TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND INTENT testator’s understanding of the language used in the will be
expressed therein. It is a matter that may be established by
JOSE S. LOPEZ vs. AGUSTIN LIBORO
Testacy of Sixto Lopez; [No. L-1787. August 27, 1948]
1.
WILLS; PAGING; PURPOSE; OMISSION OF PAGE
NUMBER SUPPLIED BY OTHER MEANS OF
IDENTIFICATION.—The purpose of the law in prescribing
the paging of wills is to guard against fraud, and to afford
means of preventing the substitution or of detecting the loss
of any of its pages. (Abangan vs. Abangan, 40 Phil., 476.)
The omission to put a page number on a sheet, if that be
necessary, may be supplied by other forms of identification
more trustworthy than the conventional numeral words or
characters.
2.
ID.; EVIDENCE; WITNESSES, CREDIBILITY OF;
CONTRADICTIONS ON INCIDENTS.—Such
contradictions in the testimony of the instrumental
witnesses as are set out in the appellant’s brief are
incidents, not all of which every one of the witnesses can be
supposed to have perceived, or to recall in the same order in
which they occurred. Far from being an evidence of
falsehood, the contradictions constitute an evidence of good
faith.
3.
ID.; SIGNATURE BY MARK.—A statute requiring a
will to be “signed” is satisfied if the signature is made by the
testator’s mark.
4.
ID.; EVIDENCE; ADMISSION OF FURTHER
EVIDENCE AFTER PARTY HAS RESTED; DISCRETION
OF COURT.—It is within the discretion of the court
whether or not to admit further evidence after the party
offering the evidence has rested, and this discretion will not
be reviewed except where it has clearly been abused.
5.
ID.; ID.; ADMISSION OF FURTHER EVIDENCE
AFTER MOTION FOR NONSUIT OR DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE; DISCRETION OF COURT.—It is within the
sound discretion of the court whether or not it will allow the
case to be reopened for the further introduction of evidence
after a motion or request for a nonsuit, or a demurrer to the
evidence, and the case may be reopened after the court has
announced its intention as to its ruling on the request,
motion, or demurrer, or has granted it or has denied the
same, or after the motion has been granted, if the order has
not been written, or entered upon the minutes or signed.
6.
ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE ALLOWABLE AFTER DIRECT
PROOFS.—After the parties have produced their respective
direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting evidence
only, but the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of
justice, may permit them to offer evidence upon their
original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the
appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears.
(Siuliong “i Co.. vs. Ylagan, 43 Phil., 393; U.S. vs. Alviar, 36
Phil., 804.) So, generally, additional evidence is allowed
when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted
through inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of
the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered.
7.
ID.; LANGUAGE; KNOWLEDGE OF TESTATOR
NEED NOT BE EXPRESSED IN WILL; PROOF
“ALIUNDE."—There is no statutory requirement that the
proof aliunde.
FORMS OF WILLS
GERTRUDIS ABANGAN vs. ANASTACIA ABANGAN
ET AL.
In re will of Ana Abangan; [No. 13431. November 12, 1919.]
1.
WILLS; ATTESTATION.—In a will consisting of two
sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary
dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and
three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation
clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three
witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further
signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses,
or be paged.
2.
ID.; ID.; TESTATOR'S SIGNATURE.—The testator's
signature is not necessary in the attestation clause because
this, as its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses
and not to the testator.
3.
ID.; DIALECT IN WHICH WRITTEN;
PRESUMPTION.—The circumstance appearing in the will
itself that.same was executed in the city of Cebu and in the
dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is
enough, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, to
presume that she knew this dialect in which her will is
written.
AUREA MATIAS, vs. HON. PRIMITIVO L. GONZALES,
ETC., ET AL.
[No. L-10907. June 29, 1957]
1.
WILLS; PROBATE; DENIAL BY PROBATE COURT;
APPEAL TAKEN BY UNIVERSAL HEIR; EFFECT IN
THE INTEREST OF SAID HEIR. Although the probate of
the will and testament of the testatrix was denied by the
Probate Court, the order to this effect is not, as yet, final
and executory. It is pending review on appeal taken by the
universal heir. The probate of said alleged will being still
within the realm of legal possibility, the universal heir, and
executrix designated in said instrument has a special
interest to protect during the pendency of said appeal. Thus,
in the case of Roxas vs. Pecson (46 Off. Gaz., 2058) the
Supreme Court held' that a widow, designated as executrix
in the alleged will and testament of her deceased husband,
the probate of which had been denied in an order pending
appeal, "has * * * the same beneficial interest after the
decision of the court disapproving the will, which, is now
pending appeal, because the decision is not yet final and
may be reversed by the appellate Court."
2.
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR; APPOINTMENT
OF TWO OR MORE SPECIAL ADMINISTRATORS.—
Where it appears that there are, at least, two factions among the
heirs of the deceased, representing their respective interest in the
estate, and the probate Court deems it best to appoint more than
one special administrator, justice and equity demands that both
factions be represented in the management of the estate of the
deceased.
BEATRIZ NERA ET AL. vs. NARCISA RIMANDO
[No. 5971. February 27, 1911.]
1.
EXECUTION OF WlLLS; POSITION OF TESTATOR
AND WlTNESS WHEN WILL is SUBSCRIBED.—The
position of testator and of the witnesses to a will, at the
moment of the subscription by each, must be such that they
may see each other sign if they choose to do so.
2.
ID. ; ID.; SIGNING IN THE PRESENCE OF EACH
OTHER.—The question whether the testator and the
subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument
in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of
the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at
the moment of its subscription by each of them, , but
whether at that moment existing conditions and the position
of the parties, with relation to each other, were such that by
merely casting their eyes in the proper direction they could
have seen each other sign.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ONE WITNESS IN OUTER ROOM WHEN
WILL is SIGNED.—If one subscribing witness to a will is
shown to have been in an outer room at the time when the
testator and the other witnesses attach their signatures to
the instrument in an inner room, the will would be held
invalid—the attaching of the said signatures, under such
circumstances, not being done "in the presence" of the
witness in the outer room.
CELSO ICASIANO vs. NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and
ENRIQUE ICASIANO
In the matter of the testate estate of the late Josefa
Villacorte; No. L-18979. June 30, 1964
Wills; Probate; Policy of Court against undue curtailment of
testamentary privileges.—The precedents cited in the case at
bar exemplify the Court's policy to require satisfaction of the
legal requirements in the probate of a will in order to guard
against fraud and bad faith but without undue or
unnecessary curtailment of the testamentary privilege.
