, 1996; Sale, 1985; Weaver, 1984).
2. Macroeconomic Impulses
Economic theory suggests that places with similar macroeconomies are more apt to link
politically, economically, and socially than are places with unlike economies (Brustein,
1987). Areas that rely on different production modes-urban industrialism versus subsis-
tence agriculture, for example-tend to develop distinct societies. These societies sport
different settlement patterns, infrastructure networks, institutions, and rules governing
property rights, trade, labor practices, environmental management, and land tenure. Places
with similar macroeconomies, and hence societies, tend to forge intraregional ties. This has
occurred, for example, in the western Canada-United States border region of Cascadia, the
extractive resource-based region of Appalachia, and the wheat and corn-based breadbasket
in the central US (Artibise, 1995; Garreau, 1981; Markusen, 1987). Macroeconomic logic
also suggests that not only are areas with similar economies prone to alliances, areas with
dissimilar economies are prone to antagonism. Interregional conflicts such as the US Civil
War or clashes between Native Americans and European settlers, for example, can be
viewed as disputes between different macroeconomic cultures (Markusen, 1987).
Because urban and rural areas have distinct macroeconomies and ways of life, their pres-
ence in a single metropolitan area would tend to hamper regionalism. Clashes between
fanners and hobby farm residents in the exurban fringe are an example of macroeconomic
friction (Berry, 1978; Gurwitt, 1993). Metropolitan regions that contain a single macro-
economy-an entirely urban industrial area, for example-would be expected to have
relatively strong regional impulses.
3. Centrality-based Impulses
Geographers’ classic statement on systems of cities, central place theory, offers a third
rationale for regionalism. Central place theory posits a nested hierarchy of places, from
small crossroads settlements that meet basic needs to increasingly larger towns, regional
centers, and world cities that offer successively broader ranges of functions and services
(Christaller, 1966; McKenzie, 1933). Within the hierarchy, central places and their hinter-
lands are mutually dependent: A regional center serves and depends upon the customer
base found in hinterland settlements, while the hinterlands support and depend upon the
regional center for specialized functions. The symbiotic exchange and interaction between
center and hinterlands causes regionalism to flourish (Berry & Horton, 1972; Stanback &
Noyelle, 1984). By this logic, metropolitan areas in which individual communities are rel-
atively self-sufficient in employment, shopping, schools, and recreational and other
facilities should have weaker regional impulses than will metropolitan areas with more tra-
ditional center-hinterland interdependencies. Forces eroding city-suburban links, coupled
with the perception that suburbs and cities do not need one another, present a formidable
threat to regional identity and unity (Downs, 1994).
A second centrality-based impulse is the desire to cultivate a vital central city. Regions
are represented by their central cities in name and reputation. Several core studies of the
school of thought known as new regionalism suggest that the health of a region depends on
the health of a central city (Ledebur & Barnes, 1993; Savitch et al., 1993; Voith, 1992). The
shortcomings of these studies notwithstanding (see Ihlanfeldt, 1995; Swanstrom, 1996),
current custom suggests that strong centers help promote strong regions and are essential
for global competitiveness (Kanter, 1995).
4. Growth Impulses
Economic theory suggests three growth-related regional impulses. The first is that
uneven growth experiences lead to interjurisdictional competition, which hinders regional
collaboration (Perry & Watkins, 1980). Places with similar growth experiences have
impulses for unity (Markusen, 1987). In particular, declining jurisdictions have incentives
to band together to demand special treatment, funds, or policy favors from growing places
or higher level governments. Rapidly developing places have incentives to form alliances
to lobby against adoption of redistributive policies or to share notes on problems that
accompany growth. These factors imply weak regional impulses between, for example, a
declining city and its growing suburbs.
The second growth-driven regional impulse originates in the notion that systems of prop-
erty taxation provide incentives to compete for development through tax abatement
bidding wars. If competition rewards developers rather than local governments, jurisdic-
tions have strong incentives to form regional coalitions to collude about the terms of
growth (Breton, 1991; Eisinger, 1988). Jurisdictions might agree to set maximum limits on
property tax abatements or desist from luring development from one another. If a regional
coalition proved unstable-as the economic theory of cartels would suggest (Quirk,
1976)-then higher level governments could intervene to standardize rules for local com-
petition or halt competition altogether (Breton, 1991). If a jurisdiction believes it can
capture a greater share of regional growth without collaborating, of course, it has a growth-
related antiregional impulse to pursue new investment on its own (Peterson, 1981).
The third growth-related regional impulse originates in the political-economic impera-
tives of the global economy. Several recent analyses argue that the most logical, viable, and
economically nimble unit of production in a globalized, nation-stateless world is the met-
ropolitan region, today’s modem-day city state (Hershberg, 1994; Ohmae, 1995; Peirce,
1993). Unless regions tackle economic, infrastructure, and cultural strategies at the metro-
politan scale, the argument holds, they will suffer the fiscal, land use, social and
environmental ills of uncoordinated development and policy decisions (Downs, 1994;
Yaro & Hiss, 1996). Global economic competitiveness provides a strong motivation for
regional cooperation and multisectoral alliances (Dodge, 1996).
5. Social Impulses
Social scientists have long noted an inverse relationship between social distance and the
intensity of social interactions (Knox, 1987; Simmel, 1969). Nations sharing social values
and behaviors, for example, are more likely to associate voluntarily with one another than
are countries with dissimilar attributes (Deutsch et al., 1957). Historical evidence indicates
that social differences are not necessarily fatal to collaboration, of course. Socially distinct
groups often interact peacefully, though accommodation generally requires ample commu-
nication and mutual predictability of behavior across a social divide (Deutsch et al., 1957).
Evidence from US metropolitan areas reinforces that differences in social rank are sig-
nificant barriers to interlocal cooperation (Friesema, 1971; Marando, 1968; Williams et al.,
1965). Central cities and suburbs that share social characteristics, for example, are more
likely to forge interlocal alliances than are central cities and suburbs with dissimilar
attributes. Dissimilar social status is an antiregional impulse for lifestyle services, notably
education, zoning, and housing, which are characterized by intense and varied preferences
acrossjurisdictions. Social rank is less significant for system maintenance services, such as
airports, highways, and sewer and water services, for which customers have relatively sub-
dued and narrow preferences (Williams, 1971).
6. Fiscal impulses
There are three prominent fiscal impulses for regionalization. First, municipalities have
incentives to regionalize service delivery to capture economies of scale. Economies of
scale are most common for services with high fixed capital costs, such as water, sewer, util-
ities, and airports, and to a lesser extent fire protection and police investigation (Honey,
1976). Central cities and large suburbs may be sufficiently large to realize economies of
scale within their borders; most small jurisdictions, however, have strong fiscal impulses to
decrease costs by sharing labor and expensive capital equipment (Parks & Oakerson, 1989;
Tullock, 1969). To safeguard against defaults by a collaborator, jurisdictions have an
incentive to make service agreements with places that have equal or better, but not worse,
fiscal capacity. Communities of similar relative to dissimilar fiscal capacity are thus more
likely to cooperate with one another (Williams et al., 1965).
A second fiscal impulse is the incentive to increase efficiency by internalizing spillover
effects and coordinating service delivery. The traffic and land use inefficiencies associated
with a municipality’s unilateral development of a region-serving mall, for example, might
be mitigated by interjurisdictional coordination of traffic signals and road repair or an
intermunicipal agreement to share development approval, costs, and tax revenues (Downs,
1994).
A third fiscal impulse rests in the theory of municipal exploitation. Municipal exploita-
tion occurs when the net costs to a jurisdiction of providing its services to nonresidents
exceed the net benefits its residents receive in other jurisdictions (Bradford & Oates, 1974;
Neenan & Ethridge, 1984). Exploited jurisdictions have a fiscal incentive to collaborate
with exploiting jurisdictions to transfer the net difference between services rendered to
nonresidents and those received elsewhere by residents. In practice, because exploiting
jurisdictions have no fiscal incentive to collaborate, the result is often an intraregional
standoff.
7. Equify impulses
Social science theory suggests that metropolitan areas characterized by interjurisdic-
tional social, economic, or service inequities have an incentive to pursue regional (or
higher level) solutions to narrow these disparities (Downs, 1994; Peterson, 1981). Expand-
ing political boundaries enables greater redistribution of resources from areas of plenty to
areas of need. Jurisdictions that are home to most of a region’s low-income housing,
I Regional lmpulses I 381
declining infrastructure, and needy residents have strong equity-based impulses to region-
alize funding and program implementation (Ofield, 1997). In contrast, affluent
jurisdictions have relatively weak equity impulses. This tendency is offset to the degree
that residents of affluent areas share collective responsibility for the region’s poor or
believe their economic fortunes are tied to those of central cities (Baldassare, 1989; Ger-
ston & Haas, 1993; Savitch et al., 1993).
8. Political Impulses
The literature on political integration suggests three important political impulses for
regionalism. The first is to establish popularly accepted institutions and a sense of shared
fortunes to ensure peace among potential rivals (Deutsch et al., 1957). Nations, for exam-
ple, forge political alliances to avoid war. The analogous political impulse in the
metropolitan context is to establish cross-jurisdictional associations to thwart counterpro-
ductive forms of competition and conflict (Hawley, 1976; Reed, 1930).
A second political impulse stems from the principle of safety and power in numbers.
Entities that present a united front and internal political consensus allegedly have greater
clout in dealing with higher level governments. This creates an incentive for alliances, such
as municipal councils of governments, to increase political leverage in relations with
county, state, or federal governments (Ake, 1967; Solinger, 1977).
Third, because political representation is often determined territorially by wards, dis-
tricts, or jurisdictions, there is a strong political impulse to align with neighbors who share
political leanings. This implies greater likelihood of political ties, especially mergers, when
collaborators have similar rather than dissimilar party affiliations. There is little incentive
for a community’s officials to support a political merger if it means allying with political
opponents. Similar antiregional impulses affect geographically concentrated minority
groups for which political consolidation means loss of representation and dilution of polit-
ical power, a situation reflected in the traditional opposition to regionalization from racial
minority interest groups (Piven & Cloward, 1967).
9. Legal Impulses
Analysts have long noted the strong links between state and federal laws and policies on
the one hand, and the arrangement of local government units on the other (Bollens, 1986;
Briffault, 1990;Marando & Reeves, 1988).Higher level governments often define the lim-
its of what constitutes the “region,” thereby prescribing regional self-consciousness.
Federal carrots and sticks influence the formation of regional special-purpose authorities
(Foster, 1997b) and promote metropolitan planning through regional councils of govern-
ment and metropolitan planning organizations (Atkins & Wilson-Gentry, 1992). In
contrast, the federal community development block grant program (CDBG) provides
incentives for communities with populations of 50,000 or more to seek funds indepen-
dently as entitlement cities, rather than collaborate with other regional jurisdictions to
jointly determine the allocation of funds. State statutes may restrict the ability of a jurisdic-
tion to incorporate, annex territory, collaborate, or consolidate with anotherjurisdiction. In
some states, local governments have considerable home rule authority, while in other states
they do not (Hill, 1993). In both instances, regional impulses are conditioned by legal
parameters that encourage or discourage regional outcomes.
10. Historical Impulses

