FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 126013. February 12, 1997]

SPOUSES HEINZRICH THEIS AND BETTY THEIS, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, HONORABLE ELEUTERIO GUERRERO, ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH XVIII,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, TAGAYTAY CITY, CALSONS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

In the instant petition, we shall have the occasion to apply the concept of mistake in the
annulment of contracts.

Private respondent Calsons Development Corporation is the owner of three (3) adjacent
parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 15515 (parcel no. 1 in the
location map), 15516 (parcel no. 2) and 15684 (parcel no. 3), with the area of 1,000 square
meters, 226 square meters and 1,000 square meters, respectively. All three parcels of land
are situated along Ligaya Drive, Barangay Francisco, Tagaytay City. Adjacent to parcel no. 3,
which is the lot covered by TCT No. 15684, is a vacant lot denominated as parcel no. 4.

In 1985, private respondent constructed a two-storey house on parcel no. 3. The lots covered
by TCT No. 15515 and TCT No. 15516, which are parcel no. 1 and parcel no. 2, respectively,
remained idle.

However, in a survey conducted in 1985, parcel no. 3, where the two-storey house stands,
was erroneously indicated to be covered not by TCT No. 15684 but by TCT No. 15515, while
the two idle lands (parcel nos. 1 and 2) were mistakenly surveyed to be located on parcel no.
4 instead (which was not owned by private respondent) and covered by TCT Nos. 15516 and
15684.

On October 26, 1987, unaware of the mistake by which private respondent appeared to be
the owner of parcel no. 4 as indicated in the erroneous survey, and based on the erroneous
information given by the surveyor that parcel no. 4 is covered by TCT No. 15516 and 15684,
private respondent, through its authorized representative, one Atty. Tarcisio S. Calilung, sold
said parcel no. 4 to petitioners.

Upon execution of the Deed of Sale, private respondent delivered TCT Nos. 15516 and 15684
to petitioners who, on October 28, 1987, immediately registered the same with the Registry
of Deeds of Tagaytay City. Thus, TCT Nos. 17041 and 17042 in the names of the petitioners
were issued.

Indicated on the Deed of Sale as purchase price was the amount of P130,000.00. The actual
price agreed upon and paid, however, was P486,000.00. This amount was not immediately
paid to private respondent; rather, it was deposited in escrow in an interest-bearing account
in its favor with the United Coconut Planters Bank in Makati City. The P486,000.00 in escrow
was released to, and received by, private respondent on December 4, 1987.
Thereafter, petitioners did not immediately occupy and take possession of the two (2) idle
parcels of land purchased from private respondent. Instead, petitioners went to Germany.

In the early part of 1990, petitioners returned to the Philippines. When they went to Tagaytay
to look over the vacant lots and to plan the construction of their house thereon, they
discovered that parcel no. 4 was owned by another person. They also discovered that the lots
actually sold to them were parcel nos. 2 and 3 covered by TCT Nos. 15516 and 15684,
respectively. Parcel no. 3, however, could not have been sold to the petitioners by the private
respondents as a two-storey house, the construction cost of which far exceeded the price
paid by the petitioners, had already been built thereon even prior to the execution of the
contract between the disputing parties.

Petitioners insisted that they wanted parcel no. 4, which is the idle lot adjacent to parcel no.
3, and persisted in claiming that it was parcel no. 4 that private respondent sold to them.
However, private respondent could not have possibly sold the same to them for it did not
own parcel no. 4 in the first place.

The mistake in the identity of the lots is traceable to the erroneous survey conducted in 1985.

To remedy the mistake, private respondent offered parcel nos. 1 and 2 covered by TCT Nos.
15515 and 15516, respectively, as these two were precisely the two vacant lots which private
respondent owned and intended to sell when it entered into the transaction with petitioners.
Petitioners adamantly rejected the good faith offer. They refused to yield to reason and
insisted on taking parcel no. 3, covered by TCT No. 155864 and upon which a two-storey house
stands, in addition to parcel no. 2, covered by TCT No. 15516, on the ground that these TCTs
have already been cancelled and new ones issued in their name.