Same; Same; Handwriting expert must have sufficient
standards of comparison to prove forgery of testatrix's
signature.—The opinion of a handwriting expert trying to
prove forgery of the testatrix's signature fails to convince
the court, not only because it is directly contradicted by
another expert but principally because of the paucity of the
standards used by him (only three other signatures),
considering the advanced age of the testatrix, the evident
variability of her signatures, and the effect of writing
fatigue.
Same; Same; Variance in ink color not reliable when
writings affixed to different kinds of paper.—The slight
variance in blueness of the ink in the admitted and
questioned signatures does not appear reliable, considering
that the standard and challenged writings were affixed to
different kinds of paper.
Same; Same; Fraud or undue influence, diversity of
apportionment and prohibition against contest no evidence
of.—Neither diversity of apportionment nor prohibition
against contest is evidence of fraud or undue influence in
the execution of a will.
Same; Same; Fraud and undue influence are repugnant
allegations.—Allegations of fraud and undue influence are
mutually repugnant and exclude each other; their joining as
grounds for opposing probate shows absence of definite
evidence against the validity of the will.
Same; Same; Inadvertent failure of an attesting witness to
affix his signature to one page of a will not fatal.—The
inadvertent failure of an attesting witness to affix his
signature to one page of a testament, due to the
simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is
not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate.
Same; Same; Signed carbon duplicate of will needs no
publication.—That the signed carbon duplicate of a will was
produced and admitted without a new publication does not
affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, already conferred
by the original publication of the petition for probate, where
the amended petition did not substantially alter the first
one filed, but merely supplemented it by disclosing the
existence of said duplicate.
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VICENTE CAGRO.
JESUSA CAGRO vs. PELAGIO CAGRO, ET AL.
[No. L-5826. April 29, 1953]
Wills; Attestation Clause; Lack of Signatures of Attesting
Witnesses at Bottom of Attestation Clause, is Fatal Defect.—
Inasmuch as the signatures of the three witnesses to the
will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause,
although the page containing the same is signed by the
wit-nesses on the left-hand margin, the will is fatally
defective. The attestation clause is "a memorandum of the
facts attend-ing the execution of the will" required by law to
be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily
bear their signatures.
MARCELA RODELAS vs. AMPARO ARANZA, ET. AL.
In the matter of the petition to approve the will of Ricardo
B. Bonilla, deceased, No. L-58509. December 7, 1982
Civil Law; Wills; Holographic Will; Admissibility of photos
tatic or xerox copy of a lost or destroyed will.—However, if
the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other
copy is available, the will can not be probated because the
best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in
said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between
sample handwritten statements of the testator and the
handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of
the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can
be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the
case of Gan vs. Yap, 104 Phil 509, the Court ruled that ‘‘the
execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic
will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses
who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself must be
presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law
regards the document itself as material proof of
authenticity.’’ But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says
that “Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or
photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or
by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of
the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and
tested before the probate court.” Evidently, the photostatic
or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may
be admitted because then the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the
probate court.
REVOCATION OF WILLS AND TESTAMENTARY
DISPOSITIONS
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA
MALOTO, ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO, CONSTANCIO
MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN
CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, AND ASILO DE MOLO,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PANFILO
MALOTO AND FELINO MALOTO, respondents.
No. L-76464. February 29, 1988.*
Civil Law; Wills; Revocation of Will; To constitute an
effective revocation, the physical act of destruction of a will
must be coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the
testator.—It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a
will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an
effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with
animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not
imperative that the physical destruction be done by the
testator himself. It may be performed by another person but
under the express direction and in the presence of the
testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the
document destroyed must be the will itself.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Intention to revoke must be
accompanied by overt physical act of burning, tearing,
obliterating or cancelling the will by the testator or by
another person in his presence and under his express
direction.—In this case, while animus revocandi, or the
intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of
mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. Animus
revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the
effective revocation of a last will and testament. The
intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt
physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling
the will carried out by the testator or by another person in
his presence and under his express direction. There is
paucity of evidence to show compliance with these
requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by
Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily
established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana
Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have
been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then,
the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses,
Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that they were
the only ones present at the place where the stove
(presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the papers
proferred as a will were burned.
Civil Procedure; Res Adjudicata; Doctrine of res adjudicata
finds no application in the case at bar; Requisites of res
adjudicata.—The doctrine of res adjudicata finds no
application in the present controversy. For a judgment to be
a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the presence of a final former judgment; (2) the
former judgment was rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the
former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there
is, between the first and the second action, identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action. We do not
find here the presence of all the enumerated requisites.
Same; Same; Same; Strictly speaking, no final judgment
rendered insofar as the probate of Adriana Maloto's will is
concerned.—For one, there is yet, strictly speaking, no final
judgment rendered insofar as the probate of Adriana
Maloto's will is concerned. The decision of the trial court in
Special Proceeding No. 1736, although final, involved only
the intestate Settlement of the estate of Adria iana. As such,
that j udgment could not in any manner be construed to be
final with respect to the probate of the subsequently
discovered will of the decedent. Neither is it a judgment on
the merits of the action for probate. This is understandably
so because the trial court, in the intestate proceeding, was
without jurisdiction to rule on the probate of the contested
will. After all, an action for probate, as it implies, is founded
on the presence of a will and with the objective of proving its
due execution and validity, something which can not be
properly done in an intestate settlement of estate
proceeding which is predicated on the assumption that the
decedent left no will. Thus, there is likewise no identity
between the cause of action in intestate proceeding and that
in an action for probate, Be that as it may, it would be
remembered that it was precisely because of our ruling in
G.R. No. L-30479 that the petitioners instituted this
separate action for the probate of the late Adriana Maloto's
will. Hence, on these grounds alone, the position of the
private respondents on this score can not be sustained.