Finally, analysts note the considerable, if idiosyncratic, influence of historical factors on
regional outcomes. Although historical impulses are by their nature case specific, two war-
rant mention. The first stems from the empirical finding that the older the age of a
settlement, the less likely it is to regionalize through boundary expansion (Dye, 1971; Jack-
son, 1972). Although this relationship may be influenced by other conditions associated
with urban age, it appears that the more long-standing the local government arrangements,
the harder it is to alter the institutional status quo. Metropolitan regions with long-fixed
political borders are less apt than regions with frequent boundary changes to pursue
regional restructuring.
The second historical impulse is less specific, but probably more influential. Every area
has a unique combination of leaders, interest groups, institutions, policies, and power rela-
tions that shape regional outcomes (Orum, 1991; Savitch & Vogel, 1996). These historical
factors may be at the root of an area’s tendency to forge or resist regional alliances. Inter-
jurisdictional hostility or friendship, for example, may persist long after the historic
conditions that shaped local relations have faded.
MEASURING REGIONAL IMPULSES AND OUTCOMES

The extent and interplay of a metropolitan area’s regional impulses provide the founda-
tion for assessing regional outcomes. The theoretical link is straightforward: Regions with
strong regional impulses should have more numerous and significant regional outcomes
than do regions with weak impulses.
In practice, however, methodological complications arise. On the regional impulse side
is the likelihood that the salience of particular impulses varies over time and place. News of
the degeneration of a regional environmental asset, for example, may boost the natural
resource impulse to regionally regulate its use, while news of its successful cleanup may
diminish the impulse to collaborate. Growth impulses, for example, may shape outcomes
in rapidly growing or declining regions, but have little influence in stable areas.
On the regional outcomes side is the reality that regional outcomes are difficult to quan-
tify. Regionalism is a multifaceted phenomenon comprising different dimensions of
regional life. Residents’ patterns of working, shopping, and pursuing entertainment, for
example, may be highly regionalized, while delivery of particular services, such as librar-
ies and recreational facilities, is highly localized. Variation in the nature of regional
outcomes means that any overall index of regionalism-say, a count of regional out-
comes-would likely mislead or require considerable qualification. Moreover, although
we can both observe regional outcomes, such as the presence of a regional marketing cam-
paign or an areawide transit system, and establish a chronology of when impulses waxed
and waned in significance, attributing specific regional outcomes to particular impulses is
inevitably an inexact science.
Despite these difficulties, researchers recognize the value in measuring and analyzing
regional processes and outcomes. One approach, developed by Savitch and Vogel, classi-
fies metropolitan regions into one of three categories according to their overall approach to
regional challenges. Under this scheme, regions primarily typify either metropolitan gov-
ernment, including formal single-tier or two-tier metropolitanwide polities; mutual
adjustment, marked by reliance on interlocal agreements and public-private partnerships;