Such refusal of petitioners prompted private respondent to make another offer, this time, the
return of an amount double the price paid by petitioners. Petitioners still refused and
stubbornly insisted in their stand.

Private respondent was then compelled to file an action for annulment of deed of sale and
reconveyance of the properties subject thereof[1] in the Regional Trial Court.[2]

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent. Identifying the core issue in
the instant controversy to be the voidability of the contract of sale between petitioners and
private respondent on the ground of mistake, the trial court annulled said contract of sale
after finding that there was indeed a mistake in the identification of the parcels of land
intended to be the subject matter of said sale. The trial court ratiocinated:

"Meeting head-on the issue of alleged mistake in the object of the same, defendants in their
answer averred that they relied on the technical descriptions of TCT Nos. 15516 and 15684
appearing in the deed of sale x x x

A resolution of the conflicting claims of the parties to the instant controversy calls for an
inquiry on their real intent relative to the identity of the parcels which plaintiff intended to
sell to defendants and which the latter in turn, intended to buy from the former. For, the
Court cannot ignore the dictates of logic and common sense which, ordinarily, could not push
a person to sell to another, a property which the former does not own in the first place, for
fear of adverse consequences. The vendee, following the same reasoning, would not buy a
thing unless he is totally certain that the seller is the real owner of the thing offered for sale.
It is equally true that when one sells or buys a real property, he either sells or buys the
property as he sees it, in its actual setting and by its physical metes and bounds, and not be
the mere lot number assigned to the same property in the certificate of title or in any
document. And, when a buyer of real property decides to purchase from his seller, he is
ordinarily bound by prudence to ascertain the true nature, identity or character of the
property that he intends to buy and ascertain the title of his vendor before he parts with his
money. It is quite obvious that the foregoing precepts and precautions were observed by the
parties in the case at bar as there is no question at all that the sale in question was
consummated through the initiative of Mrs. Gloria Contreras and then Vice-Mayor Benjamin
Erni x x x both brokers of the sale who, after a chance meeting with defendants at the Taal
Vista Lodge Hotel prior to the sale of plaintiff's parcels, brought defendants to the vicinity
where plaintiff's three (3) adjacent parcels of land are located and pointed to defendants the
two (2) vacant parcels right beside plaintiff's house. It is also undisputed that when
defendants intimated to the brokers their desire to buy the vacant lots pointed to them when
they visited the same place, they were brought to plaintiff's representative, Tarcisio S.
Calilung, at the latter's office in Makati where the parties discussed the terms of the sale.

The Court notes further from the records that defendants' desire to buy vacant lots from
plaintiff is not only confirmed by the testimony of Gloria Contreras and the ocular inspection
conducted by the court but by defendant Betty Theis herself when the latter testified as
follows:

'COURT:

Q. Why, what was the lot that you intended to buy?

A. The right side of the house, Your Honor.' (TSN of November 8, 1991, page 19)

Similarly, in answer to a question propounded to the same defendant by their counsel, she
stated that

'ATTY. ROSALES:

Q. In other words, the titles delivered to you were not the titles covering the right side of the
house?

A. No, sir.' (Ibid., page 20)

It is relevant to mention that when the defendants attempted to take possession of the
parcels of land they bought from the plaintiff on which they intended to construct their house
after their return from a foreign sojourn, they admittedly wanted to take that vacant area,
which as herein shown, turns out to be a property not owned by plaintiff. From this act of the
defendants, a clear meaning is shown. Defendants themselves, knew right from the beginning
that what they intended to buy was that vacant lot, not the lot where plaintiff's house stands,
covered by TCT No. 15684 which was wrongly mentioned as one of the objects of the sale. x
xx