INSTITUTION OF HEIR
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT
No. L-72706. October 27,1987.*
Civil Law; Succession; Preterition, meaning of; Article 854 of
the Civil Code not applicable to the surviving spouse;
Adoption makes the adopted the legal heir of the adopter.—
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator’s will of
the forced heirs or anyone of them either because they are
not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are
neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited
(Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court
of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]. Insofar as the widow is
concerned, Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as
she does not ascend or descend from the testator, although
she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the
surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no
preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for
she is not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil Code) However,
the same thing cannot be said of the other respondent
Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator
has not been questioned by petitioner (Memorandum for the
Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known
as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the
adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a
legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted
person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that
she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the
testator and that both adopted child and the widow were
deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied
that they were not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a
clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
Same; Same; Same; Preterition annuls the institution of an
heir and creates intestate succession but legacies and devises
are valid and respected insofar as they are not inofficious.—
Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment
throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance
including “la portion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en
virtual de legado, mejora o donation” (Manresa, as cited in
Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals,
114 SCRA [1982]). The only provisions which do not result
in intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for
they should stand valid and respected, except in so far as
the legitimes are concerned.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Institution of petitioner and his
brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance totally
abrogates the will.—The universal institution of petitioner
together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the
will because the nullification of such institution of universal
heirs—without any other testamentary disposition in the
will—amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was
written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 of
the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation
(Nuguid v. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having
been provided in the will the whole property of the deceased
has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers
and sisters. The effect of annulling the institution of heirs
will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy (Neri v.
Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and
devises must, as already stated above, be respected.
Same; Same; Probate of a will; Petitioner has no legal
standing to petition for the probate of the will of the
deceased, hence Special Proceeding No. 591-A-CEB must be
dismissed.—In order that a person may be allowed to
intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest
in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected
by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an
interested party is one who would be benefited by the estate
such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate
like a creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967).
Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or
a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary
disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or
real property he is called upon to receive (Article 782, Civil
Code). At the outset, he appears to have an interest in the
will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of the Civil Code
as a person called to the succession either by the provision
of a will or by operation of law. However, intestacy having
resulted from the preterition of respondent adopted child
and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect
not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to
petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and
Special Proceedings No. 591-A-CEB must be dismissed.
Same; Same; Same; Rule that probate Court’s authority is
limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, not inflexible
and absolute; Court may pass upon the intrinsic validity of
the will under exceptional circumstances.—Special
Proceedings No. 591-CEB is for the probate of a will. As
stated by respondent Court, the general rule is that the
probate court’s authority is limited only to the extrinsic
validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator’s
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic
validity of the will normally come only after the Court has
declared that the will has been duly authenticated. Said
court at this stage of the proceedings is not called upon to
rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of
the will (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 [1966]; Sumilang
v. Ramagosa, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114
SCRA 478 [1982]; Cayetano v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 522
[1984]); and Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA
206 [1985]). The rule, however, is not inflexible and
absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate
court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it
to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will
(Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v.
Nuguid the oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss on
the ground of absolute preterition. The probate court acting
on the motion held that the will in question was a complete
nullity and dismissed the petition without costs. On appeal
the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate court,
induced by practical considerations.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Trial Court could have denied
outright the probate of the will or have passed upon its
intrinsic validity where on its face it appears to be
intrinsically void.—For private respondents to have
tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the case to
progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically
void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were
instituted as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact
that one of the private respondents had been preterited
would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant
a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial
court could have denied its probate outright or could have
passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was
resolved (Cayetano v. Leonidas, supra; Nuguid v. Nuguid,
supra). The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were
properly availed of by private respondents.
Certiorari; Remedy of Certiorari cannot be a substitute for
appeal, exception.—As a general rule certiorari cannot be a
substitute for appeal, except when the questioned order is
an oppressive exercise of judicial authority (People v.
Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito v.
Segundo, 117 SCRA 573 [1982]; Co Chuan Seng v. Court of
Appeals, 128 SCRA 308 [1984]; and Bautista v. Sarmiento,
138 SCRA 587 [1985]). It is axiomatic that the remedies of
certiorari and prohibition are not available where the
petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law (D.D.
Comendador Construction Corporation v. Sayo (118 SCRA
590 [1982]). They are, however, proper remedies to correct a
grave abuse of discretion of the trial court in not dismissing
a case where the dismissal is founded on valid grounds
(Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]).
Same; Same; Certiorari may be entertained where appeal
will not afford a speedy and adequate relief.—Thus, this
Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are
indubitable, the defendants had the right to resort to the
more speedy, and adequate remedies of certiorari and
prohibition to correct a grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in not
dismissing the case, (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals,
supra) and even assuming the existence of the remedy of
appeal, the Court harkens to the rule that in the broader
interests of justice, a petition for certiorari may be
entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford
speedy and adequate relief.
ALLOWANCE AND DISALLOWANCE OF WILLS
PEDRO D. H. GALLANOSA, CORAZON GRECIA-
GALLONOSA and ADOLFO FORTAJADA, the deceased
Pedro Gallanosa substituted by his legal heirs, namely, his
above-named widow and his children, and grandchildren
named, children of the late vs. HON. UBALDO Y.
ARCANGEL and FLORENTINO G. HITOSIS, et. al.
Settlement of Estate; Wills; Res Judicata; Prescription; An
action instituted in 1967 for the annulment of a last will and
testament duly probated way back in 1939 will not
prosper.—What the plaintiffs seek is the “annulment” of a
last will and testament duly probated in 1939 by the lower
court itself. The proceeding is coupled with an action to
recover the lands adjudicated to the defendants by the same
court in 1943 by virtue of the probated will, which action is
a resuscitation of the complaint of the same parties that the
same court dismissed in 1952. It is evident from the
allegations of the complaint and from defendants’ motion to
dismiss that plaintiffs’ 1967 action is barred by res judicata,
a double-barrelled defense, and by prescription, acquisitive
and extinctive, or by what are known in the jus civile and
the jus gentium as usucapio, longi temporis possesio and
praescriptio (See Ramos vs. Ramos, L-19872, December 3,
1974 61 SCRA 284).
Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice. The Rules of Court
does not sanction an action for “annulment” of a will.—Our
procedural law does not sanction an action for the
“annulment” of a will. In order that a will may take effect, it
has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper
testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is
mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, formerly
sec. 1, Rule 76, Rules of Court; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74
Phil. 479; Guevara vs. Guevara, 98 Phil. 249). The
testamentary proceeding is a special proceeding for
settlement of the testators estate. A special proceeding is
distinct and different from an ordinary action (Secs. 1 and 2,
Rule 2 and sec. 1, Rule 72. Rules of Court).