or avoidance andor conflict, wherein regional cooperation is the exception rather than the
rule (Savitch & Vogel, 1996).
One could develop a more categorically sophisticated, though methodologically
demanding, approach that classified metropolitan areas according to the structure of public
sector governance-that is, single-tier, two-tier, regionwide multipurpose government(s),
regionwide single-purpose government@),formal interlocal agreements (by function), and
relative number of general-purpose governments per capita. A more data-intensive
approach would gauge also the nature and strength of regional activity undertaken by civic
regionalists-private, nonprofit, civic, higher education, and other nongovernmental
groups-and transsectoral coalitions-public-private, public-nonprofit, and private-non-
profit-(Foster, 1997a). Still more fastidious would be using a point system to quantify the
effectiveness of a regional system, as Putnam (1993) does in his multiyear analysis of
regional governments in Italy.
Categorizing complex regions remains a challenge, however. Regions encompass multi-
ple sectors, institutions, players, issues, and practices. Regional governance, as described
by Long, is a complex amalgam of “unconscious,” “unnoticed,” and “unplanned” interac-
tions and outcomes (Long, 1958, p. 255). Savitch and Vogel similarly acknowledge the
“vexing questions” posed by their three-category classification of regions:
When...do extensive mutual adjustments begin to resemble two-tier governance? How

do we classify a once vibrant two-tier government, now undercut by politicians and
forced to emphasize its role as a regional advisory council? Most important, how do we
balance a limited number of mutual adjustments against a backdrop of conflict and
avoidance? Even the most conflict-ridden regions possess some form of regional coop-
eration...” (Savitch & Vogel, 1996, p. 13).
Case studies are well-suited to such complex methodological conditions (Orum, Feagin,
& Sjoberg, 1991). Case studies are particularly fitting for examining phenomena for which
systematic comparative data are not available because they can provide insights that theory
cannot. Although a single case must confront the issue of generalizability and cannot
reveal the significance of variation across key variables (except over time), it can appraise
human and social interactions and decisions, historical processes and events, and complex
organizational issues that defy analysis through natural science models (Sjoberg et al.,
1991). With a common framework, case studies also enable comparisons across place and
time. Research on regional impulses and outcomes thus lends itself to a case study
approach.
REGIONAL IMPULSES IN THE BUFFALO METROPOLITAN AREA

I turn to a case study of regional impulses in the Buffalo metropolitan area. Of special
interest are two topics: (1) how well the regional impulses framework accounts for regional
outcomes in the Buffalo area, and (2) the relative importance of individual regional
impulses in shaping regional outcomes.
The Buffalo metropolitan area offers an excellent laboratory for testing the utility of
regional impulses. The area comprises Erie County, which contains a range of settlement
City of Buffalo
Ring 1 Suburbs
L Ring 2 Suburbs
1 ' Outlying Suburbs
1 !
!
North C&r Concord
I
, __
FIGURE 1
Erie County Jurisdictions
types-dense urban areas in the central city, older mostly stable or declining suburbs (ring
1 suburbs), newer growing suburbs (ring 2 suburbs), and rural farms in outer towns and vil-
lages (outlying suburbs)-in western New York (Figures 1 and 2). As of 1990, the region
had 968,000 persons, down from a high of 1,057,000 in 1970. With 328,000 people, the
Southern Ontario
I
, .
.
i
iI
i . . . . . . . .I. .... .... ..I ...... ............
Pennsylvania
.IErie County
0 t h W e m a New York counties
FIGURE 2
Vicinity Map, Western New York
City of Buffalo is the metropolitan area’s central city and the second most populous city in
New York State. Buffalo is a prototypical rustbelt city with a declining industrial base,
strong ethnic heritage, individualistic political culture (Elazar, 1966), and the lion’s share
of the region’s poor and minority residents.
Public sector governance in the region is divided among 123 jurisdictions: one county,
three cities, 25 towns, 16 villages, 29 school districts, 49 independent special districts (33
fire districts, six housing authorities, six industrial development agencies, one library dis-
trict, one soil and water conservation district, one sewer authority, and one water
authority), and parts of two Native American reservations. The metropolitan area, like the
rest of New York State, is fully incorporated. Issues of regional governance have moved to
the front burner of the regional agenda throughout the 1990s as persistent central city and
386 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vol. 19/No.4/1997
regional economic decline and fiscal pressure have renewed national attention to links
between governance structure and regional competitiveness (Peirce, 1993). Several area
entities have critically assessed and widely publicized regional self-studies of service and
financial arrangements (for example, Erie County, 1996; UB Governance Project, 1996).
The Buffalo region is thus typical of many metropolitan areas. It is politically complex,
with strong local loyalties amidst growing regional self-consciousness. The region shows
increasing willingness to consider questions of regionalism, though there is neither consen-
sus about nor an institutional framework for deliberating issues of regional significance.
Although the region’s location along an international border is relatively uncommon, its
similarities with other metropolitan regions, particularly stable or declining regions in the
Northeast, make findings from the Buffalo case generalizable to these areas.
I gauge the Buffalo area’s potential for regionalism by assessing regional impulses rela-
tive to theoretical expectations and regional outcomes. Regional outcomes constitute
formal institutions of regionalism (for example, metropolitanwide provision of service by
a general-purpose or special-purpose government), formal or informal interlocal or cross-
sectoral agreements (for example, mutual aid pacts and public-private partnerships), and
regionwide or subregional (but supralocal) cooperative practices (for example, regional
marketing campaigns and visioning efforts).
Because even the most staunchly localist regions have some regionwide practices, I intro-
duce the concept of a “regional norm.” The regional norm constitutes two groups of services
whose attributesvirtually compel regionalization accordingto theories informing the regional
impulses framework. The first group, subject to strong natural resource and fiscal impulses,
comprises services characterized by high capital costs, economies of scale, a narrow range
of consumer preferences, strong externalities, and a strong need for cross-border coordina-
tion. Services in this group include airport, transit, pollution control, highways, water, sewer,
environmental planning, and regional marketing. The second group, subject to strong equity
and, often, state and federal legal impulses, includes services for which redistribution is
appropriate or mandated. These services include public assistance, social services, and fund-
ing of region-serving cultural facilities. The critical point is that certain services are expected
to and routinely do have regionwide provision. Such services comprise the regional norm.
Identification of the regional norm provides a means for assessing and comparing levels
of regionalism in service delivery. Metropolitan areas that do not provide “normally
regional” services on a regional scale have “below normal” regionalism. Those that do pro-
vide such services on a regional scale have “normal” regionalism levels. Areas providing
regionwide services beyond the regional norm have “above normal” regionalism.
The case study draws on primary and secondary sources, including over two dozen back-
ground interviews with area officials and other knowledgeable observers of governance and
service delivery in the Buffalo region. Unless otherwise noted, figures are from the relevant
years of the Census ofPopuZation and Housing compiled by the US Bureau of the Census.
Assessing the Potential for Regionalism

