Did David Lewis successfully establish the logical possibility of backward time travel?

Hermsmeier 2016

In David Lewis’s ‘The Paradoxes of Time-travel’, Lewis argues for the logical possibility of
time-travel. In this essay, I argue that he succeeds, namely, in showing travel to the past is
logically possible. Firstly, I will define time-travel (per Lewis). Secondly, I will explore
supposed paradoxes of backward time-travel. Lastly, I will acknowledge common arguments
formulated to deny the possibility of backward time-travel, subsequently showing that, granting
their success, these arguments provide restrictions on backward time-travel too narrow in scope
to have any impact on logical possibility.

1. Time-travel Defined.
Lewis defines time-travel as a discrepancy between personal time (PT) and external time
(ET) (1,p145-6). ET can be understood as ‘normal time’ or the general rate and direction of time
as we, non-time-travellers, observe and experience it (1,p146). In contrast, PT can be defined as
time as it seems to pass for the individual (Ibid.). For non-time-travellers, PT and ET seem to
march in-step with each other. Yet for the time-traveller, this isn’t so: he may travel from 2016 to
2027 (11 years of ET), yet only experience the passing of 10 minutes (PT)1 (Ibid.).

2. Unsuccessful Arguments against Backward Time-travel.

2.1 The Grandfather Paradox

A common argument goes thus: imagine a young man, Jim, goes back in time (years before
his father’s birth) in order to kill his paternal grandfather (1,p149). If Jim succeeds, his father is
never born, Jim is never born, and Jim doesn’t travel to the past; thus his grandfather lives. If his
grandfather lives, Jim is born and goes back in time and kills his grandfather. Thus, we have a
logical contradiction: If Jim kills, Jim doesn’t kill. If Jim doesn’t kill, Jim kills. (Ibid.).
In reply, Lewis argues for a distinction to be drawn between two senses of ability (1,p148-
9). In one sense, (a) Jim can kill his grandfather: Jim is an excellent marksman, his grandfather
is an easy target, etc. (1,p148). In another sense, (b) Jim cannot kill his grandfather: his
grandfather lived. To kill him would be to change a moment in time—which is itself a logical
contradiction (1,p149).2

1
This 10 minutes of PT can be confirmed via (e.g.) biological processes of the individual, atomic decay of matter
within the time-machine, the ticking of the traveller’s (properly functioning) wristwatch, etc. (1,p146). Lewis notes
PT isn’t actually time, but plays the role of time in the various stages of an enduring object (Ibid.).
2
Lewis defines change as ‘qualitative change between temporal parts of an enduring thing’ [emphasis added]
(1,p145). Given a moment in time is a temporal part (of all things inhabiting that moment in time), it, by definition,
cannot undergo change (1,p149).
Did David Lewis successfully establish the logical possibility of backward time travel? Hermsmeier 2016

The claim (a) has compossibility with a limited set of facts (i.e., Jim’s marksmanship, lack
of wind, etc.) (Ibid.). The claim (b) is compossible with a wider set of facts (i.e., all of the facts
compossible with (a) and the fact that Jim’s grandfather lives) (Ibid.). In everyday life for non-
time-travellers, the limited set of facts compossible with (a) is all that our temporal vantage point
allows us to consider (1,p149-50). For the time-traveller, further consideration can be given to
what is known to be the case (1,p150). For both the time-traveller and the non-time-traveller,
what is the case in a moment of time trumps all other facts, but what is the case is never
available for us non-time-travellers to consider (Ibid.). Thus, we naturally commit the fallacy of
assuming all that matters are the facts compossible with (a) and conclude that Jim could
(actually) kill his grandfather if he went back in time (Ibid.). If we’re mindful not to commit this
fallacy, the grandfather paradox never gets off the ground.

2.2 Replacement Change/Counterfactual Impact.3

That said, a distinction should be drawn between replacement change and counterfactual
impact (Ibid.). As we’ve seen, a replacement change (i.e., changing/replacing the past [or present
or future]) is logically denied, but that isn’t to say a time-traveller has no impact on past events.
Indeed, Jim may have successfully shot his grandfather, being the cause of his grandfather’s
missing finger he remembers from childhood. Such counterfactual impact leads to no logical
contradiction.4
This distinction also provides rebuttals to other supposed logical objections to backward time-
travel:
A) No-Past Destination Objection (2,p444): The past is unchangeable, thus we cannot travel
to it.
B) Possibility Restriction Objection (2,p448): A button is pressed that will detonate a bomb
an hour in the past. Notably, the bomb was taped to the button. Thus, if the button is
pressed, the button will be destroyed before it was pressed.
In response to (A), we see that just because the past is unchangeable doesn’t mean we can’t
have counterfactual impact on past events (i.e., it isn’t logically contradictory to travel to, and
interact with, the unchangeable past) (2,p450).
In response to (B), we see the grandfather paradox re-worded. Although proponents of this
objection will have issue with the lack of free-will accorded to humans and other ‘agents,’ there
isn’t anything logically inconsistent with Parmenidean time or lack of free-will (2,p449).