Same; Same; Res Judicata; Consequences of due probate of a
will.—The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due
execution or formal validity of the will (Sec. 625, Act 190,
sec. 1, Rule 76, now sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court; Last par.
of art. 828, Civil Code). That means that the testator was of
sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the
will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or
undue influence; that the will was signed by him in the
presence of the required number of witnesses, and that the
will is genuine and is not a forgery. Accordingly, these facts
cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not
even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will. (3
Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, p.
395; Manahan vs. Manahan, 58 Phil. 448). After the finality
of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness
of its execution cannot be raised anymore (Santos vs. De
Buenaventura, L-22797, September 22, 1966, 18 SCRA 47).
Same; Same; Same; Decree of adjudication in a testate
proceeding is binding on the whole world.—On the other
hand, the 1943 decree of adjudication rendered by the trial
court in the testate proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of Florentino Hitosis, having been rendered in a
proceeding in rem, is, under the abovequoted section 49(a),
binding upon the whole world (Manalo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil.
938; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; De la Cerha vs.
Potot, 120 Phil. 1361, 1364; McMaster vs. Henry Reissmann
& Co., 68 Phil. 142).
Same; Same; Same; Judgment; Grounds for annulment of
judgment after period for filing petition for relief expires.—
After the period for seeking relief from a final order or
judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court has expired, a
final judgment or order can be set aside only on the grounds
of (a) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law or (b)
that the judgment was obtained by means of extrinsic or
collateral fraud. In the latter case, the period for annulling
the judgment is four years from the discovery of the fraud (2
Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pp.
245-246; Mauricio vs. Villanueva, 106 Phil. 1159).
Same; Same; Contracts; Prescription; The Civil Law rule
that an action for declaration of inexistence of a contract
does not prescribe cannot be applied to last wills and
testaments.—To hurdle over the obstacle of prescription, the
trial court, naively adopting the theory of plaintiffs counsel,
held that the action for the recovery of the lands had not
prescribed because the rule in Article 1410 of the Civil Code,
that “the action or defense for the declaration of the
inexistence of a contract does not prescribe”, applies to wills.
That ruling is a glaring error. Article 1410 cannot possibly
apply to last wills and testaments.
SUBSTITUTION OF HEIRS
MARIA LUISA PALACIOS vs. MARCELLE D. VDA. DE
RAMIREZ, ET AL., JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ
Testate Estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez, No. L-27952.
February 15, 1982.*
Testate Succession, The testator cannot impose any lien,
substitution, or condition on his widow’s legitime.—The
appellant’s do not question the legality of giving Marcelle
one-half of the estate in full ownership. They adroit that the
testator’s dispositions impaired his widow’s legitime.
Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code, “If the only
survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled
to one-half of the hereditary estate.” And since Marcelle
alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his
estate over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance,
condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art. 904,
par. 2, Civil Code.)
Same; The proposed creation by the administratrix in favor
of the testator’s widow of a usufruct over 113 of the free
portion of the testator’s estate cannot be made where it will
run counter to testator’s express will.—It is the one-third
usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question
and justifiably so. It appears that the court a quo approved
the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the testament
provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the
estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to
one-half of the estate “en pleno dominio” as her legitime and
which is more than what she is given under the will is not
entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give
Marcelle more than her legitime will run counter to the
testator’s intention for as stated above his dispositions even
impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
Same; A vulgar substitution of heirs is valid even if the heir
designated survives the testator inasmuch us vulgar
substitution can take place also by refusal or incapacity to
inherit of the first heir.—They allege that the substitution in
its vulgar aspect is void because Wanda survived the
testator or stated differently because she did not predecease
the testator. But dying before the testator is not the only
case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or
incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859
of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar substitution is
valid.
Same; A fideicommissary substitution is void if first heir is
not related in the 1st degree to the second heir.—As regards
the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the
appellants are correct in their claim that it is void for the
following reasons: The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski
and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir
originally instituted. Art 863 of the Civil Code validates a
fideicommissary substitution “provided such substitution
does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally
instituted.”
Same; Constitutional Law; The Constitutional provision
which allows aliens to acquire lands by succession does not
apply to testamentary succession.—We are of the opinion
that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to
acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary
succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught
and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the
prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in
exchange for a devise of a piece of land.
Same; Same; An alien may be bestowed usufructuary rights
over a parcel of land in the Philippines.—We uphold the
usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a real
right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and
it is the vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is
proscribed by the Constitution.
LEGITIME
BEATRIZ L. GONZALES vs. COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA
No. L-34395. May 19, 1981.*
Appeal; In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal
issues can be raised.—In an appeal under Republic Act No.
5440 only legal issues can be raised under undisputed facts
Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court
resolved only the issue of whether the properties in question
are subject to reserva troncal, that is the only legal issue to
be resolved in this appeal.
Property; Succession; “Reserva Troncal” explained.—In
reserva troncal, (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by
gratuitous title property from an ascendant or from a
brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by
another ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law
from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should
reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree from the deceased descendant
(prepositus) and who belong to the line from which the said
property came.
Same; Same; Same.—So, three transmissions are involved:
(1) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or
donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the
deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by
operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the
deceased descendant (causante de la reserva)in favor of
another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two
transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third
transmission of the same property (in consequence of the
reservation) from the reservor to the reservees
(reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from
the deceased descendant belonging to the line of the first
ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant.
Same; Same; Same.—The persons involved in reserva
troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom
the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or
gratuitous title, (2) the descendant or prepositus (propositus)
who received the property, (3) the reservor (reservista), the
other ascendant who obtained the property from the
prepositus by operation of law and (4) the reservee
(reservatario) who is within the third degree from the
prepositus and who belongs to the line (linea o tronco) from
which the property came and for whom the property should
be reserved by the reservor.
Same; Same; The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable
property and holds title subject to a resolutory condition.—
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the
reservable property but subject to the resolutory condition
that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased
the reservee. The reservor is a usufructuary of the
reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the
reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and
conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee’s
rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the
time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible
when the reservees predecease the reservor.
Same; Same; The reservee has only an inchoate right. He
cannot impugn a conveyance made by the reservor.—On the
other hand, the reservee has only an inchoate, expectant or
contingent right. His expectant right would disappear if he
predeceased the reservor. It would become absolute should
the reservor predecease the reservee. The reservee cannot
impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can
require that the reservable character of the property be
recognized by the purchaser.