The fact that the Deed of Sale subsequently executed by plaintiff and the defendants on
October 27, 1987 covers the parcel of land where plaintiff's two-storey house was
constructed will clearly reflect a situation that is totally different from what defendants had
intended to buy from the plaintiff viz-a-viz [sic] the latter's intention to sell its two (2) vacant
lots to defendants. Notwithstanding defendants' claim that it was not possible for plaintiff's
representative not to be familiar with its properties, the acts and circumstances established
in this case would clearly show, and this Court is convinced, that the inclusion of the parcel
where plaintiff's house is constructed is solely attributable to a mistake in the object of the
sale between the parties. This mistake, obviously, was made, on the part of plaintiff's
representative when the latter mistook the vacant lot situated on the right side of plaintiff's
house as its vacant parcels of land when its vacant lots are actually situated on the left side
of the same house. Indeed, such mistake on plaintiff's part appears to be tragic as it turned
out later that the vacant lot on the right side of plaintiff's house did not belong to plaintiff.
Worse, is the fact that what was conveyed to defendants under the deed of sale was the
parcel where plaintiff's house already stood at the time of the sale. This, definitely, is not what
the parties intended.

x x x Going by the facts established by defendants' evidence, it is clear that defendants did
not intend to buy the parcel of land where plaintiff's house stood as defendant Betty Theis
declared in her testimony that they wanted to buy the parcel at the right side of plaintiff's
house where she and her husband would construct their house (TSN of June 4, 1991, p. 56).
Neither can this Court accept the hypothesis that plaintiff intended to sell that parcel where
its house was already constructed for if this was its true intention, it would not sell its two (2)
lots at the price of P486,000.00 which is way below the costs of its construction of
P1,500,000.00.

The law itself explicitly recognizes that consent of the parties is one of the essential elements
to the validity of the contract and where consent is given through mistake, the validity of the
contractual relations between the parties is legally impaired.

As earlier stated, the facts obtaining in the case at bar undoubtedly show that when
defendants bought the properties of plaintiff, they intended to buy the vacant lots owned by
the latter. As the sale that was finally consummated by the parties had covered the parcel
where plaintiff's house was constructed even before the sale took place, this Court can safely
assume that the deed of sale executed by the parties did not truly express their true intention.
In other words, the mistake or error on the subject of the sale in question appears to be
substantial as the object of the same transaction is different from that intended by the
parties. This fiasco could have been cured and the pain and travails of this litigation avoided,
had parties agreed to reformation of the deed of sale. But, as shown by the sequence of
events occurring after the sale was consummated, and the mistake was discovered, the
defendants refused, insisting that they wanted the vacant lots on the right side of plaintiff's
house, which was impossible for plaintiff to do, as said vacant lots were not of its own
dominion."[3] [Emphasis supplied]
Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, petitioners sought its reversal[4] from respondent
Court of Appeals.[5] Respondent court, however, did not find the appeal meritorious and
accordingly affirmed[6] the trial court decision. Ruled the respondent appellate court:

"There is no doubt that when defendants-appellants attempted to take physical possession

of Parcel No. 4 in May, 1990, they were prevented by the true owner thereof from taking
possession of said land. To clear the matter, plaintiff-appellee hired a new surveyor who
revealed in his survey that Parcel No. 4 is not included in plaintiff-appellee's Transfer
Certificates of Title from which said plaintiff-appellee mistakenly offered defendants-
appellants said Parcel No. 4. Realizing its mistake, plaintiff-appellee offered defendants-
appellants Parcels Nos. 1 and 2 under the same Transfer Certificates of Title or the
reimbursement of the purchase price in double amount. But defendants-appellants insisted
this time to acquire Parcel No. 3 wherein plaintiff-appellee had already a house, and was not
the object of the sale.

Said Parcel No. 3 cannot be the object of the sale between the parties as plaintiff-appellee's
house already stands in the said area even before defendants-appellants had chosen Parcel
No. 4 which was described to be on the right side of said plaintiff-appellee's house in Parcel
No. 3. There is no dispute that defendants-appellants wanted to buy Parcel No. 4 as testified
to by defendant-appellant Betty Theis, herself (p. 19, TSN, Nov. 8, 1991), which lot turned out
to be outside of the Transfer Certificates of Title of plaintiff-appellee. Defendants-appellants
cannot now insist on Parcel No. 3 as the same was not the object of the sale between the
parties.

Clearly, therefore, there was honest mistake on the part of plaintiff-appellee in the sale of
Parcel No. 4 to defendants-appellants which plaintiff-appellee tried to remedy by offering
defendants-appellants instead his Parcels Nos. 1 or 2, or reimbursement of the purchase price
in double amount."[7] [Emphasis ours]

We find that respondent court correctly affirmed the findings and conclusions of the trial
court in annulling the deed of sale as the former are supported by evidence and the latter are
in accordance with existing law and jurisprudence.