3
These terms are borrowed from Alasdair Richmond (Philosophy of Time Travel, Lecture 1 Notes: The Lewisian
Analysis, 2016).
4
Many take issue with this sort of reverse causality necessitating inexplicable causal loops— ‘closed causal chains
in which some of the causal links are normal in direction and others are reversed’ (1,p148). But as Lewis notes,
inexplicability is hardly sufficient grounds for denying logical possibility to various concepts: Big Bang, infinite past,
‘simultaneous causality’, etc. (Ibid.).
Did David Lewis successfully establish the logical possibility of backward time travel? Hermsmeier 2016

Thus, we see many objections to the logical possibility of backward time-travel fail against
the Lewis’s clarification. Now, let us turn our attention to somewhat more successful arguments
against backward time-travel.

3. Successful Arguments against Specific Backward Time-travel.

3.1 Double-occupancy problem

Imagine a time-machine (henceforth WTM) which, at a time (t), changes direction in ET,
but continues to persist normally in PT and space (3,p336). Assuming WTM is stationary at (t), it
seems that two objects are found occupying the same space at the same time: the backward-
moving WTM and the forward-moving WTM (Ibid.). This seems logically contradictory: two
objects cannot inhabit the same space at the same moment (Ibid.).
To resolve this double-occupancy problem, WTM need only get a running start, vanishing
at a given point in time and space (see Figure 3.1) (3,p344). Thus, object-overlap caused by a
stationary WTM or a WTM that changes temporal direction at a point in time (rather than at a
point in time and space) is avoided (Ibid.).5

Figure 3.1 (3,p345)

5
Notably, a non-time-traveller observer would see WTM disappearing as it collided with an identical, yet
backwards-functioning/moving, WTM (much like the collision of an electron and positron) (2,p445).
Did David Lewis successfully establish the logical possibility of backward time travel? Hermsmeier 2016

3.2 Cheshire Cat Problem

Unfortunately, this move leads to another logical problem for backward time-travel: if there
are points in ET where only a portion of WTM is present (see Figure 3.1), how can WTM be
said to exist (3,p345)?
One response is to imagine an n-dimensional WTM translates while performing a half-
rotation in n+1-dimensional space (see Figure 3.2) (4,p4). By doing so, double-occupancy is
avoided and the Cheshire-fade (i.e., WTM disappearing bit-by-bit) is only an appearance to n-
dimensional observers (Ibid.).

Figure 3.2 (4,p4)

Unfortunately, such rotation in ‘hyperspace’ would restructure WTM into a mirror-image of
itself (its left side would be on the right, all the way down to its molecular structure (4,p5). Thus,
one not wishing to concede l-adrenaline as being the same as d-adrenaline might be similarly
reluctant to concede WTM is the same object as mirror-image WTM (even if causally-connected,
the change might be deemed too great to preserve identity by some).6

6
Isomers are molecules with mirror-image structures (e.g., l-adrenaline and d-adrenaline) (4, p5).
Did David Lewis successfully establish the logical possibility of backward time travel? Hermsmeier 2016

For those willing to allow such a change between two temporal parts of the series that is
WTM, a problem still remains. As Richmond cites, any object with necessarily fluid, gas, or
otherwise-filled cavities would expel its cavities’ contents (4,p6). I.e., if a 3-dimensional object
were to find itself in 4-dimensional space, there would be nothing stopping all internal substance
from going outside its body in the direction of the additional, anatomically-unaccounted-for
direction. So time-travel via rotational-WTM wouldn’t be feasible for a human wishing to
survive the journey.

3.3 Clarified Scope.

Still, this doesn’t seem like an argument against the logical possibility of backward time-
travel. Rather, it seems to be an argument for the survivability of such a feat, given certain
nomological assumptions. Further, the inside-out problem and mirror problem aren’t hurdles to
non-living, homogenously structured objects travelling backward in time via rotational-WTM
(4,p6). And though it’s hard to fathom the type of force necessary to cause an n-dimensional
object to begin rotation in n+1-dimensional space, such intervention from higher-dimensional
forces isn’t logically impossible (Ibid.).
Thus, while these arguments might succeed in a specific claim (e.g., backward time-travel
via WTM that avoids double-occupancy and Cheshire-fading isn’t survivable for non-
homogenously-structured organisms in a Newtonian universe), the logical possibility of
backward time-travel remains unscathed.

4. Conclusion
In this essay, I have argued Lewis successfully establishes the logical possibility of
backward time-travel. First, I expressed Lewis’s argument and demonstrated its strength against
three supposed paradoxes of backward time-travel. Subsequently, I explored two notable
arguments that begin as logical arguments against backward time-travel, but are eventually
beaten to a scope far too narrow to attack logical possibility.
Did David Lewis successfully establish the logical possibility of backward time travel? Hermsmeier 2016

References

1. Lewis, David. "The paradoxes of time travel." American Philosophical Quarterly 13.2
(1976): 145-152.

2. Dowe, Phil. "The case for time travel." Philosophy 75.03 (2000): 441-451.

3. Le Poidevin, Robin. "The Cheshire Cat problem and other spatial obstacles to backwards
time travel." The Monist 88.3 (2005): 336-352.

4. Richmond, Alasdair. Philosophy of Time Travel, Lecture 4 Notes: The Cheshire Cat Problem
and Other Spatial Perplexities (2016).