Same; Same; A reservee may sell his right but may not
renounce it.—There is a holding that the renunciation of the
reservee’s right to the reservable property is illegal for being
a contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo
vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96). And there is a dictum that the
reservee’s right is a real right which he may alienate and
dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the alienation
shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the
reservee survives the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111
Phil. 349, 353).
Same; Same; Case at bar involve a reserva troncal.—In the
instant case, the properties in question were indubitably
reservable properties in the hands of Mrs. Legarda
Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a
certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or
relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena
Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
Same; Same; All reservees are equally entitled to share in
reserva troncal.—This Court noted that, while it is true that
by giving the reservable property to only one reservee it did
not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is
likewise true that the heiress of the reservor was only one of
the reservees and there is no reason founded upon law and
justice why the other reservees should be deprived of their
shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).
CONSTANCIO SIENES, et al. vs. FIDEL ESPARCIA, et
al.; No. L-12957. March 24, 1961.
Succession; Reserva troncal; Reservor has legal title over
property subject to a resolutory condition.—In reserva
troncal the reservor has the legal title and dominion over
the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition.
He may alienate the same but subject to the reservation,
i.e., the rights acquired by the transferee are revoked upon
the survival of reservees at the time of death of the reservor.
Same; Eight of reservee is alienable, subject to a resolutory
condition.—The reserva instituted by law in favor of the
heirs within the third degree belonging to the line from
which the reservable property came constitutes a real right
which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, although
conditionally, the condition being that the alienation would
transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the
reservee survives the reservor.
When reservee becomes exclusive owner.—-Upon the death of
the reservor, there being a surviving reservee, the
reservable property passes in exclusive ownership to the
latter.
MARIQUITA O. SUMAYA and LAGUNA AGRO-
INDUSTRIAL COCONUT COOPERATIVE, INC., vs.
THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. Nos. 68843–44. September 2, 1991.*
Succession; Reserva troncal; Petitioners not innocent
purchasers for value and in good faith.—Petitioners would
want this Court to reverse the findings of the court a quo,
which the appellate court affirmed, that they were not
innocent purchasers for value, xxx xxx The court a quo
found otherwise. Upon the death of the propositus, Raul
Balantakbo, the reservista, Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo
caused the registration of an affidavit of self-adjudication of
the estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the
properties were inherited by Raul from his father Jose, Sr.,
as regards the subject matter of Civil Case No. SC-956 and
from his maternal grandmother, Luisa Bautista, as regards
the subject matter of Civil Case No. SC-957. The court a quo
further ruled that said affidavit was, in its form, declaration
and substance, a recording with the Registry of Deeds of the
reservable character of the properties. xxx xxx.
Same; Same; Property registration decree; Constructive
notice of reservable character of property.—It was admitted
that the certificates of titles covering the properties in
question show that they were free from any liens and
encumbrances at the time of the sale. The fact remains
however, that the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by
Consuelo stating the source of the properties thereby
showing the reservable nature thereof was registered with
the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and this is sufficient notice
to the whole world in accordance with Section 52 of the
Property Registration Decree.
Same; Same; Same; Obligation to annotate reservable
character of property in the Registry of Property.—
Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person
obliged to reserve (the widowed spouse) had the obligation
to annotate in the Registry of Property the reservable
character of the property, in reserva troncal, the reservor
(the ascendant who inherited from a descendant property
which the latter inherited from another ascendant) has the
duty to reserve and therefore, the duty to annotate also. The
jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of
Property of the right reserved in real property subject of
reserva viudal insofar as it is applied to reserva troncal
stays despite the abolition of reserva viudal in the New Civil
Code. This rule is consistent with the rule provided in the
second paragraph of Section 51 of P.D. 1529, which provides
that: “The act of registration shall be the operative act to
convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are
concerned x x x.” (italics supplied)
Same; Same; Prescription; When cause of action
commenced.—The respondent appellate court did not err in
finding that the cause of action of the private respondents
did not prescribe yet. The cause of action of the reservees
did not commence upon the death of the propositus Raul
Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but upon the death of the
reservor Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1968.
Relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right
(or property) is reserved have no title of ownership or of fee
simple over the reserved property during the lifetime of the
reservor; Only when the reservor should die before the
reservees will the latter acquire the reserved property, thus
creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their
place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are
relatives within the third degree.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ceriaco A. Sumaya for petitioners.
Tomas P. Añonuevo for private respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in
C.A, G.R, No. CV-01292–93, which affirmed the decision of
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Laguna in the consolidated cases in Civil Case No. SC-9561
and Civil Case No. SC-957.2
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts in the court a
quo, which is summarized as follows:
Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2) different ascendants
the two (2) sets of properties subject of this case: 1) A one-
third (1/3) interest, pro-indiviso in a parcel of land situated
in Dita, Lilio (Liliw) Laguna and described in paragraph 7 of
the complaint in Civil Case No. SC-956 from his father Jose,
Sr., who died on January 28? 1945; and 2) A one-seventh
(1/7) interest pro-indiviso in ten (10) parcels of registered
lands described in paragraph 6 of the complaint in Civil
Case No. SC-957 from his maternal grandmother, Luisa
Bautista, who died on November 3, 1950.
On June 13, 1952, Raul died intestate, single, without any
issue, and leaving only his mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda.
de Balantakbo, as his sole surviving heir to the real
properties above-mentioned.
On November 3, 1952, Consuelo adjudicated unto herself
the above described properties in an Affidavit entitled
“Caudal Herederario del finado Raul Balantakbo” which
provided, among others:
“I.
Que de mi legitimo matrimonio con mi difunto esposo, Jose Balantakbo,
he tenido varios hijos, entre ellos si difunto hijo, llamado Raul Balantakbo.
“II.
Que mi referido hijo Raul Balantakbo, fallencio el 13 de Junio de 1952,
en la Ciudad de Pasay, durante su minoria de edad sin dejar testamento
alguno,”
“III.
Que el finado Raul Balantakbo al morir no ha dejado descendiente
alguno.
“IV.
Que soy la unica ascendiente superviviento de mi referido hijo Raul
Balantakbo y por lo tanto su unica heredera formosa, legitima y universal.