Art. 1390 of the New Civil Code provides:

"Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have
been no damage to the contracting parties:

(1) x x x

(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence,
or fraud.

x x x"
In the case at bar, the private respondent obviously committed an honest mistake in selling
parcel no. 4. As correctly noted by the Court of Appeals, it is quite impossible for said private
respondent to sell the lot in question as the same is not owned by it. The good faith of the
private respondent is evident in the fact that when the mistake was discovered, it
immediately offered two other vacant lots to the petitioners or to reimburse them with twice
the amount paid. That petitioners refused either option left the private respondent with no
other choice but to file an action for the annulment of the deed of sale on the ground of
mistake. As enunciated in the case of Mariano vs. Court of Appeals:[8]

"A contract may be annulled where the consent of one of the contracting parties was
procured by mistake, fraud, intimidation, violence, or undue influence."

Art. 1331 of the New Civil Code provides for the situations whereby mistake may invalidate
consent. It states:

"Art. 1331. In order that mistake may invalidate consent, it should refer to the substance of
the thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which have principally
moved one or both parties to enter into the contract."

Tolentino[9] explains that the concept of error in this article must include both ignorance,
which is the absence of knowledge with respect to a thing, and mistake properly speaking,
which is a wrong conception about said thing, or a belief in the existence of some
circumstance, fact, or event, which in reality does not exist. In both cases, there is a lack of
full and correct knowledge about the thing. The mistake committed by the private respondent
in selling parcel no. 4 to the petitioners falls within the second type. Verily, such mistake
invalidated its consent and as such, annulment of the deed of sale is proper.

The petitioners cannot be justified in their insistence that parcel no. 3, upon which private
respondent constructed a two-storey house, be given to them in lieu of parcel no. 4. The cost
of construction in 1985 for the said house (P1,500,000.00) far exceeds the amount paid by
the petitioners to the private respondent (P486,000.00). Moreover, the trial court, in
questioning private respondent's witness, Atty. Tarciso Calilung (who is also its authorized
representative) clarified that parcel no. 4, the lot mistakenly sold, was a vacant lot:[10]

"COURT: What property did you point to them?

A. I pointed to parcel No. 4, as appearing in the sketch.

COURT: Parcel No. 4 is a vacant lot?

A. Yes, your Honor.

COURT: So, there was no house on that lot?

A. There was no house. There were pineapple crops existing on the property.

COURT: So, you are telling the Court that the intended lot is vacant lot or Parcel 4?
A. Yes, your Honor.

Thus, to allow the petitioners to take parcel no. 3 would be to countenance unjust
enrichment. Considering that petitioners intended at the outset to purchase a vacant lot, their
refusal to accept the offer of the private respondent to give them two (2) other vacant lots in
exchange, as well as their insistence on parcel no. 3, which is a house and lot, is manifestly
unreasonable. As held by this Court in the case of Security Bank and Trust Company v. Court
of Appeals[11]:

"Hence, to allow petitioner bank to acquire the constructed building at a price far below its
actual construction cost would undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the bank to the
prejudice of the private respondent. Such unjust enrichment, as previously discussed, is not
allowed by law."

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court Appeals in CA-
G.R. 47000 dated May 31, 1996 AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED

Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 150179. April 30, 2003]

HEIRS OF WILLIAM SEVILLA, NAMELY: WILFREDO SEVILLA, WILSON SEVILLA, WILMA SEVILLA,
WILLINGTON SEVILLA, AND WILLIAM SEVILLA, JR., HEIRS OF MARIA SEVILLA, NAMELY:
AMADOR SEVILLA, JENO CORTES, VICTOR CORTES, MARICEL CORTES, ALELEI* CORTES AND
ANJEI** CORTES, petitioners, vs. LEOPOLDO SEVILLA, PETER SEVILLA, AND LUZVILLA SEVILLA,
respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

One who alleges defect or lack of valid consent to a contract by reason of fraud or undue
influence must establish by full, clear and convincing evidence such specific acts that vitiated
a partys consent, otherwise, the latters presumed consent to the contract prevails.[1]

The instant petition for review seeks to set aside the September 26, 2000 Decision[2] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48956, affirming in toto the Decision[3] of the Regional
Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. 4240 which declared, inter alia, the
questioned Deed of Donation Inter Vivos valid and binding on the parties.