Natural Resource Impulses
With the exception of the Town of Grand Island, which is truly an island, there are vir-
tually no physical features that impede regionalism and several that promote it. The
strongest proregional resource impulse is common interest in two valuable water features,
Lake Erie and the Niagara River. These resources create over 70 miles of shoreline along-
side Erie County jurisdictions. Except for some rural towns, which draw water from wells
or surface water, the lake and river are the area’s sole water source and form its drainage
basin. Lake Erie and the Niagara River are also important recreation resources for residents
and tourists. Lake Erie abuts four states and Canada; 15 miles north of Buffalo, the Niagara
River flows over the Niagara escarpment to form Niagara Falls, a natural feature of global
significance and, thus, a potential source of regional coordination.
Macroeconomic Impulses
Macroeconomic impulses in the Buffalo area are relatively weak, offering motivation for
subregional ties within, but not between, its urban and rural areas. More so than many cen-
tral counties in US metropolitan regions, Erie County sustains two distinct economies and
ways of life, an urban-industrial northwest and a rural-agricultural southeast. As of 1990,
82% of the metropolitan area population lived in the urbanized central city and ring 1 sub-
urbs, which comprise approximately 20% of the metropolitan land area. The remaining
18% of the population lives in the relatively low density suburbs in ring 2 and outlying
areas. Around 245,000 acres in the south and east, representing over one-third of county
temtory, are in formally designated agricultural preservation districts.
Centrality Impulses
The steady and severe erosion of the City of Buffalo’s regional dominance in population,
employment, and retail sales weaken the area’s centrality-based regional impulses and,
hence, its potential for regional alliances, particularly between city and suburbs. In 1910,
the City of Buffalo, with 80% of regional residents, dominated its suburbs (Table 2). The
city retained its dominance for decades; as recently as 1950, when the City of Buffalo
reached an all-time high population of 580,000, it still had over 65% of area residents. For-
tunes reversed between 1950 and 1990, however, when the City of Buffalo lost 43% of its
residents (over 250,000 people), while the suburbs doubled in population (gaining over
320,000 persons), Today, the suburbs collectively dominate the central city, which has
only 34% of area residents.
TABLE 2
Population Attributes, 1910-1990, Buffalo City and Suburbs

Population, Population, City Share of
City of Buffalo Erie County Population Ratio, Total Metro
Year (‘000) Suburbs (’000) CitySuburbs Population
1910 423.7 105.2 4.03 0.80
1930 573.1 189.3 3.03 0.75
1950 580.1 319.1 1.82 0.65
1970 462.8 650.7 0.71 0.42
1990 328.1 640.4 0.51 0.34
Source: US Bureau of the Census. Census of Populationand Housing, 1910, 1930, 1950, 1970, 1990
TABLE 3
Manufacturing Employment, 1954-1992, Buffalo Clty and Suburbs

Pct. Change Pct. Change
Erie County City Suburbs
City of Buffalo Suburbs over previous over previous
Year (‘000) (‘ow (“h) (%I
1954 88.0 60.3 - -
1977 46.4 62.4 -47.2 3.5
1992 26.8 44.0 -42.2 -29.5
Total Change,
1954-1992 -61.2 -16.3 -69.5% -27.0%
Source: US Bureau of the Census. Census of Manufactures, 1954, 1977, 1992.
TABLE 4
Change In Retail Employment and Sales, 1958-1992, Buffalo Clty and Suburbs
Pct. Change, Retail Sales
Retail Employees (Constant ’82-’84$)
Erie County
City of Buffalo Suburbs
(“hchange over (70change over
City of Buffalo Erie County Suburbs previous) previous)
Year (‘000) % Change (’000) % Change
1958 37.2 17.6
1977 23.5 -36.8 45.3 157.4 -34.3 141.2
1992 20.9 -11.1 63.7 40.6 -35.0 11.7
Total, 1958-
1992 -16.4 -43.8 46.1 262.3 -57.3 169.4
Source: US Bureau of the Census. Census of Business, 1958; US Bureau of the Census. Census of Retail Trade.
1977,1992.
Trends in employment and retail sales tell a similar story of declining city centrality.
Although the entire region lost manufacturing jobs in the postwar period, the suburbs held
losses between 1954 and 1992 to a bleak 27%, while Buffalo lost nearly 70% of its manu-
facturing jobs (Table 3). Relentless decentralization of retail activity saw the City of
Buffalo fall from having more than twice as many retail employees as the suburbs in 1958
to fewer than one-third as many in 1992 (Table 4). Over the same period, constant dollar
retail sales in Buffalo declined 57%, while suburban sales were up 169%.
Growth Impulses
All three cities, 14 of the 16 villages, and 11 of the 25 towns in Erie County have fewer
residents than they did in 1970. Shared population decline among individual jurisdictions
suggests strong growth-based impulses for regionalism.
These proregional impulses are weakened, however, by the distinct kinds of decline
faced by the central city and most suburbs. In the City of Buffalo, population loss since
1970 was accompanied by a 14% decline in the number of households and a nearly 9%
decrease in dwelling units. Suburban population declines, in contrast, were accompanied
I RegionalImpulsesI 389
TABLE 5
Educational Attainment and Occupational Status, 1990, Buffalo City and Suburban Rings
Pct. without Pct. Managers/
Pct. with B.A.’ H.S. Degree’ Professionals
Place (%I (%) (%)
City of Buffalo 15.0 30.5 20.7
Ring 1 suburbs 21.4 18.7 27.6
Ring 2 suburbs 22.5 16.1 28.0
Outlying suburbs 13.0 22.2 20.7
Note: ‘Of persons 25 years and over.
Source: US Bureau of the Census, 7990 Census of Population and Housing.
by a 28% increase in households and a 30% increase in dwelling units. The different nature
of decline impedes formation of regionwide growth-based alliances.
Social Impulses
Social conditions offer theoretical, but ultimately weak, impulses for intraregional alli-
ances, especially across city-suburban lines. The City of Buffalo and outlying suburbs have
relatively similar educational attainment and occupational status (Table 5 ) , but potential
alliances are hampered by geographical separation. Between rural and urban areas are rings
of suburbs with relatively high social status.
Whatever proregional social impulses the city and noncity areas might have, however,
are offset by stark and widening city-noncity differences in racial composition (Table 6).
Thirty-five percent of Buffalo residents are racial minorities (primarily black), a level over
10 times that of the 3% minority level in the suburbs. Nearly 92% of the area’s black resi-
dents and 80% of its Hispanic residents live in the City of Buffalo. Relative to other
northeastern metropolitan areas, Erie County has experienced a trickle of black suburban-
ization (DeWitt, 1994).
Fiscal Impulses
Although there may be potential for subregional suburban alliances, city-suburban fiscal
differences suggest weak and diminishing fiscal impulses for regionwide collaborations.
TABLE 6
Racial Cornpositlon, 1950-1990, Buffalo City and Suburbs

Percent Minority
City of Erie County Total Metro
Buffalo Suburbs Area
Year (%) I%) (%)
1950 6 2 5
1970 21 1 10
1990 35 3 15
~
Source: US Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing, 1950,1970,1990.