“V.
Que el finado Raul Balantakbo murio sin dejar deuda alguna.
“VI.
Que el finado ed morir dejo propiedades consistentes en bienes
inmuebles situados en la Provincia de Laguna.
“VII.
Que dichas propriedades fueron a su vez adquiridas por el finado Raul
Balantakbo per herencia de su difunto padre, Jose Balantakbo, y de su tia
abuela Luisa Bautista.
“x x x,” (Rollo, p. 29)
On December 21, 1959, Consuelo Joaquin vda de.
Balantakbo sold the property described in Civil Case No.
SC-956 to Mariquita H. Sumaya. The sale was evidenced by
a deed attached as Annex “C" to the complaint. The same
property was subsequently sold by Mariquita Sumaya to
Villa Honorio Development Corporation, Inc., on December
30, 1963. On January 23, 1967, Villa Honorio Development
Corporation transferred and assigned its rights over the
property in favor of Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative,
Inc. The documents evidencing these transfers were
registered in the Registry of Deeds of Laguna and the
corresponding certificates of titles were issued. The
properties are presently in the name of Agro-Industrial
Coconut Cooperative, Inc., 2/3 share and the remaining 1/3
share is in the name of Sancho Balantakbo.
Also on December 30, 1963, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de
Balantakbo sold the properties described in the complaint in
Civil Case No. SC-957 to Villa Honorio Development
Corporation, Inc. The latter in turn transferred and
assigned all its rights to the properties in favor of Laguna
Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc. which properties
are presently in its possession.
The parties admit that the certificates of titles covering the
above described properties do not contain any annotation of
its reservable character.
On June 3, 1968, Consuelo Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo
died.
On March 4, 1970, Amadeo, Sancho, Donato, Luis, and
Erasto, all surnamed Balantakbo, brothers in full blood of
Raul Balantakbo and Luisa, Jose and Dolores, also all
surnamed Balantakbo, surviving children of deceased Jose
Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the first named
Balantakbos, filed the above mentioned civil cases to recover
the properties described in the respective complaints which
they claimed were subject to a reserva troncal in their favor.
The court a quo found that the two (2) cases varied only in
the identity of the subject matter of res involved, the
transferees, the dates of the conveyances but involve the
same legal question of reserva troncal. Hence, the
consolidation of the two (2) cases.
After trial, the court a quo rendered a joint decision in favor
of the Balantakbos, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, in both Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants, as follows:
“1. Ordering the defendant Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut
Cooperative, Inc. to convey to the plaintiffs—
“a.)
In Civil Case No. SC-956—the one-third (1/3) interest and
ownership, pro-indiviso, in and over the parcel of land described in
paragraph three (3) subparagraph 1, of pages one (1) and two (2) of
this decision;
“b.)
In Civil Case No. SC-957—the one-seventh (1/7) interest and
ownership, pro-indiviso, in and over the ten (10) parcels of land
described in paragraph three (3), subparagraph 2, of pages two (2)
and three (3) of this decision;
“c.)
The plaintiffs are to share equally in the real properties herein
ordered to be conveyed to them by the defendants with plaintiffs
Luisa, Jose and Dolores, all surnamed Balantakbo, receiving one-
third (1/3) of the one share pertaining to the other plaintiffs who are
their uncles:
“2.
Ordering the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative, Inc.
to account for and pay to the plaintiffs the value of the produce from
the properties herein ordered to be returned to the plaintiffs, said
accounting and payment of income being for the period from
January 3, 1968 until date of reconveyance of the properties herein
ordered:
“3.
In each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-956 and SC-957, defendants are
e to pay plaintiffs—
“a.
One Thousand (P1 ,000.00) Pesos in litigation expenses
“b.
Two Thousand Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos in attorney’s fees.
“4.
Defendants are to pay the costs in each of Civil Cases Nos. SC-
956 and 957.
“x x x” (p. 46, Rollo.)
This decision was appealed to the appellate court which
affirmed the decision of the court a quo in toto, The motion
for reconsideration was denied (p. 65, Rollo) by the appellate
court which found no cogent reason to reverse the decision.
This petition, before Us was filed on November 12,1984 with the
petitioners assigning the following errors allegedly committed by
the appellate court:
I.
The trial court erred in not finding defendants an (sic) innocent
purchaser for value and in good faith of the properties covered by
certificates of title subject of litigation.
II.
The trial court erred in finding it unnecessary to annotate the
reservable interest of the reservee in the properties covered by
certificates of title subject of litigation.
III.
The trial court erred in finding that ‘the cause of action of the
plaintiffs (private respondents) has not yet prescribed.
IV.
The trial court erred in awarding moral and actual damages in
favor of the plaintiffs by virtue of the institution of Civil Cases Nos.
956 and 957.
Petitioners would want this Court to reverse the findings of
the court a quo, which the appellate court affirmed, that
they were not innocent purchasers for value. According to
petitioners, before they agreed to buy the properties from
the reservor (also called reservista), Consuelo Joaquin vda.
de Balantakbo, they first sought the legal advice of their
family consultant who found that there was no
encumbrance nor any lien annotated on the certificate of
title covering the properties.
The court a quo found otherwise. Upon the death of the
propositus, Raul Balantakbo, the reservista, Consuelo vda.
de Balantakbo caused the registration of an affidavit of self-
adjudication of the estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly
stated that the properties were inherited by Raul from his
father Jose, Sr., as regards ds the subject matter of Civil
Case No. SC-956 and from his maternal grandmother, Luisa
Bautista, as regards the subject matter of Civil Case No.
SC-957. The court a quo further ruled that said affidavit
was, in its form, declaration and substance, a recording with
the Registry of Deeds of the reservable character of the
properties. In Spanish language, the affidavit clearly stated
that the affiant, Consuelo, was a lone ascendant and heir to
Raul Balantakbo, her son, who died leaving properties
previously inherited from other ascendants and which
properties were inventoried in the said affidavit.
It was admitted that the certificates of titles covering the
properties in question show that they were free from any
liens and encumbrances at the time of the sale. The fact
remains however, that the affidavit of self-adjudication
executed by Consuelo stating the source of the properties
thereby showing the reservable nature thereof was
registered with the Register of Deeds of Laguna, and this is
sufficient notice to the whole world in accordance with
Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree (formerly
Sec. 51 of R.A. 496) which provides:
“SEC. 52. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE UPON REGISTRATION.—
Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien attachment, order,
judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if
registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds for
the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be
constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering,
filing or entering.”