The undisputed facts reveal that on December 10, 1973, Filomena Almirol de Sevilla died
intestate leaving 8 children, namely: William, Peter, Leopoldo, Felipe, Rosa, Maria, Luzvilla,
and Jimmy, all surnamed Sevilla. William, Jimmy and Maria are now deceased and are
survived by their respective spouses and children.[4] Filomena Almirol de Sevilla left the
following properties:

PARCEL I:

A parcel of land known as Lot No. 653 situated at General Luna St., Dipolog City, with an area
of about 804 square meters, more or less, duly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (T-
6671)-1448 [in the name of Filomena Almirol de Sevilla, Honorata Almirol and Felisa Almirol]
and assessed at P31,360.00 according to Tax Dec. No. 018-947;

PARCEL II:

A parcel of land known as Lot No. 3805-B situated at Olingan, Dipolog City, with an area of
about 18,934 square meters, more or less, duly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
6672 and assessed at P5,890 according to Tax Dec. No. 009-761;

PARCEL III:

A parcel of land known as Lot No. 837-1/4 situated at Magsaysay Street, Dipolog City, with an
area of about 880 square meters more or less, duly covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
0-6064 and assessed at P12,870.00 according to Tax Dec. No. 020-1078;

PARCEL IV:
A parcel of residential land known as Lot No. 1106-B-3 situated at Sta. Filomena, Dipolog City,
with an area of 300 square meters, more or less, assessed at P3,150.00 according to Tax Dec.
No. 006-317;

Commercial building erected on Parcel I above-described; and residential building erected

just at the back of the commercial building above-described and erected on Parcel I above-
described;[5]

Parcel I, Lot No. 653, is the paraphernal property of Filomena Almirol de Sevilla which she co-
owned with her sisters, Honorata Almirol and Felisa Almirol,[6] who were both single and
without issue. Parcels II, II and IV are conjugal properties of Filomena Almirol de Sevilla and
her late husband Andres Sevilla.[7] When Honorata died in 1982, her 1/3 undivided share in
Lot No. 653 was transmitted to her heirs, Felisa Almirol and the heirs of Filomena Almirol de
Sevilla, who thereby acquired the property in the proportion of one-half share each.

During the lifetime of Felisa and Honorata Almirol, they lived in the house of Filomena Almirol
de Sevilla, together with their nephew, respondent Leopoldo Sevilla and his family. Leopoldo
attended to the needs of his mother, Filomena, and his two aunts, Honorata and Felisa.[8]

Felisa died on July 6, 1988.[9] Previous thereto, on November 25, 1985, she executed a last
will and testament devising her 1/2 share in Lot No. 653 to the spouses Leopoldo Sevilla and
Belen Leyson.[10] On August 8, 1986, Felisa executed another document denominated as
Donation Inter Vivos ceding to Leopoldo Sevilla her 1/2 undivided share in Lot No. 653, which
was accepted by Leopoldo in the same document.[11]

On September 3, 1986, Felisa Almirol and Peter Sevilla, in his own behalf and in behalf of the
heirs of Filomena Almirol de Sevilla, executed a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition, identifying
and adjudicating the 1/3 share of Honorata Almirol to the heirs of Filomena Almirol de Sevilla
and to Felisa Almirol.[12]

Thereafter, respondents Leopoldo, Peter and Luzvilla Sevilla obtained the cancellation of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. (T-6671)-1448, over Lot No. 653, and the issuance of the
corresponding titles to Felisa Almirol and the heirs of Filomena Almirol de Sevilla. However,
the requested titles for Lot Nos. 653-A and 653-B, were left unsigned by the Register of Deeds
of Dipolog City, pending submission by Peter Sevilla of a Special Power of Attorney authorizing
him to represent the other heirs of Filomena Almirol de Sevilla.[13]