TABLE 7
Fiscal Attributes, 1959-1992, Buffalo City and Suburbs

Median House Value
Assessed lntergovernmental
Valuation Per AidiTotal
Place 1959 1989 Household, 1992 Revenue, 1992
City of Buffalo $1 1,700 $46,700 $29.4 .34
Erie County Suburbs $16,189 $76,219 $84.0 .12
City to Suburbs Ratio .72 .61 .35 2.83
Source: US Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing, 1960, 1990; New York State Comptroller,
7992 Financial Transactions for Local Governments.
The City of Buffalo’s negative fiscal indicators-it has the county’s lowest median house
value, the lowest assessed valuation per capita, and the highest ratio of state and federal aid
to total revenues (Table 7)-make it an increasingly undesirable fiscal partner.
On economy of scale grounds, fiscal impulses are also weak for the City of Buffalo and
the four towns with populations above the 50,000 threshold for achieving economies of
scale for many services (De Torres, 1972). In contrast, the 33 towns and villages with
fewer than 20,000 residents have strong fiscal incentives to consolidate delively of services
subject to economies of scale.
Contrasting perceptions within the region of who is fiscally exploiting whom complicate
the picture of fiscal impulses associated with municipal exploitation. Suburban sentiment
holds that suburban taxpayers pay the lion’s share of public assistance and transit services,
for which city residents are the prime beneficiaries. City sentiment holds that city taxpay-
ers help fund an extensive system of exurban roads and sheriff services and bear the
greatest burden for city-located, region-serving facilities, including the symphony hall,
county medical center, central library, and professional hockey and baseball facilities.
Because the net balance of fiscal exploitation is contested, there are few fiscal impulses for
regional cooperation. The disagreement itself is a source of antiregional impulses between
city and suburbs.
Equity Impulses
Equity-based impulses offer mixed potential for regionalism. Income data reveal a poor
central core and relatively affluent suburbs, with differences increasing over time (Table
TABLE 8
Equity Indicators, 1959-1989, Buffalo City and Suburbs

Median Family Income
Proportion of
Persons below
Place 1959 1989 Povertv line. 1989
City of Buffalo $5,713 $23,887 .25
Erie County Suburbs $7,091 $40,034 ,051
Citv to Suburbs Ratio .81 .60 4.61
Source: US Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing, 1960,1990.
8). As of 1989, the median family income in the City of Buffalo was 60% of suburban
income levels, down from 81% 30 years before. One-quarter of Buffalo residents live
below the poverty line, compared to 4%-6% for areas outside the central city. Only if afflu-
ent jurisdictions agree that a more equalized distribution of wealth is desirable-and such
sentiment seems relatively muted within the region-would equity-based impulses spur
regional outcomes.
A countervailing equity impulse is the presence of pockets of poverty in rural villages
and certain ring 1 suburbs. These areas have fiscal and equity incentives to join with city
forces to lobby for a greater share of area resources, consistent with the “metropolitics”
strategy promoted by Orfield (1997). Such alliances have not occurred in Erie County, in
part because geographic, racial, and cultural differences separate poor urban and rural
areas.
Political Impulses
Patterns of political affiliation suggest potential for subregional but not regionwide alli-
ances. The City of Buffalo is solidly Democratic. As of March 1996,74% of its registered
voters and virtually every elected city official, including the mayor, comptroller, all 13 city
court judges, and 12 of 13 city council members, were registered Democrats. In contrast,
the majority of Erie County towns (19 of 25) have Republican majorities or pluralities
(Erie County Board of Elections, 1996). Split political allegiance hampers politically based
regional impulses.
A second antiregional political impulse is the City of Buffalo’s reputation as a bastion of
old-style politics characterized by patronage, partisan politics, and voting blocks based on
ethnicity and race. Although similar characteristics may hold for suburban governments,
the negative perception of “business as usual” government clings primarily to the city. To
the extent that noncity officials consequently perceive city government to be an unfit part-
ner, the chances for city-noncity collaboration is diminished.
Legal Impulses
Legal impulses for regional outcomes are mixed. State statutes enable most types of
regionalization, although specific provisions of state law dissuade regional outcomes.
Home rule provisions of the New York State constitution give jurisdictions extensive pow-
ers to manage their own affairs and limit state intrusion on local prerogatives. Approval of
municipal annexation, consolidation, and some functional transfers require a split referen-
dum-that is, majority approval by voters in each area affected by a change-a provision
that in practice thwarts reorganizations. City-county consolidation is not authorized by
general law and so requires special legislation. The State Constitution enables interlocal
service agreements but limits the scope to only those services for which participating gov-
ernments have independent authority, a provision that impedes municipal-county
collaborations in industrial development, housing, and urban renewal, functions that are
unauthorized for county government (New York State Commission on State-Local Rela-
tions, 1987).
Although state executives have encouraged intermunicipal collaboration (for example,
New York State Commission on Consolidation, 1993; New York State Comptroller, 1994),
legislative action has not followed. In 1994, the State Legislature failed to approve two
regionalism bills, one to facilitate cooperative purchasing agreements by local govern-

ments and another to authorize consolidation of county special districts. Funds have been
included in subsequent state budgets to support pilot projects for shared services and
school-municipal collaborations. Comprehensive state efforts await consensus on
approaches to designing a legislative framework for regionalism, including whether state
officials or localhegional officials should take the lead.
Historical Impulses
Three historical impulses, two antiregional and one proregional, influence regional out-
comes in the area. The first antiregional impulse is the remarkable stability of local
government borders (UB Governance Project, 1996). The 42-square-mile City of Buffalo
has essentially the same boundaries it did in 1853, putting it in a class with Washington,
DC, St. Louis, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and St. Paul, cities whose territorial size has
not changed for over a century (Jackson, 1985). Similarly, town boundaries are virtually
the same today as they were in 1857, and most village borders are identical to those estab-
lished in the late 1800s. Geopolitical stability fosters a strong sense of municipal identity
and loyalty to one’s hometown, especially among longtime residents. Coupled with New
York State’s strong home rule prerogatives, ardent localism makes for an unreceptive envi-
ronment for regional restructuring involving jurisdictional consolidation.
The second antiregional historical impulse is the long-standing rivalry and distrust
between the City of Buffalo and its suburban neighbors. Animosities date back to the
early 1820s when the then-Village of Buffalo was designated the western terminus of the
Erie Canal after intense wrangling with an adjacent larger village neighbor (Eberle &
Grande, 1987). Buffalo’s post-canal domination of regional growth, the city’s refusal in
the late 1800s to extend water to infrastructure-poor adjacent suburbs, and its similar
refusal to extend sewer services in the 1930s bred anticity resentment. When city-subur-
TABLE 9
Service Reglonalization,1930~-1990s,Buffalo MetropolitanArea