Thus, in Gatioan v. Gaffud, G.R. No. L-21953, March 28,
1969, 27 SCRA 706, 712–713, cited in People v. Reyes, G.R.
Nos. 74226–27, July 27, 1989, 175 SCRA 597; Garcia v. CA
and PNB v. CA, et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and L-40911, both
dated January 22,1980, 95 SCRA 380 and Legarda and
Prieto v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590, 600, We held:
“When a conveyance has been properly recorded such record is
constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and
equitable, included therein. , .
“Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has
examined every instrument of record affecting the title. Such
presumption is irrebuttable. He is charged with notice of every fact
shown by the record and is presumed to know every fact which an
examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption
cannot be overcome by proof of innocence or good faith. Otherwise,
the very purpose and object of the law requiring a record would be
destroyed. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of
knowledge of what the record contains any more than one may be
permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law.
The rule that all persons must take notice of the facts which the
public record contains is a rule of law. The rule must be absolute,
any variation would lead to endless confusion and useless litigation.
x x x”
In the case of Bass v. De la Rama, 73 Phil. 682, 685, the rule was
laid down that the mere entry of a document in the day book
without noting it on the certificate of title is not sufficient
registration. However, that ruling was superseded by the holding in
the’ later six cases of Levin v, Bass, 91 Phil. 420. As explained in
Garcia v. C.A., et al., G.R. Nos. L-48971 and 49011, January 20,
1980, 95 SCRA 380, 388, which is the prevailing doctrine in this
jurisdiction,
‘That ruling was’ superseded by the holding in the later six cases of
Levin v. Bass, 91 Phil. 420, where a distinction was made between
voluntary and involuntary registration, such as the registration of
an attachment, levy upon execution, notice of lis pendens, and the
like. In cases of involuntary registration, an entry thereof in the day
book is a sufficient notice to all persons even if the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title is not presented to the register of deeds.
“On the other hand, according to the said cases of Levin v. Bass, in
case of voluntary registration of documents an innocent purchaser
for value of registered land becomes the registered owner, and, in
contemplation of law the holder of a certificate of title, the moment
he presents and files a duly notarized and valid deed of sale and the
same is entered in the day book and at the same time he surrenders
or presents the owner’s duplicate certificate of title covering the
land sold and pays the registration fees, because what remains to
be done lies not within his power to perform. The register of deeds
is duty bound to perform it.” (See Potenciano v. Dineros, 97 Phil.
196).
In this case, the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by
Consuelo vda. de Balantakbo which contained a statement
that the property was inherited from a descendant, Raul,
which has likewise inherited by the latter from another
ascendant, was registered with the Registry of Property.
The failure of the Register of Deeds to annotate the
reservable character of the property in the certificate of title
cannot be attributed to Consuelo.
Moreover, there is sufficient proof that the petitioners had
actual knowledge of the reservable character of the
properties before they bought the same from Consuelo. This
matter appeared in the deed of sale (Exhibit “C") executed
by Consuelo in favor of Mariquita Sumaya, the first vendee
of the property litigated in Civil Case No. SC-956, as
follows:
“That, I (Consuelo, vendor) am the absolute and exclusive owner of
the one-third (1/3) portion of the above described parcel of land by
virtue of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition executed by the Heirs
of the deceased Jose Balantakbo dated December 10, 1945 and said
portion in accordance with the partition above-mentioned was
adjudicated to Raul Balantakbo, single, to (sic) whom I inherited
after his death and this property is entirely free from any
encumbrance of any nature or kind whasoever, x x x.” (p. 42, Rollo)
It was admitted though that as regards the properties
litigated in Civil Case SC-957, no such admission was made
by Consuelo to put Villa Honorio Development on notice of
the reservable character of the properties. The affidavit of
selfadjudication executed by Consuelo and registered with
the Registry would still be sufficient notice to bind them.
Moreover, the court a quo found that the petitioners and
private respondents were long time acquaintances; that the
Villa Honorio Development Corporation and its successors,
the Laguna Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative Inc., are
family corporations of the Sumayas and that the petitioners
knew all along that the properties litigated in this case were
inherited by Raul Balantakbo from his father and from his
maternal grandmother, and that Consuelo Vda. de
Balantakbo inherited these properties from his son Raul.
The obligation to reserve rests upon the reservor, Consuelo
Joaquin vda. de Balantakbo. Article 891 of the New Civil
Code on reserva troncal provides:
“Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any
property which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title
from another ascendant or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve
such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong
to the line from which said property came.” (italics supplied)
We do not agree, however, with the disposition of the
appellate court that there is no need to register the
reservable character of the property, if only for the
protection of the reservees, against innocent third persons.
This was suggested as early as the case of Director of Lands
v. Aguas, G.R. No. 42737, August 11, 1936, 63 Phil. 279. The
main issue submitted for resolution therein was whether
the reservation established by Article 811 (now Art. 891 of
the New Civil Code) of the Civil Code, for the benefit of ‘the
relatives’ within the third degree belonging to the line of the
descendant from whom the ascendant reservor received the
property, should be understood as made in favor of all the
relatives within said degree and belonging to the line above-
mentioned, without distinction legitimate, natural and
illegitimate ones not having the legal status of natural
children. However, in an obiter dictum this Court stated
therein:
“The reservable character of a property is but a resolutory condition
of the ascendant reservor’s right of ownership. If the condition is
fulfilled, that is, if upon the ascendant reservor’s death there are
relatives having the status provided in Article 811 (Art. 891, New
Civil Code), the property passes, in accordance with this special
order of succession, to said relatives, or to the nearest of kin among
them, which question not being pertinent to this case, need not now
be determined. But if this condition is not fulfilled, the property is
released and will be adjudicated in accordance with the regular
order of succession. The fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the
resolutory condition, the efficacy or cessation of the reservation, the
acquisition of rights or loss of the vested ones, are phenomena
which have nothing to do with whether the reservation has been
noted or not in the certificate of title to the property. The purpose of
the notation is nothing more than to afford to the persons entitled to
the reservation, if any, due protection against any act of the reservor,
which may make it ineffective x x x.” (p. 292, ibid)
Likewise, in Dizon and Dizon v. Galang, G.R. No. 21344, January
14,1926, 48 Phil. 601, 603, this Court ruled that the reservable
character of a property may be lost to innocent purchasers for
value. Additionally, it was ruled therein that the obligation imposed
on a widowed spouse to annotate the reservable character of a
property subject of reserva viudal is applicable to reserva troncal.