On June 21, 1990, Felipe Sevilla, Rosa Sevilla, and the heirs of William, Jimmy and Maria, all
surnamed Sevilla, filed the instant case against respondents Leopoldo Sevilla, Peter Sevilla
and Luzvilla Sevilla, for annulment of the Deed of Donation and the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition, Accounting, Damages, with prayer for Receivership and for Partition of the
properties of the late Filomena Almirol de Sevilla.[14] They alleged that the Deed of Donation
is tainted with fraud because Felisa Almirol, who was then 81 years of age, was seriously ill
and of unsound mind at the time of the execution thereof; and that the Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition is void because it was executed without their knowledge and consent.[15]
In their answer,[16] respondents denied that there was fraud or undue pressure in the
execution of the questioned documents. They alleged that Felisa was of sound mind at the
time of the execution of the assailed deeds and that she freely and voluntarily ceded her
undivided share in Lot No. 653 in consideration of Leopoldos and his familys love, affection,
and services rendered in the past. Respondents further prayed that Parcels II, III, and IV be
partitioned among the heirs of Filomena Almirol de Sevilla in accordance with the law on
intestate succession.

On December 16, 1994, a decision was rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City,
Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 6, upholding the validity of the Deed of Donation and declaring
the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition unenforceable. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, summing up the evidence for both the plaintiffs
and the defendants, the Court hereby renders judgment:

1) Declaring the questioned Deed of Donation Inter Vivos valid and binding, and, therefore,
has the full force and effect of law;

2) Declaring the questioned Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition as unenforceable as yet as against

the other heirs, as it lacks the legal requisites of Special Power of Attorney or any other
appropriate instrument to be executed by the other heirs who were not made parties thereto;

3) Finding the parties herein entitled to the partition of Parcel II, III, IV as designated in the
Complaint, in equal shares, and, as to Lot No. 653 designated as Parcel I, it shall be divided
equally into two, between defendant Leopoldo Sevilla on one hand, and, collectively, the
Heirs of William Sevilla, Heirs of Jimmy Sevilla, Heirs of Maria Sevilla, Felipe Sevilla, Leopoldo
Sevilla, Peter Sevilla, Luzvilla Sevilla-Tan, on the other hand, as well as the two buildings
thereon in proportionate values;

4) Directing the parties, if they can agree, to submit herewith a project of partition, which
shall designate the share which pertains to the heirs entitled thereto, that is, the particular
and specific portions of the properties subject of the partition;

5) Directing defendant Peter Sevilla to pay and/or collect from the parties the amounts
corresponding to each one entitled or liable thereto, as recorded in the Statement of
Accounts, except for defendant Leopoldo Sevilla who is found by the Court to have incurred
only an overdraft of P5,742.98 and not P33,204.33 as earlier computed therein.

6) Dismissing the plaintiffs claim for damages, which is not proved with sufficient evidence,
and defendants counterclaim, on the same ground.

7) With costs de oficio.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[17]

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners contended that the Deed of
Donation should be declared void and that Lot No. 653 should be divided equally among
them. Respondents, on the other hand, posited that the trial court erred in declaring the Deed
of Extra-judicial Partition unenforceable against the other heirs of Filomena Almirol de Sevilla
who were not parties to said Deed.

On September 26, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the assailed decision of the trial
court.[18] Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied on August
30, 2001.[19]

Hence, the instant petition based on the following assignment of errors:

THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING AS VOID AB INITIO THE
DEED OF DONATION EXCUTED BY FELISA ALMIROL IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT LEOPOLDO
SEVILLA CEDING TO HIM ONE HALF PORTION OF LOT 653, DIPOLOG CADASTRE, IT HAVING
BEEN EXECUTED WITH FRAUD, UNDUE PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE;

THAT THE APPELLATE COURT GREATLY ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THE PARTITION OF LOT 653,
DIPOLOG CADASTRE EQUALLY AMONG THE EIGHT (8) HEIRS OF FILOMENA, HONORATA AND
FELISA, ALL SURNAMED ALMIROL.[20]

To resolve the issue raised in the instant petition for review, the validity of the donation inter
vivos executed by Felisa Almirol in favor of Leopoldo Sevilla must first be determined.

Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in

favor of another who accepts it.[21] Under Article 737 of the Civil Code, the donors capacity
shall be determined as of the time of the making of the donation. Like any other contract, an
agreement of the parties is essential,[22] and the attendance of a vice of consent renders the
donation voidable.[23]

In the case at bar, there is no question that at the time Felisa Almirol executed the deed of
donation she was already the owner of 1/2 undivided portion of Lot No. 653. Her 1/3
undivided share therein was increased by 1/2 when she and Filomena inherited the 1/3 share
of their sister Honorata after the latters death. Hence, the 1/2 undivided share of Felisa in Lot
No. 653 is considered a present property which she can validly dispose of at the time of the
execution of the deed of donation.[24]

Petitioners, however, insist that respondent Leopoldo Sevilla employed fraud and undue
influence on the person of the donor. This argument involves appreciation of the
evidence.[25] The settled rule is that factual findings of the trial court, if affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, are entitled to great respect.[26] There are exceptional circumstances when
findings of fact of lower courts may be set aside[27] but none is present in the case at bar.
Indeed, neither fraud nor undue influence can be inferred from the following circumstance
alleged by the petitioners, to wit

A. That Felisa Almirol lived with respondent Leopoldo Sevilla in the residential house owned
by petitioners and respondents;
B. That the old woman Felisa Almirol was being supported out of the rentals derived from the
building constructed on the land which was a common fund.

C. That when Felisa Almirol was already 82 years old, he [Leopoldo Sevilla] accompanied her
in the Office of Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr., for the purpose of executing her last will and testament

D. That in the last will and testament executed by Felisa Almirol, she had devised in favor of
respondent Leopoldo Sevilla one-half of the land in question;

E. That respondent Leopoldo Sevilla not contented with the execution by Felisa Almirol of her
last will and testament, had consulted a lawyer as to how he will be able to own the land
immediately;

F. That upon the advice of Atty. Helen Angeles, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Norte, Dipolog City, Felisa Almirol executed a Deed of Donation, hence, the
questioned Deed of Donation executed in his favor;

G. That the subject matter of the Deed of Donation was the one-half portion of Lot 653,
Dipolog Cadastre, which was willed by Felisa Almirol, in favor of respondent Leopoldo Sevilla
in her last will and testament;

H. That at the time of the execution of the Deed of Donation, Lot No. 653, Dipolog Cadastre,
was not yet partitioned between petitioners and respondents they being heirs of the late
Filomena and Honorata, all surnamed Almirol;

I. That after the execution of the Deed of Donation, respondent Peter Sevilla and the late
Felisa Almirol were the only ones who executed the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition over Lot
653, Dipolog Cadastre, the petitioners were not made parties in the said Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition;

J. That on the basis of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of Donation, respondent
Leopoldo Sevilla caused the subdivision survey of Lot 653, Dipolog Cadastre, dividing the same
into two (2) lots, adjudicating one-half of the lot in his favor and the other half in favor of
respondents peter Sevilla and Luzvilla Sevilla, and to respondent Leopoldo Sevilla himself;

K. That only two persons knew the actual survey of the land, petitioner Felipe Sevilla and
respondent Leopoldo Sevilla himself, the rest of the co-owners were not even notified;

L. That on the basis of the Extrajudicial Partition, Deed of Donation, the approved subdivision
plan, respondent Leopoldo Sevilla filed a petition for issuance of the corresponding titles for
the two lots, but the Register of Deeds of Dipolog City refused to issue the corresponding
titles for the two lots to respondent Leopoldo Sevilla so that up to this moment the two tiles
were left unsigned by the Register of Deeds.[28]

There is fraud when, through the insidious words or machinations of one of the contracting
parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract which, without them, he would not have
agreed to.[29] There is undue influence when a person takes improper advantage of his
power over the will of another, depriving the latter of a reasonable freedom of choice. The
following circumstances shall be considered: the confidential, family, spiritual and other
relations between the parties, or the fact that the person alleged to have been unduly
influenced was suffering from mental weakness, or was ignorant or in financial distress.[30]

Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat. He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.
We have consistently applied the ancient rule that if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the
burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner facts on which he
bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.[31]
In the instant case, the self-serving testimony of the petitioners are vague on what acts of
Leopoldo Sevilla constituted fraud and undue influence and on how these acts vitiated the
consent of Felisa Almirol. Fraud and undue influence that vitiated a partys consent must be
established by full, clear and convincing evidence, otherwise, the latters presumed consent
to the contract prevails.[32] Neither does the fact that the donation preceded the partition
constitute fraud. It is not necessary that partition should first be had because what was
donated to Leopoldo was the 1/2 undivided share of Felisa in Lot No. 653.

Moreover, petitioners failed to show proof why Felisa should be held incapable of exercising
sufficient judgment in ceding her share to respondent Leopoldo.[33] As testified by the notary
public who notarized the Deed of Donation, Felisa confirmed to him her intention to donate
her share in Lot No. 653 to Leopoldo. He stressed that though the donor was old, she was of
sound mind and could talk sensibly. Significantly, there is nothing in the record that discloses
even an attempt by petitioners to rebut said declaration of the notary public.

Clearly, therefore, the courts below did not err in sustaining the validity of the deed of
donation.

Anent the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition, we find that the same is void ab initio and not
merely unenforceable. In Delos Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[34] which is a case involving the
sale of a lot by a person who is neither the owner nor the legal representative, we declared
the contract void ab initio. It was held that one of the requisites of a valid contract under
Article 1318 of the Civil Code is the consent and the capacity to give consent of the parties to
the contract. The legal capacity of the parties is an essential element for the existence of the
contract because it is an indispensable condition for the existence of consent. There is no
effective consent in law without the capacity to give such consent. In other words, legal
consent presupposes capacity. Thus, there is said to be no consent, and consequently, no
contract when the agreement is entered into by one in behalf of another who has never given
him authorization therefor unless he has by law a right to represent the latter.[35]

In the case at bar, at the time Felisa executed the deed of extra-judicial partition dividing the
share of her deceased sister Honarata between her and the heirs of Filomena Almirol de
Sevilla, she was no longer the owner of the 1/2 undivided portion of Lot No. 653, having
previously donated the same to respondent Leopoldo Sevilla who accepted the donation in
the same deed. A donation inter vivos, as in the instant case, is immediately operative and
final.[36] As a mode of acquiring ownership, it results in an effective transfer of title over the
property from the donor to the donee and the donation is perfected from the moment the
donor knows of the acceptance by the donee. And once a donation is accepted, the donee
becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.

Evidently, Felisa did not possess the capacity to give consent to or execute the deed of
partition inasmuch as she was neither the owner nor the authorized representative of
respondent Leopoldo to whom she previously transmitted ownership of her undivided share
in Lot No. 653. Considering that she had no legal capacity to give consent to the deed of
partition, it follows that there is no consent given to the execution of the deed, and therefore,
there is no contract to speak of. As such, the deed of partition is void ab initio, hence, not
susceptible of ratification.

Nevertheless, the nullity of the deed of extra-judicial partition will not affect the validity of
the donation inter vivos ceding to respondent Leopoldo Sevilla the 1/2 undivided share of
Felisa Almirol in Lot No. 653. Said lot should therefore be divided as follows: 1/2 shall go to
respondent Leopoldo Sevilla by virtue of the deed of donation, while the other half shall be
divided equally among the heirs of Filomena Almirol de Sevilla including Leopoldo Sevilla,
following the rules on intestate succession.

Finally, we note that the name of Rosa Sevilla, daughter of Filomena Almirol de Sevilla, and
one of the plaintiffs herein, was omitted in the dispositive portion of the trial courts
decision.[37] Her name should therefore be included in the dispositive portion as one of the
heirs entitled to share in the properties of the late Filomena Almirol de Sevilla.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 48956, affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 6,
in Civil Case No. 4240, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The Deed of Extra-judicial Partition
dated September 3, 1986 is declared void, and the name of Rosa Sevilla is ordered included
in the dispositive portion of the trial courts judgment.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.