Service Regionalization by Decade
Decade Regionalized Services
1930s social welfare; public hospital
1940s probation; public health; Angola Beach
1950s libraries; airport
1960s transit (takeover from private corporations)
1970s central police services; cost sharing for cultural
facilities (zoo, art museum, science museum,
historical society, philharmonic orchestra); “new
services”: mental health; environmental
conservation, seniors’ services
1980s botanical gardens, public golf course, countywide
industrial development
1990s convention center, Bennett Beach; pending: services
for the disabled; senior transit services; some city
Darks. roads
Source: UB Governance Project 1996, 81, updated by author.
ban fortunes later reversed and the fiscally strapped city turned to the suburbs for
assistance in the postwar period, suburban charity was lukewarm. Although city-county
and city-suburban accommodations have occurred, proposals over the years to regional-
ize police, public works, highways, parks, weights and measures, the operation of a city-
based regional-serving market, and other services all foundered (UB Governance Project,
1996).
An offsetting proregional historic impulse is the 20th-century track record of service
regionalization in the area. Since the 1930s, mutually beneficial municipal-to-county ser-
vice transfers, regional takeover of private service operations, assignment of new public
functions to county or higher levels of government, and formation of regionwide special-
purpose districts have resulted in regionalization of numerous functions, including social
services, public health, libraries, an international airport, transit, central police services, a
public hospital, environmental conservation, seniors services, several parks, and funding
for several cultural and recreational facilities (Table 9).
Table 10 summarizes the theoretical potential for regional alliances in the Buffalo area.
Promoting regionalism are joint interest in area water resources, political incentives to col-
laborate for greater political clout with higher level governments, legal provisions enabling
municipal service agreements, historic precedents for regional achievement in recent
decades, and some sentiment for narrowing intermunicipal disparities. Favoring subre-
gional, though not regionwide, outcomes are fiscal incentives among smaller jurisdictions
to capture economies of scale, macroeconomic commonalities in urban and rural areas,
selected cross-jurisdiction political commonalities, and similar social, fiscal, and growth
patterns in a band of relatively affluent suburban jurisdictions. Hampering regionalism are
the declining centrality of Buffalo, significant race and income differences between city
and suburban residents, uneven jurisdictional growth trends, uneven fiscal capacity, mac-
TABLE 10
Regional Impulses Balance Sheet, Buffalo Metropolitan Area

Proreaional ImDulses Antireaional ImDulses
Natural Resource:common interest in area Macroeconomic:distinct urban and rural
water resources modes of production
Equity: moderate interest in redistribution Centrality: waning central city domination
Political: common local government interest Growth: uneven city-suburban growth
versus higher-level governments experiences
Legal: permissive state legislation for intermu- Social: wide city-suburban disparities in socio-
nicipal agreements economic status and racial composition
Historical: numerous precedents for service Fiscal: wide city-suburban disparities in fiscal
regionalization capacity
Equity: some resistance to redistribution
Political: mixed patty affiliations; anticity senti-
ment
Legal: constraints on annexation, consolida-
tion, and functional transfers; strong municipal
home rule powers
Historical: long-standing local government bor-
ders; long-standing city-suburban antagonism
able 11
rie County Service Framework

I. RegionalArrangements
Service Provider Relevant Regional Impulses Comments
ransportation (bus, rail, Niagara Frontier Transit Authority Fiscal (economies of scale); Takeover of failing private transit
orts, airport) (NFTA) Natural Resources companies, 1950s
conomic Development Empire State Development Corp. Growth (compete effectively Autonomous and competitive IDAs
(state); Erie County Industrial in global economy) established in five suburban
Development Agency (IDA) municipalities, 1970s-1980s
ourism and Conventions Greater Buffalo Convention and Growth (compete effectively Managed by private Greater Buffalo
Visitors Bureau in global economy) Partnership
ibraries Buffalo and Erie County Public Fiscal; Legal (state incentives Federationestablished, 1947-1954
Libraty System to federate)
elected Parks New York State, Erie County Fiscal (economies of scale, City to county transfers, 1950s-1980s
coordination)
ublic Health and Hospital Erie County Natural Resource; Fiscal City-municipalto county transfers,
1930s-1940s
entral Police Services Erie County Fiscal (economies of scale, City to county transfers: probation,
coordination, spillovers) 1940s; forensics and training, 1970s
ublic Assistance Erie County Legal (state-mandate);Equity City to county transfer, 1930s
ultural Facilities-Zoo, Private-nonprofits,with Fiscal; Equity City to private or nonprofit ownership,
istorical Society, Art and multisectoralfunding 1960s-1980s;county assumption of
cience Museums, major funding, 1970s
hilharmonic Orchestra
oad Maintenance Mutual IntermunicipalAgreement Fiscal (economies of scale) Established 1980s
id Pact
obbying Association of Erie County Political All municipalitiesare members; regional
Governments mergers not high on agenda
II. Subregional Arrangements
Service Provider Relevant Regional Impulses Comments
ater Erie County Water Authority (most Pro: Fiscal, Macroeconomic; Buffalo, Towns of Grand Island, and
urbanized suburbs) Anti: Historical; Political Tonawanda operate local systems; rural
areas use wells or surface water.
ewer Buffalo Sewer Authority (city plus Pro: Fiscal (economiesof Towns of Amherst, Grand Island, and
selected towns to east); Erie scale); Anti: Political Tonawanda operate local systems; rural
County Sewer Districts (remainder of areas unsewered
urbanized area)
ommunity Development Consortium of small towns and villages Pro: Fiscal (economies of Smaller municipalities (36 of 43 total)
lock Grants (CDBG) scale), Legal collaborate
olid Waste Management Three subregionalconsortia, not Pro: Legal (state incentive), Countywide effort thwarted, 1990s
including City of Buffalo Fiscal; Anti: Political
lanning-University City of Buffalo, Towns of Amherst Pro: Fiscal (coordination; City-suburban-universityjoint
istrict and Tonawanda, and University at spillovers); Natural Resource; agreement, operating since 1994
Buffalc Growth
uman Resources/Civil Erie County, excluding City of Buffalo Pro: Fiscal; Anti: Political City retains own personnel and civil
ervice Personnel service department
111. Local Arrangements
Relevant Antiregional
Service Provider Impulses Comments
ital Statistics Individual municipalities Political; Fiscal Forty-four bureaus; consolidation
opposed by municipal governments
MS Dispatch Individual municipalities Political Twenty-eight dispatchers
ocal Parks and Recre- Individual municipalities Fiscal; Social Some service sharing in rural towns
tion
olid Waste Collection Arranged by individual municipalities; Political City to county transfer proposal rejected
service by municipal or private by city in 1996
provider
unicipal Courts Individual municipalities Legal (home rule powers) Forty-fourcourts; countywide District
Attorney
olice Patrol Individual municipalities;rural areas Historical; Social; Fiscal 1968 police consolidationproposal
served by County Sheriff defeated in voter referendum
oad MaintenancelSnow Individual municipalities Political; Fiscal Municipal public works departments are
lowing (interjurisdictionalcompetition) rich source of local jobs
ire Protection Municipal departments and 33 Historical; Social Strong allegiance to volunteer fire district
submunicipal fire districts companies
lanningKommunity Municipal departments or private con- Legal; Growth Regionwide planning inactive since
evelopment tracts 1980s
ublic Housing Six municipalitiesoperate housing Social; Centrality Institutional resistanceto mergers
authorities
conomic Development Municipalities,IDAs Growth; Fiscal Over 140 entities provide economic
(interiurisdictionalcomoetition) develoDment services
396 I JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS I Vo/. 19/No. 4/1997
roeconomic differences between urban and rural communities, legal constraints on