(See also Edrozo v. Sablan, G.R. No. 6878, September 13, 1913, 25
Phil. 295).
“Since these parcels of land have been legally transferred to third
persons, Vicente Galang has lost ownership thereof and cannot now
register nor record in the Registry of Deeds their reservable
character; neither can he effect the fee simple, which does not
belong to him, to the damage of Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado,
who acquired the said land in good faith, free of all incumbrances.
An attempt was made to prove that when Juan Medina was advised
not to buy the land he remarked, Why, did he (Vicente Galang) not
inherit it from his son?’ Aside from the fact that it is not clear
whether this conservation took place in 1913 or 1914, that is, before
or after the sale, it does not signify that he had any knowledge of
the reservation. This did not arise from the fact alone that Vicente
Galang had inherited the land from his son, but also from the fact
that, by operation of law, the son had inherited it from his mother
Rufina Dizon, which circumstance, so far as the record shows, Juan
Medina had not been aware of. We do not decide, however, whether
or not Juan Medina and Teodoro Jurado are obliged to acknowledge
the reservation and to note the same in their deeds, for the reason
that there was no prayer to this effect in the complaint and no
question raised in regard thereto.”
Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person
obliged to reserve (the widowed spouse) had the obligation
to annotate in the Registry of Property the reservable
character of the property, in reserva troncal, the reservor
(the ascendant who inherited from a descendant property
which the latter inherited from another descendant) has the
duty to reserve and therefore, the duty to annotate also.
The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the
Registry of Property of the right reserved in real property
subject of reserva viudal insofar as it is applied to reserva
troncal stays despite the abolition of reserva viudal in the
New Civil Code. This rule is consistent with the rule
provided in the second paragraph of Section 51 of P.D. 1529,
which provides that: “The act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey of affect the land insofar as third
persons are concerned x x x.” (italics supplied)
The properties involved in this case are already covered by a
Torrens title and unless the registration of the limitation is
effected (either actual or constructive), no third persons
shall be prejudiced thereby.
The respondent appellate court did not err in finding that
the cause of action of the private respondents did not
prescribe yet. The cause of action of the reservees did not
commence upon the death of the propositus Raul
Balantakbo on June 13, 1952 but upon the death of the
reservor Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbo on June 3, 1968.
Relatives within the third degree in whose favor the right
(or property) is reserved have no title of ownership or of fee
simple over the reserved property during the lifetime of the
reservor. Only when the reservor should die before the
reservees will the latter acquire the reserved property, thus
creating a fee simple, and only then will they take their
place in the succession of the descendant of whom they are
relatives within the third degree (See Velayo Bernardo v.
Siojo, G.R. No. 36078, March 11, 1933, 58 Phil. 89). The
reserva is extinguished upon the death of the reservor, as it
then becomes a right of full ownership on the part of the
reservatarios, who can ‘bring a reivindicatory suit therefor.
Nonetheless, this right if not exercised within the time for
recovery may prescribe in ten (10) years under the old Code
of Civil Procedure (see Carillo v, De Paz, G.R. No. L-22601,
October 28,1966,18 SCRA 467, 473) or in thirty years under
Article 1141 of the New Civil Code. The actions for recovery
of the reserved property was brought by herein private
respondents on March 4, 1970 or less than two (2) years
from the death of the reservor. Therefore, private
respondents’ cause of action has not prescribed yet.
Finally, the award of one thousand pesos (P1 ,000.00) for
actual litigation expenses and two thousand pesos
(P2,000.00) for attorney’s fees is proper under Article
2208(2) of the New Civil Code. Private respondents were
compelled to go to court to recover what rightfully belongs to
them.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The questioned decision
of the Intermediate Appellate Court is AFFIRMED, except for the
modification on the necessity to annotate the reversable character
of a property subject of reserva troncal.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Petition denied. Decision affirmed.
Note.—When land is reservable property it is obligatory to
reserve such property for the benefit of the real heir. (Aglibot vs.
Mañalac, 4 SCRA 1030.)
——o0o——
MARIA CANO vs. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
[No. L-10701. January 16, 1959]
1.
SUCCESSION; RESERVA TRONCAL; RECORD
RESERVA; DEATH OF RESERVISTA; ISSUANCE OF
CERTIFICATE OF TlTLE TO RESERVEE.—Once an
original certificate of title by virtue of the final decree of the
land court was duly issued in the name of the reservista,
subject to reserva, troncal, and subsequently the latter died,
the registration court, in view of the said recorded reserva
has authority under Sec. 112 of Act 496 to order the
reservatario; for the reason that the death of the reservista
vested the ownership of the property in the sole reservatario
troncal.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION.—Where, however,
the registration decree merely specifies the reservable
character of the property, without determining the identity
of the reservatario (as in the case of Director of Lands vs.
Aguas, 63 Phil., 279) or where several reservatories dispute
the property among themselves, further proceedings would
be unavoidable.
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES TO VEST TITLE IN
RESERVE.—The only requisites for the passing of the title
from the reservista to the reservee are (1) the death of the
reservista; and (2) the fact that the reservatario has survived
the reservista.
4.
ID.; ID.; RESERVATION NOT RESERVISTA'S
SUCCESSOR MORTIS CAUSA.—The reservatario is not
the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable
property part of the reservista's estate; the reservatario
receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant
(prepositus), the property merely reverting to the line of
origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally
strayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are
all agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the
reservista, the latter must be deemed to have enjoyed no
more than a life interest In the reservable property.
5.
ID.; ID.; DEATH OF RESERVISTA; RESERVATARIO
AUTOMATICALLY BECOMES OWNER OF
RESERVABLE PROPERTY.—Upon the death of the
reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes,
automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the
reservable property.
6.
ID.; ID.; RESERVABLE PROPERTY CANNOT BE
TRANSMITTED MORTIS CAUSA BY RESERVISTA.—The
reservable property cannot be transmitted by a reservista to
her or his own successors mortis causa so long as a
reservatario, within the third degree from the prepositus
and belonging to the line whence the property came, is in
existence when the reservista dies.