municipal annexation and consolidation, long-standing local government boundaries,
strong home rule provisions, and historical rivalries and distrust between the City of Buf-
falo and its suburbs. Although standard scales for measuring regional impulses do not
exist, I suggest that proregional impulses are less numerous and generally weaker than
antiregional impulses, especially at the city-suburban divide.
The Reality of Regionalism

The regional impulses analysis suggests relatively weak potential for regional outcomes
in the Buffalo metropolitan area. Does the reality of regionalism bear this out? Only to a
qualified extent, as indicated by the inventory of service delivery arrangements in Table
11. The inventory, which excludes services provided nationwide or statewide by federal
and state entities, lists services provided regionally, subregionally, and locally, along with
the regional or antiregional impulses most relevant to these outcomes.
On balance, there is more regionalism in the area than might be expected on the basis
of regional impulses. Numerous services are provided at the regional or subregional
scale, although several important service collaborations exclude the City of Buffalo. Fis-
cal, equity, growth, and natural resource impulses are important incentives for
regionalism. Historical, political, fiscal, and social impulses are important obstacles to
regionalism.
ASSESSING REGIONAL IMPULSES AND OUTCOMES

What accounts for the greater than expected extent of regional outcomes in the Buffalo
region? How useful is the regional impulses framework in accounting for regional out-
comes and shedding light on metropolitan regionalism? The analysis suggests five
findings.
Findings
Minimum Regional Norm
The first finding is affirmation of the concept of regional norm. Despite relatively weak
proregional impulses and several strong antiregional impulses, the Buffalo region has
numerous regional outcomes, including areawide provision of transit, public assistance,
public health, libraries, central police services, some aspects of economic development
such as regional marketing, and mutual aid for road maintenance. All except libraries and
the mutual aid road pact are regional norm services. Because of legal, fiscal, and natural
resource impulses, these services are expected to be and routinely are provided at the
regional scale. Libraries and mutual aid road maintenance exceed regional norms. Several
other regional norm services, including water, sewer, regional planning, infrastructure
development, growth management, and regional economic development, either are not
provided or are accomplished locally or subregionally.
With respect to service delivery, then, the Buffalo area has a mixed record of regionalism
relative to a regional norm. Still, services provided locally that are normally provided
regionally outnumber those provided regionally that are normally provided locally. Cou-
pled with the absence of a multisectoral forum or process for deliberating issues of regional
significance, on balance the region could be judged to fall shy of normal levels of
regionalism.
A Hierarchy of Impulses
The second finding is that although each regional impulse influences one or more
regional outcomes, some impulses are more influential than others. While the relative
importance of impulses may be case specific, the Buffalo study suggests several potential
generalizations.
Most fundamental, though often undervalued, is that legal impulses, especially mandates
or prohibitions, shape regional outcomes. Legal incentives that promote or hamper region-
alism can predispose regional outcomes, a finding consistent with studies investigating the
determinants of metropolitan political structure (for example, Bollens, 1986;Foster, 1996;
Nelson, 1990).
Next most influential are impulses that singularly affect regional outcomes. In the Buf-
falo region, this group comprises fiscal, historical, and political impulses. As elaborated
below, proregional fiscal impulses appear to be a sine qua non of regional outcomes.
Political and historical impulses are often most salient as obstacles to regionalization.
Even when other impulses warrant regional outcomes, political loyalties, a historical leg-
acy of interjurisdictional conflict, and an entrenched antiregional political culture
reflected in resident norms and attitudes toward governance can derail regional
agreements.
Other regional impulses-social, macroeconomic, centrality, equity, natural resource,
and growth-reinforce or erode regional outcomes, but, at least in the Buffalo region, do
not singularly determine them. Secondary influence may be short-lived in the case of
growth impulses, which, given pressures of a global economy, may be sufficient to offset
unhealthy forms of interjurisdictionalcompetition, a potent antiregional growth impulse in
many economically declining metropolitan areas.
Historical Accumulation
The third finding is that past decisions and historical inertia may account in large mea-
sure for contemporary patterns of regionalism. From the 1930s to the 1980s, regional
outcomes resulted from municipal to county functional transfers, public takeover of private
services, and state-mandated or federally encouraged regional services.
The analysis reveals that these outcomes emerged when regional impulses were rela-
tively stronger than they are today. Social, centrality, fiscal, and equity gaps between city
and suburbs were narrower in past decades, making for an environmentrelatively receptive
to regionalism. State mandates and federal incentives to provide transportation, environ-
mental control, regional planning, and some social services at the county or higher scale
also facilitated regional outcomes in the 1960s and 1970s. Today’s menu of regional out-
comes is largely the product of cumulative historic choices originating in regional impulses
of an earlier time. This finding reinforces the influence of regional impulses on regional
outcomes and affirms the value of detailed historical case studies in understanding metro-
politan regions (Orum, 1991).
Mutual Fiscal Benefit

A fourth finding is that mutual benefit, not altruism, governs regional outcomes. It is evi-
dently not enough for a weak party to seek regionalization as a bailout for serious
problems, nor is it sufficient for a strong entity to seek to expand its influence through
regionalization. Apparently, bargaining parties, strong and weak alike, must be made no
worse off by new regional outcomes or such outcomes will not occur.
The mutual benefit condition seems most crucial with respect to fiscal impulses. Poten-
tial collaborators require that a functional transfer not jeopardize their fiscal footing.
Contrary to theoretical predictions, widespread fiscal stress appears to hamper rather thari
motivate regional consolidations. Public officials indicate that uncertain fiscal conditions
at municipal and county halls in the Buffalo region have dampened regional impulses over
the past two decades. Only recently, as Erie County has strengthened its financial position,
have county officials been willing to assist municipalities through regionalization. Still, as
a matter of policy, Erie County rejects any service takeover that jeopardizes its credit rat-
ing, unduly raises the property tax burden, or merely shifts fiscal burdens from one
jurisdiction to others (Erie County, 1996).
The imperative of mutual fiscal benefit nonetheless suggests a new means by which fis-
cally poor but multiculturally rich jurisdictions like the City of Buffalo can be attractive
regional collaborators. Some federal and state programs require that municipalities demon-
strate economic hardship or meet minimal levels of minority participation as a condition
for receipt of program funding. As a consequence, the socioeconomic and demographic
characteristics that have traditionally rendered poorer, more diverse jurisdictions undesir-
able service partners now make them potentially desirable collaborators.
Civic Regionalism
A final finding is the importance of nongovernmental players-private, nonprofit, civic
and academic-in the regional impulses framework. Fiscal and growth impulses, notably
the desire to compete effectively against other regions for economic development, offer
strong proregional incentives for private sector players (Teaford, 1979; Wallis, 1995). In
Buffalo, the major metropolitan newspaper, The BuffuZo News,is a champion of regional-
ism and proregional efforts in the area. The Greater Buffalo Partnership, the area’s regional
chamber of commerce, takes the lead on regional marketing, promotion, and tourism; oper-
ates the area’s convention and visitors’ bureau; sponsors a regionwide, citizen-based
visioning process; and conducts research on issues of governance. Private groups, particu-
larly those with investments in the central city and a desire to revitalize downtown, respond
also to equity and centrality impulses. Some private groups base their proregional ardor in
part on a political impulse, namely lack of confidence in local governments’ ability to
effectively meet regional needs.
Fiscal, growth, centrality, equity, and political impulses also motivate nonprofit, civic,
and academic entities in the Buffalo region. These include the Erie County League of
Women Voters (which has led campaigns to streamline government), the University at
Buffalo (which has conducted research and forums on regional governance issues), and the
Buffalo Foundation and the Western New York Grantmakers Association (which have
coordinated and financially supported proregional efforts). Because the proregional initia-
tives of nongovernmental groups have been generally ad hoc and uncoordinated, however,
their cumulative influence has lagged. Beginning in 1997, talk of “consolidating the con-
solidators’’ has renewed interest in collaboration, although the region still lacks a
multisectoral regional body to deliberate issues of regional concern. This institutional
absence opens the way for strong antiregional political, social, and historical impulses to
foil proregional efforts.
CONCLUSION
Social science identifies numerous proregional and antiregional impulses for regional
outcomes. The nature, strength, and interplay of these impulses determine the extent to
which an area functions regionally. In general, the greater the similarity between people
and places with a region-socially, fiscally, politically, and developmentally-the more
apt these people and places are to pursue and forge regional alliances. History, politics,
economics, resources, and legal factors may reinforce or weaken tendencies toward region-
alism. Analyzing regional impulses can reveal gaps between the theory and practice of
regionalism in politically complex metropolitan areas.
Application of the regional impulses framework to the Buffalo metropolitan area yields
several findings worthy of further investigation in analyses of other metropolitan regions.
Legal, fiscal, political, and historical impulses are often singularly influential in achieving
or preventing regional outcomes. Proregional fiscal impulses appear to be a necessary con-
dition for regionalism in economically declining regions. History matters, too: The
accumulation of past decisions and organizational inertia underlie contemporary patterns
of regionalism. Nongovernmental groups also play key roles in the regional impulses
framework; as these private, nonprofit, and higher education players take a more aggres-
sive role in regional governance, the relative prominence of specific impulses may shift
and new impulses may emerge. Regardless of the strength of regional impulses, however,
regional outcomes in service delivery reflect a regional norm. Normally regional services
are those for which fiscal and resource impulses oblige regionalization or for which equity
and legal impulses compel regionwide delivery.
The regional impulses framework enables testing the relevance of theoretical motiva-
tions for regionalism and clarifying why some regions function more regionally than
others. As such, the framework offers a basis for comparative case studies of regionalism’s
possibilities and reality in different metropolitan areas. Investigating areas that vary by
size, age, rate of growth, and underlying political structure would shed light on the persis-
tence of regional impulses under different conditions and whether certain impulses
consistently trump others in importance. The regional impulses framework also offers a
means for policy makers to reveal gaps between theoretical norms and regional realities
and thus identify strong and weak links in a regional governance system. In short, the
regional impulses approach holds promise for scholarship and practice as regions strive to
achieve more effective regional governance systems.
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KATHRYN A.

ABSTRACT: Spurred by fiscal pressure, persistent city-suburban disparities, and the

JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS, Volume 19, Number 4, pages 375-403

The resurgence of activity in regionalism prompts investigation in this paper of “regional

REGIONAL IMPULSES: A THEORETICAL REVIEW

Summary of Regional Impulses

Categories of Regional Impulses

10. Historical Impulses

MEASURING REGIONAL IMPULSES AND OUTCOMES

adjustment, marked by reliance on interlocal agreements and public-private partnerships;

When...do extensive mutual adjustments begin to resemble two-tier governance? How

REGIONAL IMPULSES IN THE BUFFALO METROPOLITAN AREA

North C&r Concord

Assessing the Potential for Regionalism

Population Attributes, 1910-1990, Buffalo City and Suburbs

Manufacturing Employment, 1954-1992, Buffalo Clty and Suburbs

Racial Cornpositlon, 1950-1990, Buffalo City and Suburbs

Source: US Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing, 1950,1970,1990.

Fiscal Attributes, 1959-1992, Buffalo City and Suburbs

Equity Indicators, 1959-1989, Buffalo City and Suburbs

regionalism bills, one to facilitate cooperative purchasing agreements by local govern-

Service Reglonalization,1930~-1990s,Buffalo MetropolitanArea

Regional Impulses Balance Sheet, Buffalo Metropolitan Area

rie County Service Framework

roeconomic differences between urban and rural communities, legal constraints on

The Reality of Regionalism

ASSESSING REGIONAL IMPULSES AND OUTCOMES

Mutual Fiscal Benefit

Ake, C. (1967). A theory of political integration. Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press.

Foster, K. A. (1996). Specialization in government: The uneven use of special districts in US

Marando, V. L. (1968). Inter-local cooperation in a metropolitan area: Detroit. Urban Afsaairs

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